SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

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GREG ORY NECKONCHUK, Plaintiff

- Respondent,

v. LINDA SIMONE, f/k/a LINDA NECKONCHUK, Defendant

- Appellant.

_____________________ ______

Submitted February 12, 2019

– Decided Before Judges Fisher and Suter. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket No. FM

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- 15. Freidel & Kramer, P C , attorneys for appellant (Talbot B. Kramer, Jr., on the brief). Adinolfi & Packman, P A , attorneys for respondent (Robert J. Adinolfi, of counsel ; Kevin J. Murphy, on the brief).
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet , this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36

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March 4, 20192 A

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Def endant Linda Simone appeals a number of orders entered during a lengthy and convoluted post

- judgment stage of this matrimonial matter. Briefly, Linda filed various motions

– that went unopposed

– in 2013 and 2014; orders then entered granted various relief and included a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). Plaintiff Greg Neckonchuk eventually entered the fray and sought relief pursuant to Rule 4:50, claiming, among other things, he was not properly served with those earlier motions. The judge conclud ed on August 21 , 2015 that a plenary hearing was needed to resolve the parties' factual disputes and, two years later, on September 22, 2017, by which time Linda still had failed to respond to discovery demands and orders , the judge granted Greg's request and vacated the 2013 and 2014 orders. We find no merit in any of Linda's arguments 1 challenging the September 2017 or der, the August 2015 order, and others entered in between

. T he p arties wer e married in 1978 and had f our children, all now a dults. In 2008, Greg filed this matrimonial action, and a divorce judgment, which incorporated a settlement agreement, was entered in 2009

. Notw ithstanding the

1 Another panel previously reserved decision on Greg's motion to strike Linda's appellate brief. We now deny that motion.3 A

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dissolution of their marriage , the parties c ontinued to reside together in the former marital home in Stratford

. Greg eventually fil ed a motion, and Linda a cross

- motion, that resulted in a June 21, 2013 order compelling Greg 's departure from the f ormer marital home . Thereafter, Linda locked Greg o ut of the marital home , he claims prematurely. Linda then pursued equitab le distribution issues , the disposition of which had been delayed , apparently , because the parties continued to reside together after the div orce judgment. Linda moved for the pr eparation and entry of a QDRO, as well as other relief . Her motions went unopposed and rel ief was granted in her favor. Specifically, and w ithout Greg 's particip ation, the trial court enforced various terms of the divorce judgment; the judge: compelled Greg to provide a current address on September 26, 2013 ; entered a QDRO o n February 5, 2014 ; and di rected that Greg pay Linda $87,000 on July 31, 2014

. The last of these orders , which we will collectively refer to as "the 2013 and 2014 orders," stated tha t the matter would be brought back to court for a "review
h earing" on September 11, 2014. Before the September 2014 review hearing could occur, one of the parti es' children became a law clerk for a superior c ourt judge in the Camden Vicinage , a fact that p rompted the Assignmen t Judge to transfer the matter to the4 A

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Burlington Vicinage. Around the time of the change of venue, Greg engaged counsel and negotiations commenced . When the parties reached no amicable resolution, Greg moved in the family court in th e Burlington Vicinage to vacate the orders previously entered in the family court in the Camden Vicinage in his absence, claiming the 2013 and 2014 orders were e ntered without notice to him. Linda opposed the motion and the judge ultimately determined, by order entered on August 21, 2015 , that a plenary hearing was required to resolve the parties' factual disputes ; t he judge permitt ed the parties to engage in discovery. At the conclusion of the parties' arguments and the judge's decision on August 21, 2015 , Linda's attorney asked the judge whether she could "get some counsel fees," apparently seeking an award of pendente lite fees for purposes of the anticipated plenary hearing. The judge responded that he would not do that "off the cuff," so Linda's couns el later submitted a certification and, with out apparently affording Greg 's counsel a chance to respond, the judge , on September 8, 2015, en tered an order that directed Greg 's payment to Linda of $10,000 in pendente lite fees.
Because he claimed not to h ave the funds to comply, Greg moved to vacate the September 8, 2015 counsel fee order. Inde ed, he claimed that the 2013 and
2014 orders

– the subject of the anticipat ed plenary hearing

– caused a "f i nancial5 A

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role reversal"; he claimed, Linda was essent iall y holding all the liquid funds formerly available to him and was in a better position to pay her attorney than he was

. Greg also claimed by motion that Linda failed to comply with his discovery requests; the judge compelled Linda's compliance with Greg's
d iscovery requests by order entered on January 22, 2016. That order also incorporated a ruling on Linda's request that venue be transferred back to Camden in light of the completion of their child's clerkship. The judge determined that the matter would be returned to Camden but not until the scheduled plenary hearing was completed. Months later, Linda had still failed to prov ide requested and ordered discovery, so Greg moved for relief; Linda cross

- moved . After oral argument in July 2016, the judge reserv ed decision, advis ing he would provide a "written opinion order" after taking "some time [to] go through the arguments again and . . . the papers" submitted. When more than six months elapsed without a decision, Greg filed a nother motion seeking the same relief, and Linda again filed a cross

- motion

. The judge finally resolved the pending motions on June 26, 2017 . The order then entered denied without prejudi ce Greg 's request to6 A

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vacate the unopposed 2013 and 2014 orders and gave Linda even more time to

r espond to the discovery requests

. Despite the fact that Linda was afforded nearly an additional year to provide discovery solely b ecause of the delay in the disposition of the pending motions, and given more time by the June 2017 order, Linda r emained
recalcitrant . Greg filed yet anoth er motion to vacate the 2013 and 2014 orders. When Linda failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for her refusal to turn over discovery , the judge entered a Septembe r 22, 2017 order tha t vacated the 2013 and 2014 or ders. Linda appeals the September 22, 2017 final order, as well as portions of the orders entered on August 21, 2015, January 22, 2016, and June 26, 2017. In her merits brief, Linda argues:

I. THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF A PLENARY HEARING BASED ON R. 4:50

- 1 WAS IN ERROR AND THE GRANT OF A PLENARY HEARING SHOULD BE REVERSED.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS JANUARY 22, 2016 ORDER BY REFUSING TO RETURN THE MATTER TO CAMDEN COUNTY; AND IN ORDERING SIGNIFICANT DISCOVERY IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 ORDER FOR ADVANCEMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.7 A

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- 1(e)(1)(E). We add only that the linchpin to all this

– the decision to schedule a plenary hearing as the means of resolving the factual disputes generat ed by the
Rule 4:50 motion

– w as discr etionary , and the judge's exercis e of that discretion

was, in our view , quite sound . Family judges are obligated to conduct evidentiary hearin gs to resolve factual disputes, s ee , Harrington v. Harrington , 281 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 1995) , including factual disputes generated by Rule 4:50 motion s , Eaton v. Grau , 368 N.J. Super. 215, 222 (App. Div. 2004); Barrie v. Barrie , 154 N.J. Super. 301, 303

- 04 (App. Div. 1977) . The judge could
not determine whether the motions that led to the 2013 and 2014 orders were properly served , as well as all other related issues, without having the parties' factual allegations aired at an evidentiary hearing. Indeed, after careful review8 A

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of the record, we are of a mind that t he judge would have erred if he failed to order a plenary hearing. That linchpin decision gave the parties the right to seek discovery from the other

. And Linda's failure to provide discovery

– for an extraordinar y period of time

– warranted t he ultimate sanction embodi ed in the September 22 , 2017 order. As the various motions and orders that preceded that f inal order reveal, the judge was left with no recourse but to v acate the orders challenged by way of the Rule 4:50 motion. We lastly mention Linda's argument about venue. There is no question that the matter was properly transferred out of Camden when th e parties' child began a clerkship there ; that is not in dispute

. Instead, Linda argues the judge erred by refusing to immediately return the matter to Camden when the clerkship ended. We find no error; the Burlington judge was in the midst of the Rule 4 :50 proceedings and judicial econ omy demanded a delay of any venue change. It was a matter of discretion, and we see no principled reason for second

- guessing
the tria l court's handling of the venue situation

. The orders under review are affirmed.