This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

56958

Vol. 69, No. 184

Thursday, September 23, 2004

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 50 

[Docket No. PRM–50–78] 

Robert H. Leyse; Denial of Petition for 

Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is denying a petition 

for rulemaking submitted by Mr. Robert 

H. Leyse (PRM–50–78). The petitioner 

requested that the NRC’s regulations 

governing domestic licensing of 

production and utilization facilities and 

associated guidance be amended to 

address the impact of fouling on the 

performance of all heat exchange 

surfaces in a nuclear power plant. The 

petitioner further stated that the fouling 

of heat transfer surfaces is not 

adequately considered in licensing and 

compliance inspections, testing 

programs, and computer codes used for 

nuclear power facilities.

ADDRESSES: Copies of the petition for 

rulemaking, the public comments 

received, and the NRC’s letter of denial 

to the petitioner may be examined, and/

or copied for a fee, at the NRC’s Public 

Document Room, located at One White 

Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, 

Public File Area O1F21, Rockville, 

Maryland. These documents are also 

available electronically at the NRC’s 

Public Electronic Reading Room on the 

Internet at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. From this site, the 

public can gain entry into the 

Agencywide Document Access and 

Management System (ADAMS), which 

provides text and image files of NRC’s 

public documents. For further 

information contact the PDR reference 

staff at (800) 387–4209 or (301) 415–

4737 or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim 

A. Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, telephone (301) 415–1462, e-mail 

TAR@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background 

The petition for rulemaking 

designated PRM–50–78 was received by 

the NRC on September 9, 2002. A notice 

of receipt of the petition and request for 

public comment was published in the 

Federal Register (FR) on October 31, 

2002 (67 FR 66347). The public 

comment period closed January 16, 

2003. Four letters of public comment 

were received in response to the Federal 

Register notice. 

The Petition 

In PRM–50–78, the petitioner, Mr. 

Robert H. Leyse, requested that 

regulations be developed to require 

addressing the impact of fouling on the 

performance of all significant heat 

transfer surfaces in nuclear power 

plants (NPPs). The requested rule 

changes would also require that fouling 

impact be addressed in NRC-funded test 

programs and NRC-produced computer 

codes that are used to assess cooling and 

heat exchanger performance. The 

petitioner contended that fouling of heat 

exchange surfaces is not adequately 

considered in the licensing and 

compliance inspection of NPPs, for 

example, licensing bases and technical 

specifications do not specifically limit 

fouling on fuel elements. The petitioner 

also requested that regulations be added 

to require publicly available 

performance reports on these surfaces, 

including records of mechanical 

degradation, and cleaning procedures 

and their effectiveness. 

In addition, the petitioner contended 

that fouling would restrict fuel element 

cooling and that axial growth beyond 

design limits would cause fuel rods to 

bow, and contact other fuel rods and 

control rod guide tubes. The petitioner 

claimed that this would lead to a safety 

problem. In addition, the petitioner 

proposed that the rules should require 

investigating grossly off-normal 

performance of heat exchange 

equipment. For example, the petitioner 

stated that fouling of steam generator 

tubes should be investigated because it 

has occasionally reduced heat transfer 

effectiveness to force operation at 

below-normal secondary side pressure, 

creating a safety issue. 

Public Comments on the Petition 

Four letters of public comment were 

received on PRM–50–78. Two were 

from the petitioner, who noted in 

support of his petition that the Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

(ACRS) did not address fouling of heat 

exchange surfaces during a meeting 

with Electric Power Research Institute 

(EPRI) in October 2002 and that one of 

the numerous heat transfer tests done 

for the NRC by Westinghouse (FLECHT 

Run 9573) resulted in tube failure. In 

addition, the petitioner noted that five 

additional ACRS subcommittee 

meetings did not address fouling issues. 

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 

opposed the petition, noting that current 

reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.72 

and 50.73 require reporting any event or 

condition that could interfere with a 

safety function of any system needed to 

shutdown that plant and maintain it in 

a safe condition, remove residual heat, 

control radiological material, or mitigate 

accident consequences. 

The Strategic Teaming and Resource 

Sharing (STARS) group, a consortium of 

nuclear utilities, opposed the petition 

noting that these same concerns were 

previously addressed by industry 

organizations in comments on PRM–50–

73, PRM–50–73A, and PRM–50–76. In 

the STARS group’s view, this latest 

petition restates the same concern in a 

different context, without presenting 

any further evidence to provide a basis 

for revising the regulations. The STARS 

group believes that the requested 

additional reporting burden would not 

be justified by the unproven and 

questionable scenarios presented in the 

petition. 

NRC Technical Evaluation 

The NRC reviewed each of the 

petitioner’s requests and concluded that 

none of the requests justified the 

initiation of rulemaking. The NRC’s 

responses to each of the petitioners’ 

requests are as follows: 

1. Regulations are needed to address 

the impact of fouling on the 

performance of heat exchange surfaces 

throughout licensed nuclear power 

plants. The petitioner stated that this 

included fuel elements, steam 

generators, condensers, fan coolers, etc. 

The NRC disagrees with the 

petitioner’s assertion. The petitioner’s 

assertion that regulations are needed to 

address the impact of fouling on fuel 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 184 / Thursday, September 23, 2004 / Proposed Rules 56959

elements was addressed previously in a 

Federal Register notice of denial of 

PRM–50–73 and PRM–50–73A (also 

submitted by the petitioner) published 

at 68 FR 41963 on July 16, 2003. The 

petitioner did not submit any new 

information or provide any additional 

considerations that would cause the 

NRC to reconsider the denial of PRM–

50–73 and PRM–50–73A.

In regard to other heat exchange 

surfaces, regulations and guidance 

addressing fouling effects on heat 

exchanger performance already exist for 

the primary and secondary sides of 

NPPs. 

Specifically: 

• 10 CFR 50.65 requires licensees to 

monitor performance parameters or to 

demonstrate that monitoring is not 

needed, and to provide preventive 

maintenance sufficient to ensure that all 

safety related structures, systems, or 

components (e.g., heat exchangers 

important to safety) are capable of 

fulfilling their intended functions. 

• 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, 

Criterion 14 (or plant-specific principal 

design criteria in the plant design basis 

for plants issued construction permits 

before the effective date of 10 CFR part 

50, Appendix A), requires that the 

reactor coolant pressure boundary heat 

exchangers critical to safety (e.g., steam 

generators) be designed and tested to 

ensure an extremely low probability of 

abnormal leakage that might be caused 

by fouling or other factors. Steam 

generator tube performance is closely 

monitored by inspection as detailed in 

plant technical specifications. Technical 

specifications vary from plant to plant, 

but each pressurized-water reactor 

(PWR) plant has requirements to 

monitor steam generator tube 

performance. 

• 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, 

Criterion 44 (and equivalent plantspecific criteria for pre-General Design 

Criteria (GDC) plants), requires 

provision of a cooling system to transfer 

heat from structures, systems, and 

components to an ultimate heat sink 

under normal operating and accident 

conditions. This heat transfer function 

is accomplished by structures and 

components (including heat exchangers) 

in key safety systems such as the 

residual heat removal and essential 

service water systems. 

• 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, 

Criteria 45 and 46 (and equivalent plantspecific criteria for pre-GDC plants), 

require the capability by design to 

perform inspection and testing of 

cooling water systems to ensure 

integrity and adequate performance. The 

technical specifications for each plant 

define limiting conditions for operation 

(LCO) for systems that mitigate design 

basis transients and accidents. The 

operability requirements for those 

systems defined in LCOs include the 

adequate performance of heat 

exchangers needed for the systems to 

perform their safety functions. The 

specific LCOs vary by plant type and 

format of the plant-specific technical 

specifications. However, each plant 

does have requirements related to 

safety-significant heat removal systems 

such as residual heat removal and 

safety-related service water. For a 

typical boiling water reactor, the LCOs 

include but are not limited to LCOs 

3.4.9 and 3.4.10 for residual heat 

removal, LCO 3.5.1 for emergency core 

cooling, LCO 3.6.5.5 for drywell air 

temperature, LCO 3.7.1 for standby 

service water and ultimate heat sink, 

LCO 3.7.2 for high pressure core spray 

service water, and LCO 3.8.1 for diesel 

generators. Degradation of a heat 

exchanger that renders a system covered 

by an LCO inoperable would require 

completion of required actions, possibly 

including a shutdown of the affected 

unit, within the required completion 

times. The administrative requirements 

defined within all plants’ technical 

specifications also require licensees to 

establish and maintain various 

procedures related to the operation and 

testing of plant requirement. A partial 

list of the required procedures is 

provided in Regulatory Guide 1.33, 

‘‘Quality Assurance Program 

Requirements (Operation).’’ The NRC 

routinely performs inspections of 

licensees’ programs for implementing 

the required procedures. 

• Generic Letter (GL) 89–13, ‘‘Service 

Water System Problems Affecting 

Safety-Related Equipment,’’ July 18, 

1989, recommended that licensees 

initiate test programs to verify heat 

transfer capability of all safety-related 

heat exchangers cooled by service water 

and routine inspection and maintenance 

programs to ensure serviceability of 

safety-related systems supplied by 

service water. Generic Letter 89–13 

specifies that a continuing program for 

periodic retesting should address the 

effects of fouling, and licensees monitor 

parameters such as coolant flow, 

temperature, and pressure indicative of 

acceptable heat exchanger performance. 

• The NRC oversees the licensees’

testing and maintenance programs via 

the inspection and assessment 

procedures included in the reactor 

oversight process. The NRC inspection 

procedure IP 71111.07, ‘‘Heat Sink 

Performance,’’ defines the current 

sampling and review process for NRC 

inspectors assessing licensees’ programs 

for the testing and maintenance of 

safety-significant heat exchangers. 

• Standard Review Plan (SRP) 4.2 

describes the NRC review of thermal 

margins, effects of corrosion products, 

and hydraulic loads. This review also 

addresses postulated fuel failure 

resulting from overheating of fuel 

cladding. 

• SRP 4.2 also describes the NRC 

review of licensee fuel design analyses 

to ensure that dimensional changes due 

to thermal or irradiation effects (such as 

fuel rod bowing or growth) are 

addressed. 

Thus, the NRC believes that 

additional regulations are not needed to 

address the impact of fouling on the 

performance of heat exchange surfaces 

throughout licensed nuclear power 

plants. 

2. Fouling of heat exchange surfaces 

in reactors has the potential to cause 

significant safety problems. 

The NRC acknowledges that, left 

undetected, excessive fouling of key 

heat exchange surfaces, or other 

problems that challenge the safety 

function of those heat exchangers, could 

represent a significant safety problem. 

The classification of the important heat 

exchangers as safety-related equipment, 

and the resultant requirements 

associated with their design and 

maintenance, demonstrates their 

importance. The NRC determined, for 

example, that the clogging of service 

water heat exchangers could have 

caused safety significant problems in 

the past and as a result issued several 

generic communications culminating in 

Generic Letter 89–13, ‘‘Service Water 

System Problems Affecting SafetyRelated Equipment,’’ July 18, 1989. The 

NRC believes that the current regulatory 

requirements for the testing and 

maintenance of heat exchangers (as 

described in GL 89–13 along with 

recommendations for meeting the 

requirements) are adequate to identify 

and correct potential safety significant 

problems in safety-related heat 

exchangers. Consequently, the NRC has 

determined that no new regulations are 

required to address this issue. The NRC 

will continue to monitor the 

implementation of GL 89–13 and will 

take appropriate action if adverse trends 

are observed. 

3. NRC regulations must require 

publicly available reporting on the 

performance of heat exchange surfaces, 

including records of mechanical 

degradation of heat transfer assemblies, 

and cleaning procedures and their 

effectiveness. 

The NRC believes that it is not 

necessary to report the routine 

operational matters involving heat 

56960 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 184 / Thursday, September 23, 2004 / Proposed Rules 

exchanger degradation and cleaning 

which the petitioner proposes. The NRC 

is interested in system performance 

degradation when the situation might 

lead to a loss of safety function and 

regulations requiring such reporting 

already exist. 10 CFR 50.72, ‘‘Immediate 

notification requirements for operating 

nuclear power reactors,’’ and 10 CFR 

50.73, ‘‘Licensee event report system,’’

require licensees to report on 

performance of any safety system in the 

primary or secondary sides of reactors if 

an event occurs that might compromise 

safe operating conditions, such as a 

deviation from plant technical 

specifications pertaining to residual 

heat removal systems. 

Specifically, section 50.72(b)(3)(ii) 

requires reporting to the NRC within 

eight hours any event or condition that 

results in: (1) the condition of the 

nuclear power plant, including its 

principal safety barriers, being seriously 

degraded, or (2) the nuclear power plant 

being in an unanalyzed condition that 

significantly degrades plant safety. In 

addition, section 50.72(b)(3)(v) requires 

eight hour reporting of any event or 

condition that at the time of discovery 

could have prevented fulfillment of the 

safety function of structures or systems 

needed to: (1) Shutdown the reactor and 

maintain it in a safe shutdown 

condition, (2) remove residual heat, (3) 

control the release of radioactive 

material, and (4) mitigate the 

consequences of an accident. Section 

50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) requires submittal of a 

Licensee Event Report (LER) within 

sixty days regarding any operation or 

condition prohibited by the plants’

Technical Specifications, such as failure 

of a covered heat exchanger, and 

50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) requires an LER for 

any event or condition that resulted in 

the condition of the nuclear power 

plant, including its principal safety 

barriers, being seriously degraded. The 

NRC believes that existing reporting 

requirements adequately address 

degradation of performance of heat 

exchange surfaces in nuclear power 

plants.

4. NRC regulations must address the 

need for investigating the grossly offnormal performance of heat exchange 

equipment in NPPs. 

The NRC believes that the existing 

structure of regulations, technical 

specifications, reporting requirements, 

and licensee programs subject to NRC 

inspection provides the necessary 

confidence that plant safety systems, 

including heat exchangers, are properly 

designed and maintained. A discussion 

of the existing structure of requirements 

and programs is provided in the NRC 

response to the petitioner’s first request. 

An additional regulatory requirement 

related directly to the need for 

investigating the degradation of heat 

exchange equipment and to take those 

actions necessary to ensure that the 

performance of the equipment will 

support its safety function is provided 

by, Criterion XVI, ‘‘Corrective Action,’’

of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. This 

regulation requires that conditions 

adverse to quality, such as a significant 

degradation of a heat exchanger that is 

important to safety, be promptly 

identified and corrected. The NRC 

ensures compliance with these 

requirements by routinely performing 

inspections of licensees’ programs for 

identifying and correcting problems. 

5. Severe fouling of nuclear fuel 

elements leads to axial growth of the 

fuel rods beyond design limits as the 

operating temperature of the fuel rods 

becomes greater than allowed for in 

design. This would cause fuel rods to 

bow and contact adjacent rods and 

control rod guide tubes, interfering with 

coolant flow. 

The NRC believes that pressurized 

water reactor (PWR) and boiling water 

reactor (BWR) fuel bundle designs 

provide ample space for fuel pins to 

expand in the axial direction. A PWR 

fuel pin is neither supported at the 

bottom nor at the top; instead, spacers 

are used to hold the fuel pins together. 

Designed space both at the bottom and 

at the top of fuel bundles permits fuel 

pins to expand thermally without 

touching any other structures. A BWR 

fuel bundle is normally seated at the 

bottom and there is no restriction to 

prevent thermal expansion into the 

upper plenum. Expansion springs are 

sometimes used between fuel pins to 

allow nonuniform axial expansion 

within a fuel bundle. For these reasons, 

the NRC considers it unlikely that a fuel 

pin will bow enough to contact adjacent 

rods and control rod tubes and interfere 

with coolant flow. SRP 4.2 requires the 

NRC to review licensee fuel design 

analysis to confirm that dimensional 

changes due to thermal or irradiation 

effects such as fuel pin bowing or axial 

growth are adequately addressed. 

6. Fouling of heat-transfer surfaces is 

generally not adequately considered in 

the licensing and compliance 

inspections of NPPs. 

The NRC believes that the effects of 

fouling of heat transfer surfaces are 

adequately addressed in the following 

NRC licensing and compliance 

inspection program elements: 

• The NRC conducts an extensive 

review of the licensee’s design of key 

safety systems, structures, and 

components, including heat exchangers 

in the primary and secondary sides of a 

plant. NRC staff analyses of all key 

safety systems, including heat 

exchangers, are performed during 

development of NRC safety evaluation 

reports (SERs) pertaining to a license 

application. As previously discussed, 

various regulatory requirements such as 

10 CFR 50.65, Appendix B to Part 50, 

and plant technical specifications 

require that licensees maintain, test and 

restore equipment such that the safety 

functions are maintained consistent 

with the licensing of the plant. These 

processes are subject to NRC inspection 

to ensure that the requirements are met. 

• Inspections of safety systems, 

structures, and components, including 

safety-significant heat exchangers, are 

designed to determine compliance with 

Appendix A to Part 50, ‘‘General Design 

Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.’’

Specifically, in the Reactor Oversight 

Program, Inspection Procedure 

71111.07, ‘‘Heat Sink Performance,’’

requires that a sample of safety 

significant heat exchangers (e.g., for the 

residual heat removal, component 

cooling water, emergency core cooling 

systems) be inspected both annually for 

specific performance issues and 

biennially for an intense review of heat 

transfer characteristics. 

7. The NRC must require by rule the 

inclusion of fouling considerations in 

NRC-funded heat transfer test programs 

and in the several heat exchanger 

computer programs produced by the 

NRC. 

The NRC believes that these 

requirements do not need to be included 

by regulation. 

• NRC-funded computer codes used 

to audit emergency core cooling system 

(ECCS) performance are capable of 

considering the impact of fouling on the 

performance of fuel element surfaces, 

and these codes have been used for that 

purpose when warranted. 

• Ongoing experimental and 

analytical test programs (e.g., Argonne 

National Laboratory study on fuel 

cladding performance) in the NRC 

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research 

(RES) are investigating transient and 

operational oxidation models, including 

effects of significant pre-oxidation. 

• Calculations were performed by 

RES to support the evaluation of this 

petition using NRC computer codes. 

These calculations showed that fouling 

and excess pre-oxidation would not 

have a significant effect on reflood heat 

transfer capability. 

• The NRC fuel performance code 

FRAPCON–3 can calculate enhanced 

oxidation from crud buildup on fuel 

element surfaces. 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 184 / Thursday, September 23, 2004 / Proposed Rules 56961

• The RELAP and TRACE codes use 

the FRAPCON information to calculate 

transient effects. 

The NRC has evaluated the 

advantages and disadvantages of the 

rulemaking requested by the petitioner 

with respect to the five performance 

goals set out by the Commission in the 

Strategic Plan for Fiscal years 2004–

2009 announced on August 12, 2004. 

1. Maintaining Safety: The NRC 

believes that the requested rulemaking 

would not make a significant 

contribution to maintaining safety 

because current regulations, regulatory 

guidance and practices already provide 

for monitoring, detecting, and correcting 

possible fouling effects on heat 

exchanger performance. In addition, no 

data or evidence was provided by the 

petitioner to suggest that fouling of heat 

exchanger surfaces created any 

significant safety problems. 

2. Ensure Secure Use and 

Management of Radioactive Material:

The petitioner has not established, nor 

has the NRC found the existence of, any 

safety issues regarding the performance 

of heat exchange surfaces that would 

compromise the secure use of licensed 

radioactive material. 

3. Ensuring Openness in the NRC 

Regulatory Process: The Administrative 

Procedures Act provides that any 

interested person has the right to 

petition an agency for issuance, 

amendment, or repeal of a rule. This 

statute expands on the ‘‘right to 

petition’’ provided by the First 

Amendment to the Constitution. The 

NRC implements this statute through 10 

CFR 2.802, Petition for rulemaking, 

using guidance provided in NUREG–

BR–0053, Revision 5, U.S. NRC 

Regulations Handbook, to ensure that 

the regulatory process takes place in an 

open manner. 

4. Improving Efficiency, Effectiveness, 

and Realism: The proposed revisions 

would not improve efficiency, 

effectiveness, and realism because 

licensees and the NRC would be 

required to generate additional and 

unnecessary information as part of the 

evaluation of numerous heat exchanger 

surfaces throughout the nuclear power 

plant. Revising the regulations to be 

more specific about effects of fouling on 

heat exchanger performance would 

require an expenditure of NRC resources 

with little or no added safety benefit. 

5. Ensure Excellence in NRC 

Management: The petitioner’s request to 

revise the regulations to address the 

impact of fouling on all heat exchange 

surfaces in a nuclear power plant is not 

applicable to the strategic goal of 

continuous improvement in NRC 

management effectiveness. 

Reasons for Denial 

The Commission is denying the 

petition for rulemaking (PRM–50–78). 

The NRC regulation and oversight of 

nuclear power plants includes the 

establishment of regulations, the 

issuance of operating licenses and 

technical specifications, and continual 

inspections and technical reviews of 

licensee programs and plant 

performance. When viewed in total, 

these regulatory requirements and 

related oversight practices provide 

confidence in the safety of operating 

nuclear power plants. The NRC’s 

finding that no rulemaking is required, 

is based on the determination that the 

existing structure of regulations (i.e., 10 

CFR 50.65, Appendix A and B to part 

50), technical specifications, and 

licensee programs subject to NRC 

inspection provides confidence that 

plant safety features, including heat 

exchangers, are properly designed and 

maintained in order to fulfill their 

intended function. 

The Commission concludes that the 

integration of the various requirements 

and related NRC oversight functions 

provide reasonable assurance that 

systems important to safety, such as 

heat exchangers, will perform their 

intended functions. The addition of 

specific requirements to a regulation to 

address heat exchanger performance is 

not necessary. 

For these reasons, the Commission 

denies PRM–50–78.

Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 17th 

day of September, 2004.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook, 

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 04–21337 Filed 9–22–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM198; Notice No. 25–04–03–

SC] 

Special Conditions: Boeing Model 777 

Series Airplanes; Seats With Inflatable 

Lapbelts

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed amendment 

of special conditions. 

SUMMARY: This notice proposes 

amended special conditions for Boeing 

Model 777 series airplanes. These 

airplanes, manufactured by Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, have novel or 

unusual design features associated with 

seats with inflatable lapbelts. Special 

Conditions No. 25–187–SC were issued 

on October 3, 2001, addressing this 

issue. The proposed amendment would 

add a new requirement that addresses 

the flammability of the material used to 

construct the inflatable lapbelt. The 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for this design feature. 

The amended special conditions would 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish an appropriate 

level of safety considering the safety 

benefits associated with the inflatable 

lapbelt.

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before October 13, 2004.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

identified by Docket No. NM198, using 

any of the following methods: 

• Mail: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, ANM–113, Attn: Rules 

Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 

Renton, Washington 98055–4056. 

• Fax: 1–425–227–1232, Attn: Jayson 

Claar. 

• Electronically: 

jayson.claar@faa.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jayson Claar, FAA, Airframe and Cabin 

Safety Branch, ANM–115, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington, 

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2194.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

proposed special conditions, explain the 

reason for any recommended change, 

and include supporting data. We ask 

that you send us two copies of written 

comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning these special conditions. 

The docket is available for public 

inspection before and after the comment 

closing date. If you wish to review the 

docket in person, go to the address in 

the ADDRESSES section of this preamble 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments