JSOU Report 07-9 Private Security Infrastructure Abroad Turbiville
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JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

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Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

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Counter-Terrorism Studies, The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

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Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

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Kenneth H. Poole

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JSOU Senior Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

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and JSOU Associate Fellow

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Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

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Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU

Associate Fellow

Joseph A. Stuart

Ph.D., Educational Leadership

JSOU Dean of Academics

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History

Courage Services, Inc. and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/

Southeast Asian Studies

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

William S. Wildrick

Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow
On the cover. Chinese security guards run through their 

drill on a sidewalk in Beijing, 22 October 2004. The security 

business has boomed in China’s capital along with the rise 

in shopping malls and private apartment blocks. Reuters, 

used by permission from Newscom. 

JSOU Report 07-9

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2007

Private Security 

Infrastructure Abroad

Criminal-Terrorist Agendas and 

the Operational Environment

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-2765; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, 

at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-21-0
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint 

Special Operations University.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, 

Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and 

Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise,

December 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community,

January 2007, Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. 

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III
vii

Foreword

Graham Turbiville’s paper on private security organizations 

within today’s operational and security environment is important as we consider the current conflict as viewed through an

irregular warfare prism. Within the irregular warfare framework, the 

population is the center of gravity and, consequently, security for the 

population is paramount to maintaining the population’s loyalty and 

support. To maintain this security, both government security organizations and private security firms operate within sovereign nations.

Worldwide private security organizations, ranging from unarmed 

security guards to “combat-capable” paramilitary groups, can act as 

a force multiplier to enhance security. A critical component of official

and nonofficial security regimes is the role of government oversight in

ensuring criminals and terrorists are unable to hijack private security 

organizations for their own objectives. A major problem is the ability 

of governments to manage or oversee these security elements, which 

varies significantly from country to country and region to region. In

many countries, government control is almost nonexistent, creating 

an environment in which private security organizations are ripe for 

criminal or terrorist manipulation. 

Consequently, the implications of potential abuse by these “wayward” security regimes are critical to conceptualizing support to 

partner nations in the long-term conflict. This issue shows another

element of nontraditional or nonstate actors involved in the international security arena and further highlights the added complexity in 

addressing security challenges in the post 9/11 operational environment. As the United States and its allies combat terrorist networks, 

Dr. Turbiville’s work clearly shows the importance of managing private 

security organizations as a key element in mutually building capacity 

to defeat terrorists. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

ix

About the Author

Dr. Graham Turbiville is a senior fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department. His current research is centered 

on a range of regional and transnational threats to include 

insurgency, terrorism, the development of foreign Special Operations 

Forces (SOF), and foreign perspectives of the United States and allied 

capabilities and vulnerabilities. Dr. Turbiville also serves as a senior 

consultant and researcher for a Department of Defense/intelligence 

community program dealing with geographic and cultural intelligence 

in several areas of the world and producing history-based assessments 

of tribal/clan societies in contemporary war and conflict.

He received his B.A. in Foreign Languages from Southern Illinois University, M.A. in Russian Studies from George Washington 

University, and Ph.D. in History from the University of Montana. Dr. 

Turbiville served 30 years in the intelligence community analytical 

and leadership positions at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the 

Department of the Army. These positions included director/chief of 

long-range and current intelligence offices and directorates, director

of a Joint Reserve Intelligence Center, and other assignments dealing 

with foreign combined arms, security, and SOF. 

Dr. Turbiville has authored many monographs and studies for 

military, law enforcement, and intelligence venues. His articles have 

appeared in several publications, including Special Warfare, Military 

Review, Marine Corps Gazette, Infantry, Army, International Defense 

Review, The Military Engineer, ALOG: Army Logistician, Low Intensity 

Conflict and Law Enforcement, Transnational Organized Crime, Crime 

and Justice International, Strategic Review, RUSI: Journal of the Royal 

United Service Institute, Global Crime, Journal of Soviet Military Studies, and National Guard. Edited works include Global Dimensions of 

High Intensity Crime and Low Intensity Conflict and the three-volume 

National Defense University Press series, The Voroshilov Lectures, a 

collection of authoritative, classified Soviet General Staff Academy

writings on strategy, operational art and tactics, acquired clandestinely in the then USSR by a foreign officer.

Dr. Turbiville’s previous JSOU reports are Russian Special Forces

(August 2005), Logistic Support and Insurgency (October 2005), and 

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations (June 2007). 



Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad

Criminal-Terrorist Agendas and the Operational Environment

Introduction

Two decades of profound change in the global security environment have shaped the ways joint military and interagency 

security planners assess potential areas of crisis and the 

requirements they generate. New doctrinal and training approaches 

have been informed especially by the complexities of peacekeeping and 

humanitarian assistance operations in the 1990s and subsequently 

as follows:

a. By Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, 

and Iraqi Freedom

b. From less visible global counterterrorism operations

c. By a host of additional foreign support initiatives around the 

world. 

This experience suggested approaches for more effectively supporting the defeat of military, terrorist, and insurgent adversaries. It 

also was a catalyst for a substantial expansion of what had been traditional military concerns. A central theme in this regard—codified in

new military doctrine and interagency planning approaches—stresses 

the importance of being cognizant of, and productively interactive 

with, a host of civil and nongovernment entities present in actual 

and potential areas of conflict or crisis. This requirement has been

long understood by Special Operations Forces and their Civil Affairs 

components, which traditionally worked closely with foreign forces 

and organizations.1 In more recent years, however, it has gained 

importance throughout the joint military and interagency communities overall, including often detailed treatments in doctrinal literature 

and national strategy documents.2

The requirement for understanding civil and nongovernment 

organizations in an area of operations or potential crisis is a critically 

important concern of intelligence assessments at national, operational, 

and tactical levels as well. As with broader military and interagency 

concerns, the intelligence community in recent years has examined 

issues of information sharing with nontraditional organizations. 


JSOU Report 07-9

Intelligence organizations have especially been interested in ways of 

leveraging the on-the-ground knowledge and situational awareness 

that resides in civil and nongovernment organizations long-present 

in areas of operations.3

Similarly, military planners and intelligence specialists are aware 

that sometimes these organizations have interests that are contrary 

to the stability and governance of the states in which they are found. 

These organizations may also actively work on behalf of adversaries, criminal agendas, or other goals that undermine U.S. and allied 

interests. Judgments in the U.S. Army and Marines 2006 Counterinsurgency field manual—serving as a guide for ongoing efforts in Iraq,

Afghanistan, and elsewhere—underscore this concern.4 In addition, 

many specialists reporting on the role that nongovernment organizations and corrupted civil entities play in the support of terrorist, 

insurgent, and criminal agendas highlights the requirement for careful 

scrutiny and assessment.5

This paper focuses on a specific element from that larger context

that has grown exponentially in recent years—the creation of private 

security firms around the world and their frequent role in criminal and

terrorist activities. Private security in general has become an integral 

part of “public safety” in some states or national areas, and its effectiveness—or dysfunction—can substantially shape overall stability 

and the ability of institutions of all types to perform their missions 

and activities. Considerable past attention has been paid to the ways 

in which weakened government institutions and societal disarray 

contribute to rising levels of criminality and armed violence. As past 

and more recent events have underscored, when an old order dies, 

weakens, or loses legitimacy—and when war and ethnic or religious 

antagonisms become acute—organized crime, “banditry,” random 

violence, and the creation of environments suitable for the further 

growth of terrorism and insurgency appear in a variety of forms.6

The growth of private security firms has been demonstrated in

parts of the Balkans, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. 

In these areas, U.S. forces or advisors have been present at varying 

levels, illustrated most prominently today by the presence of regular 

military units and numerous private security organizations in the 

operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. Many states around 

the world live with this phenomenon, which became especially visible 

in conflict areas of the early 1990s.7 Even when insurgencies have been 


Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

defeated or ended by negotiations and a measure of national reconciliation—for example, post-conflict El Salvador or Cote d’Ivoire—levels

of violence and overall criminality remain as high or higher than in 

the war years and provide a continuing challenge for the reestablishment of law and order.8

The last 15 years have also shown these same kinds of conditions 

spark the intensified growth and employment of private security (or

military) organizations, businesses, and regimens in various forms.9

Whether formed to fill critical gaps (in a government’s inability to

deal with dangerous or complex security environments) or to provide 

value-added services for government, large corporations, or other 

enterprises, they are businesses mainly formed to earn money and 

thereby operate accordingly. Around the world these businesses 

have been created with active government support and oversight for 

reasons that include:

a. Perceived value

b. With grudging governmental acquiescence because of pressing 

need and a lack of alternatives

c. With general government indifference because of preoccupation with other problems

d. Sometimes with strong but ineffective opposition from severely 

weakened regimes. 

Private security organizations worldwide have been formed for a 

variety of sanctioned purposes that include public safety, national 

security, regional stability, and even international security missions 

and activities. Some areas of the world—for example, Africa—have 

long histories of private security solutions, while for other areas it is 

a relatively new phenomenon. As with nongovernment organizations 

generally, for which elaborate typologies have been developed, many 

names and working definitions exist to distinguish the kinds of organizations or functions performed. The dilemma, however, follows: 

a.	 Definitions and designations are far from perfect or consistent

since some firms perform multiple functions.

b. Considerable overlap and ambiguity exists among the activities 

and functions the firms perform.

c.	 Definitions differ substantially from authority to authority and

country to country. 


JSOU Report 07-9

Further, political and sectarian militias billing themselves as 

“private security” are commonplace in some environments. Since 

no universally sanctioned definitions are available, arguments over

classification are sometimes tedious and heated among specialists.

Generally, however, for convenience sake in considering these companies (or multiple functions within them), they may be differentiated 

in something approximating the following four categories:10

a. Private military companies with substantial forces and resources 

organized along military or paramilitary lines and intended to 

perform a range of training, combat support, combat service 

support, and direct combat roles. 

b. Private security companies, which offer “risk management,” 

investigative, protection, or associated consultancy services 

that may include a focus on security advice or direct support 

like personal/resource protection for customers operating 

in higher risk or unstable environments. Traditional private 

detective or guard firms, whose names and purported roles

often obscure a more active and diverse series of functions, 

are often included in this category, though some define it more

narrowly.

c. Private security intelligence companies, which may perform 

a range of intelligence-gathering and assessment functions 

including sophisticated collection and analytical services that 

parallel functions performed by law enforcement or military 

intelligence. Large corporations operating abroad sometimes 

have security components that perform these functions and 

cooperate with law enforcement or national military organizations. 

d. Private economic intelligence companies, which focus on gathering and/or evaluating economic, technological, financial, or

other information including governmental for the competitive 

benefit of corporate, other commercial, and even government

clients. The focus is on open source, public domain, or “gray 

area” materials including that available from individuals and 

networks of contacts. 

These definitions are largely derived from Western models and

do not take into account other forms of irregular—but more or less 

organized—private security groupings that are based on traditional 


Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

societal or tribal variants. These in effect form another category and 

include what may be regarded in some cases as vigilante reactions to 

crime and insecurity. Nevertheless, some of these have a measure of 

government recognition despite often having their form of auxiliary 

“community policing” compromised by misconduct. Control, oversight, 

and performance by government bodies set up to monitor private 

security activities (of the types noted above) have varied wildly in quality. Like the regular government police and security establishments 

themselves, shoddy performance, poor personnel selection criteria 

or vetting, criminality, and corruption have been a part of the record 

along with the provision of essential security services. 

This assessment focuses not on those private security establishments that have strayed or fallen short, as many institutions do from 

time to time, but rather as follows:

a. Those that were either formed for the express purpose of 

criminality, terrorism, or factional agendas using the cover of 

legitimate security firms

b. Those that otherwise turned to criminal or extremist activities. 

It also focuses principally on the many disparate private security businesses and enterprises abroad, rather than the larger, regularized, 

and generally well-regulated U.S. and Western firms that have been

so extensively treated in the growing body of “privatized security” literature. These firms fall mainly into the “private security companies”

category noted earlier, but include variants of the other categories 

as well. 

As this examination shows, numerous and growing examples exist 

from around the world to illustrate the advantages that criminal, terrorist, or extremist groups see in using a “private security cover” and 

private security venues for their own purposes.11 In this regard, it is 

instructive to review the kinds of lawlessness and criminality that 

have become associated with foreign private security establishments 

around the world and address how private security establishments 

have sometimes facilitated—or have otherwise been linked with—terrorism and militant extremism abroad. 


JSOU Report 07-9

Private Security: Incentives for Penetration and Cover

The antecedents, legislation, and imperatives shaping the creation of 

private security and paramilitary enterprises in the first decade of the

21st century—including their intensified formation in the wake of the

September 2001 attacks on the U.S. and other major terrorist events 

elsewhere—have been ably addressed in a number of instructive articles 

and books.12 A spectrum of public policy debates and views exist on 

the propriety of using nongovernment security and military establishments and the dangers this global development poses to everything 

from national sovereignty to economic health. In the West, at least, 

their roles are generally understood amidst the uneasiness. Internal 

and external oversight is present in varying levels of effectiveness and 

is subject to the most critical government and public examination 

when misconduct is alleged or demonstrated.13

This relative operational stability is far from the case in other 

areas of the world, where the numbers and diversity of large and small 

security “enterprises” have rapidly expanded. Oversight is uneven, 

and the impact on local, national, and regional security and stability 

may be substantial. For criminals and groups with terrorist/extremist agendas, the advantages of 

a “private security firm cover”

became quickly evident in many 

parts of the world. The perception was, as one frustrated 

Russian senior police general 

official put it in late 2002, why not “just call your ‘gang’ a private

security firm, purchase a license for weapons, and provide ‘protection’

until your heart’s content?”14 This cynical view has been echoed in law 

enforcement and security establishments around the world. Criminal 

penetration of private security, while instructive and important itself, 

also illustrates the vulnerability of these businesses to a level of infiltration that present a more dangerous threat to national security and 

public safety—regional and international terrorism. An understanding 

and assessment of this widespread circumstance is clearly important 

to U.S. military and interagency planners and operators charged with 

advancing U.S. interests in many areas of the world.

In general, the pretense of operating a security firm provides a

measure of legitimacy, even if a shallow one, and obscures or makes 

For criminals and groups with 

terrorist/extremist agendas, the 

advantages of a “private security firm 

cover” became quickly evident ...


Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

tacitly acceptable activities that might otherwise be suspect. The many 

benefits evident in actual experience include the following:

a. Plausible maintenance of a high level of privacy or secrecy

b. Frequent, unexplained comings and goings

c. Surveillance and other information acquisition

d. Firearms possession

e. Association with a broad spectrum of less-than-upright individuals ranging from the criminal to the terrorist.

Collaboration with police through bribery or other incentives has 

proven commonplace and safe for the police and the private firm.

These efforts have included the use of police databases, communications, uniforms, credentials, and other resources as well as those 

of the military sometimes. And indeed, the targeted recruitment of 

ill-paid former and serving police, other government security, and 

sometimes military personnel is a common practice, with far higher 

compensation, even if criminal—a proven incentive for underpaid law 

enforcement personnel in many places. The practice by some regular 

law enforcement bodies of using private security organizations to carry 

out extra-legal “justice” operations has been far from infrequent in 

some countries. 

Private security firms in many areas of the world are a primary

vector for the legal or gray market acquisition of weapons—sometimes in 

huge quantities—and including far more than the side arms sometimes 

specified in private security oversight regulations. Criminal groups

understand that the mere existence of an armed security group with 

seemingly legal status or protection serves as a means of coercion for 

a variety of shakedown and extortion rackets. Certainly, however, one 

of the major factors in the successful use of security firms by criminals or terrorists has been the sheer proliferation of such companies, 

which provides a near anonymous sea in which to swim: 

a. Low threshold for establishing security companies in many 

countries

b. Subsequent weak and haphazard oversight so often exercised

c. Increased technological sophistication of even near-street 

thugs who are often inclined to create a more legitimate, visible face. 


JSOU Report 07-9

While the criminal and terrorist agendas and activities of private 

security organizations may sometimes intersect, it is nevertheless 

useful in this examination to separate these to the extent possible. 

The discussion below will first address private security’s criminal 

dimension in specific countries and areas, then the involvement and

affiliation of private security organizations with terrorism and violent 

factional agendas in various regions. 

Criminal Conduct and Private Security in Specific Regions

Looking at how specific criminal activities have become associated with

private security companies in various countries and regions provides 

insight into what the aforementioned generalizations have meant in the 

real world. Those areas most affected correspond with the countries 

and regions that have been identified as most vulnerable to crime and

terrorism in various studies. One notable example—worth review by 

military and law enforcement planners—was prepared by the Federal 

Research Division of the Library of Congress. It identified the following “domestic elements making a nation ‘hospitable’ to transnational

crime and terrorism:” 15

a.	 Official corruption

b. Incomplete or weak legislation

c. Poor enforcement of existing laws

d.	 Nontransparent financial institutions

e. Unfavorable economic conditions

f. Lack of respect for the rule of law in society

g. Poorly guarded national borders.

Identified factors are also those that herald vulnerabilities to

insurgency or other crises, and they are widely present. They include 

countries or regions around the world. The examination below is not 

intended to provide a comprehensive survey of compromised private 

security in any or all of these areas. Rather, it is intended to underscore 

the diversity and commonality of private security problems and the 

relative ease that many of them have turned—or been turned—to illegality and crime in various forms. The easy vulnerability to penetration 

marks private security as a potential cover or vector of terrorism.

To begin with, there are few better examples than the states of the 

former Soviet Union and the former Communist regimes of Eastern 


Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

Europe—the latter now largely aligned with the West including NATO 

and other international organizations—where crime and other turmoil have led to remarkable growth in 

private security organizations. Russia 

constitutes the kind of example that 

gives insight into the many varieties 

of security-criminality linkage that 

have, or may be, replicated in other 

states and regions where the U.S. is 

directly engaged. It also constitutes an 

example pertinent to some post-conflict environments of how quickly

weak security institutions can be further compromised. 

By the mid-1990s, some 6,605 Russian “private security enterprises 

and security services” had been officially registered. About 26,000 individuals—many former military or security-service personnel—acquired 

private investigative licenses. This proliferation of security firms in

the years following the USSR’s dissolution had by the eve of 2000 

constituted in part, at least, a perceived, legitimate social requirement stemming from Russia’s “collapsed system of public security.” In 

November 1999, however, Russian officials and private citizens were

still bemused by the spectacular, decade-long growth and activities 

of private security firms around the country. The existence of these

security businesses—dubbed by the Russians as “private protection 

organizations” (chastnoye okhrannoye predpriyatiye, ChOP)—had, of 

course, been unknown in Soviet times when the state controlled all 

dimensions of public and national security. But by the end of 1999, 

the disarray in former Soviet law enforcement institutions and the 

rise of the most disparate, pernicious, and violent forms of organized 

crime had seen the establishment of various ChOP regimens. These 

security firms were intended to fill a law enforcement vacuum, buttress business agendas, and provide personal protection for those 

who needed and could afford it. 

Legislation intended to oversee and monitor ChOP activity, promulgated in 1992, scarcely reflected the coming pace and diversity of development. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)—specifically

the Main Directorate for the Maintenance of Public Order—estimated 

in late 1999 that about 11,000 ChOPs existed in Russia, employing 

more than 165,000 personnel and possessing about 71,000 weapons.16

Two years later, as one Russian observer put it, “somehow without 

Russia constitutes the kind of 

example that gives insight into 

the many varieties of securitycriminality linkage that have, 

or may be, replicated in other 

states and regions...
10

JSOU Report 07-9

noticing it ourselves, we have created a well-armed and trained parallel army, whose numbers exceed those of the Federal Security Service 

and the Federal Border Service taken together.” 17 Legislation and MVD 

oversight mechanisms that had been created in an effort to oversee 

their activities were universally recognized as ineffective or worse. 

The association of ChOPs with activities that challenged the bounds 

of legality, and not infrequently were judged blatantly criminal, had 

become part of the public safety environment. 

By the fall of 2003, Russian specialists estimated that there were 

16,000 registered firms employing about 350,000 people (up from

11,000 firms and 165,000 employees in 1999).18 By early 2005, the 

number of firms estimated had risen to 21,000 employing perhaps

500,000 security officers and other personnel.19 A number of these firms

and individuals were deeply involved in organized criminal activity or 

had turned into small private armies for individuals or organizations 

whose goals by and large did not correspond with public interest. The 

sheer number of these companies is not always what it appears. In an 

innovation newly highlighted in May 2007, multiple private security 

firms are being formed by individual owners. In some cases, only one of

several firms registered by an individual owner will be active, with the

remaining ones only maintained as shells. There are estimated to be 

more than 2,500 registered, but inactive, firms. MVD analysts believe

that one reason underlying this practice is the avoidance of damaging 

legal penalties. That is, if a firm or its employees are implicated in

crime or other malfeasance threatening prosecution or dissolution, 

firm owners simply transfer personnel and security contracts to an

inactive ChOP and continue business. In addition, MVD officials think

that some shell firms are used by organized crime figures who hire

themselves for the purpose of legally acquiring firearms.20

Figure 1. MVD forces 

in Moscow arresting an 

armed criminal, focused 

on crimes connected 

with illegal purchasing, 

selling, possession-keeping, and smuggling arms 

and explosives. ITARTASS, used by permission 

from Newscom. 
11

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

As noted above, Russians use the acronym ChOP as a catch-all 

to describe the spectrum of private protection organizations. Reflecting the practice in the West, they have also added the term “private 

military organization” (chastnaya voyennaya organizatsiya—ChVO). 

The term can refer to:

a. Well-organized and regulated Western style paramilitary companies

b. Private militias such as Moscow-allied Chechen prime minister Ramzan Kadyrov’s armed groups (“American uniforms, 

Russian weapons, Islamic beliefs and a Chechen spirit” as he 

characterized them)

c. A plethora of private protection organizations whose armament 

and focus became more militarized than earlier organizations.21

Such groups, who might wear military-looking camouflage and 

be manned by former special police or military personnel, soon 

began to carry out what was described as “the combat application of 

‘personal detachments’ for purposes that are by no means oriented

on security.” 22

Racketeering, extortion and coercion, property crimes, the forced 

seizure of assets and even whole businesses, armed clashes, and assassinations are reported with some frequency. While private security 

weapons were supposed to be limited to side arms for protection, an 

array of Kalashnikov automatic weapons, assault shotguns, Dragunov sniper rifles, and other arms or explosives are among them. As

early as 2002 in the Moscow Oblast’ (Region), more than 600 private 

security firms were possessing 4,300 known firearms. Criminals made

a conscious effort to infiltrate these firms for the arms acquisition

opportunities they provided. In a 1-month period, the MVD conducted 

a counterterrorist operation and stripped seven of these firms of

their arms licenses for violations.23 Despite occasional crackdowns, 

some ChOPs are so wealthy that in return for mutual support and 

legal cover they “sponsor” government special units, buying them 

equipment and new materiel that they would otherwise be unable to 

afford.24 They are, in short, a source of revenue for some government 

law enforcement and security services, not to mention well-paid postgovernment employment.
12

JSOU Report 07-9

Criminalized private security groups were perfectly aware of the 

need to have everything administratively in order regarding their legal 

status and activities. An excellent example of this was the notably 

murderous Orekhovo and Medvedkovo criminal groups in Moscow, 

personnel of which were convicted in the spring of 2004 after a trial 

whose phases went on for years. The two gangs were involved in a 

spectrum of often violent criminal activity and killed enumerable rivals 

as they pretended to conduct legitimate security business. The “paper” 

cover of their real activities was detailed in information revealed in 

their marathon trial: 

They almost all had licenses to act as security guards. Private 

security enterprises were created so that they had the right 

to carry weapons legally and officially provide protection for

companies—they set up security contracts with them openly 

and aboveboard. The visible part of the gangsters’ life was 

reflected in the private security enterprises’ documents:

work records, route sheets, post numbers, who had which 

weapons, what establishments were being guarded—all the 

documents were in order, everything was perfect.25

Raiding and seizure of assets by armed security companies affiliated or hired by rival financial, manufacturing, and other corporate

enterprises became an issue for the Russian corporate and financial

world. Leonid Vedenov, the head of the MVD Directorate for the Protection of Public Order’s assessment and licensing component, indicated 

that from 2000-2005, some 1,000 businesses and enterprises had 

private security groups using physical force to seize assets, sometimes 

with unsanctioned police support.26 This kind of assertive and often 

illegal role of ChOPs in Russian business dealing also had an impact 

on the activities of police enforcement, including the employment of 

units in the family of “special designation” (spetsnaz and osnaz) police 

components. One type of unit—formerly designated as Rapid Reaction Militia Detachments (SOBR) and now called Militia Detachments 

of Special Designation (OMSN)—is a case in point. A senior Russian 

officer noted that:

Virtually no major operation is conducted without the involvement of spetsnaz personnel. Even routine searches of offices

are frequently conducted with OMSN backup, because there 
13

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

is a strong probability that the efforts of investigators and 

operatives will be opposed by security guards and private 

security services.

27

A situation analogous to that in Russia existed in Eastern Europe 

soon after the dissolution of Communist regimes and their police 

establishments. In the 1990s, for example, a burgeoning number 

of Bulgarian firms were notoriously known as “wrestler companies”

because of their practice of hiring athletes for strong-arm work in 

extortion and racketeering.28 “Wrestler,” in fact, became a synonym 

for gangster. Similarly, Romanian firms carried out a range of intelligence gathering, bribery, and coercion on behalf of their clients, 

which appalled even the befuddled and reorganizing Romanian law 

enforcement establishment of the time. Illegal activities credited to 

Romanian private security include: 

a. Conducting a range of illegal intelligence-gathering activities 

to include industrial espionage

b. Seizing property and extorting “taxes” through blackmail, 

coercion, and violence

c. Bribing, blackmailing, or otherwise subverting government 

officials

d. Creating intelligence and police style secret databases for private 

use (a practice facilitated by the security service background 

of the “detective” employees).29

Figure 2. Police escort the 

chief executive of VIP Bank 

from a Moscow court room. 

He was suspected of ordering 

the murder of the Central Bank 

deputy governor. Potential 

violent resistance by the armed 

security organizations of banks 

and other businesses sometimes requires heavily armed 

and well-trained special units 

in support of regular officers. 

ITAR-TASS, used by permission 

from Newscom.
14

JSOU Report 07-9

As in many other areas around the world, the number of firms

in both countries has continued to grow in the 21st century. By the 

fall of 2005, Bulgaria had 130,000 private security personnel, while 

neighboring Romania had about 37,000 (more than double the number 

existing in 2001). Romania appeared to suffer more from private firms

engaging in criminal and other illegal activity.30 While the same kinds 

of problems still surface—and a number of unregistered security 

firms remain active—problems generally are more limited than in the

mid-1990s due to the increased association of these countries with 

European professional, legislative, and oversight regimens. 

In June 2007, the affiliations of some Hungarian private security

firms established over the previous two decades worried some observers. The extent to which Hungarian private security companies were 

controlled by security officers who had resigned or been fired remained

considerable. Their alleged collusion with criminal organizations as 

well as with active state security elements was presented as a scandal 

because of the clear conflict of interest. The firms and security service

collaborators were thought to have improperly used their influence to

advance business interests of past security service employees. Recent 

reporting asserts that “the symbiosis between the official and private

secret services has an extremely damaging effect on the performance 

of the official services,” a view that seems well supported. The potential

for criminal and political mischief remains substantial.31

As pointed out in a recent study, some concerns remain about 

other security businesses in southeastern Europe.32 The work considered private security businesses that in addition to Bulgaria and 

Romania, addressed Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the 

former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro (as it then existed), and the territory of Kosovo. Specifically, these

concerned the potential for mischief stemming from the affiliation of

private security firms with other entities and their access to arms.

Regarding problematic affiliations—evident in some way in every

country—the worries centered on links (sometimes multiple) to political 

parties, criminal groups, paramilitary groups, or ethnic groups. Regarding access to arms, every southeastern European country examined 

(except the Kosovo territory) allowed private firms to possess personal

weapons and in the case of Albania, Serbia, and perhaps some other 

countries to have automatic arms.33 Loosely controlled armories and 

worrisome affiliations and linkages constituted a potential danger for
15

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

misuse, and given the area’s volatility and background in smuggling 

of all types (including to terrorist groups), perhaps constituted a continuing, working mechanism for arms diversions or other misuse.

In Turkey (and elsewhere in parts of Europe), three factors have 

generated a wholesale increase in private security establishments: 

crime, the enduring terrorist potential of the Kurdish Workers Party 

(PKK), and the new specter of Al Qaeda and Islamic extremist groups. 

As of mid-2005, about 4,000 companies with various security missions were estimated to employ about 130,000 personnel. While many 

of these were ostensibly targeted against criminal activities (such as 

street crime, burglary, and other typical public safety threats), some 

were formed in response to a rise in “terrorist” bombing incidents. 

The immediate suspicion arose that some of these companies were 

perpetrating crimes themselves, perhaps in an effort to foster new 

business. These doubts were not allayed by the questionable background of some of the often-prominent ex-officials who set up security

businesses. 

The concern prompted increased calls in the Turkish Parliament for 

better regulation and oversight. They also highlighted the uncomfortable 

possibility that, despite legislation promulgated earlier that year, the 

Interior Ministry may not really know how many companies actually 

exist, how many were only paper entities, how many and what kind 

of people were actually employed, and what training and preparation 

they received. The concern was encapsulated by a Republican People’s 

Party deputy for Izmir, who echoed concerns heard elsewhere around 

the world, that unless “a sound structure is formed, it is inevitable 

that private security companies will first become gangs, then armies

of looters and finally mafia organizations.” 34

Moving to the far different region of Latin America, private armed 

groups affiliated with wealthy landowners, political parties, and

businesses have had a long history. However, this precedent has 

been dwarfed by the currently increasing number of private security 

establishments—indigenous, foreign national, and international—that 

operate on behalf of businesses, civil institutions, and individuals. 

As elsewhere, private security firm growth has been spurred by the

pressing need to provide some measure of institutional and personal 

protection amidst the violent spillover or aftermath of wars and insurgency; the presence of uncontrolled weapons; soaring crime rates; 

random and political violence; corrupt and ineffective Latin American 
16

JSOU Report 07-9

police and justice establishments; and a host of political, ethnic, and 

criminal agendas. However, private security firms from Mexico to the

tip of South America that were formed to address these problems have 

had at best spotty performances and been subject to criminalization, 

misconduct, and illegal activities in many forms. While government 

and human rights groups have documented innumerable anecdotal 

accounts of corrupted private security regimens, a few examples from 

several countries illustrate the kinds of issues in the region. 

Mexico is a good case in point. The excellent scholar of Mexican 

history and conflict, Paul J. Vanderwood, devoted a chapter in his

book Disorder and Progress to what he called “Bandits into Police—and 

Vice Versa.” He describes the sometimes effortless transition of late 

19th and early 20th century Mexican bandits into law enforcement 

personnel, the ease with which that transition was reversed, and the 

difficulty sometimes in telling the difference.35 Mexican private security 

companies and personnel have certainly maintained that tradition in 

21st century Mexico, which is much plagued by high rates of street 

and organized crime and policed by often corrupt law enforcement 

and judicial establishments. 

High crime rates and unreliable police spurred the creation of 

Mexican private security businesses of various types and the migration of foreign security branches from the larger firms in the U.S. and

elsewhere. Between 1998 and 1999 alone, private security companies 

reportedly increased by about 40 percent, resulting at the turn of the 

millennium to more than an estimated 10,000 ill-monitored private 

security firms, only 2,984 of which were registered with 153,885

Figure 3. Mexican private 

security officer—one of 

many thousands—in 

front of the Oaxaca City 

Banorte bank following 

the detonation of an 

explosive device in 2006. 

Reuters Photo Archive, 

used by permission 

from Newscom.
17

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

personnel. From 1998 to the end of 2003, escalating Mexican crime 

rates and law enforcement ineptitude caused private security firms

businesses to grow some 10-15 percent each year.36 In 2006, the total 

number of unregistered “security firms”—ranging from a few people

to more developed endeavors—is variously estimated but simply not 

known. 

As in most parts of the world, substantial numbers of private 

security personnel were former or moonlighting police officers.37 The 

competence and trustworthiness of such business have been problematic at best, illustrated by informed assessments from outside security 

specialists. In Guadalajara in 2006, for example, the U.S. Overseas 

Advisory Council—citing the Regional Security Office and most local

Mexican officials—judged that all firms were mediocre at best and

indicated that not a single outfit could be recommended. If possible,

local companies performed security using their own employees rather 

than the poorly paid, trained, and mistrusted alternatives.38

Kidnapping, robbery, extortion, and coercion on behalf of various criminal, economic, and political agendas have been associated 

with Mexican private security, just as they have been with the oftencomplicit serving federal, state, and local police officers. To cite some

examples from a long, dreary, and continuing mosaic of corruption 

(and while numerous serving police were also arrested apace in 2005 

for similar crimes), three private security officers operating in Ciudad

Juarez (directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas) were 

arrested for kidnapping a businessman and demanding a ransom. 

These were determined to be employees of a Sinaloa-based company 

(“Private Alarms Protection”) that had a deployed component in Ciudad 

Juarez. At about the same time, three additional private guards were 

arrested on suspicion of murdering two women. In fact, among the most 

notorious crimes on the U.S.-Mexican border has been the murder of 

scores of young women, cases steeped in mystery, believed motivated 

by everything from drug-trafficking to kidnapping and devil-worship,

and so far resulting in few plausible law enforcement successes. The 

countless private security and guard organizations located in Ciudad 

Juarez have been widely suspect in these murders along with the 

police, and the three arrested were said to be from the private firm

“Border Eagles.” Such private security entities typically patrol the 

kind of residential and business areas where young women have been 

killed. While estimates vary, one source judged that 107 “known” 
18

JSOU Report 07-9

security businesses were operating in the border city, with a combined 

employee total (some 6,000) that exceeded the active police officers

several fold. As elsewhere in Mexico, training for private officers is often

negligible in the fly-by-night firms, the pay small, and benefits slight

or nonexistent. Only half of the known firms were legally registered,

though that requirement in reality seems to mean little.39

Documented and undocumented immigrants play an important 

role in private security firm recruitment in some parts of Central

America. In Costa Rica, a Dutch anthropologist and researcher indicated that “most” private security guards there were Nicaraguans and, 

furthermore, that private security was more evident than in some 

Colombian cities despite Costa Rica’s relative peacefulness. The influx

of Nicaraguans began with the Sandinista, and civil war violence and 

has continued because of economic incentives. 

With perhaps 10 percent of the Costa Rican population estimated 

to be from Nicaragua, a large base exists for low income jobs. Streetlevel private security falls into that category.40 According to a United 

Nations official stationed in Costa Rica, the number of private security personnel more than doubled from 2004 to 2005—that is, from 

8,000 to 19,000, which includes only the personnel registered with 

the Ministerio de Gobernación, Policía y Seguridad Pública. However, 

the formal requirement for training, education, and emotional stability 

was totally lacking.41 While Costa Rica is a relatively well-off and stable 

country, some specialists are concerned 

that the new private security company 

growth—relying on poorly trained and 

undocumented personnel—may have the 

potential for future trouble.

Public impatience with violent criminals has generated formal local and 

neighborhood organizations and informal vigilante groups that have taken 

Figure 4. A Nicaraguan police officer (left) 

and private security guard provide security 

outside Managua’s La Prensa newspaper 

office during a hostage situation. Nicaraguans 

serve in large numbers in Costa Rican private 

security firms as well. Agence France Presse, 

used by permission from Newscom.
19

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

police indifference or ineffectiveness into their own hands. These 

organizations have been active in Mexico as well as south into 

Central America. In Honduras, for example, the most recent U.S. 

State Department human rights report pointed to the proliferation of “unlicensed security guard services and vigilante groups” as 

well as so-called Citizen Security Councils and private security 

companies with ties to the police. While the ostensible purpose of 

these nongovernment groups is to prevent crime and violence, they 

have been widely accused of violent vigilantism and acting as death 

squads—with police acquiescence or encouragement—in so-called 

“social cleansing.” According to some reporting, said to be based on 

Honduran government sources from 1999-2005, nearly 1,000 suspected criminals, gang members, street children, and others were 

killed in extrajudicial actions perpetrated at least in part by security 

groups.42

In Guatemala, a similar phenomenon 

exists, where city, village, and other private 

protection organizations are suspected of 

extra-judicial killings, disappearances, 

and various forms of organized crime to 

include arms and drug trafficking. By

2000, the money spent nationally for private security exceeded the public security 

budget by about 20 percent. The rapidly 

increasing number of firms produced a

range of estimates, the most authoritative indicating that by 2006, about 180 

private security companies employed 

80,000 people. This number compared 

to only 18,500 police, less than 25 percent of total private security manpower. 

With only eight police officers exercising

oversight of private security firms, real

monitoring was nonexistent.43 Salvadoran 

private security firms paralleled this disparity in private and public security—and 

effective oversight—where the presence 

of 158 companies with 18,244 “guards” 

in 2004 compared with a National Police 

Figure 5. A gunfight between 

private security guards and 

bank robbers in Guatemala 

City left this man injured. 

In growth spurred by extraordinarily high crime rates, 

private security personnel 

now outnumber police by 

nearly 10 to 1. Reuters 

Photo Archive, used by 

permission from Newscom. 
20

JSOU Report 07-9

force that had only 5,000 of its 16,800 total police officers serving

actively at any given time.44

Colombia’s decades of conflict and terrorism have made it one of

the best known centers of autodefensas and other well-armed private 

militias, the most famous/notorious being the United Self-Defense 

Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia--AUC). Linked 

crime and conflict—and the presence of huge arms supplies and

trained fighters—have generated professed private security organizations of all types, a number so well known for human rights abuses 

and criminal involvement that it need not be addressed in any detail 

here.45 Oversight of the countless formal and informal security entities 

is scarcely conceivable amidst the other problems. Nevertheless, the 

need—and government ineffectiveness—continue to generate attention 

as security firms’ involvement in “money laundering, drug trafficking,

and paramilitarism” continue to function and grow. 

One most recent example of government ineffectiveness generating 

attention is the 2006 capture and arrest of Emilse del Rosario Lopez 

Romero, known as La Gata (The Cat). Lopez had formed a security 

force of some 180 “bodyguards,” many armed with automatic weapons 

as well as the usual array of pistols and shotguns. Ostensibly a businesswoman, she claimed the need for private security to protect her 

lottery businesses and her son, a city mayor. However, she was soon 

discovered to be linked with criminal activities to include influencing

elections and extorting business. Even her capture and arrest, however, 

did not change the status of her security force, which remained legal 

due to its association with a still functioning lottery business.46

Figure 6. Colombian 

private security guard 

with sniffer dog 

searches patrons at a 

Colombian shopping 

mall in Bogota. Agence 

France Press, used by 

permission from 

Newscom. 
21

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

By spring 2006 in Paraguay, the National Police authorities in Asuncion reported that 280 private security firms were operating throughout the country, employing a total of more than 13,000 officers and

personnel. Only 30 of the companies were termed to be legal, leaving 

some 250 businesses (with 7,000 personnel) classified as “irregular.”

No national legislation governing their activities existed, and there 

seemed to be no immediate prospect of getting it. As elsewhere in 

parts of Latin America, this total number of private security personnel 

exceeded the 25,000-officer National Police force.47 Further, the private companies were said in a number of cases to be better equipped, 

organized, trained, and paid than the government law enforcement 

establishment, contributing negatively to police retention.48 Criminal 

activity attributed to private firms was widely reported, ranging from

extortion to property seizures, political intimidation, and murder. 

In the latter two categories was the notorious ambush-assassination in Asuncion of Vice President Luis Maria Argana in March 1999. 

While Paraguay eventually judged political and army complicity in the 

murder, and while two individuals were convicted, reports at the time 

suspected the involvement of seven members of a “commando” style 

private security team that had attracted the attention of authorities 

with their paramilitary training, use of high powered and automatic 

weapons, and instruction in special tactics.49 At a minimum, the presence of unregulated companies and firearms made such suspicions

plausible if difficult to prove.

Figure 7. Suspected 

political assassin

Maximo Osorio 

(center)—who was 

an expert marksman, 

detective, and bodyguard—was arrested in 

1999 for the murder of 

Paraguayan Vice President Argana. Alleged to 

be organized with some 

high level government 

complicity, the ambush 

assassination was thought to involve a private commando-like team of which 

Osario was a part. Agence France Presse, used by permission from Newscom.
22

JSOU Report 07-9

In Brazil, control of weapons in the hands of the 2,800 private 

security firms is a major issue. In less than a decade, some 56,800

firearms “disappeared from the companies, and the Brazilian police

are attempting to set up an electronic inventory system to track such 

weapons in the future.” 50 In Sao Paulo—likely reflecting the situation

nationwide—the “Sao Paulo State Private Security Companies’ Union” 

estimated that 80 percent of the private security companies there 

are “clandestine” and in substantial measure both unauthorized and 

untrained for security work. Recognizing that the union has its own 

agenda in its desire to exercise control over professional standards 

(and collect dues), many unregistered companies clearly exist that by 

some estimates could be as high as 500,000 personnel in this area 

with a population in excess of 10 million people.51 Criminality involving 

some of these firms spanned the usual crimes against property and

persons. They also included landowners using private armed security groups to eliminate landless squatters—often organized by the 

Landless Workers’ Movement—through coercion and sometimes fatal 

violence. Among the most notorious and continuing practice, going 

back at least a decade, is the social cleansing by death squads who 

execute vagrants, street youths, and beggars in Sao Paulo and Rio in 

particular. This elimination of groupings deemed socially undesirable 

involved police personnel and those moonlighting as private “security” 

in the employ of local businesses.52

African private security growth has paralleled that in other areas 

of the world reviewed above, even in the recognition that privatized 

protection had long been a feature of many African countries. It has 

been characterized by the widespread creation of smaller indigenous 

companies, the establishment of larger businesses (some of which 

now export their business regionally), and the influx of foreign,

mostly Western-owned firms offering an array of services in individual

countries and regionally. Media reporting as well as instructive work 

by academics and research organizations in troubled parts of Africa 

has highlighted private security roles amidst public safety, political, 

economic, and conflict problems.53

In Nigeria, the U.S. State Department estimates that “security” 

is the second largest money-maker, falling only behind oil and gas. 

Nigerian random and violent crime at the beginning of 2007 was 

characterized by the U.S. State Department as “endemic throughout 

the country.” 54 It affected individuals, small business, and larger 
23

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

corporations. Basic law-and-order requirements, the enormous security 

requirements generated by the oil and gas companies in particular, and 

often inadequate or corrupt government law enforcement (including 

the notorious “kill and go” Mobile Police) spurred rapid private security 

growth.55 In 2005, the estimated number of private security firms was

1,500-2000 with perhaps 100,000 employees.56 The presence of many 

unlicensed firms has been a continuing recognized problem.

Nigerian private security personnel for the most part have been 

prohibited from carrying weapons. The assignment of small, heavily 

armed “Mobile Police” elements to private companies, however, has 

provided private security with an armed presence. 

This practice in effect privatizes parts of the public law enforcement 

sector and creates tense, ambiguous command and control issues. 

As noted, Mobile Police have had a less than sterling reputation.57

In addition, larger corporations provide illicit and some governmentsanctioned arms to private security personnel in their employ. Private 

security personnel and firms have been charged with complicity, in

worker persecutions at the behest of major corporations, as well as 

petty crimes of opportunity.58

The Niger Delta provides an example. Oil and gas company operations there have created an especially complex security environment. 

Ethnic, economic, and political tensions exacerbated by resentments 

over uncompensated resource exploitation and environmental damage 

have posed a threat to oil and gas operations by various armed groups 

for some 15 years. The use of private security in support of government 

police and military forces in the Niger Delta has generated numerous 

Figure 8. Nigerian private 

security personnel sometimes 

operate with small, heavily 

armed, government Mobile 

Police and are also employed 

to protect businesses and 

individuals from the Mounted 

Police who are feared for “kill 

and go” depredations. Reuters 

Photo Archive, used by 

permission from Newscom.
24

JSOU Report 07-9

charges of complicity in excessive force and impropriety while protecting pipelines, equipment, and operations from militants. At the 

other end of the spectrum, criminality among poor communities has 

generated “private security in the form of vigilante groups and village 

or community volunteer police or guards who impose order as they 

judge appropriate.” 59

Of passing interest only—but reflecting the reputation for “gray

market,” legally questionable, or downright illegal private security 

initiatives in some African states—was the frequent role unnamed 

private security firms played in the Nigerian get-rich-quick scams.

Perpetrators very often asserted that the imaginary stolen money, 

gem stones, diamonds, valuable documents, or other high-value items 

resided safely with a private security firm.60

Sierra Leone’s civil war—running from 1991-2002—claimed some 

70,000 lives and left in its wake a perceived need for private security 

to supplement shortfalls in public safety measures provided by government.61 The area had been associated for many years with larger 

European-style private military companies (e.g., most famously the 

former Executive Outcomes) employed in combating militants, training government forces, and policing diamond smuggling among other 

tasks. 

The post-conflict environment, however, has given rise to perhaps

several dozen domestic national private security firms performing residential and commercial security functions. They provide an important 

contribution to overall policing and security. These compete in some 

ways with the larger international security firms that retain roles and

Figure 9. Niger Delta 

vigilante militants near 

their camp in Okrika, 

Rivers State, Nigeria. Rival 

gangs, police, and private 

security clashes have cost 

many lives in fighting that 

in part is for control or a 

share of oil wells there. 

Agence France Presse, 

used by permission 

from Newscom.
25

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

interests in providing protection services. The most egregious kinds 

of criminality associated with smaller private security firms in other

countries have been largely absent. However, outside and internal 

observers point to the potential for problems due to limited oversight 

of firms, uncertainties regarding future arming of security firms, and

concerns about a return of earlier civil war violence.

Kenya’s capital city Nairobi is often characterized as one of the 

most dangerous places on earth. Random and violent crime has 

resulted in “fear and insecurity” becoming “defining features of life”

as one commentator put it. This environment has generated a growing 

private security establishment as similar circumstances have in so 

many places.62 Kenya’s continuing poor economic performance and 

deep poverty have gone hand in hand with dysfunctional institutions 

and corruption. Longstanding concerns with criminal violence and 

the burgeoning crime against persons and property, engendered by 

these kinds of conditions, have been expanded further in Nairobi by 

the appearance of the violent Mungiki outlaw or bandit sect. While 

the sect began in the late 1980s, it became increasing visible as years 

went by and is now credited with many thousands of members by 

some counts. 

The Mungiki group claims the lineage and legacy of the 1950s Mau 

Mau insurgency, is similarly based on Kikuyu tribal members, and 

asserts a muddled anti-Western and “back-to-African roots” ideology 

that calls for the overthrow of the corrupt Kenyan government.63 Mau 

Mau-like oath-taking indoctrinations involving human blood have 

been reported by police, and some involvement with radical Islam has 

been reported as well. They have frequently clashed with police as 

Figure 10. Violent Mungiki 

gang members are 

rounded up by police in 

a Nairobi slum. Fears of 

the Mau Mau like Mungiki 

movement has spurred 

the creation of hundreds 

of private security organizations. Reuters Photo 

Archive, used by permission from Newscom.
26

JSOU Report 07-9

well as Nairobi residents—usually poor—that reject their views. They 

have also become involved in political rivalries and coercive criminal 

enterprise that has branded them as criminal thugs as well as a threat 

to instability. Their brutal conduct has recently featured a spate of 

decapitations, inspired supposedly by jihadist videos from Iraq.64

This kind of environment has spurred the creation and expansion of local private security firms in Kenya, so far officially unarmed.

The estimated 2,000 companies employ some 48,000 personnel as of 

2005.65 Most individuals who can afford it have at least one security 

guard, and United Nations or nongovernment organization principals 

are said to typically receive benefits that provide for three contract

guards.66 Mungiki violence specifically has even caused some Kenyan

members of Parliament to hire private security protection if they judged 

police protection provided to be inadequate.67 Poorer citizens resort 

to volunteer neighborhood watches, patrols, and vigilante groups as 

is often the case elsewhere and none with any oversight. 

As in so many areas, these private resources play critically 

important roles in visible and unnoticed ways. Of special note, a lone 

Kenyan private security guard—killed at the scene—prevented the 

explosive-filled Al Qaeda-driven truck from penetrating all the way

into the basement of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi on 20 August 1998 

where it would have killed many more people than it did. However, 

because of poor pay, inadequate licensing, indifferent state oversight, 

and interaction with corrupt and coercive government police, their 

vulnerability and alleged criminal collusion is regarded as a further 

danger to public safety and stability.68

South Africa sustained rapid privatized security increases in the 

1990s. By the turn of the millennium, an estimated 3,200 security 

companies employed 200,000 personnel in the Republic of South 

Africa. Most of these employees were guards of various types and 

collectively outnumbered the South African Police Service. Criminal 

activity then and today has ranged from minor offenses to major 

crimes, despite efforts to exercise control with limited personnel and 

inadequate legislation—problems present in many African states as 

every survey makes clear.69

Among the unusual variants that private security regimens may 

take is one resident in Cote d’Ivoire. A conservative 2005 estimate 

judged that some 300 private security firms with more than 20,000

employees were present there. In addition to the large or better known 
27

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

companies—said to include “Wackenhutt, Delta Assistance, BIP, BGSP, 

Omeifra, ASP,” and others—local security businesses are present in 

Cote d’Ivoire as well. One of the consequences of socio-political tensions there, following the civil war and unresolved issues of land reform 

and other problems, was a perceived effort to politicize or leverage 

existing or newly forming “private security groups” on behalf of one 

agenda or another. It is widely judged that a number of these firms

have become, in effect, partisan intelligence-gathering entities, with 

at least the potential for direct action. They constitute essentially 

“militias with official seals” as one observer described them. The alignment of some companies, in terms of tribe or clan, adds additional 

complexity since at least 60 ethnic groups exist in Cote d’Ivoire. This 

diverse affiliation of companies contributes to undermining efforts

to promote national cohesiveness, disarmament, and reconciliation 

while at the same time forming small or larger armed groups that can 

be mobilized in behalf of various agendas.70 One observer stated the 

perceived danger this way:

As in Iraq, private military companies are flourishing. Thanks

to their carrying of weapons, they offer more “strong-arm” 

services, ranging from personal body-guarding to military 

training. They are made up of former soldiers, often French. 

According to the local leader of one of these groups, some 

Licorne soldiers [deployed French “Unicorn Force” peacekeepers], once their four-month commission is up, come knocking at their door. The state has entrusted the surveillance of 

several of its industrial sites to this company.... Should the 

situation get worse, these companies, which operate on the 

borderline of legality, could cross the narrow line separating 

them from mercenary activity and hire their services out to 

the highest bidder.71

One notable security development concerns the presence of a 

strong Lebanese minority (estimated from 50,000 to over 100,000 

people), part of the Lebanese diaspora that has seen Lebanese expatriates buying businesses and other properties from the French who 

departed amidst earlier violence. As public safety and larger security 

concerns have emerged in recent years, and when the aftermath of 

the 2004 civil war led to increased insecurity and crime, the Lebanese 

formed one of the most powerful private security establishments in 
28

JSOU Report 07-9

Abidjan. Its strength is characterized in some reporting as more like 

a militia than a private security organization. Remaining French settlers—the “old Whites” as they are called, who were targeted in most 

intense 2004 violence by President Laurent Gbago’s rampaging “Young 

Patriots” thugs—have formed an alliance with the Lebanese. According to one of the several thousand remaining, uneasy French settlers, 

the Lebanese “are determined to stay here at any price” and “have 

the heavy materiel—grenades and rocket launchers” that promise an 

opportunity to do so and protect their substantial investments.72

Moreover, it was judged that members of the Lebanon-based terrorist group Hezbollah had been imported to buttress the Lebanese 

security establishment. This action was reported to include some 

veterans of urban combat in Beirut. Given Hezbollah’s establishment 

of cells in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and other parts 

of Africa, the reports are not implausible, and the U.S. warned about 

the potential for Hezbollah trouble-making in Cote d’Ivoire.73 More 

broadly, a parallel may be seen in remote locations like the BrazilArgentina-Paraguay tri-border area or Iquique, Chile, where Lebanese 

and other Arab expatriates (including a strong Hezbollah presence) 

run all kinds of businesses (at least some with private security). On 

Hezbollah’s part, a variety of businesses and financial institutions there

are used to launder money or raise revenues. This activity highlights 

the analogous value-added of a port like Cote d’Ivoire’s Abidjan (the 

source of much speculation along these lines).74 This is one of the 

kinds of issues that suggests the association of private security and 

terrorism deserves some attention.75

Terrorism, Violent Factional Agendas, and Private Security in 

Specific Regions 

Private security firms have been held up as both a potential counterterrorism asset and as a potential way for terrorists to disguise and 

facilitate their agendas in some of the same ways that organized criminals have used these security firms as umbrellas. Regarding counterterrorism potential, by the mid-1990s Russian specialists were quick 

to seek some way of harnessing private security to the interests of the 

state and make a little money at the same time amidst the wreckage 

of the USSR and the burgeoning growth of commercial security companies. At a security conference in Moscow in 1997—where former 
29

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

KGB and MVD “counterterrorists-turned-private operators” were well 

represented—Russian Interpol chief Yevgeniy V. Malyshenko suggested 

a role for Russian firms in infrastructure protection based on foreign

experience.76 Such early efforts have been fine-tuned and introduced

formally into Russian counterterrorism programs, apparently gaining 

some momentum in the wake of many spectacular Chechen attacks 

including the Beslan school massacre in September 2004. Particular 

interest was directed towards the protection of facilities and government and commercial infrastructure using private guard enterprises, 

but even most Moscow schools began to hire private security personnel, mostly unarmed, after the Beslan, North Ossetia terrorist attack 

in September 2004.77

Specifically, for example, a 2006 proposal was advanced to protect

and secure the Russian pipeline system of some 1 million kilometers 

(km) of energy pipelines (oil and gas) of various types. The vulnerability of the system is underscored by the fact that criminal elements 

illegally divert some 10,000 metric tons of fuel a year, not to mention 

committing acts of terrorism against gas pipelines in the north Caucasus. Too, as the chief of the Center for Military Forecasting at the 

Academy of Military Sciences indicated,

Just as they did 30 years ago when there was a drop in pressure in one sector of a main pipeline, staffers of the Unified

Gas Supply System—which has jurisdiction over 150,000 km 

of gas pipelines and 256 compressor stations—dispatched a 

breakdown team without knowing who and what will meet 

them at the scene of the incident. 

What he proposed was the creation of special Russian private military 

organizations—the ChVOs noted earlier—to protect the “operationalstrategic” pipeline network in a commercial-Federal-partnership.78

Eighteen months later, in fact, the Russian energy giant Gazprom 

and the Transneft pipeline monopoly were on a fast track to receive 

official permission to set up its own armed security force. July 2007

legislation was passed in the lower house of Parliament for both 

companies to use firearms and antiriot materiel to counter pipeline

attacks. Of note, the bill grants these private security bodies the same 

rules of engagement as Russian MVD police. The legislation goes to the 

upper body of Parliament, the Federation Council, and then to Russian President Vladimir Putin for approval. Opponents in Parliament 
30

JSOU Report 07-9

fear that other major enterprises will follow suit, citing the well-known 

dangers of “private armies.” 79 Moreover, since pipelines run through 

many populated areas, it is thought that the Gazprom armed security 

forces may become involved in broader law enforcement activities. It 

is unclear just how much the official authorization will really change

on the ground. According to Russian reporting, “Gazprom and its 

affiliates guard 91 percent of facilities, private security services guard

5.5 percent, and security services of a mixed type involving private 

security services guard 3.5 percent of facilities.” In that sense, the 

law may just “formalize the existing security system.” 80

This kind of development aimed at infrastructure and other metropolitan and national security protection initiatives for key assets 

has been advanced by a number of academic and government professionals as well as specialists in the West, particularly in the wake 

of 9/11 and other major terrorist attacks over the last half decade.81

Ongoing programs abound, with new initiatives in progress and on 

the horizon. In the U.S., popular and more scholarly critiques of these 

concepts are advanced as well, usually focusing on the uneven or poor 

screening, training, and competence of some security firm personnel

juxtaposed with the critical homeland security functions they are being 

asked to perform.82 Relative risks, benefits, and overall value-added

will in the West, at least, be worked out in the public policy debates 

centered on appropriate private security roles (and for that matter 

the analogous critiques and discussions of government and public 

institutional performance). 

In addition to the potentially positive contributions that private 

security may make to combating terrorism, the real—and sometimes 

realized—potential exists for terrorist establishment, penetration, or 

other use of private security organizations. This potential parallels 

those efforts by criminal organizations to take advantage of the considerable cover provided by private security establishments. 

As indicated earlier, Russian officials and private citizens were

expressing growing concerns about some years of striking private 

security firm growth. Still, it was more than a surprise when the

Russian newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets reported the surfacing 

of a ChOP that would be difficult to surpass as the ultimate “outlaw

private security” enterprise. Its existence came to light through efforts 

to ensure some 1,500 personnel of a firm named “Islamic Order” (Islamskiy Poryadok). Islamic Order, it was reported, was duly registered, 
31

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

held a license, had a bank account, and was listed at a street address 

in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. But it turned out to be a cover 

organization for the notorious, Chechen guerrilla and terrorist leader, 

Shamil Basayev; and its stated “liberation of hostages” mission at least 

suggested that the perpetrators of this deceit had a well-developed 

and dark sense of humor. According to Moskovskiy Komsomolets, the 

Chechen guerrilla employees and the now deceased Basayev himself 

were to be insured for $10,000 each, an amount totaling $15 million.83

The newspaper noted the differential between this amount and the 

$1 million that at the time was offered by the Russian military commander in Chechnya, General Gennady Troshin, for the elimination 

of Shamil Basayev.84

This episode appears to have been confirmed in part, at least, by

an MVD spokesman.85 Whatever its total accuracy, the information 

highlighted an issue that already was plaguing not only Russia but a 

number of states around the world—that is, the problem of regulating 

private security organizations and ensuring that criminality or terrorism was not a part—or the centerpiece—of their business model. 

The terrorist dimension of this issue has become even more acute in 

the post-9/11 period with the earlier “Islamic Order” model certainly 

not an isolated example. 

The use of private security cover for 

a kind of state terrorism is widely alleged 

in Russia. According to widespread supporting and what seems to be compelling 

evidence at times, Russia’s state security 

services—the military’s Main Intelligence 

Directorate, the Federal Security Service (FSB), and MVD elements 

have been charged with extra-judicial killings and a range of “terrorist” provocations to include planting and detonating bombs in Russia 

itself. Individuals charged in these actions often are former (or serving) 

security service and representatives of private security organizations. 

The apparent linkage was highlighted recently with the November 2006 

“Polonium-210 murder” of former KGB and FSB officer—and very visible

Kremlin critic—Alexandr Litvinenko in London. Litvinenko had written 

a book called Blowing Up Russia in which he alleged FSB involvement 

in a series of fatal and destructive Russian bombings among other 

acts and plans. British authorities named former FSB officer and

“private security” businessman Andrei Lugovoy as the perpetrator in 

The use of private security 

cover for a kind of state 

terrorism is widely alleged 

in Russia.
32

JSOU Report 07-9

a model familiar to those who had followed other analogous killings 

in Russia. Russian reporting has for years alleged the existence of a 

hidden edifice of former state security officers using private security

cover to commit crimes, assassinations, and various acts of terrorism. 

The charge is frequently made that these acts are carried out at the 

behest of the security services or political leadership, though that is 

denied by the Russian Government.86

Surprising revelations about the jihadist penetration of the British 

Health Care system in the unsuccessful June 2007 bombing attempts 

in London and Glasgow underscored that all manner of organizations 

and institutions are considered by extremist for covering terrorist 

planning and activities.87 The use of private security to cover extremist 

agendas is a recognized and considered approach by extremist groups 

using terrorism. The penetration of private security firms by terrorists—an approach endorsed and recommended by Abu Bakr Naji in his 

Management of Savagery jihadist strategy and underscored by many 

criminally corrupted private security enterprises around the world. 

Some recent illustrations may highlight this special danger, which is 

especially notable when expatriate populations are involved. 

For example, pointing to the existence of a defined current and

future planning tenet, and as a suggestion of what has already transpired, is the advice offered in the recently translated 2005 Al Qaeda 

and “jihadi strategy” document by Abu Bakr Naji entitled Management 

of Savagery. The work among other things, describes how Al Qaeda 

may consider approaches for defeating the U.S. and its allies. Of note, 

the jihadi imperative set out to infiltrate

institutions, over the course of a long 

struggle, and the theoretical framework 

for actions that not only Al Qaeda but also 

Figure 11. Dr. Mohammed Jamil Abdelkader 

Asha, British health care worker from Jordan, 

was charged with conspiracy to cause 

explosions in the failed car bomb attacks 

in London and Glasgow in July 2007. He 

and his medical accomplices represented 

a form of infiltration that had apparently 

been little considered earlier. Agence France 

Presse, used by permission from Newscom.
33

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

various terrorist (and criminal) groups have undertaken. Specifically,

Abu Bakr Naji indicates: 

Our battle is long and still in its beginning.... Its length provides an opportunity for infiltrating the adversaries and their

fellow travelers and establishing a strong security apparatus 

that is more supportive of the security of the movement now, 

and later the state. [We] should infiltrate the police forces, the

armies, the different political parties, the newspapers, the 

Islamic groups, the petroleum companies (as an employee 

or as an engineer), private security companies, sensitive civil 

institutions, etc. That actually began several decades ago, but 

we need to increase it in light of recent developments.88

These targets vary in their vulnerability and potential impact, and 

it may be that private security establishments offer some the greatest 

payoffs combined with effective cover and reduced risks.

In 2005-2006, Spanish security personnel charged with investigating potential Islamic terrorism became interested in a “significant”

number of “Chechen Islamists” who had settled in Spain, mainly Madrid 

and Barcelona. They were thought to be hiding, resting, or organizing in Spain after undertaking combat action in Russia and possibly 

Europe as well. While the reasons for their presence in Spain were 

not clear, it was postulated that it could be related to funding future 

Figure 12. Cover of Management of 

Savagery, which has been translated 

and posted under the auspices of 

the Combating Terrorism Center, 

U.S. Military Academy at West Point. 

Source: West Point CTC Web site, 

www.ctc.usma.edu/publications/

publications.asp.
34

JSOU Report 07-9

terrorist actions. The famous Costa del Sol and a few other Spanish 

areas had for some time been major organized crime centers for money 

laundering and other crime associated with Georgians, Russians, and 

other ex-Soviet citizens. The mechanisms for illegal financial activities in the wealthy tourist areas were well established. The focus of 

police and intelligence inquiries was on a “security” dimension of their 

activity, since it was suspected that the new Chechen immigrants had 

taken employment in the private security field. Since the Chechens

did not have the requisite residency papers, this kind of employment 

would be illegal, but by no means unusual in the experience of much 

of the rest of the world.89

Chechen militants in Chechnya itself have been most successful in infiltrating or subverting private security organizations there,

even those with official sanction and close association with the proMoscow Chechen Ministry of the Interior. Private security officers

under the Chechen Interior Ministry have been arrested for directly 

aiding the armed resistance groups, including providing protection for 

leadership. Bribery of such personnel to 

secure their silence or cooperation has 

been extremely successful, whatever 

role clan and ideological imperatives 

may play. The frequency of this kind of 

unreliability has made Russian military 

and security forces loath to use their services, even as translators.90

In the Middle East, public safety concerns and widespread insecurity and uncertainty have spurred the expansion of private security 

firms. These are used for personal protection as well as securing and

protecting all kinds of businesses, organizations, and structures. The 

goals and affiliations of these private firms are often cause for local

suspicion and tension, even as they provide much needed services not 

available from overwhelmed, inefficient, or corrupt government law

enforcement. Owing to its many well known and periodically acute 

security challenges, Lebanon in particular has seen substantial private 

security organization growth in 2006 and 2007. 

In a familiar story worldwide, the estimated 25,000 private security personnel in Lebanon nearly equal government internal security 

forces. Private security solutions established themselves in the early 

1980s in Beirut in particular, and the formal end to the civil war in 

1989 gave them further impetus as then-unemployed militia and 

Bribery of [private security] 

personnel to secure their 

silence or cooperation has 

been extremely successful...
35

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

factional fighters joined their ranks. Nevertheless, recent private security growth accompanying recent instability, war, bomb attacks and 

scares, assassination, and extreme uncertainty has been striking and 

understandable.91 It is not always clear who or what faction a private 

security company represents. As a consequence, they are regarded 

with suspicion by some and are suspected of affiliation with various

political or sectarian causes.92

This ambiguity was present in the assassination of former Lebanese 

Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in a February 2005 bombing in Beirut.

His assassination has been widely judged to be of Syrian origin with 

the likely complicity of pro-Syrian Lebanese. While this topic is too 

complex for discussion here, it was clear that Mr. Hariri’ security was 

based almost totally on private security guards and officers. A United

Nations’ fact-finding investigation concluded that the private security

protection failed in at least the due-diligence preventive dimensions of 

their duties, and the Lebanese Government and security forces were 

criticized harshly as well for their lack of support, their disingenuous 

responses, and incompetence.93 Senior pro-Syrian Lebanese security 

force officers dismissed before the assassination were detained and

questioned.94 While the United Nations drew no conclusions in this 

regard, the frequent complicity of personal security in assassinations 

in other areas of the world, the clear lack of focus and attention to 

protecting one of the most important political figures in Lebanon,

serve to exacerbate already existing distrust of government and private security.

In South Asia, Pakistan is a major center of private security firms.

While performing important public roles in infrastructure protection 

and even backing up security forces, they are looked at with considerable suspicion by government elements and portions of the population. 

One concern has been their potential penetration by jihadist groups and 

criminal acts committed to raise money for extremist goals. Karachi is 

a case in point, where in 2004 (the latest figures available) some 147

security firms with perhaps 25,000 personnel were estimated to be

present. These private security personnel are also permitted to carry 

arms. While their collective size falls a little below authorized municipal police strength of 28,000, shortfalls in police manning means that 

the private security presence exceeds that of the police on any given 

day. Some firms are registered, but Pakistani sources estimate that

there are “dozens” that are not.95
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JSOU Report 07-9

Private security criminality aimed at financial institutions has

been a particular concern with terrorist dimensions. It sparked an 

official campaign to better vet private security officers serving in banks,

money-changing operations, and even automatic teller machines 

(ATMs). While customers worried about security personnel watching as 

they conducted ATM business, the greatest law enforcement concern 

was about armed bank robberies. The aptly named “Maverick Security Agency,” headed by a retired Pakistani Army colonel, was shut 

down following an armed robbery in which the colonel fled when the

office was raided. Such robberies had led police to acknowledge that

intelligence reporting and other indications of militants infiltrating

private security forces suggest extremists were behind some thefts. 

They believe that large amounts of foreign currency stolen “may be 

used to fund subversive activities.” 96 What is thought by Pakistani 

officials to be a deliberate effort to infiltrate or form private security

agencies has led to the imposition of other administrative and oversight 

countermeasures. However, the substantial number of unlicensed 

firms—equipped with unauthorized weapons—constitutes a continuing danger to institutions and private Pakistani citizens.97

The northeast Pakistan city of Lahore—the location of thousands 

of Afghan immigrants and storied location of Rudyard Kipling’s “Great 

Game” spy novel Kim—is the center of an effort by the Pakistani law 

enforcement Special Branch to compile a database of Afghans who 

are employed or have businesses in the city. In addition to developing

a means for identifying Afghan refugees involved in a number of “robberies, kidnappings for ransom, killing for money, and smuggling 

weapons and narcotics crimes,” the police effort revealed some striking 

Figure 13. An explosion in 

the number of private security personnel such as these 

at a bank in Karachi, Pakistan 

has been generated by high 

crime and the fear of terrorism. These are the kinds of 

firms, as jihadist literature 

suggests, that may be vulnerable to compromise. Reuters 

Photo Archive, used by 

permission from Newscom.
37

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

information about the city’s private security companies surveyed. 

With the details these companies were asked to provide, the Special 

Branch determined that half of the Afghan employees were former 

jihadists who had fought in Afghanistan, albeit under unspecified

circumstances. 

Aside from whatever technical violations of Pakistani law such 

employment might mean for Afghan refugees, police concerns were 

mainly centered on the potential for terrorist/extremist mischief they 

have in the more than 5-million-person city. How well-founded such 

concerns might be is problematic—most of the 10,000 Afghan families 

remaining in Lahore have simply determined to rebuild their lives 

there and not return to the difficulties in Afghanistan. The discovery

of so many former Afghan jihadis in potentially sensitive jobs will no 

doubt result in continued police attention. In any event, it underscores 

the magnet that private security represents for those who possess 

only skills of former police, soldiers, and guerrillas, whatever their 

intentions.98

In the recent past, Indonesia has 

seen a kind of private security manifestation that has traditional roots but 

which has been affiliated with contemporary political and religious issues. 

About a decade ago, the western and 

regional media featured many articles 

on the so-called “ninja” phenomenon in parts of Indonesia—referring 

to supposed highly trained Indonesian assassins whose shadowy violence was popularly likened to that of the legendary Japanese martial 

artists. They were asserted to be in league with the military and were 

targeted to kill “black magicians” feared for their power, dissidents, or 

other enemies. The extent to which this assertion reflected reality and

Figure 14. Sensitive tasks are performed 

by Pakistani private security officers; they 

are checking vehicles for bombs prior to 

an international conference in Quetta. 

These private firms not only contribute 

to security but also pose a potential 

vulnerability. Agence France Presse, 

used by permission from Newscom.
38

JSOU Report 07-9

who the perpetrators actually were in any given case remains unclear, 

but people were brutally murdered and property destroyed. In at least 

some areas the violence served as an umbrella under which attacks 

on political or religious enemies were carried out by pseudo “ninjas.” 

This fostered, in turn, the creation of private security groups that 

also committed atrocities in the name of protecting their own communities and allies and eliminating suspected ninjas.99 In any event 

it highlighted an essentially tradition-based vigilante tradition that is 

scarcely private security in the usual understanding of the term, but 

which has had implications for current Indonesian practice. 

More recently, the issue of “private security” and police reform in 

Indonesia received more serious attention in a less exotic context, but 

one rooted in tradition. Resulting actions included the “devolution of 

authority over some police functions to civilian auxiliaries and private 

security organizations” in parts of the country.100 One study that focused 

on the islands of Bali and Lombok on the eve of the 2004 Indonesian 

elections credits this development to the rising violence following the 

end of the regime of President Suharto in 1998 and vigilante and 

militia violence of the type noted above. Private security—auxiliary 

self-protection groups—was seen as a solution. It was given further 

impetus by decisions that gave local authorities more power and 

responsibilities than in the past. Finally, the 1999 separation of the 

police from the military left the police short-handed. 

In Indonesia’s environment of turmoil and dysfunction, private 

support to law enforcement and justice fell to entities that earlier had 

exercised other responsibilities and were far from disinterested. These 

included the “pecalnag” ritual guards on Bali (affiliated with the late

Suharto’s political party) and on Lombok the “pam swakarsa” private 

armed groups under the control of traditional religious leaders (called 

tuan guru) and the political factions they support.101 Not surprisingly, 

allowing these entities on Bali, Lomok, and elsewhere in Indonesia, 

including East Timor, to exercise security functions, resulted in high 

levels of well-documented violence, brutality, and criminality. 

The affiliation of these private police auxiliaries with military, political, and religious and ethnically-based endorsers and controllers was 

complex.102 While internal Indonesian and international protests forced 

an end to official endorsement of some of these groups in some measure, the function lives on today in community auxiliary police variants 

whose affiliations remain a major source of controversy and impediment
39

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

to effective, even-handed law enforcement. The ties of some former 

pam swakarsa members to Muslim extremist groups—and in fact the 

origin of some extremist groups from pam swakarsa—adds another 

consideration for outside planners and operators when assessing the 

nature of Indonesian private or irregular security groupings.103

On the other side of the world the erupting violence in France by 

youths and others, drawn largely from the marginalized Islamic population of France’s bigger cities, preoccupied French police, security, 

and intelligence organizations increasingly over the last year. The 

violence—beginning in the fall of 2005 and relieved subsequently by 

simmering unrest and tension among business and the populace—

increased the importance of private security resources to supplement 

French local and national law enforcement. Many months before the 

worst of the riots broke out, however, French authorities in early 2005 

discovered that a corrupt security firm with personnel recruited by a

notorious jihadist was guarding many of the commercial businesses 

and entertainment facilities in the Paris area. The grave vulnerability 

such firms could pose resulted in security and guard service companies

becoming the subject of particular attention and surveillance, with 

several suspected of being infiltrated by Islamic extremists.104

The firm that created this increased awareness was established in

2004 and overseen by an individual of Algerian extraction. The company 

was particularly active in subcontracting roles for larger companies. 

While the senior Algerian manager seemed perfectly ordinary at first,

the deputy manager and personnel recruiter of the firm was readily

Figure 15. Immigrants 

clashing with French 

antiriot police near 

Paris—authorities 

worry about the more 

subtle dangers of terrorist-oriented security 

firms ostensibly formed 

to protect businesses 

from crime and unrest. 

Agence France Presse, 

used by permission 

from Newscom.
40

JSOU Report 07-9

determined to have ties to the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat”

(GSPC), which itself was associated with Al Qaeda. He had been active 

in the late 20th and early 21st century in conducting Islamic-oriented 

training around France, and at least two of the trainees had been killed 

fighting in Afghanistan. Recruits for the security company included

individuals tied to support networks for the Algerian terrorist organization, Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Taxes were never paid and employees 

were never reported, generating additional revenues (500,000 euros or 

U.S. $600,000) that were evidently used to support unspecified jihadist 

agendas. While many questions remained, the Algerian and his deputy 

were indicted. The Paris newspaper Le Monde summed up the import 

of the case well in noting that “the affair poses the problem of infiltration of the private security sector by criminals or terrorists who find

it a source of hidden revenue, an opening for secret networks, and a 

means of access to sensitive sites.” 

Conclusions

Private security organizations of the diverse types and associations 

reviewed above are located throughout the world in large numbers. 

They are particularly active in areas where government institutions are 

weak, levels of crime high, and where political and sectarian violence 

are present or threatening. These characteristics in substantial measure define the regions to which U.S. military forces and interagency

organizations and resources are likely to deploy. As with other nongovernment organizations, understanding and effectively managing 

contact or interaction with private security has become increasingly 

important. Such considerations are all the more imperative since these 

security companies are:

a. Closely involved with national and local police and security 

establishments

b. May deal directly or indirectly with criminal or hostile groups

c. Understand the local environment in much the same ways as 

official police and intelligence organizations understand it

d. Have weapons and sometimes powerful ones

e.	 May have affiliations and agendas hostile to U.S. and allied

interests

f. May have the potential for furthering stabilization and public 

safety. 
41

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

Private security is absolutely essential in many areas of the world 

where the capacity of public law enforcement and justice agencies—

whether through lack of resources, expertise, or will—are unable to 

meet the basic and specialized needs of public safely and national 

security. Private security may be inequitable in application, may not 

be available to everyone who needs it, may be flawed in execution,

and may have an almost crippling financial impact on national and

local economies required to bear the costs. But in these areas, private 

security is sometimes the only functioning security, and “protection 

businesses” provide at least pockets of security for infrastructure, 

business, and individuals that would otherwise be nonexistent. In 

one of the several countries where the police anti-kidnapping squad 

may actually be carrying out the kidnappings themselves, a reliable 

bodyguard service is worth whatever can be afforded. In short, privatized security can mean the difference between a failed state and a 

faltering one and a means of buying time for the maintenance and 

strengthening of key institutions. 

Where regulation and oversight are adequate—and where there is 

public policy consensus on appropriate roles, missions, and limits—private security can be a valuable and reliable government partner for 

enhancing public safety and increasingly important too in the fight

against international terrorism. However, private security firms have

shown themselves to be notably vulnerable to criminal and terrorist 

penetration when these conditions are not present and even sometimes 

when they are. The sheer numbers of these licensed and unlicensed 

firms in many countries--and the obscurity sometimes imposed by 

ethnic or clan silence and impenetrability—often means that even the 

most egregious kind of illegality remains invisible for thinly resourced 

government-oversight mechanisms. Concerns are not with petty theft 

and traditional kinds of crime—for example, the Japanese security 

guard caught stealing cash and beer coupons from the Ministry of 

Finance building. Rather, it is on the major kinds of ongoing abuses 

illustrated above, which have the potential for expanding and becoming so institutionalized that they are part of the fabric of a society. 

The potential and well-understood effects of criminal penetration on 

private security venues include:

a.	 Undermining citizen confidence in state institutions and the

very legitimacy of the state and leadership, where robbery, 
42

JSOU Report 07-9

extortion, kidnapping, extrajudicial murder, and other crimes 

are perpetrated with government impotence or complicity

b.	 Facilitating the traffic in arms, drugs, and other contraband

under legal or perceived legal cover

c. Weakening further public security organizations through corruption, coercion, and undermining dedication and morale

d. Providing powerful disincentives to local and national economic 

development by internal and external investors due to security 

concerns

e. Imposing even greater economic costs as individuals and 

institutions seek to overcome ineffective public and private 

protection venues

f. Discouraging alliances and international support in the face 

of enduring corruption and unreliability in portions of the 

security establishment. 

While these kinds of problems may be addressed—and in some 

cases are being slowly addressed—with focused national and international programs aimed at strengthening government institutions and 

oversight, the vulnerability of private security businesses to terrorist 

penetration may prove just as challenging, even when strong regulation 

and oversight is present. The stated jihadist intent to infiltrate such

institutions—and examples that provide models for how this might 

happen—underscore the need for law enforcement and intelligence 

attention to the recruiting, affiliations, and activities of private security

companies charged with sensitive tasks. For American interests, private security requirements in the continental United States (CONUS) 

are clear enough, if certainly challenging. They are more complex for 

foreign security companies abroad, however, as even a cursory survey 

of how the nongovernment security picture has evolved over the last 

decade indicates. Beyond CONUS, U.S. facilities, deployed forces, 

citizens, and commercial or other interests may be compromised by 

foreign security regimens in which corrupted private security businesses constitute a real vulnerability. That will make understanding 

the “private” dimension of the operational environment all the more 

critical for analysts, planners, and operators.
43

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

Endnotes

1. This emphasis is evident throughout recent overview documents (as well 

as in numerous specialized field manuals and in planning materials):

a. Capstone Concept for Special Operations 2006, United States Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) Futures Directorate, Center for 

Knowledge (MacDill Air Force Base, FL, 2007)

b. USSOCOM Posture Statement 2007, USSOCOM (MacDill Air Force 

Base, FL, 2007).

2. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Intelligence played a pioneering role in introducing into Army 

doctrinal and training approaches new visions of the “Contemporary 

Operational Environment” and its diversity of players. This work provided 

the basis and impetus for developing a futures-oriented “Joint Operational Environment” with the USSOCOM and other conceptual efforts. 

(See Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Director for Operational 

Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Experimentation Transformation and Concepts Division, Washington, DC, August 

2005.)

	 	 Additional voluminous writings, official and conceptual, now address

approaches for dealing with civil bodies and the wide spectrum of local, 

national, and international nongovernment organizations. Most recently 

for example, at the operational level, the 2006 Army and Marine Corps 

Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (FM 3-24 and 

MCWP 3-33.5 as designated respectively), Washington, DC, December 

2006 addresses the need for recognizing and interaction with the spectrum of civil and nonstate organizations encountered in virtually every 

area of operation. 

 Analogously, at the national level, The National Security Strategy of the 

United States of America, 2006, White House (Washington, DC, March 

2006), p. 6, pointed to the need for “forming creative partnerships with 

nongovernmental organizations and other civil society voices to support 

and reinforce their work.” 

3. An excellent review of U.S. Government (USG) Intelligence and nongovernment (NGO) relationships and possibilities is found in Ellen B. 

Laipson, “Can the USG and NGOs Do More? Information-Sharing in 

Conflict Zones,” available from Central Intelligence Agency Web site,

www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-tudies/studies/vol49no4/USG_NGOs_5.htm.

4. For example, Counterinsurgency, pp. 1-16 highlights a number of organizations (e.g., religious schools and mosques, political parties, NGOs, 

businesses and financial institutions, and patriotic or service organizations) that may provide active or passive support to extremists. 

5. Assessments like Angel Rabasa, et al., The Muslim World After 9/11

(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), pp. 450-467 note how 
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JSOU Report 07-9

Muslim NGOs and private institutions provide logistic, financial, and

intelligence support to insurgents and terrorists to include the use of 

criminal means.

6. For example, historian E. J. Hobsbawm’s review of “social banditry” over 

the centuries in his still pertinent study Bandits (London: Weidenfeld 

and Nicolson, 1969), pp.17-18, made this point well. While Hobsbawm 

focused principally on one form of banditry, his observations and 

arguments—together with those specialists who have agreed with or 

challenged his views—are extremely useful for assessing more modern 

forms of outlaw, guerrilla, or criminal activity.

7. For an early focused treatment of this phenomenon, see Colonel F. M. 

Lorenz, USMC, “Confronting Thievery in Somalia,” Military Review, 1994, 

pp. 46-55. For a broader examination of some of these areas around 

the world as they were developing in the early-mid 1990s, see Graham 

H. Turbiville, Jr., “The Organized Crime Dimension of Regional Conflict and Operations Other Than War,” in Ethnic Conflict and Regional 

Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions,

ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Richard H. Shultz (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), pp. 125-146. It 

offers a broader examination of some of these areas around the world 

as they were developing in the early-mid 1990s.

8. In late 2006, El Salvador had a murder rate of about 55.5 persons per 

100,000, which was twice the Latin American average. In addition, 

Guatemala (which also endured a long, violent war with insurgents) 

was also substantially above the Latin American national average with 

37.5 murders per 100,000 people. See:

a. Raúl Gutiérrez, “Central America: Harsher Measures Don’t Cut 

Crime,” Inter Press Service News Agency, 1 November 2006

b.	 James C. McKinley, Jr. with Eugene Palumbo, “In Guatemala, Officers’ Killings Echo Dirty War,” New York Times, 5 March 2007

c.		 Seth G. Jones, et al., Establishing Law and Order after Conflict,

Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005.

9. These groups range in character, size, and composition—as well as real or 

ostensible mission—from firms akin to the fictional No. 1 Ladies’ Detective Agency (see www.randomhouse.com/features/mccallsmith/books.

html) to Colombian private militias; from a “Wheat Stalker” investigative firm in western Kansas (www.kapi.org/ --“Who knows what evil 

lurks in the heart of the Great Plains”) to the paramilitary Blackwater 

Security Consulting firm (www.blackwaterusa.com/securityconsulting/) the former Sandline International (www.sandline.com/site/index.

html) closed in April 2004; or the Aegis Specialist Risk Management 

Corporation (www.aegisworld.com/) whose major intelligence activities 

in Iraq were profiled recently in Steve Fainaru and Alec Klein, “In Iraq,

A Private Realm Of Intelligence-Gathering,” Washington Post, 1 July 

2007; and many variants in between and on the periphery.
45

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

10. For a good, recent synopsis that was drawn upon here, see Paola 

Raffone, et al., “States without Security, Security without States,” 

Background Paper, Italian Center for International Perspectives (CIPI) 

and the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC), 

Brussels, Belgium, 2007, pp. 5-6. 

 See also trade organizations like Private Military.org at www.privatemilitary.org/home.html and other works to include:

a. Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 25 

July 2005)

b. P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military 

Industry, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 31 March 2004). 

11. An earlier version of this assessment was published in part in the Taylor 

& Francis journal Global Crime, Volume 7, Issue 3, August 2006 and 

is used here in accordance with provisions for authors’ institutional 

uses. It is available in its original version through Taylor & Francis at 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440570601073301. 

12. Five examples follow:

a. P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military 

Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004)

b. Robert Bunker, “Combatants or Non-Combatants? Where Private 

Military Companies Fit in Modern, Classical, and Legal Definitions,”

Journal of International Peace Operations, 2, No. 1 (July-August 

2006), pp. 17-18

c. Charles P. Nemeth, Private Security and the Law (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2004)

d. Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security

e. Thomas K. Adams, “The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of 

Conflict,” Parameters 24 (Summer 1999), pp. 103-16.

	 13.	 Most recently, allegations that Blackwater, USA fatally fired on Iraqi

civilian bystanders in a 16 September 2007 incident has generated 

a number of additional oversight measures, as well as calls for their 

withdrawal from Iraq. See “Blackwater on the Way Out,” Associated 

Press, 18 October 2007, received via www.military.com. 

14. Mikhail Falaleyev, “To What Trenches Have the Private Security Firms 

Been Called? Thousands of Private Security Firms Have Been Set Up 

in Russia,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, 10 December 2002, translated in 

CEP20021209000330.

15. LaVerle Berry, et al., “Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress (Washington, 

DC, October 2003), p. 1.
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JSOU Report 07-9

16. Inna Luk’yanov and Ol’ga Kazanskaya, “Kakiye lyudi bez okhrany, What 

Kind of People Are Without Protection?” Profil, 45 (167) November 1999, 

received from www.profile.ru (archives).

17. Falaleyev, “To What Trenches?”

18. Vedmosti, 24 September 2003. 

19. ITAR-TASS Information Agency, 2 February 2005, translated in 

CEP20050202000389. 

20. Major General Leonid Vedenov, “ChOP, the Devil Take You,” interview by 

Darya Zakharova (in Russian 10 May 2007), Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 

translated in CEP20070511025002.

21. Artyom Liss, “Chechnya’s gun-toting strongman,” BBC World News, 26 

November 2005, received via http://news.bbc.co.uk/.

22. Falaleyev, “To What Trenches?”

23. ITAR-TASS Information Agency, 11 October 2002, translated in 

CEP20021017000200.

24. Ibid.

25. Rita Mokhel, “All Stranglers Together,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 11 

January 2005, translated in CEP20050111000182. 

26. ITAR-TASS, 2 February 2005.

27. General Major Vladimir Gorshukov (MVD Deputy Chief of the Main 

Directorate for Combating Organized Crime), “Spetsnaz prikhodit po 

zayavkam” (Spetsnaz Can Be Requisitioned), interview by Il’ya Zubko

(10 November 2004), Rossiyskaya Gazeta, received from www.rg.ru/ 

(archives).

	 28.	 “Interior Minister Declares War on ‘Wrestler’ Companies,” BTA

broadcast in English 1835 GMT, 7 March 1997, translated in 

FTS19970307000876. 

29. Gabriela Stefan, “Over 1,600 Firms Coordinated by Former Securitate 

People Compete with Police, Intelligence Services,” Adevarul, 30 March 

2001, translated in EUP20010330000066.

30. The statistics were published in the Bulgarian Monitor, 15 September 

2005 and appeared originally on 15 September 2005 at www.csd.bg/

artShow.php?id=6325.

31. “The Crisis of the Secret Services,” Analyses, No. 160, 12 June 2007, 

translated in EUP20070707367001. 

32. South Eastern Europe Small Arms Clearinghouse (SEESAC), SALW 

[Small Arms and Light Weapons] and Private Security Companies in South 

Eastern Europe: A Cause or Effect of Insecurity? Belgrade: SEESAC, 

August 2005, online at www.seesac.org/reports/psc.pdf. 

33. Ibid.

	 34.	 See the Turkish newspaper recap in “Security or Mafia?” Nokta, 19 

June 2005, pp. 44-45, translated in GMP2005080702200.
47

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

35. Paul J. Vanderwood called “Bandits Into Police—and Vice Versa” in 

Disorder and Progress: Bandits, Police, and Mexican Development (Wilmington, DE: Scho1arly Resources Books, 1992), pp. 53-60.

36. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), “Mexico: State Protection 

(December 2003-March 2005),” Country of Origin Research Paper, May 

2005, received via www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/origin_e.htm. 

	 37.	 Benjamin Reames, “Police Forces in Mexico: A Profile,” Mexico Policing

Project—Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, USMEX 2003-04 Working Paper Series, La Jolla, CA, 2004, available from http://repositories.

cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=usmex .

38. U.S. Department of State, Guadalajara, Mexico: 2006 Crime and Safety 

Report, Overseas Advisory Council (Washington, DC, 20 April 2006), 

available from www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=45279.

39. See Frontera NorteSur (FNS), “More Baddies With Badges,” FNS Center 

for Latin American and Border Studies, New Mexico State University, Las 

Cruces, New Mexico, 16 October 2005. Original sources cited include 

articles from El Universal, Proceso/Apro, Frontera, and others. 

 See also FNS, “Private Security Firms Questioned as a Bloody Week 

Unfolds,” 18 September 2005, archived at www.nmsu.edu/~frontera/. 

Original sources cited by FNS include articles from Norte, El Universal, 

El Diario de Juarez, and others. 

40. The Dutch anthropologist researcher was Marije Van Lidthe de 

Jeude. 

 See Kent Patterson, “Remittances Driving Central American Economies,” 

FNS Center for Latin American and Border Studies, New Mexico State 

University, Las Cruces, New Mexico, 17 April 2006, archived at www.

nmsu.edu/~frontera/.

41. “Better PR needed to stem crime fears, U.N. aide says,” A.M. Costa Rica, 

8 July 2006, available from www.amcostarica.com/070706.htm.

42. U.S. Department of State, Honduras: Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices-2005, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (Washington, DC, 8 March 2006).

43. United States Agency for International Development, Central America 

and Mexico Gang Assessment, by Richard Loudis, et al., Bureau for 

Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, Office of Regional Sustainable

Development (Washington, DC, April 2006). 

 For earlier estimates, see:

a. Camilla Waszink, Security and Development Brief: Guatemala (Monterrey, CA: Program on Security and Development, 2000), pp. 6-7, 

online at http://sand.miis.edu/research/2000/may2000/guatebrief.

pdf.

b. U.S. Department of State, Guatemala: Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices - 2005, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor (Washington, DC, 31 March 2002)
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JSOU Report 07-9

c. Jill Replogle, “In Guatemala, a rise in vigilante justice,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 6 October 2005.

44. United States Agency for International Development, Central America and 

Mexico Gang Assessment, (Washington, DC: Bureau for Latin American 

and Caribbean Affairs, Office of Regional Sustainable Development,

April 2006).

45. See David Spencer, Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political 

Force?” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 

December 2001).

46. See two references:

a. “Hay Gata encerrada” (There is a Caged Cat), Semana, No. 1241, 27 

February-5 March 2006, available from www.semana.com.co/.

b. “Gobierno ordena desarmar en la Costa el ejército de Emilse del 

Rosario López Romero, ‘La Gata,’” (The Government Orders the 

Disarmament of the Army of Emilse del Rosario López Romero, ‘The

Cat’ in La Costa), El Tiempo, 12 November 2005, available from www.

eltiempo.com/.

47. “La seguridad privada tiene más efectivos que la Policía,” (Private Security Has Greater Effectiveness than the Police), Ultima Hora, 30 April 

2006, available from www.ultimahora.com/default.asp.

48. “Los guardias privados están mejor preparados que policías,” (The Private Guards Are Better Prepared than the Police), Ultima Hora, 5 May 

2006, available from www.ultimahora.com/default.asp.

49. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Paraguay: Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 28 February 2005).

50. “Federal Police Establish Register of Weapons Owned by Security Firms,” 

Istoe, 12 July 2006, translated in LAP20060711340001.

51. Carina Flosi, “Clandestine Security Companies Proliferate in Sao Paulo,” 

O Estado de Sao Paulo, 16 February 2005, available from www.estado.

com.br/.

52. For examples, see:

a. “Mass murder. Death squads. Roadside executions ... the truth 

about policing Brazilian-style,” The Daily Mail, 25 August 2005

b. Adhemar Altieri, “Brazil’s homeless visible through death,” BBC News, 

29 September, 2004, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/

programmes/3694092.stm. 

53. In this regard, work by scholars at the University of Wales in a program 

focused on the “Globalisation of Private Security” has been notable for 

several areas. These studies provide context as well as specifics on the

“industry” and serve as concise but valuable reference resources for 

military and security planners requiring an overview. The project and 

its work are highlighted at http://users.aber.ac.uk/rbh/privatesecurity/project.html. 
49

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

 See also Jeffrey Isima, “Regulating the Private Security Sector: An 

Imperative for Security Sector Governance in Africa,” Journal of Security Sector Management, Volume 5, No. 1, May 2007, online at www.

ssronline.org/jofssm/issues/jofssm_0501_isima.pdf?CFID=146499&

CFTOKEN=53406176.

54. Overseas Security Advisory Council, Nigeria 2007 Crime and Safety 

Report, U.S. Department of State, February 2007.

55. Mobile Police are one of several special Nigerian Police components 

with national level responsibilities. They exist in addition to numerous 

regionally assigned police components and police logistic and support 

elements.

56. Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, The Globalisation of Private 

Security—Country Report: Nigeria (Aberystwyth, Wales: Department of 

Internal Politics, University of Wales, January 2005), p. 3, online at 

http://users.aber.ac.uk/rbh/privatesecurity/country%20report-nigeria.

pdf.

57. Ibid.

58. At the same time, however, private security has been credited with providing critically needed support to the police in guarding and protecting 

people and property. This dynamic is common in many countries where 

private security has a large footprint.

59. “Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms, Small Arms Control in 

Nigeria,” International Alert, 2005, p. 5, online at www.internationalalert.org/pdfs/MISAC_NigeriaStudy.pdf. 

60. See the “Nigerian Scam Overview,” available from www.rickmcginnis.

com/scam/overview.htm, one of many sites addressing the phenomenon. 

61. Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, The Globalisation of Private 

Security—Country Report: Sierra Leone (Aberystwyth, Wales: Department 

of Internal Politics, University of Wales, January 2005), p. 5. The civil 

war involved the insurgent Revolutionary United Front (RUF) countered 

by the government and national military along with supporting regional 

and international allies to include private mercenary companies. 

62. Isima, “Regulating the Private Security Sector,” p. 6.

63. Paul Harris, “Mau Mau Returns To Kenya,” Sydney Morning Herald, 17 

January 2000.

	 64.	 Paul Salopek, “‘Madness’ in the Shantytowns,” Chicago Tribune, 28 

June 2007. 

65. See two references:

a. Isima, “Regulating the Private Security Sector,” p. 6

b. Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, The Globalisation of Private 

Security—Country Report: Kenya (Aberystwyth, Wales: Department 

of Internal Politics, University of Wales, January 2005), p. 3. 

66. “Going Up or Down?” The Economist, 7 June 2007.
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JSOU Report 07-9

67. Nation Team Nairobi, “Kenya: Mungiki - 300 Arrested As Hunt Stepped 

Up,” The Nation, 4 June 2007.

68. Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, The Globalisation of Private 

Security—Country Report: Kenya, pp. 9-10.

69. Jenny Irish, Policing for Profit: The Future of South Africa’s Private Security Industry, ed. Martin Schönteich, monograph No. 39, Institute for 

Security Studies (August 1999), available from www.iss.co.za/Pubs/

Monographs/No39/Contents.html. 

70. Abou Traore, “Private Security Firms: The Dangers Facing Ivorians,” 

Le Jour Plus, 21 March 2005, translated in AFP20050321000094.

71. M.B., “The Flourishing Security Business in Abidjan,” Le Figaro, 5 July 

2005.

72. Michel Peyrard, “Cote D’Ivoire: Fear Mounts,” Paris Match, 22 September 

2005, pp. 78-81, translated in EUP20050926029020.

73. “Cote d’Ivoire: Islamist Risk?” Jeune Afrique-L’Intelligent, 25 December 

2001-7 January 2002, translated in AFP20020105000119.

74. Jean-Dominique Geslin: “Diamond Connection,” Jeune Afrique-L’Intelligent, 

18 March 2002, pp 34-36, translated in AFP20020329000015.

75. For two of many examples, see:

a. Geslin: “Diamond Connection” 

b. Chris Zambelis, “Radical Islam in Latin America,” Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation 3, No. 23 (2 December 2005).

76. His translated remarks are found in his article:

 Yevgeniy V Malyshenko “Interaction of the Police and Private Security 

Services in Combating Terrorism: The Experience of Other Countries” 

Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS (March 1997),

available from http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/.

77. See two references:

a. ITAR-TASS, 2 February 2005

b. Nabi Abdullaev, “The Lost Lessons of Beslan,” ISN Security Watch, 

1 September 2005, available from www.isn.ch/ (in news archive).

78. Anatoliy Tsyganok, “Otdat’ truboprovody pod okhranu chastnykh 

voyennykh organizatsiy” (Put Pipelines Under the Protection of Private 

Military Organizations), Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 9 January 2006, available from http://nvo.ng.ru/ (archives). 

79. See two references:

a. “Gazprom, Transneft to protect pipelines with armed security 

forces,” AFX News Limited, 4 July 2007, available from www.cnbc.

com/id/19595601

b. “Gazprom to Form an Armed Security Force,” New York Times, 5 

July 2007. 

80. “Russia’s parliament lets Transneft, Gazprom use arms to protect 

pipelines,” Interfax, 4 July 2007, translated in CEP20070704950149.

81. For three of many examples, see:
51

Turbiville: Private Security Infrastructure Abroad 

a. Charles P. Connolly, “The Role of Private Security in Combating 

Terrorism,” Journal of Homeland Security (July 2003)

b. Andrew Morabito and Sheldon Greenberg, Engaging the Private Sector 

to Promote Homeland Security: Law Enforcement-Private Security 

Partnerships, NCJ 210678, Washington, DC, U.S. Department of 

Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (September 2005), online at 

www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210678.pdf. 

c. James Carafano and Alane Kochems, “Engaging Military Contractors 

in Counterterrorism Operations” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, ed. James J. F. Forest (Praeger Security 

International, June 2007).

82. Two examples of critiques follow:

a.		 Brock N. Meeks, “Are ‘rent-a-cops’ threatening security?” MSNBC, 9 

March 2005

b. C. J. Hetherington, “Private Security as an Essential Component of 

Homeland Security” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 

Monterey, CA June 2004).

83. Shamil Basayev died on 10 July 2006 in the explosion of a vehicle in 

Ingushetia. The circumstances surrounding the explosion are far from 

clear, but the large, possibly accidental blast killed Basayev and several fellow guerrillas. It is supposed that no insurance payment was 

forthcoming.

84. Aleksandr Khinshteyn, “15,000,000 $ dlya Basayeva” ($15,000,000 for 

Basayev), Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 20 November 1991. 

85. Luk’yanov and Kazanskaya, “What Kind of People.”

86. Igor Korolkov, “Reserve Bodies: Special Services Have Created Parallel 

Structures to Enforce Extra-Judicial Sentences,” Novaya Gazeta, 11 

January 2007, translated in CEP20070116336001.

87. Tom Hundley, “British terror probe focuses on doctors,” Chicago Tribune, 

4 July 2007 offers an early and instructive look at the issue.

88. Abu Bakr Naji, Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through 

Which the Umma Must Pass, sponsored by the John M. Olin Institute for 

Strategic Studies, Harvard University, trans. by William McCants, 23 

May 2006 , as presented by the U.S. Military Academy Counterterrorism 

Center at West Point, p. 121, online at www.ctc.usma.edu/Management_of_Savagery.pdf.

89. “Chechen and Colombian rebels said settling in Spain,” El Mundo, 28 

February 2006, translated in EUP20060301950017.

	 90.	 “Two Chechen Police Officers Arrested for Aiding Separatists,” The Caucasus Times, 21 August 2004, translated in CEP2004082200005.

91. See three examples:

a. Hadas Kroitoru, “Lebanon Seeks Private Guards for Security,” The 

Media Line, 21 March 2007, available from www.themedialine.org/

news/news_detail.asp?NewsID=17128
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b.	 Nayla Razzouk, “‘Cursed’ Lebanese endure yet another crisis,” Middle 

East Online, 25 May 2007, available from www.middle-east-online.

com/english/?id=20830

c.		 “Al-Manar Reports Increase in Number of Private ‘Security’ Companies in Lebanon,” Al-Manar Television, 18 March 2007, translated 

in GMP20070318644007. 

92. “Al-Manar Reports Increase.”

	 93.	 This fact-finding mission was known as the “Fitzgerald Report” and more

formally as “Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring 

into the causes, circumstances, and consequences of the assassination 

of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, 25 February-24 March 2005.” It

is available from www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/unhariri.htm

and many other sites.

94. “Lebanese police to question former pro-Syrian security chiefs,” Pravda.

ru, 30 August 2005, available from http://newsfromrussia.com/politics/2005/08/30/61949.html. 

95. Hasan Mansoor, “Banks cautioned to check records of private guards,” 

Daily Times (Pakistan), 25 October 2004.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Shahnawaz Khan, “Police cracks down on Afghan criminals; Intelligence 

agencies say illegal immigrants were involved in violent February 14 

riots,” Daily Times, 23 February 2006, available from www.dailytimes.

com.pk/. The group Jamaat-ul-Fuqra, with headquarters in Lahore and 

cells located primarily in North America, is reputed to have organized 

at least two private security firms in Brooklyn, New York to guard their

communities known as jamaats. These firms are supposedly able to

compete for commercial or even government security contracts. (Apparently appearing first in Christian M. Weber, “Examine Gunman’s Possible Ties to al Furqa,” Soldiers for Truth, 30 October 2002 and echoed 

in other media.) Jamaat-ul-Fuqra was formerly designated a terrorist 

organization by the U.S. State Department in the 1990s and continues 

to find its way into some terrorist listings.

99. Gerry van Klinken, “Is Indonesia too violent to be democratic?” Inside 

Indonesia, 26 October 1998.

100. “The Perils of Private Security in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali 

and Lombok,” Asia Report, No. 67, 7 November 2003, p. 1, available 

from www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2353. 

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid. 

103. Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, “The Military and Democracy in 

Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power,” Report No. MR-1599-SRF, 

RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2002, p. 85.

104. J.C., “A Security Company Employed Convicted Islamists,” Le Monde, 

27 February 2006, translated in EUP20060227029002.