In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 21, 2023

S23A0595. JACKSON v. THE STATE.

 LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Quentin Jackson was convicted of malice murder 

and related charges in connection with the shooting death of Darian 

Brewster.1 On appeal, Jackson contends that (1) the evidence was 

 1 The crimes occurred on August 20, 2016. On May 2, 2017, a Bibb 

County grand jury indicted Jackson and Benjamin Murphy for malice murder 

(Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), 

aggravated assault (Count 4), and possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a felony (Count 5). Jackson was also separately indicted for an 

additional count of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon (Count 3), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 

6), and two counts of violating the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and 

Prevention Act (Counts 7 and 8). 

Jackson was tried alone in August 2018, and the jury found him guilty 

on all counts. The trial court merged the felony murder counts (Counts 2 and 

3), the aggravated assault count (Count 4), and the possession of a firearm by 

a convicted felon count (Count 6) into the malice murder count (Count 1). 

Although the trial court merged Counts 2 and 3 into Count 1, they were 

actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372-

373 (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). The trial court also merged Count 6 into Count 

1. The State has not challenged the sentences, and we decline to exercise our 

discretion to address them. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696-698 (4) (808 
2

insufficient, (2) his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective 

assistance in several respects, and (3) the trial court erred by failing 

to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration. For the reasons that 

follow, these claims fail, and we affirm Jackson’s convictions.

Background. The evidence at trial showed that in the early 

morning hours of August 20, 2016, Brewster was shot while sitting 

in a car with two friends, Sandra Thomas Russell and Marilyn 

Odom, in the parking lot of a nightclub in Bibb County. Russell and 

Odom drove Brewster to a nearby hospital, where he died due to a 

gunshot wound to his heart.

At the hospital, Russell and Odom told Investigator David 

Patterson that they had been at the nightclub with Brewster and 

Caryn Powell. The four of them left the nightclub and walked to 

 

SE2d 696) (2017).

The trial court sentenced Jackson to serve life in prison without the 

possibility of parole on Count 1, plus five consecutive years to serve on Count 

5, 20 consecutive years to serve on Count 7, and 20 consecutive years to serve 

on Count 8. Jackson filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended 

through new counsel. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

denied the motion for new trial on December 7, 2022. Jackson filed a timely 

notice of appeal, and his case was docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term and 

submitted for a decision on the briefs.
3

Brewster’s car, although Powell lagged behind. Russell told 

Investigator Patterson that she noticed “three guys with blankets 

over their heads” while they were walking to Brewster’s car and that 

an unknown man asked Brewster for a “light” after Brewster sat 

down in the driver’s seat. Russell heard a “pop” and realized that 

Brewster had been shot. Odom told Investigator Patterson that she 

saw the man who shot Brewster, but she did not know his name.

Later that evening, Odom reached out to Investigator 

Patterson again and told him that: (1) Jackson was the person she 

saw shoot Brewster; (2) Jackson was living with his mother on 

Lynmore Avenue; and (3) on the night of shooting, Jackson was 

driving a champagne-colored Toyota SUV with a temporary car tag.

The next morning, Investigator Patterson located a champagnecolored Toyota SUV with a temporary car tag parked at Jackson’s 

mother’s house.

Pursuant to a search warrant, Investigator Patterson obtained 

Jackson’s phone records, which revealed a couple of calls to 

Christopher Finnell in the hours prior to the murder. Finnell told 
4

Investigator Patterson that Jackson and Murphy stopped by 

Finnell’s house before the murder, and Jackson asked Finnell if he 

wanted to participate in a robbery; Finnell declined. Finnell stated 

that the day after the murder, Murphy told Finnell that Jackson 

“had to burn the [man],” which Finnell understood to mean “shoot.” 

Several hours later, Jackson stopped by Finnell’s house, stating,

“You better not run your mouth.” 

At trial, Odom testified that, on the evening of August 19, 

2016—the evening before Brewster was shot—Jackson picked her

up and dropped her off to meet up with Russell and Powell to “party.” 

Eventually, the three women also met up with Brewster, a known 

drug dealer who always carried cash and was generous with his 

money. The three women and Brewster then went to the nightclub.

Odom’s testimony and the nightclub’s surveillance video, 

which was played for the jury, showed Odom, Brewster, Powell, and 

Russell enter the nightclub at 1:22 a.m. on August 20. At 1:34 a.m., 

Russell left the nightclub when she received a phone call, and she 

was seen holding her phone up to her ear as she was leaving. At 1:38 
5

a.m., Brewster, Powell, and Odom left the nightclub.

After leaving the nightclub, Powell saw Murphy in the parking 

lot and stopped to talk to him. Powell and Murphy both testified that 

they had a brief chat and that Murphy was wearing rubber boots.

Odom and Russell testified that they walked with Brewster to 

his car. Odom noticed Jackson’s champagne-colored Toyota SUV and 

saw Jackson on the side of the building “acting like he was using the 

bathroom.” Jackson said to the group, “[H]ey, how y’all doing,” and 

Brewster responded, “I’m good.” Brewster, Russell, and Odom 

walked to Brewster’s car, got in, and waited for Powell. Odom 

testified that, while they were sitting in Brewster’s car, Jackson 

walked up to the driver-side door and asked Brewster for a lighter. 

In contrast, Russell testified that, before they got into the car, an 

unknown person asked Brewster for a cigarette and this person was 

part of a group of two or three people in the parking lot, who were 

wearing “dark gray and black robe[s] like head to toe.”

Odom testified that, after Jackson asked for a lighter, Jackson 

shot Brewster. Murphy also testified that he witnessed Jackson lean
6

into the car and shoot Brewster. Russell testified that an unknown

person opened Brewster’s car door and “a gun went off.” Powell 

testified that she saw “a figure coming,” “heard a pop,” Brewster’s 

car drove off, and she was left in the parking lot.

According to Odom, after she and Russell took Brewster to the 

hospital, Russell told her, “[T]ake this car somewhere and go 

through the car, I know [Brewster] got more money somewhere in 

the car.” However, Odom said she simply parked the car and did not 

search it. Odom also testified that, after she and Russell left the 

hospital, Russell asked Odom if she saw who shot Brewster, and 

Odom stated it was Jackson. Russell responded, “Don’t you ever say 

his name, I don’t want to hear you say his name.” Russell then called 

Jackson and asked, “[B]aby, was you downtown?” Jackson asked,

“Why?” and Russell responded, “[Odom] said she seen you.” Russell 

then placed Jackson on speaker phone, and Jackson said to Odom, 

“[L]isten here, you fat [b**ch], if you go to them [] folks and say my 

name, I know where your fat [b**ch] stay at.” Odom also testified

that Russell told her “to say three guys with some rubber boots on” 
7

shot Brewster.2

Lakeshia Ford testified that the day after the shooting she was 

at a social gathering and “it was said that [Jackson] was the shooter 

that killed [Brewster].” Ford looked over to Jackson and Russell, 

who were also at the gathering, and rolled her eyes. Jackson hit Ford 

in the face, telling her “to keep [her] mouth shut, b**ch.”3 During 

the trial, the State presented a recording of a phone call made by 

Jackson to Russell, during which Jackson asked Russell why she 

was “hanging around with [Ford]” and later said, “I need [Ford] . . . 

to say she put everything in [Odom’s] head.” Russell responded that 

she would speak with Ford and record it.

Additionally, Finnell testified that, after Jackson was arrested, 

Finnell was arrested on unrelated charges, and while he was in 

custody, he was attacked by Jackson.

Finally, Murphy testified that Jackson was associated with the

 2 During Russell’s testimony, she admitted that she called Jackson after 

she left the hospital, but she denied that she told Jackson about what, if 

anything, Odom saw and denied that Jackson threatened Odom.

3 At trial, Russell denied that she was present when this was alleged to 

have occurred.
8

Gangster Disciples street gang and Brewster was associated with 

the Crips street gang. Additionally, the State presented the 

testimony of Investigator Cedric Penson, who was admitted as an 

expert in criminal street gang activity. Investigator Penson testified 

that the Crips and Gangster Disciples are rival street gangs in Bibb 

County. For symbols, the Gangster Disciples used a pitchfork, the 

number 74, and the Star of David. Investigator Penson reviewed 

Jackson’s tattoos and testified that Jackson had several tattoos 

depicting the Star of David and the number 74. Jackson also had a 

tattoo depicting tall buildings with the words “GDHQ” written on it. 

Investigator Penson testified that “GDHQ” meant “Gangster 

Disciples Headquarters” and the tall buildings symbolized Chicago, 

where the Gangster Disciples was founded.

Investigator Penson also testified that, based on phone records,

Jackson appeared to have an association with three other members 

of the Gangster Disciples, including the leader of the Blac Team, a 

division of the Gangster Disciples. He further testified that Brewster 

was associated with the Crips and that he had noticed a trend of 
9

gang-affiliated drug dealers getting robbed and that some of these

robberies were committed by rival gang members because 

committing a violent crime “increase[d] their status” within the 

gang.

1. Jackson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion 

for new trial because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient 

to support his convictions. We disagree.

Evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction 

if, “‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Munn v. State, 

313 Ga. 716, 720 (1) (873 SE2d 166) (2022) (quoting Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) 

(1979)). “This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in 

testimony but rather defers to the jury’s assessment of the weight 

and credibility of the evidence.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 692, 695 (878 

SE2d 502) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) The evidence was sufficient to support the malice murder 
10

and firearm convictions.

The evidence summarized above, including the testimony of 

two witnesses who saw Jackson shoot Brewster, was sufficient to 

authorize the jury to find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 

of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission 

of a felony.

(b) The evidence was also sufficient to support the convictions

for violating the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act 

(the “Gang Act”).

Jackson was convicted of violating the Gang Act by 

participating in criminal gang activity through the commission of 

the murder of Brewster while “associated with Gangster Disciples, 

a criminal street gang.” Jackson was also convicted of violating the 

Gang Act by participating in criminal gang activity through the 

commission of “the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon . . . by having in his possession . . . a firearm after having been 

convicted of the felony crime of aggravated assault” while 

“associated with Gangster Disciples, a criminal street gang.” See 
11

OCGA §§ 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed 

by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate 

in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense 

enumerated in [paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3”); 16-15-3 (1) 

(J) (enumerated offenses include any criminal offense that involves 

violence or the use of a weapon). To convict Jackson, the State had 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Jackson was associated 

with the Gangster Disciples; (2) the Gangster Disciples was a 

“criminal street gang;” (3) Jackson committed the predicate acts of 

murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and (4) the 

commission of those offenses was intended to further the interests 

of the Gangster Disciples. See Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 706, 709 (1) 

(b) (832 SE2d 809) (2019).

Regarding the first two elements, Murphy testified that 

Jackson was a member of the Gangster Disciples, and Investigator 

Penson testified that Jackson had several tattoos signifying the 

Gangster Disciples. See OCGA § 16-15-3 (3) (existence of a gang 

“may be established by evidence of a common name or common 
12

identifying signs, symbols, tattoos, graffiti, or attire or other 

distinguishing characteristics”). Investigator Penson further

testified that the Gangster Disciples was a criminal street gang, had 

at least three members, and the gang had committed violent crimes, 

including aggravated assault and murder. See OCGA § 16-15-3 (3) 

(defining a “criminal street gang” as “any organization, association, 

or group of three or more persons associated in fact, whether formal 

or informal, which engages in criminal gang activity”).

Regarding the third element, as stated in Division 1 (a), the 

evidence authorized a finding that Jackson shot at and killed 

Brewster, establishing that he committed the predicate offense of 

murder. Additionally, the State presented evidence, as discussed in 

Division 2 (b) below, that Jackson was a convicted felon. Thus, the 

evidence authorized a finding that Jackson possessed a firearm 

while he was a convicted felon, establishing that he committed the 

predicate offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Regarding the fourth element, the evidence showed that 

Brewster was a drug dealer and a member of a rival gang, the Crips. 
13

Investigator Penson testified that gang-affiliated drug dealers were 

getting robbed and that these robberies were committed by rival 

gang members because committing a violent crime “increase[d] their 

status” within the gang. From this evidence, the jury was authorized 

to conclude that Jackson shot and killed Brewster in furtherance of 

the interests of the Gangster Disciples because he killed a rival 

gang-affiliated drug dealer. See Jackson, 306 Ga. at 709-710 (1) (b) 

(affirming convictions for violation of the Gang Act where the 

evidence showed, among other things, that the victim was a member 

of a rival gang). Based on this evidence, the jury was authorized to 

convict Jackson of the violations of the Gang Act for which he was 

charged (Counts 7 and 8).

2. Jackson contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally 

ineffective assistance by (a) failing to object to other-acts evidence 

under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) and failing to request a 

limiting instruction and (b) failing to stipulate that Jackson was a 

convicted felon. These claims fail.

To prevail on these claims, Jackson must demonstrate both 
14

that his trial counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and 

that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v. 

State, 313 Ga. 57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022) (citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) 

(1984)). To establish deficient performance, Jackson must show that 

trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable 

way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing 

professional norms. See id. Establishing deficient performance

is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong 

presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [the 

appellant] bears the burden of overcoming this 

presumption. To carry this burden, he must show that no 

reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, 

or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In 

particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy 

may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if 

they were so patently unreasonable that no competent 

attorney would have followed such a course.

Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 740-741 (879 SE2d 400) (2022) (citation 

and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Jackson must 

prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial 

counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. 
15

See Bates, 313 Ga. at 62 (2). “A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

(citation and punctuation omitted). “And, this burden is a heavy 

one.” Id. at 62-63 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If an 

appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of 

the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine 

the other prong.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d 

346) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). “This Court accepts 

a trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations on an 

ineffectiveness claim unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply 

legal principles to the facts de novo.” Bonner v. State, 314 Ga. 472, 

474 (1) (877 SE2d 588) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) Jackson contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to Ford’s testimony about 

Jackson hitting her and threatening her on the day after the murder

and by failing to request a limiting instruction. We conclude that 

trial counsel did not perform deficiently.

In Jackson’s view, counsel should have filed a motion to exclude 
16

Ford’s testimony under Rule 404 (b) and OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 

403”) because it was “unduly prejudicial” and “offered simply to 

suggest propensity.” Because the evidence was properly admitted as 

intrinsic evidence, we need not address its potential admission as 

extrinsic evidence under Rule 404 (b). See Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 

19, 24 (3) (860 SE2d 509) (2021) (holding that Rule 404 (b) is not 

applicable to intrinsic evidence). 

Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is an 

uncharged offense that arises from the same transaction or series of 

transactions as the charged offense, is necessary to complete the 

story of the crime, or is inextricably intertwined with the evidence 

regarding the charged offense. See Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 

485 (IV) (d) (807 SE2d 350) (2017). Evidence may be intrinsic if it 

“pertain[s] to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and 

set-up of the crime” and “is linked in time and circumstances with 

the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an 

account of the crime.” See Heade, 312 Ga. at 25 (3) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). 
17

Here, Ford testified that the day after the shooting she was at 

a social gathering and “it was said that [Jackson] was the shooter 

that killed [Brewster].” Ford looked over to Jackson and Russell, 

who were also at the gathering, and rolled her eyes. Jackson hit Ford 

in the face, telling her “to keep [her] mouth shut, b**ch.” After 

Jackson was arrested, he called Russell, asked her why she was 

“hanging around with [Ford]” and later said, “I need [Ford] . . . to 

say she put everything in [Odom’s] head.” Russell responded that 

she would speak to Ford and record her.

Ford’s testimony regarding Jackson’s assault of Ford and 

threat that she “keep [her] mouth shut” was evidence of an 

uncharged offense, i.e., aggravated assault or battery, arising from 

the same transaction as Brewster’s murder. Ford’s testimony 

showed Jackson’s attempt to hide his involvement in Brewster’s

murder and explained why Jackson suggested Ford as a person who 

could “say she put everything in [an eyewitness’s] head,” i.e., he had 

already threatened her. Thus, Ford’s testimony was admissible as 

intrinsic evidence. See West v. State, 305 Ga. 467, 473 (2) n.6 (826 
18

SE2d 64) (2019) (where an attempt to influence a witness is an 

uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of 

transactions as the charged offense it would be properly treated as 

intrinsic evidence and thus not subject to the limitations and 

prohibition on other acts evidence set out in Rule 404 (b)). 

But intrinsic evidence must still satisfy Rule 403. See 

Williams, 302 Ga. at 360 (IV) (d). Under Rule 403, “[r]elevant 

evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Wilson 

v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 738 (8) (a) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). “[I]nculpatory evidence is inherently 

prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 

probative value that Rule 403 permits exclusion.” Early v. State, 313 

Ga. 667, 671 (872 SE2d 705) (2022) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). “The prejudicial effect of evidence is unfair if the evidence 

has the capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a 

ground different from proof specific to the offense charged, or an 

undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, 
19

though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Wilson, 315 Ga. at 738

(8) (a).

Here, Ford’s testimony showed that Jackson used the threat of 

force to dissociate his name from Brewster’s murder. Evidence that 

Jackson tried to conceal his part in the murder was obviously 

probative of his guilt. See Richardson v. State, 308 Ga. 70, 72 (3) 

(838 SE2d 759) (2020) (reasoning that the defendant’s “attempt to 

conceal his involvement in the crimes was evidence of his guilt”). 

The probative value of this evidence was very high, and whatever 

unfair prejudice may have arisen from it did not substantially 

outweigh the high probative value. See Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247, 

261 (2) (b) (869 SE2d 447) (2022) (concluding the probative value of 

the prior witness-intimidation evidence was not substantially 

outweighed by unfair prejudice). 

Accordingly, trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing 

to file a motion to exclude Ford’s testimony under Rule 404 (b) and 

by failing to seek a corresponding limiting instruction because such 

actions would have been meritless, and this claim fails. See Williams 
20

v. State, 315 Ga. 797, 806 (2) (884 SE2d 877) (2023) (trial counsel’s 

failure to file a meritless motion is not deficient performance).

(b) Jackson contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally 

ineffective assistance by failing to stipulate that Jackson was a 

convicted felon. Assuming without deciding that Jackson’s trial 

counsel performed deficiently, we conclude Jackson was not 

prejudiced by the introduction of his prior convictions.

Jackson was indicted for felony murder predicated on 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3), possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6), and violating the Georgia 

Gang Act predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon 

(Count 8). The indictment identified the predicate felony conviction 

as aggravated assault in Counts 6 and 8, but not in Count 3.4

At trial, the State tendered Exhibit 49 as evidence of Jackson’s 

convicted-felon status, and it was admitted without objection. In 

 4 Jackson does not raise any claim regarding Count 3, which accuses 

Jackson of committing felony murder while in the commission of possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon, without identifying the specific felony of which 

he was convicted.
21

presenting Exhibit 49, the prosecutor stated it was a “felony 

conviction for [Jackson] . . . for aggravated assault.” Exhibit 49 

included a certified copy of Jackson’s 2007 indictment for aggravated 

assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, 

and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, predicated on a 

felony conviction for possession of cocaine. Exhibit 49 also included 

a copy of Jackson’s sentence, which stated that the counts of 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were nolle prossed. The 

State did not present any details concerning the aggravated assault 

conviction or other indicted charges, and in closing argument, the 

State only referenced Jackson’s aggravated assault conviction in 

relation to the charges concerning possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon. Jackson argues his trial counsel’s failure to stipulate 

to his convicted-felon status prejudiced him because the jury learned 

of his convictions for aggravated assault, possession of cocaine, and 
22

possession of a firearm.5

“A defendant may be prejudiced by the admission of a prior 

conviction into evidence when the prior conviction is of the nature 

likely to inflame the jury’s passions and raise the risk of a conviction 

based on improper considerations.” Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 28 (4) 

(a) (880 SE2d 158) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). And 

“this Court has held that even violent crimes, crimes involving 

firearms, and drug offenses were not likely to inflame the jury’s 

passions in murder cases.” Parker v. State, 309 Ga. 736, 745 (5) (848 

SE2d 117) (2020).

Here, Jackson has not shown that informing the jury that he 

had been convicted of aggravated assault and that he had been 

charged with—but not convicted of—possession of a firearm during 

the commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, predicated on a felony conviction for possession of cocaine,

 5 However, as noted above, Jackson was indicted in 2007 for possession 

of a firearm during the commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by 

a convicted felon, with the predicate felony being possession of cocaine, Exhibit 

49 is clear that Jackson was only convicted of aggravated assault and not of 

the firearms charges.
23

likely inflamed the passions of the jury, particularly in the light of 

the nature of the charges and evidence against him. The evidence 

against Jackson was strong. Two eyewitnesses identified Jackson as 

the person who shot Brewster. One eyewitness also identified the 

vehicle, i.e., a champagne-colored SUV with a temporary car tag, 

that Jackson drove on the night of the shooting; this vehicle was in 

the parking lot when Brewster was shot and was located at 

Jackson’s mother’s house the next day. Further, three people 

testified that Jackson threatened them to prevent them from 

speaking about the murder. Additionally, as noted above, the 

aggravated assault conviction was identified only twice in passing, 

i.e., once when Exhibit 49 was introduced and once during closing 

argument. The prosecutor did not emphasize the nature of the 

aggravated assault conviction and never mentioned that Jackson 

was also charged with possession of a firearm during the commission 

of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 

predicated on a felony conviction for possession of cocaine.

Because the evidence against Jackson was strong and the 
24

prosecutor did not emphasize the defendant’s felony conviction when 

it was admitted into evidence or during closing argument, see 

Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 749 (8) (d) (864 SE2d 85) (2021), we 

conclude that even if Jackson’s counsel was deficient for failing to 

stipulate to his convicted-felon status, Jackson has failed to show 

that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial 

would have been different. See Willis, 315 Ga. at 28-29 (4) (a) (in a 

murder case, defendant not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to 

stipulate to convicted-felon status, because evidence of guilt was 

strong and jury’s passions were unlikely to be inflamed by prior 

conviction for possession of cocaine); Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 

252-53 (6) (a), (773 SE2d 254) (2015) (same, with past convictions 

for aggravated assault and burglary with intent to commit 

aggravated assault); Bentley v. State, 307 Ga. 1, 8 (2) (834 SE2d 549) 

(2019) (same, with past convictions for rape and incest, mentioning 

that “[t]he names and nature of the earlier convictions were not 

emphasized by the State”). Accordingly, Jackson’s ineffectiveness 

claim fails.
25

(c) Finally, Jackson contends that his trial counsel provided 

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to request an 

accomplice-corroboration instruction with respect to Murphy’s 

testimony.

We note that in his appellate brief, Jackson asserts that trial 

counsel’s failure to request an accomplice-corroboration instruction 

was deficient, but he does not explain how counsel’s deficiency was 

prejudicial. And “[i]t is well established that the burden is on the 

party alleging error to show it by the record.” Sillah v. State, 315 Ga. 

741, 751 (3) (883 SE2d 756) (2023) (citation and punctuation 

omitted). Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that Jackson’s 

counsel performed deficiently, we conclude that Jackson has not 

established that he was prejudiced.

OCGA § 24-14-8 provides in pertinent part that “[t]he 

testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a 

fact. However, in . . . felony cases where the only witness is an 

accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient.” 

“Where accomplice testimony is the bedrock of the conviction, it may 
26

be likely that the jury convicted the defendant on the accomplice’s 

testimony alone.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 326 (1) (877 SE2d 202) 

(2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, the most incriminating evidence against Jackson did not 

come from Murphy—it came from Odom. Odom told police that 

Jackson shot Brewster, described the SUV he was driving the night 

of the murder, and that the SUV could be located at Jackson’s 

mother’s house, which is where it was found the next day. Odom also 

stated that Jackson threatened her after Jackson learned that Odom 

witnessed the shooting. Additionally, Finnell testified that Jackson 

and Murphy stopped by Finnell’s house prior to the murder and 

asked him about committing a robbery. The day after the murder, 

Jackson threatened Finnell to keep him from speaking with police, 

and Murphy admitted to Finnell that Jackson shot someone. While 

Murphy testified that he witnessed Jackson shoot Brewster, he 

denied any involvement in the shooting, and he specifically denied 

speaking to Finnell about it before or after it occurred. 

Due to the extensive corroboration of Murphy’s limited 
27

testimony and the other significant independent evidence of 

Jackson’s guilt, there is not a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s alleged deficiency, the outcome of the trial would have been 

different. Thus, Jackson has failed to show prejudice, and this claim 

fails. See Payne, 314 Ga. at 329 (3) (a) (concluding that the defendant 

failed to show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to request 

an accomplice-instruction because “some of the most incriminating 

testimony came from witnesses who could not reasonably be 

considered accomplices in the murder” and the accomplice’s 

testimony was corroborated by those witnesses or other evidence).

3. In a related claim, Jackson contends that the trial court 

plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on accomplice 

corroboration. Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred 

by failing to give the instruction, we conclude Jackson failed to show 

that it likely affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.6

Because Jackson’s trial counsel did not object to the omission 

 6 Similar to our note in Division 2 (c), we note that Jackson does not does 

not explain how the trial court’s failure to give the accomplice-corroboration 

instruction likely affected the outcome of his trial.
28

of the accomplice-corroboration instruction, we review the trialcourt-error claim for plain error only. “To show plain error, an 

appellant must show that (1) the alleged error was not affirmatively 

waived, (2) it was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and (3) it 

affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which ordinarily means 

showing that it affected the outcome of the trial.” Willis, 315 Ga. at

26 (3) (b). “This Court does not have to analyze all elements of the 

plain-error test where an appellant fails to establish one of them.” 

Payne, 314 Ga. at 325 (1). 

This Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain-error 

standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. See Payne, 314 Ga. at 329 (3) (a). Thus, even if we 

assume that the trial court erred in not giving an accomplicecorroboration instruction, Jackson has not shown that this assumed 

error likely affected the outcome of the proceedings for the reasons 

explained in Division 2 (c). See Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 490, 497 

(883 SE2d 733) (2023) (concluding that the defendant failed to show

plain error when “all of the material facts from [the accomplice’s] 
29

testimony were independently corroborated by other witnesses and 

evidence, such that [the accomplice’s] testimony was cumulative of 

other evidence properly admitted at trial”).

4. Finally, because we (a) assumed deficiency in Division 2 (b) 

relating to trial counsel’s failure to stipulate to Jackson’s status as 

a convicted felon, (b) assumed deficiency in Division 2 (c) relating to 

trial counsel’s failure to request an accomplice-corroboration 

instruction, and (c) assumed error in Division 3 relating to the trial 

court’s failure to give an accomplice-corroboration instruction, we 

consider whether the cumulative prejudicial impact of these 

admissions requires a new trial. “Under State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 

(838 SE2d 808) (2020), we must ‘consider collectively the prejudicial 

effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the prejudice caused by 

any deficient performance of counsel.’” Talley v. State, 314 Ga. 153, 

165-166 (4) (875 SE2d 789) (2022). To establish cumulative error, 

Jackson must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in 

the course of the trial; and (2) considered together along with the 

entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation 
30

that they denied Jackson a fundamentally fair trial. See Flood v. 

State, 311 Ga. 800, 808 (2) (d) (860 SE2d 731) (2021). Given our 

conclusions above and assuming without deciding that the 

evidentiary error and the instructional error could be aggregated for 

cumulative-error review,7 we conclude Jackson has failed to 

establish that the combined prejudicial effect of these errors require 

a new trial. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 617 (5) n.9 (878 SE2d 

505) (2022).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. 

 7 As we have said, 

Lane involved only evidentiary issues, which usually are easily 

cumulated. Lane, 308 Ga. at 17 (1). We made explicit in Lane that 

“[s]ome other types of error may not allow aggregation by their 

nature, but that question is not presented here.” Id. 

Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 617 (5) n.9 (878 SE2d 505) (2022).