February 10, 1989 

Honorable Donald M. Keith Opinion Wo. JM-1015 

Criminal District Attorney 

Polk County Courthouse Re: Validity under article 

Livingston, Texas 77351 VIII, section 14, of the Texas 

Constitution, of section 6.30 

of the Tax Code (RQ-1479) 

Dear Mr. Keith: 

you ask the following question: 

Does section 6.30 of the Texas Property Tax 

Code violate article VIII, section 14, of the 

Texas Constitution insofar as it attempts to 

ascribe duties incident to tax collections to 

persons other than the County Tax AssessorCollector? 

Section 6.30 of the Tax Code provides as follows: 

(a) The county attorney or, if there is no 

county attorney, the district attorney shall 

represent the county to enforce the collection 

of delinquent taxes if the commissioners court 

does not contract with a private attorney as 

provided by Subsection (c) of this section. 

(b) [applies to taxing unit other than a 

county] 

(c) The governing body of a taxing unit 

may contract with any competent attorney to 

represent the unit to enforce the collection 

of delinquent taxes. . . . 

(d) [repealed] 

(e) A contract with an attorney that does 

not conform to the requirements of this section is void. 

Section 6.30 pertains to representation of the county 

in enforcing delinquent tax collections. It provides no 

p. 5240 
Honorable Donald M. Keith - Page 2 (JM-1015) 

role for the county tax assessor-collector, and for this 

reason, you wish to know whether it violates article VIII, 

section 14, of the Texas Constitution. This constitutional 

provision reads as follows: 

Except as provided in Section 16 of this 

Article, there shall be elected by the 

qualified voters of each county, an Assessor 

and Collector of Taxes, who shall hold his 

office for four years and until his successor 

is elected and qualified; and Such Assessor. 

ani2 Collector of Taxes shall all the 

uties with resnect to assessj,Ba nrouertv for 

ose of taxation and of collectinq 

taxes. as mav b or cribed bv the Leaislaw.1 (BmphasTs adizd.) 

Tex. Const. art. VIII, S 14. 

The offices of tax assessor and tax collector were 

formerly separate offices established respectively by 

sections 14 and 16 of article VIII. H.J.R. NO. 21, Acts 

1931, 42d Leg., at 942; Acts 1933, 43d Leg. at xix. In 1932 

these constitutional provisions were amended to consolidate 

the two offices into a single office of tax assessorcollector. The same amendment added the underlined clause 

to article VIII, section 14. & 

The commissioners court had statutory authority to 

contract for attorneys to enforce delinquent tax collections 

before the 1932 amendment consolidated the tax collector's 

and tax assessor's offices. See Acts 1923, 38th Leg., 3d 

C.S., ch. 13, at 31; Acts 1923, 38th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 35, 

at 78 (enacting predecessor of section 6.30 of Tax Code, 

formerly codified as article 7335, V.T.C.S. (Vernon 1960)). 

Judicial discussions of the relative powers of the commissioners court and the constitutional tax collector in 

collecting delinquent taxes provide some insight into which 

tax collection functions the legislature could at that time 

allocate to other officers. See aenerallv Attorney General 

Opinion JR-911 (1988) at 17 ("core functionsn of county 

1. The second clause of article VIII, section 14 

should be read as if it stated: Hall duties with respect to 

assessing property . . . and to collecting taxes, as may be 

prescribed by the Legislature." G. Braden, The 

d Comoarativq 

m, 638 (1977). 
Honorable Donald M. Keith - Page 3 (JM-1015) 

treasurer's office): Attorney General Opinion JW-833 (1987) 

(county tax assessor-collector). 

In &J& Countv v. Maloney, 38 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. 

APP. - Texarkana 1931, writ ref'd), the court stated that 

the tax collector*8 statutory authority to receive and 

collect taxes meant that he was "to demand and enforce in 

the ordinary way" the payment of taxes on the assessmt;: 

roll, but he did not have exclusive authority over 

collection of delinquent taxes. 38 S.W.Zd at 871. The 

commissioners court had authority to employ other persons to 

assist in enforcing the collection of delinquent taxes. & 

In upholding a provision of former article 7335, 

V.T.C.S., which authorized the commissioners court to Vw 

for an abstract of property assessed or unknown and unrendered" from the taxes, interest and penalty collected on 

such lands, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the view of the 

Court of Civil Appeals that all duties regarding the collection of delinquent taxes were vested by the constitution 

in a constitutional officer. Cherokee Countv v. Odom, 15 

S.W.Zd 538 (Tex. 1929). The Supreme Court quoted the 

following statement made by the court below: 

The Constitution provides for the election 

of a tax assessor in each county. . . . The 

Constitution has also provided forthe election of a tax collector in each county, to 

whom is committed the duty of performing all 

the duties, gther than those involved in 

al nroceedinas, which are necessary in 

the collection of taxes. It has likewise 

provided for the election of county and 

district attorneys, whose duty it is to 

represent the state and county in filing and 

prosecuting suits necessary for the collection of delinquent taxes. (Emphasis added.) 

15 S.W.Zd at 540 (guoting aerokee County v. Odom, 297 S.W. 

1055 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1927), m 15 S.W.2d 530 

(Tex. 1929)). The Supreme Court disagreed 'with the lower 

court, stating the the duty,of "performing these arduous, 

laborious, and technical services for a county" is not 

placed by the constitution or the statutes upon the county 

tax assessor, the county tax collector, the county or 

district attorney, or any other officer of government. Id. 

at 541. 

Of particular interest in addressing your question is 

the lower court*s exclusion of duties involved in judicial 

proceedings from the tax collector*8 area of responsibility. 

p. 5242 
Honorable Donald Al. Keith - Page 4 (JW-1015) 

Although that court believed that a broad range of tax collection functions may be performed only by the county tax 

collector, it did not include duties involving judicial 

proceedings among his constitutionally mandated duties. 

Section 6.30 of the Tax Code concerns the legal representation of the county by an attorney in enforcing the collection of delinquent taxes, u, tax collection duties which 

may involve judicial p;;eedings. &=R wn v. Earne 8 t , 

34 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. . ALP. - San Antonio 1930, writ 

dism'd) (attorney could be compensated for collecting 

delinquent taxes even though he did not bring suit therefor). 

The 1932 amendment to article VIII, section 14, of the 

Texas Constitution was submitted to the voters under the 

following ballot proposition: 

'For amendment to the Constitution of the 

State of Texas, combining into one office of 

Assessor and Collector of Taxes, the offices 

of Assessor and Tax Collector*: and . . . 

*Against the amendment to the Constitution of 

the State of Texas, combining into one office 

of assessor and collector of taxes, the 

offices of assessor and tax collector.# 

H.J.R. No. 21, Acts 1931, 426 Leg., f 3, at 943. Thus, 

according to the ballot proposition and also the caption to 

the resolution proposing the amendment, the reason for 

adopting this provision was to consolidate the offices. 

Neither the caption nor the ballot proposition mentioned 

the clause stating that the tax assessor-collector "shall 

perform all the duties with respect to assessing prope*y . . . and of [sic] collecting taxes as may be 

prescribed by the I.egis1ature.w 

This clause may only have been intended to mean that 

the new tax assessor-collector would perform all the duties 

formerly performed by the two separate officers, even if the 

statutes placed such duties on the "tax assessor'* or the 

"tax collector.n Duties with respect to tax assessment and 

tax collection had in the past been prescribed by the 

legislature and would still be prescribed by the legislature. The added clause is not the basis of any limits on 

the legislature*8 power to change "core functions" of 

the tax assessor-collector; these limits already existed 

with respect to the separate offices and after 1932 applied 

to the combined office of tax-assessor collector. See 

fissouri. K. & T. Rv. Co. of Tevas v. Shannon 100 S.W. 138 

142 (Tex. 1907). The explicit statement 'that the tak 

assessor-collector "shall perform all the dutiesw with 

p. 5243 
Honorable Donald W. Keith - Page 5 (JM-1015) 

respect to tax assessment and collection in effect codifies 

the view that the constitution delegates a certain body of 

tax assessment and tax collection functions to the county 

tax assessor-collector so that the legislature may not 

delegate them by statute to other persons. Green 

Stewart, 516 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1974); AttoEy 

V. 

General 

Opinion JW-833 (1987); Letter Advisory No. 117 (1976): S&Z 

v. Galveston Countv Central Dist&& 

713 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1986) (discussing article VIII, sectio;l 

18, of Texas Constitution, which mandates single appraisal 

and single board of equalization in each county). 

Neither the legislature nor the courts treated the 1932 

amendment as repealing existing law on contracts for 

delinquent tax collections or otherwise radically changing 

the legislature's power to define tax assessment and 

collection duties. The first legislative session to meet 

after the amendment was approved by the voters adopted the 

following provision to implement it: 

Hereafter, whenever the words *Assessor,* 

*Assessor of Taxes,* 'Collector,* 'Collector 

of Taxes,* or 'Tax Collector' are used, 

either in Articles 7181 to 7359 . . . as well 

as the Revised Code of 192.5 . .' . same shall 

be applicable to and mean the one office or 

officer of Assessor and Collector of Taxes, 

and shall be so construed as to accomplish 

the object and intent and carry out the 

purpose of Sections 14 and 16 of Article 8, 

of the Texas Constitution, as the same was 

amended on November 8, 1932. 

Acts 1933, 436 Leg., ch. 197, 5 5, at 600 (codified as 

V.T.C.S. art. 7181a (1925), repealed by Acts 1979, 66th 

Leg., ch. 841, 5 6(a)(l), at 2329). In determining the 

meaning of a constitutional provision, a court will give 

weight to a legislative construction, particularly to a 

contemporaneous construction which has been acquiesced in 

and adhered to for a long period of time. Director of 

nt v. P&tina Indus 

P80): we8 Ass~, 600 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. mer v. Bal& 

196 S.W.Zd 324 (Tex. 1946). 

In 1938, the Texas Supreme Court, in holding a 1937 

county contract for collection of delinquent taxes invalid 

because it was not approved by the comptroller and the 

attorney general as required by statute, stated as follows: 

The Legislature has the sole power to 

provide for the collection of delinquent 

p. 5244 
Honorable Donald H. Keith - Page 6 (JM-1015) 

taxes and to fix the compensation to be paid 

for such services. It is also true that the 

commissioners~ courts derive their power to 

execute contracts with respect to the 

collection of delinquent taxes exclusively 

from the statutes. -mterwood v. Ii- 

$&!,&y, Tex. Corn. App., 62 S.W.Zd 65. 

White v. McGm, 114 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tax. 1938). Neither 

the parties nor the court raised any question as to the 

validity of the statute under article VIII, section 14. 

Nonetheless, the court's unqualified statement about the 

legislature's power and its citation of Fasterwood v. 

Henderson, 62 S.W.Zd 65 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, 

judgmt. adopted), a case involving a pre-1932 contract for 

delinquent tax collections, suggest that no such constitutional issue even vaguely troubled the court. 

In Pritchard & Abbott v. MclQhh& 350 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 

1961), the Supreme Court determined that the commissioners 

court had implied authority to contract for the appraisal of 

all properties in the county to assist .it in carrying out 

its duties as a board of equalization for the county. In 

upholding the contract the court rejected the argument that 

it resulted in the commissioners court taking over the 

functions of the county tax assessor and collector. 350 

S.W.Zd at 336-338. The court also rejected the argument 

that the contract was invalid under the reasoning of White 

v. McGill, stating that: 

[T]he contract between Galveston County and 

Pritchard & Abbott was not entered into in 

connection with the collection of delinquent 

taxes and so for that reason did not require 

the approval of the State Comptroller. Consequently the decisions in Mar- v. Harris 

are not in point. 

350 S.W.Zd at 338. Thus, even in a case where the Supreme 

Court explicitly dealt with an issue of usurpation of the 

tax assessor-collector's authority, the court matter-offactly referred to the collection of delinquent taxes 

pursuant to a contract authorized by the commissioners court 

under a predecessor of section 6.30 of the Tax Code. 

The authorities discussed in this opinion show that the 

legislature and the courts have long assumed the contractual 

procedure authorized by section 6.30 and its predecessors to 

be consistent with the constitutional authori.ty of the 

county tax collector and tax assessor-collector. Such 

constructions of constitutional provisions are entitled to 

p. 5245 
Honorable Donald M. Keith - Page 7 (JM-1015) 

great weight. &S Director of Deoartment of Aariculture h 

Environment v. Printina Industries Assnc, zunra. Moreover, 

section 6.30 of the Tax Code pertains to collection efforts 

by the district or county attorney or by a private attorney 

with whom the commissioners court has contracted. As the 

court of civil appeals in me Countv v. Odom suggested, 

legal representation in the collection of delinquent taxes 

is outside the scope of the tax assessor-collector's 

constitutional functions. 297 S.W. 1055 (Tex. Civ. App. - 

Texarkana 1927), rev'd on other aroul& 15 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 

1929). The courts have not decided wh& powers and duties 

comprise the county tax assessor-collector's non-delegable 

duties, S.Q~ Green v. Stewart, sunra, and we need not address 

that question. The courts' long acceptance of the contracts 

now authorized by section 6.30 and the history of the 

amendment to article VIII, section 14, of the Texas 

Constitution convince us that the procedures authorized by 

section 6.30 of the Tax Code do not violate that constitutional provision. See also Tex. Const. art. V, 0 18; 

?ritchard G m , m; Cherokee Countv V. 

sT!asm, 3u2mr (authority of commissioners court to make 

contracts for the county). 

SUMMARY 

Section 6.30 of the Tax Code does not 

violate article VIII, section 14, of the 

Texas Constitution. 

dzyh 

MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

WARYKELLER 

First Assistant Attorney General 

Lou l4ccREARY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Susan L. Garrison 

Assistant Attorney General 

p. 5246