United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 4, 2014

Decided November 4, 2014

Before

RICHARD D. CUDAHY Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge   

No. 14‐2003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

CARVIN G. BROOKS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 13‐CR‐30252‐MJR

Michael J. Reagan,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Carvin Brooks was on parole from a state sentence for burglary when he was

arrested for pummeling a female gas‐station clerk and stealing $300 from the cash

register. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to one count of interference with

commerce by robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The district court sentenced him to 120

months’ imprisonment, more than double the guidelines range, and 3 years of

supervised release. Brooks was also ordered to pay $3,952 in restitution. He filed a

notice of appeal challenging his sentence, but his appointed lawyer has concluded that

the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14‐2003 Page 2

(1967). Brooks opposes this motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that

explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that a case of this kind might be

expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit

our review to the subjects discussed by counsel as well as those raised by Brooks. United

States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553

(7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel tells us that Brooks does not wish to challenge his guilty plea and thus

appropriately forgoes discussing the voluntariness of the plea or the adequacy of the

plea colloquy. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States

v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel considers whether Brooks could argue that his 120‐month sentence, well

above the calculated range of 46‐57 months, is unreasonable and correctly concludes

that such a challenge would be frivolous. We would uphold as reasonable a sentence

that exceeds the recommended guidelines range as long as the district court justifies its

reasons consistent with the sentencing factors set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

See United States v. Molton, 743 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hill, 645 F.3d

900, 911 (7th Cir. 2011). The judge here emphasized Brooks’s violent criminal history, see

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), noting that the guidelines did not adequately account for his

string of robberies and burglaries spanning twelve days in 2003 (Brooks was convicted

of crimes of violence that did not receive points because they were treated as a single

sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2)). The judge also addressed the seriousness of the

offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), remarking that Brooks “beat the tar” out of a

woman he outweighed by 100 pounds, as well as the need to promote respect for the

law, see id., justifying the lengthy sentence based on Brooks’s parole violation and his

use of heroin while incarcerated. The judge finally explained the need for both general

and specific deterrence, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), because the offense occurred in a

crime‐riddled area and Brooks was likely to recidivate, given his history of drug use

and violence against women.

Counsel also considers whether Brooks may raise a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel but properly concludes that such a challenge is best reserved for collateral

review through which a record can be developed, see Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.

500, 504–05 (2003); United States v. Harris, 394 F.3d 543, 557–58 (7th Cir. 2005), especially

because she represented Brooks at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Rezin, 322

F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2003).
No. 14‐2003 Page 3

Finally, in his Rule 51(b) response, Brooks contends that the district court did not

properly consider his mental health as a mitigating factor. But the judge acknowledged

Brooks’s long‐term struggle with depression and other mental‐health issues and acted

within his discretion in determining that these circumstances were  outweighed by the

aggravating factors present in the case. See United States v. Smith, 721 F.3d 904, 908 (7th

Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 660 (U.S. 2013).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.