Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction

v 

SIGAR 16-46 Audit Report

Afghanistan’s Information and Communications 

Technology Sector: U.S. Agencies Obligated 

Over $2.6 Billion to the Sector, but the Full 

Scope of U.S. Efforts is Unknown 

SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector

15-XX-AR/ Afghan ICT Sector

SIGAR

J U L Y

2016
For more information, contact SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil. 

WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

In 2001, Afghanistan had only a rudimentary 

telecommunications system located in major 

cities and along its borders. Since then, 

considerable development has taken place as 

a result of private sector investment, as well as 

the Afghan government and international 

partners’ efforts. According to U.S. and Afghan 

officials, the information and communications 

technology (ICT) sector is generally seen as a 

success. The U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) reports that, among 

other things, the sector contributed $1.81 

billion in revenues to the Afghan government in 

2013, employs about 130,000 Afghans, and 

provides mobile phone services to roughly 90 

percent of the population. Private sector 

investment alone had reached $2 billion by

2013. Additionally, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) estimates that the ICT sector could 

generate an additional $1 billion in revenue per 

year to the Afghan government within the next 

decade from data transit tariffs and the 

provision of information services.

U.S. agencies and other stakeholders have 

recognized the importance of the ICT sector to 

Afghanistan’s economic success. For example, 

the ICT sector has become a key enabler of the 

Afghan government and has expanded its 

ability to communicate with Afghan citizens. In 

addition, the sector includes communications 

networks that are critical to the Afghan 

National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF)

operations. 

The objectives of the audit were to determine 

(1) the scope of U.S. agencies’ efforts to 

develop Afghanistan’s ICT sector since 2002 

and (2) the extent to which the agencies 

coordinated these efforts.

SIGAR is not making any recommendations in 

this report. SIGAR provided a draft of this report 

to the Department of State (State), USAID, and 

DOD for comment. State and DOD provided 

technical comments, which are incorporated, 

as appropriate. USAID provided no substantive 

comments on a draft of this report.

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

Due to the efforts of the private sector investors, the Afghan government, the U.S. 

government, and other international partners, the Afghan ICT sector has grown 

substantially since 2002. Although the United States, coalition partners, and other 

stakeholders have supported the development of Afghanistan’s ICT sector through a 

variety of projects and programs, the sector’s infrastructure has largely been created 

through Afghan-led efforts, such as the Afghan government’s policies and regulations 

encouraging private investment, and private entities making those investments.

The country has six active service carriers, including five 3G-licensed mobile network 

service operators. These companies are responsible for building most of the over 5,000 

telecommunications cellular towers in Afghanistan that power the mobile networks 

used by most cellular phones in the country. Roshan and MTN are the largest mobile 

cell phone carriers by customer base. Two of the six service carriers—Afghan Telecom 

and Wasel Telecom—also offer landline telephone services. Afghan Telecom provides 

landline services nationally, while Wasel Telecom provides landline services regionally 

in northern Afghanistan.

Based on SIGAR’s analysis of DOD, State, and USAID data, SIGAR determined that, 

since 2002, those agencies have provided over $2.6 billion to support the Afghan ICT 

sector. DOD invested the most in ICT, obligating more than $2.5 billion. However, 

according to DOD, the department’s primary reason for spending in the ICT sector was 

to support the ANDSF’s communication needs. State obligated at least $83 million to 

support Afghan media and rule of law development, and USAID obligated at least $44 

million to increase the ICT capacity of various Afghan ministries.

However, because the agencies were not required to track their ICT efforts in a

centralized database, the information reported to SIGAR by DOD, State, and USAID may 

not be comprehensive or entirely reliable. For example, SIGAR independently identified 

a DOD contract, valued at over $400 million, to procure radios for the Afghan National 

Army that was not included in the data DOD provided. Additionally, SIGAR found that 

some of State’s and USAID’s ICT sector activities were implemented as part of larger 

programs, and funding information was not disaggregated by separate components. 

Finally, records for some USAID programs implemented before 2005 were not available 

because the agency’s document retention requirements only extend to 3 years after a 

program’s completion date. As a result, the full scope of U.S. efforts is unknown.

SIGAR also found that DOD, State, and USAID coordinated their efforts to support the 

ICT sector in Afghanistan. State established the first formal coordination unit, the 

Afghanistan Reconstruction Group (ARG), in 2004. In 2005, State appointed the first 

U.S. Senior Telecommunications Advisor to coordinate and synchronize efforts with 

both public and private organizations. State eliminated the ARG in 2008 and, along 

with it, terminated the Senior Telecommunications Advisor position. However, State 

officials indicated that informal coordination with the Afghan government continued. In 

2010, the International Security Assistance Force created the Telecommunications 

Advisory Team, which became the primary coordinating entity for U.S. agencies and led 

the Telecommunications Working Group until its mission ended in late 2014. DOD 

officials stated that since 2014, the Telecommunications Working Group has continued 

to meet under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction

July 2016 

Afghanistan’s Information and Communications Technology Sector: 

U.S. Agencies Obligated Over $2.6 Billion to the Sector, but the Full 

Scope of U.S. Efforts is Unknown 

SIGAR 16-46 AUDIT REPORT
July 19, 2016 

The Honorable Ashton B. Carter 

Secretary of Defense 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Secretary of State 

The Honorable Gayle E. Smith 

Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development 

General John W. Nicholson, Jr. 

Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, and 

 Commander, Resolute Support 

This report discusses the results of SIGAR’s audit of efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD), the 

Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to develop 

Afghanistan’s information and communications technology (ICT) sector. According to DOD officials, revenues 

from the ICT sector could potentially provide over $1 billion annually to the Afghan government’s budget and 

reduce its reliance on foreign aid. We found that DOD, State, and USAID have invested over $2.6 billion in the 

Afghan ICT sector since 2002, with DOD contributions totaling more than $2.5 billion alone. The 

reconstruction funds invested in the ICT sector largely supported the Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces and the Afghan media, and aimed to increase the ICT capacity of various Afghan ministries. However, 

the full scope of U.S. efforts is unknown because the agencies were not required to track projects as 

specifically benefiting the ICT sector. We also found that the agencies coordinated their efforts. For example, 

DOD officials stated that the Telecommunications Advisory Team within the International Security Assistance 

Force was created to exchange information and coordinate ICT efforts among U.S. agencies, coalition 

partners, Afghan ministries, and Afghanistan’s private sector. The team was active from 2010 through 

October 2014. According to State officials, U.S. coordination on the ICT sector continues to occur between 

State, USAID, and DOD mission personnel. We are not making any recommendations in this report. 

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, and DOD for comment. We received technical comments 

from State and DOD, which we incorporated, as appropriate. USAID provided no substantive comments on a 

draft of this report. 

SIGAR conducted this work under the authority of Public Law No. 110‐181, as amended, and the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

John F. Sopko 

Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ................................................................................................................................................................. 1

U.S. Agencies Have Invested Over $2.6 Billion in the Afghan ICT Sector, but the Exact Amount and Number of 

Activities Funded Are Unknown ................................................................................................................................. 3

U.S. Government Agencies Generally Coordinated Their ICT Activities ................................................................... 7

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................... 8

Agency Comments ...................................................................................................................................................... 8

Appendix I - Scope and Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 9

Appendix II - Afghanistan’s ICT Infrastructure ........................................................................................................ 10

Appendix III - DOD Non-CERP Contracts Supporting the Afghan ICT Sector ......................................................... 13

Appendix IV - Examples of Other International Support for the Afghan ICT Sector .............................................. 18

Appendix V - Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development .................................................... 20

Appendix VI - Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................. 21

TABLES 

Table 1 - Summary of DOD Activities Supporting the Afghan ICT Sector ................................................................. 4

Table 2 - Summary of U.S. Embassy in Kabul Public Affairs Section Activities Supporting the Afghan ICT 

Sector .......................................................................................................................................................................... 5

Table 3 - USAID ICT Activities with Known Program/Funding Status....................................................................... 6

Table 4 - Licensed Telecommunication Network Operators and Scope of Services Provided ............................ 11

Table 5 - DOD Non-CERP Contracts Supporting the Afghan ICT Sector ................................................................ 13

Table 6 - Primary World Bank ICT Activities in Afghanistan Since 2003 .............................................................. 18

FIGURE 

Figure 1 - Afghan Optical Fiber Cable Network ...................................................................................................... 12
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page iv

ABBREVIATIONS 

ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 

ARG Afghanistan Reconstruction Group 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

DOD Department of Defense

ICT information and communications technology

ISAF TAT

International Security Assistance Force Telecommunications 

Advisory Team 

MOCIT Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 

State Department of State 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 1 

In 2001, Afghanistan had only a rudimentary telecommunications system located in major cities and along its 

borders. Afghan citizens often had to leave the country to obtain telephone service in neighboring Iran or 

Pakistan. Building a strong national information and communications (ICT) sector has been a top priority for 

the Afghan government since 2002. In that year, the Afghan government began implementing a 

telecommunications development strategy with the goal of providing Afghan citizens with access to telephone 

and data communications, and implementing policies and other regulations intended to be favorable for 

private investment in the ICT sector. 

In its July 2013 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) estimated that private investment in the sector had reached nearly $2 billion. According to officials we 

interviewed, private investments by Afghanistan’s telecommunications service carriers have been responsible 

for building most of the telecommunications infrastructure in the sector. For example, as early as 2012, just 

four commercial telecommunications service providers in Afghanistan—Afghan Wireless Communications 

Company, Roshan, Etisalat and MTN—had reportedly already invested $1.5 billion and owned most of the 

infrastructure for mobile services and wireless connectivity.1 

In addition to private investment, the United States—primarily DOD, the Department of State (State), and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—and other international partners have provided support to 

develop Afghanistan’s ICT sector. According to the Afghan Ministry of Communications and Information 

Technology (MOCIT), as of June 2014, an estimated 27 million Afghans had access to mobile phone service. 

Subject matter experts at the National Defense University have also reported that the sector includes 

communications networks that support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF) operations. 

According to DOD, the ICT sector has become the highest revenue-generating sector. 

The objectives of this audit were to determine (1) the scope of U.S. agencies’ efforts to develop Afghanistan’s 

ICT sector since 2002 and (2) the extent to which the agencies coordinated these efforts. To accomplish these 

objectives, we obtained documents, contracts, reports, and economic research studies from DOD, International 

Security Assistance Force Telecommunications Advisory Team (ISAF TAT), State, and USAID, and interviewed 

officials representing these entities. We reviewed contract, grant, and other project documentation related to 

ICT activities in Afghanistan, as well as acquisition regulations and guidance. In addition, we spoke with 

officials from the Afghan government and the World Bank. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., and 

Kabul, Afghanistan, from November 2013 to July 2016, in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is in appendix I. 

BACKGROUND 

The Afghan government adopted a telecommunications development strategy in October 2002 and 

implemented the Afghan Telecommunications and Internet Policy the following year. In 2005, Afghanistan 

passed its first Telecommunications Law, which was intended to promote private sector investment. The 

MOCIT is responsible for establishing a modern telecommunications sector based on free markets and 

competition by organizing and leading ICT sector development, and coordinating with other ministries and 

international partners. The ministry was given the authority to establish ICT policies and regulations, and to 

issue licenses.2

1 Javid Hamdard, The State of Telecommunications and Internet In Afghanistan: Six Years Later (2006-2012), Internews, 

March 2012. 

2 Another key agency, the Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority, which reports directly to the MOCIT, was created in 

2005 to regulate telecommunications markets, collect taxes and tariffs, and manage and allocate telecommunications 

spectrum. Prior to 2005, the Afghanistan Telecom Regulatory Authority had been referred to as the Telecom Regulatory 

Bureau. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 2 

In its 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the Afghan government established a strategic vision 

for its ICT sector to be implemented through its E-Afghanistan National Priority Program and created a strategy 

for implementing this program in 2011.3 The MOCIT is the primary implementer of the program in coordination 

with other ICT stakeholders. The program’s main goals are to create a modern and efficient ICT sector and egovernment to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the public sector; provide for social 

services; develop a vibrant private sector; and create a connected and productive society. The program’s 

objectives are to strengthen all components of the ICT sector, including the regulatory framework, electronic 

and mobile processes, and telecommunications networks.4 

According to Afghan and U.S. officials we interviewed, the Afghan ICT sector is largely considered a success. 

For example, USAID has reported that the ICT sector:5 

 Generated an estimated $1.81 billion in revenue in 2013;

 Employs about 130,000 Afghans;

 Provides mobile phone services to roughly 90 percent of the population; and

 Provides internet access to over 1 million Afghans;

According to DOD, the ICT sector is Afghanistan’s greatest source of foreign direct investment, largest remitter 

of taxes to the government, and largest licit employer. According to ISAF TAT, Afghanistan is geographically 

positioned in an optimal location to serve as a transnational conduit for modern telecommunications 

processes in South Asia, and the Afghan government envisions an international role for the ICT sector. For 

example, with the expected upcoming completion of the initial phase of its optical fiber cable network, 

Afghanistan is closer to offering a premier regional telecommunications capability that could potentially 

generate over $1 billion per year in revenue from data transit tariffs and the provision of information services 

and content throughout Central Asia. 

The Afghan ICT sector’s infrastructure has largely been created through Afghan-led efforts, such as the Afghan 

government’s policies and regulations encouraging private investment, and private entities making those 

investments. The country has six active telecommunications service carriers, including five 3G-licensed mobile 

network service operators. These companies built most of the over 5,000 telecommunications cellular towers 

in Afghanistan. Roshan and MTN are the largest mobile cell phone carriers by market share. Afghan Telecom is 

the only provider to offer national landline telephone services over national civil networks made available to 

commercial service providers. 

Despite the growth of the Afghan ICT sector, several challenges confront its success, including the security 

environment and the need for reliable electric power. According to DOD officials, additional challenges that 

could prevent the Afghan ICT sector from achieving its full potential include development and implementation 

of cyber security laws and regulations, improved network reliability, and effective civil spectrum management.6

3 The Afghanistan National Development Strategy, approved in April 2008, laid out the strategic priorities and mechanisms 

for achieving the government’s overall development vision. It served as Afghanistan’s national development master plan for 

security, governance, socioeconomic growth, and poverty reduction. The strategy is supported by 22 National Priority 

Programs grouped under six major clusters: peace, human resource development, infrastructure development, private 

sector development, agriculture and rural development, and governance. The E-Afghanistan National Priority Program is

one of the 22 National Priority Programs. See Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National 

Development Strategy, 2008-2013, February 2008. 

4 See appendix II for a description of Afghanistan’s ICT infrastructure.

5 ICT Economic Impact Assessment, prepared for USAID by Altai Consulting, July 2014. 

6 Wireless communications systems depend on the use of radio frequencies, generally referred to as the radio frequency 

spectrum. Spectrum management is the process of regulating the use of radio frequencies. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 3 

U.S. AGENCIES HAVE INVESTED OVER $2.6 BILLION IN THE AFGHAN ICT 

SECTOR, BUT THE EXACT AMOUNT AND NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES FUNDED ARE 

UNKNOWN 

We and the U.S. Government Accountability Office have previously reported that no comprehensive, multiagency database of U.S. reconstruction activities in Afghanistan exists, and agencies are not required to 

maintain one.7 In lieu of such a database, we requested information from DOD, State, and USAID, and 

interviewed officials from those agencies to determine the number and cost of U.S. efforts to support the 

Afghan ICT sector. DOD, State, and USAID reported implementing nearly 6,000 activities, valued at 

approximately $2.2 billion, to support the sector since 2002.8 These activities varied from providing support to

the ANDSF to developing the capacity of non-security ministries. However, this information may not be 

comprehensive or entirely reliable. For example, while reviewing a report issued in June 2013 by DOD’s Office 

of Inspector General, we identified one ICT-related contract for procuring Datron radios for the Afghan National 

Army worth over $400 million that had not been included in the information DOD provided in response to our 

request for information. This contract brings the total investment in ICT to over $2.6 billion. Additionally, agency 

officials we interviewed stated that some programs contained ICT components, but the agencies did not 

separate the cost of the ICT components of those programs from other activities being performed under the 

programs. As a result, the full extent of U.S. efforts to support the development of the Afghan ICT sector is 

unknown. 

DOD Obligated Over $2.5 Billion to Support the ICT Sector, Primarily through Its 

Effort to Develop the ANDSF 

Among U.S. agencies, DOD invested the most in the Afghan ICT sector since 2002, obligating over $2.5 billion 

for ICT activities through July 2014.9 Over $1.8 billion of this was designated for command and control 

equipment, such as tactical radios, cell phones, and maintenance and installation services. According to DOD, 

the primary focus of DOD efforts in Afghanistan has been suppling equipment and support needed to meet the 

communication needs of Afghan National Army and Police. From 2004 through 2013, DOD implemented an

additional 477 telecommunications activities, with obligations of over $19 million, under the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP).10 This information, however, may not represent the full scope of DOD 

efforts. As noted, through our own review, we identified a $400 million, DOD-funded ICT contract that was not 

 

7 SIGAR, A Better Management Information System Is Needed to Promote Information Sharing, Effective Planning, and 

Coordination of Afghanistan Reconstruction Activities, SIGAR Audit-09-3, July 30, 2009; and U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, Afghanistan Development: Agencies Could Benefit from a Shared and More Comprehensive 

Database on U.S. Efforts, GAO-13-34, November 7, 2012. 

8 For purposes of this report, “activities” refer to U.S. government agencies’ and other donors’ programs, contracts, task 

orders, delivery orders, grants, and other procurement initiatives issued in support of the Afghan ICT sector. Although our 

focus was on DOD, State, and USAID efforts, we identified three other agencies that provided support to the Afghan ICT 

sector: (1) the Department of Agriculture through its Capacity Building and Change Management Program, (2) the 

Department of Commerce through its Commercial Law Development Program, and (3) the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention through its support of the Afghan Ministry of Health’s Data/Immunization Office.

9 We requested that DOD provide updated data through December 31, 2015, but we had not received the data as of the 

time we drafted this report. 

10 CERP is designed to enable local commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility. In August 2015, we initiated an audit examining the 

effectiveness of CERP in Afghanistan. We plan to issue a report in mid-2016.
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 4 

included in the data DOD reported to us. Table 1 summarizes DOD’s known support for the Afghan ICT 

sector.11

Table 1 - Summary of DOD Activities Supporting the Afghan ICT Sector

ICT Activity Description/Objective Number of 

Contracts or 

CERP Projects

Number of Contract 

Actions Funded 

Through ASFFa

Contract Amount or 

Amount Obligatedb

Tactical and strategic radios (training, 

installation, service, etc.); signals and 

intelligence

6 354 $1,826,895,042

Communications networks and connectivity 

(Afghanistan-wide)

43 199 $584,058,133

Cell phones and computers 3 4,886 $114,804,146

Applications for managing ANDSF personnel and 

logistics

15 19 $22,317,411

CERP 477 n/a $19,328,187

Totals 544 5,458 $2,567,402,919

Source: SIGAR analysis of DOD ICT-related contracts provided as of June 2014

a ASFF is the Afghan Security Forces Fund.

b All figures in this table were rounded to the nearest dollar.

State Obligated Over $83 Million for ICT Support of Afghan Media and Rule of Law 

Development 

In total, State obligated at least $83 million on 68 activities to support the Afghan ICT sector through 

November 2015. According to State officials we interviewed, the department did not directly fund ICT activities 

until 2010. In that year, the Public Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul began awarding contracts and 

grants to implement ICT activities.12 The Public Affairs Section supported the Afghan ICT Sector, primarily in the 

five areas listed in table 2. 

 

 

11 See appendix III for a more detailed listing of these activities. 

12 We have previously reported on the Public Affairs Section’s grant program. See SIGAR, Inquiry Letter: State Public Affairs 

Section Grants, SIGAR 15-21-SP, November 21, 2014; SIGAR, Inquiry Letter: Communication Trucks, SIGAR 15-09-SP, 

October 15, 2014; and SIGAR, Selected Public Diplomacy Awards Mostly Achieved Objectives, but Embassy Can Take 

Steps to Enhance Grant Management and Oversight, SIGAR Audit 12-13, July 30, 2012. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 5 

Table 2 - Summary of U.S. Embassy in Kabul Public Affairs Section Activities Supporting the Afghan ICT 

Sector

ICT Activity Description/Objective Number of 

Grants or 

Contracts 

Contract Amount or 

Amount Obligateda

Afghan Media, Radio/TV Stations and General News Coverage 25 $42,376,200

Afghan Government Media Capacity Development 17 $23,507,527

Media Operations, Language Training, Phone-based Education 5 $8,525,026

Afghan ICT Access, Skills Development, Training 11 $7,791,556

Women’s Capacity Development 10 $1,040,303

Totals 68 $83,240,612

Source: SIGAR analysis of State/Public Affairs Section-provided information, updated as of November 2015

a All figures were rounded to the nearest dollar.

State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs reported that its Justice Sector Support 

Program, funded at approximately $205.5 million, included one ICT-related activity, the Case Management 

System. The Case Management System was designed to track and record criminal cases throughout 

Afghanistan’s judicial system. Funding for the system cannot be disaggregated from the larger program. 

USAID Obligated Over $44 Million, Primarily on Activities Intended to Increase the 

ICT Capacity of Afghan Ministries 

USAID has supported communications and capacity building in the Afghan ICT sector since 2001. According to 

USAID officials, the agency’s earliest ICT activities were conducted in conjunction with DOD, the World Bank, 

and other ICT stakeholders, and focused on providing communications capabilities, such as support and 

funding for the Afghan government’s national, provincial, and district communications networks.13 USAID’s 

most recent ICT investments have focused on supporting an E-Government Resource Center, which is a

component of the Afghan government’s E-Government National Priority Program for ICT and the development 

and use of “mobile money” in Afghanistan.14

Although ICT was an important component of many projects, USAID officials told us that many of their ICT 

activities did not focus primarily on ICT. For example, several of USAID’s ministerial capacity development, 

economic governance, and economic growth programs had ICT support components. USAID officials we 

interviewed stated that some programs also provided skills training for mid-level Afghan ICT workers. USAID 

officials also told us they were not able to provide information on some programs implemented before 2005, 

such as the Afghan Financial Management Information System, and radios provided to provincial governments 

for emergency communications and connection to ministries in Kabul. Completion of these efforts is past the 

 

13 See appendix IV for examples of other international support to the ICT sector. 

14 Mobile money is a means of transferring funds via mobile phone. We have previously inquired about the potential 

benefits and risks of mobile money (see SIGAR, ANP Mobile Money Pilot Program Inquiry Letter, SIGAR 14-50-SP, May 3, 

2014; and SIGAR, Inquiry Letter: ANP Mobile Money Pilot Program Response, SIGAR 14-61-SP, May 3, 2014). 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 6 

agency’s timetable for records retention.15 As a result, the full scope of USAID’s efforts to support the Afghan 

ICT sector are unknown due to the lack of records. See table 3 for a summary of USAID’s ICT activities for 

which we obtained funding and other program information. 

Table 3 - USAID ICT Activities with Known Program/Funding Status

Program Status Period of 

Performance

Description/Objectives Obligations 

($ millions)

E-Government 

Resource Center II

Ongoing 2013–2016 Strengthen institutional capacity, promote 

transparency, and improve the businessenabling environment in Afghanistan

$3.9

Mobile Moneya Ongoing 2011–2016 Promote the use of mobile technologies and 

improve the transparency of payment 

systems

$24.4

E-Government 

Resource Center I

Completed n/a Strengthen the Afghan ICT sector’s egovernance culture, train ICT personnel, and 

help digitize MOCIT processes

$1.0

District 

Communication 

Network

Completed n/a Deliver voice and data services to districts 

throughout Afghanistan, including municipal 

governments and civilian users. 

$14.2

District 

Communication 

Network (Policy 

Capacity Initiative)

Completed n/a Established the ICT Directorate to promote 

modern ICT policies, standards, procedure 

and projects.

$1.0

Totals $44.5

Source: SIGAR analysis of data and information from USAID and other sources as of December 31, 2015

a Mobile Money is funded as part of Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan project.

 

15 USAID’s Automated Directives System 502 is the agency guidance on record retention policies and indicates that records 

should be maintained for 3 years. 48 Code of Federal Regulations Part 4, Subpart 4.7 - Contractor Records Retention, 

governing record retention in acquisitions, has record retention requirements between 3 and 6 years, depending on the 

type of acquisition. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 7 

U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GENERALLY COORDINATED THEIR ICT 

ACTIVITIES 

We found that U.S. government agencies generally coordinated their activities supporting the Afghan ICT 

sector. Initial coordination occured informally through efforts to assist the Afghan government in 

communicating with its citizens and in forming ministries capable of carrying out their basic functions. DOD 

officials we interviewed stated that the first formal U.S. agency coordination unit that dealt with ICT issues was 

organized in 2004 when State created the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group (ARG). The ARG included 

individuals from both the private sector and the U.S. government serving as advisors to Afghan ministries, such 

as a U.S. Senior Telecommunications Advisor who was the main liaison with the MOCIT. State ended the ARG in 

2008. However, according to State officials, informal coordination continued until 2010 when DOD created the 

ISAF TAT. 

State Initially Led U.S. Coordination in the Afghan ICT Sector 

In 2005, State appointed the first Senior Telecommunications Advisor. According to reports written by subject 

matter experts from the National Defense University, all of the Senior Telecommunications Advisors were DOD 

officials. The U.S. Ambassador designated the Senior Telecommunications Advisor as the principal U.S. 

spokesperson for ICT matters and the official liaison with the Afghan Minister of Communications, other 

ministries, and private entities.16 The advisor also participated in the ARG. 

State eliminated the ARG in 2008 and terminated the Senior Telecommunications Advisor position. This 

resulted in a 2-year gap in which the United States was without a formal mechanism for coordinating ICT 

activities across agencies and with Afghan ministries. However, State officials stated that its coordination with 

Afghan ministries on ICT continued, even after the elimination of the Senior Telecommunications Advisor 

position 

In 2009, State created the position of Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, an 

ambassador-level position unique to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, that was expected to oversee and direct all 

U.S. government civilian agency development and economic assistance to Afghanistan. However, State officials 

we interviewed stated the coordinating director had only limited involvement in ICT activities, such as reviewing 

programs with an ICT component, and did not directly oversee or coordinate ICT issues. 

ISAF TAT Became the Major Coordination Entity in 2010, but Its Mission Ended in 

2014 

DOD officials we interviewed stated that from 2010 to 2014, ISAF TAT was the primary mechanism for 

exchanging information and coordinating ICT efforts among U.S. agencies, coalition partners, Afghan 

ministries, and Afghanistan’s private sector. Additionally, based on lessons learned from military operations in 

Iraq, U.S. military and coalition officials established ISAF TAT in 2010 to help meet their own tactical and 

strategic telecommunications requirements, while at the same time supporting Afghanistan’s ICT sector. 

According to officials we interviewed, ISAF TAT’s primary goal was to ensure that the country’s ICT 

infrastructure could support coalition and ANDSF requirements after 2014, and its secondary goal was to help 

the Afghan government develop its capabilities in the ICT sector. These same officials stated that to 

accomplish this secondary goal, ISAF TAT and other ISAF officials advised, assisted, and trained Afghan 

government entities involved in the ICT sector—specifically the MOCIT, Afghan Telecom, and the Afghan 

Telecom Regulatory Authority—on things such as cyber security strategy, implementation, and legislation; 

 

16 The Afghan Ministry of Communications was the predecessor ministry to the MOCIT. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 8 

devising, issuing, and evaluating an international competitive contract for its new satellite; spectrum 

management and transition issues; and establishing and running regional emergency call centers. 

DOD officials also stated that in addition to this advising role, ISAF created a Senior Telecommunications 

Advisor position for Afghanistan within ISAF TAT. This advisor became the key individual coordinating coalition 

support to the ICT sector and maintaining a general awareness of ICT projects undertaken by U.S. agencies’, 

international donors, the Afghan government, and the private sector. 

ISAF TAT also worked with the U.S. Embassy to lead the Telecommunications Working Group, an informal, nondecisional group involving various stakeholders in the Afghan ICT sector, such as U.S. agencies, coalition 

partner countries, Afghan ministries, and Afghan private sector entities. According to ISAF personnel we 

interviewed, the Telecommunications Working Group was used as a sounding board for ICT issues and ideas. 

For example, meeting topics discussed included the Afghan Ministry of Education’s digital literacy applications, 

Internet bandwidth allocation and management, and updates on optical fiber cable installation. According to 

DOD officials, ISAF TAT’s mission ended in October 2014. However, DOD officials told us that despite the 

closure of ISAF TAT, the Telecommunications Working Group, now under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy in 

Kabul, has continued to meet on the Afghan ICT sector and coordinates with the Resolute Support Mission. 

CONCLUSION 

Due to private sector investment, as well as efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and other 

international efforts, the Afghan ICT sector has grown substantially since 2002. Since 2002, the United States, 

primarily through DOD, State, and USAID, implemented numerous projects costing over $2.6 billion to support 

the sector. However, private investment in the sector had reached almost $2 billion by 2013. U.S. investment 

in the sector will likely continue for at least the next few years, with the intent of increasing the sector’s ability 

to continue providing much-needed revenue to the Afghan government. U.S. agencies took steps to coordinate 

their efforts between themselves and with other entities; however, this coordination varied in form between 

formal mechanisms, such as ISAF TAT and the Telecommunications Working Group, and more informal 

coordination with the ministries. 

AGENCY COMMENTS 

We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, and DOD for comment. We received technical comments 

from State and DOD, which we incorporated, as appropriate. USAID provided no substantive comments on a 

draft of this report. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 9 

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

This report provides the results of SIGAR’s audit of the U.S. government’s support for Afghanistan’s information 

and communications technology (ICT) sector. The objectives of the audit are to determine (1) the scope of U.S. 

agencies’ efforts to develop Afghanistan’s ICT sector since 2002 and (2) the extent to which the agencies 

coordinated these activities. The scope of this audit was U.S. government agencies’ support for the Afghan ICT 

sector from 2002 through December 31, 2015. 

To determine the scope of U.S. government agencies’ efforts to develop the ICT sector since 2002, we 

obtained and reviewed Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) responses to SIGAR’s requests for information; relevant agency guidance 

and guidelines; supporting project and program documentation; and U.S. policies, strategies, and directives 

applicable to U.S. support of and coordination in the Afghan ICT sector. We reviewed the Afghanistan National 

Development Strategy, documents on the E-Afghanistan National Priority Program, and Afghan policy 

documents related to the ICT sector. We also reviewed analyses and reports on the status of the Afghan ICT 

sector. We interviewed officials from DOD, including U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) and the ISAF Telecommunication Advisory Team (ISAF TAT), and U.S. Central 

Command, as well as State, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention project management officials. We also interviewed Afghan officials 

with the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIT). 

Because the agencies were not required to report ICT-specific activities and did not use a common database to 

track their projects, we requested data from DOD, State, and USAID on all the projects they implemented to 

support the Afghan ICT sector from 2002 through December 31, 2015. To ascertain the completeness of the 

data, we compared the agency-provided data with information we obtained through our own research, such as 

prior audits and summary reports, contract documents, and project documents. We reviewed contract 

documents, ICT subject matter reports, prior audit coverage, and other summary reports in order to evaluate 

the ICT programs we were able to identify. We also conducted interviews with agency officials representing 

DOD, State, USAID, ISAF TAT, and U.S. Central Command. We also interviewed an Afghan official with the 

MOCIT. 

To determine the extent to which the U.S. agencies coordinated their efforts in the Afghan ICT sector, we 

identified and obtained information on the key formal and informal coordination mechanisms they employed. 

We reviewed documents addressing U.S. policy for coordination in reconstruction and stability operations. We 

also reviewed U.S. policies and commitments for coordinating with interagency and external stakeholders. We 

reviewed ISAF TAT reports and other documentation. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOD, State, 

USAID, ISAF TAT, and U.S. Central Command. We also interviewed an Afghan official with the MOCIT. 

We did not rely on computer-processed data for the purpose of the audit objectives. We assessed internal 

controls to determine the extent to which the agencies had systems in place to track and report on their efforts 

supporting the ICT sector in Afghanistan; however, as stated in the body of the report, we determined that the 

agencies were not required to have such systems 

We conducted our audit work in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., from November 2013 to July 2016, 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This audit was performed by SIGAR under 

the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 10

APPENDIX II - AFGHANISTAN’S ICT INFRASTRUCTURE 

Although the United States, coalition partners, and other stakeholders have supported the development of 

Afghanistan’s information and communications technology (ICT) sector through a variety of projects and 

programs, the sector’s infrastructure has largely been created through Afghan-led efforts, such as the Afghan 

government’s policies and regulations encouraging private investment, and private entities making those 

investments. Led by the Afghan Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIT), and driven 

largely by Afghan consumer demand, Afghanistan has substantially grown its ICT sector from almost nonexistent in 2002 to one of Afghanistan’s most successful economic sectors in Afghanistan today.17 The sector 

is primarily comprised of cellular, optical fiber cable, and satellite components. 

Cellular Networks and Landline Communications 

Afghanistan’s cellular infrastructure consists of its mobile networks and landline telecommunications market. 

The country has six active service carriers, including five 3G-licensed mobile network service operators. These 

companies are responsible for financing and building most of the over 5,000 telecommunications cellular 

towers in Afghanistan that power the mobile networks used by most cellular phones in the country. Roshan and 

MTN are the largest mobile cell phone carriers by customer base. Two of the six service carriers—Afghan 

Telecom and Wasel Telecom—also offer landline telephone services. Afghan Telecom provides landline 

services nationally, while Wasel Telecom provides landline services regionally in northern Afghanistan. 

State-owned Afghan Telecom owns the largest amount of physical infrastructure, having inherited most Afghan 

telecommunications infrastructure contributed by the United States and other ICT stakeholders. This includes 

assets of the Government Communication Network; the Provincial Governors Communications Network, which 

extended communications services to the Afghan Government Ministry offices in the Provincial Capital areas and

related facilities; and the Village Communications Network, a satellite-based network that allows the rural 

population of Afghanistan to have easy access to basic voice and Internet facilities, as well as the Afghan 

Optical Fiber Cable Network. Table 4 lists the licensed telecommunications operators in Afghanistan and the 

services they provide. 

 

17 Comparative studies suggest that the Afghan mobile telecommunications market grew at a pace equivalent, 

proportionately, to the Chinese market and faster than India’s. See Roshan, Government and the Private Sector Working 

Together to Create the Afghan Telecommunications Industry, Effective Private Sector Contribution to Development in 

Afghanistan, case study prepared for the Enabling Environment Conference, June 2007. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 11

Table 4 - Licensed Telecommunication Network Operators and Scope of Services Provided

Network Operator (Ownership) License Awarded Services Offered Locations

Afghan Wireless Communications 

Company (MOCIT and Telephone 

Systems International)

April 2002 Mobile Global System for 

Mobile communication

(GSM); 3G wireless

All 34 provincial capitals 

and principal cities

Roshan (Telecommunications 

Development Company of Afghanistan) 

(Aga Khan Fund for Economic 

Development, Monaco Telecom 

International, Telia-Sonera)

January 2003 Mobile (GSM); 3G 

wireless; M-Paisa (mobile 

money)

All 34 provincial capitals 

and principal cities

Afghan Telecom (Government of 

Afghanistan)

April 2006 Landline (digital); public 

pay phones; Mobile 

(GSM); 3G wireless; 

Internet Service Provider 

(retail and wholesale)

All 34 provincial capitals 

and satellite-based callcenter and tele-kiosk 

services

MTN (South Africa-based MTN Group) September 2005 Mobile (GSM); 3G 

wireless

All 34 provincial capitals 

and principal cities

Etisalat (U.A.E.-based Emirates 

Telecommunications Corporation)

May 2006 Mobile (GSM); 3G 

wireless

At least 30 provincial 

capitals and all major 

cities

Wasel Telecom (AG Telecom and U.A.E.-

based Modern Technology International; 

private investors)

May 2006 Wireless code division 

multiple access; Landline

All 34 provincial capitals 

and principal cities 

wireless; landline provider 

in northern provincial 

capitals of Balkh, Baghlan, 

Kunduz, and Jawzjan

Sources: Javid Hamdard, The State of Telecommunications and Internet In Afghanistan: Six Years Later (2006-2012), 

Internews, March 2012; ICT Economic Impact Assessment, prepared for USAID by Altai Consulting, July 2014; and updated 

information provided by the Department of State 

Note: GSM (Global System for Mobile communication) is a digital mobile telephony system that is widely used in Europe and 

other parts of the world. GSM uses a variation of time division multiple access (TDMA) and is the most widely used of the 

three digital wireless telephony technologies (TDMA, GSM, and code division multiple access (CDMA)).

Optical Fiber Cable Network 

With respect to fiber optics, in 2006, the World Bank implemented a project to construct an optical fiber cable 

network, with a first phase that extends roughly 3,300 kilometers in a ring alongside Afghanistan’s main road 

system (see figure 1). The optical fiber cable network aims at building an optical fiber ring around Afghanistan 

and interconnections to neighboring countries. However, the Department of Defense estimated that just over 

60 percent of this network is operational. Additionally, serious security challenges continue to delay completion 

and connectivity of the eastern spur and other critical parts of the network. Nevertheless, this network provides 

opportunities for connections to most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and with five neighboring countries: Iran, 

Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 12

Figure 1 - Afghan Optical Fiber Cable Network

Source: SIGAR analysis of MOCIT’s ICT infrastructure maps 

Satellite 

According to the MOCIT: 

 Afghansat is the Satellite Services Provider Agency of the government of Afghanistan and has one 

satellite in orbit called Afghansat-1. Afghansat is managed directly by the MOCIT with the 

organizational and financial support of Afghan Telecom. 

 Afghansat-1 is expected to allow mobile telephone and internet connection services, as well as high 

definition TV services to all Afghan provinces, neighboring countries, and countries in Central Asia.
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 13

APPENDIX III - DOD NON-CERP CONTRACTS SUPPORTING THE AFGHAN ICT 

SECTOR 

Table 5 lists of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) contracts supporting the Afghan information and 

communication technology sector. It does not include data provided by DOD on 477 projects, with obligations of 

approximately $19 million, the department implemented under the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP). 

Table 5 - DOD Non-CERP Contracts Supporting the Afghan ICT Sector

Contract or Project 

Number

Project Description Number 

of ICT 

Activitiesa

Contract 

Amount or 

Amount 

Obligated

Period of 

Performance

W56KJD-13-C-0002 Network operations—Ministries of Interior 

and Defense bandwidth service 

1 $11,127,288 February 2013–

February 2014

W56KJD-13-P-0368 Network operations—Roshan modem, 

Subscriber Identity Module card, and 

service

1 $10,521 March 2013–

November 2013

W56KJD-13-P-0501 Core Inventory Management System 

maintenance

1 $84,940 April 2013–

March 2014

W56KJD-13-P-0621 Ministry of Defense bridge network 1 $450,780 June 2013–

September 2013

W56KJD-13-P-0631 Afghan National Defense University labor 

support

1 $403,800 June 2013–

October 2013

W56KJD-13-P-0632 Computers and equipment 1 $100,566 July 2013–

July 2013

W56KJD-13-P-0658 Core Inventory Management System 

database repair

1 $14,280 August 2013–

October 2013

W56KJD-13-P-0770 Afghan Human Resource Information 

Management System bridge contract

1 $555,669 October 2013–

March 2014

W56KJD-13-P-0778 Equipment procurement for Corps signal 

kandaks

1 $472,045 September 2013–

October 2013

W56KJD-13-C-0003 Very Small Aperture Terminal satellite 

and bandwidth

1 $2,199,364 March 2013–

February 2015

W56KJD-14-C-0001 Maintain and manage Afghan Human 

Resource Information Management 

System

1 $4,118,504 January 2014–

January 2015

W56KJD-14-C-0004 Afghan Wireless Communication 

Company bandwidth for the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior

1 $7,707,800 February 2014–

September 2014
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 14

W56KJD-14-F-0008 Equipment procurement for the National 

Military Intelligence Center

1 $189,160 December 2013–

February 2014

W56JKD-13-P-0620 Core Inventory Management System 

backup server license

1 $56,811 June 2013–

June 2014

W56SGK-13-C-0004 QuickBooks accounting software and 

Training

1 $287,464 November 2012–

November 2013

W56KJD-13-C-0006 Afghan National Defense University 

network

1 $2,068,463 September 2013–

March 2014

W56SGK-13-C-0008 National Information Management 

System

1 $3,018,512 September 2013–

September 2014

W56SGK-13-C-7033 Afghan National Military Intelligence 

Center Network Installation

1 $26,330 January 2013–

March 2013

W56SGK-13-P-0017 Antenna repair at Sia Sang in Kabul 1 $26,125 November 2012–

November 2013

W56SGK-13-P-0002 Software—Intel analytical tools and 

database

1 $111,755 November 2012–

April 2014

W56SGK-13-P-0021 Internet services for Pol-i-Charkhi 1 $19,880 December 2012–

December 2013

W56SGK-13-P-0086 Biometrics training 1 $745,200 September 2013–

September 2014

W56SGK-13-P-4014 Biometric information tech skills training 1 $103,988 August 2013–

December 2013

W56SGK-13-P-7058 National Information Management 

System Building

1 $433,780 September 2013–

December 2013

W5KA4N-11-C-0148 Adobe barracks at Moqur, Ghazni, Kabul 1 $6,404,614 August 2011–

February 2013

W90YVD-12-C-0059 Construct concrete masonry units offices 

and power plant

1 $181,444 May 2012–March 

2013

W919QA-12-P-0060 Combined Tactical Operations Center 1 $12,834 February 2012–

February 2013

W91B4L-12-C-0204 Belandey Ghundy police substation 

renovation, Kandahar

1 $198,625 August 2012–

October 2012

W91B4M-07-C-4262 Network Innovations Inc.—IT network 

infrastructure

1 $88,514,402 December 2007–

May 2013

W91B4M-10-C-0031 Biometric Enrollment and Personnel 

Security Program for the Afghan National 

Army

1 $9,143,194 May 2010–

May 2013
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 15

W91B4M-10-C-4046 Radio training course 1 $2,202,277 June 2010–

March 2013

W91B4M-10-C-4055 Jahaan Tech Corp—base information 

technology support

1 $229,897 June 2010–

June 2014

W91B4M-10-C-4070 Afghan Police Information and Reporting 

System

1 $10,415,765 July 2010–

January 2014

W91B4M-10-D-4004 Ministry of Interior Network Operations 

Expansion

36 $19,035,000 May 2010–

July 2013

W91B4M-10-D-4006

Afghan Wireless—cell phone service

63 $24,000,000 July 2013–

November 2014

W91B4M-10-D-4008 CERETECHS—IT network infrastructure 46 $95,197,654 July 2010–

July 2014

W91B4M-10-D-4012 Network Innovations Inc.—IT network 

infrastructure

45 $95,039,531 August 2013-

August 2014

W91B4M-10-D-4014 Global Technology—IT network 

infrastructure

20 $95,000,000 August 2013–

August 2014

W91B4M-10-D-4015 CERETECHS—IT network infrastructure 10 $88,836,500 August 2013–

August 2014

W91B4M-10-P-0285 Afghan National Army human resources

database management (identification

cards)

1 $4,233,689 February 2010–

January 2014

W91B4M-11-C-0021 Intel Training Center information 

technology equipment

1 $4,341,959 June 2011–

May 2016

W91B4M-11-C-4019 Radio installation services 1 $1,434,943 April 2012–

March 2013

W91B4M-11-D-4001 VEKTI—manage and maintain the Afghan 

Human Resource Information 

Management System

5 $6,721,468 April 2013–

September 2013

W91B4M-11-P-0249 Sia Sang internet access (GSG2 and 

Internet service support)

1 $80,109 October 2011–

October 2012

W91B4M-11-P-4560 Global Rapid Response Information 

Package program

1 $1,883,224 April 2011–

June 2014

W91B4M-12-P-0047 Copier contract 1 $14,207 June 2012–

March 2013

W91B4M-12-P-0071 Ministry of Interior radio media buy 1 $93,600 April 2012–

April 2013

W91B4M-12-P-0073 Ministry of Interior television 

broadcasting

1 $531,786 May 2012–

August 2013
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 16

W91B4M-12-P-0074 Operations and maintenance of Afghan 

National Police Strategic 

Communications Network

1 $1,844,195 May 2012–

January 2013

W91B4M-12-P-4053 Computer training services 1 $28,567 December 2011–

December 2012

W91B4M-12-P-4103 Printer service and photo copiers 1 $11,966 April 2012–

March 2013

W91B4M-12-P-4121 Afghan Wireless—Internet 1 $196,500 August 2012–

January 2013

W91B4N-10-C-5014 Information technology support for 

Combined/Joint Task Force 82

1 $28,178,849 June 2010–

December 2014

W91B4N-11-P-5104 Commercial internet service provider for 

Task Force Protector

1 $131,117 August 2011–

August 2014

W91B4N-12-P-5023 Internet and voice services and 

communications infrastructure for the 

Afghan Criminal Techniques Academy

1 $102,655 December 2011–

December 2012

W91B4P-12-C-0043 Construction of Gardez Biometric Facility 1 $93,231 August 2012–

April 2013

W91JA4-12-C-4001 Afghan Wireless—Very Small Aperture 

Terminal satellite and bandwidth

1 $7,763,473 November 2011–

October 2016

W91JA4-11-P-4007 Dining facility service for Camp 

Blackhorse 

1 $284,989 December 2010–

June 2013

W91JA4-11-P-4084 Internet service at Camp Morehead, 

Kabul

1 $290,214 September 2011–

February 2013

W91JA4-12-P-4106 Internet service for Sia Sang Afghan 

National Army Compound 

1 $38,550 October 2012–

April 2013

W91QUZ-06-D-0006 Netbook procurement for Senior Afghan 

National Army Personnel

4,270 $64,049,544 April 2006–

April 2016

W91QUZ-06-D-0009 Laptop procurement for Afghan National 

Army National Military Academy

553 $26,754,602 April 2006–

April 2016

W15P7T-10-D-D410 Ministry of Interior Radio Fielding 14 $43,176,754 July 2010-

September 2014

W15P7T-10-D-D416 Afghan National Army radio repair and 

maintenance training contract

20 $185,510,792 July 2010–

September 2014

W15P7T-11-D-H607 Harris Radios and Training 265 $1,145,705,172 December 2010–

December 2014

W917PM-04-D0003-0002Construction of Communications 

Command Headquarters in Kabul

1 $6,968,711 Unknown
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 17

W15P7T-09-D-D212 Datron radios 53 $448,865,103 March 2009–

March 2015

Source: SIGAR analysis of DOD-provided information and contract documents as of June 2014

Note: This table excludes data on individual CERP projects.
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 18

APPENDIX IV - EXAMPLES OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE 

AFGHAN ICT SECTOR 

The World Bank has been a providing support to the Afghan information and communications technology (ICT) 

sector since 2003. The World Bank has worked and coordinated closely with U.S. government agenices to 

develop Afghan ministerial capacity, particularly for the Ministry of Communications and Information 

Technology (MOCIT), intergovernmental communications, and infrastructure. Table 6 summarizes the World 

Bank’s primary ICT activities.

Table 6 - Primary World Bank ICT Activities in Afghanistan Since 2003

Project Name

(Funding Source)

Status Timeframe Description/

Objective

Funded Amount 

($ millions)

Afghanistan ICT 

Sector Development 

Project (World 

Bank/International 

Development 

Association)

Ongoing 2011–2017 Expanded connectivity and mainstream use 

of mobile applications in strategic sectors in 

the government; funded several local, 

regional, and international consultancies to 

assist in such areas as open access policy, 

telecommunications development fund 

utilization, training on mobile government, 

mobile sector regulations, and Afghan ICT 

information technology industry policies.

$50.0

Emergency 

Communications 

Development Project 

(World 

Bank/International 

Development 

Association)

Completed 2003–2009 Supported activities designed to improve 

delivery of communications services to the 

government and people of Afghanistan, 

including expansion of the Government 

Communications Network, policy 

development and ministerial capacity 

building, and improvement in postal 

services delivery

$23.4

New Billing System–

Telecommunications 

(Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Trust 

Fund)

Completed 2004–2005 Provided a new billing system, including 

installation of hardware and software at the 

MOCIT

$0.5

Satellite Earth 

Station, Kabul 

(Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Trust 

Fund)

Completed 2004–2005 Provided a high-capacity international 

gateway, capacity for telephone service, 

television programs, data communication, 

and Internet services

$3.8

Microwave Link 

Installation–Kabul to 

Pakistan border 

(Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Trust 

Fund)

Completed 2004–2005 Provided telephone access to neighboring 

countries, particularly Pakistan

$1.9

Source: Data gathered by SIGAR and checked for accuracy by the World Bank
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 19

In addition to the World Bank’s contributions, other international sources of support for Afghanistan’s ICT 

sector include:18

 The Iranian government granted $4 million for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Information

and Communication Training Institute in Kabul.

 The Indian government granted $14 million for the emergency restoration of the telecommunications

network in 11 Afghan provinces.

 International Telecommunication Union experts helped the MOCIT create telecommunications policy

and laws, and localize spectrum monitoring standards. The union also provided ICT training courses,

workshops, and seminars for MOCIT employees.

 The United Nations Development Programme has supported the Afghan ICT sector in several areas,

such as ICT training, the National ICT Council, and the National Data Center.

 Microsoft provided assistance in Windows localization and information technology training programs

to convert software into Dari and Pashto in order to make it useable by Afghans.

 Cisco helped the MOCIT by training ICT specialists at Cisco’s Networking Academy Program.

18 Information as reported on the MOCIT website in October 2014. 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 20

APPENDIX V - COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 21

APPENDIX VI - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

Jeffrey Brown, Senior Audit Manager 

Clifton Spruill, Analyst-in-Charge 

Carlos Torres, Senior Program Analyst 
SIGAR 16-46-AR/Afghanistan’s ICT Sector Page 22

This performance audit was conducted 

under project code SIGAR-088A.
Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

Public Affairs

SIGAR’s Mission

The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate 

and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to: 

 improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

 improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors; 

 improve contracting and contract management 

processes; 

 prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

 advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan. 

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR’s Web 

site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publically released reports, 

testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site. 

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of 

fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR’s 

hotline: 

 Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud 

 Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil 

 Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

 Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303 

 Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

 Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

 U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065 

Public Affairs Officer 

 Phone: 703-545-5974

 Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil 

 Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs 

2530 Crystal Drive 

Arlington, VA 22202