United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-10040

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Ardis Williams, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:22-CR-239-1 

______________________________

Before Wiener, Stewart, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Defendant-Appellant Ardis Williams appeals his conviction of 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). He presents three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that 

§ 922(g)(1) should be construed as requiring more than a showing that the 

firearm he possessed traveled in interstate commerce and, alternatively, if the 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 13, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-10040 Document: 77-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/13/2024
No. 23-10040

2

fact of interstate travel is sufficient, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it 

exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers to regulate interstate commerce. 

Second, he argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the 

Second Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York 

State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). Third, 

he argues the district court violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure when it accepted his plea. 

Regarding Williams’s Commerce Clause arguments, we review the 

interpretation or constitutionality of federal statutes de novo. See United 

States v. Adam, 296 F.3d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bailey, 115 

F.3d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997). Here, circuit precedent forecloses his 

argument that past movement of a firearm in interstate commerce is 

insufficient. See United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242–43 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Furthermore, we have consistently upheld the constitutionality of 

§ 922(g)(1) as “a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce 

Clause.” United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145–46 (5th Cir. 2013); see 

also United States v. Perryman, 965 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 2020). 

Accordingly, these arguments are foreclosed. 

We review Williams’s Bruen argument for plain error because he did 

not preserve the issue. To demonstrate plain error, Williams must show that 

(1) there is an error, (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to 

reasonable dispute, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. Puckett 

v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes this showing, we will 

exercise our discretion to correct the error only if it “seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). However, “[m]eeting all 

four prongs is difficult, as it should be.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We recently rejected a plain-error Bruen challenge to 

Case: 23-10040 Document: 77-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/13/2024
No. 23-10040

3

§ 922(g)(1). See United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2023). 

Williams’s challenge is likewise unavailing. See id. at 572-74. 

Lastly, Williams argues that, in light of his challenges to § 922(g)(1), 

the district court misadvised him of the nature of his offense and erroneously 

accepted the factual basis for his guilty plea, in violation of Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(G), 11(b)(3). Given our disposition of 

Williams’s underlying arguments, it follows that the district court committed 

no Rule 11 error. 

AFFIRMED. 

Case: 23-10040 Document: 77-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/13/2024