Art of War Papers

Key Considerations for Irregular Security Forces 

in Counterinsurgency

 Robert L. Green, Major, US Army

 Command and General Staff College

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
Key Considerations

For Irregular Security Forces

In Counterinsurgency

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College

By

ROBERT L. GREEN, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY

B.A., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2011-01
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Green, Robert L.

 Key considerations for irregular security forces in counterinsurgency / by Robert L. Green.

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 978-0-9855879-1-8 (alk. paper)

 1. Counterinsurgency--Case studies. 2. Irregular warfare--Case studies. 3. 

Oman--History--Dhofar War, 1964-1976. 4. Iraq War, 2003-2011. I. Title. 

 U241.G74 2012

 355.02’18--dc23

 2012022613
iii

Abstract

Key Considerations For Irregular Security Forces

In Counterinsurgency

By Robert L. Green

Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security 

forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security 

forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or military 

organizations of the host nation, that are recruited locally to provide a 

basic level of security in a given area. Irregular security forces, when 

used in conjunction with all other available capabilities, contribute to, 

but do not in and of themselves, ensure success. While irregular security 

forces can be effective in conducting local security, intelligence gathering, 

surveillance and other tasks in their home areas, tasks that may prove more 

difficult for regular security forces, irregular forces are no silver bullet to 

achieving success. Counterinsurgency is a struggle for the support of the 

population against an active and thinking enemy and therefore, there are 

no hard and fast rules. Several counterinsurgency scholars and theorists 

do, however, agree on several key principles that can aid counterinsurgents 

in prosecuting their campaigns successfully. This paper seeks to add to the 

body of knowledge by examining the key aspects that counterinsurgents 

should take into account when considering raising an irregular security 

force.
iv

Acknowledgments

This thesis represents the support of my family, the leadership of past 

mentors, the support of the college, and the guidance of Dr. Daniel Marston. 

I and the other scholars are indebted to the Army for the opportunity this 

program provided. Many people contributed their personal time and 

recollections to our program, which was of great benefit to our research, 

and personally a great honor. I would like to thank in particular the men 

of the Special Air Service and the Sultan’s Armed Forces who shared their 

experiences in Dhofar so many years ago. I would also like to thank Balliol 

College at Oxford for hosting us and allowing us the use of their facilities 

for part of our research. 
v

Objectives of the Art of War Scholars Program

The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. 

It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically 

rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire 

for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War 

graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand 

the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools 

and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and 

independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt 

for cruder alternatives. Through the pursuit of these outcomes, the Art of 

War Scholars Program seeks to improve and deepen professional military 

education. 

The Art of War Program places contemporary operations (such as 

those in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a historical framework by examining 

earlier military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected 

to show the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns 

throughout the modern era. Coursework emphasizes the importance of 

understanding previous engagements in order to formulate policy and 

doctrinal response to current and future campaigns. 

One unintended consequence of military history education is the 

phenomenon of commanders and policy makers “cherry picking” 

history—that is, pointing to isolated examples from past campaigns 

to bolster a particular position in a debate, without a comprehensive 

understanding of the context in which such incidents occurred. This trend 

of oversimplification leaves many historians wary of introducing these 

topics into broader, more general discussion. The Art of War program seeks 

to avoid this pitfall by a thorough examination of context. As one former 

student stated: “The insights gained have left me with more questions than 

answers but have increased my ability to understand greater complexities 

of war rather than the rhetorical narrative that accompanies cursory study 

of any topic.”

Professor Michael Howard, writing “The Use and Abuse of Military 

History” in 1961, proposed a framework for educating military officers in 

the art of war that remains unmatched in its clarity, simplicity, and totality. 

The Art of War program endeavors to model his plan:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne in mind by the 

officer who studies military history as a guide to his profession and who 

wishes to avoid pitfalls. First, he must study in width. He must observe the 

way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period. Only 

by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not; and as much 

as can be learnt from the great discontinuities of military history as from 
vi

the apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the great captains 

through the ages....Next he must study in depth. He should take a single 

campaign and explore it thoroughly, not simply from official histories, 

but from memoirs, letters, diaries. . . until the tidy outlines dissolve and 

he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience... 

and, lastly, he must study in context. Campaigns and battles are not like 

games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from 

their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars are not tactical 

exercises writ large. They are...conflicts of societies, and they can be 

fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting 

them. The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the 

battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors which explain why 

armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in 

the way they do.... 

It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, military or civil... 

is not to make men clever for the next time; it is to make them wise forever.

Gordon B. Davis, Jr. 

Brigadier General, US Army

Deputy Commanding General

CAC LD&E

Daniel Marston 

DPhil (Oxon) FRHistS

Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair 

in the Art of War

US Army Command & General 

Staff College
vii

Table of Contents

Abstract......................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgments........................................................................ iv

Table of Contents ........................................................................ vii

Glossary ........................................................................................ ix

Chapter 1 Introduction .....................................................................1

Chapter 2: Raising Irregular Security Forces.................................21

Chapter 3: Dhofar Case Study .......................................................47

Chapter 4: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Case Study ..................83

Chapter 5: Conclusions................................................................115

Bibliography ...............................................................................127
viii
ix

GLOSSARY

AFM Army Field Manual

ANM Arab Nationalist Movement

AQI Al Qaeda in Iraq

BATT British Army Training Team

CAP Combined Action Platoon

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CSAF Commander, Sultan’s Armed Forces

DCA Dhofar Charitable Association

DLF Dhofar Liberation Front

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Alliance

OMLT Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team

OPLAN Operations Plan

PFLOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied 

Arabian Gulf

PLA People’s Liberation Army

SAF Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces

SAS Special Air Service
x
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

Mankind has waged insurgencies and counterinsurgencies throughout 

history.1

 Despite the large volume of material available for the study of 

these forms of conflict, there yet remains a great deal of myth and confusion 

surrounding insurgency and counterinsurgency. Modern western militaries 

largely neglected the study of counterinsurgency prior to the attacks on 

the United States on 11 September 2001. Stung by the loss in Vietnam, 

the US military chose to minimize counterinsurgency2

 and focused on the 

conventional warfare which it preferred and was better trained, organized, 

and equipped to conduct.

This choice was not merely academic, but impacted the way the Army 

trained, procured equipment, educated its leaders, and prepared for war. 

As Jonathan M. House wrote in Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth 

Century, “To meet the challenge of the wars of national liberation, Western 

armies had two choices – they could attempt to adapt their conventional 

forces to a style of war for which they were not intended, or they could 

neglect the development of new generations of armored weapons in favor 

of a renewed interest in light infantry forces.”3

 Should the United States 

expend the bulk of its resources to prepare its forces to win proxy wars of 

insurgency and counterinsurgency, or should it remain prepared to win the 

less likely but more serious conventional conflict with the Soviet Union? 

After Vietnam the choice was clear, and counterinsurgency was mostly 

discarded by the conventional force as a task for Special Forces.4

As the United States focused more on the possible conventional 

fight between the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) and the Sovietbacked Warsaw Pact, American strategy and doctrine envisaged a battle 

against numerically superior enemy forces5

 which required a defensive 

posture reliant more on firepower than maneuver.6

 In order to increase the 

odds of survival against a numerically superior enemy, American military 

leaders pressed for weapons systems with greater precision in an attempt 

to improve the Army’s odds on the battlefield.7

While precision weapons provide certain advantages, reliance upon 

them and idealistic overestimation of their capabilities supported false 

impressions of the true capabilities of a force. The decisive defeat of 

Saddam Hussein’s forces in the 1991 Gulf War bolstered and propelled the 

faith in technological silver bullets to ensure dominance in future armed 

conflict.8

 As Lieutenant Colonel H.R. McMaster wrote in his War College 

research paper, “The prevailing explanation for victory in the Gulf War – 

technological superiority – led many to believe that America had already 

generated or now had the opportunity to craft a “revolution in military 

affairs” or RMA.”9

If technology can provide silver bullets, all that remains is to determine 
2

what kind of threat must be eliminated. This leads to over-categorization of 

war as a necessary step in the process to develop silver-bullet solutions.10

As the former Army Chief of Staff, General George Casey, wrote in his 

October 2009 article in ARMY magazine, “Formerly, we could differentiate 

and categorize threats as conventional or unconventional; regular or 

irregular; high intensity or low intensity; traditional, terrorist or criminal. 

Such categorization was useful because each categorized threat had an 

associated counter.”11 The tendency to try to categorize warfare creates 

confusion, a muddled lexicon of catch-phrases, and leads to the search for 

a silver bullet as the “associated counter” to each type of threat.

The United States Army is not alone in its over-categorization of 

war. Frank Kitson12 commented on the confusion created by the use of 

several different terms used to describe basically the same type of conflict 

(e.g. “Civil Disturbance, Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare, Subversion, 

Terrorism”).13 Despite the fact that the armies of the US and UK have 

fought shoulder-to-shoulder in Iraq and Afghanistan for nearly a decade, 

and as a result each has revised its counterinsurgency doctrine with each 

manual citing Kitson’s works, each force has similar but distinct definitions 

for counterinsurgency and insurgency.

The United States Army and Marine Corps field manual on 

counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, defines counterinsurgency as “Those military, 

paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken 

by a government to defeat insurgency.”14 The British counterinsurgency 

manual, Army Field Manual (AFM) Volume 1:10 (2010), defines 

counterinsurgency as “Those military, law enforcement, political, 

economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency while 

addressing the root causes.”15 Counterinsurgency therefore is reactionary 

towards insurgency. The important question now becomes what are they 

countering? What is insurgency? 

FM 3-24 defines insurgency as “An organized movement aimed at 

the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion 

and armed conflict.”16 The British AFM 1:10 defines insurgency as “An 

organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as 

a challenge to established authority.”17 US and UK doctrine agree at least 

that insurgencies include violence and subversion.

King’s College London, professor and author John Mackinlay’s 

definition of insurgency, found in his book, The Insurgent Archipelago, 

agrees with the US and UK Army field manuals: 

[G]roups which used bombing, assassination, hostage-taking 

and similar acts, but failed to combine these acts with a broader 

subversive campaign, quickly found themselves fastened in a 

cycle of violence that seldom succeeded in gaining the sympathy 

of a wider population; they could therefore be correctly regarded 
3

as terrorists. But a movement which in addition to committing 

acts of terrorism also had a political strategy to subvert the 

population to such an extent that it attracted a reciprocating 

political response from the government, amounted to something 

more than terrorism. By successfully involving a substantial 

element of the population they raised the game from terrorism 

to insurgency.18

According to Mackinlay, insurgency includes both subversion 

and violence. David Kilcullen, a fellow contemporary author and 

counterinsurgency adviser, offers this definition of insurgency in his book, 

Counterinsurgency: “...an insurgency is an organized, protracted politicomilitary struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an 

established government, or occupying power, or other political authority 

while increasing insurgent control.”19 While Kilcullen’s definition doesn’t 

address the violence and subversion elements as directly as the definitions 

found in the manuals, one can assume that an organized struggle combining 

political and military components included both subversion and violence.

While the field manuals and these two authors generally agree that 

insurgency is the combination of subversion and violence, well-known 

counterinsurgency theorists of the Cold War20 era were not so uniform 

in their definitions of insurgency. For example, Frank Kitson separated 

subversion from insurgency.

Subversion, then, will be held to mean all illegal measures short 

of the use of armed force taken by one section of the people of 

a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, 

or to force them to do things which they do not want to do. 

Insurgency will be held to cover the use of armed force by a 

section of the people against the government for the purposes 

mentioned above.21

Robert Thompson22 also saw a distinction between subversion and 

insurgency, but placed them in order as a natural progression of conflict. 

The stage has been reached when the communists are ready 

for, but still not quite committed to, open insurgency. The 

main prong of their attack, subversion supported by selective 

terrorism, has reached a point at which they have to decide 

whether they can bring the government down by this means 

alone, or whether they will have to use the second prong of 

their attack, “armed struggle.” Insurgency is a measure both of 

the success and of the failure of subversion.23

According to Thompson, insurgency is the openly violent stage which 

follows subversion but only when subversion alone fails to bring down the 

government.
4

David Galula’s24 definition of insurgency did not use terms such as 

subversion or violence but dealt more with the process of overthrowing 

authority.25 “On the other hand, an insurgency is a protracted struggle 

conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific 

intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing 

order.”26 While Galula’s definition did not directly address violence, 

terrorism, or subversion, he did describe the “cold” and “hot” phases 

of the insurgent’s campaign which emphasize subversion and violence 

respectively.27 Perhaps Galula’s more general definition was due to the 

fact that his only counterinsurgency experience at the time he wrote his 

book was as a French tactical level commander during the Algerian War 

of Independence. 

Roger Trinquier, another commander of French troops during the 

Algerian War of Independence, saw insurgency as a new form of warfare 

and called it modern warfare.28 “Warfare is now an interlocking system 

of actions – political, economic, psychological, military – that aims at the 

overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement 

by another regime.”29 Perhaps, such as with Galula, Trinquier was 

commenting more broadly on nature of armed conflict in the modern era. 

Trinquier was trying to articulate his vision of the future of armed 

conflict so that his nation could better prepare, hopefully avoiding another 

defeat. As Carl von Clausewitz famously advised,

As the first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment 

that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish 

the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking 

it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its 

nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most 

comprehensive.30

Although it is important to understand the nature of the conflict, it is 

equally important to recognize that warfare is characterized by uncertainty. 

As H. R. McMaster wrote in an article regarding the character of conflict, 

“Indeed, leaders must recognize that war on land will remain fundamentally 

in the realm of uncertainty due to the human, psychological, political and 

cultural dimensions of conflict as well as the immanent interaction with 

adversaries able to use terrain, intermingle with the population, and adopt 

countermeasures to technological capabilities.”31 This brings us back to the 

former Army Chief of Staff’s comment regarding categorizing threats in 

order to develop appropriate counters. Superficially studying a campaign 

to identify one aspect or capability as the counter to the threat causes one 

to take a narrow view of conflict. After identifying the silver bullet, one 

then attempts to replicate not only the solution to the last conflict, but also 

the very nature of the last conflict as a comfortable problem frame.

The treatment of the Malayan Emergency in FM 3-24 provides an 
5

interesting example of the need for context. According to the manual, 

police reform and development were the keys to victory in the campaign. 

“The Malaya insurgency provides lessons applicable to combating any 

insurgency. Manpower is not enough; well-trained and well-disciplined 

forces are required. The Malayan example also illustrates the central role 

that police play in counterinsurgency operations.”32 The first sentence in 

the quote above would be true if it began with, “Once the context of the 

campaign is understood. . .” The second sentence is fairly obvious. Not 

until the third sentence do we begin to see the problem of looking for the 

silver bullet in a successful campaign. This broad generalization regarding 

the central role of police in successful counterinsurgency campaigns is 

not true. For example, police were not a major factor in the successful 

counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar.33

The simple term “police” itself is vague. Were the authors referring 

to the Home Guards who were a form of police auxiliaries, the local 

uniformed police who handled minor crime and dealt with law and order 

issues in population centers, or the Police Field Force (police jungle squads) 

which conducted counter-guerrilla operations?34 Additionally, the police 

were only one part of the security forces which were only one element 

of the campaign strategy.35 Without exploring the details of the Malayan 

Emergency, it would be easy for one reading FM 3-24 to conclude that 

a successful counterinsurgency strategy must include indigenous police 

forces as its centerpiece, or as the “associated counter” to the insurgent 

threat.

The value of FM 3-24 and AFM 1:10 is in their discussion of general 

principles of counterinsurgency warfare.36 While some principles included 

in these manuals were the result of examinations of the conflicts in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, most of the principles were developed by many of 

the authors mentioned thus far (e.g. Galula, Thompson, and Kitson). 

Because these past authors, and some modern ones, developed their 

principles based on an in-depth examination of various counterinsurgency 

campaigns, they have proven to be of value in understanding the nature 

of counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, most modern theorists use many 

of the same principles derived from the study of the last 200 years of 

counterinsurgency experience. 

Unlike strategists who seek victory through, and advocate for, silver 

bullets (e.g. advanced command and control networks and information 

dominance37), classic counterinsurgency theorists such as Thompson, 

Kitson, and Galula acknowledge the unpredictable nature of conflict. 

These theorists describe what worked in specific campaigns and how the 

general principles of those successful components could apply without 

attempting to portray their ideas as guarantees of success. A brief discussion 

of the key principles developed by classic and modern counterinsurgency 

authors follows.
6

Galula’s most influential contributions to the study and practice of 

counterinsurgency were the importance of protecting the population, and 

the primacy of political power over military power.38 In his own words,

Destroying or expelling from an area the main body of the 

guerrilla forces, preventing their return, installing garrisons to 

protect the population, tracking the guerrilla remnants–these 

are predominantly military operations.39

That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of 

both principle and practicality. What is at stake is the country’s 

political regime, and to defend it is a political affair. Even if 

this requires military action, the action is constantly directed 

toward a political goal. Essential though it is, the military action 

is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to 

afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with 

the population.40

Galula further stated that the political and military aspects of the 

counterinsurgency campaign are multiplied and not added to reach a 

product and not a sum, and that if any of the factors is zero, the product, or 

results of the campaign, will also be zero.41

In addition to these tenets, Galula offered four laws. The first law stated 

that the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent 

as for the insurgent.42 His second law stated that support is gained through 

an active minority, which requires those supporting the counterinsurgents 

to assist in gaining the support of the neutral minority against the minority 

which supports the insurgents.43 Galula’s third law cautioned that 

support from the population is conditional based on the perception of the 

counterinsurgents’ strength, will and capability to win, and demonstrated 

success against the insurgents.44 Galula’s fourth law advised against 

diluting efforts and resources across the entire area of operations but rather 

concentrating them area by area to relieve the population and convince 

them of the counterinsurgents’ viability.45

Thompson also developed a set of five principles to guide future 

counterinsurgents based on his experiences in various campaigns. As with 

Galula, Thompson emphasized the role of politics in counterinsurgency as 

well as the importance of protecting the population while also advocating 

for a clear political aim and plan for the campaign.46 As the predecessor 

to the contemporary term “clear, hold, build,” Thompson coined the term 

“clear and hold” as part of his four stage operational concept:47

For “clear” operations the ... area itself should be selected 

as an extension of an area already securely held, and should 

first be subjected to an intense intelligence effort before any 

operations start...the first essential is to saturate it with joint 

military and police forces. This will force the insurgent units 
7

either to disperse within the area or possibly to withdraw to 

neighbouring areas still under their control or disputed. The 

government’s forces should then be so deployed as to make 

it impossible for the insurgent forces to reconcentrate within 

the area or to re-infiltrate from outside. Clear operations will, 

however, be a waste of time unless the government is ready to 

follow them up immediately with “hold” operations. ... The 

objects of a hold operation are to restore government authority 

in the area and to establish a firm security framework. ... This 

hold period of operations inevitably takes a considerable time. 

... It never really ends.48

Thompson’s concept was put to good use in the Iraqi city of Tal Afar 

in 2005 by the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment49 whose commander was 

well versed in the works of Galula, Thompson, and Kitson.50

The final classic theorist discussed is Frank Kitson, who wrote Low 

Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping that 

encapsulated his experiences in campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. 

While Kitson provided a detailed and comprehensive examination of 

counterinsurgency, his most profound contribution centered on intelligence 

collection. According to General Sir Michael Carver,51 “The necessity for 

the intimate integration of intelligence and operations is his most important 

lesson and the one least appreciated by the conventional soldier.”52 As noted 

in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, “More than any other theorist, 

he explained the importance and methods of intelligence collection and 

training. Indeed, he is the first to articulate intelligence collection as key 

to success, rather than assuming it to be an unstated and integral aspect of 

other principles.”53

Kitson regarded intelligence as consisting of two main functions – 

collection of background information, and development of actionable 

intelligence.54 The whole purpose of these intelligence functions was 

to put troops in contact with the insurgents.55 Kitson offered, “To oversimplify the full process it could be said that it is the responsibility of the 

intelligence organization to produce background information and that it is 

then up to operational commanders to develop it to the extent necessary for 

their men to make contact with the enemy, using their own resources.”56

Frank Kitson placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of the 

commander in the intelligence function of a counterinsurgency campaign. 

He acknowledged the fact that fulfilling this role would require a great 

deal of the commander’s time and focus.57 Kitson justified commanders’ 

devotion of time and energy to the intelligence function against criticism 

that acting in this manner would cause commanders to neglect the other 

duties associated with command. 

But the point has already been made that the main problem in 
8

fighting insurgents lies in finding them ...a tactical commander 

should concentrate on it, and in any case the business cannot 

be delegated, because the process of absorbing the background 

information and making plans for the use of the troops based 

on it is inseparable from the function of command. Either the 

commander does it or it is not done at all.58

Kitson concluded his 200-plus page book on counterinsurgency by 

cautioning the reader that, “Although such a cursory examination can not 

be expected to lead to any fundamental conclusions, it might at least serve 

to provide a stepping stone for a further study.”59 This type of humility 

underscores the classic counterinsurgency theorists’ understanding that 

there are no associated counters to insurgency, only general principles 

which emerge only after in-depth examination of multiple conflicts.

David Kilcullen continued this sentiment, stating, “there are no standard 

templates or universal solutions in counterinsurgency. Fundamentals and 

principles exist, but they require judgment in application, and there is 

no substitute for studying the environment in detail, developing locally 

tailored solutions, and being prepared to adjust them in an agile way 

as the situation develops.”60 Kilcullen offered his views in the form of 

“Twenty-Eight Articles,”61 a distillation of his observations of companylevel counterinsurgency best practices.62

Another set of fourteen counterinsurgency fundamentals offered by 

contemporary authors is included in the introduction of Counterinsurgency 

in Modern Warfare.

63 Key among these fundamentals are “Comprehension 

of existing history and doctrine.... Adaptation to local situations and 

learning from mistakes. ... Population security ... and Raise, mentor, and 

fight alongside host nation forces.”64 Developed from an examination of 

selected counterinsurgency campaigns from 1898 to present, and ongoing 

campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the list of fundamentals “attempts 

to capture some of the elements which are present in successful COIN 

campaigns.”65 As with Kitson and Kilcullen, the authors emphasize the 

complex nature of counterinsurgency operations which confounds any 

attempts to rely on a “silver bullet” solution.66

Despite the long period of neglect in the US military’s study of 

counterinsurgency, the results of past campaigns have once again emerged 

to be studied. This is evident in the first revision of US Army and Marine 

Corps counterinsurgency doctrine in decades as well as a thorough revision 

of the UK Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. Additional evidence 

includes the guidance issued by commanders at the highest level in the 

ongoing war in Afghanistan such as the following from the former senior 

US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McCrystal:

1. Protect and Partner with the People.

2. Conduct a Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Campaign.
9

3. Understand the Environment.

4. Ensure Values Underpin our Effort.

5. Listen Closely—Speak Clearly.

6. Act as One Team.

7. Constantly Adapt.

8. Act with Courage and Resolve.67

This guidance reflects many of the principles, rules, and themes 

identified by past and contemporary students of counterinsurgency.

Recognition of the need to discard unrealistic aspirations of “silver 

bullets” to counter security threats now resides in the office of the senior 

US Army officer, newly appointed Army Chief of Staff General Martin E. 

Dempsey. During a speech on 25 February 2010, General Dempsey said: 

Technology will never deliver everything we need to know about 

our adversaries. Army forces must first strive to understand the 

situation in depth, width and context, then develop the situation 

through action, adjusting the approach over time as needed. 

To understand our enemies’ capabilities, intentions, morale 

and level of support among the civilian population, we have to 

think, act, learn and then adapt.68

Despite General Dempsey’s comments and guidance issued by senior 

commanders engaged in counterinsurgency operations, there remains 

a tendency to attempt to extrapolate solutions developed at lower levels 

across the operational area in a “cookie-cutter” manner. This may be due 

in part to intense pressure to produce results, or a fundamental lack of 

understanding of the principles of counterinsurgency described thus far. 

It may also stem from thinking such as that expressed by Trinquier which 

advocated for a single hand guiding the ship:

The struggle against the guerrilla is not, as one might suppose, 

a war of lieutenants and captains. The number of troops that 

must be put into action, the vast areas over which they will be 

led to do battle, the necessity of coordinating diverse actions 

over these vast areas, the politico-military measures to be taken 

regarding the populace, the necessarily close cooperation with 

various branches of the civil administration – all this requires 

that operations against the guerrilla be conducted according to 

a plan, established at a very high command level.69

Trinquier’s comment has merit, especially in a campaign lacking 

much diversity across the operational area (e.g. ethnic, tribal, political, 

religious). In more complex environments such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 

Trinquier’s vision of centralized control becomes more difficult as the 

conditions change dramatically from one valley to another, indeed from one 
10

neighborhood to the next. As stated in the 2009 Army Capstone Concept, 

“The uniqueness of local conditions and uncertainty associated with the 

interaction of Army forces with the enemy and complex environments will 

confound efforts to develop an aggregated common operational picture as 

a basis for centralized decision making or control of forces.”70

The attempt to replicate the Al Anbar Awakening71 through the Sons 

of Iraq72 was an example of this ongoing issue. In Al Anbar province, a 

predominantly Sunni area of Iraq, the traditional leaders and the people 

of the resident tribes saw Al Qaeda as the greater evil over the American 

troops and sought assistance in ousting Al Qaeda.73 It signaled a tectonic 

shift in the will of the people of Al Anbar province. Unlike the Anbar 

Awakening, the Sons of Iraq program sought to replicate the product of the 

Awakening, irregular forces securing their areas against Al Qaeda activity 

and influence, without the unity of the communities to bind them together 

and support them. 

What led U.S. senior commanders to believe such a shallow replication 

of events in Al Anbar could work? Perhaps the true reasons for the shift 

in Sunni attitude in Al Anbar were misunderstood. One side of the debate 

discussed by Najim al Jabouri, a former Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police officer, 

and former mayor of Tal Afar, believed that the Anbar Awakening was a 

result of successful coalition operations resulting in the confidence of the 

people. “Contrary to a growing U.S. narrative about the Sunni Awakening 

being mainly the fruit of U.S. counterinsurgency tactics, in Ramadi having 

the U.S. forces in the neighborhoods was not what made the people feel 

safe. They felt safe when their men could join the police force and secure 

their areas by themselves.”74

Certainly it appears that the Sons of Iraq, in conjunction with other 

efforts during the period of the Surge, had a positive impact and contributed 

to the success of the campaign.75 If nothing else, the Sons of Iraq initiative 

tied local Iraqis and their families to the US-led coalition and the Iraqi 

government while creating a local security force able to hold cleared areas 

against re-infiltration of insurgents.76 The fact that a locally raised security 

force was effective in supporting the government against insurgents is not 

surprising given the examination of classic and modern counterinsurgency 

theorists who all agree such forces are vital to success.

Raising conventional security forces is fairly straightforward forward 

but takes a long time and often fails to produce forces able to gather 

intelligence critical in counterinsurgency operations. As author James 

Corum concluded in Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: 

A Tale of Two Insurgencies, regarding counterinsurgency campaigns in 

Malaya and Cyprus, 

What determined government success or failure in 

counterguerrilla operations was not force size or firepower, 
11

but intelligence. ... In counterinsurgency campaigns, military 

units and special police strike units, such as the police jungle 

companies in Malaya, are routinely shifted around to different 

sectors, according to the needs of the moment, while police 

remain on the ground dealing with civilians on a daily basis 

and, hopefully, building a detailed intelligence picture of the 

insurgent strength, organization, and support in each local 

sector. Effective counterinsurgency relies on good human 

intelligence, and no military unit can match a good police unit 

in developing an accurate human intelligence picture of their 

area of operations.77

The Sons of Iraq were not police though many among them aspired to 

one day join the police.78 The Sons of Iraq shared many characteristics with 

the police forces described by Corum as they were from the community in 

which they operated, were not employed outside of their communities,79

and were therefore able to provide additional intelligence. As Greg Bruno 

of the Washington Post wrote, “In April 2008, Petraeus echoed those 

gains in testimony before U.S. lawmakers. Tips from Sunni volunteers 

have ‘reduced significantly’ al-Qaeda in Iraq’s ability to strike, the general 

said, and have increased the number of weapons caches uncovered and 

confiscated.”

In view of the volume of analysis provided by past and contemporary 

counterinsurgency scholars, and in light of recent and ongoing 

counterinsurgency operations, this thesis explores the key considerations 

for irregular security forces in counterinsurgency. Using the theme 

discussed above, this thesis examines two conflicts and presents case 

studies of the campaigns in Dhofar, Oman, from 1965 to 1975 and in Iraq 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This body of work will attempt to 

demonstrate the value of irregular security forces while also dispelling 

any ideas that such forces in themselves constitute a silver bullet or an 

associated counter to insurgent threats. 
12

Notes

1. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (London: Faber and Faber, 

1972), 15. “The important point to notice is that guerrilla warfare is described as 

a traditional form of conflict, and that it has been used throughout history either 

independently or in conjunction with orthodox operations. In fact, comments on 

the conduct of such operations were included in a book written as long ago as the 

fourth century B.C. by the Chinese general Sun Tzu, which still makes sense and 

which Mao Tse Tung is known to have studied when formulating his own ideas 

on the subject.”

2. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 13. “After being neglected 

in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the study of counterinsurgency returned to 

prominence in the early years of the 21st century as a result of the wars in Iraq 

and Afghanistan.”

3. Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century

(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 190. “Moreover, nuclear 

deterrence made it seem suicidal for two nuclear powers to fight directly; instead, 

the United States and the Soviet Union fought a series of proxy conflicts, in 

which one or both sides provided aid to lesser allies while maintaining the fiction 

that the two superpowers were at peace with each other.”

4. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), vii. “Counterinsurgency 

operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine 

and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years 

ago.”

5. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 239. “The West 

German government’s desire to protect every kilometer of its shallow territory 

obligated the U.S. Army to defend along the interzonal border established in 

1945, with little opportunity for delaying or maneuver tactics. At least during the 

first battles of such a war, the U.S. Army would have to fight outnumbered and 

outgunned by a superior Soviet foe.”

6. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 240. “The 

How-to-Fight manuals described offensive operations as well as maneuver when 

on the defensive, but they seemed to emphasize a desperate struggle against 

overwhelming odds, much like that fought by Israeli tankers on the Golan Heights 

at the start of the 1973 war. Using the ROAD divisional structure, cross-attached 

task forces and teams of infantry and armor would fight from hull-down positions. 

Minefields would slow down the enemy advance, after which antitank guided 

missiles at long range and faster firing tank guns at short range would whittle 

down a huge attacking force. The defenders would rely on firepower more than 

on maneuver or initiative.”

7. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 246. “For 

centuries, tactics had been based on firing a huge volume of shells at the enemy, 

even though only a small percentage ever found their targets. In the late twentieth 

century, however, the advent of guided bombs, cruise missiles, and individually 

fired missiles changed this equation fundamentally, making a few, relatively 
13

inexpensive, weapons far more effective than thousands of dumb bombs and 

shells.”

8. Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC PAM 525-3-0, The Army 

Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability—Operating Under Conditions of 

Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict (Fort Monroe, VA: 

Government Printing Office, 2009), 6. “In the 1990s, many argued that United 

States’ (U.S.) competitive advantages in communications, information, and 

precision strike technologies had brought about a revolution in military affairs 

(RMA). RMA advocates, however, neglected many of the continuities of armed 

conflict and did not recognize the limitations of new technologies and emerging 

military capabilities. In particular, concepts that relied mainly on the ability to 

target enemy forces with long range precision munitions separated war from its 

political, cultural, and psychological contexts. Some of this work focused on how 

U.S. forces might prefer to fight and then assumed that preference was relevant 

to the problem of future war. Literature describing the RMA and the movement 

known as defense transformation was rooted in the belief that surveillance, 

communications, and information technologies would dramatically improve 

battlespace knowledge, eliminate surprise, and permit U.S. forces to achieve full 

spectrum dominance through the employment of precision-strike capabilities. 

Concepts and ideas with labels such as network-centric warfare, rapid decisive 

operations, and shock and awe, entailed the application of leap-ahead capabilities 

that would enable small networked forces to win wars quickly and at low cost. 

RMA and defense transformation-related thinking influenced Army doctrine, 

organization, and modernization.”

9. Lieutenant Colonel Herbert R. McMaster, “Crack in the Foundation: 

Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge 

in Future War” (Research Projects, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, 2003), 9.

10. For a rich debate on this topic, visit the Small Wars Journal “On War 

Modifiers” debate posted 6 March 2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ 

2009/03/print/on-war-modifiers/ (accessed 27 April 2011). 

11. General George W. Casey Jr., “The Army of the 21st Century,” ARMY

(October 2009): 28.

12. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 15. 

“General Sir Frank Kitson (British Army) wrote Low Intensity Operations in 

1971. Kitson served in the anti-Mau-Mau, Malayan Emergency, Oman, Cyprus, 

and Northern Ireland operations.”

13. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 2. “In writing on this subject one of 

the most difficult problems concerns the matter of terminology. The British Army 

gives separate definitions of Civil Disturbance, Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare, 

Subversion, Terrorism, Civil Disobedience, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, 

and Insurrection on the one hand and of Counter Insurgency, Internal Security, and 

Counter Revolutionary Operations on the other. Elsewhere conflicts are variously 

described as Partisan, Irregular or Unconventional Wars, and the people taking 

part in them have an even wider selection of labels attached to them. Furthermore, 

although a particular author will use one of these terms to cover one aspect of the 

business and another to cover another, a different author will use the same two 
14

terms in a totally different way.”

14. FM 3-24, Glossary-4.

15. Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, 

Countering Insurgency (London: Ministry of Defense, 2010), 1-4.

16. FM 3-24, Glossary-5.

17. British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10, 1-4.

18. John Mackinlay, The Insurgent Archipelago, (London:C. Hurst and Co. 

Ltd., 2009), 70-71.

19. David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, (New York:Oxford University 

Press, 2010), 1. On page 2, Kilcullen further defines counterinsurgency, “Indeed, 

if you cut the qualifying adjectives out of the field manual’s [FM 3-24] definition 

of counterinsurgency, you are left only with ‘actions taken by a government to 

defeat insurgency.’ This truncated definition shows that there is no template, 

no single set of techniques, for countering insurgencies. Counterinsurgency is, 

simply, whatever governments do to defeat rebellions. Thus, the character of any 

particular conflict is impossible to understand without reference to three defining 

factors: the nature of the insurgency being countered, the nature of the government 

being supported, and the environment – especially the human environment – in 

which the conflict takes place.”

20. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare,, 13. 

“There are three ‘key’ theorists from this period, whose works are still influential: 

Colonel David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, Sir 

Robert Thompson, and General Sir Frank Kitson.”

21. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 3.

22. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare,, 14. “Sir 

Robert Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, outlining the 

lessons of his experiences in the Malayan Emergency.”

23. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of 

Malaya and Vietnam, (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967), 28.

24. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 13. 

“Colonel David Galula was a French officer who served from 1965-58 in the 

Algerian War of Independence. His book, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 

and Practice, was written in 1964, based upon his experiences in Algeria.”

25. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, (Florida: 

Hailer, 2005), 44-58. Galula describes the orthodox or communist pattern for 

revolutionary warfare as a five-step process. The first step is the creation of a 

political party. The second step is to build up support for the party. In the third 

step, guerrilla warfare, armed struggle continues the political struggle when 

political action and subversion have failed to allow the insurgents to seize power. 

Movement warfare is the fourth step. It is required to defeat the counterinsurgents’ 

conventional forces. In the final step, the annihilation campaign, the insurgents 

conduct offensive operations to complete the destruction of the counterinsurgents.

26. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 4. 

27. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 63. “From the 
15

counterinsurgent’s point of view, a revolutionary war can be divided into two 

periods: 1. The ‘cold revolutionary war,’ when the insurgent’s activity remains 

on the whole legal and nonviolent ... 2. The ‘hot revolutionary war,’ when the 

insurgent’s activity becomes openly illegal and violent ...”

28. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, 

(New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), 8-9. “In modern warfare, we are not 

actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few 

armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special 

organization. ... In seeking a solution, it is essential to realize that in modern 

warfare we are not up against just a few armed bands spread across a given 

territory, but rather against an armed clandestine organization whose essential 

role is to impose its will upon the population. Victory will be obtained only 

through the complete destruction of that organization. This is the master concept 

that must guide us in our study of modern warfare.”

29. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 6.

30. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88–9.

31. H.R. McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned,” in Survival: Global 

Politics and Strategy, 50, no. 1 (2008): 27.

32. FM 3-24, 6-22.

33. For a detailed description of the Dhofar campaign, refer to the Dhofar 

case study in this paper.

34. Robert Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization 

of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort. (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972), 38-41.

35. For a detailed description of the Malayan Emergency and the elements of 

the successful strategy, see Daniel Marston, “The Indian Army, Partition, and the 

Punjab Boundary Force, 1945-1947,” War in History 16, no. 4 (2009): 469-505; 

Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of 

British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 

eds. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 

101-118; Robert Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization 

of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972), http://

www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R957/ (accessed 23 April 2011), 25-68; John 

Coates, Suppressing Insurgency (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 77-108; 

James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of 

Two Insurgencies, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pubs/display.

cfm?PubID=648 (accessed 23 April 2011), 1-24, 34-54. 

36. FM 3-24 discusses the principles and paradoxes of counterinsurgency on 

pages 1-20 thru 1-28, and in AFM 1:10 (2010) on pages 3-1 thru 3-16.

37. McMaster, Crack in the Foundation, 61. “Enthusiasm for impressive 

new technologies connected by the network into a ‘system of systems’ led many 

to conclude prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom that those capabilities represented a 

‘silver bullet’ solution to the complex problem of war.”

38. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 13-14.

39. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 87.
16

40. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 89.

41. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 87. “The 

expected result — final defeat of the insurgents — is not an addition but a 

multiplication of these various operations; they are all essential and if one is nil, 

the product will be zero.”

42. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 75. “The 

population, therefore, becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was 

for his enemy. Its tacit support, its submission to law and order, its consensus — 

taken for granted in normal times — have been undermined by the insurgent’s 

activity. And the truth is that the insurgent, with his organization at the grass roots, 

is tactically the strongest of opponents where it counts, at the population level. 

This is where the fight has to be conducted, in spite of the counterinsurgent’s 

ideological handicap and in spite of the head start gained by the insurgent in 

organizing the population.”

43. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 75-76.

44. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 78-79.

45. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 79. Galula’s 

fourth law is “Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.”

46. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 50-58. Thompson’s 

principles are: “First principle. The government must have a clear political aim: to 

establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically 

and economically stable and viable. ...Second principle. The government must 

function in accordance with law. ... Third principle. The government must have an 

overall plan. ... Fourth principle. The government must give priority to defeating 

the political subversion, not the guerillas. ...Fifth principle. In the guerilla phase 

of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.”

47. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 111. “As already stated in 

the basic principles, the government must have an overall plan to co-ordinate all 

military and civil effort and to lay down priorities. The plan must also take into 

account the fourth and fifth principles that the main emphasis should be given 

to defeating subversion, not the guerillas, and that the government must secure 

its base areas first. When applying this to action and operations on the ground, 

there will be four definite stages which can be summed up as clearing, holding, 

winning, and won.”

48. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 111-112.

49. FM 3-24, 5-22 thru 5-23.

50. This is based on the author’s personal experience as the plans officer for 

the 3d ACR during the pre-deployment training period which included seminar 

discussions between the Regimental Commander and his subordinate commanders, 

as well as a reading list which included several of the counterinsurgency classics.

51. Chief of the General Staff in the UK at the time of publication

52. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, xi. Included in the foreword by 

General Carver.

53. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 15.
17

54. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 96. “A cow can turn grass into milk 

but a further process is required in order to turn the milk into butter. Two separate 

functions are therefore involved in putting troops into contact with insurgents. The 

first one consists of collecting background information, and the second involves 

developing it into contact information.”

55. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 96. “Two separate functions are 

therefore involved in putting troops into contact with insurgents.”

56. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 96.

57. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 98-99. “Clearly, if a commander 

is going to operate in this way it means that he must be prepared to devote an 

immense amount of his time, thought, and energy to handling information.”

58. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 99.

59. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 200.

60. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 26-27.

61. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 26. “Twenty-Eight Articles” has been 

published numerous times in periodicals such as Military Review, the Marine 

Corps Gazette, and FM 3-24.

62. A newly annotated version of “Twenty-Eight Articles” is included in 

David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 

30-49.

63. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 18. 

64. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 18.

65. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 18.

66. Marston and Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 19. “This 

book does not endorse any single explanation for success in counterinsurgency. 

As this list shows, the whole process of waging a successful counterinsurgency 

campaign is delicate and complex, requiring nuanced understanding and flexibility 

on the part of all involved.”

67. General Stanley A. McChrystal, U.S. Army, Commander, US ForcesAfghanistan, Commander, International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan, 

“Eight Imperatives for Success in Afghanistan From ‘Commander’s Initial 

Guidance,’ 13 June 2009,” Military Review, (July-August 2009): 136. “1. Protect 

and Partner with the People. We are fighting for the Afghan people—not against 

them. Our focus on their welfare will build the trust and support necessary for 

success. 2. Conduct a Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Campaign. Insurgencies 

fail when root causes disappear. Security is essential, but I believe our ultimate 

success lies in partnering with the Afghan Government, partner nations, NGOs, and 

others to build the foundations of good government and economic development. 3. 

Understand the Environment. We must understand in detail the situation, however 

complex, and be able to explain it to others. Our ability to act effectively demands 

a real appreciation for the positive and negative impact of everything we do — or 

fail to do. Understanding is a prerequisite for success. 4. Ensure Values Underpin 

our Effort. We must demonstrate through our words and actions our commitment 

to fair play, our respect and sensitivity for the cultures and traditions of others, and 
18

an understanding that rules of law and humanity do not end when fighting starts. 

Both our goals and conduct must be admired. 5. Listen Closely-Speak Clearly. We 

must listen to understand—and speak clearly to be understood. Communicating 

our intentions and accurately reflecting our actions to all audiences is a critical 

responsibility—and necessity. 6. Act as One Team. We are an alliance of nations 

with different histories, cultures, and national objectives united in our support 

for Afghanistan. We must be unified in purpose, forthright in communication, 

and committed to each other. 7. Constantly Adapt. This war is unique, and our 

ability to respond to even subtle changes in conditions will be decisive. I ask you 

to challenge conventional wisdom and abandon practices that are ingrained into 

many military cultures. And I ask you to push me to do the same. 8. Act with 

Courage and Resolve. Hard fighting, difficult decisions, and inevitable losses will 

mark the days ahead. Each of us, from our most junior personnel to our senior 

leaders, must display physical, mental, and moral courage. Our partners must trust 

our commitment; enemies must not question our resolve.”

68. General Martin E. Dempsey, “The Army Capstone Concept and 

Institutional Adaptation,” Landpower Essay 10-1 (March 2010): 3, http://www.

ausa.org/ publications/ilw/Documents/LPE10-1.pdf (accessed 31 May 2011). 

69. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 92.

70. Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC PAM 525-3-0, 28.

71. Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles 

in the Sunni Awakening,” PRISM 2, no. 1 (2010): 11. “The people were hoping 

for someone to take a stand against AQI. Abdul Sattar started stating openly what 

people were thinking (but did not dare to say publicly): that al Qaeda and Iran 

were the real occupiers in Iraq, not the Americans. Then, on September 9, 2006, 

Abdul Sattar and Faisal Gaoud — a former governor of Anbar and representative 

of the tribal elite residing in Amman who had been soliciting U.S. support for an 

Awakening since 2004 — announced the Anbar Awakening. In his guestroom, in 

the presence of the 1–1 AD commander as well as over a dozen of his tribal peers, 

Abdul Sattar boldly declared that the American troops were “friendly forces” and 

“guests in Anbar.” This topic is discussed in detail in the Iraq case study. 

72. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

14. “In an effort to expand the influence of the Awakening, General Petraeus 

started the Sons of Iraq program for operations in Diyala and Baghdad, usually 

paying Sunni tribesmen in al Qaeda-infested areas to work as paramilitaries with 

the hope that someday they would be integrated into the Ministry of the Interior.”

73. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

12. “As Sheikh Sattar was successful in gaining U.S. support in police recruitment, 

his popularity and influence grew.”

74. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

11.

75. Colonel Wayne Grigsby, DefenseLink News Transcript: DOD News 

Briefing with Colonel Grigsby from Iraq, https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/

document.php? CISOROOT=/merln&CISOPTR=7324&REC=1, (accessed on 

13 May 2011). As an example, Sons of Iraq are noted in this quote as assisting 

in holding and controlling areas cleared of insurgents. “For instance, where al 
19

Qaeda and other Sunni extremist groups had their run in the southern portion 

of our battlespace, now we estimate there are three Sunni extremist groups of 

no more than 10 personnel per group in our battlespace, disrupted and not able 

to synchronize operations. We killed or captured their leaders, denied them use 

of safe houses and support zones and with our Sons of Iraq allies we are sitting 

in the former resupply lines, holding the terrain, not letting the extremists come 

back in.” 

76. Captain Pete Hegseth, “Sons of Iraq: A grassroots surge against al-Qaeda,” 

National Review Online, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/223811/sonsiraq/pete-hegseth (accessed 13 May 2011). “The importance of these forces can 

hardly be overstated. After American and national Iraqi forces clear an area of 

insurgents, the Sons of Iraq remain to hold the neighborhood and protect the 

population, driving out the final remnants of resistance.”

77. James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale 

of Two Insurgencies. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ display.

cfm?PubID=648, (accessed 13 March 2011): 36.

78. Hegseth, “Sons of Iraq,” 3. “The Sons are not nearly as well trained as 

their Iraqi army and police counterparts, but to a man, they expect to eventually 

become formally recognized as trained Iraqi police. They want to serve their 

country in uniform and — as soon as conditions permit — without consideration 

of sectarian background.”

79. Hegseth, “Sons of Iraq,” 2. “All Sons of Iraq and their leadership are 

required to be residents of the neighborhoods they protect and are not allowed to 

enforce law outside their assigned area or to conduct offensive operations.”
20
21

Chapter 2

Raising Irregular Security Forces

A victory is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s 

forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus 

the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, 

isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by 

and with the population.

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare

This paper explores the key considerations for irregular security forces 

in counterinsurgency. These factors include purpose, strategy, threat, 

composition, legitimacy, training, location of employment, leadership, 

partnership, advisory, and scope. The remainder of this chapter defines 

irregular security forces and discusses the factors listed above.

US Army doctrine defines irregular forces as “Armed individuals or 

groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other 

internal security forces.”1

 For the purpose of this paper, the term irregular 

security forces refers to indigenous security forces, not part of the regular 

police or military organizations of the host nation. Irregular security forces 

recruit from the local population to provide a basic level of security in a 

given area. Examples of irregular security forces include the Philippine 

Constabulary,2

 the Firqat in Dhofar,3 and the Sons of Iraq.4 Other common 

terms for irregular security forces include militias, auxiliaries, and 

paramilitary forces. 

Irregular security forces generally do not clear areas of insurgents, 

but rather conduct security operations to hold an area after regular forces 

(e.g. army,5

 police) have cleared it in order to prevent the insurgents from 

regaining control.6

 Irregular security forces operate where they live to 

secure their own clansmen, tribesmen, families, or communities. Irregular 

security forces generally do not conduct operations outside of the local 

area from which the host nation or intervening power recruits them. 

Because irregular security forces usually operate where they live, 

they are the first line of defense against insurgent attempts to infiltrate, 

re-infiltrate, intimidate, or recruit members of the population to support 

the insurgency. Although army forces can provide this first line of defense, 

they are not the force best suited to the task. Army forces train to locate, 

close with, and destroy enemy forces. Army approaches often involve 

ample use of firepower and may result in collateral damage. For example, 

Major General C. H. Boucher, General Officer Commanding at the outset 

of the Malayan Emergency, initially saw the campaign as a conventional 

war, and subsequently directed soldiers to respond to violence with greater 

violence, shoot to kill, and conduct large-scale sweeps to locate and destroy 

enemy persons, factions, and supporters.7
22

Because they are a national force versus a local force, army forces 

often operate outside their home areas and therefore lack any connection 

to the local population.8

 When army forces operate in a particular area, it 

is usually for a short-term operation which, when contrasted to irregular 

security forces that operate in the area permanently, creates a more limited 

level of situational understanding. Additionally, employing army forces 

in local security duties consumes offensive capabilities possibly needed 

elsewhere.9

 Because army forces take longer to train and equip than 

irregular security forces, a host nation may give development of army 

forces a lower priority when battling an insurgency. This is especially 

likely when the host nation faces no external conventional threats, or when 

a capable interventionist power is present to assist the host nation and 

deter external aggression. 

Police forces10 are generally better suited to local security than are 

army forces.11 Police seek to prevent violence if possible and, because they 

generally live in the area where they operate, are in constant contact with the 

local populace. As with army forces, police also require extensive training, 

equipment, and infrastructure (e.g. headquarters or precinct buildings, 

vehicles, communications equipment), and therefore require more time 

and resources to form. When counterinsurgents form improperly trained 

police forces, these forces often tend to exacerbate the situation through 

heavy-handed tactics and corruption.12

When drawn from the population, irregular security forces have 

several inherent advantages (e.g. knowledge of local terrain, normal 

patterns of life and social structure, and shared interests in the welfare 

of the community) over other types of security forces, which combine to 

make them effective sources of intelligence.13 In contrast to army or police 

units, counterinsurgents can raise irregular forces relatively quickly. These 

rapidly raised irregular security forces can be effective without extensive 

training or a large amount of materiel support. This reduces the amount of 

resources that counterinsurgents must divert from regular security forces, 

and allows the regular security forces to focus on offensive operations 

versus static security duties.14 Because of the unique capabilities and 

characteristics of irregular security forces, the host nation may choose to 

raise them even if it has the capability and capacity to raise regular forces. 

It is important to note at this point that while irregular security forces 

can potentially fill a security gap more quickly than regular forces can, this 

is only a short-term solution. Defeating insurgencies often requires a longterm approach involving development or expansion of regular forces.15

The development of regular security forces may involve the incorporation 

of some of the irregular forces into the regular security forces or the 

formalization of the irregular forces as was the case in the Philippines16

and Malaya17 respectively. The government of Iraq initially overlooked the 

benefits of transitioning irregular security forces to regular security forces 
23

after the formation of the Sons of Iraq, many of whom sought inclusion 

into a more long-term security force.18

Purpose

In order to develop appropriate irregular security forces, host nations 

and/or intervening powers must understand and clearly articulate the 

security requirements that irregular security forces will address. For 

example, if the purpose of irregular security forces is to deny insurgent 

access to the population by conducting patrols around a secured population 

center at night, as was the case with the Home Guard in the Malayan 

Emergency,19 then the level of training required for irregular security 

forces may be low. Other potential purposes for irregular forces may 

include assisting in population control,20 intelligence gathering, fixed site 

security,21 performing surveillance of local areas, or augmenting regular 

forces during limited offensive operations. Without a clear purpose for 

irregular security forces, the host nation or intervening power cannot 

apply the appropriate resources to train, equip, and employ those forces. 

To develop a clear purpose for irregular security forces, the host nation 

must first understand several aspects of the campaign such as the enemy 

situation, and the availability of regular forces to support and advise 

irregular forces on a daily basis.22 Other aspects include the drivers of 

conflict fueling the insurgency, the sentiments of the population in the area 

of employment, the composition of the society among which the irregular 

forces will operate, and the capacity of the host nation to train, equip, and 

control the irregular force. Each localized area within a counterinsurgency 

campaign has unique conditions – what works in one situation may not 

work in another. Understanding these key aspects will enable the host 

nation to raise the right kind of force for each unique set of conditions in 

each local area of employment. 

Strategy

The overall strategy of the counterinsurgency campaign, which shifts 

as the campaign unfolds, weighs heavily in making the determination 

between quality and quantity. In the Malayan Emergency, the initial 

response to the insurgency was to recruit large numbers (quantity) of 

security forces (to include both regular and irregular forces).23 In the case 

of the Home Guards in Malaya, the government action to raise a massive 

number of irregular security forces provided temporary stability, but did 

not stop the insurgency from swelling its ranks.24 A similar effort to expand 

rapidly host nation security forces is currently underway in Afghanistan.25

As the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya progressed, the need 

to reform and retrain the rapidly raised and poorly trained security forces 

became apparent. The quality of security forces became more important 

than quantity.26 As James Corum stated in Training Indigenous Forces in 
24

Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies, regarding police forces 

in Malaya, 

It is better to suffer from a shortage of officers than to have 

sufficient numbers, but many of those incompetent or corrupt. 

A corrupt police and military culture is of enormous benefit 

to the insurgents. ... In the long run, it is cheaper to spend the 

money up front to build effective police and security forces 

than to spend less and end up with corrupt and abusive forces 

that alienate the population.27

The development of irregular security forces must be flexible and 

adaptable to changes in the campaign. The host nation must recognize that 

the type of forces required in the early stages of the campaign may not be 

the same as those needed later. The host nation institutions that generate 

security forces require both short-term and long-term capacities to meet 

early requirements while still building toward end-state security capability 

goals.

In the French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 

for example, the contemporary strategy, known as quadrillage, meaning 

framework or grid, was to employ static forces to secure populated areas as 

well as mobile reserves that could conduct operations between the secured 

populated areas as well as reinforce the static forces as required.28 In order 

to employ this strategy, the French forces would require 120,000 irregular 

forces recruited from the population to augment security operations. 

To gain sufficient popular support to enable recruitment of such a large 

number of forces would require the French first to secure the populated 

areas.29 As David Galula observed in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 

and Practice, “If the counterinsurgent is so strong as to be able to saturate 

the entire country with garrisons, military operations along conventional 

lines will, of course work. The insurgent, unable to grow beyond a certain 

level, will slowly wither away. But saturation can seldom be afforded.”30

In contrast to the French strategy in Algeria, a recommended approach 

devised in Vietnam known as the oil-blot or oil-spot approach was to 

establish security in one local area and then extend the control of security 

forces outward gradually.31 Once regular security forces clear an area, 

and the host nation establishes irregular security forces to hold the area, 

regular security forces can then continue offensive operations to clear 

additional areas. Where quadrillage envisions gaining influence over all of 

the critical areas simultaneously,32 the oil-blot or oil-spot approach seeks 

a slow expansion of control, or in modern parlance, clear-hold-build. In 

these two brief examples, the impact of strategy on the scope of irregular 

security force development becomes readily apparent, as a quadrillagelike approach requires a large amount of forces throughout where an oilspot approach requires a steady increase in forces over time. 
25

Threat

Irregular security forces must be able to survive encounters with the 

insurgents in their area of operations. This requires some level of training, 

equipping, and force protection.33 Based on the local conditions, irregular 

security forces may require different types of equipment to include small 

arms, heavy weapons, communications equipment, and vehicles. Irregular 

security forces may be easier to intimidate or drive away if the insurgents 

have significantly greater firepower.

In rural areas, irregular security forces may require vehicles in order 

to patrol large open areas or to post and support personnel at checkpoints. 

In urban areas where vehicular traffic is high, irregular security forces may 

require greater force protection measures to counter car bombs and suicide 

attacks. The use of small arms by irregular security forces requires training 

to instill confidence and proficiency. As additional types of equipment 

become necessary based on local conditions, the training requirements 

increase. 

When irregular security forces make contact with enemy forces, they 

may also require the means to request and receive responsive support 

from regular forces depending upon the capabilities of the insurgents.34 As 

discussed later, partnership between regular and irregular security force 

units or embedding trained advisers with irregular forces may better enable 

irregular forces to access capabilities normally found only in regular forces 

(e.g. aviation support, fire support). 

Composition

Forces drawn from the local population best secure cleared areas.35

Drawing forces from local areas not only ties the local population to the 

government, but also increases the effectiveness of the irregular force 

in intelligence gathering36 as they are familiar with the local area and 

population. Additionally, when the host nation recruits irregular forces 

representative of the local population (e.g. ethnic, tribal, religious), it 

creates opportunities for disaffected segments of the population.37

Failing to develop forces representative of the population can result in 

greater resistance to government control. As a case in point, the Catholic 

minority in Northern Ireland saw itself as the target of security forces 

predominately of Protestant composition and sympathy.38 The highly 

sectarian Iraqi Security Forces provides another example. As Najim Abed 

al Jabouri, the former mayor of Tal Afar noted, Sunnis seeking assistance 

in raising irregular security forces “were generally from the mixed cities 

in Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Baghdad, where the Iraqi Police were already 

well established but were heavily sectarian. ... In these heterogeneous 

areas, the Iraqi Police were often an instrument for sectarian violence 

where Sunnis sought a means to defend themselves legally.”39
26

Legitimacy

Irregular security forces are important not only for the added security 

capability they provide to the counterinsurgent’s forces, but also because 

they demonstrate a connection of the will of the people to the government40

and away from the insurgents.41 This does not imply that the formation 

of irregular security forces equates to wholehearted support of the entire 

population for the government. It does signal that the population has 

taken a step away from the insurgents and toward the government. David 

Galula’s principle of irreversibility applies here:

When troops live among the population and give it protection 

until the population is able to protect itself with a minimum 

of outside support, the insurgent’s power cannot easily be 

rebuilt, and this in itself is no mean achievement. But the 

turning point really comes when leaders have emerged from the 

population and have committed themselves on the side of the 

counterinsurgent. They can be counted upon because they have 

proved their loyalty in deeds and not in words, and because 

they have everything to lose from a return of the insurgents.42

Local populations must see irregular security forces as legitimate 

and representative of the social and ethnic groups that comprise those 

populations. This requires consultation with local leaders, ethnic and 

racial representation, and possibly some level of control over the local 

security forces wielded by the community. Failure to create security forces 

representative of the local community will likely alienate segments of the 

population, which may encourage their support to the insurgency. As seen 

in Malaya, recruiting from disaffected groups of the population can result 

in broader support for the government, thus limiting the undecided pool of 

potential recruits for the insurgency.43 As stated in a 2007 study by RAND, 

“The use of indigenous forces, especially forces from the particular area 

in question, increases the legitimacy of the counterinsurgents and can also 

help to divide and weaken the insurgency by psychologically unhinging 

the insurgents.”44 Support of the local population is also critical to irregular 

security forces as they serve as a source of information on insurgent activity 

in the local area45 and can provide irregular forces with early warning of an 

impending attack or the emplacement of an improvised explosive device 

or ambush.46

By allowing a local population to raise irregular security forces, the 

host nation government provides an outlet for the natural desire of the 

people to respond to the threat posed by insurgents by providing for the 

defense of their own interests (e.g. family, business, tribe, ethnic group).47

Another aspect of legitimacy is the desire or willingness of the local 

population to support the host nation government and join the security 

forces.48 Sources of such desire to participate vary based on the nature of 
27

the conflict, the grievances of the population, the local perceptions of the 

government and the insurgent organization, and the likelihood of one side 

or the other to prevail in the conflict. Sir Robert Thompson described the 

natural desire to end up on the victorious side: “What the peasant wants to 

know is does the government mean to win the war because if not, he will 

have to support the insurgent.”49

In Dhofar for example, the tribesmen of the Jebel fought on both 

the insurgent and host nation sides in varying degrees over the course of 

the campaign. Once Qaboos, the son of the Sultan of Oman, overthrew 

his father and assumed the throne, he enacted sweeping reforms that 

addressed many of the grievances fueling support for the insurgency to 

include amnesty for those willing to join the Sultan’s forces against the 

insurgents. As the new Sultan addressed the grievances and began to show 

greater aptitude and resolve to defeat the insurgency, many of the Jebeli

tribesmen quit the insurgency and joined with the Sultan.50

Among the reforms enacted by Sultan Qaboos after deposing his 

father were lifting of sanctions against education, technology (e.g. 

modern medicine, movies, radios), and movement within Oman and to 

other countries. One of the key reforms that contributed to increased 

popular support for the Sultan was recruitment of irregular forces from 

within Dhofar, especially from among the tribes living on the jebel. The 

recruitment effort was initially indirect and involved dispatching Civil 

Aid Teams51 that included medical personnel to provide care for the local 

populace in Taqa and Mirbat. Initially, only women and children came forth 

to receive treatment for chronic ailments. As word of effective treatment 

spread, men from the local tribes began to appear seeking treatment, which 

created opportunities for the Sultan’s representatives to engage and recruit 

for the firqats.

52

As the inclusion of Dhofaris in the Sultan’s Armed Forces in the form 

of tribally-based firqats expanded, the local perceptions of these forces 

improved. No longer did Dhofaris view the Sultan’s forces as an army 

of occupation once they had opportunity to join.53 Although the firqats

were irregular forces with dubious utility in the eyes of traditional military 

observers, the Sultan paid and supplied them like any other military force, 

which increased their legitimacy in the eyes of the population.54

Despite outward appearances and the difficulties of employing firqats, 

they were invaluable to the Sultan’s Armed Forces for their abilities in 

“reconnaissance, gathering intelligence and communicating with the 

nomadic population.”55

Indeed, Ian Gardiner, who operated with various firqats in the Dhofar 

campaign, stated the following regarding the value of these irregular 

forces: “For all their limitations, I do not believe we could have won the 

war without the Firqat.”56
28

Location of Employment

In addition to the purpose and scope, it is important to determine 

where irregular security forces will operate as part of the plan to develop 

them. While the counterinsurgency strategy may require irregular security 

forces in several locations throughout the area of operations, the host 

nation must establish priorities for these locations based on the enemy 

situation and the host nation’s ability, and potential interventionist ability, 

to provide support in order to raise irregular security forces appropriate to 

the situation. David Galula’s Fourth Law in counterinsurgency operations 

dictates that the counterinsurgent cannot dilute his forces and hope to 

gain sustainable progress, but must “[concentrate] efforts, resources, and 

personnel” in order to secure the population and gain support by providing 

the population with confidence that the counterinsurgent side will prevail.57

With Galula’s Fourth Law in mind, the host nation must determine 

where initial success is most likely. If the counterinsurgent force has 

sufficient strength, it may focus initially on the most difficult areas where 

the insurgents enjoy strong support and freedom to operate, and then move 

on to areas less contested. If the counterinsurgent force is relatively weak, 

the host nation may choose to consolidate the areas it controls and move 

gradually toward the more difficult areas.58 When determining the relative 

strength of the opposing sides, the host nation must look beyond the 

military aspects (e.g. number of troops, types of equipment, mobility), and 

factor in the political and social dimensions (e.g. whether the population 

in a particular area more likely to sympathize with the government or the 

insurgency).59 Determining the most viable approach should factor into the 

size, quality, and location of employment of irregular and regular forces. 

The host nation must also consider the willingness of the population to 

join and support irregular forces. This willingness is often dependent upon 

where the forces will conduct operations. Popular support and willingness 

on the part of the population to join irregular security forces increase 

when irregular forces operate in their local area. In Vietnam, for example, 

drafted recruits were often required to operate far from their home areas, 

which went against the cultural norms of the rural population and caused 

many potential draftees to seek refuge among the insurgent camps to avoid 

service.60 Aside from cultural considerations such as those in Vietnam, 

local communities want their efforts, their blood and treasure, to go toward 

providing security locally. 

Training

As Dr. Daniel Marston wrote, “Proper training and build-up of local 

indigenous forces is key to clearing and holding any contested region in a 

successful counterinsurgency campaign.”61 Irregular security force training 

requirements vary based on the local conditions of the area in which 

they will operate. To determine the appropriate skills and corresponding 
29

training requirements of irregular security forces, counterinsurgents 

must understand the other factors mentioned at the beginning of this 

chapter – purpose, strategy, threat, composition, legitimacy, location of 

employment, leadership, partnership, advisory, and scope. As FM 3-24 

advises, counterinsurgents must employ irregular security forces in limited 

roles initially to build confidence and avoid politically costly defeat:

Committing poorly trained and badly led forces results in 

high casualties and invites tactical defeats. While defeat in 

a small operation may have little strategic consequence in a 

conventional war, even a small tactical defeat of HN forces 

can have serious strategic consequences in a COIN. Insurgent 

warfare is largely about perceptions. Effective insurgent leaders 

can quickly turn minor wins into major propaganda victories. 

Defeat of one government force can quickly degrade the morale 

of others. If a HN force fails, the local populace may begin to 

lose confidence in the government’s ability to protect them.62

Regardless of the exact capabilities that irregular security forces 

require, counterinsurgents must enforce some key elements of their training. 

Irregular security forces must have common standards to improve their 

effectiveness63 and allow them to operate in harmony with regular forces. 

This does not mean that all irregular security forces should be the same in 

each area, but rather that their capabilities, basic skills, and organization 

should be uniform. Irregular security forces also require strict standards 

for interacting with the local population to develop trust and gain access to 

intelligence. Additionally, irregular security forces must be able to report 

intelligence and changes in the local situation in a timely and accurate 

manner to enable effective coordination with other forces in the area.

When training irregular forces it is important to remember that they are 

not American forces. To paraphrase T. E. Lawrence, irregular forces must 

figure out for themselves the best way to achieve the objectives of the host 

nation in their local area.64 Too much influence in tactics and techniques 

can lead to a dependence on interventionist capabilities that the host nation 

cannot replicate,65 thus creating false capacities and hidden weaknesses in 

the irregular force. David Kilcullen, a contemporary counterinsurgency 

theorist, reinforces Lawrence’s advice to avoid forming irregular security 

forces in the interventionist’s image. Kilcullen advises counterinsurgents 

to develop irregular security forces that mirror the insurgents’ organization, 

equipment, and mobility.66

The task of training irregular security forces is not an easy one, or 

one that most regular forces are well suited to undertake. As Gardiner 

wrote, “Regular soldiers could find the Firqat infuriating. The SAS, who 

themselves were somewhat irregular, and were trained to train irregular 

soldiers, were mostly pretty well adjusted to the task.”67 Recognizing that 

special operations forces such as the British SAS may not be available 
30

to train irregular security forces, at a minimum, the officers employed in 

training indigenous forces must be highly trained and specially selected 

for the task.68

While highly trained professionals of irregular warfare such as the 

British SAS may best accomplish training irregular forces, they are not 

the only option available to counterinsurgents. For example, in 2004 the 

British Argyll & Sutherland Battalion took on the task of training local 

security forces in southern Iraq.69 Partnership of regular counterinsurgent 

forces comes later in this paper, but it is important to note at this point, 

however, that in Iraq and more recently in Afghanistan, regular forces 

work together with indigenous forces of all types with positive results. 

Other methods proven effective in building indigenous forces include 

sending elements of those forces to train in established overseas institutions 

and combining training programs of both regular and irregular security 

forces. Corum argues that by sending indigenous forces to overseas training 

institutions, the host nation creates a more capable professionally trained 

cadre, those trained overseas return with enhance prestige, and builds 

stronger bonds between the host nation and the overseas nation sponsoring 

the training.70 In Afghanistan, the counterinsurgents train the Afghan 

National Police alongside the Afghan National Army. This enables a more 

efficient training program as both forces can train basic skills at the same 

facilities. Additionally, as the populace views the Afghan National Army 

as more legitimate than the police due to a history of police corruption, 

by training these forces together, the counterinsurgents produce a more 

professional police force.71

When counterinsurgents begin to consider developing irregular 

security forces, they must predicate the training plan on long-term 

solutions that create viable security institutions. In the early stages of a 

counterinsurgency campaign, quantity may trump quality. While meeting 

the immediate security requirements with rapidly raised irregular security 

forces, counterinsurgents must devise development plans that look to the 

future in order to incorporate elements of “quantity” forces into the future 

“quality” forces.72

In the Malayan Emergency, the counterinsurgents raised hundreds 

of thousands of irregular security forces known as Home Guards. 

Home Guards began as a very basic irregular security force with very 

few weapons and little to no training. By the end of the campaign, the 

counterinsurgents developed the Home Guards into a centrally controlled 

force with common doctrine, improved weapons, and training institutions 

at the national and state level. The duties performed by the Home Guards 

increased from basic security guard type duties to augmentation of regular 

security forces conducting offensive operations.73

To retrain irregular security forces either to assume a greater role in 
31

the campaign, or to become part of the regular security forces, may require 

pulling large numbers of forces out of the fight to conduct training. To 

avoid creating a security vacuum, regular counterinsurgent forces may be 

required to assume a greater role temporarily while the irregular forces 

receive additional training. The ability of regular security forces to take on 

a greater role will influence the speed and scope of irregular security force 

retraining programs.74

Leadership

James Corum noted, “The effectiveness of the indigenous security 

forces in Cyprus and Malaya was directly related to the quality of the 

officer leadership.”75 Corum further stated that it is not possible to have 

effective forces without effective leaders.76 While developing indigenous 

security force leaders takes time, the investment is worthwhile to both the 

host nation and to an interventionist power. The host nation benefits from 

indigenous security forces with increased capability because of quality 

leadership. More capable indigenous security forces potentially reduce the 

requirements for interventionist forces in terms of quantity and duration.77

Developing leaders takes time in any security force under the best 

of conditions. Leader development efforts may take longer depending 

upon the culture, experience, and education of the pool of potential 

leadership candidates. Culture can affect leader development in societies 

that do not reward merit over status. It is important to weigh the cultural 

implications against westernized ideal leadership characteristics. Recall 

T.E. Lawrence’s advice to allow the locals to develop local solutions. If 

the irregular security force does not accept “ideal” leader candidates, they 

become irrelevant at best and can lead to the collapse of the irregular force. 

If the pool of candidates has little or no previous military or leadership 

experience, the task of developing leaders may be more difficult. It 

may be possible to mitigate the lack of experienced leaders if sufficient 

development time does not exist. The unclassified version of the 2009 

Afghan assessment suggests increased partnership between coalition 

forces and indigenous forces with poor leadership as a means to minimize 

the negative effects of poor leadership and to develop those leaders over 

time.78

If literacy rates are low, communication skills poor, or problemsolving capacity low, training leaders becomes a greater challenge. 

During the counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar, Oman, the host nation 

incorporated reading instruction as a component of basic training for 

the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces (SAF) to address the low literacy 

level of the population.79 Similar education programs for irregular 

security force leaders could address issues of literacy if needed. Another 

possible approach would be to provide quality officer leadership from 

either host nation regular forces or interventionist forces to lead irregular 
32

forces temporarily.80 This approach would allow additional time to train 

indigenous leadership,81 but requires acceptance on the part of the local 

forces and sufficient leadership capacity from the donor force to provide 

temporary leadership.

Partnership

Partnering regular security forces with irregular security forces has the 

potential to increase the competence, professionalism, and confidence of 

irregular security forces. Regular security forces can partner with irregular 

security forces after they have been formed and trained, or can participate 

in their formation and development. David Kilcullen suggests starting at 

the lowest level with platoons building an indigenous squad that becomes 

a partnered platoon over time. He further suggests that company level 

leadership should develop the leadership of their indigenous partner.82

Historical examples demonstrate the positive effects of partnership 

while also showing that it is not a panacea. In Vietnam, the United States 

Marine Corp partnership program known as combined action platoons, or 

CAPs, was partially successful.83 As Andrew Krepinevich wrote in The 

Army and Vietnam, “there was a direct correlation between the time a CAP 

[combined action platoon] stayed in a village and the degree of security 

achieved, with CAP-protected villages progressing twice as fast as those 

occupied by the PFs [popular forces] alone.”84 A downside to partnership 

in Vietnam was the fact that South Vietnamese forces became too much 

like US forces and relied on American firepower and airpower. When US 

support dissipated, the South Vietnamese forces collapsed because they 

had not developed their own solutions within their means. 

In Dhofar, British Special Air Service (SAS) troopers partnered with 

the firqa in support of the Sultan of Oman’s campaign against communistbacked insurgents. The partnership combined the small unit skills and 

access to modern military capabilities of the SAS (called British Army 

Training Teams, or BATTs, during the conflict) with the knowledge of 

local terrain, ability to communicate with the local population, and 

understanding of enemy tactics to create a force indispensible to the 

success of the campaign. According to John Akehurst, commander of the 

Dhofar Brigade during the conclusion of the Dhofar campaign, “BATT’s 

contribution in raising and training the Firqats had been of inestimable 

importance in the winning of the war.”85 Despite this glowing praise, the 

SAS/firqa combined teams were only part of the forces employed in the 

strategy to defeat the insurgents, and could not have prevailed alone. As 

noted by MG Tony Jeapes, “The firqats’ understanding of ground and their 

speed of manoeuvre were both superior to SAF troops’, but when it came 

to straight military tactics, the SAF’s discipline told every time. The two 

forces were complementary; neither could have won the war alone.”86

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, British forces operating in 
33

southern Iraq committed a battalion to train Iraqi forces to conduct 

counterinsurgency operations based on lessons learned from previous 

British counterinsurgency experience.87 The approach included small 

patrols, limited use of force, and an emphasis on gathering intelligence. The 

British efforts paid off initially. According to Carter Malkasian, “Some of 

the first effective Iraqi units appeared in the British operating area.”88 This 

initial success in developing Iraqi Security Forces in 2003 did not ensure 

success in southern Iraq. By 2006, British forces had lost control of the 

area to Shia militias, and had lost the political will to continue in earnest.89

Advisory

Advisers can have a great affect on the development of security 

forces, either positively or negatively. In Dhofar, BATTs advised firqa

and seconded or contracted British officers were attached to SAF units 

as commanders. Attaching British officers to Omani units made the SAF 

more effective. Because the British officers were assigned to the Sultan’s 

forces and under his command, their presence did not overshadow the 

efforts and leadership of SAF.90 In contrast, US advisers in Vietnam often 

stifled the development of Vietnamese commanders. As James Willbanks 

noted, 

According to one ARVN general, “The power and influence 

of US advisers in the field did tend to overshadow the role of 

Vietnamese unit commanders. For example, activities of a unit 

tended to follow along the lines recommended by the adviser. In 

many instances, it was the adviser who won the battle by calling 

effective tactical air or firepower support from US resources. 

This gradually produced overreliance and sometimes total 

dependence on US advisers. As a consequence, the initiative, 

responsibility, and prestige that the unit commander usually 

wielded were greatly affected and, over the long run, the 

presence of advisers resulted in reduced opportunity for ARVN 

cadres to develop their command capabilities and leadership.”91

Advisers must be able to improve their indigenous partners without 

overshadowing and undercutting them. Not all good officers and soldiers 

make good advisers. As Richard Hunt noted regarding advisers in Vietnam, 

John Paul Vann, who would during the course of the war 

run the CORDS program in III and IV Corps, expected an 

adviser to become within thirty days of his arrival “the world’s 

leading expert” on the functional and geographical areas of his 

assignment. At a minimum, Vann expected a district adviser to 

know in detail the district’s political, social, educational, and 

demographic structure; the local economy; the strengths and 

effectiveness of all components of friendly and enemy forces; 

the strengths and weaknesses of local political and military 
34

leaders; the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces 

(ARVN to police); the steps being taken to improve those forces; 

and the location of all friendly, contested, and enemy-controlled 

hamlets. Vann’s list went even further, but he regarded it as 

representing “only a fraction of the knowledge’ an effective 

district adviser would need to have at his fingertips.”92

Despite Vann’s demands for high-caliber personnel to serve as 

advisers, the US military did not make the advisory mission in Vietnam a 

top priority. As Willbanks wrote, 

By early 1970 ... the MACV Training Directorate . . . responsible 

for providing advisers to RVNAF training facilities, was at only 

70 percent of assigned strength, and the U.S. training advisory 

detachments in the field were likewise short-staffed. Another 

issue was the quality of advisory personnel. ... It was clear that 

top professionals were not being assigned to training advisory 

duties.93

Those serving as advisers must be dedicated to the task. An example 

illustrated by Daniel Marston regarding the UK experience in Afghanistan 

underscores the point that advisory duty should not be an additional duty. 

He described the 7th Royal Horse Artillery of the 16 Air Assault Brigade. 

Not only was this artillery unit not trained for advisory duties, it was 

required to provide indirect fire support while conducting the advisory 

mission, which resulted in poor performance.94 Marston described how the 

British Army changed its approach to better advise their Afghan partners: 

This experience led senior command in the UK to assign a 

dedicated infantry battalion to train and embed as an OMLT 

(Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team) in subsequent 

deployments with the 205 Corps. The subsequent deployments 

have seen 45 Royal Marines, Grenadier Guards, 2 YORKS, 1 

Royal Irish, 1 RIFLES and 2 MERCIANS serving in the OMLT 

role. ANA actions and reports over the last four years have 

demonstrated their increased ability.95

Finally, those serving as advisers should want to be there among the 

indigenous troops. Fewer advisers, dedicated to the task and equipped 

with the requisite skills, will accomplish more than mass levees of the 

unwilling. As Field Marshal William Slim wrote,

This I know is rank heresy to many very experienced “coasters.” 

I was constantly told that, far from being too many, with the 

rapidly expanded African forces, more British officers and 

N.C.O.s were needed. But these large British establishments 

in African units had great drawbacks. The only way to fill 

them was to draft officers and N.C.O.s willy-nilly to them, 

and this did not always give the right kind. The European who 
35

serves with native troops should be, not only much above 

average in efficiency and character, as he must accept greater 

responsibility, but he should serve with them because he wants 

to, because he likes them.96

Scope

Scope refers to the size and organization of forces. All of the factors 

discussed thus far (i.e. purpose, strategy, threat, composition, legitimacy, 

training, location of employment, leadership, partnership, and advisory) 

affect the scope of the irregular force. The host nation or intervening power 

must estimate and refine the scope of irregular security force required to 

achieve the stated purpose.97 Should the situation call for a large number 

of forces, the host nation must weigh quality and quantity, and adjust the 

training, advisory, partnership, etc. accordingly. 

Other factors will likely impact the pace at which the host nation can 

progress toward attaining a goal of a certain number of irregular security 

forces. In Dhofar, for example, the expansion of the firqa corresponded 

largely to the progress of SAF across the jebel.

98 In Iraq, the expansion of 

the Sons of Iraq was more rapid, occurring nearly simultaneously in areas 

across the country.99 Host nation must start with an estimate of the scope of 

irregular force requirements. The host nation must then continually revise 

and update the estimate based on changing conditions in the campaign. 
36

Notes

1. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 1-02 Operational 

Terms and Graphics, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,September 

2004), 1-105.

2. Angel Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, Paraag 

Shukla, Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency 

(COIN) Operations, (Washington, D.C.:National Defense Research Institute, 

RAND Corporation, 2007), 13. “The Constabulary was semi-autonomous 

paramilitary forces set up to fight insurgents. . .” The Philippine Constabulary is 

not discussed in detail in this paper. For more information on this irregular force, 

review the RAND study cited above, pages 7-17.

3. Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the 

Dhofar Insurgency, (South Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword Books Limited, 

2007), 156. “The word firqat means a military unit or group. The Firqat Forces 

units were made up of Dhofari Jebeli tribesmen, many of whom had been fighting 

on the other side but who had been persuaded to come over to the Sultan.”

4. Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in 

the Sunni Awakening,” PRISM 2, No. 1 (2010): 3. “The Sons of Iraq program was 

a U.S.-led and -funded initiative to spread the success of the Anbar Awakening into 

other Sunni areas, particularly heterogeneous areas, and was not fully supported 

by the Iraqi government.” 

5. References to army include all regular ground forces that are part of the 

host counterinsurgent military forces. In the US, this would include both Army 

and Marine forces. 

6. Lieutenant Colonel William E. Rieper, Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency 

Operations: Their Roles and Considerations, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School 

of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff 

College, 2010), 7. “Militias are most useful in security roles closely tied to their 

homes to safeguard them against insurgent reprisals. Surrogates are quite effective 

in neighborhood watch programs, occupying checkpoints or access points to 

markets or other public activities. Their presence reassures civilians and dissuades 

insurgent attempts to infiltrate population centers. Their actions drive a wedge 

between the civilian population and the insurgents denying them the opportunity 

to coerce the population.”

7. Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The 

Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60,” in Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010), p. 103.

8. Locally raised and employed security forces provide a great source of 

human intelligence and create a sense of connection to the government and esprit 

de corps, as well as employment opportunities within their communities.

9. James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale 

of Two Insurgencies. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ display.

cfm?PubID=648, (accessed 13 March 2011): 23. “Though the home guards saw 

little action in Malaya, they were still of enormous value in suppressing the 
37

insurgency. The home guards were able to assume many routine security duties, 

freeing up thousands of regular police and military personnel for offensive 

operations.”

10. Police forces include regular “law and order” police, paramilitary police 

such as the Italian Carabinieri, and intelligence focused police such as the British 

Special Branch. In the US, there are no equivalents to the Carabinieri (paramilitary) 

or Special Branch (intelligence gathering) forces. These types of police forces 

are effective in counterinsurgency campaigns and must not be overlooked when 

assisting a host nation in developing security forces.

11. Rabasa et al, Money in the Bank, 74. “By no means should the military do 

police work, because the military is trained to capture and kill, whereas the police 

are trained to detain and interrogate.”

12. John Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency from Palestine to Northern 

Ireland, (London: Palgrave, 2002), 48. “Rapid recruitment and the lack of trained 

police leadership afforded many new policemen the opportunity to abuse their 

power and use their status to extort money from the population.”

13. Rieper, Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations, 45-46. 

“In each conflict [Malaya, Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM], the 

irregulars were an excellent source of intelligence, especially the invaluable 

Human Intelligence on insurgent activities in and around their homes.”

14. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 47. “The 

Malayan Campaign illustrates the important role irregular, part-time security 

forces can play in supporting the government campaign. In Malaya, over 200,000 

villagers eventually were enrolled and organized into home guard units that served 

primarily to guard the villages at night. The home guards, with only basic arms 

and minimal equipment, were very useful in freeing up a large number of regular 

police and military personnel from basic security and guard duties, which enabled 

the better-trained and equipped forces to concentrate on the complex operational 

tasks.”

15. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 35. “Despite 

political pressure to accomplish a quick fix that would enable the British military to 

remove forces from Malaya, the Colonial Office had the moral courage to support 

the long-term strategy proposed by Templer and Young. In Malaya, Templer and 

Young understood that they were fighting a prolonged war that required a longterm commitment.”

16. Brian Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902. (Lawrence: University of 

Kansas Press, 2000), 204. General Arthur MacArthur, the commanding officer 

beginning in 1900, issued General Order 87 which directed the arming of the police 

and creation of mounted constabulary bodies for operations within the boundaries 

of towns and barrios. In December of 1900, with the imminent departure of US 

volunteers, MacArthur ordered the arming of these forces and transferred much of 

the pacification duties to them. “...[I]n 1901 local police [constabularies] proved 

some of the more effective counterinsurgency forces the army raised.”

17. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 47. “Templer 

took an eclectic mix of loosely-organized local forces and quietly instituted 

some centralized control and supervision. He brought in a team of experience 
38

officers and set up district and state home guard organization with a small training 

center in each state. The central home guard command issued doctrine, provided 

training guidance, and set standards. The state and district commands ensured that 

some rudimentary training was provided, and that local commands performed to 

standard.” 

18. Rieper, Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations, 37. “The 

most glaring weakness in the program was its failure to develop a coherent plan to 

transition SOIs after they had secured the environment ... What the SOIs wanted 

was inclusion in the ISF, which GOI resisted.”

19. Robert Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization 

of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort. (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972), 39. 

“Gradually the local security force in each Chinese village came to be a police 

post of ten to twelve Malay constables, supported by a part-time Home Guard 

of about thirty-five men, of whom normally five were on duty patrolling the 

perimeter at night...”

20. Population control measures include census taking, controlling access 

to secured population centers, curfew enforcement, rationing commodities, and 

searching persons, dwellings, and vehicles for contraband. 

21. Fixed security points include traffic control points (both vehicular and 

foot traffic), securing critical infrastructure, and other static guard duties. 

22. Rieper, Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations, 51 “Sponsors 

[e.g. host nation or intervening power in support of the host nation] should note 

that militias could falter if left unsupported and conventional forces should closely 

monitor their activities to ensure compliance.”

23. Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds,” 106. Lieutenant 

General Briggs took over the campaign in Malaya in 1950 with a plan to “dominate 

the populated areas” and build up “a feeling of complete security” so that people 

would provide the government with information about the communists, break 

up the Min Yuen and thereby isolate the MRLA from their supplies of food and 

information, and force the MRLA to attack ‘us on our own ground.’”

24. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 13. “The 

massive application of largely untrained manpower worked to stabilize the 

situation. Despite an overwhelming advantage in manpower and resources, this 

policy made no headway. Indeed, the insurgency continued to grow, with the 

active insurgent military force reaching its peak of 8,000 in 1951.”

25. Raymond A. Millen, “Time for a Strategic and Intellectual Pause 

in Afghanistan,” Parameters 40, No. 2 (Summer 2010): 38. “Worse, the 

corresponding rapid increase of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 134,000 

soldiers (and perhaps 240,000) as part of an exit strategy lacks a logical rationale.”

26. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 18-19. The 

police force in Malaya was cut by 10,000 between 1952 and 1953 in order to shed 

those police who were corrupt or incompetent. 

27. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 39-40.

28. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. (Florida: 

Hailer, 2005), 24.
39

29. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 24-25.“Allowing 

one platoon for every hamlet, 400,000 men would have been required for the static 

forces. Fifty thousand were needed for the mobile reserves, taking into account 

the threat posed by the borders. Seventy thousand were required to protect the 

six or seven thousand vulnerable points. The total bill came to 520,000 men, 

not counting the support services and the Navy and Air Force. Not until August 

1956 did we reach our greatest strength, and that was only 400,000 men. The 

rest clearly would have to be provided by the population itself, but not before 

we could get the people to commit themselves on our side. This in turn required 

that we first give them security, which we could not provide because we were 

understrength. We were apparently caught in a vicious circle from which only 

strategy could free us.”

30. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 72-73. 

31. Robert Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam 

Conflict. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 135. Assistant Secretary Roger 

Hilsman’s final memorandum to the Secretary of State in March 1964 called for, 

“primary emphasis on giving security to the villagers. The tactics are the so-called 

oil-blot approach, starting with a secure area and extending it slowly...This calls 

for the use of military forces in a different way from that of orthodox, conventional 

war. Rather that chasing Viet Cong, the military must put primary emphasis on 

clear-and-hold operations and on rapid reinforcement of villages under attack. 

It is also important of course, to keep the Viet Cong regular units off balance by 

conventional offensive operations, but these should be secondary to the major 

task of extending security...”

32. This is an oversimplification of the strategy which was intended to attack 

the insurgent network and organization versus the insurgent forces. For a complete 

discussion of the French strategy in Algeria, see David Galula, Counterinsurgency 

Warfare Theory and Practice, Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958. Santa Monica: 

RAND, 2006, pp. 5-25 and 243-270; and Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A 

French View of Counterinsurgency. Ft Leavenworth: CSI, 1985, pp. 67-93.

33. Force protection can include barriers or berms to provide cover or to 

make approach by vehicle difficult, and personal equipment such as body armor 

and helmets.

34. British Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, “CSAF Assessment in 

Dhofar,” (Oman: CSAF, 16 Feb. 1972), 11.“There will be major problems to 

overcome in respect of resupply, casualty evacuation and morale, but I believe 

that the reduced visibility will offer great opportunities for offensive action to 

the side which is the best trained and most aggressive. Firqats supported by 

22 SAS should achieve a lot: Firqats supported by a small party from SAF or 

unsupported will achieve little. They might even decamp to the Coastal Plain. 

Thus I recommend that 22 SAS be permitted to remain in Dhofar at one Squadron 

strength until at least the end of the monsoon, with the primary task of supporting 

the Firqats on the Jebel in the Eastern Area.”

35. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Maryland:The John 

Hopkins University Press,1986), 13. “Paramilitary forces should be drawn from 

among the inhabitants and trained in counterinsurgency operations such as small 

unit patrolling, night operations, and the ambush.”
40

36. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 11. “At the 

start of the insurgency, the police faced other daunting problems that severely 

limited their ability to collect intelligence. There were very few police personnel 

of Chinese ethnic background, and almost no Malayan or British intelligence 

personnel who knew Chinese. This greatly limited the amount and quality of 

intelligence that the police could collect on the insurgents...”

37. Rabasa et al, Money in the Bank, 74. “In recruiting indigenous security 

forces, the counterinsurgents should seek to create a force that reflects the ethnic, 

religious, and socioeconomic makeup of the local population and should make 

a special effort to recruit a reasonable number of potentially oppressed ethnic 

minorities to increase their stake in fighting the insurgency.”

38. Colonel Richard Iron, Britain’s Longest War: Northern Ireland 1967-

2007, in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds.), Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010, p. 158. “By mid-1970, the 

great majority of the Catholic minority saw itself under attack not just from the 

Protestant majority but from the British Army as well. Recruitment into the newly 

formed PIRA grew dramatically.” 

39. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

13-14.

40. Rieper, Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations, ii. “Militias 

also provide a means for the government to garner local support against the 

insurgency through inclusion. They can facilitate reconciliation with disaffected 

groups and provide a unifying force for these groups in politics.”

41. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 23. “As the 

security forces became more representative of the population, the attitude of the 

Chinese population towards the government became more positive.”

42. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 57.

43. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 23. “Moreover, 

recruiting the Chinese into the home guard had the very positive political effect of 

bringing a large number of the Chinese into the government process and making 

them part of the solution to the insurgency.”

44. Rabasa et al, Money in the Bank, 72.

45. Carter Malkasian, The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in 

Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-2005, Small Wars and 

Insurgencies, Vol. 17, no 3, September 2006, p. 384. “Some insurgents feared to 

operate within the city because the tight security environment allowed people to 

inform on them with little fear of retribution.” 

46. Malkasian, The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in 

Counterinsurgency, 383-384. “The insurgents could no longer mount major 

attacks, such as assaulting police stations or conducting car bombings, to impress 

the population of their strength. People interacted with Iraqi and Coalition forces 

freely.”

47 . Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 48. “When 

a nation is faced with instability and disorder, there is an inevitable response for 

local citizens to establish militias and irregular forces for their own security. It 
41

is politically unwise, perhaps even impossible, for any national government to 

ignore the issue of local militias, which are based on the natural desire for local 

security.”

48. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 1. “Success 

in counterinsurgency depends on a number of major elements, to include 

establishing the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people, defeating 

the insurgent forces, providing a basic level of security for the population, and 

creating the conditions for economic growth. Underpinning these tasks is the 

establishment of an effective security force.”

49. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of 

Malaya and Vietnam, (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967),19.

50. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 156. “It must also be said that 

many Jebelis recognized the Sultan had won their hearts and minds by removing 

the causes of their original rebellion, and by meeting more closely their needs and 

aspirations. But perhaps the greatest incentive was that most human of instincts, 

the wish to be on the winning side when the war stopped. There could be no more 

unambiguous indicator that the Sultan was winning than the flow of these people 

to his side.”

51. Civil Aid Teams were developed to bring the benefits of governance to 

disaffected areas in order to tie the community to the Sultan, gather intelligence, 

and address the underlying grievances of Dhofaris. 

52. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 159. “...the concept of recruiting 

the Firqat and keeping them alongside was a courageous masterstroke, generally 

attributed to John Watts in 1970 when he was the Commanding Officer of the 

SAS ... It started with the placing of Civil Aid Teams with medics in the towns of 

Taqa and Mirbat. They treated all-comers but mostly the women and children. As 

the miracle of penicillin gradually banished hitherto chronic afflictions, the word 

began to spread to the men folk on the jebel. They too would come in with their 

ailments, and so on; and thus the tide of war had imperceptibly but indubitably 

turned.”

53. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 159. “Hitherto, there had been 

virtually no Dhofaris in the Army, and the Sultan’s forces in Dhofar had looked 

suspiciously like an army of occupation. By bringing the Jebelis on board in 

substantial numbers in the form of Firqats, that could no longer be said.”

54. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 157. “They were supplied and 

paid like any other military formation. It was best not to be too rigorous with 

the arithmetic when counting them as there were always ghosts on the payroll 

and it was not easy to see what the Sultan was getting for his money. They were 

intensely tribal and would only work in their own tribal area and so, to the orderly 

military eye, they had limited utility.”

55. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 159. “As our former enemies they 

knew the ground and the tactics of their former friends intimately, and they were 

good at things that we were poor at, namely reconnaissance, gathering intelligence 

and communicating with the nomadic population. They were of that population, 

after all. They were, therefore, extremely useful in retaining the peace in an area 

which had been cleared of adoo, thereby leaving conventional forces to get on 
42

with prosecuting the war elsewhere.”

56. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 159.

57. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 79. “The 

operations needed to relieve the population from the insurgent’s threat and to 

convince it that the counterinsurgent will ultimately win are necessarily of an 

intensive nature and of long duration. They require a large concentration of 

efforts, resources, and personnel. This means that the efforts cannot be diluted all 

over the country but must be applied successively area by area.”

58. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 97. “According 

to the first approach, one proceeds from the difficult to the easy. ...It is the fastest 

way, if it succeeds. The other approach, from the easy to the difficult, requires 

fewer means at the outset, but is slower and gives more opportunity for the 

insurgent to develop and to consolidate ... The choice between the approaches 

depends essentially on the relative strength of the opponents.”

59. General Chang Tien-chen, Chief of the South China Service Corps, 

member of the Central Committee, as quoted in The New York Times, 4 July 1949: 

“A revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political.”

60. Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An. (California: UC Press, 1972), 164.

61. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of Our Errors and Forging the 

Road Ahead Afghanistan 2001-2010,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 

(eds.) Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 

271.

62. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 6-16.

63. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 47. “The 

central home guard command issued doctrine, provided training guidance, and set 

standards. The state and district commands ensured that some rudimentary training 

was provided, and that local commands performed to standard. The efficiency of 

the home guards was improved without sacrificing their local character.”

64. Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab 

Bulletin, Article Number 8, 27 August 1917. “Do not try to do too much with your 

own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their 

war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”

65. James Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam. (Lawrence, Kansas: University 

of Kansas Press, 2004), 281. “In many instances, it was the adviser who won the 

battle by calling effective tactical air or firepower support from US resources. 

This gradually produced overreliance and sometimes total dependence on US 

advisers.”

66. Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles,” Military 

Review, May-June 2006, 107. Article 22 states, “The natural tendency is to build 

forces in the U.S. image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. 

This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy’s 

capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent’s role.”

67. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 156.

68. Ian Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar, 
43

1965-1975,” Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. Daniel Marston and Carter 

Malkasian (eds.), (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 186.

69. Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds.), (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010), 290.

70. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 44.

71. David Barno, “Fighting the other war: counterinsurgency strategy in 

Afghanistan 2003-2005.” Military Review, 87:5, September-October 2007, 39.

72. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 39. “While it 

might be necessary to stand up ad hoc security forces at the start of an emergency, 

U.S. policy should be to institute a comprehensive program of police and security 

training as quickly as possible ... should have a comprehensive plan for police 

training before intervention begins, as well as ample funds and specialist personnel 

allocated for the task ... [envisioning] a several-year program to systematically 

build police institutions and leadership.”

73. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 47-48.

74. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 43.

75. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 42.

76. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 42.

77. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, 44.

78. General Stanley McCrystal, COMISAF Initial Assessment 

(UNCLASSIFIED), (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters International Security 

Assistance Force, 30 August 2009), G-2

79. Walter Ladwig III, Supporting Allies in COIN: Britain and the Dhofar 

Rebellion, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 19:1, March 2008, p. 72. 

80. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 71. “...the British provided 

assistance in four key areas: developing a plan for victory; training and expanding 

the Sultan’s Armed Forces; providing experienced leadership and technical skills; 

and equipping the SAF for counterinsurgency.”

81. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 185.

82. Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles”, 107. Article 22 states, “Platoons 

should aim to train one local squad, then use that squad as a nucleus for a partner 

platoon. Company headquarters should train an indigenous leadership team.”

83. See Michael Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and 

Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972, (Westport, Ct: Praeger, 1997) for 

more details on CAPs.

84. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 174.

85. John Akehurst, We Won a War, The Campaign in Oman 1965-1975, 

(Great Britain: Biddles Ltd., 1982), 177.

86. Tony Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, (Surrey: Harper Collins, 1996), 237.

87. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 290. “Applying the lessons of a 

half-century of counterinsurgency, the British patrolled in small units, rigorously 
44

collected intelligence, and used firepower sparingly. ... As early as September 

2003, British generals made the development of local Iraqi forces a priority. For 

example, in 2004, the entire Argyll & Sutherland Battalion was dedicated to 

training them.”

88. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 290.

89. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 306.

90. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 79. “Attaching officers directly to 

the host nation’s service provides an alternative to the standard ‘advisor model.’ 

... Making themselves part of the SAF’s force structure, and therefore ultimately 

under the Sultan’s command, sent a strong message to Omanis that the government 

in Muscat, not London, was calling the shots.”

91. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 281. “Buu Vien, a close personal 

adviser to President Thieu, said after the war: ‘The presence of American advisers 

at all levels of the military hierarchy created among the Vietnamese leadership 

a mentality of reliance on their advice and suggestions.’... According to one 

ARVN general, ... ‘The power and influence of US advisers in the field did 

tend to overshadow the role of Vietnamese unit commanders. For example, 

activities of a unit tended to follow along the lines recommended by the adviser. 

In many instances, it was the adviser who won the battle by calling effective 

tactical air or firepower support from US resources. This gradually produced 

overreliance and sometimes total dependence on US advisers. As a consequence, 

the initiative, responsibility, and prestige that the unit commander usually wielded 

were greatly affected and, over the long run, the presence of advisers resulted in 

reduced opportunity for ARVN cadres to develop their command capabilities and 

leadership.’”

92. Richard Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts 

and Minds. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 94-95.

93. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 37. “By early 1970, the U.S. authorities 

were so disturbed by the situation [the state of training in GVN forces] that the 

army chief of staff dispatched a fact-finding team led by Brig. Gen. Donnelly 

Bolton to tour RVNAF training facilities in Vietnam...Bolton’s team found the 

efforts of both the South Vietnamese and the U.S. military training advisers in 

Vietnam to be insufficient...the MACV Training Directorate ... responsible 

for providing advisers to RVNAF training facilities, was at only 70 percent of 

assigned strength, and the U.S. training advisory detachments in the field were 

likewise short-staffed. Another issue was the quality of advisory personnel ... 

It was clear that top professionals were not being assigned to training advisory 

duties.”

94. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road 

ahead: Afghanistan 2001-2010,” in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds.), 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010, p. 

281.“One key aspect of the campaign in Helmand (as in the rest of Afghanistan) 

is the establishment of a viable indigenous security apparatus. The British were 

assigned to work with the 3/205 Kandak on Herrick IV. Initially, due to the paucity 

of troops on the first operational tour, the 16 Air Assault Brigade could only assign 

their artillery detachment, 7th Royal Horse Artillery, as advisers to the Kandak, 
45

something they had not been trained for. Hence there was much scrambling to get 

systems up and running. It must be remembered that this regiment, in addition to 

fulfilling this role, was also providing artillery support for the brigade during the 

deployment. They did their best, but it is evident that execution of the mission was 

more or less ad hoc.”

95. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the extent of our errors and forging the road 

ahead: Afghanistan 2001-2010,” in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds.), 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010, p. 281.

96. William Slim, Viscount, Defeat into Victory, (London: MacMillan 

Publisher Limited, 1986), 166.

97. Factors that help estimate the appropriate size include the capabilities of 

the enemy, the area of employment (e.g. number of areas to secure, the dispersion 

of these areas, and terrain), a reasonable projection of the capabilities of the 

irregular security forces, and the overall strategy of the campaign. 

98. See Chapter Three for a discussion of the firqa in Dhofar.

99. See Chapter Four for a discussion of the Sons of Iraq.
46
47

Chapter 3

Dhofar Case Study

The officers whom Britain sent to Oman, both contracted and 

regular, were highly trained volunteers. ... The patience and 

tolerance to live harmoniously in an unfamiliar culture; the 

fortitude to be content with less than comfortable circumstances 

for prolonged periods; and understanding of and sympathy for 

a foreign history and religion; a willingness to learn a new 

language; the flexibility, imagination and humility necessary to 

climb into the head of the people who live by a very different 

set of assumptions; none of these are to be found automatically 

in our modern developed Euro-Atlantic culture.

— Ian Beckett,

“The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar”

The campaign in Dhofar from 1965 to 1975 is widely considered a 

successful execution of counterinsurgency warfare.1

 Lieutenant Colonel 

John McKeown captured the significance of the victory in his dissertation 

on the campaign: “It was a rare victory in a period when the combination 

of real grievance and Communist exploitation of it proved irresistible 

in many countries with vastly greater Western support.”2

 What is not as 

widely understood are the reasons for success in Oman against a wellorganized and equipped insurgency which enjoyed strong popular support. 

Just as there were several factors which contributed to the insurgency, 

there were several factors which contributed to its defeat. In his book We 

Won a War, John Akehurst described what he believed to be the reasons for 

the Sultan of Oman’s victory over the insurgents.3

 Chief among these was 

winning the support of the population. In Oman this support manifested in 

the form of fighters changing sides to support the Sultan of Oman against 

their former insurgent comrades. While Sultan Said bin Taimur nearly lost 

the campaign due to his alienation of the population, his son, Sultan Qaboos 

bin Said, quickly turned the war around and won decisively once he had 

the population on his side. Ian Gardiner captured this sentiment succinctly: 

“It must also be said that many Jebelis recognized the Sultan had won their 

hearts and minds by removing the causes of their original rebellion, and 

by meeting more closely their needs and aspirations. ... There could be no 

more unambiguous indicator that the Sultan was winning than the flow of 

these people to his side.”4

 The flow of people to the side of the Sultan, to 

fight for the Sultan against the remaining insurgents, is one of the unique 

aspects of the campaign in Oman, and relates most directly to the topic of 

this research, irregular security forces. 

Known as firqa, the fighters that joined the Sultan against their former 

comrades turned the tide against the insurgents in many ways. Their shift in 

allegiance resulted in a large change in the balance of power in the Sultan’s 
48

favor. By gaining the support of the former enemy fighters, the Sultan 

also gained the support of the families and tribes of those fighters which 

helped reduce insurgent support and freedom of maneuver. Although the 

firqa had weaknesses as a fighting force, their strengths compensated for 

the weaknesses of the Sultan’s conventional forces, known as the Sultan’s 

Armed Forces or SAF, and vice versa. While both the firqa and the SAF 

each played vital roles in the campaign, neither would likely have won 

without the other.

Background

The Sultanate of Oman is on the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula 

along the coast of the Arabian Sea. Oman is roughly the size of England 

and Wales combined.5 Adjacent to Oman are Yemen to the west, Saudi 

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to the north, and across the Strait of 

Hormuz, Iran. Although at the time of the insurgency that began in 1965 

Oman had no significant oil production, its location at the mouth of the 

Strait of Hormuz was of strategic interest based on the flow of oil to the 

west and Japan through the strait.6 

The Sultan of Oman rules Oman as a patrimonial monarchy.7 Sultan 

Said bin Taimur ruled Oman at the outset of the 1965-1975 insurgency, 

followed by his son Qaboos who deposed Sultan Said and became Sultan 

of Oman on 23 July 1970. Sultan Qaboos bin Said rules Oman to the 

present day. 

Dhofar is a region within the Sultanate of Oman, and is geographically8

and ethnically9

 divided from the rest of the nation. Dhofaris are distinct 

from other Omanis due to their physical features and language which 

more closely resemble East Africans than Arabs.10 Under Sultan Said Bin 

Taimur, most Omanis viewed Dhofaris as inferior even though the Sultan’s 

wife was Dhofari and his son Qaboos was half Dhofari.11 A common 

saying among Northern Omanis was, “If your path is blocked by a snake 

and a Dhofari, kill the Dhofari first.”12 While the origin of this saying is 

unknown, it may have come from the numerous rebellions in Dhofar since 

the Sultan of Oman annexed Dhofar in 1879.13

Dhofar itself is internally divided by geography and ethnicity. 

Geographically, Dhofar consists mainly of a coastal plain and a high 

plateau known as the Jebel. The Jebelis, the peoples who occupy the Jebel, 

are nomadic cattle herdsmen with a distinct dialect “closer to Aramaic 

than Arabic.”14 The Jebel runs west to east just north of Oman’s coastal 

plain in the western part of the country. South of the Jebel is the Salalah 

plain between the Jebel and the Arabian Sea. North of the Jebel lies a vast 

expanse of open desert of sand and gravel. For most of the year the Jebel 

is barren, but during the monsoon season it becomes green with vegetation 

and is covered in a heavy low-lying fog. 
49

Prelude to War

In 1959, the Sultan of Oman defeated an uprising that was spawned 

from strife between the Sultan of Oman and the Imam of the Interior. The 

campaign unfolded on the Jebel Akhdar, which means Green Mountain, in 

the northern part of Oman.15 Prior to the rebellion, Saudi Arabia claimed 

much of Omani territory and occupied portions of it, most likely motivated 

by the discovery of oil.16 The Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF), commanded 

by seconded and contracted British officers, was born of an agreement 

made in 1958 between Sultan Said and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 

of State at the Foreign Office in the British Government, Julian Amery.17

In addition to this beneficial arrangement, Britain sent SAS forces to 

Oman to support the Sultan in defeating the insurgents in what came to be 

referred to as the Jebel Akdar, or “Green Mountain,” campaign.18

Sultan Said Bin Taimur attempted to preserve and protect traditional 

Omani society from corrupting western influences by banning not only 

education, modern medicine, internal and external migration, and 

technology, but also trousers, smoking, eyeglasses, bicycles, and many 

other vestiges of modern society.19 Sultan Said bin Taimur misguidedly 

believed that he could shield Dhofari culture from external corrupting 

influences.20 He made no exceptions in his policies, and confined his son 

Qaboos to house arrest upon his return from the British Royal Military 

Academy at Sandhurst21 and a tour in Germany with the British Army’s 

Cameronians.22 Sultan Said also remained reclusive himself23 and 

effectively isolated himself from his people. 

Additionally, the sultan refused to invest in developing the country 

until he had cash in hand from oil production. While it was apparent 

that Oman would soon profit from the discovery of oil, Sultan Said was 

unwilling to borrow money against future profits as he believed this was 

against the teachings of the Quran.24 Sultan Said’s reluctance to invest in 

improving infrastructure combined with repressive edicts meant to protect 

Oman from western corruption resulted in rebellion among the Dhofari 

tribes who were hardest hit by Sultan Said’s policies. 

1963-1969

The Sultan of Oman and the SAF battled an insurgency from 1965 to 

1975 that began with dissatisfaction among Dhofaris over the repressive 

edicts of the Sultan,25 and the fact that Dhofaris were mistrusted and 

mistreated by the Sultan and by many within Oman. The roots of the 

insurgency formed in 1962 with the creation of the Dhofar Charitable 

Association (DCA) by disaffected members of the Arab Nationalist 

Movement (ANM) in Dhofar. While the DCA’s claimed purpose was to 

improve the lot of Dhofaris, its true purpose was to prepare for an uprising 

against the British-backed Sultanate in Oman.26 The DCA formed the roots 
50

of the organization that would eventually oppose Sultan Said known as the 

Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF).27

The uprising began in 1963 with attacks led by Musselim bin Nufl, 

formerly in the employment of the Sultan. These attacks were made 

against a relatively soft target consisting of some assets of a foreign oil 

company and resulted in several vehicles destroyed and one of the Sultan’s 

askars (guards) killed. Nufl fled to Saudi Arabia and then to Iraq where he 

trained in guerilla warfare and gathered others to return to fight against 

the Sultan. Nufl’s group incorporated other dissident groups to include 

the ANM, the DCA, and members of the Dhofar Soldiers’ Organization28

to form the core of the DLF in 1964.29 The members of these opposition 

groups were generically referred to as adoo, a Dhofari term adopted by the 

British forces during the campaign.

Because the Sultan offered no terms to negotiate a settlement or address 

grievances, and no hope of amnesty, the only way to end the fighting was 

for one side to destroy the other. In fact, in 1966, Colonel Anthony Lewis, 

Commander of SAF, felt the war was stalemated and recommended 

increased military pressure paired with political concessions to break the 

stalemate.30 In his dissertation on the Dhofar campaign published in 1981, 

McKeown quotes from the Colonel Lewis’ paper: “Rebel movements have 

only been finally destroyed by leniency. A rebel who has no prospect of 

surrender terms will fight to the bitter end once he is committed to the 

movement. If there is some opportunity of pardon, this thought when his 

morale is low will weaken his resistance and lead him to capitulate.”31

According to a former senior intelligence officer at the time, many of the 

people and sheikhs on the jebel felt the conflict would have ended in late 

’66 or early ’67 had Sultan Said offered reasonable terms.32

The DLF began to receive support in the form of Soviet and Chinese 

weaponry, and an influx of ideological rebels. Both the materiel and 

personnel came through Yemen, then a communist-supported safe haven 

created in part due to the withdrawal of British forces. The influx of new 

ideologues supplanted the DLF leadership.33 In 1968 the DLF held its 

second conference where communist hardliners took control.34 DLF then 

changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied 

Arabian Gulf, or PFLOAG.35 PFLOAG’s ideology was Marxist versus 

DLF’s nationalist ideology.36 Ian Beckett described the adoo gain in 

strength under PFLOAG:

Its new manifesto called for the breaking of tribalism, the 

end of Western imperialism and the institution of a Marxist 

republic. With an estimated hard core of 2,000 active insurgents 

in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), dedicated deathsquads known as idaarat, and 3,000 part-time jebali militia, 

PFLOAG had become a formidable opponent. It comfortably 
51

outnumbered the single battalion of the SAF now stationed in 

Dhofar.37

While the SAF had some tactical success, no meaningful progress could 

be obtained due to the sultan’s firm stance against concessions. PFLOAG 

increased its activity resulting in a rise in contacts with SAF from about 

one per week to several per day. This increased pressure caused SAF to 

abandon western Dhofar and cede control of lines of communication and 

the population to PFLOAG.38

From 1964 to 1969, the Sultan’s efforts to defeat the insurgency 

struggled to make any meaningful progress. The SAF consisted of three 

battalions of infantry consisting primarily of Baluchi recruits, with some 

supporting personnel (e.g. armored cars, artillery). These units were led 

by seconded or contracted British officers, but had no familiarity with the 

Dhofar region, nor any connection with the Dhofari peoples, and were 

seen as a foreign army by the Dhofaris.39 In essence, Sultan Said was 

attempting to counter a foreign-backed insurgency fueled by legitimate 

grievances in a geographically and ethnically separated part of his country 

with a small force comprised of foreign troops unfamiliar with the terrain 

or the people of Dhofar, and unable to hold ground in the contested area.

In addition to the advantage of knowledge of the local terrain and 

population, examination of past campaigns indicate several other 

advantages of recruiting forces from within the contested area. Commenting 

on operations in Vietnam, noted author Andrew Krepinevich advised, 

“Paramilitary forces should be drawn from among the inhabitants and 

trained in counterinsurgency operations such as small unit patrolling, night 

operations, and the ambush.”40 The lack of forces with an understanding 

of the local area negatively impacts intelligence collection as noted by 

James Corum in his examination of the Malayan Emergency: “There 

were very few police personnel of Chinese ethnic background, and almost 

no Malayan or British intelligence personnel who knew Chinese. This 

greatly limited the amount and quality of intelligence that the police could 

collect on the insurgents...”41 Finally, possibly of greatest importance, 

local recruiting contributes to representative security forces that are more 

legitimate in the eyes of the local population.42 As representative recruiting 

in local areas includes all ethnic, religious, and tribal groups, it creates ties 

between the government and all of the people.43

The Sultan’s small force, unfamiliar and unconnected to the population, 

had no ability to retain any ground taken from the adoo.

44 In fact, most of 

the incursions into Dhofar by SAF from ’64 to ’69 were short-term raids 

aimed at killing or capturing adoo.

45 During the monsoon season, SAF 

would withdraw from the jebel entirely. 

Although many of the SAF’s difficulties stemmed from its lack of 

resources, the adoo fighters they faced were a formidable and capable 
52

force. Tony Jeapes, an SAS commander during the campaign, described 

the adoo’s capabilities:

They were good fighters, that I certainly knew. They had cleared 

SAF off the jebel and it was over a year since SAF had spent 

more than 24 hours up there. . . I had plenty of evidence as to the 

adoo’s fighting capability. They were brave men, not afraid to 

push home an attack if SAF made a blunder. They were skillful 

at using ground to provide covered approaches and their brown 

skins and dull clothing gave them natural camouflage. Whereas 

the SAF tended to stay in one place, the adoo were constantly 

moving, probing the SAF flanks, working around them to cut 

off their withdrawal, and using every dip and fold of the ground 

to advantage.46

Additionally, the adoo knew the terrain and how to maximize it in 

conducting ambushes and sniping attacks. The adoo had great mobility 

which they used to their advantage against the Sultan’s force which was 

less mobile and tended to try to hold ground. The adoo were well equipped, 

but often poorly trained resulting in inconsistent results with mortars and 

recoilless rifles. Using traditional tactics of the guerilla facing a stronger 

conventional force, the adoo sought to use hit-and-run tactics to harass and 

wear down the SAF.47

Insurgent gains against the Sultan’s forces included control over most 

of the jebel by 1969. The coastal town of Rakhyut and the Thumrait road 

fell to the insurgents.48 By the end of 1969, there were no SAF operating 

in the western part of Dhofar.49 The assessment of the situation during the 

1969 monsoon was that “SAF could hold Salalah and contain the enemy, 

but not suppress them.”50

To further complicate matters, the Sultan required a contingent of his 

troops, at least one full battalion,51 to remain in Northern Oman to conduct 

training, prepare for future rotations in Dhofar, and keep the peace.52

While this may seem an excessive demand for forces away from the fight 

in Dhofar, the threat of attack in Northern Oman was real.53

1970

The long-dreaded threat of attack in Northern Oman became reality 

in June of 1970 when a group of rebel leaders attacked the military 

encampments at Ziki and Nizwa.54 The attack on Ziki was intended to 

allow the rebel leaders to gain experience which they would take back 

to their separate groups. Each group would then conduct attacks against 

predetermined military and civil targets in Northern Oman. The attack was 

a success in the fact that all of the leaders gained experience and walked 

away unharmed. Unfortunately for the adoo leaders, the SAF Commander 

at Ziki pursued them and killed or captured the lot, thus decimating the 

leadership of the insurgency in the north.55
53

Although the uprising in Northern Oman was quickly crushed, the fact 

that it happened at all underscored the level of dissatisfaction of Omanis 

with the Sultan who still refused to change his policies, made only minor 

investments in his armed forces, and showed no signs of altering his 

course.56 As Walter Ladwig III states in his examination of the conflict, 

“By 1970 it had become clear to London that Sultan Said was an obstacle 

to victory in Dhofar . . . At the same time, it was recognized that no change 

of government would occur without the acquiescence of the British officers 

seconded to the Sultan’s service.”57 Sultan Said had to go. 

Sultan Qaboos overthrew his father in a largely bloodless palace coup 

on 23 July 1970.58 Although the exact details remain unclear, Sultan Qaboos 

obviously had some assistance from the British government. Indeed, at the 

time of the coup, a British Royal Air Force transport aircraft happened to 

be parked at RAF Salalah and was used to transport the deposed Sultan 

Said out of Oman. It was the only time such an aircraft was seen at RAF 

Salalah during the course of the war.59

Sultan Qaboos wasted no time. Soon after deposing his father, he 

enacted a series of broad reforms aimed at addressing the grievances 

which fueled the insurgency as well as modernizing and increasing the 

size of the armed forces. He recalled Omani exiles that were unable to 

return previously due to his father’s policies against migration. Among 

those recalled was Sultan Qaboos’ uncle, Tariq bin Taimur, who Qaboos 

made the prime minister. Other reforms included the release of political 

prisoners, lifting bans on internal movement and travel between Oman and 

certain foreign countries, and creation of four new ministries: education, 

health, justice, and interior. Sultan Qaboos also created an Interim Advisory 

Council, which enacted a development plan to address many of the social 

issues fueling dissent among Dhofaris.60

Under Sultan Qaboos, one month after the coup, Oman joined the 

Arab League and the United Nations,61 which signaled the new regime’s 

desire to modernize the country.62 Britain now had a viable ally in Sultan 

Qaboos, and quickly developed a plan to assist the Sultan to include the 

following described by Ladwig: “...the British provided assistance in 

four key areas: developing a plan for victory; training and expanding the 

Sultan’s Armed Forces; providing experienced leadership and technical 

skills; and equipping the SAF for counterinsurgency.”63

Just before the coup, Lieutenant Colonel John Watts, the CO of 22 

SAS, took a small team to Oman to make an assessment of the situation 

in order to determine what could be done to assist the Sultan in defeating 

the insurgency.64 Watts’ assessment recommended SAS participation 

along five fronts: intelligence, information, medical support, veterinary 

support, and “When possible, the raising of Dhofari soldiers to fight for the 

Sultan.”65 The first SAS team was replaced by a second team led by Tony 
54

Jeapes, at which point the SAS was operating on the first four of the five 

fronts, but without success on the fifth front of raising Dhofaris to fight for 

the Sultan.66

Many of Sultan Qaboos’ reforms addressed the grievances that sparked 

the insurgency. Arguably the most important reform enacted by Sultan 

Qaboos was adopting a policy of amnesty. As a result, members of the 

adoo began to surrender to the Sultan’s forces, and some acted in support 

of Sultan Qaboos against the adoo. In order to retain support, PFLOAG 

leadership threatened to execute any adoo attempting to surrender. The 

combination of the Sultan’s reforms and the PFLOAG leadership’s 

growing repression came to a head on September 12, 1970 when fighting 

erupted between PFLOAG hardliners and other adoo elements no longer 

satisfied with the communist agenda.67

The heavy-handed tactics and practices of the communists and their 

forced takeover of the DLF triggered an internal battle in which Salim 

Mubarak and his core of fighters resisted the communist takeover. Mubarak 

then led his men off the mountain to surrender to the Sultan’s forces.68 As a 

result of the internal conflict and the attractive reforms of Sultan Qaboos, 

Salim Mubarak, the second in command of the Eastern Area of the DLF, 

and 2469 of his best fighters defected to the side of the Sultan.70

Although a few former insurgent fighters had previously changed sides, 

they were few and of little influence as most of the insurgents inclined 

to change sides were skeptical of Sultan Qaboos’ promised reforms.71

Mubarak was the first adoo leader of great influence to surrender. Indeed, 

Mubarak is credited with the idea of forming a firqa loyal to the Sultan to 

not only fight the adoo, but also to recruit them to switch sides and support 

the Sultan.72

The arrival of Mubarak and the formation of the firqa Saladdin was 

a turning point in the campaign, but also a learning point. Initial thinking 

was to mix the tribes within each firqa to as a natural check on any one 

tribe becoming too powerful. After the death of Mubarak, BATT placed 

Mubarak’s second in command as the new leader. 73 Unfortunately, 

Mubarak’s second in command was rejected by the men of the various 

tribes, and the firqa Saladdin collapsed under tribal rivalries and distrust.74

While Mubarak’s defection was significant, it was only the beginning. 

In a seven-month period, from September of ’70 to March of ’71, more 

than 200 enemy fighters surrendered to the Sultan’s forces.75 In early 1972 

there were 11 firqas varying in size from 40 to 140 members in each.76

By the middle of ’74 the firqa had grown to about 1,000 members,77 and 

by the end of the campaign about 20 different firqas were formed totaling 

approximately 3,000 fighters.78 In the battle for the will of the people, 

Sultan Qaboos outpaced both his father and the insurgents. 

The firqa were not only a visible indication of the Sultan’s growing 
55

support among the population, but also the preferred means of reducing 

the enemy’s ranks. Killing an adoo might reduce the enemy by one, but 

might also create a tribal blood feud that could add to the conflict. If, 

however, the Sultan’s forces could convince an adoo to surrender and join 

the Sultan’s firqa, the gain would be a “plus two” as the adoo lose one, and 

the Sultan gains one.79 A former SAF officer Ian Gardiner describes the 

mindset of the former adoo joining the firqas: 

The Firqat Forces units were made up of Dhofari Jebeli 

tribesmen, many of whom had been fighting on the other side 

but who had been persuaded to come over to the Sultan. These 

people were called Surrendered Enemy Personnel - SEPs - but 

it was a misnomer because it implied that they had been beaten. 

As soldiers, they were not beaten, but the political system 

which had recruited them was.80

By the end of 1970, the situation in Oman had changed dramatically. 

Sultan Qaboos deposed his father and instituted long overdue reforms to 

include amnesty. Sultan Qaboos pushed for Omanis to join the SAF while 

Britain sent SAS to serve as British Advisory Training Teams (BATTs) 

to assist the Sultan. The BATTs began training the first firqa, Saladdin, 

at Mirbat. Sultan Qaboos ordered the formation of the Dhofar Brigade81

in 1970 to provide a permanent presence in Dhofar as opposed to the 

constant rotation of forces in and out of Dhofar under his father’s reign.82

Headquartered at RAF Salalah, the Dhofar Brigade encompassed all of the 

Sultan’s forces in Dhofar regardless of service.83

With so many changes occurring in such a short period of time it 

is difficult to determine the level of impact of any one change. Many 

veterans of the campaign credit the firqas as being critical to the success 

of the campaign. As Ian Gardiner put it, “For all their limitations, I do 

not believe we could have won the war without the Firqat.”84 Similarly, 

John Akehurst described the role of the firqa, “I must reiterate how vitally 

important the Firqats were in the struggle. Their knowledge of the ground 

and their influence with the civilians were indispensible, and worth all 

the time, trouble and money spent to secure and retain their goodwill and 

allegiance.”85

1971

Over the next year, BATT continued to develop firqas as the Sultan’s 

reforms continued to attract additional adoo surrenders. By assisting 

the Sultan in raising, training, and employing the surrendered enemy 

personnel as firqa, the SAS/BATT were acting along Watts’ fifth front, 

raising Dhofaris to fight for the Sultan. Operation JAGUAR began in 1971 

with the aim of reestablishing a foothold on the jebel. Operation JAGUAR 

involved two SAS Squadrons (B and G), and three newly raised firqas. The 

end result of the operation was the establishment of a foothold on the jebel 
56

from which the Sultan’s forces could patrol, signaling the determination 

to remain permanently. From the foothold established during Operation 

Jaguar, SAF, SAS, and firqa began moving slowly but steadily westward 

across the jebel to clear away the adoo and establish the Sultan’s control 

in Dhofar.86

From the beginning of 1971 with Operation JAGUAR, the general 

strategy was to clear an area of adoo, establish firqa to hold their tribal 

areas once cleared, and continuously push the adoo west. The enemy was 

strongest in the Western Area of Dhofar and as such, SAF would require 

a large force to deal with them in the difficult terrain of the jebel. To this 

end, the decision was made to employ the firqa to hold the Eastern and 

Central Areas once cleared to allow regular SAF and allied87 units to mass 

in the west.88

The use of the firqa to hold cleared areas was a slight change in the 

original vision for the irregular force. The original concept was to raise a 

small force of specially selected89 recruits numbering no more than 100 

to conduct ambushes, interdiction of enemy supply routes, pre-planned 

raids, raising and leading their tribes against the adoo, and to conduct 

diversionary actions in support of SAF operations.90 As the numbers of 

adoo changing sides to fight for the Sultan grew, the plan was modified 

to allow for a maximum of 700 total fighters.91 Eventually this figure was 

thrown out as well as the Sultan ended the campaign with about 3,000 

fighters in his firqas. 

While there was motivation to accept all comers into the firqa as a 

means of keeping the Dhofaris on side,92 there were some screening 

criteria. As recorded in BATT Notes on the Raising and Training of 

Irregular Forces in Dhofar, “The most important factor in selecting an 

irregular indigenous force is to establish their true motive for fighting and 

to use this as a bait as much as possible. In this way a force will be created 

using its own motivation which will hold it together and keep it going in 

difficult times.”93

Other criteria used in Dhofar include age and overall health. Recruits 

that were too old, too young, or in very sick were rejected as unfit for the 

rigors of combat.94

While Operation JAGUAR had some success in establishing 

permanent SAF and firqa bases in the Central Area, it failed to achieve its 

original aim which was to clear the Eastern Area of enemy. Retention of 

the base areas on the jebel did signal a renewed strength and resolve on 

the part of the Sultan’s forces, and enabled patrolling in the area by SAF 

and firqa forces. Previous attempts to establish a permanent base on the 

jebel met with failure and eventual withdrawal. Operation JAGUAR was 

different and the base established at Medinat Al Haq, known as “White 

City” to the SAS, remained throughout the campaign.95
57

1972

In 1972 PFLOAG attacked from inside Yemen across the border 

to seize the town of Habarut just inside the Omani border. The Sultan 

responded by sending his air force to attack the Yemeni town of Hauf a few 

weeks later. PFLOAG’s next move was an attack on the outpost at Mirbat 

on 19 July.96 Mirbat defenders, 30 men altogether, included local town 

guards, firqa, an eight man BATT from B Squadron, Dhofar Gendarmerie, 

and a 25-pound field gun.97 PFLOAG massed more than 200 fighters to 

attack the outpost.98

The PFLOAG force made one critical mistake in that they opened 

fire with indirect weapons too soon that alerted the assembled defenders 

of the attack before the ground troops could press home the assault.99

Additionally, G Squadron was armed and on their way to conduct ranges 

when the attack went in and were able to quickly conduct a counterattack against the PFLOAG fighters. The BATT also made good use 

of Strikemaster attack aircraft from the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force in 

breaking up the PFLOAG assault.100

PFLOAG lost 30 percent of its attacking force as killed in action 

during the assault on Mirbat, and never tried such a large scale direct 

assault again.101 Instead, in order to relieve pressure on PFLOAG forces 

in Dhofar, PFLOAG tried to renew their attacks in Northern Oman. As 

described previously, the plot was uncovered and thwarted. 

Also in 1972, as SAF pressure increased, the PFLOAG attempted 

another coordinated attack in the north to cause SAF to draw resources 

northward, thus relieving some of the pressure in the Center Area and 

Eastern Area (PFLOAG had divided Dhofar into three areas, Western, 

Center, and Eastern).102 Arms were smuggled, recruiting increased, and 

a plan was formed. Adoo misfortune again, the SAF uncovered the plot 

and thwarted the plan. This led to the capture of the adoo leaders as well 

as other collaborators. In the end, 77 people involved in the plot were 

convicted and sentenced either to life in prison or death by firing squad.103

Other operations in 1972 built upon the gains of Operation JAGUAR, 

and included Operations HORNBEAM, SYCAMORE, and HAWK. 

The aim of these operations was to interdict enemy supplies going to the 

Eastern Area to support destruction of the enemy operating there. As with 

Operation JAGUAR, these operations failed to eliminate the enemy in the 

Eastern Area but did result in the capture of 80 fighters and smuggled arms 

as well as an overall disruptive effect on PFLOAG.104

1973

The long-term impact of Operation JAGUAR and the permanent bases 

on the jebel became more evident in 1973. Operating from these bases 

throughout the monsoon, SAF, firqa, and allied forces made significant 
58

strides towards controlling the Eastern Area. These gains include the 

opening of the Midway Road by the Iranian contingent, the beginning and 

completion of the Hornbeam Line, as well as the civil aid activities by the 

Royal Engineers on the jebel. In addition to the permanent bases on the 

jebel, deployment of an Abu Dhabi Defence Force battalion to Northern 

Oman to relieve SAF forces operating there enabled SAF to increase the 

number of troops operating in Dhofar. 105

The Midway Road was a vital line of communication because it was 

the only link between Salalah and Northern Oman overland. Until the 

Iranian forces reopened the Midway Road in 1973, all movement between 

Northern Oman and Salalah had to be conducted by air.106 With limited 

air transport assets, control of the Midway Road greatly improved the 

mobility and sustainability of the Sultan’s forces in Dhofar.

The Hornbeam Line was the first major obstacle emplaced to disrupt 

adoo movement from the Western Area eastward. The line consisted of 

wire and mines and included base areas at regular intervals to enable 

patrolling. While the line did not prevent enemy personnel from crossing, 

the crossing points where the line was breached were easy to identify. The 

Sultan’s forces would follow up crossings with air reconnaissance and/or 

ground trackers to locate the intruders. The Hornbeam Line did prevent 

the adoo from transporting large quantities of materiel as it could not be 

crossed by camels or other pack animals.107

Civil aid on the jebel was given top priority among civil aid projects 

by Sultan Qaboos.108 This was part of the Sultan’s priorities for the fighting 

season of ’72-’73 which also included securing the Oman-Yemen border 

and defending the Salalah plain.109 Newly formed Civil Action Teams 

augmented the civil aid efforts by coordinating aid efforts such as drilling 

wells, building schools, and medical assistance visits in an effort to establish 

governance and address the local grievances fueling the insurgency.110

All of these efforts, the Hornbeam Line, opening the Midway Road, 

increasing civil aid, were components of Sultan Qaboos’ plan, but 

were coordinated under the Commander of the Sultan’s Armed Forces 

(CSAF) at the time, Major General Timothy Creasy. Creasy took Sultan’s 

Qaboos’ priorities and developed a plan to achieve them, which focused 

on interdicting the movement of adoo from west to the Eastern Area 

in order to clear the Eastern Area.111 While PFLOAG had previously 

divided Dhofar into Western, Central, and Eastern Areas for coordination 

purposes, the Sultan’s forces under CSAF Creasy were physically dividing 

Dhofar to impede adoo freedom of maneuver, interdict adoo logistics, and 

systematically clear the adoo from east to west. 

1974

In 1974 CSAF Creasy directed the Dhofar Brigade, which was then 

commanded by Brigadier John Akehurst, to clear the Eastern Area and 
59

continue to push west.

112 The Dhofar Brigade in 1974 was approximately 

10,000 strong and included Omani forces, and foreign forces from 

Britain, Iran, and Jordan.113 The Dhofar Brigade included four infantry 

battalions, two Omani and two Baluch.114 The brigade also included the 

Oman Artillery Regiment which had a variety of guns from 5.5-inch 

medium guns to 4.2-inch mortars, an Armoured Car Squadron (half of 

which remained in Northern Oman) equipped with forty-eight armored 

cars mounting 76mm guns, and a mobile patrol unit called Z Company 

mounted in Land Rovers carrying .50-caliber machine guns.115 Last but 

not least, in 1974 the Dhofar Brigade had about 1,000 fighters in its firqas

with more joining every week.116

In order to carry out his instructions from CSAF Creasy, Brigadier 

Akehurst created his battle plan:

The Firqats at that time were about 1,400 strong and were the 

key to the centre and east. Considerable strength would be 

needed to take on the enemy in the west and it could only be 

amassed at the expense of the centre and east. Either the enemy 

must be cleaned out altogether, an impossible task in the short 

term, or the securing must be taken over by the Firqats. If roads 

could be built to those places now supplied by air, especially 

helicopters, more resources still would be made available for 

the west.117

Firqas had grown since Mubarak led his band down from the mountain, 

and had certainly contributed to the Sultan’s campaign. Beginning in 1974, 

the firqa would play a larger role in the defeat of the adoo. 

Brigadier Akehurst, building on the successes of the previous years 

(e.g. regaining control of the Midway Road, completion of the Hornbeam 

Line, permanent bases on the jebel), combined the military capabilities at 

his disposal (e.g. Omani battalions, Iranian forces, supporting arms), the 

civil aid resources (e.g. the Civil Aid Department, Civil Action Teams), 

and the firqa to clear the Eastern Area of adoo, hold it to prevent adoo

return, and improve the civil infrastructure to consolidate support for the 

Sultan. The firqa played a key role in the execution of Akehurst’s plan: 

The Jebali people were intensely tribal and very jealous of 

their own tribe’s lands and customs ... Several Firqats were 

formed from surrendered enemy but had to live on the Salalah 

Plain or in other secure areas not their own because the enemy 

prevented occupation of their tribal areas. From conversations 

with their leaders and their SAS advisers I learned of their 

intense desire to reoccupy their own land. All of them promised 

instant security if they could be established in positions of their 

own choosing. . . If good and constant water could be provided 

at a central point, most civilians could be expected to come 
60

into that point and there be persuaded that the Government was 

offering the better deal.118

Akehurst saw a way to use the firqas natural motivation to return to 

and secure their tribal areas to support his campaign. He describes the first 

step in his 10-point pattern as “A SAF operation in strength supported by a 

Firqat secures a position of the Firqat’s choice which dominated its tribal 

area.”119

The first operation to establish firqas in their tribal areas on the jebel

took place in October of 1974120 and involved the firqa Abu Bakar Sadeeq 

establishing a position at Jebel Kaftawt.121 To further support disruption 

of enemy movement east on the jebel, SAF constructed a supplementary 

line called the Hammer Line which ran for about five kilometers near 

Jebel Kaftawt. In addition to the establishment of firqa Abu Bakar Sadeeq, 

additional firqa established positions at Hagleet, Zeak, Ashinhaib, Ayun, 

and Burg Haluf. 122

Although the positive benefits of placing firqa in their tribal areas began 

to show in less than a month (e.g. increased surrenders, vital intelligence 

on the enemy situation),123 the Sultan was unsure what to do with the firqa

once the war ended.124 Some advocated for the firqa to be developed and 

organized into a National Guard, but this plan was rejected for two main 

reasons. First, the tribesmen of the jebel were not accustomed to discipline 

and training, and would likely spend a good deal of time absent. Second, 

the Sultan did not trust the firqa completely as they were recently fighting 

against him.125 Providing them better weapons, training, and organization 

was too great a risk to take. In the end, the Sultan determined to keep 

the firqa as tribal forces which would secure their own areas with small 

arms.126

A third and final attempt to open a new front in Northern Oman 

involved a member of PFLOAG’s central committee from Beirut who 

was killed at a checkpoint by a SAF soldier on 29 October 1974. In the 

committee member’s vehicle were money, weapons, explosives, and 

evidence of planned attacks. Due to rapid exploitation of the information 

found in the vehicle, Omani security forces were able to make additional 

arrests and foil the plot.127

1975

The next major operation in the Dhofar campaign involved an assault 

to destroy the very large adoo arms cache in the Sherishitti cave complex 

west of the Damavand Line. Beginning in January 1975, Operation 

Dharab originally called for the Iranian contingent to seize the Sherishitti 

caves, but CSAF later gave the task to the Dhofar Brigade commanded by 

Akehurst.128 The plan called for a SAF battalion supported by 40 men from 

the Tariq Bin Zeead and Southern Mahra firqas along with their BATTs.129

Apparently forgetting the lesson of the first firqa Saladdin which 
61

disintegrated under tribal friction,130 a mixed firqa was formed to lead the 

SAF companies into their planned positions for the assault on the caves 

at Sherishitti. The mixed firqa had no cohesion, and thus no confidence, 

especially as the lead element against what was believed to be a very 

hard target.131 Bryan Ray describes the effect of the mixed firqa during 

Operation DHARAB. “Disastrously, however, surprise for the operation 

was lost because of the heavy supporting fire insisted on by the firqas

before moving forward. Thus alerted, the adoo were ready and waiting 

in excellent ambush positions which dominated the line of the SAF 

advance.”132 Operation DHARAB, although not well executed, eventually 

achieved the overall aim of removing the Sherishitti caves as an adoo

supply depot. 

The next major operation, called Operation HIMAAR, would mark 

one of the last operations conducted to gain control of the Central and 

Eastern Areas. SAF operations between the Hornbeam and Damavand 

Lines, such as Operation HIMAAR, resulted in the destruction of the 9th 

June Regiment of the adoo,

133 and left only the Western Area to clear of 

adoo. The Sultan would gain control over all Dhofar at the conclusion of 

the next and final major operation, Operation HADAF.

The overall aim of Operation HADAF was to establish a new 

defensive line to continue to increase pressure on the Western Area while 

remaining out of range of indirect fire originating from Yemen. Operation 

HADAF included deception operations to confuse and disintegrate the 

adoo operating in the objective area. The deceptions included tactical 

movements, false communications, and other means intended to convince 

the adoo that the objectives of the pending operation were the coastal pass 

below the Sarfait position and the Sherishitti cave complex.134

The adoo were not fooled by the deception involving Sarfait as they 

believed any operations there were for deception only, and not sustainable. 

Because of the adoo lack of reaction and the resultant success at Sarfait, 

as well as the adamant insistence of the firqa135 involved to hold onto 

the ground gained, Akehurst requested CSAF support a change in the 

operation.136 The new CSAF, Major General Ken Perkins, agreed and 

approved the change.137

The final major operation would sweep the remaining adoo and 

Yemeni troops from the Western Area. The success of the operation not 

only placed all of Dhofar under the Sultan’s control, but also resulted in 222 

surrenders between mid-October and the end of the year 1975.138 Akehurst 

sent Sultan Qaboos a message on behalf of CSAF, “I have the honour to 

inform your Majesty that Dhofar is now secure for civil development.”139

Sultan Qaboos announced the end of the war on 11 December 1975.140

Conclusions

The role of the firqa in the campaign was vital, but is often overblown. 
62

The firqa filled a gap in capability that SAF could never fill. The firqa were 

Dhofaris and Jebalis who knew the land and had the trust of the people. By 

the same token, the firqa alone could never have achieved success against 

PFLOAG. The interdependence of the forces involved in the campaign 

was illustrated by Jeapes:

The firqats’ understanding of ground and their speed of 

manoeuvre were both superior to SAF troops’, but when 

it came to straight military tactics, the SAF’s discipline told 

every time. The two forces were complementary; neither could 

have won the war alone. If the firqats were the most important 

Government department to be created to win the war, Civil Aid 

must run them a close second. The Civil Aid department was, 

I believe, the one new lesson the Dhofar Campaign provided 

in the study of counter-revolutionary war, yet it came about 

almost by default.141

SAF and BATT both recognized the firqa as critical to success, but had 

different views of the purpose of these irregular forces. While generically 

the Watts Plan called for recruiting indigenous forces to the side of the 

Sultan – “When possible, the raising of Dhofari soldiers to fight for the 

Sultan”142 – this does not truly capture the purpose of the firqa. General Sir 

Peter De La Billiere, who served in multiple campaigns from the Korean 

War to the Gulf War of 1991 to include campaigns in Malaya, Aden, 

Borneo, and Dhofar offered his insights:

As in Malaya and Borneo, our aim was to help local people 

help themselves. ... From the beginning the key element in our 

plans were the firqats ... we began to recruit and train irregular 

soldiers loyal to the Sultan. .... Our aim was that they should 

defend the settlements on the plain, and also lure rebels down 

off the jebel. ... Only by training native soldiers could we build 

up a force large enough to defeat the rebels. . . 143

According to Sir Peter, the purpose of the firqa was to increase the 

strength of the Sultan’s forces by holding cleared areas and enticing their 

fellow tribesmen to quit the adoo and join with the Sultan. To achieve a 

victory that would last, the peoples of Oman had to help themselves.144

Continuing in this vein, Major General Tony Jeapes offered his 

philosophy on recruiting irregular security forces from the ranks of the 

enemy:

Persuading a man to join you is far cheaper than killing him. 

Words are far, far less expensive than bullets, let alone shells 

and bombs. Then, too, by killing him you merely deprive the 

enemy of one soldier. If he is persuaded to join the Government 

forces the enemy again becomes one less, but the Government 

forces become one more, a gain of plus two.145
63

Jeapes saw the role of the firqa as gaining a victory over the insurgents 

by winning over their membership through persuasion and example while 

reducing the level of violence. Jeapes saw increased defections to the 

side of the Sultan as a psychological blow to the adoo. Jeapes related an 

account which demonstrated the impact of firqa on the psyche of the adoo:

One thinks again of the political commissar of the adoo firqat

defending Shershitti who surrendered during Operation Badree. 

... If ever a man was a Communist, it was surely he, but when 

asked why he had come across to the Government he replied, 

“Because you are here – and you could not be here in the West 

unless the loyal firqats were with you. You would not have any 

firqats unless the people supported them you would only have 

that support if the rumours of progress and development I have 

heard are true. If they are true, then the Front has told me lies. 

If they lied on that, they have probably lied on other things. 

Therefore I have surrendered to you.”146

As Akehurst mentioned in his book, by assuming a local security role 

in less-contested areas in the east, the firqa created the opportunity for SAF 

to concentrate more forces for offensive operations as early as 1971.147 As 

the commander of the Dhofar Brigade, Akehurst was more focused on 

the firqa as increased manpower which would enable him to focus his 

conventional forces on the conventional fight. Akehurst recognized the 

strengths and the weaknesses of the firqa and incorporated them into his 

plan accordingly.148

Both the SAF and BATT views of the purpose of the firqa were 

complementary. It is important to note as well that the firqa themselves 

understood and accepted their role, and had a voice in shaping operations 

and how they were employed.149 The overriding aim of the firqa was to 

regain control over their tribal lands.150

The combined purposes of the firqa (e.g. SAF, BATT, firqa) fit into, 

and indeed helped shape the Sultan’s strategy over time. Watt’s fivepoint plan constituted more of an assessment and identification of lines 

of operation than an actual strategy.151 Although Watts is credited with the 

idea of raising indigenous forces to fight for the Sultan,152 the plan did not 

reach any level of detail or result in any concrete steps toward forming 

an indigenous force prior to the defection of Salim Mubarak and his 

followers.153 The surrender of Salim Mubarak was not only unexpected, 

but also caught the Sultan’s forces without a plan to deal with surrendered 

enemy personnel. As one SAS veteran of Dhofar related the surrender of 

Mubarak, “First of all the surrender of Mubarak took us all by surprise. 

Nobody knew he was coming in. He was a firqa leader with the adoo, 

so his position was known . . . His actual arrival surprised everybody. 

Nobody knew what to do with him or where to put him.”154 Despite the 

slow start, once BATT and others recognized the potential of forming firqa
64

from surrendered enemy personnel, recruiting adoo became a key part of 

the campaign and operations.155

Because the adoo outnumbered the SAF, and in many cases had better 

equipment, reversing the gains of PFLOAG in Dhofar required greater 

combat power to clear the adoo from the jebel. Increased combat power 

came after Sultan Qaboos authorized increases in his conventional forces, 

and the firqa assumed the local security role in their tribal lands in the 

Eastern Area,156 thus releasing SAF forces for offensive operations.157 As 

SAF regained footholds on the jebel and slowly pushed west, BATT and 

firqa supported SAF operations by conducting reconnaissance and security 

operations ahead of SAF, and communicated with the local population to 

gain support for the Sultan and to recruit adoo to join the firqa.

158

In addition to increasing the combat power of the Sultan, formation 

of firqa from surrendered enemies greatly reduced the combat power 

available to PFLOAG. McKeown’s research estimates the PFLOAG 

strength at the end of 1969 as 2,000 organized fighters and 3,000 militia 

fighters which constituted nearly the entire population of the jebel.

159

Assuming the population of the jebel remained fairly constant, this gave 

the PFLOAG approximately 5,000 fighters. By the end of March 1971, 

more than 200 adoo surrendered to the Sultan’s forces,160 which would put 

PFLOAG strength at about 4,800. This shift in combat power continued 

and by the end of the campaign, with approximately 3,000 fighters in the 

Sultan’s firqas,

 161 PFLOAG strength would have been approximately 

2,000. This constituted a significant shift in combat power directly from 

one side to the other, and demonstrated the effectiveness of the strategy. 

Although the firqa in this campaign did not exist until 1970, they 

played a vital role in the successful outcome. Those involved in the 

campaign provided several insights into raising, training, and employing 

the Dhofari irregular security forces known as firqa, or as Tony Jeapes 

humorously put it, “...the SAS did not always talk of the firqats, they 

called them the firkins or the firks or even, in moments of stress, both.”162

The composition of the firqa was based on tribal affiliation and the number 

of fighters available. For example, in 1972 there were 11 firqas which 

varied in size from 40 to 140 fighters.163 Firqas were armed with small 

arms, but did not receive heavy machine guns or mortars.164 Each firqa had 

at a minimum a four-man BATT assigned to it which conducted training, 

joined the firqa on operations,165 and served as the link between the firqa

and SAF. 

Indeed, without BATT the success of the firqa may have been out 

of reach due to the unique requirements for effective firqa advisers. As 

Ian Gardiner pointed out, SAS soldiers were better suited than most to 

working with the firqa. “Regular soldiers could find the Firqat infuriating. 

The SAS, who themselves were somewhat irregular, and were trained to 

train irregular soldiers, were mostly pretty well adjusted to the task.”166 In 
65

one of many compliments to the SAS who worked with the firqa, Akehurst 

concluded, “BATT’s contribution in raising and training the Firqats had 

been of inestimable importance in the winning of the war . . .”167

The firqa members elected their leaders, one military and one 

political.168 BATT commanders would coordinate with the firqa leaders, 

but the BATT commanders were also in command of the firqa itself.169

While BATT served as effective advisers and commanders of the Sultan’s 

firqa, they also learned from the firqa fighters170 and adapted their tactics 

accordingly.

The firqa were uniquely familiar with the capabilities and tactics of 

their enemies as they previously defected from the ranks of the enemy to 

join the Sultan. The key enemy advantages in the Dhofar campaign were 

legitimate grievances with Sultan Said which they could exploit to gain 

support of the population, numerical superiority over SAF, and superior 

equipment. Once Sultan Qaboos seized power and enacted reforms, the 

enemy advantage of the support of the population was contested, and 

finally lost to the Sultan.171

As mentioned above, the PFLOAG had approximately 5,000 fighters 

on the jebel at its high water mark at the end of 1969. Defections to the 

Government side were costly in terms of manpower, but possibly more 

costly psychologically. As fighters left the adoo to join the Sultan’s firqa, 

they brought with them and shared their knowledge of enemy tactics and 

tricks, one instance of which was described by a former SAS Dhofar 

veteran:

What he said they used to do was come in quite close under 

the cover of darkness, they would put down a volley of fully 

automatic fire at about ten feet, and they would send what they 

called their commandos in under the tracer and used to find the 

Iranians all cowering in their sangars. And they just used to 

put their AK-47s over the top of the sangars and they just used 

to spray them. On that particular night they tried it with us, 

and fortunately we were ready for them and they lost casualties 

that night rather than ourselves. We had a couple of lightly 

wounded. That process of how the adoo used to do with the 

Iranians was explained to me by one of our surrendered enemy 

personnel.172

Due to support from Communist China and the Soviet Union,173

PFLOAG was well equipped, often having better small arms and mortars 

than SAF.174 As the Sultan committed additional resources to modernizing 

his forces, the enemy advantages in small arms diminished. As most firqa 

operated with BATT support,175 the SAF were usually able to overmatch 

enemy firepower with SAF artillery or attack aviation support.176

PFLOAG also benefited from training support, with a select few 
66

receiving training in China177 consisting of six months of training on 

political and military topics.178 Jeapes described an operation to capture of 

the coastal town of Sudh in February 1971. During this operation, Salim 

Mubarak used his Communist-supplied training to great effect. After a 

daring nighttime landing from the sea, the Firqa Saladdin and their BATT 

took control of the city without violence. After raising the Omani flag over 

the fort in the center of the town, the firqa leader Salim Mubarak shouted 

to the city that the firqa were here to stay, the communists were defeated, 

and that all of the men should assemble at 10:00 a.m. that morning. Once 

all of the men were gathered from their homes, Mubarak put his training 

under the communists to good work.179 As Jeapes recounted in his book 

SAS Secret War, “I realized that what I had witnessed was a Communist 

takeover in reverse. Salim had used the methods he had been taught in 

China. It was a perfectly executed example of indoctrination such as no 

SAF or British troops could possibly have achieved.”180

The campaign in Dhofar against the DLF and PFLOAG was a success. 

Many factors contributed to the successful outcome. Sultan Qaboos was 

an enlightened ruler who understood the grievances of his people and was 

willing to make concessions to alleviate their grievances. The Communists 

supporting the PFLOAG pushed the Dhofaris too far in their assault 

on tribalism and Islam.181 Sultan Qaboos pursued a policy of amnesty 

which was accepted by many whose previous reasons for fighting had 

been removed by Sultan Qaboos’ other reforms. Iran and Jordan agreed 

to support Sultan Qaboos in his fight and provided resources vital to the 

overall success of the campaign. 

The success of Sultan Qaboos was not a foregone conclusion upon his 

assumption of power. From 1965 to 1970, Sultan Said lost most of Dhofar 

to DLF and PFLOAG, failed to increase his security force’s capabilities, 

and continued to alienate the people of Dhofar and the Jebel. Despite the 

constant presence of security forces in Northern Oman, Sultan Said’s 

enemies were emboldened enough by his weakness to attack outposts in 

Northern Oman as training operations. 

Sultan Qaboos did not win through superior forces – he was 

outnumbered and outgunned in 1970. He did not win because he raised 

irregular security forces – there were none when he took power. Sultan 

Qaboos did not prevail due to overwhelming external support – the SAS 

“were never there,” only a small number of British Army Training Teams 

and seconded and contracted officers. Sultan Qaboos won because he was 

willing and able to regain the support of the people through a combination 

of reforms to address legitimate grievances, security operations to remove 

enemy forces and secure his people, and civil aid projects to demonstrate 

his resolve and concern for the well-being of his people. 
67

Notes

1. Ian Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar, 

1965-1975,” Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Daniel Marston and Carter 

Malkasian, (eds) (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 175. “Indeed, it has often 

been described as a model counterinsurgency campaign, displaying both the fruits 

of the operational experience gained by the British Army since 1945, and also the 

flexible British approach to such things.”

2. Lieutenant Colonel John McKeown, Britain and Oman: The Dhofar War 

and Its Significance, (Cambridge, UK: Dissertation submitted for the degree of 

Master of Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, 1981), 96.

3. John Akehurst, We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman 1965-1975. 

(Great Britain: Biddles Ltd., 1982), 183. “I think the Sultan’s success came 

mainly from four mistakes by the enemy and six things that he and his Armed 

Forces got right.”: 

Enemy Mistakes

1. Trying to replace the simple but deep Islamic faith of the Jebalis 

with Communist atheism.

2. Trying to break down tribalism before the people were ready for it.

3. A cumbersome command and communications structure. 

4. Reliance on a single supply line.

Features of the Sultan’s Success

1. The coup and the reforms which followed it.

2. Concentrating attention on winning the support of the population 

away from the enemy. 

3. Joint civil/military control.

4. Interrupting the enemy’s supply line.

5. Air power, especially helicopters.

6. Intelligence.

4. Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the 

Dhofar Insurgency. (South Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword Books Unlimited, 

2007), 156.

5. D.L. Price, Oman: Insurgency and Development, (London: Institute for 

the Study of Conflict, 1975), 1.

6. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 175.

7. Bard O’Neill, “Revolutionary War in Oman,” Insurgency in the Modern 

World, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 213. 

8. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 175. 

9. Cited from notes taken during a lecture by Dr. Daniel Marston on 18 

January 2011.

10. Marston lecture, 18 January 2011.

11. Walter Ladwig III, Supporting Allies in COIN: Britain and the Dhofar 

Rebellion, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 19:1 March 2008, p. 66.

12. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 64. 
68

13. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 17-18. “Sultan Said bin Sultan despatched 

a force from Muscat to annex the province but the force was soon withdrawn. A 

second annexation took place in 1879 at the invitation of a leader of a revolution 

against a Moplah priest who had fled India and established personal leadership in 

Salalah. From 1879, Dhofar remained continuously under the Sultan’s rule through 

his appointed wali. Rebellions were frequent. In 1880 and 1883, there were risings 

which the small local garrison could contain. In 1885 and 1887, more serious 

rebellions needed forces from Muscat to restore the situation. The most serious 

rebellion, in 1895, was ended only when British assistance was accepted and an 

Anglo-Omani force sent by sea in 1897. There were minor uprisings until 1900, 

when the end of foreign intrigue by the displaced Moplah in Constantinople, and 

the permanent transfer of the unpopular wali ‘whose proceedings were generally 

characterized by energy rather than discretion,’ led to peace.”

14. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 64.

15. General Sir Peter De La Billiere, Looking for Trouble: SAS to Gulf 

Command, The Autobiography, (London: Harper Collins, 1995), 132. “Three 

rebel leaders — Sheikh Ghalib bin Ali, his younger brother Talib bin Ali, and 

Sheikh Suleiman bin Himayer — had established themselves on top of the Jebel 

Akhdar — literally Green Mountain — a massif with a flat top 8000 feet above sea 

level, and all efforts to evict them had been in vain. The prime mover of the revolt 

appeared to be Ghalib, an imam, or religious leader, who had defied the Sultan; 

but Talib had had military experience, and was thought to be in command of the 

dissident army. Suleiman was Paramount Sheikh of the Bani Riyam, the principal 

mountain tribe. All three were being financed and armed by Saudi Arabia, who 

had sent them arms, mines, and gold.” See also Sir Frank Kitson’s account of this 

campaign in his book, Bunch of Five, (London: Faber and Faber 1977).

16. British Army Tactical Retrieval Cell, Notes from Dhofar presentations, 

(Alanbrooke Hall, Staff College, UK, 30 June 1982), 4.

17. Akehurst, We Won a War, 31. “SAF was born of an exchange of letters 

in 1958 between Julian Amery, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at 

the Foreign Office in the British Conservative Government, and Sultan Said bin 

Taimur. It was one of the moves that in 1959 enabled the Sultan, with substantial 

British help, quickly to put down a rebellion in the Jebel Akhdar. For the next ten 

years British officers and NCOs continued to be seconded to SAF, but money, arms 

and equipment — even uniforms — remained in short supply. Soldiers, especially 

those who drove or maintained vehicles, became masters of improvisation.” 

18. For a more detailed discussion of the campaign, see General Sir Peter 

De La Billiere, Looking for Trouble: SAS to Gulf Command, The Autobiography, 

London, Harper Collins, 1995, chapter nine.

19. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 176.

20. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran, interview by Robert Green, 28 March 

2011. “My understanding, and this is from talking to members of the firqa, and 

talking to some of the more senior people in Salalah, it was felt that he, as I said 

the main aim of the Sultan was to keep the Dhofari unspoiled, and keep the worst 

aspects of civilization out of Dhofar basically.”

21. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 179.
69

22. Paul Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, (London: Spiderwise Publishing, 2011), 

299.

23. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 176.

24. Akehurst, We Won a War, 13. “Until 1967 Said could plead poverty to 

support his denial of development, but then oil revenues began and despite a 

declaration of intent no development occurred. He claimed that he must wait until 

the cash built up before taking any action. Investment was the same as borrowing; 

borrowing meant usury; and usury was expressly forbidden by the Koran. He held 

an unshakable belief in a cash economy and eventually suffered the fate of Canute 

as the tide of progress rolled in.”

25. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 176. 

“The insurgency was primarily a result of the feudal and increasingly authoritarian 

style of Sultan Said bin Taimur, who had ruled Oman since 1932. No one was 

allowed to leave the country (nor, indeed, to move from one area to another) 

without permission, and this was rarely granted. There were only three state-run 

schools in the whole of Oman, their exclusively male pupils chosen by the sultan 

and denied education beyond primary level. The only hospital was run, under 

sufferance, by an American mission, and diseases such as malaria, trachoma, and 

glaucoma were endemic. All symbols of modernity were banned, from medical 

drugs to spectacles, radios, bicycles, cigarettes, trousers, music, and dancing. ...

Matters were exacerbated by the failure to use any of the growing oil revenues for 

the benefit of the Omani people.”

26. Price, Oman: Insurgency and Development, 3-4. Referring to the 

Dhofar Charitable Association, “Its politics were mixed — nationalist, Marxist, 

Nasserite — but primarily it was opposed to the Sultan’s rule and to the British 

connection. Its purpose was, ostensibly, to build mosques and aid the poor; in 

reality it collected funds, recruited members and established political contacts 

for the purpose of armed rebellion against the Al Bu Said dynasty and British 

influence in the region.”

27. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 293.

28. This was a loose organization of Dhofari members of police or military 

forces of the various Gulf States. 

29. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 293-294.

30. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 33. “At the end of 1966, Colonel Lewis 

considered there was military stalemate. Because of manpower and equipment 

shortages SAF was unable to destroy the rebel movement, though it was in a poor 

moral and physical state. He recommended increased military measures such as 

collective punishments against tribes and evacuation of free-fire zones. He also 

pressed for political moves.”

31. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 33.

32. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 34. Citing a 1981 interview with a 

source who was a senior intelligence officer during the time in question, “ ‘We 

were talking to people on the jebel, particularly the sheikhs,’ recalled the senior 

intelligence officer at the time. ‘They said if His Highness would give some 

reasonable terms they could pull most people out of the conflict.’”
70

33. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 178.

34. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 40. “In August, the change from tribal 

rebellion to Communist revolution culminated at a congress in the Wadi Hamrin. 

The newly elected 25-man General Command included only three of the original 

18-man DLF executive. The Front was renamed the Popular Front for the 

Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), with the aim of spreading 

armed struggle throughout the Gulf.”

35. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 297. 

36. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 40. “The ideology was officially changed 

from nationalism to Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary transformation of 

Dhofar planned.”

37. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 178.

38. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 178. “In 

the course of 1968, indeed, contacts between the SAF and the insurgents increased 

from one to two per week, to two to three per day. In the end, SAF was compelled 

to withdraw from western Dhofar, leaving rebel supply lines untouched and the 

jebalis unprotected.”

39. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 177. “The 

sultan’s response to the DLF proved weak and ineffective, the SAF comprising 

only two British-officered battalions ... neither battalion was stationed in Dhofar, 

nor were they recruited from Oman; most came from Baluchistan, a province once 

ruled by Oman. ... A third battalion was raised in 1966 as the Desert Regiment. 

Initial operations were made difficult by the unfamiliarity of SAF personnel with 

the area and its inhabitants.”

40. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, The John Hopkins 

University Press, 1986, p. 13. 

41. James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale 

of Two Insurgents. http: www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display 

cfm?PubID=648 (accessed 13 March 2011): 11.

42. Angel Rabasa, Lesley Anne Warner, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, Paraag 

Shukla, “Money in the Bank Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency 

(COIN) Operations,” National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 

2007, p. 72. “The use of indigenous forces, especially forces from the particular 

area in question, increases the legitimacy of the counterinsurgents and can also 

help to divide and weaken the insurgency by psychologically unhinging the 

insurgents.”

43. Rabasa, et al, Money in the Bank, p. 74. “In recruiting indigenous security 

forces, the counterinsurgents should seek to create a force that reflects the ethnic, 

religious, and socioeconomic makeup of the local population and should make 

a special effort to recruit a reasonable number of potentially oppressed ethnic 

minorities to increase their stake in fighting the insurgency.”

44. Adoo was the common term used by SAF, BATT, and the Sultan’s Firqas 

to refer to the enemy fighters.

45. SAF Report, “Dhofar Ops as of January 70,” Thwaites Collection GB 
71

0099, Box 1/2 LCHMA. “SAF OVERALL AIM Purely military: TO KILL 

THE ENEMY. No political aim aside from unconditional surrender, therefore 

no political or civil aids to the war. None of the established civil measures for 

counterinsurgency exist. a. No police or special branch; b. no resettlement of 

the population; c. scant food control; d. no surrender or amnesty terms; e. no 

psyops or propaganda; f. no hearts and minds; g. no civil govt on the Jebel; h. 

comparatively little intelligence.”

46. Tony Jeapes, SAS: Secret War (Surrey: Harper Collins, 1996), 23-24.

47. Beckett, Britain and Oman, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign 

in Dhofar,” 186-187. “The field craft, ambush skills, and sniping of the insurgents 

... [adoo] ... were generally excellent. They were wholly familiar with the terrain, 

and were highly mobile. Increasingly, too, they had become supplied with modern 

Soviet and Chinese weapons. ... The standard of insurgent training, however, 

varied, and the adoo’s performance with mortars and recoilless rifles could be 

erratic ... they much preferred a stand-off encounter ... in daylight ... [using] 

darkness for movement or laying mines ... rarely capable of holding ground ... 

seeking instead to dominate the jebel by their mobility.” 

48. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 44. After a failed operation to capture the 

caves at Shershitti, the Muscat Regiment under the command of Colonel Peter 

Thwaites abandoned the western area to the enemy. This left Rakhyut open to 

attack and overrun. 

49. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 297-298.

50. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 44.

51. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 70. “Paranoid about the prospect of 

another uprising in Northern Oman, he [Sultan Taimur] mandated that at least one 

battalion of the SAF remain in the north at all times.”

52. Akehurst, We Won a War, 33-34. “There were four Omani infantry 

battalions, the Muscat Regiment ..., the Northern Frontier Regiment ..., the Desert 

Regiment ..., and the Jebel Regiment ... Two of these would be in Dhofar at any 

one time, on nine month tours, while the other two would be in their permanent 

bases at Bid-Bid and Nizwa in Northern Oman, recruiting and retraining for their 

next Dhofar tour.”

53. The Sultan’s enemies tried three separate attempts to shift focus and 

forces from Dhofar to Northern Oman by conducting or plotting to conduct 

attacks in the north in 1970, 1972, and 1974 (as discussed later in this chapter).

54. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 298.

55. Bryan Ray, Dangerous Frontier:, Campaigning in Somaliland & Oman, 

(South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2008), 127-128.

56. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 71. “Sultan Said’s fears of a northern 

uprising proved justified. In June 1970, a group of Omani exiles calling itself 

the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf 

attacked several northern towns. Although they were quickly defeated, the revolt 

made it clear how isolated and unpopular Sultan Said was.”

57. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 84-85. Found in endnote 59. 
72

58. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 71.

59. BL070, Retired General Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, 

Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 30 March 2011.

60. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 179. 

“Within 24 hours, Qaboos established an Interim Advisory Council, which invited 

Qaboos’s exiled uncle, Sayyid Tariq bin Taimur, to become prime minister. Other 

exiled Omanis were also recalled. Restrictions on movements within the state and 

to selected foreign countries were lifted, political prisoners were released, and a 

development plan was announced.”

61. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 179.

62. Ken Perkins, A Fortunate Soldier, (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers 

Limited, 1988), 119. “With the advent of Sultan Qaboos, civil development was 

begun in earnest and the oil revenues, hitherto unused, were deployed to hustle 

Oman into the twentieth century.”

63. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 71.

64. BL070, Retired General Officer.

65. Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman. (London: William Kimber, 1980), 

31.

66. BL070, Retired General Officer.

67. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 299.

68. Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, 28.

69. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 182. 

“The shift to Marxism within PFLOAG undermined the two fundamental 

principles of jebeli life — Islam and tribalism. This occurred to such an extent 

that 24 of the most experienced former DLF insurgents, led by Salim Mubarak, 

surrendered to the SAF following a gun battle with hard line elements.” 

70. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran. According to an SAS Dhofar veteran 

present at the time of Mubarak’s surrender, Mubarak could not surrender to the 

army and therefore surrendered to a British Army Training Team with about 100 

men. The difference may be that among the approximately 100 men, 24 were 

some of his most experienced fighters. “He couldn’t surrender to Jaysh [army] so 

he surrendered to BATT, British Army Training Team. While arrangements were 

being made for his, if you like, more formal type of reception, he stayed the night 

with me... he surrendered with this whole firqa, a group of about a hundred, and 

he’d left them at memorial gardens which was about ten miles away, and walked 

in himself.”

71. Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, 28.

72. BL070, Retired General Officer. Cites Salim Mubarak as saying, “We 

are going to form a firqa of all the people coming down [from the Jebel to join the 

Sultan] ... and then we will sweep them [adoo] off the Jebel!”

73. BL070, Retired General Officer.

74. Akehurst, We Won a War, 61. “The first Firqat to be formed was multi-
73

tribal and failed for this reason. The Jebali people were intensely tribal and very 

jealous of their own tribe’s lands and customs. Subsequent Firqats were therefore 

always tribal.”

75. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 299.

76. Irregular Forces – SAF View, Annex A to Section 10 of unknown report, 

Middle East Centre, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, UK, p. 2.

77. Akehurst, We Won a War, 42. “Finally, in the Dhofar Brigade, there were 

the Firqats. In mid-1974 there were about 1,000 of them, and more joined every 

week. Mostly they were surrendered enemy who after interrogation (a relaxed and 

friendly process in the company of former colleagues) were given a cooling-off 

period of perhaps a month and then, if they wished, allowed to join their tribal 

Firqat.” 

78. BL050, Dhofar Veterans Panel. Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, 

Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 38 March 2011.

79. BL070, Retired General Officer.

80. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 156.

81. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 185. “A 

key ingredient to this expansion was the recruitment of seconded and contracted 

British military officers with the correct background and mindset.”

82. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 185.

83. Akehurst, We Won a War, 32.

84. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 159

85. Akehurst, We Won a War, 43.

86. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran. “The next year was about, if you like, 

establishing the firqas, and then in ’71 was Operation JAGUAR which was the 

first operation for two years for the jaysh to re-establish a presence on the Jebel. 

That was led by two squadrons of SAS and certainly the three original firqas ... 

with B Squadron coming in with FKW from the north, and G Squadron coming 

up from Marbat ... That was achieved basically, and a foot hold was established 

on the Jebel. We then split into two groups, one to the west and one to the east 

of Wadi Darbat. The jaysh came in and consolidated the positions, and then we 

just sat there for the next few months while the adoo came and threw everything 

they could at us to try and dislodge us. Every night there were pitched battles 

and contacts which really made a lot of noise but achieved very little as far as the 

adoo were concerned. I think we took a few casualties but nothing major. And 

then of course we used to patrol out during the day with the firqa, and the jaysh 

used to hold the ground. That was the pattern if you like for the next year. So, I 

can’t remember exactly when it was in ’71, but Operation JAGUAR was the big 

operation to re-establish a presence, a government presence, right on the Jebel, 

and that was successful. And the next seven years we spent moving slowly westwards.”

87. Another significant event in 1971 was the arrival of the first element 

of Iranian forces fighting in support of the Sultan. The Iranian forces would 
74

play a key role in the campaign. Not only did their presence signal international 

support for the Sultan of Oman, they also assumed static defensive positions in 

the Western Area of Dhofar which allowed SAF to concentrate in the Eastern and 

Central Areas. Iranian forces would re-open the Midway Road and recapture the 

coastal town of Rakhyut. Part of their defensive efforts included constructing the 

Damavand Line which ran north from the coastal town of Rakhyut.

88. Akehurst, We Won a War, 61. “The Firqats at that time were about 1,400 

strong and were the key to the centre and east. Considerable strength would be 

needed to take on the enemy in the west and it could only be amassed at the 

expense of the centre and east. Either the enemy must be cleaned out altogether, 

an impossible task in the short term, or the securing must be taken over by the 

Firqats. If roads could be built to those places now supplied by air, especially 

helicopters, more resources still would be made available for the west.” 

89. Irregular Forces – SAF View, Annex A to Section 10 General Graham 

Papers, Middle East Centre, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, UK, p. 4. “In the 

early days when a small highly selective force was envisaged it was agreed to pay 

Firqats SAF pay plus ten Riyals per month.”

90. Irregular Forces – SAF View, 1.

91. Irregular Forces – SAF View, 1.

92. Akehurst, We Won a War, 81. “It was felt to be a wiser policy to keep the 

Firqats in the smaller tribal groups responsible for the security of their own homes 

and tribal areas but without integral heavy weapons or support weapons. Although 

this would mean up to 3,000 of them being paid for not much work, and in some 

cases no work at all, it represented good security at reasonable cost, besides being 

a very satisfactory means of distributing some of the national wealth among the 

jebel tribes — an interesting form of social security.”

93. BATT Notes on Raising and Training of Irregular Forces in Dhofar, 

Annex B to Section 10 of unknown report, Middle East Centre, St. Anthony’s 

College, Oxford, UK, p. 1.

94. BATT Notes, 1.

95. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 187.

96. British Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Notes from a group of 

presentations on Dhofar, (Alanbrooke Hall, Staff College, UK: 30 June 1982), 2.

97. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 188.

98. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 301.

99. BL070, Retired General Officer.

100. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 301.

101. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 301.

102. Price, Oman: Insurgency and Development, 4. “From 1965 to 1967 the 

DLF’s main objective was to consolidate and establish its presence in Dhofar. 

Dividing the province into three sections — eastern, western, and central — it 

recruited volunteers on an individual basis.”

103. Ray, Dangerous Frontiers, 128-129.
75

104. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 301.

105. British Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Notes from a group of 

presentations on Dhofar, (Alanbrooke Hall, Staff College, UK: 30 June 1982), 3.

106. British Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Notes from a group of 

presentations on Dhofar, (Alanbrooke Hall, Staff College, UK: 30 June 1982), 4.

107. British Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Notes from a group of 

presentations on Dhofar, (Alanbrooke Hall, Staff College, UK: 30 June 1982), 

6-7.

108. British Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Notes from a group of 

presentations on Dhofar, (Alanbrooke Hall, Staff College, UK: 30 June 1982), 7.

109. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 188.

110. O’Neill, “Revolutionary War in Oman,” 225.

111. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 188.

112. Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar,” 188.

113. Akehurst, We Won a War, 36.

114. Akehurst, We Won a War, 33.

115. Akehurst, We Won a War, 35-36.

116. Akehurst, We Won a War, 42.

117. Akehurst, We Won a War, 61.

118. Akehurst, We Won a War, 61-62.

119. Akehurst, We Won a War, 63-64. The full pattern devised by Brigadier 

Akehurst was, “1. A SAF operation in strength supported by a Firqat secures 

a position of the Firqat’s choice which dominated its tribal area. 2. Military 

engineers build a track to the position giving road access, followed by an airstrip 

if possible. 3. A drill is brought down the track followed by a Civil Action Team 

with shop, school, clinic, and mosque. 4. SAF thins out to the minimum needed 

to provide security. 5. Water is pumped to the surface and into the distribution 

system prepared by military engineers to offer storage points for humans, and 

troughs for animals. 6. Civilians come in from miles around and talk to Firqat, 

SAF and Government representatives. They are told that enemy activity in the 

area will result in the water being cut off. 7. Civilians move out in surrounding 

area and tell the enemy not to interfere with what is obviously ‘a good thing.’’ 

8. Enemy, very dependent on civilians, stop all aggressive action and either go 

elsewhere or hide. 9. Tribal area is secure. 10. All SAF withdrawn.” 

120. Akehurst, We Won a War, 75. “During October [1974] the policy of 

installing Firqats in their tribal areas really got under way. One of the first, and 

most difficult, was at Hagleet, near Ayun, just north of the monsoon-affected 

jebel. This had been a beleaguered defensive position in the early days of the 

war from which SAF had eventually withdrawn. As always happened, the enemy 

laid antipersonnel mines in and around the sangars but here they were more 

prolific and better hidden than usual. In the first two days three Jebel Regiment 

soldiers were badly wounded and one slightly. It was decided to move to virgin 

ground two miles away. The other moves went without a hitch and both Firqats 
76

and civilians were delighted. New positions were established at Zeak, Ashinhaib, 

Ayun, Burg Haluf, and Jebel Khaftawt, where a five-kilometre line to interrupt 

enemy movement was constructed by the Jebel Regiment and called ‘Hammer’. 

It was almost due north of Raysut and a major blow to the enemy who had been 

using the area for years as a sort of holiday camp for rest and recuperation.”

121. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 304.

122. Akehurst, We Won a War, 75. “New positions were established at Zeak, 

Ashinhaib, Ayun, Burg Haluf, and Jebel Khaftawt, where a five-kilometre line 

to interrupt enemy movement was constructed by the Jebel Regiment and called 

‘Hammer.’ It was almost due north of Raysut and a major blow to the enemy 

who had been using the area for years as a sort of holiday camp for rest and 

recuperation.”

123. Akehurst, We Won a War, 77. “The Frontier Force mounted a major 

operation at the end of October [1974] to tackle the enemy south and east of 

Tawi Atair, with the bonus of opening the road from Taqa to Marbat which had 

been closed for so long. ... The installation of the Firqats in their tribal areas 

was beginning to pay off already, with the number of surrenders increasing 

dramatically and the flow of information from both Firqats and civilians providing 

invaluable intelligence. This confirmed that lack of supplies was causing severe 

morale problems among the enemy in the centre. The new positions also made 

valuable patrol bases deep in what had been enemy-held areas. These successes 

led to more ambitious plans to expand the track network on the jebel.” 

124. Akehurst, We Won a War, 80. “In November, at the Sultan’s invitation, 

Sir Gawain Bell and Mr. Tony Ashworth, a British Government official, came to 

Dhofar to study the long-term needs of the province.” Part of their report included 

recommendations on what to do with the firqa.

125. Akehurst, We Won a War, 81. “The report suggested that Firqats should 

be formed into a National Guard which would be multi-tribal and firmly under 

discipline. This plan was examined in great detail during the following months, 

and retained its adherents, but was shelved for the time being because of the 

practical difficulties of selling it to the Firqats and of arranging the expensive 

and intensive training for such a force. The Jebali is not easily dragooned into 

anything and would not take kindly to being taken far from home for disciplined 

military training. But far from home it would have to be or the disruption and 

absenteeism would be intolerable. There might also be a potential security risk 

in creating a force of this kind with modern training and weapons when in the 

previous year or two many of the tribesmen involved had been fighting against the 

Government and had been subject to Communist indoctrination.”

126. Akehurst, We Won a War, 81. “It was felt to be a wiser policy to keep the 

Firqats in the smaller tribal groups responsible for the security of their own homes 

and tribal areas but without integral heavy weapons or support weapons. Although 

this would mean up to 3,000 of them being paid for not much work, and in some 

cases no work at all, it represented good security at reasonable cost, besides being 

a very satisfactory means of distributing some of the national wealth among the 

jebel tribes - an interesting form of social security.” p. 81

127. British Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Notes from a group of 
77

presentations on Dhofar, (Alanbrooke Hall, Staff College, UK: 30 June 1982), 4.

128. Akehurst, We Won a War, 88. General Creasy, CSAF, visited the Dhofar 

Brigade on his way to meet with the Iranians, and to discuss options for how 

the Dhofar Brigade could take on the mission at Sherishitti. CSAF believed the 

Iranians would succeed in their ongoing operation to capture the town of Rakhyut, 

but still had a great deal of work to do. After two hours of planning, Akehurst and 

his staff determined that the task would have to fall on the Jebel Regiment of the 

Dhofar Brigade.

129. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 200.

130. BL070, Retired General Officer. The original intent behind raising 

firqas was to create multi-tribal units in order to create a balance of power and 

avoid tribal based units. Although the firqa Saladdin was multi-tribal, they were 

held together by their leader Salim Mubarak. Upon his death, a BATT officer 

appointed Mubarak’s second in command to lead the firqa. This person was 

rejected by the firqa, which lead to its disintegration. 

131. Akehurst, We Won a War, 91. “Now began an appalling and frustrating 

delay from which we learned a valuable lesson for the rest of the campaign. Quite 

wrongly as it turned out, but for what seemed sensible reasons at the time, it had 

been decided to lead the advance with a mixed group of Firqats. ... They had been 

assembled hurriedly from different Firqats which made for a lack of cohesion and 

they now applied deliberate delaying tactics.”

132. Ray, Dangerous Frontiers, 190. 

133. British Army Tactical Retrieval Cell, Notes from a group of presentations 

on Dhofar, Alanbrooke Hall, Staff College, UK (30 June 1982), 5.

134. Akehurst, We Won a War, 139.

135. Akehurst, We Won a War, 69. Probably the South Mahra Firqa. “An 

important early move was to install thirty men of the South Mahra Firqat at 

Sarfait. This was their tribal area and they made a significant contribution to the 

pioneering of routes off the position, which was required of the battalion by my 

first operational order. They knew them intimately and behaved with commendable 

courage and aggression as they picked their way through the minefields.”

136. Akehurst, We Won a War, 157-158. “The prize was great. If we moved 

down to the bottom and held on we could stop all enemy supplies and movement 

of men and material, which would quickly end the war. ... As we talked about 

these things and were approaching a decision there was a call from Ian on the 

National radio from down below: ‘I’ve just told the Firqats that we are only 

staying for two or three days and they are very mush mabsoot [unhappy]. They 

say we must stay and we can make it very difficult for the enemy. If we try to 

withdraw I think there may be a rebellion.’ If the scales needed tipping this tipped 

them. If the Firqats wanted to stay it was likely to be all right.”

137. Ken Perkins, A Fortunate Soldier (London: Brassey’s Defence 

Publishers Limited, 1988), 147. “On the morning of the 16th, still with five days 

to go to the main operation, I arrived at Salalah en route to visit Ian’s company, 

anticipating that I might have to fly in between shot and shell. I was met by John 

Akehurst who reported that while the enemy were still making life hazardous on 
78

Sarfait, they had so far ignored our diversion. He thought we should reinforce 

success and, in anticipation of my approval, had scratched together an ad hoc 

force as there would not be time to assemble the intended D-Day battalions which 

were still deployed in the Salalah area. As we drove the few hundred yards to 

John Akehurst’s headquarters I made the decision to switch the main operation to 

Sarfait that night and out of the window went months of planning . . .”

138. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 306.

139. Akehurst, We Won a War, 173.

140. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 230.

141. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 237.

142. Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, 31.

143. De La Billiere, Looking for Trouble, 266-267.

144. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 80. “In a counterinsurgency, the 

armed forces of the host nation should bear the brunt of the fighting. In providing 

personnel, the British kept that point in mind as they focused on supplying 

capabilities and expertise lacked by the Omanis. Despite the need for large 

numbers of combat troops, the British declined to provide regular soldiers for 

combat operations in Oman. This had two effects. First, it required Oman to 

provide its own soldiery, which it did by tripling the size of the SAF between 1970 

and 1972. Second, when this proved insufficient, Oman reached out to regional 

allies. The deployment of combat troops from a Muslim country like Iran was far 

more politically acceptable than British troops would have been. Tangible support 

from Jordan and Iran also helped deflect criticism, particularly from the Soviets 

and the political left in Britain, that the British were engaged in a neo-colonial 

enterprise or that Oman was simply a puppet state.”

145. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 14.

146. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 239-240. “Before becoming commissar of this 

unit, he had taught political affairs at the Lenin School at Al Ghayda and before 

that he had been in charge of political broadcasting on Radio Aden.”

147. Akehurst, We Won a War, 61. “The Firqats at that time were about 

1,400 strong and were the key to the centre and east. Considerable strength would 

be needed to take on the enemy in the west and it could only be amassed at the 

expense of the centre and east. Either the enemy must be cleaned out altogether, 

an impossible task in the short term, or the securing must be taken over by the 

Firqats. If roads could be built to those places now supplied by air, especially 

helicopters, more resources still would be made available for the west.”

148. Akehurst, We Won a War, 43. “I have described the Jebali as fierce, 

independent and unruly and these qualities were much in evidence in the Firqats, 

who were very difficult indeed to control. . . . Properly motivated, and with the 

prospect of financial or other gain, they could be splendid fighters, as good for 

us as they had been against us; but equally they could, if the mood took them, be 

intransigent and uncooperative, sometimes aggressively so. . . . Again, however, 

I must reiterate how vitally important the Firqats were in the struggle. Their 

knowledge of the ground and their influence with the civilians were indispensible, 
79

and worth all the time, trouble and money spent to secure and retain their goodwill 

and allegiance.”

149. BL330, Interview with SAS Dhofar veteran. “The firqa leaders used to 

come into the BATT conference. We used to run a firqa leader conference. The CO 

from Hereford used to come out and we would have a conference with the firqa 

leaders. ... It was a regular thing. Probably towards the end of each four month 

tour I suspect. [Did those influence operations in any way?] Oh I think so, yes. 

It was a one-to-one with the CO of the Regiment, I don’t think any jaysh were 

present, but it was a one to one thing with the firqa and the BATT. We would say 

what we wanted and they would say what they wanted.”

150. Akehurst, We Won a War, 61-62. “The first Firqat to be formed was 

multi-tribal and failed for this reason. The Jebali people were intensely tribal and 

very jealous of their own tribe’s lands and customs. Subsequent Firquats were 

therefore always tribal. Several Firqats were formed from surrendered enemy but 

had to live on the Salalah Plain or in other secure areas not their own because the 

enemy prevented occupation of their tribal areas. From conversations with their 

leaders and their SAS advisers I learned of their intense desire to reoccupy their 

own land. All of them promised instant security if they could be established in 

positions of their own choosing.”

151. While the Watt’s plan called for raising indigenous forces to fight for 

the Sultan, there was no clear plan of how to do this or what the indigenous force 

would look like. The surrender of Salim Mubarak and his firqa came as a surprise 

to all. As mentioned earlier, the formation of firqa to fight for the Sultan was 

Mubarak’s idea. 

152. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 159. “... the concept of recruiting 

the Firqat and keeping them alongside was a courageous masterstroke, generally 

attributed to John Watts in 1970 when he was the Commanding Officer of the 

SAS.”

153. There was at the time a psychological operations campaign which 

emphasized the Sultan’s offer of amnesty.

154. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran.

155. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran. “On an operation, branching out from 

our main base to see first of all what the lay of the land was, and what we could 

establish, and again whether we could get SEPs in. They came in in a steady 

trickle.”

156. Akehurst, We Won a War, 61-62.

157. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 159. “They were, therefore, 

extremely useful in retaining the peace in an area which had been cleared of adoo, 

thereby leaving conventional forces to get on with prosecuting the war elsewhere. 

For all their limitations, I do not believe we could have won the war without the 

Firqat.”

158. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 159. “As our former enemies 

they knew the ground and the tactics of their former friends intimately, and they 

were good at things that we were poor at, namely reconnaissance, gathering 

intelligence and communicating with the nomadic population. They were of that 

population after all.”
80

159. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 45.

160. Sibley, A Monk in the SAS, 299.

161. BI050, Dhofar Veterans Panel.

162. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 14.

163. Irregular Forces – SAF View, 2.

164. Irregular Forces – SAF View, 3. “Firqats have weapons similar to SAF 

rifle platoons. They are not armed with GPMGs or 81mm mortars as a matter of 

principle.” The firqa relied on BATT for these types of supporting weapons.

165. Irregular Forces – SAF View, 3.

166. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 156.

167. Akehurst, We Won a War, 177.

168. Irregular Forces – SAF View, Annex A to Section 10 General Graham 

Papers, Middle East Centre, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, UK, p. 3. “Each 

Firqat usually elects two leaders: a military leader to lead them in the field, and a 

tribal political leader who is the more powerful to decide all major matters.” 

169. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran. “Basically because, I didn’t make this 

point earlier but, you had a firqa leader, an Arab firqa leader who was from the 

tribe but when BATT was with the firqa it was the BATT commander who was the 

firqa leader. So when I was with the firqa I was the firqa leader, and that was true 

of all the BATT/firqa relationships. So you were actually in command, and what 

you said was an order even though perhaps there was some negotiation before you 

would go firm on that.”

170. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 41. Jeapes referring to Salim Mubarak: “I 

was naively surprised and impressed by the speed with which he understood the 

reasoning behind information services, not yet knowing that in the coming months 

I was to learn more from him that I could teach.”

171. McKeown, Britain and Oman, 97-99. “The first, and fundamental, 

factor in winning the Dhofar War was the change of Sultan in 1970.” “The policy 

of welcoming back former enemy without fear of punishment was very important 

in giving members of the PLA a way out. ... This led to a constant drain of 

defectors from the Front which increased where government military pressure 

reduced their morale.”

172. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran.

173. Akehurst, We Won a War, 29. “Until 1972 China had provided a good 

deal of support, but was then persuaded by the Shah to desist, agreeing because 

of its economic and cultural interests in Iran. Russia then became the dominant 

supporter, although Libya and Cuba also sent money, supplies and training staff.”

174. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 24. “Whereas SAF, too, were still largely 

armed with the old .303 bolt-action British Enfield rifle and only just beginning to 

re-equip with automatic FNs, the hard-core adoo all had modern, fully automatic 

Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifles and machine guns, and even the soft-core had 

Simonov semi-automatic. Nor did their weapons stop at small arms. The Chinese 

82mm mortar, for instance, is not only very effective, but cleverly designed 
81

too. It will fire the bombs of the British 81mm mortar besides its own, whereas 

Chinese bombs will not fit into the British barrel. The 60mm mortar is smaller, but 

outranges by far its British equivalent.”

175. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran. “FTZ were in the west without BATT 

and they asked for BATT, which I translated at the time. We were extended two 

weeks in our tour in order to go down to the west to conduct an operation with 

the firqa, FTZ, Tariq bin Zaid, which then led on to the disastrous operation in 

the Shershitti area. They had operated without BATT for some time, and they 

particularly wanted BATT.”

176. Akehurst, We Won a War, 36. “Fire response was always quick and 

accurate, and often very close indeed; it gave SAF an important advantage.”

177. Ladwig, Supporting Allies in COIN, 67. “The best among them 

[PFLOAG members] were sent to China for specialized military training at the 

Anti-Imperialist School in Beijing ...”

178. British Army Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Anti-Guerrilla Operations 

in Dhofar Lessons Learned, 23-24. This document describes the PFLOAG course 

of instruction at the Anti-Imperialist School in Peking, China. “The course is of 6 

months duration. It alternates between one month’s Political Instruction, the next 

Military Instruction.” The document includes the titles of the courses for both 

political and military instruction as well as a daily routine for students.

179. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 71-76.

180. Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, 76.

181. BL330, SAS Dhofar veteran. “There was a clash between communism 

and Islam. And also, as I said earlier, the communists overplayed their hand. They 

thought they had control, and they did. They had about a 90-plus percent control 

over the people on the Jebel. But they’d just overplayed that extra 5 percent 

perhaps, and started intimidating and bullying, and I think they tried to remove the 

tribal structure, and they put in place a typically Russian-type political hierarchy 

which is unacceptable to the Dhofaris.”
82
83

Chapter 4

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Case Study

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the US military and coaltion 

partners raised several types of security forces to include army, police, 

national guard, and irregular security forces. The manner in which the USled coalition raised these security forces was as haphazard as its overall 

strategy, and indicated poor planning and preparation for post-combat 

operations. This chapter will discuss the pre-invasion planning, key 

strategy shifts, and the irregular security forces of the Anbar Awakening 

and the Sons of Iraq program.1

Plans and Strategy

Since the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf 

War, United Nations members had maintained no-fly zones in the northern 

and southern portions of Iraq to limit Saddam’s brutality against minority 

groups within the country.2

 No-fly zones supported the US strategy to 

contain Saddam’s regime versus toppling it, which would possibly draw 

the US into a lengthy internal struggle.3

 The Clinton administration 

continued the Bush policy of containing Saddam, and ordered a massive 

airstrike against suspected weapons storage locations after tension over 

Saddam’s lack of compliance with United Nations’ weapons inspectors 

grew beyond an acceptable level.4

With a defiant Saddam Hussein still in power, the US military developed 

contingency plans as a preparation for possible future hostile action by 

Iraqi forces. General Binford Peay, Commander of US Central Command 

(CENTCOM), developed an operations plan (OPLAN) to counter what he 

termed a “Basra breakout” in which Saddam would mass five divisions 

in southern Iraq and overwhelm the forces defending Kuwait, requiring 

basically a replay of the 1991 campaign to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait.5

Known as CENTCOM OPLAN 1003-98, successive CENTCOM 

Commanders, including US Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni and 

U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, updated the plan for war with Iraq. 

Citing an interview with Zinni, Gordon and Trainor offer the following 

insight regarding refinement of OPLAN 1003-98: 

“If I had to point to one person who was deeply involved in 

1003-98 it was Tommy Franks,” Zinni recalled. “He was the 

major contributor to the force levels and the planning and 

everything else. He was more involved in it than just about 

anybody else. That was his life. He and his planning staff 

seemed to be committed to the plan.”6

OPLAN 1003-98, updated by Franks as the commander of Third 

Army (the Army portion of CENTCOM),7

 and endorsed by Zinni, focused 

more on the aftermath of the collapse of Saddam’s regime than on the 
84

conventional fight required to defeat Saddam’s forces.8 With the security, 

stability, and reconstruction seen as the more difficult part of the problem, 

OPLAN 1003-98 called for more than 400,000 troops. Although Franks 

moved from command of Third Army to command of CENTCOM,9

he later found his own plan inadequate when briefing the Secretary of 

Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.10 At some point it appeared that Franks’ focus 

shifted from the requirements for post-regime collapse to the requirements 

to cause the regime to collapse.

As planning and preparations progressed to support a possible conflict 

with Iraq, OPLAN 1003-98 became OPLAN 1003V, no longer a conceptual 

plan but an active one.11 Although the interaction between Secretary 

Rumsfeld and General Franks was described as “constant negotiation,”12

Rumsfeld got what he wanted in the way of decreased troop commitments 

(he wanted a plan for 125,000 troops) for operations in Iraq.13 A coalition 

led and predominately composed of US forces invaded Iraq in 2003 to 

enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions14 which required Iraq 

to provide full disclosure of its weapons of mass destruction program.15

The aim of the operation was to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein, 

hopefully engendering a popular uprising which would take control from 

the Baath Party and pursue a democratic form of government.16

 The war began on 19 March 2003 with an air campaign two days after 

President Bush issued an ultimatum for Saddam and his sons to leave Iraq 

or face military action.17 In the end, counting Gulf State Coalition allied 

contributions, the coalition invaded Iraq with 292,000 troops, 170,000 

of which were ground troops.18 As a former battalion commander in Iraq 

commented, the US-led coalition lost control because efficiency trumped 

effectiveness: “We would have saved ourselves a number of years and lives 

if we had committed the large force early vice doing it on the cheap.”19

Many have criticized the invasion of Iraq as having neglected planning 

and preparation for post-regime collapse. Although Franks’ self-proclaimed 

grand strategy based on “lines” of operation and “slices” or elements of 

Saddam’s power and control included nonkinetic considerations such as 

infrastructure, civilian population, political-military, and civil-military 

lines and slices, it amounted to little in the way of actual preparation for 

the post-combat phase.20 Ultimately the job of planning for post-combat 

phase operations fell to retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, whom 

Rumsfeld appointed as “... our senior man in charge of Iraqi occupation 

and reconstruction ...”21

Franks acknowledges that appointing Garner to lead the post-combat 

phase was important, but not enough. In order to succeed in his mission, 

Garner would require a secure environment in order to conduct civil 

action. Additionally Franks noted, “Washington would be responsible 

for providing the policy – and, I hoped, sufficient resources – to win the 

hearts and minds of the Iraqi people ...”22 In the end, possibly the greatest 
85

challenge Garner faced was unity of command. As Bing West noted in his 

book The Strongest Tribe,

Once the war was over, he [Franks] and Secretary of Defense 

Rumsfeld had agreed that retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay Garner 

would serve as the Central Command deputy for Phase IV – the 

occupation of Iraq. Yet when fighting petered out in late April, 

the Phase III commander for combat operations, Lt. Gen. David 

McKiernan, kept control over all units. Central Command 

never passed control from Phase III to Phase IV. Garner was 

supposedly in charge, but the 173,000 soldiers in the invincible 

coalition did not work for him. He was stranded in Baghdad, 

his tiny staff out of touch and having to hitch rides to meetings. 

Garner was a deputy commander with no one to command.23

Although it had been the stated policy of the US to “seek to remove 

the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a 

democratic government” since 1998, the focus of planning and preparation 

for OPLAN 1003V seemed to emphasize the removal of Saddam and 

neglect the formation of a democratic government part of the policy.24

Perhaps part of the problem US planners had in preparing for postcombat or Phase IV operations was the prevailing sentiment that the 

associated tasks were postwar issues. As Nadia Schadlow argued in “War 

and the Art of Governance,” 

The root of Washington’s failure to anticipate the political 

disorder in Iraq rests precisely in the characterization of these 

challenges as “postwar” problems, a characterization used by 

virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The 

Iraq situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance 

of civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, 

to consider the establishment of political and economic order 

as a part of war itself.

25

Franks wrote, “Throughout our planning of 1003V, we discussed 

Phase IV – ‘the Day After.’ A postwar Iraq might be modeled on postWorld War II Japan or Germany.”26 Franks plan for Phase IV was called 

Eclipse II after the postwar Eclipse plan for Germany.27 In postwar Japan 

and Germany, the economic and political recovery tasks fell to the Army 

as it was the only entity with the capacity to accomplish them.28 If postwar 

occupation of Japan and Germany were the models Franks used for his 

Phase IV plan, it seems odd that he accepted a force cap so far below his 

own estimates of the number required to secure a post-Saddam Iraq. 

Another potential cause for the lack of planning and preparation for 

Phase IV was an institutional bias toward fighting at the expense of postcombat operations. As Bing West described it, “For decades, the military 

had designed force-planning guidance that emphasized fighting and 
86

swiftly winning a major war, then withdrawing quickly to ready to fight 

somewhere else. This planning method ensured that the budget went to 

the fighting forces, while ignoring the forces needed for an occupation.”29

Regardless of the causes of the lack of planning and preparation for 

Phase IV, the results were chaos, inaction, and confusion.30 As noted in 

Cobra II, “There was a vicious circularity to the military and civilian 

planning. CENTCOM was hoping that the success of Garner’s team would 

speed the withdrawal of U.S. troops; Garner was hoping that CENTCOM 

would provide the security he needed ...”31 To make matters worse, Garner, 

who had developed a plan for Phase IV operations but was not supported 

in his efforts, was replaced by L. Paul Bremer III only three weeks after 

arriving in Iraq.32 Bremer made two key decisions shortly thereafter. The 

first decision was to remove all senior government officials with ties to the 

Baath party. The second decision was to disband all security forces.33 As 

noted in On Point II, 

These orders, designed to signal the end of Saddam’s tyranny 

and the beginning of a new era, removed thousands of Sunni 

Arab Iraqis from political power, creating the perception that 

Sunni Arabs would have limited power in a new Iraq, fostering 

a huge unemployment problem, and leaving Iraqi institutions 

without bureaucratic or technical leadership.34

Bremer’s vision for the future of Iraq seemed disconnected from the 

CENTCOM Commander’s vision for turning over control to the Iraqis. 

Franks recalled, “At some point I said, we can begin drawing down our 

force . . . our troop reductions should parallel deployment of representative, 

professional Iraqi security forces. Our exit strategy will be tied to effective 

governance by Iraqis, not to a timeline.”35 Neither of Bremer’s orders 

contributed to the establishment of effective governance or professional 

Iraqi security forces. Indeed, many believed that these decisions help fan 

the flames of insurgency.36 Najim al Jabouri, the former mayor of Tal Afar, 

offered his understanding of the impact of Bremer’s orders: 

When Paul Bremer replaced Jay Garner, the Coalition Provisional 

Authority’s first two orders were the de-Ba’athification laws 

and disbanding the Iraqi security services. While many in 

the security services were not working after the invasion, 

these surprising mandates agitated the Sunni community and 

increased the momentum to organized insurgency.37

Secretary Rumsfeld did not see an insurgency growing in Iraq and 

explained away the growing violence as the work of “dead-enders.”38 Not 

until July did the new CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid, 

identify the resistance as “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.”39 The 

military commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, presided 

over a broad array of approaches to the problems in Iraq. These approaches 
87

included the 3d Infantry Division’s firm but even approach in Al Anbar, 

the 4th Infantry Division’s targeting and raiding approach to eliminate 

insurgents, the 101st Air Assault Division’s focus on restoring normalcy 

in Mosul through projects and engagement with local leaders and former 

military officers,40 and a more traditional tactical counterinsurgency 

approach in southern Iraq by the British.41 From the tactical (division) 

level to the strategic (Secretary of Defense) level there was no coherent 

plan or strategy to guide the efforts of the coalition forces. 

David Galula described this kind of circumstance as an “accidental

mosaic”42 brought about by an absence of control over the campaign. Galula 

argued that control and progress go hand in hand in counterinsurgency 

operations using a planned execution of logical steps to guide the actions 

at tactical level to achieve intermediate objectives.43 Galula emphasized 

the role of commanders in assessing the situation and making adjustments 

to adapt:

With the step-by-step approach, the counterinsurgent provides 

himself with a way of assessing at any time the situation and the 

progress made. He can thus exert his control and conduct the 

war by switching means from an advanced area to a retarded 

one, by giving larger responsibilities to the subordinate leaders 

who have proved successful, and by removing those who have 

failed. In other words, he can command because he can verify.44

Without a coherent plan to apply and adapt, Sanchez was unable to 

grasp the situation or devise a strategy to deal with the growing violence and 

unrest and to guide and unify the actions of his subordinate commanders.

As violence increased across most of Iraq, the majority of coalition 

forces responded with blunt force,45 perhaps in the belief that if they could 

crush the insurgents just a little more they would cease to be a threat. In the 

absence of a coherent strategy, the coalition was vulnerable to overreaction 

and excessive use of force which was the most readily available tool (if 

not the only one). For example, after the killing and mutilation of four 

American contractors in Fallujah, the Bush administration ordered 

an assault on the city against the recommendations of the CENTCOM 

Commander.46 Lieutenant General James Conway, the commander of the 

Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq commented, “By attacking frontally, 

we unified the city against us.”47 In fact, the attack on Fallujah united 

the greater Sunni population against the coalition forces as they saw the 

offensive not as an effort to bring the perpetrators of the attack on the 

contractors to justice but as an assault on Sunni society.48

The offensive, begun on 4 April 2004, ended on 9 April after two 

members of the Iraqi Governing Council resigned in protest of the attack.49

Coinciding with the offensive in Fallujah was an uprising of disaffected 

Shia, predominately poor males, led by Muqtada al Sadr who fanned the 
88

flames against the presense of US forces in Iraq.50 In light of the growing 

unrest and violence, the need for a new strategy became increasingly 

clear.51

Shifting Strategy

As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified to Congress in 

October 2005, the US strategy in 2003 was to enforce the United Nations’ 

resolutions against Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein. In 2004 the 

strategy shifted to executing a plan to end the occupation and establish 

Iraqi sovereignty. In 2005 the strategy shifted to emphasize transition, both 

military and political, to an Iraqi-led campaign. In 2006 US strategy would 

shift to clear, hold, build to create lasting stability in Iraq.52 As Galula 

pointed out, “All wars are theoretically fought for a political purpose, 

although in some cases the final political outcome differs greatly from the 

one intended initially.”53 These shifts in strategy could be indicative of the 

administration’s reaction to changing circumstances on the ground. Based 

on the lack of post-conflict planning it is difficult to give the administration 

credit for adapting the strategy based on an evolving situation. More likely 

it was a result of short-sighted efforts to plan the way ahead.

As discussed earlier, Franks saw the development of Iraqi security forces 

as the path to success in Iraq. Although Franks did not include countering 

an insurgency in his post-combat planning, all of the counterinsurgency 

theorists and authors discussed to this point also identified indigenous 

security forces as a key component of a sound counterinsurgency strategy.54

Bremer’s CPA Orders No.1 and No. 2 made this path more difficult as they 

eliminated a huge portion of the Iraqi population that was fit for military 

service, and the majority of the population with military experience (the 

size of the Iraqi Army which Bremer officially dissolved was estimated to 

have been as many as 400,000).55 Additionally, as it became clear that the 

campaign in Iraq would take longer than one year, requiring a rotation of 

troops to replace those already in country, huge gaps in the US military 

force structure emerged.56

Even if the US could replace one-for-one the forces deployed in 

the invasion to continue operations through the subsequent year, the 

coalition force structure would have been inadequate. Carter Malkasian 

said of the situation, “The breadth of violence made it abundantly clear 

that the coalition could not secure Iraq without more numbers.”57 Indeed, 

Lieutenant General Sanchez determined additional forces were required 

to cope with the security situation in Iraq, “but at all levels of command it 

was acknowledged that there were no additional forces available.”58

The only viable option to increase the size of the force in Iraq to stem 

the tide of the growing unrest and violence was Iraqi security forces. 

According to Malkasian, 

Abizaid and the American commanders had been looking 
89

to the Iraqis to supply those numbers, rather than request US 

reinforcements, which was not considered politically feasible 

and might deepen the perception of occupation among the Iraqi 

population. Since the dissolution of the old Iraqi Army, the 

coalition had focused on creating locally based forces, known 

as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (renamed the Iraqi National 

Guard after June 2004), to help provide security within Iraq 

while a new Iraqi Army was built.59

Unfortunately, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps/Iraqi National Guard 

produced mixed results, largely dependent on the population from which 

they were drawn.60 In addition to the social pressures and perceptions, the 

lack of effective training and advisers contributed to the collapse of the 

majority of these units in the Sunni dominated areas.61

The stopgap measure of locally raised security forces had failed, 

at least in the Sunni dominated areas. Franks had predicted that the 

success of the campaign required professional Iraqi Army forces.62 As 

Lieutenant General Conway remarked in late 2004, “The situation will 

change when Iraqi Army divisions arrive. They will engender people with 

a sense of nationalism. Together with an elected government, they will 

create Stability.”63 These predictions of success based on the arrival of 

professional Iraqi Army divisions would prove to be false as the Sunnis 

refused to cooperate64 (especially against fellow Sunnis in the insurgency),65

and Iraqi Army units of predominately Shia ethnicity were unwelcome, 

ineffective, and hesitant to operate in Sunni dominated areas.66

Perhaps the first adjustment to the strategy in Iraq could be described 

as accelerated democracy. As Bing West noted referring to President Bush, 

“Addressing the Army War College in May of 2004, he shifted the rationale 

for the war from removing the Saddam regime to bringing democracy to 

the Middle East . . . He clung to the belief that an election and an Iraqi 

government would reduce the insurgency and improve security by unifying 

the country.”67 As President Bush described it, 

Our agenda, in contrast, is freedom and independence, 

security and prosperity for the Iraqi people. And by removing 

a source of terrorist violence and instability in the Middle East, 

we also make our own country more secure. Our coalition has a 

clear goal, understood by all -- to see the Iraqi people in charge 

of Iraq for the first time in generations. America’s task in Iraq is 

not only to defeat an enemy, it is to give strength to a friend - a 

free, representative government that serves its people and fights 

on their behalf. And the sooner this goal is achieved, the sooner 

our job will be done.68

The first round of elections had the opposite effect as the Sunnis, who 

felt they had been cut out of Iraq’s future, boycotted the elections.69
90

As the minority in Iraq when compared with the Shiites, the Sunnis 

saw popular elections as a sure path to Shia dominance in the government.70

Additionally, the Sunnis believed they would be called upon by the US-led 

coalition to form the post-Saddam government as they held the majority 

of people with government and administrative experience, and because 

a Shia-dominated Iraqi government would give Iran greater influence.71

The Sunnis formed their own local governments to maintain order and 

to position themselves favorably for participation in the future national 

government,72 but these bottom-up initiatives at governance were cast 

aside by Bremer,73 further alienating Sunnis. 

On 8 June 2004 the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 

mandated a series of elections and votes to reach a democratically elected 

government in Iraq.74 Key elements of the planned path to democracy 

included a vote in January 2005 to elect an interim National Assembly 

to draft the Iraqi constitution. The people of Iraq would vote to approve 

or reject the constitution in October of 2005. If accepted, then the next 

vote in December 2005 would select the first permanent democratic Iraqi 

government.75

Several other significant events unfolded in the latter half of 2004. 

The Coalition Provisional Authority returned sovereignty to Iraq under 

the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004, ending the occupation.76

General George W. Casey Jr. assumed command of Multi-National Forces 

Iraq from Lieutenant General Sanchez the next month,77 and conducted an 

assessment of the campaign in order to refine the strategy, determining that 

“Iraqi Army formation needed to be accelerated.”78 To this end, Lieutenant 

General David Petraeus, who commanded the 101st Air Assault Division 

during the invasion and first year of occupation, was assigned as the 

commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq 

(MNSTC-I) which had the task of training Iraqi Security Forces.79 As 

Malkasian noted, “Petraeus returned to oversee the creation of 300,000 

Iraqi security forces which included 120,000 men for 10 Iraqi Army 

divisions.”80

Coalition and Iraqi forces conducted operations in Najaf, Baghdad, 

and Samarra to quell violent uprisings, but the second assault on Fallujah 

drew the most attention. Casey took the time to build political will and 

legitimacy for the offensive which was designed to rid the city of the 

3,000-6,000 insurgents then controlling Fallujah. Once the Iraqi Interim 

Government gave its full support for the operation known as AL FAJR, 

the combined U.S. and Iraqi force commenced operations on 7 November 

2004 and killed or captured 2,000 insurgents.81

Following up the offensive with reconstruction and governance 

initiatives and resources paid dividends in Fallujah. Indicative of the 

success of the operation – planned and resourced through all phases – was 

the 65 to 80 percent turnout of the population of Fallujah for three separate 
91

elections in 2005. After the combat ended, US and Iraqi security forces 

patrolled the city together to prevent the return of insurgents. As further 

evidence of the success of the operation, Malkasian observed, “When 

sectarian violence broke out in Baghdad in 2006, Sunnis fled to Fallujah 

because they considered it the safest city in Iraq.”82 Contributing to this 

perception of security was the presence of a police force raised by the 

Marines comprised of local Sunnis from Fallujah.83 Although not officially 

the strategy at the time, Operation AL FAJR was a clear example of clear, 

hold, build.

Casey’s campaign plan emphasized the fact that the coalition was 

battling an insurgency, not executing the final stages of the invasion 

plan. Additionally, Casey’s plan acknowledged the shift from occupying 

power to one of supporting the Interim Iraqi Government. The wording 

of the plan was different from previous plans in that it replaced the terms 

“offensive operations” and “stability operations” with “full spectrum 

counterinsurgency operations.”84 Understanding the nature of the fight, 85 Casey was able to articulate a strategy that could produce meaningful 

gains toward defeating the insurgency, shepherding along the Iraqi political 

process, and eventually withdrawing US forces.

Recognizing the threat as an insurgency was only the beginning. 

According to Bing West, Casey had basically three options to choose 

from to deal with the insurgency: offensive operations to wipe out the 

insurgents; classic counterinsurgency operations using a clear and hold 

method; or “the third option: transition security responsibility to Iraqis. . . 

Casey chose the transition strategy. The main effort was to build the Iraqi 

forces.”86 Malkasian explained, 

The planners viewed the Iraqi Army as the lynchpin of effective 

counterinsurgency. From their perspective, the Iraqi Army could 

both provide vital manpower and gather intelligence better than 

coalition forces. Plus, Iraqi soldiers would not be perceived 

as occupiers, undercutting a major cause of the insurgency. It 

was thought that the Iraqi Army could eventually shoulder the 

burden of counterinsurgency operations, allowing the coalition 

to withdraw. Accordingly, Casey directed coalition forces to 

shift their focus from fighting insurgents to training Iraqis.87

What the planners perhaps missed was the fact that the Iraqi Army 

was often seen as a sectarian militia by those of the opposite sect of Islam. 

In the case of the Sunnis, the Iraqi Army, predominately Shia, was seen 

as predatory not protective. It would not be until local communities had 

the authority to raise forces to secure themselves that the sought after 

manpower, popular support, and intelligence would materialize.

In addition to the creation of MNSTC-I to take over training Iraqi 

Security Forces, Casey envisioned transition teams of 10-12 personnel 
92

each assigned at battalion through division level in every Iraqi Army 

formation.88 This signaled a dramatic increase in advisory capacity, 

about 1,200 total, compared to the 350 advisors at the beginning of the 

campaign.89 Coalition units also partnered with Iraqi units as a means 

of improving Iraqi forces’ training and confidence. These were all steps 

taken in support of Casey’s strategy of developing Iraqi forces to assume 

security responsibilities. The focus had shifted from killing insurgents to 

developing Iraqi Security Forces better suited to the task of securing Iraq 

from internal threats.90

Although development of the Iraqi security forces became the 

centerpiece to the US-led coalition strategy, the coalition and Iraqi military 

leaders were not operating in unison at the highest levels. The senior Iraqi 

military leadership’s strategy was completely enemy-focused while the 

coalition strategy was more broad.91 Describing the interaction between 

the Iraqi Ground Forces Command the and US-led Multi-National 

Corps-Iraq during the surge, a senior adviser to the Iraqi Ground forces 

Command noted, “Only in one short period of time did we ever bring the 

staffs together and develop a coherent plan together, and then it just kind 

of fell apart. It was a bit of a façade.”92

Despite the perceived progress toward democracy on the political 

front (as Iraqis turned out to vote and all of the planned steps toward 

an Iraqi elected government were met), Iraq began to disintegrate into 

chaos as sectarian violence pushed the country into civil war, partly due to 

Sunni perceptions of continued disaffection93 and partly due to insurgents 

fomenting sectarian attacks. Bing West marks the start of the civil war, 

On February 22 [2006], al Qaeda blew up the al-Askariya 

Golden Mosque in Samarra, a sacred Shiite shrine. With that 

sacrilege, the Jordanian-born terrorist Zarqawi succeeded in 

touching off the civil war he had murdered so many thousands 

to consummate. Urged on by Sadr, impassioned militiamen 

leaped into cars, vans, and minitrucks and sped out of Sadr City 

in east Baghdad to ransack Sunni neighborhoods and mosques. 

Both Sadr’s Jesh al Mahdi and the Badr Corps militia launched 

attacks.94

In Baghdad, the coalition was unable to quell the violence or secure 

the population as up to 100 civilians died as a result of sectarian attacks 

per day.95 Coalition forces conducted two major operations in Baghdad in 

attempts to regain control. These efforts failed, as acknowledged on 19 

October by the coalition.96 The unraveling of Iraqi society amid sectarian 

violence required another shift in strategy.97 In fact, sectarian attacks 

increased significantly during the course of the coalition operations.98

The Sunnis in Al Anbar found themselves in a difficult position. The 

Iraqi security forces were predominately Shia because, believing the 
93

Sunni insurgency would prevail, the Sunnis had refused to participate in 

the political process or to send their sons to join the army or police. As 

Malkasian observed, “many Sunnis refused to compromise, regardless 

of Coalition efforts to redress Sunni inequality, because they believed 

the insurgency would succeed militarily.”99 Although Sunnis had long 

rebuffed coalition efforts to gain Sunni support to stabilize Iraq, once 

the coalition and Iraqi government began to gain ground politically and 

militarily, Sunnis were forced to re-evaluate their position.100

As the traditional tribal leadership in Al Anbar was fractured,101

third-tier sheiks led efforts to change course against the insurgency in 

the province, starting with the Albu Mahals and the Albu Nimr tribes in 

Al Qaim.102 To oust the insurgents, these two tribes joined together and 

formed their own local militia called the Hamza battalion, which actively 

resisted Al Qaeda in Iraq. In response, the insurgents recruited two rival 

tribes and drove the Albu Mahals and Albu Nimr tribes from the city. Once 

the Marines finally drove the insurgents from the city, the Albu Mahals 

and Albu Nimr tribes regained their positions in the community and 

formed a large part of the Iraqi Army and police forces in the area while 

the tribesmen helped prevent the re-emergence of insurgents by assisting 

in providing local security.103 While the tribal resistance to the insurgents 

in Al Qaim did not ignite the Al Anbar Awakening, Sheik Sittar, the leader 

of the Al Anbar Awakening gave credit for this mini-awakening to the 

Albu Mahals.104

The Al Anbar Awakening

The only bright spot in 2006 was the Al Anbar Awakening. Led by 

Shaykh Abd al Sittar Bezia Ftikhan al Rishawi who openly opposed Al 

Qaeda, this tribal movement shifted the balance in Al Anbar away from the 

extremist elements and toward cooperation with coalition forces to rid the 

province of the brutal insurgency.105 Described by Najim Abed al Jabouri, 

Partnering with the United States in 2006 was mainly an attempt to 

recoup Sunni losses once the United States had seemingly changed its 

position in their regard. This happened as the Sunni community increasingly 

saw al Qaeda and Iran as bigger threats than the U.S. occupation. . . The 

Anbar Awakening was an Iraqi grassroots initiative supported by the 

United States and paid for by the Iraqi government.106

While the decision and risk of the Awakening belonged to the Iraqis 

in Al Anbar, the movement was encouraged by coalition forces. As noted 

by Major Niel Smith and Colonel Sean MacFarland in their 2008 article, 

the Awakening 

... was the result of a concerted plan executed by U.S. forces in 

Ramadi. Tactical victory became a strategic turning point when 

farsighted senior leaders, both Iraqi and American, replicated 
94

the Ramadi model throughout Anbar province, in Baghdad, 

and other parts of the country, dramatically changing the Iraq 

security situation in the process.107

These officers served in the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division 

which originally deployed to Tal Afar to replace the 3d ACR, but later 

relocated to Ramadi, the capital of Al Anbar province in May of 2006. 

Due to the large size and population of the city, the brigade lacked 

sufficient combat power to control the city even though it had five 

maneuver battalions.108 The brigade leadership realized that Iraqi security 

forces would be required to pacify the city, but without the cooperation of 

the local leaders and the population any security would be fleeting: “We 

had to convince the tribal leaders to rejoin the fight against Al Qaeda.”109

The brigade’s plan involved several key objectives: isolation of the 

insurgents; deny the insurgents sanctuary; and build Iraqi security forces 

with emphasis on police.110 Recognizing the support of the population as 

the center of gravity, and the local tribal leaders as the key to popular 

support,111 the brigade took measures to protect the local leaders who 

were cooperative. This conformed to Galula’s First Law regarding the 

importance of the support of the population which stated, 

What is the crux of the problem for the counterinsurgent? It 

is not how to clean an area. We have seen that he can always 

concentrate enough forces to do it, even if he has to take some 

risk in order to achieve the necessary concentration. The problem 

is, how to keep an area clean so that the counterinsurgent forces 

will be free to operate elsewhere. This can be achieved only 

with the support of the population.112

To protect the source of popular support, the brigade collaborated with 

the local leaders to form irregular security forces. In the words of Smith 

and MacFarland, “We established neighborhood watches that involved 

deputizing screened members of internal tribal militias as ‘Provisional 

Auxiliary Iraqi Police,’ authorizing them to wear uniforms, carry weapons, 

and provide security within the defined tribal area.”113

In addition to creating irregular security forces, the brigade also 

changed its message to the local sheiks to convey resolve. As Smith and 

MacFarland wrote in their article, “Instead of telling them that we would 

leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security, 

we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the 

terrorists. That was the message they had been waiting to hear.”114 With 

the confidence that they would have an ally against the insurgents, the 

local leaders supported coalition efforts to recruit from the tribes to form 

additional irregular security forces as well as Iraqi Police. The popular 

support led by the sheiks allowed the nascent Sunni security forces to 

snuff out the insurgents in their tribal areas. As a former commander in 
95

Ramadi commented, “The irregular security forces were really the key to 

success. When a tribal area would flip, all enemy activity in that area would 

stop overnight.”115 With the population firmly behind the Awakening, the 

security forces in Al Anbar grew rapidly, and effectively eradicated the 

insurgency there by April of 2007.116

The Surge

The final major shift in the strategy coincided with the arrival of 

General David Petraeus as the senior commander in Iraq, replacing Casey 

in February 2007. In addition to a new strategy, Petraeus arrived in Iraq 

amid the deployment of an additional five US Army brigade combat teams 

and two Marine infantry battalions. Malkasian observed, “Upon taking 

command on February 10, Petraeus incorporated the best lessons...into 

the security plan for Baghdad...Over 50 small outposts...manned by Iraqi 

police, the Iraqi Army, and US soldiers were emplaced throughout the 

city.”117 While the strategy became known as “the Surge” based on the 

surge of troops into theater, the deployment of additional forces was only a 

component of the plan. The new strategy focused on securing the population 

to create time and space for political reconciliation versus building Iraqi 

security forces.118 General Petraeus communicated his vision for the clearhold-build strategy on 19 March 2007, stating,

Improving security for Iraq’s population is ... the over-riding 

objective of your strategy. Accomplishing this mission requires 

carrying out complex military operations and convincing the 

Iraqi people that we will not just “clear” their neighborhoods of 

the enemy, we will also stay and help “hold” the neighborhoods 

so that the “build” phase that many of their communities need 

can go forward.119

Unfortunately, as the emphasis was on the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi 

security forces fielded to this point were not well-suited to conduct the 

long-term hold phase.

Prior to the Surge, the US-led coalition lacked a viable strategy to 

establish security and stability in Iraq under Iraqi control, the prerequisites 

for withdrawal of US forces. In July of 2007, General Petraeus issued 

his Counterinsurgency Guidance which included the following: “Secure 

the people where they sleep, give the people justice; Every unit must 

advise their ISF partners; and, Include ISF in your operations at the lowest 

possible level.”120 Stated simply, the Iraqi and coalition forces had to 

secure the population to allow the political process to occur.

Despite the increase in coalition combat power and the application of 

a new strategy, without the support of the local populations the plan would 

fail. As Kitson advised, “... the political leadership should take precedence 

over the military because the ultimate aim is usually political, and the 

means of achieving it are also political in so far as they are concerned with 
96

gaining control of the population.”121 Galula made the point that the key 

objective in counterinsurgency is for the population:

If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from 

the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active 

support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the 

exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit 

agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness. 

Thus the battle for the population is a major characteristic of 

the revolutionary war.122

By the early stages of 2008 it was apparent that the Surge was working 

as violence was dramatically decreased after an initial uptick as increased 

numbers of security forces entered hotly contested areas.123 David Ucko 

cites two main factors as the source of the success at this point: “First, the 

Sunni community was increasingly turning against the extremist – or takfiri

– groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), creating a split in the Sunni-led 

insurgency. ... The second factor behind the reduction in violence was 

the U.S. military’s change in strategy.”124 Further, Ucko credits the US 

military with applying Galula’s second law.125 “By co-opting the middle 

ground and working with it against more extreme elements, the US 

military not only helped achieve common goals but also contributed to the 

marginalization of hardliners.”126

As Ucko pointed out, the Al Anbar Awakening greatly contributed 

to the success of the Surge by fracturing the Sunni insurgency. Another 

way in which the Awakening impacted the Surge was the development 

of the Sons of Iraq program that sought to replicate the Sunni shift away 

from the insurgents beyond the confines of Al Anbar and across all of Iraq. 

As a former brigade commander in Baghdad commented regarding these 

irregular security forces, “I will tell you that they were probably the most 

critical piece, the greatest key to our success.”127 Najim Abed al Jabouri 

offered this description of the Sons of Iraq: “The Sons of Iraq program 

was a U.S.-led and -funded initiative to spread the success of the Anbar 

Awakening into other Sunni areas, particularly heterogeneous areas, and 

was not fully supported by the Iraqi government.”128

The Sons of Iraq program initially sought to capitalize on the Sunni 

movement in Al Anbar to inspire other Sunnis across Iraq to resist the 

insurgents. The program eventually expanded to incorporate Shia Sons of 

Iraq groups. As James Corum noted, 

When a nation is faced with instability and disorder, there is an 

inevitable response for local citizens to establish militias and 

irregular forces for their own security. It is politically unwise, 

perhaps even impossible, for any national government to ignore 

the issue of local militias, which are based on the natural desire 

for local security.129
97

Some of the willing recruits for the Sons of Iraq were 

probably motivated only by the financial gain or increased status, 

but as Corum described above the natural desire to protect their 

families and communities was the dominant motivation. As a 

former brigade operations officer in Iraq commented regarding 

the Sons of Iraq, “Even though they were not well trained and did 

not have uniforms, their mere presence on the checkpoints was a 

psychological boost for the populace.”130

Najim Abed al Jabouri’s assessment also pointed to security as 

the primary reasons Iraqis were anxious to form their own Sons of 

Iraq groups, “Since tribes are cross-sectarian social organizations, 

news of the Anbari tribes defeating AQI traveled fast. Sunnis 

in other AQI-infested areas, such as in northern and western 

Baghdad, wanted the same type of access to the Americans as 

Sheikh Sattar.”131 One of the main differences in the motivations 

between members of the Awakening and the Sons of Iraq was the 

threat of sectarian violence. Many of the Sunnis who lived in Shia 

dominated areas wanted to raise Sons of Iraq groups to protect 

them from sectarian violence waged by Shia dominated security 

forces.132

Conclusions

Those responsible for planning and preparing for the invasion of 

Iraq in 2003 failed to develop, resource, and implement viable plans for 

operations after the conventional combat phase concluded. The US exit 

strategy assumed that post-conflict operations would be brief and quickly 

turned over to Iraqis. Tom Ricks described a background interview Jay 

Garner conducted regarding the post combat phase:

Among the principles he laid down for the postwar Iraq was 

that an obtrusive U.S. role would be short and the Iraqi army 

would continue to exist. “We intend to immediately start turning 

some things over, and every day, we’ll turn over more things,” 

Garner said. ... The overall duration of the U.S. presence, he 

said, would be short. “I’ll probably come back to hate this 

answer, but I’m talking months.”133

Due in part to a superficial understanding of Iraq’s complex society 

and internal dynamics, the failure to plan and the assumption that the 

campaign would be brief resulted in poor strategy. The strategy shifts 

and lack of familiarity with previous counterinsurgency campaigns was 

disruptive to efforts to raise security forces.

These failures were compounded by the Bush administration’s denial 

of the insurgency in its early stages.134 Galula pointed out that in the 

cold revolutionary war phase, when the insurgents are largely operating 

within the law, it is difficult to justify a response to the insurgent threat.135
98

Similarly, Sir Robert Thompson wrote, “. . .during the build-up phase [of 

an insurgency], the signs are not always recognized, and the existence 

of a subversive movement may even be ignored or denied for shortsighted political reasons.”136 But the US-led coalition had just toppled the 

government (hardly a cold phase in any regard) and the actions of the 

insurgents were not difficult to recognize as violent threats inconsistent 

with Galula’s cold phase. Were attacks on coalition forces the acts of final 

hold-outs hopelessly resisting the US-led occupation or something else?

As mentioned previously, Iraqi security forces (mainly army) were 

the key to the US exit strategy. Iraqi security forces would solve the 

problem of growing violence, and by allowing US forces to leave, would 

remove the source of agitation and restore a sense of nationalism. Recall 

Lieutenant General Conway’s comment in 2004: “The situation will 

change when Iraqi Army divisions arrive. They will engender people with 

a sense of nationalism. Together with an elected government, they will 

create Stability.”137

There was no such thing as Iraqi nationalism in post-Saddam Iraq. 

Because the US neglected to develop an understanding of Iraqi society 

in order to formulate viable plans for the post-combat phase, those in 

charge of developing the New Iraqi Army did not understand the impact 

of sectarian friction on the effectiveness of any Iraqi military operation.138

Najim Abed al Jabouri summed up the friction succinctly:

Misunderstanding between the United States and Iraqi Sunni 

Arabs fed the insurgency. When coalition forces invaded Iraq 

in March 2003, the predominantly Sunni provinces of Anbar, 

Ninevah, and Salah al-Din did not want to confront the invading 

forces militarily. ... The reigning U.S. assumption at the time 

was that the political vacuum created by the fall of the former 

regime would strengthen the position of the tribal leaders. . . 

Meanwhile, Sunnis—in particular those without deep ties to the 

former regime—assumed that the United States would broker 

with them, since Sunnis had more government experience than 

any of the other ethnic or sectarian groups. Sunnis also assumed 

it was not in the U.S. interest to give the majority of the next 

government to Shia and Kurdish opposition groups, most of 

which were connected to Iran.139

These failures directly impacted the US strategy to secure Iraq after 

the fall of Saddam’s regime. As Tony Cordesman wrote in his assessment 

of Iraqi Security Forces, “The United States did more than fail to plan for 

an effective effort to secure the country or to develop effective Iraqi forces 

before or during the invasion. It failed to deal with the risk – and then with 

the reality – of a growing insurgency effort for nearly a year after the fall 

of Saddam Hussein.”140 The inability (or unwillingness) to acknowledge 
99

the nature of the campaign limited the US-led coalition’s ability to develop 

an appropriate response. 

General Abizaid took command of CENTCOM in July of 2003 and 

diagnosed the violence in Iraq as “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.”141

Recognition of the threat as a guerrilla or insurgent campaign apparently 

had little impact on strategy. A brief scan of even the table of contents 

of the works of classic counterinsurgency theorists would have led to 

many of the basic principles for successful counterinsurgency campaigns 

discussed thus far. For example, the table of contents of Sir Robert 

Thompson’s work, Defeating Communist Insurgency, The Lessons of 

Malaya and Vietnam, lists “Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency” as 

beginning on page 50.142 Among these principles, Thompson advises the 

counterinsurgent to “secure its base areas first,” advising that “priority in 

respect of security measures should be given to the more highly developed 

areas of the country” as they contain the majority of the population.143

Eventually, US strategy focused on securing the population versus 

destroying the insurgents. Recall General Petraeus’ vision as the senior 

commander in Iraq which stated, “Improving security for Iraq’s population 

is...the over-riding objective of your strategy.”144 In pursuit of this vision, 

Petraeus required additional troops to expand security to a greater part 

of the population. The simple increase of US forces may have worked 

on its own, but when combined with a new strategy focused on securing 

the population which isolated the insurgents from bases of support, places 

to hide, and pools from which to recruit, the addition of combat forces 

contributed to success. 

The most important factor which contributed to success was the shift 

in the support of the population sparked by the Al Anbar Awakening. As 

a retired general officer of the British Army commented, “An army can 

defeat an army. An army can’t defeat a people.”145 To paraphrase, the Iraqi 

Army cannot defeat an insurgency, only the Iraqi people can. As each of 

the counterinsurgency theorists discussed advised, counterinsurgency is a 

political struggle with victory going to the side which gains the support of 

the population.

Sending more coalition troops was not a viable consideration at any 

rate based on political repercussions and strained resources. Additional 

coalition forces would not likely have swayed the population to stand 

against the insurgents, or to provide additional intelligence. According to 

Najim Abed al Jabouri, 

Surge troops that came to Anbar in 2007 were not seen as 

useful, other than on the eastern border with Baghdad where the 

ISF acted as a sectarian militia. In fact, U.S. troops in general 

were not seen as useful even before the surge. ... Sheikh Sattar 

told the Americans ... the U.S. forces could stay on their bases 
100

while the Anbaris fought, since they knew who the al Qaeda 

fighters were.146

Nor would greater numbers of often sectarian Iraqi Army battalions 

have caused the population to throw their support behind the central 

government as neither side, Sunni and Shia, trusted the other. 

The difference in the Al Anbar Awakening, and later the Sons of Iraq, 

was the ability of the population to take matters into their own hands to 

secure themselves and their interests. As Najim noted, 

Contrary to a growing U.S. narrative about the Sunni 

Awakening being mainly the fruit of U.S. counterinsurgency 

tactics, in Ramadi having the U.S. forces in the neighborhoods 

was not what made the people feel safe. They felt safe when 

their men could join the police force and secure their areas by 

themselves.147

It is important to re-emphasize Najim’s point above. The Surge alone 

did not turn things around in Iraq. The shift in the dialogue between 

coalition forces and disaffected Sunnis bolstered the change in strategy to 

focus on securing the population. 

The irregular security forces in the Iraq campaign represented many 

things to the various sides of the conflict. To the Iraqi government and the 

US-led coalition, they represented a shift in popular support away from 

the insurgents. The insurgents and their supporters undoubtedly saw the 

Al Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq as the greatest threat to their 

ability to operate in Iraq. To the people, the families and neighbors of 

the Sons of Iraq, they were trustworthy protectors with common interests. 

A retired British Army general advised, “If the terrorists come from the 

people, you’re not going to defeat the people, and therefore you’ve got to 

influence the terrorists in such a way that they will stop fighting.”148 Once 

the people turned against the insurgents, the insurgents had no chance of 

success. 
101

Notes

1. For an explantion of the origins of the Al Anbar Awakening and the 

Sons of Iraq and their differences, see Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, 

“The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” PRISM, Vol. 2 Issue No. 1, 

National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., December 2010.

2. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: the 

Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, (New York: Vintage Books, 

February 2007), 13. “A no-fly zone was decreed over northern Iraq, effectively 

making Kurdistan an autonomous enclave. Six months later, as the Iraqis kept 

up their air raids against the Shiites, a no-fly zone was belatedly established over 

southern Iraq as well.”

3. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 13. “The Bush administration settled on a 

policy of economic sanctions, military containment, and regular United Nations 

inspections to dismantle Saddam’s programs to develop nuclear, biological, 

and chemical weapons. It was a strategy for a slow, steady squeeze, not deeper 

involvement.”

4. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 14.

5. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 29. “When it came to Iraq, Franks was 

not starting with a blank slate. General Binford Peay, the commander of the 101st 

Airborne during the Gulf War, had been appointed to run CENTCOM in 1994. 

He had been particularly concerned about a ‘Basra breakout,’ the possibility that 

Saddam would mass five divisions in the southern part of Iraq and rush them 

into Kuwait before the Americans could respond. If war came, the United States 

would defend Saudi Arabia, again fight to reclaim Kuwait, and then press north 

into Iraq.”

6. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 31.

7. General Tommy Franks, American Soldier, (New York: Harper Collins, 

2004), 182. General Franks assumed command of Third Army in May of 1997.

8. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 29. “Containing Saddam was not the 

problem. It was filling a potential power vacuum that worried him.”

9. Franks, American Soldier, 182, 198. General Franks assumed command 

of Third Army in May of 1997, and CENTCOM in July 2000.

10. Franks, American Soldier, 315. Relating a conversation with Secretary 

Rumsfeld: “Mr. Secretary,” I said, “we have a plan, of course. OPLAN 1003.” 

“What’s your opinion of it, General?” “Desert Storm II. It’s out of date, under 

revision because conditions have changed. We have different force levels in the 

region than we had when the plan was written. And we obviously have learned 

some valuable lessons about precision weapons and Special Operations from our 

experience in Afghanistan.”

11. Franks, American Soldier, 385.

12. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 28-29. “Franks later described the constant 

back and forth between them as an ‘iterative process.’ Gingrich had a more apt 

description: it was ‘constant negotiation.’”
102

13. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 4. “Greg Newbold, the three-star general 

who served as chief operations deputy for the JCS, had the main assignment for 

the session. He was to outline Central Command’s OPLAN 1003-98, the military’s 

contingency plan in the event of a war with Iraq. ... As Newbold outlined the 

plan, which called for as many as 500,000 troops, it was clear that Rumsfeld 

was growing increasingly irritated. ... Myers asked Rumsfeld how many troops 

he thought might be needed. The defense secretary said in exasperation that he 

did not see why more than 125,000 troops would be required and even that was 

probably too many.”

14. The United Nations Security Council issued resolutions against Iraq 

following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the US-led coalition’s ouster of 

Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in 1991. For an in-depth account of the 

1991 war in the Persian Gulf, see Certain Victory by Brigadier General Robert M. 

Scales, published by Brassey’s in 1997. 

15. Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: 

Transition to the New Campaign, (Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, August 

2008), 10-11.

16. Colonel Gregory Fontenot, US Army, Retired; Lieutenant Colonel E.J. 

Degen, US Army; Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, US Army, On Point, (Kansas: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 86.

17. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 622.

18. Franks, American Soldier, 428. “Ground troops” refers to Army and 

Marine forces and does not indicate combat troops, but rather includes support 

troops as well. “By the third week of March, our total strength in all components 

— including our Gulf State Coalition allies in Kuwait — would number 292,000. 

Of these, there would be approximately 170,000 soldiers and Marines assigned to 

the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC).”

19. BB010, Battalion Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Nathan 

Springer, 2 March 2011.

20. Franks, American Soldier, 339-341. Referring to the diagram on page 

340, “The starbursts at the intersections of Lines and Slices represented points 

of focus we would use to develop the specifics of a detailed plan. For example, 

the starburst at the intersection of ‘Operational Fires’ and ‘Leadership’ meant 

we would attack leadership targets using bombs and missiles. Simply stated, 

the starbursts helped the Component Commanders and staff match specific 

military tools to specific targets, resulting in better synergy among traditionally 

independent arms and services.” 

21. Franks, American Soldier, 423. “Over the weeks ahead, Jay Garner and I 

would meet; he would build a team of specialists and experts from across the U.S. 

government, deploy the team to Kuwait, establish links with our commanders 

on the ground, and prepare to enter Iraq on the heels of our attacking troops. . . 

Secured by Coalition forces, these teams would work with Iraqis to build local 

governance in each major population center. And local Iraqis would represent 

every ethnic, tribal, and religious interest in the country in establishing national 

leadership.”

22. Franks, American Soldier, 424.
103

23. Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq, 

(New York: Random House, 2008), 5.

24. Franks, American Soldier, 421. “... Congress passed, and President 

Clinton signed, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. This legislation declared that it 

would be the “policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein 

regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government.” The 

Act directed the President to designate one or more suitable Iraqi opposition 

organizations to receive assistance.”

25. Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters (Autumn 

2003): 85.

26. Franks, American Soldier, 419.

27. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 165.

28. Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” 88. “Civilian leaders 

supported the Army’s leadership over governance operations largely because of a 

lack of alternatives. Political leaders realized that the Army was the only agency 

capable of accomplishing reconstruction in the midst of and aftermath of combat. 

While some World War II leaders expressed concern that civilians could ‘lose’ the 

postwar world by default (by failing to offer a ‘comprehensive plan to rival that of 

the Army’s’), President Roosevelt recognized that only the Army would be able to 

deliver ‘prompt results.’ Even the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, acknowledged 

that the State Department did not have the capacity to run an occupation.”

29. West, The Strongest Tribe, 6.

30. West, The Strongest Tribe, 5-6. “Saddam’s reign of terror had ended, but 

chaos was about to reign. Throughout the city, American commanders stood off to 

one side as mobs rushed like locusts into hundreds of government buildings and 

stripped them clean. ... I asked an American colonel what he was going to do to 

restore order. ‘Nothing,’ he said. ‘I have no such orders. They deserve whatever 

they can haul away, after what Saddam did to them.’ In early May, Ambassador 

Zalmay Khalilzad and Assistant Secretary of State Ryan C. Crocker visited 

Baghdad and left shocked by the chaos and the American paralysis. Washington 

responded not by addressing the systemic failures of a detached military and a 

rudderless administration, but by replacing Garner.”

31. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 533.

32. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 23.

33. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 26. “Ambassador Bremer arrived with 

the Bush administration’s charge to dramatically reshape Iraq, a mandate which 

led to two major decisions. ... On 16 May Bremer issued CPA Order No. 1, ‘DeBaathification of Iraqi Society,’ which removed from public life those Iraqis who 

had held the top four ranks in the Baath Party and subjected to review members 

with lesser ranks. ... CPA Order No. 2, ‘Dissolution of Entities,’ quickly followed 

on 23 May and disbanded all of Saddam’s military and intelligence institutions, 

rendering hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers jobless.”

34. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 26. 

35. Franks, American Soldier, 393.
104

36. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 26-27. “Many Coalition military 

figures believed at the time that these important CPA decisions created a pool of 

disaffected and unemployed Sunni Arabs from which a growing insurgency could 

later recruit.”

37. Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles 

in the Sunni Awakening,” PRISM, Vol. 2 Issue No. 1, National Defense University 

Press, Washington, D.C., December 2010, 5.

38. West, The Strongest Tribe, 10.

39. West, The Strongest Tribe, 10.

40. West, The Strongest Tribe, 11-12.

41. Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds.), (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010), 290.

42. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, (New 

Dehli: Praeger Security International, 2010), 60.

43. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 59. “The 

division of the over-all action into successive steps following each other in logical 

order facilitates the tactical tasks of the agents; they know at each step what the 

intermediate objectives is and what they have to do to reach it.”

44. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 59.

45. West, The Strongest Tribe, 23. For example, “Maj. Gen. Charles H. 

Swannack, commanding the 82nd, told the sheiks that he wasn’t going to tolerate 

the attacks against his paratroopers, which had increased from twelve a day in 

October to twenty a day in November. The JTF initiated Operation Iron Hammer, 

a get tough (or tougher) approach to quelling the insurgency. Attack aircraft with 

thousand-pound bombs were directed at insurgent hideouts and arms caches, the 

wives of insurgents were detained for questioning, and uncooperative villages 

were sealed off with barbed wire.”

46. West, The Strongest Tribe, 30.

47. West, The Strongest Tribe, 30.

48. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 291. “The ensuing offensive 

ignited widespread Sunni outrage. Viewing it as an attack on their society, Sunnis 

poured into Fallujah from other Sunni cities. When the Marines stepped off, they 

encountered heavy resistance from roughly 2,000 insurgents.”

49. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 626.

50. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 291-292. Because of the 

increase in violence in southern Iraq, the British also pushed for an end to the 

offensive in Fallujah. 

51. This implies that prior to the first assault on Fallujah there was a strategy. 

As discussed previously, Jay Garner, who was supposed to execute the postcombat phase of the campaign, was replaced after only three weeks on the ground. 

If there was a strategy it may have left with Garner. Lieutenant General Sanchez 

and L. Paul Bremer apparently had no strategy to cope with the aftermath of the 
105

fall of Saddam’s regime or the growing insurgency.

52. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Opening Remarks before the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, 19 October 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 

military/library/congress/2005_hr/051019-rice.pdf, (accessed 19 May 2011), 1-4. 

“In 2003, enforcing UN resolutions, we overthrew a brutal dictator and liberated 

a nation. Our strategy emphasized the military defeat of the regime’s forces and 

creation of a temporary government with the Coalition Provisional Authority and 

an Iraqi Governing Council. In 2004, President Bush outlined a five step plan 

to end the occupation: transferring sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, 

rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure, getting more international support, preparing for 

Iraq’s first national election this past January, and helping establish security. ... In 

2005, we emphasized transition: a security transition to greater reliance on Iraqi 

forces and a political transition to a permanent, constitutional democracy. ... Now 

we are preparing for 2006. ... We are moving from a stage of transition toward the 

strategy to prepare a permanent Iraqi government for a decisive victory. ... With 

our Iraqi allies, we are working to: Clear the toughest places — no sanctuaries 

to the enemy — and disrupt foreign support for the insurgents. Hold and steadily 

enlarge the secure areas, integrating political and economic outreach with our 

military operations. Build truly national institutions working with more capable 

provincial and local authorities. ... None of these elements can be achieved by 

military action alone. None are purely civilian. All require an integrated civilmilitary partnership.”

53. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 4.

54. See the first chapter for a brief discussion of some of the prominent 

counterinsurgency theorists and authors.

55. West, The Strongest Tribe, 9.

56. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 166-167. 

57. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 293.

58. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 166.

59. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 293.

60. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 293. “Success in developing 

the Iraqi Nation Guard and other forces depended entirely on the attitudes of 

the local population. National Guard battalions based on the Kurdish militia 

(peshmerga), or Shi’a militias, performed adequately. Battalions based on Sunnis 

did not. Disaffected from the Iraqi government and angry at the coalition, at this 

stage in the war, Sunnis generally sympathized with the insurgency and had no 

intention of fighting their fellow tribesmen or family members.”

61. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 293. “There is little doubt that 

the US military could have done a better job advising and training the Iraqis. Few 

commanders embedded advisers with local forces. Yet at this time, even when 

Americans did, Sunnis remained reluctant to fight.”

62. Franks, American Soldier, 393.

63. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 294.

64. West, The Strongest Tribe, 74. “Petraeus had agreed to train on a priority 
106

basis 1,000 former soldiers from the Habbaniyah area. But the Sunni recruits 

refused to leave the province, or fight alongside Americans and have their own 

people turn against them.”

65. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 449. As an example, referring to the 2d 

Battalion of the New Iraqi Army, “Sunni soldier in the unit refused to engage in 

combat against Sunni insurgents. ...”

66. West, The Strongest Tribe, 74. “The Shiite battalions stationed near 

Baghdad didn’t want to come to Anbar and be shot at.”

67. West, The Strongest Tribe, 39.

68. President George W. Bush, National Address, Carlisle PA, 24 May 2004, 

(accessed 31 May 2011), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/

releases/ 2004/05/print/20040524-10.html

69. West, The Strongest Tribe, 41.

70. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

8. “However, the announcement of the Interim Governing Council in July 2003, 

5 months after the invasion, confirmed Sunni suspicions that the United States 

intended to de-Sunnify Iraq and tilt the regional balance of power toward Iran. 

Choosing Shia and Kurdish opposition groups close to Iran to form the next Iraqi 

government not only was a catalyst for national resistance, but it also created 

the conditions for the national resistance — now being led by once-skeptical 

former military and Ba’athist officials — to tolerate, trust, and in some instances 

embrace jihadists and al Qaeda as means to spoil American objectives. After 

the interim government had formed, the majority of Sunnis, rather than just the 

margins, significantly distrusted U.S. intentions. Ideas circulated through the 

Sunni community that the United States was changing its alliances in the Middle 

East because it now considered Shia religious extremism less threatening to its 

long-term interests in the region than Sunni religious extremism, especially the 

Wahhabism coming from Saudi Arabia. Whether the United States intended to 

de-Sunnify Iraq and change the regional balance of power from Sunni to Shia 

leadership did not matter at this point. Sunnis were now convinced this was the 

case.”

71. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

4. “Misunderstanding between the United States and Iraqi Sunni Arabs fed the 

insurgency. When coalition forces invaded Iraq in March 2003, the predominantly 

Sunni provinces of Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din did not want to confront the 

invading forces militarily. As Sunnis in the north saw the destruction and looting 

taking place in the south as coalition troops entered, a number of tribal leaders 

who had been in contact with U.S. military and intelligence personnel prior to 

the invasion convinced the Iraqi military and Ba’ath party leadership in Anbar, 

Ninevah, and Salah al-Din to meet with the Americans upon their arrival. The 

reigning U.S. assumption at the time was that the political vacuum created by 

the fall of the former regime would strengthen the position of the tribal leaders. 

Therefore, brokering with the tribes was a means to communicate with civilmilitary leaders and in turn to influence the populace. Meanwhile, Sunnis — in 

particular those without deep ties to the former regime — assumed that the United 

States would broker with them, since Sunnis had more government experience 

than any of the other ethnic or sectarian groups. Sunnis also assumed it was not in 
107

the U.S. interest to give the majority of the next government to Shia and Kurdish 

opposition groups, most of which were connected to Iran. Giving the Shia and 

Kurds responsibility for the government would increase Iranian influence in Iraq.”

72. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

5. “In the early days of the post-invasion, the tribes convinced military and 

political leaders in Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din to negotiate an arrangement 

until the next government took shape. Military and Ba’ath party leaders were 

chosen as interim governors and police chiefs through temporary elections in 

Ninevah and through appointment by tribal leaders in Anbar and Salah al-Din.

The Sunni leaders in these provinces thought that doing so would spare their 

cities and personal property and would put them in leadership positions for the 

next government.”

73. West, The Strongest Tribe, 14. “... word went out over the classified 

military Internet — Bremer will decide when, where, and how any election will 

be held. ... The military stood down their plan for local elections.”

74. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 627.

75. West, The Strongest Tribe, 39.

76. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 627.

77. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 627.

78. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 296. “In 2004 Casey conducted 

a review of the campaign and determined, with advice from COIN expert Kalev 

Sepp, that Iraqi Army formation needed to be accelerated.”

79. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 176. “The new organization, MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), would follow the newer 

vision for the ISF. Major General Petraeus, who commanded the 101st AABN 

during the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, was selected and promoted to be the 

first three-star commander of MNSTC-I, taking command on 6 June 2004.”

80. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 294.

81. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 295-296.

82. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 296.

83. Correspondence with a Marine adviser in Iraq in 2004 to 2005. 

84. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 177.

85. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88–9. “As the first, the 

supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander 

have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither 

mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This 

is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

86. West, The Strongest Tribe, 70-71.

87. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 297.

88. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 297.

89. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 456.
108

90. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 297. “From their perspective, 

the Iraqi Army could both provide vital manpower and gather intelligence better 

than coalition forces. Plus, Iraqi soldiers would not be perceived as occupiers, 

undercutting a major cause of the insurgency.”

91. BC010, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 1 March 2011.

92. BC010, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and Aaron 

Kaufman, 1 March 2011

93. Carter Malkasian, “The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in 

Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-2005.” Small Wars and 

Insurgencies, Vol. 17, no 3, September 2006, pp. 370-371.

94. West, The Strongest Tribe, 114-115.

95. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 302.

96. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 302. “On October 19, Major 

General William Caldwell, the coalition spokesman, acknowledged that Operation 

Together Forward II had failed.”

97. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 304. “The civil war forced a 

major change in US strategy. The Republican defeat in the midterm elections, 

followed by the Iraq Study Group report, made it impossible for Bush to ignore 

the deteriorating situation. The Iraq Study Group. ... recommended placing 

greater effort in expanding and training the Iraqi security forces, particularly the 

Iraqi Army. The group also called for benchmarks to measure the progress of 

the Iraqi government toward political reconciliation, and negotiating with Iraq’s 

neighboring countries.” 

98. Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, US Army, Director, Defense 

Intelligence Agency, “The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, Statement 

for the Record Senate Armed Services Committee,” (15 November 2006), 3. 

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/ 2006_hr/111506maples.pdf, (accessed 20 May 

2011),“Overall attacks averaged approximately 180 per day in October 2006, 

up from approximately 170 the previous month, and 70 in January 2006. Daily 

average of attacks against Iraqi Security Forces in October more than doubled the 

number reported in January, approximately 30 compared to 13. Daily average of 

attacks on civilians in October was four times higher than reported in January, 

approximately 40 compared to 10.”

99. Carter Malkasian, “The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in 

Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-2005,” Small Wars and 

Insurgencies, Vol. 17, no 3, September 2006, pp. 367-368.

100. Malkasian, “The Role of Perceptions and Political reform in 

Counterinsurgency,” p. 368. “When the Coalition and Iraqi Interim Government 

broke this perception through a series of military and political successes, Sunnis 

made serious approaches to find a compromise.”

101. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

12. “The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) controlled the Anbar Provincial Council, and al 

Qaeda’s murder and intimidation campaign and word of a U.S. armored brigade 

(1–1 AD) coming to Ramadi in spring 2006 to conduct a large, Fallujah-like 
109

military sweep of the city sent the provincial and municipal council into exile. 

The tribal leadership was also in exile, leaving mainly third-tier tribal leaders in 

the province.”

102. James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: 

Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005 to 

2007, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2011) 60.

103. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, 60-61.

104 . BH040, Afghanistan Veterans Panel. Interview by Richard Johnson, 

Aaron Kaufman, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 24 March 2011.

105. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 304.

106. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

4.

107. Major Niel Smith and Colonel Sean MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: the 

Tipping Point,” Military Review (March-April 2008): 41.

108 Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: the Tipping Point,” 43. These 

battalions included Marine and Army units.

109. Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: the Tipping Point,” 43. As 

an aside, the article also describes the previous attempt by Sunni leaders in Al 

Anbar to oust the insurgents while simultaneously battling the coalition forces, 

which failed. 

110. Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: the Tipping Point,” 43.

111. See David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 

p. 53. Discussion of the active minority: “The Second Law: Support Is Gained 

Through an Active Minority. The original problem becomes now: how to obtain 

the support of the population — support not only in the form of sympathy and 

approval but also in active participation in the fight against the insurgent. The 

answer lies in the following proposition, which simply expresses the basic tenet 

of the exercise of political power: In any situation, whatever the cause, there will 

be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority 

against the cause. The technique of power consists in relying on the favorable 

minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the 

hostile minority.”

112. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 52.

113. Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: the Tipping Point,” 43.

114. Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens: the Tipping Point,” 44.

115. BA010, Brigade Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and 

Thomas Walton, 22 February 2011. “We got the Iraqi government to pay them. 

Now they are taking the government’s salt, and they’re swearing allegiance to the 

government of Iraq. They weren’t a tribal militia with no affiliation to the ISF. 

They were an adjunct to the ISF. They were an extension of them. ... I used them 

mostly in the neighborhood watch mode which allowed me to use the actual IPs 

proper into the city and into the more problematic areas. . . The irregular security 

forces were really the key to success. When a tribal are...would flip, boom, all 

enemy activity in that area would stop overnight. ... The important thing was 
110

they were providing their own security. ... They knew exactly who the bad guys 

were in those areas and they were able to let them know, ‘Hey the bottom rail’s 

on top now; either clean up your act or get out of town’ ... Were some of these 

guys former insurgents? Absolutely. I’m sure they were. ... But I didn’t care. All 

that mattered to me was my soldiers and marines weren’t being killed anymore in 

those areas. That’s what mattered to me.”

116. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 304. “Sittar’s movement 

backed local police forces. Because they were Sunni, the local community would 

give the police intelligence, enabling them to kill or detain more insurgents than 

the Iraqi Army. The number of police actively in operations grew from fewer than 

1,000 in early 2006 to over 7,000 in early 2007. By April, the police had managed 

to suppress insurgent activity in Ramadi, and most of the key tribes of Al Anbar 

had aligned with Sittar’s movement.”

117. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 304.

118. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 304. “His top priority was 

protecting the people rather than building the Iraqi Army (although that remained 

a critical task). In his view, the point of the surge was to create a breathing space 

in the violence...in which political reconciliation could take place.”

119. General David Petraeus, Note to Troops, Baghdad, 19 March 2007.

120. General David Petraeus, MNF-I COIN Guidance, Baghdad, July 2007.

121. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 41.

122. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 4. “Afflicted 

with his congenital weakness, the insurgent would be foolish if he mustered 

whatever forces were available to him and attacked his opponent in a conventional 

fashion, taking as his objective the destruction of the enemy’s forces and the 

conquest of the territory. Logic forces him instead to carry the fight to a different 

ground where he has a better chance to balance the physical odds against him. The 

population represents this new ground.”

123. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 305. “Violence escalated 

initially as US and Iraqi forces (ISF) moved into contested neighborhoods to 

create and man the joint security stations. ... In June 2007, at the height of the 

surge, there were more than 1,500 security incidents throughout Iraq; in August 

2008, these had dropped to just under 200.”

124. David Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US 

Military for Modern Wars, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 

126. “The transition from larger isolated bases to smaller joint security stations 

helped U.S. troops provide security, which enabled bridges to be built with local 

communities seeking greater stability or protection. ... In short, U.S. brigades 

moved from a narrow and predominantly enemy-centered focus on rooting out 

the insurgency to a broader effort to “end the cycle of violence,” primarily by 

engaging with its adversaries’ initial motivation to take up arms.”

125. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 53. “The 

Second Law: Support Is Gained Through an Active Minority. The original 

problem becomes now: how to obtain the support of the population — support 

not only in the form of sympathy and approval but also in active participation 
111

in the fight against the insurgent. The answer lies in the following proposition, 

which simply expresses the basic tenet of the exercise of political power: In any 

situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a 

neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause. The technique of power 

consists in relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority 

and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority.”

126. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era, 126.

127. BE060, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 9 March 2011.

128. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

3.

129. James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A 

Tale of Two Insurgencies. http://www. strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?PubID=648 (accessed 13 March 2011): 48.

130. BG070, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Nathan Springer and Thomas 

Walton, 15 March 2011.

131. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

13-15. “In the Anbar Awakening, Sunnis did not see benefit in having the U.S. 

combat forces stationed in the cities taking the lead in security operations. Sunnis 

felt the best way to combat AQI was through local security force recruitment 

and permission to conduct their own operations with support from the American 

troops. This was because Anbar is largely a homogeneous province in which 

Sunnis saw a U.S. troop presence in the cities as a clear sign of occupation. All 

efforts were made by Awakening leaders to distance themselves from being seen 

as supporting a U.S. occupation. For them it was ideal if the Iraqis could take the 

lead, with the United States playing a supporting role. This way they could show 

the populace that the Americans were their guests helping them fight the real 

occupiers, al Qaeda and Iran.”

132. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

13-14. “Abdul Sattar’s Sunni visitors were generally from the mixed cities in Salah 

al-Din, Diyala, and Baghdad, where the Iraqi Police were already well established 

but were heavily sectarian. The Americans in these mixed areas were less likely 

to work with former insurgents or people who did not fully support the local ISF 

or government — Americans were inclined to only support local military and 

political leaders, even if those leaders lacked legitimacy or were seen as sectarian. 

In these heterogeneous areas, the Iraqi Police were often an instrument for 

sectarian violence where Sunnis sought a means to defend themselves legally.”

133. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 

(New York: Penguin Group USA, 2007), 104.

134. West, The Strongest Tribe, 10. Secretary Rumsfeld did not see an 

insurgency growing in Iraq and explained away the growing violence as the work 

of “dead-enders.”

135. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 43-44. “The 

situation at this stage is characterized by the fact that the insurgent operates 

largely on the legal side, and only partly on the fringe of legality, through his 
112

subversion tactics. He may or may not have been recognized as an insurgent; if he 

has been identified as such, only the police and a few people in the government 

generally realize what is looming. The essential problem for the counterinsurgent 

stems from the fact that the actual danger will always appear to the nation as out 

of proportion to the demands made by an adequate response. The potential danger 

is enormous, but how to prove it on the basis of available, objective facts? How 

to justify the efforts and sacrifices needed to smother the incipient insurgency?”

136. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons 

of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967), 50.

137. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 294.

138. Had the administration worked through basic questions such as “Who is 

going to gain power?; Who is capable of administration at the national, provincial, 

and local levels?; Who is going to keep the lights on and the water running?” they 

might have identified some of the complexity of the Iraqi society.

139. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

4. “Misunderstanding between the United States and Iraqi Sunni Arabs fed the 

insurgency. When coalition forces invaded Iraq in March 2003, the predominantly 

Sunni provinces of Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din did not want to confront the 

invading forces militarily. As Sunnis in the north saw the destruction and looting 

taking place in the south as coalition troops entered, a number of tribal leaders 

who had been in contact with U.S. military and intelligence personnel prior to 

the invasion convinced the Iraqi military and Ba’ath party leadership in Anbar, 

Ninevah, and Salah al-Din to meet with the Americans upon their arrival. The 

reigning U.S. assumption at the time was that the political vacuum created by 

the fall of the former regime would strengthen the position of the tribal leaders.

Therefore, brokering with the tribes was a means to communicate with civilmilitary leaders and in turn to influence the populace. Meanwhile, Sunnis — in 

particular those without deep ties to the former regime — assumed that the United 

States would broker with them, since Sunnis had more government experience 

than any of the other ethnic or sectarian groups. Sunnis also assumed it was not in 

the U.S. interest to give the majority of the next government to Shia and Kurdish 

opposition groups, most of which were connected to Iran. Giving the Shia and 

Kurds responsibility for the government would increase Iranian influence in Iraq.”

140. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces, A Strategy for Success,

(Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 15.

141. West, The Strongest Tribe, 10.

142. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 111.

143. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 57.

144. General David Petraeus, Note to Troops, Baghdad, 19 March 2007.

145. BL070, Retired General Officer, Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kauffman, Dustin Mitchell, 

Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 30 March 2011.

146. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

15.
113

147. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

11. “Contrary to a growing U.S. narrative about the Sunni Awakening being 

mainly the fruit of U.S. counterinsurgency tactics, in Ramadi having the U.S. 

forces in the neighborhoods was not what made the people feel safe. They felt safe 

when their men could join the police force and secure their areas by themselves. 

Joining the police and working in their own local areas were also a way to avoid 

being targeted by the Americans. As policemen, they might have wanted U.S. 

support doing operations, but they did not want to support U.S. operations — as 

experienced by the Fallujah Brigade in 2004. Also, as policemen they received 

official pay and had better chances of winning reconstruction work in their areas.”

148. BL070. Retired General Officer, 30 March 2011.
114
115

Chapter 5

Conclusions

Irregular security forces have had major impacts on the outcome of 

many counterinsurgency campaigns (e.g. firqa,

1

 Sons of Iraq,2 Philippine 

Constabulary). Irregular security forces are indigenous forces, not part 

of the regular police or military organizations of the host nation, that 

are recruited locally to provide a basic level of security in a given area. 

Irregular security forces, when used in conjunction with all other available 

capabilities, contribute to, but do not in and of themselves ensure success. 

As Major General Tony Jeapes concluded, “The firqats’ understanding of 

ground and their speed of manoeuvre were both superior to SAF troops’, 

but when it came to straight military tactics, the SAF’s discipline told 

every time. The two forces were complementary; neither could have won 

the war alone.”3

In Dhofar, the firqa added critical elements to the Sultan’s campaign 

such as knowledge of local terrain,4

 the ability to convince other insurgents 

to switch sides,5

 and by securing cleared areas, the firqa enabled the Sultan’s 

conventional forces to concentrate for offensive operations elsewhere. As 

John Akehurst described it in his book We Won a War,

The Firqats at that time were about 1,400 strong and were the 

key to the centre and east. Considerable strength would be 

needed to take on the enemy in the west and it could only be 

amassed at the expense of the centre and east. Either the enemy 

must be cleaned out altogether, an impossible task in the short 

term, or the securing must be taken over by the Firqats.

The firqa relied heavily on conventional forces and capabilities to 

include their SAS advisers, fire support, logistics support, communications, 

and medical treatment. The regular and irregular forces in Dhofar formed 

a more complete fighting force complementing for the weakness of the 

other, and capitalizing on their respective strengths. 

Due to their intimate knowledge of their local areas, the irregular 

security forces of the Awakening and the Sons of Iraq were able establish 

security where coalition and Iraqi Security Forces could not. According 

to a former commander in Ramadi during the Awakening, “The irregular 

security forces were really the key to success. When a tribal area 

would flip, all enemy activity in that area would stop overnight.”6

 Each 

constituted forces capable of preventing the re-emergence of insurgents 

in cleared areas, and signaled a shift away from the insurgents toward 

the government. Each force relied to varying degrees on support from 

conventional forces and the Iraqi government which helped solidify their 

shift away from the insurgents.7

Paraphrasing Clausewitz,8 counterinsurgents must understand the 
116

nature and the aim of the conflict in which they are engaged. Regarding 

irregular security forces, counterinsurgents must consider several factors 

to include the intended purpose of the force, how the force fits into the 

overall strategy, the nature and capabilities of the threat the irregular 

force will encounter, and the appropriate composition of the force to 

support the strategy and counter the threat. 9 Additional factors include 

the perception of legitimacy of the force in the eyes of the population, the 

type and duration of the training required, the location of employment, of 

the force, and the availability and competency of likely leadership for the 

force. Finally, counterinsurgents must be prepared to provide competent 

partnership and advisory support to the force in quantities sufficient to 

account for the size and distribution, or scope, of the irregular force.When 

raised with consideration of these aspects, irregular security forces provide 

additional capabilities to the host nation’s efforts that conventional forces 

do not possess. 

While irregular security forces could provide a multitude of capabilities 

to complement conventional forces, counterinsurgents must understand 

the purpose of such forces in the context of the overall strategy. When 

asked about the key aspects of raising irregular security forces, a former 

counterinsurgency practitioner and retired general officer from the British 

Army identified the purpose as the first requirement: “What is the aim? 

What are you trying to do? ... Your aim must obviously be compatible 

with the government’s aim, although they may not necessarily be exactly 

the same. They must be compatible. You must know what you’re trying 

to do.”10

When counterinsurgents recruit irregular security forces from, 

and employ them within, their local area, these forces prove useful in 

gathering intelligence, holding cleared areas, strengthening ties between 

the population and the government, and enabling other forces to focus 

on offensive operations against insurgents. Dependent upon the nature 

of the conflict and the myriad variables of the environment in which the 

campaign unfolds, irregular security forces could conduct surveillance 

tasks, fixed site security,11 population control measures,12 or augment 

regular forces during limited offensive operations. The purpose of the 

irregular security force within the greater context of the overall strategy 

drives the determination of the other requirements (i.e. training, equipping, 

advisory). 

Counterinsurgents have used various strategies in previous 

campaigns. The French campaign in Algeria generated the quadrillage13

strategy, whereas the US experience in Vietnam brought about the oilspot strategy.14 In Dhofar, Lieutenant Colonel John Watts devised the Five 

Fronts to guide SAS support to the Sultan’s campaign.15 The US strategy 

in Iraq shifted several times but eventually evolved into Clear, Hold, 

Build.16 Counterinsurgents must have a clear strategy in order to raise 
117

proper irregular security forces which support the efforts of the host nation 

government to achieve its desired end state. As a retired British general 

officer observed, “A short-term success that doesn’t affect the long-term 

aim is a failure.”17

Counterinsurgents tend to overlook irregular security forces as a 

component of their strategy, instead focusing initially on increasing the 

capacities of army or police.18 This indicates that either the observations 

of previous counterinsurgency practitioners have not been considered,19

or the host nation has failed to identify the true nature of the conflict. 

Considering the primacy of the political in counterinsurgency operations,20

and the supreme importance of popular support, properly raised irregular 

security forces are often more effective than other security forces in 

gaining the support of the population.

In counterinsurgency operations, irregular security forces serve as 

a symbol of popular support.21 For this reason, counterinsurgents must 

understand the capabilities of the insurgents to avoid employing irregular 

forces beyond their capabilities. As FM 3-24 advises, counterinsurgents 

must employ irregular security forces in limited roles initially to build 

confidence and avoid politically costly defeat.22

It is important to understand the cultural and social factors that could 

potentially impact the effectiveness of an irregular security force. For 

example, in Dhofar, to avoid in-fighting and disintegration, firqa units were 

developed along tribal lines versus mixed tribal firqa.23 As an SAS veteran 

of the Dhofar campaign observed, “It was only the first firqa that was a 

composite tribal mix. And then I think people realized pretty quickly that 

they needed a tribal based firqa.”24 Based on the discussion of sectarian 

violence in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom,25 the negative outcome 

of a mixed Sunni and Shia irregular security force are obvious. 

In addition to the social considerations regarding the composition of 

irregular security forces, there are organizational considerations. Irregular 

security forces generally conduct operations within their local areas and 

therefore do not require a great deal of infrastructure or logistic support. 

Being light and agile is one of the advantages of irregular security forces. 

As an SAS veteran of Dhofar described the firqa: 

I suppose you would class them as light recce troops really.... 

They always travelled light. They rarely carried any weight. ... 

Most of them were pretty athletic. They were fast over the sort 

of first three to five meters, so in a contact they would move 

very quickly, but they couldn’t carry weight for any distance. . 

. What we would often do is have a patrol at night, establish a 

position, before first light put up a light sangar, and then we’d 

get the helicopters to come in, and the first load would always 

bring in the mortar and a number of rounds.26
118

Should the host nation provide irregular security forces equipment 

such as vehicles, advanced communication systems, or heavy weapons, 

the host nation must also provide training and logistic support to the 

irregular force. 

Irregular security forces provide the population a means to secure 

their own areas, and often, a source of income with which to support 

their families. Because one of the key benefits of irregular security 

forces is greater access and connection to the population which produces 

intelligence, the population must see irregular security forces as legitimate. 

Without the popular perception of legitimacy, irregular security forces will 

become disconnected from the population and lose their ability to operate 

effectively. As Ian Gardiner recounted regarding the benefit of the firqa’s 

connection to the local population, 

As our former enemies they knew the ground and the tactics of 

their former friends intimately, and they were good at things that 

we were poor at, namely reconnaissance, gathering intelligence 

and communicating with the nomadic population. They were 

of that population after all. They were, therefore, extremely 

useful in retaining the peace in an area which had been cleared 

of adoo, thereby leaving conventional forces to get on with 

prosecuting the war elsewhere. For all their limitations, I do 

not believe we could have won the war without the Firqat.

27

In order to create effective irregular security forces which suit 

their intended purpose as part of the overall strategy, counterinsurgents 

must have an understanding of the local population from which they 

are recruiting. Important factors which impact training include literacy, 

fluency in the local language and other dialects, social structures which 

may affect discipline, previous military or police experience, and health.28

Counterinsurgents should train irregular security forces to maximize their 

natural capabilities. Recall T. E. Lawrence’s advice: “Do not try to do too 

much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you 

do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for 

them.”29 Members of the BATT in Dhofar offered the following advice: 

“The most important factor in selecting an irregular indigenous force is 

to establish their true motive for fighting and to use this as a bait as much 

as possible. In this way a force will be created using its own motivation 

which will hold it together and keep it going in difficult times.”30 This is 

especially true of those selected as leaders of irregular security forces as 

discussed later in this chapter.

Where irregular security forces operate is of critical importance. 

When irregular security forces operate on their own turf and they have the 

support of population, they gain several advantages over the insurgents. In 

this case, irregular security forces have intimate knowledge of the terrain 

and the population, and can access intelligence from the population which 
119

can provide early warning of attacks. By operating close to home, irregular 

security forces’ logistics requirements are lessened. Additionally, because 

the local population sees their own family members providing for their 

security, they feel more secure, and are naturally more supportive.31

By their nature, irregular security forces generally do not have a 

pool of experienced veterans from which to select their leadership. There 

may be members of the community with prior experience in either the 

military or the police which can be beneficial. The most important aspect 

for irregular security force leadership is the support they enjoy from the 

local population and the members of the force. As a retired British general 

officer advised regarding leaders of irregular security forces: “There’s got 

to be somebody who is a leader, in local terms, not necessarily someone 

who meets our staff college requirements. He’s got to be a local leader. 

He’s got to be respected. He’s got to have a following otherwise there’s no 

point in having him.”32

As David Galula stated, “[T]he turning point really comes when 

leaders have emerged from the population and have committed themselves 

on the side of the counterinsurgent. They can be counted upon because 

they have proved their loyalty in deeds and not in words, and because 

they have everything to lose from a return of the insurgents.”33 In the 

case of the Sons of Iraq, the key leadership was at the tribal sheik level. 

Once these sheiks made the decision to take coalition support against the 

insurgents, the population by and large followed their lead.34 In Dhofar, 

the firqa generally chose their own leaders, but when operating with a 

BATT, the SAS man commanding the BATT was essentially the firqa 

commander as well.35 The question of leadership must be answered by the 

local population and approached by the counterinsurgents as a matter of 

compromise versus confrontation.36 What works for them? If they don’t 

accept the leader, his qualifications to lead are irrelevant. 

Partnering irregular security forces and conventional forces provides 

many benefits. By partnering conventional and irregular forces, each has 

access to the other’s unique capabilities (e.g. knowledge of local terrain, 

access to fire support).37 Each force is able to learn from the other during 

training and operations. Partnership between irregular and conventional 

forces can also mitigate the negative effects of poor irregular force 

leadership by developing those leaders over time.38 

Although similar to partnership, embedding advisers into irregular 

force units instead makes the adviser part of the team. Advisers share 

hardships and burdens, provide a constant source of advice, expertise, and 

leadership, and access to conventional force capabilities.39 The CSAF in 

1972 summed up the effect of competent advisers, “Firqats supported by 

22 SAS should achieve a lot: Firqats supported by a small party from SAF 

or unsupported will achieve little. They might even decamp to the Coastal 

Plain.”40
120

Not all good soldiers make good advisers. Given the importance 

of the advisory mission, and the above criteria for effective advisors, 

counterinsurgents must regard selection of officers for advisory duty as 

a positive and beneficial assignment, selecting only those best qualified. 

As Ian Gardiner wrote, “Regular soldiers could find the Firqat infuriating. 

The SAS, who themselves were somewhat irregular, and were trained to 

train irregular soldiers, were mostly pretty well adjusted to the task.”41

Critical to the success of advisory missions are advisers that can speak 

the language of the forces with which they are operating. One former SAS 

adviser to the firqa in Dhofar identified the lack of language capability as 

the greatest source of friction between the firqa and their advisers.42 As 

a retired British officer who commanded SAS troops in Dhofar related, 

“My directive stated that my primary task was to train surrendered enemy 

personnel.”43 This task was made easier by the language capabilities within 

his command. “18 of my soldiers, out 65, could speak Arabic. Every four 

man patrol had an Arabist.”44

The final key aspect is scope. How many irregular security forces are 

needed in how many areas by when to achieve the purpose in support of 

the strategy? If only a small number of such forces are needed in only a 

few areas, the host nation may perhaps be able to apply more resources and 

time to develop them. Should the scope of the requirement for irregular 

security forces be great, counterinsurgents should avoid rapidly raising 

large numbers of forces with little training or leadership.45

All of the aspects discussed above are interconnected. Changes in one 

ripples into changes in all. The first aspect counterinsurgents must address 

is the purpose in the context of the strategy. What does the host nation hope 

to achieve by raising irregular security forces? If that is not understood, 

the other aspects cannot be accurately factored into the development of 

appropriate irregular security forces. 

While this thesis does not cover the topic of irregular security forces in 

counterinsurgency with sufficient depth to be used as a sole source for raising 

such forces, it is a starting point. Within each of the aspects discussed there 

are multiple variables which counterinsurgents must identify and consider 

as they develop plans to raise irregular security forces. For example, what 

impact does simple and affordable communications devices have on the 

ability of less experienced indigenous leaders to command and control 

irregular security forces and access support from other forces? 

Much remains to be learned regarding irregular security forces. 

Additional case studies of other campaigns would expand the body of 

knowledge on this topic. Intelligence services may have some lessons to 

share regarding irregular security forces, but those lessons would most 

likely push the research and the thesis into classified areas. Perhaps one 

of the yet untapped sources for further study of irregular security forces is 
121

Soviet material from the era of cold war and proxy wars. 

Irregular security forces have proven to be a powerful capability in 

counterinsurgency operations. They have never been the silver bullet 

or associated counter to insurgency. Irregular security forces provide 

capabilities which are different than, but complementary to, conventional 

forces, and should be considered as a component of any counterinsurgency 

operation. 

Notes

1. See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of the firqa in Oman.

2. See Chapter Four for a detailed discussion of the Sons of Iraq.

3. Tony Jeapes, SAS: Secret War, (Surrey: Harper Collins, 1996), 237.

4. John Akehurst, We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman 1965-1977 (Great 

Britain: Biddles Ltd.), 43. “I must reiterate how vitally important the Firqats

were in the struggle. Their knowledge of the ground and their influence with the 

civilians were indispensible, and worth all the time, trouble and money spent to 

secure and retain their goodwill and allegiance.”

5. BL070, Retired General Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, 

Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 30 March 2011. Cites Salim Mubarak as 

saying, “We are going to form a firqa of all the people coming down [from the 

Jebel to join the Sultan]...and then we will sweep them [adoo] off the Jebel!”

6. BA010, Brigade Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson and Thomas 

Walton, 22 February 2011. “We got the Iraqi government to pay them. Now 

they are taking the government’s salt, and they’re swearing allegiance to the 

government of Iraq. They weren’t a tribal militia with no affiliation to the ISF. 

They were an adjunct to the ISF. They were an extension of them. ... I used them 

mostly in the neighborhood watch mode which allowed me to use the actual IPs 

proper into the city and into the more problematic areas. ... The irregular security 

forces were really the key to success. When a tribal area would flip, boom, all 

enemy activity in that area would stop overnight. ... The important thing was 

they were providing their own security. ... They knew exactly who the bad guys 

were in those areas and they were able to let them know, ‘Hey the bottom rail’s 

on top now; either clean up your act or get out of town’. ... Were some of these 

guys former insurgents? Absolutely. I’m sure they were. ... But I didn’t care. All 

that mattered to me was my soldiers and marines weren’t being killed anymore in 

those areas. That’s what mattered to me.”

7. For a detailed discussion of the differences between the Al Anbar 

Awakening and the Sons of Iraq, see Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen, 

“The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” PRISM, Vol. 2 Issue No. 1, 

National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., December 2010, p. 4.

8. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. And trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88–9. “As the first, the 
122

supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander 

have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither 

mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This 

is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”

9. See Chapter Two for a detailed discussion of the key aspects to consider 

for irregular security force development.

10. BL070, Retired General Officer, 30 March 2011.

11. Fixed security points include traffic control points (both vehicular and 

foot traffic), securing critical infrastructure, and other static guard duties. 

12. Population control measures include census taking, controlling access 

to secured population centers, curfew enforcement, rationing commodities, and 

searching persons, dwellings, and vehicles for contraband. 

13. For a complete discussion of the French strategy in Algeria, see David 

Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, Pacification in Algeria 

1956-1958. Santa Monica: RAND, 2006, pp. 5-25 and 243-270, and Roger 

Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Ft Leavenworth: 

CSI, 1985, pp. 67-93.

14. Robert Komer, Bureaucracy at War, U.S. Performance in the Vietnam 

Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 135. Assistant Secretary Roger 

Hilsman’s final memorandum to the Secretary of State in March 1964 called 

for “primary emphasis on giving security to the villagers. The tactics are the socalled oil-blot approach, starting with a secure area and extending it slowly. ...

This calls for the use of military forces in a different way from that of orthodox, 

conventional war. Rather than chasing Viet Cong, the military must put primary 

emphasis on clear-and-hold operations and on rapid reinforcement of villages 

under attack. It is also important of course, to keep the Viet Cong regular units off 

balance by conventional offensive operations, but these should be secondary to 

the major task of extending security...”

15. Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, 31.

16. National Security Council, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” The 

White House, 30 November 2005, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/

infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf, p. 8. “Objective: To develop 

the Iraqis’ capacity to secure their country while carrying out a campaign to 

defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency. To achieve this objective, we 

are helping the Iraqi government: Clear areas of enemy control by remaining 

on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and denying them safehaven, Hold areas freed from enemy control by ensuring that they remain under 

the control of a peaceful Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force 

presence, Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to 

deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.”

17. BL070, Retired General Officer, 30 March 2011.

18. As examples, in Malaya the initial response to the crisis was to rapidly 

expand the police force in short order whereas in Iraq and Afghanistan the initial 

emphasis was placed on building armies to improve security.

19. For more detail on the principles developed by various counterinsurgency 
123

practitioners and scholars, see Chapter One of this thesis.

20. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, (Florida: 

Hailer, 2005), 89. “That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of 

both principle and practicality. What is at stake is the country’s political regime, 

and to defend it is a political affair. Even if this requires military action, the action 

is constantly directed toward a political goal. Essential though it is, the military 

action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the 

political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.”

21. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 57. “When 

troops live among the population and give it protection until the population is able 

to protect itself with a minimum of outside support, the insurgent’s power cannot 

easily be rebuilt, and this in itself is no mean achievement. But the turning point 

really comes when leaders have emerged from the population and have committed 

themselves on the side of the counterinsurgent. They can be counted upon because 

they have proved their loyalty in deeds and not in words, and because they have 

everything to lose from a return of the insurgents.”

22. FM 3-24, 6-16. “Committing poorly trained and badly led forces results 

in high casualties and invites tactical defeats. While defeat in a small operation 

may have little strategic consequence in a conventional war, even a small tactical 

defeat of HN forces can have serious strategic consequences in a COIN. Insurgent 

warfare is largely about perceptions. Effective insurgent leaders can quickly turn 

minor wins into major propaganda victories. Defeat of one government force can 

quickly degrade the morale of others. If a HN force fails, the local populace may 

begin to lose confidence in the government’s ability to protect them.”

23. Tribal alignment was a lesson learned and an example of a successful 

adaptation on the part of the SAS in Dhofar after the first mixed tribe firqa 

collapsed after the death of its leader, Salim Mubarak.

24. BL330, Interview by Robert Green with SAS Dhofar veteran, UK, 28 

March 2011

25. See Chapter Four.

26. BL330, Interview with SAS Dhofar veteran.

27. Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the 

Dhofar Insurgency. (South Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword Books Unlimited, 

2007), 159

28. BATT Notes on Raising and Training of Irregular Forces in Dhofar, 

Annex B to Section 10 of unknown report, Middle East Centre, St. Anthony’s 

College, Oxford, UK, 1. Recruits that were too old, too young, or in very sick 

were rejected as unfit for the rigors of combat.

29. Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab 

Bulletin, Article No. 8, 27 August 1917. While Lawrence referred directly to 

Arabs as that was his experience, the same advice is probably valuable when 

raising irregular security forces in any country or among any ethnic group.

30. BATT Notes, 1.

31. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

11.
124

32. BI080, Retired General Officer. Interview by Ben Boardman, Robert 

Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 3 April 2011.

33. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, Praeger, 57.

34. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

11. “After Abdul Sattar had announced the Anbar Awakening, working with the 

Americans was a means of securing Sunni areas.”

35. BL330, Interview with SAS Dhofar veteran, UK, 28 March 2011. “You 

had a firqa leader, an Arab firqa leader who was from the tribe but when BATT 

was with the firqa it was the BATT commander who was the firqa leader. So when 

I was with the firqa I was the firqa leader, and that was true of all the BATT/firqa 

relationships. So you were actually in command, and what you said was an order 

even though perhaps there was some negotiation before you would go firm on 

that. The BATT commander was in charge of the group shall we say, the firqa. 

That maybe puts a slightly different perspective on it.” 

36. BL330, Interview with SAS Dhofar veteran, UK, 28 March 2011. “It was 

the way you chose to lead the firqa whether it was successful or not, whether you 

were in constant confrontation or you compromised and achieved an operational 

objective.”

37. Najim and Jensen, “The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening,” 

15.

38. General Stanley McCrystal, “COMISAF Initial Assessment 

(UNCLASSIFIED),” (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters International Security 

Assistance Force, 30 August 2009), G-2

39. Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Michaelis, “The Requirements for FullSpectrum Operations.” Military Review, 85:4 (July-August 2005): 7-8. “Over 

500,000 hours of dedicated training by an embedded advisory staff, who lived, 

ate, and trained with the Iraqi Army, resulted in over 3,000 Iraqi missions executed 

independent of coalition presence in and around Baghdad. This critical step in 

the progress toward establishing full independence was accomplished through a 

robust advisory system where the division embedded over 70 full-time military 

advisory teams per Iraqi battalion over the course of the deployment. Resourced 

down to the platoon level, the advisors leveraged the cultural importance of 

relationships to the Arab people to build trust and rapport and create momentum 

toward a truly professional military force.”

40. CSAF Assessment, 11. 

41. Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan, 156.

42. BI330, Dhofar Veteran. Interview by Robert Green, 28 March 2011. 

“But coming back to the importance of language, perhaps; that was a major 

problem that was never fully acknowledged I do think. A lot of the guys just did 

not understand what the guy was saying, and then tempers would get frayed and 

people would get very heated when there was no need to do so.”

43. BI090, Retired General Officer. Interview by Ben Boardman, Robert 

Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 4 April 2011.

44. BI090, Retired General Officer. Interview by Ben Boardman, Robert 
125

Green, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 4 April 2011.

45. FM 3-24, 6-16. “Committing poorly trained and badly led forces results 

in high casualties and invites tactical defeats. While defeat in a small operation 

may have little strategic consequence in a conventional war, even a small tactical 

defeat of HN forces can have serious strategic consequences in a COIN. Insurgent 

warfare is largely about perceptions. Effective insurgent leaders can quickly turn 

minor wins into major propaganda victories. Defeat of one government force can 

quickly degrade the morale of others. If a HN force fails, the local populace may 

begin to lose confidence in the government’s ability to protect them.”
126
127

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BC060, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Richard 

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BE010, Transition Team Leader. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas Walton, 

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128

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BE060, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas Walton, 9 

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Fort Knox, Kentucky

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March 2011.

BD030, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin Mitchell, 14 

March 2011.

BD040, Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin Mitchell, 15 

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BD060, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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23 February 2011.

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23 February 2011.

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129

Fort Stewart, Georgia

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Nathan Springer, 29 March 2011.

BI020, Battle Group Commander. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Thomas 

Walton, 31 March 2011.

BI030, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Robert Green and Thomas Walton, 29 

March 2011.

BI040, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes and Dustin Mitchell, 1 

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Springer, and Thomas Walton, 28 March 2011.

BI060, Dhofar Veterans Panel. Interview by Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben 

Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin 

Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 2 April 2011.

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Boardman, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin 

Mitchell, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 30 March 2011.

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Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 3 April 2011.

BI090, Retired General Officer. Interview by Ben Boardman, Robert Green, 

Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 4 April 2011.

BI100, Senior Army Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes, Richard Johnson, Aaron 

Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 4 April 2011.

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Dustin Mitchell, 8 April 2011.

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130

Springer, and Thomas Walton, 8 April 2011.

BI130, Platoon Commander. Interview by Ben Boardman and Richard Johnson, 

5 April 2011.

BI140, Afghan Army Adviser. Interview by Ben Boardman and Richard Johnson, 

5 April 2011.

BI150, Company Sergeant Major. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 5 April 2011.

BI160, Company 2nd In Command. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 5 April 2011.

BI170, Afghan Army Adviser. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin Mitchell, 

5 April 2011.

BI190, Senior Non-Commissioned Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes and 

Thomas Walton, 5 April 2011.

BI200, Platoon Commander. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin Mitchell, 

7 April 2011.

BI210, Company 2nd In Command. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas 

Walton, 7 April 2011.

BI220, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Aaron Kaufman and Dustin Mitchell, 7 

April 2011.

BI230, Company Commander. Interview by Robert Green and Nathan Springer, 

7 April 2011.

BI240, Company Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Richard 

Johnson, 7 April 2011.

BI250, Battalion Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Richard 

Johnson, 7 April 2011.

BI260, Non-Commissioned Officer. Interview by Robert Green and Nathan 

Springer, 7 April 2011.

BI270, Company Grade Officer. Interview by Mark Battjes and Thomas Walton, 

7 April 2011.

BI280, Commander’s Panel. Interview by Richard Johnson, 1 April 2011.

BI290, Battery Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson, 1 April 2011.

BI300, Company Commander. Interview by Richard Johnson, 2 April 2011.

BI310, Company Commander. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Nathan 

Springer, 31 March 2011.

BI320, Field Grade Officer. Interview by Benjamin Boardman and Dustin 

Mitchell, 29 March 2011.

BI330, Dhofar Veteran. Interview by Robert Green, 28 March 2011.

Washington, DC

BH010, Senior Policy Official. Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben Boardman, 

Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan 

Springer, and Thomas Walton, 21 March 2011.

BH020, Brigade Commander. Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben Boardman, 

Robert Green, Richard Johnson, Aaron Kaufman, Dustin Mitchell, Nathan 

Springer, and Thomas Walton, 21 March 2011.

BH030, Iraq Veterans Panel. Interview by Mark Battjes, Robert Green, Aaron 

Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 2011.
131

BH040, Afghanistan Veterans Panel. Interview by Richard Johnson, Aaron 

Kaufman, Nathan Springer, and Thomas Walton, 24 March 2011.

BH050, Historian. Interview by Mark Battjes, Robert Green, Richard Johnson, 

Aaron Kaufman, and Dustin Mitchell, 22 March 2011.

BH060, Vietnam Political and Military Analyst. Interview by Mark Battjes, Ben 

Boardman, Robert Green, and Dustin Mitchell, 24 March 2011.

BH070, Iraqi Mayor. Interview by Mark Battjes and Robert Green, 25 March 

2011.

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