NIST-SP 1118 Volume I

Technical Study of the Sofa Super 

Store Fire - South Carolina, June 18, 

2007 

Nelson P. Bryner 

Stephen P. Fuss 

Bryan W. Klein 

Anthony D. Putorti 

 

Photograph copyright Stewart English 
ii 
iii 

NIST–SP 1118 Volume I 

Technical Study of the Sofa Super 

Store Fire - South Carolina, June 18, 

2007 

 

Nelson P. Bryner 

Stephen P. Fuss 

Bryan W. Klein 

Anthony D. Putorti 

Fire Research Division

Engineering Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

March 2011 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Gary Locke, Secretary 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Patrick D. Gallagher, Director
iv 

Disclaimer 

Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials are identified in this document in order to describe a 

procedure or concept adequately or to trace the history of the procedures and practices used. Such identification is 

not intended to imply recommendation, endorsement, or implication that the entities, products, materials, or 

equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

Disclaimer

The policy of NIST is to use the International System of Units (metric units) in all publications. In this document, 

however, units are presented in metric units or the inch-pound system, whichever is prevalent to the discipline. 

Conversion tables are provided in this report. 

National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST-SP 1118 

Natl. Inst. of Std., 738 pages (March 2011) 

CODEN: XXXXXX NSPUE2 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON: 2008

_________________________________________ 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov — Phone: (202) 512-1800 — Fax: (202) 512-2250 

Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
v 

ABSTRACT

A fire occurred on the evening of June 18, 2007, in the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, SC. NIST 

analyzed the fire ground, consulted with other experts, and performed computer simulations of fire 

growth alternatives. Based on these analyses, the following sequence of events is likely to have occurred. 

A fire began in packing material and discarded furniture outside an enclosed loading dock area. The fire 

spread to the loading dock, then into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces. During the early 

stages of the fire in the two latter locations, the fire spread was slowed by the limited supply of fresh air. 

This under-ventilation led to generation of a large mass of pyrolyzed and only partially oxidized effluent. 

The smoke and combustible gases flowed into the interstitial space below the roof and above the 

suspended ceiling of the main retail showroom. As this space filled with unburned fuel, the hot smoke 

also seeped through the suspended ceiling into the main showroom and formed a hot smoke layer below 

the suspended ceiling. Up to this time, the extent of fire spread into the interstitial space was not visible 

to fire fighters in the store. If the fire spread had been visible to the fire fighters in the store, it would 

have provided a direct indication of a fire hazard in the showroom. Meanwhile, the fire at the back of the 

main showroom and the gas mixture below the suspended ceiling were both still fuel rich. When the front 

windows were broken out or vented, the inflow of additional air allowed the heat release rate of the fire to 

intensify rapidly and added air to the layer of unburned fuel below the suspended ceiling enabling the 

ignition of the unburned fuel/air mixture. The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom 

extremely quickly, and then into the west and east showrooms. Nine fire fighters were killed in the Sofa 

Super Store fire. Based on NIST’s simulation of events, this report includes eleven recommendations to 

help mitigate such future losses. 

Keywords: fire investigation, fire modeling, fire spread, fire sprinklers, furniture flammability, retail store 

fire, sprinklers 
vi 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (VOL. I) 

Page 

Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................. v

List of Acronyms, Abbreviations, Units, and Conversion Factors ................................................................... xi

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... ................xiv 

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................................... xv

Chapter 1 Background

1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1-1

1.2 Description of the Building and Site .................................................................................................. 1-1 

1.3 Combustible Material....................................................................................................................... 1-23 

1.4 Fire Control Provisions .................................................................................................................... 1-29 

1.5 Water Supply ................................................................................................................................... 1-29 

1.6 History of the Building .................................................................................................................... 1-30 

1.7 Aerial Photography of the Sofa Super Store .................................................................................... 1-35 

1.8 References for Chapter 1 .................................................................................................................. 1-41 

Chapter 2 Description and Time Line of the Incident 

2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 2-1 

2.2 Overview Narrative ............................................................................................................................ 2-2 

2.3 Overall Incident Time Line .............................................................................................................. 2-7 

2.4 Fire Ignition, Growth, and Spread ................................................................................................... 2-11 

2.5 Weather ............................................................................................................................................ 2-17 

2.6 References for Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................ 2-18 

Chapter 3 The Emergency Incident Response

3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 3-1

3.2 Charleston Fire Department .............................................................................................................. 3-2

3.3 Fire Services Response ...................................................................................................................... 3-4 

3.4 Ventilation ....................................................................................................................................... 3-17

3.5 Incident Command ........................................................................................................................... 3-17

3.6 Mutual Aid ....................................................................................................................................... 3-18 
vii 

3.7 References for Chapter 3 .................................................................................................................. 3-20 

Chapter 4 Computer Simulation Of Fire And Smoke Spread

4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 4-1 

4.2 NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator Overview ......................................................................................... 4-3 

4.2 Baseline Simulation ......................................................................................................................... 4-12 

4.4 Baseline Simulation With Sprinklers Added Inside the Loading Dock ........................................... 4-29 

4.5 Baseline With Front Windows Intact.............. ............................................................................. 4-37

4.6 Summary of Simulation Results.............. .................................................................................... 4-46 

4.7 References for Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................. 4-60 

Chapter 5 Model Codes, Standards, And Practices 

5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 5-1 

5.2 Code History ...................................................................................................................................... 5-1 

5.3 Model Code Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 5-2 

5.4 Limiting Fire Spread in Large Furniture Display Areas .................................................................. 5-10 

5.5 Code Comparison Tables ................................................................................................................. 5-11 

5.6 References for Chapter 5 .................................................................................................................. 5-29 

Chapter 6 Summary, Findings and Recommendations

6.1 Summary of Technical Study ............................................................................................................. 6-1 

6.2 Findings ............................................................................................................................................. 6-2 

6.3 Recommendations for Improving Model Standards, Codes. and Practices ..................................... 6-11 

6.4 Research Recommendations and Other Appropriate Actions .......................................................... 6-14 

6.5 References for Chapter 6 ................................................................................................................ 6-16 
viii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (VOL. II) 

Page 

Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................. v

List of Acronyms, Abbreviations, Units, and Conversion Factors ................................................................... xi 

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................... xiv 

Appendix A Weather Data 

A.1 Weather Data .................................................................................................................................... A-1 

A.2 References for Appendix A .............................................................................................................. A-5 

Appendix B Overall Scene Photos 

B.1 Overall Scene Photos ........................................................................................................................ B-1 

Appendix C Loading Dock Area 

C.1 Loading Dock Area Photos- Before Removal of Roof ................................................................... C-1 

C.2 Loading Dock Area Photos- After Removal of Roof ....................................................................... C-6

Appendix D Main Showroom 

D.1 Main Showroom Exterior Photos – Before Removal of Wall and Roof ........................................... D-1 

D.2 Main Showroom Exterior Photos – After Removal of Wall and Roof .......................................... .D-11 

Appendix E West Showroom 

E.1 West Showroom Exterior Photos ...................................................................................................... E-1 

E.2 West Showroom Interior Photos ..................................................................................................... E-16 

Appendix F East Showroom 

F.1 East Showroom Exterior Photos ........................................................................................................ F-1 

F.2 East Showroom Interior Photos ..................................................................................................... ..F-11 

Appendix G Warehouse Photographs 

G.1 Warehouse Exterior Photos ............................................................................................................... G-1 

G.2 Warehouse Interior Photos .............................................................................................................. G-15 
ix 

Appendix H Repair Shops 

H.1 Repair Shop Photos ........................................................................................................................... H-1 

Appendix I Rear Wall Of Main Showroom 

I.1 Rear Wall of Main Showroom Photos ............................................................................................... I-1 

I.2 Rear of Main Showroom After Removal of Warehouse .................................................................. I-12 

Appendix J Retail Merchandise Estimates 

J.1 Retail Merchandise ............................................................................................................................ J-1 

J.2 References for Appendix J ................................................................................................................. J-8 

Appendix K Computer Simulation of Fire and Smoke Spread 

K.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... K-1 

K.2 NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator Overview ........................................................................................ K-3 

K.3 FDS Incident Simulation Overview .................................................................................................. K-6 

K.4 Baseline Simulation..... .............................................................................................................. ...K-20 

K.5 Baseline with Sprinklers Added on Loading Dock ......................................................................... K-42 

K.6 Baseline with Front Windows Intact ............................................................................................... K-52 

K.7 Vertical Ventilation – Small Roof Vent .......................................................................................... K-62 

K.8 Vertical Ventilation – Large Roof Vent .......................................................................................... K-72 

K.9 Summary of Simulation Results ...................................................................................................... K-83 

K.10 References for Appendix K ........................................................................................................... K-96 

 

Appendix L Computer Simulation Input Files 

L.1 Fire Dynamic Simulator Version 5.1.0 ............................................................................................. L-1 

L.2 Sofa Store Base Case ........................................................................................................................ L-2 

L.3 Base Case with Sprinklers ............................................................................................................ L-120 

L.4 Base Case with Windows Intact .................................................................................................... L-122 

L.5 Base Case with Windows Intact with Small Vent ......................................................................... L-123 

L.6 Base Case with Windows Intact with Large Vent ......................................................................... L-124 

Appendix M Fire Inspection and Building Pre-Plan 

M.1 City of Charleston Fire Inspection ................................................................................................... M-1 
x 

M.2 City of Charleston Fire Department Pre-Planning .......................................................................... M-3 

M.3 City of Charleston Fire Department Pre-Planning Sketch ............................................................... M-4

Appendix N Additional Aerial Images 

N.1 Aerial Images .................................................................................................................................... N-1 

N.2 Top Down or Overhead Aerial Images ............................................................................................. N-1 

N.3 Angled or Oblique Aerial Images ................................................................................................... N-15 

N.4 References for Appendix N ............................................................................................................. N-24 

Appendix O Additional Aerial Images 

O.1 Roll-Down Doors .............................................................................................................................. O-1 

O.2 Warehouse Roll-Down Doors ........................................................................................................... O-3 

O.3 Holding Area/Breezeway Roll-Down Doors .................................................................................... O-6 

O.4 Holding Area/Loading Dock Roll-Down Door .............................................................................. O-12 

O.5 Main Showroom/West Showroom Roll-Down Door ...................................................................... O-17 

O.6 Main Showroom/East Showroom Roll-Down Door ....................................................................... O-34 

Appendix P Loading Dock Fuels 

P.1 Loading Dock Fuels ............................................................................................................................ P-1 

P.2 Hydrocarbon Solvents ......................................................................................................................... P-1 

P.3 Wood Framing .................................................................................................................................... P-2 

P.4 Wood Decking ..... ......................................................................................................................... ...P-3 

P.5 Carpeting .............................................................................................................................................. P-3 

P.6 References for Appendix P ................................................................................................................. P-4 

Appendix Q Technical Reports, Media Articles, Web Pages, and Other 

Resources 

Q.1 Technical Reports .............................................................................................................................. Q-1 

Q.2 Media Articles ................................................................................................................................... Q-1 

Q.3 Web Pages ....................................................................................................................................... Q-4 

Q.4 Other Resources ................................................................................................................................ Q-5 
xi 

LIST OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, UNITS, AND CONVERSION 

FACTORS

AHJ Authority Having Jurisdiction 

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

BBC Basic Building Code 

CCSO Charleston County Sheriff’s Office 

CSMO City of Charleston Safety Management Division 

CFD Charleston Fire Department 

CPD Charleston Police Department 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EST Eastern Standard Time 

FDS Fire Dynamics Simulator 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

HRR heat release rate 

IBC International Building Code 

IFC International Fire Code 

IC Incident Command 

ICC International Code Council 

IFSTA International Fire Service Training Association 

LLR South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation 

NFPA National Fire Protection Association 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

RTI response time index 

SBC Standard Building Code 

SFC Standard Fire Code 

t time 

TC thermocouple 
xii 

UL Underwriters Laboratories 

USC United States Code 

USFA United States Fire Administration 

Units 

°C degrees Centigrade 

°F degrees Fahrenheit 

ft feet 

GJ Gigajoule 

gpm gallons/minute 

in inch 

kg kilogram 

kPa kilopascal 

kW kilowatt 

L liter 

m meter 

mm millimeter 

min minute 

MW megawatt 

psi pounds/in2 

s second 

W Watt 

μm micrometer 
xiii 

Conversion Factors 

°F = 1.8 x °C + 32 

1 bar = 100 kPa 

1 foot = 0.3048 m 

1 inch = 2.54 cm 

1 m = 3.281 ft 

1 mm = 0.03937 in 

1 L = 0.2642 gal 

1 kg = 2.204 lb (mass) 

1 kg/m3

 = 0.06243 lb/ft3

1 kPa = 0.1450 psi 

1 kJ = 0.9479 Btu 

1 kJ= 1,000 J 

1 MJ= 1,000,000 J 

1 GJ= 1,000,000,000 J 

1 kJ/kg = 0.4301 Btu/lb 

1 kJ/kg-o

C = 0.2389 Btu/lb-oF 

1 kW = 3413 Btu/hr 

1 kW/m2

 = 317.1 Btu/hr/ft2

1 kW/m2

-

o

C = 176.1 Btu/hr-ft2-

o

F 

1 W/m-o

C = 0.5778 Btu/hr-ft-oF 

1 kg = 1000 g 

1 m = 1000 mm 

1 μm = 0.001 mm 

1 kW = 1,000 W 

1 MW = 1,000,000 W 
xiv 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The collaboration with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, including Tim Merinar, 

Matt Bowyer, Jay Tarley, Dawn Castillo, and Robert Koedam, provided on-scene assistance, access to 

interviews, and support for computer fire model simulations. The cooperation of the Bureau of Alcohol 

Tobacco and Firearms, including John Golder, Chris Porreca, and David Sheppard provided on-scene 

assistance and discussions on computer simulations and fire origin and cause. The NIST team also held 

valuable discussions with Ken Farmer, Robert Neale, and Kenneth Kuntz of the Department of Homeland 

Security, United States Fire Administration, concerning previous large fire incidents. Lee Baughman of 

the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation provided access to the fire scene. 

The entire Charleston Fire Department is acknowledged for providing access to staff, fire stations, and 

fire apparatus to make possible this technical study. The Charleston Police Department provided access 

to scene photographs and videos. The on-scene assistance and discussion with City of Charleston Safety 

Management Division, Ted Austin, is also acknowledged. The City of Charleston Zoning Division, Edye 

Graves, provided background information on building codes for the City of Charleston. 

A number of people from NIST assisted the official team members. Of particular note were David 

Stroup, Glenn Forney, and Anthony Hamins, who devoted considerable time on the fire scene 

documenting dimensions, materials of construction, and burn patterns. William Grosshandler, Anthony 

Hamins, and Richard Gann devoted significant time to reviewing and improving the report. The 

assistance of Adam Barowy and Jonathan Kent in improving the figures, slice files, and digital images 

was critical and much appreciated. The support that Kelly Opert provided for documenting the reports 

and media citation significantly improved the readability of the appendices. The energetic assistance of 

Sue Haga in formatting, assembling, and proofreading these two volumes is also gratefully 

acknowledged. 
xv 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

A fire occurred on the evening of June 18, 2007, in the Sofa Super Store at 1807 Savannah Highway, 

Charleston, South Carolina. The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely 

quickly, and then into the west and east showrooms. Nine fire fighters from the Charleston Fire 

Department were killed in the fire. 

Based on the NIST technical study, the following sequence of events are likely to have occurred. From 

an unknown source, a fire ignited in a pile of packing material and discarded furniture outside an enclosed 

loading dock area. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used 

for staging furniture for delivery and for repair of furniture. The fire spread quickly within the loading 

dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces. During the early stages, the fire 

was unable to access enough oxygen (ventilation limited), which slowed its growth. Due to the lack of 

sufficient air to allow complete combustion, the fire produced large volumes of partially pyrolyzed fuel in 

the form of smoke and combustible gases. The large volumes of unburned fuel flowed into the interstitial 

space below the roof and above the suspended ceiling of the main retail showroom. As the interstitial 

space filled with unburned fuel, the hot smoke also seeped through the suspended ceiling into the main 

showroom and formed a hot smoke layer below the suspended ceiling. Up to this time, the extent of fire 

spread into the interstitial space was not visible to fire fighters in the store. If the fire spread had been 

visible to the fire fighters in the store, it would have provided a direct indication of a fire hazard in the 

showroom. The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited 

additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom at which time it became more visible to fire fighters in 

the main showroom. The fire at the back of the main showroom was still ventilation limited and its 

growth was slowed by the lack of oxygen. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire 

pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the suspended ceiling. The lack of oxygen 

prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting. When the front windows were broken out 

or vented, additional oxygen flowed in the front windows, along the floor, and to the rear of the 

showroom and became available to the fire. The additional oxygen allowed the heat release rate of the 

fire to increase extremely rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the suspended ceiling. The 

fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east 

showrooms. Both the temperatures and oxygen depletion reached values that were life-threatening to 

unprotected individuals. Intense heat from sustained burning of furniture in the main showroom 

weakened the roof joists and supports and resulted in the collapse of a portion of the roof over the main 

showroom approximately 13 minutes after flames emerged from the front windows (40 minutes after the 

fire department arrived on scene). Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued 

to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished. 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted a study to determine the likely 

technical causes of the rapid fire growth that led to the high number of fire fighter casualties in that fire. 

NIST is a nonregulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The purpose of NIST building 

and fire safety studies is to use knowledge gained from the studies to help improve safety through 

recommended changes to codes, standards, and practices. NIST does not have the statutory authority to 

make findings of fault or negligence by individuals or organizations. 
xvi 

This technical study included the following tasks: 

• Identification of technical issues and major hypotheses requiring examination. 

• Data collection, including building design documents, records, and plans from local 

authorities, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, field data, and interviews with 

emergency responders, and discussions with store employees. 

• Analysis and comparison of building and fire codes and practices, and review and analysis of 

practices used in operation of the building. 

• Simulation and analysis of phenomena, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, 

and operation of active and passive fire protection systems. 

The local criminal investigation of the fire took priority over the NIST technical study. NIST access to 

witnesses and local authorities was limited due to the criminal investigations and civil litigation. 

NIST compared the building design and operation to provisions within the model codes in order to assess 

possible improvements in public safety through revision of model codes, standards and practices. Many 

of the recommendations are directed toward the current national model codes maintained by the National 

Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Code Council (ICC), the standards within those 

codes and elsewhere (e.g., ASTM International, and Underwriters Laboratories (UL)), and the practices 

associated with their adoption and implementation. Other recommendations are provided for state and 

local regulatory authorities and first responders. 

Since there were no continuous real-time observations or photos in all locations, NIST conducted 

computer modeling to fill in the gaps and determine the probable sequence of events based on fire 

physics, coupled to the fire response time line. 

Findings 

During the course of this technical study, NIST was able to identify the reasons for the rapid spread of fire 

and smoke, and the reasons for the difficulties encountered by the fire fighters as they attempted to exit 

the main showroom. Many of the findings summarized in this section may have had a direct bearing on 

the tragic outcome of the fire. Those particular findings are highlighted below (boldface). Other findings 

had a more peripheral role but are important to capture because of the potential to help mitigate the 

consequences of similar situations in the future. 

Fire Growth 

Fire was observed at rear of store at 6:56 p.m. The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread 

into the enclosed loading dock. Fire department arrived at 7:11 p.m., less than four minutes after being 

dispatched. From the loading dock, the fire spread through the merchandise holding area to the rear of the 

main showroom, then to the front of the main showroom, and then into the west and east showrooms. At 

the same time, the fire spread into the holding area and through a metal wall into the warehouse. 

The extremely rapid spread of fire through the main and west showrooms trapped six fire fighters in the 

main showroom and three fire fighters in the west showroom. Although the intense heat from the fire 
xvii 

Floor Plan of Sofa Super Store. 
xviii 

weakened the light weight steel trusses and led to the partial collapse of the roof, the coroner’s report 

indicated that the fire fighters died from thermal burns and/or smoke inhalation, not from compression 

type injuries that would have been associated with the collapse. 

The following sections highlight specific findings that are associated with fire spread. 

Loading Dock

• A large amount of fuel (130 GJ) was present, including a) furniture that was staged 

for delivery, b) wood framing, c) liquid hydrocarbon solvents, and d) flooring. 

• An open floor plan and the large amount of fuel allowed rapid fire growth across the 

loading dock. 

• An open non-fire-activated roll-down door allowed smoke and flames to flow into the 

holding area. 

• Metal walls that the loading dock shared with the warehouse and west showroom allowed 

the fire to spread into those spaces. 

• The heat release rate of the fire was slowed by the lack of air; that is, the fire was 

underventilated. 

Holding Area 

• Smoke and flames entered the holding area through the open roll-down door (non-fire 

activated). Furniture and other items within the holding area were ignited by the 

flames and thermal radiation from the loading dock fire. 

• During the early stages of the fire (5 minutes to 10 minutes after fire department 

arrived), the fire spread into the holding area. The fire in the holding area was not 

visible from the main or west showrooms. 

• Smoke and flames flowed from the holding area into the space above the main 

showroom suspended ceiling. At a later stage, fire spread either over or through the 

holding area partition wall and into the rear of the main showroom. 

• The heat release rate of the fire was slowed by the lack of air; that is, the fire was 

underventilated. 

 Showrooms 

• Fire spread through the holding area into the rear of the main showroom, then 

through the entire main showroom, and then into the west and east showrooms. 

• Three fire doors between the main and west showrooms activated, but did not close 

during the fire. Three fire doors between the main and east showrooms activated; two 

doors closed completely and the third door partially closed. 

• A large amount of fuel was available, including up to 1100 combustible items (480 GJ) 

displayed in the main, west, and east showrooms. 
xix 

• Smoke and flames from the fire on the loading dock and holding area flowed into the 

space above the main showroom suspended ceiling. 

• An open floor plan and the large amount of fuel allowed the fire to grow and spread in 

the rear of the main showroom. 

• During the early stages of the fire (10 minutes to 15 minutes after fire department 

arrived) the heat release rate of the fire in the rear of the main showroom was slowed 

by the lack of air; that is, the fire was underventilated. 

• Front windows were broken or vented by the fire department to improve visibility. 

• Fire spread extremely rapidly from the rear to the front of the showroom as 

additional air flowed through the broken windows, feeding the fire in the rear of the 

showroom. 

• Within the main and west showrooms, both the temperatures and oxygen depletion 

reached values that were life-threatening to unprotected individuals. 

• The fire resulted in six fire fighter fatalities in the main showroom. Fire spread 

through three open roll-down fire doors into the west showroom and resulted in three 

additional fire fighter fatalities. 

• Intense heat from sustained burning of furniture weakened the roof supports and resulted in 

the collapse of the roof over the main showroom and sagging of the roof over the west 

showroom. 

Warehouse 

• A large amount of fuel was available, including up to 1900 items (840 GJ) stored on high 

rack shelves in the warehouse. 

• An open floor plan and the large amount of fuel allowed the fire to grow and spread 

from the front to the rear of the warehouse. 

• Intense heat from sustained burning of the furniture weakened roof supports and 

resulted in collapse of the roof and walls into the warehouse. 

• No fire fighter entered the warehouse to attempt to extinguish the flames, and no one was 

injured in this portion of the structure. 

Fire Protection Systems 

The lack of fire sprinklers to control the fire during an early stage of its growth and the lack of effective 

compartmentation were direct contributors to accelerated fire growth in the retail showrooms and the 

distribution warehouse. The following was found regarding the installation and operation of fire 

suppression and other safety systems applicable to the building: 

Fire Sprinklers 

• Fire sprinklers were not installed in the showrooms or distribution warehouse. 
xx 

• Computer model simulations demonstrated that fire sprinklers in the loading dock 

would have controlled the fire and prevented the fire from extending beyond the 

loading dock. 

• Computer model simulation demonstrated that tenable (survivable) conditions were 

maintained within the loading dock, showrooms, and warehouse with a sprinkler 

system installed on the loading dock. 

Compartmentation 

• Large open spaces allowed the fire to spread over large areas, including loading dock, 

showrooms, and warehouse. Interior walls and fire doors did not provide adequate 

compartmentation. 

• The open roll-down door between the loading dock and holding area was not a fireactivated door and allowed the fire to spread to the rear of the main showroom 

• Only three of the seven roll-down fire doors activated and closed fully during the fire. 

• Uninsulated metal walls (the north wall of the warehouse and the south wall of the 

west showroom) allowed heat from the fire to ignite fuels that were against the walls 

in the warehouse and west showroom. 

Other Fire Protection Systems 

• The store did not have a fire alarm system, smoke detectors, or standpipe. 

• There were more than five portable fire extinguishers located in the structure. A store 

employee discharged two portable extinguishers at the loading dock fire. 

Combustible Material 

The large fuel load made up of the retail merchandise staged in the loading dock, displayed in the show 

rooms, and stored in the warehouse was a key contributor to the spread of the fire and the eventual failure 

of the building. In addition, the storage of flammable solvents in the loading dock area allowed the fire to 

spread more quickly to the holding area and to the warehouse. 

 Fuel Load 

• The high total energy content of the structure and contents, estimated at up to 

1450 GJ, was a contributing factor to the severity of the fire. 

• The furniture fuel mass loading was estimated to range up to 16 kg/m2

 (3.4 lbs/ft2) for 

the showrooms and 52 kg/m2

 (10.6 lbs/ft2) for the warehouse. The high rack storage 

in the warehouse contributed to the higher fuel mass loading than in the showrooms. 

 Fuel Package 

• The type and configuration of the fuels also contributed to the fire growth in the 

loading dock, showrooms, and warehouse. 
xxi 

• A significant fraction of the fuel was upholstered furniture, which has a large surface 

area, synthetic coverings, and foam padding. The coverings and padding contributed 

to the rapid spread of the fire. 

• Wood was also an important component of the upholstered furniture as well as of the 

dressers, tables, and nightstands. The wood contributed to the sustained burning 

that occurred after the initial rapid spread of the fire. 

Model Codes and Standards 

Specific findings regarding model codes and standards, both current and in effect at the time of 

construction: 

• Strict adherence to the 2006 model building and fire codes available at the time of 

the fire would have required the main showroom and warehouse to be sprinklered. 

• The roll-down door between the loading dock and holding area was not a fire door. 

If the loading dock was considered as a separate occupancy or fire area, current 

model fire codes require a fire rated door. 

• The addition of an enclosed loading dock area between the north wall of the 

warehouse and the south wall of the west showroom without the upgrading of the 

fire resistance of these partition walls would have caused the warehouse, loading 

dock area, and west showroom to be considered a single 2330 m2

 (25,040 ft2) 

building lacking the required occupancy separations. This building area exceeds 

the allowable unsprinklered building areas in the 1991/1994 SBC and 2006 IBC 

codes for both mercantile and storage occupancies. In addition, the 1991/1994 SBC 

and 2006 IBC codes would both have required fire sprinklers for a building of this 

size. 

• The 1991 SFPC and 2006 IFC, both require sprinkler protection for the warehouse 

based on the high-piled storage of upholstered furniture. 

• Large amounts of hydrocarbon solvents were stored on the loading dock, but quantities 

did not appear to exceed the maximum allowable quantities for storage occupancies in 

the 1991/1994 SBC or 2006 IBC. 

• Neither current nor contemporaneous fire codes sufficiently address the uniquely 

high fire hazard from the type and configuration of the combustibles in a building 

loaded with upholstered furniture. Furniture is often displayed in large open areas. 

As demonstrated in the main and west showrooms and warehouse, displaying large 

amounts of furniture in large open spaces can contribute to extremely rapid fire 

spread. 

Emergency Response 

The NIST study examined emergency response only as needed to reconstruct the behavior and time line 

of the fire. The NIST study found the following: 
xxii 

• The fire department arrived on scene in fewer than 4 minutes after the 911 dispatch 

received the report of an exterior trash fire behind the Sofa Super Store. 

• Upon initial survey of the exterior of the structure, the fire department located a fire 

inside the enclosed loading dock. 

• Initial survey of the interior did not find any smoke or fire in the showrooms. 

Three minutes after arrival, inspection of the rear of the west showroom confirmed 

the loading area was fully involved in fire. 

• Up to 5 minutes after arrival, there were no reports of significant smoke or fire 

observed inside any of the showrooms. 

• Within 5 minutes of arrival the fire department began suppressing the loading dock 

fire using tank water from the first two arriving engines; it took the fire department 

about 10 minutes to establish a water supply from a fire hydrant to the exterior 

loading dock area and about 16 minutes from a fire hydrant to the front of the store. 

• Between 16 minutes and 19 minutes after arrival, radio communications indicated 

that fire fighters may be disoriented or lost in the structure and a “Mayday” call 

was transmitted. 

• Between 16 minutes and 21 minutes after the first unit arrived, the Assistant Chief 

led a team to rescue an employee trapped inside the rear of the store. 

• The fire department vented the front windows about 24 minutes after arrival. 

• Flames emerged from the front windows within 3 minutes of the windows being 

vented. 

• The last fire fighters to exit successfully from the front of the store did so within 4 

minutes of windows being vented.The roof collapsed over the west side of the main 

showroom about 40 minutes after fire department arrived on scene. 

• Material in the showrooms and warehouse, including furniture and merchandise, 

continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished. 

Initial Response and Risk Management Plan 

The initial response of the fire department included two engine companies, a ladder truck company, and a 

battalion chief. With an engineer, a fire fighter, and an officer on each apparatus, the fire department’s 

initial response included 10 people. A comprehensive risk management plan developed according to 

NFPA 1500 for the Sofa Super Store would likely have identified it as a high hazard occupancy due to the 

lack of sprinklers and the presence of large open areas and a large fuel load. For high hazard 

occupancies, NFPA 1710 advocates a minimum crew size of 5 to 6 members for each apparatus, which 

for this incident would amount to 16 to 19 people for the initial response. 
xxiii 

Water Supply 

The supply of water to the fire fighters was limited to the water on the fire engines for 9 minutes at the 

loading dock and 15 minutes at the front of the store. When the connection was made to the municipal 

water supply, the two engines were pumping water to the store through long lines of small diameter 6.4 

cm (2.5 in) hose. The water being supplied was inadequate to suppress the fire in a timely fashion due to 

the following factors: 

• The time required to establish connections to water hydrants. 

• The limited number of water supply hose lines established before the structure was 

evacuated. 

• The significant water pressure drop caused by long runs of hose. 

Incident Command 

Fire department operations were directed by the Fire Chief on the loading dock and the Assistant Chief at 

the front of the store. Specific findings regarding incident command include: 

• The Assistant Chief led a team of fire fighters around to the rear of the main 

showroom to rescue the trapped employee. 

• During this same time period as the rescue operation, conditions within the 

showroom deteriorated. Radio communications indicated that fire fighters became 

disoriented or lost within the store. 

• Shortly after the Assistant Chief returned to the front of the store after the rescue 

effort, fire fighters broke out the front windows and vented the smoke from the main 

showroom. 

• Conditions within the store deteriorated rapidly. At the loading dock, the Fire Chief held 

back fire teams from re-entering. 

• While the trapped employee was being rescued, the Fire Chief radioed “...we need to 

evacuate the building,” but it is not clear what was done at the front of the store to 

implement this order. 

Ventilation 

A burning structure can be ventilated by breaking windows and cutting holes in the roof, which can 

allow the smoke and hot gases to escape the structure in order to provide better visibility for fire fighters. 

As the smoke and hot gases exhaust from the structure, fresh air is pulled into the building, which may 

result in an increased heat release rate. 

• The front windows of the main showroom were broken to allow the smoke and hot gases 

to vent. 
xxiv 

• Venting the front windows of the main showroom did allow the smoke to escape, but 

it also provided more air to feed the fire and provided a path for the fire to spread. 

• The fire trapped six fire fighters in the main showroom and three fire fighters in the 

west showroom. 

Building Record-keeping Practices for Public Safety 

Inspections and record-keeping practices are an integral part of a community fire safety program. 

Findings relevant to the Sofa Super Store fire include the following: 

• Records were not found of the initial building design. Records of modifications -- when 

located -- lacked sufficient detail to track the changes to the structure. 

• Neither the historical nor most current use and occupancy permit for the building was located; 

however, the use of the Sofa Super Store was consistent with the SBC 1994, IBC 2006, and 

IFC 2006 occupancy classifications of Group M with Class III commodity. 

• Records documenting fire department inspections of the structure noted deficiencies in exit 

signs and cluttered aisles. The inspection records also documented the lack of fire alarms and 

sprinklers. 

• Fire department inspections did not identify the large fuel load, the non-code compliant wood 

construction, the solvent storage on the loading dock, or the lack of a fire door between 

loading dock and holding area as significant fire hazards. 

Recommendations

Based on its study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store fire, NIST makes eleven recommendations, listed 

in the following Table, that (a) involve modification, adoption, or enforcement of model building and fire 

codes, (b) involve standard operating procedures for the fire service, and (c) identify research necessary to 

underpin and provide additional technical justification for these actions. 

Table of Recommendations 

1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions 

adopt a building and fire code covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies based on 

one of the model codes (as a minimum requirement), and update local codes as the model codes are 

revised. 
xxv 

Table of Recommendations 

2. Model Building and Fire Code Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions 

implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address: 

a) all aspects of the building and fire codes; 

b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations; 

c) means of fire protection systems inspection and detailed record keeping; 

d) frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and 

e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.

3. Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local 

jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a 

national standard such as NFPA 1031 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire Inspector and Plan 

Examiner. Professional qualification may be demonstrated through a nationally accepted certification 

examination, such as the Fire Plan Examiner; Fire Inspector I and II, and Certified Fire Marshal. 

4. Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems, and that state and local 

authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision: 

 a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and 

 b) for all existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 

190 m2

 (2000 ft2). 

5. Comprehensive Fire Risk Management Plans: NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions 

develop comprehensive fire risk management plans to: 

a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies; 

b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and 

c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks. 
xxvi 

Table of Recommendations 

6. Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities: 

a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; 

b) provide education to fire fighters on the science of fire behavior in vented and non-vented 

structures and how the addition of air can impact the burning characteristics of the fuel; and 

c) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation (vertical, horizontal, or positivepressure) and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground. 

7. Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to 

better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by 

the design profession to improve the fire performance of furniture. The following specific areas require 

research: 

a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for furniture, wall, ceiling and floor 

lining materials, and room furnishings; 

b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants, and 

fire resistive materials; and 

c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires. 

8. Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the 

tools needed by the design profession to improve the performance of compartmentation. The following 

specific areas require research: 

a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal, and gypsum wallboard; 

b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal; and 

c) prediction of performance of roll-down doors and activation devices in actual fires and after 

extended service. 

9. Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be 

conducted to: 

a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code 

changes and fire safety technologies, and 

b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to 

ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of casualties is effective. 
xxvii 

Table of Recommendations 

10. Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be 

conducted to : 

a) characterize how ventilation can affect the growth and spread of fire within structures; and 

b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire 

environment during fire service operations. 

11. Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be 

conducted to: 

a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection; 

b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and 

c) utilize metrics to optimize development of new fire protection technologies. 

 
xxviii 
1-1

Chapter 1 BACKGROUND

1.1 INTRODUCTION 

A fire occurred on the evening of June 18, 2007, in the Sofa Super Store at 1807 Savannah Highway, 

Charleston, South Carolina. Nine fire fighters from the Charleston Fire Department were trapped in the 

showrooms and lost their lives in the fire. 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted a study to determine the likely 

technical causes of the rapid fire growth that led to the high number of fire fighter casualties in that fire. 

NIST is a nonregulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The purpose of NIST building 

and fire safety studies is to use knowledge gained from the studies to help improve safety through 

recommended changes to codes, standards, and practices. NIST does not have the statutory authority to 

make findings of fault nor negligence by individuals or organizations. 

This technical study included the following tasks: 

• Identification of technical issues and major hypotheses requiring examination. 

• Data collection including building design documents, records, and plans from local 

authorities, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, field data, discussions with 

store employees, and interviews with emergency responders. 

• Analysis and comparison of building and fire codes and practices, and review and analysis of 

practices used in operation of the building. 

• Simulation and analysis of phenomena, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, 

and operation of active and passive fire protection systems. 

This report documents the NIST technical study into the Sofa Super Store fire. The following sections of 

this chapter describe the building and surroundings as they were prior to the fire and review the general 

history of the building. Chapter 2 provides a time line of the incident, including the ignition and spread of 

the fire, and fire fighting activities. The fire service and incident response procedures are detailed in 

Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides background and results of the computer simulation of the fire and smoke 

movement. Chapter 5 reviews the model building and fire codes that are relevant to a structure like the 

Sofa Super Store. The report concludes with a summary of findings and recommendations in Chapter 6. 

The appendices provide more detail and information that is peripheral to the main objectives of the study. 

Animated renderings of NIST fire model simulations are included in the DVD that accompanies this 

report. 

1.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE BUILDING AND SITE 

1.2.1 Collection of Building Data 

In the process of developing this description of the Sofa Super Store, the NIST team collected data from a 

range of sources including: post-fire data, digital photographs [1-4], interviews of fire fighters [5], a 

discussion with store employees [6], articles from news outlets [8], and investigative reports [8-10]. 
1-2

Information from all these sources was incorporated into a series of floor plans and descriptions presented 

in this chapter. 

The NIST team had access to the exterior of the Sofa Super Store the day after the fire. Exterior 

photographs documented the geometry, construction, and materials of the structure. A week after the fire, 

the NIST team was allowed access to the entire fire scene and collected additional photographs, both 

interior and exterior. Dimensional measurements were also collected for the overall structure and specific 

spaces. The team also documented type, location, and nature of post fire residue. This data allowed the 

team to estimate what merchandise, equipment, or supplies had occupied the space prior to the fire. For 

example, the presence of a specific type of hardware such as hinges indicated that recliners had been 

displayed in the west showroom. Partially burned merchandise, such as sofas, end tables, and chairs 

demonstrated that living room furniture had been displayed in the east showroom. 

Unburned sections of structure including walls, ceilings, and flooring, provided insight into what 

materials had been incorporated into the structure. For example, surviving sections of an interior wall 

indicated that 1.3 cm (0.5 in) thick gypsum board had been screwed over 5 cm x 10 cm (2 in x 4 in) metal 

studs. Burn residue of floor tile and unburned portions of carpet allowed the team to estimate the type 

and location of floor coverings. Examination of steel racks in the warehouse demonstrated the number 

and spacing of the high rack storage bays. Surviving steel joists, “Z” channels, and siding documented 

how the roofs and exterior walls had been constructed. 

Aerial photography provided information on the history of the structure and how it was constructed. As 

will be presented in more detail in Section 1.6, aerial images documented that the loading dock was not 

present in 1994 images, but was present in 1998 images; therefore the loading dock had been added 

sometime after 1994, but prior to 1998. Aerial photographs provided information on the number, type, 

and location of skylights, as well as other structural components. 

Discussion with store employees and interviews with fire fighters provided information about how the 

store floor space was configured and what type of merchandise was displayed. Store employees provided 

insight as to whether a space was used for displaying, repairing, or staging merchandise. For example, 

employees described how furniture was staged on the loading dock while awaiting delivery. Fire fighters 

that had visited the store to conduct fire safety inspections or to shop for furniture were able to provide a 

general description of how the furniture was displayed. 

Articles from newspapers, television stations, and the internet [7] were reviewed by the NIST team for 

potentially new sources of information. The information was examined, and if it could be verified, the 

new data were included in the description of the store. Investigative reports from Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) [8], National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH) [9], and the Post Incident Assessment and Review Team [10] were carefully reviewed and 

provided additional information into how specific spaces were used and the materials of construction. 

1.2.2 General 

The Sofa Super Store was located at 1807 Savannah Highway, in the West Ashley Subdivision of 

Charleston, South Carolina. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 are photographs of the building on its lot (additional 

images in Appendix N). The north-facing front of the store was set back about 30 m (100 ft) from 

Savannah Highway, a five-lane, two way street that runs roughly east-to-west. A parking lot for over 50 

cars was located in the front and east side of the building. Along Savannah Highway to the east was a 
1-3

gasoline station and to the west were a car repair garage, a used car lot, and an open lot. While the rear of 

the warehouse was along Pebble Road, several residential structures were located between the rear of the 

main and east showrooms and Pebble Road. There were no residential structures between the rear of the 

warehouse and Pebble Road. The lot appeared to be at the same elevation as Savannah Highway and 

Pebble Road. The parking lot in front of the store sloped gradually upward to the store. The east side 

parking lot was at the same elevation as the poured concrete floor of the east showroom. A driveway 

along the west side of the showrooms provided access to the warehouse for delivery trucks. The asphalt 

surface of the driveway was approximately 0.7 m (2 ft) below the poured concrete floor at the front of the 

west showroom. The driveway sloped gradually down towards the warehouse, and the asphalt surface 

was about 0.9 m (3 ft) below the floor at the rear of the west showroom. The poured concrete floor of the 

warehouse was approximately 0.8 m (2.5 ft) below the floor of the showrooms. Wooden fences had been 

constructed from the northwest corner of the lot at Savannah Highway around the rear of the warehouse 

and along the rear of the main and east showrooms. Trees lined the fence along the rear of the east and 

main showrooms with a single large tree located at the corner where the main showroom intersected the 

repair shops. Various small trees and bushes were outside the fence to the rear of the warehouse, and a 

shallow drainage ditch was located between the vegetation and Pebble Road. 

A distant aerial view of the area, Figure 1-3, shows the store in relation to the local fire stations and 

community. Note that both Station 11 and Station 10 of the Charleston Fire Department (CFD) were 

located east on Savannah Highway, about 1.3 km (0.8 mile) and 2.1 km (1.3 miles) from the Sofa Super 

Store, respectively. The nearest station of St. Andrew’s Fire Department was approximately 1.6 km 

(1 mile) north of the store, on Ashley River Road. 

1.2.3 Collection of Building Data 

The NIST team was on-site the day after the fire and photographed the exterior of the structure. Portions 

of the structure appeared to represent collapse hazards and had to be removed before the NIST team was 

allowed access to the interior of the showrooms and warehouse. The NIST team then photographed the 

interior and exterior of the structure. Selected images of the showroom, warehouse, and loading dock are 

included in Appendices B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I. Still photographs and video were also recorded by 

others including civilians, law enforcement, newspapers, and television stations. The NIST team 

reviewed these additional photographs and videos as part of this technical study. 

Working in cooperation with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and 

South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, NIST team members recorded the 

physical dimensions of the structure, the construction materials, and the function of each area within the 

space. The team was not able to collect every dimension due to the extent of fire damage and the early 

removal of portions of the structure in order to reduce the collapse hazard. Physical dimensions were 

collected using tape measures and laser ranging devices. Construction materials were noted as each space 

was measured. The function of each space, for example, merchandise storage, merchandise display, or 

wood repair, was noted for each space. If the fire damage was extensive in a particular space, the 

function was estimated from the fire residue such as steel coil springs indicating mattresses, or steel 

hinges indicating recliners. As described in the following sections, these dimensions, materials, and 

estimated space usage were used to develop the floor plans for the structure and were used as input for the 

computer model. 
1-4

Figure 1-1. Sofa Super Store at 1807 Savannah Highway in Charleston, South Carolina. 

Background image used with permission of Pictometry. Enhancements by NIST.

Figure 1-2. Retail Showrooms and Warehouse Distribution Spaces. Background image 

used with permission of Pictometry. Enhancements by NIST. 
1-5

Figure 1-3. Aerial View of Sofa Super Store with locations of nearby Charleston and St. Andrew’s Fire Stations. Background image used with permission of Charleston County Website. Enhancements by NIST. 
1-6

An informal conversation with store employees provided insight into how the furniture was arranged in 

the showrooms and loading dock area.1

 The discussion also allowed the team to better understand the 

configuration of a holding area space located between the loading dock and the main showroom. The 

team also visited other stores within the Sofa Super Store chain to gain insight into how furniture was 

typically displayed in the retail space. 

Overhead photographs of the Sofa Super Store were collected at regular intervals by remote sensing 

imaging or aerial photography. Overhead images are often used by commercial companies and 

municipalities to track land usage or as an aid to land development. DigitalGlobe, a commercial aerial 

imagery company, recorded aerial images of the store in 1989, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2006, and 2007. Aerial 

photographs were recorded by a second commercial imagery company, Pictometry, in 2007. The aerial 

images provided information about the addition of the east and west showrooms, warehouse, loading 

dock area, and repair shops. The images are discussed in Section 1.7, and all the images are included in 

Appendix N. 

The team was not able to locate a complete set of dimensioned drawings for the entire structure. Each of 

the floor plans presented in this study was created using the dimensions and photographs collected by the 

NIST team. Several partial drawings, including a portion of the construction drawings for the warehouse 

addition, were provided by the City of Charleston. 

1.2.1 Main Retail Showroom 

The interior floor plan of the entire structure is represented in Figures 1-4 and 1-5. The dimensions for 

each of the spaces were part of the data the NIST team collected while they were on the post-fire scene. 

The main showroom was 38.4 m (126.0 ft) wide and 39.1 m (128.3 ft) deep and with an additional section 

of 13.5 m (44.4 ft) by 6.1 m (20.0 ft) deep in the southwest corner nearest to the loading dock area. The 

total area of the main showroom was calculated as about 1585 m2

 (17,100 ft2). 

There were two sets of double doors near the center of the front (north) wall, which were the only 

entrances on the front of the structure (see Figure 1-5 and additional photographs in Appendix D). The 

two front doors were flanked on either side by small and large glass display windows (see Figures 1-6, 

1-7, and Appendix D, Figure D-15). There were no exits or windows on the rear wall of the main 

showroom. While there may have been exits on the rear wall when the structure was originally built, all 

the rear exits had been closed or filled using masonry blocks (see Figures I-4 and I-8). The east and west 

walls of the main showroom each featured three interior fire doors which allowed customers to move to 

either the east or west showrooms (Figure 1-4). Employees also used these fire doors to re-position 

furniture between different showrooms and move furniture from the warehouse into the retail showrooms. 

 

 

1

 The informal conversation with store employees was not audio or video recorded by the NIST team nor was a written transcript 

generated. 
1-7

Figure 1-4. Sofa Super Store floor plan. 
1-8

 

Figure 1-5. Store floor plan with dimensions. 

Figure 1-6. Front view of the store showing the large glass display windows flanking the 

western side of the front doors. Photo used with the permission of Alexander Fox. 
1-9

Figure 1-7. Front view of the store showing the large glass display windows on the western 

side of the store front. Photo used with permission of Alexander Fox. 

Figure 1-6. Front view of the store showing the large glass display windows flanking the 

western side of the front doors. Photo used with the permission of Alexander Fox. 
1-10

In addition to the six roll-down fire doors leading to the other showrooms, there was an additional rolldown fire door which was located in the rear southwest corner of the main showroom that connected to 

the warehouse. Also, in the rear southwest corner of the main showroom was a non-fire roll-down2

 door 

that provided access to the loading dock area. 

Roughly three-quarters of the main showroom space was used to display various pieces of 

furniture (Figure 1-8). This estimate was based on post-fire evidence and observations during visits to 

other stores that were part of the Sofa Super Store chain. Some of the displays involved a row of similar 

pieces, such as a number of different recliners, while other displays featured different pieces of furniture, 

such as chairs, sofas, loveseats, end tables, and coffee tables that were arranged to simulate a living room 

setting. Behind the furniture display areas, to the rear of the main showroom, were office related spaces 

including the sales counter, filing rooms, manager’s office, employee break room, and restrooms. The 

floor of the main showroom was formed from poured concrete, and there was no basement. Concrete 

blocks were used to construct the four exterior walls, and each of the walls extended through and above 

the composite roof (see Figures C-7, C-8, D-10, D-17, D-18, D-21, D-22, E-24, E-26, F-19, and F-20). 

Over the main showroom, the composite flat roof was supported by light weight steel trusses which ran 

roughly east to west or parallel to the front wall (Figures 1-9 and D-27). According to dimensions 

measured during post-fire inspection, the top of the steel trusses appeared to be 4.3 m (14 ft) above the 

concrete floor at the rear of the main showroom. Using elevations obtained in the showroom at several 

locations, a suspended ceiling was located about 2.7 m (9 ft) above the floor. While the heat pump units 

were located outside and behind the showroom (Figures D-5, D-6, and D-10), the cooling coils, air 

handling units, and air delivery ducts were suspended below the roof trusses and above the suspended 

ceiling. 

From post-fire examination of the main showroom, the interior walls appeared to have been 12.7 mm 

(0.5 in) thick gypsum wallboard. For the portions of the interior wall adjacent to the masonry wall on the 

west, north, and east sides, wood furring strips, approximately 76 mm (3 in) wide by 19 mm (0.75 in) 

thick had been attached to the masonry walls to allow the subsequent installation of the 12.7 mm (0.5 in) 

gypsum wallboard. For walls in or around the office spaces to the rear of the main showroom, gypsum 

wallboard was typically mounted to either sheet metal or wood studs. From post-fire inspection of less 

burned portions of the walls that were located at several locations around the main showroom, the 

gypsum walls appeared to extend just above the suspended ceiling. 

In the rear southwest corner of the main showroom was a small holding area approximately 15 m2

 

(160 ft2

), 2.44 m (8 ft) wide x 6.1 m (20 ft) long. This area was the intersection of three doors, a rolldown fire door leading to the warehouse, an electric, but non-fire3

 roll-down door to the loading dock, and 

a 0.9 m (36 in) wide metal door that led into the rear of the main showroom. According to descriptions of 

the holding area by store employees, at the north end of this space was a storage closet for paper supplies. 

 

2

 Roll-down doors refer to door assemblies composed of interlocking steel slots or plates, a frame, and hardware 

including an overhead mechanism for moving the door up and down. When in the up position, the door is rolled 

into a cylindrical shape above the wall opening. The door industry refers to these as rolling steel doors, but they 

may be referred to as roll-up or roll-down doors in common usage. Rated rolling steel fire door assemblies are 

designed to automatically roll down and cover a wall opening in response to fire conditions. Rolling steel fire doors 

may also be referred to as roll-down fire doors. This report will use “roll-down door” to describe these doors. 

3 Fire doors are doors that are designed to withstand exposure to fire conditions. Fire doors are “rated” by time (in 

minutes or hours) that a door can withstand exposure to fire test conditions [12 -19]. Non-fire doors are not required 

to meet fire exposure standards. 
1-11

Also according to the employee descriptions, this space did not have a suspended ceiling, but a plywood 

shelf had been installed at least 2.44 m (8 ft) above the floor. Furniture or futon cushions were stored on 

the shelf. The space also contained snack vending machines and lockers for employees as was evidenced 

by post-fire residue. 

Figure 1-8. Floor space utilization for the main showroom. 
1-12

1.2.4 West Retail Showroom 

From data collected by the NIST team on-site, the interior floor plan of the west showroom has been 

reconstructed in Figure 1-10. The west showroom was 18.2 m (59.8 ft) wide and 35.8 m (117.5 ft) deep 

for a total calculated area of 652 m2

 (7020 ft2). The west retail showroom was not part of the original 

structure. A single exit door was located at the northwest corner of the retail space (see Figure E-8), and a 

set of double doors at the rear of the showroom led to the loading dock (Figure C-7). The wall shared 

with the main showroom featured four doors; three roll-down fire doors and a single door (see Figures 

O-16, O-22, and O-29). Based on post-fire residue, the single door which would have opened into the 

closet 

Figure 1-9. Wall and truss construction for the main showroom. 
1-13

within the holding area appeared to be blocked with supplies in the storage closet. According to 

employees, these fire doors between the west and main showrooms were used to reposition furniture and 

to move furniture from the warehouse into the retail areas. The space utilization was based on post-fire 

evidence and observations during visits to other stores that were part of the Sofa Super Store chain. 

Based on post-fire inspection of the showroom, most of the showroom space was used to display various 

pieces of furniture. As evidenced by unburned material including glass, knobs, hinges, frames, and 

springs, some of the displays involved a row of similar pieces, such as a number of different recliners, 

while other displays featured multiple pieces of furniture, such as a chair, loveseat, and coffee table 

arranged in a living room configuration. Area rugs and carpets were also displayed on the showroom 

floor as well as in vertical hanging racks (see Figure E-25). The rear portion of the showroom displayed 

sofas, sleeper sofas, and futons. The rear section included a set of shelves approximately 1.1 m (42 in) 

above the floor that allowed a second level of sofas and futons to be displayed above the set located on 

the floor (see Figures E-20 and E-21). In front of the east to west partition wall, there was another set of 

Figure 1-10. Floor space utilization plan for the west showroom. 
1-14

display shelves that allowed two levels of recliners and a third level of lamps to be displayed (see Figure 

E-19). 

The lower shelf for recliners was approximately 0.6 m (24 in) above the floor while the second shelf for 

smaller retail items was about 1.2 m (48 in) above the floor. The area in the front of the store may have 

displayed patio or deck furniture. The floor of the west showroom was poured concrete and there was no 

basement. Wall-to-wall carpeting appeared to have been installed on top of the concrete floor. Area rugs 

and carpets were also displayed on the floor. 

Figure 1-11. Wall and I-beam configuration for the west showroom. 
1-15

The lower shelf for recliners was approximately 0.6 m (24 in) above the floor while the second shelf for 

smaller retail items was about 1.2 m (48 in) above the floor. The area in the front of the store may have 

displayed patio or deck furniture. Based on post-fire inspection of the showroom, the floor of the west 

showroom was poured concrete and there was no basement. As evidenced by residue examined after the 

fire, wall-to-wall carpeting appeared to have been installed on top of the concrete floor. Portions of 

unburned area rugs and carpets were also observed on the floor of the showroom. 

Over the west showroom, a sheet metal roof was supported by “Z” shaped steel channel which ran 

roughly north to south or perpendicular to the front wall (see Figures 1-11, E-16, and E-17). To support 

the steel channel, the west showroom incorporated steel I-beam columns (see Figure E-18), that supported 

horizontal beams that were 0.15 m (6 in) deep at center of span and 0.58 m (23 in) deep at the east and 

west walls. Along the east wall adjacent to the main showroom, the top of the horizontal I-beams were 

4.32 m (14.2 ft) above the “Z” shaped steel channel. The roof sloped down toward the west wall where 

the top of the horizontal beam was 3.56 m (11.7 ft) above the concrete slab. Sections of “Z” channel were 

also installed horizontally between the vertical I-beams (east and west walls) and vertical columns (south 

and north walls). The exterior south and west walls were corrugated metal siding that was attached to 

horizontal “Z” channel between the vertical members. 

As evidenced by hardware and post-fire residual materials, a suspended ceiling was located about 2.7 m 

(9 ft) above the floor. The suspended ceiling consisted of a grid-work of metal channels in the shape of 

an upside-down "T", suspended on wires from the “Z” channel roof supports. The grid openings were 

filled with 0.6 m (2 ft) x 1.2 m (4 ft) x 1.6 cm (0.63 in) panels. While the heat pump units were located 

outside and behind the showroom (see Figures B-3 and B-6), the cooling coils, air handling units, and air 

conditioning ducts were suspended below the roof trusses and above the suspended ceiling. 

Portions of interior wall that had not been consumed by the fire demonstrated that gypsum wallboard, 

12.7 mm (0.5 in) thick, formed the interior surface and were attached to a combination of sheet metal and 

wood studs. The gypsum board was attached to sheet metal studs for the south (rear), west, north (front), 

and east walls. Each of these walls appeared to extend less than 0.3 m (1 ft) above the suspended ceiling. 

The partition wall which extended from the west wall toward the main showroom was constructed using 

wood studs and gypsum wallboard. The partition wall did not appear to extend above the suspended 

ceiling. 

1.2.5 East Retail Showroom 

Using dimensions and data collected on-scene; the interior floor plan of the east showroom has been 

reconstructed in Figure 1-12. The east showroom was 18.2 m (59.6 ft) wide and 35.5 m (116.5 ft) deep 

for a total calculated area of 645 m2

 (6940 ft2). The east retail showroom was not part of the original 

structure. There were two sets of double exit doors located on the east wall of the showroom (Figure 

F-7). The wall shared with the main showroom featured three roll-down fire doors (Figures O-33, O-39, 

and O-48). Employees also used these fire doors between the west and main showrooms to reposition 

furniture and move furniture from the warehouse into the retail areas. 

All of the showroom space was used to display various pieces of furniture. The assumptions about space 

utilization were based on post-fire evidence and observations during visits to other stores that were part of 

the Sofa Super Store chain. Some of the displays involved a row of similar pieces, such as a number of 

different beds, while other displays featured different pieces of furniture, such as a bed, end table, chest of 
1-16

drawers arranged in a typical bedroom configuration. Unlike the single partition wall in the west 

showroom, this showroom had two partition walls (see Figures F-13 and F-16). The middle and rear 

sections included sets of bedroom furniture while the front section displayed living room furniture. The 

east showroom did not appear to utilize shelving to display two levels of merchandise. Inspection of the 

showroom demonstrated that the floor of the east showroom was poured concrete, and there was no 

basement. Post-fire examination suggested that wall-to-wall carpeting had been installed on top of the 

concrete floor. 

Over the east showroom, a sheet metal roof was supported by “Z” shaped steel channel which ran roughly 

north to south and perpendicular to the front wall (Figure 1-13). To support the steel channel, the east 

showroom incorporated steel I-beam columns, that supported horizontal beams that were 0.15 m (6 in) 

deep at center of span and 0.58 m (23 in) deep at the east and west walls (Figure F-21). Along the west 

wall adjacent to the main showroom, the top of the horizontal I-beams were about 4.32 m (14.2 ft) above 

the “Z” shaped steel channel. The roof sloped down toward the east wall where the top of the horizontal 

beam was 3.6 m (11.7 ft) above the concrete slab. Sections of “Z” channel were also installed 

horizontally between the vertical I-beams (east and west walls) and vertical columns (south and north 

walls). The exterior south and east walls were corrugated metal siding that was attached to horizontal “Z” 

channel between the vertical members. 

Figure 1-12. Floor space utilization plan for the east showroom. 
1-17

Post-fire examination of remaining intact sections of the ceiling demonstrated that a suspended ceiling 

was located about 2.7 m (9 ft) above the floor. The suspended ceiling consisted of a grid-work of metal 

channels in the shape of an upside-down "T", suspended on wires from the “Z” channel roof supports 

(Figure F-17). The grid openings were filled with 0.61 m (2 ft) x 1.22 m (4 ft) x 1.6 cm (0.6 in) panels. 

While the heat pump units were located outside and behind the showroom (see Figures F-9 and F-10), the 

cooling coils, air handling units, and air conditioning ducts were suspended below the roof trusses and 

above the suspended ceiling. 

Surviving sections of showroom walls indicated that painted gypsum wallboard, 12.7 mm (0.5 in) thick, 

formed the interior surface and was attached to a combination of sheet metal and wood studs (Appendix 

F, Figures F-18, F-19, and F-21). The gypsum board was attached to sheet metal studs for the south 

(rear), west, north (front), and east walls. Each of these walls appeared to extend less than 0.30 m (1 ft) 

Figure 1-13. Walls and I-beam configuration for the east showroom. 
1-18

above the suspended ceiling. The front partition wall which extended from the east wall toward the main 

showroom was constructed using wood studs and gypsum wallboard. The rear partition wall, which had a 

doorway opening in the center, was constructed using metal studs and gypsum wallboard. Neither of the 

partition walls appeared to extend above the suspended ceiling. 

 

1.2.6 Loading Dock, Repair Areas, and Warehouse 

Aerial images (see Section 1.6) demonstrated that the loading dock, repair areas and warehouse were not 

part of the original structure, but were added in stages after 1989. Using dimensions and data collected 

on-scene; the interior floor plan of these areas has been reconstructed in Figures 1-14 and 1-15. The 

enclosed loading dock area was used to stage, load, and repair furniture. The equipment, tools, and 

supplies that were not consumed by the fire were consistent with materials typically used to repair and 

refinish damaged furniture. According to descriptions that were provided by employees, the warehouse 

stored inventory for the multiple locations of the Sofa Super Store retail chain. 

The tracking records and files for the store and warehouse inventory were stored inside the structure and 

were not recovered after the fire. Without specific records, the quantity and type of merchandise in the 

store, warehouse, and loading dock could not be precisely reconstructed. Since the roof and walls of the 

loading dock had been removed for safety reasons, the post-fire residue appeared to have been displaced 

and was not as useful in determining how the furniture had been staged. A discussion with store 

employees indicated that various pieces of furniture were staged adjacent to the north wall for delivery the 

next day. Additional items for future delivery (1 or 2 days beyond next day) tended to be staged in the 

area closer to the center of the loading dock. Symbols that represent bedroom sets, dressers, sofas, and 

chairs were added to the floor plan to illustrate how the furniture might have been arrayed. 

Based on dimensions collected at the post-fire scene, the loading dock area was approximately 12.6 m 

(41.3 ft) east to west and 15.4 m (50.6 ft) north to south for an area of 210 m2

 (2200 ft2). Aerial images 

indicated that it was built in at least two sections although building permits could not be located for either 

addition. As evidenced by post-fire residue, both sections were built with wood framing, a wood 

deck/floor, and sheet metal siding and roof. The section that shared a wall with the warehouse was added 

first and featured a 2.7 m (9 ft) ceiling while the portion next to the rear of the west show room had a 

3.7 m (12 ft) ceiling. 

As demonstrated by post-fire photographs, gallon cans of organic solvents, including acetone, naphtha, 

and lacquer thinner, which may have been used to clean or refinish furniture, were stored in the southwest 

corner of the loading dock area (Figures C-18 and C-19). The loading dock area featured four doors of 

which two doors on the west side adjacent to the asphalt area were used to load delivery trucks. 

The two “loading” doors utilized overhead tracks similar to “barn” doors which allowed staff to slide the 

doors to the side for better access to the delivery trucks (see Figures C-2 and C-4). The roll-down door 

that led to the rear of the main showroom allowed access to the warehouse through the breezeway (Figure 

O-7). This roll-down door used an electric motor with backup manual chain for opening and closing. 

The double doors on the north wall led to the rear of the west showroom. A large vent/exhaust fan had 

been installed in the west wall of the loading dock area. The fan which was approximately 0.61 m (2 ft) 

in diameter was positioned in a square opening between the two sliding doors (Figure C-2). 
1-19

According to employee descriptions, when the fan was not in operation, a heavy cloth/blanket was 

apparently draped over the inlet of the fan to reduce drafts. As shown by post-fire residue, the floor or 

deck of the loading dock had been constructed over the asphalt covered surface between the west 

showroom and the warehouse. The loading dock floor was 1.1 m (42 in) above the asphalt surface (see 

Figures C-3, C-4, and C-23). The floor was constructed using a lower layer of pressure treated lumber 

that was overlaid with particle board or plywood. As post-fire residue indicated, carpeting was installed 

Figure 1-14. Floor space utilization for loading dock area and warehouse.
1-20

over some portions of the plywood floor. Portions of the loading dock walls included wood studs with an 

interior surface of gypsum wall board. The roof of the southern section of the loading dock incorporated 

at least three fiberglass skylights which were visible in aerial images of the store. Each skylight which 

was oriented roughly north to south was approximately 0.61 m (2 ft) wide by 4.9 (16 ft) long. Portions of 

at least one fiberglass skylight were found in roof material removed from the loading dock. 

As determined by measurements and data collected on-site, the warehouse was approximately 36.9 m 

(120.9 ft) wide and 39.8 m (130.7 ft) front to rear for an area of 1470 m2

 (15800 ft2). The warehouse was 

an open clear span structure with poured concrete floor and sheet metal walls and roof. The roof was 

approximately 8.8 m (29 ft) above the floor. Post-fire examination of the warehouse demonstrated that 

the high rack storage, 1.1 m (42 in) deep and 6.1 m (20 ft) tall, was arranged in nine back-to-back rows in 

the center of the warehouse and single rows around the outside walls (see Figures G-15, G-16, and G-17). 

If each rack was arranged for six vertical rows, the warehouse would have had the capacity for at least a 

thousand sofas, chairs, and mattresses. Since the inventory records were not recovered, the specific items 

stored in the warehouse could not be precisely reconstructed. 

The warehouse had two single exit doors, one on the north wall west of the roll-down door, and one on 

the south or rear wall near the south east corner (see Figures G-5 and G-13). A 4.9 m (16 ft) x 4.9 m 

Figure 1-15. Floor plan for the loading dock, the holding area, and the repair shops. 
1-21

(16 ft) roll-down door in the north wall provided forklift access for unloading furniture that arrived via 

tractor trailer. Post-fire examination of the warehouse revealed that two doorways had been cut out of the 

metal siding to provide access to the repair shops located at the north east corner of the structure. A 2.5 m 

(8ft) x 2.5 m (8ft) opening in the north wall provided access to the enclosed breezeway which led to the 

holding area at the rear of the main showroom. According to store employees, when furniture was moved 

from the warehouse to the retail area, it was moved through the breezeway to the holding area, then 

through the roll-down door into the loading dock, through the rear of the west showroom, and then into 

the main or east showroom if necessary. As on-scene inspection of the post-fire indicated, the roof of the 

warehouse was constructed of sheet metal roof and was supported by “Z” shaped steel channel which was 

installed roughly perpendicular to the front wall (north to south) (Figure 1-16). The steel channel was 

supported by I- beam roof joists which were bolted to the steel columns in a design that was similar to the 

east and west showroom additions. 

Between the north wall of the warehouse and the rear of the main showroom were two additional repair 

areas. Building permits could not be located for either of these two repair rooms. The “wood” repair 

room appeared to have had power wood working tools such as a lathe and drill press. After the fire, a 

large number of spray cans of paint/finishes were found in what will be referred to as the “paint” repair 

room. The paint repair room was adjacent to the breezeway and had wood framing and sheet metal walls 

and roof. Based on measurements and observations after the fire, the paint repair room was approximately 9.7 m (31.7 ft) x 7.1 m (23 ft) with an area of 68 m2

 (730 ft2). It had a poured concrete floor and 

an estimated ceiling height of 2.7 m (9 ft). Slightly smaller than the paint repair space was the wood 

repair area which also had wood framing and sheet metal walls and roof. The wood repair room also 

featured a poured concrete floor and had dimensions of approximately 10 m (32.8 ft) x 7.6 m (25 ft), 

minus some overlap with the paint repair room, to yield an area of 56 m2

 (610 ft2). 

1.2.7 Holding Area 

In the rear southwest corner of the main showroom was a small holding area approximately 15 m2

 

(160 ft2

), 2.4 m (8 ft) wide x 6.1 m (20 ft) long. These dimensions were estimated from observations 

collected on-site after the fire. The fire severely damaged the holding area and materials had been 

removed from this area in order to allow safe access, so it was difficult to completely characterize the 

dimensions of this area. Three doors opened into the holding area including a roll-down fire door leading 

to the warehouse, an electric, but non-fire roll-down door to the loading dock, and a 0.9 m (36 in) wide 

metal door that opened into the rear of the main showroom. According to descriptions provided by 

employees, the north end of this space was a storage closet for paper supplies. As evidenced by post-fire 

remnants, a snack vending machine and steel lockers were also located along the west wall of the holding 

area. 

A roll-down fire door was located on the south wall of the area and this door provided access through the 

breezeway to the warehouse (see Figures O-5, O-6, and O-7). Another roll-down door was situated on the 

west wall which was shared with the enclosed loading dock. This roll-down door appeared to be the 

original door to the loading dock from when the structure was in use as a grocery store (Figure O-11). 

This roll- up door could be operated either manually by pulling on a chain or electrically by energizing 

the electric motor and allowed access to the loading dock. This door did not have a fusible link for 

activation during fires and did not appear to be designed as a fire door. Also on the west wall of the 

holding area were two steel 0.9 m (3 ft) wide doors, which also may have been original doors that dated 
1-22

back to the grocery store4

. One of these doors, the one nearest to the non-fire roll-down door, would 

haveopened onto the grocery store loading dock (Figure O-11). The original role of the second door, 

which was about 11 m (35 ft) further north on the same wall, was not as obvious. Access from within the 

holding area was obstructed for both of these doors. A food vending machine was positioned in front of 

 

4

 History of structure discussed in more detail in Section 1.6 

Figure 1-16. Wall and I-beam configuration for the loading dock area and the warehouse.
1-23

the first door (Figure D-19) and a storage closet at the north end of the holding area made access difficult 

to the second door. 

The Charleston Fire Department visited the Sofa Super Store to conduct pre-plan inspections which were 

typically used to identify fire protection systems and locations of utility shut-offs, as well as sketch the 

interior floor plan. The pre-plan building inspection sketch (Figure M-4) does identify the location of an 

external roll-down door, but does not indicate that this door was a fire door. In the same sketch, the other 

roll-down fire doors on the west and east walls of the main showroom were indicated as fire doors. 

Based on observations on-scene after the fire, a fourth door on the east wall of the holding area led to the 

rear of the main showroom. As revealed during the review of post-fire photographs, this door was a 

single metal or steel door that appeared to open into the holding area from the main showroom. This door 

was mounted in a wall that had metal studs with 12.7 mm (0.5 in) thick gypsum board mounted on both 

sides. Inspection of metal wall studs after the fire suggested that the wall extended just above the 

suspended ceiling in the main showroom and the remaining steel studs did not reach the underside of the 

roof. The south and west walls were concrete block construction and had extended to the underside of the 

roof. Discussions with store employees indicated that there was no suspended ceiling above the holding 

area. The underside of the metal roof decking was visible when one looked up towards the roof. At least 

one large, approximately 1.2 m (4 ft) by 2.4 m (8 ft) shelf, which was constructed out of plywood, had 

been installed at least 2.44 m (8 ft) above the holding area. Store employees described how furniture or 

futon cushions were stored on the shelves. 

According to store employees, when retail merchandise that was stored in the warehouse was needed for 

display on the showroom floor, it was pulled through the breezeway into the holding area, then through 

the non-fire roll-down door into the loading dock area. The merchandise was then pulled through the 

double steel doors at the rear of the west showroom and maneuvered into one of the retail showrooms. 

1.3 COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL 

1.3.1 General 

As expected from a store of this type, the inventory of combustible material within the buildings was the 

retail merchandise. This included a wide range of furniture including sofas, chairs, tables, beds, dressers, 

lamps, and rugs. Inventory records were stored within the store, so it is not clear how many of each type 

of furniture were present in the showrooms or warehouse. 

Lacking specific information on the type, number, and location of the merchandise, the amount of 

merchandise was estimated. The estimates incorporated data that collected on-scene from unburned 

merchandise, metal hardware such as hinges or handles that were not consumed by the fire, and information provided by store employees and fire fighters. The estimates assumed a range for the fraction of 

floor space that was used to display merchandise. Different types of merchandise were then assigned 

dimensions and material properties. This provided estimates for total number of items, mass, and energy 

content. The estimation process is summarized in this section and described in greater detail in 

Appendix J. 

The number of items that might have been present in the showrooms were created by assuming an area or 

“foot print” for a sofa, chair, mattress, and dresser (Table 1.1), and how much of the retail floor space 

might typically be used to display merchandise. From remaining furniture and metal parts that were 
1-24

observed on the fire scene, the east showroom appeared to have a higher fraction of mattresses and 

dressers. The main showroom appeared to display a lower fraction of mattresses, but more sofas and 

chairs. The west showroom displayed sofas, futons, and recliners, but few mattresses. The estimated 

fraction of each type of furniture was incorporated in the rough estimates for the main, west, and east 

showrooms which are tabulated in Appendix J. 

The main showroom had about twice the floor space as either west or east showrooms and this is reflected 

in the number of items estimated to be in each showroom which ranged up to 590, 290, and 240, for the 

main, west, and east showrooms, respectively (Table 1-2). The total number of items in the combined 

showrooms ranged from 700 to 1120 items for 50% and 80% of floor space, respectively. The estimated 

mass loadings ranged from 7.6 kg/m2

 (1.6 lb/ft2) to 16.5 kg/m2 (3.4 lb/ft2) depending on the fraction of 

floor space and the showroom (Table 1-1). The estimated number of items staged in the loading dock 

ranged from 40 to 110 items depending on what fraction of the floor space was utilized (Table 1-3). Due 

to the high rack storage shelves, the warehouse was estimated to have more items stored than in all the 

showrooms and loading dock combined. Again, depending on the fraction of rack space used to store 

items in the warehouse at the time of the fire, between 220 and 2000 items for 10% and 90 % of available 

rack space were estimated as being stored in the warehouse. 

Mattresses, upholstered chairs, sofas, recliners, and futons typically contain significant amounts of 

polyurethane foam [19, 20]. Dressers, tables, chairs, and end tables are made of wood or wood products 

[21]. Area rugs and carpeting also contain large amounts of synthetic materials. All of these items 

contributed to the fuel loading in the store. Average mass and energy content for a range of furniture 

types are tabulated in Table 1.2. The average mass estimated values ranged from 15 kg (35 lbs) to 50 kg 

(110 lbs) for different types of merchandise. The average energy content estimates ranged from 200 MJ 

to 620 MJ. 

Merchandise item totals for a range of fraction of floor space used to display furniture in the showrooms 

are summarized in Table 1.2. Combining the average mass and number of items provides an estimate for 

the total mass and total energy content [19-21]. Dividing the total mass values by the available floor 

space converts these values to mass loading or fuel per area either kg/m2

 or lbs/ft2 (Table 1-4). 

The loading dock and warehouse would likely have contained a different mix of retail merchandise. 

Retail merchandise which had already been purchased and was awaiting delivery was staged in the 

loading dock area. Using a similar estimating technique, rough estimates were calculated for the 

merchandise that might have been staged on the loading dock area (Tables 1-1 and 1-3). Merchandise for 

the West Ashley store, as well as the other two Sofa Super Store locations were stored in the warehouse. 

There were about 18 rows, each 30.5 m (100 ft) in length, of storage racks inside the warehouse. Each 

rack featured up to six layers of shelves (Appendix J). Combining the average mass and number of items 

provides an estimate for the total mass and total energy content. Dividing the total mass values by the 

available floor space converts these values to mass loading or fuel per area either kg/m2

 or lb/ft2 (Table 

1-5). The estimated total energy content for the showrooms and warehouse was up to 480 GJ and 840 GJ, 

respectively (Tables 1-4 and 1-5). 
1-25

Table 1-1. Dimensions, average mass, and average potential energy content for merchandise 

items. 

Item Length Width Height / 

Thickness 

Average Mass* 

[11-13] 

Average 

Energy* 

Content 

[11-13] 

in m in m in m lbs kg MJ 

Sofa 84 2.1 36 0.91 34 0.86 120 55 560 

Chair 42 1.1 36 0.91 34 0.86 70 25 300 

Mattress 84 2.1 66 1.7 16 0.41 145 55 600 

Dresser 36 0.91 18 0.46 48 1.2 110 50 620 

Table 72 1.8 48 1.2 6 0.15 35 15 200 

Rug 96 2.4 96 2.4 0.5 0.012 35 15 200 

*Average mass and energy content are rounded. 

Table 1-2. Estimated number of furniture items for different fractions of floor space used to 

display merchandise in showrooms. 

Percent of Available 

Floor Space Used to 

Display Merchandise 

Total Items* 

Main 

Showroom 

West 

Showroom 

East 

Showroom 

Combined Three 

Showrooms 

50 % 360 180 160 700 

60 % 440 220 180 850 

70 % 510 250 220 980 

80 % 590 290 240 1120 

*Number of items in each showroom is rounded and may not sum to combined total. 
1-26

Table 1-3. Estimated number of furniture items for different fractions of floor space used to stage 

or store merchandise in loading dock and warehouse.

Percent of Available 

Floor Space Used to 

Stage or Store 

Merchandise 

Total Items* 

Loading Dock Warehouse Combined Loading Dock 

and Warehouse 

10 % 220 

20 % 440 

30 % 40 640 690 

40 % 50 860 910 

50 % 70 1000 1070 

60 % 80 1290 1370 

70 % 90 1500 1590 

80 % 110 1720 1830 

90 % 1940 

*Number of items in each space is rounded and may not sum to combined total. 
1-27

Table 1-4. Estimated mass loading and total energy content (merchandise) for showrooms. 

Percent of 

Available 

Floor Space 

Used to 

Display 

Merchandise 

Main Showroom West Showroom East Showroom Combined Three* 

Showrooms 

Estimated 

Mass 

Loading 

kg/m2

(lbs/ft2) 

Estimated 

Total 

Energy 

Content 

GJ 

Estimated 

Mass 

Loading 

kg/m2

(lbs/ft2) 

Estimated 

Total 

Energy 

Content 

GJ 

Estimated 

Mass 

Loading 

kg/m2

(lbs/ft2) 

Estimated 

Total 

Energy 

Content 

GJ 

Estimated Total Energy 

Content 

GJ

50 % 7.7 

(1.6) 

 150 10.2 

(2.1) 

80 11.3 

(2.1) 

80 270 

60 % 9.5 

(1.9) 

180 11.7 

(2.5) 

90 12.0 

(2.4) 

90 360 

70 % 10.9 

(2.2) 

210 13.3 

(2.9) 

110 14.2 

(2.9) 

110 420 

80 % 12.6 

(2.6) 

250 15.9 

(3.3) 

120 15.9 

(3.3) 

120 480 

*Mass and energy estimates are rounded and may not sum to combined total. 

 
1-28

Table 1-5. Estimated mass loading and total energy content (merchandise) for the loading dock 

and the warehouse. 

Percent of 

Available 

Floor Space 

Used to Stage 

or Store 

Merchandise 

Loading Dock Warehouse Combined Loading 

Dock and Warehouse* 

Estimated 

Mass 

Loading 

kg/m2

(lbs/ft2

) 

Estimated 

Total 

Energy 

Content 

GJ 

Estimated 

Mass 

Loading 

kg/m2

(lbs/ft2

) 

Estimated 

Total 

Energy 

Content 

GJ 

Estimated Total Energy 

Content 

GJ

10 % 

 5 

(1.0) 

65 

20 % 

 12 

(2.4) 

190 

30 % 

8.4 

(1.7) 

20 17 

(3.5) 

280 300 

40 % 

10.2 

(2.1) 

25 23 

(4.7) 

375 400 

50 % 

13.9 

(2.8) 

30 29 

(5.9) 

460 490 

60 % 15.8 

(3.2) 

40 35 

(7.0) 

560 600 

70 % 18.6 

(3.8) 

40 40 

(8.2) 

650 690 

80 % 21.4 

(4.4) 

50 46 

(9.4) 

750 800 

90 % 52 

(10.6) 

840 

*Mass and energy estimates are rounded and may not sum to combined total.
1-29

1.4 FIRE CONTROL PROVISIONS 

1.4.1 Fire Alarms 

There were no records or reports of fire alarms or smoke detectors installed in the showrooms or 

warehouse. During a routine fire inspection (Appendix M, Figure M-1 and M-2), no fire alarms or smoke 

detectors were noted. During separate pre-planning building inspections by the individual response units, 

fire alarm indicators were marked as “not applicable” (Figure M-3). 

1.4.2 Fire Suppression 

There were no records or reports of any fire sprinklers5

 or manual hose line capability within the building. 

During a routine fire inspection (Figure M-1 and M-2), no sprinkler system or standpipe systems were 

noted. The presence of at least five portable fire extinguishers was indicated. During separate preplanning building inspections by units of the fire department, fire sprinklers and standpipe were each 

marked as “not applicable” (Figure M-3). 

1.4.3 Fire Doors 

The pre-plan building inspection sketch (Figure M-4) identified the location of six roll-down fire doors, 

three on the east wall of the west showroom and three on the west wall of the east showroom. In the 

sketch, each of these six doors was indicated as a fire door. The inspection also listed the external rolldown door between the loading dock and holding area, but does not indicate that this door was a fire door. 

1.5 WATER SUPPLY 

The area in which the Sofa Super Store was located had immediate access to a municipal hydrant system 

to support fire ground operations. Water hydrants were located along Savannah Highway to the west and 

east of the store, on Pebble Road behind the store, and at Blitchridge and Wappoo Roads to the north of 

the store. The location of the six hydrants is shown in Figure 1-17. Each hydrant typically had a pair of 

6.4 cm (2.5 in) outlets and a single 10.2 cm (4 in) outlet. 

The pre-plan inspection report that was dated April 26, 2006 (Appendix M) listed the pre-plan hydrant6

 as 

the hydrant on Pebble Road behind the store (intersection of Pebble Road and Sarah Street). The hydrant 

that had been located at the corner of Wappoo Road and Savannah Highway had been removed and not 

replaced. 

 

5

 The terms “fire sprinkler,” “automatic sprinkler system,” “automatic fire sprinklers,” and “sprinklered” refer to 

water based fire protection systems designed, installed, and maintained in accordance with fire protection 

engineering standards such as NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems,[22] and NFPA 25 

Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems [23]. This report 

will use “fire sprinklers” to refer to these systems. 

6

 Pre-plans or pre-planning response documents are often generated by a fire department to identify the location of 

water and utility shut-offs for specific structures. This allows the fire department to plan how it will position its 

units if a fire occurs. 
1-30

Water supply lines, 20.3 cm (8 in) diameter, were located along Savannah Highway, Stinson Drive, 

Dupont Road, First Drive, and Blitchridge Road (Figure 1-18). A smaller supply line, 15.2 cm (6 in) 

diameter, ran south of the warehouse along Pebble Road. On Wappoo Road, the water line was 20.3 cm 

(8 in) south of Savannah Highway and 25.4 cm (10 in) north of Savannah Highway. 

1.6 HISTORY OF THE BUILDING 

NIST found no building records that identified the original owner, architect, design engineer, or builder of 

the Sofa Super Store building at 1807 Savannah Highway, Charleston, SC. Anecdotes indicated that the 

building originally was a Piggly Wiggly Supermarket that was erected in the late 1950s or early 1960s. 

The roll-down door between the loading dock area and the holding area was consistent with what would 

have been a loading dock door for the original grocery store. As an exterior door, the roll-down delivery 

door was not designed as a fire door and did not have a fusible link. The grocery store refrigerator/freezer 

compressor equipment was located in the enclosed area behind the store (Figure 1-19). The incinerator 

was also located at the rear of the store and was still visible although no longer operational. 

Existing records indicate that the property was annexed into the City of Charleston from Charleston 

County in 1990, and also provide building permits for the addition of the west showroom in 1994, the east 

showroom in 1995, and the warehouse in 1996. Building permits were not located for the loading dock 

area or the repair areas which were added subsequent to the completion of the warehouse. The time line 

of construction and additions is summarized in Table 1-6. 
1-31

Figure 1-17. Location of fire hydrants near Sofa Super Store. Hydrant identified during pre-plan inspection was on Pebble Road (upper right of figure). Hydrant at corner of Savannah Highway and Wappoo Road had been removed and not replaced (center left of figure). Background image used with permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST. 
1-32

Figure 1-18. Water supply lines near Sofa Super Store. Hydrants behind store on Pebble Road were on 15.2 cm (6 in) diameter lines while hydrants located along Savannah Highway were on 20.3 cm (8 in) diameter lines. Background image used with permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST. 
1-33

Figure 1-19. Grocery store loading dock, incinerator, and refrigeration equipment areas. Loading dock and incinerator photographs taken after warehouse was torn down and removed from site. 

NIST Photograph 

NIST Photograph 

NIST Photograph 
1-34

Table 1-6. Time Line of Construction and Changes of Use 

Year Modification Extent of Construction 

circa 1960 

Original construction as a grocery 

store 

New construction 

1630 m2

(17,500 ft2) 

Concrete block walls 

Lightweight steel bar joists 

Composite roof – sheet metal decking, foam 

insulation, and polymer membrane 

1990 Annexed into Charleston City 

1994 

Addition of west showroom Commercial alteration 

650 m2

 (6,970 ft2) 

Sheet metal walls 

Steel I-beam roof joists 

Sheet metal roof 

Three roll-down fire doors in common wall 

with main showroom 

1995 

Addition of east showroom Commercial alteration 

650 m2

 (7,020 ft2) 

Sheet metal walls 

Steel I-beam roof joists 

Sheet metal roof 

Three metal roll-down fire doors in common 

wall with main showroom 

1996 

Addition of high rack storage 

warehouse 

Commercial alteration 

1450 m2

 (15,600 ft2) 

Sheet metal walls 

Steel I-beam roof joists 

Sheet metal roof 

1996 – 1998 

(no building permit 

located) 

Visible in 1998 aerial 

photograph 

Addition of loading dock – south 

section 

Commercial alteration 

95 m2

 (1000 ft2) 

Elevated wood deck 

Wood framing – studs and joists 

Metal walls 

Metal roof 

1996 – 1998 

(no building permit 

located) 

Visible in 1998 aerial 

photograph 

Addition of paint repair shop Commercial alteration 

70 m2

 (730 ft2) 

Wood framing – studs and joists 

Sheet metal walls 

Sheet metal roof 

1998 – 2006 

(no building permit 

located) 

Visible in 2006 aerial 

photograph 

Addition of loading dock – north 

section 

Commercial alteration 

110 m2

 (1200 ft2) 

Elevated wood deck 

Wood framing – studs and joists 

Sheet metal walls 

Sheet metal roof 

2001 – 2006 

(no building permit 

located) 

Visible in 2006 aerial 

photograph 

Addition of wood repair shop Commercial alteration 

60 m2

 (610 ft2) 

Wood framing – studs and joists 

Sheet metal walls 

Sheet metal roof 
1-35

1.7 AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE SOFA SUPER STORE 

Remote sensing images or aerial photographs have been routinely recorded by commercial imaging 

companies and have been used for monitoring land use or in planning new residential areas or commercial 

facilities. The early remote sensing images were usually black and white and of lower resolution. Aerial 

photographs taken more recently are typically in color and with better resolution. 

NIST obtained aerial images from DigitalGlobe of the West Ashley area of the city of Charleston from 

1989, 1994, 1998, 2001, and 2006. These images were taken directly overhead the store at 110 m 

(370 ft), 230 m (740 ft), 340 m (1100 ft), 450 m (1480 ft), and 1120 m (3700 ft) resolutions.7

 NIST also 

obtained aerial photographs from Pictometry at narrow and wide fields of view. Angle or oblique views 

were obtained from north, south, east, and west views at 40 degree angles. Figures 1-20 through 1-24 

were taken at 366m (1200 ft) resolution. Other images at different resolutions as well as the angle or 

oblique images are in Appendix N. 

These images provide some insight into the chronological order in which the Sofa Super Store was 

expanded, but since photographs were not available for each year, NIST could not identify the specific 

years when the loading dock and repair areas were constructed. 

An aerial photograph from 1989 (Figure 1-20) demonstrates that only the main showroom was present on 

the site. The residential structures behind the main showroom had already been constructed. The car 

repair shop to the west of the store was also built. The gas station to the east of the store does not appear 

in this photograph in its current configuration. The low resolution of the image makes it more difficult to 

analyze, but the structure to the east appears perpendicular to the current gas station configuration. 

An image from 1994 (Figure 1-21) verifies that the west showroom was added first and was constructed 

before February, 1994. The east showroom, warehouse, loading dock, and repair areas do not appear in 

the image. The gas station to the east of the store does appear in its current configuration. 

Figure 1-22 is an aerial photograph taken in March 1998 which shows that the west and east showrooms 

as well as the warehouse had been added to the structure. Examination of the area between the rear of the 

west showroom and the warehouse reveals that the southern portion of the loading dock area had been 

constructed, but not the northern section. Neither the paint repair shop nor the wood repair shops had 

been constructed at this time. 

An aerial image from 2001 (Figure 1-23) demonstrates that the paint repair shop had been added. It 

appears that the wood repair shop was not yet constructed. Some portion of the north section of the 

loading dock appears to have been added, possibly just the deck or floor. The north portion of the loading 

dock was not enclosed when this photograph was taken. 

Figure 1-24,which is an aerial photograph from December 2006, reveals that the north section of the 

loading dock was enclosed and the wood repair shop was added to the east side of the paint repair shop. 

 

7

 Image resolution refers to meters or feet per pixel in an image. A 110 m resolution image had 2500 pixels with each pixel 

representing 0.045 m. This translated into an image displaying an area approximately 110 m x 110 m. Similarly, a 1120 m 

resolution displayed an area 1120 m x 1120 m. 
1-36

 Figure 1-20. Aerial photograph of Sofa Super Store on February 12, 1989. 
1-37

Figure 1-21. Aerial photograph of Sofa Super Store on February 14, 1994. 
1-38

 Figure 1-22. Aerial photograph of Sofa Super Store on March 1, 1998. 
1-39

 Figure 1-23. Aerial photograph of Sofa Super Store on April 1, 2001. 
1-40

 Figure 1-24. Aerial photograph of Sofa Super Store on December 1, 2006. 
1-41

1.8 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 1 

[1] Digital photographs taken during fire by public individuals including Stewart English and 

Alexander Fox. 

[2] Digital photographs taken during and after the fire by law enforcement organizations including 

the Charleston Police Department and Charleston County Sheriff’s Office. 

[3] Digital photographs taken during and after the fire by news outlets including The Post and 

Courier and Associated Press. 

[4] Digital photographs taken after the fire by NIST Team. 

[5] Interviews of fire fighters conducted by National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NISOH). Interviews organized by the NIOSH investigation team and NIST team allowed to 

participate. Interviews included fire fighters from Charleston, St. Andrew’s, and St. James Island 

Fire Departments. 

[6] Informal discussion between store employees and the NIST team. 

[7] Articles from a number of news outlets including The Post and Courier, Associated Press, Fire 

Engineering, washingtonpost.com, MSNBC.com, charlston.net, and ENR_com News. A listing 

of articles that were reviewed was placed in Appendix Q. 

[8] Sofa Super Store Fire – Report of Investigation, ATF National Response Team Origin and Cause 

Report, Investigation 763010-07-0172, Report 32, June 22, 2007. 

[9] Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Investigation Report #F2007-18, National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, 

Morgantown, WV, February 2009. http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200718.pdf. 

[10] “Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report, Sofa Super Store, 1807 Savannah Highway, 

Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007,” City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and 

Review Team, Phase II Report, June 2008. 

[11] NFPA 80, Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives, National Fire Protection 

Association, Quincy, MA, 2010. 

[12] UL 10B, Fire Tests of Door Assemblies, Underwriters Laboratories Standard for Safety. 

[13] 1991 Standard Building Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 

Birmingham, AL. 

[14] 1991 Standard Fire Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., Birmingham, 

AL. 

[15] 1994 Standard Building Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 

Birmingham, AL. 

[16] 1994 Standard Fire Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., Birmingham, 

AL. 

[17] 2006 International Building Code, International Code Council, Inc., Falls Church, VA. 
1-42

[18] 2006 International Fire Code, International Code Council, Inc., Falls Church, VA. 

[19] Denize, Hamish, “The Combustion Behavior of Upholstered Furniture Materials in New 

Zealand,” Fire Engineering Research Report 00/04, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New 

Zealand, March 2000. 

[20] Firestone, James, “An Analysis of Furniture Heat Release Rates by Nordtest,” Fire Engineering 

Research Report 99/07, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, March 1999. 

[21] Stroup, D.W., Bryner, N., Lee, J.L., McElroy, J., Roadarmel, G., Twilley, W. H., “Structural 

Collapse Fire Tests: Single Story, Wood Frame Structures,” NISTIR 7094, National Institute of 

Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, March 2004. 

[22] NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, National Fire Protection 

Association, Quincy, MA, 2010.

[23] NFPA 25 Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection 

Systems, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2011..
2-1 

Chapter 2 DESCRIPTION AND TIME LINE OF THE INCIDENT

2.1 INTRODUCTION 

2.1.1 Background 

The deaths of nine fire fighters on June 18, 2007, in the Charleston Sofa Super Store fire was the single 

greatest loss of life for the fire service in the United States since 343 fire fighters died in the collapse of 

the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001. For South Carolina, this fire was the deadliest fire since 11 

people died in the Lancaster County Jail fire on Dec. 27, 1979 [1-2]. 

The fire and resulting structure loss at the Sofa Super Store involved the main and west showrooms, 

repair areas, and warehouse. The only section of the store that did not collapse was the east showroom 

where the fire spread was limited to the rear portion of that space. No part of the structure was 

sprinklered. 

The time lines presented in this chapter identify the specific events that occurred during the Sofa Super 

Store fire that started just after 6:56 p.m., Daylight Savings Time (DST), June 18, 2007, as well as the 

order in which they transpired. The time line focuses on the growth and spread of the fire as it moved 

through the Sofa Super Store, but it also incorporates the response of the fire service in order to provide a 

broader perspective. The response of the fire service is presented in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this 

study. 

2.1.2 Collection of Time Line Data 

In the process of developing this time line, the NIST team collected data from a range of sources 

including: video recordings [3-4], digital photographs [5-8], interviews of fire fighters [9], a discussion 

with store employees [10], radio and cell phone recordings and transcripts [11], articles from news outlets 

[12], and investigative reports [13-15]. 

Video recordings and digital photographs provided information about fire growth during the incident. If 

these images were time stamped or linked to specific events where the time was known then the 

information was incorporated into the time line. Since none of the photographers or videographers was 

present before the fire began, neither the video nor digital photographs captured the initial stages of the 

incident. All digital photographs and video were recorded outside the structure and did not provide 

images of fire growth inside the store. 

Interviews with fire fighters provided information about the conditions inside and outside the structure. 

In combination with the fire department radio transmissions, it was possible to link the conditions to the 

time line. The arrival time of the fire department units was documented via the radio transmissions from 

arriving fire units to central dispatch. The City of Charleston released audio recordings of the radio 

communications [11] and the Post Incident Assessment and Review Team tabulated the radio and phone 

transmissions into a single time-linked table [15]. 

Articles from newspapers, television stations, and the internet [12] were reviewed by the team for 

potentially new sources of information. The information was examined, and if it could be verified, the 
2-2

new data were included in the time line. Investigative reports from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) [13], National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 

[14], and the Post Incident Assessment and Review Team [15] were carefully reviewed and provided 

critical insight into how the fire spread. Specifically, the time-linked reports by the fire fighters of smoke 

and fire conditions within the showrooms were invaluable in developing the time line. 

2.2 OVERVIEW NARRATIVE 

On June 18, 2007, at 6:56 p.m., the time of the first sighting of the fire, the Sofa Super Store was open 

and employees were inside the showroom and warehouse areas within the structure. The fire was first 

observed by a passerby driving along Savannah Highway in front of the store and was reported to store 

employees. After being notified by the passerby of a fire on the outside of the loading dock, the store 

manager located the fire inside the loading dock around a door frame. According to the investigation by 

the ATF [13], a fire was discovered in a pile of trash/debris outside the structure between the rear of the 

showroom area and the warehouse. Upon initial verification of the fire, the store manager discharged a 

portable dry chemical fire extinguisher, but was unable to extinguish the fire. Upon returning to the 

showroom area, the store manager asked other employees to call 911. The manager subsequently 

returned with a second extinguisher, found the loading dock more fully involved in fire, and discharged 

the extinguisher into the loading dock area from outside the loading dock. At 7:08 p.m., a report of a fire 

at the Sofa Super Store was received by the Charleston County 911 Emergency Center and the Charleston 

Fire Department was dispatched. All of the employees in the showroom area were able to exit the store 

through the front doors of the showroom. 

At approximately 7:10 p.m., one minute after being notified, Engine 11 (E-11), Engine 10 (E-10), 

Ladder 5 (L-5), Battalion Chief 4 (BC-4), and an Assistant Chief (AC) from the Charleston Fire 

Department (CFD) were en route to the scene of the reported fire. While en route to the scene, the BC 

observed a smoke plume at the rear of the store and reported to dispatch. This confirmation initiated an 

additional unit, Engine 16, being dispatched to the fire scene. Upon arriving on the scene at 7:11 p.m., 

BC 4 reported a trash/debris fire at the rear of the showroom. Engine 10 was directed by the BC to 

position the apparatus near the loading dock and begin suppressing the trash fire (Figure 2-1). 

By 7:12 p.m., additional units, including an AC and Engine 11, had arrived on scene, and an initial search 

of the main showroom did not reveal either fire or smoke in the main showroom. When the AC asked the 

store employees if there was anyone left in the store, the response was that everybody was out [9]. A 

second search to the rear of the west showroom was conducted by the AC and fire fighters and after 

opening doors at the rear of the west showroom, fire was discovered in the loading dock area. By 

7:16 p.m., fire crews were applying water using a 3.8 cm (1.5 in) diameter hose line on the fire in the 

loading dock. At the same time, at the front of the store, crews were pulling a 3.8 cm (1.5 in) diameter 

hose line in the front door, through the main showroom, and into the west showroom. At the time, neither 

E-10 at the loading dock nor E-11 at the front of the store had been connected to water hydrants, so any 

water being used for suppression would have been drawn from the onboard tanks of E-10 or E-11. 

Additional units, including Engine 12 (E-12), Engine 16 (E-16), Engine 15 (E-15), Engine 19 (E-19), and 

the Fire Chief were on scene or en route. 
2-3 

In the next 10 minutes, two engines were connected to water hydrants (Figure 2-2). E-10 was connected 

through E-12 to a hydrant at the corner of Blitchridge Road and First Drive. By 7:21 p.m. a water supply 

line was connected to the engine pumping water to the loading dock fire teams. E-12 was pumping water 

through approximately 230 m (750 ft) of 6.4 cm (2.5 in) diameter supply line. Requests to increase the 

water pressure were radioed to E-12 at 7:25 p.m. By 7:27 p.m. the engine positioned at the front of the 

store (Figure 2-3) was also connected to a fire hydrant. E-11 was being supplied by E-16 which had 

located a water hydrant at 1714 Savannah Highway in front of Morris Nissan automobile dealership. 

E-16 was pumping water to E-11 through about 560 m (1850 ft) of 6.4 cm (2.5 in) diameter supply line. 

Although the roll-down fire door in the breezeway between the holding area and warehouse had activated 

and closed direct access to the warehouse, the fire inside the enclosed loading dock spread to the front of 

the warehouse through a shared corrugated metal wall. The fire heated the metal wall sufficiently to 

cause items inside the warehouse to ignite. 

Figure 2-1. Location of Engines 10 and 11, and Ladder 5 at approximately 7:12 p.m. 

Background image used with permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST. 
2-4

Figure 2-3. Engine 11 and Ladder 5 at front of Sofa Super Store. Engine 10 next to loading 

dock. Both engines connected to water supply. Photo taken at approximately 7:30 p.m. 

Background image used with permission of Alexander Fox. Enhancements by NIST.

 

Figure 2-2. Positioned at fire hydrants on Savannah Highway and Blitchridge Road, 

Engines 16 and 12 were pumping water to Engines 10 and 11 at about 7:27 p.m. 

Background image used with permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST.
2-5 

At approximately the same time, 7:27 p.m., dispatch notified the Fire Chief of a cell phone call from a 

man claiming to be trapped inside the store. The caller indicated to the fire department that he was an 

employee who worked in the repair shop. The roll-down fire door in the breezeway had closed and 

prevented the employee from escaping the warehouse/repair shop areas. The employee was banging on 

the wall with a hammer. The Fire Chief radioed the AC and directed him to respond to the trapped 

employee. Since at this stage in the fire, all the fire fighters and chiefs were using the same radio channel, 

any fire fighter with a radio also would have heard the report of a trapped employee in the rear of the 

store. The AC asked the store manager if the trapped person was an employee of the store, and the store 

staff verified that the man was someone who repaired furniture for the store. The AC took a team of fire 

fighters and went around the east end of the store, chopped through a locked wooden gate, and located the 

employee banging on the metal wall (Figure 2-4). Using pry bars, the fire fighters were able to create an 

opening in the metal wall and extract the trapped employee. After 7:31 p.m., the AC, rescue team, and 

rescued employee returned to the front of the store. 

Figure 2-4. An Assistant Chief directed rescue of the trapped employee. The team moved 

around the east side of the store and located the trapped employee at the rear of the store. This 

occurred between approximately 7:27 p.m. and 7:31 p.m. Background image used with 

permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST.
2-6

During the rescue effort at about 7:27 p.m., several inaudible radio communications suggested that fire 

fighters were lost or disoriented. Several minutes later, between 7:29 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., there were 

additional radio communications that were still difficult to understand, but seem to be one or more fire 

fighters asking for directions to exit or requesting assistance to escape. Other radio calls were 

interspersed with calls for help related to getting the trapped employee out. Beginning around 7:31 p.m., 

additional broken radio traffic more clearly indicated that several fire fighters were in distress. An 

unknown fire fighter called “Mayday,” and dispatch advised the Fire Chief that the L-5 engineer had 

activated the emergency button on his radio. At 7:35 p.m., the Fire Chief radioed, “....we need to vacate 

the building.” 

By the time the AC returned to the front of the store from rescuing the trapped employee the fire 

conditions at the front of the store had changed dramatically. Brown smoke was flowing out of the front 

doors. At about 7:35 p.m., the front windows of the main showroom were vented and broken out. As 

clean air was drawn into the main showroom through the lower part of the broken windows, heavy brown 

smoke poured from the upper sections of the broken windows. Less than a minute later, the brown smoke 

changed to thick black smoke. The fire then spread rapidly from the southwest rear of the main 

showroom to the northwest front of the main showroom and out the front windows and to the east side of 

the main showroom and out through the front windows on the east side of the main showroom. The fire 

also spread rapidly into the west showroom through three roll-down fire doors that did not close. Nine 

fire fighters were trapped in the fire, resulting in their deaths. 

The metal roof over the enclosed loading dock area partially collapsed and was supported by several 

remaining vertical wood columns. At approximately 7:51 p.m., the roof over the west side of the main 

showroom collapsed into the main showroom. Portions of the parapet wall and front façade collapsed 

onto the front parking lot. The fire continued to burn vigorously in the main showroom and eventually 

almost the entire roof over the main showroom collapsed onto the showroom floor. Post-fire photographs 

demonstrate that the fire consumed almost all the available fuel in the main showroom (Appendix D). 

The fire had also spread into the west showroom and consumed most of the furniture in the front twothirds of the retail space. By approximately 7:50 p.m., the intense heat had caused the roof to sag to 

within 1.2 m (4 ft) of the floor in the front portion of the space (Appendix E, Figure E-11). Significant 

amounts of unburned furniture remained in the rear of the west showroom (Appendix E, Figure E-21). 

The fire had also spread into the rear of the east showroom through the partially closed roll-down fire 

door (Figure 1-8, door #7) at near the rear of the east showroom. Although significant amounts of 

merchandise were burned, the damage to the roof supports was limited and structural collapse did not 

occur in the east showroom. 

The fire was brought under control after 10 p.m. Recovery operations continued until after 4:00 a.m. the 

next morning, June 19, 2007. 
2-7 

2.3 OVERALL INCIDENT TIME LINE The overall incident time line was assembled from the photographs, radio transmissions, interviews and other sources (Sec

Figure 2-5. Overview time line of the Sofa Super Store Fire. Engine and ladder companies are designate“E” and “L,” respectively. For example, E-10 is Engine 10 and L-5 is Ladder 5. Assistant and Battalion designated “AC” and “BC”. 
2-8

Figure 2-6. Overview time line of the Sofa Super Store Fire. Ladder companies are designated by letter “L,” respecL-5 is Ladder 5. Items in red involved actions by fire department. Items in blue involved water suppression activit
2-9 

Table 2-1. Incident Time Line. (Uncertainty is +/- 2 min) 

DST* Fire Time Description 

6:56 p.m. -15 Fire observed at rear of store 

 Store manager discharges first extinguisher at fire on loading 

dock 

 Fire reported to 911 Center 

 Store manager discharges second fire extinguisher through 

holding area door towards fire on loading dock 

7:08 p.m. -3 Dispatch receives report of fire behind store 

7:09 p.m. -2 

E-11, E-10, L-5, and BC-4 dispatched†

E-10, E-11, L-5, and BC-4 en route 

BC-4 confirms smoke plume 

E-16 dispatched 

7:11 p.m. 0 BC-4 on scene and reports trash fire outside store loading dock 

7:12 p.m. 1 

AC, E-10, E-11 on scene 

AC reports no fire/smoke in showroom 

Fire Chief en route 

7:13 p.m. 2 

E-12 dispatched 

AC and E-11 crew at rear of west showroom 

AC opens door and observes fire in loading dock 

AC radios E-15 to come to scene 

 3 E-6 dispatched 

 4 

Fire Chief radios dispatch to send E-19 

E-10 using on board water to suppress fire on loading dock. 

E-16 on scene 

7:16 p.m. 5 

Fire Chief on scene 

E-11 using on board water to suppress fire at rear of west 

showroom 

6 E-12 on scene, lay hose line to supply water to E-10 

7:20 p.m. 9 E-19 on scene 

 

*

 Times are approximate and are rounded to the nearest minute. For comparison, NIOSH [14]truncated times to the minute. 

†

 Engine and ladder companies are designated by letter “E” and “L”, respectively. For example, E-10 is Engine 10 and L-5 is 

Ladder 5. Assistant and Battalion Chiefs are designated “AC” and “BC”. The Fire Chief is designated “Fire Chief”. 
2-10

DST* Fire Time Description 

 10 E-12 begins pumping water to E-10 at loading dock 

E-16 looking for water hydrant on Savannah Highway 

 11 

E-6 on scene 

E-11 radios that onboard tank is half empty 

7:24 p.m. 13 

Fire Chief requests E-12 boost water pressure 

BC-5 on scene 

St. Andrew’s Fire (Mutual Aid) Department on scene 

 14 E-10 radios that onboard water tank is one quarter full 

Fire Chief requests E-12 to boost water pressure 

7:27 p.m. 16 

E-16 begins pumping water to E-11 at front of store 

Dispatch notifies Fire Chief of cell phone call from trapped 

employee 

Fire Chief directs AC to respond to trapped employee 

2.5” hose line in operation at warehouse 

Inaudible radio transmissions – “lost or trapped inside” 

 18-19 

Inaudible radio transmissions- “which way out or everyone out” 

E-11 radios 2.5” hose line is charged 

Distress radio calls, “need help out” and “need help getting out” 

7:31 p.m. 

to 

 7:34 p.m. 

20-23 

Fire Chief requests dispatch of E-3 

L-5 repositioned to west side of store 

BC-5 reports trapped employee rescued 

Fire fighter calls “Mayday” 

Fire Chief radios, “....we need to vacate the building” 

Dispatch notifies Fire Chief that L-5 engineer activated 

emergency button 

7:35 p.m. 24 Front windows vented, brown smoke pours out broken windows 

7:36 p.m. 25 Thick black smoke rolls out front windows 

7:37 p.m. 26 

Fire rolls out front windows 

E-13 dispatched 

7:38 p.m. 27 Fire Chief radios “Everybody abandon the building” 

E-11 air horns sounded to signal evacuation 

 BC-T * radios E-16 to boost water pressure 

 

*

 BC-T is the Battalion Chief in charge of Training Section. 
2-11 

DST* Fire Time Description 

29 St. Paul’s Fire Company laying hose to L-5 

31 E-13 on scene 

7:44 p.m. 33 AC requests dispatch to call water department to boost pressure 

7:48 p.m. 37 Ladder 4 dispatched 

7:50 p.m. 39 Fire Chief requests dispatch to notify Charleston Mayor 

7:51 p.m. 40 Portion of main showroom roof collapses 

8:05 p.m. 

54 

(1 hour & 9 

minutes) 

Master stream off ladder platform still operating 

10:00 p.m. 

176 

(3 hours & 

11 minutes) 

Fire under control 

Recovery operations begin 

04:00 a.m. 

536 

(9 hours & 

11 minutes)

Recovery operations continue 

2.4 FIRE IGNITION, GROWTH, AND SPREAD 

The fire began in a pile of trash and discarded furniture, which had accumulated on the asphalt outside the 

loading dock area. The fire spread into or through a wall that had an exterior surface of metal siding, 

wood studs and framing, and an interior surface of plywood and/or gypsum board. Store merchandise 

was staged on the enclosed loading dock for delivery over the next several days. Since there were six 

trucks utilized to deliver merchandise to customers, there could have been multiple sofas, futons, 

loveseats, chairs, tables, rugs, dressers, and mattresses inside the loading dock for delivery (Figure 1-14). 

As the fire spread into the enclosed dock, these furniture items provided additional fuel in addition to the 

wood framing, synthetic carpeting, and wooden deck of the dock itself. 

The fire spread from the loading dock through the open loading dock door into the holding area. The fire 

spread more quickly to the interior of the warehouse than to the rear of the west showroom because of 

differences in wall construction. As the fire grew inside the loading dock, the energy from the fire heated 

up the metal siding of the warehouse and rear of the west showroom. At the rear of the west showroom, 

the interior surface was gypsum board mounted on metal studs (Appendix E, Figures E-23 and E-24). 

Due to the structural steel in the rear wall of the west showroom and the metal studs, there was a 

concealed space of at least 15 cm (6 in) between the metal siding on the outside loading dock side and the 

interior gypsum wall. This concealed space helped provide an insulating volume that slowed the transfer 

of energy from the hot metal siding into the rear of the west showroom. On the other hand, the warehouse 

wall did not appear to have an interior surface of gypsum board (Appendix G, Figures G-15 and G-18), so 

the energy from the hot metal siding of the warehouse was transferred more quickly to combustibles 

inside the warehouse. The fire spread through the loading dock and into the 
2-12

holding area and warehouse is shown qualitatively in Figure 2-4. Additional animated images of the fire 

spread are presented in Chapter 4 and Appendix K of this report. 

From the holding area, the fire spread into the rear or southwest corner of the main showroom. The rolldown fire door between the holding area and the warehouse closed and prevented the fire from spreading 

from the holding area to the warehouse. The fire growth is shown qualitatively in Figure 2-7 and 

estimated to have occurred around 7:31 p.m. It is not clear how the fire spread or moved into the rear of 

the main showroom. Smoke and flames were flowing from the loading dock into the holding area and 

into the interstitial space above the suspended ceiling above the main showroom. There did not appear to 

be significant fuel in this interstitial space, below the metal decking of the roof and above the suspended 

ceiling. The hot gases could have ignited items and these items could have dropped through the ceiling 

into the main showroom and ignited furniture. The fire could also have penetrated the partition wall 

between the holding area and the rear of the main showroom. The wall was constructed of gypsum board 

mounted on both sides of metal studs. Or, it is possible that the fire moved through a metal door into the 

rear of the main showroom. While the exact path is not understood, the fire did spread into the rear of the 

main showroom, which resulted in additional furniture being ignited. 

Partially burned fuel in the form of smoke and combustible gases from the fire on the loading dock filled 

the interstitial space above the ceiling in the main showroom, and the smoke began to flow through 

ventilation openings down into the main showroom. At about the same time, the fire spread from the 

holding area into the rear of the main showroom. The smoke being generated by the fire in the rear of 

main showroom and the smoke flowing down through the ceiling was forming a layer of unburned fuel 

below the ceiling of the main showroom. At this stage, the fire did not have access to sufficient oxygen to 

burn completely. 

The smoke layer in the main showroom continued to thicken and as the layer dropped further down, the 

visibility in the showroom decreased dramatically. In order to improve visibility, the fire fighters broke 

the front windows and allowed smoke to flow out of the showroom. However, breaking the windows also 

allowed additional air to flow into the main showroom. As this air flowed to the rear of the main 

showroom, the fire had additional oxygen and began to burn more intensely. The increased burning rate 

of the fire released additional energy, increased the temperature of the smoke layer, and ignited the layer 

of smoke and partially burned fuel below the ceiling in the main showroom. 

The fire spread extremely rapidly from the rear of the main showroom toward the front of the west side of 

the main showroom. The fire first appeared at the front windows of the main showroom at approximately 

7:36 p.m. and is qualitatively shown in Figure 2-8. Moments later the fire moved toward the east side of 

the main showroom as shown in Figure 2-9. The three roll-down fire doors between the main showroom 

and west showroom (doors #2, #3, #4 in Figure 1-8) did not close, and this allowed the fire to move from 

the main showroom into the west showroom (Figure 2-10). On the east side of the main showroom, two 

roll-down fire doors near the front of the store (doors #5 and #6 in Figure 1-8) did close, and the third fire 

door near the rear of the showroom (door #7 in Figure 1-8) closed only about one-third of the way down. 

The fire did not spread through the closed fire doors, but did spread through the partially closed fire door 

into the rear of the east showroom. 
2-13 

Figure 2-7. Fire was beginning to spread into the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and through the shared metal wall of the warehouse. This was estimated to occur at about 7:31 p.m. Background image used with permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST.
2-14

Figure 2-8. Fire spread rapidly from rear of main showroom to the front of the main showroom. Fire continued to spread towards rear of warehouse. This occurred by about 7:36 p.m. Background image used with permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST.
2-15 

Figure 2-9. Fire spreading to east side of main showroom. This occurred by about 7:37 p.m. Background image used with permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST.
2-16

Figure 2-10. Fire spreading to west showroom and the rear of east showroom. This occurred by about 7:38 p.m. Background image used with permission of DigitalGlobe. Enhancements by NIST.
2-17 

2.5 WEATHER 

Weather data were recorded about 13.6 km (8.5 miles) north of the store at the Charleston International 

Airport. The conditions from approximately the beginning of the fire to the end of suppression activities 

are tabulated in Table 2-2. Additional weather data for June 18, 2007 are tabulated in Appendix A [16]. 

From photographs that were taken during the fire, such as Figures 1-7 and 2-3, the smoke plume appeared 

to move from the rear of the warehouse toward the front of the showrooms, which is consistent with a 

wind blowing from the south (warehouse) toward the north (front of store). 

Table 2-2. Weather Data for Sofa Super Store Fire. 

Weather Data * June 18, 2007 

6:56 p.m. 

June 18, 2007 

7:56 p.m. 

June 18, 2007 

8:56 p.m. 

June 18, 2007 

9:56 p.m. 

Sky Conditions Few clouds Clear Clear Few clouds 

Temperature 27.8 oC (82oF) 26.1 o

C (79oF) 25.6 oC (78oF) 25.6 oC (78oF) 

Relative Humidity 69 % 82 % 85 % 79 % 

Wind Speed 4.0 m/s (9 mph ) 4.5 m/s (10 mph) 4.5 m/s (10 mph) 3.6 m/s (8 mph) 

Wind Direction 

190 o

(from near south) 

190 o

(from near south) 

200 o

(from southsouthwest) 

190 o

(from near south) 

 

*

 Weather data definitions and descriptors are provided on the National Climatic Data Center website, 

http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/gcldc/QCLCD [16]. 
2-18

2.6 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 2 

[1] “Smoky Death,” The Evening Independent Newspaper, St. Petersburg, FL, Dec. 28, 1979. 

[2] “Ten Inmates killed in fire at historic jail,” The Ledger Newspaper, Lakeland, FL, Dec. 28, 1979. 

[3] Video images recorded during the fire by Howard Armstrong and John Pundt. 

[4] Video images recorded after the fire by the NIST Team. 

[5] Digital photographs taken during fire by private individuals including Stewart English and 

Alexander Fox. 

[6] Digital photographs taken during and after the fire by law enforcement organizations including 

the Charleston Police Department and Charleston County Sheriff’s Office. 

[7] Digital photographs taken during and after the fire by news outlets including The Post and 

Courier and Associated Press. 

[8] Digital photographs taken after the fire by the NIST Team. 

[9] Interviews of fire fighters conducted by National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NISOH). Interviews organized by the NIOSH investigation team and the NIST team allowed to 

participate. Interviews included fire fighters from Charleston, St. Andrews, and St. James Island 

Fire Departments. 

[10] Informal discussion between store employees and the NIST team. 

[11] Radio Transmissions and Phone Call Transcript Sofa Super Store – Charleston, SC, June 18, 

2007. Released by City of Charleston on Aug. 10, 2007. Audio recordings available at 

http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2007/aug/10/911_ tapes_sofa_store_fire_be_released 

_afternoon/ . 

[12] Articles from a number of news outlets including The Post and Courier, Associated Press, Fire 

Engineering, washingtonpost.com, MSNBC.com, charlston.net, and ENR_com News. A listing 

of articles that were reviewed was placed in Appendix Q. 

[13] Sofa Super Store Fire – Report of Investigation, ATF National Response Team Origin and Cause 

Report, Investigation 763010-07-0172, Report 32, June 22, 2007. 

[14] Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Investigation Report #F2007-18, National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, 

Morgantown, WV, February 2009. http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200718.pdf. 

[15] “Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report, Sofa Super Store, 1807 Savannah Highway, 

Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007,” City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and 

Review Team, Phase II Report, June 2008. 

[16] National Climatic Data Center - http://cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov/gcldc/QCLCD. 
3-1

Chapter 3 EMERGENCY INCIDENT RESPONSE

3.1 INTRODUCTION 

3.1.1 General 

The overall incident time line presented in Chapter 2 summarized the fire events from a broad 

perspective. The following overview of the emergency incident response focuses on the sequence of 

events from the first responders’ perspective. By identifying the observations and actions of the fire 

fighters, insight can be gained about how the fire spread through the Sofa Super Store. With the 

additional insight, this overview builds and extends upon the time line in Chapter 2. 

While this overview notes key tactical challenges facing the fire department and how they responded, the 

NIST study addressed the emergency response only as needed to reconstruct the behavior and time line of 

the fire. Additional analysis of the fire department response and recommendations were reported in the 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Line of Duty Death Report 2007-18 [1], the City of 

Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team, Phase II Report [2], and South Carolina Office of 

Occupational Safety and Health (SC-OSHA) Report of S.C. OSHA Findings in June 18, 2007 Charleston 

Sofa Super Store Fire [3]. 

3.1.2 Collection of Incident Response Data 

In the process of developing this overview of incident response, the NIST team collected data from a 

range of sources including: video recordings [4], digital photographs [5-7], interviews of fire fighters [8], 

radio and cell phone recordings and transcripts [9], and investigative reports [1-3, 10]. 

Video recordings and digital photographs provided information about fire fighter actions during the 

incident. If these images were time stamped or linked to specific events where the time was known then 

the information was incorporated into this overview of incident response. Since none of the 

photographers or videographers was present before the fire, neither the video nor the digital photographs 

captured the initial actions of the Charleston Fire Department (CFD). All of the digital photographs and 

video were recorded outside the structure and did not provide images of fire fighter activities inside the 

store. 

Interviews with fire fighters provided information about their activities inside and outside the structure. 

For inside the structure, the information included: where the fire was located, how they entered the 

showroom, what the interior conditions were, how they pulled hose lines, when they ran out of air, and 

how they exited the structure. Exterior operational information included: where the fire equipment 

(engines and ladder trucks) was positioned, where water lines were connected to hydrants, how the fire 

was or was not spreading, and how rescue attempts were conducted. The information provided by the fire 

fighters was critical to developing this overview of the fire service response. 

In combination with the interview information, the CFD radio transmissions allowed the response of CFD 

to be confirmed and linked to the time line. For the CFD, the arrival time of the fire companies, the Fire 

Chief, and additional support was documented via the radio transmissions with central dispatch. The 

CFD used a different radio system than the surrounding mutual aid fire departments and CFD radio 

recordings did not include any transmissions from mutual aid departments. 
3-2 

Investigative reports from National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) [1], the Post 

Incident Assessment and Review Team [2], South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (SC-OSHA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) [10] were 

carefully reviewed and provided critical insight into fire service response. Specifically, the reports 

identified specific actions of the fire service at specific times both inside and outside the structure and 

those time-linked actions were invaluable in developing the overall incident response. 

3.2 CHARLESTON FIRE DEPARTMENT 

The Charleston Fire Department (CFD) provides fire suppression services to a community of 

approximately 108,000 people [11]. Emergency medical services are provided for the City of Charleston 

by two surrounding counties, Charleston and Berkeley. Charleston is situated geographically in the south 

east portion of the state where the Cooper and Ashley rivers intersect and flow into the Atlantic Ocean. 

The city of North Charleston is to the north of Charleston, and Mount Pleasant is to the east (Figure 3-1). 

Covering an area of 236 km2

 (91 square miles), Charleston is divided into six distinct areas or 

subdivisions, the Peninsula/Downtown, West Ashley, Johns Island, James Island, Daniel Island, and 

Cainhoy Peninsula. The Sofa Super Store was located in the West Ashley subdivision as shown in Figure 

3-1. The location of a number of fire stations, some of which are CFD stations and others that are mutual 

aid departments, North Charleston, Mt. Pleasant, St. Andrew’s, and James Island are also shown in Figure 

3-1. The fire stations that were located nearest to the Super Sofa Store are shown in Figure 3-2 (street 

map) and Figure 3-3 (aerial view). As shown in Figure 3-4, the jurisdictional boundaries between the 

municipal and unincorporated areas were intermingled. Adjoining properties in the same block could be 

in different jurisdictions. In the past, this led to situations where the first units to arrive at an incident 

were from outside their jurisdiction. 

The department’s approximately 237 uniformed personnel operated from 14 stations with a combined 

response capability of 16 engine companies and three ladder companies [12]. The Fire Chief supervises 

three Assistant Chiefs (AC) and twelve Battalion Chiefs (BC), who command three shifts and work 24 

hours on and 48 hours off. When fully staffed, each apparatus was assigned four fire fighters; a captain, 

an engineer/driver and two fire fighters [12]. Depending on staffing availability for each shift, stations 

were routinely operated with three fire fighters (captain, engineer/driver, and a fire fighter). On June 18, 

2007, the department had 61 fire fighters, four BC, and an AC on-duty. 

A fire department or municipality can develop the minimum recommended complement of engine and 

truck company personnel by using the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards 1500 [13] 

and 1710 [14]. Compliance with NFPA 1500 requires that a fire department develop and adopt a 

comprehensive risk management plan to identify and evaluate potential hazards. The risk management 

plan would have identified the Sofa Super Store as a low-, medium-, or high-hazard occupancy. For low 

hazard occupancies, compliance with NFPA 1710 advocates a minimum crew of four members operating 

from each type of apparatus. With the total floor space of 4700 m2

 (50,400 ft2) and combustible 

merchandise, the Sofa Super Store probably would have been identified as a medium- to high-hazard 

occupancy. For high hazard occupancies, the standard advocates a minimum crew of five or six members 

operating from each type of apparatus. Unit staffing levels directly affect the fire fighting crew’s tactical 

performance capabilities, the speed at and duration of which they can be relied upon to accomplish 
3-3

Figure 3-1. Charleston City areas or sub-divisions – the Sofa Super Store was located in the West Ashley subdivision. Locations of fire stations, both CFD and mutual aid departments are indicated by red circles. Background image used with permission of County of Charleston, South Carolina. Enhancements by NIST. 
3-4 

various tasks, such as establishing water supply, advancing hose lines, or effecting rescues, as well as the 

overall scope and effectiveness of the tactical intervention strategy being applied in a given situation. 

In the past, the CFD inspected the Sofa Super Store, assessed fire hazards associated with store, and noted 

locations of electrical and gas supply (Appendix M). In addition, as part of pre-planning for buildings 

within their response area, the first due companies, Engines 11 and 10 and Ladder 5 inspected Sofa Super 

Store. Their inspection noted a hydrant location to the rear of the warehouse on Pebble Road at the 

intersection with Sarah Road (Appendix M). The inspection did not identify new additions to the 

structure, the lack of a fire door between the holding area and loading dock, the lack of a suspended 

ceiling above the holding area, the wood construction of the loading dock, or the solvents stored on the 

loading dock. The frequency of the inspections could not be documented. The training and qualification 

of inspection team members to a national standard, such as NFPA 1031, Professional Qualifications for 

Fire Inspector and Plan Examiner [15], could not be documented. Professional qualification may be 

demonstrated through a nationally accepted certification examination, such as the Fire Plan Examiner

[16]; Fire Inspector I and II [17,18], and Certified Fire Marshal [19]. 

CFD procedures indicated that for fires involving structures less than five stories in height, the first alarm 

assignment was two engine companies, a ladder truck company, and a BC [1, 8]. For structures over five 

stories, the first alarm assignment was three engines, a ladder truck, a BC, and an AC. Procedures also 

stated that a confirmed report of smoke would trigger the assignment of an additional engine company. 

When a ranking officer arrived on the fire ground, that officer automatically became the incident 

commander. A captain arriving with an engine or truck company would be incident commander until a 

BC, AC, or Fire Chief arrived in which case the ranking officer would automatically become the incident 

commander. Once on the scene, an incident commander could request additional fire companies as 

incident conditions warranted. 

3.3 FIRE SERVICE RESPONSE 

3.3.1 Initial Alarm 

A driver on the Savannah Highway observed a smoke plume/fire at the rear of the west showroom of the 

Sofa Super Store at approximately 6:56 p.m. The driver notified the store manager who walked back to 

the loading dock area and observed a fire near the ceiling in the loading dock area. The manager 

discharged a portable fire extinguisher but was not able to extinguish the fire. The manager returned to 

the main showroom and instructed an employee to call 911. The manager located a second portable fire 

extinguisher and returned to the holding area. Because of the heat and smoke from the fire on the loading 

dock, he was unable to enter the loading dock through the open roll-down door between the holding area 

and the loading dock, but discharged the extinguisher towards the fire through the open door. The 

manager heard the roll-down fire door (Figures O-5, O-6, and O7) to the warehouse close before he 

returned to the showroom. 

 
3-5

Figure 3-2. Location of fire stations and street names for West Ashley sub-division of Charleston. Background image used with permission of County of Charleston, South Carolina. Enhancements by NIST. 
3-6 

Figure 3-3. Aerial view of the location of fire stations and street names for West Ashley sub-division of Charleston. Background image used with permission of County of Charleston, South Carolina. Enhancements by NIST. 
3-7

Figure 3-4. Unincorporated areas (various colors) intermingle with Charleston City area (gray). Background image used with permission of County of Charleston, South Carolina. Enhancements by NIST. 
3-8 

3.3.2 Dispatch and Arrival of Initial Companies 

At 7:09 p.m., the CFD was dispatched for a possible fire behind the furniture store at 1807 Savannah 

Highway in the West Ashley area. Engine 11 (E-11) and an AC were en route from Station 11 at 1517 

Savannah Highway, approximately 1.3 km (0.8 miles) east of the Sofa Super Store. BC-4 was also 

dispatched and responded. The second due engine, Engine 10 (E-10) was out of its station, but responded 

and was en route at 7:09 p.m. Responding from Station 10 which it shared with E-10, Ladder 5 (L-5) was 

also en route from their station at 805 Savannah Highway, approximately 3.4 km (2.1 miles) east of the 

furniture store. While en route to the store, BC-4 observed smoke and confirmed the fire and initiated the 

dispatch of the third engine assignment. 

At 7:11 p.m. BC-4 arrived on the scene and reported a trash fire at the side of the store. The AC arrived 

next by 7:12 p.m., entered the front of the store, and walked down the center aisle to the rear of the main 

showroom. As BC-4 returned to the front of the store from the loading dock area, he conferred with the 

AC who indicated that he did not find any fire or smoke in the main showroom. As E-10 arrived at the 

store, it was directed to back down the driveway to the west of the store to set-up to attack a trash fire. 

After relocating his car, BC-4 joined E-10 near the loading dock. As E-11 arrived, it was positioned in 

front of the store to support operations through the front doors of the main showroom (Figure 3-5). 

At this time, the first two arriving companies, E-10 and E-11, were positioned to attack the fire, E-10 at 

the loading dock, and E-11 at the front of the store. Each engine was equipped with a 2900 L (750 gal) 

water tank, which provided water until a connection to a hydrant was established. The third company on 

the initial dispatch, Ladder 5, was equipped with an aerial ladder, but with neither a water tank nor a 

water pump. 

3.3.3 Loading Dock Fire 

The captain from E-10 used a 2.5 cm (1 in) diameter hose to extinguish the trash and debris burning 

outside the loading dock (Figures C-1 and C-4). The E-10 crew observed fire inside the loading dock and 

used a 3.8 cm (1.5 in) diameter pre-connected hose line to initiate an interior attack on the fire inside the 

loading dock. 

As BC-4 directed the suppression operations at the loading dock, he radioed the AC and informed him 

that the fire had spread to the interior of the loading dock. 

At this early stage in the response, only five minutes after dispatch, the fire department had located the 

trash fire on the asphalt paved area and had discovered that the fire had spread to the interior of the 

loading dock. The AC surveyed the interior of the showrooms and did not observe any fire or smoke. 

Based on observations of the fire fighters in the showroom, the fire did not appear to have spread into the 

showrooms. 

After reporting that the fire had spread to the interior of the loading dock, BC-4 instructed E-12 to lay a 

supply hose to E-10 at the loading dock to provide water for the suppression operations. At the time at 

which E-12 received the command to lay hose, E-12 had been dispatched, but was notyet enroute. Until 

E-12 connected E-10 to a hydrant, the water available for suppression was limited to E-10’s onboard 

water tank. 
3-9

3.3.4 Discovery of Fire at Rear of West Showroom 

While the fire fighter and engineer of Engine 11 worked to locate a hydrant, the AC and the E-11 captain 

re-entered the showroom to search for extension of the fire into the retail space. Accompanied by a store 

employee, the E-11 captain and AC went to the rear of the west showroom. The AC opened a door that 

connected to the loading dock and observed that the fire had spread into the loading dock. Using a glove 

protected hand, the E-11captain was able to close the door . The E-11 captain immediately requested a 

3.8 cm (1.5 in) hose line be pulled to the rear of the west showroom. The AC radioed that the fire had 

spread to inside the rear of the building and instructed E-15 to pull a 3.8 cm (1.5 in) hose line to the rightrear of the building. 

At this point (7:14 p.m.), the fire department was aware that the fire had spread into the showroomas 

demonstrated by the radio communication “I’ve got fire inside the rear of the building and it’s walking 

it’s way right on into the, into the showroom.” But, it is not clear if “showroom” referred to the rear of 

the west showroom, the rear of the main showroom, or both. While the fire had been detected through the 

double doors at the rear of the west showroom, it is not clear whether fire fighters had discovered any fire 

spread above the suspended ceiling or into the holding area. 

3.3.5 Suppression Activities at Loading Dock Fire 

The captain of E-10 selected a 3.8 cm (1.5 in) diameter hose line for an interior attack into the enclosed 

loading dock area. Wearing full protective gear and self-contained breathing apparatus, the captain and a 

fire fighter from E-10 advanced the charged 3.8 cm (1.5 in) hose into the loading dock area approximately 

7.6 m (25 ft). The team entered the enclosed loading dock area through the sliding door adjacent to the 

warehouse (Appendix C, Figure C-4). The loading area appeared to be fully involved in fire from floor to 

ceiling. The interior team directed water at about 230 L/min (60 gal/min) on the fire, but were not able to 

control the fire. The team indicated that the flow from their fog nozzle appeared to push the fire around 

the room. As the team retreated from the loading dock area, the hose line burst or was burned through by 

the fire near the doorway. The fire fighting team moved through the water spray from the burst hose line 

and exited the structure through the door adjacent to the warehouse. 

By 7:17 p.m., E-12 had arrived on the scene and began to lay a 6.4 cm (2.5 in) supply line to E-10. Fire 

fighters from E-12 repaired the burst 3.8 cm (1.5 in) hose line while the captain and fire fighter from E-10 

attempted another interior attack using the 2.5 cm (1 in) hose line. The smaller diameter hose line was 

not effective in controlling the fire inside the loading dock, so the E-10 team backed out. The 3.8 cm 

(1.5 in) hose line had been returned to service, so the E-10 team attempted a third interior attack. 

By 7:16 p.m., the Fire Chief arrived on the fire scene and met with the AC and BC 4. After surveying the 

fire in the loading dock area, the Fire Chief halted the interior attack and ordered the interior team to back 

out of the enclosed loading dock. At 7:20 p.m. E-12 radioed E-10, indicating that the supply line to E-10 

was being charged from the hydrant at the corner of Blitchridge Road and First Drive. 

3.3.6 Extension of Fire into the Warehouse 

As the interior of the enclosed loading dock area was fully involved in fire and the crew of E-10 exited 

the loading dock, BC-4 identified the spread of the fire into the warehouse. The only opening from the 

showrooms or loading dock area was a roll-down fire door from the holding area through the breezeway 
3-10 

and into the warehouse (roll-down fire door # 1 in Figure 1-8). The store manager reported hearing this 

fire door close before he exited the main showroom. 

After observing the black smoke plume, units from St. Andrew’s Fire Department, a mutual aid 

department, self dispatched to the fire scene. At 7:24 p.m., the mutual aid department arrived and after 

discussion with the Fire Chief, at least two engine companies and a ladder company from St. Andrew’s 

Fire Department were assigned to the rear of the warehouse. Once the mutual aid units connected to a 

hydrant on Pebble Road, they deployed their ladder and directed an aerial water stream onto the rear of 

the warehouse. 

E-10 was receiving water through a supply line from E-12 which had located a hydrant at the intersection 

of Blitchridge Road and First Drive (see Figures 1-17 and 2-4). It is not clear how much or how steady 

the water supply was to E-10. The supply lines were laid across Savannah Highway and radio calls 

requested the Charleston Police to stop automobile traffic from driving across the hose lines. E-12 was 

pumping water to E-10 at the loading dock through about 230 m (750 ft) of 6.4 cm (2.5 in) hose, but 

received requests to increase the pressure. Crews from E-10 were applying water through at least one 

6.4 cm (2.5 in) line and one 3.8 cm (1.5 in) line. 

BC-4 directed the E-12 crew and other off-duty fire fighters to cut a hole through the external roll-down 

door on the north side of the warehouse. E-10 radioed that the tank water was down to one-quarter full, 

and the Fire Chief instructed E-12 to increase water supply pressure by “50 more pounds.” 1

 Two 6.4 cm 

(2.5 in) hose lines were pulled from E-10 in an attempt to suppress the fire from outside the warehouse. 

However, the fire was spreading rapidly across the furniture items, and crews did not enter the warehouse 

or attempt to conduct an interior attack. BC-4 directed an off-duty captain and additional off-duty fire 

fighters to move L-5 from the front (north side) of the store to the adjacent grass lot (west side). Once a 

water supply was established to L-5, the aerial ladder/platform was used to initiate an aerial stream to 

suppress the fire in the warehouse and loading dock as well as protect an adjacent auto repair garage to 

the west of the store. 

3.3.7 Suppression of West Showroom Fire 

As the E-11 captain left the rear of the west showroom and returned to the front of the store, the captain 

found L-5 fire fighters pulling a 3.8 cm (1.5 in) hose in the front door. The AC directed E-16, which was 

en route to the front of the store with instructions to pull a 6.4 cm (2.5 in) hose in the front door. Both 

hose lines deployed through the front doors were pulled to the rear of the west showroom. Since fire 

crews were pulling the hoses to the rear of the west showroom, the fire department appeared to be focused 

on suppressing the fire on the loading dock. They did not appear to have evidence that the fire had spread 

through the open roll-down door into the holding area, into the void space above the suspended ceiling, 

and eventually into the rear of the main showroom. 

After the E-16 engineer dropped off his captain and fire fighter near the front of the store, the engineer 

began to deploy a 6.4 cm (2.5 in) supply line to E-11. In this case, E-16 deployed the end of a hose near 

E-11 at the front of the store and then drove east on Savannah Highway to locate a hydrant. The hydrant 

that had been installed near the intersection of Wappoo Road and Savannah Highway had been removed 

 

1

 Pounds was used as shorthand for pounds per square inch (psi), a measure of water pressure. Double jacketed fire hose lines 

typically have working pressures of 300 psi (2070 kPa) and fire engine water pumps can produce in excess of 500 psi (3450 kPa) 

of water pressure at the pump outlet. 
3-11

(Figures 1-16 and 1-17), so E-16 continued east on Savannah Highway until the engineer located a 

hydrant in front of Morris Nissan automobile dealership at 1650 Savannah Highway (Figures 1-16, 1-17, 

and 2-4). 

At 7:16 p.m., the L-5 engineer requested that E-11 charge with water or pressurize the 3.8 cm (1.5 in) 

hose line. Until a supply line was connected to E-11, the water available to the fire fighters working 

through the front door was limited to the on-board tank of E-11. By 7:16 p.m., the Fire Chief had arrived 

on the scene and discussed the fire situation with the AC and BC-4. While the AC directed operations at 

the front of the store, the Fire Chief directed operations in the loading dock area. 

The E-16 engineer notified E-11 that the supply line to E-11 was being charged with water. As water 

began to move through the supply hose from E-16 to E-11 at 7:26 p.m., the E-16 engineer radioed that 

water was coming. By 7:27 p.m., E-11 was receiving water through a single supply line. It is not clear 

how much or how steady the water supply was to E-11. The supply line was laid across Savannah 

Highway and radio calls were still requesting the Charleston Police to stop automobile traffic from 

driving across the hose lines. E-16 was supplying water to E-11 at the front of the store through 

approximately 560 m (1850 ft) of 6.4 cm (2.5 in) hose. Interior crews had pulled at least three lines, a 

2.5 cm (1 in), a 3.8 cm (1.5 in) and a 6.4 cm (2.5 in), through the front door of the store. It is not clear 

that E-11 was receiving sufficient water for simultaneous operation of all of these hose lines. 

3.3.8 Rescue of Trapped Employee 

At about 7:27 p.m., when both engines were initially connected to hydrants, a Charleston Fire 

Department dispatcher notified the Fire Chief that it had received a cell phone call from an employee 

trapped inside the rear of the building. After the Fire Chief spoke over the radio with the AC, the AC and 

BC-5 led a team of four fire fighters from St. Andrew’s Fire Department around to the rear of the main 

showroom to rescue the trapped employee. The team had to break through a locked wooden gate at the 

rear of the east showroom (Appendix F, Figure F-9) in order to gain access to the rear of the main 

showroom and then to the exterior wall of the repair shop. The trapped employee was using a hammer to 

bang on a metal exterior wall. Guided by the sound of his banging, fire fighters located the trapped 

employee and used a fire ax and forcible entry tool to open a hole in an exterior wall of the repair shop. 

The team rescued the employee through a hole in the wall in the workshop that was connected to the 

warehouse (not from the showroom) (Appendix H, Figure H-3). After rescuing the trapped employee, the 

team returned to the front of the store. 

3.3.9 Fire in the Rear of the Main Showroom 

While the fire department attempted to suppress the fire on the loading dock and at the rear of the west 

showroom, the fire had also spread to the holding area (Figure 2-5). The store manager reported that the 

roll-down fire door to the warehouse closed before he had exited the store. The employee who was 

rescued from the repair shop also indicated that he was trapped because the roll-down fire door to the 

warehouse was closed. The fire did not spread from the warehouse to the rear of the main showroom 

through the closed roll-down fire door. 

Post-fire inspection of the holding room documented that the roll-down door from the loading dock to the 

holding area did not close during the fire. Examination of the operating mechanism after the fire 
3-12 

demonstrated that this roll-down door did not have fusible links or other components that would have 

automatically closed the door in case of a fire. The smoke and flames from the loading dock flowed 

through this open door and into the holding area. 

Thermal radiation from smoke and flames ignited furniture items that were staged inside the holding area. 

The metal frames that were visible in the post fire photographs (see Figures D-28, D-29, and D-30) 

demonstrate that multiple items including sofas and futons were in the holding area at the time of the fire. 

Store employees reported that the holding area lacked a suspended ceiling and that one could see the 

underside of the roof if one looked up while in the holding area. 

(i) Smoke Fills the Void Space 

The lack of a suspended ceiling above the holding area allowed the hot smoke to flow into the void space 

above the suspended ceiling but below the roof of the main showroom. The volume above the suspended 

ceiling of the main showroom was significant, representing about one-third the volume of the main 

showroom structure and would have required significant time to fill. The wisps of smoke emerging from 

the vertical seam between the main and west showrooms (Figure 1-6) at about 7:34 p.m. were consistent 

with the smoke filling a significant portion of the interstitial volume. 

(ii) Fire Spreads from Holding Area to Rear of Main Showroom 

It is not clear how the fire moved from the holding room to the rear of the main showroom. There were at 

least three possible paths that would have allowed the fire to spread into the main showroom: 

• First, the hot smoke moving into the interstitial space might have ignited items above the 

suspended ceiling. From post-fire photographs of the east showroom interstitial space which 

was the only interstitial space not completely consumed by the fire, the combustible fuels 

above the suspended ceiling may have been limited to flexible wire-reinforced plastic air 

ducts, electrical wiring, and 0.1 m (4 in) x 0.1 m (4 in) x 1.8 m (6 ft) wood supports for the air 

handling units. The hot fire gases could have ignited some of these items above the suspended 

ceiling and the burning items/material might have dropped down into the main showroom. If 

the hot gases/flames had ignited combustible items above the suspended ceiling, the fire would 

likely have spread very quickly into the rear of the main showroom. 

• A second potential path for the fire might have been through the partition wall. However since 

the wall was constructed out of 12.7 mm (0.5 in) thick gypsum board on both sides, it would 

have taken the fire some time to penetrate both sides of the partition wall. If the wall was 

constructed using two layers of fire resistant Type X, 15.6 mm (0.625 in) thick gypsum board 

on both sides of a metal studs, the wall would have been rated as a two-hour fire wall [20]. If 

the fire team on the loading dock had directed a solid stream of water onto the partition wall 

then the impingement of the water stream on the gypsum wall would have likely shortened the 

time to failure of the wall. For the second path, significant time would have been required for 

the fire to penetrate both sides of the gypsum lined partition wall. Video of the fire shows fire 

penetration into the main showroom approximately 40 minutes into the fire. 

• The third potential path that might have allowed the fire to spread was through the metal door 

between the holding area and the main showroom. It is unlikely that this metal door was open 

during the early part of the fire because smoke would have flowed through an open door into 

the rear of the main showroom and the fire spread would have been visible to fire fighters in 

the showroom. After the early part of the fire, it appears that the door may have opened or 
3-13

been partially opened sometime during the fire. Hot gases or flames from the loading dock 

would have ignited the items within the holding area, which included futons and a sofa. The 

heat from the burning items in the holding area and the loading dock might have heated the 

door frame sufficiently to warp the frame. The fire would then have moved through the 

cracks, or possibly the partially opened door into the main showroom. It is also possible that a 

fire fighter might have opened the door to check for fire and was unable to close the door. 

Once the door was unlatched, if it was unlatched, the fire induced air flow may have pulled the 

door open. The hot smoke and burning items in the holding area may have also prevented a 

fire fighter from closing the door. 

Of the three potential paths identified above, the third path, fire spreading through the door appears most 

consistent with the fire development. 

(iii) Fire Growth in Rear of Main Showroom 

Once the fire spread from the holding area into the rear of the main showroom, there was more fuel 

available to the fire. The fire in the rear of the main showroom did not have ready access to air and was 

under-ventilated. Post-fire review of photographs and videos, as well as fire fighter interviews, 

demonstrated that the only ventilation paths to the rear of the showroom were the open front doors, the 

roll-down door to the loading dock, and the double doors at the rear of the west showroom. Fire fighters 

described a “cone” of clear air at the front doors of the main showroom. This would have been consistent 

with fresh air being drawn into the front of the structure. The fire on the loading dock was welldeveloped and consuming large amounts of air. It is unlikely that the fire at the rear of the main 

showroom had access to air from the loading dock or through the double doors at the rear of the west 

showroom. The CFD did not ventilate the roof, so no vertical pathway existed in the rear of the main 

showroom. There were no doors or windows on the rear (south) side of the main showroom. Although 

there were open fire doors between the main showroom and the east and west showrooms, the exterior 

doors on the west and east showrooms were closed. The fire growth in the rear of the main showroom 

was slow due to the lack of air. 

With only limited access to air, the fire would have initially ignited the outer layers of fabric and foam on 

the furniture. The fabric and foam would likely have supported an intense, but relatively short, release of 

heat that might not have been sufficient to spread the fire due to the limited amount of oxygen. The 

slower burning wood components of the furniture might have allowed the fire to continue to burn, albeit 

at much lower heat release rate, for a longer period of time. 

3.3.10 Fire in the Front of the Main Showroom 

As the AC returned to the front of the store, the fire was spreading into the main showroom. Inside the 

showroom were crew members of Engines 6, 11, 15, 16, and 19 and L-5. At this stage in the response, 

the crews had already pulled a 3.8 cm (1.5 in) hose and a 6.4 cm (2.5 in) hose through the front doors, 

through the main showroom, and to the rear of the west showroom. An additional 6.4 cm (2.5 in) hose 

had been pulled about 23 m (75 ft) into the main showroom. But, it was unclear as to whether the second 

6.4 cm (2.5 in) hose line was intended for the rear of the main showroom or the rear of the west 

showroom. Even with the hose lines in place, E-11 did not appear to be providing sufficient water to 

charge or pressurize all three hose lines simultaneously. The amount of water was not sufficient to 

control the fire at the rear of the main showroom. 
3-14 

As the fire continued to grow in the rear of the main showroom and the smoke filled the volume above the 

ceiling, smoke continued to accumulate in the main showroom. As the smoke layer above the heads of 

the fire fighters continued to thicken and eventually dropped closer to the floor the visibility decreased. 

The fire fighters within the smoke filled main showroom became disoriented as evidenced by radio 

transmissions, and at approximately 7: 27 p.m., fire fighters began to request help [8, 9]. 

As observed in photographs and videos, the smoke that initially appeared at the front of the store was 

light brown in color and did not flow upward quickly. This lack of upward flow or buoyancy resulted in 

the smoke moving across the store front rather than flowing up past the façade (Figure 3-7). The brown 

color was consistent with partially burned combustion products from an under-ventilated fire, a fire that 

did not have sufficient air for complete combustion. The lack of buoyancy was likely the result of the 

smoke being diluted with cooler air as the smoke moved towards the front of the showroom. As the fire 

continued to grow and spread in the rear of the main showroom, the brown smoke emerged from the front 

doors in increasing quantities (Figure 3-8). The smoke exhibited more buoyancy, either because of less 

mixing or higher temperature, and flowed in a more vertical plume up the building façade. At about 

7:35 p.m. the fire fighters broke the front windows to allow more of the smoke to vent and improve the 

visibility in the main showroom. After the windows were vented, air was drawn into the front of the main 

showroom through the lower portion of thebroken windows in addition to the doors. Photographs 

demonstrate that furniture just inside the front windows which smoke had obscured, became visible after 

the windows were broken. The amount of smoke at the front of the main showroom increased and 

changed from a brownish to a blacker color. The change in smoke color was still consistent with partially 

oxidized combustion products from a fire that was ventilation-limited. 

The smoke continued to mix with air from either the loading dock through the holding area or from the 

vented windows at the store front. The air provided additional oxygen to the fire, which increased and 

released more energy. The additional energy increased the temperature of the smoke below the 

suspended ceiling in the main showroom. Eventually, the hot smoke mixed with sufficient air to create a 

layer below the suspended ceiling. As the fire at the rear of the main showroom ignited this layer of 

unburned combustion products, the fire rapidly moved from the rear of the showroom (southwest corner) 

to the front of the store (Figure 3-9). The fire then spread into the east side of the main showroom before 

emerging from the front of the store (northeast corner). After spreading to the entire main showroom, 

video recorded during the fire [4] demonstrated that the fire spread through the open fire doors into the 

west showroom and eventually to the front windows of the west showroom. 
3-15

Figure 3-7. Light brown smoke began to flow out of broken front windows. Photo 

taken at approximately 7:36 p.m. Photo used with permission of Alexander Fox. 

Figure 3-8. Additional smoke moved out of broken windows. Photo taken at approximately 

7:36 p.m. Photo used with permission of Alexander Fox. 
3-16 

3.3.11 Evacuation 

According to post-fire interviews of fire fighters, at approximately 7:27 p.m., the smoke layer continued 

to collect below the ceiling and began to increase in temperature. During post-fire interviews, fire 

fighters who were inside the main showroom described how they move toward the front of the store in 

response to the increased temperature and low visibility conditions. Some fire fighters were able to 

follow hose lines to the front door, while others moved toward the noise of E-11, which was located at the 

front of the store. As fire had spread to the rear of the main showroom and conditions inside the main 

showroom continued to deteriorate, at approximately, 7:35 p.m., the Fire Chief radioed that “...we need 

to vacate the building.” Once the smoke layer ignited, the fire spread extremely quickly. At about 

19:38 p.m., the Fire Chief ordered “Everybody abandon the building.” Multiple blasts of a fire engine air 

horn signaled for all fire fighters to exit the structure. Nine fire fighters were trapped within the 

showrooms, three within the west showroom and six within the main showroom. 

3.3.12 Search for Trapped Fire Fighters 

As the smoke layer dropped in the main showroom and visibility deteriorated, fire fighters began to call 

for assistance over their radios. Beginning around 7:27 p.m., broken radio calls indicated fire fighters in 

distress and “Mayday.” Due to the number of radio calls, it was not initially clear how many fire fighters 

needed assistance, who the trapped fire fighters were, or where they were located. It was not immediately 

clear which fire fighters had been on the teams inside the showrooms. The Fire Chief directed two twoman teams to attempt to enter and search for the trapped fire fighters. Both teams entered the main 

Figure 3-9. Black smoke and flames flowed out of front windows as fire spread to the main 

showroom. Photo taken at approximately 7:38 p.m. Photo used with permission of Alexander 

Fox. 
3-17

showroom, but were forced to retreat by the intense heat. At approximately 7:38 p.m., the last of the 

search teams exited the front of the structure. 

3.3.13 Post-Evacuation 

After the main and west showrooms were fully involved in fire, the fire department used multiple 6.4 cm 

(2.5 in) hose lines to direct water on the fire from the front of the store. An engine from a mutual aid 

company laid supply lines to L-5, which had been relocated to the grassy lot to the west of the store. L-5 

initiated two streams of water from its elevated platform and directed water toward the showrooms, 

loading dock, and warehouse. At around 7:44 p.m. the fire department requested that the city water 

department increase the water pressure in the supply lines in West Ashley. L-4 arrived and set up in the 

parking lot in front of the store and directed additional water streams down onto the showrooms from its 

elevated ladder. At about 10:00 p.m. the fire was declared under control and recovery operations were 

initiated. At approximately 4:00 am the next morning, recovery operations were completed. 

3.4 VENTILATION 

The CFD did not routinely cut vents or holes in roofs to exhaust hot gases. Fire fighters were not directed 

to ventilate any portion of the roof on the Sofa Super Store. 

During the early stages of the fire, the fire on the loading dock was under-ventilated. It appears that the 

skylights above the 2.7 m (9 ft) high section of the enclosed loading dock allowed the fire to vent through 

the roof early in the fire evolution. 

As the fire spread from the loading dock area to the holding area, flames extended from the loading dock 

and holding areas and impinged on the underside of the roof above the holding area. The intense heat 

ignited roofing material above the metal decking. After sustained flame impingement from underneath 

the metal decking and the burning roofing materials, the intense heat caused the metal decking to warp 

and this created cracks that allowed combustion products to vent through the roof. 

As the fire spread to the rear of the main showroom, the fire still behaved as though it was under 

ventilated. At approximately, 7:35 p.m., the front windows of the store were broken by fire fighters. 

Shortly after the windows were broken, the fire was provided with additional air either from the vent front 

windows or through the loading door roll-down door. The additional oxygen allowed the fire to spread 

rapidly from the rear to the front of the main showroom. 

3.5 INCIDENT COMMAND 

The initial Incident Command (IC) was established with the arrival of BC 4 at approximately 7:11 p.m. 

BC-4 directed E-10 to back down the driveway to the loading dock area and begin suppressing the trash 

fire. 

At about 7:12 p.m. the AC arrived on scene and became Incident Commander. The AC met with BC-4 

and decided that BC-4 would direct operations at the loading dock while the AC would check for 

extension of fire into the retail showrooms. The AC did locate the fire in the loading dock when the door 

at the rear of the west showroom was opened. Initially, the AC performed incident command functions 

by directing E-12 to supply water to E-10 at the loading dock and E-16 to supply water to E-11 at the 
3-18 

front of the store. The AC also directed responding companies to perform specific tasks such as E-15 

pulling hose lines into the front of the store. 

By 7:16 p.m., the Fire Chief had arrived on scene and became the IC. The Fire Chief met with the AC 

and BC-4 and instructed the AC to direct operations at the front of the store while the Fire Chief would 

direct loading dock operations. The Fire Chief subsequently directed operations at the loading dock, but 

also functioned as an incident commander by requesting additional resources, coordinating coverage of 

the city when units responded to the fire, and requesting the water company to increase water pressure. 

The transition of incident command from BC-4, to AC, to Fire Chief was accomplished as each higher 

ranking chief arrived on the scene. The fire department did not appear to set up or designate a specific 

location as a command post. The Fire Chief moved between the loading dock area and the front of the 

store to continually assess the fire ground operations on the west and north sides of the structure. It is not 

clear how the conditions on the east and south sides of the structure were monitored during the fire. 

There was not a single location for incoming fire fighters to check in or receive coordinated assignments. 

CFD procedures allow off-duty fire fighters to respond to and participate in fire ground activities. 

Department procedures required each fire fighter to provide a chief officer with an identification card 

before participating in fire ground activities. Department procedures did not require that the off-duty fire 

fighter check in with the incident commander, just a chief officer. 

The lack of a single command post and the ability of off-duty fire fighters to check in with different chief 

officers did not allow easy or coordinated tracking of personnel on the fire ground. For example, when 

the Fire Chief received the call from a trapped employee, the chief directed the AC to rescue the 

employee. However, it is not clear who was directing operations at the front of the store or inside the 

showrooms while the AC was leading the successful rescue effort. 

3.6 MUTUAL AID 

Most emergency services providers, and fire departments in particular, develop and operate with the 

assistance of mutual aid agreements with neighboring departments to augment their capability to respond 

to incidents when their assets are committed or otherwise unable to satisfy the community’s emergency 

response requirements. Such agreements are typically intended to facilitate rapid augmentation the 

requesting department’s staffing or equipment during an emergency, when needs exceed their capabilities. 

Mutual aid agreements vary widely in scope and content. Some agreements are designed to provide 

assets as specifically requested while others provide for the routine deployment of another department’s 

specialized assets such as hazardous materials units, advanced life support (ALS), bomb disposal units, 

water supply, aerial apparatus, or other specialty units when an alarm is initially transmitted. In the latter 

situation, the mutual aid assets are in effect shared by signatories to the agreements, and are used 

independent of actual jurisdictional or organizational ownership. All agreements benefit the member 

agencies by providing emergency surge capabilities (staffing, equipment, etc.) from other agencies that 

would be prohibitively expensive to operate and maintain in each jurisdiction. 

While mutual aid arrangements have an obvious practical value, they also have limiting characteristics. 

Assets which are infrequently used by a department requesting the mutual aid from another may be in use 

by the department possessing the asset on a regular basis, and therefore unavailable when needed by 

others. In a wide scope event, there may be more departments in need of specific assets than are available 
3-19

within the member compact. Jurisdictional differences in equipment, tactics, and communications 

systems may also present interoperability challenges to the effective use of mutual aid assets, as was the 

situation at this incident. Some agreements are relatively small in scope, limited for example, to nearby 

departments. Others may apply to all the departments in a county or cover a multi-county or even a 

multi-state region. 

Most agreements center on strategic principles that assure that the specific mutual aid requested will 

normally come from the nearest jurisdiction with the assets available. Depending on the amount of aid 

needed (the number, magnitude, and/or the diversity of the assets required), the aid is typically moved 

toward the incident in a fashion that first thins the assets of the area departments nearest the incident and 

then progressively back-fills or covers those departments providing the initial aid with units from 

departments further away, providing for successive concentric waves of resource augmentation. 

On-scene mutual aid was provided to the CFD by the St. Andrew’s Fire Department and St. James Island 

Fire Department. Each of the mutual aid departments responded on their own, not at the request of CFD. 

Interviews with fire fighters indicated that St. Andrew’s responded because the smoke plume was visible 

from two of their stations (HQ and Station 2). Fire fighters reported that St. Paul’s responded because 

several volunteer members of St. Paul’s Department were also full-time fire fighters with CFD. Radio 

communication over the CFD’s radios alerted many off-duty fire fighters. Units from Mt. Pleasant, North 

Charleston, St. James Island, and Summerville departments back-filled CFD stations and covered CFD 

response areas while CFD units were at the fire scene. 

Engine and truck companies from St. Andrew’s positioned themselves on Pebble Road and conducted 

suppression on the warehouse. A crew from St. Andrew’s also assisted the AC in extracting the trapped 

employee. Later in the fire, St. Paul’s Fire Department laid a water supply line to L-5 which was 

positioned to the north of the repair garage which was west of the store. St. James Island Department 

responded with an engine and a water tanker which were also positioned in support of L-5. This enabled 

L-5 to initiate a master stream on the loading dock and warehouse. L-4 responded and was positioned in 

the parking lot in front of the store. Fire fighters from St. Andrew’s Fire Department assisted in laying a 

water supply line to L-4 along Savannah Highway which enabled Ladder 4 to initiate a master stream on 

all three of the showrooms. 
3-20 

3.7 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 3 

[1] Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Investigation Report #F2007-18, National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, 

Morgantown, WV, February 2009. http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200718.pdf. 

[2] “Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report, Sofa Super Store, 1807 Savannah Highway, 

Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007 .” City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and 

Review Team, Phase II Report, June 2008. 

[3] “Report of S.C. OSHA Findings in June 18, 2007 Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire,” South 

Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Office of Occupational Safety and 

Health; undated report, file recorded 9/21/2007. 

[4] Video images recorded during the fire by Howard Armstrong and John Pundt. 

[5] Digital photographs taken during the fire by the private individuals including Stewart English and 

Alexander Fox. 

[6] Digital photographs taken during the fire by law enforcement organizations including the 

Charleston Police Department. 

[7] Digital photographs taken during the fire by news outlets including The Post and Courier and 

Associated Press. 

[8] Interviews of fire fighters conducted by National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

(NISOH). Interviews organized by the NIOSH investigation team and NIST team allowed to 

participate. Interviews included fire fighters from Charleston, St. Andrew’s, and St. James Island 

Fire Departments. 

[9] Radio Transmissions and Phone Call Transcript Sofa Super Store – Charleston, SC, June 18, 

2007. Released by City of Charleston on Aug. 10, 2007. Audio recordings available at 

http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2007/aug/10/911_ tapes_sofa_store_ 

fire_be_released_afternoon/. 

[10] Sofa Super Store Fire – Report of Investigation, ATF National Response Team Origin and Cause 

Report, Investigation 763010-07-0172, Report 32, June 22, 2007. 

[11] U.S. Census 2005, http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/SUB-EST2008.html. 

[12] City of Charleston website, http://www.charlestoncity.info/dept/content.aspx?nid=114. 

[13 NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, 2010 

National Fire Codes, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, pp. 1500-11, 2007. 

[14] NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, 

Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire 

Departments, 2010 National Fire Codes, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, pp. 

1710-9, 2010. 

[15] NFPA 1031, Professional Qualifications for Fire Inspector and Plan Examiner, National 

Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2003. 
3-21

[16] Fire Plan Examiner (CFE) Program – NFPA 1, Fire Code, NFPA 13, Installation of Sprinkler 

Systems, NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, and NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. 

http://www.nfpa.org/certifications 

[17] Certified Fire Inspector I (CFI/I) Program- NFPA 1, Fire Code, NFPA 13 Installation of Sprinkler 

Systems, NFPA 25, Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection 

Systems, NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, and NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. 

http://www.nfpa.org/certifications 

[18] Certified Fire Inspector II (CFI/II) Program– CFI/I codes listed above and NFPA 24, Installation 

of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances, and NFPA 220, Types of Building 

Construction. http://www.nfpa.org/certifications 

[19] Certified Fire Marshal - International Building Code, International Fire Code, NFPA 921 Guide 

for Fire and Explosion Investigations, International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA) 

Introduction to Fire Origin and Cause, and IFSTA Fire and Life Safety Educator. 

http://www.iccsafe.org/accreditation 

[20] Fire Resistance Design Manual – Gypsum Systems, GA-600-2009 Fire Resistance Design 

Manual, 19th Edition, Gypsum Association, Hyattsville, MD, 2009, www.gypsum.org. 
3-22 
4-1 

Chapter 4

COMPUTER SIMULATION OF FIRE AND SMOKE SPREAD

4.1 INTRODUCTION 

4.1.1 General 

Computer simulations, also known as numerical modeling, have been demonstrated to be useful, when 

properly applied, as a tool to help fill in details of the fire dynamics and to demonstrate the value of 

alternative building designs and fire safety measures [1]. When properly verified and validated, models 

can be used to obtain quantitative results. The Sofa Super Store simulation results are an approximation 

of the actual event, and should be considered considered as qualitative rather than quantitative. In other 

words, it is likely that the simulations do not return exactly the same results as might have been present in 

the real world situation, but can provide a reasonable approximation of conditions. These simulated 

scenarios can then be used to further examine relative differences when simulations that include changes 

to the modeled environment are compared with each other. 

This chapter provides a brief description of the models and the inputs that were used to simulate the fire 

and smoke spread during the Sofa Super Store fire for five different scenarios. The computations 

included simulated fire and smoke spread, potential temperatures, and oxygen concentrations that may 

have existed in the actual incident. Each of the simulation results was analyzed and compared to 

published tenability criteria [2], excluding any protective clothing or use of self-contained breathing 

apparatus (SCBA). Additional details and data on how the inputs were selected, assumptions about 

ventilation events, geometry, material properties and simulation results are detailed in Appendix K. The 

input files for each of the simulation runs are included in Appendix L. 

4.1.2 Simulation of the Fire and Smoke Spread 

The value of the computer simulation of the Sofa Super Store fire is its ability to generate a clearer picture 

of the conditions that existed within the Sofa Super Store as the fire progressed. The simulation can be 

used to examine the change in the initial conditions and analyze possible interventions on the dynamics of 

the fire and the environment within the store. The store environment and fire dynamics are characterized 

in this study by the following dependent variables: 

• heat release rate of the fire as a function of time; 

• visibility as a function of location and time; 

• temperature as a function of location and time; 

• oxygen volume fraction as a function of location and time; and 

• velocity of the air and fire plume as a function of location and time. 
4-2

(i) Fire Growth and Spread Inside the Store 

The focus of this simulation was the examination of conditions that may have been present in the Sofa 

Super Store during the first 40 minutes (2400 s) after the fire department discovered the fire in the loading 

dock area. For these model simulations, the fire department was on scene at time = 0, the fire was 

discovered at the rear of the west showroom at 2 minutes, E-12 began pumping water to E-10 (loading 

dock) at 10 minutes, broken radio calls began to indicate fire fighters in trouble at 16 minutes, front 

windows were vented at 24 minutes, fire was emerging from front windows at 26 minutes, last fire fighter 

successfully exited structure at 27 minutes, and the roof over the main showroom partially collapsed at 

40 minutes. Each 40 minute simulation covered the time period from fire department’s arrival at 

7:11 p.m., to just after the partial collapse of the main showroom roof at 7:51 p.m. 

(ii) Fire-Spread into Showrooms versus Warehouse 

The fire spread from the loading dock into both the warehouse and showrooms. The manner in which the 

fire spread to these two areas was significantly different. The spread of the fire into the showrooms was 

not reported by the fire fighters for at least 10 minutes after they entered the showrooms. The simulation 

was designed to provide insight into how the fire might have spread into the showrooms in a concealed or 

less visible manner. This simulation considered different scenarios for fire-spread into the showrooms, 

including 1) through the double doors at the rear of the west showroom, and 2) through the holding area. 

The movement of the fire into the warehouse was observed and reported by the fire fighters (Section 

3.3.6). The energy (heat) from the fire apparently moved through a metal wall and into the warehouse, 

igniting the fuel load stored in the warehouse. Because the movement of fire into the warehouse was 

straightforward, it was not the focus of this simulation. 

(iii) Impact of Sprinklers on the Loading Dock Fire 

Fire sprinklers are very effective in controlling the growth and spread of fires. Fire sprinklers were not 

installed in the showrooms, loading dock, or warehouse of the Sofa Super Store. The simulation 

considered the effect of sprinklers by including a scenario in which fire sprinklers were installed in the 

enclosed loading dock. 

(iv) Impact of Ventilation 

Ventilation can significantly impact how a fire grows and develops. The fire service often ventilates a 

structure by breaking windows or cutting holes in roofs in order to allow the smoke and hot gases to be 

exhausted from the structure. Less smoke and hot gases can improve visibility and make working 

conditions more tenable. Ventilation can also provide additional air to the fire and can result in a greater 

release of heat or energy. 

The fire at the rear of the main showroom moved quickly toward the front of the store after the front 

windows were broken by the fire service. This simulation considered how different ventilation scenarios 

might have affected the fire-spread, including 1) breaking the front windows, and 2) leaving the front 

windows intact. 

In addition to ventilating structures by breaking windows, the fire service might also cut holes in the roof. 

The simulation considered different scenarios involving holes in the roof, including: 1) a small opening 

above the holding area; and 2) a large opening above the rear of the main showroom. 
4-3 

4.1.3 Computer Model Simulations of the Fire Dynamics 

The simulation of the Sofa Super Store fire included the following five scenarios or cases: 

1) Baseline Scenario – an approximation of what actually occurred in Sofa Super Store. 

2) Sprinklered Scenario – fire sprinklers added to the loading dock. 

3) Front Windows Intact Scenario – baseline case except front windows remained intact. 

4) Small Vent Scenario – roof vented with a small hole, 1.7 m2 (18 ft2

), above holding area front 

windows intact. 

5) Large Vent Scenario – roof vented with a large hole, 5.9 m2 (64 ft2

), above rear of main 

showroom, front windows intact. 

The baseline scenario represents an approximation of what actually occurred in the store on June 18, 

2007, based upon the evidence and time line described in the previous chapters. The baseline, 

sprinklered, and intact front windows cases will be described briefly in this chapter. Each of the scenarios 

is described in more detail in Appendix K. 

4.2 NIST FIRE DYNAMICS SIMULATOR OVERVIEW 

4.2.1 General 

The NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) is a computational fluid dynamics model of fire-driven fluid 

flow. It solves a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally driven flow 

with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires [3]. A companion software program, 

Smokeview, allows for the simulation results to be easily displayed. Smokeview allows the viewing of 

FDS results in three-dimensional images. Smokeview can display contours of temperature, velocity, and 

gas concentration in planar slices. It can also display properties with iso-surfaces that are threedimensional versions of a constant value of a property of interest. Iso-surfaces are most commonly used 

to provide a three-dimensional approximation of the flame surface where fuel and oxygen mix in a 

stoichiometric ratio, yielding a reaction and a flame surface. Complete descriptions of the FDS model 

and Smokeview, as well as the technical references which support the model, are given in references 

[3-5]. 

Inputs required by FDS include the geometry of the structure, the computational cell size, the location of 

the fire source, the energy release rate of the fire source, the mass, geometry and thermal properties of 

walls, ceilings, floors, and furnishings, and the size, location, and timing of door and window openings to 

the outside of the structure. The selection of thermophysical properties and dimensions for the input 

parameters can have a significant impact on the outcome of the simulation, and because considerable 

uncertainty exists in the values of these parameters, a range of values is used. 

For a specific set of inputs, FDS calculates the fire-spread and smoke movement within the Sofa Super 

Store. The results of the simulation including the spread of fire and smoke within the loading dock, 

holding area, and showrooms, are compared to the photographic and video record and the statements of 

witnesses to assess the agreement between the simulation and the actual fire. The input parameters are 

systematically adjusted and the simulation re-run. This process of refining the input parameters continues 

until the best possible agreement has been achieved. 
4-4

4.2.2 Computational Domain and Cell Size 

A computational fluid dynamics model requires that a room or building be divided into a series of small 

boxes or cells. The model computes the density, velocity, temperature, pressure and species 

concentration of the gases in each cell as it steps through time. Based on the laws of conservation of 

mass, momentum, species, and energy, the model tracks the generation and movement of fire gases. 

Collected on scene by the NIST team, data describing the geometry, materials of construction, and 

estimated number and type of retail merchandise were incorporated as input parameters for the FDS 

simulations. Figure 4-1 shows a Smokeview rendering of the computational domain of the Sofa Super 

Store. 

The computational domain for the incident simulation consisted of a total of 1,102,382 cells that 

encompassed a total volume of approximately 140,000 m3

 (5 million ft3). Figure 4-1 shows an isometric 

view of the structure with cells to show relative scale. The black lines surrounding the structure indicate 

bounds of the volume within the computational domain. This outer perimeter reflects the computation of 

the fire and smoke within the building. It also includes the outdoor conditions that might have affected 

the flow of air to the fire and the flow of smoke from the fire. Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 show front and 

side views of the Sofa Super Store, respectively, as rendered by Smokeview. Two different cell sizes 

were used in the simulation. For volumes that contained parts of the structure, cells were 37.5 cm 

(14.8 in) on each side. Cells that were outside of the structure were used to track smoke movement, and 

were 75 cm (29.5 in) on each side. 

Selecting the appropriate cell size required balancing the need to resolve critical dimensions and physical 

phenomena against the need to budget enough time to perform the hundreds of computer runs necessary 

to assess the importance of different variables on the outcome. The FDS input parameters were adjusted 

by comparing the simulation results with the available photos, videos, witness statements and other 

documentation of the fire. This methodology has been used previously by NIST researchers in post-fire 

studies [6-13]. Over 250 computer simulations were required to match the observed phenomena and time 

line. The simulation that best matched with observations and time lines is presented as the baseline case. 

Each of the other cases presented in this report used the baseline case as the starting point and was 

subsequently modified to incorporate fire sprinklers, maintain the front windows intact, or create 

openings in the roof. Approximately four days were required to generate each 2400 second simulation. 

Figure 4-1. Computational domain of the Sofa Super Store. Image rendered by Smokeview. 
4-5 

Figure 4-2. Front view of the Sofa Super Store as rendered by Smokeview. 

Figure 4-3. Side view of the Sofa Super Store as rendered by Smokeview. 

4.2.3 Geometry 

Building features such as walls, floors, windows, doors and furniture are described in FDS as 

“obstructions” (OBST in the input file, Appendix L). The obstructions may be colored for identification 

and may be assigned material properties. The obstructions may be entered into the simulation with exact 

measurements from the building. However, FDS can only work with items that fall exactly on cell 

boundaries. FDS takes the obstructions as they are defined in the input file and adjusts them to match the 

cell boundaries. As a result, items may either grow or shrink to match the cells. Given the cell 

dimensions, these size adjustments were of only secondary importance. 

Figure 4-4 is a plan view of the Sofa Super Store, as rendered by Smokeview, showing a layout of the 

furniture and walls. Furniture in the main showroom was consumed almost completely by the fire (see 

Figures B-15 to B-17, and D-20 to D-25). There was some remaining furniture in the west showroom, 

primarily in the rear (south) end of the building (see Figures E-17 to E-25). This area of the showroom 

stored sleep sofas in displays that were stacked two high on wood-framed racks. The damage in the east 

addition was much less severe because the roll-down doors closed when their fusible links released (see 

Figures F-11 to F-16). The rear roll-down fire door between the main and east showrooms was partially 

blocked by a coat rack and did not close completely. The warehouse contained multiple rows of highrack storage. The fire consumed nearly all of the furniture in the warehouse (see Figures G-15 to G-17) 

and loading dock (see Figures B-4 to B-6). The consumption of fuel in the main and west showrooms 
4-6

was so extensive that the furniture layout used in the model was based largely on post-fire residue and 

witness accounts. Post-fire residue included metal hardware, steel frames, hinges, and springs. Witnesses 

described the showrooms as being “crowded” with furniture. The general description of the main 

showroom placed aisles down the center of the room, from the front door to the rear office area. Further, 

three aisles stretched across the showroom, east to west, aligned approximately with the roll-down doors. 

The remaining floor space was filled with upholstered furniture laid out tightly in typical rectilinear 

configurations. Because the exact layout was not known, furniture in the simulation was arranged in 

rows. Some of the rows were created by arranging furniture in “U” shaped configurations with a sofa and 

two chairs. In other places, rows consisted of single furniture items. The rear of the west addition was 

arranged in a manner that was similar to what could be discerned from the furniture that was in place 

during the post-fire scene examination. 

Figure 4-5 shows a rendered view from the interior of the main showroom. The light colored area in the 

lower center of this image is the rear roll-down door (roll-down fire door 2 in Figure 1-8) on the wall 

separating the main showroom from the west showroom. This figure also shows the open non-fire rolldown door in the wall that separated the loading dock from the holding area. At the south end of the 

holding area, the light-colored area represents the location of the roll-down door (fire door 1 in Figure 

1-8) in the wall that separated the original structure from the breezeway that provided access to the 

warehouse. According to witness accounts this door closed early in the event and this would be 

consistent with the fusible links activating. 

Figure 4-4. Overhead view showing furniture layout used in the FDS simulations. 
4-7 

Figure 4-5. Overhead view including sections of the main and west showrooms, the holding area, 

loading dock, breezeway, warehouse and work areas in the simulation. 

4.2.4 Synchronizing the Model 

In order to develop an understanding of the fire progression and the conditions inside the structure, it was 

necessary to synchronize the simulated time line with the physical time line. The development of the 

incident time line was presented in Chapter 2. Since the earliest available photos and video were captured 

well into the event (approximately 13 minutes after the first dispatch), it was determined that the most 

appropriate way to synchronize the simulated time line with the physical time line was through a 

combination of radio transmission transcripts and witness statements. 

At 7:07 p.m., a report of a fire at the Sofa Super Store was received by the Charleston County 911 

Emergency Center. A store manager attempted to put out the fire with a portable dry chemical fire 

extinguisher, but he was unsuccessful. After locating a second portable extinguisher, and heading back 

toward the loading dock, the store manager was unable to enter the loading dock because of the intense 

heat and smoke. From a position within the holding area, he discharged the second extinguisher into the 

loading dock. As he discharged the extinguisher, he heard one of the roll-down doors closing. The sound 

was presumably from the door (fire roll-down 1 in Figure 4-5) at the end of the holding area. 

Battalion Chief 4 was the first city fire department unit to arrive on scene. At 7:10:46 p.m.1

, BC-4 made a 

radio transmission to dispatch stating, “Bunch of trash and debris burning along side the building.” That 

was followed 10 seconds later by, “...it may have got in the building. It’s right up against the wall.” 

Following these transmissions, BC-4 relocated to the front of the building to direct Engine 10 to back 

down the driveway to the loading dock area. Engine 10 arrived on scene at 7:11:40 p.m. When BC-4 and 

 

1

 Times in Table 2-1 rounded to nearest minute, so 7:10:46 p.m. rounded to 7:11 p.m. 

West Showroom

Warehouse

Loading Dock

Holding

Area

Main Showroom

NIST Image

Open non-fire

 roll-down door

Roll-down fire

door to

warehouse

Top of Ramp
4-8

E-10 captain returned to the loading dock area, flames were visible inside the loading dock through the 

opening in the wall that housed the exhaust fan. This sequence of events was used to synchronize the 

model time line to the physical time line, where time 0 in the simulation is equal to 7:10:53 p.m. 

4.2.5 Heat Transfer and Materials 

Radiative heat transfer is included in the model and is shown as the solution of the radiation transport 

equation for a non-scattering gray gas. All solid surfaces are assigned thermal boundary conditions, plus 

information about their burning behavior. Heat and mass transfer to and from solid surfaces are based on 

empirical correlations. FDS utilizes material properties of the furnishings, walls, floors, and ceilings to 

compute fire growth and spread. For materials that burn, additional parameters such as reference 

temperature, heat of combustion, heat of reaction and maximum burning rate are specified. The 

properties for the materials, to the extent they were available, were taken from published fire data and 

references. 

The assumption was made that all furnishings in the building were composites of foam and fabric, and 

that this material or composite constituted the entire fuel load. Table K-2 (Appendix K) details the 

properties for each of these layers. It was assumed that a single step reaction occurred for each material, 

and that all of the material was converted into gaseous fuel. The reaction was based on polyurethane 

foam, represented as C6.3H7.1O2.1N [5, Appendix C, Table C.3]. Other fuels such as flooring, wood 

display shelves, ceiling tile, paper documents, or wood framing, were not included as fuel for these 

simulations. 

Interior finishes were categorized into the following list of materials: gypsum board, concrete block, 

concrete slab, sheet metal, steel, glass, carpet, ceiling tile, and wood. Table K-3 summarizes the 

properties assigned to materials in the simulation. Sheet metal and steel were assigned the same 

properties but were distinguished by thickness. 

The simulations did not include specific items as components of the fuel package because these items 

were considered to have negligible impact on the rapid fire spread through the showrooms during the 

early stages of the fire. These items included spray cans of solvents and paint at the rear of the main 

showroom and the foam insulation and membrane in the roof. Post-fire examination of an enclosed 

storage area outside the rear wall of the main showroom revealed dozens of spray cans that appeared to 

have contained paint or solvents. It was assumed that the fire spread across the main showroom to reach 

this storage area. Therefore, it was unlikely that the fuels in this storage area contributed significantly to 

the fire spread in the main showroom during the first 40 minutes of the fire. 

The foam insulation and roof membrane were located above the metal roof decking. If flames from the 

fire had impinged on the underside of the metal decking and increased the temperature of the decking, the 

foam insulation could have softened, melted, and eventually pyrolyzed. The pyrolysis products would 

then have leaked into interstitial void space below the decking and above the suspended ceiling through 

cracks or holes in the metal decking. If the unburned fuel/pyrolysis products had combined with 

sufficient air, then it would have resulted in increased heat release rate. 

The flames from the loading dock had direct access to the underside of the metal decking above the 

holding area because it lacked a suspended ceiling. However, a suspended ceiling had been installed 

above the rest of the main showroom. If the suspended ceiling tiles had remained intact, flames from fire 

on the showroom floor would not have been able to impinge on the underside of the metal decking and it 

would have been difficult for additional air to flow into the interstitial space. 
4-9 

Photographs taken during the fire demonstrate flames above the roof, but the flames appeared to be 

present only in close proximity to the holding area. During post-fire interviews, fire fighters did not 

report significant numbers of dislodged ceiling tiles or describe any flames above the ceiling except for 

around the holding area. This is consistent with the lack of flames on the roof, with the exception of the 

roof above the holding area. Since the direct impingement of flames appeared to be limited to the metal 

decking above the holding area, the energy content of the foam above the holding area was estimated to 

be less than 0.5% of the energy content of the fuels in the the enclosed loading dock. During the first 40 

minutes of the fire, the quantity of smoke and unburned fuel from the loading dock that was channeled 

through the holding area into the void space was assumed to be much greater than the leakage of foam 

pyrolysis through the metal decking above the holding area. 

4.2.6 Combustion 

The combustion process is handled by tracking where fuel and air mix at certain concentrations and react 

to produce heat. This is known as a mixture fraction combustion model [3], in which burning occurs in 

regions where the fuel and air are in specified stoichiometric proportion. This reaction processes 

generates heat along with products of combustion such as carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2) 

and water ( H2O), that are tracked as they move throughout the cells. 

4.2.7 Boundary Conditions and Vent Openings 

The placement of obstructions within the simulation forms the structure of the building and its contents. 

The flow calculations performed by FDS allow air, hot gases, smoke and flames to flow through the 

simulated building. Thermal radiation travels by line-of-sight and may be intercepted by obstacles within 

the cells. 

During the course of a fire, some items within the building may be consumed by the fire or otherwise 

change position. FDS does not have the capability to calculate burn-through or collapse but the user can 

remove items during the course of the calculations. Items that are removed can represent objects that fall 

or are destroyed by fire, or objects that are changed by people such as doors or windows that are opened. 

An opening or vent at the boundary of the simulation domain is defined in the simulation as a ‘VENT’ in 

the FDS input file (see Appendix L). All sides of the computational domain were modeled as being open 

to the environment. In these simulations, vents were used to allow fresh air to enter the simulation 

domain and to allow smoke and heat to exit the domain. Vents may be either simple openings that allow 

natural flow to occur based on the buoyancy of the hot gases, or vents may use a specified or forced flow 

rate such as the flow from a fan. 

A vent can also be used to introduce heat into the simulation and thus create the effect of a fire source in 

the model, by ejecting fuel according to a prescribed heat release rate (HRR)2

. Simulating the movement 

of the fire from the trash pile, through the wall, and into the loading dock, vents were used to initiate the 

fire on the loading dock. Later in the fire evolution, additional vents were used to simulate the spread of 

the fire from the holding area into the rear of the main showroom. 

 

2

 Heat Release Rate (HRR) is the rate at which a fire generates or releases energy or heat. 
4-10

Doors and windows were opened during the simulation based on time estimates obtained from photos, 

video, radio transmissions and interview statements. Additionally, some venting was triggered by 

temperature events. Roofs on the loading dock and warehouse were equipped with skylights that failed at 

various points during the fire. Likewise, the roll-down fire doors on the warehouse breezeway and the 

east showroom were closed in the simulation when temperatures nearby reached the activation 

temperature of the fusible links, 73.9 °C (165 °F). Fusible links that were stamped with “165” were 

observed by the NIST team in post-fire inspections. The performance or melting of the link at 73.9 °C 

(165 °F) was not tested by NIST. 

The CFD used the front doors to the main showroom access the showroom to survey fire-spread, to pull 

hoses, and to conduct suppression. Throughout each simulation, the front doors were open. Time 

stamped photographs were used to determine the times at which the windows of the main showroom were 

vented by fire fighters at the scene. A series of photographs documented the removal of the front 

windows on the main showroom between 7:35:05 p.m. and 7:35:57 p.m. Photos were also used to 

estimate the times at which the windows on the west showroom failed. These windows failed between 

approximately 7:38 p.m. and 7:44 p.m. In the simulation, windows were removed at times corresponding 

to estimates based on photographs and not based on the interior conditions or material properties of the 

windows. 

Radio transmission logs were used in conjunction with interview statements to estimate the time at which 

the door connecting the west showroom to the loading dock was opened by CFD. The timing events 

associated with venting the loading dock roof, main showroom ceiling and roof and west showroom 

interstitial space were all based on the conditions simulated by the model. NIST did not conduct fullscale tests to quantify the performance of roof, ceiling, or skylight assemblies. 

Photographs taken during the early stages of the fire show heavy smoke and flames exiting at the roof 

level. Figure 4-6 shows a photograph taken at 7:28:15 p.m. This photo shows heavy smoke venting from 

the loading dock and rear of the main showroom. Flames are also visible and appear to be coming from 

the roof of the main showroom. Because it was not possible to determine the exact location or size of the 

holes in the ceiling and roof, several holes were used in the simulations to represent the ventilation that 

took place. Table K-4 summarizes the ventilation conditions used in the simulations. 

4.2.8 Fire Sources Used in the Simulation 

Although the cause of the fire was undetermined, the area of origin was identified [14]. The fire initiated 

on a pile of discarded furniture outside the loading dock. The discarded furniture was generally located in 

the corner formed by the loading dock exterior (west) wall and the ramp that was used to access the 

loading dock door. Figure 4-7 shows a photograph of this area. 

In the simulation, the fire was initiated3

 in the loading dock at floor level, between the door and the 

ventilation fan access hole. This is identified as “Loading Dock Source” in Figure 4-8 and produced a 

 

3

 In FDS, the initiating fire is treated as an inflow of heat and combustion products through a vent. A vent was used within the 

simulation to introduce heat into the modeling domain and create the effect of a fire source in the model, by injecting fuel 

according to a prescribed HRR. 
4-11 

Figure 4-7. Photograph showing the outside of the loading dock. This was 

identified as the area of fire origin. 

Figure 4-6. Photograph showing the north and west sides of the showroom. 

Photo was taken at 7:28:15 p.m. 
4-12

peak HRR of 700 kW. The fire source was activated at the start of the simulation, operated for 600 s, and 

then shut off. No attempt was made to simulate the fire on the exterior side of the wall. 

The route by which fire made its way through the holding area and into the main showroom is not 

precisely known. The most likely means would have been for fire to breach the wall or door of the 

holding area into the rear of the main showroom, or for ignition to occur as a result of burning material 

dropping from above the ceiling. Because the route of spread was not known, fire-spread into the main 

showroom was assumed to be initiated in the area near the holding area wall. This area is identified in 

Figure 4-8 as “Main Showroom Source 1” and “Main Showroom Source 2.” These initiating fires were 

ramped separately using parameters for ultrafast t2

 fire curves [15]. Source 1 was initiated at 525 s 

(7:19:38 p.m.) and peaked at 4 MW. Source 2 was initiated at 660 s (7:21:53 p.m.) and peaked at 6 MW. 

A range of fire development parameters and conditions was input into different model runs and the 

simulation results were compared to observations. The parameters and conditions described above 

provided simulation outputs that were most consistent with the observations. 

4.3 BASELINE SIMULATION 

4.3.1 Overall Accuracy 

The baseline simulation represents an estimate of what actually occurred in the Sofa Super Store based 

upon the evidence and time line described in the previous chapters. The resulting HRRs in the different 

portions of the store, visibility as estimated from the predicted smoke flows, and the temperatures and 

oxygen volume fractions at different elevations are presented in the following sections. 

The following sections describe the simulation of properties that were not measured or observed on site. 

These simulated properties characterize the fire development (HRR, fire-spread rate, smoke movement, 

and temperature field) and are presented in the context of loss of tenability within the building due to lack 

of oxygen and heat. 

4.3.2 Heat Release Rate 

The total HRR for the fire, excluding the warehouse, is plotted as a function of time in Figure 4-9. The 

HRR produced by the warehouse contents dominated the total HRR in the mid and late stages of the 

simulation, but since the breezeway door closed early in the fire time line, there was no flow or transfer of 

material between these areas of the structure. In addition, the fire department did not enter the warehouse 

to suppress the fire there. This analysis will focus on conditions in the loading dock and showrooms. 

The HRR grew quickly from the initiating 700 kW fire, reaching 90 MW in 280 s as fire spread through 

the loading dock and into the holding area. Figure 4-10 separates the HRR events in the loading dock, 

holding area and rear showroom, main showroom, and west showroom. During the first 500 s, the 

loading dock fire dominated the HRR at about 85 MW. As the fire spread into the holding area and rear 

of the main showroom the HRR for the holding area and the rear of the main showroom began to increase 

to about 100 MW at around 1200 s. This increase in fire-spread to the holding area and main showroom 

was simulated by turning on Source 1 and 2 (Figure 4-8) in the computer model. As the fire spread into 

the rear of the main showroom, the fire became underventilated and began to decrease in HRR. The total 

HRR continued to decrease until about 1450 s when the removal of the windows in the main showroom, 

beginning at 1457 s (7:35:10 p.m.), provided a fresh influx of oxygen leading to the subsequent rapid fire 
4-13 

growth. The HRR of the fire grew to over 100 MW in the main showroom and 50 MW in the west 

showroom. The energy release rate of the holding area/rear main showroom increased slightly and then 

leveled out at about 40 MW. The loading dock HRR exhibited a transient peak at about 50 MW and then 

decreased to about 15 MW. 

4.3.3 Fire Growth and Smoke Spread 

The earliest available photos of the fire were taken at 7:22 p.m., approximately 13 minutes after the first 

dispatch. Therefore, knowledge of the early fire development is based on eyewitness accounts obtained 

during interviews of fire fighters. Some information was also gleaned from transcripts of the CFD radio 

transmissions. The fire initiated outside the enclosed loading dock in a pile of discarded furniture. This 

fire developed for an unknown period of time, and eventually spread into the enclosed loading dock 

through the floor and gaps in the construction. For each simulation, the model fire was initiated inside the 

loading dock. The model time line was synchronized to the physical time line at 7:12:43 p.m., the time 

BC-4 made the statement to the Assistant Chief, “Chief, I know it’s inside that part of the building right 

there.” This transmission was made after BC-4 had guided Engine 10 down the driveway to the loading 

dock area. The model time corresponding to this event was 110 s. By this time, fire inside the loading 

dock had progressed to the point that flames were venting from the exhaust fan in the west wall as well as 

through a gap between the roof sections of the loading dock. Figure 4-11 is an image rendered 110 s into 

the simulation viewing the west side of the structure that shows fire and smoke venting from the loading 

dock wall and roof. It should be noted that the orange color in Smokeview tracked the location of 

stoichiometric fuel and air mixture. If the temperature were high, then the orange surface could be 

thought of as a flame; if the temperature were below a threshold value, then no flame was actually 

present, just a non-burning mixture of fuel and air. 

Figure 4-8. Diagram showing locations of initiating fire sources in the loading dock 

and rear of main showroom. 
4-14

0

50

100

150

200

250

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Heat Release Rate, MW

Time, s

0

50

100

150

200

250

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Total HRR

Loading Dock

Holding & Rear Main Showroom

Main Showroom

West Showroom

Heat Release Rate, MW

Time, s

Figure 4-9. Total heat release rate, excluding the warehouse. 

Figure 4-10. Component heat release rates for the loading dock, holding area, 

main showroom, and west showroom. 
4-15 

By the time (110s), smoke had filled the loading dock and begun entering the void space above the main 

showroom ceiling through the holding area. The holding area was adjacent to the loading dock and was 

accessible through an open roll-down door. This room did not have a suspended ceiling and had shelves 

upon which futon cushions were stored. Smoke and heated combustion gases produced by the fire passed 

into the void space above the main showroom. This development was concealed from the fire fighters 

upon first entry into the building. 

Figure 4-12 shows a rendered image of the loading dock and showrooms at 110 s. In this figure, 

obstructions below ceiling level have been removed and all remaining obstructions are transparent 

(indicated only by their outlines) to allow visible access to the fire and smoke. This figure shows that 

very early in the fire event smoke had entered the holding area through the open roll-down door and 

entered the void space above the main showroom ceiling. 

The AC and E-10 captain entered the main showroom and initially observed clear conditions. Figure 

4-13 shows an image of the main showroom, from the perspective of a person standing at the front 

entrance and facing south west, toward the holding area. This image was rendered 80 s into the 

simulation (7:12:13 p.m.), approximately the time the Assistant Chief entered the showroom and 

observed clear conditions. 

 At 7:13:17 p.m. (144 s) the E-11 captain called over his radio “I need an inch and a half inside this 

building.” The AC opened the double doors connecting the west showroom to the loading dock and had 

the door pulled out of his hand by the force of air rushing into the loading dock. 

Figure 4-11. Rendered image showing the west side of the loading dock 110 s into the simulation.
4-16

NIST Image

East Showroom West Showroom Main Showroom

Front of Store

Rear of Store

Open non-fire roll-downdoor to loading dock

Double doors toloading dock

Figure 4-12. Smoke filling in void space above main showroom. Image was rendered 110 s into the simulation. 
4-17 

 Figure 4-13. Image rendered 80 s (7:12:13 p.m.) into the simulation from inside the main 

showroom, near the entrance. View is toward the south west corner of the main showroom. 

 Gas

Velocity

 m/s

2.50

2.25

2.00

1.75

1.50

1.25

1.00

0.75

0.00

0.50

0.25

NIST Image

Figure 4-14. Image rendered 145 s (7:13:18 p.m.) into the simulation from the west 

showroom, near the double doors that lead to the loading dock. Arrows indicate 

direction and relative speed of air moving from the showroom into the loading dock 

(The relative speed is proportional to the length of the arrow, i.e. longer arrows indicate 

higher relative speeds and color scale indicates velocity magnitude). 
4-18

Figure 4-15 shows a rendered image of the double 

doors from inside the west showroom at 145 s, 

1 second after they were opened. The arrows or 

velocity vectors indicate that the air was flowing 

from the rear of the west showroom into the 

loading dock just after the doors were opened. 

Smoke penetration through the ceiling was 

modeled by creating an opening in the rear of the 

main showroom when the adjacent temperature 

reached 50°C. Figure 4-15 shows the progression 

of fire and smoke below the ceiling level (2.6 m) 

throughout the loading dock, holding area and 

showrooms between 300 s (7:15:53 p.m.) and 

900 s (7:25:53 p.m.). The images in this figure 

have been clipped down to the level of the ceiling 

in the showrooms. 

At 300 s (7:13:53 p.m.) there is light smoke in the 

rear of the main and west showrooms. Initially, 

smoke in the west showroom entered through the 

double doors while the smoke in the main 

showroom entered through the ceiling. The 

ventilation openings in the ceiling in the main 

showroom (blue colored squares in Figure 4-15) 

opened between 261 s (7:15:14 p.m.) and 976 s 

(7:27:09 p.m.). 

By 600 s (7:20:53 p.m.), the smoke layer had 

permeated the west and main showrooms, and 

there was evidence of a “tunneling” as fresh air 

was being pulled into the front door to supply 

oxygen. This is consistent with the account of 

Engineer 6, who entered the structure at 

approximately 7:24 p.m. (787 s) and reported a 

tunnel of clear space that extended several feet 

inside the showroom as fresh air was being pulled 

through the open door. Beyond this space he 

reported heavy smoke conditions. By 900 s 

(7:25:53 p.m.), the fire in the rear of the main 

showroom had grown to approximately 23 MW. 

The captain and two fire fighters from E-15 

entered the main showroom at approximately 

7:19:00 p.m. (487 s into the simulation). According 

to reports, they encountered smoke and donned their 

Figure 4-15. View of fire and smoke 

progression from above the showrooms from 

300 to 900 s (7:15:53 p.m. to 7:25:53 p.m.). 

The images are clipped to view conditions 

below the ceiling. 
4-19 

self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) face pieces. Figure 4-16 shows an image of the front of the 

main showroom, with the front wall removed, at 487 s. This image shows that smoke had filled the void 

space above the ceiling and banked down to the showroom floor. Conditions on the east side, including 

the area near the entrance, are not as severe. However, as one progresses toward the rear and west, 

conditions degrade significantly. 

Engine 19 reported on scene at 7:20:08 p.m. (555 s). E-11 captain was making his way out of the 

structure to investigate the problem with the 6.4 cm (2.5 in) hand line at approximately the same time the 

crew from E-19 was entering the building. At this time E-11 captain noted heavy smoke conditions and 

increasing temperatures. 

Figures 4-17 and 4-18 show smoke filling in, respectively, the main and west showrooms from the 

perspective of someone at the front of the room. The sequence in Figure 4-17 begins at 270 s 

(7:15:23 p.m.), after smoke began penetrating the ceiling. The sequence in Figure 4-18 begins at 270 s 

(7:15:23 p.m.). In both showrooms, conditions deteriorate considerably within a 120 s span. 

At 1020 s (7:27:53p.m.), the fire in the main showroom reached about 70 MW and had begun moving 

forward toward the front of the showroom. Figure 4-19 shows the progression of fire and smoke 

throughout the loading dock, holding area and showrooms between 1020 and 2040 s. The front windows 

were vented during the period between 1457 through 1530 s (7:35:10 through 7:36:23). Fire reached the 

front of the main showroom at approximately 1540 s (7:36:33 p.m.) and spread across the west side of the 

main showroom by 1590 s (7:37:23 p.m.). By 1680 s (7:38:53 p.m.), the fire had moved into the front of 

the west showroom. This is consistent with the image in Figure 4-23, where the fire is visible in the west 

showroom through the window opening. 

Figures 4-20 through 4-24 show comparisons of the fire and smoke progression with available photos at 

various times during the critical time between 7:23 p.m. and 7:45 p.m. (740 s through 2040 s). Figure 

4-20 shows one of the earliest photos that were obtained of the fire, taken at 7:23:16 p.m. (743 s). At this 

time the fire was still mainly concentrated in the loading dock and holding area. Although the showrooms 

were charged with smoke, there was no smoke pushing out the open door at the front of the store. The 

fire had impinged on the underside of the roof over the holding area and flames were visible from the 

exterior at the roof level. At 1530s (7:36:23 p.m.), shown in Figure 4-21, the main sections of the front 

windows had been broken out and smoke was pushing out the front of the main showroom. At this At

Figure 4-16. Model rendering of view inside the front of the main showroom at 487 s (7:19:00 p.m.). 
4-20

this 

Figure 4-17. Smoke progression 

inside the west side of the main 

showroom between 270 s to 390 s 

(7:15:23 p.m. to 7:17:23 p.m.). 

Figure 4-18. Smoke progression 

inside the west showroom between 

270 s to 390 s (7:15:23 p.m. to 

7:17:23 p.m.). 
4-21 

Figure 4-19. View of fire (orange color indicates stoichiometric boundary) and smoke 

progression from above the showrooms from 1020 s to 2040 s (7:27:53 p.m. to 7:44:53 p.m.). 

The images are clipped to view conditions below the ceiling. 
4-22

 time, flames were not yet visible from the exterior through the front windows. By 1655 s (7:38:28 p.m.), 

shown in Figure 4-22, fire had reached the front of the main showroom and had stretched across the west 

side of the main showroom. At 1686 s (7:38:59 p.m.) flames were visible inside the west showroom, 

Figure 4-23, and the first window in this side had failed. By 1884 s (7:42:17), shown in Figure 4-24, fire 

had stretched across the front of the west showroom and two of the three windows were broken out. 

Figure 4-20. Comparison between photo and rendered image from the simulation at 743 s 

(7:23:16p.m.). The view is of the north west corner of the structure. 

Figure 4-21. Comparison between photo and rendered image from the simulation at 1530 s 

(7:36:23 p.m.). The view is of the front of the main showroom. 

Figure 4-22. Comparison between photo and rendered image from the simulation at 1655 s 

(7:38:28 p.m.). The view is of the front of the main showroom. 
4-23 

Figure 4-23. Comparison between photo and rendered image from the simulation at 1686 s 

(7:38:59 p.m.). The view is of the front of the main and west showrooms. 

Figure 4-24. Comparison between photo and rendered image from the simulation at 1884 s 

(7:42:17 p.m.). The view is of the front of the main and west showrooms. 

4.3.4 Tenability Criteria 

Purser [2] has published data that identify when conditions become untenable for humans. Purser 

provides an algorithm for estimating the time to lose consciousness due to low oxygen. At 0.12 volume 

fraction, the time is estimated at about five minutes. In a closed fire-engulfed environment, toxic gases 

(such as carbon monoxide) are likely to be present at incapacitating levels before the oxygen gets this 

low. Since the simulation tracks the oxygen volume fraction, it will be used as one indicator for 

tenability. A second indicator will be when the temperature exceeds 120 °C (250 °F) for about five 

minutes [2]. The effects of carbon monoxide, depleted oxygen, and temperature are dose-related, 

involving both magnitude and time of exposure [2]. Thus the time at which 120 °C (250 °F) is exceeded 

is before the time at which the person is incapacitated. For each of the simulations, the time for areas to 

become untenable4

 due to elevated temperature5 or oxygen depletion6 will be tabulated. These 

incapacitation criteria are simplifications of complex studies and serve as a basis for appraising the 

relative effects of alternate fire scenarios. 

 

4

 For this study, untenability was equated to incapacitation. A person is defined as incapacitated when he or she is unable to 

effect his or her own escape (ISO 13943)[16]. 

5

 For this study, temperature greater than 120 °C (250 °F) for at least five minutes (300 seconds). 6

 For this study, oxygen volume fraction less than 0.12 for at least five minutes (300 seconds). 
4-24

The NIST study did not include analysis of the threat to protected fire fighters. If a fire fighter in turnout 

gear is utilizing a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and has an adequate supply of air, the fire 

fighter can temporarily survive higher temperatures and depleted external oxygen levels. This safety shell 

ends when the fire fighter runs out of tank air or remains within the hot fire environment too long. 

4.3.5 Temperature 

Temperatures were examined to assess tenability conditions that existed during the evolution of the fire. 

Horizontal slices were taken 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor with the roof and ceiling rendered transparent to 

display the temperature distribution throughout the structure. Additionally, temperatures were tracked 

over time at different elevations at specific horizontal locations as shown in Figure 4-25 with the filled 

red circles. These temperature monitoring locations were defined in the simulation in order to track 

temperatures at a specific location during each simulation. The labels in Figure 4-25 that identify 

temperature locations (referred to as "sensor arrays") are consistent with those used throughout this 

report. The three positions indicated to the left of the figure (front, mid, rear) were located, respectively, 

3.38 m (11.1 ft), 14.62 m (48.0 ft), and 26.62 m (87.3 ft) from the front if the showrooms. Sensors in the 

west showroom were located near the center, 7.5 m (24.6 ft) from the west wall. In the west side of the 

main showroom, the front and mid sensors were positioned 7.9 m (25.9 ft) from the west wall. The rear 

and corner sensors were located 9.8 m (32.2 ft) from the same wall; the corner position was 39 m 

(128.0 ft) from the front wall. The sensors positioned in the center of the main showroom were located 

19.1 m (62.7 ft) from the west wall of the main showroom. Sensors in the east side of the main 

showroom were positioned 30 m (98.4 ft) from the west wall of the main showroom. 

Figure 4-25. Location of simulation sensor arrays in main and west showrooms. 
4-25 

Figure 4-26 shows a series of images with a temperature slice 1.5 m (5 ft) from the floor rendered at a 

range of times between 900 s through 1620 s (7:25:53 p.m. through 7:37:53 p.m.). These images show 

the progression of the elevated temperatures from the loading dock, into the holding area, and eventually 

into the main showroom. Temperatures above 100 °C (approximately indicated by the border between 

dark blue and light blue) are first observed in the holding area approximately three minutes into the 

simulation. Note that the double doors separating the west showroom from the loading dock were opened 

at 144 s, but the temperature in the west showroom remained low even as fire was spreading into the 

holding area. 

Figure 4-27 shows a chart of temperatures recorded in the west showroom, near the double doors. The 

data are from sensors located 0.3 m (1 ft), 0.91 m (3 ft), 1.52 m (5 ft), and 2.13 m (7 ft) from the floor. 

Figure 4-27 shows that temperatures remained below 100 °C through approximately 750 s (7:23:23 p.m.). 

The fire was positioned near the double doors to the loading dock; however, during the early stages much 

of the heat was venting through the loading dock roof and later through the main showroom roof. Air was 

being pulled through the doorway to feed oxygen to the fire in the loading dock and holding area. There 

was a surge in temperature in the upper layer lasting several minutes caused by fire progression into the 

showroom. At 900 s (7:25:53 p.m.), a section of the roof above the holding area was removed and this 

resulted in the subsequent temperature drop. Temperatures dropped below 100 °C, but as the fire 

increased in the main showroom the temperatures in both showrooms began to rise quickly. A second 

temperature surge, which began at approximately 1460 s (7:35:13 p.m.), was due to the fire entering the 

west showroom through the open roll-down door as it moved to the front of the main showroom. It 

should be noted that the focus of suppression efforts was in this area of the showroom, and that the 

simulation does not take this into account. 

Figures 4-28 through 4-30 show charts of temperatures recorded at the locations throughout the main and 

west showroom as indicated in Figure 4-25. All data in these charts were recorded 1.5 m (5 ft) above the 

floor. Figure 4-28 shows temperatures in the west showroom. Temperatures in the west showroom 

remained relatively low, below 100 °C, until the fire began moving toward the front of the main 

showroom. The temperature at the rear sensor surpassed 120 °C at 1350 s (7:33:23 p.m.). As the fire in 

the main showroom continued to move forward, the temperature at the mid and front sensors reached 

120°C at 1400 s (7:34:13 p.m.) 

Figure 4-29 shows a temperature chart that displays data from sensors located on the west side of the 

main showroom. This chart contains a fourth data location, labeled Rear Hold, which was identified in 

Figure 4-25. Temperatures in the west side of the main showroom became elevated at an earlier point 

than in the other areas of the showroom because the fire moved across these sensors as it moved to the 

front of the showroom. The rear holding area location reached 120 °C at 864 s (7:25:17 p.m.); the rear 

location was roughly 30 s behind, reaching 120 °C at 900 s (7:25:53 p.m.). The mid and front locations 

reached 120 °C simultaneously at 1250 s (7:31:43 p.m.). Temperatures in the center and east areas of the 

main showroom showed similar trends. 

 

 
4-26

 

 

Figure 4-26. Temperature slices located 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor. 
4-27 

Figure 4-27. Temperatures at different elevations, 0.3 m (1 ft), 0.9 m (3 ft), 1.5 m (5 ft), and 

2.1 m (7 ft) in rear of west showroom near double doors. 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

TC- 2.1m above floor Dbl Drs Rear West SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Dbl Drs Rear West SR

TC- 0.9m above floor Dbl Drs Rear West SR

TC- 0.3m above floor Dbl Drs Rear West SR

Temperature, o

C

Time, s

Figure 4-28. West showroom temperatures for 1.5 m (5 ft) above floor. 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

TC- 1.5m above floor Frt West SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Mid West SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Rear West SR

Temperature, o

C

Time, s
4-28

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

TC- 1.5m above floor Frt West Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Mid West Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Rear West Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Rear Hold West Main SR

Temperature, o

C

Time, s

Figure 4-29. Main showroom (west) temperatures for 1.5 m (5 ft) above floor. 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

TC- 1.5m above floor Frt Ctr Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Mid Ctr Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Rear Ctr Main SR

Temperature, o

C

Time, s

Figure 4-30. Main showroom (center) temperatures for 1.5 m (5 ft) from floor. 
4-29 

4.3.6 Oxygen Volume Fraction 

Figure 4-31 shows a series of images with an oxygen slice 1.5 m (5 ft) from the floor rendered at a range 

of times between 360 s and 1440 s (7:16:53 p.m. through 7:34:53 p.m.). 

Figures 4-32 through 4-34 show charts of oxygen volume fraction recorded at several locations 

throughout the main and west showroom. All data in these charts were recorded 1.5 m (5 ft) above the 

floor. The locations correspond to those used for the temperature results shown in Figures 4-28 through 

4-30. The oxygen volume fraction at the sensor in the rear of west showroom fell below 0.12 at 1500 s 

(7:35:53 p.m.). As the fire in the main showroom continued to move forward, the oxygen at both the mid 

and front sensors reached 0.12 volume fraction at 1600 s (7:37:33 p.m.). 

Figure 4-33 shows a chart that displays oxygen data from sensors located on the west side of the main 

showroom. Oxygen in the west side of the main showroom became depleted at an earlier point than in the 

other areas of the showroom because this was the path of the fire as it moved to the front of the 

showroom. The holding area location reached 0.12 volume fraction at 950 s (7:26:43 p.m.); the rear 

location was roughly six minutes behind, reaching 0.12 volume fraction at 1250 s (7:31:43 p.m.). The 

mid and front locations initially reached 0.12 volume fraction approximately the same time at 1400 s 

(7:34:13 p.m.). The mid and front locations then increased up to 0.15 volume fraction as the front 

windows were broken. Oxygen volume fractions in the center and east areas of the main showroom had 

similar trends. 

4.4 BASELINE SIMULATION WITH SPRINKLERS ADDED INSIDE THE 

LOADING DOCK 

4.4.1 General 

A simulation was performed with code-compliant fire sprinklers added inside the enclosed loading dock 

to examine the effects that sprinklers might have had on the fire and the resulting environment inside the 

building. Otherwise, the simulation was identical to the baseline simulation. FDS has been shown to be 

able to predict the number of sprinklers activated and the approximate activation times, as well as trends, 

temperatures, heat fluxes and oxygen volume fractions in reasonable agreement with measured values [5; 

Vols. 2&3]. However, the suppression physics in FDS is simplified and cannot capture all of the details 

of the suppression process. 

The sprinkler system layout was designed in accordance with NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of 

Sprinkler Systems [17]. The system was designed as an Ordinary Hazard Group 2 wet pipe system, 

assuming that the enclosed loading dock area was heated. An Ordinary Hazard Group 2 sprinkler system 

was utilized in order to provide a more conservative estimate for the design area/water density as 

compared to an Extra Hazard design, for simulating the effects of sprinklers on fire conditions. The 

locations of the sprinklers within the enclosed loading dock are shown in Figure 4-35. Note that given the 

dimensions of the cells in the simulation, the locations of the sprinklers in the simulation vary up to 2 cm 

(0.8 in) from the layout shown. The specific locations of the sprinklers are given in the FDS input file. 

The sprinkler characteristics and operating parameters are given in Table K-8. 
4-30

Figure 4-31. Oxygen volume fractions (slice images) for 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor. 
4-31 

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

O2- 1.5m above floor Frt West Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Mid West Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Rear West Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Rear Hold West Main SR

Oxygen Volume Fraction

Time, s

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

O2- 1.5m above floor Frt West SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Mid West SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Rear West SR

Oxygen Volume Fraction

Time, s

Figure 4-32. West showroom oxygen volume fractions for 1.5 m (5 ft) above the 

floor.

Figure 4-33. Main showroom (west) oxygen volume fractions for 1.5 m (5 ft) above

the floor.
4-32

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

O2- 1.5m above floor Frt Ctr Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Mid Ctr Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Rear Ctr Main SR

Oxygen Volume Fraction

Time, s

Figure 4-34. Main showroom (center) oxygen volume fractions for 1.5 m (5 ft) 

above the floor.

Figure 4-35. Sprinkler layout inside the enclosed loading dock.
4-33 

Twenty sprinklers were placed inside the loading dock as shown by the black circles in Figure 4-35. The 

sprinkler specifications that were used in the simulation are detailed in Appendix K, Table K-6. In this 

configuration, the maximum protection area of coverage per sprinkler was approximately 11.9 m2

(128 ft2

) with a water density of approximately 8.8 L min-1 m-2 (0.22 gpm/ft2). Two sprinklers, labeled 4 

and 8 in Figure 4-35, activated in the simulation. Sprinkler 8 was the first to activate, at 50 s, while 

sprinkler 4 activated at 75 s. 

Figure 4-36 shows a series of images indicating the progression of fire and smoke in the loading dock 

during the sprinklered simulation. These images show an overhead view, centered on the loading dock 

(the area shaded in red). The north end of the warehouse is shown at the top of the images and the south 

end of the west showroom is at the bottom. The southwest corner of the main showroom (including the 

holding area) is shown in the lower left corner. In these images, the roof and walls of the loading dock 

were made invisible in order to facilitate viewing the loading dock interior. Additionally, the roofs over 

the main and west showrooms were clipped so that the interior of the holding area was visible. The areas 

colored black are the showroom ceilings. The west showroom ceiling is only partially revealed because 

this addition had a sloped roof and only the upper section was clipped away. 

The quantity of fire generated smoke increases through the first five images in this sequence, from 

30 through 210 s. Smoke spread across the underside of the loading dock roof and began to fill 

downward. At 210 s, the smoke layer was low enough to begin spilling into the holding area where there 

is access to the space above the showroom ceiling. By 240 s however, the fire is no longer burning and 

the smoke is beginning to dissipate. 

The same initiating fire was used in this scenario as for the baseline case, an ultrafast t2

 growth curve to a 

peak HRR of 750 kW and then held at this level for a period of two minutes, after which time it was 

ramped linearly down over a period of one minute. The intent of this fire was to ignite furniture in the 

loading dock. However, because the initiating fire was sufficient to activate two sprinklers (at 50 s and 

75 s), the fire did not spread to the nearby furniture. 

4.4.2 Temperature 

Figure 4-37 shows the sprinkler temperature at each of the sprinkler locations. The graph indicates that 

the temperature at locations 4 and 8 reached 74°C, at which point the sprinklers were activated in these 

locations. Temperatures at locations 1 and 2 peaked in the 60°C to 70°C range but never reached the 

threshold for activation. 

The predicted temperatures and oxygen volume fraction in the main and west showroom remained near 

ambient throughout since the fire in the loading dock was extinguished by the sprinklers. 

 
4-34

 

Figure 4-36. Fire and smoke progression in the early stages of the sprinklered scenario. Sprinkler 

8 was the first to activate, at 50 s, while sprinkler 4 activated at 75 s. 
4-35 

 

Figure 4-38 shows a series of images with a temperature slice 1.5 m (5 ft) from the floor rendered at a 

range of times between 30 s through 240 s. Note that the scale on these images is consistent with those in 

Figure 31. These images show that the area of elevated temperatures is limited to the immediate vicinity 

of the fire inside the loading dock. 

4.4.3 Oxygen Volume Fraction 

A similar result is seen in the oxygen volume fraction data, shown in Figure 4-39. This figure shows a 

series of images 1.5 m (5 ft) from the floor at times between 30 s through 240 s. Depleted oxygen levels 

are observed in the vicinity of the holding area. The oxygen volume fraction at 1.5 m never drops below 

the tenability threshold of 0.12 (volume fraction). There is an increase in oxygen volume fraction 

between the final two images, as fresh air enters the holding area. 

Figure 4-37. Sprinkler temperatures inside the enclosed loading dock. 

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

0 100 200 300 400 500

Sprinkler 1

Sprinkler 2

Sprinkler 3

Sprinkler 4

Sprinkler 5

Sprinkler 6

Sprinkler 7

Sprinkler 8

Sprinkler 9

Sprinkler 10

Sprinkler 11

Sprinkler 12

Temperature, 

o

C

Time, s
4-36

 

 

Figure 4-38. Temperatures 1.5 m 

(5 ft) above the floor in the 

sprinklered simulation.

Figure 4-39. Oxygen volume fractions 

1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor in the 

sprinklered simulation.
4-37 

4.5 BASELINE WITH FRONT WINDOWS INTACT 

4.5.1 General 

In this simulation, the windows at the north (front) end of the main and west showrooms were kept in 

place, while everything else remained fixed from the base scenario. The front entrance, through which 

fire department personnel entered and exited the main showroom, was kept open and all other ventilation 

parameters were unaltered. The results of this simulation are presented here. 

4.5.2 Fire Growth and Smoke Spread 

Figure 4-40 shows the progression of fire and smoke throughout the loading dock, holding area and 

showrooms between 1020 s and 2040 s (7:27:53 p.m. through 7:44:53 p.m.). The first three images in 

this figure are indistinguishable from the corresponding images in Figure 4-19 (the baseline simulation). 

The differences appear in the later images – 1500 s and beyond. Compared to Figure 4-19, Figure 4-40 

shows far less burning in the northwest quadrant of the main showroom. 

In the base simulation the fire HRR begins to diminish after 1380 s, but when the front windows of the 

main showroom were taken out starting at 1457 s, there was a rapid increase in the HRR. In this scenario, 

with the windows remaining intact, the fire HRR continues to decrease after 1380 s. The fire moved 

toward the front of the showroom, where oxygen was still being supplied through the front door. With 

the front windows intact, the flames reached the front of the main showroom at 1800 s (7:40:53 p.m.), 

approximately 3 minutes longer than the base scenario. At 2040 s (7:44:53 p.m.) in the base case, the 

flames appear across the front of the main and west showrooms, while with the windows intact, the 

flames only appear across a small portion of the main showroom. 

4.5.3 Heat Release Rate 

Figure 4-41 shows the change in HRR over time for this scenario and the baseline simulation. In both 

scenarios, HRR peaked at 120 MW at around 1300 s after which the HRR decreased. This would be 

consisent with the fire becoming underventilated. The venting of the front windows in the main 

showroom at 1457 s corresponds with the subsequent rapid increase in HRR for the base case. In the 

simulation with the windows intact, the HRR did not increase at approximately 1500 s, but continued to 

decrease until about 1600 s. 
4-38

Figure 4-40. Fire and smoke progression in simulation with front windows intact. 
4-39 

4.5.4 Temperature 

Figure 4-42 shows a series of images with a temperature slice 1.5 m (5 ft) from the floor rendered at a 

range of times between 900 s through 1620 s (7:25:53 p.m. through 7:37:53 p.m.). The trends in this 

figure are similar to those seen in Figure 4-28 for the baseline simulation. For the windows intact 

scenario the high temperature areas, shown in red, diminishes between 1380 s and 1500 s. After 1500 s 

the simulation displays less red areas in the windows intact case than for the same times in the baseline 

case (Figure 4-28). 

Figures 4-43 through Figure 4-46 show temperature data recorded at the same sensor locations used in 

Figure 4-25 for the baseline simulation. For comparison purposes, the scale in these figures was kept the 

same as the corresponding scale in Figure 4-27 through Figure 4-30. After 1500 s, the temperatures 

were lower in the scenario with the front windows intact as compared to the base case. The 

temperatures with the windows intact exceeded the 120 °C tenability threshold at each sensor 

location before the time at which the windows would have been broken out. 

4.5.5 Oxygen Volume Fraction 

Figures 4-47 through 4-49 show oxygen volume fraction data for the front windows intact case that were 

recorded at the same sensor locations (Figure 4-25) as the baseline case. For the first 1000 s, the oxygen 

volume fraction in the west showroom (Figures 4-47 and 4-32) drops to about 

0

50

100

150

200

250

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Front Windows Vented 

Front Windows Intact

Heat Release Rate, MW

Time, s

Figure 4-41. Comparison of the heat release rate in the simulations for front windows 

vented and front windows intact. 
4-40

 

Figure 4-42. Temperature slices located 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor in simulation with front 

windows intact. 
4-41 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

TC- 2.1m above floor Dbl Drs Rear West SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Dbl Drs Rear West SR

TC- 0.9m above floor Dbl Drs Rear West SR

TC- 0.3m above floor Dbl Drs Rear West SR

Temperature, o

C

Time, s

Figure 4-43. Temperatures at different elevations, 0.3 m (1 ft), 0.9 m (3 ft), 1.5 m 

(5 ft), and 2.1 m (7 ft) in rear of west showroom near double doors. 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

TC- 1.5m above floor Frt West SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Mid West SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Rear West SR

Temperature, o

C

Time, s

Figure 4-44. West showroom temperatures for 1.5 m (5ft) above the floor. 
4-42

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

TC- 1.5m above floor Frt West Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Mid West Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Rear West Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Rear Hold West Main SR

Temperature, o

C

Time, s

Figure 4-45. Main showroom (west) temperatures for 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor. 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

TC- 1.5m above floor Frt Ctr Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Mid Ctr Main SR

TC- 1.5m above floor Rear Ctr Main SR

Temperature, o

C

Time, s

Figure 4-46. Main showroom (center) temperatures for 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor. 
4-43 

0.16 for both cases. For about the next 400 s, the oxygen volume fraction decreases more slowly in both 

cases. By 1400 s the volume fraction drops below 0.1 for the windows intact case, but decreases to 0.15 

for the base scenario. For the windows intact case, after the time when the windows would have been 

broken at 1457 s, the oxygen volume fraction in the rear of the west showroom begins to increase and 

peak at about 0.12 at 1850 s. The oxygen volume fractions in the mid and front of the west showroom 

decrease to 0.09 and 0.07, respectively. The oxygen volume fractions in the rear of the main showroom 

(Figures 4-48 and 4-33) show similar trends during the first 1300 s. For the windows intact case, the 

oxygen volume fraction became more steady between 0.07 and 0.09. The oxygen volume fraction for the 

same location in the base scenario continues to drop to less than 0.02. For the base case, after 1700 s, the 

oxygen volume fraction is less than 0.03 for the holding area, rear, and mid showroom. For the windows 

intact scenario, at about the same time, 1700 s, the oxygen volume fraction for the rear, mid, and front 

showroom locations are all above 0.07. Overall, the trends for both cases are similar during the early 

portion of the simulations, but after the time at which the windows were broken out in the base scenario, 

the oxygen volume fractions appear lower than in the front windows intact case for the rear holding, rear, 

and mid showroom locations. 

Figure 4-50 shows a series of images with an oxygen slice 1.5 m (5 ft) from the floor rendered at a range 

of times between 360 s and 1440 s. As was the case with temperature, the conditions in the main and 

west showrooms become untenable because of oxygen depletion prior to 1440 s (7:34:53 p.m.). While 

minimum oxygen volume fractions were not as low in the case with the windows intact, they nonetheless 

dropped below 0.12 (indicated by the red shaded areas in Figure 4-50) in the main and west showrooms. 

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

O2- 1.5m above floor Frt West SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Mid West SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Rear West SR

Oxygen Volume Fraction

Time, s

Figure 4-47. West showroom oxygen volume fractions for 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor. 
4-44

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

O2- 1.5m above floor Frt West Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Mid West Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Rear West Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Rear Hold West Main SR

Oxygen Volume Fraction

Time, s

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

O2- 1.5m above floor Frt Ctr Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Mid Ctr Main SR

O2- 1.5m above floor Rear Ctr Main SR

Oxygen Volume Fraction

Time, s

Figure 4-48. West main showroom oxygen volume fractions for 1.5 m (5 ft) above the 

floor. 

Figure 4-49. Main showroom (center) oxygen volume fractions for 1.5 m (5 ft) above the 

floor. 
4-45 

Figure 4-50. Oxygen volume fractions (slice images) 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor in simulation with 

front windows intact. 
4-46

4.6 SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS 

Using FDS, NIST modeled the development of the fire in the Sofa Super Store during the fire that 

occurred on June 18, 2007, in which nine fire fighters lost their lives. This baseline fire scenario was 

constructed using measurements from the scene, witness interviews and discussions, time stamped 

photographs, and radio transmission logs. The simulation was run for 2400 s, closely corresponding to 

the duration of the time that passes from the time that the fire started inside the loading dock to the time 

when the roof of the main showroom collapsed. Simulations were designed to provide insight into: 

• fire and smoke spread inside the structure, 

• fire-spread into the showrooms versus the warehouse, 

• impact of sprinklers on the loading dock, and 

• impact of ventilation, including breaking front windows and openings in the roof. 

The insights provided by these simulations served as a basis for examining the potential effects of some 

intervention strategies. These were the installation of a fire sprinkler system, breaking the front windows 

of the building, and venting the rear of the showroom with two differently sized roof openings. 

For each of the five simulations, the time for areas to become untenable due to elevated temperature or 

oxygen depletion are tabulated in Tables 4-1 to 4-6. These untenability criteria are simplifications of 

complex studies and serve as a basis for appraising the relative effects of alternate fire scenarios. 

The NIST study did not include analysis of the threat to protected fire fighters. If a fire fighter in turnout 

gear is utilizing a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and has an adequate supply of air, the fire 

fighter can temporarily survive higher temperatures and depleted external oxygen levels. This safety shell 

ends when the fire fighter runs out of tank air or remains within the hot fire environment too long. 
4-47 

Table 4-1. Temperature and Oxygen Tenability Conditions for Rear of West Showroom. 

Simulation 

Temperature Oxygen 

Time to 

Untenability 

(>120 oC)1

s 

Peak 

Temp 

oC 

Time to 

Peak 

Temp. 

s 

Time to 

Untenability 

(< 0.12)2

s 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

volume 

fraction 

Time to 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

s 

Base 1650 260 2300 1800 0.02 2300 

Base with Sprinklers Fire growth limited to loading dock. Conditions remained tenable. 

Front Windows 

Intact 1650 200 1400 1700 0.09 1450 

Small Vent 1800 210 1600 1800 0.09 1600 

Large Vent 1850 230 1400 1650 0.08 1400 

1. Time for temperature to exceed 120 oC plus 300 s. 

2. Time for oxygen volume fraction less than 0.12 plus 300 s. 

Table 4-2. Temperature and Oxygen Tenability Conditions for Front of West Showroom. 

Simulation 

Temperature Oxygen 

Time to 

Untenability 

(>120 oC)1

s 

Peak 

Temp 

C 

Time to 

Peak 

Temp. 

s 

Time to 

Untenability 

(< 0.12)2

s 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

Volume 

Fraction 

Time to 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

s 

Base 1700 1100 1950 1900 0.2 1950 

Base with Sprinklers Fire growth limited to loading dock. Conditions remained tenable. 

Front Windows 

Intact 1700 140 1450 1750 0.07 1700 

Small Vent 1850 140 1600 1900 0.1 1700 

Large Vent 1700 170 1550 1700 0.06 1700 

1. Time for temperature to exceed 120 oC plus 300 s. 

2. Time for oxygen volume fraction less than 0.12 plus 300 s. 
4-48

Table 4-3. Temperature and Oxygen Tenability Conditions for Rear of West Side of Main 

Showroom. 

Simulation 

Temperature Oxygen 

Time to 

Untenability 

(>120 oC)1

s 

Peak 

Temp 

C 

Time to 

Peak 

Temp. 

s 

Time to 

Untenability 

(< 0.12)2

s 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

Volume 

Fraction 

Time to 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

s 

Base 1200 850 1300 1550 0.01 1750 

Base with Sprinklers Fire growth limited to loading dock. Conditions remained tenable. 

Front Windows 

Intact 1200 850 1300 1550 0.06 1400 

Small Vent 1200 600 1400 1800 0.07 1550 

Large Vent 1200 950 1400 1650 0.03 1400 

1. Time for temperature to exceed 120 oC plus 300 s. 

2. Time for oxygen volume fraction less than 0.12 plus 300 s. 

Table 4-4. Temperature and Oxygen Tenability Condition for Front of West Side of Main 

Showroom. 

Simulation 

Temperature Oxygen 

Time to 

Untenability 

(>120 oC)1

s 

Peak 

Temp 

C 

Time to 

Peak 

Temp. 

s 

Time to 

Untenability 

(< 0.12)2

s 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

Volume 

Fraction 

Time to 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

s 

Base 1200 850 1300 1550 0.01 1750 

Base with Sprinklers Fire growth limited to loading dock. Conditions remained tenable. 

Front Windows 

Intact 1200 850 1300 1550 0.06 1400 

Small Vent 1200 600 1400 1800 0.07 1550 

Large Vent 1200 950 1400 1650 0.03 1400 

1. Time for temperature to exceed 120 oC plus 300 s. 

2. Time for oxygen volume fraction less than 0.12 plus 300 s. 
4-49 

Table 4-5. Temperature and Oxygen Tenability Conditions for Rear of East Side of Main 

Showroom. 

 

Simulation 

Temperature Oxygen 

Time to 

Untenability 

(>120 oC)1

s 

Peak 

Temp 

C 

Time to 

Peak 

Temp. 

s 

Time to 

Untenability 

(< 0.12)2

s 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

Volume 

Fraction 

Time to 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

s 

Base 1550 1100 1550 1700 0.05 1900 

Base with Sprinklers Fire growth limited to loading dock. Conditions remained tenable. 

Front Windows 

Intact 1550 800 1700 1700 0.06 1700 

Small Vent 1550 230 1550 1850 0.1 1600 

Large Vent 1600 1050 1500 1700 0.05 1500 

1. Time for temperature to exceed 120 oC plus 300 s. 

2. Time for oxygen volume fraction less than 0.12 plus 300 s. 

Table 4-6. Temperature and Oxygen Tenability Conditions for Front of East Side of Main 

Showroom. 

Simulation 

Temperature Oxygen 

Time to 

Untenability 

(>120 oC)1

s 

Peak 

Temp 

C 

Time to 

Peak 

Temp. 

s 

Time to 

Untenability 

(< 0.12)2

s 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

Volume 

Fraction 

Time to 

Minimum 

Oxygen 

Level 

s 

Base 1650 1000 1680 1400 0.08 1800 

Base with Sprinklers Fire growth limited to loading dock. Conditions remained tenable. 

Front Windows 

Intact 1650 230 1700 1750 0.09 1850 

Small Vent 1800 160 1550 2450 0.11 2150 

Large Vent 1650 220 1500 1750 0.08 1700 

1. Time for temperature to exceed 120 oC plus 300 s. 

2. Time for oxygen volume fraction less than 0.12 plus 300 s. 
4-50

4.6.1 Baseline Simulation 

Results from the baseline simulation were tabulated with specific events from the fire ground in Table 

4-7. The simulation results are consistent with available photos, video, and witness accounts. The results 

indicate that fire spread from the loading dock into the holding area and void space above the main 

showroom. The fire also spread to the warehouse and to the rear of the west showroom. The simulation 

demonstrates that although the fire did spread into the rear of the west showroom, the spread through the 

double doors was limited. The fire moved into the main showroom through the holding area and then into 

the rear of the main showroom. The flow of the smoke into the holding area and up into the void space 

above the main showroom would have been hidden by the holding area partition wall and suspended 

ceiling of the main showroom. 

The results indicate that as early as 270 s into the simulation, smoke may have begun to flow down 

through ventilation openings in the suspended ceiling and into the rear of the main showroom. By 300 s, 

there is also a layer of smoke beginning to develop under the suspended ceiling in the rear of the west 

showroom. It cannot be concluded from the simulation whether an observer located in the main 

showroom would have noticed smoke in the rear main showroom at 300 s, or would have been able to 

distinguish the source of that smoke. The smoke continued to flow down through ventilation openings 

and, after forming a substantial layer in the rear of the main showroom, began to spread throughout the 

main showroom. At about 400 s, the simulation indicates that the smoke layer extended down to near the 

floor on the west side of the main showroom. As the fire spread from the holding area into the rear of the 

main showroom at around 500 s, additional smoke was added to the smoke layer in the main showroom. 

As demonstrated by the rendering of smoke by the simulation, visibility became compromised in the 

showrooms within 8 minutes to 10 minutes. The simulation results are consistent with the E-11 captain 

reporting heavy smoke in the main showroom at 7:20 p.m., which would correspond to 555 s into the 

simulation. 

At 900 s, the baseline simulation results demonstrate dense black smoke would have been present from 

the floor to the ceiling in the main and west showrooms and less dense gray smoke in the east showroom. 

About a minute later at 7:27 p.m. there were fragmented radios transmissions suggesting fire fighters 

were “lost or trapped inside” and this would have been consistent with the dense black smoke in the 

showrooms. The model indicates that the fire continued to grow in the rear of the main showroom. By 

1380 s in the simulation, the fire in the rear of the main showroom had exceeded 90 MW and involved at 

least 15 percent of the main showroom. At about 7:35 p.m. (1450 s), the fire department vented the front 

windows and the fire spread extremely quickly to the front of the main showroom. Flames extended out 

the front windows on the west side of the main showroom at 1620 s (7:37:53 p.m.) in the simulation. 

This is in good agreement with fire ground photographs which show fire out the front window at 

7:37 p.m. 

During the base simulation, the loading dock, holding area, west showroom, and main showroom each 

exceeded the tenability thresholds (Tables 4-1 to Table 4-6). Although not specifically tabulated, but 

apparent from the temperature and oxygen plots (Figures 4-29 and 4-35), both the loading dock and the 

holding area became untenable early in the fire. The rear of the west side of the main showroom first 

became untenable due to high temperature at 1200 s. The front of the west side of the main showroom 

exceeded the modeled temperature tenability threshold at 1350 s. These times are consistent with the 

observed fire spreading from the rear to the front of the main showroom. The rear of the west showroom 

became untenable due to high temperature and oxygen depletion at 1650 s while the front of the west 

showroom exceeded both tenability thresholds at 1700 s. The slightly longer time for the west showroom 
4-51 

to exceed the tenability limits is consistent with the observed fire spreading through the main showroom 

first and then moving into the west showroom. 

The simulation peak temperatures provide some understanding of the fire behavior within the building. 

The relatively low 210 oC peak temperature in the rear of the west showroom is consistent with the 

understanding that the observed fire did not move directly through the rear of the west showroom to reach 

the main showroom. The higher simulation temperatures in the front of both showrooms, as compared to 

the rear of the showrooms, are consistent with additional oxygen being available in the front of the 

showrooms, relative to the less ventilated rear areas of the showroom. 

The HRRs for the loading dock, main showroom, and west showroom are tabulated in Table 4-8. The 

simulation indicates that the peak HRR for the loading dock was approximately 85 MW, the peak 

occurred at 280 s, and the total energy released was 95 GJ. The peak heat release rate for main showroom 

were about one and a half times the loading dock at 135 MW peak and 160 GJ for total heat release. The 

west showroom values were a peak HRR of 50 MW and total energy release of 30 GJ which is consistent 

with the west showroom being about half the floor space of the main showroom and the rear third of the 

west showroom not being as involved in the fire. 
4-52

Table 4-7. Observed Fire Ground and Computer Simulation Events. 

Clock Time 

hh:mm:ss 

Computer 

Simulation 

Time 

s 

Observed Fire Ground Event Computer Simula

6:56 p.m. Fire observed at rear of store 7:07 p.m. Dispatch receives report of fire behind store 

7:10:46 p.m. BC-4 reports trash and debris fire outside loading dock 7:10:53 p.m. 0 

Computer simulation start time Loading Dock Source Fire initiaramped up to 700 kW) 

7:10:56 p.m. 3 BC-4 reports fire may have gotten into building 7:11:40 p.m. 47 E-10 on scene 7:12:13 p.m. 80 AC enters main showroom Smoke not visible at rear of main 

 110 

Smoke filled loading dock Smoke beginning to fill interstitishowroom 

7:13:17 p.m. 144 Double doors at rear of west showroom opened Double doors opened 7:13:18 p.m. 145 Fire pulling air from rear of wes

loading dock through double doo

7:15:23 p.m. 270 Smoke begins to flow through op

ceiling in rear of main showroom 
4-53 

Clock Time 

hh:mm:ss 

Computer 

Simulation 

Time 

s 

Observed Fire Ground Event Computer Simula

7:15:53 p.m. 300 

Fire spread across entire loading to flow into interstitial space aboLight smoke flowing down throususpended ceiling into rear of mLight smoke below suspended ceshowroom 

7:16:32 p.m. 339 Fire Chief on scene 7:16:53 p.m. 360 

Loading dock fully involved in fSmoke continuing to flow into inmain showroom Medium smoke flowing down thsuspended ceiling into rear of mMedium smoke below suspendeshowroom Light smoke below suspended ceand west showrooms 

7:17:23 p.m. 390 Hot smoke layer forms below su

main and west showrooms 

7:17:33 p.m. 400 Warehouse Source Fire initiated 

 420 Smoke layer filling west side of 

suspended ceiling to floor 

7:18:53 p.m. 480 Holding area fully involved in fi
4-54

Clock Time 

hh:mm:ss 

Computer 

Simulation 

Time 

s 

Observed Fire Ground Event Computer Simula

Smoke continuing to flow into inmain showroom Medium smoke flowing down thsuspended ceiling into rear of mMedium smoke below suspendeshowroom Medium smoke below suspendemain showroom Light smoke below suspended cemain showroom Medium smoke below suspendeshowroom 

7:19:00 p.m. 487 E-15 captain and two fire fighters enter main showroom encountered smoke and donned SCBA facepieces 7:19:38 p.m. 525 Main Showroom Fire Source 1 i

4 MW) 

7:20:08 p.m. 555 

E-15 arrives on scene and as E-11 captain exits structure passes by E-15 crew entering structure. E-11 captain reports heavy smoke and increasing temperatures 

7:20 p.m. E-12 begins pumping water to E-10 at loading dock 

7:20:53 p.m. 600 

Holding area fire has penetrated showroom Fire burning in rear of main showfire flowing under suspended cei
4-55 

Clock Time 

hh:mm:ss 

Computer 

Simulation 

Time 

s 

Observed Fire Ground Event Computer Simula

Heavy smoke in rear of main shoMedium to heavy smoke below west side of main showroom Light to medium smoke below seast side of main showroom Medium smoke below suspendeshowroom 

7:21:53 p.m. 660 Main Showroom Fire Source 2 i

6 MW) 

7:23:16 p.m. 743 Photograph shows flames on roof above rear of main showroom and/or holding area (Figure 4-23) 7:25:53 p.m. 900 

Fire burning in rear of main show23 MW. Smoke from fire flowinceiling in main showroom Heavy smoke in rear of main shoHeavy smoke below suspended cshowroom Heavy smoke below suspended cshowroom Light smoke below suspended ce

 7:27 p.m. E-16 begins pumping water to E-11 at front of store Inaudible radio transmissions –“lost or trapped inside” 
4-56

Clock Time 

hh:mm:ss 

Computer 

Simulation 

Time 

s 

Observed Fire Ground Event Computer Simula

7:27:53 p.m. 1020 

Fire in main showroom continueshowroom. Fire in main showroapproximately 90 MW 

7:31:53 p.m. 1260 Fire continues to grow in southw

showroom involving about 10% 

7:31 p.m. to 

7:34 p.m. 

Fire fighter calls “Mayday” Fire Chief “we need to vacate building” 

7:33:53 p.m. 1380 Fire begins to spread out of sout

involves about 15% of main sho

7:35:10 p.m. 1457 Removal of front windows of main showroom Main showroom windows opene7:35:53 p.m. 1500 

Fire spreading toward front of stmain showroom and involves abshowroom 

7:36 p.m. Thick black smoke rolls out front windows 

7:36:23 p.m. 1530 Removal of additional front windows of main showroom Main showroom windows opene7:36:53 p.m. 1560 Fire has spread to front of store o

showroom and involves about 30

7:37 p.m. Fire rolls out front windows of main showroom 
4-57 

Clock Time 

hh:mm:ss 

Computer 

Simulation 

Time 

s 

Observed Fire Ground Event Computer Simula

7:37:53 p.m. 1620 Fire spreading to east side of ma

of west showroom 

7:38:00 p.m. 1627 Failure of front windows of west showroom 7:44:00 p.m. 1987 Failure of additional front windows of west showroom 7:50:53 p.m. 2400 End of computer simulation - a

minutes after fire department arr

7:51 p.m. Portion of main showroom roof collapses 
4-58

4.6.2 Fire Sprinklers Simulation 

In the simulation with fire sprinklers, the two sprinklers nearest the fire (in the southwest corner of the 

loading dock) activated early in the fire, at 50 s and 75 s. The two sprinklers controlled the fire and 

prevented the fire from spreading into the showrooms or warehouse. As a result, the temperatures and 

oxygen volume fractions remained below untenability thresholds. 

4.6.3 Alternate Ventilation Scenarios 

Three simulations were performed in which the building ventilation conditions were altered from the 

baseline scenario. 

In the first, the windows at the front of the main showroom were kept in place. While this did effectively 

reduce the peak heat release rate, conditions throughout the main and west showrooms became untenable 

due to excessive temperature and depleted oxygen. Untenability would have occurred prior to the time 

that the windows were removed in the base scenario. 

In the second variation, a 1.7 m2

 (18 ft2) vent was placed in the roof at the rear of the main showroom. 

The results of this simulation were not significantly different from the ventilation scenario with the front 

windows intact. With a vent or hole in the roof, the smoke and unburned fuel exited the structure and that 

if gases vented outside were ignited, the energy released would not have contributed to the energy inside 

the modeled structure. 

In the final ventilation variation, the roof vent was expanded to 5.9 m2

 (64 ft2). This enlargement did not 

change the peak HRR, temperature, or minimum oxygen volume fractions. However, the fire progression 

was delayed at the rear of the showroom by several minutes. This delay in the movement of the fire did 

not significantly change the time that conditions became untenable throughout the main and west 

showrooms. 
4-59 

Table 4-8. Fire Energetics for the Loading Dock, Main Showroom, and West Showroom. Simulation 

Loading Dock Main Showroom West Showroo

Time to 

Peak 

HRR 

s 

Peak 

HRR 

MW 

Total 

Heat 

Release 

GJ 

Time to 

Peak 

HRR 

s 

Peak 

HRR 

MW 

Total 

Heat 

Release 

GJ 

Time to 

Peak 

HRR 

s 

Peak 

HRR 

MW 

Base 280 85 95 1720 135 160 1940 50 Base with Sprinklers 60 0.9 1.4 Front Windows Intact 1260 130 75 
4-60

 

4.7 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 4 

[1] Nelson, H.E., “An Engineering Analysis of the Early Stages of Fire Development- The Fire at the 

Dupont Plaza Hotel and Casino- Dec. 31, 1986,” NBSIR97-3560, National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (formerly the National Bureau of Standards), Gaithersburg, MD, April 1987. 

[2] Purser, D.A., “Toxicity Assessment of Combustion Products,” SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection 

Engineering, 3rd ed. DiNenno, P.J., et al. (eds). National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Quincy, 

MA, 2002. 

 [3] McGrattan, K.B., Hostikka,S., and Floyd, J.E. Fire Dynamics Simulator (Version 5), User’s Guide. 

NIST Special Publication 1019-5, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 

October 2007. 

[4] Forney, G.P. Smokeview (Version 5), A Tool for Visualizing Fire Dynamics Simulation Data, 

Volume I: User’s Guide. NIST Special Publication 1017-1, National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, August 2007. 

[5] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, USA, and VTT Technical 

Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland. Fire Dynamics Simulator, Technical Reference Guide, 5th 

edition, October 2007. NIST Special Publication 1018-5 (Four volume set). 

[6] Grosshandler , W.L., Bryner , N., Madrzykowski ,D., and Kuntz , K. Report of the Technical 

Investigation of The Station Nightclub Fire. NIST NCSTAR 2, National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, July 2005. 

[7] McGrattan, K., Bouldin, C., and Forney , G. Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the 

World Trade Center Disaster: Computer Simulation of the Fires in the WTC Towers. NIST NCSTAR 1-

5F, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, September 2005. 

[8] Madrzykowski, D., and Vettori, R.L., “Simulation of the Dynamics of the Fire at 3146 Cherry Road 

NE, Washington D.C., May 30, 1999,” NISTIR 6510, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

Gaithersburg, MD, April 2000. 

[9] Madrzykowski, D., Forney, G.P., and Walton, W.D., “Simulation of the Dynamics of a Fire in a TwoStory Duplex-Iowa, Dec. 22, 1999,” NISTIR 6854, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

Gaithersburg, MD, January 2002. 

[10] Sutula, J., “Applications of Fire Dynamics Simulator in Fire Protection Engineering Consulting,” 

Fire Protection Engineering, No. 14, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, Bethesda, MD, Spring 2002. 

[11] Rehm, R.G., Pitts, W.M., Baum, H.R., Evans, D.D., Prasad, K., McGrattan, K.B., and Forney, G.P., 

“Initial Model for Fires in the World Trade Center Towers,” NISTIR 6879, National Institute of 

Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, May, 2002. 
4-61 

[12] Sutula, J., “Practical Applications of Fire Dynamics Simulator in Fire Protection Engineering 

Consulting,” Fire Protection Engineering, No. 15, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, Bethesda, MD, 

Summer 2002. 

[13] McGrattan, K.B., and Hamins, A., “Numerical Simulation of the Howard Street Tunnel Fire, 

Baltimore, MD, July 2001., NISTIR 6902, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, 

MD, August 2002. 

[14] Sofa Super Store Fire – Report of Investigation, ATF National Response Team Origin and Cause 

Report, Investigation 763010-07-0172, Report 32, June 22, 2007.

[15] Fire Dynamics, Chapter 2, The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th edition, Society 

of Fire Protection Engineers, Quincy, MA page 2-29. 

[16] ISO 13943, Fire Safety – Vocabulary, International Standards Organization, Geneva. 

[17] NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2007 edition, National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) Quincy, MA 2007. 
4-62
5-1 

Chapter 5

MODEL CODES AND STANDARDS

5.1 INTRODUCTION 

An analysis was performed to compare the fire safety provisions contained in a number of current and 

past codes and standards to the fire safety related characteristics of the Sofa Super Store. The purpose of 

the analysis was not only to determine if the Sofa Super Store met the applicable code provisions, but also 

to determine if changes are necessary to the codes and standards requirements for new and/or existing 

buildings in order to prevent or mitigate future incidents. 

A contract was entered into with Koffel Associates, Inc. of Elkridge, Maryland, to identify the current 

model building and fire codes that were available for application to a structure such as the Sofa Super 

Store. They were also contracted to identify the model building and fire codes in place at the time the 

building was constructed and at the times when modifications were made to the structure. Koffel 

Associates provided comparisons of the requirements of the identified building and fire codes. The 

analysis and discussion of this chapter focus on areas that are expected to be related to the growth and 

spread of the fire that occurred on June 18, 2007. Any conclusions and findings that are presented are 

solely those of NIST. 

5.2 CODE HISTORY 

Since the 1950s or 1960s original construction of the building at 1807 Savannah Highway in Charleston, 

SC, numerous model codes have been published and revised. Prior to 2000, most model codes were 

limited to regional adoption. Table 5-1 summarizes the model building codes that were relevant to the 

structure over its history. Table 5-2 summarizes the model fire codes that were relevant to the structure 

over its history. 

Table 5-1. Applicable Model Building Code

Building Permit Date Description of Work Applicable Building Code 

1950s or 1960s* Original Building Construction 1949 or 1955 National Building Code 

1993 West Showroom Addition 1991 Standard Building Code 

1995 East Showroom Addition 1994 Standard Building Code 

1996 Warehouse Addition 1994 Standard Building Code 

1996-2005* Four Fill-In Additions** 

1994 or 1997 Standard Building Code or 

2000 International Building Code 

* No building permit was located. 

** Additions that occupy the space between existing buildings or sections of an existing building. 
5-2

Table 5-2. Applicable Model Fire Code

Building Permit Date Description of Work Applicable Fire Code** 

1950s or 1960s* Original Building Construction Unknown 

1993 West Showroom Addition 1991 Standard Fire Prevention Code 

1995 East Showroom Addition 1994 Standard Fire Prevention Code 

1996 Warehouse Addition 1994 Standard Fire Prevention Code 

1996-2005* Four Fill-In Additions

1994 or 1997 Standard Fire Prevention 

Code or 2000 International Fire Code 

* No building permit was located. 

** Assumed fire code based on building code. 

The first edition of the National Building Code (NBC) was published in 1905, by the National Board of 

Fire Underwriters (now the American Insurance Association). The first edition of the Standard Building 

Code (SBC) was adopted in November 1945 at the Annual Research Conference of the Southern Building 

Code Congress International (SBCCI). The first edition of the Standard Fire Prevention Code (SFPC) 

was published in 1974. The purpose of both the National Building Code and the Standard Building Code 

was to serve as a comprehensive regulatory building code designed to protect the public’s life, health, and 

welfare in buildings. The Standard Building Code incorporated, by reference, nationally-recognized 

consensus standards for use in judging the performance of materials and systems. The last edition of the 

Standard Building Code was the 1999 Edition. 

In 2000, the International Code Council (ICC) published the first International Building Code (IBC) and 

first International Fire Code (IFC), both now published in 2003, 2006, and 2009 editions. The ICC was 

founded in 1994 by three regional code writing organizations: Southern Building Code Congress 

(SBCCI), Building Officials and Code Administrators International (BOCA), and International 

Conference of Building Officials (ICBO). With the publication of the International Codes in 2000, the 

three regional code writing organizations ceased updating and publishing revised editions of their 

respective regional codes (including the SBC and SFPC). 

5.3 MODEL CODE ANALYSIS 

The model code analysis was based upon the 1991 and 1994 editions of both the Standard Building Code 

(SBC) [1,2] and the Standard Fire Prevention Code (SFPC) [3,4] as well as the 2006 editions of the 

International Building Code (IBC) [5] and the International Fire Code (IFC) [6]. The 1991 editions of 

the SBC and SFPC were the applicable codes at the time of the west showroom addition. The 1994 

editions of the SBC and SFPC were the applicable codes for the east showroom and warehouse additions 

and possibly for the fill-in additions as well. The 2006 editions of the IBC and IFC were the codes in 

effect at the time of the fire. A comparison of the relevant sections of these codes is included as Table 

5-4. In areas where the codes had differing requirements, the impact of both requirements was evaluated. 

NIST's technical investigation did not focus on compliance or non-compliance with the specific state or 

local regulations in effect at the time of the fire, nor did it seek to find fault. Rather, the focus of the 

study was on the relevant model codes, and how the design and operation of the Sofa Super Store 
5-3 

compared with the guidance provided within the model codes. The findings and recommendations from 

the NIST investigation are expected to be useful across the nation by being incorporated into the model 

codes. 

It should be noted that a portion of the NIST building code evaluation utilizes current building code 

requirements, which are not applied to buildings that existed, or had been issued permits, prior to the 

adoption and effective date of the code. Building code requirements generally apply to new construction, 

as well as new additions to structures, building alterations, and changes in use or occupancy. For 

example, changes to the height or area of a building could potentially require the installation of fire rated 

separations or sprinkler protection based on the new size of the building. Some local or state laws 

mandate that when a certain percentage of the building is renovated, the entire building must be brought 

into compliance with current codes. Section 101.5.1 of the 1991 edition of the SBC states that for 

existing buildings, “The Building Official shall determine the extent to which the existing system shall be 

made to conform to the requirements of the technical codes for new construction.” 

Existing structures are, however, subject to some provisions of the current edition of the International Fire 

Code if adopted by the jurisdiction. The intent of the International Fire Code is to provide a reasonable 

level of fire safety, in new and existing buildings, for protection of property and to provide for the safety 

of the occupants, the fire service, and other emergency responders during emergency operations 

(IFC §101.3, 2006 edition). 

 

5.3.1 Administration 

IBC §105.1 requires that permits be obtained prior to enlarging, altering, repairing, or changing of the 

occupancy of any building. SBC and SFPC §103 contain similar requirements. Building permits for the 

addition of the west and east showrooms and warehouse of the Sofa Super Store were located during this 

study. A partial set of design drawings for the warehouse addition was provided by City of Charleston 

Zoning Division. Building permits for the addition of the loading dock and repair shop areas were not 

located. 

5.3.2 Occupancy 

Chapter 3 of the IBC and Chapter 4 of the 1991 SBC (Chapter 3 of the 1994 SBC) both classify the 

furniture showrooms as mercantile occupancies and the warehouse and loading dock as moderate-hazard 

(S-1) storage occupancies. 

The moderate-hazard (S-1) storage occupancy classification includes the use of a building, or a portion of 

a building, for the storage of items that pose a moderate hazard. Specific examples of moderate hazard 

(S-1) storage occupancies are given in the building codes, and include buildings used for the storage of 

furniture. The use of the warehouse and loading docks for furniture storage was consistent with the 

moderate-hazard storage occupancy classification, but the storage of liquid hydrocarbons and solvents 

was potentially inconsistent with an S-1 storage occupancy. Areas where flammable paint, hydrocarbon 

solvents, and aerosols are used and stored, are classified by the building codes as Group H occupancies if 

the quantities exceed the maximum allowable quantities in the building and fire codes (1991 SBC Table 

408.1.2, 1994 SBC Table 308.2B, 2006 IBC Table 307.1[1], 2006 IFC Table 2703.1.1[1]). In addition, 

the 1991/1994 SBC states that portions of Group S occupancies involving highly-combustible, 
5-4

flammable, or explosive products are required to be properly ventilated, protected, and separated from the 

remainder of the building in accordance with NFPA standards. Otherwise, the entire building is classified 

as a Group H occupancy. The quantities of flammable and combustible materials in the warehouse and 

loading dock areas of the Sofa Super Store did not appear to exceed the maximum allowable quantities 

for Group S-1 occupancies in the 1991/1994 SBC or 2006 IBC. 

The repair shop areas, where flammable paint, hydrocarbon solvents, and aerosols were used and stored, 

would also have been classified by the building codes as Group H occupancies if the quantities exceeded 

the maximum allowable quantities listed in the building and fire codes. The quantities of flammable and 

combustible materials in the repair shop areas did not appear to exceed the maximum allowable quantities 

for Group M and S-1 occupancies in the 1991/1994 SBC or 2006 IBC. These quantities were estimated, 

however, since the containers were not cataloged individually at the site. 

Additional fire protection requirements in the fire codes would apply depending on the application 

methods and quantities of hazardous materials in open use within the repair shops and loading dock areas. 

Application of flammable / combustible finishes to furniture would require consideration of ignition 

sources, development of flammable atmospheres, fire barriers, and automatic suppression systems, etc. It 

is not known to what extent the hazardous materials were in open use within these areas. 

The mercantile occupancy classification describes the use of a building, or portions of a building, for the 

display and sale of merchandise. Examples of mercantile occupancies include department stores, retail 

stores, and sales rooms. The use of the showrooms to display and sell furniture was consistent with the 

mercantile occupancy classification. 

5.3.3 Fire Walls, Fire Areas, and Occupancy Separations 

The 1991 SBC Table 403.1 (1994 SBC Table 704.1) requires a three-hour fire resistance rated separation 

between moderate hazard (S-1) storage occupancies and adjacent occupancies if the building is 

considered a mixed occupancy. A one-hour or greater fire resistance rated separation is required between 

mercantile occupancies and other occupancy types, depending on the other occupancy classification. The 

more stringent requirement is dictated by the moderate hazard (S-1) storage occupancy, and the 

separation between an S-1 occupancy and an M occupancy is required to be three-hour fire resistance 

rated. 

The gypsum board covered concrete block walls and roll-down fire doors between the showrooms appear 

to meet the requirements of a two-hour fire resistance rated separation, and therefore provide three 

showroom fire areas according to the 2006 IBC §706.3.9. It is not known, however, if the gypsum 

board / concrete block walls met the requirements for a fire wall (SBC §202, 2006 IBC §702 and 

Tables 705.4 and 715.4) with required fire resistance ratings of four hours under the SBC or three hours 

under the IBC. The presence of fire walls would allow the three showrooms to be considered separate 

buildings for height area limitations and sprinkler requirements (1994 SBC §202 definition of “building”, 

2006 IBC §705.1). 

When the warehouse was constructed, the moderate hazard (S-1) storage occupancy would have required 

a three-hour separation between it and the other occupancies. According to design drawings, the rolldown fire door at the rear of the main showroom that led to the warehouse was a three-hour fire door. 

The exterior walls of the warehouse, however, were two-hour fire resistance rated according to design 
5-5 

drawings. The City of Charleston granted the store owner a variance†

 because the separation distance 

between the rear of the west showroom and north wall of the warehouse was in excess of 15 m (50 ft). 

The two-hour fire resistance rated walls are sufficient to meet code requirements for exterior walls of 

separate structures separated by 15 m (50 ft,) while the three-hour fire door is sufficient to meet the code 

requirements for an occupancy separation and fire wall. 

The SBC requires a three-hour fire resistance rated separation between the loading dock (S-1 occupancy) 

and the showrooms (M occupancy). There was not a fire resistance rated separation between the loading 

dock and the main showroom due to the unrated roll-down door. In addition, the required three-hour fire 

resistance rated separation was not present between the loading dock and the west showroom. The 

separation would not be required if the authority having jurisdiction allowed the loading dock to be 

considered an accessory occupancy (1994 SBC §704.1.2.2). 

5.3.4 Construction Type 

Chapter 6 of both the IBC and SBC classify the main building structures as Type II B construction and 

Type V unprotected construction respectively, in which the building elements are of unprotected 

noncombustible material. The wooden fill-in buildings would have been considered as Type V B 

construction under IBC, which is of any material approved by the code. Under the SBC, the fill-in 

buildings would have been classified as Type VI unprotected construction which is of wood or other 

approved material. Under either code, the building elements of the fill-in buildings would not have been 

required to have fire-resistance ratings. 

Due to the varying construction types, requirements for the least fire resistant construction type would 

have to be met or the construction types would have to be properly separated with a fire wall. Given the 

existing ratings of the exterior walls of the showrooms and warehouse, when the loading dock was added, 

it should have been of a different construction type or the existing building walls would have had to be 

upgraded. 

5.3.5 Height and Area Requirements 

For a one-story building of Type II B construction, IBC Table 503 allows mercantile occupancies to be up 

to 1161 m2

 (12,500 ft2) and allows storage occupancies to be up to 1626 m2 (17,500 ft2). SBC Table 500 

allows mercantile occupancies to be up to 836 m2

 (9000 ft2) and storage occupancies to be up to 1486 m2

(16,000 ft2

). Both codes allow for area increases due to frontage on open areas and public ways, and 

complete building fire sprinkler protection. 

The original showroom was 1510 m2

 (16,250 ft2). Under the SBC, with allowances for open frontage on 

all sides (assumed to be 9.1 m (30 ft) clear), the showroom building would only have been permitted to be 

up to 1394 m2

 (15,000 ft2). When the additional showrooms were constructed, the frontage area was 

decreased. The east and west showrooms were both 669 m2

 (7200 ft2), which is well under the 836 m2

(9000 ft2

) permitted before frontage allowances. The warehouse was 1449 m2 (15,600 ft2), just under the 

allowable 1486 m2

 (16,000 ft2). Under the IBC, the showrooms would have been permitted to be 1161 m2

(12,500 ft2

) and the warehouse would have been permitted to be 1626 m2 (17,500 ft2). If the fire 

 

†

 The Sofa Super Store building configuration, with the enclosed breezeway connecting the rear of the main showroom and the 

warehouse, is not explicitly addressed by the SBC and IBC. 
5-6

separations between the showrooms are insufficient to meet the requirements of a fire wall, however, all 

three showrooms would have been considered a single building. The total showroom area would be 

2882 m2

 (31,060 ft2), which exceeds the maximum allowable area for a non-sprinkler protected 

mercantile occupancy in both the SBC and IBC. The separation of the main showroom from the east and 

west showrooms may have been designed to establish fire area separations, and therefore keep the square 

footage of each area under the requirements for height and area that would mandate sprinkler protection. 

 

Table 5-3 Allowable Heights and Building Areas from Table 500 of the 1994 SBC. 

Type Construction V Unprotected VI Unprotected 

Maximum Height 16.8 m (55 ft) 12.2 m (40 ft) 

Occupancy Unsprinklered

[h] 

Sprinklered 

[j] 

Unsprinklere

d 

[h] 

Sprinklered 

[j] 

M - Mercantile 

Max No. of Stories 

Area: Multistory, m2

 (ft2) 

Area: One Story Only, m2

 (ft2) 

[f] 

2 

836 (9000) 

836 (9000) 

5 

1672 (18,000) 

2508 (27,000) 

[f] 

2 

557 (6000) 

557 (6000) 

2 

1115 (12,000) 

1672 (18,000) 

S - Storage[g]

Max No. of Stories 

Area: Multistory, m2

 (ft2) 

Area: One Story Only, m2

 (ft2) 

2 

1486 (16,000) 

1486 (16,000) 

4 

2973 (32,000) 

4459 (48,000) 

1 

557 (6000) 

1 

1672 (18,000) 

Notes: 

Lower case letters in the table refer to notes. These letters are the same as those used in the building code for easier 

reference. See 1994 SBC Table 500 for additional notes not included here. 

 Heights for construction types are limited to the number of stories and height (ft) shown in table. 

 Allowable building area is shown in m2

 (ft2) per floor. 

[f] The total area for unsprinklered Group M occupancies after the increases permitted by 1994 SBC §503.3 shall not 

exceed 1394 m2

 (15,000 ft2). 

 [g] The maximum height in feet is not applicable to Group S and Group F occupancies. 

[h] When all portions of buildings are sprinklered in accordance with 1994 SBC §903.2, the height of the buildings listed 

under this column may be increased buy one story. The general area increase in 1994 SBC §503.3.2 may be applied before 

using footnote h. 

[j] When the building is fully sprinklered in accordance with 1994 SBC §903.2, the allowable building heights and areas 

shall be as listed under this column.
5-7 

Table 5-4 Allowable Heights and Building Areas from Table 503 of the 2006 IBC 

Construction Type 

Type II B Type V B 

Group Height, m (ft)

Stories / Area 

16.8 (55) 12.2 (40) 

M 

Max. Stories 

Max Area, m2

 (ft2) 

4 

1161 (12,500) 

1 

836 (9000) 

S-1 

Max. Stories 

Max Area, m2

 (ft2) 

3 

1626 (17,500) 

1 

836 (9000) 

Notes: 

See 2006 IBC for notes concerning increases to allowable heights and areas due to fire sprinkler systems and street frontage. 

See 2006 IBC Table 503 for additional notes not included here.

5.3.6 Storage Height 

SFPC §502.3.2 and IFC §315.2.1 require high-piled or rack storage to have a 61 cm (2 ft) clearance from 

the top of the storage to the ceiling. It is unknown if 61 cm (2 ft) of clearance was maintained due to the 

conditions of the warehouse and stored products observed after the fire. 

5.3.7 Fire Sprinkler System 

The model codes may require fire sprinkler protection for buildings based on a combination of factors 

including occupancy, building area, construction type, building height, and occupant location relative to 

exit discharge. The SBC (SBC Table 500 Note F and SBC §903.7.1) requires sprinkler protection for 

mercantile occupancies with areas in excess of 1394 m2

 (15,000 ft2) that stock combustible commodities. 

According to the code, the Sofa Super Store showrooms would be required to be sprinklered unless they 

were separated by fire walls that were positioned to produce buildings of 1394 m2

 (15,000 ft2) or less in 

area. The fire barriers between the showrooms may have been installed to avoid sprinkler system 

installation requirements, although the fire barriers may not have met the code definition of a fire wall. 

Those barriers failed during the fire due to a roll-down fire door not operating properly. 

The IBC (2006 IBC §903.2.6) requires sprinkler protection throughout new buildings containing a 

mercantile occupancy if any of the following conditions exist: a fire area exceeds 1115 m2

 (12,000 ft2), or 

the fire area is more than three stories above grade plane, or the total area of all mercantile areas in the 

building exceeds 2230 m2

 (24,000 ft2). According to the code, fire sprinklers would be required in the 
5-8

showrooms unless they were separated by fire walls (to form separate buildings) and fire barriers (to form 

smaller fire areas) to conform to the area limitations above. 

Although outside of the scope of this report, the 2009 editions of the IBC [7] and IFC [8] (IBC §903.2.7 

and IFC §903.2.7) require fire sprinkler systems in new buildings housing Group M occupancies if they 

are used, “for the display and sale of upholstered furniture.” This is a new requirement in the 2009 

editions of the codes. 

The SBC and SFPC (Table 3605) require fire sprinkler systems for buildings that contain over 1115 m2

(12,000 ft2

) of high piled combustible furniture (Commodity III or IV) storage. Fire sprinklers are also 

required by the IBC and IFC (Table 2306) for high piled storage of combustible furniture (Class III or IV 

Commodity) with areas greater than 1115 m2

 (12,000 ft2). Based on the square footage of the warehouse 

building, fire sprinklers are required by the SBC/SFPC and IBC/IFC model codes. 

As stated in the occupancy section of this report, the loading dock would be classified as an S-1 

occupancy by the building codes. If the loading dock was considered an accessory occupancy to the 

adjacent mercantile areas (1994 SBC §704.1.2.2), then it would need to be sprinkler protected according 

to the code sections governing the showrooms discussed above. If the loading dock was considered a 

different occupancy, due to increased hazard over the showrooms (mercantile), then fire rated occupancy 

barriers would be required, but sprinklers would not be required by the SBC due to the small area. 

5.3.8 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance 

Both IFC §703.2 and SFPC §504.7.3 require rolling fire doors to be maintained and tested in accordance 

with NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives [9]. As part of their inspection, it 

must be verified that there are no obstructions in the path of the roll-down door and that the door 

assembly will properly close under fire conditions. If fire doors fail to activate and close when tested, 

corrective action must be taken. The fusible link(s) used to activate the door must also be inspected and 

replaced when fused or damaged. NFPA 80 (§5.2.1) requires that inspection and testing occur not less 

than annually, and that a written record of the inspection be signed and kept for possible future inspection 

by the authority having jurisdiction. 

Any inspection, testing, and maintenance documentation for the Sofa Super Store was lost during the fire. 

After the fire, it was determined that multiple roll-down doors had failed to operate properly. One of the 

roll-down doors had the fusible link function, but the door caught on a piece of furniture, keeping it from 

closing completely. 

5.3.9 Egress 

Egress requirements are located in Chapter 10 of both the SBC and IBC. A travel distance limit of 61 m 

(200 ft) is dictated by both codes for both mercantile and storage occupancies. Both codes also require 

three exits for the showroom and two exits for the warehouse based on the code specified minimum 

occupant load of the buildings and the required exit remoteness of one-half the diagonal of the space 

(one-half of the diagonal dimension of the space, measured along the floor, typically from the most 

distant room corners). 

Prior to the addition of the loading dock area, the east and west showrooms each had two exits of 

sufficient width, which led directly to the building exterior. If the showrooms are examined individually, 
5-9 

the two required exits in the west showroom were adequately spaced from each other, but the two 

required exits in the east showroom appear to be separated slightly less than required by the SBC. The 

main showroom, however, does not contain the three required exits without using paths leading through 

the roll-down fire doors and through the east and west showrooms. The roll-down fire doors separating 

the east and west showrooms from the main showroom do not meet the requirements for an egress door 

(1994 SBC §1012.1.2 and §1012.1.8). However, if the paths through the fire door openings are assumed 

to be acceptable for egress due to their “normally open” status, and the space is treated as one large 

showroom, then the showroom areas are equipped with an adequate number of exits with adequate 

separation distance, adequate exit width, and exits that are within the required travel distance. 

When the loading dock was added, it blocked the south exit from the west showroom and the south exit 

from the rear of the main showroom due to the sliding horizontal doors in the loading dock. (The 

horizontal doors in the loading dock are not of a type permitted by the codes to be a component of a 

means of egress.) The loading dock area is also an intervening space with a higher hazard than the 

showroom due to the storage of combustible materials and the probability of obstructed paths of travel. 

Without the egress paths on the south ends of the main and west showrooms, the egress paths through the 

roll-down doors between the showrooms are needed to provide the adequate number of exits. 

The warehouse building contains the required two exits, along with adequate egress width, exit 

separation, and travel distance to comply with the provisions of the SBC. 

Table 5-6 Maximum Travel Distance from Table 1004 of the 1994 SBC. 

Occupancy 

Classification

Max. Travel Distance to Exit, m (ft) 

Unsprinklered Sprinklered 

Group M 61.0 (200) 76.2 (250) 

Group S 61.0 (200) 76.2 (250)[7]

Notes: 

Bracketed numbers in the table refer to notes. These numbers are the same as those used in the building code for easier 

reference. See 1994 SBC Table 1004 for additional notes not included here. 

[7] See §1004.1.4 for exceptions. Travel distance may be increased to 122 m (400 ft) if additional requirements are met.

Table 5-7 Maximum Travel Distance from Table 1016.1 of the 2006 IBC. 

Occupancy Unsprinklered 

m (ft)

Sprinklered 

m (ft)

A, E, F-1, I-1, M, R, S-1 61.0 (200) 76.2 (250)[b]

Notes: 

Bracketed letters in the table refer to notes. These letters are the same as those used in the building code for easier 

reference. See 2006 IBC Table 1016.1 for additional notes not included here. 

[b] Buildings equipped with fire sprinkler systems throughout in accordance with 2006 IBC §903.3.1.1 or §903.3.1.2. See 

2006 IBC §903 for occupancies where fire sprinkler systems in accordance with 2006 IBC §903.3.1.2 are permitted.
5-10

5.4 LIMITING FIRE SPREAD IN LARGE FURNITURE DISPLAY AREAS 

The type and amount of fuel, in conjunction with the large open display area, enabled the Sofa Super 

Store fire to spread rapidly within the building. Both fire sprinklers and compartmentalization can 

effectively limit how fast a fire spreads within a structure. As discussed in Chapter 4, the sprinklered 

loading dock simulation demonstrated that fire sprinklers can be effective in controlling fire spread. In 

addition, during the fire incident, compartmentalization of the east showroom was effective in slowing the 

fire spread from the main showroom to the east showroom. As demonstrated in the computer 

simulations, once the fire spread into the rear of the main showroom, it moved rapidly across open spaces 

within the main showroom. The fire then spread quickly from the main showroom, through the open rolldown fire doors, and into and across the west showroom. The fire did not spread as quickly into the east 

showroom due to activation of the three roll-down fire doors, two of which closed completely. The 

separation of the main showroom from the east showroom by the fire resistive masonry wall and rolldown fire doors effectively slowed the spread of the fire in the Sofa Super Store. 

For display areas of furniture stores, the maximum floor areas allowed by the model codes do not appear 

to be effective in sufficiently limiting the magnitude and severity of furniture showroom fires. As 

described above in Section 5.3.5, for one-story buildings of Type IIB construction, the 2006 IBC allows 

unsprinklered mercantile occupancies to be up to 1115 m2

 (12,000 ft2), and the 1991/1994 SBC allows 

similarly constructed, unsprinklered, mercantile occupancies to be up to 836 m2

 (9000 ft2). The computer 

simulations, however, demonstrate that fire was able to spread rapidly throughout the west showroom, 

which had a significantly smaller area, 650 m2

 (7000 ft2), than required by the model code. Furthermore, 

as seen in the post-fire images in Appendix E, the building structure housing the west showroom was 

severely damaged in the fire incident. 

Based on allowable area, merchandise sold, and configuration of furniture stores, the maximum amount 

of fuel that is permitted by the model code does not appear to be effective in limiting the rapid spread and 

magnitude of the resulting fire to a level consistent with other sections of the code. For example, in 

typical unsprinklered occupancies, the 2009 IBC model code limits the amount of stored flammable 

liquids (Class 1A, 1B, and 1C) and combustible liquids (Class II) to no more than 460 L (120 gal). Using 

diesel fuel #2 as an example of a typical Class II combustible liquid, the energy content of 460 L is 

estimated to be 16 GJ. Using the estimated average potential energy content of a sofa (Table 1-1 and 

Appendix J) as 560 MJ, 28 sofas would also have an energy content of approximately 16 GJ. 

Approximately 180 m2

 (1900 ft2) of floor space would be required to display 28 sofas, based on the same 

average dimensions for a sofa (Appendix J) and assuming 50 percent of the available floor space was 

used for the display of merchandise. Reducing the maximum allowable size of fire areas in furniture 

stores from 1115 m2

 (12,000 ft2) to approximately 190 m2 (2000 ft2) would align the furniture fuel loading 

with the IBC allowable combustible liquid fuel loading. 

In summary, the hazard of a fire spreading rapidly across a large furniture display area can be reduced by 

compartmentalizing the display area(s), or by installing fire sprinklers which have been demonstrated as 

an effective method of controlling building fires. The unsprinklered fire areas allowed by the model 

codes are too large to prevent rapid fire growth and sufficiently limit the magnitude and severity of fires 

in furniture display areas. Reducing the maximum allowable size of unsprinklered furniture showroom 

fire areas to 190 m2

 (2000 ft2) would slow the rate of fire spread within buildings and reduce fire 

magnitude by compartmentalizing the otherwise open spaces. 
5-11 

5.5 CODE COMPARISON TABLES 

Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

1. Permits 103 Permits. A person, firm 

or corporation shall not maintain, store or handle materials, or conduct processes which produce conditions hazardous to life or property, or install equipment used in connection with such activities without first obtaining a permit from the fire official.

103 Permits. A person, firm or corporation shall not maintain, store or handle materials, or conduct processes which produce conditions hazardous to life or property, or install equipment used in connection with such activities without first obtaining a permit from the fire official. 

105.1 Required. Any owner or authorized agent who intends to construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move, demolish, or change the occupancy of a building or structure, or to erect, install, enlarge, alter, repair, remove, convert or replace any electrical, gas, mechanical or plumbing system, the installation of which is regulated by this code, or to cause any such work to be done, shall first make application to the building official and obtain the required permit. 

315.1 General. Storage, use and handling of miscellaneous combustible materials shall be in accordancwith this section. A permit shall be obtainin accordance with Section 105.6. 

2. Mercantile Occupancy 410 Mercantile Occupancy – 

Group M 410.1 Scope Group M occupancy is the use of a building or structure or any portion thereof, for the display and sale of merchandise including stocks of goods, wares or merchandise incidental to such purposes and accessible to the public and shall include, among others, the following: department stores, drug stores, markets, retail stores, shopping centers, sales rooms, wholesale stores (other than warehouses). 

309.1 Mercantile Group M. Mercantile Group M occupancy includes, among others, buildings and structures or a portion thereof, for the display and sale of merchandise, and involves stocks of goods, wares or merchandise incidental to such purposes and accessible to the public. Mercantile occupancies shall include, but not be limited to, the following: department stores, drug stores, markets, motor fueldispensing facilities, retail or wholesale stores, sales rooms.

 
5-12

Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

3. Storage Occupancy 412 Storage Occupancy – 

Group S 412.1 Scope 412.1.1 Group S occupancy is the principal use of a building or structure, or any portion thereof, for storage that is not classed as a Group H occupancy or used for the purpose of sheltering animals. 412.1.2 S1 Moderate Hazard Storage shall include buildings used for the storage of combustible materials when not classified as S2 Low Hazard or Group H. 412.1.4 Portions of Group S occupancy involving highly combustible, flammable or explosive products or materials shall be properly ventilated, protected and properly separated from the remainder of the building in accordance with the appropriate NFiPA‡ Standard 

or the entire building will be classified as Group H occupancy. 412.1.5 Refer to Chapter 36 of the Standard Fire Prevention Code for provisions on storage of highpiled combustible material and high-rack storage systems. 

SECTION 311 STORAGE GROUP S 311.1 Storage Group S. Storage Group S occupancy includes, among others, the use of a building or structure, or a portion thereof, for storage that is not classified as a hazardous occupancy. 311.2 Moderate-hazard storage, Group S-1. Buildings occupied for storage uses that are not classified as Group S-2, including, but not limited to, storage of the following: ...furniture...

 

‡ The SBC and SFPC use the abbreviation “NFiPA”, while the IBC and IFC use the abbreviation “NFPA” for the National Fire Protection Association

NFiPA and NFPA are synonymous in this report. 
5-13 

Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

4. Occupancy Separation 403.1.3 The minimum fire 

resistance of construction separating any two occupancies in a building of mixed occupancy shall be the higher rating required for the occupancies being separated, as specified in Table 403.1. Table 403.1 Occupancy Separation Requirements Storage, Moderate Hazard S1...3 hour. Table 403.1 Occupancy Separation Requirements Mercantile...1 hour. 

508.3 Mixed occupancies. Each portion of a building shall be individually classified in accordance with Section 302.1. Where a building contains more than one occupancy group, the building or portion thereof shall comply with Sections 508.3.1, 508.3.2, 508.3.3 or a combination of these sections. Exceptions: 1. Occupancies separated in accordance with Section 509. 2. Where required by Table 415.3.2, areas of Group H-1, H-2 or H-3 occupancies shall be located in a separate and detached building or structure.

 

5. Height and Area Table 500 Type V 

Unsprinklered Mercantile One-Story = 9000 ft2, 59 ft height 

Storage One-Story = 16,000 ft2, 59 ft height 

506.1 General. The areas limited by Table 503 shall be permitted to be increased due to frontage (If) and automatic sprinkler system protection (Is) in accordance with the following: Aa = {At + [At x If ] + [At x Is ]} 

(Equation 5-1) where: Aa = Allowable area per 

story (ft2). 

At = Tabular area per story in 

Table 400 Type 2B Unsprinklered Mercantile = 12,500 ft2, 

55 ft height Storage = 26,000 ft2, 55 ft 

height 402.3.2 Where streets or public spaces, or horizontal separation from property lines of total width of not less than 30 ft (9144 mm), or 30 ft (9144 mm) between buildings on commonly owned property, extend along the building perimeter, except for hazardous occupancies, the areas permitted by Table 400 may be increased as follow: I = 4/3[100(F/P – 0.25)] Where 

 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

accordance with Table 503 (ft2). 

If = Area increase factor due 

to frontage as calculated in accordance with Section 506.2. Is = Area increase factor due 

to sprinkler protection as calculated in accordance with Section 506.3. 506.2 Frontage increase.

Every building shall adjoin or have access to a public way to receive an area increase for frontage. Where a building has more than 25 percent of its perimeter on a public way or open space having a minimum width of 20 ft (6096 mm), the frontage increase shall be determined in accordance with the following: I f = [F/P - 0.25]W/30 

(Equation 5-2)where: I f = Area increase due to 

frontage. F = Building perimeter that fronts on a public way or open space having 20 ft (6096 mm) open minimum width (ft). P = Perimeter of entire building (feet). W = Width of public way or open space (ft) in accordance with Section 506.2.1. 

I = Percent increase of unsprinklered areas in Table 400. F = Building perimeter which fronts on streets, public spaces or horizontal separation not less than 30 ft (9144 mm) wide. P = Total perimeter of building. 402.3.3 For both an unsprinklered building and a sprinklered building the percent increase is multiplied by the unsprinklered area permitted in Table 400 for the type of construction of the building, and the resulting are increase is added to either the sprinklered or unsprinklered areas in Table 400. When there are no unsprinklered areas permitted for the building in Table 400 an unsprinklered area can be computed for use in this section. The corresponding unsprinklered areas are computed as one-third of the sprinklered area for one story only and as one-half of the sprinklered area for multi-stories. 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

6. Construction Type 603 Type V Construction 

Type V is construction in which the exterior bearing or nonbearing walls are of noncombustible material and have fire resistance not less than that specified in Table 600; bearing portions of interior walls are of material permitted in Table 600, and have fire resistance not less than that specified in Table 600; and beams, girders, trusses, arches, floors, roofs, and interior framing are wholly or partly of wood or other approved materials and have fire resistance not less than that specified in Table 600. Type V construction may be either protected or unprotected. Fire resistance requirements for structural elements of Type V construction shall be as specified in Table 600. 605 Type VI Construction Type VI is construction in which the exterior bearing and nonbearing walls and partitions, floors and roofs and their supports are wholly or partly of wood or other approved materials. Type VI construction may be either protected or unprotected. Fire resistance requirements for structural elements of Type VI construction shall be specified in Table 600. 609.1 When two or more types of construction not separated by fire walls occur in the same building, the area 

602.2 Types I and II. Type I and II construction are those types of construction in which the building elements listed in Table 601 are of noncombustible materials, except as permitted in Section 603 and elsewhere in this code. 602.5 Type V. Type V 

construction is that type of construction in which the structural elements, exterior walls and interior walls are of any materials permitted by this code. 

 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

of the entire building shall not exceed the least area permitted based on occupancy for the types of construction used in the building. 

7. Building Separation 

Distances 

503.1.2 Buildings on same lot. Two or more buildingon the same lot shall regulated as separate buildings or shall be considered as portionof one building if the height of each buildinand the aggregate areof buildings are within the limitations of Table 503 as modified by Sections 504 and 506. The provisions othis code applicable tthe aggregate buildinshall be applicable to each building. 

8. Suppression Systems – 

Based on Occupancy Type 

901.7.1 Group M. An approved automatic sprinkler system shall be provided in stores and similar occupancies where stocks of combustible materials are on display for public sale and where the story floor area exceeds 15,000 ft2 (1395 m2). 

903.2.6 Group M. An automatic sprinkler system shall be provided throughout buildings containing a Group M occupancy where one of the following conditions exists: 1. Where a Group M fire area exceeds 12,000 ft2

(1115 m2); 2. Where a 

Group M fire area is located more than thrstories above grade plane; or 3. Where thcombined area of all Group M fire areas on all floors, including anmezzanines, exceeds 24,000 ft2 (2230 m2). 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

9. Suppression Systems – 

Based on Storage Configuration 

901.7.3 High Piled Combustible Stock. An approved automatic sprinkler system shall be provided throughout buildings required to have sprinkler protection by Chapter 36 of the Standard Fire Prevention Code. Exception: Automatic sprinkler systems may be provided only in the storage area of the building when the storage is separated from the remainder of the building by a minimum 2-hour fire resistant separation.

903.2.6.1 High-piled storage. An automatic sprinkler system shalbe provided in accordance with the International Fire Codin all buildings of Group M where storaof merchandise is in high-piled or rack storage arrays. 

10. Commodity Definitions 3604.1 Commodity 

classifications shall be defined and in accordance with the following: ...3. Class III commodity - a commodity of wood, paper, natural fiber cloth, or Group C plastics or products thereof, with or without pallets. Products may contain a limited amount of Group A or B plastics, such as wood dressers with plastic drawer glides, handles and trim. Examples of Class III commodities include but are not limited to the following: combustible fiberboard; baled cork, bagged feed, bagged fertilizers, furniture (wood, natural fiber, upholstered, non-plastic or wood or metal with plastic-padded and covered arm rests), lubricating or hydraulic 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

fluid in metal cans, lumber stored flat), mattresses (excluding foamed rubber and foamed plastics), nonflammable liquids in plastic containers, oil base paints in cans, paper and pulp (horizontal storage), baled waste paper, food containers, plywood, baled rags, rugs (no foamed backing), bagged sugar, baled wood, wood doors, frames and cabinets, yarns (natural fiber and viscose). 

11. Commodity Suppression 3605 Fire protection for 

buildings used for highpiled combustible storage shall be in accordance with Table 3605 and the building code. Nationally recognized standards or guidelines as applicable may be used when approved by the fire official. 

12. Automatic Sprinkler 

Systems (Where Required) 

903.7.1 Group M. Automatic sprinkler system required in stores and similar occupancies where stocks of combustible materials are on display for public sale and the storey floor area exceeds 15,000 ft2. 

 [F] 903.2.6 IBC contains 

language identical to IFC. [F] 903.2.6.1 IBC contains language identical to IFC. 

[F] 903.2.6 Automatic sprinklers are requirein M occupancies wheone of the following exists: 1. An M occupancy fire area exceeds 12,000 ft2

(1115 m2); 2. An 

M occupancy fire area located more than 3 stories above grade3. The combined area all M occupancy fire areas exceeds 24,000 ft2 (2230 m2). 

[F] 903.2.6.1 Automasprinklers are require
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

in all buildings of GroM occupancy where storage of merchandiis in high piled or rack storage arrays. 

13. Automatic Sprinkler 

Systems (Where Required) 

903.7.3 High Piled Combustible Stock. Automatic sprinkler system required throughout buildings where required by Chapter 36 of the Fire Code. 

Table 3605. Automatic fire extinguishing system required for high piled combustible storage (Commodity III) for areas greater than 12,000 ft2

(1115 m2). 

[F] 903.2.8 IBC contains language identical to IFC. 

[F] 903.2.8 Group S-1An automatic sprinklesystem shall be provided throughout abuildings containing a Group S-1 occupancy where one of the following conditions exists: 1. A Group S-1 fire area exceeds 12,000 ft2 (1115 m2); 

2. A Group S-1 fire aris located more than three stories above grade plane; or 3. The combined area of all Group S-1 fire areas all floors, including anmezzanines, exceeds 24,000 ft2 (2230 m2). Table 2306.2 Automasprinklers are requirefor high piled storage areas of Class III Commodities (furniturwith areas greater tha2500 ft2 if public 

accessible. Table 2306.2 Automasprinklers are requirefor high piled storage areas of Class III Commodities (furniturwith areas greater tha12,000 ft2 (1115 m2). 

14. Storage of Readily 

Combustible Materials/ Miscellaneous Combustible Materials 

 502.3.2 Storage in 

buildings shall be orderly, shall not be within 2 ft of the ceiling, shall be separated from heaters 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

Storage or heating devices by 

distance or shielding so that ignition cannot occur, and not so located as to endanger exit from the building. Storage in the open shall not be more than 20 ft in height, shall be so located with respect to adjacent buildings, as not to constitute a hazard, and shall be compact and orderly. 

15. Storage 315.2 Storage in 

buildings. Storage of combustible materials buildings shall be orderly. Storage shabe separated from heaters or heating devices by distance oshielding so that ignitcannot occur. 315.2.1 Ceiling Clearance. Storage shall be maintained 2 (610 mm) or more below the ceiling in nonsprinklered areas buildings or a minimuof 18 in (457 mm) belsprinkler head deflectors in sprinklerareas of buildings. 

16. Building 202. Building is defined as 

the structure that encloses any occupancy. Each portion of a building that is separated by other portions of the building by a fire wall are considered separate buildings. 

202. Building is defined as a structure that intended to support or shelter an occupancy or use. 705.1. Each portion of a building separated from all others by fire walls providing a complete separation are considered separate buildings. If the 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

fire wall(s) also separate occupancies that are required to be separated by a fire barrier wall, the most restrictive requirements of each separation wall apply. 

17. Fire Barrier, Fire Area 702. Fire Area. Building 

area surrounded by exterior walls, fire barriers, fire walls, or horizontal barriers. 702. Fire Barrier. Fire rated wall assembly that restricts the spread of fire. Table 706.3.9 The fire barrier separating an M occupancy into different fire areas is required be of 2 hour fire rated construction, with 1.5 hour fire rated doors (Table 715.4). Table 706.3.9 The fire barrier separating an S-1 occupancy into different fire areas is required be of 3 hour fire rated construction, with 3 hour fire rated doors (Table 715.4). 

18. Fire Walls, Fire Doors. 202. Fire wall. A 4 hour fire 

resistant wall, with protected penetrations or openings, extending from the foundation to / through the roof with sufficient stability to withstand the collapse of the construction on either side. 

 702. Fire wall. Fire rated 

wall, with protected penetrations or openings, extending from the foundation to / through the roof with sufficient stability to withstand the collapse of the construction on either side. Table 705.4 Fire wall fire resistance rating for M occupancies shall not be less than 3 hours. Fire wall fire resistance rating for S-1 

 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

occupancies shall not be less than 3 hours. Table 715.4 Fire doors installed in 3 hour rated fire walls are required to be 3 hour fire rated or consist of two 1.5 hour fire rated doors installed on opposite sides of the wall. 

19. Fire Walls, Fire Doors 504.7.1 Fire walls, fire 

stops, and fire rated partitions and floors required by the Building Code shall be maintained. All openings made therein for the passage of pipes, electrical and the like, and holes made for any reason shall be sealed with approved noncombustible material to protect against passage of smoke and fire. All openings through these partitions (i.e., access doors) shall be protected by self-closing or automatic doors of approved construction meeting the partition requirements. 

703.1 Maintenance. The required fireresistance rating of firresistance-rated construction (includinwalls, firestops, shaft enclosures, partitionssmoke barriers, floorsfire-resistive coatings and sprayed fireresistant materials applied to structural members and fireresistant joint systemshall be maintained. Such elements shall bproperly repaired, restored or replaced when damaged, alterbreached or penetrateOpenings made therefor the passage of pipes, electrical condwires, ducts, air transopenings and holes made for any reason shall be protected witapproved methods capable of resisting thpassage of smoke anfire. Openings througfire-resistance-rated assemblies shall be protected by self- or automatic-closing dooof approved construction meeting 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

the fire protection requirements for the assembly. 

20. Fire Walls, Fire Doors 504.7.3 All fire and 

smokestop doors shall be kept in operable condition. No fire door may be blocked or obstructed or otherwise made inoperable. Fusible links shall be replaced promptly whenever fused or damaged. 

703.2 Opening protectives. Opening protectives shall be maintained in an operative condition in accordance with NFPA 80 [9]. Fire doand smoke barrier doshall not be blocked oobstructed or otherwimade inoperable. Fusible links shall be replaced promptly whenever fused or damaged. Fire door assemblies shall not bmodified. 

21. Fire Walls, Fire Doors 504.7.4 Fire doors 

designed to be kept normally open shall be marked: FIRE DOOR - DO NOT BLOCK. Fire doors designed to be kept normally closed (such as stairwell doors) shall be marked: FIRE DOOR - KEEP CLOSED. 

703.2.1 Signs. Wherrequired by the fire coofficial, a sign shall be permanently displayeon or near each fire door in letters not less than 1 in (25 mm) heito read as follows: 1. For doors designed to be kept normally opeFIRE DOOR - DO NOBLOCK. 2. For doordesigned to be kept normally closed: FIRDOOR - KEEP CLOSED. 

22. Fire Walls, Fire Doors 504.7.5 Hold open 

devices and automatic door closers, where provided shall be maintained. During the period that any such device is out of service for repairs, the door it operates shall remain in the closed position. 

703.2.2 Hold-open devices and closer. Hold-open devices anautomatic door closerwhere provided, shall maintained. During thperiod that such devicis out of service for repairs, the door it operates shall remain the closed position. 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

23. Fire Resistance-Rated 

Construction 

 703.4 Testing. 

Horizontal and verticasliding and rolling fire doors shall be inspecand tested annually to confirm proper operation and full closure. A written record shall be maintained and be available to the fire coofficial. 

24. Portable Fire 

Extinguishers 

 901.6 Inspection, 

testing and maintenance. Fire detection, alarm and extinguishing systems shall be maintained in an operative condition at all times, and shall replaced or repaired where defective. Nonrequired fire protection systems anequipment shall be inspected, tested and maintained or remove

25. Inspection, Testing and 

Maintenance 

 901.6.1 Standards. F

protection systems shbe inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with the referenced standards listed in Table 901.6.1 [Table indicates Portable fire extinguishers use NFPA 10]. 

26. Portable Fire 

Extinguishers 

 603.3.1 Portable fire 

extinguishers shall be installed in occupancies and locations as set for the in this Code, or as may be determined by the Fire Official. Portable fire extinguishers shall be in accordance with 

 906.1 Where required

Portable fire extinguishers shall be installed in the followilocations. 1. In new and existing Group AE, F, H, I, M, R-1, R-2R-4, and S. 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

NFiPA 10. occupancies.... 

27. Portable Fire 

Extinguishers 

 906.2 General 

requirements. Portabfire extinguishers shaselected, installed anmaintained in accordance with this section and NFPA 10

28. Movable Furniture 808 Where the floor 

space of an occupancy is occupied by tables, chairs or other movable furniture, aisles at least 36 in clear width shall be maintained to provide ready access to exit doorways. 

29. Number of Exits

1004.2 Minimum Number of Exits 1004.2.1 There shall be not less than two approved independent exits, accessible to each tenant area, serving every story, except in Group R3 occupancies and as modified in 1018. 1004.2.2 The minimum number of exits for all occupancies, except as modified by 1018, based on occupant load, shall be as follows: Minimum Number of Exits: Occupancy Load per Story  2 : 1-500 3 : 501-1000 4: more than 1000 

1019.1 Minimum number of exits. All rooms and spaces within each story shall be provided with and have access to the minimum number of approved independent exits required by Table 1019.1 based on the occupant load of the story, except as modified in Table 1019.1 based on the occupant load of the story, except as modified in Section 1015.1 or 1019.2. For the purposes of this chapter, occupied roofs shall be provided with exits as required for stories. The required number of exits from any story, basement or individual space shall be maintained until arrival at grade or the public way. 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

30. Exit Remoteness 1104.1.2 Where more than 

one exit or exit access door is required, at least two of the exit doors or exit access doors shall be placed a distance apart equal to not less than one half of the length of the maximum overall diagonal dimension of the building or area to be served measured in a straight line between such doors. The two doors shall be so located and constructed to minimize the possibility that both may be blocked by any one fire or other emergency condition. 

1015.2.1 Two exits or exit access doorways. Where two exits or exit access doorways are required from any portion of the exit access, the exit doors or exit access doorways shall be placed a distance apart equal to not less than onehalf of the length of the maximum overall diagonal dimension of the building or area to be served measured in a straight line between exit doors or exit access doorways. Interlocking or scissor stairs shall be counted as one exit stairway. 1015.2.2 Three or more exits or exit access doorways. Where access to three or more exits is required, at least two exit doors or exit access doorways shall be arranged in accordance with the provisions of Section 1015.2.1. 

31. Exit Width 1003.2.1 The width of the 

means of egress shall be determined from occupants served in accordance with Table 1004. 

1005.1 Minimum required egress width. The means of egress width shall not be less than required by this section. The total width of means of egress in inches (mm) shall not be less than the total occupant load served by the means of egress multiplied by the factors in Table 1005.1 and not less than specified elsewhere in this code. Multiple means of egress shall be sized such that the 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

loss of any one means of egress shall not reduce the available capacity to less than 50 percent of the required capacity. The maximum capacity required from any story of a building shall be maintained to the termination of the means of egress. Exception: Means of egress complying with Section 1025. 

32. Travel Distance 1004.1 Arrangement of Exits 

1004.1.1 Exist shall be so located that the distance from the most remote point in the floor area, room or space served by them to the nearest exit, measured along the line of travel, shall not be more than specified in Table 1104.

1016.1 Travel distance limitations. Exits shall be so located on each story such that the maximum length of exit access travel, measured from the most remote point within a story to the entrance to an exit along the natural and unobstructed path of egress travel, shall not exceed the distances given in Table 1016.1. Where the path of exit access includes unenclosed stairways or ramps within the exit access or includes unenclosed exit ramps or stairways as permitted in Section 1020.1, the distance of travel on such means of egress components shall also be included in the travel distance measurement. The measurement along stairways shall be made on a plane parallel and tangent to the stair tread nosings in the center 
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Section Title 1991/1994 SBC 1991/1994 SFPC 2006 IBC 2006 IFC 

of the stairway. Exceptions: 1. Travel distance in open parking garages is permitted to be measured to the closest riser of open stairs. 2. In outdoor facilities with open exit access components and open exterior stairs or ramps, travel distance is permitted to be measured to the closest riser of a stair or the closest slope of the ramp. 3. Where an exit stair is permitted to be unenclosed in accordance with Exception 8 or 9 of Section 1020.1, the travel distance shall be measured from the most remote point within a building to an exit discharge. 
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5.6 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 5

[1] 1991 Standard Building Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 

Birmingham, AL. 

[2] 1994 Standard Building Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 

Birmingham, AL. 

[3] 1991 Standard Fire Prevention Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 

Birmingham, AL. 

[4] 1994 Standard Fire Prevention Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 

Birmingham, AL. 

[5] 2006 International Building Code, International Code Council, Inc., Falls Church, VA. 

[6] 2006 International Fire Code, International Code Council, Inc., Falls Church, VA. 

[7] 2009 International Building Code, International Code Council, Inc., Falls Church, VA. 

[8] 2009 International Fire Code, International Code Council, Inc., Falls Church, VA. 

[9] NFPA 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives, 2007 Ed., National Fire 

Protection Association, Batterymarch Park, MA. 
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6-1

Chapter 6

SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL STUDY 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology established a team of engineers and researchers 

to reconstruct the 2007 fire in the Charleston Sofa Super Store that resulted in a high number of fire 

fighter casualties. The technical study included the following objectives: 

• to establish the likely technical cause or causes of the rapid fire growth inside the Sofa 

Super Store; and 

• to recommend appropriate actions, including further research, to improve the structural 

safety of similar buildings, and to improve evacuation and emergency response 

procedures. 

The following activities were undertaken by the team to reach the first objective and to establish the 

basis for the second objective: 

• identifying technical issues and developing hypotheses for examination; 

• collecting data from local authorities, including building design documents, video and 

photographic data, radio transmissions, field data, and other relevant records and plans, 

and from interviews with emergency responders and discussions with store employees; 

• analyzing and comparing national model building and fire codes and practices; and 

• simulating and analyzing phenomena, such as fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, 

and operation of active and passive fire protection systems. 

The preceding chapters of this report describe the methodology used to conduct the technical study; 

detail what occurred on the night of June 18, 2007; review the history of the building and the model 

codes and standards that applied to the building; and present the results of the simulations. The key 

findings from the technical study are summarized in Section 6.2, Recommendations for Improving 

Model Building and Fire Standards. Codes and practices are listed in Section 6.3, and 

recommendations and other appropriate actions are identified in Section 6.4. 

The analysis of the fire department response and the associated recommendations were reported in the 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health’s (NIOSH) Line of Duty Death Report 2007-18

[1] and the City of Charleston’s Post Incident Assessment and Review Team, Phase II Report [2]. 

The NIST study addressed the emergency response only when necessary to reconstruct the behavior 

and time line of the fire. 
6-2

6.2 FINDINGS 

6.2.1 General 

During the course of this technical study, NIST was able to identify the reasons for the rapid spread of 

fire and smoke, and the reasons for the difficulties encountered by the fire fighters as they attempted 

to exit the main showroom. Many of the findings summarized in this section had a direct bearing on 

the tragic outcome of the fire. Those particular findings are highlighted below (boldface). Other 

findings had a more peripheral role but are important to capture because of the potential to help 

mitigate the consequences of a similar situation in the future. 

6.2.2 Fire Growth 

(i) Overview 

Fire was observed at rear of store at 6:56 p.m. The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and 

spread into the enclosed loading dock. Fire department arrived at 7:11 p.m., less than four minutes 

after being dispatched. From the loading dock, the fire spread through the merchandise holding area 

to the rear of the main showroom, then to the front of the main showroom, and then into the west and 

east showrooms. At the same time the fire was spreading into the holding area, the fire also spread 

through a metal wall into the warehouse. 

The fire in the main showroom resulted in six fire fighter fatalities in the main showroom. Fire 

spread through three open roll-down fire doors into the west showroom and resulted in three 

additional fire fighter fatalities. Although the intense heat from the fire weakened lightweight steel 

trusses that led to the partial collapse of the roof, the coroner’s report indicated that the fire fighters 

died from thermal burns and/or smoke inhalation, not from compression type injuries that would have 

been associated with the collapse. 

The following sections present a more detailed description of the progression of the fire. 

(ii) Loading Dock 

• The fire ignited outside the structure and spread into the enclosed loading dock. 

• A large amount of fuel (130 GJ) was present, including a) furniture that was 

staged for delivery, b) wood framing, c) liquid hydrocarbon solvents, and 

d) flooring. 

• An open floor plan and the large amount of fuel allowed rapid fire growth 

across the loading dock. 

• An open non-fire-activated roll-down door allowed smoke and flames to flow 

into the holding area. 

• Metal walls that the loading dock shared with the warehouse and west showroom 

allowed the fire to spread into those spaces. 

• The loading dock area was fully engulfed in fire before the fire department arrived. 

• The heat release rate of the fire was slowed by the lack of air; that is, the fire was 

under-ventilated. 
6-3

(iii) Holding Area 

• The roll-down fire door to the breezeway activated and closed before arrival of the fire 

department. 

• A small amount of fuel (20 MJ) was available including a) chairs/sofas/futons, and b) 

futon cushions. 

• Smoke and flames entered the holding area through the open roll-down door 

(non-fire activated). Furniture and other items within the holding area were 

ignited by the flames and thermal radiation from the loading dock fire. 

• During the early stages of the fire (5 minutes to 10 minutes after fire department 

arrived), the fire spread into the holding area. The fire in the holding area was 

not visible from the main or west showrooms. 

• Smoke and flames flowed from the holding area into the space above the main 

showroom suspended ceiling. At a later stage, fire spread either over or through 

the holding area partition wall and into the rear of the main showroom. 

• The heat release rate of the fire was slowed by the lack of air; that is, the fire was 

under-ventilated.

(iv) Showrooms 

• Fire spread through the holding area into the rear of the main showroom, then 

through the entire main showroom, and then into the west and east showrooms. 

• Three roll-down fire doors between the main and west showrooms activated, but 

did not close during the fire. Three roll-down fire doors between the main and 

east showrooms activated; two doors closed completely and the third partially 

closed. 

• A large amount of fuel was available, including up to 1100 combustible items (480 

GJ) displayed in the main, west, and east showrooms. 

• Smoke and flames from the fire on the loading dock and holding area flowed into 

the space above the main showroom suspended ceiling. 

• Smoke flowed down into the main showroom through ventilation openings in the 

ceiling. A smoke layer formed under the suspended ceiling of the main showroom 

impairing visibility. 

• An open floor plan and the large amount of fuel allowed the fire to grow and 

spread in the rear of the main showroom. 

• During the early stages of the fire (10 minutes to 15 minutes after fire department 

arrival) the heat release rate of the fire in the rear of the main showroom was 

slowed by the lack of air; that is, the fire was under-ventilated. 

• Front windows were broken or vented by the fire department to improve visibility. 
6-4

• Fire spread extremely rapidly from the rear to the front of the showroom as 

additional air flowed through the broken windows, feeding the fire in the rear of 

the showroom. 

• Within the main and west showrooms, both the temperatures and oxygen 

depletion reached concentrations that were life-threatening to unprotected 

individuals. 

• The fire in the main showroom resulted in six fire fighter fatalities in the main 

showroom. Fire spread through three open roll-down fire doors into the west 

showroom and resulted in three additional fire fighter fatalities. 

• Intense heat from sustained burning of furniture weakened the roof supports and 

resulted in the collapse of the roof over the main showroom and sagging of the roof 

over the west showroom.

(v) Warehouse 

• Intense heat from the loading dock fire passed through a shared metal wall and ignited 

combustibles in the warehouse. 

• A large amount of fuel was available, including up to 1,900 combustible items 

(840 GJ) stored on high-rack shelves in the warehouse. 

• An open floor plan and the large amount of fuel allowed the fire to grow and 

spread from the front to the rear of the warehouse. 

• Intense heat from sustained burning of the furniture weakened roof supports and 

resulted in collapse of the roof and walls into the warehouse. 

• No fire fighters entered the warehouse to attempt to extinguish the flames and no one 

was injured in this portion of the structure. 

6.2.3 Fire Protection Systems 

(i) Overview 

The lack of fire sprinklers to control the fire during an early stage of its growth and the lack of 

effective compartmentation were direct contributors to the loss of nine fire fighters’ lives and the loss 

of the retail showrooms and distribution warehouse. Fire sprinklers are designed to activate in 

response to a fire and to deliver a spray of water droplets to suppress or control fire growth [3]. 

Compartmentation is designed to create a series of smaller spaces which slows the spread of a fire. 

Fire walls and fire doors can be used to divide a single large space into multiple smaller 

compartments. The following was found regarding the installation and operation of fire suppression 

systems and other safety systems relevant to the building: 

(ii) Fire Sprinklers 

• Fire sprinklers were not installed in the showrooms or distribution warehouse. 

• Computer model simulations demonstrated that fire sprinklers in the loading 

dock would have controlled the fire and prevented the fire from extending beyond 

the loading dock. 
6-5

• Computer model simulations demonstrated that tenable (survivable) conditions 

were maintained within the loading dock, showrooms, and warehouse had a 

sprinkler system been installed on the loading dock. 

(iii) Compartmentation 

• Large open spaces allowed the fire to spread throughout the structure, including 

the loading dock, showrooms, and warehouse. Interior walls and fire doors did 

not provide adequate compartmentation. 

• The open roll-down door between the loading dock and holding area was not a 

fire-activated door and remained open, allowing the fire to spread to the rear of 

the main showroom. 

• Only three of the seven roll-down fire doors activated and closed fully during the 

fire. 

• Uninsulated metal walls (the north wall of the warehouse and the south wall of the 

west showroom) allowed heat from the fire to ignite fuels that were against the 

walls in the warehouse and west showroom. 

• Concrete block walls of the main showroom prevented the fire from spreading through 

the walls to the west or east showrooms. 

• Partition walls that separated the holding area from main showroom did not extend to 

the underside of the roof. Smoke and flames filled the space above the suspended 

ceiling in the main showroom and provided a path for the fire to spread from the 

holding area to the rear of the main showroom. 

• The exterior west wall/elevated floor of the enclosed loading dock did not prevent the 

exterior fire from spreading to the inside of the structure. 

(iv) Other Fire Protection Systems 

• The store did not have a fire alarm system, smoke detectors, or wet or dry standpipes. 

• There were more than five portable fire extinguishers located in the structure. A store 

employee discharged two portable extinguishers at the loading dock fire. 

6.2.4 Occupant Egress 

(i) Overview 

The two front doors allowed all of the occupants in the retail showrooms and office areas at the rear 

of the main showroom to exit safely. An employee was trapped for a period of time in the repair 

shop/warehouse area due to blocked exits. The fire department was able to rescue the trapped 

employee. Specific findings regarding the occupant load and egress process are presented here. 
6-6

(ii) Emergency Exit Doors 

Neither of the workshop areas had the proper number of or adequately designed exits to meet 2006 

model code requirements [4, 5]. Doors in the warehouse, two single-wide doors and a roll-down, the 

two slider doors on the loading dock, and the single exit door near the front of the west showroom 

were locked while the store was occupied. The doors on the east side of the east showroom were 

equipped with exit alarms, but were also equipped with vertical door latches. It was unclear if the 

exit doors in the east showroom were latched or unlatched during the fire. If any of the doors in the 

warehouse had been properly equipped for emergency exits, the trapped employee would likely have 

been able to exit without assistance. 

6.2.5 Combustible Material 

(i) Overview 

The large fuel load made up of the retail merchandise staged in the loading dock, displayed in the 

show rooms, and stored in the warehouse were key contributors to the spread of the fire and the 

eventual failure of the building. In addition, the storage of flammable solvents in the loading dock 

area allowed the fire to spread more quickly to the holding area and to the warehouse. Specific 

findings regarding the merchandise, construction materials, and flammable solvents are listed below. 

(ii) Fuel Load 

• Furniture inventory records were not recovered after the fire. The amount and type of 

retail merchandise had to be estimated. 

• The high total energy content of the structure and contents, estimated at up to 

1450 GJ, was a contributing factor to the severity of the fire. 

o Loading dock fuel load was up to 130 GJ. 

o Retail merchandise in the showrooms was up to 480 GJ. 

o Retail merchandise on high racks in the warehouse was up to 840 GJ. 

o Flammable solvents on the loading dock were at least 3 GJ in fuel. 

• The furniture fuel mass loading was estimated to range up to 16 kg/m2 (3.4 

lbs/ft2

) for the showrooms and 52 kg/m2 (10.6 lbs/ft2) for the warehouse. The 

high-rack storage in the warehouse contributed to the higher fuel mass loading 

than in the showrooms.

(iii) Fuel Package 

• The type and configuration of the fuel also contributed to the fire growth in the 

loading dock, showrooms, and warehouse. 

• A significant fraction of the fuel was upholstered furniture which has a large 

surface area, synthetic coverings, and foam padding. The coverings and foam 

padding contributed to the rapid spread of the fire. 

• Wood was also an important component of the upholstered furniture and a large 

amount of wood furniture was displayed throughout the showrooms or stored in 
6-7

the warehouse. The wood contributed to the sustained burning that occurred 

after the initial rapid spread of the fire. 

6.2.6 Model Codes and Standards 

Specific findings regarding model codes and standards, both current and in effect at the time of 

construction: 

• Strict adherence to the 2006 model building and fire codes [4, 5] available at the 

time of the fire would have required the main showroom and warehouse to be 

sprinklered. With the addition of the loading dock and repair shops, 

compliance with the model codes would have required either sprinklers on the 

loading dock and/or higher rated fire barriers between the loading dock and the 

holding area, between the loading dock and the west showroom, and between 

the loading dock and the warehouse. Sprinklers and/or higher rated fire 

barriers would have reduced the rate of fire spread and have improved 

occupant and fire fighter safety. 

• The team was unable to locate any building permits for the enclosed loading dock 

and two repair workshops. Aerial images demonstrate that these areas were 

constructed between 1996 and 2006. The model building codes at the time of 

construction (1991/1994 SBC/SFPC [6 -9]) required construction permits. 

• Wood framing and decking were used in construction of the loading dock and 

workshop areas, which were located in the space between the showrooms and 

warehouse and resulted in common walls. The model building codes at the time of 

construction (1991/1994 SBC/SFPC [6-9]) would have required either the installation 

of fire sprinklers in these areas or upgrading the fire rating of the common walls. 

• The roll-down door between the loading dock and holding area was not a fire 

door. If the loading dock was to be considered as a separate fire area, current 

model fire codes at the time of construction required a fire rated door assembly. 

• The fire rating of fire barriers including the concrete block walls and fire doors 

between the three showrooms, main, west, and east, was sufficient under 1991/1994 

SBC/SFPC to allow each showroom to be considered a separate fire area of less than 

1390 m2

 (15,000 ft2). Therefore, each showroom was not required to have fire 

sprinklers. 

• The walls that the warehouse and west showroom shared in common with the loading 

dock were designed as exterior walls. The separation distance between the north wall 

of the warehouse and the rear walls of the main 6.8 m (22.31 ft) and west 15.2 m 

(49.87 ft) showrooms was sufficient under the model codes (1991/1994 SBC /SFPC). 

The offset or separation distance between the warehouse and west showroom allowed 

these two areas to be considered non-adjacent spaces. 

• The addition of an enclosed loading dock area between the north wall of the 

warehouse and the south wall of the west showroom without the upgrading of 
6-8

the fire resistance of these partition walls would have caused the warehouse, 

loading dock area, and west showroom to be considered a single 2330 m2

 

(25,040 ft2

) building lacking the required occupancy separations. This building 

area exceeds the allowable unsprinklered building areas in the 1991/1994 SBC 

and 2006 IBC [4, 5] for both mercantile and storage occupancies. In addition, 

the 1991/1994 SBC and 2006 IBC codes would both have required a fire 

sprinkler system for the entire area 2330 m2

 (25,040 ft2) of the building. 

• The 1991 SFPC[7] and 2006 IFC[5], both require sprinkler protection for the 

warehouse based on the high-piled storage of upholstered furniture. 

• Large amounts of hydrocarbon solvents were stored on the loading dock, but 

quantities do not appear to exceed the maximum allowable quantities for storage 

occupancies in the 1991/1994 SBC or 2006 IBC. These flammable and combustible 

liquids were not stored in compliance with NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible 

Liquids Code [10] that requires metal cabinets, enclosures, and/or safety cans. 

• Neither current nor contemporaneous fire codes sufficiently address the 

uniquely high fire hazard from the type and configuration of the combustibles in 

a building loaded with upholstered furniture. Furniture is often displayed in 

large open areas. As demonstrated in the main and west showrooms and 

warehouse, displaying large amounts of furniture in large open spaces can 

contribute to extremely rapid fire spread. 

• High fuel-load mercantile occupancies, including furniture stores, represent a 

significantly greater fire hazard than low fuel-load occupancies. 

6.2.7 Emergency Response 

(i) Overview 

Detailed analysis of the fire department response and recommendations were reported previously by 

others [1, 2]. Therefore, the NIST study examined the emergency response only as needed to 

reconstruct the behavior and time line of the fire. The NIST study found the following: 

• The fire department arrived on scene in fewer than 4 minutes after the 911 

dispatch received report of an exterior trash fire behind the Sofa Super Store. 

• Upon initial survey of the exterior of the structure, the fire department located a 

fire inside the enclosed loading dock. 

• Initial survey of the interior did not find any smoke or fire in the showrooms. 

Three minutes after arrival, inspection of the rear of the west showroom 

confirmed the loading area was fully involved in fire. 

• Up to five minutes after arrival, there were still no reports of significant smoke 

or fire being observed inside any of the showrooms. 

• Within five minutes of arrival the fire department began suppressing the 

loading dock fire using tank water from the first arriving engine. 
6-9

• The Fire Chief arrived on the scene approximately 6 minutes after arrival of the first 

unit. 

• The Fire Chief directed operations at the loading dock and the Assistant Chief 

directed operations at the front of the store. 

• The fire department required about 10 minutes to establish a water supply from 

a fire hydrant to the exterior loading dock area. 

• A mutual aid company arrived on scene about 14 minutes after first unit of the 

Charleston Fire Department. 

• The fire department took about 16 minutes to establish a water supply from a 

fire hydrant to the front of the store. 

• Between 16 minutes and 19 minutes after arrival, radio communications 

indicated that fire fighters may be disoriented or lost in the structure and a 

“Mayday” call was transmitted. 

• The Assistant Chief led a team between 16 minutes and 21 minutes after the first 

unit arrived to rescue an employee trapped inside the rear of the store. 

• The fire department vented the front windows about 24 minutes after arrival. 

• Heavy smoke flowed out of front windows within 2 minutes of the windows 

being vented.

• Flames emerged from the front windows within 3 minutes of the windows 

being vented. 

• The last fire fighters to exit successfully from the front of the store did so within 4 

minutes of windows being vented. 

• The roof collapsed over the west side of the main showroom about 40 minutes after 

fire department arrived on scene. 

• Material, including furniture and merchandise, in the showrooms and warehouse 

continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished. 

(ii) Risk Management Plan and Initial Response 

The initial response of the fire department included two engine companies, a ladder truck company, 

and a battalion chief. With an engineer, a fire fighter, and an officer on each apparatus, the fire 

department’s initial response was 10 people. A comprehensive risk management plan developed 

according to NFPA 1500 [11] for the Sofa Super Store would likely have identified it as a high hazard 

occupancy due to the lack of sprinklers and the presence of large open areas and a large fuel load. 

For high hazard occupancies, NFPA 1710 [12] advocates a minimum crew size of five to six 

members for each apparatus, which for this incident would amount to 16 to 19 people for the initial 

response. 

(iii) Situational Awareness 

The responders did not know when fire and smoke entered the showrooms. The fire department 

visually checked below the suspended ceiling for fire spread. The NIST study was not able to 
6-10

document any fire fighter removing a ceiling tile to check for fire spread above the suspended ceiling. 

Because the fire was pulling air from the west showroom, when the door to the loading dock area was 

opened, the door was pulled into the loading dock. If the fire had been pushing at the time that the 

door was opened, fire and hot gases could have enveloped the fire fighters when the door was opened. 

There were no heat or smoke alarms installed in the building and there was no central fire alarm panel 

to provide such information to the fire fighters. 

(iv) Water Supply 

The supply of water to the fire fighters was limited to the water on the fire engines for 9 minutes at 

the loading dock and 15 minutes at the front of the store. When the connection was made to the 

municipal water supply, the two engines were pumping water to the store through long lines of small 

diameter 6.4 cm (2.5 in) hose. The water being supplied was inadequate to suppress the fire in a 

timely fashion due to the following factors: 

• The time required to establish connections to water hydrants. 

• The limited number of water supply hose lines established before the structure 

was evacuated. 

• The significant water pressure drop caused by long runs of hose. 

(v) Incident Command 

Fire department operations were directed by the Fire Chief on the loading dock and the 

Assistant Chief at the front of the store. Specific findings regarding incident command include: 

• The Assistant Chief led a team of fire fighters around to the rear of the main 

showroom to rescue the trapped employee. 

• During this same time period, conditions within the showroom deteriorated and 

radio transmissions indicate that fire fighters were becoming disoriented or lost 

within the store. 

• Shortly after the Assistant Chief returned to the front of the store after the rescue 

effort, the decision was made to break the front windows to vent the smoke. 

• Conditions within the store were deteriorating rapidly. At the loading dock, the Fire 

Chief held back fire teams from re-entering. 

• While the trapped employee was being rescued, the Fire Chief radioed, “...we need to 

evacuate the building,” but it is not clear what was done at the front of the store to 

implement this order. 

(vi) Ventilation 

A burning structure can be ventilated by breaking windows and cutting holes in the roof, which can 

allow the smoke and hot gases to escape the structure in order to provide better visibility for fire 

fighters. As the smoke and hot gases exhaust from the structure, fresh air is pulled into the building, 

which may result in an increased heat release rate. 

• The front windows of the main showroom were broken to allow the smoke and hot 

gases to vent. 
6-11

• Venting the front windows of the main showroom did allow the smoke to escape, 

but it also provided more air to feed the fire and provided a new path for the fire 

to spread. 

• After the windows were broken, the fire spread extremely rapidly into the main 

showroom and into the west showroom. 

6.2.8 Building Record-keeping Practices for Public Safety 

Inspections and record-keeping practices are an integral part of a community fire safety program. 

Findings related to this area that are relevant to the Sofa Super Store fire include the following: 

• Records were not found for the initial building design. Records of modifications—when 

located—lacked sufficient detail to adequately track the changes made to the structure. 

• Neither the historical nor current building use and occupancy permit for the building was 

located; however, the use of the Sofa Super Store was consistent with the SBC 1994[8], 

IBC 2006[4], and IFC 2006[5] occupancy classifications of Group M with Class III 

commodity. 

• Records documenting fire department inspections of the structure noted deficiencies in 

exit signs and cluttered aisles. The inspection records also documented the lack of fire 

alarms and sprinklers. 

• Fire department inspections did not identify the large fuel load, the non-code compliant 

wood construction additions, the solvent storage on the loading dock, or the lack of a fire 

door between loading dock and holding area as significant fire hazards. 

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING MODEL STANDARDS, 

CODES, AND PRACTICES 

Neither of the 2006 model codes [4, 5] was required to be followed at the time of the Sofa Super 

Store fire. NIST did not examine the code actually in force in Charleston on June 18, 2007, since the 

goal of the study was to understand how the incident happened, how it progressed, and how changes 

could be made in current standards, codes and practices to avoid similar situations. 

Adoption of a model code, in and of itself, is not sufficient to guarantee the safety of a building. The 

source of a building failure that leads to significant loss of life usually can be traced to a breakdown 

in one or more of the following key assumptions upon which model codes are based: (1) that the 

building designer, constructor, owner, operator, staff and patrons will adhere to all applicable code 

provisions; (2) that the authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) properly interpret and enforce the code 

provisions; (3) that the historical record is a reliable predictor of worst case events; and (4) that 

implementation is non-retroactive. Recognizing this, model codes need to be robust and contain 

sufficient redundancies to minimize the chances of loss of life caused by the failure of a building that 

is built or operating out of compliance with code provisions. 
6-12

The findings presented above and the first four recommendations that follow raise a number of issues 

concerning model codes and standards, and the practices surrounding their adoption, application, and 

enforcement.

Recommendation 1

NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire 

code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile 

occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised. 

If current model codes had been adopted and applied retroactively to high fuel-load mercantile 

occupancies, the model codes would have required the Sofa Super Store’s main showroom and 

warehouse be sprinklered. 

Recommendation 2

NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire 

inspection and enforcement programs that address: 

a) all aspects of the building and fire codes; 

b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations; 

c) means of fire protection systems inspection and detailed record keeping; 

d) frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing 

procedures; and 

e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code 

provisions. 

Effective inspections and enforcement of the 2006 model building and fire codes available at the time 

of the Sofa Store fire would have required the door and walls of the showrooms and warehouse to be 

upgraded or would have required fire sprinklers to be installed throughout the structure. Either of 

those measures would go a long way to toward preventing similar tragedies in the future. 

Recommendation 3

NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building 

plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as NFPA 1031 [13]. 

Professional qualification may be demonstrated through a nationally accepted certification 

examination, such as the Fire Plan Examiner [14]; Fire Inspector I and II [15,16], and Certified 

Fire Marshal [17].

If fire inspectors had identified the wood framing, solvent storage, and lack of fire-rated barriers and 

if corrective actions had been implemented, the fire would not have moved into the loading dock and 
6-13

the fire spread from the loading dock to the rest of the structure would have been slowed 

significantly. 

Recommendation 4

NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities 

adopt and aggressively enforce this provision: 

 a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and 

 b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 

m2

 (2000 ft2). 

An installed fire sprinkler system that complied with a national standard such as NFPA 13 [3] would 

have activated and would have controlled the fire growth. If the showrooms had been divided into 

smaller areas with fire barriers, the compartmentation would have slowed the spread of the fire as 

well. 

Recommendation 5

NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions develop comprehensive fire risk management 

plans to: 

a) identify low, medium, and high-hazard occupancies; 

b) allocate resources according to identified risks; and 

c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks. 

A fire risk management plan, properly implemented, would have identified the hazards associated 

with the size, type, and configuration of the fuel load and the large open spaces that existed at the 

Sofa Super Store. 

Recommendation 6

NIST recommends that state and local authorities: 

a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; 

b) provide education to fire fighters on the science of fire behavior in vented and nonvented structures and how the addition of air can impact the burning characteristics of the 

fuel; and 

c)provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation (vertical, horizontal, or 

positive-pressure) and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground. 

Standard operating guidelines on when, how, and why ventilation should be used — would have 

prevented the rapid fire movement that occurred after the front windows were broken. 
6-14

6.4 RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS AND OTHER APPROPRIATE 

ACTIONS 

This study focused on the Sofa Super Store fire. Several recommendations in this report relate 

directly to commercial retail structures, and other recommendations apply more broadly. Model 

building and fire code organizations as well as state and local regulatory authorities may benefit from 

reviewing this study and considering the findings regarding fire sprinklers, combustible loads, 

compartmentation, and fire protective system performance as they make revisions to their codes.

The acceptance of the recommendations made in this report by the model code and standards 

organizations and the adoption of any modified provisions of the national model codes into local 

codes and enforcement practices, will depend upon the perceived benefits weighed against the costs 

of implementing any changes. There are a number of areas where the benefits may be obvious and 

the costs of implementation may be easily determined. In those areas, policy decisions to adopt 

particular provisions of the code are made according to technical information and recommendations 

available to the decision maker. 

There are other areas in which the basis for making changes to local codes is not currently supported 

by reliable technical information. Continuing research is needed to gain new understanding and to 

collect the data necessary to ensure that changes are adopted, or rejected, based upon sound scientific 

findings. Research results may also serve as the basis for setting thresholds or pass/fail criteria for 

fire protection systems and recommendations for fire operations and training. 

6.4.1 Recommendations for Research 

Based upon the findings of this study and the resulting recommendations presented in section 6.3, 

additional research is recommended in three general areas: 

• Fire performance of upholstered furniture. 

• Fire spread. 

• Decision guidance. 

Recommendation 7

In terms of furniture flammability, fire science needs to focus additional research on the development 

of two types of knowledge: 1) how to make furniture that is less flammable, and 2) how to accurately 

simulate the burning of existing furniture for forensic use. This research will help develop an 

understanding of the ignition and spread of fire over common furniture items and the resulting release 

of heat and harmful combustion products. At present, it is necessary to rely on scientific experiments 

and real-scale fire testing of products in room geometries that are similar to what existed in the actual 

event to develop empirical data as input to computer fire models. 

NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on 

upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve 

the fire performance of furniture. The following areas require research: 
6-15

a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings, and foam padding, for 

furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings; 

b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire 

retardants, and fire resistive materials; and 

c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires. 

Recommendation 8

Improving fire barriers requires that additional research be focused on: 1) how to design products that 

will contain a fire while at the same time meeting other functional requirements, and 2) replicating the 

performance of existing partitions in forensic models. Fire-resistance testing of walls, floors, ceilings, 

and door assemblies typically ends when the temperature on the non-fire side exceeds a standard 

value. There is insufficient understanding of the mechanisms by which partitions and door 

assemblies pass flames into adjacent spaces, especially for the composite assemblies typical of real 

construction. Having an accurate modeling capability for how flames pass into adjacent spaces will 

improve the ability to accurately establish fire time lines and to evaluate the relative importance of 

multiple fire paths. 

NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design 

professionals to improve the performance of compartmentation. The following specific areas 

require research: 

a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal, and gypsum 

wallboard; 

b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal; 

c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and 

d) prediction of performance of roll-down fire doors in actual fires and after extended 

service. 

Recommendation 9

New knowledge, data, and predictive methods generated in the above research will lead to new 

technologies and improved building and fire codes and standards. The selection among alternative 

fire safety technologies or building design options, and the threshold values established in the model 

codes, can have significant economic ramifications. New tools are needed that can be tailored to 

specific situations and rigorously account for costs and other impacts in a manner transparent to 

competing interests. 

NIST recommends that research be conducted to: 

a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of 

alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and 

b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and 

staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential 

casualties will be effective.
6-16

Recommendation 10

First responders commonly use ventilation is to improve the firefighting environment, increase the 

survivability of trapped occupants, and reduce property damage. In some cases though, ventilation 

may improve conditions within a structure, but may also lead to increased fire growth and spread, 

flashover, or back draft (deflagration). The effects of natural ventilation on the fire environment 

during fire fighter operations are not well understood. 

NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to: 

a) improve understanding and characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and 

spread of fire within structures; and 

b) provide the fire service with better guidance on when and how to use ventilation to 

improve the fire environment during fire service operations. 

Recommendation 11

Providing fire protection for a community involves a range of factors including building stock, 

population demographics, climate, resource allocation, water supply, response time, and adoption of 

model codes. Assessment of the value of each of these factors is key to informed decision-making 

regarding technologies and procedures to provide an acceptable level of protection. 

NIST recommends that research be conducted to: 

a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection; 

b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and 

c) use metrics to optimize development of new fire protection technologies. 

6.4.2 Impact of Research 

Completing the research recommended will provide a reliable technical foundation for making 

changes to codes, standards and practices. Specifically, a comprehensive research program would 

facilitate: 

• Improved understanding of the relationship between material properties and prediction of 

ignition and fire spread for upholstered furniture and room furnishing.

• Improved accuracy in predicting smoke and toxic gas levels, and how they affect fire 

spread. 

• Improved characterization of the mechanisms that allow fires to spread through composite 

walls and doors. 

• Creation of computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of 

alternative code changes and fire safety technologies. 

• Development of performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection. 
6-17

6.5 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 6 

[1] Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Investigation Report #F2007-18, National 

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and 

Prevention Program, Morgantown, WV, February 2009. 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200718.pdf 

[2] “Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report, Sofa Super Store, 1807 Savannah Highway, 

Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007,”. City of Charleston Post-Incident Assessment 

and Review Team, Phase II Report, June 2008. 

[3] NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, National Fire Protection 

Association, Quincy, MA, 2002. 

[4] 2006 International Building Code, International Code Council, Inc., Falls Church, VA. 

[5] 2006 International Fire Code, International Code Council, Inc., Falls Church, VA. 

[6] 1991 Standard Building Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 

Birmingham, AL. 

[7] 1991 Standard Fire Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., Birmingham, 

AL. 

[8] 1994 Standard Building Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 

Birmingham, AL. 

[9] 1994 Standard Fire Code, Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., Birmingham, 

AL. 

[10] NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, National Fire Protection Association, 

Quincy, MA, 2008. 

[11] NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, 2010 

National Fire Codes, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, pp. 1500-11, 2007. 

[12] NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, 

Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire 

Departments, 2010 National Fire Codes, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 

pp. 1710-9, 2010. 

[13] NFPA 1031, Professional Qualifications for Fire Inspector and Plan Examiner, National Fire 

Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2003. 

[14] Fire Plan Examiner (CFE) Program – NFPA 1, Fire Code, NFPA 13, Installation of Sprinkler 

Systems, NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, and NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. 

http://www.nfpa.org/certifications 

[15] Certified Fire Inspector I (CFI/I) Program- NFPA 1, Fire Code, NFPA 13 Installation of 

Sprinkler Systems, NFPA 25, Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire 

Protection Systems, NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code, and NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. 

http://www.nfpa.org/certifications 
6-18

[16] Certified Fire Inspector II (CFI/II) Program– CFI/I codes listed above and NFPA 24, 

Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances, and NFPA 220, Types of 

Building Construction. http://www.nfpa.org/certifications 

[17] Certified Fire Marshal - International Building Code, International Fire Code, NFPA 921 

Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations, International Fire Service Training Association 

(IFSTA) Introduction to Fire Origin and Cause, and IFSTA Fire and Life Safety Educator. 

http://www.iccsafe.org/accreditation