1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 121,858

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

ARTHUR W. DAVIS III,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Douglas District Court; AMY J. HANLEY, judge. Opinion filed May 7, 2021. 

Affirmed.

Arthur W. Davis III, appellant pro se. 

Kate Duncan Butler, assistant district attorney, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek 

Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before SCHROEDER, P.J., MALONE, J., and MCANANY, S.J.

PER CURIAM: Arthur W. Davis III was convicted of aiding and abetting in the 

attempted first-degree murder of his former wife, Michelle Davis; aggravated kidnapping

of Michelle; and contributing to a child's misconduct. These convictions were affirmed in 

State v. Davis, No. 103,873, 2011 WL 3795267 (Kan. App. 2011), and our Supreme 

Court denied review. Davis then sought relief by way of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. The 

district court summarily denied relief on a number of Davis' claims. The court held an 

evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims and found them to be without merit. Davis 

appeals the district court's rulings on his motion and also claims the district court 

originally imposed an illegal sentence. 
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We find that substantial evidence supports the district court's decision following 

the evidentiary hearing. We conclude in our de novo review of the remaining claims in 

Davis' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively 

establish that Davis is not entitled to relief. See Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284, 293, 

419 P.3d 1180 (2018). Finally, we find no merit to Davis' new claim that his original 

sentence was illegal. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The events leading to Davis' convictions and to the present appeal center on a 

post-divorce dispute between Davis and Michelle over residential placement of their two 

minor children.

Briefly summarized, Davis and Michelle divorced in 1999. Michelle was granted 

primary residential placement of their two children. We will refer to the children in this 

opinion only as the son and the daughter.

In June 2007, Davis moved to change placement of the children and attached to 

his motion affidavits of the children in which they expressed their desire to live with 

Davis. That fall the son began living with Davis. 

In the spring of 2008, the district court ordered a custody evaluation by Dr. 

Milford Dale. During the evaluation process, Davis and Michelle came to an agreement 

that their son should continue living with Davis, but they continued their dispute about 

their daughter's primary residential placement. Michelle wanted their daughter to 

continue living with her and Davis wanted her to live with him. 
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Dr. Dale's report was completed in June 2009. His recommendation was consistent 

with Michelle's desire: that the parties' 15-year-old son live with Davis and the parties'

13-year-old daughter live with Michelle. Dr. Dale reviewed his recommendation with 

Michelle. He then scheduled a separate meeting for Davis to review his recommendation 

two days later. 

On June 12, 2009, Davis brought the two children with him for that meeting. 

Davis was given the report to read, and he shared it with the children. After reading the 

report Davis was angry. He took the two children and left. The daughter later testified 

that after the meeting Davis took the children to lunch and told them he wished they 

could get rid of Michelle by killing her.

A neighbor later testified that the following day, June 13, 2009, the son was seen 

using a baseball bat to hit a basketball in the bed of a pickup truck while Davis watched.

According to the trial testimony, two days later, on Monday, June 15, 2009, Davis 

met the children at Michelle's home at 5:30 p.m. and discussed with them how they were 

going to kill Michelle with the baseball bat. The plan was for the daughter to let the son

into the house at 1 a.m. that night and the son would bludgeon Michelle to death with the 

baseball bat. Then Davis would arrive and they would call the police and report that the 

daughter killed Michelle in self-defense after Michelle attacked her. According to the 

daughter, this was one of five times they talked about the plan before it was executed.

The plan was executed at 1 a.m. that night. The son entered his mother's 

bedroom where she was sleeping and began striking her on the head with the 

baseball bat. The daughter came into the room, turned on the light, and told her 

brother and Michelle to stop. The son continued to struggle with Michelle. The 

daughter left but then returned a second time, Michelle pleaded with her to call 

911. The son responded that he did not want to go to jail and told his sister to call 
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Davis. The daughter left but came back again, said that she did not know what to 

do, and put the phone on the bed. Michelle grabbed the phone, ran to the 

bathroom, and locked herself in as she called 911. The daughter later admitted at 

trial that at her brother's urging she too hit her mother with the bat before Michelle 

escaped to the bathroom.

When Davis arrived, he broke down the bathroom door and dragged 

Michelle out and held her and, as later testified to by the daughter, told his son to 

continue hitting Michelle with the bat, which the boy did. Davis' sandal prints 

were later found in Michelle's bathroom. Michelle broke free and ran to the 

kitchen where Davis caught and held her while the son again hit her on the head 

with the bat. Finally, Michelle escaped the house and ran to a police car with her 

son in pursuit.

The police took the son into custody. When the daughter tried to speak to the 

officer, Davis told her not to speak to anyone, and he led her back into the house. When 

they eventually came out of the house, neither would speak to the officers.

The daughter later told the police the prior-agreed story that she used the bat in 

self-defense when Michelle attacked her. But when separated from Davis she recanted 

this story, and Davis and the two children were charged. Prior to trial, the State granted 

the daughter immunity in exchange for her testimony against Davis and an agreement to 

reduce the charge against her brother to aggravated battery. 

At trial, the State's charges against the son were still pending so he invoked his 

Fifth Amendment right not to testify. The daughter testified to five separate discussions 

with Davis about killing Michelle. These discussions took place over the weekend before 

the attack. Davis testified in his own defense. He denied having anything to do with the 

crime either as principal (swinging the bat) or as an aider or abettor. He denied 
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participating in the planning of the crime and asserted there was no plan between him and 

the children to murder Michelle. According to Davis, his daughter was solely responsible 

for the attack on Michelle, and that he and his son arrived that morning after his daughter 

phoned begging for help.

Davis was convicted on all charges and was sentenced to 310 months in prison.

His convictions were affirmed on appeal in August 2011, and our Supreme Court denied

review in February 2012. See State v. Davis, No. 103,873, 2011 WL 3795267 (Kan. App. 

2011) (unpublished opinion).

Davis then moved for relief under K.S.A. 60-1507 based on a number of claims. 

After initially denying an evidentiary hearing on all of Davis' claims, and in response to a 

motion to alter or amend, the district court determined that the following issues were 

worthy of an evidentiary hearing: (1) whether Davis' trial counsel knew that 

premeditation was an element of attempted first-degree murder and (2) whether Davis 

was prejudiced by Greg Robinson, Davis' trial counsel, not informing him that 

premeditation was an element of attempted first-degree murder.

Davis testified at the evidentiary hearing that followed. According to Davis, he did 

not receive a copy of the charging document until after the trial was over. He testified 

that Robinson did not explain what he was charged with before the preliminary hearing. 

He claimed that Robinson never informed him of the elements of the crime, the concept 

of premeditation, Robinson's defense theory, Davis' trial rights, Robinson's plans for 

investigating the case, his proposed witnesses, the content of any filed motions, or even 

the trial date. According to Davis, he told Robinson that he was teaching tai chi on the 

evening of June 15, 2009, when one of the alleged conversations between him and his 

children took place. Davis contends that his tai chi students could testify that he could not 

have met that evening to plan the crime because of the class, thereby undercutting the 
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element of premeditation. But he acknowledged he never asked Robinson to call any of 

his tai chi students to testify as alibi witnesses at trial. 

Robinson testified at the hearing that he had been practicing as a defense attorney 

since 1999. He stated that he had developed a pattern that he followed when meeting with 

clients. That pattern included discussing with the client the charges and the elements the 

State had to prove for a conviction. He stated that when he discussed the charges with 

Davis, the concept of premeditation would have come up. While the complaint did not 

specifically refer to premeditation, based on his experience in dealing with similar cases 

Robinson knew that premeditation was required. When premeditation was an issue,

Robinson would give clients examples of "any overt acts, planning, things of that nature

could be used as a basis to show the fact finder, the jury, that it was a premeditated and 

thought—a thoughtful or upon reflection type act." Robinson did not recall Davis ever 

asking him during the trial about premeditation. During the trial Davis never expressed 

any confusion over this element.

Robinson testified that the defense strategy was a "general denial of the 

allegations." This would have included the element of premeditation that the State would 

need to prove. The State proceeding on an aiding and abetting theory did not require him 

to change this strategy because the State, in any event, had to prove premeditation. He 

was aware that the State's case involved allegations of a plan between Davis and his 

children to kill Michelle, and as the case developed it became apparent that Davis'

daughter was going to testify to a series of meetings with Davis and her brother about a 

plan to kill Michelle. 

Robinson testified that he did not recall having a conversation with Davis about an 

alibi. He did not recall Davis telling him at trial that he could not have been at Michelle's 

house for the purported meeting to plan the murder because he was teaching a tai chi 

class at the time. Moreover, the two students whom Davis now claims could have 
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provided alibi testimony never told Robinson that Davis could not have been at the 

purported planning meeting because of the class. Had they done so, Robinson testified 

that he would have called them to testify.

The tai chi students were Donald Dorsey and Gail Underwood, husband and wife. 

They were good friends of Davis and had known him for many years. They maintained 

contact with Davis even after his conviction. Underwood had Davis' power of attorney 

and spoke on his behalf at the sentencing hearing. Underwood testified that she and her 

husband were in class with Davis the evening of the purported 5:30 planning meeting at 

Michelle's house between Davis and the children. Underwood and her husband would 

have arrived at around 5:40 for the 6:00 class. Davis was typically already there when 

they arrived. They did not leave the class until around 8 p.m. 

Underwood attended the entirety of Davis' trial but did not tell Robinson that she 

had a class with Davis on the evening of the purported planning meeting when it came up 

during the testimony. 

Dorsey provided testimony similar to that of Underwood.

The district court denied relief. In ruling on Davis' motion, the court found 

Robinson's testimony to be credible and that Davis' testimony "completely lack[ed]

credibility." Likewise, the court found Underwood and Dorsey's testimony to be 

unpersuasive and "unreliable." The court noted that "Underwood and Dorsey never 

volunteered their memories about tai chi class until almost three years after Davis's trial."

The court found that Robinson understood the concept of premeditation as it 

applied to attempted first-degree murder in Davis' case and understood the requirement 

that the State prove premeditation. Robinson told Davis about premeditation, and 
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Robinson never expressed any confusion about this element. Moreover, there was no 

prejudice to Davis given the State's overwhelming evidence of premeditation.

Davis' appeal brings the matter to us. 

ANALYSIS

The District Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Grant Relief Following the Evidentiary 

Hearing on Davis' K.S.A. 60-1507 Motion.

The issues before the district court at the evidentiary hearing were (1) whether

Robinson, Davis' trial counsel, was ineffective in not knowing that the first-degree 

murder charge against Davis required proof of premeditation; and (2) whether Davis was 

prejudiced by Robinson not informing him that premeditation was an element of 

attempted first-degree murder.

Standard of Review

When the district court conducts a full evidentiary hearing on a K.S.A. 60-1507 

motion, we review the district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are 

supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the court's 

conclusions of law. We exercise de novo review over the district court's conclusions of 

law. State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831, 853, 416 P.3d 116 (2018).

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, a defendant must 

establish (1) that the performance of trial counsel was deficient under the totality of the 

circumstances and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced, i.e., that there was a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would have been different absent the deficient performance. 

Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875, 882-83, 335 P.3d 1162 (2014) (relying on 
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh. 

denied 467 U.S. 1267 [1984]).

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all the evidence before the 

judge or jury. The reviewing court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct fell 

within the broad range of reasonable professional judgment. State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 

970, 318 P.3d 987 (2014).

Robinson Knew That Attempted First-Degree Murder Required Premeditation.

On this first issue Davis argues that Robinson "did not understand the nature of the 

charges, particularly the premeditation element of the charge, in this case." But the 

district court stated:

"At the hearing, Robinson repeatedly testified that he knew about the law of attempted

first-degree murder, premeditation included. The Court finds this statement credible 

based on the following additional testimony given by Robinson; 1) he demonstrated the 

explanation of premeditation he used with defendants—an illustration he drew directly 

from case law; 2) he stated he knew that accomplices must share intent, including 

premeditation, with the principal; 3) he referenced his strategy for addressing the 

premeditation component and the various evidence that purportedly supported the State's 

theory of premeditation. Nothing in the record supports the allegation that Robinson did 

not understand that the State needed to prove premeditation. Accordingly, the Court finds 

and concludes Robinson knew about the premeditation element."

Davis cites State v. Overstreet, 288 Kan. 1, Syl. ¶ 3, 200 P.3d 427 (2009), wherein

the court held that the "specific intent required to be proved for conviction on a 

premeditated first-degree murder charge is premeditation. Therefore, under K.S.A. 21-

3205(1), a person guilty of aiding and abetting a premeditated first-degree murder must 
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be found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have had the requisite premeditation to murder 

the victim." This was essentially a restatement of what was contained in K.S.A. 21-

3205(1)—now K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5210(a)—which states that "[a] person is

criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if such person, acting with the 

mental culpability required for the commission thereof, advises, hires, counsels or 

procures the other to commit the crime or intentionally aids the other in committing the 

conduct constituting the crime." In order to prove that Davis was guilty of attempted firstdegree murder under an aiding and abetting theory, the State was required to prove that 

Davis premeditated the crime and aided his son in its commission. See K.S.A. 2020 

Supp. 21-5402(a)(1); K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5210(a).

Robinson expressed familiarity with the concept of accomplice liability principles 

throughout his testimony. Robinson understood that Davis and his son both had to have 

premeditated the crime in order for Davis to be convicted.

Robinson approached the trial with a general denial defense. Davis now argues 

that a general denial defense was inappropriate and that Robinson relying on it 

demonstrates that Robinson did not understand that Davis was being charged under an 

aiding and abetting theory. But a general denial defense is a denial that the accused had 

anything to do with the crime. That is what Robinson argued throughout the case. 

Robinson's choice of defense was not merely a denial that Davis swung the baseball bat 

at Michelle; it was a denial that Davis had any involvement in the crime.

To that end, in closing argument Robinson pointed out that the State had not 

presented any text messages or other electronic messages about a plan to kill Michelle. 

Robinson argued that his daughter's testimony—a crucial portion of proving the plan 

existed—was "purchased." While there could be premeditation without the extensive 

planning Davis' daughter testified to, the multiple meetings she testified to presented 

solid evidence of mutual premeditation between Davis and his son to kill Michelle. 
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It is clear that Robinson was aware of, and argued against, the aiding and abetting 

portion of the charges in his defense of Davis. We find substantial competent evidence to 

support the district court's finding that Robinson understood that premeditation was 

required in order to convict Davis of attempted first-degree murder.

Robinson Informed Davis That Premeditation Was an Element of Attempted FirstDegree Murder and, Therefore, Davis Was Not Prejudiced by Robinson's Claimed 

Failure to Do So.

The district court found that Robinson's testimony on this issue was credible and 

that Davis' testimony was unsupported by the record and was not credible. When 

considering whether substantial evidence supports a finding by the district court, we do 

not substitute on appeal our own view on matters of credibility for that of the district 

court. Rather, we view the evidence in the light favoring the State, the prevailing party in 

these proceedings. State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 668, 414 P.3d 713 (2018). 

The district court recounted Robinson's testimony that supported the finding that 

Robinson explained the concept of premeditation to Davis. As the district court 

explained, Robinson testified that he had a pattern of discussing the elements of the 

crimes his clients were charged with during their first meeting. While he did not 

specifically remember doing so with Davis, he was confident that he would have 

discussed with Davis the elements of first-degree murder—including premeditation. The 

district court found that Robinson told Davis about the element of premeditation. Viewed 

in the light favoring the State, the prevailing party, there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support this finding, and we find no basis for disturbing it on appeal.

Davis' claim of prejudice from Robinson not calling Dorsey and Underwood to 

testify as alibi witnesses is predicated on a finding that Robinson failed to informed Davis 

about the element of premeditation. But because the evidence supports a contrary 
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finding—that Robinson informed Davis about premeditation—we need not address the 

issue of prejudice.

Besides, the district court found that Davis's testimony at the 1507 hearing was not 

credible and that the testimony of Davis' longtime close friends, Underwood and Dorsey,

was not reliable. Moreover, as the court explained, the evidence of guilt was 

overwhelming, obviating any possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been 

any different had Underwood or Dorsey testified about one of several meetings at which 

there was testimony that Davis planned Michelle's murder.

The district court did not err in denying relief on the issues addressed at the 

evidentiary hearing on Davis' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion.

The District Court Did Not Err in Summarily Dismissing Without an Evidentiary Hearing 

the Remainder of Davis' K.S.A. 60-1507 Claims.

Standard of Review

When presented with a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion the district court has three options: 

"'"(1) The court may determine that the motion, files, and case records conclusively show 

the prisoner is entitled to no relief and deny the motion summarily; (2) the court may 

determine from the motion, files, and records that a potentially substantial issue exists, in 

which case a preliminary hearing may be held. If the court then determines there is no 

substantial issue, the court may deny the motion; or (3) the court may determine from the 

motion, files, records, or preliminary hearing that a substantial issue is presented 

requiring a full hearing."' [Citations omitted.]" White v. State, 308 Kan. 491, 504, 421 

P.3d 718 (2018).

When the district court summarily dismisses a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, we review 

the matter de novo to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case 
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conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief. Beauclair, 308 Kan. at 293.

We conduct this same type of review when the district court summarily dismisses some, 

but not all, of a defendant's claims.

Isolated claims

Davis argues the district court incorrectly isolated his claims against counsel and 

did not consider the cumulative impact of the alleged errors. The effectiveness of 

counsel's assistance should be gauged by the totality of the representation and not by 

isolated consideration of specific instances of conduct. See Chamberlain v. State, 236 

Kan. 650, 652-63, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). But the district court is entitled to separate the 

wheat from the chaff by dismissing claims that the record shows clearly lack merit before 

considering any potentially meritorious claims. See White, 308 Kan. at 504. The record 

shows that the district court did so here. The district court considered Davis' ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims and found them lacking. There is no indication that the court 

decided the matter by considering claims in isolation without considering the overall 

impact of counsel's conduct on Davis' right to a fair trial.

Inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law

Davis argues that the district court failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and 

conclusions of law to support its decision. Under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 183(j), the 

district court "must make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented"

in a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 240.) Compliance with the Rule 

enables an appellate court to conduct a meaningful review. State v. Moncla, 269 Kan. 61, 

65, 4 P.3d 618 (2000).

The district court summarily dismissed several of Davis' claims without providing 

detailed findings of fact or conclusions of law. The question for us is whether we can 
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conduct a meaningful review under these circumstances. We conclude that we can. 

Because our review is de novo we follow the same procedure applicable to the district 

court: we must consider with respect to each of Davis' claims whether the motion, files, 

and records of the case conclusively show that Davis is not entitled to relief. K.S.A. 2020 

Supp. 60-1507(b). If so, then we affirm the district court on that issue. If not, we can 

remand to the district court for further proceedings on that issue.

Davis' Claims

To obtain relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, Davis had to establish by a preponderance 

of the evidence either (1) the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, (2) the 

sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack, or 

(3) there has been such a denial or infringement of his constitutional rights so as to render 

the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(b); Supreme 

Court Rule 183(g) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 239).

In his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, Davis referred to his attached memorandum for his 

grounds for relief and the facts and witnesses he relied upon to support such grounds. 

Davis' memorandum in support of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion consists of 72 pages 

followed by a 3-page explanation of his actual innocence, followed by 13 pages that 

appears to be a summary of various arguments raised in the memorandum. He also 

attaches the affidavits of Underwood and Dorsey.

Davis' initial claim is that the charging document was fatally defective and 

deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the charge of attempted first-degree 

murder. At page 34 of this 72-page memorandum Davis first makes any reference to the 

performance of his counsel when he states, with regard to his claim that he was 

prejudiced by pretrial publicity, that neither the court, the prosecutor, or defense counsel 
15

examined each juror about their knowledge of the facts of the case. Davis asserts that his 

counsel should have known of the prejudicial community atmosphere Davis faced. 

Davis' next criticism of his counsel is found on page 40 of his memorandum where 

he notes that his trial counsel "never mentions [Davis'] whereabouts in reference to 5:30 

p.m. in opening [statement]." This relates to Davis' claim that he had alibi witnesses that 

would place him elsewhere when his daughter testified that she and Davis and her brother 

met to plan Michelle's murder. This, of course, relates to an issue that the district court 

considered at the evidentiary hearing on Davis' claims. 

The first time Davis is critical of appellate counsel is on page 51 of his 

memorandum where he states that the State's witness coaching "admitted at trial by the 

witness should have been raised on direct appeal. . . . The failure to raise these issue[s]

and the ineffective of counsel issue in failing to secure alibi witnesses . . . is a mockery of 

justice." Davis continues, "For all the grounds stated above, appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise these dead bang winners."

At page 67 Davis argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 

aggravated kidnapping because "there was no act of holding separate from a general

attack of aggravated battery." After setting forth his arguments on this claim he states that 

"trial counsel was ineffective for the claims stated above." More specifically, trial counsel 

(1) failed "to request PIK Crim. 3d 52.18 as [Davis'] testimony was not to be on the same

plain as [other] witnesses testimony as she is an accomplice." (2) He failed "to put before

the jury and instruction on defenses theory." (3) And he "[f]ailed to contact or investigate

alibi witnesses, including a plethora of other structural errors."

In between these portions cited above, Davis gives essentially a blow-by-blow 

description of major sections of the trial and describes all his claimed trial errors by the 

district court, the evidence that he claims was improperly admitted, the objections of 
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defense counsel that he claims were improperly overruled, and the conduct of the 

prosecutor which he claims was improper, all of which could have been raised in Davis'

direct appeal if they were worthy of being asserted rather than being collaterally raised 

for the first time by way of this K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. See Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 

603, 607, 88 P.3d 214 (2004) (noting that alleged trial errors generally must be addressed 

on a direct appeal); Supreme Court Rule 183(c)(3) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 239). Moreover, 

he spends considerable ink on matters of witness credibility, all of which the jury 

resolved against him and none of which are subject to review in these proceedings. See 

Chandler, 307 Kan. at 668; Drach v. Bruce, 281 Kan. 1058, 1067, 136 P.3d 390 (2006). 

It its May 30, 2014 decision, the district court was able to reframe Davis'

complaints into the following claims. We will take them up in the order set forth by the 

district court in its May 30, 2014 decision.

The Charging Document

First, Davis contends that the charging document was fatally defective, divesting 

the district court of jurisdiction over the charge of attempted first-degree murder. The 

district court characterized Davis' criticism of the charging document as a contention that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that it was defective because the 

charge of attempted first-degree murder did not include the words "intentionally and with 

premeditation." The amended information stated:

"That on or about the 16th day of June 2009, in Douglas County, Kansas one Arthur W. 

Davis III, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously commit an overt act, to wit: 

struck Michelle Davis repeatedly with baseball bat, toward the perpetration of the crime 

of Murder in the First Degree, as defined by K.S.A. 21-3401(a) with the intent to commit 

said crime but failed in the perpetration thereof or was prevented or intercepted in 

executing said crime, all in violation of K.S.A. 21-3301. (Attempted Murder in the First 

Degree, Level 1/Person/Felony)."
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The record shows that Robinson did not move to arrest judgment, and the State 

concedes that Robinson did not claim the information was defective, so there is no need 

for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The question for us is whether, as a matter of 

law, Davis has an actionable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the 

charging document. 

Contrary to Davis' argument, the claimed defect in the charging document did not 

deprive the district court of jurisdiction. In State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 811, 375 P.3d 

332 (2016), overruling the court's prior holding in State v. Minor, 197 Kan. 296, 416 P.2d 

724 (1966), our Supreme Court stated:

"Charging documents do not bestow or confer subject matter jurisdiction on state courts

to adjudicate criminal cases; the Kansas Constitution does. Charging documents need 

only show that a case has been filed in the correct court, e.g., the district court rather than 

municipal court; show that the court has territorial jurisdiction over the crime alleged; 

and allege facts that, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, would constitute a Kansas 

crime committed by the defendant."

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Davis must establish not 

only that the performance of his counsel was deficient but also that he was prejudiced 

thereby. See Sola-Morales, 300 Kan. at 882-83. Davis claimed that Robinson's ignorance 

of premeditation being an element of attempted first-degree murder resulted in him 

failing to challenge the amended information for this deficiency and in him failing to call

Underwood and Dorsey as alibi witnesses to undercut the notion of premeditation. But, as 

the district court found and as we discussed earlier, Robinson knew and understood that 

the State was required to prove premeditation, and Robinson explained that to Davis. 

Davis and Robinson clearly understood what the State had to prove for a conviction. 

Even if the charging document was deficient for not referring to premeditation, Davis and 

Robinson had all the necessary information with which to mount a defense, and Robinson 
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did so, albeit unsuccessfully in the face of the compelling evidence presented by the 

State. See Dunn, 304 Kan. at 821. Likewise, for these reasons, had Robinson moved to 

arrest judgment following the jury's verdict, the district court correctly would have denied 

it. 

As for the claim that Robinson should have called Underwood and Dorsey, the 

district court found at the evidentiary hearing that the testimony of these witnesses, who 

were longtime personal friends of Davis, was unreliable and would not have affected the 

outcome of the trial, given the fact that they could testify to only one of several meetings 

in evidence during which Michelle's murder was planned. Moreover, as to the timing of 

the Monday afternoon meeting, the district court found that the testimony of Underwood 

and Dorsey did not eliminate the possibility of Davis conducting their tai chi class and 

still attending the afternoon meeting with the children. The records of the case 

demonstrate that Davis cannot establish the necessary element of prejudice.

Davis also contends that the use of the disjunctive "or" in the amended information

("failed in the perpetration thereof or was prevented or intercepted. . .") led to 

impermissible uncertainty which Robinson should have challenged. We find no merit to 

this claim. Davis relies on State v. Seeger, 65 Kan. 711, 711, 70 P. 599 (1902), in which 

the complaint charged the defendant with maintaining

"'a place where intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, sold, bartered, or given away in 

violation of law, or where persons are permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking 

intoxicating liquors as a beverage, or where intoxicating liquors are kept for the purpose 

of sale, barter, or delivery in violation of law, or a place where intoxicating liquors, 

bottles, glasses, kegs, pumps, bars, and other property are kept and used in maintaining 

such place.'" 65 Kan. at 711.
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The court held that the complaint lacked certainty in that no one could tell if the 

defendant was being charged with maintaining a liquor warehouse or a bar. 65 Kan. at 

711.

In State v. Woods, 222 Kan. 179, 181, 563 P.2d 1061 (1977), the Kansas Supreme 

Court had to determine whether the language "'which did inflict great bodily harm upon 

the [victim], or which was done in a manner whereby great bodily harm or disfigurement 

could have been inflicted'" ran afoul of the rule in Seeger. The court held that it did not 

because, generally, the use of the disjunctive is fatal only when uncertainty results. The 

court held that the use of the disjunctive was permissible in Woods because there was no 

uncertainty. 222 Kan. at 183.

The same can be said about Davis' case. The disjunctive used in the charging 

document merely related to the Davis' failure to complete the act of first-degree murder. 

It was his failure to complete the crime that was the operative fact, not that his failure was 

due to having been prevented or having been intercepted. Neither Davis nor his trial 

counsel was left in doubt as to what Davis was charged with having done. The use of the 

alternative "or" was totally inconsequential when it came to Davis' defense to the charge. 

See Woods, 222 Kan. at 182-83.

Accordingly, we conclude as a matter of law that the district court did not err in 

summarily denying relief on this claim regarding the charging document.

The Sufficiency of the Evidence of Attempted First-Degree Murder

Second, Davis appears to argue that his appellate counsel was unable to argue on

appeal that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of attempted 

first-degree murder due to trial counsel's failure to expose false testimony by the State's 

witnesses and failure to file a notice of an alibi defense. 
20

The false testimony apparently relates to the daughter's testimony about the 

Monday evening meeting between Davis and the children about attacking Michelle later 

that night. Davis claims his daughter was coached to say that he wanted to have Michelle 

killed, rather than simply to "get rid" of her. But the jury heard recordings of the 

daughter's statements which used these phrases and could decide for themselves the 

import of the daughter's statements. 

Davis also complains that he was unable to counter his daughter's testimony with 

that of his son because his son had asserted his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. In summarily denying this claim, the district court found that the son's 

refusal to testify was not a violation of Davis' rights. We find no error in this conclusion. 

Moreover, Davis did testify on his own behalf and refuted his daughter's claim about the 

Monday evening meeting.

As to the alibi issue, Davis testified at trial that he could not have participated in 

the claimed Monday afternoon meeting to plan the murder because he was teaching a tai 

chi class at the time. Underwood and Dorsey had not been called to testify at trial about 

the Monday tai chi class to support Davis' testimony. But the lack of their alibi testimony 

did not prevent appellate counsel from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. As we 

discussed earlier, had Underwood and Dorsey testified at trial their testimony would not 

have materially affected the outcome of the trial. Moreover, had they testified, their 

testimony would not have been sufficient to undercut on Davis' direct appeal the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting Davis' attempted first-degree murder conviction. 
21

Premeditation and Robinson's Failure to Call Underwood and Dorsey as Alibi 

Witnesses

Davis' third claim relates to the claim already discussed above that trial counsel 

did not understand that premeditation was an element of attempted first-degree murder 

and that counsel's failure to inform Davis about premeditation prejudiced Davis by 

Underwood and Dorsey not being called to testify as alibi witnesses. We need not address 

this issue further.

The Court's Instructions on Attempted Second-Degree Murder and Voluntary 

Manslaughter

Fourth, Davis argues that his trial and appellate counsel failed to challenge the 

court's instructions on attempted second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. This 

issue was thoroughly discussed in the district court's May 30, 2014 decision. We need not 

repeat here all of the district court's analysis. We do note, however, that the district court 

acknowledged that it erred by not providing a proper lesser included instruction. But that 

error does not require reversal. The Kansas Supreme Court has held that "when a 

defendant has been charged with and convicted of murder in the first degree, the 

correctness of instructions relating to manslaughter becomes immaterial." State v. 

Metcalf, 203 Kan. 63, 67, 452 P.2d 842 (1969). Consistent with Metcalf, the court later 

stated in State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 43, 91 P.3d 517 (2004), overruled on other grounds 

by State v. Neighbors, 299 Kan. 234, 328 P.3d 1081 (2014), that when a court gives 

instructions for first- and second-degree murder, but fails to include further lesser 

included offenses, and the jury convicts on the greater offense, any error resulting from 

the failure to include additional lesser included offenses is cured. 

The district court provided first- and second-degree murder instructions in this 

case. The failure to include further lesser included offense instructions was cured when 

the jury convicted Davis of attempted first-degree murder. See Horn, 278 Kan. at 43.
22

Given the extent of the evidence supporting Davis' conviction of attempted first-degree 

murder, the failure of Davis' trial counsel to challenge these instructions would not have 

affected the outcome of the case, and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

raise this issue on appeal. 

Finally, Davis seems to argue at some point that by including lesser included 

offense instructions to the jury, the district court thereby acquitted him of the greater 

crime. Davis clearly misunderstands the law regarding lesser included offense 

instructions. Lesser included instructions are provided to the jury by the district court if 

there is "'some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser 

included crime.'" State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 324, 409 P.3d 1 (2018).

Essentially, lesser included instructions should be provided if there is some 

evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the defense, that would allow the jury 

to convict the defendant of the lesser crime. This does not mean that the jury is precluded 

from convicting the defendant of the primary offense so long as there is substantial 

evidence to support the jury's choice.

The Court's Instruction on General Intent

Fifth, Davis contends that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for 

failing to challenge the court's general intent instruction. He argues that the jury was 

instructed on general and specific intent when none of the crimes charged was a general 

intent crime.

Davis was charged with contributing to a child's misconduct, which is a general 

intent crime. See K.S.A. 21-3612(a) (now K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5603). Thus, a general 

intent instruction was appropriate as it relates to that crime. Moreover, the district court 

instructed the jury in Instruction No. 5: "Each crime charged against the defendant is a 
23

separate and distinct offense. You must decide each charge separately on the evidence 

and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other charge." It is clear 

from the record that it was not error to provide a general intent instruction under the 

circumstances, and Davis' trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective in failing to 

challenge this instruction.

Lesser Included Crimes of Kidnapping and First-Degree Murder

Sixth, Davis contends his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to 

argue that the district court should have instructed the jury that criminal restraint is a 

lesser included crime of kidnapping and that aggravated battery is a lesser included crime 

of first degree murder.

On the first issue, Davis was charged with aggravated kidnapping. The court 

instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated kidnapping and ordinary kidnapping. At 

the time, the crime of kidnapping was defined as "the taking or confining of any person, 

accomplished by force, threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person . . . to 

inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another." K.S.A. 21-3420(c). Aggravated 

kidnapping is defined as the same, except that it requires bodily harm to be inflicted upon 

the person kidnapped. K.S.A. 21-3421. Ordinary kidnapping is a lesser included offense 

of aggravated kidnapping. State v. Corn, 223 Kan. 583, 591, 575 P.2d 1308 (1978). 

Likewise, criminal restraint is a lesser included offense of kidnapping and could have 

been included as a lesser included offense instruction in this case. See State v. Carter, 

232 Kan. 124, 126-27, 652 P.2d 694 (1982). As the district court noted in its May 30, 

2014 decision, "[h]ad the jury found Davis guilty of kidnapping, he could contend that 

the criminal restraint instruction should have been given." But any error in not including 

the criminal restraint instruction was cured when the district court provided jury 

instructions for aggravated kidnapping and its "only lesser offense, kidnapping" and the 

jury convicted Davis of aggravated kidnapping. State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 43, 91 P.3d 
24

517 (2004). Davis suffered no prejudice from the court's failure to instruct on criminal 

restraint. 

On the second issue, aggravated battery is not a lesser included offense of 

attempted murder. State v. Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, 692, 156 P.3d 602 (2007). 

There was no need for an evidentiary hearing to determine that Davis' trial and 

appellate counsel were not ineffective in failing to raise these issues.

Pretrial Publicity

Seventh, Davis contends his trial and appellate counsel failed to assert that Davis 

was denied a fair trial because pretrial publicity tainted the jury pool and trial counsel 

was also inadequate in failing to adequately question prospective jurors about their 

impartiality.

The State and Davis' counsel participated in voir dire and questioned prospective 

jurors about their knowledge of the case. In some instances, prospective jurors expressed 

an inability to put aside their prior knowledge and opinions about the case and were 

excused for cause. Others explained that they had heard about the case but could set aside 

any preconceptions about it and decide the case solely on the evidence presented in court.

Davis does nothing more than make conclusory accusations that he was prejudiced 

by media coverage of the attack on Michelle. He offers no evidence that members of the 

jury were actually prejudiced against him based on any pretrial knowledge of the events.

Nor was his counsel ineffective for not objecting to the jury panel merely because the 

crime was covered in the local news media. See State v. Jackson, 262 Kan. 119, 128-29, 

936 P.2d 761 (1997) (noting that the defendant has the burden to show a demonstrable 
25

prejudice against defendant exists within the community and that it is reasonably certain 

that he will not receive a fair trial).

Davis fails to provide any evidence that the jury pool was prejudiced against him 

or that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the jury pool was prejudiced 

against him. Davis is not entitled to relief on his motion based on this claim.

False Testimony and Davis' Alibi Defense

Eighth, Davis' trial counsel failed to expose false testimony of the State's witnesses 

and failed to file a notice of alibi defense. We discussed these claims at length earlier in 

this opinion. We need not address them further.

Failures of Appellate Counsel

Nineth, Davis contends that his appellate counsel "failed to raise each issue set 

forth in Davis' 1507 motion." Among Davis' various complaints is the claim that his 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the issue of possible 

coaching of his daughter while she testified at trial. But Davis' appellate counsel did raise 

this issue on appeal and it was extensively discussed in the appellate opinion. Davis, 2011 

WL 3795267, at *6-8.

We have addressed all the other various instances in which Davis finds fault with 

his appellate counsel and have found Davis' criticisms lacking in merit. Besides, the 

decision by appellate counsel to not raise an issue does not necessarily amount to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. As the Kansas Supreme Court has stated, 

"[c]onscientious counsel should only raise issues on appeal which, in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment, have merit." Baker v. State, 243 Kan. 1, 10, 755 P.2d 
26

493 (1988). The record does not disclose any issue of merit that if raised on appeal could 

have resulted in a more favorable outcome for Davis.

Michelle's 911 Call

Tenth, Davis contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object at 

trial to the admission of Michelle's 911 call. He contends that the recording of the call 

had been altered. But his trial counsel objected to the altered version being admitted into 

evidence, and the district sustained the objection. Instead, the original unaltered recording 

was admitted and played to the jury. Davis also argues that the State utilized the altered 

tape during closing arguments but presents no evidence that the State actually did so. 

This claim does not merit an evidentiary hearing. The record shows that Davis is not 

entitled to relief on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Sufficiency of the Evidence of Aggravated Kidnapping

An issue not specifically addressed by the district court in its May 30, 2014 ruling 

is Davis' claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his aggravated kidnapping 

conviction and that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this 

claim.

In Davis' direct appeal, this court noted: "Davis challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support an aggravated battery conviction; however, we note that his 

arguments all concern his aggravated kidnapping conviction." Davis, 2011 WL 3795267, 

at *8. The issue was clearly raised in Davis' direct appeal. This court specifically found 

that there was sufficient evidence to support Davis' conviction. In reciting the facts of the 

case, the court noted:
27

"After Michelle managed to lock herself in the bathroom, Davis broke through the door, 

dragged Michelle into the hallway, held her by the arms, and yelled at [the son] to hit her. 

[The son] complied by twice hitting Michelle on the head with the bat. When Michelle 

managed to escape Davis' grasp, Davis pursued her into the kitchen, grabbed and held her 

while [the son] again struck her head with the bat." 2011 WL 3795267, at *9.

To be found guilty of aggravated kidnapping the State was required to prove that 

Davis committed the offense of "taking or confining [Michelle], accomplished by force, 

threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person: . . . to inflict bodily injury or to 

terrorize the victim or another" and in doing so bodily harm was inflicted on the person 

kidnapped. K.S.A. 21-3420; K.S.A. 21-3421. There was ample evidence presented at trial 

to support Davis' conviction of aggravated kidnapping. Davis forcefully restrained 

Michelle in the bathroom and again in the kitchen so that their son could strike her with 

the baseball bat, which he did. Davis' trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective in 

failing to raise this issue.

Davis fails to establish that under the totality of the circumstances his trial and 

appellate counsel were ineffective in representing him at trial and on appeal or that he 

was prejudiced by their performance. See Beauclair, 308 Kan. at 293; Sola-Morales, 300 

Kan. at 882. He also fails to show a denial of constitutional rights that deprived him of a 

fair trial. In our de novo review we conclude that the motion, files, and case records 

conclusively show that Davis is not entitled to relief on his motion and the district court 

did not err in summarily denying relief.

The District Court Did Not Impose an Illegal Sentence for Attempted First-Degree 

Murder When Davis Should Have Been Sentenced for Domestic Battery

For Davis' final issue on appeal, he argues that the district court imposed an illegal 

sentence because he should have been sentenced for domestic battery instead of 

attempted first-degree murder. He contends that because he was related to Michelle in the 
28

past as her husband, he should have been charged with and sentenced for a domestic 

battery, not attempted first-degree murder, because domestic battery is a more specific 

charge.

Standard of Review

Our review over this issue of law is unlimited. State v. Lee, 304 Kan. 416, 417, 

372 P.3d 415 (2016). A sentence is illegal under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3504(c)(1) when: 

(1) it is imposed by a court without jurisdiction; (2) it does not conform to the applicable 

statutory provisions, either in character or the term of punishment; or (3) it is ambiguous 

about the time and manner in which it is to be served. State v. Hambright, 310 Kan. 408, 

411, 447 P.3d 972 (2019).

Analysis

The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Here, Davis claims his 

sentence does not conform to the applicable statutory provision. He claims the applicable 

statutory provision was K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 21-3412a (now K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5414), 

the statute defining domestic violence, not our statutes defining attempted first-degree 

murder.

The court sentenced Davis for the specific crime he was convicted of—attempted 

first-degree murder. The court did not sentence him to a different crime. But that is what 

Davis is claiming should have been done: he should have been sentenced for domestic 

battery—a crime which was never charged and for which he was never convicted—

instead of the crime for which he was convicted and for which our court on direct appeal 

found substantial supporting evidence. 
29

Domestic violence and attempted first-degree murder are wholly different crimes. 

To convict Davis of attempted first-degree murder, the State had to prove that Davis 

attempted to intentionally and with premeditation kill—or in this case aid and abet in the 

attempt to kill—Michelle. See K.S.A. 21-3301; K.S.A. 21-3401. On the other hand, to 

prove domestic battery, the State merely had to prove that Davis knowingly or recklessly 

caused bodily harm to a family or household member. See K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 21-3412a. 

There are significant differences between these crimes. Attempted murder requires a 

higher culpable mental state and a different objective for the victim: death and not 

merely bodily harm. Even though Michelle did not suffer fatal wounds in the attack, the 

State intended to prove—and did prove—that the objective of the attack was Michelle's 

death, not merely bodily harm. The State's decision to prosecute Davis for attempted 

first-degree murder was certainly within the prosecutor's discretion to determine who 

shall be charged and with what crimes. State v. Williamson, 253 Kan. 163, 165, 853 P.2d 

56 (1993). The district court sentenced Davis accordingly. The district court did not err in 

doing so.

Affirmed.