Interim Decision #2146 

MATTER OF YEE 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-19428311 

Decided by Board April 28, 1972 

Petitioner's adoption of beneficary in mainland China subsequent to 1950 (in 

1956) by written agreement of adoption which was examined and approved by 

an agency of the Government of the People's Republic of China is a valid 

adoption for Immigration purposes, since new evidence indicates that Article 

13 of the Marriage. Law of the People's Republic of China relates to adoptive 

relationships; that the courts of the People's Republic of China have recognized the existence of adoptive relationships; and that the procedure for 

effecting adoption has been adequately spelled out in court decisions and 

other legal writings. Wutte/ of Yee, 13 L & N. Dec. 620, overruled_] 

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 

Benjamin Gim, Esquire 

217 Park Row 

New York, New York 10038 

(Brief filed) 

ON BEHALPOF SERVICE: 

R. A. Vielhaber 

Appellate Trial Attorney 

(Brief filed) 

The lawful permanent resident alien petitioner applied for preference status for the beneficiary as his adopted son under section 

202(02) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The District 

Director, on October 14, 1970, found that an adoption had been 

established and approved the petition. However, his initial approval was revoked on September 30, 1971, on the basis of this 

Board's decision in the case of another Chinese with the same 

family name, Matter of Yee,'13 I. & N. Dec. 620 (BIA, 1970). From 

the revocation the petitioner appeals. His appeal will be sustained. 

The beneficiary was born in the People's Repuhlie of China on 

August 22, 1955. The record indicates that he was adopted in 

Canton on January 31, 1956. The file contains a copy of a document 

signed by the natural parents entitled "Deed on Giving Own Son 

Away to Other Persons for Adoption." A translation of it reads as 

follows: 

We, Moy Sam Nui and Chew Hon You, the undersigned, residing at No. 10, 

Chou Yuet Lane, Canton City, Residence I.D. Card Nos. 2283737 and 1007540, 

due to poverty and having too many children to take care of, have agreed to 

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give our own baby child, Moy Hor Foo, to our friend, Yee Ken Kee, as his 

adopted child. A mutual agreement has been filed with the Community Office 

and the Police. This child's birth certificate, No. 5518, has also been given to 

Mr. Yee Ken Kee and a new name has been given to the child. From this date 

on, this child will be under the care of Mr. Yee, and we will have no rights 

whatsoever to claim him back. 

The adoption was registered with the local civil authorities on 

January 31, 1956. The file contains a translation of an instrument 

styled "A Guaranty on Children Adoption." It was signed by both 

natural parents and was endorsed by The People's Committee, 

North District of Canton. Although the adoption agreement only 

mentioned the petitioner as the adoptive parent, the "Guaranty" 

mentions both him and his spouse as the "receivers." • 

Foreign law is a matter of fact which, like any other fact, must 

be established by evidence. In Matter of Yee, supra, we found, on 

the basis of the evidentiary material presented to us, that the Civil 

Code of the Nationalist Republic had been suspended when the 

Chinese Communist Government seized control of the niainland of 

China in 1950. We also found that the People's Republic of China 

had not enacted any adoption law and that there was no evidence 

of any intention to revert to traditional Chinese custom and 

practice with respect to adoption. The actual legal basis for our 

decision in that case revolved around our construction of Article 13 

of the Marriage Law of the People's RepubliC of China. We held (1) 

that Article 13 related only to foster children and not to adopted 

children, and (2) that even if it did relate to adopted children, it did 

not outline a procedure for effecting adoptions. 

Our decision in Matter of Ye's, supra, was founded upon an 

opinion prepared by the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library 

of Congress, which observed that the People's Republic of China 

had not yet promulgated a statute governing adoption. The opinion quoted a 1952 Peking translation of Article 13 of the Marriage 

Law which interpreted the Chinese characters "yang tzu to 

mean "foster children." 

Counsel maintains that a subsequent opinion from the Far 

Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress and other legal 

materials not previously available tend to indicate that our holding in Matter of Yee, supra, was incorrect. He contends that (1) 

Article 13 of the Marriage Law does relate to adoptive relationships, (2) the courts of the People's Republic of China have 

recognized the existence of adoptive relationships, and (3) the 

procedure for effecting adoptions has been adequately spelled out 

in court decisions and other legal writings. 

We have received a new memorandum from the Chief of the Far 

Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress,• dated January' 

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19, 19'72, which apparently supersedes the opinion referred to 

above. It concludes that the Chinese characters "yang tzu nfi" 

appearing in Article 13 of the Marriage Law should properly be 

translated as "adopted children," and not as "foster children." This 

new opinion also contains translations of a number of court 

decisions and legal writings emanating from the People's Republic 

of China.1This evidence supports the three contentions of counsel listed above. We agree that the new evidence now made 

available to us requires a change in the conclusion we had reached 

in Matter of Yee, supra. 

In the present case a valid adoption was initially established to 

the satisfaction of the District Director. There is no dispute as to 

the facts surrounding the adoption. The approval of the District 

Director was subsequently revoked on the basis of our decision in 

Matter of Yee, supra. Inasmuch as we have receded from our 

decision in that case, it no longer serves as a bar to the approval of 

the present petition. 

In the present case we find that (1) a written agreement of 

adoption has been presented, and (2) the adoption was examined 

and approved by an agency of the government of the People's 

Republic of China. Accordingly, we find that the beneficiary 

qualifies as an adopted child for purposes of section 101(bX1)(E). 

He, therefore, is entitled to preference classification under section 

203(aX2), having met all the other requirements. The approval of 

the application for preference status was incorrectly revoked and 

should be reinstated. The appeal will be sustained and the following order will be entered. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the District Director's revocation of 

the approval of the petition granting preference classification to • 

the beneficiary be and the same is hereby set aside, and the 

approval of the petition granting preference classification be and 

the same is hereby reinstated as of the date of original approval. 

Some of the new sources which are cited by the Library of Congress, and 

which we have carefully considered in reaching our conclusion, are the following: 

a. Marriage Law and Policy in the Chinese People's Republic by M. J. Meijer 

(Hong Kong University Press, 1971). 

b. An undated document entitled "Several Opinions Concerning Questions of 

Adoption Relationships Expressed by the Supreme People's Court of the Central 

People's Government." 

c. An editorial entitled "Several Questions Concerning Adoption," appearing in 

Chinese Law and Government: A Journal of Translations, Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring 

1969). 

d. An article entitled "General Discussion of the Marriage Law of the People's 

Republic of China," by Ma Ch'i, Tung pei jen min to 1u3uhlt jen wen k'o hew& pao 

(Academia Journal of the Humanistic Sciences of Northeastern People's University), No. 3 (1956). 

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