[Cite as State v. McMillen, 2016-Ohio-370.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

LLOYD E. MCMILLEN 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 27666 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 2013 10 2910 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: February 3, 2016 

 

SCHAFER, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Lloyd McMillen, appeals the judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of theft against the elderly. For the reasons set 

forth below, we affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} On November 26, 2013, the grand jury indicted McMillen on one count of theft 

against the elderly in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3), (B)(3), a fifth degree felony. McMillen 

pled not guilty and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, 

the trial court allowed McMillen to reserve his right to make a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal 

following the defense’s case. After the defense rested at trial, McMillen made a Crim.R. 29 

motion, which the trial court denied. The jury ultimately found McMillen guilty of the sole 

count in the indictment and the trial court sentenced McMillen to 12 months in prison, but 

suspended the imposition of that sentence and ordered McMillen to complete 12 months of 
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community control. The trial court also ordered McMillen to pay $330.00 in restitution to the 

victim. 

{¶3} McMillen filed this timely appeal, raising two assignments of error for our 

review. To facilitate our analysis, we elect to address his assignments of error together. 

II. 

Assignment of Error I 

The trial court committed reversible error when it found Mr. McMillen 

guilty of theft from the elderly because the evidence was insufficient to 

support such a finding. 

Assignment of Error II 

Mr. McMillen’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

meriting reversal. 

{¶4} In his two assignments of error, McMillen argues that it was erroneous for the 

trial court to enter a judgment of conviction that was unsupported by either sufficient evidence or 

the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. 

{¶5} “‘We review a denial of a defendant’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal by 

assessing the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.’” State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27389, 

2015-Ohio-2842, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Frashuer, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24769, 2010-Ohio-634, 

¶ 33. A sufficiency challenge of a criminal conviction presents a question of law, which we 

review de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). In carrying out this review, 

our “function * * * is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such 

evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

After such an examination and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

we must decide whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
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crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Although we conduct de novo review when 

considering a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, “we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor 

assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. 

Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570, C-120751, 2013-Ohio-4775 , ¶ 33. 

{¶6} A sufficiency challenge is legally distinct from a manifest weight 

challenge. Thompkins at 387. Accordingly, when applying the manifest weight standard, we are 

required to consider the whole record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

consider the credibility of the witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice 

that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 

339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). Courts are cautioned to only reverse a conviction on manifest weight 

grounds “in exceptional cases,” State v. Carson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26900, 2013–Ohio–5785, 

¶ 32, citing Otten at 340, where the evidence “weighs heavily against the 

conviction,” Thompkins at 387. 

{¶7} This matter implicates McMillen’s conviction on theft against the elderly under 

R.C. 2913.02(A)(3), which prohibits a person, “with purpose to deprive the owner of property or 

services, [from] knowingly obtain[ing] or exert[ing] control over either the property or services * 

* * [b]y deception[.]” Deception means: 

knowingly deceiving another or causing another to be deceived by any false or 

misleading representation, by withholding information, by preventing 

another from acquiring information, or by any other conduct, act, or omission that 

creates, confirms, or perpetuates a false impression in another, including a false 

impression as to law, value, state of mind, or other objective or subjective fact. 

R.C. 2913.01(A). 
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{¶8} One purposely deprives another of property or services when he has the specific 

intent to “[a]ccept, use, or appropriate money * * * with purpose not to give proper consideration 

in return for the money * * * and without reasonable justification or excuse for not giving proper 

consideration.” R.C. 2913.01(C)(3); see R.C. 2901.22(A). An individual “acts knowingly, 

regardless of his purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause 

a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). Where the victim is 

elderly, and the defendant steals less than $1,000.00 worth of services or property, theft is a fifth 

degree felony. R.C. 2913.02(B)(3). 

{¶9} Here, the victim, who was 74 years of age at the time of the offense, testified via 

deposition that on November 30, 2012, McMillen, a roofing subcontractor, came to her home in 

Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio to fix a leak in her roof. The homeowner testified that she and McMillen 

discussed possible repair options and costs after McMillen examined the roof. She further 

testified that McMillen agreed to repair a soil vent, fix the chimney flashing, and reseal nails all 

for $330.00. McMillen testified that he took several photographs of the roof on his cell phone, 

which he claimed was standard protocol for subcontractors who needed to submit photographs of 

their projects in order to get paid. McMillen, however, only took photographs of the roof before 

his repairs. He never took photographs of the roof following his repairs because, according to 

him, the battery on his cell phone had died. It is undisputed that McMillen never showed any of 

the photographs to the homeowner, despite the fact that the homeowner testified that McMillen 

agreed to provide her with “before” and “after” photographs, as she was not physically able to 

inspect the quality of the repairs on her roof. The homeowner also claims that she asked to see 

the photographs before McMillen left, but McMillen told her that his phone was not working and 

that he would provide her with the photographs later, which he never did. The homeowner 
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testified that McMillen was only on her roof for about 30 minutes before leaving, which 

McMillen disputes. The homeowner stated that she gave a check for the full amount of $330.00 

to McMillen because he represented to her that he had completed all of the work that they agreed 

upon. The homeowner also testified that she never would have paid McMillen if she knew that 

he did not repair her roof. 

{¶10} The homeowner testified that her roof continued to leak after McMillen departed. 

She testified that she called McMillen on several occasions, but he either did not answer his 

phone or he would agree to reexamine her roof, but never came. She also testified that she later 

called two other roofers to independently examine her roof. According to the homeowner, the 

results of the two roofers’ respective examinations caused her to doubt whether McMillen 

performed any work on her roof at all. She testified that she again called McMillen and 

demanded a full refund because she suspected that he did not do any work on her roof. After 

McMillen refused to provide a refund, the homeowner contacted the police. According to the 

homeowner, almost ten months after McMillen supposedly worked on the homeowner’s roof, 

she hired another roofing company to finally repair her leaking roof. The new roofer testified at 

trial that, in his opinion, it appeared as if no work had been done on the homeowner’s roof when 

he arrived to fix it. 

{¶11} Detective Dominic Perella of the Cuyahoga Falls Police Department investigated 

the homeowner’s complaint against McMillen. According to Detective Perella’s testimony, he 

spoke with McMillen via telephone and asked McMillan to send him the “before” pictures that 

he took of the homeowner’s roof. It took McMillen nearly two months to send those 

photographs to him. Detective Perella testified that he subsequently showed McMillen’s 

“before” photographs to the roofer who ultimately fixed the homeowner’s roof. According to the 
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new roofer, McMillen’s “before” photographs from November 2012 matched the condition of 

the homeowner’s roof on the date that the new roofer appeared to fix the roof. 

{¶12} After viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude 

that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a jury to conclude that McMillen purposely 

deprived the homeowner of $330.00 by deception. The homeowner testified that she paid 

McMillen $330.00 for repair work that was never performed. This testimony was buttressed by 

the subsequent roofer’s testimony that, in his opinion, it appeared as if no work was done to the 

roof prior to his repairs in August 2013. In light of the foregoing, we determine that the State 

met its burden of production in this matter. 

{¶13} Turning to McMillen’s manifest weight challenge, he contends that his 

conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State’s witnesses lacked 

credibility. For example, McMillen alleges that the homeowner’s testimony regarding her 

interactions with him on the day in question was “contradictory, unreasonable, doubtful and at 

times incredible.” Moreover, McMillen argues that the testimony of the new roofer who was 

hired to finally repair the roof ten months after the day in question was suspect, as his memory of 

the roof’s condition was limited. However, the jury apparently accepted the testimony of the 

State’s witnesses which, if believed, demonstrated that McMillen received $330.00 for work that 

he claimed to have done, but did not actually perform. Although McMillen attempted to show 

through direct and cross-examination that he actually performed the repairs to the homeowner’s 

roof and that the State’s witnesses lacked credibility, the jury was free to disregard such a theory. 

After reviewing the entire record, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way and committed a 

manifest miscarriage of justice in convicting McMillen of theft against the elderly. See State v. 

Lewis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21722, 2004-Ohio-1233 (concluding that defendant’s conviction for 
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theft by deception of the elderly was neither insufficient nor against the manifest weight of the 

evidence). 

{¶14} Accordingly, McMillen’s two assignments of error are overruled. 

III. 

{¶15} McMillen’s two assignments of error are both overruled and the judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JULIE A. SCHAFER 

 FOR THE COURT 
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WHITMORE, J. 

CONCURS. 

CARR, P. J. 

DISSENTING. 

{¶16} I respectfully dissent. I would reverse McMillen’s conviction as being against the 

manifest weight of the evidence as the new roofer specifically testified that some recent work 

had been done to the roof. 

{¶17} The transcript in this case reads more like a civil action than a criminal 

prosecution. I agree with Judge Painter’s position that we should refrain from attempting to 

remedy alleged civil wrongs in the criminal context. 

In several opinions written when he was a judge for the Hamilton County 

Municipal court, Judge Painter observed that too often civil wrongs are 

inappropriately placed into the context of criminal wrongdoing. In one case 

where the defendant was accused of theft for failing to make timely payments or 

return some furniture, the trial court wrote: 

From a public policy standpoint, allowing a criminal conviction in this type of 

case would, simply stated, be ridiculous. The prosecuting witnesses and their 

employer ***, have myriad rights and remedies in a court exercising civil 

jurisdiction. 

State v. Glenn, 56 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 3 (1990). Noting a disturbing tendency to 

bring criminal charges in cases more properly decided in a civil court, Judge 

Painter stated that “[g]reat care should be taken that the criminal law not be 

employed to attempt to right an alleged civil wrong. Criminals enough we have.” 

State v. Howell, 64 Ohio Misc.2d 23, 29 (1994). 

State v. Gordon, 3d Dist. Putnam Nos. 12-10-04, 12-10-05, 2011-Ohio-5738, ¶ 59. 

{¶18} For these reasons, I would reverse and remand. 

APPEARANCES: 

KRISTEN KOWALSKI, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.