Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 1 of 22

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Patrick J. Smith

Bedford, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joe Paul Hambel,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 15, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-686

Appeal from the Washington 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Larry W. Medlock, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

88C01-1608-MR-400

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 2 of 22

Statement of the Case

[1] Joe Paul Hambel appeals his convictions for two counts of murder, felonies, 

and one count of criminal trespass, as a Class A misdemeanor, following a jury 

trial. Hambel presents the following consolidated issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied his motion for mistrial based on alleged juror 

misconduct.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.1

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 19, 2016, Hambel approached an officer with the Salem Police 

Department, Ronald Mays, to discuss Hambel’s “concern with drugs” in 

Washington County, including drug activity at a home where a woman named 

Valerie Dicus lived. Tr. Vol. 2 at 168. Hambel told Officer Mays that he 

wanted to become an informant, and he asked Officer Mays “how [Hambel] 

could help get the drugs out of Washington County.” Id. Officer Mays told 

Hambel to contact Salem Police Officer Eric Mills. 

 

1

 We held oral argument in this case on February 26, 2019, at Pike Central High School in Petersburg, 

Indiana. We thank counsel for their excellent advocacy and extend our appreciation to the faculty, staff, and 

students of Pike Central High School for their hospitality.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 3 of 22

[4] Later that evening, Hambel was out with his neighbor R.J. Sease, and they 

stopped at a Circle K gas station. Officer Mills was there to investigate a motor 

vehicle collision at the station. Hambel approached Officer Mills, identified 

himself, told Officer Mills that he wanted to help “clean up the drug problem in 

the town,” and identified Dicus as “one of the drug dealers that he was wanting 

to help with.” Id. at 185. Officer Mills told Hambel that he would call him so 

that the two could sit down and discuss the matter another time.

[5] After Hambel and Sease left the gas station, they went back to Hambel’s 

apartment. There, Hambel took Sease to a bedroom and showed him a gun, 

which Hambel put into a holster “around his ankle.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 6. Sease also 

saw that Hambel had a gun “on his hip.” Id. at 7. Sease then left the apartment 

with his girlfriend to run an errand.

[6] Sease returned to Hambel’s apartment a while later, and, at approximately 

midnight, the two left in Hambel’s car, which Hambel wanted to sell to Sease. 

Hambel drove the car back to the Circle K and bought cigarettes. After that, 

Hambel drove to a house on Small Street. Hambel parked his car on the street, 

turned the headlights off, and got out of the car. Sease stayed in the car. After 

a few minutes had passed, Sease heard gunshots, and then Hambel ran back to 

the car and got in the driver’s seat. Hambel had a gun in his hand, and he told 

Sease that “he had took [sic] care of one of Washington County’s biggest drug 

problems.” Id. at 17. And Hambel told Sease that he had just “shot her in the 

head” and “shot him.” Id. Hambel then drove back to his apartment. Before 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 4 of 22

he pulled the car into the parking lot, he told Sease, “[I]f you tell anyone, I’ve 

got a bigger [gun] I’m going to use on you.” Id. at 18.

[7] Logan Shelton, Dicus’ half-brother, had been sleeping in his bedroom at his 

family’s house on Small Street when, after midnight on August 20, he was 

awakened by gunshots. Logan went to the living room to investigate and found 

Dicus’ boyfriend, Joe Hobson, on the floor bleeding and “struggling to 

breathe.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 149. Logan’s brother Seth was there, and they decided 

that they should call 9-1-1. When Logan went for the phone, he saw Dicus

motionless on the couch, and he saw “a little pile of blood.” Id. at 150. Logan 

then called 9-1-1. Dicus and Hobson were subsequently declared dead as a 

result of gunshot wounds.

[8] In the early morning hours of August 20, Indiana State Police Detective David 

Mitchell began investigating the murders, and he quickly learned from Officer 

Mays about Hambel’s interest in Dicus’ drug-dealing activity. Accordingly, 

Detective Mitchell found Hambel at his apartment, told him that he would like 

to discuss the murders, and transported Hambel to the Washington County 

Sheriff’s Department, where Hambel agreed to give a recorded statement. 

Hambel initially denied having been at Dicus’ house. But he later admitted that 

he had gone to her house the night of August 19 and “looked in windows.” Tr. 

Vol. 3 at 84. At the conclusion of the interview, Hambel gave Detective 

Mitchell consent to search his apartment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 5 of 22

[9] Hambel accompanied Detective Mitchell to Hambel’s apartment, and Hambel 

told Detective Mitchell that he could find his 9-mm handgun under the driver’s 

seat of his car. Detective Mitchell secured that handgun. Inside Hambel’s 

apartment, Detective Mitchell found a .32-caliber handgun in an ankle holster 

on top of a cabinet in the bathroom. Detective Mitchell remembered that there 

were “several .32 caliber shell casings at the scene” of the murders. Id. at 181. 

Detective Mitchell then transported Hambel back to the Sheriff’s Department 

for a second interview. In that interview, Hambel admitted that he had shot 

Dicus and Hobson in “self defense.” Id. at 187. He claimed that he had gone 

into the house “to scare the s*** out of” Dicus and Hobson and, following a 

scuffle between Hambel and Hobson for Hambel’s gun, the gun went off. Id. at 

225.

[10] The State charged Hambel with two counts of murder; two counts of felony 

murder; and burglary, as a Level 5 felony. The State subsequently dismissed 

the burglary count and added a count of criminal trespass, as a Class A 

misdemeanor. During the voir dire portion of the ensuing jury trial, a potential 

juror ultimately seated as Juror 2 engaged in the following colloquy about his 

familiarity with Hambel and the murders:

Juror 2: My wife graduated High School with [Hambel].

State: Okay and not you, but your wife?

Juror 2: Yeah.

State: Do you know . . . him then?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 6 of 22

Juror 2: Ah, just through her.

State: Through her, does she, was she a friend . . .

Juror 2: Yeah.

State: . . . close friend?

Juror 2: Yeah, pretty close friends with her.

State: Have you talked with her about this situation then?

Juror 2: Not a lot, no.

State: Okay, have you talked to her about what kind of 

person he may be?

Juror 2: Yeah.

State: Have you, I don’t want you to tell me . . . have you 

developed any kind of opinions or beliefs about him 

or the case, based on that conversation?

Juror 2: Yeah, a little.

State: Okay. . . . Do you feel like this may not be the right 

case for you, given what you know?

Juror 2: Yeah, probably.

Voir Dire Tr. at 7. The State then moved to strike Juror 2 for cause. Defense 

counsel asked Juror 2 several questions about his wife’s relationship with 

Hambel, and defense counsel argued that Juror 2 could be impartial. The trial 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 7 of 22

court agreed and denied the State’s motion to strike Juror 2 for cause. Juror 2 

was ultimately seated on the jury.

[11] On the morning of the sixth day of the jury trial, the court announced that two 

jurors had notified the bailiff that “one juror may have had extra judicial 

conduct with a family member . . . .” Tr. Vol. 4 at 64. The juror in question 

was Juror 2. Accordingly, the court conducted interviews with several jurors to 

assess the situation. The first juror the court interviewed stated that he had not 

heard Juror 2 make any improper comments. The second juror the court 

interviewed stated as follows:

Juror: One item is, he comes in to the jury room and 

continues talking about his wife making comments 

about the defendant. Somewhat, to my assumption, 

of course, I am making an assumption that he’s speaking 

with this about [sic] his wife.

Defense: And without telling us what was said, is he saying 

this to the entire group? Are all of the jurors. . .

Juror: I don’t think that all of the jurors are hearing it, no. 

I mean obviously, that’s why, there was [sic] a few 

[of] us that . . .

Defense: Right. Were matters being discussed without all of 

the jurors present?

Juror: No.

Defense: How would he then have a discussion where only 

part of the group was here and the entire group was 

not here?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 8 of 22

Juror: When we go to the jury room everybody talks 

about, not necessarily things about the case, but just 

their general conversations about their day or where 

they are going and things like that.

Defense: Right. Has [Juror 2] related out loud where you 

could hear him say that his wife has formed an 

opinion and provided that opinion to him?

Juror: Yes.

Defense: And has he carried that opinion into the jury room? 

Juror: I have, no, no. Has not, no. [sic]

Defense: When, where and how was he making these 

expressions to jurors?

Juror: The jurors that sit in that area, the only thing I recall 

him saying is talking about his wife and her opinion 

of what’s going on. And that’s it.

Defense: Okay. And does he, is that your impression or 

understanding that based upon what he’s saying is

that he’s discussing what he’s hearing in court with 

her?

Juror: That, that’s an assumption that, that I’m making.

Defense: And, and that’s a fair statement. But, that’s your 

impression, is that. . .

Juror: That’s my impression.

Defense: . . . that him [sic] and his wife are having a 

discussion about the case?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 9 of 22

Juror: That’s my impression, yes.

Defense: And he is quoting his wife as to how and why she’s 

expressing herself to him?

Juror: Not really giving a reason, no, no. I assume that it’s 

something from the past.

Defense: Okay. Is he saying that his wife is telling him that 

she’s receiving communications from family 

members?

Juror: No, no, no, nothing in regards to that. Just 

basically making a generalized comment about how 

his wife feels.

Defense: And I assume then that his wife has a firm 

impression of. . .

Juror: I can’t speak for someone else.

Defense: Okay. [Juror 2] is expressing, in his words, that she 

has a firm impression on these matters?

Juror: I wouldn’t say firm impression. I mean, I don’t 

know either one of them so I mean that he’s making 

a statement about how she feels that’s all I can tell 

you.

Defense: Okay. How many times has he made statements in 

that regard?

Juror: I would say at least three or four times.

Defense: Besides yourself, who are you aware of that may 

have heard these comments on the jury?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 10 of 22

Juror: [Two other jurors], I believe. Um, [one other juror]

and I believe [one other juror] has heard. I believe, 

like I said. I am definite of the first three, not sure 

about the fourth.

Defense: From your observations of [Juror 2], does he appear 

to have his mind made up?

Juror: I’m not Nostradamus, I can’t predict how he has his 

mind.

Defense: Has he expressed any statement to you that would 

lead you to believe he has his mind made up?

Juror: I guess it depends how big of a stick his wife wields. 

I couldn’t tell you that, I mean, you know you’re 

asking me questions that I can’t, I’m making 

assumptions and I’ve probably, maybe assumed too 

much already.

* * *

State: Do you have a, is he saying, my wife thinks he’s 

guilty or my wife thinks he’s not guilty?

Juror: Not those words, no.

State: So what words?

Juror: She has basically said that Mr. Hambel, this is not 

Mr. Hambel.

State: It’s not the guy she knew.

Juror: Yes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 11 of 22

State: Okay, okay. So what he basically said is my wife 

knows, my wife says she knows him but it’s based 

on something she knew years, years ago of him.

Juror: From my understanding, they, he, he made, I 

remember him when he was, during jury selection, 

he stated that . . . the defendant came to his house 

two years ago, or something like that.

Id. at 73-78 (emphases added). After questioning two additional jurors, the 

court engaged Juror 2 in the following colloquy:

Defense: There has been some concern expressed through the 

bailiff to the Court and to the attorneys that you 

may be either having people attempt to approach 

you to discuss the merits of the case with you or 

receiving information other than the evidence that 

has been introduced to the Court. Have you 

discussed the matters for which you’re serving as a 

juror with anyone besides either the Court, the 

bailiff or other jurors?

Juror 2: Mmmm, no, I mean coworkers at Wal-Mart come 

up to me and try to talk to me but I pretty much 

hush it up pretty quickly.

Defense: Have you discussed this matter with your wife?

Juror 2: Mmmm, no.

Defense: Has your wife attempted to discuss this matter with 

you?

Juror 2: No, not really.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 12 of 22

Defense: Okay. If we were receiving information that 

suggested you were quoting her to other jurors and 

that she had expressed an opinion and you carried 

the opinion into these informal discussions, would 

that be true?

Juror 2: No.

Defense: Okay. Any idea why someone else would suggest 

that you’re bringing up outside conversations in the 

course of your informal discussions in the jury 

room?

Juror 2: No, well my wife went to school with him so that 

would be one. I have brought up conversations that 

she’s had with him in school.

Defense: Okay. Would that be during times when you were 

guys were back in the jury room waiting to come 

back into Court?

Juror 2: Yeah.

Defense: Okay. Has anyone approached your wife in an 

attempt to communicate with you?

Juror 2: Not that I know of, no.

Defense: Have you carried into those informal discussions 

her thoughts or her recollections or opinions about 

Mr. Hambel?

Juror 2: Yeah.

Defense: Tell the Court what those thoughts or recollections 

may have been.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 13 of 22

Juror 2: Uh, just her opinion of him when they were in 

school, their friendship, their conversations and 

that’s pretty much it.

Defense: Were they friends by your understanding when they 

were in school together?

Juror 2: Yeah.

Defense: And you talked about that in jury selection I 

believe, is that right?

Juror 2: Yes.

Id. at 88-90.

[12] At that point, Hambel moved for a mistrial “based upon what [he] believe[d]

[we]re inappropriate communications that a juror had with a non-witness, in 

direct violation of the admonitions provided by the Court to the jury.” Id. at 92. 

Hambel also moved for a mistrial “based upon the disclosures, most notably 

from [one particular juror, that] the deliberations ha[d] already commenced.” 

Id. After hearing argument, the trial court took the matter under advisement 

and, after a recess, the court interviewed the remaining jurors. The court 

admonished each of the jurors not to discuss the interviews with the other 

jurors. At the conclusion of those interviews, the court denied Hambel’s 

motion for a mistrial. And, without objection from Hambel, the court removed 

Juror 2 from the jury.

[13] The jury found Hambel guilty as charged on all five counts. The court entered 

judgment of conviction on three counts: two counts of murder, felonies; and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 14 of 22

one count of criminal trespass, as a Class A misdemeanor. The court then 

sentenced Hambel to an aggregate term of 121 years. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Mistrial Motion

[14] Hambel challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. A trial 

court is in the best position to evaluate whether a mistrial is warranted because 

it can assess first-hand all relevant facts and circumstances and their impact on 

the jury. Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. 2014). We therefore review 

the denial of a motion for mistrial only for abuse of discretion. Id.

[15] Hambel contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion for a mistrial because: (1) the court did not apply a presumption of 

prejudice when it came to light that Juror 2 “was bringing outside information 

into the jury room”; (2) in the alternative, the court erred when it concluded 

that Juror 2 did not commit gross misconduct that probably harmed Hambel; 

and (3) the court erred when it concluded that the jury had not begun 

deliberating prior to the conclusion of the parties’ submission of evidence. 

Appellant’s Br. at 22. We address only Hambel’s first and third contentions, 

which are dispositive of this issue.

2

 

2

 We need not address Hambel’s contention in the alternative that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it concluded that Juror 2 did not commit gross misconduct that probably harmed Hambel. As we explain 

below, the trial court did not make such a conclusion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 15 of 22

Rebuttable Presumption

[16] In Ramirez, our Supreme Court addressed confusion among our courts 

regarding the presumption of prejudice in cases with alleged tainting of the jury. 

The Court held as follows:

Defendants seeking a mistrial [in such cases] are entitled to the 

presumption of prejudice only after making two showings, by a 

preponderance of the evidence: (1) extra-judicial contact or 

communications between jurors and unauthorized persons 

occurred, and (2) the contact or communications pertained to the 

matter before the jury. Currin[ v. State], 497 N.E.2d [1045,] 1046

[(Ind. 1986)]. The burden then shifts to the State to rebut this 

presumption of prejudice by showing that any contact or 

communications were harmless. See Myers v. State, 240 Ind. 641, 

646, 168 N.E.2d 220, 223 (1960); Oldham v. State, 249 Ind. 301, 

305, 231 N.E.2d 791, 793 (1967). If the State does not rebut the 

presumption, the trial court must grant a new trial. On the other 

hand, if a defendant fails to make the initial two-part showing, 

the presumption does not apply. Instead, the trial court must 

apply the probable harm standard for juror misconduct, granting 

a new trial only if the misconduct is “gross and probably 

harmed” the defendant. Henri v. Curto, 908 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ind.

2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). But in egregious cases 

where juror conduct fundamentally compromises the appearance 

of juror neutrality, trial courts should skip Currin’s two-part 

inquiry, find irrebuttable prejudice, and immediately declare a 

mistrial. May[ v. State], 716 N.E.2d [419,] 422-23 [(Ind. 1999)]; 

Kelley[ v. State], 555 N.E.2d [140,] 142 [(Ind. 1990)]; Woods[ v. 

State], 233 Ind. [320,] 323-24, 119 N.E.2d [558,] 560-61 [(Ind. 

1954)]. At all times, trial courts have discretion to decide 

whether a defendant has satisfied the initial two-part showing 

necessary to obtain the presumption of prejudice or a finding of 

irrebuttable prejudice. See May, 716 N.E.2d at 421-22.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 16 of 22

Id. at 939.

[17] Here, in response to Hambel’s motion for a mistrial, and after questioning a few 

jurors, including Juror 2, about the extra-judicial contact, the trial court stated 

as follows:

Well, my . . . analysis is as would be required by Ramirez, that 

two prong test: proof by a preponderance of the evidence that 

extra judicial information or communications occurred. It seems 

obvious that [Juror 2] has at least communicated some 

information or opinion about Mr. Hambel to perhaps, limited 

members, perhaps all members, but many of them appear to have 

not paid any attention or didn’t hear him. And that the 

communications occurred and that pertained to a matter pending 

before the jury. That . . . portion is not obvious to the court. 

Even if Ramirez would indicate that the State does not rebut, but

[sic] the presumption, [the] trial court must grant a new trial and 

on the other hand if the defendant fails to make an initial two 

part showing the presumption does not apply, instead the trial 

court must apply a probable harm standard for juror misconduct 

granting a new trial only if the misconduct is gross and probably 

harmed the defendant. My analysis is that the communication 

did not harm the defendant, in fact, it appeared from the court’s 

perception that it may have been trying to help the defendant. So 

I find that the communications w[ere] harmless. Now, I think that it 

also appears appropriate that, therefore your motion to, for 

mistrial is denied. . . .

Tr. Vol. 4 at 125 (emphasis added).

[18] On appeal, Hambel first notes that “[t]he trial court’s ruling is hardly a model of 

clarity” and interprets it to mean that the court did not apply the rebuttable 

presumption under Ramirez. Appellant’s Br. at 24. We agree that, at first 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 17 of 22

glance, it is unclear whether the court applied the presumption here. On the 

one hand, the trial court found that it was “obvious” that the first prong under 

Ramirez was satisfied, and the court then stated that whether the second prong 

had been satisfied was “not obvious.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 125. However, the court 

concluded that Juror 2’s extra-judicial “communications w[ere] harmless,” 

which is a direct reference to the State’s burden under Ramirez to rebut the 

presumption.3 Id. Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling, when read as a whole, 

demonstrates that the court properly applied the rebuttable presumption under 

Ramirez, and we reject Hambel’s contention that the court erred on this issue.

[19] Further, the evidence is overwhelming that Juror 2’s communications to some 

of the jurors were harmless. Hambel asserts that he was prejudiced by Juror 2’s 

remarks because another juror described Juror 2 as “trying to throw [the jurors] 

in another direction” while discussing the case. Tr. Vol. 4 at 79. But it is 

undisputed that Juror 2 communicated only information that was favorable to 

Hambel. Thus, there is no evidence that Hambel was harmed by the substance 

of Juror 2’s remarks.4 Hambel concedes that only two or three jurors had even 

heard Juror 2 remark on his wife’s opinions of Hambel. And, after Juror 2 was 

 

3

 Hambel asserts that the trial court applied the probable harm standard, but the court only mentioned the 

probable harm standard in explaining the test under Ramirez.

4

 To the extent Hambel contends that he was harmed by the trial court’s removal of Juror 2 from the jury

because Juror 2 had a favorable opinion of Hambel, Hambel did not object to his removal and cannot now 

complain.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 18 of 22

removed from the jury and replaced, the trial court admonished the jurors as 

follows:

I want to remind the jury of the preliminary instructions that the 

court had previously provided to the jury. As I admonish you, 

each and every time that you leave, you are not to have any 

discussions with anyone other than yourselves and only while

you’re together in the jury room. Only consider that evidence 

which comes before you in this court room and was admitted by 

the Court.

Tr. Vol. 4 at 129. There is no evidence that Juror 2’s remarks impacted the 

jurors’ ability to remain impartial. In any event, assuming any prejudice to 

Hambel, we presume that the court’s admonishment cured it. Jones v. State, 101 

N.E.3d 249, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it concluded that Juror 2’s remarks to a few jurors were 

harmless and denied Hambel’s motion for mistrial on that basis. See, e.g., 

Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 16 (Ind. 2015) (holding trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it denied mistrial motion where, after extrajudicial 

communication to jurors was exposed, court questioned each juror, 

admonished the jurors, and dismissed the offending juror).

Deliberations

[20] Hambel next contends that the jurors engaged in deliberations “prior to the 

conclusion of the evidence in the case.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. In support of 

that contention, Hambel directs this court to a juror’s statement that Juror 2 

“was thwarting the jury’s deliberations.” Id. In particular, when asked about 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 19 of 22

Juror 2’s inappropriate remarks about Hambel, one juror said: “[W]e’d be 

sitting there, deliberating and [Juror 2 would] come off with something to try to 

get us in another direction.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 80. When defense counsel asked that 

juror to clarify what he had meant by “deliberating,” the juror agreed that they 

were “discussing the evidence that had been presented during the most recent 

session in court.” Id.

[21] Indiana Jury Rule 20(a)(8) provides in relevant part that jurors “are permitted 

to discuss the evidence among themselves in the jury room during recesses from 

trial when all are present, as long as they reserve judgment about the outcome 

of the case until deliberations commence.” With the promulgation of that rule, 

our Supreme Court “has unambiguously made a distinction between 

discussions and deliberations.” Weatherspoon v. State, 912 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

[22] The State maintains that there is no evidence that the jurors began deliberations 

before all of the evidence had been submitted. Indeed, each of the jurors 

questioned about whether deliberations had begun when the court removed 

Juror 2 responded that there had only been discussions, but no judgments about 

the ultimate outcome. We agree with the State and hold that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion when it denied Hambel’s motion for mistrial on this 

basis.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 20 of 22

Issue Two: Sentence

[23] Hambel contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he 

Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of 

the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This court 

has held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has 

selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 

71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has 

explained that: 

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to 

leaven the outliers . . . but not achieve a perceived “correct” 

result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the 

sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. 

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), 

decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original). 

[24] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate 

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should 

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we 

regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of 

the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 21 of 22

The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather 

whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 

268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless 

overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the 

offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the 

defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples 

of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[25] With respect to the nature of the offenses, Hambel asserts that, while there were 

“young persons in the residence” at the time of the murders, “there is no 

evidence that the young persons did see the offenses, and little evidence that 

Hambel thought they would see the offenses.” Appellant’s Br. at 38. And 

Hambel points out that “it should be considered that the events of August 20

were set into motion by Hambel’s serious concerns about drug use and dealing 

in Washington County.” Id. With respect to his character, Hambel maintains 

that: he has no criminal history; despite his PTSD, anxiety, and depression, he 

has maintained steady employment; and he has two children. Hambel 

characterizes his character as “excellent.” Id. at 39.

[26] However, as the State points out, the nature of the offenses supports the 121-

year sentence in that Hambel: planned the murders; shot Dicus in the head 

from close range; shot Hobson six times; and threatened to kill Sease if he told 

anyone about the murders. As for his character, Hambel may have been 

motivated to commit these murders by his concern about the drug problem in 

Washington County and his interest in helping law enforcement. But when he 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 22 of 22

became a vigilante and took the law into his own hands, he displayed a blatant 

disrespect for the law, which reflects poorly on his character. We cannot say 

that Hambel’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and 

his character.

[27] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.