UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7995

ROBBIE SHERRON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

BUTCH JACKSON; MARY A. WILLINGHAM; F. HANS, Nurse; LINDA 

PADGETT; DONALD V. MICLOS; MICHAEL BELL, 

 Defendants – Appellees, 

 and 

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; CURTIS CLIFFORD, 

Dr.; DAVID M. HINDS; NURSE HAWNS, 

 Defendants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

District Judge. (5:06-ct-03089-D) 

Submitted: March 31, 2009 Decided: April 23, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Robbie Sherron, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth F. Parsons, 

Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

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PER CURIAM: 

Robbie Sherron seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order granting partial summary judgment for Defendants and 

denying Sherron’s motion to compel discovery, motion for a 

hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f), motions for 

preliminary injunctions, and motions for temporary restraining 

orders. Sherron also seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

denying his motion for appointment of counsel. This court may 

exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

(2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 

U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial 

Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). With the exception of 

the portion of the order denying Sherron’s motions for 

preliminary injunctions, the orders Sherron seeks to appeal are 

neither final orders nor appealable interlocutory or collateral 

orders. 

The order denying a preliminary injunction is, 

however, an appealable interlocutory order. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(a)(1). However, Sherron failed to file a timely notice 

of appeal of this order. Parties in a civil case in which the 

United States is not a party have thirty days following entry of 

a final order in which to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(a)(1)(a). Upon a finding of excusable neglect or good 

cause the district court may extend this period up to thirty 

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days beyond the original appeal period, or reopen the appeal 

period upon a party’s motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), (6). 

These time periods are mandatory and jurisdictional. Bowles v. 

Russell, 557 U.S. 205, ___, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (2007); 

Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978). 

The order denying Sherron’s motions for preliminary 

injunctions was entered on August 4, 2008, and Sherron did not 

file his notice of appeal until, at the earliest, September 6, 

2008, three days beyond the expiration of the thirty-day appeal 

period.* Therefore, Sherron’s notice of appeal was untimely. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED

 * See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).