*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 2, 2005*

Decided June 6, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-3758

MARC NORFLEET,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DANIEL DRINGOLI,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Wisconsin

No. 03-C-378

William C. Griesbach, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Marc Norfleet, an Illinois pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, appeals the

grant of summary judgment in favor of Neenah, Wisconsin police detective Daniel

Dringoli in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging constitutional violations during

his arrest and subsequent prosecution. We affirm.

The civil litigation is premised on events surrounding Norfleet’s arrest and

prosecution for the charge of distributing cocaine within 1000 feet of a school in

violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)(4), 961.49. Detective Dringoli arrested

Norfleet after a tip from a confidential source led to the discovery of a cellophane

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-3758 Page 2

bag containing small plastic baggies of cocaine. The plastic baggies contained

Norfleet’s fingerprints and those of a second unidentified person. The existence of

the unidentified set of fingerprints was not disclosed to Norfleet until five days

before his state criminal trial. Because the prosecutor refused to reveal the identity

of the confidential source, the court dismissed the charge with prejudice. 

Norfleet subsequently sued Detective Dringoli under § 1983, alleging

violations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based on his arrest and

the alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence (the second set of fingerprints). 

The district court screened Norfleet’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and

construed the allegations to state a claim of false arrest or arrest with excessive

force under the Fourth Amendment. After further proceedings, the district court

granted Dringoli’s motion for summary judgment. The court noted initially that it

could have granted summary judgment for Dringoli based on Norfleet’s failure to

submit any supporting affidavits or documents but proceeded to address the merits

of his claim. The court then concluded that Norfleet was challenging his arrest and

not any condition of detention or imprisonment, and so it dismissed the claims that

Norfleet argued arose under the Eighth Amendment (or the Fourteenth

Amendment for a pre-trial detainee). Further, the court explained that qualified

immunity shielded Dringoli from liability because he arrested Norfleet pursuant to

a facially valid arrest warrant, and because Norfleet could not show that Dringoli’s

conduct violated any clearly established right of which a reasonable officer would be

aware. And even if Dringoli were not entitled to qualified immunity, the court

found that there was no factual evidence to support a violation of due process. 

From what we can discern, Norfleet appears to argue on appeal that the

district court’s § 1915A order misled him into thinking that he could proceed only

on a Fourth Amendment legal theory, when he had intended instead to press claims

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that the court construed

Norfleet’s complaint as stating a claim of false arrest or arrest with excessive force

under the Fourth Amendment, but in the subsequent proceeding the court

permitted Norfleet to continue to pursue arguments under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments, and the court in fact entertained those arguments. 

Norfleet has not identified how he believes he has been harmed by the court’s

handling of these claims. 

Norfleet also asserts without elaboration that the district court’s grant of

summary judgment overlooked several of his due process claims. According to

Norfleet the district court failed to address his claim that Dringoli withheld the

allegedly exculpatory evidence of the second set of fingerprints, “prosecuted” him

despite knowing that another person’s fingerprints were on the bag, and held him

unlawfully in jail for five days on the drug trafficking charge. The district court

properly rejected these claims on their merits, however, and Norfleet has given us
No. 04-3758 Page 3

no basis to disrupt the court’s rulings. See e.g., Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d

544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001) (litigant must present understandable argument for

disturbing the district court’s judgment). 

Finally, Norfleet contests the district court’s determination that his case was

not sufficiently complex or meritorious to warrant the appointment of counsel. But

there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases, see Forbes v. Edgar, 112

F.3d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1997); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322-23 (7th Cir. 1993),

and Norfleet has given us no reason to conclude that the district court abused its

discretion when it determined that his claims were not so complicated as to require

the assistance of counsel. See Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288-89 & n.2 (7th Cir.

1995).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.