Art of War Papers

Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the 

Philippines

A Case Study of Limited Intervention 

Counterinsurgency

Andrew E. Lembke, Major, US Army

 

 Combat Studies Institute Press

 US Army Combined Arms Center

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
Lansdale, Magsaysay, America, and the Philippines

A Case Study of Limited Intervention Counterinsurgency

Andrew E. Lembke, Major, US Army

B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 

2001

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2012-02
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lembke, Andrew E.

 Lansdale, Magsaysay, America and the Philippines: A Case Study of 

Limited Intervention Counterinsurgency / Andrew E. Lembke, Major, US 

Army, B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point.

 ISBN 978-0-9885837-6-4

1. Philippines--History--1946-1986. 2. Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan 

(Philippines) 3. Counterinsurgency--Philippines--History--20th century. 

4. United States--Military relations--Philippines. 5. Philippines--Military 

relations--United States. 6. Lansdale, Edward Geary, 1908-1987. 7. 

Magsaysay, Ramon, 1907-1957. I. Title. 

 DS686.5.L37 2013

 959.904--dc23

 2013 008604

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover 

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The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as 

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seal on any republication without the express written permission of the 

Director of CSI.

Editor

Carl W. Fischer

2013
iii

Abstract

Historians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay’s leadership and his 

relationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important features 

of the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks from 1946-

1954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of their relationship 

deserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks to further illuminate 

Magsaysay and Lansdale’s relationship by focusing on the role of empathy 

and sociocultural understanding, in defeating the Huks and restoring the 

Philippine government’s legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time, 

bolstered regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcing 

poor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy. This 

energized the Huk movement until they were on the verge of toppling 

the government. A change in US policy coincided with the emergence of 

Magsaysay and Lansdale. They reversed Huk momentum, rejuvenated 

the demoralized and oppressive armed forces, and restored the Philippine 

government’s legitimacy, all in less than four years. Their shared, genuine 

empathy for the Filipino people fostered deep sociocultural understanding. 

Their combined capabilities and resources then translated empathy and 

sociocultural understanding into concrete measures to combat the Huks 

and rebuild popular support for the government.

v

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank first and foremost my wife Lachlyn for her support 

and encouragement throughout this process, despite our geographic 

separation. She has, without fail, pushed me to complete my work based 

on her own notable academic accomplishments. She has truly been one of 

my most important guides.

The support of my thesis committee, consisting of Dr. D. Scott 

Stephenson, Dr. Joseph Fischer, and Dr. Nicholas Murray, was absolutely 

essential to the successful completion of my thesis. Their feedback and 

insights have proven invaluable throughout the course of this endeavor, 

and without their support I have no doubt that my work would have fallen 

short of the mark.

During my research in the Philippines I received the utmost support 

of the US Embassy team in Manila. Ambassador Harry K. Thomas and his 

staff, headed by Executive Secretary Ms. Eloisa Williard, were instrumental 

in arranging a number of my interviews with Filipino notables. Within the 

embassy team I would also like to specifically thank Mr. Ramon Taruc for 

coordinating my interview with his distant relative, Dr. Romeo Taruc.

In addition to the support of the US Embassy team I would like 

to acknowledge the assistance of another group that was extremely 

supportive of my efforts in the Philippines. The West Point Association 

of Graduates of Manila, specifically Ms. Grace Jarque and Captain Mark 

Posadas (Philippine Army, West Point Class of 2004), proved invaluable 

in facilitating my research. I would also like to acknowledge Mr. Jim Cisek 

(US Embassy Manila, West Point Class of 1974) for introducing me to this 

wonderful community.

I am eternally grateful to Dr. Daniel Marston. If it were not for his 

advocacy I would not have had this opportunity. I would also like to thank 

him for his editorial advice and assistance. Other academics I would like 

to acknowledge are Dr. Douglas Macdonald and Colonel (ret.) Joseph 

Felter. Dr. Macdonald, currently a Visiting Research Professor of National 

Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, was kind enough 

to review my early thesis ideas and help me focus them on the topic I 

finally settled on. Colonel (ret.) Felter, currently a Research Fellow at the 

Hoover Institution at Stanford University, provided invaluable assistance 

in facilitating my research at the Hoover Institution Archives, as well as 

my research in the Philippines.
vi

I would be remiss in not thanking the subjects of my research in the 

Philippines. I am truly indebted to former President Fidel V. Ramos, 

former senator Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., Mr. Alfredo Lim, mayor of Manila, 

Dr. Romeo Taruc, Municipal Councilor of Angeles City, Pampanga, Mr. 

Frisco San Juan, president of the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, and Father 

Jack Schumacher, retired Jesuit priest, historian, and professor at Ateneo 

University, Manila. Interviews with these men not only shed light on the 

character and personality of the subjects of my research, but also provided 

invaluable context for the rest of my writing and research.

I would also like the staffs of the Hoover Institution Archives, the 

Truman Library, and the Combined Arms Research Library. Their 

professionalism, dedication, and inherent knowledge after decades of 

service to their organizations, made them indispensable assets during my 

limited duration visits. Without their assistance I would not have been able 

to achieve the breadth of research I finally achieved.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge and thank my fellow Art of War 

scholars, Will Harris, Lou Ruscetta, and Stephen Campbell. The intellectual 

rigor they subjected me to on a daily basis constantly challenged me to 

improve. They were both a source of inspiration and frustration, and were 

essential to the development of my argument.
vii

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction........................................................................ 1

Chapter 2 Context of a Crisis............................................................11

Chapter 3 New Beginnings............................................................... 35

Chapter 4 New Threats..................................................................... 67

Chapter 5 Conclusion ..................................................................... 101

Appendix A Map of Primary Huk Influence ...................................115

Appendix B Subject Biographical Timelines..................................117

Appendix C Interviewee Biographical Data ...................................119

Bibliography................................................................................... 121

ix

Acronyms

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AMT Aguman ding Malding Talapagobra (General 

Workers Party)

BCT Battalion Combat Team

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIC Counterintelligence Corps

EDCOR Economic Development Corps

HMB Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People’s 

Liberation Army)

JUSMAG Joint United States Military Advisory Group

KPMP Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa 

Pilipinas (National Society of Peasants in the 

Philippines)

MPC Military Police Command

NAMFREL National Movement for Free Elections

OPC Office of Policy Coordination

OSS Office of Strategic Services

PC Philippine Constabulary

PCAC Presidential Complaints and Action Commission

PHILRYCOM Philippines Ryukus Command

PKP Partido Komunistang Pilipina (Philippine 

Communist Party)

USAFFE United States Armed Forces Far East

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Huk campaign was a classic example of counterinsurgency, 

with lessons all too often overlooked or misunderstood by those 

who face the problems of insurgency in other countries of the 

world.

— Major General Edward Lansdale, personal correspondence 

with Lavinia Hanson (Valeriano), 5 March 1984.1

American interest in counterinsurgency seems to emerge only when 

confronted by insurgency. Major General Lansdale’s comment in 1984 

about the lack of interest in the Huk campaign, and counterinsurgency 

in general, was likely attributable to a number of factors, among them 

America’s recent experience in Vietnam. The US military focused on the 

conventional Soviet threat rather than lessons from irregular conflicts. 

However, since 9/11 the US engaged in two conflicts that developed into 

counterinsurgencies, and the Huk campaign continued to receive scant 

attention. Whatever the reasons for previous inattention during the last 

decade, the Huk campaign bears important lessons for US military and 

civilian policy-makers.

US defense and foreign policy seems to be shying away from largescale counterinsurgency operations and nation-building.2

 Yet, if the US 

intends to defend its national interests abroad it must be prepared to 

confront the possibility of engaging in future counterinsurgency campaigns. 

Memories of Vietnam and recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq 

may bias American understanding of counterinsurgency as inherently 

large-scale, i.e. long, resource and manpower intensive, and generally 

American-led. Generalizing the characteristics of counterinsurgency in 

this way ignores both the historical context of the respective situations 

in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and other examples of successful, 

small-scale counterinsurgency campaigns. By contrast, US assistance to 

the Philippine government against the Huks, from 1946-54 provides an 

excellent case study of limited, yet successful intervention.3

The US and Philippine governments were ultimately successful in a 

counterinsurgency campaign that went poorly for the first four years. The 

initial years following World War II saw a dangerous mix of ill-informed 

US policy in the Philippines and a Philippine government beset with 

corruption and scandal. By 1950 a change in US policy acknowledged the 

gravity of the situation by tying economic and military aid to political and 

social reforms.4

 Yet this top-down approach was insufficient to address 
2

the most immediate problem. The Filipino masses had lost faith in their 

government, weakening its legitimacy. Without immediate action to reverse 

this trend the Huk movement, which was really just a symptom of this loss 

of faith, stood a very real chance of toppling the government. Essentially, 

the US approach required a complementary bottom-up approach to tie the 

people back to their government while the longer term top-down reforms 

took effect.

Such a complementary approach to national level reform efforts 

had to rebuild popular faith in and support for the government, thereby 

reestablishing its legitimacy. Developing the necessary bottom-up 

strategy required individuals cognizant of the nuances of Philippine 

politics, and capable of understanding and identifying with the Filipino 

people. Additionally, the Americans needed a strong Filipino counterpart 

capable of rallying the people just as they were nearing physical and 

moral exhaustion. Amidst this need came Edward Lansdale from the US 

government and Ramon Magsaysay from the Philippine government.

Magsaysay and Lansdale’s close contact with and understanding of 

the people’s needs, their unique backgrounds, and common character 

combined to make them an extremely powerful and effective team, despite 

their relatively junior positions at the beginning of the Huk campaign. This 

thesis will argue the collaboration between Ramon Magsaysay and Edward 

Lansdale emerged as a critical factor in the Philippine government’s 

successful campaign against the Huk movement, from 1946-54, because 

of their shared empathy for the Filipino people, deep sociocultural 

understanding, and complimentary capabilities and resources. While 

this may suggest that it is impossible to duplicate the success of the Huk 

campaign because of the unique characters involved, it may be possible 

to replicate the factors of success by finding leaders with the attributes 

demonstrated by Lansdale and Magsaysay.

The Role of Empathy

This paper will argue that genuine empathy for the Filipino masses was 

a key feature of the Lansdale-Magsaysay dynamic. In order to analyze and 

assess the implications of empathy within the context of this case study, 

and because this is not a paper on leadership theory, a working definition 

of empathy is required. Dr. Jaepil Choi, in his paper on charismatic 

leadership, identified the characteristic of empathy as:

the ability to understand another person’s motives, values, 

and emotions . . . and it involves entering the other person’s 

perspectives . . . sensitivity to followers’ needs . . . individualized 
3

attention to followers . . . encourag[ing] personal development . . . 

[and] displaying support for the efforts of followers.5

For the purpose of this paper, empathy is “the ability to experience and 

relate to the thoughts, emotions, or experience of others.”6

 Using this 

definition and the characteristics of empathy described above, it is clear 

that this trait is intensely personal; requiring a significant degree of 

understanding of and contact with subordinates, or in this case the Filipino 

populace.

Empathy, of all character traits, was a requirement for the efforts of the 

Philippine and US governments in the campaign against the Huks because 

of the nature of the conflict. Philippine society, particularly those areas 

most affected by the Huk rebellion, existed under a paternalistic system 

whereby the landlords and elites acted as the benefactors or protectors 

of their patrons and the lower classes.7

 A study conducted by the Center 

for Creative Leadership notes that “paternalism characterizes leadersubordinate relationships, where a leader will assume the role of a parent 

and feel obligated to provide support and protection to their subordinates 

under their care” and that “empathic emotion plays an important role in 

creating this paternalistic climate of support and protection.”8 The problem 

for the Philippine and US governments in the mid-1940s was that the Huk 

seemed to have a monopoly on identification with the Filipino masses.

The Philippine and US governments were combatting an enemy 

whose main propaganda messages resonated with a popular base that had 

grown further and further from the landlord and elite class, even before 

the Japanese invaded in 1941. As will be discussed in more depth in the 

next section, the divide between rich and poor had increased with time, 

and the effects of the war and Japanese occupation only exacerbated and 

accelerated the divide. The Huks offered an appealing narrative that was 

difficult for the government to counter or deny. They also had a legitimate 

record of fighting oppression during the occupation that earned the masses’ 

trust. In order to reverse the trend, the masses needed government officials 

and institutions they could trust. This trust could only be built through 

genuine empathy for the lower classes plight, and understanding of the ills 

plaguing society.

Sociocultural Understanding

Forty years of US colonial rule over the Philippines left American 

officials with an abundance of institutional knowledge of pre-war

Philippine society and culture. However, the effects of the war and 

Japanese occupation on Philippine society cannot be overemphasized. In 
4

the immediate post-war period the US and Philippine governments adopted 

policies that failed to acknowledge societal dislocation brought on by the 

war and in some cases attempted to actively counter a potentially beneficial 

status quo change.9

 Finally, both governments failed to fully grasp the 

second and third order effects of Philippine independence on society. In 

the aftermath of these failures the American and Philippine governments 

needed individuals capable of understanding post-war Philippine society 

in order to mend the rift between the government and the masses.

Unfortunately, senior US officials in Manila were either holdovers 

from the pre-war US High Commission in the Philippines, or were 

imported from elsewhere in Asia, specifically China. High Commissioner, 

and later ambassador, Paul McNutt “recruited from all the old China 

hands and all the old Philippine colonial hands.”10 While this should have 

represented continuity and institutional understanding of the Philippines, 

these individuals represented a return to pre-war Philippine society. 

Almost five years after the war, a US government report would note the 

lost opportunity to rebuild an economically independent Philippines, and 

avoid a return to the status quo ante after World War II.11

The war exposed many of the ills plaguing Philippine society and 

resulted in a significant degree of dislocation. As will be discussed in 

greater detail in the next chapter, most of the landlords and elites who 

could have represented the leadership of Central Luzon fled to the cities 

and collaborated with Japanese occupation forces. Pre-war peasant 

and labor leaders stepped into the void, raising local guerrilla groups, 

eventually coalescing into the Hukbalahap guerrillas in March 1942.12

Largely due to their origins the Huks remained autonomous from the US 

directed guerrilla groups in the Philippines, often bringing the two entities 

into conflict, and fostering a sense of American abandonment during the 

occupation.13 Without positive elite involvement in Central Luzon, and 

with little US involvement, the Huks gained increasing control over the 

region.

Societal dislocation in Central Luzon manifested itself in a potential 

change in the social status quo. Where the elites and Americans had 

provided leadership, governance, security, and social support prior to the 

war, the Huks filled those roles during the war. With liberation in 1945 the 

Huks and their peasant supporters felt a justifiable sense of entitlement. 

The Americans acknowledged the Huks as the most active and aggressive 

of the guerrilla organizations in the Philippines. 14 They were also arguably 

the most organized. The Huks believed they deserved recognition and a 

place in the post-war government. Those aspirations ran counter to both 
5

the US and Philippine government’s desire for a return to the pre-war 

status quo.15

Finally, both governments failed to realize what Philippine 

independence meant to the Huks and their peasant base. It should have 

represented empowerment, acknowledging the status quo change in 

Central Luzon induced by the occupation’s effects. Instead it reinforced 

a return to the status quo ante, and a return to power of the same men 

the Huks fought against during the occupation. Thus, for the Huks and 

their supporters, independence signaled a continuation of the struggle 

against a government that looked strikingly similar to the collaborationist 

government.16 Independence also provided the elites a mandate to destroy 

the peasant movement in Central Luzon, ensuring the perpetuation of the 

old social system.

Understanding the dynamics of post-war Philippine society was 

absolutely essential for anyone to determine proper courses of action to 

combat the Huks and rebuild popular faith in the government. It was not 

simply understanding the Huks militarily, as their base of support stemmed 

from legitimate social grievances. Developing an effective strategy 

required an understanding of the character of the Huks, the problems 

facing the people, and the deficiencies of the Philippine government.

Complementary Capabilities and Resources

The Philippine government may have represented one of the biggest 

obstacles to a successful counterinsurgency strategy. Any strategy 

that advocated a change in the status quo represented a threat to the 

Philippine elite establishment. Due to the pervasive political patronage 

system defining Philippine politics, the status quo represented stability 

and financial security to elements within business, government, and the 

military.17 Anyone advocating a strategy of change needed significant 

protection and support from the highest levels of the US government as 

well as widespread popular support from the Philippine masses in order to 

prevail over the entrenched establishment.

The bottom-up US campaign in the Philippines required unity of 

effort. The US mission in the Philippines possessed both an ambassador 

and a general officer in charge of the military assistance mission.18 Both 

individuals could potentially claim responsibility for the counterinsurgency 

strategy. Complicating matters were the parallel chains of command in 

Washington, DC in both Departments of State and Defense. In order to 

develop unity of effort, those charged with developing and implementing 

the strategy had to be capable of garnering the support, confidence, and 
6

trust of the US diplomatic and military leadership in the Philippines and 

Washington.

Support from Washington was also necessary as a transferable 

commodity to associated Filipino partners. Perceived threats to the 

establishment would inevitably result in attempts to purge the threats 

from the government. An individual understood or believed to possess 

Washington’s support had long been a powerful political tool in Manila.19

Preventing such establishment interference was essential to success. In 

addition to Washington’s support, those Filipino partners also required 

popular support, which could serve as a counterbalance to the power of 

the entrenched political and elite establishment. The establishment would 

find it particularly difficult to get rid of an extremely popular figure.20

In adopting a strategy requiring popular support, the US clearly 

needed a strong Filipino counterpart. However, this person could not be a 

puppet or merely an expedient tool. 21 The severity of the situation by 1950 

required an individual capable of both winning popular support away from 

a movement that already enjoyed widespread support, while surviving 

attacks from the entrenched, elite establishment. US support might thwart 

initial Philippine government attempts to rid itself of a “change agent,” but 

that support would be useless if their counterpart proved untrustworthy 

to the people. Therefore, the US counterpart had to be genuine and 

trustworthy, with the force of personality to overcome both the Huks and 

the entrenched establishment.

The US counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines necessitated a 

significant degree of trust. Trust on the part of officials in Washington for 

their personnel in the Philippines, and trust on the part of the masses in 

their own officials and government. The former could be given; the latter 

had to be earned, yet both required individuals worthy of that trust. Trust 

was also essential because of the international situation. Events elsewhere 

in the world caused an oscillation of US focus on the Philippines. During 

the war, US military and economic interests saw the post-war Philippines 

as the “gateway” to Asia.22 However, post-war Europe almost monopolized 

US attention until 1949, when China fell to the communists. Even when 

US attention returned to Asia, the Korean War dominated that attention.

23 Washington’s limited focus on the Philippines thus necessitated a 

significant degree of trust between US officials in Washington and Manila.

This paper will analyze the efforts of Ramon Magsaysay and Edward 

Lansdale during the Huk campaign, through mid-1954, focusing on the 

importance of their shared empathy for the Filipino people, sociocultural 
7

understanding, and complimentary capabilities and resources. 

Understanding the need for the unique characteristics found in Magsaysay 

and Lansdale necessitates understanding the origins of the conflict, and 

how and why that conflict was able to expand disproportionate to Huk 

strength. Following this contextual material is a chronological analysis of 

the situation in the Philippines in the context of Lansdale and Magsaysay’s 

characteristics. Each chapter will analyze a particular phase of the Huk 

campaign, which in itself became the backdrop of a more troubling 

struggle for the Philippine government’s legitimacy.
8

Notes

1. Lansdale to Lavinia Hanson (Valeriano), personal correspondence, 5 

March 1984, (Lansdale Papers, Box 15, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA).

2. US Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, January 2012).

3. For a general history of the Huk rebellion and the events leading to 

it, see chapters 11 and 12 of Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire 

in the Philippines (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989). For a comprehensive 

study of the Huks, their origins, and their grievances, see Benedict J. Kerkvliet, 

The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (New York: 

Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2002). Edward Lansdale’s autobiography, In the 

Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and 

Row, 1972), and biography by Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet 

American (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1998), chronicle Lansdale’s activities in 

the Philippines.

4. Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for 

Reform in the Third World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 135.

5. Jaepil Choi, “A Motivational Theory of Charismatic Leadership: 

Envisioning, Empathy, and Empowerment,” Journal of Leadership and 

Organizational Studies 13, no. 1 (2006): 27.

6. William A. Gentry, Todd J. Webber, and Golnaz Sadri, Empathy in the 

Workplace: A Tool for Effective Leadership (Greensboro: Center for Creative 

Leadership, 2010), 3.

7. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in 

the Philippines (New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 6-7.

8. Gentry, Webber, and Sadri, 6.

9. Upon liberation, the Philippine Islands reverted to its pre-war US 

commonwealth status. US High Commissioner Paul McNutt served in a caretaker role until Philippine independence on 4 July 1946. While US specialists 

and experts served as advisors to many Philippine government officials, an 

indigenous civil service existed, and Filipinos administered the provinces, 

districts, and villages. The High Commissioner’s mission seemed to represent 

a conflict of interests. While McNutt was supposed to assist the Philippine 

government in developing policies and legislation facilitating the country’s 

transition to independence, he also represented US policy interests. In such a 

position, McNutt was able to influence future Philippine domestic and economic 

policy to America’s benefit.

10. Clarence A. Boonstra, Agricultural Officer, Manila (1945-1947); 

interviewed by Donald Barnes (1989) and Allan Mustard, W. Garth Thorburn, 
9

and James E. Ross (2006), transcript, Oral History Country Reader Series, 

Philippines, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, http://adst.

org/oral-history/country-reader-series/. From here on, interviews from the 

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Country Reader Series, will 

be cited by the acronym ADST/CRS. Transcripts of all further interviews from 

ADST/CRS are consolidated at the same internet address.

11. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, Report to the President 

of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950), 12. From here on this 

source will be cited only as Economic Survey Mission.

12. Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York: International Publishers, 

1953), 65.

13. Taruc, 72-73.

14. W. T. T. Ward, 13th Air Force Historical Office, The Guerrilla 

Resistance Movement in Central Luzon, About Oct. 26 1944, as Reported to 

Allied Forces About to Invade the Philippine Islands (Edward Geary Lansdale 

Papers, Box 15, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, 

CA), 9,

15. Kerkvliet, 117.

16. Taruc, Born of the People, 230.

17. Mina Roces, “Kinship Politics in Post-War Philippines: The Lopez 

Family, 1945-1989,” Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2000), 182.

18. Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral 

Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 445.

19. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines

(New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 630. Google e-book.

20. Carlos P. Romulo, Marvin M. Gray, The Magsaysay Story (New York: 

The John Day Company, 1956), 154.

21. Buell, 446-447.

22. Karnow, 633.

23. Karnow, 633-636.

11

Chapter 2

Context of a Crisis

Men joined for complex reasons, including severe economic 

dislocation, starvation, and misery as well as greed and local 

factionalism. Old grudges and wanton violence could be hidden 

under a patriotic mantle.

— David J. Steinberg, “An Ambiguous Legacy: Years at War in the 

Philippines.”1

Suggesting that Ramon Magsaysay and Edward Lansdale were 

successful against the Huks for the reasons outlined in the previous chapter 

implies members of both the Philippine and US governments lacked those 

qualities. Taken at face value this would seem counterintuitive. Naturally, 

the Philippine government was comprised of Filipinos and one would 

think they empathized with and understood their own people. The United 

States ruled over the Philippines for four decades, and should have had 

a fairly nuanced understanding of Filipino society and culture. How is it 

possible that both governments were so ill prepared or unwilling to handle 

the task of combatting the Huk movement?

The origins of the two government’s problems in handling the Huks 

stemmed from the war and its immediate aftermath. In the case of the 

Philippine government, the problem lay in their changing society and the 

development of Philippine democracy. Though class and social divisions 

existed long before the emergence of the Huk movement, by 1946 these 

divisions had grown to a point where conflict was almost unavoidable. 

Exacerbating this division was a political system that favored the few 

while failing to represent the many.2

 The status quo may have remained 

for some time, but the outbreak of war in 1941, and the Filipino experience 

under Japanese occupation, brought the long simmering conflict to a head. 

These factors all contributed not only to a lack of true understanding of the 

nature of the problem by the Philippine government, but also discouraged 

the changes necessary to deal with the problem.

American officials responsible for Philippine policy suffered from a 

series of overlapping issues. First was misplaced trust in four decades of 

institutional knowledge of the Philippines that really only amounted to 

theoretical or superficial understanding. Regarding the Huks, the US based 

their assessment of the problem and potential solutions on the reports and 

interactions of groups that were decidedly biased against the movement. 

The Americans may have overcome these first two issues immediately 

following liberation. However, US government and military personnel 
12

lacked the type of contact with the Philippine populace necessary to develop 

deeper understanding of the problem, and even if they had the necessary 

contact, in many cases post-war US officials represented the entrenched 

local establishment. Additionally, the Philippines represented the center 

piece of US post-war decolonization policy in the region. America could 

not be seen interfering in Philippine domestic matters. Underpinning all of 

these issues, and informing all US actions in the Philippines at the time, 

was the threat of communism.

War and Occupation

The war and occupation led to the evolution of the Huk insurgency 

from a localized problem to a national crisis. First and foremost, and 

perhaps the most obvious point from this period, is the creation of the Huks 

as an organized movement with a large support base. Next, those Filipinos 

who collaborated with the Japanese, particularly the elite and land owning 

class, served as a focal point for Huk and peasant animosity and retaliation 

during the Japanese occupation, unleashing a cycle of post-war violence 

that would come close to toppling the Philippine government. Finally, 

US interaction with the Huks during the war, compounded by their close 

relationship with the elite and land owning class, colored American policy 

towards, and understanding of the Huks for the first half of the campaign.

The Huk movement was a manifestation of a wider evolutionary 

movement, and was not truly revolutionary, despite its much publicized 

communist leadership. Prior to the war, the 1930s saw three localized 

peasant uprisings originating from deplorable social conditions. The 

last of these, the Sakdal rebellion in 1935, saw six thousand peasants 

engage in widespread attacks on villages and government buildings in 

provinces south of Luzon, causing significant alarm within the Philippine 

Commonwealth government.3

 Social unrest was a common occurrence in 

the agricultural areas of Luzon and the uprisings demonstrated that the will 

for action was there, but the peasants needed organization and direction.

During the same period, the Philippine Socialist Party developed a 

strong peasant following under the leadership of men like Pedro Abad 

Santos, and Luis Taruc, appealing to the same social discord that fueled 

the uprisings.4

 The Philippine Communist Party (Partido Komunistang 

Pilipina or PKP) of the 1930s was a fairly weak organization with a small 

support base, having been outlawed by the Commonwealth government, 

and lacking a narrative that resonated with the average Filipino.5

 When 

the two parties merged in 1938, retaining the PKP title rather than the 

socialist title, communist influence increased but still remained weak.6 The 
13

communists still lacked a narrative or common threat that could garner 

sufficient popular support to achieve their objectives. The Japanese and 

collaborationist Filipinos would provide the common threat.

The Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon or People’s 

Anti-Japanese Army) was an armed resistance movement established by 

the United Front on 29 March 1942.7

 The Huk would grow to become “one 

of the largest and most powerful guerrilla organizations in central Luzon.”8

The PKP exercised varying degrees of control over the local leadership of 

the organization during the occupation – largely because so many of the 

senior Huk leaders were also leaders within the PKP – but the rank-andfile consisted of peasants with little to no communist indoctrination. A 

fairly distinct separation persisted between the Huk movement and the 

PKP throughout the occupation.9

On 27 March 1942, two days before the official formation of the 

Huks, their supreme military commander Luis Taruc, sent a letter to 

General MacArthur pledging allegiance to both the US and Philippine 

governments, and requesting guidance and support, neither of which was 

forthcoming.10 In the absence of guidance from MacArthur, and in a desire 

to maintain autonomy from other US-led guerrilla units, the Huks initiated 

an aggressive campaign against Japanese forces and the collaborationist 

government. 

The Huks are alleged to have killed 25,000 people in the Philippines 

during the occupation; of that number only 5,000 were Japanese.11 These 

figures are usually used to suggest a reign of terror throughout Central Luzon 

and as another reason for the US government not formally recognizing 

the Huks as guerrillas after the war. Regardless of the actual statistics, 

they must be taken in context.12 The Huks had a much broader conception 

of what classified collaborationist activities justifying a death sentence. 

If the Huks were indeed responsible for the deaths of 20,000 Filipinos, 

they likely saw the majority of those deaths as justifiable. Throughout Luis 

Taruc’s memoir, Born of the People, he recounts Huk activities against 

Filipino collaborators, but also devotes considerable efforts to describing 

the positive Huk relationship with the peasants. Therefore, a Huk reign 

of terror is relative to who was providing the Americans with accounts of 

Huk activities.

In addition to their military activities, the Huks established local shadow 

governments that provided peasant conflict resolution, performed civil 

functions such as marriages, and provided law and order.13 When liberation 

forces entered Central Luzon, they found functioning Huk governments in 
14

a number of provinces and towns.14 The Huks governed their relations 

with the populace and their everyday actions and operations through two 

pamphlets, “The Fundamental Spirit” and “The Iron Discipline.” Taken 

together these essentially represented the Huk Code of Conduct.15 Huk 

public relations did not necessarily transcend class however, with those 

landlords still present in the provinces targeted as potential sources of 

weapons, money, and supplies. The landlords that chose to flee to the cities 

saw their lands seized for use by the Huks and the peasants.

The situation in Central Luzon during the Japanese occupation was 

nothing less than chaotic. Though the Huks strictly governed their own 

ranks, as mentioned above, Taruc admits that there were elements within 

the movement that engaged in unacceptable behavior, such as theft and 

murder.16 However, even the American leadership of the United States 

Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) guerrilla units acknowledged that their 

own Filipino personnel used the chaos of the occupation to settle old 

scores and rivalries.17

The Americans described the Huks as owing no allegiance to any side 

in the conflict and constituted a threat not only to the Japanese, but also 

to USAFFE guerrillas and their intelligence nets.18 Based on the accounts 

of former USAFFE guerrilla leaders there may have been good reason 

for this mistrust. Luis Taruc asserted in his memoirs that USAFFE units 

actively worked with the collaborationist Philippine Constabulary (PC) to 

fight the Huks during the occupation.19 By Huk logic this was tantamount 

to collaborating with the Japanese. The USAFFE leadership viewed the 

ill-disciplined PC as vulnerable to infiltration and influence and did on 

occasion use the PC to fight the Huks in Luzon.20 With the arrival of 

liberation forces, the Huks were viewed as an enemy by the Japanese, the 

landlords and elites, and the USAFFE guerrillas. The latter two groups, 

particularly the collaborationists, would play a significant role in both US 

and Philippine government Huk policies following liberation.

It is clear that the Huks publicly offered their services and allegiance 

to the US and Philippine governments prior to the Japanese invasion.21 But 

beyond infrequent contact, the USAFFE-Huk relationship can almost be 

characterized as a tragic comedy. On numerous occasions the two sides 

attempted meetings that were either broken up or ambushed by Japanese 

and collaborationist PC forces.22 These types of occurrences only fueled 

suspicion and hostility between the groups and prevented the development 

of a unified guerrilla command in the Philippines in the early stages of the 

campaign.23
15

Collaboration was not a new phenomenon in the Philippines. The 

land owning class that developed under Spanish rule collaborated with 

the US during the Spanish-American War and the subsequent Philippine 

Insurrection less than fifty years earlier. There was a certain degree of 

pragmatism on the part of the landowners and elites in dealing with 

the Japanese; there was significant money to be made in supplying the 

occupiers. Also, had they sided with the insurgency they would have 

potentially legitimized peasant demands for reform following the war. 

For others, collaboration was an order from the government-in-exile, as a 

number of prominent post-war politicians claimed.24 Still others claimed 

that it was their national duty, that by serving in the “puppet government” 

they could more effectively protect the Filipino people from within the 

system.25 Yet collaboration was no small affair for the elites, with thirty 

percent of the Philippine House of Representatives, seventy-five percent 

of the Senate, most of the Supreme Court, and eighty percent of the officers 

of the Army accepting positions in the collaborationist government.26

The people of Central Luzon did not necessarily agree with the logic 

of the collaborationists. During the occupation, many of the peasants 

and guerrillas felt that the collaborationist government and associated 

security forces were more brutal than the Japanese. 27 Significant 

animosity developed between landlords and elites represented within the 

collaborationist government, and the rural based insurgency. As one US 

Army officer serving with the USAFFE guerrilla forces in Central Luzon 

noted, the region was easily comparable to Hobbes’ State of Nature, and 

the life of the average Filipino civilian reduced to being “nasty, brutish, 

and short.”28

The elite and land owning class were not the only collaborators 

targeted by the Huks. When the US military and fledgling Philippine 

Army were defeated by the Japanese, the PC largely remained intact. The 

new rulers and their allies in the collaborationist government quickly set 

the PC to work, attacking the Huks and their support base.29 The poorly 

trained, equipped, and led Constabulary forces resorted to brutality to 

compensate for their deficiencies. The PC excesses generated hatred 

within both the Huks and the civilian population that would survive the 

war and significantly influence the actions of both Huk and PC veterans.30

The problem for the Americans started soon after the fall of Corregidor. 

The USAFFE guerrilla organizations that sprang up throughout the Islands 

more closely resembled a loose confederation of organizations than a single 

united front. While various USAFFE unit leaders attempted to convince the 

Huks to submit to USAFFE command, the Huks resisted. Huk commander 
16

Luis Taruc noted a general arrogance and disdain for the Huks within the 

US guerrilla leadership.31 Captain Ray Hunt, a former USAFFE guerrilla 

confirms the disdain, but not for Taruc’s perceived reasons. The American 

guerrilla leaders were all traditional, conventional US Army officers with 

no background in and little regard for guerrilla warfare, viewing it as a 

necessary evil.32 Ironically, while the Huks generally viewed the USAFFE 

guerrillas more as bandits and militarily ineffective, several USAFFE 

veterans grudgingly acknowledged Huk military prowess.33

The USAFFE guerrillas, loosely directed by MacArthur’s headquarters, 

were also disdained by the Huks for their lack of activity. Ironically, the 

PKP advocated a defensive policy that would have brought the Huks more 

in line with USAFFE policy.34 However, for the peasants of Central Luzon 

there were few alternatives to armed resistance. Many landowners used 

the occupation as an opportunity to crush the peasant movement in Central 

Luzon. The lawlessness of the period, combined with Japanese support 

for the elites meant there were few limitations to the depredations in 

Central Luzon during the occupation. Had the Huks agreed with the PKP 

leadership, they might have found common ground with the USAFFE 

guerrillas to establish a united front against the Japanese.

Another problem for the Americans in the Philippines during the 

occupation was actually in Brisbane, Australia, the location of General 

MacArthur’s headquarters. In May 1943, MacArthur chose Colonel 

Courtney Whitney as his chief of the Philippine Regional Section within the 

Allied Intelligence Bureau. The official history of intelligence operations 

in the Philippines during the war cites Whitney’s selection as derived from 

a need to “place in charge an individual having a very broad knowledge of 

the Islands and the personalities involved.”35 Unfortunately, Whitney was 

quite possibly one of the worst choices for a job that included coordination 

of intelligence and guerrilla activities in the Philippines, described later 

as “undiplomatic, belligerent...[and] condescending toward all Filipinos, 

except those, who like himself had substantial investments in the islands.”36

The man General MacArthur relied on the most to lay the groundwork for 

post-liberation Philippine policy firmly believed in a return to the status 

quo ante, though events after liberation demonstrated that he was not the 

only one with this view.37

As the occupation ended and liberation began, American understanding 

of the Huks came from two main sources. The first source was the 

negative interaction between USAFFE guerrilla units and the Huks, 

and the second was information provided by the collaborationist elites 

favored by American senior leadership.38 Ironically, the same Philippine 
17

collaborationists who provided information about the Huks would later 

use American assessments of the guerrillas derived from that information, 

in determining official guerrilla recognition in the post-war years.39 Poor 

American understanding of, and Philippine elite hostility towards the 

Huks ensured a short honeymoon between the three parties as liberation 

gave way to tentative peace. America’s institutional knowledge of the 

Philippines not only proved shallow, it failed to account for the devastating 

effects of the war.

The Aftermath: 1945-1946

The war decimated the Philippine economy. A pre-independence 

assessment by United States Army Forces Western Pacific intelligence 

staff painted a rather discouraging picture, stating that it “was far worse 

than what was envisioned in 1941,” and went on to provide the following 

summary:

Property damage alone is estimated between $700 and $800 

million. The Philippine government faces probable expenditures 

of ₱186 million for its first fiscal year, with an estimated income 

of only ₱6 million . . . Foreign trade is too scant to sustain the 

Philippine economy as formerly. The cost of living has risen to 

6-1/2 times the pre-war level, while the 1945-46 food crop is 30% 

below normal. Many necessities of life are nearly impossible to 

obtain except through the black market . . . in Manila alone, there 

was 70% damage to housing . . . Nearly 80% of the schools need 

to be rebuilt. Only 40% of the pre-war power plants are operating 

today.40

In this uphill economic battle another significant issue hindered the 

Philippines, the structure of the Philippine economy under US sovereignty.

As US business interests found a ready market for consumer goods 

in the Philippines, as well as an abundant source of raw materials and 

commodities, the local economy developed to meet the demand. The 

development was unbalanced at best. US interests focused on raw material 

and commodity extraction rather than developing locally based industry 

and manufacturing. Indigenously manufactured consumer goods were 

unnecessary in the Philippines because US goods were readily available 

for import. The economic imbalance fostered dependence, and was 

incentivized by an absence of tariffs between the Philippines and the 

United States.41

In a 1946 cable to the State Department, US High Commissioner to the 

Philippines, and later ambassador, Paul McNutt explained the economic 
18

situation. From 1909 to 1941 trade relations between the United States 

and the Philippines encouraged economic dependence. Interests in the 

Philippines saw where the money lay in regards to exports and adjusted 

their production and focus accordingly. The proposed economic transition 

period was originally scheduled from 1941-46 in a move to extricate 

the Philippines from this economic dependence. The transition failed to 

materialize due to the war, and with independence looming the Philippine 

economy faced collapse because it would no longer enjoy the preferential 

treatment it had prior to independence.42 While the landlords and elites 

would survive the economic transition associated with independence, the 

lower classes would experience the greatest upheaval.

Deplorable economic conditions only exacerbated an already growing 

problem in the post-war Philippines. Despite President Roosevelt’s 

strong stance on collaboration his death opened the door to a more liberal 

policy advocated by General MacArthur and other key members of his 

staff.43 The death of Philippine Commonwealth president-in-exile Manuel 

Quezon during the war, brought Vice President Sergio Osmeña to power. 

Osmeña was politically weak within the Nationalista Party, and so sought 

the support of other groups outside of the party by taking a hard line on the 

collaboration issue. Osmeña was soon opposed by Manuel Roxas, a senior 

official within the collaborationist government, member of the Philippine 

establishment, and long-time friend of General MacArthur.44

Through a series of deft political and legal moves, Roxas was able to 

declaw all of Osmeña’s attempts to push the collaboration issue.45 These 

efforts proved successful in garnering Roxas significant support from 

collaborators within the government and security forces when he split from 

the Nationalista Party and formed the Liberal Party for his presidential 

bid against Osmeña. In a close race Roxas defeated Osmeña and assumed 

the presidency, promptly pardoning all collaborators not already held 

and indicted by American forces. In one swift action Roxas put an end 

to the collaboration issue, much to the outrage of former Huks.46 While 

the historical record clearly demonstrates Roxas’ actions and intent being 

motivated by self-interest, the period from the first American amphibious 

landings in the Philippines until the end of the war are far from clear.

The months encompassing the American liberation of the Philippines 

represents an example of historical “he-said-she-said” between the Huks 

and their opponents, and is unlikely to ever be fully resolved. Former 

USAFFE guerrilla leader, Captain Ray C. Hunt aptly notes in his memoirs 

that there were four reasons why it is unlikely anyone will ever produce an 

accurate history of the entire guerrilla campaign: 1) most of the key figures 
19

are dead; 2) many leaders never kept diaries or records; 3) internecine 

rivalry between various group leaders generated biased accounts following 

the war, particularly those about specific individuals; and 4) towards 

the conclusion of the campaign when US-Philippine success was clear, 

countless people attempted to join the guerrillas or later claim they had 

been one, in order to reap post-war rewards.47

However, from existing accounts from both the USAFFE guerrillas and 

the Huks it is clear that the Huks had already experienced the beginnings of 

retribution long before Manuel Roxas took up residence in the presidential 

palace at Malacañan. The Americans clearly viewed the Huks as a threat, 

disarming Huk squadrons – at gunpoint in some instances – during the 

course of liberation.48 In an extreme case, a disarmed Huk squadron of 

more than one hundred men was detained by a USAFF- recognized unit in 

Malolos, Pampanga Province and summarily executed. The leader of the 

unit was quickly arrested by the Americans and then quickly released and 

appointed mayor of Malolos.49 Huk leaders, including Luis Taruc, were 

quickly arrested and held by the US Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), in 

some cases multiple times, but eventually released.50 The rapid expansion 

of communism in the post-war world made US officials wary of groups 

even remotely communist, and the Huk leadership fit the description.51

The Americans also contributed to the growing problem through the 

officials chosen to rebuild the diplomatic corps in the Philippines. The US 

mission in the newly liberated country closely resembled the US mission 

before the war:

All MacArthur’s friends and all McNutt’s prewar colonial 

administration friends were there, and they had reinstalled the old 

elite crowd, the old rulers, the old colonial rulers of the Philippines, 

who all wanted the sugar industry and the prewar structure done.52

While it might seem appropriate to have rebuilt the diplomatic corps with 

experienced personnel who were familiar with the Philippines, those 

personnel simply reinforced a return to the status quo ante. They lacked 

interaction with the lower classes, remaining focused on their limited 

contacts within the upper classes. Even when an outsider, Senator Millard 

Tydings arrived in the Philippines to assess the situation and develop 

rehabilitation aid recommendations MacArthur confined his survey to 

Manila, preventing the congressman from seeing the situation in Central 

Luzon and elsewhere.53 The almost willful ignorance of US officials 

regarding the growing social conflict in the immediate post-war period 

contributed to almost five years of ill-informed Philippine policy.
20

As the status quo returned to Central Luzon following liberation, 

the landlords built up private armed groups that came to be popularly 

referred to as Civilian Guards. Hired from amongst the ranks of the former 

collaborationist PC, these paramilitary forces were often paid and equipped 

by the government.54 In addition to pay and equipment the Civilian Guards 

acted as auxiliaries for the most recent manifestation of the PC, the Military 

Police Command (MPC), as the landlords attempted to reassert control 

over Central Luzon.55 It is this period that suffers the most from a plethora 

of contrasting, and at times contradictory stories about who was at fault 

for the greatest amount of violence. However, while specific, verifiable 

accounts are difficult to come by, multiple sources on both sides refer to 

the general lack of discipline and training, and the widespread abuses of 

the MPC and Civilian Guards from their inception through 1949.56

Under the guise of a “pacification program” the MPC and Civilian 

Guards increased the frequency and intensity of their operations prior to and 

during the April 1946 congressional elections.57 In response, Hukbalahap 

veterans started banding together to resist the increased attacks by the MPC 

and Civilian Guards, and the violence in Central Luzon escalated.58 At the 

same time, PKP and former Huk leaders and the Roxas administration were 

attempting to negotiate a peaceful settlement. As previously mentioned, 

both sides were guilty of armed violence while each accused the other of 

having started it.59 The Huks had tentatively disbanded after the war, and 

local violence was not coordinated and remained localized. However, by 

June 1946 former Huk senior leaders met to discuss a “contingency plan” 

to prepare for possible hostilities against the government, resulting in the 

formation of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People’s Liberation 

Army), or HMB.60

Complicating matters was US policy that seemed schizophrenic at 

best, hypocritical at worst. The growth of nationalism, reinforced by the 

exploits of wartime resistance movements and Mao’s successes in China, 

had a ready appeal in Southeast Asia with the conclusion of the war. When 

the Dutch attempted to reassert their control over the Dutch East Indies 

they found a well-entrenched Indonesian independence movement ready to 

fight for their sovereignty.61 Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh forces in Indochina 

had already declared a republic and initiated hostilities toward Chinese 

nationalist and Indian Army forces by the time the French returned.62

Meanwhile, Filipino nationalist sentiment was strong, but found an outlet 

in the independence promised by the United States in 1946.

Philippine independence was the centerpiece of US anti-colonial 

policy in Asia. President Truman was pushing his European allies to grant 
21

independence to their colonial possessions, and desired that Philippine 

independence represent the first step towards greater self-determination in 

post-war Asia.63 In so doing, the US would be able to effectively counter 

Soviet propaganda, and potentially increase the number of pro-Western/

pro-democracy members of the new United Nations Organization. Taken 

together, these factors were rapidly making the emergence of a democratic, 

economically viable, and stable Philippines a “no fail” mission.64

Following the Japanese surrender in September 1945, 50,000 US 

troops remained in the Philippines to take part in this “no fail” mission. 

This number would rapidly decrease as the US downsized its military 

forces generally, and was forced to commit troops to occupation duties 

in Europe and elsewhere in Asia.65 In addition to being committed to 

the defense of the Philippine Islands against external aggression, the US 

government realized the importance of maintaining a presence in the 

Islands as a base of operations against potential communist aggression in 

the Far East. However, the size and disposition of those forces remained a 

point of debate and contention up to and beyond Philippine independence 

on 4 July 1946.66 American defense concerns were not the only factor 

influencing the situation in the Philippines in the aftermath of the war.

Despite a defense policy that supported Philippine independence, the 

US economic policy designed to rebuild the Philippines resembled a return 

to the status quo ante, including continued Philippine dependence on the 

United States.67 The influence of US business interests was manifested in 

the Bell Trade Act of 1946. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes was critical 

of the provisions of the bill that showed favoritism towards American 

economic and development interests and believed that it was counter to 

America’s stated goals in the Far East.68 The United States government 

tied ratification of the Bell Trade Act in the Philippine Congress to US 

rehabilitation aid, a move of questionable integrity that political scientist, 

Dr. Douglas Macdonald describes as “a most ungenerous treatment of a 

battered ally.”69 Philippine economic devastation represented a perverse 

opportunity in that it offered an almost blank slate to retool the economy 

towards self-sufficiency and relative economic independence.

Ratification of the Bell Trade Act became an important issue in 

the Philippines in 1946. The Philippine press quickly grasped the 

ramifications of the bill and excoriated it in editorials throughout 1946.70

The controversy surrounding the bill increased the importance of the 1946 

congressional elections for President Roxas and the Liberal Party. They 

needed three-fourths majority in both houses of congress in order to pass 

an amendment to the Philippine Constitution for the Bell Trade Act’s 
22

“parity rights” clause, granting US citizens full commercial rights equal to 

those of Filipino citizens.71 The elections did not result as Roxas wished. 

Six candidates from the Democratic Alliance ticket, which included PKP 

and former Huk members, were elected to congress that April. The six 

men, Luis Taruc among them, were decidedly against the Act and their 

votes would prevent ratification.72

In a move that undermined the Philippine government’s legitimacy, 

Roxas had the six Democratic Alliance congressmen, and five other 

opponents of the Act, unseated from congress citing their alleged use of 

violence and intimidation to win their seats.73 However, all six Democratic 

Alliance men came from provinces in Central Luzon where the MPC 

and Civilian Guards were active throughout the April 1946 election, but 

had won large majority victories. Besides Roxas’ clear motivations for 

the move, a Liberal Party congressman may have accurately identified 

a further reason for unseating the Democratic Alliance congressman, 

essentially observing that they do not represent the interests of elite class.74

The war was the catalyst for the conflict between the Philippine 

government and the Huks. In the absence of contact with or guidance 

from the government in exile, the Huks instituted what amounted to 

shadow governments in the barrios, districts, and provinces. After decades 

of attempting to gain political legitimacy the Huks experienced nominal 

independence and authority in Central Luzon during the occupation. Much 

to their delight, Huk authority came at the expense of the landlords and 

elites who were generally in support of the Japanese. Huk military forces 

gained significant experience fighting the Japanese and collaborationist 

Philippine government forces and viewed themselves as a proper guerrilla 

army. Essentially, during the occupation they succeeded in temporarily 

altering the status quo in their favor. The US supported return to the status 

quo ante and subsequent Philippine government actions against the Huks 

represented a point of no return as both sides hurtled toward open conflict.

75

Missed Opportunities: 1946-1949

The period following Philippine Independence on 4 July 1946, can 

best be characterized as a series of missed opportunities. Reconstruction 

and rehabilitation of the Philippines lagged far behind what should 

have been accomplished given the hundreds of millions of dollars in 

aid provided by the US government. The Philippine government also 

missed the opportunity to repair the relationship between the government 

and elites and the lower classes of society. Another significant missed 
23

opportunity was the reinvigoration of Philippine representative democracy. 

While President Roxas’ controversial actions surrounding the unseated 

congressmen in 1946 represented a setback for representative democracy, 

the 1949 presidential elections dealt a significant blwo to popular faith in 

the government. Finally, the Philippine government missed the chance to 

deal a decisive blow to the PKP and Huks when they were at their weakest.

Events elsewhere in the world distracted officials in Washington from 

the developing crisis in the Philippines.76 As the Department of State 

Philippine Desk Officer recalled, “I had been called by Dean Acheson 

and told that, “I’ve got a lot of things to do, a lot of things on my mind. 

You’re on the Philippine desk now. You go ahead and decide what has 

to be done.”77 Communism was on the march in Europe and other parts 

of Asia. Communists were leading civil wars in Greece and China, 

communist republics had been declared in Albania and Bulgaria, and 

Soviet forces continued to occupy much of Eastern Europe. Additionally, 

US policy towards the Philippines necessitated minimal intervention. Yet 

US policy was inadvertently supporting a Philippine government trend 

towards authoritarianism which was undermining popular government 

legitimacy.78

The post-war Philippines return to the status quo truly got into full 

swing following the passage of the Bell Trade Act. As rehabilitation aid 

and war damage claims money flowed in, the elites quickly set to work 

rebuilding the same pre-war industries that ensured Philippine economic 

dependence on the United States.79 While this move could possibly be 

explained away as simple short sightedness on the part of the elites, after 

the industries were rebuilt and functioning, rather than reinvesting profits in 

research and development, and increasing production capacity, substantial 

sums were instead invested in commerce and trade. In the aftermath of the 

war with so few industries operating, demand for imports was extremely 

high making trade and commerce extremely lucrative.80 Substantial profits 

served to perpetuate a cycle that prevented the development of industries 

that could provide locally produced products to replace imported products.

As elites remained profit focused, their counterparts in government 

routinely prioritized projects and programs benefitting the upper class. 

Projects and programs designed to alleviate the conditions of the lower 

classes were given lower priority. Schools, hospitals, and public projects 

received significantly less governmental attention than did the critical prewar industries of sugar mills, saw mills, and mines.81 While industry was 

critical to rejuvenating the Philippine economy, the public works sector 

deteriorated so badly during those years that teachers almost annually went 
24

without pay for up to three to four months.82 Despite large expenditures 

for residential construction in the Philippines, particularly in Manila, there 

was virtually no change in living conditions for the lower classes. The lack 

of improvement for the lower classes suggests most of the funds, some of 

them public funds, went towards construction in only upper class areas.83

In the three years following independence little was done to 

alleviate the situation of the average Filipino. In this case, as previously, 

responsibility rested with the upper class of Philippine society. As recovery 

got underway, 1947-1949 saw inordinately large profits on the part of 

wealthy landowners and businessmen, while wages remained extremely 

low.84 Despite the windfall profits of the wealthy, the tax burden remained 

largely on the lower classes. The vast majority of the government’s tax 

revenue came from excise and sales taxes while a correspondingly small 

percentage of revenue came from taxes likely to effect the wealthy.85 By 

simply raising wages – one of the Huk demands – and reforming the tax 

code to evenly distribute the burden, the government and elites might have 

gone a long way towards mending class and social divisions.

Compounding the economic disparity between the elites and 

landowners were the abuses of the Civilian Guards and MPC. The 

observations of the Civilian Guards and MPC noted previously not only 

continued, they worsened as the brutality of these group’s retaliations 

increased. Discipline and training had not improved, but their firepower 

had, and Civilian Guard and MPC frustration at increasingly effective 

Huk attacks and a recalcitrant populace was manifested in widespread 

destruction.86 Several congressmen and provincial officials publicly 

protested against MPC abuses in their provinces.87 As a contemporary 

Manila Times editorial noted:

These practices, and other depredations by official and quasiofficial forces, have created the feeling among people that the 

Huks somehow embody social virtue while the government and 

its people are capable only of brutal excesses. This is the kind of 

feeling from which governments fall.88

Nevertheless, the landlords and elites were reasserting their authority in the 

provinces militarily, opting out of a negotiated peace that risked reforms.

The destruction advocated and authorized by elites was part of 

President Roxas’ “mailed fist” campaign.89 Ironically, this campaign 

ostensibly started as a peace initiative. Both President Roxas and President 

Elpidio Quirino, who succeeded Roxas following is sudden death in 1948, 

offered amnesty to the Huks. However, both sides refused to back down 
25

from certain key demands. The Huks understandably refused to give up 

their arms until the Civilian Guards were abolished and MPC attacks 

halted. The government insisted on disarmament before negotiation.90

When the Huks rebuffed Roxas and then Quirino, both men insisted they 

had tried every approach to peace and their only recourse was the armed 

destruction of the Huks and their supporters.91

The Philippine government faced a crisis of legitimacy. Abuses by the 

government’s representatives in uniform, the MPC, and their paramilitary 

proxies, led the people to believe that officials in Manila did not truly 

represent them. After all, why would a government of the people send its 

soldiers to fight the people? It was no coincidence that as the government 

was losing popular support, the Huks were gaining it. Luis Taruc believed 

that “the Huks can only hold out as long as it is supported by the masses. 

No more, no less.”92 Part of this belief likely stemmed from a lack of 

external support from other communist countries.93 External support has 

become a commonly accepted and major factor in successful subversive 

insurgencies.94 Lacking external support the Huks had to rely entirely 

on popular support, further emphasizing how suicidal the Philippine 

government’s actions toward its own people must have appeared.

The final failure was in rebuilding popular faith in the government. 

Luis Taruc, like many Filipinos and others within the Huk movement, 

grew up learning US history in the American run schools of his youth. 

Taruc counted among his heroes many of the American founding fathers, 

and was capable of reciting the Gettysburg Address well into old age.95 He 

had certain expectations of and ideas about democracy, fueled in no small 

part by his admiration for the democratic ideals learned decades earlier. 

Philippine independence held special meaning for many of the Huks and 

their support base. It represented an opportunity for change, but the events 

of 1946 severely damaged their belief that they could achieve change 

through the Filipino version of democracy. Unfortunately the events of 

1949, largely attributed to President Quirino and his Liberal Party, would 

eclipse those of 1946.

The general election of 1949 was widely acknowledged as beset by 

widespread corruption and violence. A senior member of the Philippine 

Electoral Commission observed “there is no more democracy in the 

Philippines.”96 As a friend who ran in the congressional elections in 1949 

would later joke with Edward Lansdale, he received only one vote in the 

entire district, and with his own vote cast for himself, he was sure that at 

least his mother had voted for him.97 A non-Huk led uprising broke out in 

Batangas Province, south of Manila because of the corruption.98 The AFP 
26

and PC, at the direction of political masters, assisted in the fraud. Local 

police forces operated “generally as the goons and pluguglies of the local 

political bosses.”99 The election also resulted in a new Huk slogan, “bullets 

not ballots.”100 This simple slogan encapsulated the effect that Quirino’s 

administration had on the Philippines by 1949; representative democracy 

was an illusion and the only way to break free of government oppression 

was through violence.

The 1949 election reinvigorated the Huk movement by providing 

them with a popular and undeniable narrative about the government’s 

irretrievable state. Prior to the elections the Huks were struggling to find 

mass appeal outside of Central Luzon, and discipline was beginning to 

break down.101 Additionally, the PKP continued to oppose armed struggle 

in favor or parliamentary struggle, and focused on developing the “urban 

working class” until mid-1948, when they finally rejoined the Huk 

movement.102 From 1946 to 1948, armed opposition in Central Luzon 

went largely uncoordinated and should have made an easy target for a 

multi-pronged government approach that combined military operations 

with reforms. Yet the elections resuscitated the movement, and before long 

they would pose an existential threat not just to Philippine stability, but to 

the government itself.103

By the close of 1949 the Philippine government had squandered 

hundreds of millions of dollars, with US consent, rebuilding a pre-war 

economy not suited to economic independence. Under the Quirino 

administration income and social inequality increased, and popular faith in 

the government was virtually destroyed, thus undermining its legitimacy. 

As the government neared economic collapse because of failed policies, 

the armed forces were steadily getting worse, and were operating within 

an increasingly hostile populace. Amidst this chaos the Huks were getting 

stronger. Even without the realignment of the PKP and HMB in 1948 and 

the resulting improvement in organization, the Quirino administration was 

pushing more and more peasants and urban sympathizers into the Huk 

camp.104 The outlook for the Philippine government was grim as 1950 

dawned.
27

Notes

1. David J. Steinberg, “An Ambiguous Legacy: Years at War in the 

Philippines,” Pacific Affairs 45, No. 2 (Summer, 1972): 182.

2. Economic Survey Mission, 2-3.

3. David R. Sturtevant, “Sakdalism and Philippine Radicalism,” The 

Journal of Asian Studies 21, no. 2 (February 1962): 208. See also, Kerkvliet, 37.

4. Taruc, Born of the People, 33.

5. Kerkvliet, 50-58.

6. Kerkvliet, 50, 264-266. See also, Taruc, Born of the People, 46.

7. Taruc, Born of the People, 65. The United Front consisted of the AMT, 

or General Workers’ Union, a Pampanga based organization, and the KPMP, 

or National Society of Peasants in the Philippines. The AMT and KPMP were 

a mix of social and labor movements organized to represent peasant and labor 

demands.

8. Ward, 9.

9. Taruc, Born of the People, 66. See also, Kerkvliet, 102-104; Ray C. 

Hunt, Norling, Bernard, Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the 

Philippines (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1986), 105. Google 

e-book.

10. A copy of the original letter was provided by Dr. Romeo Taruc during 

an interview with the author on 18 October 2012, Angeles City, Pampanga. For a 

short biographical sketch of Dr. Taruc see Appendix C.

11. Edward G. Lansdale, “A Comparison: Viet Nam and the Philippines” 

(Lansdale Papers, Box 74, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, 

Palo Alto, CA), 6,

12. For a map of the main Huk areas of operation see Appendix A.

13. Taruc, Born of the People, 124, 179.

14. Kerkvliet, 108-109.

15. Taruc, Born of the People, 67.

16. Taruc, 128-129.

17. Hunt, Norling, 105; See also, Michael Guardia, American Guerrilla, 

the Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volkmann (Havertown, PA: Casemate 

Publishers, 2010), 113. Google e-book.

18. Ward, 9.

19. Taruc, Born of the People, 149.

20. Hunt, Norling, 106-107.
28

21. Taruc, Born of the People, 52. While there is ample evidence of the 

Huk’s proclamations of support for both the US and the Philippine governmentin-exile, it is difficult to ascertain their sincerity. US and Philippine government 

sources believed that the Huks never intended to really support the government, 

and were using the occupation as an excuse to arm and prepare. The Huks can 

claim that US officials offered little tangible support or acceptable guidance, 

forcing them to take their own path.

22. Taruc, Born of the People, 148, 159. See also Hunt, Norling, 106.

23. Sources from both USAFFE and the Huk Movement note that both 

sides believed in the concept of a unified command structure that would 

coordinate all guerrilla activities in the Philippines, but USAFFE insisted that 

the Huks subordinate themselves to the American led organization. The Huks 

steadfastly refused this demand. For the general USAFFE opinion on unified 

command see Hunt, 103. For the Huk opinion on unified command see Taruc, 

Born of the People, 155-156.

24. Karnow, 628-629. See also, William Manchester, American Caesar: 

Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (New York: Hachette Book Group, 1978), 375-

376. Google e-book.

25. Claro M. Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation: The Issue of 

Political Collaboration in the Philippines (Manila: People’s Publishers, 1946), 

74; See also, Manchester, 376; Hunt, Norling, 154.

26. Bernard Seeman, Salisbury, Laurence, Cross-currents in the Philippines

(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946), 22. Further references to an 

“elite and land owning class,” or derivations thereof, should not be mistaken as 

a generalization that all elites or landowners acted the same or held the same 

beliefs about the Huks and peasantry. Philippine society was far too complex to 

make such a generalization. However, for the purposes of this paper references 

to the elites and land owners as a group is based on the statistics cited by 

Seeman and Salisbury, and the extensive research of Dr. Benedict Kerkvliet.

27. Taruc, Born of the People, 78. See also, Kerkvliet, 68.

28. Hunt, Norling, 147.

29. Taruc, Born of the People, 221. See also, Kerkvliet, 148-149.

30. Kerkvliet, 116-118.

31. Kerkvliet, 71-72, 150-155.

32. Hunt, Norling, 69-70.

33. Hunt, Norling,103.

34. Kerkvliet, 103-104. MacArthur’s headquarters directed the USAFFE 

guerrilla units they were in contact with to primarily maintain a low profile and 

focus on intelligence collection.
29

35. General Headquarters, Far East Command, Brief History of the G-2 

Section, GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 

1948), 46, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

36. Manchester, 375.

37. According to Lieutenant Colonel Jesus A. Villamor, a Filipino 

pilot awarded the US Distinguished Service Cross and sent to the occupied 

Philippines by General MacArthur to coordinate with the guerrillas, Whitney 

was incensed by guerrilla actions that damaged infrastructure critical to the 

rehabilitation of the most profitable pre-war Philippine industries, particularly 

the sugar and lumber industries, even if that infrastructure was materially aiding 

the Japanese war effort (Seeman, Salisbury, 39-40).

38. Manchester, 377.

39. Brief History of the G-2 Section, 32.

40. Assistance Chief of Staff, G-2, Army Forces Western Pacific, 

Philippine Islands Rehabilitation, Intelligence Assessment No. 29 (Lansdale 

Papers, Box 74, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, 

CA), 4.

41. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman, 18 

April 1946. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 3 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1971), 874.

42. The United States High Commissioner in the Philippines (McNutt) 

to Mr. Richard R. Ely, of the Office of United States High Commissioner, 

Washington, 18 January 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 3, 

865.

43. Manchester, 375.

44. Manchester, 377. According to Karnow, MacArthur helped Roxas’ 

overcome his collaborationist past by “summarily exhonerat[ing]” him after he 

was captured by US forces. When MacArthur reunited with Roxas he publicly 

embraced him and reinstated him in the Philippine Army as a brigadier general, 

and claimed that Roxas had been a member of the underground, providing 

vital intelligence to MacArthur’s headquarters, though a later investigation was 

never able to prove the claim. MacArthur next directed President Osmeña to 

convene the legislature. Since most of the congressmen had collaborated with 

the Japanese, and because Roxas represented the senior collaborator in congress, 

it was almost assured he would be voted senate president, giving him control 

of the upper house, and making him chairman of the Appointments Committee. 

This committee was responsible for approving all governmental appointments, 

giving him significant leverage over the president, and significant power to 

dispense patronage to supporters or coerce potential opponents (Karnow, 627-

628).

45. Manchester, 416-417.
30

46. Kerkvliet, 199-200; See also Karnow, 628. In August 1945, MacArthur 

ordered the release of 5,000 collaborators, many of them from the political and 

elite establishment.

47. Hunt, Norling, 71.

48. Taruc, Born of the People, 190.

49. Taruc, Born of the People, 191. According to Taruc’s claim, at least 

109, but as many as 160, men of Huk Squadron 77 were massacred by Colonel 

Adonais Carlos Maclang’s forces in Malolos on 7 February 1945. See also 

Kerkvliet, 115, and Karnow, 650.

50. Taruc, 196, 198.

51. The connection between the Huks and external communist support 

remains a point of contention. According to the Huk military commander, 

Luis Taruc, at the beginning of the war they only had two books to reference 

in developing their organization–Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China, and 

a translated copy of Chu The’s book on guerrilla tactics (Taruc, Born of the 

People, 63). A military intelligence assessment of guerrilla organizations in 

Luzon prior to the invasion in late 1944 noted that the Huk movement “was 

said to be modeled [on] Chinese communist organizations, and it was probable 

that Chinese had a hand in the early organization” (Ward, 9). The only recorded 

Communist Chinese material contribution to the Huks was the Wa Chi, or 

Squadron 48, which wasn’t formed until May of 1942. This squadron was drawn 

not from Chinese smuggled in from mainland China, but rather from the Chinese 

community of Manila. Amongst that community were veterans of Mao’s 8th 

Route Army, who became the backbone of the squadron. Due to battlefield 

successes, the organization and methods of the Wa Chi were widely copied by 

other Huk squadrons (Taruc, Born of the People, 75-76). Finally, in light of 

the difficulties facing Mao’s forces in China it is unlikely that the Huks were 

receiving any real aid or support from China during the war.

52. Clarence A. Boonstra interview.

53. Karnow, 638.

54. Kerkvliet, 148.

55. Kerkvliet, 152. Following World War II the Philippine Constabulary 

was renamed the Military Police Command. It would revert to the name 

Philippine Constabulary by 1948.

56. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 7, 4 February 1947, (Lansdale Papers, 

Box 72, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA). 

Subsequent references will omit publication information, as all of Lansdale’s 

journal entries were found in the same box in his papers at the Hoover Institution 

Archives. See also Kerkvliet, 149.

57. Kerkvliet, 146.
31

58. Kerkvliet, 151.

59. Kerkvliet, 153.

60. Kerkvliet, 169. The HMB would continue to be popularly referred to 

as the Huks, so the terms Huk and HMB will be used interchangeably from this 

point forward.

61. ‘Daniel Marston, Rock in an Angry Sea: The Indian Army 1945-1947, 

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), TBC.

62. Douglas Porch, “French Imperial Warfare 1945-62,” in 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 80.

63. The United States High Commissioner in the Philippines (McNutt) 

to Mr. Richard R. Ely, of the Office of United States High Commissioner, 

Washington, 18 January 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 3, 

865. Ironically, the US contradicted this policy early on by supporting France’s 

retention of Indochina after the war. Rising anti-communist sentiment overrode 

a recommendation from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that America 

recognize Ho Chi Minh’s government because the US supported him during 

World War II.

64. Macdonald, 141.

65. The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 

29 November 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 3, 934.

66. The United States High Commissioner in the Philippines (McNutt) 

to Mr. Richard R. Ely, of the Office of United States High Commissioner, 

Washington, 18 January 1946, 865.

67. Clarence A. Boonstra interview. See also Karnow, 693.

68. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman, 18 April 

1946. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 3, 874.

69. Macdonald, 131.

70. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 1, 30 October 1946.

71. Kerkvliet, 151.

72. Kerkvliet, 150.

73. Seeman, Salisbury, 53. See also Karnow, 643. This was despite the 

fact that several seated members of the Philippine Congress were still under 

enditment for treason stemming from their collaboration with the Japanese.

74. Abraham Chapman, “Note on the Philippine Elections,” Pacific Affairs

19, no. 2 (June 1946): 198.

75. Kerkvliet, 118. See also James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of 

Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International 

Relations, 1992), 83.
32

76. Consolidated timeline of events from 1945-1954.

77. John F. Melby, Philippine Desk Officer, Washington, DC (1948-1953); 

interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy (June 1989), ADST/CRS.

78. Central Intelligence Agency, The Current Situation in the Philippines, 

30 March 1949 (CIA Freedom of Information Act Library, http://www.foia.cia.

gov/search .asp, accessed 27 August 2012). See also Cliff Forster, Branch Public 

Affairs Officer, USIS, Davao (1949-1952); interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt 

(29 May 1990). See also Macdonald, 133, 139, 144.

79. Economic Survey Mission, 12.

80. Economic Survey Mission, 47.

81. Economic Survey Mission, 12. See also Leslie R. Bungaard, 

“Philippine Local Government,” The Journal of Politics 19, No. 2 (May 1957): 

271. These teachers were often forced to sell their anticipated paychecks to 

moneylenders at rates as high as forty percent interest 

82. Economic Survey Mission, 90.

83. Economic Survey Mission, 95.

84. Economic Survey Mission, 17.

85. Economic Survey Mission, 24.

86. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 12, 30 March 1947. Luis Taruc lists 

76 barrios by name in Central Luzon that were either completely or partially 

destroyed during this period (Taruc, Born of the People, 243-244).

87. Harold Isaacs, “The Danger in the Philippines, Part 2,” Manila Times, 

14 June 1950 (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 4, Truman Library, Independence, 

MO). See also Macdonald, 138.

88. Isaacs.

89. Mateo del Castillo, Luis Taruc, Manuel Roxas, “Taruc-Roxas 

Correspondence” Far Eastern Survey 15, No. 20 (9 October 1946): 315.

90. Joseph T. Hart, The Huk Insurgency in the Philippines, 1946-1954, 

Conflict Analysis Division, Strategic Studies Counterinsurgency Series 

(Bethesda, MD: Research Analysis Corporation, 1963), 8.

91. Isaacs, “The Danger in the Philippines, Part 2.”

92. Kerkvliet, 247.

93. Romeo Taruc, interview with the author, Angeles City, Pampanga, 

18 October 2012. See also, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas 

Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 3 February 1949, Cold War International History 

Project (CWIHP), www.CWIHP.org, by permission of the Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars. In this 1949 conversation Mao informed 

Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, that the Chinese 

Communist Party maintained contact with communist parties throughout Asia, 
33

but that “all work of liaison with com[munist] parties is carried out through a 

special comrade, located in Hong Kong, but it is conducted poorly.” Mikoyan 

then warned Mao that in “the membership of the politburo of such com[munist] 

parties as those of the Philippines . . . there are many American and English 

spies, therefore the CCP must be careful in relations with them.” This poor, and 

limited, contact between the Chinese communists and the PKP and Huks, and 

suspicion on the part of the Chinese, suggests that the Philippine communists 

were effectively isolated from external support.

94. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: 

Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-9, 

1-16. 

95. Karnow, 648

96. Macdonald, 134.

97. Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to 

Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 29. An additional, widely 

repeated anecdote of the period was that “in Lanao Province, another Liberal 

Party stronghold, the people said that “even the trees and monkeys voted in 

favor of the administration” (Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 59).

98. Harold Isaacs, “The Danger in the Philippines, Part 5,” Manila Times, 

date unavailable (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 4, Truman Library, Independence, 

MO). See also Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 60.

99. Harold Isaacs, “The Danger in the Philippines, Part 4,” Manila Times, 

16 June 1950 (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 4, Truman Library, Independence, 

MO). Mr. Alfredo Lim, a member of the Manila police force in the early 1950s 

confirmed that police were used as “the private armies of the mayors.” At the 

time, the police forces were not professionalized. When a new mayor was 

elected, as part of the spoils of victory, he would appoint a new force. These 

policemen were generally loyal supporters with little to no law enforcement 

experience. The situation changed in October 1950 when the Philippine Civil 

Service first instituted standardized examinations as a requirement for police 

service. Alfredo Lim, interview with the author, Manila City Hall, 22 October 

2012. For a short biographical sketch of Mr. Lim see Appendix C.

100. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 69.

101. In an interview with the author, Father Jack Schumacher recounted his 

first interaction with the Huks. A Huk unit came to his seminary in Novaliches, 

Manila, and demanded food and supplies. The Jesuit priests explained that they 

only had enough food to feed themselves. The Huks apologized to the priests 

and then left. However, as they departed the Huks proceeded to take food and 

shoes from the Filipino construction workers employed by the seminary. In the 

1960s Father Schumacher had the opportunity to meet Luis Taruc and recounted 

this experience. Upon hearing this, Taruc acknowledged the positive treatment 

afforded the priests, but then claimed the Huk unit “must have been a splinter 
34

group” because of their treatment of the workers (John Schumacher, interview 

with the author, 17 October 2012, Jesuit Residence, Ateneo University, Manila).

102. Kerkvliet, 179-180.

103. The term existential threat, as used here, refers to a threat to the 

existence of stability in the Philippines and to the actual government. By this 

point in the Huk rebellion the government was facing political and economic 

crisis, and significant Huk military victories may have toppled the government.

104. Isaacs, “The Danger in the Philippines, Part 5.”
35

Chapter 3

New Beginnings

The weakness in our position here is that we no longer have 

authority. This leaves us only influence, of which we must make 

best possible use.

— Ambassador Myron Cowen, The Ambassador in the 

Philippines (Cowen) to the Department of State, February 15, 

1951.1

By 1949, US government officials knew the situation in the 

Philippines was critical. The arrival of the new decade would shed light 

on just how grim the situation was. The massively corrupt 1949 general 

elections gave the incumbent Elpidio Quirino another four years at the 

helm of a country without a rudder. President Quirino, while adept at 

playing Philippine politics, was not the type of figure the country needed 

to repair the social fissures and economic problems it faced. Additionally, 

the practice of dispensing patronage to loyalists ensured the Armed Forces 

of the Philippines (AFP) and PC ranks contained men more concerned 

with demonstrating loyalty to political masters than to upholding their 

constitutional oaths. Complicating matters for the US was the initiation 

of hostilities on the Korean peninsula and a host of other international 

events, distracting US attention from the Philippines, though this may 

have proved to be good for the situation.

The emerging Philippine crisis called for a strong leader of good 

moral character and integrity. Elpidio Quirino lacked integrity, and was 

both physically, ethically, and morally weak. In a memorandum from 

Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s office to President Truman, Qurinio was 

described as stubborn, vain, arrogant, petty, vindictive, micro-managing, 

egotistical, politically and morally irresponsible, and that “all indications 

are that he would prefer to see his country ruined than compromise with his 

insatiable ego or accept outside assistance on any terms except his own.”2

Quirino’s own family did not help the situation. His brother, Antonio 

“Tony” Quirino, a judge for the People’s Court, was seen as a “sinister 

character who seems to be mixed up in all sorts of dubious transactions in 

the Philippines,” and would continue to play a role in Elpidio Quirino’s 

increasingly authoritarian actions.3

Quirino essentially mortgaged the legitimacy of the Philippine 

government to ensure his own reelection. While he succeeded in holding 

on to the presidency, the election politically weakened him within the 

Liberal Party and exacerbated the security situation in the provinces.4
36

Threatening to expose his fellow party leaders’ improprieties mitigated 

this weakness, but he was in an increasingly precarious position.5 Indeed, 

by June 1950 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysts were predicting 

Quirino’s imminent downfall, noting that “despite an oppressive disregard 

for civil rights, [he] has been unable to maintain law and order, and has 

permitted excessive graft, corruption, and inefficiency.”6

By 1950 Philippine society was increasingly fractured. The Huks 

were capitalizing on class divisions exacerbated by World War II and 

the previous four years of misgovernment. The Huks easily pointed out 

the links between the elites and the government, as the government was 

composed of the elite and land owning class.7 However, class division 

was not the only ill plaguing Philippine society. Rival political factions 

also divided communities across the country.8

 As mentioned previously, 

following the results of the 1949 election supporters of Quirino’s opponent, 

Jose Laurel, rose up in a short lived but violent revolt in his home province 

of Batangas. Unfortunately this kind of factional conflict was typical of 

the time, and by 1950 American officials assumed that violence would 

accompany future elections.9

If the sociopolitical problems were not enough, by 1950 the Philippine 

government was on the verge of bankruptcy. American aid money helped 

to improve the situation, but by late 1949 the US government insisted on 

dispatching an economic mission to the Philippines to assess the severity 

of the problem. In 1950 the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, 

led by former Under Secretary of the Treasury Daniel W. Bell, compiled a 

concise report on the problems facing the country. The results of the Bell 

survey mission were unsettling:

There are officials in the Philippine Government who are aware 

of the dangers in this pervading economic unbalance between 

production and needs, between prices and wages, between 

Government expenditures and taxes, between foreign exchange 

payments and receipts. Some of them understand the reasons 

why these difficulties arose; but the measures that could halt the 

deterioration have not been put into effect. Inefficiency and even 

corruption in the Government service are widespread. Leaders 

in agriculture and in business have not been sufficiently aware 

of their responsibility to improve the economic position of the 

lower income groups. The public lacks confidence in the capacity 

of Government to act firmly to protect the interests of all the 

people. The situation is being exploited by the Communist-led 

Hukbalahap movement to incite lawlessness and disorder.10
37

President Truman was alarmed at the findings. The situation was so 

bad that before Bell even left the Philippines he informed Washington 

that the government would collapse unless it received an emergency loan 

of $20-30 million.11 Among the governmental departments requiring 

immediate assistance was the Department of National Defense which was 

on the verge of being unable to pay its soldiers.12

The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary 

were at a low ebb by 1950. While they were well equipped with modern 

weapons, provided through the Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group (JUSMAG), their primary problems were leadership and morale.

13 Officials in the US embassy understood the AFP needed a change in 

leadership, but they lacked the leverage necessary to bring about such 

changes.14 Poor leadership and morale contributed to a lack of discipline 

within the security forces, manifested in their abuse of civilians during 

operations, perhaps the worst of which occurred on Good Friday, 1950. 

On that day, “army troops massacred 100 men, women, and children in 

Bacalor, Pampanga, and burned 130 homes in retaliation for the killing 

of one of their officers.”15 When combating the insurgency the security 

forces, particularly the PC, were proving counterproductive. Popular 

support was critical to successful prosecution of the campaign, and the 

“Constabulary [was] alienating the populace by their actions.”16 Militarily, 

if Huk successes and expanding capabilities continued and AFP defeats 

and professional atrophy continued, the CIA believed the Huks would be 

capable of toppling the government.17

Unfortunately, professional atrophy appeared to be the preferred 

course for the armed forces. Officers “often engaged in large-scale 

corruption,” and “were often implicated in Manila-based scandals.”18

Offensive operations usually only occurred as a result of some Huk 

operation that “made political waves in Manila.”19 Frustrated, underpaid 

soldiers, garrisoned in local barrios for extended periods, with little 

supervision preyed on the local population, while “those above [them] 

seemed as equally unconcerned, more interested in graft, corruption, and 

a comfortable life than with fighting [the Huks].”20 While average soldiers 

may have been the ones abusing the people, the crux of the problem was 

clearly in the officer corps.

One of the main causes of this crisis of professionalism was the 

politicization of the officer corps. A patronage system existed whereby 

politicians were able to reward family, friends, and supporters with military 

positions.21 According to Carlos Romulo, the system was perpetuated by 

“the mutual protective society sponsored . . . by the army officers’ corps.”22
38

Once in position, the system continued to promote those with the best 

political connections over those with combat experience.23 “Conditions 

were deplorable in the Department of Defense and worse in the uniformed 

forces. The latter especially had been weakened by the almost complete 

infiltration of political influence and machination. Officers openly 

intrigued for promotion and plush assignments.”24 Without a substantial 

shock to the system the situation was unlikely to change, as there was no 

incentive to change.

In 1950, events elsewhere in the world kept the United States actively 

engaged in almost all theaters. The previous year saw the Soviet Union 

detonate an atomic bomb, a communist victory in China, and communist 

regimes take power in East Germany and Hungary. Malaya, Indochina, 

and Burma were all in the midst of communist insurgencies and in June 

1950 North Korean forces invaded South Korea, initiating a conventional 

war on the Korean peninsula. In light of the rapidly expanding communist 

threat, American decolonization policy took a back seat to preventing 

communist success in the Philippines.25

For US officials in the Philippines, the publication of NSC-68 by 

the National Security Council in April 1950 provided the basis for 

future American policy in the Philippines. Those parts of the document 

specifically addressing concerns in Asia properly identified the problems 

facing officials in the Philippines, as not simply economic but also 

institutional and administrative.26 As one political scientist noted, the US 

moved away from a policy of bolstering, or almost blindly supporting the 

existing regime, and towards a policy of quid pro quo reforms.27

With Washington’s attention focused elsewhere, US officials in the 

Philippines had significant leeway for local action, as long as those actions 

met America’s policy objectives. Under a weak or indecisive ambassador 

this could have spelled disaster, but the embassy was ably led at the time 

by Ambassador Myron Cowen. When Lansdale finally joined Cowen and 

the rest of the US mission in the Philippines, the leeway afforded them 

by Washington’s distraction allowed US officials in the Philippines to 

develop local solutions to local problems.28

Only a week before the publication of NSC-68, the US Counselor of 

Embassy Vinton Chapin, assessed the security situation in the Philippines 

in a dispatch to Secretary of State Acheson. Chapin believed the US military 

aid program and JUSMAG were “well-equipped to advise with respect 

to ordinary matters of military organization and operations but [they] 

have inadequate knowledge of and expertise with political subversion 
39

and guerrilla warfare,” and that perhaps the JUSMAG mandate needed to 

expand beyond just an advisory role. He further noted that the equipment 

being supplied to the Philippines was “not well-suited to the requirements 

of guerrilla warfare.”29 Interestingly, Chapin noted the need for the proper 

US military personnel to advise on counterinsurgency, yet neglected to 

note that AFP personnel were inadequate to the task, focusing instead on 

their materiel. Chapin comes close to, but misses making the point that the 

US advisory effort needed to focus on professionalizing the AFP officer 

corps and improving esprit de corps.

Chapin went on to recommend that the Department of Defense assign 

a “substantial” number of officers to JUSMAG with experience in guerrilla 

warfare - specifically mentioning colonels David D. Barrett and Frank N. 

Roberts, both of whom were involved with guerrilla movements in China 

during World War II. Chapin’s vision of an expanded role for JUSMAG 

included the types of actions employed by the US advisory mission during 

the Greek Civil War, and went so far as to suggest the US “Quietly . . . 

move moderate-sized Army units onto the Clark Field Air Base,” an idea 

expanded on by the Melby-Erskine Military Assistance mission to “not 

less than a reinforced division.”30

As noted by Chapin, the situation called for new personnel to assist the 

embassy team in the Philippines. However, the Philippines was not China, 

and whoever was chosen to tackle the problems in the Philippines needed 

to have some background or understanding of the country. The US also 

needed a reliable partner within the Philippine government.31 Yet existing 

candidates within the government’s senior leadership were assessed 

as lacking the necessary capabilities.32 While the situation was dire, it 

also provided an opportunity for change that may not have developed 

otherwise, and the opportunity came in the form of Edward Lansdale and 

Ramon Magsaysay.33

Lansdale’s Development

Edward Lansdale truly represents a case of the right person, in the 

right place, at the right time. In hindsight it would seem that every aspect 

of his development, aided by his personality, prepared him for his role in 

combating the Huks. From his experiences with the Office of Strategic 

Services (OSS) in the Pacific theater during the war, to his post-war 

assignments and professional relationships, Lansdale personality and 

professional development prepared him for the challenges he faced in the 

Philippines. However, this apparent luck or providence was grounded in 

something more tangible.
40

Throughout Lansdale’s autobiography and biography, it is clear that 

personality played an important part in his actions in the Philippines. 

He possessed deep convictions about the importance of his work in 

fighting communism, but more importantly in promoting democracy 

and democratic ideals.34 Lansdale’s journal, from his early days in the 

Philippines, demonstrates that he genuinely cared about the plight of the 

lower classes, particularly those in the provinces, applying blame equally 

to the Huks and the PC for the peasant’s suffering.35 Lansdale’s genuine 

nature was also noted by those who came to know him personally. In 

describing Lansdale, Ramon Magsaysay’s son noted that “he was nice. He 

was not rough or tough. He [had] good rapport with ordinary people. I think 

that’s why my father got close to him, because they were both sensitive of 

ordinary people . . . He was sincere. He didn’t ruffle feathers. He was quiet 

. . . he was more observing.”36 All of these characteristics contributed to a 

charisma that naturally attracted people to him, and allowed him to work 

with individuals from diverse backgrounds.

Prior to World War II he worked as an advertising executive in 

California, a career path that would later prove useful. During the war 

he found employment in the ranks of the OSS. His work with the OSS 

exposed him to the usefulness of clandestine and covert operations. The 

OSS also broadened his horizons in terms of who might prove useful in 

intelligence work, as he traveled the west coast of the US speaking with 

a broad range of experts in various fields.37 Working with the OSS in the 

Pacific Theater also provided him a geographic orientation that would 

remain for the vast majority of his career.

Following the war, with his unconventional OSS days behind him, 

Lansdale was assigned to the conventional G-2 (Intelligence) section of 

US Army Forces Western Pacific, based in the Philippines, from 1945-

1948. In this capacity, Lansdale was responsible for collecting, analyzing 

and presenting information on a wide range of issues. His section not only 

produced intelligence on security threats, such as the Huks, they were also 

responsible for assessing the political and economic situation.38 While 

Lansdale had a staff to aid in this process, he shied away from office based 

assessments and analysis, preferring instead to go out and see the situation 

for himself.

This desire for firsthand information started as early as late 1945, 

when he wanted to determine why the Huks had so much popular support. 

Prior to an anti-Huk PC operation Lansdale looked at maps of the intended 

operations area and identified likely Huk escape routes. He then drove 

a jeep to one of the identified routes and after encountering a Huk unit, 
41

spent time talking to them, sharing beer and cigarettes as he listened to 

their stories.39 The event helped shape his understanding of the Huks as 

individuals. It also led him to develop his own ideas about how to come to 

grips with the situation in the Philippines, concluding that “the first lesson 

is rather basic: there is no substitute for first-hand knowledge.”40

Lansdale’s rapidly increasing appreciation of the problems in the 

Philippines yielded a later observation that “90% of the officers hadn’t the 

least idea of what was going on for the Wack Wack [Country Club] is still 

operating, and there are lots of dependents living here now and the Army 

has started drawing off into its own little community.”41 Lansdale made 

an important observation in this remark. Despite US pre-war institutional 

knowledge, World War II altered the fabric of Philippine society.42

Ambassador Cowen identified a similar problem within the diplomatic 

corps. Part of the problem was a need for “better training of political 

officers and desirability they spend less time at their desks.”43 Instead of 

actively getting out amongst the population, Americans in the Philippines 

were content to isolate themselves.

Lansdale’s developing empathy for the people in the Philippines also 

began to encompass the rank-and-file of the Huk movement. Based on 

his contact and interaction with Huks during his forays into the field, 

combined with the personality traits described earlier, Lansdale developed 

an appreciation of the differences between the Huk leadership and the 

average Huk fighter.44 In one instance, PC officer Napoleon Valeriano 

invited Lansdale to observe an operation in which they surrounded a 

Huk base and were preparing to attack. Lansdale declined the invitation 

to observe from the PC forward command post because “I have broken 

bread and shared cans of beer with folks on both sides of this squabble, 

and I couldn’t square with myself if I had to sit and listen to the orders 

being issued to kill people I knew.”45 The Huks were no longer faceless, 

dogmatic communists to Lansdale, but individuals with unique and 

perhaps justifiable motivations for fighting the government.

Just as Lansdale was growing closer to the Filipino people, the same 

was not true of civil-military relations between the American military 

and Filipino civilians. Civil-military relations were suffering during the 

immediate post-war years for a number of reasons, and the decision was 

eventually made to place the Public Information Office under the G-2 

in order to reinvigorate the office with new leadership. The office had 

previously been led by a full colonel. Major Lansdale was given the task 

of rebuilding the American military’s image in the Philippines through 

the Public Information Office.46 This position was to prove extremely 

important in Lansdale’s development.
42

As the de facto public information officer for the Philippines Ryuku 

Command (PHILRYCOM), Lansdale came in close contact with the 

editors of almost all of the major newspapers and publications in the 

Philippines. One of his most important contacts, Juan “Johnny” Orendain, 

was both Lansdale’s lawyer and his subordinate in the Intelligence 

Division, Armed Forces Western Pacific, G-2.47 Orendain was well known 

in Manila and became President Roxas’ press secretary in late 1946.48

Unlike previous press secretaries, Orendain was invited to participate 

in cabinet meetings, giving him unprecedented access to the executive 

decision-making process in Malacañan, and indirectly providing Lansdale 

the same access.49 Through Orendain and other lower level government 

officials, and his press contacts, Lansdale developed a substantial social 

network that included businessmen, industrialists, and local, provincial, 

and national level government officials. Combined with his provincial 

trips that allowed him to meet with the lower classes, Lansdale’s network 

encompassed virtually all social classes.

An early lesson in humility and relationship building came when 

Lansdale’s superior officer in the G-2/Public Information Office departed 

the Philippines. The embassy public relations officer, Julius C.C. Edelstein 

was departing around the same time and had performed similar functions 

and traveled in the same circles. Lansdale learned an important lesson 

from their respective legacies:

Julius is just getting a lot of dirty cracks from the papers and he 

is quite annoyed. He has helped [President] Roxas with most of 

his speeches as well as being [Ambassador] McNutt’s P.R.O., 

but he also goes around after a couple of drinks telling people 

that he has made his mark on Philippine history and is a big man 

in the Islands, which doesn’t wash down so well with the local 

folks. Julius probably worked a lot harder than [Colonel] Chester 

but, Chester spent his time making friends. There’s a moral there 

somewhere for Americans out in the Philippines.50

Even though Lansdale was quite visible in the Philippines during his 

service in the country, he clearly tried to take Colonel Chester’s lesson 

in humility and relationship building to heart. When Lansdale left the 

Philippines with his family in 1948, more than a hundred Filipinos came 

to see them off.51 He left his mark on the hearts of his Filipino friends 

during his first assignment, but it would take his next assignment in the 

Philippines for him to leave his mark on the country’s history.52
43

Magsaysay’s Development

Unknown to Lansdale during his first assignment in the Philippines, 

his future partner in the struggle against the Huks was developing along a 

parallel track. Congressman Ramon Magsaysay was building a name for 

himself not only in his home province of Zambales, but on the national 

scene as well. By 1950, Ramon Magsaysay had solidified his understanding 

of the problem and what was needed to reverse his country’s slide into 

chaos. However, his development as a leader began long before he burst 

onto the stage in 1950.

Magsaysay spent his early years in Zambales as the son of a trade 

school teacher, in a simple house. An early life lesson impressed on 

Magsaysay the cost of adhering to principles and ideals. His father failed 

the son of the trade schools superintendent, and was fired.53 Despite the 

family’s crisis, Ramon Magsaysay took the lesson to heart and continued 

to learn from his very principled father. Magsaysay started working at the 

age of seven and continued to work throughout his childhood in order to 

help make ends meet for his family. During this period he began working 

in his father’s small blacksmith shop where he developed a lifelong interest 

in all things mechanical, and which started him down a road that would 

lead to the presidency.54

Magsaysay became a mechanic for the Try Tran bus company in 

1931. Working for Try Tran brought him intervals of relative prosperity 

and absolute misery as the fortunes of the company rose and fell. He 

and his newly formed family learned what it was to live in poverty.55

Yet his association with the bus company also brought him opportunity. 

When the Japanese invaded the Philippines in late 1941, the company 

was commandeered by the US military to transport soldiers. Magsaysay 

volunteered his services and because of his skills was commissioned as a 

captain in the 31st Division’s motor pool, under the command of Colonel 

Napoleon Valeriano.56

When Bataan fell, Magsaysay and his unit were still in Zambales. 

Rather than surrender, they organized themselves into a guerrilla unit 

under the command of Colonel Gyles Merrill.57 As an officer in the 

Zambales Guerrillas, as they came to be known, Magsaysay excelled at 

motivating his fellow Filipino guerrillas, but held one belief that caused 

him grief with both his countrymen and the Americans. He believed in 

reconciliation with collaborators. Rather than executing or assassinating 

collaborators, Magsaysay argued on their behalf. This trait would continue 
44

beyond the war in his views of the Huks and their supporters.58 Despite 

differences of opinion regarding collaboration, Magsaysay eventually rose 

to command the Zambales Guerrillas, developing an impressive operational 

record.59 When liberation came, MacArthur asked for nominations for 

provincial military governors from the guerrilla leaders and Colonel 

Merrill submitted Magsaysay’s name. Magsaysay was appointed military 

governor of Zambales province in February 1945, starting him on his postwar political career.60

Though his career as the military governor of Zambales was a short 

two months this post, combined with his reputation as a guerrilla leader, 

brought him to the attention of Manuel Roxas. Roxas invited him to Manila 

and offered him a seat on his ticket for the upcoming election in 1946.61

Magsaysay turned him down, but later relented under pressure from 

former guerrilla comrades that he run for congress, helping establish a 

large popular base within the province.62 His election campaign ironically 

pitted him against a man chosen by Roxas after Magsaysay’s initial 

refusal. Despite the party machinery backing Roxas’ chosen candidate, 

Magsaysay won by the largest majority in the history of Zambales.63 The 

attributes that characterized Magsaysay the man, helped make Magsaysay 

the congressman.

The attributes that made Magsaysay so popular with the people derived 

from two main sources. The first were his humble origins and the traits 

imbued in him while living in Zambales. Out of those origins came his 

belief in hard work and uncompromising principles.64 The people related 

to Magsaysay because they saw something of themselves in him, and vice 

versa. This built a strong bond of trust between Magsaysay and the people, 

and he was unwilling to break that bond of trust by taking advantage of his 

position for personal gain. Magsaysay’s son remembered that as president, 

when his family would host family and friends at gatherings at Malacañan 

Palace, his father would deduct the cost of the event from his monthly 

salary.65 Magsaysay wanted to demonstrate integrity and character by 

personally setting the example.

Magsaysay’s leadership by example, developed during his days as a 

guerrilla leader, characterized his other main attribute. One of Magsaysay’s 

lieutenants related advice given him by Magsaysay that “a leader must go 

through the same difficulties of his men if he is to understand them.”66

Once in office, Magsaysay translated this wartime lesson from service to 

his fellow guerrillas to his fellow citizens. The example Magsaysay set 

fostered a strong sense of loyalty not only amongst his supporters, but also 

in converts to his cause. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr. noted the story of Eddie 
45

Ngolab, a former Huk that his father pardoned while Secretary of National 

Defense. Ngolab was allowed to join the AFP and was subsequently 

assigned as a bodyguard to the Magsaysay family, specifically Ramon, 

Jr. The former Huk remained with the family throughout the presidency. 

Following President Magsaysay’s untimely death, Ngolab requested 

to remain with the now former-first family, and did so until Ramon, Jr. 

completed college.67

Coming from the provinces and humble origins, Magsaysay had 

an almost innate sociocultural understanding. This in turn fostered his 

empathy for the average Filipino, with whom he readily identified. These 

qualities gave Magsaysay a powerful popular base that would serve him 

well in the years to come, but that did not necessarily translate into the type 

of support or recognition necessary to on the national stage. As 1949 drew 

to a close there was no indication that in less than a year Magsaysay would 

be the Secretary of National Defense. In fact, given the volatile nature of 

Philippine politics and rigidity of the social classes, the Americans took a 

risk in backing him.

Why Magsaysay?

History should not assume that Magsaysay was the American’s logical 

or only choice for a partner. Reuters correspondent Peter C. Richards, a 

contemporary and acquaintance of Magsaysay and Lansdale, believed that 

Lansdale could have had the same success in promoting his houseboy, 

such were Lansdale’s skills.68 Lansdale’s extensive contacts from his early 

days in the Philippines exposed him to many, if not most, of the most 

important political, business, and social leaders in the country. So why did 

the United States choose to back Magsaysay?

Magsaysay was not from the political establishment in the Philippines. 

While this made him popular with the lower and middle classes, he faced 

formidable opposition from the entrenched ruling class. Philippine politics 

was characterized by what has been termed dynasticism or the rule of 

powerful political families or patronage networks. While “factionalism 

and patron-client ties have been isolated as the main structures of 

Philippine politics,” Dr. Mina Roces argues that these are symptoms of the 

larger, underlying problem of “politica de familia” or kinship politics.69

The families that maintained traditional control over the provinces had 

significant support bases stemming from the old practice of caciquism, 

or political control through local political bosses.70 Traditionally, political 

success rested on the degree of support derived from these families.
46

In addition to Magsaysay’s lack of political pedigree, he also lacked 

the refinement normally associated with service at the national executive 

level. In a letter from Carlos Romulo, Philippine ambassador to the US, 

to Ambassador Myron Cowen, Romulo discussed a press conference held 

for Magsaysay in Washington, DC. In response to press questions during 

the event, Magsaysay “unfortunately tried to answer and did not know 

who Adenauer and Schumacher are, did not know what the Bonn Treaty 

is, nor the difference between Teheran and Yalta.”71 In light of Lansdale’s 

exposure to a broad cross-section of Philippine leadership, it would seem 

he could have chosen someone more refined and from the existing political 

establishment. Lansdale once described his friend, experienced Filipino 

politician Lorenzo Tañada as “the defender of almost forgotten national 

ethics,” a good starting qualification by any standard.72 Ambassador Carlos 

Romulo represented another option. He was well known to the Americans, 

having come ashore with MacArthur at Leyte in 1945, and then serving 

as the Philippine ambassador to the United States.73 Both Tañada and 

Romulo were polished and experienced politicians. Despite other options, 

Lansdale and the Americans must have been looking at other qualities.

Magsaysay’s personality played a role, and personality was extremely 

important if the US was going to overcome the power of the entrenched 

ruling class. His popularity with the people gave him mass appeal that 

would help to shield him from inevitable attacks by opponents within the 

ruling class. Frisco San Juan, a former Magsaysay lieutenant, shed light 

on the American decision to choose Magsaysay over someone closer to 

the ruling class. “We are hero worshipers. I would say, between a man 

who you would love and worship as your leader, and an institution, like 

say, democracy . . . what’s democracy all about? I love this man! That’s 

how I think [we] behave.”74 By 1950, the Philippines needed a hero, not a 

representative of the old order.

The US took a gamble by backing a man who was capable of developing 

such a large, popular base of support. Compounding the American gamble 

was that they were sponsoring Magsaysay against the vested interests 

of the existing establishment. Instead of serving as a rallying point or 

unifying force for the whole country, there was a risk that Magsaysay 

might divide the classes further. During a local political race in Negros 

Province, opposition candidate Moises Padilla was murdered at the behest 

of the provincial governor Rafael Lacson. Padilla’s body was hung in the 

street as a warning against challenging the existing order. Upon hearing 

of the case, Magsaysay immediately went to the town, retrieved the body 

of Padilla and personally carried it through the streets, and subsequently 
47

arrested Lacson. The much publicized event incensed President Quirino, 

as Lacson was “one of Quirino’s biggest vote manufacturers.”75

Lacson was from the establishment, and Magsaysay’s actions directly 

threatened that establishment. Even more damaging, in the eyes of the 

elites, was the popular outpouring of support from the lower classes 

that prevented Magsaysay experiencing any real repercussions for his 

actions.76 Widespread popular support of the masses could be dangerous 

if Magsaysay was not committed to democratic ideals. In the end, trust 

was arguably one of the most important factors in the US selection of 

Magsaysay as its partner. Lansdale and the US had to trust that once in 

power, Magsaysay would not consolidate power in an authoritarian 

regime, relying on popular support.

With the decision made in favor of Magsaysay in the spring of 1950, 

a delegation of American officials traveled to Manila to work for his 

appointment as Secretary of National Defense.77 The delegation arrived 

none too soon, as a political dispute between Quirino and Speaker of 

the House Eugenio Perez threatened to rip the government apart. Perez 

was threatening Quirino’s impeachment if he did not step down. In turn 

Quirino was likely to fire the Secretary of National Defense and assume 

the position himself in order to forestall the impeachment.78 Such an act 

would have at best undermined US foreign policy in the Far East, and at 

worst, doomed democracy in the Philippines. Making matters worse, the 

Huks launched major, coordinated offensives in a number of provinces in 

Luzon, highlighting the Philippine government’s weakness.79

Developing the Team

President Elpidio Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary 

of National Defense on 31 August 1950, and Magsaysay assumed his 

duties the next day. Within a week of Magsaysay’s appointment, Edward 

Lansdale was once again in the Philippines. Lansdale and Magsaysay 

appear to have seen eye to eye on many of the actions necessary to avert the 

growing crisis in the Philippines when they were discussing the situation 

from the safety of Washington.80 They were now responsible for putting 

those ideas into action. 

Lansdale’s guidance from Washington was sufficiently broad to 

provide him leeway to execute his mission as necessary, but it also had a 

clear intent to guide his actions. His mission was to:

Protect American interests in the Philippines and to consolidate 

a power base for Ramon Magsaysay . . . provide counsel and 

support to the new secretary of national defense, influence the 
48

revitalization of the Philippine Army, help the government make 

progress in its war against the Huks, urge political reform upon 

the government, and . . . help Filipinos have an honest election in 

the November 1951 balloting.81

While the tasks were daunting, Washington’s intent was much simpler. 

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) wanted Lansdale to help the 

Philippine government defeat the Huks in any way he could, and “it 

was up to me to figure out how best to do this.”82 As noted previously, 

Washington’s preoccupation with events elsewhere in the world distracted 

official attention on the Philippines, contributing to Lansdale’s freedom of 

action there.

In order to accomplish his assigned tasks, Lansdale arrived as a 

nominal member of JUSMAG, ostensibly assigned as the intelligence 

advisor to President Quirino. In fact, his authorities far exceeded his low 

rank and position. Embassy officials were supposed to cooperate with 

Lansdale almost without question, up to and including the ambassador and 

the JUSMAG chief.83 Despite Lansdale’s significant power, the memories 

of Lansdale’s colleagues at the embassy and in JUSMAG suggest that 

rather than abusing or flaunting his power, he preferred instead to build 

consensus and support for his operations.84 It would seem he remembered 

the lesson of Colonel Chester and Julius Edelstein from his previous 

Philippines assignment.

The first order of business had to be security sector reform. Lansdale 

and Magsaysay had to stabilize the deteriorating security situation before 

they could move forward on more ambitious projects. Some reforms were 

already underway. The unwieldy Philippine infantry divisions, organized 

and equipped on the US model, were ill suited to fighting the Huks. 

The result was the Battalion Combat Team (BCT) concept. The BCT 

organizational reform created smaller, lighter, more mobile, and more lethal, 

multifunctional units of 1,000-1,500 soldiers that would theoretically be 

more capable of engaging the Huks on their own territory.85 Unfortunately, 

while the BCT reform was a major step in the right direction it was largely 

cosmetic. The real problem facing the AFP, even with the new BCTs, was 

that the same men were still leading both the Army and Constabulary.

If the peasants of Central Luzon were suffering from absentee 

landlordism, then the soldiers of the AFP and PC were suffering from 

absentee leadership. There were professional, dedicated officers within 

both organizations, but the officer corps was increasingly politicized, 

and to achieve significant rank or position, an officer needed a political 
49

patron. Officers with little or no field experience were being promoted 

over officers who were actively engaged in fighting the Huks in the field.86

Essentially, the soldiers in the field felt they were fighting the war alone 

while their leaders were out of harm’s way. Morale was at an all-time low, 

and the “armed forces . . . needed rehabilitation almost as much as did the 

country itself.”87

As noted previously, the embassy and JUSMAG knew the AFP and 

PC needed new leadership, but they could only advise and apply pressure 

through aid. Now, with Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense they 

had an ally in position to affect change. However, because of the politicized 

officer corps, it was unlikely that Magsaysay would be able to bring about 

any real change.88 He needed broad authority from President Quirino to 

make personnel decisions if he was going to make the necessary reforms 

within the security forces, without them he would be impotent. This 

authority represented a significant increase in the power of the Secretary 

of National Defense, and a simultaneous diminishing of Quirino’s power. 

Actually getting Qurinio to give Magsaysay that power would require 

external pressure.

The Americans were able to pressure Quirino into giving Magsaysay 

more power, and his new powers were not insignificant. As a result, 

Magsaysay had the power to promote, demote, and fire officers on the spot.

89 This one act was arguably the catalyst needed to rebuild the AFP. With his 

new found power, Magsaysay embarked on his soon to be famous inspection 

tours, literally dropping in on unsuspecting AFP units in the field. Not only 

was Magsaysay able to rid the field army of underperforming officers, he 

was able to promote good ones immediately.90 Magsaysay established the 

Special Board of Inquiry to investigate abuses and improprieties within 

the AFP; all told Board investigations led to the removal or retirement 

of 400 officers.91 The power also allowed him to reform the promotion 

boards. Where previously, rear echelon and staff officers with connections 

received the promotions, Magsaysay insisted that field officers with good 

combat records take priority.92 The soldiers in the field now felt they had a 

champion in Manila. Morale steadily improved in the AFP, as did combat 

performance.

Another basic, but important initiative was increasing the pay of 

Filipino soldiers. Previously, AFP personnel only received 30 centavos a 

day. Magsaysay increased it to one peso a day, funded by US military 

aid. This seemingly simple move had important implications for the 

counterinsurgency campaign. Magsaysay knew that his soldiers had been 

stealing food and other basic necessities from the populace, alienating the 
50

AFP from the people. The more than threefold increase in pay allowed 

soldiers to pay for supplies.93 During Magsaysay’s inspection tours he was 

also checking on his soldier’s welfare, as “the underdog of the army was 

certainly the common soldier who was battling the Huks in the field.”94

The new Secretary endeavored to improve the average soldier’s lot in life 

and as a result esprit de corps gradually returned to the armed forces.95

Even with improving morale and combat performance, the AFP 

faced a stiff fight. By early 1950 estimates put Huk strength at around 

fifteen thousand armed fighters, with an active support base of around one 

million.96 During Lansdale’s first weeks in the Philippines he reinitiated 

contact with local friends from his first tour in the country. He wanted to 

understand why the Huks were succeeding and government failing. The 

picture his friends painted was not good, and most of it stemmed from 

government and security force abuses of power. It appeared as though 

Quirino’s administration was assuming the trappings of an authoritarian 

regime.97

Reminiscent of his first tour in the Philippines, Lansdale wanted to get 

outside of the protective bubble of Manila that few embassy or JUSMAG 

officials ventured beyond. JUSMAG policy for members of the US 

government in the Philippines severely restricted travel throughout many 

parts of the country. While this security measure improved the safety of 

US personnel, it also blinded the embassy. Without the ability to travel 

freely, the embassy was forced to rely largely on the word of their personal 

and professional contacts. Not surprisingly, most of those contacts were 

from the elite and land owning class. Using the authority given him by 

OPC, Lansdale requested that Major General Leland Hobbs waive the 

policy for his team in the Philippines.98 With uninhibited freedom of 

movement, Lansdale quickly returned to his old habit of getting out into 

the countryside.

Lansdale’s contact with his old friends, and more importantly with 

civilians in the provinces, gave him pause. While some of the Huks actions 

may have been reprehensible, they appeared justifiable to the peasants of 

Central Luzon given the Philippine government’s repressive actions.99

Between the corrupt government and abusive security forces, more 

and more people were either actively or passively supporting the Huk 

movement. The people felt they no longer had a stake in the survival of 

the government. Before they could reverse Huk successes, Lansdale and 

Magsaysay had to find a way to rebuild the relationship between citizen 

and government.
51

The Team in Action

Magsaysay achieved an important victory early in his tenure as 

Secretary of National Defense. A mid-level Huk leader, Tarciano 

Rizal, approached Magsaysay under the guise of seeking amnesty and 

reconciliation with the government. His real mission was to assassinate the 

new secretary. However, Rizal apparently had a change of heart because of 

a long conversation he had with Magsaysay. Rather than just reconciling 

with the government, Rizal provided Magsaysay information on how to 

locate the PKP Politburo.100 On 18 October 1950 the AFP launched raids 

across Manila, netting more than a hundred PKP members, a number of 

Politburo members, and literally tons of documents. As useful as the event 

was in terms of intelligence, AFP morale, and positive publicity, it did not 

solve the immediate problem facing Magsaysay and Lansdale.

They had to identify ways to regain popular support and trust in the 

AFP. It was not simply a question of increasing military effectiveness 

against the Huks. Magsaysay’s internal reforms were gaining traction, but 

it was an uphill battle against an entrenched establishment, that would 

take time. They needed to develop programs that would begin siphoning 

away the Huk support base, improve the AFP image, and alleviate the 

conditions of the Filipino people. Unfortunately, the Roxas and Quirino 

administrations had made promises before with little follow through. 

Whatever programs Magsaysay and Lansdale developed had to be derived 

from empathy for the plight of the people, and based on an understanding 

of the sociocultural condition of those people. Any disingenuous efforts 

would be viewed as simply more of the same from a government that was 

only concerned with self-preservation. 

It would not be easy. The AFP Chief of Staff, Major General Mariano 

Castaneda, was a Quirino loyalist and hindered the development of 

Magsaysay’s initiatives. From Castaneda’s point of view, Magsaysay 

was simply a “guerrilla major,” with no real military experience or 

background.101 Additionally, Magsaysay could only affect half the 

problem, as the Secretary of the Interior administered the Constabulary, 

while provincial governors maintained operational control of the PC 

units in their provinces.102 Magsaysay was able to bring the PC under his 

authority on 23 December 1950, causing a significant uproar within the 

entrenched establishment.103 The PC had been the establishment’s tool 

of choice in targeting the peasant movement, as the governors generally 

came from the landowning establishment. Magsaysay’s control of the PC 

stripped the establishment of a significant degree of power.
52

While the establishment no longer controlled the PC as they once 

did, they still had the paramilitary Civilian Guards. According to Charles 

T. R. Bohannon and Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, both of whom played 

important roles in the Huk campaign, Magsaysay attempted to disband the 

Civilian Guards entirely. This proved infeasible because the AFP lacked 

the personnel to replace them in the provinces. The order to disband 

was rescinded and Magsaysay and the AFP embarked on a campaign to 

professionalize the Civilian Guards by sending AFP personnel “to train and 

control” them.104 The program must have been successful, as former Huks 

credited Magsaysay with getting rid of the Civilian Guards entirely.105

With JUSMAG backing, Magsaysay was finally able to shake-up 

the combined AFP-PC leadership, though it was not quite the victory 

Magsaysay, Lansdale and JUSMAG hoped for. The AFP and PC chiefs of 

staff were both fired, but another Quirino loyalist was appointed as chief 

of staff, Castaneda retained his title without the authority, and Brigadier 

General Ramos, the former PC chief of staff, was made the director of 

the National Bureau of Investigation.106 The Philippine Ambassador to the 

US, Joaquin M. Elizalde described Brigadier General Florencio Selga, the 

new Constabulary chief of staff, as a “complete Ramos stooge.”107 Despite 

Quirino’s actions, Magsaysay pushed ahead with his plans.

Magsaysay started in the right direction to rebuild the AFPs integrity. 

Now he needed initiatives to tie the people back to the AFP. Even with his 

sociocultural understanding, Magsaysay relied on a wide range of inputs. 

He utilized his former guerrilla contacts in the provinces to inform him 

of Huk activities and initiatives, providing him with context in which to 

develop his own initiatives.108 Lansdale also played an instrumental role 

in helping Magsaysay refine and develop his ideas further, in a unique 

way. Informal discussion groups developed at Lansdale’s residence on 

Camp Murphy, where Magsaysay likewise resided.109 These groups grew 

to include AFP officers from combat units, staff officers, businessmen, 

trusted politicians, and essentially anyone Lansdale and Magsaysay 

thought might have innovative and useful ideas.110

Easily the most memorable and oft cited Magsaysay-Lansdale 

initiative was the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR).111 While this 

was an important initiative in terms of positive publicity, there were others 

of equal significance in rebuilding the bonds between the people and the 

AFP. When poor farmers were taken to court by wealthy landowners they 

generally did so alone, while the landowner was represented by lawyers. 

Inevitably the farmer lost. One of Magsaysay’s initiatives was using AFP 

Judge Advocate lawyers in civilian clothes to represent farmers in court 
53

pro bono.112 Magsaysay believed that “he who has less in life should have 

more in law.”113 Where they had previously had little in life and the law, 

Magsaysay was using the AFP to alter the equation.

Another initiative, and one that would continue into Magsaysay’s 

presidency, was the “10 centavo telegram.” Magsaysay wanted feedback 

from the people about AFP performance, similar to that which he got from 

his surprise inspection tours. In order to get this feedback he established 

a method for anyone to send him a telegram at an inexpensive rate, with 

the promise of rapid follow up. While skepticism ran deep at first, it did 

not take long for word to get around that the new Secretary of National 

Defense of was true to his word. Not only did the volume of telegrams 

increase exponentially, people began sending information on Huk 

activities in addition to reports on AFP performance.114 These were just 

two of the initiatives that had a significant effect on civil-military relations 

in Magsaysay’s first year as Secretary of National Defense.

With popular trust and confidence in the AFP on the rise, the 

military campaign gained traction against the Huks. However, this 

did not necessarily translate into trust and confidence in the Philippine 

government. One of the same characteristics making Magsaysay popular 

also limited the effectiveness of their campaign. Magsaysay was not from 

the traditional political establishment and might prove to be an anomaly. 

The bottom line was that the same men were still in power in Manila, and 

the November 1951 mid-term congressional and gubernatorial elections 

might undermine any success the AFP might have militarily.115

American influence was strong in the Philippines, but no matter 

how much Washington lobbied for clean elections, US embassy officials 

believed that “the elections will be honest only if Quirino sincerely wishes 

them to be.”116 In this case, honest elections were not in the best interest of 

Quirino or the Liberal Party. Despite the significant leeway Lansdale had 

in accomplishing his mission in the Philippines, he had to be particularly 

careful in handling the 1951 election. Rather than attempting to engineer 

the election outcome, like Liberal Party officials were planning to do, 

Lansdale and Magsaysay needed to ensure clean elections.117

Understanding Philippine society, culture, and politics, Lansdale 

determined their best recourse was to use the Philippine electoral code 

and existing laws to their advantage.118 Partnering with the Philippine 

Electoral Commission, Magsaysay and the AFP provided much needed 

manpower to the woefully understrength government body.119 Members 

of Lansdale’s OPC team helped establish the National Movement for Free 
54

Elections (NAMFREL), a non-governmental body dedicated to supporting 

clean elections through educating the electorate.120 NAMFREL was ably 

assisted throughout the election period by Gabriel Kaplan, a progressive 

New York Republican with extensive experience in combatting electoral 

fraud and corruption in the United States.121 Throughout the campaign 

season traditional intimidation methods employed by the entrenched 

political elite were thwarted by the AFP. Campaign rallies and speeches 

were guarded by AFP soldiers, permitting citizens to hear candidates from 

both parties equally. 

Lansdale and his team stepped up their efforts on election day in 

November. The AFP actively patrolled the areas surrounding the polling 

sites and ROTC cadets served as election-watchers under Electoral 

Commission supervision.122 Lansdale also orchestrated a large national 

and international media turnout at polling sites to cover the election, 

further preventing fraud. In each provincial capital, where the votes were 

tallied, Philippine News Service correspondents reported unofficial tallies 

over the radio, preventing vote tampering after the polls closed.123

Lansdale and Magsaysay relied on existing Philippine laws and 

institutions to provide the framework for clean elections.124 They 

supplemented this by simply ensuring citizens understood the electoral 

process and had the opportunity to vote. The result was an overwhelming 

success for the opposition party, renewed confidence in democratic 

processes, increased government legitimacy, and a solid relationship 

between the AFP and the people. While the people felt they now had a 

stake in their own government, Magsaysay’s AFP was seen as having 

provided them the opportunity to exercise their rights. The Huk high water 

mark came and went with the 1951 election, but the Philippines was not 

out of danger yet.

The success of the 1951 election was almost a Pyrrhic victory for 

Magsaysay’s career as Secretary of National Defense. “Magsaysay was a 

Liberal Party defense secretary, but he saw to it that the elections would 

be as fair as possible. The majority of the opposition won, and of course 

Quirino, a Liberal, thought my father was part of that.”125 The press did not 

help his relationship with Quirino either, giving Magsaysay credit for the 

clean elections and ignoring Quirino.126 Magsaysay was rapidly moving 

from an inconvenience for Quirino to a potential rival.

In little more than a year, Magsaysay and Lansdale achieved significant 

success in establishing the initiatives that formed the bottom-up effort to 

the Huk campaign. In the absence of the landlords, who once served a 
55

paternalistic function in Philippine agrarian society, Magsaysay was 

rapidly filling the void through his leadership of the AFP, reversing a trend 

that saw the Huks assuming the mantle of leadership in Central Luzon. 

As noted by Magsaysay subordinate Jose Crisol, the military reforms 

“emphasized professionalism and in-service training.”127 His leadership 

of the AFP and PC and programs to professionalize both organizations 

gained traction and were visible in the improved civil-military relationship. 

Magsaysay’s efforts to reform the military were based on his belief that 

the military and the people must be inextricably linked, because “when 

the people are with the Army – here or any place – the Communists are 

finished.”128

Magsaysay and Lansdale also succeeded in empowering the electorate, 

something the lower classes were denied following independence in 

1946. The two men were able to achieve this, despite an entrenched and 

experienced political elite, because of their understanding of that elite 

and what it would take to counter them. The first year of Magsaysay 

and Lansdale’s partnership also saw significant unity of effort within the 

US mission in the Philippines, largely because of Lansdale’s ability to 

build consensus rather than compel support. This unity of effort led to the 

embassies concerted efforts to successfully protect Magsaysay from the 

entrenched establishment. In return, Magsaysay lived up to American faith 

in his abilities by garnering significant popular support and loyalty. The 

successes of this first year proved crucial to preventing the political crisis 

that would develop over the next two years from plunging the country into 

chaos.
56

Notes

1. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Department of 

State, February 15, 1951. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, 6, Part 2 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), 1507.

2. Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 20 

April 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 5 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1976), 1442.

3. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast 

Asian Affairs (Lacy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs 

(Rusk), 30 March 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 5, 1430. 

By this point, Quirino was acknowledged within the US diplomatic community 

as using the armed forces for his political benefit, violating constitutional 

and civil rights. During the 1949 elections Quirino replaced or removed 

non-compliant PC commanders with those willing to do his bidding, he had 

threatened to declare martial law if certain legislation was not passed by 

congress, and was considering taking on the portfolio of Secretary of National 

Defense shortly before being pressured into appointing Magsaysay to the post. 

The reference to Antonio Quirino’s association with the People’s Court is 

significant because this was the judicial body established to try collaborators 

after World War II. The likely gave Antonio Quirino very dubious grounds on 

which to collect “evidence” about former collaborators, who just happened to 

comprise a significant number of senior officials in all branches of government 

and the military.

4. Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 20 April 

1950, 1441.

5. Macdonald, 138. Antonio Quirino was alleged to have had dossiers 

on numerous public officials with evidence implicating them in a range of 

improprieties that would have engulfed them in scandal.

6. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum No. 296: 

Current Situation in the Philippines, 6 June 1950 (CIA Freedom of Information 

Act Library, http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp, accessed on 27 August 2012), 

1-2.

7. Central Intelligence Agency, 3, 9.

8. Carl H. Lande, “Parties and Politics in the Philippines,” Asian Survey 8, 

No. 9 (September 1968): 728. Philippine politics of the time was characterized 

by frequently shifting political alliances. Rather than characteristically American 

party loyalty based on platforms, Filipino politicians were known to move from 

party to party based on individual loyalty to a patron. Individual politicians 

were supported by local political bosses and family leaders who delivered the 

votes in their local areas on election day. Rival political factions often engaged 

in violence and intimidation in the provinces during political campaigns, pitting 

villages against villages or neighborhoods against neighborhoods.
57

9. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum to Director of Central 

Intelligence: Violence during Philippine Elections, 14 October 1949 (CIA 

Freedom of Information Act Library, http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp, 

accessed on 27 August 2012) 1-2.

10. Economic Survey Mission, 3.

11. Macdonald, 146-147.

12. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Assistant Secretary 

of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), 1 June 1950, Foreign Relations of the 

United States, 1950, 6, 1454.

13. Intelligence Memorandum No. 296, 5. In the summer of 1950 the 

CIA characterized the armed forces as lacking coordination between the Army 

and PC, failure to relieve units after long operational periods, low quality 

unit leadership, lack of aggressiveness in all ranks, difficult terrain, and local 

sympathy for the Huks.

14. The Chargé in the Philippines (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, 7 

April 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 6, 1436.

15. Lawrence M. Greenberg, Analysis Branch, US Army Center of 

Military History, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful 

Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1995), 76.

16. The Chargé in the Philippines (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, 7 

April 1950, 1436.

17. Intelligence Memorandum No. 296, 1.

18. Greenberg, 74.

19. Greenberg, 73.

20. Greenberg, 78.

21. Greenberg, 84.

22. Romulo, Gray, 129.

23. Macdonald, 143.

24. Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade in Asia (New York: The John Day 

Company, 1995), 124.

25. Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 20 

April 1950, 1443; See also “A Report to the National Security Council by the 

Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National 

Security” (NSC-68), 15 April 1950 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1950), 8. From here on this document will be cited as NSC-68.

26. NSC-68, 31.

27. Macdonald, 135.
58

28. Lawrence F. Finkelstein, “US at Impasse in Southeast Asia,” Far 

Eastern Survey 19, No. 16 (27 September 1950): 168.

29. The Chargé in the Philippines (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, 7 

April 1950, 1436.

30. Chapin, 1437. See also in the same volume, The Ambassador in the 

Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State, 29 September 1950, 1495. 

Colonel Barrett was a US Army officer with significant experience in China, 

working with the Chinese Communists as part of the US Army Observation 

Group during WWII. Colonel Roberts was the Assistant Chief of Staff of the 

China-Burma-India Theater during WWII, was the US Military Attaché in 

Moscow from 1945-1946, and from 1950-1953 served on the National Security 

Council Senior Staff (Planning Board) as well as serving as the military advisor 

to W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President and Director for 

Mutual Security.

31. Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 20 April 

1950, 1442.

32. Central Intelligence Agency, Prospects for Stability in the Philippines, 

10 August 1950 (CIA Freedom of Information Act Library, http://www.foia.cia.

gov/search.asp, accessed on 27 August 2012), 3.

33. For a condensed biographical timelines for Edward Lansdale and 

Ramon Magsaysay see Appendix B.

34. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, ix, 105-106; Lansdale professed the 

belief that the United States should not simply be anti-communist, but they must 

put forth a positive program that built optimism and hope. See also Lansdale, 

“Reunion of Nieman Fellows,” lecture, Harvard University, 19 June 1957 

(Lansdale Papers, Box 80, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, 

Palo Alto, CA).

35. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 7, 4 February 1947.

36. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012. For a short biographical sketch of Mr. Magsaysay see 

Appendix C.

37. Currey, 23.

38. Headquarters, PHILRYCOM (Philippines Ryukus Command), Weekly 

Activities Report, 9 January 1948 (Lansdale Papers, Box 33, Hoover Institution 

Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA), 4. In the same box in Lansdale’s 

papers are PHILRYCOM Weekly Activities Reports for the weeks of 14 

November and 12 December 1947, and 9 January, 27 March, and 2 April 1948.

39. Currey, 38-39.

40. Edward Lansdale, “Lessons Learned, The Philippines: 1946-1953,” 

Interdepartmental Course on Counterinsurgency, Foreign Service Institute, 
59

26 September 1962, (Lansdale Papers, Box 79, Hoover Institution Archives, 

Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA).

41. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 1, 20 October 1946.

42. Karnow, 637.

43. Typed notes for a presentation on the present situation in the 

Philippines, 5 June 1951 (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 7, Truman Library, 

Independence, MO). In the same document, Cowen also identifies the following 

issues: “A) Need for intelligence coordination, both on a country and an area 

basis. B) Adequate briefing for ambassadors before going to a new post. C) 

Language training, even if it is only a smattering of a difficult language. D) 

Desirability ambassadors should familiarize themselves with all countries within 

their area by periodically visiting such countries. This is perhaps more valuable 

than regional meetings. E) Better economic staffs. [point F is quoted above]. 

G) More adequate coordination of activities of various agencies and better staff 

integration. H) Reduction of administrative overhead.” These notes were likely 

for a meeting Ambassador Cowen had with State Department officials on 8 June 

1951. In this meeting, Cowen elaborated on the points cited above. He believed 

that if he had had a better economic staff there would not have been a need for 

the Bell Economic Survey Mission. He also believed that the State Department 

“should not send people to the Far East who are not interested in going there. 

These officers . . . reflect their unhappiness, and this affects our relations with 

the country.” In response to this, one of the officials at the meeting noted that 

“no one wants to be assigned to the [Far East] . . . which places those posts 

under a severe handicap” (Memorandum of the Under Secretary’s Meeting, 

Prepared in the Department of State, 8 June 1951, Foreign Relations of the 

United States, 1951, 6, Part 2, 1543).

44. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 12, 30 March 1947.

45. Lansdale.

46. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 1, 20 October 1946. The US 

military’s image in the Philippines suffered during the post-World War II years. 

One reason was the “bases” issue, or the US government leasing American 

military installations from the newly independent Philippine government for 99 

years. Arguably though, the main issue was the poor behavior and indiscipline of 

US military personnel in the Philippines.

47. Ward, 1.

48. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 3, 28 November 1946.

49. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 5, 11 January 1947.

50. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 10, 5 March 1947.

51. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 11.

52. Guillermo Sison to Edward Lansdale, personal correspondence, 
60

18 November 1948 (Lansdale Papers, Box 33, Hoover Institution Archives, 

Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA). Throughout Lansdale’s papers at the 

Hoover Institution are letters similar to the one cited here. Beyond generic letters 

of appreciation, the Filipino authors of these correspondences specifically noted 

Lansdale’s personality and character, and the effect he had on the people around 

him.

53. Romulo, Gray, 15.

54. Romulo, Gray, 18.

55. Romulo, Gray, 42-43.

56. Romulo, Gray, 43. Napoleon Valeriano would later play an important 

part in not only the Huk campaign, but also in the work of Lansdale’s CIA team 

in the Philippines, and later in Vietnam.

57. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

58. Romulo, Gray, 48-49.

59. Colonel (ret.) Gyles Merrill to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., 

personal correspondence, 10 June 1952 (Lansdale Papers, Box 34, Hoover 

Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA). In Colonel Merrill’s 

letter to Secretary Pace, he recounts the Zambales Guerrilla’s actions on the 

night of 16-17 January 1945 in response to MacArthur’s orders to guerrillas 

in the Philippines to maximize violence against the Japanese in support of the 

invasion. Under Magsaysay’s command, the Zambales Guerrillas destroyed 

28 Japanese aircraft at San Marcelino airfield, two bridges while under enemy 

fire, a radio installation close to one of the invasion beaches in the vicinity of 

San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. They also blocked the Olongapo-Subic 

highway. The guerrillas eventually succeeded in capturing San Marcelino 

airfield and cleared it of hundreds of mines, thus preparing it for immediate 

American use. Magsaysay’s operations resulted in the unopposed landing of the 

US XI Corps, “despite the presence of about one division of enemy troops in the 

Subic-Bataan area. All valid enemy resistance in the general landing area had 

been overcome by the Zambales Guerrilla Forces.

60. Romulo, Gray, 68.

61. Romulo, Gray, 77-78.

62. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012. Magsaysay served as an officer in the Philippine Veterans 

Association, and continued to nurture his contacts within the ex-guerrilla 

community throughout his career. The popularity of Magsaysay’s former 

guerrilla force in Zambales province gave him uncontested support of the 

guerrillas, their families, and a large number of former guerrilla supporters and 

sympathizers. Additionally, support of the Veterans Association lent organized 

grass roots support during his campaign.
61

63. Romulo, Gray, 84.

64. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

65. Magsaysay.

66. Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012. For a short biographical sketch of Mr. San Juan see Appendix C.

67. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

68. Currey, 89-90.

69. Roces, 184-185.

70. Putzel, 56.

71. Carlos P. Romulo to Myron Cowen, personal correspondence, 9 July 

1952, (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 7, Truman Library, Independence, MO).

72. Journal of Edward Lansdale, No. 11, 19 March 1947.

73. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

74. Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012.

75. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

76. Macdonald, 158, 162.

77. Currey, 70-72. After his initial meeting with Magsaysay, Lansdale 

arranged a meeting between Magsaysay and Assistant Secretary of State 

Livingston Merchant, then serving as liaison to the CIAs Office of Policy 

Coordination (OPC), General Nathan Twining, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force, Colonel George Chester, an intelligence community professional, Colonel 

Richard Stilwell, OPC Director of Far East/Plans Division, and Frank Wisner, 

also of OPC. Having met Magsaysay, the group decided that OPC would support 

Magsaysay in the Philippines. While Ambassador Cowen and JUSMAG Chief, 

Major General Leland Hobbs were responsible for presenting the ultimatum to 

President Quirino, an Office of Policy Coordination team consisting of Colonel 

Chester and Assistant Secretary of State Merchant traveled to the Philippines to 

assist and provide guidance. Other accounts of who presented the ultimatum to 

Quirino exist. John F. Melby of the Department of State Philippine Desk claimed 

in an interview that Ambassador Cowen preferred not to present the ultimatum 

personally as it would have soured an already tense relationship with Quirino 

(John F. Melby interview).

78. Macdonald, 144.

79. Macdonald, 137.
62

80. Currey, 70.

81. Currey, 78.

82. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 2. As originally designed, the Central 

Intelligence Agency only recommended covert operations based on the 

intelligence it collected. A joint Department of Defense and Department of State 

panel then determined which operations should be carried out. The instrument 

created to carry out those operations was the Office of Policy Coordination 

(OPC). The OPC was placed under the CIA because of the intelligence 

collection activities provided by the Agency, but the Departments of Defense 

and State essentially maintained directive authority and operational control of 

the organization. The OPC was also funded by the CIA and its personnel were 

drawn from CIA ranks (Currey, 62-63).

83. Currey, 79-80.

84. Lansdale to Cowen, personal correspondence, 2 September 1960 

(Myron Cowen Papers, Box 6, Truman Library, Independence, MO). Lansdale 

maintained positive relationships with ambassadors Myron Cowen and 

Raymond Spruance. Cowen and Lansdale maintained a friendship long after 

Cowen’s departure. In a letter from Lansdale to Cowen in 1960, referring to 

Cowen as “Boss,” Lansdale thanked Cowen for his continued interest in his 

career progression and promotion. Also in the letter, Lansdale felt compelled to 

apologize to Cowen for not inviting him to his promotion, stating that he “just 

kept this one in the family.” Cowen also believed that Lansdale was “a better 

source of intelligence than all the rest of our intelligence efforts put together” 

(Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary 

of State, 19 September 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, 6, 

Part 2, 1567). As will be noted later, Ambassador Spruance played a pivotal role 

in securing Lansdale’s return to the Philippines in early 1953 despite Department 

of State misgivings.

85. Fidel V. Ramos, interview with the author, Makati City, Manila, 22 

October 2012. A BCT consisted of three infantry companies, a heavy weapons 

company with .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, 57mm and 75mm recoilless 

rifles, and mortars. The BCT also contained organic indirect fire support in the 

form of a field artillery battery of 105mm howitzers. A reconnaissance company 

also contained the light armored elements and trucks of the BCT. For a short 

biographical sketch of President Ramos see Appendix C.

86. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 45.

87. Romulo, Gray, 126.

88. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 25.

89. Macdonald, 145.

90. Uldarico S. Baclagon, Lessons from the Huks Campaign in the 

Philippines (Manila: M. Colcol & Company, 1960), 6.
63

91. Donn V. Hart, “Magsaysay: Philippine Candidate,” Far Eastern Survey

(May 1953): 67.

92. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 45.

93. Greenberg, 85.

94. Romulo, Gray, 132.

95. Romulo, Gray, 133.

96. Lansdale, Handwritten notes for National War College Lecture, 25 

March 1964 (Lansdale Papers, Box 74, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA). Despite the estimates from outside sources, during 

Lansdale’s first embassy protocol visits and briefings upon his return to the 

Philippines in 1950, he recounts that the threat was significantly underrated, with 

some figures as low as “about a thousand” or “not more than five thousand;” his 

visit with Philippine intelligence impressed him as more thorough and reliable 

(Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 22).

97. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 24-26.

98. Currey, 83. Ambassador Cowen noted the results of Hobbs’ granting 

Lansdale’s request in a telegram to the Secretary of State in March 1951. “I 

have impression one of reasons Hobbs has been getting better results than his 

predecessors is because he has been having his men go out to the provinces 

in order to come to direct grips with the similar problems of the Phil[ippine] 

mil[itary] establishment.” The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the 

Secretary of State, 21 March 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, 

Part 2, 6, 1521

99. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 24-28. Two weeks prior to his 

return to the Philippines, the Huks raided Camp Makabulos, a military camp 

approximately seventy miles north of Manila. During the raid they entered the 

camp’s hospital and killed twenty-three military personnel and seven civilians, 

some of them patients still in hospital beds. The civilians in the town adjacent to 

Makabulos recounted how the Huk force spent the entire day prior to the attack 

infiltrating the area. Despite the brutality of the massacre, the local townspeople 

spoke of how well they had been treated by the Huks.

100. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

101. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

102. Greenberg, 70.

103. Greenberg, 88. See also Baclagon, 5, 7, and Macdonald, 142. On 26 

July 1950 the Philippine Constabulary was brought under the Department of 

Defense by Executive Order No. 308. US military aid was contingent upon 

the merger. On 23 December 1950 Quirino published Executive Order No. 
64

389, abolishing the major commands and activating a unified AFP structure 

consisting of the Philippine Army, Constabulary, Air Force, and Navy. It further 

divided the Philippines into four major area commands, with BCTs assigned 

to each area under a single unified command structure, which in turn was 

subordinate to the AFP Chief of Staff.

104. Charles T. R. Bohannon, Napoleon Valeriano, Counter-Guerrilla 

Operations: The Philippine Experience (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 

International, 2006), 103.

105. Kerkvliet, 208, 240.

106. The Chargé in the Philippines (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, 5 

January 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, 6, Part 2, 1491.

107. Cowen to US Embassy Manila, Department of State cable, 2 January 

1951 (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 7, Truman Library, Independence, MO). 

Ironically, this exactly contradicts the assessment of Chargé de Affairs Vinton 

Chapin, who remarked in a telegram to the Secretary of State that Selga “is no 

stooge of Ramos.” (The Chargé in the Philippines (Chapin) to the Secretary of 

State, 5 January 1951, 1492).

108. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

109. Due to security concerns Lansdale sought approval for Magsaysay to 

live with him on Camp Murphy. This close association is commonly cited in 

histories of the Huk campaign as a key source of Magsaysay’s initiatives and as 

an example of the indirect control Lansdale exerted over Magsaysay. 

110. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 45-47.

111. Lansdale, 50-59. The Economic Development Corps, or EDCOR, 

was an initiative that provided plots of land, a carabao (water buffalo), building 

materials, and other essentials, to civilians, veterans, and reconciled Huks, on 

reclaimed government land. The first farm started in December 1950 and was 

activated in February 1951. The first farms were established in Mindanao, 

though others were later established in other parts of the country. A total of 

25,000 Filipinos would benefit from the EDCOR initiative.

112. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 47-48.

113. Office of the President of the Philippines, “Magsaysay Credo,” Official 

Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. http://www.gov.ph/1956/05/29/

magsaysay-credo/ (accessed 18 November 2012).

114. Greenberg, 86. In its first year alone, this initiative received 59,000 

telegrams, all of which received responses with three days.

115. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 86.

116. The Chargé in the Philippines (Harrington) to the Department of State, 

15 June 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, 6, Part 2, 1547. 
65

See also from the same volume, Memorandum Prepared by the Embassy in the 

Philippines, August 1951, 1562. Paradoxically, by helping to get the Philippine 

economy back on a positive track, thus forestalling economic disaster, the US 

reinforced the Quirino regime’s power. Embassy officials were concerned that 

“we have developed a threat to the very institutions we wished to strengthen,” 

and that Quirino’s reinvigorated regime would seek “the elimination of the 

two-party system.” These officials felt the best way to forestall this was by 

strengthening and encouraging the opposition Nationalista Party. However, their 

close association with the Quirino administration, a necessity for any diplomatic 

mission, alienated US officials from the opposition, further highlighting the 

diplomatic tight-rope officials were walking in the Philippines.

117. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Department of 

State, 15 February 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, 6, Part 2, 

1506-1507.

118. Harold M. Vinacke, “Post-War Government and Politics of the 

Philippines,” Journal of Politics 9, No. 4 (November 1947): 720. See also James 

L. Dalton, “Ins and Outs in the Philippines,” Far Eastern Survey 21, No. 12 (30 

July 1952): 122.

119. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 90.

120. Macdonald, 157.

121. Nakano Satoshi, “Gabriel L. Kaplan and US Involvement in Philippine 

Electoral Democracy: A Tale of Two Democracies,” Philippine Studies 52, No. 2 

(2004): 153-155.

122. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 90.

123. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 91.

124. The Philippine Constitution authorized the establishment of an 

Electoral Commission that is responsible for administering, observing, and 

recording elections and their results. In 1950 the Philippine Congress passed 

legislation strengthening the electoral code. While the laws were on the books, 

this did not necessarily give the Electoral Commission the political strength to 

contend with the entrenched establishment, or the physical strength to supervise 

fair elections throughout the country. By law, the Electoral Commission could 

request the assistance of other government bodies in the execution of its duties. 

For a detailed description of the Electoral Commission see Vinacke, “Post-War 

Government and Politics of the Philippines.”

125. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

126. Julian F. Harrington (Chargé de Affairs) to Cowen, 8 January 1952, 

Embassy Telegram, No. 2375 (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 6, Truman Library, 

Independence, MO).

127. Kerkvliet, 241.
66

128. “We Smashed the Communists: Philippine Leader Tells how Guns and 

Food Won War on Huks,” US News & World Report, 13 February 1953 (Myron 

Cowen Papers, Box 12, Truman Library, Independence, MO), 35.
67

Chapter 4

New Threats

I was mortified by the excesses of high society at a time when 

poor people were still scrambling like mad.

— Laurin B. Askew, interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy 

(1998).1

With the turn of the New Year in 1952, the Philippine government was 

making significant inroads against the Huks, largely thanks to the efforts 

of Ramon Magsaysay and his supporters, and Edward Lansdale and the 

US embassy team. Those inroads also represented potential problems. 

Though the people of Central Luzon were placing increased faith and trust 

in Magsaysay, that did not translate into faith and trust in the government. 

Despite empowering the electorate during the 1951 elections, politics in 

the Philippines and the political elites remained unchanged. Furthermore, 

by empowering the electorate, Magsaysay represented a threat to the 

entrenched establishment. The next two years would require even more 

unity of effort within the American team at the embassy and support from 

Washington, to counter Philippine establishment attempts to rid themselves 

of Magsaysay. The demands of the new situation required extraordinary 

insights into Philippine politics, society, and culture.

Ironically for the PKP and Huks, by late 1951 Magsaysay, someone 

within the government, was challenging the status quo and entrenched 

establishment. Through a policy of “all out force and all out friendship” 

Magsaysay was winning over the peasants that represented the Huks 

primary support base.2

 The new Secretary of National Defense was turning 

the situation around, combining genuine empathy with sociocultural 

understanding to gain popular support. Edward Lansdale ably supported 

Magsaysay in these efforts, providing ideas and the support required to 

see necessary reforms through to implementation. Despite the successes 

of 1950-1951 a long road lay ahead.

Just as the AFP was experiencing a renaissance under Magsaysay, 

the Huks were experiencing infighting and confusion amongst the ranks. 

Under PKP leadership, the Huks were ostensibly communist and subject 

to communist doctrine and theory, but outside of the senior leadership, 

the PKP-Huk union lacked theoretical and doctrinal depth. Unfortunately 

for the guerrillas, and fortunately for the Philippine government, the PKP 

leadership had not properly linked their ends with their means. The PKP 

wanted to install a communist government in Manila, while the agrarian 

peasant support they relied on did not share those aspirations.3
68

The PKP theoreticians and leadership espoused an early Soviet model 

of Bolshevism.4 While few within the PKP and Huk movement had 

formally studied communism, leading men like Vicente Lava had actually 

studied in Moscow prior to World War II.5

 Under the Soviet model, the 

PKP preferred to focus on building support within the labor movement, 

ignoring the already rebellious peasants in Central Luzon for a significant 

amount of time. Though decidedly communist, Vicente Lava represented 

a more moderate track within the PKP. Internal divisions within the 

party promoted the fortunes of Vicente Lava’s two younger brothers, 

Jose and Jesus. The elder Lava brother described his younger siblings as 

“intellectually arrogant, dogmatic, and sectarian, and liable to commit acts 

of serious leftist adventurism that would be irreparable.”6

Leftist adventurism increasingly became the party’s orientation after 

the capture of the Politburo in October 1950.7

 Unbeknownst to Magsaysay 

and Lansdale, that event had significant repercussions within the PKPHuk leadership. Three men emerged as the new guiding lights of the PKP, 

Jesus Lava, Casto Alejandrino, and Mateo de Castillo.8 Though wellgrounded in communist theory, these men were all from wealthy families 

and preferred Manila to the countryside.9 Throughout 1950 and 1951, the 

trio representing the Secretariat of the Politburo, developed policies that 

were increasingly out of touch with reality. Though the Huks had been 

on the rise in 1950 and were dealing significant blows to government 

forces, the PKP leadership failed to account for the AFPs evolution under 

Magsaysay.10 Thus, as Huk fortunes took a turn for the worse, the PKP 

leadership continued to issue overly optimistic guidance based on outdated 

understanding of the situation.11

The Huk field commander, Luis Taruc, in attempts to clarify their 

orders and guide them toward more realistic objectives soon became a 

target of the Lava-Alejandrino-Castillo block.12 Taruc advocated a “policy 

of self-preservation and conservation of our strength.”13 Though he had 

already been secretly removed as Huk military commander in August 

1950, Taruc formally resigned the post during a PKP Central Committee 

conference in the spring of 1951.14 Taruc was an extremely popular figure 

within the movement, representing the only member of the PKP-Huk senior 

leadership of peasant origin. His resignation suggests a radicalization of 

the party leadership and message just as radicalism was losing resonance 

with the masses.

It was after the Central Committee conference, when Lava, Alejandrino, 

and Castillo, advocated what was tantamount to full scale war that Taruc 

first started thinking that it might be time to come to terms with the 
69

government.15 Taruc took an assignment with Huk Regional Committee 1, 

but continued to remain an extremely popular and influential figure within 

the Huk movement. The Lava-Alejandrino-Castillo Secretariat became 

increasingly insulated and isolated, preferring that “only those cadres 

that would offer blind obedience were to staff organizations working with 

them directly,” and sending those who were out of favor to particularly 

dangerous Regional Committees, “where there was great danger of being 

isolated, captured, or killed.”16

Just as the AFP was regaining popular support within the populace 

during the November 1951 elections, the Huks were preoccupied with 

internal matters. Instead of working to influence the elections, Luis Taruc 

was moving through the mountains of eastern Luzon during the first three 

weeks of November to join Regional Committee 1.17 In the spring of 1952, 

Taruc and several other Politburo members held a local conference to 

discuss the 1951 Central Committee Resolutions in terms of the objectives 

specific to Regional Committee 1. The result of the conference was further 

Huk field force disillusionment with PKP leadership. However, any serious 

discussion within the PKP-Huk leadership that may have resolved these 

issues was hampered by increasingly effective AFP operations, constantly 

harrying Huk units.18

Prior to Magsaysay’s reforms Philippine Army and Constabulary 

personnel were widely known for stealing food and other bare essentials 

from the populace, while the Huks were known for paying for everything 

they took. As AFP discipline improved under Magsaysay, these issues 

virtually disappeared. Additionally, improved AFP combat performance 

and operational planning forced the Huks away from their traditional 

support bases. When Huks were able to get into the barrios, the peasants 

no longer willingly offered support because of the improved relationship 

between the AFP and the populace, often forcing the Huks to use harsh and 

even terroristic measures to obtain the needed supplies.19

Improved combat performance and operational planning was not 

just a byproduct of Magsaysay’s military reforms. As a former guerrilla, 

Magsaysay understood how the Huks operated, and remembering tactics 

the Japanese employed against his own guerrillas, he understood the 

fundamentals of countering the Huks.20 Given the emotionally neutral 

definition of empathy, Magsaysay demonstrated that his empathy for the 

Huks informed his operations against them.21 First and foremost though, 

he simply insisted that AFP and PC formations leave the safety of their 

garrisons and move into the jungles and hills to fight them on their own 

ground.22 In Magsaysay’s mind, the armed forces had to keep the Huks 
70

on the run. Based on accounts from former Huks, this tactic became 

increasingly successful, pushing some Huk units to the point of starvation.23

The increased operational tempo also disrupted communications between 

the Huk squadrons, preventing any kind of coordinated response to AFP 

operations.24

Frequent offensive operations of increasing duration would have 

been pointless if the AFP and PC did not alter their earlier tactics of large 

scale sweeps. These operations provided the Huks ample warning of the 

armed forces intentions and usually resulted in little return for the amount 

of resources invested. Rather than large scale operations, Magsaysay 

emphasized smaller, intelligence driven operations. One officer from 

the period recounted how his unit spent countless hours conducting 

surveillance of local cemeteries for Huks attempting to visit their relative’s 

graves.

It took a lot of nonmilitary . . . call it, expertise, to do those things 

well. Because they don’t teach those things in the military. You 

had to know not only personalities, but the way they operated, the 

way they related to their suspected relatives in the vicinity.25

A consequence of operations requiring significant local understanding, 

whether intended or not, was that when it came time to implement 

civic actions in that locality, the BCTs undoubtedly had much better 

understanding of the situation, allowing them to administer rehabilitation 

projects more effectively.

One small innovation that had a significant impact on the campaign was 

the creation of the scout ranger teams. The idea originated from a young 

Filipino lieutenant during one of the brainstorming sessions at Magsaysay 

and Lansdale’s combined residence. Captain Rafael “Rocky” Ileto was 

a United States Military Academy graduate and had spent subsequent 

time in the US in ranger training.26 He broached the idea of forming small 

teams of highly trained personnel who would take the fight into the heart 

of Huk territories.27 These teams would conduct reconnaissance, raids, and 

ambushes in areas the Huks once thought secure. The scout ranger teams 

proved very effective during operations against the Huks, but they had 

a more important effect on AFP morale and aggressiveness. Rather than 

being isolated in a specialized organization, separate from the BCTs, each 

BCT had its own scout ranger team. As the regular soldiers of the BCT saw 

the successes of these small units against the elusive Huks, they were either 

shamed or emboldened to become more aggressive themselves, resulting 

in an overall improvement of individual BCTs as healthy competition 

developed between the line units and the scout ranger teams.28
71

Just as the scout ranger teams had a psychological effect on their fellow 

soldiers, Lansdale and Magsaysay wanted the AFP to have a psychological 

effect on the Huks. Complimentary to AFP offensive operations was the 

inclusion of psychological operations, or psywar as Lansdale referred to it, 

into some aspect of almost every AFP operation.29 Lansdale was a strong 

advocate of psychological operations and helped establish a psychological 

warfare training center for the AFP.30 While AFP offensive operations 

focused on attacking the Huks military strength, with casualties often 

the result, it appears the psychological operations focused more on Huk 

morale in an attempt to get them to surrender.31 As noted previously, both 

men frequently cited the larger number of Huks who surrendered than 

were killed or captured, but as Magsaysay’s thoughts on reconciliation 

demonstrated, he empathized with the Huk rank-and-file and preferred 

they rejoin society peacefully.

Without Magsaysay’s security sector reforms the PKP may have 

been able to weather their internal divisions, because the underlying 

grievances of the peasants would have remained a legitimate recruiting 

tool. However, the success of the November 1951 elections in rebuilding 

popular faith in government, and increasing popular support for the AFP 

started to undermine peasant support, which was absolutely essential to 

the Huks. In September 1952 Taruc issued a “Call for Peace,” that while 

continuing to espouse the PKP line, further divided Huks in the field and 

the PKP leadership.32

A House Divided

The internal PKP-Huk feuds could not have come at a better time 

for the Philippine government. Despite the positive effect the election 

had on popular confidence in democracy, it set the stage for conflict 

between Magsaysay and Quirino. The first fissures resulted from popular 

press coverage of the election, giving credit to the Secretary of National 

Defense. Quirino’s vanity and ego were the first casualties in the conflict. 

“[Quirino] deplored this and all other insinuations that Magsaysay rather 

than Quirino was responsible for [the] honesty [of the] last elections. He 

contends that credit is due to him alone for the steps he took regardless 

of [political] consequences.”33 While Quirino might have been mollified 

following Magsaysay’s media attention, the growing popularity and media 

coverage of Magsaysay’s civic initiatives deepened Quirino’s resentment.

The entrenched political establishment was growing increasingly 

hostile to Magsaysay as well. Magsaysay’s arrest of Governor Eugenio 

Lacson over the Moises Padilla incident had already caused some alarm 
72

within elite circles. Additionally, the shake-up in congress caused by 

the 1951 election almost paralyzed the legislature, as committees and 

congressional leadership were constantly reshuffled in the first half of 1952. 

This drew the ire of the very power Speaker of the House, Liberal Party 

leader Eugenio Perez.34 Perez was the representative and standard bearer 

of the Liberal Party old guard. Rather than watch the upstart Secretary of 

National Defense grow more powerful, Perez fueled fears of a Magsaysay 

initiated coup because of the latter’s control over both the Philippine Army 

and Constabulary. Perez clamored for the return of the Constabulary to the 

Secretary of the Interior, a Quirino loyalist.35

Magsaysay’s troubles were not confined to his own country either. In 

a memorandum from Myron Cowen to Lansdale in January 1952, Cowen 

relates a conversation with the Philippine Ambassador to the US, Joaquin 

M. Elizalde, in which the ambassador disparaged Magsaysay and planted 

rumors of impropriety.36 Magsaysay’s inspection tours had not diminished 

following the elections, and Quirino noted his frequent absences from 

cabinet meetings, questioning the motives as potentially political.37

Magsaysay’s initiatives may not have been politically motivated at the 

time they were instituted, but they definitely developed his popular support 

base. By mid-1952, he was no longer a relatively obscure congressman 

from Zambales. His inspection tours, the 1951 elections, and the 10 

centavo telegram program ensured he was virtually a household name. 

Lansdale noted that more and more people, of all walks of life were visiting 

Magsaysay at his quarters, and he “realized that, to the people, Magsaysay 

rapidly was becoming the government, the leader who cared about what 

was happening to them and who would try to right any wrongs.”38 By 

the fall of 1952, popular feelings were not simply confined to visitors to 

Magsaysay’s quarters. During trips into the provinces, Lansdale noted 

overwhelmingly positive public reaction to Magsaysay in areas that had 

once been solidly Huk territory.39

Part of that positive public reaction stemmed from an increased respect 

for the rule of law within the AFP. Despite advocating for and receiving a 

suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Magsaysay reassured US officials 

he would not engage in the typical abuses associated with such a move.40

It appears that Magsaysay was good to his word. According to former 

President Fidel Ramos, a junior officer in the AFP during the Huk campaign, 

“you [could not] just apprehend people...you must develop information, 

until finally you have a legal basis for apprehending.”41 Despite broad 

powers to prosecute the Huk campaign, Magsaysay reversed the previous 

trend of the campaign that ignored civil rights.42 This approach further 
73

demonstrated to the masses that someone within the government was 

attempting to alter the status quo.

Filipino civilians were not the only ones Magsaysay appealed to 

and won over. In addition to the AFP reforms, Magsaysay developed an 

effective reconciliation and reintegration program for surrendered Huks. 

Though he may not have had the benefit of modern counterinsurgency 

doctrine, which stresses the importance of reconciliation programs, 

Magsaysay saw the issue in terms of healing the rifts in Philippine 

society.43 Magsaysay and Lansdale both made frequent reference to the 

number of Huks who surrendered compared to the number of killed or 

captured as an example of the effectiveness of their campaign.44 Once 

cleared of any civil criminal acts, the Huks were inducted into the AFP as 

a way to demonstrate their allegiance to the government and dedication to 

democracy.45 In Magsaysay’s opinion, the majority of the Huk rank-andfile “never were Communists really. They were just desperate men.”46 By 

providing an acceptable alternative to the Huks, Magsaysay was not only 

winning away popular support of the populace, he was beginning to win 

away Huk manpower.

Secretary Magsaysay believed the hard-core communists within the 

Huks had to be destroyed militarily, but rehabilitation remained his main 

course of action for the rest.47 Magsaysay took an interest in the cases of 

individual Huks, as mentioned earlier in his son’s recounting the case of 

Eddie Ngolab, and also in the accounts of Carlos Romulo and Lansdale.48

Magsaysay’s desire to rehabilitate in hopes that other Huks would 

surrender upon hearing of the good treatment afforded other surrendered 

Huks took its toll on the Huk movement. As Luis Taruc recounted, “the 

new discipline he imposed within the army, his good public relations, and 

his treatment of Huks who surrendered or had been captured and who were 

willing to turn over a new leaf, seriously threatened the morale of our rank 

and file.”49

Arguably the most often cited example of Magsaysay’s rehabilitation 

policy was the EDCOR program. Though widely publicized, EDCOR only 

resettled around 300 Huk farmers and their families.50 However, numbers 

were not Magsaysay’s concern. Though Lansdale may have intended to 

use EDCOR for its psychological value, Magsaysay saw it as building new 

communities in which the former Huks would rejoin society by working 

alongside fellow Filipinos.51 The secretary’s ideas were not simply aimed 

at defeating the Huks, but at rebuilding society. Significant resources 

went into the EDCOR project generating some criticism about the cost 

in view of the small return, but as a subordinate of Magsaysay noted, the 
74

cost was ancillary because the real purpose of EDCOR “was to create 

communities.”52

In the summer of 1952 the situation in the Philippines was secure 

enough for Magsaysay to travel to the United States in an official capacity. 

His last trip resulted in the Americans backing him as Secretary of National 

Defense. The 1952 trip reaffirmed US faith in Magsaysay as the right man 

for the job. In meetings with officials at both the Departments of State 

and Defense, Magsaysay received praise. Yet the visit raised concerns in 

certain Philippine government circles. In a letter from Myron Cowen to 

Philippine Ambassador to the US, Carlos Romulo, Cowen reassured him 

that “their sole interest in him is as a man who is honest and courageous 

and intensely interested in cleaning up the Huks and bringing peace and 

order back to the Philippines.”53

Though American intentions had not yet coalesced around Magsaysay 

as a potential candidate for the presidency, Lansdale was already thinking 

and planning along those lines. Edward Lansdale’s team, code named 

Kugown, continued to focus on defeating the Huks militarily, while he 

found ways to promote his friend.54 In conjunction with Magsaysay’s trip 

to Washington, Lansdale engineered an invitation by the International 

Lions Club to Magsaysay to be the key-note speaker at their conference in 

Mexico City in June 1952. Under intense pressure from all sides, including 

his own daughter, Quirino gave Magsaysay approval to speak at the event. 

Quirino was wary of the event because of the notoriety it would afford 

Magsaysay, and he suspected Lansdale of orchestrating the invitation.55

The affairs surrounding the 1951 elections alerted the entrenched political 

establishment to Lansdale’s efforts, and by the summer of 1952, Quirino 

was increasingly hostile towards the American.

Despite the 1951 election results the embassy was finding it 

increasingly difficult to work with Quirino and the entrenched political 

establishment. In 1952 Quirino was already eyeing the 1953 presidential 

election, and was more than reluctant to push the land reform necessary 

to alleviate continuing social tensions.56 Amongst existing politicos in 

Manila, US officials determined that “neither Quirino or Lopez in the 

Liberal Party, nor Laurel or Recto in the Nationalista Party, have shown 

the slightest indication of taking any interest in land reform.”57 The only 

real leverage the Americans had was military aid, and if they withheld that 

aid it would potentially reverse recent AFP military successes, just when 

the Huks were looking weakest.58
75

Fortunately, embassy leadership, in the form of Ambassador Raymond 

Spruance and Counselor William Lacy, had a grasp on the situation, 

understanding the necessity of Lansdale’s plans.59 However, a number 

of key positions continued to be staffed by “China hands” that made the 

mistake of “thinking that the rest of Asia was like China.”60 Lansdale 

provides more clarity about the US mission in the Philippines.

The US civilian mission, polarized on the Embassy, operated almost 

as though the Huk fight didn’t exist, except as a conversation piece and 

its battlegrounds being places to avoid. There were exceptions to this 

general attitude, of course, notably the Ambassador and several of his 

chief assistants.”61

In light of this, Lansdale’s team continued to focus on getting into the 

provinces to see conditions for themselves. In September 1952, Lansdale 

sent one of his most trusted subordinates, Charles T. R. Bohannon on 

a shadowy reconnaissance mission into the Bicol region of southeaster 

Luzon.62 The purpose of the reconnaissance was to ascertain the suitability 

of Bicol for “friendly” guerrilla operations, as opposed to an anti-Huk 

campaign.

By late 1952 the Philippines were a flurry of political activity. In 

an attempt to co-opt Magsaysay’s popularity, Quirino offered him the 

vice-presidency if he would be his running mate in the 1953 election. 

Magsaysay was opposed to the idea out of principle, and turned him 

down.63 Beyond the principle, Quirino would be able to marginalize 

Magsaysay as vice-president, and deprive him of his main source of 

power, the AFP.64 Following the rejection, US embassy officials suspected 

Quirino of engaging in intrigue to determine Magsaysay’s next move. The 

situation was so sensitive that Ambassador Spruance and William Lacy 

ceased sending sensitive cables by traditional means, opting instead to send 

handwritten letters to Washington, suspecting Quirino was monitoring 

their message traffic.65

Nationalista Party leaders seized the opportunity almost immediately. 

They approached Magsaysay quietly to offer him the presidency on the 

Nationalista ticket. Part of their rationale was that with Magsaysay on 

the ticket, the AFP would not be used against them during the election.66

Ambassador Spruance was skeptical of Nationalista Party leadership, 

believing their motives to be dubious. He was concerned that they would 

use Magsaysay’s popularity during the campaign season, and then drop 

him from the ticket just before the election. Without the backing of 

the Nationalista Party apparatus, it would be extremely difficult, if not 
76

impossible for Magsaysay to win on his own. The embassy was equally 

concerned about Quirino’s reaction if he discovered that Magsaysay had 

secretly agreed to side with the Nationalistas. William Lacy believed that 

if Quirino felt sufficiently threatened, he might resort to authoritarian 

measures, such as declaring martial law, or jailing political opponents.67

The Liberal Party establishment attempted to hedge their bets by 

making veiled threats to US officials in Manila. In mid-December 1952 

a Quirino loyalist, Senator Macario Peralta paid an unannounced call 

on Ambassador Spruance and charged embassy personnel with directly 

interfering in Philippine politics. He specifically cited Lansdale and James 

D. Bell, a political officer in the embassy. Spruance subsequently informed 

the State Department that “I desire to emphasize this [message is] not to 

be construed as [a] reflection [on] either Lansdale or Bell, both of whom I 

regard as outstanding men who have not stepped outside the limits of their 

duties and instructions.” Spruance assessed that Quirino and Liberal Party 

leadership were behind the visit and that they hoped the threat of public 

attacks in the press would be sufficient to get the embassy to back away 

from calls for free elections and reforms.68

In the response from the State Department, Deputy Secretary of State 

David Bruce suggested that Lansdale’s presence was no longer required in 

the Philippines and that he should return to the US immediately. Lansdale 

was already due to return to the US on leave, but Spruance informed the 

State Department that his presence in the Philippines was essential because 

of his contacts and influence with Magsaysay, and he should be allowed 

to return to the Philippines.69 Upon returning Lansdale soon found himself 

without a home. Following a meeting with Filipino officials, JUSMAG 

chief Major General Albert Pierson answered a reporter’s question in such 

a way that Lansdale was publicly no longer welcome in the JUSMAG.70

Reassigned to the 13th Air Force’s office of the historian at Clark Air 

Base north of Manila, Lansdale continued to covertly run Magsaysay’s 

campaign. Regardless of his new cover, Quirino and his associates now 

watched Lansdale more than ever.71

The impetus for the final split between Quirino and Magsaysay came 

on 27 February 1953, when the President told reporters that Magsaysay 

was “only good for killing Huks.”72 Magsaysay response clearly indicated 

a much deeper appreciation of the problems facing the Philippines and 

their potential solutions:

It would be useless for me to continue as Secretary of National 

Defense with the specific duty of killing Huks as long as the 
77

administration continues to foster and to tolerate conditions which 

offer fertile soil for Communism. Merely killing dissidents will not 

solve the Communist problem. Its solution lies in the correction 

of social evils and injustice, and in giving the people the decent 

government free from dishonesty and graft.73

However, Quirino’s statement also provided the perfect cover to allow 

Magsaysay to resign ahead of the planned Nationalista Party convention 

scheduled for March. During the convention, the party would announce 

Magsaysay as their candidate for president.74 With the announcement of 

Magsaysay’s candidacy, all eyes turned to the elections in November, 

clouded by memories of the 1949 elections.

Significance of November 1953

There was little disagreement by anyone about the importance of 

the 1953 elections. Quirino and the Liberal Party saw the election as 

either an opportunity to reinstate the status quo ante, or the end of their 

monopoly on power. The Huks most likely saw it as an opportunity to keep 

Magsaysay out of power and further undermine popular confidence in the 

government. The Americans and the opposition, led by Magsaysay, saw it 

as the opportunity to keep the democratic process alive in the Philippines.75

All of the progress made against the Huks could be undone if the 1953 

elections went the way of the 1949 elections.

Even before Magsaysay resigned as Secretary of National Defense, 

US officials were cautioning him about what it would mean once he lost 

control of the military.76 Almost immediately, Magsaysay and his family 

were forced to leave the protective environs of Camp Murphy (AFP 

headquarters in Manila), and for the next seven months the family took up 

residence with various friends.77 Magsaysay’s successor as Secretary of 

National Defense, Oscar Castello, proved to be a Quirino loyalist and no 

friend of Magsaysay. Magsaysay’s supporters quickly experienced run-ins 

with Castello’s men during any kind of public assembly, and the clashes 

escalated into what could almost be described as open warfare between 

the two groups.78 Without the Philippine security forces at his disposal, 

Magsaysay was increasingly vulnerable.

Though Magsaysay did not control the military officially, he still had 

a considerable number of loyalists within the AFP. The two main loyalist 

groups appear to have been former guerrillas and reconciled Huks.79

Magsaysay’s support base in the AFP represented a paradox for the United 

States. The AFP made significant strides in professionalization under 

Magsaysay, but a crisis that forced the AFP to choose between loyalty 
78

to the government and loyalty to a man could undermine those strides. 

A State Department committee established to assess the 1953 election’s 

implications determined that significant violence was quite possible if 

Quirino managed to engineer a victory similar to that of the 1949 election.80

Lansdale’s own assessment of the situation, in his after action report to the 

CIA about the elections, was more severe, “if the Liberals had robbed 

the election there would have been a revolution, led by Magsaysay.”81

Complicating matters was the growing belief that even if Quirino won a 

clean election there would still be violence.82

Magsaysay broached the subject with US officials, but they counseled 

against such a course of action.83 A Magsaysay led revolt would likely 

have split the AFP in two, with Magsaysay’s supporters within the military 

turning their weapons on Quirino’s loyalists, led by the still intact AFP 

old guard Magsaysay had been unable to completely expel as Secretary. 

The pro-Quirino forces would not have been insignificant, and if Quirino 

won a relatively fair election, his forces would still be the recipients of 

significant US military aid. Based on this, the US had to make its position 

absolutely clear to Magsaysay, President Quirino, and the Liberal Party.

A potential Magsaysay led revolt that risked splitting the AFP in two 

raised difficult questions. As mentioned earlier, the US took significant 

risk in backing a man who was capable of developing widespread popular 

support and loyalty. He managed to professionalize the AFP in terms of 

its responsibility to act in the best interests of the people rather than selfinterest, improve its tactical and technical proficiency, and rejuvenate 

morale and esprit de corps within the ranks. Yet in a Western-style 

democratic government, the armed forces are loyal to the constitution 

rather than a certain political party or individual. Many within the AFP 

upheld their oaths to the constitution during the 1951 election, some of 

them at great professional risk.84 However, the context of the situation 

had changed. Magsaysay was now a political candidate, outside of the 

recognized government, rather than their official leader. In the 1951 

elections, upholding their oaths to the constitution implied doing the right 

thing, whereas in 1953, the same act implied the opposite. The risk to longterm AFP professionalism and apoliticism highlighted the importance of 

not only a fair election in 1953, but a Magsaysay victory as well.

As soon as Magsaysay was viewed as a viable candidate, US officials 

analyzed their policy options. The problem for the Americans was that 

while supporting Magsaysay was clearly in their best interests, they 

could not be seen as intervening in Philippine domestic politics. Yet it 

was virtually impossible for the US not to become involved in Philippine 
79

domestic politics. Even without overt statements of US support, those 

politicians viewed as having the support of the Americans, and thus able 

to receive increased aid, had a decided advantage over their opponents.85

The US had to tread carefully with Magsaysay. As Deputy Secretary Bruce 

noted in his cable to Ambassador Spruance, the US-Magsaysay relationship 

already threatened to derail US-Philippine relations, and that full support 

for Magsaysay’s Huk campaign was far different than support for him 

as a candidate against the administration he was serving in. In Bruce’s 

view, “any widespread conviction that he is hand-picked candidate of US 

[would] not further his own [political] career.”86

Bruce elaborated that US policy “operates on [the] basis [of] 

principles rather than personalities.” Finally, Ambassador Spruance was to 

emphasize that Filipino politics was the sole business of Filipinos and that 

“people [should] continue to choose leaders they desire in free and honest 

elections; that we will cooperate with any [non-communist] administration 

so elected.” He believed that the press and others would conclude that 

“although we will never so specifically state, that [administration] which 

comes into power thru force and corruption will not receive US [military] 

and [economic] aid.”87 Ironically, by stating that the United States 

would only cooperate with a non-communist government, and that an 

administration elected through coercion would not receive aid, Bruce was 

advocating intervention.

Such a policy may seem decidedly neutral, but it was clear to all 

involved that by supporting a policy of free and fair elections the US 

was warning the Quirino administration. The embassy staff understood 

the policy to mean “supporting free elections in the Philippines was 

support to Magsaysay.”88 In order to avoid discovery of US intervention, 

support for Magsaysay had to come from Lansdale’s team, with peripheral 

assistance from embassy assets.89 Covert actions in support of Magsaysay 

in 1953, while more diverse and widespread, were patterned on the model 

established during the 1951 elections.

From Secretary of National Defense to President

In Lansdale’s opinion, if the US was going to defeat communism in the 

Philippines they had no alternative but to support Magsaysay’s campaign. 

He believed that “with a government brought into being by the power of 

the people and reflecting their will in its actions, the people would deeply 

resent and oppose any attempt at armed overthrow of that government 

(their government) by the Communists.”90 Lansdale had no doubt that 

Magsaysay would succeed in a fair election against Quirino, and directed 
80

his efforts and those of his team toward ensuring a fair election. However, 

they faced an entrenched elite that were shocked and dismayed that the 

lower classes actually wanted to vote as they pleased.91

The first step was organizing Filipino political support behind 

Magsaysay. While the Nationalista Party political machinery was a 

necessary evil for Magsaysay, he would need support from trusted nonAmerican advisors. As an opposition candidate to the sitting president, 

Magsaysay could no longer seek council from those he once did, like 

William Lacy and Ambassador Spruance. Lansdale did not have to work 

hard to find men of character to help Magsaysay. Senator Lorenzo Tañada 

of the Citizen’s Party and Eleuterio “Terry” Adevoso, the founder of 

the Hunter’s ROTC Guerrillas during the war, were two well-connected 

politicians who quickly offered their services. Additionally, the Papal 

Nuncio of the Philippines, Signor Emilio Vagnozzi, lent support to the 

Magsaysay campaign through the Catholic Church’s voter education 

program, Catholic Action.92

In addition to the specific individuals mentioned by Lansdale, 

Magsaysay enjoyed the support of the Philippine Junior Chamber of 

Commerce, Lions Club, and Rotary Club.93 These organizations could 

not only support Magsaysay’s campaign, as chapters of worldwide 

organizations they could leverage international support. Magsaysay also 

had the support of the Philippines Veterans Association, an organization 

he had once been a provincial president in, and one that had extensive 

grassroots access and support.94 Lastly, Magsaysay’s ability to garner 

the loyalty of his subordinates ensured that the men who had served as 

his protection detail as Secretary of National Defense, joined him on the 

campaign trail after resigning from the AFP.95 This would prove extremely 

important, as Lansdale became increasingly suspicious of the security 

personnel assigned to Magsaysay by the government.96

With trustworthy support in place, Lansdale’s team reinvigorated the 

organizations they built for the 1951 election, and built relationships with 

other groups to diversify their outreach. Lansdale’s subordinates worked 

hard to ensure NAMFREL played an even bigger role during the 1953 

election than it did in the 1951 election. The result was that the organization 

“gained strength in the first half of 1953, emerging prior to election day as a 

highly respected national body (candidates and citizens alike turned to it for 

impartial help).”97 The Committee for Good Governance, an organization 

started for the 1951 election, was revived to act as an intermediary with 

foreign press correspondents, ensuring they were present at polling sites. 

Finally, the Magsaysay for President Movement, “a group of business and 
81

professional people . . . headed by Terry Adevoso” was active in building 

grassroots support for the candidate.98 By the time of the election the 

MPM had chapters in 15,600 of the approximately 18,000 barrios in the 

Philippines.99

The press played an important role in the 1951 elections, and 

Lansdale was intent on repeating that successful relationship with a useful 

ally. Using his vast contacts within the Philippine press establishment, 

Lansdale was able to garner support from many of the major publications. 

Through a trusted, longtime friend and supporter of Lansdale’s efforts in 

the Philippines, Manuel “Manny” Manahan, they were able to prepare the 

Philippine News Service to act as election watchers on election day.100 The 

Americans also established their own newspaper, The Free Philippines.101

The paper operated underground during the Japanese occupation, and 

reviving it for the election was a calculated psychological move to rekindle 

popular memories of resistance. Their publication also served a secondary 

function of providing the Americans valuable intelligence on the situation 

in the provinces, as they were increasingly forced to keep a low profile 

during the campaign.

Lansdale’s preparations for the election and support for Magsaysay’s 

campaign focused on educating the populace and ensuring a fair election. 

“All of our major efforts . . . went into teaching Filipino people to stand up by 

themselves and work as free men. This was in keeping with our consistent 

operating philosophy of helping the Filipinos to help themselves.”102 It 

also reflected his empathetic personal belief that the Filipino people were 

engaged in a righteous struggle that America was duty-bound to support.103

He believed that if he could achieve those two objectives, Magsaysay was 

capable of winning over the electorate. Early reaction to Magsaysay’s 

resignation and speculation of his nomination resulted in such widespread 

support that Ambassador Spruance speculated that if the election had been 

held in April 1953 he would have easily won. However, he went on to 

caution that it would “undoubtedly be tough and dirty.”104

Lansdale was correct to believe in Magsaysay’s ability to win over 

the electorate. He oriented his energetic campaign toward connecting with 

the common man.105 “By November, he probably will have shaken the 

hand of every voter in the country...and they love it.”106 He seemed to 

be made for the campaign trail and impromptu, unscripted meetings with 

the people. As Secretary of National Defense Magsaysay often spent time 

with local peasants during his inspection tours to get a sense of what they 

were experiencing, but this was likely limited to where there AFP was 

operating. Now that he was a presidential candidate those constraints were 
82

lifted. Magsaysay engaged with the electorate everywhere he went, and 

though he was campaigning, he took the time to stop and connect with 

individual Filipinos.107

Magsaysay was criticized for his poor public speaking ability 

earlier in his career, likely stemming from his poor mastery of English 

and preference for native Filipino dialects.108 However, in a letter from 

Lansdale to Cowen about the campaign, he informed Cowen that “you 

would thoroughly enjoy the way friend Ramon campaigns. You recall 

what a lousy public speaker he is. Well, he’s knocking around in the barrio 

circuit in jeeps, trucks, caratelas, and carabao carts mostly shaking hands 

with people and talking only a few minutes.” He continues by noting it is 

“simple stuff, sure, but the people eat it up, understand it, and feel that here 

is one of them – far more than the big words that [Carlos Romulo] uses or 

the “economic mobilization” words of Quirino.”109

If Magsaysay was the embodiment of a young, energetic candidate, 

Quirino was the exact opposite. The president’s health had never been 

good, but it took a turn for the worse during the campaign, leaving 

Philippine and US government officials speculating about what would 

happen if Quirino died. Vice President Jose Yulo was “quietly running 

the government from behind-scenes in Malacañan.”110 In a display of his 

deep sociocultural understanding, Lansdale further related the political 

intrigues taking place in the event of Quirino’s death:

[Romulo] and Lopez say privately that they will quickly hold 

another Liberal convention and get the [Liberal Party] to back 

their ticket. Yulo, though, is now a deadly enemy (probably will 

destroy the Lopez clan politically in July or August) and probably 

would inherit Quirino’s file of material to keep politicos (such as 

Perez) in line.111

Even with Quirino in poor health, the Liberal Party machinery was hard 

at work behind trying to preserve their grip on power. The files mentioned 

above were the dossiers compiled by Antonio Quirino’s own semi-official 

agents, and with the election in full swing they were being used towards 

other ends.

In 1947, President Roxas had formed a special intelligence division 

within Malacañan that answered solely to the president, and under the 

command of former guerrilla leader Marcos “Marking” V. Agustin. A US 

Army counterintelligence corps report on the unit noted that the agents 

carried weapons, had badges and credentials, but lacked any real training 

and experience in traditional intelligence gathering operations. The 
83

investigator also noted that many of the agents had criminal records and 

had been brought up on charges of abuse of authority.112 When Roxas died 

and Quirino assumed the presidency, he inherited the organization.

Antonio Quirino wasted no time getting to work. One of his targets 

was Lansdale, but the poor training of the agents was evident in Lansdale’s 

immediately associating them with Quirino:

Your old buddies Tony Quirino and the Markings (Yay and 

Agustin) are in our hair plenty. Tony has got himself recalled to 

active duty as a Lt-Col and is running a lot of intelligence service 

activities out of General Duque’s office. Agents are mostly 

Marking’s boys.113

Their amateurish methods included phone taps, surveillance, and an 

occasional attempted ambush that never achieved the intended purpose.114

What concerned Lansdale more than Quirino’s agents were his 

overtures towards the Huks. “What worries me is that Tony has been 

playing footsie with Luis Taruc; the latter hopes to play the Moscow peace 

line and arrange an amnesty again; Tony wants the Huks out of the hills 

and working hard for the Liberal ticket in central Luzon.”115 Taruc sent 

his son Romeo as emissary to Quirino with assurances of safe passage 

by Antonio Quirino and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Calixto 

Duque.116 As Romeo Taruc relates the story, he was taken to a meeting at 

the home of Speaker of the House Eugenio Perez. Unbeknownst to Taruc, 

Perez, Duque, and the Quirino’s, the driver sent to pick up Romeo was a 

Magsaysay loyalist. Rather than reaching his destination he was taken to 

the prison at Camp Murphy. Romeo Taruc went on to explain that Quirino 

was afraid of Magsaysay so he was willing to negotiate with the Huks.117

Quirino also attempted to use the AFP to Liberal Party advantage. 

Throughout 1953, Quirino loyalists were hard at work preparing for the 

election. By October, two-thirds of PC provincial commanders had been 

replaced by Quirino loyalists, officers known to oppose use of the AFP 

for political purposes were transferred to non-command assignments, 

and speculation was rampant that Quirino would install a new Secretary 

of National Defense and AFP chief of staff.118 Ironically, the results of 

Quirino’s meddling would likely have weakened the AFP in the long term. 

If he won the election through fraud, he would either have faced a revolt 

by Magsaysay loyalists or a resurgent Huk movement which would reap 

the benefits of popular disillusionment with democracy. In either event, 

the very instrument he would need to defeat these threats would have been 

weakened in order for him to attain his goal.
84

In addition to Quirino’s manipulation of the AFP, he sought to directly 

tamper with the ballots. During the election, the individual responsible 

for tallying the votes was the provincial treasurer. In July and August, the 

most trustworthy treasurers were called to Manila to work on the national 

budget for the next fiscal year, with “acting” treasurers appointed, “who 

follow orders.”119 Despite US covert and diplomatic activities to ensure a 

fair election, Quirino’s actions to secure a Liberal victory by any means 

transformed the election into something more significant. “Rumors of a 

recurrence of the violence and dishonesty characteristic of the Presidential 

election four years ago have given the forthcoming elections the character 

of a test of representative government in the Philippines.”120

For all of Quirino’s schemes, Lansdale still achieved his goal. In 

November 1953, the Filipino people elected Ramon Magsaysay President 

of the Philippine Republic by an overwhelming majority: 2,912,992 to 

Quirino’s 1,313,991.121 The US-Filipino team dedicated to Magsaysay’s 

election accomplished the task by teaching and encouraging the populace; 

encouraging government agencies and departments to uphold their sworn 

duties instead of bowing to political pressure; physically protecting 

Magsaysay from threats; ensuring fraud and corruption were quickly 

publicized; working closely with the press; keeping tabs on Liberal 

Party activities; and leveraging the significant talent residing within the 

embassy team.122 Where the Americans and Magsaysay’s team leveraged 

the legitimate political process,

The Liberal Administration campaigned using the old Spanish and 

Malayan system of working with leaders (family heads, village 

elders) as well as the American system of ward bosses. The people 

simply changed age-old customs, stopped following normal 

leaders, [and] acted each for himself. This was the real revolution 

which took place.123

Magsaysay’s supporting team was able to alter the political status quo 

by leveraging his enormous popularity to overcome the entrenched 

establishment. The establishment had relied on a system that had not 

accounted for someone like Magsaysay.

The Presidency

Ramon Magsaysay assumed office in late December 1953, and a short 

time later Edward Lansdale returned to the United States, his mission in 

the Philippines complete.124 The fight against the Huks and for Philippine 

democracy was not yet over for Magsaysay. As president he had to live 

up to the reputation he developed as Secretary of National Defense and 
85

while on the campaign trail. This would prove no easy task in the face 

of a political establishment that was still controlled by many of the same 

men who represented the system Magsaysay wanted to overthrow, some 

within his own party.125 The one thing Magsaysay could count on in the 

near term was the electorate. His enormous victory, as mentioned above, 

clearly gave him a popular mandate, and building on the empathy he had 

developed for the lower classes, he was intent on living up to the people’s 

expectations.

Magsaysay’s first actions were in keeping with his personality and 

character.126 During the campaign he promised the people that he would 

open the doors of Malacañan to the public. After his inauguration he 

returned to the Palace and expected to find Filipino citizens joining him 

to see the historic palace. When he found the doors still locked, because a 

member of his staff wanted to give him time to rest after the inauguration, 

he got angry and demanded the doors opened immediately.127 Magsaysay 

wanted to be around the people who had elected him president. As Frisco 

San Juan affectionately remembered of his former leader, “the people 

always...he would be lonely without the people.”128

As average citizens were seeing the grounds of the presidential 

palace for the first time, Magsaysay was attempting to bring a degree of 

transparency to the government. On 5 January 1954, he issued an executive 

order, requiring all public servants to make their financial records open to 

the public. Magsaysay led the way by making his own records public on 

3 January 1954. The order required compliance by 31 January 1954.129

He announced this measure through his Press Office, which was going 

into overdrive to keep up with Magsaysay’s activities. The Press Office 

began issuing almost daily press releases on everything from Magsaysay’s 

day to day activities, to details of Huk surrenders, to abuses of public 

office by government officials.130 With one instrument, Magsaysay was 

humanized for the average Filipino, the people could track the progress of 

the campaign against the Huks, and they could see what their own officials 

held accountable for their actions.

Continuing a program Magsaysay started as Secretary of National 

Defense, he reinstituted the 10 centavo telegram that worked so well 

previously. To cope with the volume of telegrams his office received, 

Magsaysay established the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission 

(PCAC), appointing Manuel Manahan as its first director. The PCAC was 

no longer focused just on the Huks or AFP abuses, it encompassed the entire 

government. Every government agency was answerable to the PCAC.131

The program was so successful that Magsaysay’s staff established a radio 
86

show to publicize the work performed by PCAC on behalf of Filipino 

citizens.132

Despite all of his presidential duties, Magsaysay continued to take 

a personal interest in the problems of his people. Frisco San Juan, who 

would take over as the second director of the PCAC, recalled a time when 

Magsaysay was supposed to attend a conference with AFP and other 

government officials. Instead of attending the conference he took his own 

car to Nueva Ecija province to check on the status of a complaint filed by 

a farmer claiming his landlord beat him.133

Magsaysay’s campaign against the Huks culminated shortly after 

taking office. In February Magsaysay instructed Manuel Manahan 

and Benigno Aquino, Jr. to open negotiations with Luis Taruc to try to 

convince him to surrender. On 16 May 1954, Taruc surrendered to Aquino. 

Taruc’s son Romeo noted his father’s weariness at seeing Filipino’s killing 

Filipino’s, and Taruc’s own writing suggests exhaustion as a primary cause 

of his surrender.134 However, Magsaysay and Lansdale’s operations had 

also reduced the Huk support base to almost nothing, and Huk fighters 

were surrendering in ever increasing numbers because of the lure of 

Magsaysay’s reconciliation policies.

All of the programs and initiatives described thus far demonstrate 

Magsaysay’s desire to remain as closely connected to the people as he had 

ever been. In Magsaysay’s mind “it’s a leadership issue. He’s from them. 

He’s with them. And he’s out to help them out.”135 People saw Magsaysay 

as different. He was not one of the “professional politicians” and was 

unlike all the previous presidents.136 Unfortunately for Magsaysay, the 

professional politicians and their political machines were still very much 

opposed to some of the policies he had promised during his campaign.

Despite the popular mandate Magsaysay received from the Filipino 

people in November 1953, he still faced opposition from congress and 

entrenched elites. In the opinion of knowledgeable US officials, party 

leadership from both sides would likely “oppose any radical departure 

from conservative economic policies and will probably have more 

political influence than the group favoring a liberal point of view.”137 The 

uneasy union of Magsaysay with the Nationalista Party was embodied in 

the relationship between the new president and party leader Claro Recto. 

“[Magsaysay] distrusts and fears Recto but both emotions are colored by 

a great respect long since acquired for Recto’s intellectual attainments 

and his remarkable powers of political improvisation . . . Recto’s attitude 

toward [Magsaysay] is one of thinly disguised condescension.”138
87

On one side was Magsaysay and his supporters, “mostly AFP men 

plus some talented amateurs like Manny Manahan,” while the other side 

consisted of the old guard of the Nationalista Party and certain business 

interests.139 While Magsaysay’s opponents were opposed to land reform, 

they were able to compromise in certain areas, and the president was 

determined to work around the issues his own party was presented him:

He had executive initiatives on community development. So 

he worked within the scope of the executive. He would issue 

executive orders. On those . . . the congressmen and senators 

knew he was trying to help the poor, so they did not really bother 

blocking him. They were very supportive, except on the land 

reform. They wanted him blocked.140

Even in the face of stiff opposition from his own party, Magsaysay 

continued to push for the social and land reform issues he had promised 

the Filipino electorate during his campaign.141 However, popular support 

of the masses did not necessarily translate into political capital in Manila.

The level of US support Magsaysay enjoyed from 1950-1954 virtually 

evaporated overnight. Absent the PKP-Huk menace, US policy makers no 

longer felt the need to push for reforms behind the scenes. The Eisenhower 

administration had already shifted focus to the communist threat in Vietnam, 

generally leaving Magsaysay and the Philippines to fend for themselves.142

Lansdale’s departure for Vietnam, along with a significant number of 

his CIA team members, created a void that appears to have never been 

filled. The effect of this policy shift away from the Philippines was felt in 

Washington. “We would go into a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 

meeting and there would be 40 people in the room. Not many of those 40 

knew a lot about the Philippines.”143 This was only a few years after the 

Philippines had been a major theater in the war against communism in 

Asia, and was still far from being socially and politically stable.

Despite the challenges Magsaysay faced during his two and a half 

years as president, he and Lansdale succeeded in two very important 

tasks. First, the Huks ceased to be an existential threat to the Philippine 

government, and stability in general. As the representative voice of one 

faction within the PKP-Huk movement, Luis Taruc noted in 1954 that 

they viewed Magsaysay’s administration differently than the Quirino 

administration. The people had spoken in the 1953 elections and it 

was time to seek peace.144 Second, and related to the first success, the 

popular support generated by Magsaysay for the government restored its 

legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate. Instead of being the focal point of 
88

peasant and lower class outrage and derision, the government was now 

perceived as responsive to their needs. Magsaysay and Lansdale’s success 

was further highlighted by the fact that they were able to accomplish those 

rather significant feats in only four years, in the face of opposition from 

both an armed insurgency and an entrenched establishment.
89

Notes

1. Laurin B. Askew, Economic Officer, Manila (1954-1956); interviewed 

by Charles Stuart Kennedy (1998), ADST/CRS.

2. Fidel V. Ramos, interview with the author, Makati City, Manila, 22 

October 2012.

3. Kerkvliet, 265. While religion in general, and Catholicism particularly, 

was a factor, the existing literature does not suggest that it was a significantly 

divisive issue, as the PKP tended to avoid the question of religion. PhilippineUS efforts to capitalize on the doctrinal communist stance on religion likely 

encountered the same problem the PKP experienced in their attempts to 

indoctrinate the lower classes. The majority of people simply either did not care 

about or understand the ideology. They were merely fighting back against a 

repressive government and unacceptable societal conditions. Intellectual appeals 

from both sides were lost because the PKP had long since given up on preaching 

the ills of religion to their rank-and-file. Because so few of the rank-and-file did 

not understand communist doctrine to begin with, Philippine-US psychological 

operations highlighting the communist stance on religion likely fell on deaf 

ears. Thus, it appears that the Huk rank-and-file generally retained their largely 

Catholic identity throughout the campaign.

4. Fidel V. Ramos, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012.

5. Kerkvliet, 103. Vicente Lava was a well-known Filipino scientist who 

had actually served in the Philippine government’s Bureau of Science and held 

a doctorate from Columbia University. According to Lansdale, only about seven 

Filipinos went abroad to study communism, with five going to the Soviet Union 

and two going to China. He contrasts this with the dozens of Vietnamese who 

studied in the Soviet Union and China, citing this as one of the reasons why the 

Vietnamese communists were so much stronger than their Filipino counterparts. 

This may also explain why the PKP espoused Marxist-Leninist doctrine as 

opposed to Maoist, despite the larger agrarian base extant in the Philippines at 

the time (Lansdale, A Comparison: Viet Nam and the Philippines, 3-4).

6. Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 

1967), 95.

7. Based on the context of Vicente Lava’s statements, “leftist 

adventurism” might be characterized as the radical leadership of the PKP 

attempting to infiltrate and subvert other social and labor groups and movements 

in order to bring them under PKP domination. This is as opposed to Taruc and 

Vicente Lava’s view that the best hope for political and social change in the 

Philippines was through a broad based coalition, or united front, representing 

the interests of many diverse groups. Leftist adventurism, as suggested by 

Taruc, was heavily influenced by Leninist principles, and also sought the armed 

overthrow of the government, just at a time when he believed the PKP-Huk 

movement was not militarily capable of such a move.
90

8. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 92.

9. Kerkvliet, 100.

10. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 97.

11. Taruc, 109. Among the more unrealistic objectives set forth by the 

Secretariat in the 1951 Central Committee Resolutions were to “establish 

revolutionary local governments and peasant committees for the distribution 

of land, to levy revolutionary taxes, and to create revolutionary workers’

committees in all key industries and public utilities in the country.” 

12. According to Romeo Taruc, in an interview with the author, 18 October 

2012, the break between Taruc and his colleagues during the 1951-52 period 

persists to this day in the form of separate Huk veteran’s organizations, the Huk 

Foundation, and the Hukbalahap Veterans Association.

13. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 98.

14. Taruc, 93.

15. Romeo Taruc, interview with the author, Angeles City, Pampanga, 18 

October 2012.

16. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 98-99.

17. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 103-104.

18. Taruc, 121.

19. Kerkvliet, 237.

20. “We Smashed the Communists,” 32, 35.

21. As defined in Chapter 1, empathy is “the ability to experience and 

relate to the thoughts, emotions, or experience of others.”

22. William Pomeroy, The Forest (New York: International Publishers, 

1963), 102-103, 138, 190. See also Karnow, 668.

23. Pomeroy, 123-137, 210-211, 228-230, 233-234.

24. Romeo Taruc, interview with the author, Angeles City, Pampanga, 18 

October 2012.

25. Fidel V. Ramos, interview with the author, Makati City, Manila, 22 

October 2012.

26. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 49. Ranger operations of the time 

were characterized by small unit actions focused on long range infiltrations 

of the enemy lines to conduct ambushes, raids and sabotage. In the case of an 

insurgency, the concept simply meant that rather than infiltrating enemy lines, 

the small units infiltrated into insurgent controlled areas to conduct the same 

types of operations.

27. Edward Lansdale, “A Case History of Insurgency: The Philippines,” 

lecture, National War College, 25 March 1964 (Lansdale Papers, Box 74, 
91

Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA). The 

culminating “exercise” for scout ranger candidates, prior to graduating, 

consisted of infiltrating a known Huk stronghold and returning alive, either with 

useable intelligence or a confirmable report that they had eliminated the Huks in 

the area.

28. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 50.

29. Lansdale, 71.

30. Lansdale, 70.

31. Lansdale, 75-78. While the operation associated with this citation is 

simply one example of the many types of psychological operations employed 

by the AFP, throughout the available sources it is clear that the vast majority of 

these types of operations were meant to encourage Huks to surrender, whether 

through enticement, sowing suspicion amongst the Huk ranks, coercion, or 

playing on popular local superstitions. For a comprehensive account of the 

psychological operations employed by the AFP during the Huk campaign, see 

Chapter 5 of Lansdale’s autobiography, In the Midst of Wars.

32. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 122.

33. Julian F. Harrington (Chargé de Affairs) to Cowen, 8 January 1952, 

Embassy Telegram, No. 2375.

34. H.M. Menzi to Cowen, personal correspondence, 5 May 1952 (Myron 

Cowen Papers, Box 5, Truman Library, Independence, MO).

35. Robert S. Hendry (Associate Editor, Philippines Free Press) to Cowen, 

personal correspondence, 4 December1951, (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 9, 

Truman Library, Independence, MO).

36. Official Memorandum for Melby and Lansdale from Cowen, 8 

January 1952, declassified, (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 6, Truman Library, 

Independence, MO). Since departing Manila as the US Ambassador to the 

Philippines, Cowen had assumed duties in Washington, DC, as the Consultant 

to the Secretary of State on Far Eastern Affairs and Special Assistant to the 

Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs.

37. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

38. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 101.

39. Lansdale., 101.

40. Macdonald, 151.

41. Fidel V. Ramos, interview with the author, Makati City, Manila, 22 

October 2012.

42. Cliff Forster interview.
92

43. Romulo, Gray, 142, 174. For modern counterinsurgency doctrinal 

references to reconciliation programs see Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, Field Manual 3-24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 2008), 4-11, 7-5, 7-7, 7-8, and US Government 

Counterinsurgency Guide January (Washington, DC: Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs, 2009), 3, 15, 23. For United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 

doctrinal references see Ministry of Defense, Army Field Manual: Countering 

Insurgency, vol. 1, part 10, January 2010, p.1-13.

44. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 51. See also, “We Smashed the 

Communists: Philippine Leader Tells how Guns and Food Won War on 

Huks,” 32. According to Philippine Army records cited by Lansdale in his 

autobiography, “6,874 Huks were killed and 4,702 were captured, while in 

the same period 9,458 Huks surrendered!” Magsaysay cites similar (rounded) 

figures in his interview with US News & World Report.

45. “We Smashed the Communists,” 32.

46. “We Smashed the Communists,”, 35.

47. Romulo, Gray, 142.

48. Romulo, Gray, 142-143. According to Romulo and Gray’s account, 

a surrendered Huk named Amat was guilty of three murders, but Magsaysay 

felt he had acted out of desperation and wanted to give him a second chance. 

Magsaysay provided a small machine shop in the prison so he could earn a 

living, in hopes that Amat’s story would entice other Huks to surrender. For 

Lansdale’s account see In the Midst of Wars, 51. In Lansdale’s account, a Huk 

named Tomas Santiago “had approached Magsaysay with the intent of killing 

him, only to lose heart and surrender.” Once in prison Santiago wanted to 

redeem himself, and Magsaysay eventually provided him wood and tools so he 

could resume his former trade as a carpenter. As other prisoners saw what was 

happening, they wanted the same opportunity. Eventually, Magsaysay had their 

carpentry shop incorporated as a business. The ex-Huk carpentry firm later bid 

on, and won, a contract to make furniture for the AFP.

49. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 97.

50. “We Smashed the Communists,” 32.

51. Fidel V. Ramos, interview with the author, Makati City, Manila, 22 

October 2012.

52. Ramos.

53. Myron Cowen to Carlos P. Romulo, personal correspondence, 26 July 

1952 (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 7, Truman Library, Independence, MO).

54. Edward Lansdale under pseudonym “Geoffrey Villiers,” The 

Philippines Election, 1953, 23 November 1953 (Lansdale Papers, Box 34, 

Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA). Lansdale 

allegedly chose his codename for the operation by randomly selecting a name 

from a phone book (Karnow, 665-666).
93

55. Romulo, Gray, 163-166.

56. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Secretary of State, 

8 September 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 12, Part 

2, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 498.

57. Spruance.

58. Spruance.

59. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 104-105. Lansdale describes Spruance 

and Lacy’s support as critical for garnering Washington’s approval for his plans 

for the 1953 elections.

60. James J. Halsema, Information Officer, USIS, Manila (1952-1954); 

interview by G. Lewis Schmidt (1989), ADST/CRS.

61. Lansdale, A Comparison: Viet Nam and the Philippines, 23.

62. Charles T. R. Bohannon, Report of Reconnaissance of the Bicol Region, 

September 1952, declassified, (Bohannon Papers, Box 28, Hoover Institution 

Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA).

63. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

64. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Department of 

State, 1 April 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 12, Part 

2, 523-524. Additional reasons outlined for Magsaysay turning Quirino down 

are the President’s refusal to guarantee free elections and institute political and 

administrative reforms; that it would not make sense to run for vice-president 

when he could run for president; Magsaysay’s popular standing threatened 

Quirino; and Magsaysay would have to work within the Liberal Party apparatus, 

which was run by Eugenio Perez, and Magsaysay would find “association with 

Perez almost unbearable.” Perez had enormous political power and he and his 

“cronies” support was absolutely essential to Quirino.

65. The Counselor of Embassy in the Philippines (Lacy) to the Assistant 

Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison), 31 October 1952, Foreign 

Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 12, Part 2, 508-510. In one instance, 

Magsaysay came to William Lacy’s office to tell him that he had overheard 

President Quirino telling men close to him that he wanted to use the Philippine 

military to ensure a Liberal Party victory in the 1953 elections. Lacy suspected 

that Quirino’s “slip,” making those statements in Magsaysay’s presence, was 

really an attempt to 1) know who Magsaysay was meeting with at the embassy, 

2) determine Magsaysay’s relationship to Nationalista Party leadership, 3) 

determine embassy attitude toward a Magsaysay candidacy, 4) if evidence could 

be adduced, request removal of Ambassador Spruance and/or Lacy, and 5) make 

Magsaysay out to be a US tool or puppet.

66. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.
94

67. Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 

Affairs (Allison), 5 December 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1952-1954, 12, Part 2, 515.

68. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Department of 

State, 10 December 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 

12, Part 2, 520.

69. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Department of 

State, 10 December 1952, 520.

70. Currey, 120. As will be noted in more detail in the last chapter of this 

thesis, the relationship between Major General Pierson and Edward Lansdale 

requires additional research. In the specific case of Lansdale’s return to the 

Philippines it is unknown if Pierson played any part in spurring the initial call 

from Washington for Lansdale’s departure from the Philippines, and subsequent 

reservations about his return. By early 1953, the Office of Policy Coordination 

was no longer under the combined purview of the Departments of State and 

Defense, and was solely under the control of the CIA. Without departmental 

ownership of Lansdale’s mission it is possible that complaints and appeals from 

Pierson may have found a receptive audience in both departments.

71. Lansdale to Cowen, declassified personal correspondence, 11 June 

1953, (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 6, Truman Library, Independence, MO).

72. Currey, 119.

73. Hart, 69.

74. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Department of 

State, 31 December 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 

12, Part 2, 526.

75. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

76. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Department of 

State, 31 December 1952, 526.

77. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

78. Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012.

79. Frisco San Juan.

80. Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 

Affairs (Allison), 16 December 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1952-1954, 12, Part 2, 524.

81. Lansdale, The Philippines Election, 1953, 6. Lansdale discounted the 

rumors at first, but gave them more credence when individuals associated with 

Magsaysay and others associated with the 1949 Batangas Revolt approached 
95

his team and other US officials with specific requests for items like anti-tank 

weapons.

82. Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 

Affairs (Allison), 16 December 1952, 523.

83. Buell, 452. US officials were in a difficult position with the revelation 

that Magsaysay was considering leading an armed revolt against Quirino. 

Magsaysay and Lansdale, with the assistance of JUSMAG, made great strides 

in professionalizing the AFP in a short time. Ironically, that professionalism 

was supposed to translate into loyalty to the constitution and the nation rather 

than patrons or political parties, i.e. Quirino and other politicians. Loyalty to 

Magsaysay rather than to the constitution would demonstrate that the AFP had 

not truly professionalized, but instead found a more palatable patron.

84. Lansdale to Lavinia Hanson (Valeriano), personal correspondence, 5 

March 1984.

85. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs 

(Wanamaker) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 

Affairs (Bonsal), 5 December 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1952-1954, 12, Part 2, 518. In 1946, Manuel Roxas was perceived to be General 

MacArthur and High Commissioner Paul McNutt’s choice for president. In 

1949, Quirino was perceived to be Ambassador Cowen’s choice for president 

over the collaborationist Jose Laurel.

86. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, 13 

December 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 12, Part 2, 

521.

87. Acting Secretary of State, 522.

88. Robert L. Nichols, Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Davao (1951-

1954); interviewed by Robert Amerson (30 August 1988), ADST/CRS.

89. Earl Wilson, Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Manila (1950-1952); 

interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt (1988) ADST/CRS.

90. Lansdale, The Philippines Election, 1953, 1.

91. Charles J. Nelson, Public Administration Specialist, International 

Cooperation Administration (ICA), Manila (1952-1955); Special Advisor to 

Mission Director for Rural Development/Deputy Chief, ICA, Manila (1956-

1958); interview by Celestine Tutt (1981), ASDT/CRS. During a trip to the 

provinces Mr. Nelson encountered the matron of a large estate, and she talked 

“about the persons who worked on her estate. She was talking about the fact that 

the farmers wanted to vote as they pleased. She was really upset about this.”

92. Lansdale, The Philippines Election, 1953, 2. Terry Adevoso, Frisco 

San Juan, and Jaime Ferrer founded NAMFREL for the 1951 elections with 

Lansdale’s support.
96

93. The Counselor of Embassy in the Philippines (Lacy) to the Assistant 

Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison), 31 October 1952, 509.

94. Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012.

95. Frisco San Juan. See also, Romulo, Gray, 197. This demonstration 

of loyalty, though admirable under the circumstances, called into question the 

future viability of the AFP as an apolitical organization. Mr. San Juan’s earlier 

quote about the role of hero worship in Philippine society highlights the issues 

that a popular figure like Magsaysay raised. Fortunately, Magsaysay was a man 

of principle and character, who actively sought counsel before acting.

96. Lansdale, The Philippines Election, 1953, 2.

97. Lansdale. Signor Vagnozzi was already well known by Quirino, as the 

President had tried to have the Vatican recall him. The US Embassy intervened 

on his behalf by contacting the Archbishop of New York, Cardinal Francis 

Spellman to relay their concerns to the Vatican (Assistant Secretary of State for 

Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Counselor of Embassy in the Philippines 

(Lacy), 2 December 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 

12, Part 2, 513).

98. Lansdale to Cowen, declassified personal correspondence, 11 June 

1953.

99. Gosnell, Harold F. “An Interpretation of the Philippine Election of 

1953.” The American Political Science Review 48, no. 4 (December 1954): 

1135.

100. Lansdale, The Philippines Election, 1953, 2.

101. Lansdale, 3. The Free Philippines was published by Manuel Manahan, 

with the aid of Juan “Johnny” Orendain and others.

102. Lansdale, The Philippines Election, 1953, 4.

103. Lansdale to Cowen, declassified personal correspondence, 11 June 

1953.

104. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Department of 

State, 6 March 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 12, Part 

2, 529-530.

105. Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012.

106. Lansdale to Cowen, declassified personal correspondence, 11 June 

1953.

107. Luz Magsaysay to Dorothy Cowen, personal correspondence, 10 

September 1953 (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 6, Truman Library, Independence, 

MO). See also Macdonald, 167. Also Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, 

Quezon City, Manila, 15 October 2012.
97

108. Romulo, Gray, 89-90, 95, 98. Carlos Romulo was one of those who 

noted Magsaysay’s gaffs while Secretary of National Defense during his visit 

to Washington, DC in 1952. Ambassador Cowen and Lansdale both shared 

those concerns. It is likely that Lansdale’s claim that his team wrote most of 

Magsaysay’s major speeches originates from their earlier concerns. However, 

previous Filipino politicians utilized Americans as speech writer; for example, 

Julius Edelstein served as President Roxas’ speech writer until the formers 

departure, as noted by Lansdale in his journal (previously cited).

109. Lansdale to Cowen, declassified personal correspondence, 11 June 

1953. The cartellas and carabao carts mentioned by Lansdale are traditional 

Philippine modes of transportation. A caratella is generally a small, twowheeled, horse, mule, or donkey drawn, covered carriage. A carabao cart is 

similar to a caratella, but is often uncovered and is drawn by a carabao, which is 

a type of water buffalo.

110. Lansdale to Cowen, declassified personal correspondence, 11 June 

1953.

111. Lansdale.

112. 229th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment, Captain Paul R. Lutjens, 

PHLRYCOM, Malacañan Intelligence Division, 7 February 1949 (Bohannon 

Papers, Box 28, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, 

CA).

113. Lansdale to Cowen, declassified personal correspondence, 11 June 

1953.

114. Lansdale.

115. Lansdale.

116. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 126.

117. Romeo Taruc, interview with the author, Angeles City, Pampanga, 18 

October 2012.

118. Memorandum Prepared for the Ambassador in the Philippines 

(Spruance), 2 October 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 

12, Part 2, 549. According to this source, “an unsigned handwritten note on 

the source text” stated that Lansdale prepared the memorandum. Other actions 

by the Quirino administration and Liberal Party cataloged by Lansdale and 

the embassy staff included recalling the most honest provincial treasurers to 

Manila to work on the next year’s budget, and replacing them with compliant 

acting treasurers. Provincial treasurers are responsible for receiving municipal 

ballot tallies, compiling them into a provincial tally, and reporting the provinces 

ballot results to the Electoral Commission. Liberal Party officials also attempted 

to pressure managers of the Philippine National Bank “to refuse crop and 

developmental loans to selected persons opposing the Liberals.” The Liberals 

also attempted to use the tax collection services to make “sudden demands 
98

for taxes or sudden reallocation of land...these means have been used, also, 

in keeping Liberal rank-and-file in line.” Liberal candidates were also taking 

control of municipal mayors and police forces in certain localities to assist in 

fraud during the election. The Liberal Speaker of the House, Eugenio Perez 

was believed to have been distributing blank ballots to officials in the provinces 

for use on election day. A courier who was bringing samples of the fraudulent 

ballots was believed to have been murdered while traveling to Manila with 

the samples. Government officials were also believed to have hired 800-1,000 

“goons” by October 1953, but the number was expected to dramatically increase 

on election day. Among the “goons” were the “intelligence agents” of the 

Office of the President mentioned previously (Memorandum Prepared for the 

Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance), 2 October 1953, 550-551).

119. Memorandum Prepared for the Ambassador in the Philippines 

(Spruance), 2 October 1953, 549.

120. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Executive 

Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay), 16 July 1953, Foreign 

Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, 12, Part 2, 539.

121. Currey, 130. The combined voter turnout of 4,226,983 was out of a 

total population of roughly 18 million in late 1953.

122. Lansdale, The Philippines Election, 1953, 4-7. In reference to 

protecting Magsaysay, Lansdale specifically mentions one incident in which 

the Kugown team sanctioned a direct action operation by security forces loyal 

to Magsaysay after receiving intelligence that a man named Ben Ulo was in 

command of a group of men President Quirino had recently released from 

prison, all of whom were serving life sentences for murder. These men were 

to ambush Magsaysay during a campaign stop in Pangasinan, and Lansdale’s 

team sent messages to Magsaysay to cancel the trip. Magsaysay went anyway 

in order to support an embattled local politician. Lansdale’s team “marshaled 

all security forces” with one specific mission, “to get Ulo first. Ulo disappeared. 

The ambushes did not take place.” 

123. Lansdale, 9. Lansdale’s reference to “ward bosses” is actually a 

reference to the traditional Philippine political process of the time. Under 

the traditional system a congressional candidate from a certain party would 

nominate mayoral candidates for each of the towns in his province. The mayoral 

candidate would then nominate municipal councilors and barrio lieutenants. 

In return for those nominations, the barrio lieutenants were expected to deliver 

votes for the mayoral candidate, who then delivered votes for the congressional 

candidate. If the province was controlled by the presidential candidate’s party, 

those votes would also carry over to the presidential candidate (Bungaard, 279).

124. Currey, 132-133.

125. Bungaard, 280-281.
99

126. Romulo, Gray, 31. One of Magsaysay’s first actions was to officially 

change the spelling of the presidential residence from the English spelling, 

Malacañan, back to the Tagalog spelling, Malcañang.

127. Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012.

128. Frisco San Juan.

129. Office of the Press Secretary, “RM Orders Gov’t Officers, Employees 

Bare their Finances; Abolishes IB,” Press Release No. 1-6-3, 6 January 1954, 

(Lansdale Papers, Box 34, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, 

Palo Alto, CA).

130. Office of the Press Secretary, Unnumbered Press Release, 3:30 pm, 4 

January 1954 (Lansdale Papers, Box 34, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA).

131. Office of the Press Secretary, “President Appoints Crisol Acting NBI 

Director,” Press Release No. 1-4-2, 4 January 1954 (Lansdale Papers, Box 34, 

Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA).

132. Office of the Press Secretary, “PCAC Press Release,” Press Release 

No. 2-4-3, 4 February 1954 (Lansdale Papers, Box 34, Hoover Institution 

Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA).

133. Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012. When Magsaysay arrived in Nueva Ecija he investigated the 

incident and found that the landlord in question had actually been a “heavy 

contributor” to his presidential campaign. Regardless of the contribution, 

Magsaysay ordered the landlord arrested when he saw evidence of the landlord’s 

beatings.

134. Romeo Taruc, interview with the author, Angeles City, Pampanga, 18 

October 2012.

135. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

136. Alfredo Lim, interview with the author, Manila City Hall, 22 October 

2012.

137. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and 

Southeast Asian Affairs (Day) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright), 16 November 1953, Foreign Relations of the 

United States, 1952-1954, 12, Part 2, 558.

138. Untitled memorandum regarding the situation in the Philippines, 10 

March 1954, (Myron Cowen Papers, Box 6, Truman Library, Independence, 

MO).

139 . Untitled memorandum.
100

140. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

141. Petzel, 91-92. See also Bugaard, 280; Macdonald, 180. In 1954, 

Magsaysay successfully pushed through Congress the Agricultural Tenancy Act, 

which codified the regulations for “share and leasehold rentals.” A year later 

he successfully passed the Act Creating a Court of Agrarian Relations. Later 

that year he also passed the Land Reform Act of 1955. Also in 1955 Magsaysay 

successfully made the positions of mayor and municipal councilor elected 

positions for ten chartered cities; previously, these positions were by presidential 

appointment.

142. Macdonald, 173, 180.

143. Stephen Low, Philippine Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 

Washington, DC (1956-1957); interviewed by Professor I.W. Zartman (1988), 

ASDT/CRS.

144. Kerkvliet, 247.
101

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Violence takes much deeper root in irregular warfare than it 

does in regular warfare . . . It becomes very difficult to rebuild a 

country, and a stable state, on a foundation undermined by such 

experience.

— Sir B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy.

1

The US-Philippine government campaign against the Huks from 

1946-1954 offers important insights into limited US intervention on 

behalf of a foreign government. The lessons of the campaign may not have 

appeared relevant to counterinsurgency practitioners and policy makers 

during the US-led campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan because of the scope 

of operations in those countries, thus precluding significant analysis of 

the Huk campaign. However, the Huk campaign may provide important 

lessons for future interventions and serve as a critical comparison for 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan going forward.

Ramon Magsaysay and Edward Lansdale successfully executed a 

counterinsurgency campaign against the Huk movement because of their 

shared empathy, deep sociocultural understanding of the Filipino people, 

and their complimentary capabilities and resources. The evidence clearly 

suggests that Magsaysay’s programs and initiatives, and Lansdale’s covert 

operations, demonstrated their empathy and sociocultural understanding, 

but would have been impossible without their complimentary capabilities 

and resources.

Lansdale and Magsaysay’s empathy for the Filipino people originated 

from their frequent contact with the Filipino people, particularly those in 

the provinces, and interaction with the Huks themselves. Magsaysay’s 

empathy was critical to the success of the Huk campaign for several reasons. 

First, it allowed him to fill the paternalistic void extant in Philippine society 

at the time. Amidst the social dislocation following World War II the Huks 

started to fill the void left by an unresponsive upper class. Had the trend 

continued unchecked, the relatively localized Huk movement may have 

grown into a wider societal conflict bordering on civil war.

Second, Magsaysay’s empathy aided him in rapidly rebuilding the 

morale and esprit de corps of the armed forces. In his role as Secretary 

of National Defense, Magsaysay served a paternalistic function for his 

soldiers. Where they had no advocate before, now the Secretary himself 

was taking a genuine interest in their welfare. In little more than a 
102

year Magsaysay had a profound impact on the armed forces. The AFP 

Magsaysay inherited in the fall of 1950 was hardly visible in the AFP that 

secured the clean elections of 1951.

Lansdale’s empathy was critical to the eventual success of the 

campaign because people perceived him as genuine and trustworthy. 

These characteristics allowed him to develop the wide network of 

contacts throughout Philippine society that informed his actions during 

the campaign. Without these contacts and access to Philippine society, 

Lansdale may have gone in one of two directions. He might have resigned 

himself to the same benign insularity that so many other Americans in the 

Philippines seemed content to accept. The other, and perhaps worse, course 

he might have taken was one of arrogance and belligerence, coercing 

his Filipino counterparts into implementing ill-informed programs and 

initiatives. Lansdale’s empathy also provided a solid foundation for his 

relationship with Magsaysay, which was characterized by mutual trust and 

respect.2

 Without this foundation it is unlikely that their association would 

have lasted long. If Lansdale had not trusted or respected Magsaysay, 

the counterinsurgent camp probably would have polarized between the 

Americans and Filipinos because of the deep respect, trust, and loyalty 

Magsaysay’s followers had for him.

Magsaysay and Lansdale demonstrated sociocultural understanding in 

the types and design of the programs, initiatives, and covert operations they 

executed. They understood that in a counterinsurgency campaign local 

governance breaks down, offering the insurgents an opening to exploit, 

and that “the man in uniform whether he is a policeman, a constabulary 

man, or an army trooper [becomes] the sole link between the government 

and the masses, or the governed.”3

 Understanding this, they were able to 

select the programs, initiatives, and covert operations that would have the 

most effect on the population and the Huks. Even the smallest military 

operations against the Huks usually incorporated psychological operations 

grounded in sociocultural understanding. Rather than focusing just on 

improving the combat capabilities of the AFP, they also spent considerable 

time developing the AFPs popular image. Lansdale and Magsaysay 

understood that the existing image when they took over the campaign 

reinforced the popular perception that the whole government was against 

the people.

Lansdale’s covert operations in support of Magsaysay clearly 

demonstrated his sociocultural understanding. He understood that 

Magsaysay would become a threat and therefore a target of the entrenched 

political and social elites. Lansdale’s operations and the support of US 
103

officials at the embassy were specifically calculated to provide Magsaysay 

the necessary time to implement his programs and initiatives and see 

results. Specifically, he understood that in Magsaysay lacked support from 

the powerful political clans in the Philippines. In order to prevent Quirino 

from removing the upstart Secretary of National Defense, popular opinion 

and support for Magsaysay was absolutely necessary.

The complimentary capabilities and resources of Lansdale and 

Magsaysay allowed them to execute the programs, initiatives, and covert 

operations that removed the Huks as an existential threat to the Philippine 

government. Magsaysay’s son noted that while Lansdale provided his 

father with “a lot of guidance on counterinsurgency,” Magsaysay, Sr. in 

turn showed Lansdale “the way it should be done . . . in the Philippines.”4

Lansdale also provided Magsaysay valuable political guidance about 

operating at the national level, while Magsaysay proved to be the catalyst 

needed to repair Philippine society. Lansdale and his team initially 

worked with Magsaysay under the impression they were building him up, 

but they quickly realized that he was a force all his own. Lansdale came 

to understand that while he could manufacture an image, he could not 

manufacture a man.

Lansdale derived his authority from his parent organizations, the 

Office of Policy Coordination and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Magsaysay’s power and authority were derived from the popular support 

of the people, not just his governmental positions. Interestingly enough, 

neither man abused that authority. Historians and political scientists may 

disagree about the degree to which Lansdale interfered in the domestic 

politics of the Philippines. However, Lansdale’s actions simply empowered 

the Philippine electorate through free and fair elections. As noted by 

most observers of the time popular disgust with the existing regime 

almost guaranteed popular support for Quirino’s opposition in 1951 and 

Magsaysay in 1953.

When distilled to its essence, the counterinsurgency campaign in the 

Philippines represented an extremely effective ends-ways-means analysis 

on the part of both men. Lansdale and Magsaysay determined the proper 

ends, i.e. the objectives of their programs and initiatives, because of their 

empathy for the people. They determined the proper ways to accomplish 

those objectives through deep sociocultural understanding. Finally, 

their complimentary capabilities and resources served as the means for 

accomplishing their objectives.
104

Critics might argue that the Huk campaign was not truly successful 

because communism was not eradicated, and Huk remnants gave birth 

to the New People’s Army. However, the Huks did not really give birth 

to the New People’s Army; unaddressed social, political, and economic 

grievances rejuvenated a popular support base for the communists. Thus, 

the Philippine government allowed a communist resurgence, where it had 

previously only been a nuisance after 1954. Magsaysay’s untimely and 

tragic death in 1957 prevented full implementation of the reforms that 

might have permanently relegated the communists to nuisance status. Of 

note, Magsaysay became a measure of character and integrity for future 

Filipino leaders.5

Lansdale may have been able to help manufacture the image of 

Magsaysay, but he could not, and did not have to, manufacture the man that 

was Magsaysay. After Magsaysay’s death, US officials, particularly those 

in the CIA, were quick to start looking for “another Magsaysay.”6

 While 

there may have been candidates of similar caliber available, it appears 

as though American officials settled for regimes more closely resembling 

Quirino’s than Magsaysay’s. The communists no longer represented an 

existential threat to a “democratic” Philippine government. As long as 

Philippine policies were in line with American policy there was no reason 

to continue pushing for reforms that strengthened democratic institutions 

and further alleviated social unrest. The ascension of Ferdinand Marcos in 

the 1960s and US policy toward his regime in subsequent years highlighted 

America’s return to schizophrenic Philippine policy. It is perhaps no small 

coincidence that US policy toward the Marcos regime only shifted once 

the Cold War in Asia had largely subsided.

Subjects of Further Study

The psychological effects of World War II, the Japanese occupation, 

and the subsequent Huk rebellion, on the Filipino population deserve 

further study. Numerous Filipinos from the period cited the population’s 

experiences during the occupation, as the reason for the moral and ethical 

decay of Philippine society.7

 Murder, torture, rape, and robbery topped a 

long list of crimes that became common place from 1942-1945. As one 

contemporary observer of the time noted “the war made it seem that to 

obey was to abandon the good fight, while to resist the law was heroic.”8

Historical texts tend to catalogue the atrocities committed on both sides 

of the conflict, rather than analyze the long-term social and cultural 

implications of the irregular war that raged in Central Luzon during the 

occupation. As a former member of the Hunters Guerrillas noted “at the 

age of 21 in my area, I had the power of life and death.”9

 Such power 
105

and authority proved difficult to relinquish for many of the guerrillas. The 

post-war Huk rebellion may very well emerge as simply the second phase 

of a civil war that began during the occupation, and continued until the 

people regained faith in the central government.

The existing scholarship would be thoroughly complimented if the 

lives of Luis Taruc and Ramon Magsaysay were compared and contrasted 

in the context of occupation guerrilla activities and the Huk rebellion. 

Their lives possessed striking similarities. Taruc and Magsaysay were 

both “of the people” in that they came from the barrios.10 Both men came 

from humble financial origins and managed to impress their bosses with 

their character and integrity, earning them promotions.11 Both men courted 

women from wealthy families and encountered upper class discrimination 

in the process.12 They were also capable of imbuing profound loyalty in their 

subordinates, and became extremely popular leaders.13 Once in positions 

of power and authority they faced political opposition, Magsaysay’s 

coming from the entrenched political establishment, and Taruc’s coming 

from the largely urban intellectual elites of the PKP.14 A study of these two 

men would provide a unique look at the entire period from the perspective 

of two of the most important participants.

Another important relationship requiring additional research and 

illumination was that of Lansdale and Major General Albert Pierson. 

Lansdale maintained good relationships with two of the three JUSAMG 

chiefs during his service in the Philippines, but had a decidedly negative 

relationship with Pierson. Despite the fact that Pierson and Lansdale were 

at odds during a critical period of the Huk campaign, 1952-1953, very 

little has been written about that relationship. Pierson was the Assistant 

Division Commander of the 11th Airborne Division during the liberation 

of the Philippines, and the division was cited by Americans and the Huks 

as having had a positive relationship with the Huk squadrons in their 

area of operations.15 With that background, Pierson could have been an 

asset during the counterinsurgency campaign. Yet he actively worked to 

remove Lansdale from JUSMAG and may have gone behind Ambassador 

Spruance’s back, to officials in Washington, to have Lansdale removed 

from the Philippines altogether. Without understanding all of Pierson’s 

background it is difficult to ascertain his motives.16 If Pierson was indeed 

going behind Ambassador Spruance’s back to work for Lansdale’s removal, 

an in-depth study of that relationship could have wider implications for the 

subject of unity of effort within embassy teams, and between Washington 

and US officials abroad.
106

An important, though unanswered, question was whether or not 

the US had a contingency plan if Quirino won a fraudulent election in 

1953, causing Magsaysay to initiate or join an armed revolt against the 

government. US policy clearly linked fair elections with future economic 

and military aid, but Quirino’s actions during the 1953 campaign 

indicated that future aid was secondary to short-term regime survival. 

If Quirino won a victory reminiscent of 1949, and Magsaysay and his 

supporters responded with violence, the US government would have been 

in a precarious position. Backing Quirino would have likely destroyed 

any future relationship with the opposition and would fuel communist 

propaganda both in the Philippines and internationally. If America backed 

the opposition they would have been directly interfering in the domestic 

affairs of a government they once supported, which also could have 

fueled communist anti-imperialist propaganda. Though US officials in the 

Philippines were confident of Magsaysay’s victory given a fair election, 

they must have given significant thought to alternate outcomes. Identifying 

an American contingency plan would go a long way towards determining 

the degree to which Magsaysay’s election was a “no fail” mission.

Finally, further research of the differences between Lansdale’s 

operations in the Philippines and those in Vietnam may provide insights 

into the pitfalls of using the same campaign model in two vastly different 

environments. Lansdale may have been a victim of his own success. 

Immediately after completing his work in the Philippines, he went on 

to Vietnam and embarked on a counterinsurgency campaign partnered 

with President Ngo Dinh Diem. His failure there led some of his former 

colleagues in the Philippines to conclude that “Ed got along fine with 

Filipinos, but he didn’t understand the Vietnamese.”17 It is difficult to 

comprehend how a man who was so successful at connecting on a personal 

level with Filipinos from all walks of life, was unable to do the same in 

Vietnam. As this paper has shown, Lansdale’s ability to connect on that 

personal level was instrumental in shaping his operations in the Philippines. 

Further research and comparison of his operations in the Philippines and 

Vietnam would clarify where Lansdale actually failed in the latter country.

Enduring Conclusions

The Huk counterinsurgency campaign demonstrates that limited 

intervention on behalf of a sovereign state is possible. A significant caveat 

to this statement is that while limited, the US was still heavily invested 

in the campaign behind the scenes. Even junior officials at the US 

embassy understood they “were involved in nation-building in a very real 

sense.”18 However, this statement should not be confused with the current 
107

conception of nation-building. In terms of this case study, the Philippines 

more accurately represented an example of indigenous nation-building 

with American support. The Americans involved in the counterinsurgency 

campaign in the Philippines understood that the situation could not be 

solved by military assistance alone. Reform and change was necessary 

throughout the government, and that required significant financial aid and 

almost intimate advisory support.

The Huk campaign clearly highlights the importance of security sector 

reform. However, US officials from both the Department of State and 

Defense tended to default to the importance of the material aid provided 

to the Philippines. The embassy’s chargé de affairs, while noting the need 

for the right personnel in the Philippines, then focused on the type of 

equipment the US was providing the AFP. JUSMAG officials then echoed 

this preoccupation with material assistance by correlating improved esprit 

de corps within the AFP to the delivery of US weapons and equipment.19

Lansdale appreciated the difference between material aid and the aid he 

provided. “If we understand that this is war over people, then we can start 

understanding the real human values in it - which go far beyond sizes 

of forces, reports of battles, statistics on casualties, [and] differences in 

quality [of] weapons.”20

The US government did not benefit from its long association with the 

Philippines and the inherent understanding that should have accompanied 

that association. This meant officials involved in the campaign could not 

remain passive in their approach. It is perhaps necessary to heed the warning 

of the noted military theorist Sir B. H. Liddell Hart that “those who frame 

policy and apply it need a better understanding of the subject [support for 

guerrilla warfare] than has been shown in the past.”21 While his caution 

referenced Allied support for partisan and guerrilla organizations during 

World War II and the potentially long-term, detrimental effects that type 

of warfare had on society, it still has bearing on this subject. By suggesting 

that previous policy-makers did not spend enough time understanding the 

moral and ethical implications of unleashing an irregular form of warfare, 

he implied a basic need for historical understanding prior to developing 

and implementing policy.

Lansdale grasped his own shortcomings in this field. In 1948 he 

requested assistance from the Department of the Army Public Information 

Office in procuring any historical material they could find on guerrilla 

warfare and insurgency going “back to biblical times, if necessary.”22

Unfortunately, it is unclear whether other American personnel in the 

Philippines were as proactive as Lansdale in trying to grasp the complexities 

of the problems facing the country.
108

Choosing the proper personnel to assist in an intervention in a 

foreign country is another important lesson from the Huk campaign. 

Embassy officials in the Philippines understood they needed individuals 

knowledgeable in counterinsurgency operations. Once those individuals 

are in place they must be afforded the opportunity to complete the mission, 

unhindered by administrative or bureaucratic requirements. Lansdale 

was in the Philippines for around six and a half years from mid-1945 to 

early-1954. During that time he was able to develop relationships that 

facilitated his covert operations in the Philippines. The effect of Lansdale’s 

departure was indirectly noted by members of the intelligence community. 

“The [State Department] despatches that came in and described what was 

happening were of much more value than the spot reports that came from 

the CIA . . . I don’t think they knew a great deal about Philippine political 

history.”23

Frequent personnel turnover hinders the development of institutional 

knowledge and locally based contact networks and is not lost on host 

nation nationals. The editor of the Manila Chronicle, Ernie del Rosario 

once told an embassy official:

You know, Jim, there’s one problem with Americans that come out 

here in the embassy and the military and they come to negotiate. 

They forget that Filipinos know a great deal more about Americans 

than Americans know about Filipinos. They come here and they 

stay here for a couple of years, two or three, and then they go off 

and they leave.24

The Huk campaign case study demonstrates the significant benefits of 

employing personnel with deep host nation sociocultural understanding. 

As one embassy official recollects, “There was a certain amount of selfdelusion in our reporting...we could never really assess because we weren’t 

around long enough to see the ultimate effects.”25 It also highlights the 

drawbacks of personnel who presume that major, life altering events such 

as World War II, have not altered the status quo in some way. Additionally, 

individuals who assumed their experience in other Asian nations qualified 

them as experts in Philippine affairs without additional study and 

experience, only distracted from rather than added to the solution.

The right personnel would be useless without clearly defined objectives 

from policy makers. Lansdale departed Washington for the Philippines 

with defined, realistic objectives, only after Ramon Magsaysay emerged 

from the chaotic Philippine political scene. As mentioned earlier, the 

Americans understood that change and reform were necessary throughout 
109

the Philippine government. They also understood that change and reform 

had to come from within, and overt US pressure and influence would 

ultimately undermine their regional policy objectives.

The emergence of Magsaysay reflects the need for partners of character 

and integrity who are committed to their own ideals rather than ideals 

they think are important to Americans. Magsaysay’s ideals and vision 

coincided and corresponded with American ideals and objectives, making 

him an ideal partner. Magsaysay was not simply an American puppet. He 

maintained his own ideals, at times butting heads with American officials.26

An indigenous official committed to his or her own ideals and beliefs is 

more likely to come across as genuine and find it easier to deflect criticism 

or accusations of undue external influence. Magsaysay’s personality and 

character also lent significantly to success in the Philippines. “Ed Lansdale 

was obviously his tactician but Magsaysay understood Filipinos very well 

and he knew how to reach them. They made a great team.”27 Selecting the 

right partner was a matter of understanding the nature of the problem in the 

Philippines and identifying an individual capable of positively influencing 

the situation, in this case, popular faith and trust in the government.

The Huk campaign was characterized by almost unprecedented 

unity of effort within the US team in the Philippines. The “country 

team” concept originated during the period of the Huk campaign though 

it is unclear if Lansdale’s claim, that the country team concept was the 

brainchild of Counselor of Embassy William Lacy, is factual.28 Other than 

a negative relationship with one JUSMAG chief, Major General Pierson, 

it appears that Lansdale had a very good relationship with the other 

JUSMAG chiefs of the period, notably generals Hobbs and Cannon.29

He also had very strong relationships with ambassadors Myron Cowen 

and Raymond Spruance, and Counselor of Embassy William Lacy. The 

team in the Philippines relied on personal relationships built on trust and 

mutual support. Lansdale’s authority afforded him the power to demand 

support, but he preferred instead to build supportive relationships within 

the embassy team.

Another important lesson from the Huk campaign is the level of 

Filipino involvement in US plans and operations in the Philippines. 

Lansdale’s covert operations directly and indirectly incorporated support, 

input, and actions from the Filipinos.30 He understood that they were 

all working towards a common goal, and no one was more invested in 

the successful outcome of American operations in the Philippines than 

Filipinos themselves.31 Many Americans abroad displayed a certain degree 

of arrogance in their actions.32 Lansdale and his team eschewed that way 
110

of operating and sought local help in developing solutions to problems. In 

his opinion,

If we move in on a foreign people to help them, and see this only 

as a pragmatic exercise, equating full bellies with man’s liberty, or 

compromise our principles in the name of expediency, or let the 

egos of some turn Americans into big frogs in little ponds, then we 

can stifle that very, precious spark of true national life we seek to 

help protect and guide towards strength.33

By working with and through Filipino counterparts who were fully 

invested in and believed in the mission, the entire Philippine-American 

team benefited.

The counterinsurgent leadership in the Philippines, both Filipino and 

American, understood the importance of security sector reform. Rather 

than focusing on a materiel and increasing end strength, they opted instead 

to focus on professionalizing the existing security forces.34 The key aspect 

of Magsaysay’s military reforms was the priority given to rebuilding the 

morale and professionalism of the Philippine military throughout the chain 

of command. This was largely accomplished first through Magsaysay’s 

ability to promote, demote, and fire officers, regardless of rank or political 

association. In a military characterized by a politicized officer corps, the 

senior security sector official had to have the ability to rid the organization 

of negative influences without political interference. Magsaysay’s empathy 

for his soldiers led to the next key factor in professionalizing the security 

forces. By acknowledging and remedying the underlying causes of his 

soldier’s poor treatment of the populace he successfully prevented further 

abuses and revitalized the military’s relationship with the people.

As mentioned in the previous section, Lansdale attempted to export 

his experiences in the Philippines to his later operations in Vietnam 

and experienced far different results. Any successful counterinsurgency 

practitioner risks falling victim to similar mistakes when asked to develop 

and execute a counterinsurgency campaign in another place at another time. 

The enduring lesson from Lansdale’s dual experiences is that in another 

place and another time, context has changed. In the Philippines Lansdale 

had significant freedom of movement, allowing him to see the context 

of the problem firsthand. From his earliest days in Vietnam, Lansdale’s 

reputation preceded him, preventing him from developing the same kind 

of understanding he developed in the Philippines, perhaps preventing him 

from understanding the nature of the problem.35
111

The final enduring lesson from the Huk campaign lies in the available 

history of the campaign itself. Militarily, the vast majority of the existing 

scholarship focuses almost solely on Lansdale and Magsaysay’s efforts to 

defeat the Huks. Politically, the scholarship focuses on US diplomatic and 

Philippine government actions to counter the communists. Many of the 

conclusions derived from the existing scholarship subsequently emphasize 

the US and Philippine military, governmental, and diplomatic effects on the 

PKP-Huk movement, with little acknowledgment of their internal divisions 

and conflicts. Absent the work of largely one individual, Dr. Benedict 

Kerkvliet, there would be little understanding of the internal conflict 

within the PKP-Huk movement. Failure to acknowledge the nuances of 

an opponent’s weaknesses lends to substantially flawed understanding of 

the true historical sequence of events, and tends to promote a one-sided, 

egotistical account of events.

The Huk campaign provides an excellent case study of a successful, 

limited intervention counterinsurgency campaign. In less than four years 

the insurgency ceased to be an existential threat to the government, 

popular faith in government was restored, and government institutions 

and processes were reformed and strengthened. Ramon Magsaysay and 

Edward Lansdale formed the nucleus of a team that achieved significant 

victories over both the Huks and negative forces within the Philippine 

government itself. The enduring lessons from the campaign suggest that 

while it is impossible to duplicate the conditions of the Huk campaign, it 

may be possible to replicate them.
112

Notes

1. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 

380-381.

2. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

3. Napoleon Valeriano, “Colonel Valeriano’s Speech,” Given at unknown 

location or date (Lansdale Papers, Box 15, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA), 6.

4. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012.

5. Alfredo Lim, interview with the author, Manila City Hall, 22 October 

2012.

6. Karnow, 702.

7. Lorenzo Tanada, Untitled Speech, Rotary Club, Baguio, Philippines, 

March 1947 (Lansdale Papers, Box 32, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA).

8. Steinberg, 185.

9. Frisco San Juan, interview with the author, Quezon City, Manila, 15 

October 2012.

10. Romulo, Gray, 13-14; Taruc, Born of the People, 13.

11. Romulo, Gray, 37, 41; Taruc, Born of the People, 35-36.

12. Romulo, Gray, 39-40; Taruc, Born of the People, 18-19, 22-24.

13. Romulo, Gray, 47, 72-73, 99-100, 139-140; Taruc, He Who Rides the 

Tiger, 86.

14. Isaacs, “The Danger in the Philippines, Part 2.” See also Romulo, Gray, 

267, and Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger, 80-84.

15. Arlington National Cemetery, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/

apierson.htm, (accessed 27 November 2012). For the 11th Airborne Division’s 

relationship with the Huks, see Taruc, Born of the People, 199.

16. Pierson was stationed in the Philippines starting in 1936, a period 

when MacArthur was arguably one of the most important Americans in 

the Philippines. As a general officer during operations in New Guinea, the 

Philippines, and with occupation forces in Japan, Pierson may have been 

significantly influenced by MacArthur. MacArthur was known for his dislike 

of the OSS and organizations he could not control. If Pierson was a MacArthur 

adherent, that might explain his dislike of Lansdale and his mission in the 

Philippines.

17. James J. Halsema interview.
113

18. Cliff Forster interview.

19. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State, 

25 October 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, 6, p. 1574.

20. Edward Lansdale, “Symposium on The Challenge of Subversive 

Insurgency,” lecture, Michigan State University, Lansing, MI, 29 February 1964, 

(Lansdale Papers, Box 74, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, 

Palo Alto, CA).

21. Hart, Strategy, 382.

22. Memorandum to Public Information Division, Department of the Army, 

Information about Guerrillas, 27 April 1948 (Lansdale Papers, Box 33, Hoover 

Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA).

23. Stephen Low interview.

24. James T. Pettus, Jr., Press Attaché, USIS, Manila (1954-1957); 

interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt (30 May 1990), ADST/CRS.

25. James J. Halsema interview.

26. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr., interview with the author, Pasay City, Manila, 

22 October 2012. In one instance, Magsaysay informed embassy officials they 

had to find a new bombing range for Clark Air Base because of complaints he 

received from farmers in the area surrounding the existing bombing range.

27. James J. Halsema interview.

28. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 114. The first move towards the country 

team was actually enacted by President Truman through Executive Order no. 

10338, which was approved by Congress on 10 October 1951. The Department 

of State describes the country team as consisting of “all Embassy sections 

and heads the heads of each [US government] agency at post,” where “each 

member reports to the Ambassador on activities, next steps for their office. The 

Ambassador resolves differences, if any, and seeks guidance from Washington 

if course corrections appear necessary.” The team then “formulates the Mission 

Strategic Plan that spells out specific, details [US government] interaction in 

that country” (US Department of State, “Introduction to Department of State 

Agency Culture,” http://www.state.gov/courses/rs401/page_25.htm, accessed on 

3 December 2012).

29. Director of Central Intelligence Walter B. Smith to Major General 

Leland Hobbs, personal correspondence, 9 January 1951 (Lansdale Papers, Box 

34, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA). After the 

conclusion of Lansdale’s initial assignment in the Philippines, Hobbs actively 

sought approval from the Director of Central Intelligence for an extension of 

Lansdale’s tour. In a handwritten note at the bottom of the letter, the Director 

Smith wrote “I agree with you. He is almost indispensable where he is.” For 

Lansdale’s assessment of Major General Cannon see Lansdale, The Philippines 

Election, 1953, 2.
114

30. Edward Lansdale, Memorandum for Matt Baird, 1 March 1961 

(Lansdale Papers, Box 97, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, 

Palo Alto, CA). In this memorandum, Lansdale specifically cites individual AFP 

officers who made all of their main programs and initiatives “click.”

31. Lansdale, “Lessons Learned, The Philippines: 1946-1953,” 

Interdepartmental Course on Counterinsurgency.

32. Robert L. Nichols interview.

33. Lansdale, “Lessons Learned, The Philippines: 1946-1953,” 

Interdepartmental Course on Counterinsurgency.

34. This decision was aided by the fact that the US was the guarantor of 

Philippine sovereignty and defense from external threats, minimizing the need 

for a large, conventionally trained military that organizationally mirrored its 

American counterpart.

35. Currey, 128.
115

Appendix A

Map of Primary Huk Influence

Map created by the author utilizing a base map courtesy of: http://www.ibiblio.org/

hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-AvPhil/USMC-M-AvPhil-3.html.

117

Appendix B

Subject Biographical Timelines

119

Appendix C

Interviewee Biographical Data

Fidel V. Ramos

President Ramos served as the 12th President of the Republic of the 

Philippines from 1992-1998. He also served as Chief of the Philippine 

Constabulary, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 

Chief of Staff of the Integrated National Police, and Secretary of National 

Defense.

President Ramos graduated from the United States Military Academy 

at West Point in 1950 and served in the Philippine Army during the Huk 

campaign as a lieutenant and captain. He also served with the 20th BCT 

during its deployment to fight in the Korean War. In 1962 he became the 

Group Commander for the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Philippine 

Army. In 1966 he deployed to Vietnam as the Chief of Staff of the 1st 

Philippine Civic Action Group.

Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr.

Senator Magsaysay served two terms in the Philippine Senate from 

1995-2007, having started his political career in 1966 as the congressman 

for Zambales Province. Senator Magsaysay studied at the Harvard 

Business School and New York University Business School in the early 

1960s. In the 1970s he became a successful businessman in the Philippine 

telecommunications industry.

Senator Magsaysay is the son of former president Ramon Magsaysay, 

Sr., and was a teenager at the time of his father’s election to the presidency.

Alfredo S. Lim

Mr. Lim is currently serving his fourth term as Mayor of Manila, the 

first three terms being 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 2007-2010. He holds 

bachelor’s degrees in Business Administration and Law from the University 

of the East, and a master’s degree in National Security Administration 

from the National Defense College of the Philippines.

As the Manila Chief of Police in the 1980s, Lim led the police force in 

retaking government installations from rebellious military units during the 

1987 attempted coup. Under President Corazon Aquino’s administration 

Lim was appointed Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. 

During the early 1950s Mr. Lim was a member of the Manila police force.
120

Frisco F. San Juan

Mr. San Juan served two congressional terms from 1966-1973. 

Amongst his many committee memberships, Mr. San Juan served on the 

Committee on National Security and Defense and Peace and Order, and 

was Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Veterans Affairs. He is currently 

the president of the Nationalist People’s Coalition, a Philippine political 

party.

During World War II Mr. Lim served with Hunters ROTC Guerrillas. 

Following the war he was a National Commander of the Philippine 

Veterans Legion. Mr. San Juan served on the personal staff of Ramon 

Magsaysay during his tenure as Secretary of National Defense, and 

later as chief of Magsaysay’s inner cordon security element. He was a 

founding member of NAMFREL, and was intimately involved in the 

counterinsurgency campaign against the Huks. He would later go on to be 

one of the founding members of the Freedom Company, an organization 

that aided in Lansdale’s covert operations in Vietnam.

Romeo B. Taruc

Dr. Taruc is a physician and former city councilor for Angeles City, 

Pampanga. He continues to play an active role in local politics in his home 

province of Pampanga, and is on the board of directors of the Philippine 

Land Bank.

Dr. Taruc is the only son of former Huk supreme military commander 

Luis Taruc. During parts of the Huk campaign, Dr. Taruc traveled with his 

father and was directly involved in his father’s negotiations with President 

Quirino in 1953.

John N. Schumacher

Father Schumacher is a retired Jesuit priest and historian. He is a 

recipient of Ateneo University’s Lifetime Achievement Award, and is the 

author of Father Jose Burgos: Priest and Nationalist (Manila: Ateneo 

University, 1972). He was first posted to the Philippines in 1948 to study 

at the seminary in Novaliches, Quezon City. From 1951-1954 Father 

Schumacher taught high school seminary in Quezon City.
121

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123

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Patterns of Political Leadership and Organization in the Rural 

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McHale, Thomas R. “Problems of Economic Development in the 

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van der Kroef, Justus M. “Communism and Reform in the Philippines.” 

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Additional Resources

Catapusan, Benicio T. “Agrarian Conflicts as the Bases for Agrarian 

Legislation.” United States Agency for International Development, http://

pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ PNABH968.pdf (accessed 14 July 2012).

Gentry, William A., Todd J. Webber, and Golnaz Sadri, Empathy in the 

Workplace: A Tool for Effective Leadership. Greensboro, NC: Center for 

Creative Leadership, 2010.

Greenberg, David R. “The US Response to Philippine Insurgency.” PhD 

diss., Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 

1994.


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