R ule 1 0 o f t he R ules o f

t he C o urt o f

A p p ea l s o f

T en ne ssee st ates: 1

T his C o urt, wit h the c o nc urre nc e o f all jud ge s p arti cip ati ng i n the c ase , m ay aff i rm , rev erse o r mo d i f y t he act i o ns o f

t he t ri al co urt by me m o randum op i ni o n w hen a fo rma l op i ni o n wo ul d have no pre ceden t i al va l ue. W hen a c as e i s decid ed b y memoran dum o pi ni on i t s hal l be des i gn at ed “M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N ” , sh a ll no t be pub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or rel i ed on f o r any r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 11, 200 4 S es sio n CHARLES FREDRICK GL ANZ MAN v. J OYCE BRYANT GL ANZ MAN

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-004908-02 G eorgeH. Brow n, Jud ge

No. W2003-03067-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 2, 2004

This is a divorce c ase. The husband appe als from the tria l court’s divorc e dec ree distri b uting the m ar i t a l a n d s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y a n d a w ar d i n g t h e w i f e a l i m o n y in f

utu ro . We a ff

ir m.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.
Charles Fredrick Glanzman, Pr o s e . J . Richard Rossie and D avid A. B illions , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Joy ce B ry ant Glanzman.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1
Fac ts a nd P

ro c e dur al B ac kg ro und Plaintiff/Appellant Charles Fredrick Glanz man (“Husband”) and De fendant/Appellee Joy ce Bry ant Glanzman (“ W i fe”) we re ma rried on D ece mber 27, 1980. At the time they wer e mar

ried, Husband wa s thirty -three (33) y ear s old while W ife was fifty (50) y ear s old. No children we re born of the marria g e . D uring the marria g e , H us bandwa s e mpl oy e d a s a n e ng ine er for Pr ime Deve lopment Gr o u p , I nc. and a lso worked a s a consulting eng ineer . Early in the marria g e, Wife-2-

operated a private lea

rning clinic, but she worke d primarily as a pa rt-time school tea cher

during the latter stag es of the ma

rriag e. At the time of the divorce , Wife was seventy -three (73) y ear s old and Husband wa s fifty -six (56) y ear s old.
On Novembe r 17, 2003, the trial c ourt enter ed a F inal Dec ree of Divorce , awa rding a divorc e to Wi fe on the g round of inappr opriate ma rital conduc t. I n the di vorce decr ee, the trial court or dere d, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: 1. That [W ife] . .

. i s here by awa rded an absolute divorce from [Husband] upon the g round of inappr opriate ma rital conduc t . . . .;

. . . . 3. That [W ife] shall retain as her sole prope rty the [marital residenc e] and/or the proc eeds f

rom the sale of

the home . . . . That [ Wife] s hall be re sponsible for the [first and second] mortga g e payments . . . . ;

. . . . 5

. T h a t[ H u s b a n d ] s h a l l p a y [ W i f e ] p e r m a n e n ta l i m o n y in f utu ro in the amount of $1,500.00 per

month . . . . ; 6. That [W ife] shall be awa rded as her sole property all persona l property and oth e r ite ms ide nti fi e d in Tri a l E xhibi t 6,

. . . a ndthat [Hu sb a nd ] sha ll b e a wa rd e d a ll other pe rsonalty or items of the marria g e which are not ide ntified in said E x hibit . . . . ;

. . . . 8. That [Husband] shall retain as his sole and sepa rate property his I RA, 401k and other retire ment[] acc ounts[ .]
Husband filed an appea l to this Court presenting , as we perc eive them, the foll owing issues for our revie w: (1 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inits di st ri bu tio n o f the mari ta l a ndse pa rate property , and ( 2 ) W h e t h e r

t h e tr i a l c o u r te rr e d i n a w ar d i n g a l i m o n y in futuro to Wi fe.-3- Stan dard of Revie w
I n m at t er s h ea rd b y

a t ri al j u d ge s i t t i n g wi t h o u ta j u ry , o u r r ev i ew o f t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa c t is de novo up on the re c or d, a c c omp a nie d by a pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 13(d) ( 2004). We will not rever se t he trial court’s factua l finding s unless the evidenc e in the re cord preponde rate s ag ainst those finding s. Jahn v. J ahn , 932 S.W .2d 939, 941 (Ten n
. C t

. App. 1996). A t rial court’s conclusions on questions of law a re r eviewe d de novo , but without any presumption of cor rec tness. Id

. (c i t i n g Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) ). Property Div ision
Un de r s e c tio n 3 6- 4- 12 1 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e , th e c ou rt ma y , upo n r e qu e st o f e ith e r p art y in a divorce action, equitably divide or distribute the mari t al p ro p er t y . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4- 12 1( a )( 1) (2 00 4)

. I n makin g a n e qu ita ble div isi on , th e tr ia l c ou rt sh a ll c on sid e r a ll r e le va nt f a c tor s, including any

of those listed in section 36-4-121( c). Fl an na ry v . Flan na ry , 121 S.W .3d 647, 650–51 (T e nn . 2 00 3) . Se c tio n 3 6- 4- 12 1( c ) s e ts f orth the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s: (1) The duration of the ma rriag e; ( 2 ) T h e a g e , p h ys i c a l a n d m e n t a l h e a l t h , v o c a t i o n a l s k i l l s , e m p l o yab i l i t y, e arn ing c apa c ity , e state , f inanc ia l li abil iti e s a ndfi na nc ia l ne e ds of the pa rt ie s; (3) The tang ible or i ntang ible contribution by one (1) party to the education, tr a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (4 ) Th e re la tiv e abil ity of e a c h part y fo r fu tur e a c qu isi tio ns of c apit a l a sse ts and income; (5) The contribution of ea ch party to the ac q u isiti on, prese rvation, appre ciation, depr eciation or dissipation of the ma rit al o r s e p a rate property , including the c on tr ibu tio n o f a

pa rt y to the marria g e a s ho me make r, wa g e e arn e r o r p are nt, wi th the contribution of a pa

rty as homemaker or wag e earner to be g iven the same we ight if ea ch party

has fulfilled its role; ( 6 ) T h e v a l u e o f

t h e s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y o f

e a c h p ar t y; (7) The estate of

eac h party

at the time of the ma

rriag e; (8) The economic c ircumstance s of ea ch party at the tim e t h e divi sion of property is to become e ffe ctive; (9 ) T he ta x co ns e qu e nc e s to e a c h party , co sts a sso c ia te d withthe re a so na bly fo re se e able sa le of

the a sse t, andoth e r f

or e se e able e xpe n s e s a s so c ia te d w ith the a sse t; (10) The amount of social se curity benef its available to ea ch spouse; and (11) Such other

fac tors as are necessary to consider the equities betwe en the pa rt ie s.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( c ) ( 20 04 ). “ A d ivi sio n is no t re nd e re d ine qu ita ble simply

be c aus e it is not precisely

equal, o r b eca

use ea ch party

did not rece ive a sha

re of every piece of marital property .” Ma nis v . M

an is , 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 5 , 3 0 6 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d 220, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). Trial c ourts are g rante d broad discr etion when dividingP ri o r t o t he t ri al , each p art y prep ared a pro p o se d li st of ass et s, divi d i ng t he p ers o nal pro p ert y
. D uri ng t he 2

c o u rs e o f t h e trial, W ife intr o d u c e d he r p ro p o se d li st a s T ria l E x h ib it 6

. -4- the marital estate, and such decisions are “entitled to g reat weig ht on appea l.” W att e rs v . W

atte rs , 9 5 9 S

. W

. 2 d 5 8 5 , 5 9 0 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 7 ) ( ci t i n g Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W .2d 849, 859 (Tenn Ct. Ap p. 19 88 )) . A pp e llate c ou rt s w ill g e ne ra lly de fe r t o a tr ia l c ou rt ’s div isi on of pr op e rt y un le ss it is inconsistent w ith the f actor s enumerated in section 36-4- 121(c) or is ag ainst the weig ht of the evidenc e. Id

. I n the ca se at ba

r, the p ar t i es s t ipulated prior to the divorc e hea ring that Wife would be awa rded the net proceeds from the s ale of the m arital residence as her sole separ ate pr operty . The order awa rding Wife the marital re sidence also provided that the court shall consider Husba nd’s relinqui s h ed i ntere st in those procee ds when de ciding the re maining disputed issues, including pr op e rt y div isi on a nda lim on y . In th e div or c e de c re e , Wif e re c e ive d the mari ta l ho me , b ut s he a lso assumed both mortg ag es. The r ecor d ref lects that, depe nding on the amount for whic h the martial home sold, Wi fe w ould rec eive be tween $166,000 and $240,000 in sale proc eeds.
Wit h reg ard to the pe rsonal prope rt y , t h e p ar ties were unable to ag ree to a division of the pe rs on a l pr op e rt y
. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a wa rd e d Wif e ite ms o f p e rs on a l pr op e rt y lis te d in Tria l E xhibi t 6. Although Husband prese nted evidenc e, throug h cross -examination of Wife, of the value of three 2
se pa rate ri ng s a nda

fu r c oat, the re is n o e vid e nc e in the re c or d a s to the va lue of the oth e r i te ms listed in Trial Ex hibit 6. Husband rec eived all other items of persona l pr operty not l i s t ed i n Trial Ex hibit 6, as well as all funds held in his I RA, 401k and other r etireme nt acc ounts.
I n Dube v . Dube , 104 S.W .3d 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), t his Court affirmed a tria l court’s division of marital property that resulted in one spouse re ceiving a sig nificantly g reater proportion of the marital assets. Id. at 868. I n Dube , the husband ha d g reater e arning potential than the wife ; g reater abilit y

to acquire assets; signif

icant educ ational bac kg round; and wa s signific antly y oung er than the wife

. Id . The Dube c ou rt re a so ne d that, wh ile the div isi on of a sse ts w a s c e rt a inl y

no t e qu a l, the division was equitable in lig ht of the fa ctors enume rate d in section 36-4-121( c). Id

. He re , Wife w as se ve nty -thr e e y e ars olda t th e tim e of the div or c e . T he re c or d s ho ws that, during the marriag e, she c ontributed signif icantly as a w ag e ea

rner, while working full-time. Howeve r, due to poor phy sical hea lth, she had bee n unemploy ed since at least the y ear 2000. She didno t ow n a ny

inv e stm e nts or re tir e me nt ac c ou nts

. She re c e ive d a pp ro xima te ly

$6 00 pe r m on th in social security . Husband, howeve r, was fifty -six y ear s old at the time of trial, in relatively g ood he a lth , a ndma int a ine d f ull -t ime e mpl oyme nt a s a n e ng ine e r, e arn ing inc ome fr om P ri me Deve lopment Group, I nc. in the amount of $73,150.50 a s ref lected by his 2002 W -2. I n addition, Husband owne d retire ment acc ounts worth approximately $40,000. Although Wife r ece ived the marita l re s i d ence and many items of persona l property , we cannot c onclude that the trial court’s division of property was inequitable without evidenc e of the value of the per s o n al p ro p er t y
. There fore , afte r re viewing the re cord and in light of the f actor s-5-

enumer ated in Section 36-4- 121(c) , we c onclude that the evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst the tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d i v i s i o n o f

p r o p e r t y. Alimony
T h e tr i a l c o u r ta w ar d e d W i f e $ 1 , 5 0 0 p e r m o n t h i n a l i m o n y in f utu ro . Husband a sserts that the alimony

pay ment is bey o n d his abilityto pay . Husband further c ontends that, bec ause Wife rec eived suc h a lar g e shar e of the property division, she does not require spousal support.
Simi lar to the division of marital property , the trial court’s determination of whether to awar d alimony is guide d by

statutory fac tors found in section 36-5-101(E) of the Tennessee Code. T enn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(E) ( 2004). Section 36-5- 101(E) pr ovides that, in determining the nature , amount, leng th of term, and manner of alimony payment, the trial court shall consider a ll releva nt fa ct o rs , i n cl u d i n g:

(I ) The r elative e arning capa city , obligations, needs, and f inancial r esourc es of eac h party , including income from pension, profit sharing or re tirement plans and a ll o the r s ou rc e s; (ii) The r el at i v e education and training of ea ch party , the ability and opportunity

of ea ch party

to secure education and training , and t h e n ec es sityof a party to secure further

education and training to imp ro ve such pa rty ’s ea rning c apa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (iii) The duration of the marriag e; ( i v ) T h e a g e a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n o f e a c h p ar t y; (v) The phy sical condition of ea ch party , including, but not limited to, phy sical disability

or inca pacity due to a c hronic de bilitating disease ; (vi) The ex t en t to which it would be undesira ble for a party to seek employ ment outside the home bec ause such p ar t y wi ll be the custodian of a minor child of the mar

riag e; (vii) The se parate as s et s o f each pa rty , both rea l and per sonal, tang ible and intang ible; (v iii ) T he pr ov isi on s ma de wi th r e g ardto the mari ta l pro pe rt y a s d e fi ne d in § 36-4-121; (ix ) The sta ndard of

living of the parties e stablished during the marriag e; (x) Th e e xten t to wh ic h e a c h p art y ha s ma de su c h t angib le andint a ng ibl e c on tr ibu tio ns to t

he marri age as m on eta ry

and ho mem akercon tr ib ut io ns , an d t ang ibl e and intang ible contributions by a party to the education, training or incre ased e arning p o w e r o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (xi ) The r elative fault of t he parties in case s where the court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and (xi i) Such other fac tors, including the tax conse quence s to e ach party , as ar e ne c e ssa ry to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.-6-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(E) (i)–(xii) ( 2004). Whil e the statute sets forth many fac tors, the two mos t impo rt a nt f

a c tor s a re (1 ) the ne e d of the re c ipi e nt s po us e a nd(2 ) the ob lig or sp ou se ’s abil ity to pay , with the single most important fac tor being the rec ipient spouse’s nee d for support. Pe rry v . P e rry , 114 S.W. 3d 46 5, 46 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Scarbrough v. Sc arbrough , No. W2000–01807-COAR3-CV, 2001 WL

640368, at * 2, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2001) ( no perm. app. filed ). The trial courts have broad discr etion in apply ing the fac tors set forth in sec tion 36-5-101(E)

. Anderton v. Anderton , 988 S.W .2d 675, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “A ppellate c ourts are g ener ally disinclined to second-g uess a tria l court’s spousal support decision unl ess it is not supported by the evidenc e or is contrary

to the public policies ref

lected in the a

pplicable statutes.” Id

. I n issuing it s ruling in this case, the tria l court stated its opinion that “this is a case that cries ou t f or a lim on y .” Th e re c or d li ke wi se su pp orts the fa c t tha t Wife wa s in nee d o f s po us a l su pp ort. As stated pre viously , she wa s seventy -three y ear s old; in poor ph y s i ca l h ea l th; with no retirement saving s b es i d es social sec urity benef its of $600 per month; and she ha d monthlyexpenses of approximately

$3,500. Other f

actor s supporting the awa rd of a limon y i n cl u d e the dur ation of the marria g e, which la sted twenty -two y ear s . There is also evidence in the rec ord to support consideration of the relative fault of Husband. I n light of the fore g oing and in view of the f act that the re cord r efle cts that Husband is c apable of paying the alimony awa rd, we c onclude that the trial court’s a war d of alimony in f utu ro was not an a

buse of discr etion.
Conclu sion
For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the trial court in all respec ts. Costs of this a ppeal a re a s s e s s e d t o t h e A p p e l l a n t , C h ar l e s F r e d r i c k G l a n z m a n , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE