[Cite as State v. Pierce, 2024-Ohio-82.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SCIOTO COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : Case No. 22CA4002

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

v. : DECISION AND

JUDGMENT ENTRY

TAYLOR L. PIERCE, :

Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 1/8/2024

______________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Adam J. Banks, Amlin, Ohio, for appellant.

Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecutor, and Jay Willis, Scioto County Assistant 

Prosecutor, for appellee.

______________________________________________________________________

Hess, J.

{¶1} Taylor L. Pierce appeals her conviction for aggravated drug trafficking, a 

first-degree felony after she entered a no contest plea. Pierce challenges her sentence of 

8 to 12 years in prison. She contends that, although the sentence is within the statutory 

range, it is invalid because it is clearly and convincingly contrary to law and the trial court 

abused its discretion in imposing it. She also contends that her no contest plea was not 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because she was coerced into it by her 

trial counsel, and she was confused at the change of plea hearing and experiencing a 

headache caused by a prescription narcotic she had taken. She contends that the trial 

court erred in denying her request to withdraw her no contest plea before sentencing and 

in finding that her motion was not supported by evidence. Finally, she contends that she 

received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 2

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} The Scioto County grand jury indicted Pierce on a first-degree felony count 

of aggravated drug trafficking and a first-degree felony count of aggravated drug 

possession, both counts included major drug offender specifications. The indictment also 

included a count for tampering with evidence, a third-degree felony, two counts of failure 

to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, and a count for possession of 

marijuana. Pierce filed a motion to suppress. Prior to the commencement of the 

suppression hearing, the parties negotiated a plea agreement by which Pierce would 

plead no contest to count one, drug trafficking, without the major drug offender 

specifications, the remaining counts would be dismissed, and the parties would argue 

sentencing. At the change of plea hearing, the state argued that the evidence would show 

that Pierce was driving a rental car, which crossed over the fog lines three different times. 

When the state trooper signaled her to stop and pull over, Pierce refused to comply, but 

instead continued to drive for four miles before finally pulling over. As a result, Pierce 

was immediately handcuffed and advised of her Miranda rights as soon as she exited the 

vehicle. Pierce told the trooper that she did not stop because she had a child in the car 

who needed medical attention and was unresponsive. The trooper located and removed 

the eight-year-old child from the back seat of the vehicle and saw that the child was not 

panicked, crying, or unresponsive. They placed the child in the back seat of the cruiser 

with Pierce’s passenger and codefendant, who was the child’s father. A pat down of 

Pierce revealed that she had a baggie of marijuana in the front of her pants and a baggie 

of methamphetamine in the back of her pants. Upon finding those drugs, the troopers 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 3

searched the vehicle and discovered what was later analyzed to be over 2,221 grams of 

methamphetamine.

{¶3} The trial court accepted the plea and the suppression hearing did not go 

forward. Three weeks later, Pierce filed a motion to withdraw plea, a motion to make the 

presentence investigation (PSI) report part of the court record, and a motion to withdraw 

counsel, after which Pierce obtained new counsel. The state filed an objection to the 

motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw as trial 

counsel, revoked bond, and continued any decision on her motion to withdraw her plea 

and her motion to make the PSI report part of the court record pending Pierce’s retention 

of new trial counsel. Pierce’s new trial counsel filed a supplemental memorandum in 

support of her motion to withdraw her plea and asked that bond be reinstated. The trial 

court denied Pierce’s motion to withdraw her plea and sentenced her to a mandatory 

minimum 8-year prison term to an indefinite maximum term of 12 years. She was also 

ordered to pay a mandatory drug fine of $20,000. Pierce filed a motion for 

reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The trial court entered a nunc pro tunc 

judgment entry removing the language describing the sentence as a joint 

recommendation and agreement. Pierce appealed.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶4} Pierce presents five assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant.

2. The trial court erred in accepting Defendant Pierce’s plea as it was not 

knowingly, voluntarily, and freely entered.

3. The trial court erred in denying Defendant’s request to withdraw her plea 

before sentencing. 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 4

4. The Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel such that she 

is entitled to a reversal of her conviction and withdrawal of her plea. 

5. The court erred in finding Defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea not 

supported by evidence. 

{¶5} We address the assignments of error out of order.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Pierce’s No Contest Plea

{¶6} In her second assignment of error, Pierce contends that her plea was not 

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Pierce contends that her plea of no contest 

was the result of coercion by her trial counsel and because she was confused at the 

change of plea hearing and experiencing a headache caused by a prescription narcotic 

she had taken. She argues that she was “threatened and coerced into believing she would 

not receive a fair trial,” that she was “clearly confused,” “believed she was going to jail 

that day,” and said that “she did not understand and that she was lost.” 

{¶7} She argues that her trial counsel’s coercion was known to the trial court 

because counsel’s statements were made on the record and the trial court should have 

made further inquiries. She also contends that after she told the trial court she was on a 

narcotic prescribed by a doctor and had a headache, the trial court did not ask any followup questions. Because the trial court did not ask follow-up questions on the narcotic, she 

argues that it erred in determining that her plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. 

1. Standard of Review
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 5

{¶8} We conduct a de novo review of the record to determine whether 

the plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily:

“An appellate court determining whether a guilty plea was entered 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily conducts a de novo review of the 

record to ensure that the trial court complied with the constitutional and 

procedural safeguards.” State v. Moore, 4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA965, 

2014-Ohio-3024, ¶ 13.

State v. Leonhart, 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA38, 2014-Ohio-5601, ¶ 36.

2. Pierce’s Plea Was Made Knowingly, Intelligently, and Voluntarily

{¶9} “Because a no-contest or guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional 

rights, a defendant's decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary.” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 10.

If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea 

is unconstitutional. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 

(1992).

{¶10} Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that trial courts are to follow when 

accepting pleas to provide “an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to 

personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and 

determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.” Dangler at ¶ 11, quoting 

State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 331 N.E.2d 411 (1975). Our focus on review is 

not on whether the trial court recited the exact language of Crim.R. 11, but “on whether 

the dialogue between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant 

understood the consequences” of the plea. Id. at ¶ 12; State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 

176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 15-16. A criminal defendant must establish that 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 6

an error occurred and that it was prejudicial. State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-

Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14-15.

{¶11} If the trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant 

waives by pleading guilty or no contest, it is presumed that the plea was entered 

involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required. Dangler at ¶ 14.

These constitutional rights are those set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c): the right to a jury 

trial, the right to confront one's accusers, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right 

to compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and the right to require the state to prove guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Veney at ¶ 19. If a trial court fails to fully cover other 

“nonconstitutional” aspects of the plea colloquy, a defendant must affirmatively show 

prejudice to invalidate a plea. Id. at ¶ 17.

{¶12} Additionally, if a trial court completely fails to comply with a portion of 

Crim.R. 11(C), the defendant need not show prejudice. State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 

86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22 (the trial court’s complete failure to comply 

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)'s requirement that it explain the maximum penalty, despite the 

fact the defendant was subject to a mandatory five years of postrelease control, relieved 

the defendant of the burden to show prejudice).

{¶13} If neither of these two exceptions apply, then the defendant is not entitled 

to have the plea vacated without demonstrating prejudice. The test for prejudice is 

“whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” Dangler at ¶ 16, quoting State v. 

Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).

Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the 

trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court 

has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 7

excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) 

if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?

Dangler at ¶ 17.

{¶14} The record shows that the trial court properly complied with Crim.R. 11 in 

explaining the constitutional rights she was waiving by entering a no contest plea and 

Pierce does not contend otherwise. It is also clear from the record that the trial court 

explained the charges, maximum penalties involved, postrelease control, and indefinite 

sentencing and that Pierce stated that she understood them. Pierce repeatedly stated 

that she understood the trial court’s explanations and that she had no questions. The trial 

court asked Pierce if she understood the plea agreement and she stated, “Yes, Judge.” 

In addition, Pierce signed a written waiver form in which she acknowledged that she 

understood the constitutional rights she was waiving and desired to enter a no contest 

plea. The written waiver also included a statement Pierce signed which states, “No 

promises, threats or inducements have been made to me by anyone to secure my plea 

of no contest.” The trial court asked Pierce if she was voluntarily entering a no contest 

plea and she stated that she was:

THE COURT: Okay. Other than what we’ve discussed here on the record, 

has anyone promised you anything, or threatened you, or otherwise caused 

you or induced you to come in here and change your plea from not guilty to 

no contest on this charge?

DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Are you doing this of your own freewill?

DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. 

{¶15} Contrary to Pierce’s assertions, there was no evidence that she was bullied 

or threatened into entering the no contest plea. Rather, Pierce was indecisive and may 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 8

have been receiving different advice from different family members who were present. At 

the beginning, prior to the start of the suppression hearing, the trial court asked Pierce if 

she had any interest in engaging in plea negotiations. To which Pierce made two inaudible 

remarks and then stated, “Can we take a second? Yes. Can we like take a second?” The 

court recessed, the parties engaged in plea negotiations, and then court resumed.

Pierce’s attorney explained that Pierce had her mother and grandmother in the courtroom 

with her and that “it’s just a very, very, very tough thing.” Pierce’s attorney explained that 

he covered this scenario with her the day before and explained to her “the world will stop. 

She’s going to have to make a decision and that - - now she’s got her mom and grandma 

here * * * there may be some difference of opinion among the family on what’s going on, 

you know.” The trial court asked Pierce if she was accepting the state’s offer and she 

responded, “I’m rejecting it.” The trial court asked the state if it wished to leave the offer 

open or withdraw it. The state responded by stating that if Pierce went to trial and were 

found guilty, “she’s looking at 15 and a half years, with an additional five and a half, I 

believe, indefinite term on that - - on Count 1 or 2. * * * And that we will not negotiate a 

plea after the suppression hearing begins.”

{¶16} After she initially rejected the state’s offer, Pierce contends that her trial 

counsel told her the bond could be revoked and she could be remanded to the sheriff’s 

custody. She argues that this advice was “clearly incorrect and false” and “the record 

does not reflect any such conversation between” the trial court and her trial counsel. 

However, the court recessed so that the prosecutor and Pierce could engage in plea 

negotiations. Their discussions are not part of the record. Considering the state’s 

subsequent request to revoke bond and the court’s grant of it, trial counsel’s cautionary
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 9

statement does not appear to be a falsehood invented to pressure Pierce. Pierce also 

contends that her trial counsel told her she was going “upriver because of her skin tone.” 

However, Pierce’s trial counsel made no statements about Pierce’s skin tone or race at 

the change of plea hearing. Instead, his comments were vague, and he expressed

general skepticism about going to trial “for a lot of obvious reasons,” whether she would 

“get a fair trial,” and “the makeup of the jury.” Therefore, despite Pierce’s argument that 

her counsel told her that she would not receive a fair trial due to her race, there are no 

such statements on the record. We reject Pierce’s contention that the trial court had an 

obligation to explain to Pierce “that race would not affect the trial,” as there was nothing 

said at the hearing that would prompt the trial court to discuss Pierce’s race with her. 

{¶17} After the state indicated it would not leave the offer open, the trial court 

asked Pierce if she understood the sentences she faced if convicted and that the state’s 

offer would not remain open. After Pierce stated she did understand it, her trial counsel 

explained to her that he was recommending she take the offer, but “as your lawyer, I tried

to stay out of it as much as I could for a recommendation * * * I care about you and I care 

about your family here, but 11 years and all these other years, I’m recommending take 

the State’s offer, F1, every other case is thrown out. * * * I’m telling you, you do what you 

want. I’m recommending you take the offer right now. * * * It’s up to you now. I’ve done 

the best that I can possibly on your behalf. I’m just not that big a gambler that you might, 

you know, be for you.”

{¶18} Pierce then asked the trial court for additional time. The trial court granted 

her additional time to talk to her mother and grandmother who were in the back of the 

courtroom. After she returned, the trial court asked her what her decision was with respect 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 10

to the state’s offer. Pierce asks the trial court if she would have to go to jail today if she 

took the offer or if she would have to go to jail today if she didn’t take the offer. The trial 

court explained that she would not be going to jail, but that they would likely have a trial 

the following Monday. Pierce then expressed some exasperation, “Oh, Jesus. And then 

if I take the deal - - I’m sorry, I’m just – I’ve never been through this a day in my life.” The 

trial court explained the plea deal and the sentencing process, explaining to her that the 

sentencing hearing would be held by the end of the month. Pierce acknowledges with 

“um hmm” several times and then asks about prison and whether she will be required to 

go to prison under either scenario:

THE COURT: Ms. Pierce, any other questions for me?

DEFENDANT: So, I will still - - my - - my only issue is the - - the going to 

prison thing. * * * That’s - - I wouldn’t - - I wouldn’t have never wanted to 

take it to trial if I was going to prison. I just - - there’s - - that’s - -

THE COURT: Well, for these types of charges if you’re convicted of these 

charges or what the state’s offering, or even one of the - - even a lesser 

amount - - somewhat lesser amount of methamphetamine, it’s mandatory 

prison. So, there’s no discretion on my part. If you accept the state’s offer it 

- - it would be the mandatory minimum is three. If you don’t accept it and 

you’re convicted as charged, then the mandatory minimum is 11. 

DEFENDANT: And it’s just the F - - F1 or is the other charges with the F1?

* * *

THE COURT: Yeah. They said that they want you to plead guilty to the - - felony one 

trafficking without the major drug offender and they’re going to dismiss the rest of the 

charges when you come back for sentencing.

THE DEFENDANT: I would have to – trafficking. Oh, my God. This is so hard for me 

to make. I’m sorry you guys.

THE COURT: I need your answer, ma’am.

DEFENDANT: I don’t know. I don’t - - -
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 11

{¶18} Trial counsel then explained that “we had a conference yesterday. We 

talked and I tried to prepare her for this exact moment. At some point you’re going to have 

to make up your mind and if next Tuesday or Wednesday is not so good, you can’t go 

back to it, and you know.” 

THE COURT: Ms. Pierce, I – I don’t care what you do, but I - - it’s all the same to 

me. I - - you take it or don’t take it. Either way, we have trials here. That’s why we 

- - why we have trials.

DEFENDANT: But then it’s like (inaudible).

THE COURT: But we do a lot of guilty pleas too. And something [sic] there’s a 

benefit in doing that. But I need your answer.

DEFENDANT: It’s like I’m - - oh, my God. I’m sorry, but this – like I’m not – my side 

of the story is just not getting heard. It’s just not. It’s like regardless if I take it or I 

don’t it’s - - it’s not - - this just isn’t fair.

Pierce’s trial counsel explained that if she accepts the plea deal she will have an 

opportunity to explain her side to the probation department, which will compile a PSI

report and the judge will have the report when he decides the sentencing range. She will 

have her story out there and in return have the higher end of the sentencing “thrown out.” 

Pierce then asks why the state did not make several offers for her to choose among:

DEFENDANT: By why is it the only option – other plea deal. Like, I don’t 

understand. 

MR. O’BRIEN: Say what?

DEFENDANT: I said why isn’t there an option to plead different? Why – this 

is like the only deal that I ever got - - that we’ve gotten.

MR. O’BRIEN: That’s their plea deal. That’s it, you know. That’s - - don’t 

ask me, that’s them. I mean, you don’t like the plea deal, that’s their plea 

deal. It’s up to them to make a plea deal and it’s up to you to say yes or no. 

All right. And if you don’t like the plea deal you’re staying in at - - you’re still 

playing with 11 years.

DEFENDANT: (Inaudible).
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 12

THE COURT: Ms. Pierce, I need your answer.

DEFENDANT: Okay.

MR. O’BRIEN: I’d take the best I could today and then let’s start getting it 

down farther and farther. That’s my recommendation. It’s your life.

DEFENDANT: Okay. Well, I’ll take the offer.

MR. O’BRIEN: No contest, everything else thrown out?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

MR. O’BRIEN: Okay. 

{¶19} The record shows that Pierce was very indecisive and could not make up 

her mind about whether she wanted to accept the plea offer or go to trial. She appears to 

have wanted a third option that included no prison term, but the trial court explained that 

under either scenario, she would be required to serve a prison term. Based on statements 

made by her trial counsel, input from family members may have complicated her decisionmaking process. Regardless of the source of her indecisiveness, the trial court eventually 

instructed Pierce to make up her mind so that a suppression hearing could move forward 

if necessary. Although Pierce was a very indecisive individual, there is no evidence that 

she was bullied or threatened by her trial counsel to accept the plea offer. The record 

reflects that he was a patient lawyer advising an indecisive client. And Pierce stated that 

she was satisfied with his legal representation:

THE COURT: Now, you’ve retained Mr. O’Brien to represent you in this 

matter, are you satisfied with his representation?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

{¶20} Pierce also contends that her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary because she had admitted that she had taken a prescription medication, and 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 13

the trial court did not make any further inquiries. More than halfway through the hearing, 

after the trial court had the opportunity to observe Pierce’s behavior and responses 

throughout it, the trial court asked Pierce about drug and alcohol use:

THE COURT: All right. Now ma’am, before I accept these I have some 

additional questions for you. Have you used any drugs or alcohol in the last 

24 hours?

DEFENDANT: No, just all my medication.

THE COURT: All right. The medication you take, is that any kind of narcotic?

DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. As you - - have you been taking your medication as 

directed by the doctor?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And as you sit here today are you clearheaded and 

understand what you’re doing?

DEFENDANT: Minus the headache, yes.

THE COURT: Pardon?

DEFENDANT: I have a headache, but I’m clear minded.

{¶21} Pierce does not argue that she was mentally incapacitated or confused by 

her medication. Rather, she argues that because the trial court “did not ask any follow up 

questions,” it erred in determining that she entered the plea knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. However, the trial court did ask her follow up questions about her medication 

and determined that she was taking a prescribed medication, that she was taking it in 

accordance with the doctor’s instructions, and that she was clearheaded and understood 

what she was doing. The trial court also had an opportunity to observe her mannerisms 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 14

and converse with Pierce a great deal during the hearing prior to asking her about her 

drug and alcohol use. 

{¶22} Our de novo review of the record establishes that the trial court complied 

with the constitutional and procedural safeguards in Crim.R. 11 to ensure that Pierce's 

plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The record shows that Pierce 

was aware of the nature of the charge and the effect of her no contest plea. She was not 

bullied or threatened into accepting the plea, nor was she mentally incapacitated or 

confused by medication. Because we find no error in the change of plea hearing, we 

overrule Pierce’s second assignment of error.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶23} For her fourth assignment of error, Pierce contends that she was denied 

effective assistance of counsel because her attorney (1) bullied and threatened her to 

enter the no contest plea, (2) filed a motion to make the PSI report part of the record, and 

(3) failed to show her the police video of her traffic stop. We have already determined that 

her attorney did not bully or threaten her into her plea. We summarily reject that as 

grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim here. Pierce contends that by filing 

a motion to make the PSI report part of the record, trial counsel “knowingly volunteered 

all statements made by Defendant Pierce to the Court and the State.” She argues that 

the information contained in the PSI report became known to the trial court at the time it 

considered her motion to withdraw her plea and it was used by the trial court against her 

and as the basis on which to deny her motion. She argues that had her attorney not filed 

a motion to make the PSI part of the record, “it is logical and reasonable to believe that 

the Court would not have considered said alleged statements at the aforementioned 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 15

hearing and the outcome would have been different.” She also contends that her trial 

counsel did not share the state’s video of the traffic stop with her and that this constituted 

“a miscarriage of justice.”

1. Standard of Review

{¶24} To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show: “(1) 

deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard 

of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's errors, the proceeding's result would have been different.” State v. Short, 129 

Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641, 952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 113, citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Failure 

to satisfy either part of the test is fatal to the claim. See Strickland at 697. The defendant 

“has the burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed 

competent.” State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62. 

We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 

of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered 

sound trial strategy.’ ” Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 

76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.E. 83 (1955); State v. Bailey, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 22CA10, 2023-

Ohio-2919, ¶ 10.

2. Legal Analysis
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 16

{¶25} The record does not support Pierce’s argument concerning the PSI report. 

First, the trial court ordered the PSI report at the change of plea hearing on July 7, 2022. 

The PSI report was ordered after the state presented its statement of facts and submitted 

photographic and lab evidence and the trial court found Pierce guilty of aggravated 

trafficking in drugs. Following the state’s presentation, the trial court ordered the PSI 

report. When the court ordered the PSI report, it instructed Pierce to be cooperative in 

preparing the PSI report and to “thoroughly fill out that packet of documents” because 

that would give the court information it would consider. Pierce’s attorney assured the court 

that Pierce would be cooperative with the PSI investigation, “we’ll tell you a lot on the 

probation report and we know you’re going to read it.” 

{¶26} The record shows that Pierce’s counsel believed the information that Pierce 

would provide to the trial court through the PSI report would be favorable to Pierce and 

would help him argue for a lower sentence. Earlier in the hearing he advises Pierce that 

she will be able to tell her side of the story in the PSI report, and the judge would review 

it and Pierce’s attorney would use it to get Pierce the “least sentence you can.” 

{¶27} After the trial court ordered the PSI report on July 7, 2022, three weeks later 

on July 27, 2022 – two days before the July 29, 2022 sentencing hearing date, Pierce’s 

attorney filed the motion to make the PSI report part of the record, along with the motion 

to withdraw the no contest plea and his own motion to withdraw as trial counsel. On July 

29, 2022, a hearing was held but the sentencing was postponed because of the pending 

motions. The trial court addressed Pierce’s counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel and 

granted it. The trial court continued the sentencing hearing, the motion to withdraw plea,
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 17

and the motion to make the PSI report part of the record until Pierce could retain substitute 

counsel.

{¶28} On August 9, 2022, substitute counsel made a notice of appearance. 

Pierce’s substitute counsel did not address the pending motion to make the PSI report 

part of the record, nor did he seek to withdraw that motion. The trial court held a hearing 

on the motion to withdraw plea and denied it, but the motion to make the PSI report part 

of the record was not addressed at the hearing, nor was it addressed in a subsequent 

court order.

{¶29} “[W]hen a trial court fails to rule on a motion, it is considered denied.” 

Spencer v. Blankenship, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 03CA2882, 2004-Ohio-1738, ¶ 15, citing 

State v. Olah, 146 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 2001–Ohio–1641, 767 N.E.2d 755 (9th Dist.).

There is nothing in the record addressing the motion to make the PSI report part of the 

record and therefore we consider it denied. Thus, even if we assume that filing the motion 

constituted deficient performance by counsel, because the trial court denied the motion,

Pierce cannot show she was prejudiced. Additionally, the record shows that the trial court 

ordered the PSI report weeks before trial counsel moved to have the PSI report made 

part of the record. There is nothing in the record that supports Pierce’s speculation that 

the trial court would not have reviewed the PSI report but for trial counsel’s motion. Finally, 

we do not find that filing a motion to make a PSI report part of the record to be deficient 

performance on the part of trial counsel. The PSI report was already part of the trial court’s 

record and was relevant to the sentencing determination. See State v. Gwynne, ___Ohio 

St.3d___, 2023-Ohio-3851, __N.E.3d__, ¶ 37-43 (Fischer, J. concurring). In fact, the 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 18

failure to ensure that a PSI report makes it into the appellate record can be fatal to 

appellate review of sentencing issues. Id. at ¶ 38.1

{¶30} We reject Pierce’s argument that her trial counsel was deficient for filing a 

motion to make the PSI report part of the record. It was not deficient performance to file 

the motion. And even assuming it was, the motion was denied so Pierce can show no 

prejudice. 

{¶31} She also contends that trial counsel did not share the police video of the 

traffic stop with her. To support this contention, she cites comments she made at the 

hearing on the motion to withdraw as counsel. Her remarks were not made under oath or 

in an affidavit but were made to the trial court in response to questions from the judge as 

to whether she wanted to continue to retain her trial counsel. She also made sweeping, 

false statements such as her attorney did “no work” and she “couldn’t get him to do 

nothing.” Yet the record shows her attorney engaged in discovery, filed a motion to 

suppress, and a supplemental memorandum. The state informed the trial court that 

Pierce’s attorney has “done everything that all other defense counsel, competent defense 

counsel does. He’s asked for discovery. He’s received and obviously reviewed it. You can 

see where defense counsel in our Matrix system access documents.” Pierce’s trial 

counsel also made statements to the trial court during that hearing and explained that he 

had multiple conferences with Pierce, but it was as if she had “total amnesia of what had 

happened.” Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain with certainty whether the video was 

1 Here Pierce’s PSI report was not originally part of the appellate record, but we requested that it be 

transmitted to us to ensure a complete record when we review her assignment of error concerning 

sentencing. Gwynne at ¶ 40 (“the appellate court could have requested this missing piece of the record, it 

was not required to do so” (Emphasis sic.)); State v. Day, 2019-Ohio-4816, 149 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 17 -18 (4th

Dist.) (“PSI reports are part of the appellate record and when they are missing from the record and 

necessary for our review, we will sua sponte acquire them from the clerk.”).
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 19

shared with Pierce. However, even if we assume that her attorney did not show her the 

police video, she has failed to argue that this prejudiced her. She does not argue that it 

would have changed her plea or that there was a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

{¶32} Pierce has failed her burden to show that she received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. She was not bullied or threatened by her trial counsel to enter the 

no contest plea. Her counsel’s motion to make the PSI report part of the record was 

neither deficient nor prejudicial. And, assuming she did not review the police video of the 

traffic stop, she failed to allege any prejudice resulting from this failure. We overrule her 

fourth assignment or error. 

C. Motion to Withdraw Plea

{¶33} For her third and fifth assignments of error, Pierce contends that the trial 

court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her plea. She contends that it was timely 

because it was made prior to sentencing and that she presented sufficient evidence to 

justify the withdrawal. She also argues that the trial court should have granted her motion 

to withdraw because the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and 

her attorney coerced her into it. However, we rejected these arguments in overruling her 

second and fourth assignments of error. Her plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily, and she was not coerced into it, therefore those were not grounds on which 

the trial court could have granted the motion to withdraw the plea.

{¶34} Crim.R. 32.1 states: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty * * * may be made 

only before sentence is imposed * * *.” Although “a presentence motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted,” “a defendant does not have an absolute 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 20

right to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 

N.E.2d 715 (1992). “ ‘The decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court' and will not be reversed absent 

an abuse of that discretion.” State v. McCoy, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 19CA4, 2020-Ohio-3088, 

¶ 12, quoting Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus. An “abuse of discretion” is “an 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion” or “a view or action that no 

conscientious judge could honestly have taken.” State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 

2008-Ohio-4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23.

{¶35} We consider nine factors when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a 

presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea:

(1) whether “highly competent counsel” represented the defendant; (2) 

whether the trial court afforded the defendant “a full Crim.R. 11 hearing 

before entering the plea”; (3) whether the trial court held “a full hearing” 

regarding the defendant's motion to withdraw; (4) “whether the trial court 

gave full and fair consideration to the motion”; (5) whether the defendant 

filed the motion within a reasonable time; (6) whether the defendant's 

motion gave specific reasons for the withdrawal; (7) whether the defendant 

understood the nature of the charges, the possible penalties, and the 

consequences of his plea; (8) whether the defendant is “perhaps not guilty 

or ha[s] a complete defense to the charges”; and (9) whether permitting the 

defendant to withdraw his plea will prejudice the state.

(Alteration in Howard.) State v. Howard, 2017-Ohio-9392, 103 N.E.3d 108, ¶ 24 (4th 

Dist.), quoting State v. McNeil, 146 Ohio App.3d 173, 176, 765 N.E.2d 884 (1st Dist.). “ ‘ 

“Consideration of the factors is a balancing test, and no one factor is conclusive.” ’ ” Id., 

quoting State v. Jones, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-530, 2016-Ohio-951, ¶ 14, 

quoting State v. Zimmerman, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-866, 2010-Ohio-4087, ¶ 13. “ 

‘The ultimate question is whether there exists a “reasonable and legitimate basis for the 

withdrawal of the plea.” ’ ” Id., quoting State v. Delpinal, 2d Dist. Clark Nos. 2015-CA-97 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 21

& 2015-CA-98, 2016-Ohio-5646, ¶ 9, quoting Xie at 527. “A mere change of heart is not 

a legitimate and reasonable basis for the withdrawal of a plea.” Id.

{¶36} Pierce does not explicitly address these nine factors in her brief. We 

construe the arguments in her third assignment of error as challenging the competency 

of counsel (the first factor) and the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of her plea

following a Crim.R. 11 hearing (the second factor). We have already found that her 

counsel was not ineffective when we overruled her fourth assignment of error. And, we 

found that her plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily after a proper 

Crim.R. 11 hearing when we overruled her second assignment of error. Therefore, we 

reject these arguments. Additionally, the trial court reviewed these two factors and found 

that she was represented by highly competent counsel and entered the plea knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily following a full Crim.R. 11 hearing. Based on our review of 

the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making these findings.

{¶37} However, in addition to the claim her counsel had coerced and threatened

her into the plea, she contends her counsel was ineffective because at the change of plea 

hearing he “admitted that this case was too much pressure on him.” She speculates that 

this pressure was likely the reason he coerced her into a no contest plea. However, Pierce 

fails to cite in the record trial counsel’s statements about pressure. Trial counsel makes 

a remark about “pressure” when informing the trial court that Pierce has accepted the 

state’s offer, but he was describing conflicting family pressure being placed upon Pierce 

to decide about the plea offer: “A lot of pressure and counter pressure and the 

recommendations from the family members that might not be the same 

recommendations.” The trial court determined that Pierce was represented by highly 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 22

competent counsel; she was facing a potential 25.5-year prison term and her trial counsel 

brought that down to a range of 3 to 11 years, he “was certainly effective in his negotiating 

of this matter.” We reject Pierce’s argument and find it is not supported by the record.

{¶38} We construe her arguments in her fifth assignment of error as contesting

the fourth factor (whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration to the motion) and 

fifth factor (timeliness of motion). For the fifth factor, Pierce contends that the motion was 

timely made because it was made before the sentencing hearing. The trial court found 

that it was not timely because it was faxed to the court and the state two days before the 

sentencing hearing. However, we find that her motion was timely and this factor weighs 

in her favor. State v. Sow, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-772, 2018-Ohio-4186, ¶ 28 

(motion to withdraw plea was considered timely when it was filed two days before the 

sentencing hearing). Additionally, Pierce and her trial counsel disagreed concerning the 

plea withdrawal as is evident from his accompanying motion to withdraw as counsel. “An 

‘undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea 

and the filing of a motion under Crim.R. 32.1 is a factor adversely affecting the credibility 

of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion.’ ” State v. Burke, 4th Dist. 

Lawrence Nos. 19CA1 & 19CA2, 2019-Ohio-4744, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Bush, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 235, 2002-Ohio-3993, 773 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 14. Here, it appears that there was no 

undue delay between the time the conflict in the attorney-client relationship arose and the

time the motion to withdraw the plea was filed. Finally, a factor influencing our 

consideration of the timeliness of the motion here was the trial court’s decision to grant 

Pierce’s attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel. Because Pierce’s counsel was 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 23

permitted to withdraw, the entire case was delayed while Pierce located new counsel, 

giving the parties ample time to address the motion to withdraw plea. 

{¶39} As for the fourth factor, the trial court held a full evidentiary hearing on 

Pierce’s motion to withdraw her no contest plea and gave her motion full and fair 

consideration. The record shows that following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

reviewed each of the nine factors listed.

{¶40} Pierce asserts that one reason for the motion to withdraw was her professed 

innocence. However, a defendant's claims of innocence are not sufficient to warrant 

withdrawal of a plea knowingly entered. State v. Powers, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 03CA21, 

2004-Ohio-2720, ¶ 18. All defendants who request a withdrawal of their plea base their 

request upon some claim of innocence. Here, Pierce makes only an unsubstantiated 

claim of innocence. She offered no evidence to support this claim. The state offered the 

testimony of one of the state troopers involved in the traffic stop to refute her claims of 

innocence. The trial court noted that the “baggie with meth” in her pants made her 

professed innocence “somewhat difficult.” Therefore, the trial court could reasonably have 

concluded that Pierce’s profession of innocence was nothing more than a change of 

heart, which is an insufficient basis for withdrawing a guilty plea. Id. 

{¶41} She also contends she was induced to pleading no contest by her trial 

counsel’s insistence that she would not have a fair trial “because the jury would be all 

white and she is African American.” However, there was no evidence presented at the 

plea hearing to support this allegation. Pierce did not testify, nor did she subpoena her 

former trial counsel and present his testimony. The trial court admonished Pierce at the 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 24

hearing that without offering any evidence at the change of plea hearing, she was leaving 

a very limited record on which the court could decide her motion: 

THE COURT: You understand that if you don’t offer evidence you’re giving 

me a very limited record in which to make my decision, which is almost 

exclusively the pretrial proceedings that have been here on the record and 

the Rule 11 colloquy that I conducted with your client before she was your 

client.

As we discussed previously, at the change of plea hearing Pierce’s counsel expressed 

concerns about taking her case to trial, but he did not identify race as one of his concerns. 

He expressed general skepticism about going to trial “for a lot of obvious reasons.” This

could refer to the fact that her criminal activity was caught on video tape (including the 

presence of her eight-year-old child in the car) and would be played to the jury or – as 

Pierce suggests – could refer to concerns of racial prejudice. His concern about “the 

makeup of the jury,” could be based on his belief that the population in Scioto County has 

been disproportionately impacted by illegal drug trafficking and overdoses and thus views 

drug traffickers unfavorably or – as Pierce suggests – they are racists. However, either 

supposition is pure speculation because Pierce never called her attorney to testify at the 

hearing on her plea withdraw. Similarly, Pierce made remarks at the hearing on her 

attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel, in which she states, “My skin tone, he keeps 

talking about that.” But then she immediately followed up with her rejection of race as an 

issue in her case, “I don’t look at it that way. I just – I haven’t looked at it as a black and 

white situation.” The trial court immediately affirmed Pierce’s position, “Race doesn’t have 

anything to do with it in this court.” Again, however, her counsel put neither Pierce’s former 

counsel nor Pierce on the stand to provide testimony about alleged racial concerns. 

Pierce’s unsworn statements rejected race as a concern she held. At the conclusion of 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 25

the hearing the trial court reiterated the lack of any evidence presented on the claim of 

racial animus in the process or the jury pool:

THE COURT: Now, the Defense has raised issues and allegations about 

what Ms. Pierce was told by previous counsel. No one was [sic] 

subpoenaed that counsel here. She’s not testified as to what those 

statements were, although her Counsel argued that, there’s no evidence

presented to the Court in support of that. So, the Court was unable to test 

the credibility of any evidence that – since there was none offered.

{¶42} Pierce failed to submit any evidence or provide any testimony at the 

evidentiary hearing on her motion to withdraw her plea. In her brief, she contends that 

she “was under no obligation” to present evidence or subpoena her former attorney or 

her passenger/codefendant. She contends that statements made at the previous 

proceedings (which we have discussed previously) and the written statements her

codefendant made that were placed in the PSI report were sufficient. Oddly, Pierce 

appears to argue against having an evidentiary hearing on her motion. Typically, 

defendants argue that the trial court erred by not providing an evidentiary hearing. E.g., 

State v. Wolfson, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 02CA28, 2003-Ohio-4440. She describes any 

effort to subpoena witnesses as “redundant.” And she argues both that the trial court 

should not have considered the PSI report as far as her own statements contained in it, 

but also that it should have considered the PSI report as far as her codefendant’s 

statements contained in it. However, Pierce did not call her codefendant as a witness or 

seek a written statement in affidavit form from him.

{¶43} In State v. Elkins, 2016-Ohio-8579, 77 N.E.3d 360, ¶ 10-16 (4th Dist.), we 

discussed the type of hearing that must be held on motions to withdraw pleas. We noted 

that “[w]hile Xie states that a hearing is mandatory, it does not define the type 

of hearing that is required.” Id. at ¶ 10. We held that “a hearing complying with at least 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 26

the minimum mandates of due process is necessary.” Id. The trial court retains discretion 

to define the scope of the hearing to “reflect the substantive merits of the motion.” Id.

“The motion to withdraw the plea must, at a minimum, make a prima facie 

showing of merit before the trial court need devote considerable time to it. 

This approach strikes a fair balance between fairness to the accused and 

the preservation of judicial resources.” “Bold assertions without evidentiary 

support simply should not merit the type of scrutiny that substantiated 

allegations would merit.” (Citations omitted.)

Wolfson, 2003-Ohio-4440, ¶ 16. Here, the trial court afforded Pierce both fairness and 

judicial resources in providing her an evidentiary hearing on her motion to withdraw her 

plea. Pierce cannot fault the trial court for her own failure to take full advantage of it. 

{¶44} After balancing the above factors, the majority of which weigh against 

granting the motion to withdraw, we cannot conclude that the trial court's determination 

that there was no reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the no contest

plea was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it denied the presentence motion to withdraw the no contest plea. 

Accordingly, we overrule the third and fifth assignments of error.

D. Felony Sentencing

{¶45} Pierce contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced her to a definite 

and mandatory term of 8 years in prison, up to an indefinite term of up to 12 years. She 

contends that the sentence is invalid because the trial court was punishing her “for 

exercising her constitutional right to be proven guilty of the charges against her at trial”

because she had changed her mind and wanted to withdraw her plea. She argues that 

“the burden is on the sentencing judge to demonstrate that it gave no improper weight to 

Defendant Pierce’s initial failure to plead guilty and that she was sentenced solely upon 

the facts of the case and her personal history.” In addition, she argues that when the trial 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 27

court considered the statutory factors, it did not give adequate weight to factors favorable 

to Pierce, such as her college enrollment, employment, care for a special needs son, and 

her lack of a history of criminal conduct. She argues that the trial court ignored statements 

made by her codefendant concerning his control and culpability and his criminal history. 

Finally, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in giving Pierce a longer 

sentence than her codefendant. 

1. Standard of Review

{¶46} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts apply R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2), which specifies that an appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or 

vacate and remand a challenged felony sentence if the court clearly and convincingly 

finds either:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under 

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of 

section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, 

whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

{¶47} A defendant bears the burden to establish, by clear and convincing 

evidence, 1) that a sentence is either contrary to law or 2) that the record does not support 

the specified findings under R.C. 2929.13(B), R.C. 2929.13(D), R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e), 

2929.14(C)(4), or R.C. 2929.20(I). State v. Shuler, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 22CA8, 2023-

Ohio-2444, ¶ 14.

Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree of proof which is 

more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of 

such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, 

and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or 

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 

Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 28

Ogle v. Hocking Cnty. Sheriff, 4th Dist. No. 22CA9, 2023-Ohio-1446, 214 N.E.3d 31, ¶ 

30.

{¶48} “A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C. 2953.08(F) to 

review the entire trial-court record, including any oral or written statements and 

presentence-investigation reports.” State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 

198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 20, citing R.C. 2953.08(F)(1) through (4). However, “[n]othing in R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the 

record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that 

best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d

242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 42. Therefore, appellate courts cannot review a 

felony sentence when appellant’s sole contention is that the trial court improperly 

considered the factors of R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12 when sentencing. Id.

{¶49} Additionally, “an appellate court's determination that the record does not 

support a sentence does not equate to a determination that the sentence is ‘otherwise 

contrary to law’ as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Jones at ¶ 32. “[O]therwise 

contrary to law” means “ ‘in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.’ ” Id. at 

¶ 34, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990), cited with approval in Bryant at ¶ 

22. Thus, for example, “when a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or 

considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 

2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law.” Bryant at ¶ 22; Shuler at ¶ 17.

2. Pierce’s Sentence is Supported by the Record and Is Not Contrary to Law

{¶50} “ ‘[A] sentence is generally not contrary to law if the trial court considered 

the R.C. 2929.11 purposes and principles of sentencing as well as the R.C. 2929.12 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 29

seriousness and recidivism factors, properly applied post[-]release control, and imposed 

a sentence within the statutory range.’ ” State v. Perry, 4th Dist. Pike No. 16CA863, 2017-

Ohio-69, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Brewer, 2014-Ohio-1903, 11 N.E.3d 317, ¶ 38 (4th Dist.).

{¶51} At both the sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry, the trial court 

stated that it considered the R.C. 2929.11 purposes and principles of sentencing and the 

R.C. 2929.12 seriousness and recidivism factors, properly applied post-release control, 

and imposed an 8-year mandatory minimum with an indefinite maximum of 12 years,

which is within the statutory range for a first-degree felony. Contrary to Pierce’s argument, 

a trial court is not required to make its findings under R.C. 2929.11 or R.C. 2929.12 on 

the record. Rather, a trial court is required only to “carefully consider” the factors in R.C. 

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 when imposing sentence, and is not required to make any 

“findings,” or state “reasons” regarding those considerations. State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, 846 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 38. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) does not provide a 

basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the 

sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. 

Moore, 4th Dist. Washington No. 20CA35, 2021-Ohio-3149, ¶ 7.

{¶52} Pierce argues that the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 

2929.12(D)(2) (the offender's history of criminal convictions) and R.C. 2929.12(E)(3) 

(offender led a law-abiding life for a significant number of years) do not support 

her sentence. In other words, Pierce disagrees with the trial court's analysis and 

balancing of these factors.

{¶53} The Supreme Court of Ohio summarized the applicability of R.C. 2929.11 

and 2929.12 in sentencing decisions:
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 30

In Ohio, two statutory sections serve as a general guide for 

every sentencing. First, R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the overriding 

purposes of felony sentencing “are to protect the public from future crime 

by the offender and others and to punish the offender.” To achieve these 

purposes, the trial court “shall consider the need for incapacitating the 

offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating 

the offender, and making restitution.” Id. The sentence must be 

“commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's 

conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent 

with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” 

R.C. 2929.11(B). * * *

Second, R.C. 2929.12 specifically provides that in exercising its discretion, 

a trial court must consider certain factors that make the offense more or less 

serious and that indicate whether the offender is more or less likely to 

commit future offenses. * * * [A]n offender's conduct is considered less 

serious when there are “substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's 

conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.” R.C. 

2929.12(C)(4). R.C. 2929.12(C) and (E) also permit a trial court to consider 

“any other relevant factors” to determine that an offense is less serious or 

that an offender is less likely to recidivate.

State v. Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, ¶ 17–18.

{¶54} The trial court stated that it considered both the principles and purposes 

of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 

2929.12. Specifically, the trial court considered the PSI report and the additional following 

matters:

I’ve considered her lack of prior record, considered the large amounts of 

narcotics involved in this traffic stop, considered the fact that her child was 

involved, and to the extent the child was in the car during this traffic stop. 

I’ve considered the circumstances of the stop, as far as the driving and 

having to be brought out at gunpoint. I’ve considered all those arguments 

that Counsel has made here today, and the additional facts and factors that 

are included in the presentence investigation. (OR 98, Tr. 53)

{¶55} Although Pierce disagrees with the trial court's analysis and its balancing of 

the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12, in imposing a sentence it is the 

role of the trial court to determine the weight afforded to any particular statutory factors, 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 31

mitigating grounds, or other relevant circumstances. See State v. Day, 2019-Ohio-4816, 

149 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.); State v. Bailey, 4th Dist. Highland No. 11CA7, 2011-

Ohio-6526, ¶ 34, citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000) 

(“in considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, the trial court has ‘the discretion to 

determine the weight to assign a particular statutory factor’ ”); State v. Kuykendall, 2017-

Ohio-7280, 97 N.E.3d 32, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Steger, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2016-03-059, 2016-Ohio-7908, ¶ 18 (“Although appellant disagrees with the trial 

court's analysis and its balancing of the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 

2929.12, it is ‘[t]he trial court [that], in imposing a sentence, determines the weight 

afforded to any particular statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant 

circumstances’ ”).

{¶56} Pierce has failed to meet her burden to establish that her 

prison sentence was clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. “Simply 

because the court did not balance the factors in the manner appellant desires does not 

mean that the court failed to consider them, or that clear and convincing evidence shows 

that the court's findings are not supported by the record.” State v. Butcher, 4th Dist. 

Athens No. 15CA33, 2017-Ohio-1544, ¶ 87. After reviewing the 

record, we find no clear and convincing evidence that the court erred in balancing the 

factors in R.C. 2929.12 or in considering the principles and purposes of sentencing under 

R.C. 2929.11. 

{¶57} Pierce also contends that the sentence reflects the trial court punishment of 

her “because she exercised her constitutional rights and/or demanded that her guilt be 

proven at trial.” However, Pierce pled no contest; she cites no place in the record to 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 32

support her contention that the judge sentenced her in a retaliatory manner. At the change 

of plea hearing, the judge told her he did not care whether she accepted the plea or not, 

“Ms. Pierce, I don’t care what you do, it’s all the same to me, you take it or you don’t take 

it. Either way, we have trials here.” Pierce cites to no place in the sentencing transcript 

that even creates the appearance that the trial court enhanced her sentence in a vindictive 

or retaliatory manner. See State v. Morris, 159 Ohio App.3d 775, 2005-Ohio-962, 825 

N.E.2d 637 (4th Dist.).

{¶58} Finally, she contends that it was “unsound” that her codefendant received 

a lighter sentence than she did. However, “that fact alone does not require a finding that 

the trial court erred in its sentencing decision. * * * [A] sentence is not contrary to law 

because the trial court failed to impose a sentence that is the same as another offender 

who committed similar conduct.” State v. Graham, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013–07–

066, 2014-Ohio-1891, ¶ 14-15. Consistency in sentencing does not mean 

uniformity. State v. Micomonaco, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011–07–139, 2012–Ohio–

5239, ¶ 49 (“A consistent sentence is not derived from a case-by-case comparison, but 

from the trial court's proper application of the statutory sentencing guidelines.” ).

{¶59} The language of R.C. 2929.11(B) provides that a felony sentence must be 

“consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” 

There is no requirement that codefendants receive equal sentences. State v. Adams,

2016-Ohio-7772, 84 N.E.3d 155, ¶ 44 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Gibson, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98725, 2013-Ohio-4372. ¶ 76. “Each defendant is different and nothing 

prohibits a trial court from imposing two different sentences upon individuals convicted of 

similar crimes.” State v. Wickham, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2006–0084, 2007-Ohio-
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 33

1754, ¶ 29, citing State v. Aguirre, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 03CA5, 2003-Ohio-4909, ¶ 50. 

When that happens, “the task of the appellate court is to determine whether 

the sentence is so unusual as to be outside the mainstream of local judicial practice. We 

bear in mind that although offenses may be similar, there may be distinguishing factors 

that justify dissimilar sentences.” State v. Beasley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82884, 2004-

Ohio-988, ¶ 24 (internal citation omitted).

{¶60} In Gibson, supra, the defendant raised a “consistency” argument. The 

Gibson court noted that to support a contention that a sentence is disproportionate 

to sentences imposed upon other offenders, the defendant must raise this issue before 

the trial court and present some evidence, however minimal, to provide a starting point 

for analysis and to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

99121, 2013-Ohio-3141, ¶ 17. In Gibson, the record revealed that Gibson's 

counsel did not make any proportionality argument at the trial court level. Thus, the 

appellate court summarily overruled Gibson's assignment of error without undertaking a 

review of it.

{¶61} In State v. Montanez–Roldon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103509, 2016-Ohio3062, the appellate court observed that “[a] consistency-in-sentencing determination, 

along with all sentencing determinations pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, is a factintensive inquiry that does not lend itself to being initially reviewed at the appellate 

level.” Id. at ¶ 14. The court held:

“[A]ny review must begin with the defendant producing a record for the trial 

court's consideration before the final sentence is imposed. As courts have 

long concluded, a “defendant must raise [the consistency-in-sentencing] 

issue before the trial court and present some evidence, however minimal, 

in order to provide a starting point for analysis and to preserve the issue for 

appeal.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Spock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99950, 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 34

2014-Ohio-606 [2014 WL 688793], ¶ 37, citing State v. Lang, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 92099, 2010-Ohio-433 [2010 WL 457140]; State v. 

Picha, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102506, 2015-Ohio-4380 [2015 WL 

6392638], ¶ 9. Without evidence provided on the record at sentencing upon 

which to base an R.C. 2929.11(B) argument on appeal, and without any 

other arguments for us to consider for the purpose of declaring Montanez–

Roldon's sentence contrary to law, we cannot review his final sentence as 

being contrary to law pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(4).” (Brackets sic.).

Id.

{¶62} We have reviewed Pierce’s sentencing transcript, and it makes no mention 

of Pierce’s codefendant's sentence or that Pierce’s sentence was inconsistent. However, 

after Jones, infra, it is not clear that this type of appellate review is provided for under 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

The narrow holding in Jones is that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an 

appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that 

the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 

2929.12. See Jones at ¶¶ 31, 39. Nothing about that holding should be 

construed as prohibiting appellate review of a sentence when the claim is 

that the sentence was imposed based on impermissible considerations—i.e., 

considerations that fall outside those that are contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 

2929.12. Indeed, in Jones, this court made clear that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) 

permits appellate courts to reverse or modify sentencing decisions that are “ 

‘otherwise contrary to law.’ ” Jones at ¶ 32, quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b). 

This court also recognized that “otherwise contrary to law” means “ ‘in 

violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.’ ” Id. at ¶ 34, 

quoting Black's Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990). Accordingly, when a trial 

court imposes a sentence based on factors or considerations that are 

extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, 

that sentence is contrary to law. Claims that raise these types of issues are 

therefore reviewable.

State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22 (discussing 

State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649).

{¶63} Pierce’s claim is that her sentence is “unsound” because it was greater than 

her codefendant’s, which raises the question of whether the record supports the trial 

court’s application of the “consistency” purpose in R.C. 2929.11(B). It does not raise a 
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 35

question about whether “a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or 

considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11.” Id.

However, because she did not raise this consistency issue at sentencing with the trial 

judge, we can summarily reject this argument for that reason alone without resolving 

whether Jones, supra, allows us to review it. Moreover, we have already noted that the 

trial court weighed the purposes and principles of R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and 

recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12. 

{¶64} Pierce has failed to meet her burden to establish that her

prison sentence was clearly and convincingly not supported by the record or that it was 

contrary to law. Therefore, we overrule Pierce’s first assignment of error.

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶65} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 22CA4002 36

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the 

costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto 

County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS 

BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is 

temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. 

The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay 

is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day 

period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of 

the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the 

appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court

BY: ________________________

 Michael D. Hess, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with 

the clerk.