Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Appellate Procedur e 43(c) (2), Attorney Gene ral Er ic H. Holder , * Jr. i s a uto ma tic a lly su

bs tit ute d fo r fo rm e r Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l Mic ha e l B . M uk a se y a s Re sp on de nt i n this case. The Honora

ble Solomon Oliver, J r., United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District ** of Ohio, sitting by

desig nation. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0355n.06 No. 08-3124 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

AL EXAND ER GRI GORI EVI CH URI TSKY, ) ) Petitioner, ) ON PETI TI ON F OR REVI EW ) OF A

N ORDER OF THE B OARD v . ) O F IM M IG RA T IO N A P P E A LS ) ERI C H. HOL DER, J R., ) O P I N I O N * Attor ne y Ge ne ra l of

the Un ite d St a te s, ) ) Re sp on de nt. ) __________________________________________) Before: M OORE an d WHIT E, Circuit Judges, and OLIVER, District Judge. ** WHITE , Circuit Judge. Petitioner Alexander Ur itsky seeks review of

the J anuar

y 2, 2008 order of the B oard of

I mmigr at i on Appea ls (BIA) de ny ing his motion to reopen immig ration pr oc e e din g s. We D I SMI S S th e pet it ion fo r r e vie w i n p art

fo r l a c k o f j ur isd ic tio n a nd oth e rw ise DENY the petition.2 I The fac ts a

re not in dispute. Uritsky , a native of Ukra ine and citizen of I srae l, was admitted to the United States in 1996 at the ag e of eleve n and beca me a lawful perma

nent resident on J anuar

y 4, 20 02 . Wh e n h e wa s se ve nte e n, he ha d in te rc ours e wi th a fo ur te e n y e ar- old

g ir l. H e e ve ntu a lly pleaded g uil ty

to t he fe lony c ha rg e of thi rd -d e g re e se xua l c on du c t, M ic h. Com p. L aws § 750.520d(1)( a), w hich prohibits eng ag ing in se x ual pene tration with a person who is at least thirtee n and less than s ix teen y ear s old. See U ritsky v. Gonzale

s , 399 F.3d 728, 729 ( 6th Cir. 2005). J udg ment ag ainst Uritsky

was e ntere d on September 24, 2002, a nd Uritsky

was a ssigne d to “y outhful trainee status” under

the Holmes Youthful Traine e Act, Mich. Comp. L aws §§ 762.11-16. Uritsky , 399 F.3d at 729. On Novembe r 2, 2002, the Depa rtment of Homeland Security serve d Uritsky with a Notice to A pp e ar, c ha

rg inghim wi th h a vin g been c on vic te d o f a n a g g ra vate d f e lony and thu s su bje c t to

remova l pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)( A)(iii). Uritsky filed a motion to t erminate the re moval proce eding s, arguing that his a djudication as a “y outhful trainee ” did not constitute an ag g ravated felony conviction under the I mmigration and Nationality Act (I NA). Uritsky , 399 F.3d at 730. The I mmigration J udg e ag ree d and ter minated the re moval proce eding s. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a ppeale d this ruling, and on O ctober 6, 2003, the B I A sustained the a ppeal, or dering that Uri tsk

y be re mov e d a

nd a llo wi ngUr its ky

the op po rt

un ity to c ho os e a

c ountr y fo r r e mov a l. Ur it s ky d e s i g n a t e d

I s r a e l ( o r , a s ana l t e r

n a t i v e , U kr a i n e ) a s t h e c o u n t r y o f r e m o v a l

. H e a lso petitioned this cou rt fo r re v i ew of the BIA’s dec ision. On March 7, 2005, w e af firmed the B I A’s decision, ruling that Uritsky ’s g uilty plea to third-deg ree sexual conduct constituted a “c onviction” under the I

NA notwithstanding his a ssigne d status a s a “youthful trainee .” See id. at 728. UritskyI t a ppear s that as part of the stipulation describe d above, Uritsky pleade d g uilty

to one count 1 of attempted a g g ravated assault, Mich. Comp. L aws §§ 750.81a & 750.92, a

misdemeanor. 3 filed a pe tition for writ of cer tiorari, which the Supreme Court denie d on October 3, 2005. Uritsky v. Gonzales , 546 U.S. 823 (2005). On J une 22, 2005, while the pe tition for cer tiorari wa s pending , a Michig an c i rc u it court order ed that Uritsky ’s conviction of third-deg ree sexual c onduct be set aside based on a stipulation

s i gn edb y b o t h t h e p ro s ec u t i o n an d Ur i t s ky ’s at t o rn ey t h at t h er e wa s a “d ef ec t i n t h e p l eap ro ce ed i n g” that e nti tle d U ri tsk

y to re lie f und e r sub c ha

pte r 6.5 00 of the Mic hig an Co ur t Ru le s. Ne ve rt

he le ss, 1 Uritsky was re moved from the United S tates i n Fe bruar y 2006. Nothing in the r ecor d indicates that Uritsky notified the immigra

tion authorities before he was removed that his felony conviction had be e n v a c a te d, no r is the re any ind ic a tio n that the imm ig ratio n a uth or iti e s w e re a lr e a dy

awa re of thi s pe rt ine nt f

a c t. On July 3, 20 07 , Ur its ky fi le d a motio n to re op e n with the B I A. Ur its ky c on te nd e d tha t hi s

remova l was not leg ally

executed bec ause it wa s based on a conviction that was no long er va lid. This, acc ording to Uritsky , allowed the BIA to g rant the motion to reopen de spite the fac t that he had alre ady been r emoved. Ur itsky

also reque sted that the B I A exercise its powe r to reope n his case sua sp on te , m ai n t ai n i n g h i s re m o v al “f o r a cr i m e he h as n o tb ee nco n v i ct edo f” wa s a “ gro s s m i s ca rr i age of justice” a

nd constituted an “e x ceptional c ircumstance ” mer iting such a reope ning. The Gover

nment opposed Uritsky ’s motion. On J anuar y 2, 2008, the B I A denied U ritsky ’s motion in a written order , stating “ [t ]he moti on will be deni ed bec ause it wa s not filed within the statutory and re g ulatory

90-day time limit for filing a motion to reope n,” as “ [a] final administrative4

order was e ntere d in this case on Oc tober 6, 2003, a nd this mot ion was filed more than three y ear s later.” J .A. 5 (c iting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c )(7) (C)(i) a nd 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2))

. The motion was “a lso denied” on the g round that it wa s filed af ter Ur itsky

had bee n remove d from the United States. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d))

. Th e B IA d isa g re e d w ithUr its ky ’s c la im that he wa s unla

wf ull y re mov e d, no tin g tha

t he “ ha d o ve r se ve n mont hs ” be fo re he wa s r e mov e d “ to notify or inform the D HS or this Boar d that his ag g rava ted felony conviction had been va cate d,” y et “he did nothing .” Id. The BI A observe d there was no e vidence that immigration authorities were

even a war e of the state cour

t’s order vacating Ur itsky ’s conviction. Finally , the B I A found that no e x ceptional c ircumstance s exi sted that would war rant a sua sponte re op e nin g . I t c ite d its pr e vio us ru lin g that it s p ow e r t o r e op e n o r r e c on sid e r c a se s su a s po nte is “limit ed to exceptional cir cu m s t an ce s and is not meant to cure filing de fec ts or circ umvent the regulations, where enfor cing them might re sult in hardship.” Id. (quoting the summary of the decision in In re J-J

, 21 I & N De c . 97 6 (B I A 19 97 ))

. Th e B I A f ound that U ri tsk

y “ fa ile d to e xer c ise due dil ige n c e in

th is c a s e , ” a s h e d id

n o t i n f o r m t h e D H S o r

th e B I A th a t h is c o n v ic ti o nh a d b een

va c a te d b e fo re he wa s r e mov e d, and that he “ fa ils to pr ov ide any e xplanatio n for the un tim e lin e ss of this motion which was filed more than three y ear s after the issuance of our pr i or dec ision and more than one y ear

afte r his remova l.” Id. Uritsky filed a timely

notice of petition for re view with this court. We have jur isdiction under 8 U .S.C. § 1252. II We reviewthe denial of

a motion to reopen f

or an a b u s e o f d i s cretion. Tapia-Martinez v. Go n z a l es , 482 F.3d 417, 421 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I ssues of law a re r eviewe d de novo. Id. “The5

Supreme Court has made clea r that re opening is discretionary with the BIA and that the B I A re tains br oa d dis c re tio n to g ra

nt or de ny su c h mot ion s. B e c a us e the B I A ha s su c h b ro a d d isc re tio n, a pa rt y seekingreope ning or reconsideration bears a ‘hea vy burden.’ ” Alizoti v. Gonzales , 477 F.3d 448, 4 5 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g IN S v . D oh e rty , 5 02 U. S. 3 14 , 3 23 (1 99 2) ); s ee a l s o Da n es hvar v. A s h c r o ft , 355 F.3d 615, 625 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (noting the BIA’s discre tion “is broad but is not unlimit ed”)

. “The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily , irrationally or contrary to law.” Ss waj je v . A sh c ro

ft , 350 F.3d 528, 532 ( 6th Cir. 2003). I n deter mining w h et h er a

n abuse of discretion occ urre d, we must dec ide whethe r t he denia l of the motion to reopen “ was made without

a ratio na l e xplanatio n , i n e xp l i c a bly de pa rt e d f ro m e sta bli sh e d p oli c ie s, or

re ste d o n a

n im pe rm iss ibl e basis such as invidious di scrimination ag ainst a par ticular ra ce or

g roup.” Allabani v. Gonzales , 402 F.3d 668, 675 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). A A par ty must ge nera lly

file a motion to reope n “within 90 day s of the date of entry of a f inal administrative order of remova l.” 8 U.S .C. § 1229a(c) (7)( C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2). “The time limit s for filing a motion to reope n ‘ar e cr y stal clea r.’” Barry v. M

ukasey , 524 F.3d 721, 7 2 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Randhawa v. Gonzales , 474 F.3d 918, 920 ( 6th Cir. 2007)). Fur ther, “[a]n alienis g e n e r a ll y

p r e c lu d e d

. . . f r o m f il in g a mo ti o nto r e o p e nh is o r h e r d e p o rtation proce eding s once the alien has left t he country .” Mansour v. Gonzales , 4 70 F .3 d 1 19 4, 11 98 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) ; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) ( “A motion to reope n . . . shall not be made by or on behalf of a per son who is the subject of e x clusion, deportation, or r emoval proc eeding s subsequent to his orBut see W illiam v. Gonzales , 499 F.3d 329, 332 ( 4th Cir. 2007) (2-1 de cision) (holding that 2 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) is invalid bec ause it conf licts with the statutory

l an gu age in 8 U.S.C. § 12 29 a(c)(7) (A ) p ro vid ingtha t “ [a]n a lie n ma y fi le on e mot ion

to r e op e n p ro c e e din g s und e r t his se c tio n, ” a s s uch lan gu a g e “ un a mbi g uo us ly pr ov ide s an a lie n w iththe ri g ht t o f ile on e mot ion

to reope n, reg ardle ss of whethe r he is within or without the country”). I n W ie de rsp e rg , t h e Ni n t h Circuit gr anted a petition for re view of the BIA’s denia l of a 3 motion to reopen, which w as filed a fter the petitioner had be en depor ted, bec ause the state convic tion underlying his de portation had be en vac ated. Se e W ie de rsp e rg , 896 F.2d at 1180-82. I t is worth noting that our observation in a prior unpublished opinion that “Wiedersper g was deporte d after his conviction had been vac ated,” Du tc hie v ic i v . I NS , 90 F. App’ x 126, 133 (6th Cir. 2004) (e mphasis added) , was mistaken. In fac t, the “expunge ment” of Wieder sperg ’s conviction pursuant to state law oc curr ed prior to his depor tation, but the conviction was “ vacated” only afte r he had be en depor

ted. Se e W

ie de rsp e rg , 896 F.2d at 1180.

6 her de parture from the United States.”). Uritsky conce des t hat hi s motion to reope n was filed a fter 2 th e 9 0

- d ay

t i m e l i m i t a t i o nh a d

r u n . N e v e rt h e l e s s , h e c o n t e n d s t h a th i s r e m o v a l w a s n o t“ l e g a lly executed” be cause t h e felony conviction on which his re moval was ba sed wa s vacated, and thus neither the usual time limi t on motions to reope n nor the de parture bar should have been a pplied. We need not addr ess Uritsky ’s argument that the BIA err ed when it r uled that his depar

ture from the United States ba rre d his subsequent motion to reopen. The BIA’s dec ision was independe ntly

g rounded on U ritsky ’s fa ilure to file his motion to reopen within the 90-da y period allowed f or such motions. Uritsky relies he avily

on the Ninth Circuit case of W ie de rsp e rg

v . I NS , 896 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1990). Howeve r, W ie de rsp e rg was decided in 1990, when there we re no 3 statutory or re g ulatory t i me limits for r equesting the re opening of a c ase. A s the Supreme Court

rec ently rec ounted, in 1990, “fe ar[ful] that deporta ble or excludable aliens [were] try [i ng ] t o p ro long the ir sta y s in the U. S. b y

fi lin g on e ty

pe of di sc re tio na

ry re lie f .

. . a ft e r a

no the r i n immigration procee dings,” J ustice De pt . Finds Aliens Not Abusing Requests for Relief, 68 No. 27 Interpre ter Relea ses 907 (July 22, 1991), Cong re s s order ed the Attorney Gene ral to “issue r eg ulations with respec t to

. . . the period of time in whic h motions t o reope n . . . may be off ere d in deportation proc eeding s,” including “aSuc h an ar g u me n t w o u ld h a v e b e e n d if f ic u lt to ma

k e b e c a u s e it w o u ld h a v e require d a 4 demonstration t hat he e x erc ised due dilig ence . Se e Ba rry , 524 F.3d at 724. Accor ding to the B I A, Uritsky “fa iled to exercise due dilig ence in this case,” a conclusion with which it is difficult to differ

. 7 lim itatio n o n th e numbe r o f s uc h mo tio ns tha t ma y be filed and

a ma ximumtim e period for the filing of such motions,” § 545(d)( 1), 104 Stat. 5066. The A t t o rney Gene ral found litt le evidenc e of a buse, conc luding that r equire ments for re opening are a disincentive to ba d faith filing s. See 68 Interpre ter Relea ses, su pra . B e c a

us e “Cong ress . . . ne ither re scinded [n] or ame nded its mandate to limit the number a nd time frame s of motions,” howeve r, the De p ar t m en t of J ustice (DO J ) issued a regulation imposi ng new time limits and restrictions on filings. The ne w re g ulation allowed the alien t o file one moti on to reope n within 90 day s. Ex ecutive O ffice for I mmigration Review; Motions and Appeals in I mmigration Proceedings , 6 1 Fe d. Reg . 18900, 18901, 18905 (1996); see 8 CFR § 3.2(c) (1996). Wit h the 1996 enactment of the [I lleg al I mmigration Reform and Immigra nt Responsibili ty Act], Cong ress adopted the rec ommendations of the DOJ with respect to n ume ri c a l and

tim e lim its

. Dada v. M

ukasey , 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2315 (2008). The 90-day time limit for motions to reopen wa s in effe ct at all times pertinent to Uritsky ’s case . Be cause we a re r eviewingthe denial of his moti on to reope n on the basis of untimeliness, W ie de rsp e rg

is inapplicable. Uritsky filed his motion to reopen too late. As the B I A observe d, “[a] final administrative order was e ntere d in this case on Oc tober 6, 2003, a nd this motion was filed more tha n three y ear s later.” I ndeed, U ritsky filed his motion over two y ear s after his felony

conviction was va cate d and over sixteen mont hs after he wa s removed f

rom the United States. Ur itsky did not provide any

e xplanatio n to the B I A f

or his de lay , no r do e s he do so in h is p e tit ion fo r r e vie w. Whil e e qu ita ble tolling can salvag e a petitioner’s otherwise time- barr ed motion to reopen, se e Ha rc he nk o v . I NS , 379 F.3d 405, 409- 410 (6 t h C i r. 2004), Ur itsky has made no such ar g ument. Acc ording ly , the B I A’s 4 denial of his motion to reopen a s untimely was not an a

buse of discr etion. BRe qu e sti ngtha t th e B I A e xer c ise its sua sponte authority is precise ly

the route one of our 5 sister circ uits rece ntly

sug g ested to a pe titioner who cl ai m ed a conviction was no long er va lid for im m i gra tion purposes but whose motion to reopen w ould be untimely

. See Toledo-Hernande z v. Mukase y , 521 F.3d 332 ( 5th Cir. 2008). I n that ca s e, t h e conviction under ly ing the petitioner’s r e m o v a l w a s v a c a t e d ( o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t h i s g u i l t y p l e a w a s n o t kn o w i n g a n d v o l u n t a r y) approximately

four months afte r t he ex piration of t he 90-day period for filing a motion to reope n. Id. at 334 & n.1. One week after his conviction was vacated, t he petiti oner f iled a petition in fede ral court; he did this rathe r than first raise the question of the continuing validity of his conviction bef

ore the B I A in a motion to reopen beca use he was mindful of the 90-da y deadline f

or such motions and knew “ it was impossibl e for him to file a motion to reopen within the requisite time fr ame.” Id. at 334. Howeve r, the F ifth Circuit dismi ssed the petition, reminding the petitioner that “notwithstanding the untimeliness of a motion to reopen, a petitioner may never

theless re quest that the B I A e xer c ise its sua sponte power to reope n a ca se whe re e x ceptional c ircumstance s are prese nt.” Id. at 333, 335. I ndeed, the court pointed o u t , “t h e BI A has shown a willingness to su a s

po nte reope n case s where there is evidence that an immigr ant’s convic tion was vac ated f or substantive or proce dural de fec ts.” Id. at 3 3 5 n . 2 (c o l l ec t i n g BI A d ec i s i o n s , i n cl u d i n g In re So ro k in ). 8 Ur its ky fu rt he r a rgue s th a t th e B I A abu sed its dis c re tio n b y de c lin ingto r e op e n h is imm ig ratio n p ro c e e din g s sua sponte under 8 C.F .R. § 1003.2(a), w hich provides that the B I A “may at any time reope n or re consider on its own motion any case in which it has rende red a decision.” Uritsky points to In re So ro k

in , 2007 WL 1520791 (B I A May 11, 2007), an unpublished per curiam order that g rante d an untimely motion to reopen su a s

po nte beca

use the responde nt’s g uilty plea a nd conviction, which we re the basis for r emovability , wer e vac ated and no longe r valid for immigration purposes, a

nd thus the responde nt demonstrat ed “ex ceptional c ircumstance s.” This decision, 5 Uritsky contends, amounts to a BI A policy from which it irrationally depar ted in his case. I n the instant case , the B I A found that Ur itsky “fa iled to present e x ceptional c ircumstance s

wa rr an t i n g sua sponte re o p e n in g .” Eve n assuming he had demonstrated such c ircumstance s, section 1003.2(a) mere ly “allows the BIA to r eopen proce eding s in e x ceptional situations; it does not require t h e BI A to do so.” Harche nko , 3 7 9 F

. 3 d a t 4 1 1

. We h a v e p r e v io u s ly h e ld th a t t h is c o u rt “ lacks jur isd ic tio n to fi nd that the B I A a bu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

fa ili ngto e xer c ise its dis c re tio na ry a uth or ity9

to r eopen [a pe titioner]’s proc eeding s. . . . The decision whe ther to invoke sua sponte a uth or ity is committed to the unfettere d discretion of the BIA . . . [and is] not subjec t to judicial review.” Id. at 41 0- 11 (c itatio ns and

qu otatio n ma

rk s o mit te d) ; s e e a l

s o Ba rry , 5 2 4 F.3d at 724 (observingthat

“ Sixth Cir c uit law is cle ar” that w e la c k ju ri sd ic tio n to re vie w a

de c isi on by the B I A n ot t o e xer c ise its sua sponte a

uth or ity “ ir

re sp e c tiv e of wh e the r t

hat de c isi on

wa s p ro pe r” ). Thus , w e mus t di smi ss the pe tit ion

fo r l a c k of jur isd ic tio n ins of ar a s it re qu e sts that th is c ourt re vie w t he B I A’ s f

a ilure to

e xer c ise its sua sponte authority

. Se e Ba rry , 524 F.3d at 726. III For the re asons stated a

bove, we DISMI SS t he petition for r eview insofa r as we lack jur isd ic tio n to re vie w the B I A’ s f a ilure to e xer c ise its sua sponte authority and otherwise DENY the petition.