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i 

25–047 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–15] 

THE EFFECT OF SEQUESTRATION 

AND CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS ON 

MARINE CORPS MODERNIZATION 

AND READINESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 10, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MATT GAETZ, Florida 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

TOM O’HALLERAN, Arizona 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(Vacancy) 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................................ 2 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces .................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Thomas, LtGen Gary L., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and 

Resources, U.S. Marine Corps ............................................................................. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Thomas, LtGen Gary L. ................................................................................... 29 

Turner, Hon. Michael R. .................................................................................. 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Carbajal ...................................................................................................... 46 

Ms. Rosen .......................................................................................................... 44 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 44 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 41 

(1) 

THE EFFECT OF SEQUESTRATION AND CONTINUING 

RESOLUTIONS ON MARINE CORPS MODERNIZATION 

AND READINESS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Friday, March 10, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Good morning. This hearing will come to order. 

The subcommittee meets today to continue informing our members and the public about the ongoing readiness crisis that all of 

our military services find themselves in. Readiness includes many 

things, such as end strength, training, and modernization. 

Today, we will focus on how sequestration and years of continuing resolutions [CRs] in our budgetary process have impacted the 

Marine Corps’ ability to modernize the current force to be ready 

and capable against current and emerging threats. We will have a 

similar hearing planned with the Army next week. 

I would like to welcome our witness, Lieutenant General Gary L. 

Thomas, the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources, 

United States Marine Corps. 

General Thomas, we thank you for your service, and we look forward to receiving your important testimony today. 

Today’s hearing will allow us for a much deeper review of the 

modernization and readiness challenges identified by the Assistant 

Commandant of the Marine Corps [ACMC] during last month’s full 

committee hearing on the state of the military. Based on his testimony, we know that the Marine Corps is not only out of balance, 

but also lacks the necessary resources needed to rebalance itself. 

This is a dangerous trend that we must reverse for the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. 

As such, General Thomas has been asked to address and identify: one, the near- and long-term impacts that continuing resolutions and sequestrations are having on the Marine Corps’ ability to 

modernize and ready its forces; two, the specific impacts to ground 

system and rotorcraft modernization programs; three, the processes 

the Marine Corps is utilizing to prioritize modernization requirements in order to address immediate and near-term capability gaps 

in a budget-constrained environment; four, where the Marine Corps 
2 

should be focusing its modernization strategies across the Future 

Years Defense Programs in order to address anticipated security 

environments; five, the potential resources that would be required 

to support these strategies. 

To be clear about these resources, the top line is the issue. I support the President’s commitment to rebuild the military, as well as 

his early directive to Secretary Mattis that, quote, ‘‘to pursue peace 

through strength, it shall be the policy of the United States to rebuild the United States Armed Forces,’’ close quote. 

However, early reports indicate that the administration’s plan is 

to offer a budget of $603 billion as a base for defense in fiscal year 

2018. I agree with Chairman Thornberry that a 3 percent increase 

above President Obama’s budget request from last year is not 

enough. While we cannot repair all of the damage done as a result 

of sequestration in a single year, we can and should do more than 

this level of funding will provide. 

For national security reasons, we cannot afford to wait until 2019 

to begin the process to rebuild our military. I look forward to working with the administration in order to increase the fiscal year 

2018 budget to get as close as possible to the $640 billion number 

referenced in Chairman Thornberry’s views and estimates letter 

that was sent to the Budget Committee. 

Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and colleague from Massachusetts, Niki Tsongas, for any comments that 

she might want to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. 

And welcome, General Thomas. Thank you for making the time 

to be with us today. We appreciate it. 

Before we begin, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention the ongoing investigation into the unauthorized sharing of photographs by 

marines and former marines. Let me be clear: These actions are 

reprehensible, harmful to our military and our national security, 

and detrimental to not just service women, but to all service members and to the culture of our Armed Forces. 

We must strongly support those who had their rights and privacy 

violated and make sure they have all the resources they need. But 

we must also fully investigate these acts and bring to justice those 

who violated the law and the rights of other service members. 

I appreciate the fact that the Military Personnel Subcommittee 

will be receiving briefings from the Marine Corps next week, and 

I look forward to hearing what the service is doing to make sure 

that those responsible are held accountable. 

Today’s hearing on Marine Corps modernization provides this 

subcommittee with an opportunity to hear testimony on the effects 

of continuing resolutions and sequestration, an important topic, 

and also gives us a chance to review several major programs and 

consider how best to equip the Marine Corps of the future. 
3 

While I look forward to getting into the details on a few major 

programs, I would also like to discuss what seems like an imbalance in the Marine Corps budget and, in particular, its procurement accounts. Specifically, for many years, the Marine Corps has 

requested and received vastly more funding for procuring aircraft 

as compared to ground equipment. While the Marine Corps certainly has a need for aircraft of many types, the ratio of spending 

on aircraft compared to ground equipment is striking. 

The fiscal year 2017 budget request was no exception to this 

trend. In it, the Marine Corps requested approximately $1.5 billion 

for procurement of ground equipment and ammunition. However, 

in the same President’s budget [PB], it requested $5.3 billion for 

just five aircraft programs: the F–35B Joint Strike Fighter, the 

CH–53K King Stallion helicopter, the V–22 Osprey, the AH–1 attack helicopter, and the KC–130 refueler. 

While the individual aircraft programs in question are likely very 

important when taken individually, the scale of the imbalance, 

more than 3-to-1 in just this fiscal year, suggests that upgrading 

aircraft is currently valued higher than upgrading ground equipment. I have some concerns about this ratio of spending on aircraft 

versus ground equipment, given the Marine Corps’ mission to be 

the premier force in readiness, and the historical reliance that the 

Nation has placed on the Marine Corps’ role in ground combat. 

I look forward to hearing more about how the Marine Corps is 

making tradeoffs in its modernization efforts and what risks are 

associated with those choices. 

And, with that, I yield back. And I look forward to hearing from 

you, General. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Ms. Tsongas. 

While not the subject matter of this hearing, I share Ms. Tsongas’ concern of the allegations of improper behavior from marines. 

A part of the great working relationship that Ms. Tsongas and 

I have is the history of being the co-chairs of the Sexual Assault 

Prevention Caucus for over the last 5 years. We have been the 

major authors of every piece of legislation that has been in the National Defense Authorization Act concerning this issue. 

It is one that is of grave concern to us, because no one—no one— 

should feel as if they are in a compromising position in serving 

their Nation. And we want to ensure that not just those who have 

been subject to sexual assault, but those who fear of the consequences and of the potential are protected. 

We are beginning our work and our investigation today after this 

hearing in a series of meetings that we have requested with the 

Marines on a briefing on this matter. And I am certain that our 

Sexual Assault Prevention Caucus will be very active in looking not 

only, as Ms. Tsongas had said, for issues of justice and accountability, but also ways in which we can impact future actions and 

prevention. 

With that, General, I turn to you on our subject matter. 
4 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN GARY L. THOMAS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES, U.S. MARINE 

CORPS 

General THOMAS. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Tsongas, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today. I am honored 

to represent your Marines and testify on the effect of sequestration 

and continuing resolutions on Marine Corps modernization and 

readiness. 

Our role as America’s naval expeditionary force in readiness informs how we man, train, and equip our force. It also drives how 

we prioritize and allocate the resources that we are provided by 

Congress. 

As we have experienced budget cuts and fiscal uncertainty over 

the past several years, we have prioritized the readiness of our forward-deployed forces. But in order to maintain this readiness, we 

have assumed risk in our nondeployed forces, infrastructure sustainment, and, most critically, modernization. 

Over time, this has resulted in maintaining older or obsolete 

equipment at higher cost and more operational risk. As we continue to spend limited resources to sustain legacy systems developed for threats of the past, we risked steadily losing our competitive advantage against potential adversaries. 

The future operating environment is characterized by complex 

terrain, technology proliferation, information warfare, the need to 

shield and exploit signatures, and an increasingly nonpermissive 

maritime domain. The threats of the 21st century demand a modernized force with new capabilities that complement our traditional 

warfighting skills and equipment. 

The Marine Corps has learned to live with less and to manage 

the instability brought about by continuing resolutions and sequestration. We will always strive to be good stewards of what we are 

given and will generate the maximum readiness possible with the 

resources provided. But to be prepared for crisis response and contingency now and in the future, we must invest to restore readiness 

and achieve the right balance of capability and capacity. 

The Marine Corps is short of the resources required to effectively 

modernize, and we do not have the budget predictability that would 

allow us to optimize the resources entrusted to us by Congress. The 

uncertainty of the current fiscal year and looming threat of BCA 

[Budget Control Act] caps continue to disrupt our planning and directly challenge our current and future readiness. With your help, 

we can begin to overcome these challenges and ensure that the Marine Corps is postured for the 21st century. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Thomas can be found in the 

Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. TURNER. General Thomas, I understand that the Marine 

Corps has conducted a bottom-up review entitled ‘‘Marine Corps 

Force 2025.’’ It has identified several capability and capacity gaps 

which need to be addressed. Would you please elaborate on some 

of those findings? And, specifically, what levels of additional funding would be required to begin addressing these gaps? 
5 

And I want to emphasize the word ‘‘required.’’ We can’t wish our 

way into filling those gaps. And it is obviously an issue of resources 

and not just the Marine Corps deciding to undertake addressing 

them. 

General Thomas. 

General THOMAS. Thank you, Congressman. 

I would just begin by saying, you know, that we feel that we are 

not optimized in our organization, training, and equipment for the 

new operational environment—— 

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry, General. Could you move closer to the 

microphone? Because it is not registering you very well. 

General THOMAS. I am sorry. 

The first thing I would say is that we feel that we are not optimally organized, trained, or equipped to meet the emerging operational environment. 

One of the things that has occurred over the past 15 years is the 

change in threat capabilities. And while we have overmatch in 

most areas, we are seeing in some cases that our potential adversaries are developing capabilities that rival and in a few cases exceed our own. 

The capability gaps that we have seen are largely in terms of 

force protection first. If you look at some of our current vehicles, 

they no longer are adequate for the types of threats that they face 

in terms of protecting our marines. Programs like the Joint Light 

Tactical Vehicle begins to get at that threat, and new technologies 

like active protection systems will assist us in going up against 

counter-armor capability. 

The other challenge that we face in terms of capability gaps is 

an emerging UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] threat, and we 

have to be able to counter that capability. One of the ways that we 

have to counter that is be able to find it, to ID [identify] it. Again, 

we have a program in place with the G/ATOR [Ground/Air Task 

Oriented Radar] radar that performs an important piece of that kill 

chain function. 

In terms of maneuver, our current amphibious vehicle is 40 years 

old. With the Amphibious Combat Vehicle [ACV], that addresses 

that need. 

And then, in terms of capacity, we have several shortages in 

terms of munitions and then just numbers of ready aircraft on the 

flight line. Many of our aircraft have met or even exceeded their 

planned service life, and so, as a result, many of those aircraft, 

much more than we would like, are in depot maintenance, and that 

means less on the flight line. Again, we have programs in place, 

in the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] and CH–53K in particular, to address those challenges. 

In terms of additional resources that we need, we need additional 

funds above the PB 2017 request. The ACMC, in his testimony, 

talked about $4 billion, top line. But regardless of the top line, 

what we are seeking to do is to modernize, and then whatever is 

required to modernize, we would address other areas appropriately. 

Mr. TURNER. General, I have stood in front of a bunch of F–18s 

that were disassembled. Would you please speak as to how your 

readiness in aircraft affects training and, therefore, affects readiness in pilots? And also talk about the need for growth in the Ma-
6 

rine Corps and how that is accomplished and measured as we look 

to increasing the size of the force. 

General THOMAS. Congressman, with the help of Congress over 

the past few years, we have actually seen an uptick in readiness. 

But, overall, the readiness of our aviation forces as well as the 

number of pilot hours per month is still much lower than we would 

like. 

The readiness that we desire for aviation is about 75 percent of 

our fleet. Nominally, across the entire fleet, we are down around 

45 percent. And then the average flight hours per pilot per month 

is, you know, about 10 hours or less. That has—— 

Mr. TURNER. Sorry. Could we go back for a second? You just said 

you want to be at 75. You are at 40-what? 

General THOMAS. Forty-five percent. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. But you began by saying we have been improving. So, I mean, that is pretty abysmal. To have that be closing 

the gap, we must have been in dire straits. 

General THOMAS. So, Congressman, I just wanted to acknowledge 

that, you know, we have received some assistance over the past few 

years from the Congress, and that has helped some, but you are 

right, the gap is still very wide. 

I think a lot of it just has to do with, you know, old metal. You 

were talking about F–18s. That is the community that I come from. 

A year ago, I was back in Beaufort walking the flight line, similar 

to what you did. And I noticed an airplane, a bureau number that 

I recognized that I had flown as a first lieutenant—— 

Mr. TURNER. Just one question. Still, I am struggling with this. 

At 75, is that a reduced goal? I mean, because that is still one in 

four, right? 

General THOMAS. No. Seventy-five percent readiness is a reasonable readiness of, you know, aircraft across a fly line. You are always going to have, you know, routine maintenance that you are 

going to take airplanes off the fly line. So if you have a 75 percent 

readiness rate, you can perform all of your missions. Obviously, we 

are well below that. 

Mr. TURNER. Yeah, we are currently below half. 

General THOMAS. Correct. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I would like to circle back to the question I posed in my 

opening statement, and that is just how you are thinking through 

the priority that the Corps has placed on aviation assets in comparison to ground capabilities and just get your take on what risks 

you see for the Marine Corps, given that 3-to-1 ratio. 

Do you believe these risks are manageable? And do you see in 

the future the Marine Corps shifting the other way to focus more 

modernization dollars on ground capabilities in the future? Do you 

have a plan, you know, whatever, looking out, so that you are covering all the necessary bases in order to meet the challenges you 

have to confront? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, I would characterize how we 

have allocated our modernization portfolio is balanced. We are not 

balanced across the Marine Corps because we haven’t been able to 
7 

put as much into modernization as we like because we have been 

applying our resources writ large to near-term readiness. But in 

terms of the resources that we have been able to apply towards 

modernization, we do feel like we are balanced. 

We have several needs, both on the aviation side and on the 

ground side. It is true that we have, you know, a 3-to-1 ratio in 

terms of aviation versus ground, but a lot of that is just the nature 

of aviation platforms and the relative expense to ground equipment. 

But if I could paint a picture, I would just say, on the aviation 

side, you know, our CH–53Es are over 30 years old; our F–18s are 

over 30 years old. On the ground side, you know, our Amphibious 

Assault Vehicle, 40 years old; our LAVs [Light Armored Vehicles], 

over 30 years old. 

So we have programs in place to address all of those. We haven’t 

been able to, you know, modernize as quickly as we could to get 

out of the old metal. But in terms of balance, we feel that we have 

got it about right. 

When we spoke, you know, the other day—you know, we are a 

light, general-purpose force. One of the things that gives the Marine Corps an advantage on the battlefield is its mobility and its 

fires. Much of that comes from aviation. The ground side in terms 

of fires, mobility, those are equally as important. But if we were 

just to look, relatively, how we are investing across aviation and 

ground, not looking at the cost, although there are significant differences there, but in terms of capability and capacity, we think we 

are balanced in that area. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, do you foresee a time in which that balance 

will have to shift a bit? 

And, actually, in that context, I would just like to ask a question 

about the CH–53K helicopter program related to cost. 

So the original unit cost for this program in current-year dollars was about $95 million. Last year’s Selected Acquisition Report for 

this program showed that its average unit cost had increased 14 

percent above the baseline estimate to $116 million. This week, the 

Marine Corps provided information to the committee indicating 

that it is now projected to be 22 percent above the baseline estimate, which would be about $122 million a copy. 

The Marine Corps intends to buy 200 of these aircraft. So that 

cost growth multiplied by 200 is a heck of a lot of money. And even 

if there is no additional cost growth, it seems worth pointing out 

that $122 million per aircraft in 2006 dollars exceeds the current 

cost of an F–35A aircraft for the Air Force by a significant margin. 

So, while I know this helicopter will provide the Marine Corps 

a very unique and useful capability, I would like to ask you two 

things. First, can the Marine Corps really afford 200 of such an expensive helicopter? And, second, in comparison to how little the 

Marine Corps is spending on upgrading ground combat equipment, 

does the scale of this investment in niche aircraft capability make 

sense for the Marine Corps? 

And, again, it gets back to that 3-to-1 ratio. And, again, you 

know, given this helicopter, this aircraft, just the extreme cost of 

one unit, at some point it seems to me there might be an imbalance. 
8 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, we are always paying very 

close attention to the cost. You mentioned the $122 million price 

point. We anticipate that the unit recurring flyaway when the aircraft begins full rate production will shrink below $89 million. That 

is still very expensive, and we are working very hard with the program office and the vendor to keep the cost down and to drive 

value for the taxpayer. 

In terms of, you know, can we afford it, we do have a plan within 

our top line that would account for the purchases of the new aircraft that we desire. 

In terms of getting back to your question about the balance, we 

intend to address all of the concerns on the ground side that I am 

sure we are going to discuss here in just a moment. We have good 

programs in place, we believe, that meet the capability requirements at reasonable cost to the taxpayer. But we have found, both 

on the ground side and the aviation side, is we simply don’t have 

the resources to do, you know, either one at the rate that we desire. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, I think it is worth bearing in mind that this 

is a very costly aircraft, that you have large numbers in mind. And 

while, yes, the impacts of sequestration have been great, continuing resolutions great—and we will debate how many much 

more investment we need to make in defending our country—as a 

country, we also have many other needs. And we have to bear that 

in mind as each service makes its commitments. 

So I thank you for your testimony, and I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

In looking at the members who are currently in attendance and 

the fact that we have votes at about 10:30, we have just enough 

time for everyone to get a question in, as long as everybody complies with the 5 minutes. So I am going to ask people to be diligent 

in that. 

And we will start first with Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you and all the members of the Corps for their 

service. 

You started to tell us you were walking a flight line and you 

spotted the plane that you flew or a model that you flew? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, you know, as aviators, when you 

are in a squadron, you become familiar with the bureau numbers 

of the airplanes that you have flown. So it was just a bureau number that I recognized and had flown over many years early in my 

career, and it was still in active service. So, again, a good capability 

for the Nation; it is just that the fact is the bones are old on some 

of these machines. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. So what plane was that? 

General THOMAS. It was an F–18. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. And how old was it? 

General THOMAS. It was 30-plus years old. I am not sure exactly 

the age. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. 

Can you tell us what the current state of readiness is for the Marine Corps rotorcraft? 
9 

General THOMAS. Congressman, as I mentioned, we have seen 

some improvement over the past few years with some help from 

Congress, but our readiness is still below where we would like it 

to be. 

Our number-one degrader, if you will, has been supply—essentially, parts and the funding for that. We still take aggressive steps 

to help recover that readiness. We have conducted what we are 

calling independent readiness reviews for all of the rotorcraft that 

we have. And we are also taking steps to making sure that we are 

doing everything we can to lower lifecycle costs. 

An example of that would be what we are doing with the MV– 

22. We have several different configurations of the airplane, just as 

over time they roll off the line. They have different parts. And we 

are seeking to drive that down to a common configuration, which 

will drive down lifecycle costs over the long term. 

But in terms of certain airplanes, with Congressman Tsongas we 

have already talked about the CH–53. Again, those airplanes are 

greater than 30 years old, and we have flown them pretty hard 

over the past 15 years in Afghanistan. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. General, what would you say would be the top 

two or three unfunded readiness priorities that you have? 

General THOMAS. Our top three priorities, I would say, on the 

ground side would be our Amphibious Combat Vehicle, it would be 

the G/ATOR radar, and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Are we likely to make any progress with that 

with what we are looking at here in the near future? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, we are making progress. Again, 

we have programs in place—vehicles like the Joint Light Tactical 

Vehicle, we have requested a number in 2017, and that number 

will ramp up as we go out. 

The challenge that we face is not having programs in place that 

provide the capabilities that we need. The challenge that we have 

is we simply don’t have enough resources to buy them at the rates 

that we desire. So the transition to new equipment is very slow. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Very slow. Okay. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Rosen. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ranking Member Tsongas. 

And I really appreciate your being here today and explaining all 

this to us. 

What I would really like to ask on another question is this. The 

Trump administration has suggested that we go from 24 infantry 

battalions to 36. What are the challenges to create over a dozen— 

potentially a dozen new battalions? And how do you see that fitting 

in with what you are going to ask for? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, I would characterize that 

question this way—or the answer to that question is, as the Commandant says, we do need to grow, because we need additional capabilities primarily in areas such as cyber, EW [electronic warfare], 

and additional intel [intelligence] capacity. Those are the capabilities that we would grow as a part of growing to, for example, the 

185,000 that was approved through the NDAA [National Defense 

Authorization Act]. 
10 

We also have capacity challenges. Our deployment-to-dwell ratio 

still remains very high. Prior to 9/11, I would say for every deployment you had three times that period, you know, at home. Our average, you know, dep-to-dwell is, you know, around 1 to 2.2 to 2.3. 

So growth would provide capacity as well. 

But, to your question, you have to balance any growth with the 

equipment that you need for those new people, the training and infrastructure that is required to get those marines ready for their 

particular mission, and then, of course, modernization. 

So the plan to grow in this year to 185K will give us additional 

capability, primarily in those areas—cyber, EW, and intel—that I 

mentioned, as well as some relief on capacity. However, we will not 

grow any more—or we will only grow relative to the additional resources that are provided. 

One of the things that we are trying to do, getting back to Congresswoman Tsongas’ question, is we are trying to protect our modernization accounts. Over the past, you know, several years, with 

the BCA and sequestration, our investment in modernization has 

been as low as 7 percent. In our request for 2018, we are going to 

raise it to 10 percent, and our goal is to get to 15 percent of our 

portfolio in modernization. 

All of those things impact our ability to grow. So we will stay in 

balance, and then we will only grow as additional resources become 

available. 

Ms. ROSEN. I have one more quick question. And you talked 

about drones, the unmanned aerial flying. How does that reduce 

the number of manned flights? And how do you work—I know it 

is not a short answer, but doesn’t it reduce the number of manned 

flights, therefore reducing the amount of stress on the aircraft? 

General THOMAS. It can. But, you know, whether you have an 

unmanned, a UAS, or a manned aircraft, you are still putting, you 

know, hours on that particular—so if it is a new unmanned system, 

it is going to do fine. If it is an old unmanned system, you are 

going to have some of the same challenges. 

But, to your question, you know, we are always looking for the 

right capabilities, and if that right capability is in an unmanned 

system, then we are going to pursue that. 

Ms. ROSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General, it is good to see you again. Thanks for answering a lot 

of my questions that I brought up about reactive armor. 

Part of the problem, at least from my perspective, is the tempo 

of ops [operations]. And this has been around as long as I can remember in the Marine Corps, when I was in there, and that op 

plan—umpty ump, umpty ump, umpty ump, umpty ump. It keeps 

going on and on and on. 

You can only so do so much. And I always thought, when I was 

a captain many years ago, that we were overly committed, because 

we are going to do NEO [noncombatant evacuation operation] ops, 

we are going to do this, this, and this. And Congress is going to 

ask you and all the armed services to continue to do that, because 

you do it well. But do we have to be more realistic in terms of the 
11 

impact of the sequester and the fact that a lot of this equipment 

is aging and we have to fix that stuff? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, you know, you brought up an 

important point. In any equation, you know, we talk about resources, but the other side of the equation is demand signal. And 

the higher that demand signal is, you know, the greater—you are 

going to use up your resources at a greater rate. 

So that is clearly something that, you know, the Nation has to 

consider. Where we, the Marine Corps, bases its requirements on 

is based on what we have been asked to do and the missions that 

we have been given by senior leadership. 

Mr. COOK. Well, you know, many years ago, in 1966, I was at 

Francis Marion. And we had an exercise where we actually went 

over the side in the nets. Now, I know I am old, but this was a 

ship that, basically, it was 11 years since World War II. But now 

we are talking about aircraft and items that are around 30, 40 

years. It is just almost incomprehensible, with the changes. 

Anyway, readiness indicators. I think at least in my short time 

on this committee, I think there has been more attention to readiness indicators. I think congressional Members are going to be asking more and more about why is it unit C–4 or C–3; how come 

more units aren’t C–1 and C–2? 

And I think that pressure is going to continue, unless I am 

wrong, because I say to myself, just like the previous question, 

where the money should go. How are we going to bring these units 

up to speed? Is it just money or—I think you answered the question already—is it the supply block, maintenance, everything else 

which had been overlooked? 

And I know we had talked about this a little bit. How are we 

going to correct that maintenance—General Dunford had talked 

about this earlier. How are we going to fix—do we just have to say 

‘‘time out’’? We have to have our maintenance game in play, or we 

are never going to get there? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, you alluded to it, but, I mean, 

there are several factors that come into bear. A lot of it is resources. Some of it is time. That is, you know, you use your equipment and your people up—you know, there is a period of time that 

is required to get the equipment and the people back up into fighting standard. 

And then the third aspect of it is just—it is recapitalization. That 

is, we can apply resources to many of our old pieces of equipment. 

And in many cases, we can continue to use them for many years 

to come, but in some cases, there is a diminishing return. That is, 

you are spending resources to keep old equipment going, but you 

are getting less and less return on investment. 

Mr. COOK. Yeah. 

Is the IG [inspector general] specifically looking at units that are 

C–4 or C–3 on how to best solve that problem, with a report to the 

Commandant? 

General THOMAS. I think there are a number of looks within the 

naval aviation enterprise, the DOD IG. Many people are looking at 

the areas that you describe in an attempt to provide more clarity 

to the discussion and what would be required to address those. 
12 

We feel like we have a good understanding of what is required 

to address it, and you have alluded to some of those. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. Thank you for being here. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Carbajal. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member 

Tsongas. 

Thank you, Lieutenant General Thomas, for being here. It is always a good day when marines are in the room, being a marine 

myself. 

You know, I also share what Ranking Member Tsongas shared, 

her concerns about the denigration, the allegations that we heard 

of the circulation of photographs regarding women marines. It is 

very concerning. And I do hope that there is an expeditious adjudication of the perpetrators and that they are brought to justice as 

soon as possible. 

To that end, General Thomas—Lieutenant General Thomas—it is 

my understanding the Marine Corps has been working on developing body armor that provide better fit and coverage for female marines. There were some concerns that the Marine Corps was just 

developing more sizes rather than developing female-specific body 

armor. 

Can you update this subcommittee on what approach the Marine 

Corps is taking and where we are in terms of getting these body 

armors to our female marines? 

General THOMAS. Thank you, Congressman. 

The Marine Corps is committed to providing high-quality force 

protection for all of its service members in terms of form, fit, and 

function and regardless of gender. 

One of the policy changes that have been made in terms of—previously made in terms of how we, you know, build our force protection equipment, we used to have sizes that would only be from the 

5 percentile to the 95 percentile of marines writ large. The new policy is down to the 2 percentile female on one end of the spectrum, 

all the way up to the 98 percentile male. And the reason I highlight 

the male in this case is because we have actually had, you know, 

males who were very, very large and they didn’t have adequate 

protection as well. 

We think that we have two pieces of gear, primarily. We have 

the plate carrier and the IMTV [Improved Modular Tactical Vest]. 

The plate carrier, we think, is in a good position for females and 

males. It is 2 pounds lighter. And we believe that we have the right 

sizes for females as well as some of the larger males. 

The IMTV is an area that we have also added additional sizes. 

One of the things that we found was that they were too long, in 

some cases, in the small, medium, and large sizes. So we have 

added, you know, a small short, a medium short, and a large short, 

much like we do with our camouflage utilities. 

And, if I could, you know, one of the things that Congresswoman 

Tsongas and I discussed the other day, she had a question about, 

you know, fit, specifically for females, and one of the things I did 

learn is that the Army, you know, has—in their particular sets, 

they have included some features that will help fit a female. We 

continue to look at those, and we are closely aligned with the 
13 

Army, but we don’t have those specific features incorporated into 

our equipment yet. 

Mr. CARBAJAL. Well, Lieutenant General Thomas, I would say we 

should be, at the very least, at the same standards that the Army 

has for adapting our armor for women. And I don’t think it bodes 

well for us to not be at least on par in appreciating our female marines as the Army seems to be appreciating their women soldiers. 

So I just want to encourage us to get going, because it just 

doesn’t bode well. Especially when you consider incidents that we 

are dealing with, the allegations that we are dealing with, it just 

doesn’t bode well for the type of institution we want to portray to 

our country and women marines and females in general. 

So thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

And thank you, Lieutenant General Thomas. And just for shortness, I am just going to say ‘‘General Thomas.’’ I understand you 

are a lieutenant general. 

One of the things that Ms. Tsongas talked about was the cost of 

the aircraft versus the ground stuff. Is some of that just not the 

cost and procurement and research for a F–35 versus a Joint Light 

Tactical Vehicle? 

I mean, the costs associated with those things on the ground are 

just much cheaper whether you buy them on bulk. The cost of an 

asset on the ground is generally cheaper than that in the air. Is 

that correct or incorrect? 

General THOMAS. That is correct. I mean, you know, buying a car 

as opposed to a 737, I mean, there is that difference that you are 

going to have. So anything that flies nominally is going to be more 

expensive. 

But, you know, the question is a good one. That is, you know, are 

we balanced across, you know, the very important needs on the 

ground side as well as the aviation side. 

Mr. KELLY. And I think we need to be very conscious to make 

sure we keep those costs low, but it is just going to cost more. 

And then, once you have and procure that equipment, it costs 

more to maintain an F–18 or an F–35 than it does those ground 

vehicles also. Would that be correct? 

General THOMAS. That is correct. 

Mr. KELLY. Now, going back, on the parts thing. And I have 

served in the Army, so I understand parts stockage and a lot of 

those things. Is our shortage of parts to keep our current fleets, 

whether it be aircraft or ground vehicles, is it a shortage of supply 

and not being able to get the parts? Is it a shortage of dollars? 

And how much do things like having OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] funding, as opposed to top-line funding, affect 

your getting the correct stockage of parts to fix it when it breaks, 

as opposed to having to have it on order for 90 days? 

General THOMAS. I think, to your last question, you know, we are 

very appreciative for OCO, and it helps us in many ways. As you 

may well be aware, there are sometimes limitations depending on 

the type of money that you get in terms of how you can actually 

spend it. And then there is also the issue of lead time for, you 

know, parts. 
14 

But I would just say, broadly speaking, we know what our parts 

requirement is, and we know what the resources required to get 

those parts. We just haven’t been able to afford the quantity that 

we have needed. 

Mr. KELLY. So it is a dollars, not a production, it is a dollars— 

in order to get the right stockage and to maintain that to fix the 

vehicles when they—— 

General THOMAS. By and large, that is correct. 

Mr. KELLY. Okay. 

And, I guess, during this period of reduced funding but not reduced missions or OPTEMPO [operations tempo], what types of 

investments has the Marine Corps sacrificed to sustain the deployable readiness level of operational forces? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, we have, you know, sacrificed 

several areas in terms of modernization. You know, our end 

strength was kept down. 

One area where we have particularly felt—and I expect the other 

services have, as well—is in terms of home station readiness. That 

is important, because your home station readiness is your ready 

bench that is going to respond to crisis as well as major contingency. And the effect of having lesser home station readiness is that, 

when they do need to go forward, there is going to be a delay, because they are not going to either have the equipment or they are 

not going to have the readiness that they need. 

We have also seen sacrifices in terms of infrastructure sustainment, some quality of life. But as we, you know, have discussed already, I would say that the biggest sacrifices have been in terms 

of modernization, whether it is our long-range precision fires capabilities, some of the things we are trying to do to counter UAS. 

And then there is the aspect of maintaining older equipment at 

a higher cost with a lesser return on investment. So there is that 

aspect of it. You know, we didn’t get that way overnight. We are 

not going to get out of it overnight. 

And, again, I would just emphasize what has changed, also, in 

addition to the resource environment, is the threat environment 

has changed. And that is just something that we are going to have 

to deal with going forward. 

Mr. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

The order of the list is Bacon, Banks, Wittman, McSally. 

Going to Mr. Bacon. 

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Chairman Turner. 

I really appreciate General Thomas being here today. I have to 

say for the record we have known each other since 2003, classmates. And I happen to know him as a humble leader with great 

character and morals, treats people great. 

So it is an honor to see you here today. 

I wanted to ask you a little more about the readiness levels and 

the spending cuts that we have had, you know, in recent years. 

And you have already mentioned the top priorities, so I will move 

to my next one. What would you like to do with electronic warfare 

if you were properly resourced? What areas would you want to expand in? 
15 

General THOMAS. I think, you know, we have—Congressman, 

first of all, it is good to see you again, sir. 

And in terms of electronic warfare, we have a pretty good understanding and a plan for where we need to get on the aviation side, 

you know, as part of the joint force and how we fit into that and 

working with our joint partners. 

Where we are seeing areas of growth is on the ground side. And 

we are also seeing the nexus of cyber and EW. And it is about providing the equipment that allows to you do that, but also now the 

organization that gives you that capability as well. As part of the 

185K growth, the Commandant is growing what he calls a MEF 

[Marine expeditionary force] information group, and it will incorporate all the critical aspects of information warfare, to include additional intel capacity, cyber capacity, and, yes, the EW capability. 

We do have, you know, some very good EW capability on the 

ground side in terms of protection, you know, against IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and so forth. But our perspective is now 

broadening in terms of additional capabilities that we would need 

when you are going force-on-force and being able to counter some 

of the EW capabilities that our adversaries are developing as well. 

Mr. BACON. So if I understand right, with a little more resourcing, you are going to put a focus on cyber, intelligence, EW. 

And one other question for you. I was going to ask you a little 

more about ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], but 

I think you just did that, to a degree. With our readiness levels 

being where they are at, what I found with all the services, and 

I believe the Marines too, we are focused on responding to Syria, 

Iraq, the Middle East right now. And that is what our focus area 

is for the folks back home getting ready to deploy, focused on that 

direction. 

How able are we to respond if we have a second trouble spot 

blow up in the world, say, like North Korea? With your readiness 

levels today, how are we positioned and what would be the roadblocks you are going to have to cross to get a force there quickly? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, I will keep my comments, you 

know, more general in nature, but to paint a picture—and you correctly described. You know, the units that we are sending out the 

door today are trained to a high level, they are equipped, they have 

got what they need. But we are seeing, as you point out, a slow 

degradation of that ready bench. And that has been going on for 

several years now. 

The way that manifests itself, if you are talking a major contingency operation, plans call for certain units at certain times within 

so many days of a conflict beginning, and what we are seeing is delays at which those particular units can meet those. And, in some 

cases, those delays are significant. 

Mr. BACON. Well, thank you. When our readiness levels are 

down, it undermines deterrence and it makes this world a more 

risky place. 

So, with that, I yield back, and I thank you for your testimony 

today. 

General THOMAS. Good to see you, Congressman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Banks. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
16 

General, thank you for being here today. Thanks for your service. 

You have made a compelling case overall today about the impact 

of the chaotic congressional appropriation process through funding 

the military through CRs, sequestration, the BCA. And while, statistically, that testimony is very compelling, I often find, as a new 

Member of Congress, as a freshman on this committee, that the 

anecdotal evidence is often even more compelling. 

When I read about marines raiding museums for parts for aircraft, or when I read stories about units from the chairman’s home 

State of Ohio having to cancel training exercises in my home State 

of Indiana at Camp Atterbury because of government shutdowns 

and CRs and the congressional process, those anecdotal stories are 

often most compelling when I make the case to constituents at 

home about what is wrong with the processes here on Capitol Hill. 

And I wonder if you can—first of all, can you confirm those anecdotal examples? And give us more examples of the second- or thirdorder effects of what does it mean when we have to cancel a training exercise, what does it mean to morale when we have to raid 

museums for parts for aircraft, for example. 

General THOMAS. Congressman, I would just say—and, generally, 

I mean, you know, the stories that you hear across the joint force 

as anecdotes, and, you know, to the extent that there are limits on 

anecdotes, but they are generally—they are accurate. What I have 

found is, you know, marines, they want to be marines, they want 

to be good at what they do, and they want to be trained to a high 

level. Part of that is making sure they have the resources for, you 

know, equipment, but training and other things that you have articulated. 

If I would characterize from a, you know, higher level just some 

of the additional challenges that we face with, kind of, the budget 

uncertainty, you know, it really makes it difficult for us to plan. 

We don’t have predictability, and we feel like we are not optimizing 

the dollars that the Congress has generously allocated to us. 

It also slows our acquisition programs. In many cases, we have 

got the right program, but we are purchasing things at the minimum sustained rate. And what that means is that certainly has 

an impact on our industry partners, but we pay a premium for 

that. We are not achieving economic order quantities. 

And then there are all sorts of authorities aspects that—authorities that we can’t use, depending on the vagaries of budget challenges. For example, with the continuing resolution, you know, we 

can’t do any new starts. That affects our research and development. It affects buying more quantities of a certain capability, even 

if we have the money to do that. 

And then, you know, as you have said, all of these things together, the uncertainty forces us to focus on the 5-meter target and 

focusing on that near-term readiness, but, meanwhile, our ready 

bench is being eroded. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you. 

On a final note, can you comment, maybe briefly, about the impact of these processes on the Reserve Component of the Marines, 

the undue stress applied to your reservists? 

General THOMAS. I think, you know, at our level, it is all about 

managing risk, and we have to manage risk across the entire force. 
17 

That has an impact on the Reserves, as well, in terms of equipment 

and training and so forth. 

You know, one of the things that we have, you know, struggled 

with is we would actually like to engage our Reserves more and 

send them on deployments. We just haven’t been able to afford the 

additional O&M [operations and maintenance] required. You do 

pay a little bit of a premium to, you know, call up the Reserves or 

to activate them and send them on deployment, but we haven’t 

been able to use that to provide some dep [deployment] tempo relief 

to our Active Duty forces. 

Mr. BANKS. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Lieutenant General Thomas, thank you so much for joining us. 

We appreciate your leadership. And I am very proud to have Marine Corps Base Quantico in America’s First District. We have a lot 

of great marines there, a lot of great things that go on there. So 

I appreciate that. 

I wanted to talk to you about the AAV [Amphibious Assault Vehicle] and subsequently the ACV. I had an opportunity a couple 

weeks ago to visit Textron just outside of New Orleans, who, as you 

know, is producing the new Ship-to-Shore Connector, which is the 

replacement for Landing Craft Air Cushion, better known as our 

LCACs. And we all understand how important for the Marine 

Corps our connectors are. 

You stated, though, that the AAV, which is a 40-year-old platform, needs to be replaced immediately. And we know the process 

we have gone through to get to the development of the Amphibious 

Combat Vehicle. Can you tell me, in that context, where we are 

with modernizing those connectors? 

Tell me, where are we with the ACV? How important is it for the 

Marine Corps and total Marine Corps doctrine today to have a 

modernized connector that is used in conjunction with our Ship-toShore Connectors in what the Marine Corps needs to do and its 

mission statement on having that forced-entry capability? 

General THOMAS. Thank you, Congressman. 

To your first question about, you know, connectors, you know, 

the Department of the Navy continues to invest in connectors, you 

know, the Landing Craft Air Cushion, to keep that, you know, relevant for many years to come. But we are also looking towards new 

concepts, particularly for connectors for things like Amphibious 

Combat Vehicle, for example. 

As you know, you know, amphibious operations are all about 

rapid buildup of combat power ashore, so speed is important. The 

challenge that we learned from the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 

is that when you optimize a vehicle for high water speed, for example, you are sub-optimizing it for operations on land. So we are no 

longer pursuing that with the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. 

But what we are looking at are concepts of, for example—many 

concepts. One example would be, you know, essentially a sled that 

the vehicle goes on, gives you that high water speed. And then, 

once the vehicles are ashore, you now have the, you know, armored 

protection and so forth that you need. 
18 

To your question about the Amphibious Combat Vehicle and 

where it is, it is fully funded. It is on track for an IOC [initial operating capability] of 2020. And, as you know, that will be the first 

increment of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. We are doing a survivability upgrade on our legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicles as a 

bridge to the second increment of ACV, ACV 1.2. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Let me ask you, too, about amphibious lift. Obviously, our Marine Corps has a requirement of 38 ships today. We are at 31. As 

we talk about growing the fleet, it is not just about the number of 

ships, but I believe it is also about fleet architecture; it is the type 

of ships. Give me your perspective on where we are today. 

And there has been some discussion about a ship like the LHA, 

the large-deck amphibious ship that does flight operations. The 

Marine Corps has gone from having a ship that doesn’t have a well 

deck, now back to having a well deck, as part of the Marine Corps 

expeditionary unit, that amphibious readiness group that we know 

is so critical, as you pointed out, to put marines forward. 

Give me your perspective about fleet architecture when it comes 

to our amphibious ships and the importance of, you know, largedeck amphibious ship, and especially whether or not it should have 

a well deck. Should it be a platform for aircraft? Should it have 

that multicapability? Give me your perspective. Because I know 

there has been a lot of question about maybe replacing that with 

a smaller aircraft carrier like a CVL [light carrier]. Give me the 

Marine Corps’ perspective about where that is. 

General THOMAS. Congressman, as you rightly point out, it is important for us, when we talk about amphibious lift, what are we 

trying to do? And, you know, the requirement is for a two Marine 

expeditionary brigade of lift. And then within that, you know, what 

is the proper balance between how much you are going to fly, how 

much you are going to ride on, you know, your amphibious vehicles 

and your connectors. 

That is an ongoing discussion. As you know, the new big-deck 

amphibs [amphibious ships] will have a well deck. And we think 

that that is a proper balance between both aviation and, you know, 

the additional space that you need for your ground forces and those 

maneuver vehicles. 

In terms of fleet architecture, as you know, the Department of 

the Navy is doing several studies, which we are participating in, 

writ large. And, again, when you look at threat environment, dispersal, signature are all the things that, you know, have to be considered, you know, going forward. And those may inform, you 

know, other options that we haven’t previously considered. 

From a Marine Corps perspective, though, the big-deck, you 

know, amphib provides a tremendous value to the combatant commander and the Nation. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, for your testimony. 

I want to talk about how you have had to go to ‘‘The Boneyard,’’ 

which is in my district—which they don’t like using that word, by 
19 

the way—the Aerospace and Maintenance Regeneration Group, or 

AMARG, in order to bring aircraft out, F–18s out, going to be upgraded to C-plus to address some of the issues you have talked 

about today. 

You know, given the fact that you have many squadrons who are 

unable to have the parts and supplies to have a readiness level for 

those units—and I was an A–10 pilot, just so you know; I get those 

challenges and those numbers—are these aircraft intended to be 

additive to the ones in the squadrons? If you don’t have parts for 

them, how are you going to have parts for additional ones? Or are 

you swapping them out because they have less flight hours on 

them? What is the cost? How is that going? How many are you 

bringing out? 

I mean, you have seen the reports of, you know, the Marine 

Corps is dumpster diving, you know, to try and meet their aviation 

needs. I wouldn’t call AMARG a dumpster, but you can see how 

this is sort of shocking to people who are looking at what is going 

on, where our Marine Corps is having to go back into, you know, 

those that were put into various stages of preservation in order to 

meet its aviation needs. 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, I would just say that when 

you look across any type of model series, as you know, it is an 

enterprise effort. And if you have shortages in certain areas, the 

enterprise will make decisions where it makes sense to harvest, 

you know, in this case could be parts or, in lesser cases, with regard to the F–18, you know, the body of an airplane that has still 

got service life on it. 

And it just speaks to the broader point. It is old iron. You have 

got an originally planned service life, you have had multiple extensions approved by Naval Air Systems Command, and you are just 

managing that risk. 

And, in some cases, if you’ve got, you know, full aircraft in 

AMARG or specific parts that are difficult to produce, the subs 

have gone away for whatever reason, it is one of those one-offs, you 

may choose to take advantage of that. Again, it is—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. But are you swapping out a lower flight-hour aircraft with a higher one that is in a unit right now? There are reports that there are 10 F–18s being refurbished this year, up to a 

couple dozen total. Can you just give me an update and the cost 

of how that is all happening? 

General THOMAS. So, you know, again, you are looking across an 

enterprise of several hundred. I would say, in most cases, you are 

not replacing, you know, airplanes anymore. I mean, that was done 

several years ago. You may be taking components, primarily, from 

those airplanes to repair—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. So we are not taking airplanes out of AMARG? 

General THOMAS. Well, we are taking airplanes out of AMARG, 

but what we are doing for it—that is, we are not taking an airplane 

out of AMARG and it is necessarily full-up. We may take components off of it. Or if you do have service life remaining on it—but 

my understanding is that all of the airplanes are, you know, high 

service time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 
20 

General THOMAS. So if we have life on it, we are just trying to 

get parts from—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. This is confusing me now, because the reports were saying that there was a contract with Boeing specifically to take these aircraft, 10 this year, up to a couple dozen total, 

upgrade them to the C-plus—— 

General THOMAS. Right. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. And get them into operation. So are 

you saying that is not happening? 

General THOMAS. No, that is happening. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. And do you know the number, how many, 

and the cost? 

General THOMAS. I don’t know the cost. I can get that information for you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

General THOMAS. The number of 10 sounds correct. I would 

check with General Davis. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah, if you don’t mind getting back to me on 

that. 

General THOMAS. Okay. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Because, again, these are media reports saying 10 

this year and a couple dozen total. 

General THOMAS. Yeah. 

Ms. MCSALLY. It would just be helpful to understand. 

General THOMAS. Okay. 

Ms. MCSALLY. And, again, you know, I had a squadron of—needed to get 24 airborne to deploy. I had 27 to make 24. Like, they 

didn’t give me 30 to make 24 when we had, you know, a backlog 

in parts. So I am just trying to understand, are you adding so 

squadrons have more airplanes that are, you know, more of them 

sitting unable to fly? Or how—— 

General THOMAS. You have got many squadrons sitting in Beaufort that are remained behind that, you know, they have maybe 

half to two-thirds of the actual shadows that they are supposed to 

have on the flight line. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

In the parts of the readiness we are talking about here with 

these pilots flying 10 hours a month, I mean, those hours are 

meaningless to me; it is what kind of actual missions you are training on that matter. Is it related to flight-hour money, or is it all 

about the parts and the backlog? 

General THOMAS. It is the parts and the backlog. It is the aircraft. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Are you seeing a pilot retention issue? There are push and pull 

factors. Are you seeing any—— 

General THOMAS. Today, we have all the pilots that we have. We 

are concerned that we may have some challenges going forward 

based on the plans of the airlines going forward. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 
21 

General THOMAS. And, you know, again, you know, quality of life 

for our marines, you know, a piece of quality of life is giving the 

marines—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Doing your job. 

General THOMAS [continuing]. The equipment—exactly. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah. I get it. So I look forward to working with 

you more on this, because I think there are going to be some push 

factors. 

And I am over my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. Thank you for appearing before us today. 

We will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:11 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 10, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 10, 2017 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 10, 2017 

(41) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. General Thomas, you obviously have some significant challenges before you with respect to modernizing your ground combat vehicle fleets. The Amphibious Assault Vehicles are more than 40 years old. Your Light Armored Vehicle 

fleet is on average 26 years old, and your M1 Abrams tanks are over 30 years old. 

I understand that as a result of budget constraints you have had to defer modernization efforts and are making incremental improvements to current systems. 

How would additional resources in FY17 and FY18 help in accelerating ground combat vehicle modernization? 

General THOMAS. In order to maintain balanced investment relative to other capabilities, the Marine Corps deliberately planned to selectively and sequentially modernize the combat and tactical vehicle fleets. Achieving a comprehensive modernization of the assault amphibian capability remains the highest priority within the 

portfolio. Selective High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) replacement via the first increment of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program has 

been timed to field to the elements of the light combat portion of the fleet most at 

risk in conjunction with the first phase of Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program. This approach enables an affordable, incremental modernization of the two 

most pressing gaps within the ground combat and tactical vehicle portfolio. All vehicle modernization programs are funded to support their acquisition strategies and 

require stable funding in order to execute effectively. There is also potential to accelerate the second increment of the JLTV program with additional procurement funding in FY20 and beyond, after completing low rate initial production. Additional 

RDT&E funding in FY18 and beyond will help to accelerate a critical element of 

modernization, the development of Vehicle Protection Systems for tanks and ACVs 

in order to increase force protection and survivability against increasing proliferated 

anti-tank guided missiles. 

Mr. TURNER. It’s my understanding the Army and Marines are currently testing 

vehicle active protection systems (APS) for possible use on a range of combat vehicles. The current Marine APS technology demonstration effort, as understood, involves installing an existing Israeli Trophy APS on the M1A1 tank in conjunction 

with the Army’s ongoing Expedited APS Non Developmental Item testing. Please 

describe your ongoing APS tests and your plans for the rest of the fiscal year. What 

are some of the challenges you have come across during testing as well as some of 

your successes? 

General THOMAS. Your understanding is accurate. The Marine Corps evaluation 

of Trophy is a technology demonstration to understand the potential operational application and feasibility of installation and integration of the Trophy Active Protection System on the USMC M1A1 Abrams. The Marine Corps is working closely with 

the Army’s expedited APS effort and our evaluation is complementary to the Army 

evaluation of Trophy as applied to the M1A2SEP v2. The Marine Corps’ effort involves developing a technical package for an installation kit for USMC M1A1, installing the Trophy system, assessing Human Systems Integration analysis with 

Marine operators, experimenting and testing the M1A1 with APS in order to capture unique operational, employment and platform specific challenges and requirements as well as MAGTF integration opportunities and challenges, and using lessons learned to inform requirements and future deliberate acquisition and integration programs. To date, we have completed the analysis, design and fabrication of 

a suitable installation kit as well as leveraging the Army’s radar testing and tuning. 

The Marine Corps evaluation of the system integrated on a M1A1 Abrams is 

planned to start at the end of April and continue through the end of July. The initial focus will be assessing the suitability of the Trophy systems integration by performing a user evaluation, assessing stabilization, target tracking, slew rate, physical characteristics, bonds and grounds, and main gun live fire. Subsequently, live 

fire events will characterize the Trophy system’s effectiveness while installed on the 

M1A1 Abrams. These events will assess system performance related to fields of fire 

and fields of view, and target tracking. The primary focus of efforts to date has been 

to rapidly create a suitable installation kit for the Trophy system and address immediate technical challenges to ensure the system can function as intended when 
42 

installed on the M1A1 Abrams. The M1A1 current turret design is not optimized 

for the installation of the Trophy system, resulting in reduced fields of view for the 

tank commander, interference with the employment of the Stabilized Commander’s 

Weapon Station, required relocation of the CREW system and relocation of several 

other components. The planned evaluations, which will help inform how critical it 

is to address these challenges, will be the focus of development and integration efforts during fiscal year 2018. 

Mr. TURNER. We’ve heard testimony that the most serious readiness concerns are 

found in aviation units. There’s a direct correlation here to modernization. General 

Thomas, how have continued fiscal constraints caused by sequestration and continuing resolutions affected Marine Corps aviation modernization strategies, and if 

additional funding were available, what programs would the Marine Corps invest 

in? 

General THOMAS. Lowered budgets have shallowed procurement profiles, delayed 

introduction of the F–35B/C, and CH–53K and forced the DON to accept risk in 

Naval Aviation modernization. Meanwhile, sustained operational demand over the 

last 15 years has prematurely aged our aircraft, kept them forward deployed, and 

flown them on harder missions at longer ranges. With additional funding, Marine 

aviation could simultaneously improve aviation readiness by investing in and accelerating its transition to new platforms. For example, by increasing and optimizing 

the F–35 ramp rate to the desired and executable amount of aircraft that could be 

procured, Marine aviation will transition from legacy TACAIR platforms to F–35 

five years ahead of forecast. Additionally, Marine aviation will continue to fully fund 

the readiness accounts towards executable levels across the FYDP. Although readiness accounts will improve with funding, they remain a concern and require full 

funding in future years. 

Mr. TURNER. During this period of reduced funding, but not reduced missions or 

operational tempo, what types of investments has the Marine Corps sacrificed to 

sustain the deployable readiness levels of the operating forces? 

General THOMAS. The combination of inconsistent funding and the continuously 

high operational tempo has frustrated the Marine Corps’ modernization efforts. 

Operational tempo is not expected to slow and the readiness of deployable forces remains a top priority. That readiness comes at the cost of much needed modernization. 

The pace at which we modernize is completely dependent on available resources. 

With fiscal limitations, we have made the conscious decision to work within the construct of 185,000 end strength (185K). Therefore, we have decided to focus our modernization efforts on: 

• The Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) survivability upgrade. This will continue to provide a ship to shore self-deploying capability bridge until we have 

replacement for our 40 year old AAVs. 

• The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 1.1, which is our first step in an incremental approach to replacing those AAVs. 

• The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), a joint USMC/U.S. Army program to 

procure the next generation replacement for the venerable High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). 

• Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) and Ground/Air Task 

Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) which will provide an ability to control our airspace 

enabling freedom of action to employ our organic weapons with the speed and 

tempo that makes the Marine Air Ground Task Forces successful. 

• Networking-On-The-Move (NOTM) and MQ–21A Blackjack a small tactical unmanned aircraft system (UAS) are some of the new capabilities that we must 

buy to support the IW enablers. 

• Increase our quantities of Communications Emitter Sensing and Attack Systems (CESAS II) and Intrepid Tiger II, an airborne communications-band electronic attack pod, in order to support increases in end strength. 

However, the aforementioned investments come at the expense of the other 150+ 

programs in need of sustainment and modernization. In most cases lower priority 

programs are underfunded, not procured to the full identified requirement, or not 

sustained at a level that would be expected for the Nation’s crisis response force. 

While not a direct investment sacrifice, the Marine Corps has made the following 

adjustments to rotational force allocations in order to recover readiness for the operating forces to better meet major contingency operation response requirements: 

• Reduced MV–22 and KC–130 allocations for Crisis Response SPMAGTF’s in 

CENTCOM and AFRICOM by 50% and 25%, respectively. 

• Reduced a future VMFA squadron deployment in the CENTCOM AOR from approximately 6 months to 3 months. 
43 

• Replaced a recent VMFA squadron deployment with a VMA squadron in order 

to facilitate readiness recovery in the FA–18 community. Temporarily reduced 

the flightline entitlement for deploying VMFA squadrons from 12 to 10 aircraft 

in order to facilitate readiness recovery in the FA–18 community. 

Mr. TURNER. Modernization not only deals with next generation platforms and 

technology, but also has a direct correlation to capacity. Regarding long range precision fires, munitions, and ammunition, are you currently experiencing any inventory 

shortfalls, and if so, what are the plans to address them? 

General THOMAS. The vast majority of USMC ground ammunition inventories are 

sufficient to satisfy the Total Munitions Requirement. However, baseline funding is 

insufficient to replace training expenditures and modernize munitions leading to an 

increase in projected shortfalls. Additional funding was requested for FY17-Amendment that will help with capacity concerns and improve the outlook. The War Reserve Munitions Requirement is prioritized over training and has minimal shortfalls. Additional efforts are underway to reduce training ammunition expenditures 

to a level that is fiscally feasible while ensuring readiness levels maintain acceptable risk. The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) is the Marine 

Corps long-range precision fires capability. The GMLRS Alternative Warhead (AW) 

is an area-effects rocket designed to replace the GMLRS Dual Purpose Improved 

Conventional Munition (DPICM), which is leaving the inventory due to policy restrictions. The Marine Corps began procurement of GMLRS AW in FY15. With 

FY17 funding, we have a sustainable path to reaching the Total Munition Requirement for this munition in the mid-2020s. However, there will be some risk to Marine Corps long-range area effects capability as GMLRS DPICM will be removed 

from the inventory (1 January 2019 per current U.S. Policy on Cluster Munitions) 

prior to GMLRS AW reaching the Total Munitions Requirement. Shortfalls of critical aviation weapons do exist, but are being mitigated through the use of inert 

training weapons and simulation. Additionally, Overseas Contingency Operation 

(OCO) funding has been helpful, but late to need, in further mitigating inventory 

shortfalls. We expect these shortfalls to continue into FY18 due to the existing constrained inventory and unplanned expenditures in support of OIR. Efforts are underway to pursue maintenance and repair of the existing weapon inventory, which 

will improve life cycle sustainment at significant cost avoidance when compared to 

new weapons procurement. 

Mr. TURNER. The Marine Corps has had numerous security cooperation engagements in recent years. In light of current readiness and deferred modernization 

shortfalls, do you believe that this type of activity is valuable in the long-term, or 

should they be deferred and the savings put back into efforts such as modernizing 

equipment and facilities maintenance? 

General THOMAS. The Marine Corps continually seeks to increase efficiencies in 

security cooperation activities. No single Service—or country—has the capability or 

capacity to be everywhere at once. In an ambiguous security environment, faced 

with hybrid warfare, we stay ahead of our adversaries by partnering with our allies 

and partners. Marine security cooperation enables and sets the force up for success 

in crisis response, contingencies, and major combat operations. The Marine Corps 

engages with foreign partners to enable their forces to operate with ours, to provide 

access for Marine power projection, to build relationships that support strategic objectives, and develop Service operational capabilities with minimal impact to readiness. Our engagements maintain interoperability with capable partners who will 

share our battlespace, ensure our forces can get to the fight—at any clime or place— 

are trained and ready when they arrive, and can alleviate the need for or improve 

the lethality of the Marine Corps. In many ways, security cooperation is what we 

excel at: partnering in peacetime to help the nation avoid war, but prevailing together with our partners when conflict arises. Reducing security cooperation activities would undermine the interoperability forged with allies and partners through 

over a decade of conflict, threatens Marine access and basing established through 

trust and sustained engagement, and jeopardizes forward-training bases and ranges 

that ensure our forces are operationally ready for any fight. 

Mr. TURNER. Staying in line with the specific focus of this hearing, what are your 

top three ground force modernization priorities, and are they currently fully funded? 

General THOMAS. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV), Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), and the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) are the Marine 

Corps’ top ground acquisition priorities, although G/ATOR will support the entire 

MAGTF in ground and aviation mission sets. While these programs will be in full 

rate production over the next five years, the Marine Corps will also be taking every 

opportunity to address other modernization priorities, wherever possible, to ensure 

we remain a Lethal Force with a 21st century approach to combined arms that integrates information warfare, long-range precision fires, and air defense and seeks to 
44 

destroy and defeat our enemies across five domains—air, land, sea, space, and 

cyberspace. These three modernization programs are funded to support their acquisition strategies assuming stable funding remains available. 

Mr. TURNER. Currently, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle Increment 1.1 (ACV 1.1) 

is in the preliminary stages of Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD) 

testing with the current schedule requiring about 12 to 14 months of testing and 

an operational assessment in the 2nd Quarter of FY 2018. If the operational assessment proves successful, the Marine Corps would then down-select to one vendor in 

August 2018 to provide 204 vehicles and achieve an initial operational capability 

(IOC) in FY 2020. While admittedly this is an aggressive schedule, if additional resources are made available in FY 2017 and beyond, is there potential to achieve an 

earlier IOC for ACV 1.1 and perhaps accelerate the development of ACV 1.2? 

General THOMAS. Additional resources in 2017 would not accelerate the program. 

Through the efforts of OSD and all other stakeholders, the aggressive ACV 1.1 

schedule (currently fully funded) has been designed to field a much needed capability as quickly as possible, while solidifying the requirements and path forward 

for ACV 1.2. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. The question involves the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Survivability 

Program. In the annual report, the Director pointed out that ‘‘additional armor coupon testing is required to fully characterize all areas of the crew-occupied space 

against the expected range of threats’’ and that ‘‘due to the lack of sufficient quantity of armor coupons’’ the Program Office deferred the additional armor characterization to later in the program. Is the additional armor coupon testing recommended 

by the Director is going to happen when he recommends, and if not, why not? Also, 

if this is a funding issue, can Congress help by providing additional funds through 

a reprogramming action or some other way? 

General THOMAS. The armor coupon issue on AAV SU was worked out to DOT&E 

satisfaction when the Program Office proposed the use of an EMD vehicle to conduct 

all of the remaining testing, as opposed to additional coupons. DOT&E is using the 

full vehicle exploitation and characterization testing conducted from January 

through March of this year to meet their testing requirements. There is no additional funding required at this time. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN 

Ms. ROSEN. During this period of reduced funding, but not reduced missions or 

operational tempo, what types of investments has the Marine Corps sacrificed to 

sustain the deployable readiness levels of the operating forces? How do we balance 

combat readiness with cyber readiness? 

General THOMAS. The combination of inconsistent funding and the continuously 

high operational temp has frustrated the Marine Corps’ modernization efforts. Operational tempo is not expected to slow and the readiness of deployable forces remains 

a top priority. That readiness comes at the cost of much needed modernization. 

The pace at which we modernize is completely dependent on available resources. 

With fiscal limitations, we have made the conscious decision to work within the construct of 185,000 end strength (185K). However, the Marine Corps’ revised POM– 

18 submission is insufficient to maintain either the 185K end strength or for modernizing equipment within an acceptable timeline. The Marine Corps would require 

an estimated increase of approximately $5B more per year in order to modernize 

within an acceptable timeline for the 185K force. Therefore, we have decided to 

focus our modernization efforts on: 

• The Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) survivability upgrade. This will continue to provide a ship to shore self-deploying capability bridge until we have 

replacement for our 40 year old AAVs. 

• The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 1.1, which is our first step in an incremental approach to replacing those AAVs. 

• The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), a joint USMC/U.S. Army program to 

procure the next generation replacement for the venerable High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). 

• Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) and Ground/Air Task 

Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) which will provide an ability to control our airspace 

enabling freedom of action to employ our organic weapons with the speed and 

tempo that makes the Marine Air Ground Task Forces successful. 
45 

• Networking-On-The-Move (NOTM) and MQ–21A Blackjack a small tactical unmanned aircraft system (UAS) are some of the new capabilities that we must 

buy to support the IW enablers. 

• Increase our quantities of Communications Emitter Sensing and Attack Systems (CESAS II) and Intrepid Tiger II, an airborne communications-band electronic attack pod, in order to support increases in end strength. 

However, the aforementioned investments come at the expense of the other 150+ 

programs in need of sustainment and modernization. In most cases lower priority 

programs are underfunded, not procured to the full identified requirement, or not 

sustained at a level that would be expected for the Nation’s crisis response force. 

While not a direct investment sacrifice, the Marine Corps has made the following 

adjustments to rotational force allocations in order to recover readiness for the operating forces to better meet major contingency operation response requirements: 

• Reduced MV–22 and KC–130 allocations for Crisis Response SPMAGTF’s in 

CENTCOM and AFRICOM by 50% and 25%, respectively. 

• Reduced a future VMFA squadron deployment in the CENTCOM AOR from approximately 6 months to 3 months. 

• Replaced a recent VMFA squadron deployment with a VMA squadron in order 

to facilitate readiness recovery in the FA–18 community. 

• Temporarily reduced the flightline entitlement for deploying VMFA squadrons 

from 12 to 10 aircraft in order to facilitate readiness recovery in the FA–18 community. 

Lastly, ‘‘Cyber readiness’’ is inherent to ‘‘combat readiness.’’ All warfighting functions are increasingly dependent on freedom of action in cyberspace—operating and 

defending our systems and networks, and projecting power through cyberspace. The 

Marine Corps—Operating Forces enabled by the Supporting Establishment—require 

resilient and responsive cyberspace operations capabilities for mission accomplishment. Without freedom of action in cyberspace, our ability to plan operations, deploy 

and sustain Marines, find and fix targets, conduct fires, and command and control 

forces would be severely compromised. 

Ms. ROSEN. General, you named electronic warfare, cyber, and intelligence capabilities as areas requiring the most growth in response to my question about the 

equipment-related challenges associated with standing up an additional 12 active 

duty infantry battalions and growing the Marine Corps writ-large. How does the 

Marine Corps plan to balance equipping new units, while also continuing to modernize in a budget constrained environment? 

General THOMAS. With the additional 3,000 Marines added to our end strength 

in the FY17 NDAA, we look to close some of our capability gaps by investing in the 

Information Warfare, Long Range Precision Fires, and Air Defense communities. 

However, the current budget constraints will not allow us to sufficiently modernize 

even this 185,000 person force. Additionally, these increased capabilities will not 

meet the Marine Corps’ desired capacity for a 1:3 deployment to dwell ratio. Growing the Marine Corps past 185,000 would help mitigate dwell issues, but we risk 

building a hollow force if no modernization funding accompanies the growth. With 

fiscal limitations, we have made the conscious decision to work within the construct 

of 185,000 end strength (185K). However, the Marine Corps’ revised POM–18 submission is insufficient to maintain either the 185K end strength or for modernizing 

equipment within an acceptable timeline. Therefore, we have decided to focus our 

modernization efforts on: 

• The Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) survivability upgrade. This will continue to provide a ship to shore self-deploying capability bridge until we have 

replacement for our 40 year old AAVs. 

• The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 1.1, which is our first step in an incremental approach to replacing those AAVs. 

• The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), a joint USMC/U.S. Army program to 

procure the next generation replacement for the venerable High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). 

• Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) and Ground/Air Task 

Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) which will provide an ability to control our airspace 

enabling freedom of action to employ our organic weapons with the speed and 

tempo that makes the Marine Air Ground Task Forces successful. 

• Networking-On-The-Move (NOTM) and MQ–21A Blackjack a small tactical unmanned aircraft system (UAS) are some of the new capabilities that we must 

buy to support the IW enablers. 

• Increase our quantities of Communications Emitter Sensing and Attack Systems (CESAS II) and Intrepid Tiger II, an airborne communications-band electronic attack pod, in order to support increases in end strength. 
46 

However, the aforementioned investments come at the expense of the other 150+ 

programs in need of sustainment and modernization. In most cases lower priority 

programs are underfunded, not procured to the full identified requirement, or not 

sustained at a level that would be expected for the Nation’s crisis response force. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL 

Mr. CARBAJAL. General Thomas, it is my understanding the Marine Corps has 

been working on developing body armor that provide better fit and coverage for female Marines. There were some concerns that the Marines Corps was just developing more sizes rather than developing female-specific body armor. Can you update 

this sub-committee on what approach the Marine Corps is taking and where we are 

in terms of getting these body armors to our female Marines? Why isn’t the Marine 

Corps taking the same approach as the Army? 

General THOMAS. The Marine Corps fits our female Marines with the best personal protection systems available. The Plate Carrier (PC) is the primary body 

armor system for the Marine Corps. The PC is 3.5lbs lighter and provides better 

form, fit, and function to female Marines than the Army’s Female Improved Outer 

Tactical Vest (FIOTV). The female specific modifications made to the FIOTV are either already incorporated in the Marine Corps’ PC or are in areas that were removed from the Army’s PC, which provides a better fit overall for the entire population of Marines. Fit studies conducted by the Marine Corps throughout 2015 and 

2016, focusing on our body armor systems, have shown that Marines and Soldiers 

(both female and male) prefer the Marine Corps PC to the Army’s IOTV/FIOTV and 

their new Modular Scalable Vest (MSV)(replacing the IOTV) in form, fit, and function. 

In 2013, the Marine Corps received the results of a comprehensive anthropometric 

survey of U.S. Marines conducted through the Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center. The survey incorporated (94) directly-measured dimensions, (39) derived dimensions and 3D scans of 1,301 male and 620 female Marines. This survey provides the large body of data needed to inform the Marine 

Corps’ design and engineering needs and is the basis of the physical measurements 

used to inform the design of personnel protective and load bearing equipment, as 

well as clothing and individual warfighter equipment to accommodate smallstatured (2nd percentile) females through large-statured (98th percentile) males. In 

the rare cases where a Marine falls outside of the 2nd percentile female and 98th 

percentile male parameters, the Marine Corps procures custom sized uniforms and 

equipment to ensure the Marine is properly fitted with mission essential capabilities. 

The Marine Corps is currently developing the Plate Carrier, Generation III (PC 

Gen III). The PC Gen III is less bulky, lighter in weight, and provides a smaller 

overall footprint than the current PC while maintaining the same soft armor coverage and protection level. It is 1.5′′ shorter than the current PC, provides reduced 

shoulder width for a better shoulder and weapon stock weld, and has graded shoulder strap lengths to better accommodate smaller and larger Marines. PC Gen III 

will accommodate the 2d percentile female to 98th percentile male and will be 4.8 

lbs lighter and 2′′ shorter than the FIOTV. The Army is currently evaluating the 

PC Gen III as a potential solution for their Soldier Protection System Increment II 

vest. With the information developed through multiple fit studies of the plate carrier 

systems, neither the Army nor Marine Corps plan to make female specific variants 

of their future body armor systems. 

The Marine Corps has a standing Improved Personal Protective Equipment System (IPPES) Integrated Product Team (IPT) to develop requirements for the next 

generation of personal protective equipment. The U.S. Army Maneuver Center of 

Excellence is an active participant in the IPPES IPT, and both services continue to 

work hand-in-hand in our research and development efforts for individual combat 

and personal protective equipment—particularly with regards to female Marines/ 

Soldiers. 

Æ