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i 

25–833 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–40] 

THREE DECADES LATER: A REVIEW AND 

ASSESSMENT OF OUR SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS FORCES 30 YEARS AFTER 

THE CREATION OF U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 2, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

PETE VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Chairwoman, 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Thomas, GEN Raymond A., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ..................................................................................................................... 5 

Whelan, Theresa, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict ...................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Stefanik, Hon. Elise M. .................................................................................... 25 

Thomas, GEN Raymond A. .............................................................................. 34 

Whelan, Theresa ............................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 57 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 62 

Ms. Stefanik ...................................................................................................... 61 

(1) 

THREE DECADES LATER: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 

OF OUR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 30 YEARS 

AFTER THE CREATION OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 2, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M. Stefanik 

(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Ms. STEFANIK. I call this hearing of the Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee 

to order. I am pleased to welcome everyone this morning to a very 

important hearing entitled, ‘‘Three Decades Later: A Review and 

Assessment of U.S. Special Operation Forces 30 Years After the 

Creation of U.S. Special Operations Command.’’ 

This year marks the 30-year historical point for our special operations forces [SOF] when Congress added an amendment to the 

Goldwater-Nichols reform legislation that created the United 

States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM]. Since that time, 

this force has been preserving strategic options for our Nation, and 

their track record is second to none. 

During my time in Congress and as chair of this subcommittee, 

I have traveled to many war zones and embassies and seen this 

force in action. I can say from firsthand experience that I am continually impressed and humbled by the men and women conducting 

these important missions, and our Nation can truly be proud of 

their accomplishments. 

And although this hearing offers an opportunity for reflection, in 

some ways the threats that special operations forces respond to are 

as timeless as warfare itself and have existed in the form of irregular and asymmetric challenges from state and nonstate actors 

alike. These challenges, and indeed those of the past 16 years since 

9/11, have demanded a heavy focus on counterterrorism and direct 

action skills for this force, but how much that experience will shape 

our thinking about future conflicts remains to be seen. And despite 

this constant theme, the world at large continues to change, and 

we must not let today’s war overshadow the need to prepare for the 

wars of tomorrow. 
2 

While the global CT [counterterrorism] fight continues, adversarial advances in synthetic biology, quantum computing, information warfare, and, indeed, the proliferation of more than 10 trillion 

sensors and devices connected to the internet presents risks for tomorrow. However, if managed right, these risks become great opportunities for this highly capable force. 

In thinking about the years ahead, we must ask hard questions 

after nearly 16 years of constant war, including: What parts of this 

force are broken and what needs to be repaired quickly? What adversarial nation-states are advancing faster and achieving a qualitative edge over our forces? And what must we do to ensure that 

our special operations forces are postured for the next 30 years to 

mitigate our most pressing national security concerns and to continue to preserve strategic options for our Nation? 

As in the past, Congress will play a major role by aligning resources and policy to keep special operations effective, silent, globally postured, and when necessary, absolutely lethal. To do that, 

we will need the help of our witnesses before us this morning: Ms. 

Theresa Whelan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)], 

and General Raymond Thomas, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. 

It is worth noting that Ms. Whelan, although also performing the 

duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is appearing today 

before the committee in her capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense. 

I would like to turn now to my friend and ranking member, Mr. 

Jim Langevin from Rhode Island, for any comments he would like 

to make. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik. 

And thank you, Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, for being here 

today. I look forward to your testimony this morning. And, General, 

in particular, I want to thank you for your service to the Nation, 

and all the men and women who serve under your command. 

Despite not having a detailed budget request submitted by the 

administration, there are many issues regarding the command and 

our special operations forces to be discussed by the committee 

today. Approximately 30 years ago, Congress established SOCOM 

to ensure joint and ready special operations forces capable of defending U.S. national security interests. 

For the last decade and a half, we have relied heavily on SOF 

to perform activities in support of counterterrorism operations. 

However, we must keep in mind that SOF activities, such as unconventional warfare [UW], foreign internal defense, counter-messaging, and hostage rescue, remain equally important to countering 

aggression of other actors, including nation-states. 

Despite drawdowns of conventional forces and overseas contingencies, the demand for SOF remains high across the combatant 
3 

commands. SOF is still very much engaged in battle. Sadly, we lost 

three Army Special Forces in Afghanistan fighting ISIL [Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant] just in April. This high operation 

tempo has created stress on the force and has affected readiness. 

Precision and discrimination in use of SOF remain fundamental to 

not breaking the force. 

We must also ensure that SOF are employed under policies, 

guidance, and authorities conducive to achieving our broader national security goals and objectives set forth in clear strategies. 

This includes both in and outside areas of active hostilities in each 

theater, against each threat. This requires us to be mindful when 

considering or legislating operational authorities. 

SOCOM and the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and 

Low-Intensity Conflict clearly have a lot on their plate. In addition, 

last year SOCOM was assigned the responsibility for synchronizing 

the countering weapons of mass destruction [CWMD] mission from 

Strategic Command [STRATCOM]. SOCOM has always been involved in CWMD and brings a depth of knowledge to employing a 

left-of-boom approach conducive to our strategy. 

The threats our Nation faces today are ever-evolving and complex and will continue to shape our special operations forces and 

policies for employment of those forces. I certainly look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses today on these topics. 

Again, I thank you for all the extraordinary work that you and 

the special operations forces perform on behalf of our Nation day 

in and day out in very dangerous areas, performing very dangerous 

missions, and we thank you all for your service. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

Immediately following this open hearing, the committee will reconvene upstairs in 2337 for a closed classified roundtable discussion with both of our witnesses. 

Before we begin, I remind our witnesses that your full written 

statements will be submitted for the record, and we ask that you 

summarize your comments in 5 minutes or less. 

Secretary Whelan, we will begin with you, and we look forward 

to your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW–INTENSITY CONFLICT 

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you. Chairwoman Stefanik, Congressman 

Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today in my capacity as the Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

Low-Intensity Conflict. I am pleased to share this table with General Tony Thomas, who has served at the forefront of the special 

operations forces at all levels of command. Our entire SO/LIC team 

is proud to partner with him and his command in forging the future of DOD [Department of Defense] special operations. 

I would like to thank you and your predecessors for the foresight 

to create SO/LIC and SOCOM 30 years ago, and for your commitment to maintaining that vision over the last three decades. We 

are grateful for this committee’s support for special operations, as 
4 

evidenced by the resources, authorities, and depth of understanding you provide in your oversight. Our military is stronger and 

more capable due to your efforts. 

Today I will focus on three topics. First, winning the current 

fight and defeating emerging threats. Second, building on the foundations of section 922 ASD(SO/LIC) authorities. And third, continuing to hone the edge of SOF personnel and capabilities. 

SOF is a vanguard force in countering emerging threats at the 

leading edge of the modern security landscape. In the last 15 years, 

we have encountered a networked enemy. We flattened our organizations and accelerated our targeting cycles and we built a network 

to defeat them. We now face advanced transregional threats that 

demand greater levels of coordination and collaboration, and we are 

redoubling our focus on building relationships with international 

and interagency partners. 

Today, SO/LIC provides oversight and advocacy for the special 

operations budget, which is approximately 1.8 percent of our defense budget in 2017, and we directly manage over $2 billion in 

various budgets that support counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. 

The three-decades-long partnership between SOCOM and SO/ 

LIC has generated a force capable of dealing with emerging 

threats, and a force that is able to translate those gains across the 

Department. We will win the fight against the VEOs [violent extremist organizations] and protect our citizens’ vital interests, allies, and partners. This requires a long-term strategic approach 

that combats terrorists, disrupts terrorist networks, discredits extremist ideologies, and diminishes factors that contribute to recruitment and radicalization. 

Sustaining funding and flexible legislative authorities have been 

instrumental to these efforts. I want to thank the committee for establishing section 127e, formerly known as section 1208, as a permanent authority. The maturation of this program has provided 

our warfighters a powerful tool to employ to support our allies, attack our enemies, and protect our force, and is a great example of 

interagency synergy, enabled by strong congressional support and 

oversight. 

Congressional support for countering threat finance and transnational organized crime is also crucial to our overall efforts. Terrorists, insurgents, and other threat networks depend upon illicit revenue streams and criminal facilitators for logistic support, money 

laundering, and also obtaining weapons and fraudulent documents. 

Thank you also for codifying the responsibilities of ASD(SO/ 

LIC)’s important oversight role comprised of the complementary 

tasks of monitoring and advocacy in the fiscal year 2017 NDAA 

[National Defense Authorization Act]. USSOCOM has made dramatic advances during wartime in response to urgent battlefield 

demands, gains that require an institutional foundation to endure. 

The service secretary-like authorities in section 922 serve as a 

strategic linchpin, ensuring that we lock in these hard-won gains. 

These authorities empowered the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council, which we have used in the past year to resolve base 

infrastructure and casualty evacuation issues among USSOCOM 

and the services. 
5 

Ultimately, these gains can be leveraged across the entire force 

with SOF best practices in technology and talent management 

serving as templates for the Department in addressing emerging 

challenges. 

A key part of SO/LIC’s role is to advance the state of the art in 

concepts, technologies, and strategies for both humans and hardware. Our Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office [CTTSO] 

leads this effort within SO/LIC by developing cutting-edge technologies for SOF, the interagency, and law enforcement. 

The SOF truths state that humans are more important than 

hardware. As we continue to provide agile and innovative capabilities, we must also continue to maintain and sustain an elite workforce suited to the unique and diverse demands of 21st century 

warfare. 

For more than 30 years, SOF has remained at the leading edge 

of global megatrends. We have employed SOF in consequential battles and we have seen SOF diminish threats before they evolve. We 

take lessons from every operation, and those lessons have informed 

and fostered innovation through SOF and across the larger force 

and Department. We will continue to work closely with Congress 

to ensure that we have the right policy, agile authorities, and necessary resources to employ SOF effectively. 

I thank Congress for its continued support of our men and 

women in uniform and their families, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Ms. Whelan. 

General Thomas. 

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND A. THOMAS, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

General THOMAS. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. I am especially grateful 

to be here with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan in a 

session dedicated exclusively to special operations, as it provides us 

the opportunity to discuss in detail the unique requirements, capabilities, and challenges associated with your United States Special 

Operations Command. 

This body legislated us into existence a little over 30 years ago 

to act as a unique Department of Defense organization, a dualheaded service-like entity responsible for both the manning, training, and equipping of special operations forces, as well as a globally 

focused, functional combatant command. 

In fulfilling the first role, which continues to be our primary 

function, I believe we have consistently provided the world’s best 

special operations forces to the geographic combatant commanders. 

However, it is in the second role, as a globally focused combatant 

command, where SOCOM has evolved the most. 

As we carry out both of these roles today, special operations 

forces are more relevant than ever to the current and enduring 

threats facing our Nation. We have been at the forefront of national security operations for the past three decades, to include con-
6 

tinuous combat over the past 151⁄2 years. This historic period has 

been the backdrop for some of our greatest successes as well as the 

source of our greatest challenge, which is the sustained readiness 

of this magnificent force. 

We are thankful for the resources you have provided not only to 

operate this force, but also to perform the critical sustainment efforts that underpin our most precious resource, our people. 

Last month was particularly difficult for USSOCOM, losing its 

407th hero, Staff Sergeant De Alencar, in a firefight in Nangahar 

Province in Afghanistan while operating alongside his Afghan partners. Then, last week, we lost Ranger Sergeants Thomas and Rodgers, our 408th and 409th casualties, respectively. This comes on 

the heels of 16 other combat fatalities since I assumed command 

a year ago and is a stark reminder that we are a command at war, 

and will remain so for the foreseeable future. 

My current priorities for the command fall into three broad categories. 

First, we must win the current fight, which consists of carrying 

out assigned missions running the gamut from defeating Islamic 

extremism, both Sunni and Shia, to countering Russian aggression, 

to preparing for contingencies in Korea, as well as various security 

operations to defend the homeland. 

Second, we must continue to transform our enterprise to remain 

relevant in this rapidly changing security environment. 

Finally, we must take care of our people and their families, as 

they form the foundation upon which our force is built. 

My first year in command has seen us focused on these priorities 

as we transform the way DOD looks at many of the national military strategy challenges, in our role as the coordinating authority 

for countering transregional threats, and more recently we have 

also poured significant resources into defining our role as the DOD 

synchronizer for countering weapons of mass destruction. 

Both of these substantive roles are additive to the current missions, where approximately 8,000 SOF are deployed in over 80 

countries working with international, interagency, and DOD partners in support of the geographic combatant commanders’ priorities. 

This focus is also occurring during a period of unprecedented recapitalization of substantive parts of our warfighting capability, to 

include the conversion of our entire C–130J—our fleet to J model 

C–130s, as well as other major platforms. We are extremely thankful to the services for enabling this transformation to the force, as 

it sets us on the path of success for decades to come. 

We are equally grateful to the support of Congress for required 

resourcing that in turn has produced a SOCOM which is relevant 

to all the current and enduring threats facing the Nation. We appreciate the continued oversight and advocacy for your United 

States Special Operations Command. 

I look forward to your questions today as well as the planned 

closed session to follow. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Thomas can be found in the 

Appendix on page 34.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, General Thomas. 
7 

I ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection? 

Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be recognized 

at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

My first question is for Ms. Whelan. In your written statement 

you note that adversarial powers are increasingly turning towards 

unconventional warfare to pursue their objectives, including Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. 

And as you know, this committee shares this concern, and in the 

NDAA for FY 2016 we included a provision directing the Secretary 

of Defense to coordinate with the interagency and submit a strategy to counter these unconventional threats. This strategy, which 

is now almost 2 years late, ultimately can help provide a way to 

ensure that our ends, ways, and means are aligned to help counter 

these unconventional threats. 

So I have two questions on that front. Can you provide an update 

on the strategy and how the Department is coordinating with the 

interagency, and also when Congress can expect to receive it? 

Ms. WHELAN. Yes, ma’am. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the 

question. 

We have been engaged on the issue of UW, and actually we appreciate the language in the NDAA in fiscal year 2016 asking us 

to focus on this issue set. We have been, I think as you noted in 

your opening statement, quite focused on the counterterrorism 

fight for the last 15 years, and UW is an emerging area. 

We have as a consequence had to shift resources to focus on this 

and develop capabilities and knowledge bases that had to a certain 

extent atrophied over the years. But also because the nature of UW 

has fundamentally changed because of 21st century technologies 

and techniques, we really in many ways have been starting from 

scratch, and that has been one of the challenges that we faced as 

we dug into this over the last 18 to 24 months. 

We have been working with our interagency partners, and actually, as we have conducted that work with our interagency partners, we have begun to realize the extent to which UW in the 21st 

century really is an interagency team sport involving multiple 

parts of the U.S. Government and posing multiple threats to the 

U.S. Government because of the ways that our adversaries are 

using it. 

Studies by USASOC [U.S. Army Special Operations Command], 

and also work that Georgetown University has done on UW, have 

indicated that our adversaries, particularly the more sophisticated 

ones, are actually focusing on the seams between our organizational entities and trying to exploit those seams and decision-making cycles in order to gain advantage on us in the space that essentially is below conventional war, the space that we now refer to as 

the gray zone or hybrid warfare. 

What we are doing and have set in motion is two research 

projects. One, Johns Hopkins University is conducting a study on 

the nature of Russian unconventional warfare in particular. We 

also have engaged CTTSO, our RDT&E [research, development, 

test and evaluation] enterprise, to look at developing predictive 

analytic technologies that will help us identify when countries are 
8 

utilizing unconventional warfare techniques at levels essentially 

below our normal observation thresholds so that we can identify 

these early and be able to use that to develop our strategies. Once 

we complete the Russia UW strategy, we will also move on to look 

at Iran and China. 

Again, this continues to be an evolving threat. So we look forward to continuing to work with you as we iterate and try to get 

our heads around what is probably one of the most interesting 

areas in terms of the emerging warfare techniques in the 21st century. We do expect to have an interim answer with our thoughts 

to you before the end of June. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Ms. Whelan. 

My second question is for both you and General Thomas. In 

terms of countering unconventional warfare threats, are we any 

closer to linking all of our tools and capabilities, such as conventional, unconventional, economic, cyber, intel, and IO [information 

operations], in an effort to counter adversarial threats? 

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I think you actually hit on the problem, the challenge that we 

are facing right now, is how to achieve that level of exquisite integration across multiple components of not only the Defense Department, but also the U.S. Government, and also to include the issues 

that bleed into the homeland space where, of course, we have a 

number of different laws and authorities that govern how we in the 

Defense Department operate, let alone how DHS [Department of 

Homeland Security] operates. These are some of the very things 

that we are trying to understand better as we look at the tactics 

and techniques that our adversaries are trying to use to exploit us. 

Ms. STEFANIK. General Thomas. 

General THOMAS. Chairwoman, to really dovetail with the first 

question as it plays to your second one, we are working closely with 

the Department for the overall strategy, but I think as importantly 

and more practically, we are focused on the resources and the authorities that would underpin that strategy. So we actually are 

having some pretty substantive discussions, specifically as it applies towards countering Russian aggression. 

On that end, and to your second question, I do think you are seeing an increasingly enhanced and capable blend of everything that 

we bring to the table in terms of military capabilities, information 

operations, influence operations, partner capacity, all the way 

through to DA [direct action], although less applicable in some of 

the UW environments that we are currently in, but always kind of 

the hold card, but also cross-cued with everything the interagency 

can bring and with our host nations. 

I do think that you are seeing a trend in the right direction, as 

I think your question hopes we are moving in that regard. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

I now recognize Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Again, thanks to our witnesses today for your testimony. 

Ms. Whelan, section 922 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for fiscal year 2017 focused on solidifying the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Oper-
9 

ations and Low-Intensity Conflict as related to the administrative 

matters of SOCOM. 

Can you please provide an update on how this provision is being 

implemented and how the relationship between ASD(SO/LIC) and 

SOCOM has been shaped by the provision? 

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 

We very much actually appreciate the language in the NDAA for 

fiscal year 2017 in section 922 that further clarified and strengthened the role of ASD(SO/LIC) in the oversight and management of 

the Special Operations Command in the context of its service-like 

responsibilities for the joint SOF enterprise. This is, we think, a 

very important step forward in terms of enhancing the joint SOF 

enterprise. 

What we have done so far internally within the Department is 

we have established a tiger team under the direction of Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Work—now, of course, that will continue into 

the future—to fully flesh out the areas in which we need to organizationally adjust ourselves within the Office of Secretary of Defense 

and within ASD(SO/LIC) to more effectively carry out these responsibilities. 

But in the interim, we have also achieved seats on the Deputy’s 

Management Action Group. It is an independent seat for ASD(SO/ 

LIC), so that ASD(SO/LIC) can, similar to the other service secretaries, represent the service interests of SOCOM. We have achieved 

a similar seat on the Special Access Programs Oversight Committee for the same purpose, to represent the interests of the joint 

SOF enterprise. We have also made gains in achieving for ASD(SO/ 

LIC) the authorities provided to other service secretaries with regard to management of some personnel and hiring issues for 

SOCOM. 

So we are slowly establishing greater precedents for ASD(SO/ 

LIC) to act in those service-like secretary functions within the Department. We will continue to find ways to work more effectively 

to represent SOCOM in the Department and to the Secretary of 

Defense, and we appreciate, again, the language and the clarity 

that was provided in the terms of the role that ASD(SO/LIC) 

should be providing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So ASD(SO/LIC) office has not seen an increase 

in resources for many years. In your opinion, is the office of 

ASD(SO/LIC) properly resourced to carry out the roles and responsibilities outlined in section 922? 

Ms. WHELAN. Thanks for the question, Congressman. 

So you are correct, we have not seen an increase. In fact, we 

have actually downsized because of requirements for downsizing of 

the Federal workforce, particularly at major headquarters organizations. 

However, that is one of the functions of the tiger team, is looking 

at the language in 922, determining what functions the ASD(SO/ 

LIC) must provide in order to fully implement that language, and 

then essentially determining a troop-to-task requirement and 

whether or not, how we can meet those in terms of the workforce 

while staying within the requirements for downsizing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And what is the status of the Special Operations 

Oversight Council? 
10 

Ms. WHELAN. The SOPOC, the Special Operations Oversight 

Council, actually meets regularly. It meets at multiple levels, a 

working level, a mid-level, a sort of general officer, one-star, deputy 

assistant secretary level, and it also meets at the principals level, 

the assistant secretary level. It has had multiple meetings at the 

working level on a day-to-day basis to resolve issues that come up 

related to SOCOM and management, personnel, training issues, 

and also resourcing issues. 

We have had also a number of meetings at the deputy assistant 

secretary, general flag officer level to take on a little bit more 

thornier issues, including some requirements for new authorities. 

We have had two meetings so far this year at the assistant secretary level in which we actually, as I mentioned in my remarks, 

were able to resolve some particularly thorny issues in the favor of 

SOCOM with the services on infrastructure and casualty evacuation requirements. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you. 

My time has expired, but hopefully, if we do a second round, I 

would want to get to General Thomas and just ask you for an update on the countering weapons of mass destruction synchronization responsibility that was transferred from STRATCOM to 

SOCOM. Hopefully we can do a second round. 

I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Ms. Cheney. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

And thank you very much to both of our witnesses this morning. 

General Thomas, I wonder if you could talk a little bit more 

about the extent to which we are seeing a changing national security environment, how quickly it’s changing, and what those demands mean in terms of conflict with near-peer, peer-to-peer competitors, give us an assessment of sort of the rapidity of that 

change and how that is affecting your fundamental mission and 

what some of those changing requirements might be. 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, as you stated in the question, 

the evolution of change in terms of the threat environment is almost at kind of a frantic level in terms of number of threats, the 

transregional aspect that pertains, and the varied nature of the 

threats, so running the gamut from hybrid threats all the way 

through to high-end, arguably existential threats. 

The challenge to our force, obviously, is to maintain the current 

effort towards combating violent extremism while we transform the 

force to be prepared for both current and emerging threats as I described them here. So we recognize the challenge. I think we are 

changing consistent with the specific campaign plans relative to 

each one of those threats. But it is a continuous evolution. 

Ms. CHENEY. And as you look at the overall threat environment 

and the sort of initial mission and dealing with the counterterrorism challenge, talk a little bit about the issue of safe havens, if you 

would, please, in terms of specifically the separate campaign missions that we might have and particularly separate missions we 

might have within individual countries. But is there an effort 

underway to look broadly, to say what are we doing globally to 

deny safe haven to ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], what are 
11 

we doing globally to deny safe haven to Al Qaeda, and how do the 

SOF assets fit into that? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, I would be very happy to go 

into much greater detail in the closed session. But to your point, 

I think it is worth reminding ourselves that the reason we got involved in Afghanistan in the first place was that we were attacked 

from that sanctuary, where there was a symbiotic relationship between Al Qaeda and other forces there that enabled them to attack 

our country. 

Obviously, we want to avoid that situation in the future, both in 

declared areas of hostility and other locations where the adversary 

is inclined to migrate. And they do have a tendency to migrate to 

ungoverned spaces, which drives the need for strategies to deal 

with those locations. 

Again, I would be happy to go into much more detail, because we 

are not just observing the problem, we are addressing that tendency. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you. 

And in terms of the work that we are doing with partner nations—and this is also a question for Secretary Whelan—with partner forces, how we are working in terms of building capacity in 

those partnership relationships, could you talk a little bit about 

how that is developing and how we can be most effective in terms 

of working with our allied forces in partnership capacity training? 

Ms. WHELAN. Thanks, Congresswoman, for the question. 

Actually, I think that we have made significant advances in the 

area of capacity building. DOD now, thanks to the new legislation, 

triple three [section 333], has, I think, greater flexibility in the use 

of title 10 resources, which we are now also working with State Department to ensure that those resources are implemented in a complementary fashion to the title 22 FMF [foreign military financing] 

resources that they have. 

So not only do we have the flexibility that we need, but I think 

that we are continuing to develop improved ways of managing the 

programs such that we can assess the effectiveness of those programs in terms of achieving our strategic objectives. We are continuing to iterate and work with the COCOMs [combatant commands] in terms of program design, as well as program evaluation 

at the back end, and then flowing that evaluation into adjustments 

to program design. 

So this is a continual process, but fundamentally capacity building is a critical part of our strategy. It is not just something that 

is separate from our strategy that we do independently. It is a 

fundamental element of our strategy, because we need partners in 

many of the areas of the world that we work. And so building their 

capacity to make them essentially security providers as opposed to 

countries that absorb security or require security will enhance our 

security in the long run. 

Ms. CHENEY. Thank you very much. I will yield back and look 

forward to pursuing both of these topics further in the closed session. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mrs. Murphy. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Thank you. 
12 

Thank you, General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, for being here 

today and for your testimony. 

As I shared with General Thomas at the Special Ops Caucus 

breakfast this morning, I had the honor of serving in OSD [Office 

of the Secretary of Defense] SO/LIC in the Special Ops/Countering 

Terrorism Directorate in the mid-2000s, and I am grateful to be engaging on this issue today, and I am looking forward to visiting 

SOCOM headquarters on Friday this week with my colleague Congresswoman Kathy Castor. 

Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, as you know, this committee 

is very focused on finding ways that the Department can improve 

its acquisition processes to keep pace with rapid technology advancements. I understand that SOCOM uses alternative acquisition authorities and exemptions with great success, including the 

regular use of other transactional authority, which was granted to 

the Department as an alternative business process to quickly and 

flexibly fund research and prototype development. For example, I 

understand that SOCOM has set up a business and technology incubator called SOFWERX using OTA [other transaction authority]. 

Can you talk a little bit about what SOFWERX does in downtown Tampa and discuss where SOCOM’s use of alternative business processes has helped field game-changing technology? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, thanks for the question, and 

I look forward to your visit this Friday, and hopefully you will have 

a chance to visit our facility in Tampa. 

First off, on exquisite acquisition authorities: our acquisition director would actually tell you that our authorities aren’t that much 

significantly different from the services’. The advantage we do have 

is that he works directly for me, and so we have a very direct kind 

of affiliation, daily affiliation, I would offer. He has been extraordinarily creative, as has the rest of the organization, in trying to create an environment that enables and encourages innovation from 

our problem-solving base through to how we codify it in our organization. 

SOFWERX, as you mentioned, is a relatively new endeavor, 

about a year and a half old, which was really established as an offsite, specifically and intentionally, off the MacDill compound to provide an environment where, as he would describe it, we have the 

opportunity for a collision of acquisition types, technologists, and 

most importantly, operators. 

So as you visit that site, you will find very current operational 

individuals who have the problem-solving ideas and kind of ethos 

that is then married with academia, technologists, and acquisition 

types so that we can rapidly consider alternative sourcing, alternative problem-solving methods, and really get to the crux of the 

matter of providing enabling technology to our force. 

So, again, I hope you have a chance to see it. I have probably 

done a disservice, but as you have the opportunity to visit, I think 

you will appreciate how nuanced and really effective this new process has been. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Great. Thank you. 

Do you have any thoughts on how we could encourage the Department to more frequently use this rapid acquisition authority 
13 

and tools that have already been provided to DOD on a larger 

scale? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, there is actually a very good 

news story here. I would normally tell you about our interdependence on the services. While they provide us platforms that we 

then transition with our funding authorities to create SOF platforms, what you are seeing is a trending in the opposite direction, 

where based on our research and development and some of our acquisition activities, we are now enabling the services, and even 

more so, we are enabling some of our foreign counterparts. 

So we have a number of memorandums of understanding with 

foreign counterparts that is enabling them to keep pace with us as 

they can afford it and sustain it, and then really driving towards 

interoperability. But that in the past has been thought of just a 

niche SOF approach that now has expanded to our services. So 

there are a few good examples where we are returning the favor 

back to the services for things that we have already done the trailblazing research and development, and they are inclined to leverage us. 

So I think it is a good news story. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Great. And then do you think you can outline 

some of the more difficult advanced technology requirements that 

SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on the battlefield? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, the one that we discussed 

very briefly today that I am fascinated and arguably stunted as a 

58-year-old to get my head around, and that is leveraging machine 

learning, deep learning, cognitive computing, that I know it, I can 

see it, you know, I can see it in action in terms of corporate applications, I know the requirement in terms of how we are dealing, 

literally swimming in the morass of information and intelligence, 

a mixed bag, but how we sort through that in terms of applying 

business solutions is right—we are on the cusp of it. And the good 

news is we are starting to marry up the right people with our operators and our problem solvers to get at this wicked problem of information management and deep data, all the things that go with 

it that arguably corporations have already addressed. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Great. Thank you. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairwoman Elise Stefanik, for your 

leadership on Emerging Threats. 

And, Madam Secretary, General, thank you for being here today. 

It is especially meaningful to me. My second son is a doctor in the 

Navy. He trained with SEAL Team 2. He has served in Baghdad 

with the Rangers and the SEALs. I was on a delegation one time 

with Congressman Mike Pence of Indiana, and while we were there 

my son gave you the highest backhanded compliment. He claimed 

that the Rangers are good too. 

And so I was so proud of his service and what it means to our 

country. So I know firsthand how significant. 

General, your organization is funded differently from other commands, but can you highlight the effects, particularly on readiness, 

of your organization if we do not successfully address the issue of 

sequestration? 
14 

General THOMAS. Congressman, first of all, thanks for the compliment on the Ranger regiment. I will take that home with us. 

To your first point, we are very appreciative for the level of funding that we currently enjoy. We entail about 2 percent or less of 

the DOD budget for all the activities that we are endeavoring to 

accomplish. I would also acknowledge that we get matching funds, 

so to speak, from the services that amount to about double that 

budget, again, emphasizing our dependency on the services. But a 

small price, 2 percent, provides you the special operations capability that you see manifest everywhere in the world these days. 

The short answer for sequestration, the impact on us is catastrophic going forward. And I cannot imagine the ripple as much, 

because I don’t appreciate the ripple to the services on whom I am 

so dependent. So I can probably itemize it for us internally and 

then I can only speculate how even more tragic it would be in 

terms of our interservice dependence. 

Mr. WILSON. And, General, something I would appreciate, at a 

later date, if you could provide to me what the catastrophic effects 

are so that I can distribute that to our colleagues, because they 

need to know. Sadly, this just hasn’t been recognized. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Mr. WILSON. Additionally, General, can you outline to the committee the role that special operations has in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, other areas of active hostilities? What authorities do you 

have? Are there any concerns about the authorities you have? 

What can we do to help? 

I am particularly concerned about rules of engagement. There 

have been reports where the restrictive rules of engagement have 

actually resulted in mass deaths, particularly of SEALs, where 

there were restrictions that simply went beyond common sense. 

I also want to thank you, with Congresswoman Cheney your referencing, truly restating Afghanistan. The American people have 

forgotten 9/11, that indeed, this was an attack on the American 

people, mass murder, from a cave in Afghanistan. And, sadly, the 

media doesn’t ever connect the dots. And we are in a global war 

on terrorism, and we here support you on that. 

Additionally, I am grateful. I actually had a son serve for a year 

in Afghanistan too. So thank you for referencing the significance of 

Afghanistan. 

So back again to the authorities you have, and then have there 

been any adjustments to the rules of engagement? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, I would like to give you a much 

more detailed response to that in closed session, if I can, for the 

specific roles we are playing. I just returned from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, the entire Middle East where we have forces, Lebanon, 

et cetera. So I can go into great detail. 

I would tell you that I ask that question everywhere I go: Do you 

have the authorities you need to do your job? And I am very satisfied that we have affected the authorities under the current leadership of the combatant commanders who we are supporting to enable our force. 

Anecdotally, I can tell you where there are still shortcomings. I 

just recently was in Helmand, where there was a particular nuance 
15 

to the mission set that I was able to address back to that commander. And, again, I can get in more detail there. But that is the 

consistent question our leadership is asking our folks every day: Do 

you have the authorities you need? If not, how do we fix that going 

forward? But, again, if I can go into more detail in the closed session, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, I appreciate your leadership so much. 

And, Secretary Whelan, as we are looking ahead to fiscal year 

2018, what cuts do you see that are coming that could impact special operations capabilities? 

Ms. WHELAN. Thanks for the question, Congressman. 

I think the concerns that we have mostly are in readiness across 

the force. And we have been operating at such a high OPTEMPO 

[operations tempo] for the last decade-plus, and with budgets going 

down, what we have had to do is essentially we have had to eat 

our young, so to speak. I mean, we have mortgaged the future in 

order to facilitate current operations. That has impacted readiness 

and it has also impacted the development of force for the future, 

and as the threats grow, this is only going to get worse. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Good morning. Thank you both for being here. 

Given the unprecedented integration between special operations 

forces and the intelligence community, I am wondering if you can, 

as best you can in this unclassed forum, talk about this integration, 

how it has been going, particularly focused on how the Department 

of Defense conducts oversight over this? And at what point is the 

decision made when concerning title 50 activities how and where 

our special operators are used? 

Ms. WHELAN. Congresswoman, thanks for the question. I think 

it would be best if we answered that in the closed session in terms 

of the details. It gets us into some very sensitive areas. 

Ms. GABBARD. Are you able to talk about the oversight portion 

of this? 

Ms. WHELAN. What I can say is that we have a very proactive 

relationship with the commands and then also our counterparts in 

the intelligence community, and there is an active dialogue that 

takes place all the way up to the Secretary of Defense, and he engages with his counterpart regularly. So I think I would say that 

we have very effective oversight between the two elements of the 

U.S. Government. 

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. Thanks. Looking forward to continuing this 

in the closed session. 

Given the unique capabilities that you both have talked about 

here that our special forces offer to today’s environment, the high 

operational tempo has resulted in some of the readiness challenges 

that you have mentioned as well. Can you talk a little bit about 

how to address that? Is there a look to increase the numbers of special forces that we have to deal with and address the environment 

that we are facing, how much and how quickly, and how can we 

get to a place where this is sustainable and it is not creating such 

a stress on our troops and their families? 
16 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, I will take a shot at that one. 

Part of the friction, I would offer, is driven by two aspects. One is 

the deployment tempo, in some cases unforecasted. For instance, 

Afghanistan, the expectation was that we were going to be finished 

in 2014. We are now throttling into 2017 and beyond. So that unexpected aspect of continued deployment where we would otherwise 

recapitalize people and capabilities elsewhere is something that 

has been a challenge to manage, but we are able to do so right 

now. 

The other part is the transformation piece I mentioned earlier. 

Again, based on some assumptions on when we might be able to 

afford the opportunity to transform some of our platforms, particularly our C–130s and others, good assumptions were made. They 

are being challenged by current events. So it adds a little extra 

friction. 

I mention that because I closely monitor the parts of our force 

that are under the most stress. And I can get into them specifically 

in the closed hearing probably better, but there are forces that are 

meeting themselves coming and going in some regards, others are 

in better balance. And we are trying to kind of create better balance across the force in its entirety going forward, but it is a challenge. 

Ms. GABBARD. Can you talk about the rate of suicide amongst 

your troops and how it compares to the rates that we are seeing 

in other branches of the military, and what the defense health 

services are doing to help address that? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, we are as, or more, challenged than the other services in the Armed Forces. That may 

come as a surprise to you, and I don’t want to get into the morbid 

statistics, but we are suffering the same challenges as the rest of 

the services. 

We have doubled and tripled our efforts in terms of awareness 

amongst both our leaders—and truthfully this is not—this is 

leadership as it permeates down to the lowest level of our force. We 

have doubled and tripled our efforts in terms of availing our service 

members to the services that otherwise might mitigate the challenges that they are facing. But nonetheless, we still suffer from 

this challenge and we are absolutely trying to rectify it. It is a primary focus for us. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Thanks. Look forward to continuing 

the conversation. 

I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. A few members have additional questions before 

we go to the closed classified session. 

My question, General Thomas, broadly, you note that SOCOM is 

preparing for conflicts of the future. What are future conflicts you 

fear the most and how are you prioritizing preparation for those 

conflicts? 

General THOMAS. Chairwoman, I don’t fear the future conflicts as 

much as I am concerned about our ability to get it right, to anticipate the real—the essence of the requirement. 

I think anyone who is paying attention to the news these days 

knows the number and type of threats that would challenge DOD 
17 

to the greatest extent possible. And we are integral to every one 

of those preparatory activities. 

So I think you can extrapolate from that, and I would be glad 

to get into more details in closed session on the specifics of what 

we are preparing to do, but suffice to say, we are integral to all the 

preparatory activities that are currently undergoing. 

Ms. STEFANIK. And my next question is, it is mentioned in the 

discussion today how heavily dependent SOF is on OCO, Overseas 

Contingency Operations funding, and portions of the force remain 

in very high demand with minimal time to reset. U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in particular fall into this category. 

What readiness concerns do you have and how are you dealing 

with shortfalls in this area? And do you anticipate that the fiscal 

year 2018 budget request will help you in this area? 

General THOMAS. Thanks very much for that question, Chairwoman, because it is a point of emphasis for us, and I know you 

are attentive to it. 

Given the current trending for budgeting, SOCOM will be leveraged to OCO to the tune of about 30 percent of our total obligation 

authority, 30 percent relative to the services, who typically have 

about a 7 percent reliance an OCO. So we are three to four times 

more dependent on OCO. 

I think you know, because it has been a topic of discussion for 

the last 5 years among my predecessors, that OCO has purchased, 

has acquired us enduring capabilities that we think are applicable 

to future threats, but it is not in the base. 

So therein lies the rub, that if for whatever reason OCO was to 

dissipate without a transition to baseline, SOCOM as it is right 

now is a large facade, and it is mostly manifested in one of our 

most prominent forces. And I can get in more detail in the closed 

session, but it would absolutely undercut their ability to continue 

performing to the level I think the Nation requires. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

I recognize Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General Thomas, if I could go back to the question I wanted to 

talk about. If you would provide an update on the countering weapons of mass destruction synchronization responsibility that was 

transferred from STRATCOM to SOCOM, and in particular, have 

all the necessary resources been transferred from STRATCOM to 

SOCOM to carry out this role? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, as you know, we picked up that 

mission in January based on a Presidential decision last year. The 

actual effective transfer was in January. So we have had the mission for about 5 months now. 

We held our first semiannual synchronization conference with an 

extraordinary turnout of both interagency and international partners, and kind of the enthusiasm was palpable in the room in 

terms of a real community of action vice a community of interest. 

We are very enthusiastic about pushing this mission set forward. 

We are in the throes of rewriting the campaign plan as well as conducting an assessment that I hope to provide our Secretary in 

about the August timeframe. 
18 

On your very practical question about resourcing, I appreciate 

your attention there. We are in the midst of some pretty substantive discussions in terms of the resources required. We have already done some internal task organization to get at the problem 

so we didn’t sit idly by while we waited on resources. 

We did receive some very extraordinary capabilities resident in 

DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, that were transferred with the mission set to us, so about 50-some folks there. And 

so we are in the process of kind of cobbling together our new task 

organization for this problem. So I am confident, I am somewhat 

confident, that we will get the resourcing required to enhance our 

capability in this critical mission set. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. We look forward to have you keep us posted on that. 

And what organization changes at DTRA and SOCOM have occurred? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, not so much organizational. We 

actually morphed in terms of SOCOM structure. So I put a flag officer against this mission to kind of emphasize the criticality of it. 

I was lucky to have a plans officer that I could dual hat there. We 

applied some of our contractor focus. More importantly, we immediately adopted part of our infrastructure into a fusion cell for our 

common operating picture for this mission set. 

The interaction with DTRA really has been more of the nature 

of exchanged liaison officers and then really a process, kind of a 

binding process in terms of our interoperability with our existing 

SOCOM staff with the DTRA component. So we just tightened the 

lash-up there. We had a preexisting relationship, but it is much 

tighter and more process focused now. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there any priorities and challenges that you 

have identified so far or is it still a work in progress? 

General THOMAS. Still a work in progress, Congressman. Obviously, quite a few challenges on the WMD front. Again, going back 

to one of the earlier questions, I am concerned about how we see 

this problem in the morass of information that is out there, especially in terms of dual-use technology, how do we see the flow of 

innocuous dual-use technology and otherwise nefarious technology, 

and then how it is integrated into our whole-of-government and our 

international approach to the problem set. 

So I am concerned going in only because I am not as attuned to 

the set as I probably want to be, but we are endeavoring to get 

there. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mrs. Murphy. 

Mrs. MURPHY. This is a follow-up to the last question I had for 

you. You had identified some of the areas that are important for 

you to have to maintain a competitive advantage on the battlefield, 

including what you just discussed, artificial intelligence, machine 

learning, and such. 

How are you staying ahead in the research and development in 

these areas when your budget has been steadily declining over the 

last few fiscal years? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, I think we have the advantage of having an attractive mission set that regardless of our—and 

I don’t—I wouldn’t say our budget has declined. We have flatlined 
19 

a little bit. But nonetheless we are able to track the right kind of 

innovative business leads, who essentially invest in our problem 

without a great resourcing expense at the moment. Again, it depends on where we take it. 

But I am somewhat satisfied that we have the attractiveness of 

our mission set and really the ability to cross-cue what they are 

doing from a business standpoint to where we are trying to apply 

it to military challenges, that there is enough of a nexus there to 

drive a less resource-intensive problem-solving approach. 

Mrs. MURPHY. And then can you talk a little bit about your cyber 

warfare and cyber operations requirements? And also, how is 

SOCOM working with USCYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command]? And are there any policy or authority concerns? 

General THOMAS. Congresswoman, the bottom line is we have an 

extraordinary level of coordination and collaboration with CYBERCOM, so I am very comfortable there. Probably, if I could wait to 

the closed session to get into the details of what we are endeavoring to do from a SOCOM standpoint. But clearly we have the same 

challenge that CYBERCOM has in terms of both defending a network and then seeking offensive capabilities as required for the respective problem sets. And, again, I would be glad to talk in the 

closed session in more detail. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Great. And I look forward to the closed session. 

I will yield back my time. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you to the witnesses for your testimony. 

We will now adjourn and reconvene in about 5 minutes in Rayburn 

2337. 

[Whereupon, at 11:01 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 2, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 2, 2017 

(25) 

Opening Statement 

Chairwoman Elise M. Stefanik 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 

Three Decades Later: A Review and Assessment of Our Special 

Operations Forces 30 Years After the Creation of U.S. Special 

Operations Command 

May 2, 2017 

I call this hearing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to order. 

I am pleased to welcome everyone this morning to a very important 

hearing entitled, "Three Decades Later: A Review and Assessment of U.S. 

Special Operations Forces 30 Years After the Creation of U.S. Special 

Operations Command." 

This year marks a 30-year historical point for our Special Operations 

Forces, when Congress added an amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols 

reform legislation that created the United States Special Operations 

Command. Since that time, this force has been preserving strategic options 

for our Nation, and their track record is second to none. 

During my time in Congress, and as Chair of this subcommittee, I have 

travelled to many war-zones and embassies, and seen this force in action. I 

can say from first hand-experience that I am continually impressed and 

humbled by the men and women conducting these important missions, and 

our Nation can truly be proud of their accomplishments. 

And although this hearing offers an opportunity for reflection, in some 

ways the threats that Special Operations Forces respond to are as timeless as 

warfare itself, and have existed in the form of irregular and asymmetric 

challenges, from state and non-state actors alike. 

These challenges- and indeed those ofthe past 16 years since 9111 

have demanded a heavy focus on counterterrorism and direct action skills for 

this Force. But how much that experience will shape our thinking about future 

conflicts remains to be seen. 

And despite this constant theme, the world at large continues to change, 

and we must not let today's war overshadow the need to prepare for the wars 

of tomorrow. 

While the global CT fight continues, adversarial advances in synthetic 

biology, quantum computing, information warfare, and indeed the 

proliferation of more than l 0 trillion sensors and devices connected to the 

Internet- present risks for tomorrow. However, if managed right, these risks 

become great opportunities for this highly capable force. 

In thinking about the years ahead, we must ask hard questions after 

nearly 16 years of constant war, including: what parts of this force are broken, 
26 

and what needs to be repaired quickly; what adversarial nation-states are 

advancing faster, and achieving a qualitative edge over our Forces; and what 

must we do to ensure that our Special Operations Forces are postured for the 

next 30-years to mitigate our most pressing national security concerns, and to 

continue to preserve strategic options for our Nation? 

As in the past, Congress will play a major role, by aligning resources 

and policy to keep Special Operations effective, silent, globally postured, and 

when necessary, absolutely lethal. To do that, we will need the help of our 

witnesses before us this morning: 

• Ms. Theresa Whelan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; and, 

• General Raymond 'Tony" Thomas, Commander, U.S. Special 

Operations Command 

It is worth noting that Ms. Whelan although also perfonning the 

duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is appearing today before 

the committee in her capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense. 

I'd like to turn now to my friend and Ranking Member, Mr. Jim 

Langevin from Rhode Island, for any comments he'd like to make. 
27 

STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW -INTENSITY CONFLICT 

BEFORE THE HOUSE 

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

IIS'h CONGRESS 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAP ABILITIES 

May 2, 2017 

1 
28 

Introduction 

Chainnan Stefanik, Congressman Langevin, and other distinguished members of the Committee, 

I am honored to appear before you today in my capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLI C). I am pleased to share this 

table with General Tony Thomas, who has served the special operations force (SOF) community 

at all levels of command. Our entire SOLIC team is proud to partner with his command in 

forging the future of special operations on behalf of the Department of Defense and the 

American people. 

We are grateful for this committee's strong support of special operations, as evidenced by the 

resources, authorities, and depth of understanding you provide in your oversight. We pledge to 

make the best use of these resources to accomplish all special operations mission sets- including 

defeating the threat networks of terrorists, illicit traflickers, and transnational criminals; denying 

the acquisition, proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction; and countering 

unconventional threats. At the same time, we appreciate your support in advancing SOF warrior 

care and force resiliency through the Preservation of the Force and Family- which places 

psychologists, counselors, and exercise physiologists into the daily routines of SOF to perform 

'preventative maintenance,' catching and resolving problems before they become chronic - and 

SOF-for-Life initiatives. 

As part of its roles and responsibilities, the OASD(SO/LIC) provides oversight and advocacy for 

the special operations budget, which is approximately 1.8% of our defense budget in 2017. 

Additionally, we directly manage over $2 billion in various budgets that support our 

counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts, such as the Counterten·orism Fellowship Program, 

the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, and the counternarcotics budget. We ensure 

that these investments are leveraged to provide return on investment across the strategic 

landscape, the interagency, and across the joint force. 

I am here to report to you on the current and anticipated strategic environment that our Nation's 

special operations enterprise will face during this time of transformation. As global events shape 

our environment, our special operations mission continues finding, fixing, and finishing an 

innovative enemy while harnessing these trends and technologies for our own advantage. Let me 

begin by discussing that rapidly evolving environment and its effect on combating terrorists, 

state-sponsored unconventional warfare, and illicit networks that include, but are not limited to, 

transnational organized crime. I will then describe three SO/LIC focus areas that will allow us to: 

I) win the current tight and defeat emerging threats, 2) build on the foundation of the Section 

922 authorities, and 3) hone the edge of SOF personnel and capabilities. 

Strategic Environment: The Megatrends oflndividual Empowerment, Diffusion of Power, 

and Demographic Instability 

When John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt wrote their seminal work Networks and Netwars in 

1991, they introduced the now-ubiquitous phrase: "it takes a network to defeat a network." Their 

work foresaw changes in the nature of warfare, which shaped how both we and our enemies 

encounter each other. Previously, Al-Qaeda leveraged the advantage of flat networks to strike 

2 
29 

fielded forces and vulnerable targets around the world. In response, we built our own global 

network to harness these trends and seize the initiative. 

Where Al-Qaeda leverages globalization and franchised network structures to threaten our 

interests, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) evolves its threat networks further, presenting 

new analytical and operational challenges by harnessing emerging megatrends. ISIS thrives in 

the volatile space carved out by these trends. This generation ofVEOs adopts the latest 

technology to communicate on the battlefield and to inlluence new individuals and groups on 

behalf of the organization. They also use existing tools in novel ways- the non-state equivalent 

of the "gig economy"- and adapt so quickly that they overcome most governmental decision 

cycles. This generation of threats is challenging U.S. national security interests in ways we have 

not seen before. Social media allows ISIS to connect with individuals who share alienation and 

grievances, or agree with ISIS' distortion of Islam. Digital innovation, both in warfighting and 

communications technologies, is a key to their success. Technologies such as mobile 

applications and the dark web help enable illicit trade on an exponentially increasing scale and 

have contributed to the growth in the number and power of illicit groups. As these groups 

leverage the darker side of these megatrends, SOF must adapt and innovate in order to disrupt 

threat networks and deter unconventional adversaries. 

30 Years ofUSSOCOM and ASD (SO/LIC): SOF at the Intersection of Global Megatrends 

This year, we celebrate the 30'11 anniversary of both USSOCOM and ASD(SO/LIC). It is 

appropriate for us to reflect and build upon the past as we look to the future. For the latter half of 

the past 30 years, war has transformed our nation's special operations community from a unique, 

specialized force that occupied a crucial niche in our security posture into a vanguard force that 

is reshaping our world. In combatting terrorists, special operations forces have built f1at 

networks that bridge interagency divides down to the tactical level. Inherently joint, our special 

operations warfighters have continued to support global U.S. Government objectives by 

leveraging critical interagency and international partnerships. These boundary-spanning 

networks minimize our tactical response time while radically accelerating innovation. They also 

counter illicit threat networks, such as drug, weapons, and human trafficking, that fuel terrorist 

organizations and organized criminal enterprises. SOF support in Afghanistan for counter illicit 

drug trafficking has resulted in increased interdiction of opiates in various forms, reducing this 

funding resource for the Tali ban and other insurgent and criminal groups. 

Transregional threats like ISIS and transnational organized crime like drug cartels arc demanding 

greater levels of coordination and collaboration from their- including operational planning, 

resource requirements, and information sharing. Effectively disrupting ISIS and other threat 

forces, requires all tools of U.S. national power, including diplomatic, intelligence, military, 

economic, financial, information, and law enforcement capabilities. The innovations the special 

operations enterprise has built to defeat adaptive threat networks are informing emerging 

concepts of unconventional and conventional warfare alike. In this way, SOF leads in 

Department-wide innovation, fielding, and optimizing emerging technologies and theories of 

war fighting. 

Win the Current Fight and Defeat Emerging Threats 

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30 

We must win the protracted fight against terrorist organizations and their enabling networks in 

order to protect our homeland, our citizens, and support our allies and partners. This will require 

a long-term strategic approach to support the U.S. government and international partnerships. 

Within this DoD strategy, SOF contributes its unique capabilities to combat terrorists, disrupt 

adversary networks, discredit extremist ideologies, and diminish those factors that contribute to 

recruitment and radicalization. Sustained funding and flexible legislative authorities will 

continue to be instrumental in the defeat of priority terrorist organizations like ISIS and AlQaeda. 

In light of U.S. conventional dominance, adversary powers are increasingly turning toward 

unconventional warfare to pursue their objectives. Countries demonstrating a willingness to use 

unconventional warfare, such as Russia, China, and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional, 

warfare, and cyber warfare, information operations, clandestine, criminal, and other activities to 

undermine U.S. and allied national security objectives, particularly in ways and places that fall 

below thresholds conventional U.S. Government or international response. Our special 

operations forces are exploring the capabilities and authorities required to defeat these challenges 

to our influence and our interests. 

At the same time, I want to thank the committee for establishing Section 127e formerly known 

as Section 1208- as a permanent authority. The maturation of this program has provided our 

warfighters a powerful tool to employ to support our allies and confront our enemies and is a 

great example of strong congressional support and oversight. 

Congressional support for countering threat finance (CTF) and transnational organized crime is 

crucial to both of these eff(nts. Terrorist, insurgents, and other threat networks depend upon illicit 

revenue streams and criminal facilitators for logistical support, money laundering, or the 

procurement of weapons and fraudulent documents. These activities often involve both state and 

non-state actors in spaces between traditional war and peace. As the global synchronizer for DoD 

counter-threat finance, USSOCOM is uniquely positioned to synchronize efforts across the 

geographic combatant commands to disrupt the threat finance systems of ISIS, as well as other 

illicit networks. USSOCOM works alongside the National Guard Bureau and USG components 

in CTF teams in each GCC. Together, they provide essential support to military operations and 

to interagency law enforcement partners. The CTF teams analyze financial intelligence, integrate 

intelligence and operations, and coordinate and execute CTF activities. Countering threat finances 

disrupts and weakens terrorist and criminal adversaries in ways and places that traditional 

military weapons typically cannot reach. This capability is valuable across the lull spectrum of 

conflict, including in·egular and unconventional warfare. These efforts have enabled action 

against drug trafficking and other illicit networks, a~ emerging counter-network doctrine and 

technologies help unmask dark networks that threaten our national security. CTF efforts have 

proven to be a cost-effective tool to impact threatening forces and transnational criminal 

organizations, whether through law enforcement actions, designations, sanctions, or- as in the 

case of ISIS -through military actions against economic and financial targets. 

The unique skills, culture, and capabilities underpinning SOF's success against these dark networks 

enable the command to serve as synchronizer against complex problem sets. As with CTF, this 

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31 

expertise underwrites the recent transfer of the counter-WMD mission set, which USSOCOM 

recently inherited as a result of changes in the Unified Command Plan. 

Transform the Enterprise: Building on the Foundations of Section 922 Authorities 

We appreciate the committee's support in codifying the responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC) to 

provide oversight and advocacy for SOF. As our force continues to adapt to meet the enduring 

challenge of global campaigns against global threats, we find ourselves at an institutional 

crossroads. SOF has made dramatic advances during wartime in response to urgent battlefield 

demands, gains that require an institutional foundation to endure. SOL!C has completed a 

preliminary analysis of previous and newly assigned functions and activities to determine where 

there are gaps and associated risk. Currently SOLIC is reviewing whether these functions are 

directed by law or directed by Department guidance in order to make recommendations to our 

senior leaders on the divestiture of non-legally binding responsibilities. In overseeing SOF 

acquisitions, technology, logistics, personnel, readiness, and talent management functions, 

SOLIC will be positioned to institutionalize these hard-learned lessons of contemporary 

conflicts. The 'Service-secretary-like' authorities in Section 922 serve as a strategic linchpin, 

ensuring that we lock in these hard-won gains. 

The FY17 NDAA codified the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council, which we have 

used over the past year to resolve Department-wide SOF-related issues, such as base 

infrastructure. We are already serving in a 'Service-secretary-like' role in approving waivers for 

mission-essential positions under the current civilian hiring freeze. We now sit alongside our 

colleagues from USSOCOM at budgeting and programming Deputy Management Action Group 

meetings. Our office is currently implementing the full scope of these far-reaching authorities, 

even as we benchmark concepts fl·om these initial gains. By leveraging existing Service 

processes and relationships, we aim to minimize administrative burden and focus on architecture 

building and strategic awareness. Ultimately, we intend to leverage these gains for 

implementation across the entire force. 

Honing the Edge of SOF Personnel and Capabilities 

A key part of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role is to leverage our elite force to advance state of the art 

concepts, technologies, and strategies for both humans and hardware. For our operators, we 

strive to improve mental and physical performance on the battlefield and to take care of them and 

their families at home. For hardware, our investments in technologies and our policy advocacy 

for special operations capabilities give our SOF the tools they need to get the mission done. 

The Countering Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) develops cutting edge 

technologies for SOF, the interagency, and law enforcement. For instance, we are exploring 

deep learning and big data analytics to sharpen strategies for outcompeting our adversaries. We 

are also investing in better technologies to analyze and present fused information to the 

warfighter. CTTSO's ability to leverage crowdsourcing pathways has helped field data tools that 

support operational preparation of the environment in ways we never thought possible. The 

versatility of these tools allows small tactical units to conduct a broad spectrum of military, 

special warfare, and cyber operations. Because the CTTSO model is inherently collaborative, 

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32 

these gains are leveraged across the interagency, as well as with international, state, and local 

governmental partners. 

The first SOF Truth states that "humans are more important than hardware." Therefore, as we 

provide agile and innovative capabilities in support of high-priority U.S. national objectives, we 

must also continue to build and sustain an elite workforce suited to the unique and diverse 

demands of 21 sr century warfare. SOF has borne the weight of grueling deployments and 

protracted overseas contingency operations over the course of the last decade, and we have 

accordingly turned our culture of innovation toward fostering and protecting our people. 

Conclusion 

As we look back at the last thirty years, we note that SOF has consistently remained at the 

leading edge of global megatrends. This past year has been no exception. We have diligently 

leveraged your investment by deriving key concepts for the larger force from that experience. 

The small portion of the budget that supports our nation's SOF provides a tremendous return on 

investment. We are applying your support and oversight to institutionalize a decade and a half of 

hard-earned warfighting lessons and advances the goal of a joint SOF enterprise. With these 

authorities, we will continue to evolve how we man, train, and equip our force in order to: win 

the current fight and defeat emerging threats; transform the special operations enterprise; and 

hone the edge of SOF. We will continue to work closely with Congress to ensure we have the 

right policies, agile authorities, and enhanced oversight structure in place to employ SOF 

effectively. 

I thank Congress for its continuing support of our men and women in unifonn and their families, 

and look forward to your questions. 

6 
33 

Theresa Whelan 

Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/LowIntensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) 

Theresa Whelan, a career member of the Senior Executive Service, is performing the 

duties of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. She is also serving as the Acting Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). In her 

capacity as USD for Policy, she is responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on all 

matters pertaining to the development and execution of U.S. national defense policy and 

strategy. Ms. Whelan brings over twenty-nine years of experience in the defense 

intelligence, defense policy and national intelligence communities. 

Prior to assuming her current position, Ms. Whelan served as the Acting Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict from March 2016 

through January 2017. 

From July 2015 through March 2016, Ms. Whelan served as Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. 

Before returning to the Department of Defense, Ms. Whelan served as the national 

intelligence officer for Africa on the Director for National Intelligence's National 

Intelligence Council. Between 2003-2011, she held three separate deputy assistant 

secretary of defense (DASD) positions within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy: DASD, Homeland Defense Domains and Defense Support to Civil Authorities; 

DASD, Defense Continuity and Crisis Management; and DASD, African Affairs. 

In addition to the deputy assistant secretary positions, her other assignments in the 

Department include Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's Balkans Task Force, Senior 

Program Director for the US/South Africa Joint Defense Committee, Countries Director 

for Southern Africa and West Africa, and African military capabilities analyst for the 

Defense Intelligence Agency covering West, Central and East African countries. 

Ms. Whelan has a Master of Arts in national security studies from Georgetown University, 

a Master of Science in national security strategy from the National War College, and a 

Bachelor of Arts in international relations with a minor in Russian studies from the College 

of William and Mary. 

Her awards include two Presidential Rank Executive A wards, at the Distinguished and 

Meritorious levels; two Department of Defense Medals for Distinguished Civilian Service; 

the National Intelligence Superior Service Medal; the American University Roger W. 

Jones Award for Executive Leadership; the Paul H. Nitze Award for Excellence in 

International Security Affairs, and the French National Order of Merit. 
34 

STATEMENT OF 

GENERAL RAYMOND A. THOMAS, lll, U.S. ARMY 

COMMANDER 

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAY 2, 2017 
35 

Opening Remarks 

Chairwoman Stefanik and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to address you today as the II '

11 Commander ofUnited States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM). This is my first address on the posture of US Special Operations 

Forces (SOF). Even in the short span of my first year in command we've seen the world evolve 

in complexity and the desire for SOF continue to increase. While challenges endure, and new 

ones emerge our force continues to evolve in the attempt to present options and decision space 

for our national leadership. During my remarks, I would like to highlight the breadth of missions 

where SOF is integral to the support of the current National Military Strategy (NMS), as well as 

how we arc adapting to future challenges aud transforming our capabilities. It goes without 

saying that NONE of this is possible without the professionalism, talent, and innovative problem 

solving capabilities of our most precious asset, our people, the decisive edge, who constitute the 

greatest Special Operations Force in history. 

The Formative Evolution ofSOF 

Last month we celebrated the 30'11 Anniversary of the creation ofUSSOCOM as a result 

of The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment-- prescient pieces of 

legislation that created US Special Operations Command lrom an ad hoc, individual servicebased confederation of capability to become both a highly effective Service-like entity and an 

extraordinarily collaborative and efTectively networked global functional Combatant Command. 

USSOCOM's service-like responsibilities continue to be the command's primary focus 

providing the world's best SOF to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. We look forward to 

working closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Special Operations and Low Intensity 

Cont1ict's (ASD/SOLIC) assigned role in our chain of command in the Title 10 role of manning, 

training, and equipping the force. 

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36 

USSOCOM has evolved enormously since its inception. Rather than a mere "breakglass-in-casc-o f-war" force, we are now proactively engaged across the "battle space" of the 

Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), providing key integrating and enabling capabilities 

to support their campaigns and operations. We operate and fight in every corner of the world as 

an integrated joint, combined and interagency force. Today, there are approximately 56,000 

active duty, 7,400 reserve, guard, and 6,600 civilian personnel across the SOF enterprise. On a 

daily basis, we sustain a deployed or forward stationed force of approximately 8,000 across 80-

plus countries. They are conducting the entire range of SOF missions in both combat and noncombat situations with a wide variety of Joint, Interagency, International, and Multi-national 

partners. 

We have recently taken on a number of new roles intended to leverage our global 

perspective on problems, and focus our unique capabilities in support of not only the GCCs, but 

also the Department of Defense (the Department) as a whole. First, we are the designated 

coordinating authority for trans-regional terrorist organizations and other threat networks. 

Acting in support of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, our responsibility in this role is 

to provide a coherent global framework for action and synthesize the perspectives and inputs of 

the Geographic Combatant Commanders into a single comprehensive military assessment of 

DoD's global counter-terrorism efforts. This assists the combatant commands, the Chairman, 

and the Secretary in understanding and prioritizing efforts to counter violent extremist networks 

that operate across GCC boundaries in pursuit of a coherent and effective campaign. 

To date, our team's combined quarterly assessments, supported by productive dialogue 

with our mission partners aod the integration of dozens of other assessments conducted by 

combatant commands, combat support agencies, and specialized task forces, have led to specific 

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37 

recommendations for the conduct of the Counter-Violent Extremist Organization effort. 

Specifically, we have identified the necessity to understand and address the underlying 

infrastructure that terrorist organizations use to generate and sustain their "combat power," 

especially their enablers which include foreign fighters, financing and strategic communications. 

We have galvanized international and interagency focus on the effort in the form of Operation 

GALLANT PHOENIX, a SOF-led activity, designed to empower, support and integrate the 

efforts of our international (currently 19 foreign members with several others in the queue), 

interagency, and Joint Force partners to disrupt trans-regional terrorist networks and their ability 

to develop and field foreign fighters. Through inforn1ation sharing, our partners support security 

and law enforcement actions against these networks, and inform decision makers on border 

security, identification oflegal remedies and tools, and the structuring of counter-messaging 

campaigns. 

Our second new responsibility is the assumption of the Countering Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (CWMD) synchronization mission for the Department of Defense, recently 

transferred from USSTRATCOM. In this role, we are responsible for maintaining the DoD 

CWMD Campaign, establishing intelligence priorities, monitoring global operations and 

conducting assessments. We are publishing a new Global Campaign Plan to provide a 

comprehensive, trans-regional approach which integrates ongoing regional and interagency 

efforts. We have also established a CWMD Coordination Center to design, execute and assess 

this new trans-regional approach and connect to other USG Departments and Agencies, as well 

as international partners. The Center leverages the resources and skills of multiple agencies that 

will result in a multi-layered comprehensive approach to address the CWMD problem set. In 

coordination with the Geographic Combatant Commands, we will conduct this campaign 

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38 

attempting to focus more intently on the transregional nature of identified portions of the CWMD 

challenge and assess effectiveness towards national objectives, while providing resourcing and 

strategic recommendations to the Chairman and Secretary. 

While the Department is addressing our stated requirements, U SSOCOM has already 

implemented temporary manning strategies to mitigate risk as we transfer funding and 

manpower, hire new personnel, and build a network of partners. We have an established 

counter-teJTorism (CT) network and a committed partner in the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency to assist us as we move into this mission space. We are no stranger to adapting and 

building our network, and we have embraced this mission as we do all others- bringing focus 

and energy to some of the nation's most complex challenges. 

While we have evolved and now field an unmatched capability to conduct countertenorism operations with our partners and execute a select set of niche missions in support of the 

Joint Force, this expertise is not necessarily tailored to compete with near-peer competitors. We 

are focused on transformation as rapidly as possible across a broad range of mission capabilities. 

SOF in Today's Competitions and Conflicts. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified five current and enduring threats in 

the new National Military Strategy (NMS): Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), Russia, 

Iran, North Korea, and China. Although constituting only 2% of the Department's budget and 

about 2% of its manpower, as a Combatant Command with global responsibilities, USSOCOM 

plays a critical role in the campaigns against each of these. While not a panacea nor a standalone solution, SOF produces substantive results at low cost, and with a potentially low pro tile I 

signature. However, none of the challenges can be effectively dealt with in isolation as they are 

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39 

intetTelated and cut across GCC boundaries. USSOCOM is striving to be part of our whole of 

government efforts to face these threats. 

Violent Extremist Organizations. The threat posed by VEOs remains the highest priority for 

USSOCOM in both focus and effoti. Special Operations Forces are the main eJTort, or major 

supporting effort for US YEO-focused operations in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, 

Libya, across the Sahel of Africa, the Philippines, and Central/South America- essentially, 

everywhere AI Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are to be found. Our 

priorities are disrupting external attack capability, destroying/neutralizing AQ and ISIS, 

developing a long-term approach to defeat and/or counter VEOs, and building partner capacity 

helping our partners stabilize their environment and secure gains. SOF are also engaged in 

countering aggressive Iranian behavior that not only destabilizes the Middle East, but also, 

stokes sectarianism. SOF activities are in support of the GCCs' efforts toward a strengthened 

deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities, and building patiner nations' capacity. 

This methodology is more comprehensive than simple counter-terrorism, and is an 

important part of an overarching whole-of-government approach to advance broader national 

security objectives. Organizations such as ISIS and AQ are trans-regional threats that require the 

Joint Force to work with partners across the US govemment as well as coalition patiners. It 

requires focused effort to secure and hold our gains by empowering local entities within and 

among the populations that terrorists exploit. As we move forward in our coordinating authority 

role within DoD, we are committed to further developing this comprehensive approach to 

support the US military's integration across the range of activities that like-minded organizations 

are pursuing. In this vein, we appreciate the NDAA mandate to expand the role of the State 

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40 

Department's Global Engagement Center, with whom we work, which provides critical counter 

messaging against state and non-state actors~ a key to ultimately defeating organizations such as 

ISIS. 

Russia. Our second priority in terms of resources and impact is supporting United States 

European Command (USEUCOM) in countering Russian aggression in Europe. As Secretary 

Mattis pointed out, Russia is seeking control over the economic, diplomatic, and security 

decisions of its neighbors. Further, Russia has reemerged as a strategic competitor of the US 

around the globe. This trend is most pronounced in the post-Soviet space, where Russia has 

shown itself as willing to act aggressively to limit US and Western institutions there. They are 

particularly adept at leveraging unconventional approaches to advancing their interests and it is 

clear they are pursuing a wide range of audacious approaches to competition ~ SOF often present 

a very natural unconventional response. USEUCOM is responding by using European 

Reassurance Initiative funding to deter Russia and reassure Allies, including by working with 

NATO to build more effective defense institutions in partner nations. In support of this, we have 

had persistent SOF presence for over 2 years in nearly every European country on Russia's 

western border (Baltics, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Georgia)~ assuring our allies and partners 

while building host nation and NATO capabilities to compete short of conflict in a hybrid 

environment. Our current focus consists of a~suring our allies through building partner capacity 

efforts to counter and resist various types of Russian aggression, as well as enhance their 

resilience. We are working relentlessly with our partners and the Department of State to build 

potency in eastern and northern Europe to counter Russia's approach to unconventional warfare, 

including developing mature and sustainable Special Operations capabilities across the region. 

Page 7 of 19 
41 

In support of GEN Scaparrotti, we will continue to refine our SOF posture to strengthen these 

partnerships in order to deter or respond to aggression in the region, as well as reassure our allies 

and contribute to a broader deterrent effect 

North Korea. USSOCOM has recently focused more intently on the emerging threat that is of 

growing concern to us as well as most of our DoD teammates- the nuclear threat of an 

increasingly rogue North Korea. Although previously viewed as a regional threat, North Korea's 

relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, facilitated by a transregional network of commercial, military, and political connections, make it a threat with global 

implications. In response, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and United States 

Forces-Korea (USFK) are focused on sustaining credible combat power in the region, 

maintaining unrelenting resolve in the face of multiple provocations, and sustaining partnerships 

with our closest allies. We maintain a persistent and rotational presence on the peninsula, 

working with our increasingly capable South Korean pminers to prepare for future crises. In the 

meantime, we are actively pursuing a training path to ensure readiness for the entire range of 

contingency operations in which SOF, to include our exquisite CWMD capabilities, may play a 

critical role. As previously noted, we are looking comprehensively at our force structure and 

capabilities on the peninsula and across the region to maximize our support to USPACOM and 

USFK. This is my warfighting priority for planning and support. 

Iran. Iran uses both traditional state-based military capabilities and a network of terrorist, substate, and non-state partners to conduct operations, actions, and activities that incite violence and 

threaten US security interests. It relies on militias and a range of partner organizations to expand 

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42 

its influence and develop access to key areas. SOF activities are in support ofCENTCOM's 

efforts toward a strengthened deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities, and 

building partner nations' capacity. Our priority remains illuminating this Iranian network in 

order to understand its capabilities as it seeks to expand its influence. We also support and 

assure Israel and regional Gulf partners with foreign internal defense and security force 

assistance, aiding their efforts to counter Iranian threats. 

China. China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed 

to improve its armed forces' capability to fight short duration, high intensity regional conflicts. 

China is intent upon expanding its regional and global influence, while developing capabilities to 

limit our ability to project power in the Pacific. SOF actions support USPACOM's efforts to 

focus on building military-to-military relations with China, focused on risk reduction. At the 

same time, we maintain persistent SOF presence in over a dozen countries in the USPACOM 

AOR- assuring our allies and building partner capabilities to address complex threats. The SOF 

community has worked to connect experts across the region, and between regions, to share 

lessons learned that provide opportunities to help our partners grow more effectively. 

Other Challenges. Although the five NMS threats are the priority challenges for DoD, we 

remain focused on other parts of the world in terms of presence and engagement. The 

USSOUTHCOM Commander recently testified that aspects of the NMS-specitied threats in the 

Southern Hemisphere are likely to become security challenges to the US homeland itself: Four 

out of the five named challenges are active in this region. To help mitigate these challenges, 

USSOUTHCOM's lines of effort are focused on countering threat networks, preparing for and 

Page 9 of 19 
43 

responding to disasters and crises, and building relationships to meet global challenges. SOF are 

actively supporting Interagency efforts that range from counter-threat financing, for which 

USSOCOM is the DoD lead, to counter-terrorism. We will continue to assure allies and support 

efforts to counter malign activities in Latin America while working to undermine transnational 

criminal networks. We have learned that the best way to deal with competition short of conflict 

is to match the range of tools we have at our disposal to the needs ofthe Ambassadors and 

GCCs. We recently hosted a Senior Leader Seminar focused on special interest aliens that 

involved representatives from USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, Secretary Kelly from the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other members of the IA, and various South and 

Central American Country Teams. We enjoy tremendous collaborative efforts as part of the 

team that provides layered security relative to our southern border and beyond. 

The SOF Advantage 

USSOCOM provides a focused set of unique capabilities to deal with the challenges 

facing our Department and Nation today. Maintaining a forward presence in strategically 

important areas, leveraging established relationships, and identifying and addressing problems 

before they become full blown crises. Our ability to see, understand, and act across geographic 

boundaries is what allows SOF to operate globally at the speed of war, provide value to the 

GCCs, and provide options and decision space to national leadership. Additionally, we have 

increased the lethality, precision and mobility of our forces over time, which assists us in rapidly 

repositioning and Jocusing- providing enhanced options and effects. 

Although SOF are effective across the spectrum of conflict, we are most optimally 

employed "left of bang" pre-crisis. We believe that specialized application ofSOF alongside 

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44 

partner nations, the Joint Force, and the Interagency conducting activities across the spectrum of 

conflict allows us to present options that best serve our national interests. In fact, a critical 

component of our effectiveness in the field is the ability to work with the Services, defense 

agencies, and interagency partners to support forward deployed forces. We have approximately 

30,000 personnel actively engaged in providing support to deployed units in the areas of 

intelligence collection and analysis; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

operations; cyber operations; exploitation activities; and communications and logistics support. 

Transformation: The Next Evolution ofSOF 

While we are fully committed to winning the current fight, we are simultaneously 

working to prepare for the conflicts of tomorrow. We are always searching for improvements 

and relentlessly pursuing our next advantage. Key to this effort is USSOCOM's approach to 

requirements validation and acquisition, which allows us to rapidly field resources to those 

forces actively engaged in the fight. We appreciate Congress' continued resourcing of these 

efforts- l assure you we will continue to maximize the return on that investment. 

Our current budget supports recapitalizing our platforms as well as developing our 

technological capabilities for dealing with near-peer competitors and competition short of armed 

conflict. Programmatically, we remain focused on enhancing Service-provided platforms with 

Major Force Program-11 funds to provide for the unique needs of our force. As always, the 

effectiveness of our investments is highly dependent upon the investment decisions of the 

Services. 

A good example is seen in the success of our critical AC/MC-130J aircraft recapitalization efforts, which include Radio Frequency Countermeasures, Terrain Following 

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45 

Radar, Airborne Mission Networking and Precision Strike Packages. We have taken delivery of 

I 0 new AC-130J Ghostriders and remain on track to declare Initial Operational Capability by the 

end of2017. In our legacy Gunship fleet, we fielded eight up-gunned AC-130W Stinger Irs with 

I 05mm large caliber guns and immediately deployed this enhanced capability to the fight in 

Syria and Iraq. 

To improve our intelligence and analysis capabilities, we have distributed acquisition 

efihrts across the air, ground and maritime domains- particularly for those systems and 

platforms that suppmi operations in remote locations. We are developing and fielding 

interoperable, networked sensors built to enable common operational and intelligence pictures as 

well as feed data into all-source analysis tools. This further assists us in leveraging interagency 

partnerships. 

As previously noted, our effectiveness over the last 15 years does not necessarily equate 

to success against near-peer competitors. We also require urgent investments in capabilities 

necessary for denied battlefields of the future. This includes submersibles, terrain following I 

avoidance and all-weather radar, advanced electronic attack capabilities, countermeasures, and 

precision munitions. We must enhance our effectiveness in partnership with the services. For 

example, we look forward to continuing work with the Department of the Navy to develop and 

enhance new options to support undersea operations- a key SOF capability. This is not a one 

way relationship. Recently the Army leveraged the efforts of our AT &L directorate to determine 

their future ground mobility vehicle. We continue to refine both our tactics and technological 

developments to enhance our man hunting and network defeat capabilities. 

To integrate the advantages of rapidly evolving technology, we are making investments 

that will pay dividends for future mission sets. For example, "deep I machine teaming" will help 

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46 

us mitigate thousands of man-hours spent on sorting through vast sums of data. The analysis of 

publically available information; the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information, 

specifically, JSR data; and sensitive site exploitation, are all wide-open areas for the application 

of this technology. We are pursuing technology which can be applied to open architectures, 

enabling rapid upgrades and integration of commercial on:the-shelf capability to leverage the 

latest advancements in data analytics and machine learning. 

USSOCOM continues to build networks and venues that support innovation in our 

research, development, and acquisition programs. These networks include industJy, academia, 

and other government organizations. The command also continues to support agile acquisition 

with appropriate venues, including SOFWERX our open collaboration facility that has now 

been in operation for over a year and has successfully brought hundreds of non-traditional 

partners together to work on our most challenging problems. 

A key part of the unique capabilities that SOF bring to the fight is the ability to fight in 

contested areas, often leveraging and enhancing the capabilities of indigenous partner forces. 

Accordingly, we continue to invest in ways that allow SOF to assist our partners better: 

command and control; ISR; Building Pattner Capacity (BPC); and Aviation Foreign Internal 

Defense. The emphasis for all partner capabilities is on systems and inJrastructure which is 

organically sustainable. An enhanced ability to leverage local relationships will ultimately help 

us better influence regional outcomes. 

We also continue to invest in safeguarding our networks and communication 

infrastructure. USSOCOM has a unique service-like responsibility to provide all ofSOF with 

networks and communications capability through the SOF Information Environment (SIE). The 

Global Enterprise Operations Center (GEOC) located at USSOCOM HQ manages network 

Page 13 of 19 
47 

operations for over 70,000 SOFNET users around the world, to include over 1,200 deployed 

nodes. The ability to share information across our network- from the unit deployed forward to 

the USSOCOM Headquarters- provides us with a key advantage in dealing with the 

information-rich environment we find ourselves in today. Defending the SIE requires sustained 

investment for cyber defense sensors and tools. 

A continuing key area of concern for SOCOM (cited over our last 5 years of testimony) is 

our reliance on Overseas Contingency Operations funding, or OCO. Since 9/11, we expanded 

the size of om force by almost 75% in order to take on mission-sets that are likely to endure. 

OCO underwrites much of that growth, which remains critical to ensuring SOF readiness. OCO 

represents about 28% of our FY17 budget -triple the rate of OCO reliance among the Services. 

Approximately 90% ofUSSOCOM's OCO funds enduring capabilities, which are applicable to 

the threats beyond the current combat environment. Ultimately, we must reconcile the nature of 

SOF's work, which requires enduring structure and capabilities, with the relatively temporary 

funding achieved through OCO. Migrating this funding to the base budget over time will 

provide SOFa degree of certainty in tomorrow's turbulent security environment that enables us 

to better program for, train, and equip our joint force. 

The Sustainment of SOF 

Our people are our single greatest resource. The goal continues to be to recruit, assess, 

and select the very best, providing them the requisite training and experience, empowering them 

to exercise their initiative and problem solving abilities, while managing them over a potential 

career in SOF. This is underpinned by an ethos and process to build in resiliency and provide the 

best possible care system for service members and their families. 

Page 14 of 19 
48 

It is critical that SOF preserves its high state of full-spectrum readiness in order to 

support enduring, priority tasks while maintaining the ability to surge in support of major 

contingencies. Healthy dwell rates and Personnel Tempo are essential here. Most SOF units are 

employed to their sustainable limit, while some are consistently under that goal. Despite 

growing demand for SOF, we must prioritize the sourcing of these demands as we face a rapidly 

changing security environment. As we work to support the GCCs in addressing the challenges 

they face, we are constantly on guard against overcommitting this relatively small force. 

Another key aspect of sustainment is our dependence on our Service and interagency 

partners. The Services provide the foundation upon which we build our force. This includes 

recruitment, acquisitions, intelligence, mobility, and logistics support- to name just a few. 

Many of the programs we have are based on Service investments and we often point out that a 

major shift in Service priorities will require a reassessment of our own. Our purchasing power 

and our readiness are inextricahly linked. We will continue to work with all of the Services as 

well as Congress to ensure we preserve these foundations. In support of these efforts, we have 

scheduled annual war tighter talks with all of the Services, as well as key interagency partners 

(DIA, NSA, NGA, CIA), to integrate our approach to developing and resourcing the force. 

Our intcroperability with the Services also extends to the operations we conduct. Today 

we support the Joint Force in countering ISIS in Syria and Iraq, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere 

around the world. Examples of our interoperability occur every day, most recently in Sirte, 

Libya, where Special Operators assisted Libyan forces in re-taking the city relying heavily on 

over 450 airstrikes conducted by our Joint Force partners. Similar relationships are routine 

throughout all areas of active hostility, such as with the 5'11 Fleet in the CENT COM AOR and 

multiple service and lA partners in the Philippines, where our SOF Headquarters ensure we 

Page 15 of 19 
49 

remain closely nested with theater service components as an integral component of the Joint 

Force. Today we are more than simply interoperable with the Services ... we are truly 

interdependent. 

W c arc also highly dependent on the capabilities that reside within the defense agencies, 

such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the 

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA). With improvised threats, we continue to see examples of our adversaries taking 

commercial off-the-shelf technologies and manipulating and employing them as weapons as well 

as surveillance systems, such as small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS). The recent 

integration of Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) with DTRA provides us with 

an expanded ability to counter the improvised threats confronting our force today. 

We invest heavily in developing relationships with our interagency partners, as well, such 

as the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Counter Terrorism 

Center, and others. In total, we have 36 Special Operations liaison officers working across 16 

agencies. This is indicative of the importance we place on whole-of~government solutions to the 

problems we all share integrated cffmis being the objective. 

Operational requirements demand that we recruit, assess and select mentally and 

physically resilient SOF who can anticipate, respond, and adapt to any operating environment; 

excel in ambiguous situations; and arc skilled at operating in the human domain in order to deal 

with population-centric conflicts. In addition to rigorous training, SOF require specialized 

education in areas related to our unique mission sets. SOF-specitic education oppmiunities are 

an investment in our people and we will continue to augment Service-provided career 

development programs. A critical component to how we accomplish this is through the efforts of 

Page 16 of 19 
50 

our Joint Special Operations University, or JSOU, which shapes the future strategic environment 

by not only providing specialized joint professional military education through specific 

undergraduate and graduate curriculum, but also through engagement with partner nations 

militaries. It is imperative we continue to provide the most highly trained and educated force to 

support persistent, networked, and distributed GCC operations to advance our nation's interests. 

Futihermore, it is critical that we continuously develop their talent by providing demanding, 

realistic training and placing people in the right jobs at the right times to gain valuable 

experience. In doing so, we empower our people while challenging them to exercise their 

initiative and make difficult decisions. Maintaining this highly trained and experienced force is 

the critical objective it enables everything we do. 

Because USSOCOM is significantly engaged in current operations, we continue to incur 

casualties, along with training injuries and illnesses. Caring for over 6,000 active-duty wounded 

and ill SOF Service Members, our Warrior Care program a peer program to the Service 

Warrior Care programs remains the gold standard for SOF Service Members and families 

whose resiliency has been challenged by a life-altering wound, injury, or illness. Recognized by 

Congress as one ofUSSOCOM's Service-like responsibilities, the USSOCOM Warrior Care 

Program (also known as the Care Coalition) executes our mission of returning wounded, ill, and 

injured SOF personnel to their units, maintaining their experience within the force and 

capitalizing on the immense investment oftime and resources invested in them. The USSOCOM 

Warrior Care Program conserves its Service Members at rates higher than the conventional 

Service programs due to our focus on retention. 

The Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative remains a command 

priority, and we are deeply gratetul for Congress' support for the resources required to execute 

Page 17 of 19 
51 

this effort. The POTFF program enables us to build in physical, psychological, spiritual, and 

social resilience in our service members and their families to cope with the unique challenges of 

this demanding profession. The unique demands placed on SOF requires specialized attention to 

reduce injuries, speed recovery, and assure the overall well-being of our force. With your 

support, we've been able to place professional staff and equipment at our operational units where 

they have paid huge dividends in sustaining our warriors and their families. In partnership with 

academia, we are studying how we can continue to enhance the application of the POTFF's 

holistic approach to improve the effectiveness and sustainment of our force. 

Although the command has made progress in reducing suicides, we still have a great deal 

of work to do. Through our partnerships with the Services and academia, we arc analyzing how 

to better predict and prevent suicidal behaviors. We recently completed an analysis of SOF 

suicides over the past four years and are using what we learned to inform our suicide prevention 

strategy going forward. We will improve suicide prevention training for our military members 

and their families by addressing the underlying cognitive processes that lead to suicides and 

providing enhanced screening of our military members. 

One consequence of our high PERSTEMPO is the challenge it creates for our tarnilies 

(over two-thirds of our force arc married). Ensuring our families are cared for is a necessary 

component of our readiness posture. The Department of Defense as well as the Military Services 

have provided outstanding resources and support for USSOCOM families. I am also deeply 

appreciative of Congress's support in allowing the command to tailor family programs that are 

geared toward meeting the specific needs of our community. This support enabled the command 

to conduct pre and post-deployment programs, SOF unit orientations, and programs that enrich 

marital and parental relationships. This year we are using the pilot family program authority to 

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52 

develop suicide prevention training for families, given we have found that spouses are often the 

first to notice when their partners are struggling. 

Conclusion 

In closing, I would like to emphasize my three priorities for SOCOM now and into the 

future. First, SOCOM is fully committed to winning the current and future fights. Second, we 

must transform our force to be prepared to deal with all future adversaries. Finally, we must 

continue to place the greatest emphasis on selecting, retaining, and empowering our people, and 

sustaining them and their families. 

I would like to thank you for your continued support ofUSSOCOM and our people. As 

we adapt to new roles and challenges, I look forward to sustaining an open dialogue with 

Congress on how we can work together to safeguard America's security interests. 

Page 19 of 19 
53 

General Raymond A. Thomas III 

Commander 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

General Raymond A. Thomas Ill currently serves as the II th Commander of U.S. Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. 

Prior to assuming command ofUSSOCOM, Gen. Thomas served as Commander, Joint 

Special Operations Command (JSOC), Fort Bragg, N.C. 

GEN Thomas' other assignments as a general officer include: Associate Director for 

Military Affairs at the Central Intelligence Agency; Commanding General, NATO Special 

Operations Component Command Afghanistan; Deputy Commanding General, JSOC; 

Deputy Director for Special Operations, The Joint Staff in the Pentagon; Assistant Division 

Commander, 1st Armor Division in Iraq; an Assistant Commanding General, JSOC. 

Prior to being promoted to brigadier general, Gen. Thomas also served as the JSOC Chief 

of Staff and Director of Operations. His other formative and key, joint and special 

operations assignments include: Commander, Joint Task Force- Bravo, Soto Cano, 

Honduras; Commander, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Savannah, Ga.; and 

Commander, B Squadron, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment- Delta, Fort Bragg, 

N.C. 

He is a graduate of the US Army War College, Carlisle, Penn., and the Naval Command 

and Staff College, Newport, R.I. 

Gen. Thomas is a native of Philadelphia, Pa. He attended the United States Military 

Academy at West Point, N.Y., and was commissioned an infantry second lieutenant upon 

graduation in 1980. Gen. Thomas and his wife Barbara have two sons Tony and Michael. 

(Current as of March 2016) 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 2, 2017 

(57) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

General THOMAS. (U) Over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), the combination of Budget Control Act (BCA) caps, our heavy reliance on Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) funding and an extremely high OPTEMPO rate bring USSOCOM 

dangerously close to sinking below a reasonable degree of readiness risk. Impacts 

across USSOCOM can be best summarized as 1) reducing and/or eliminating training and exercises which result in degraded proficiency and operational readiness, 

and 2) degrading C5ISR support which will negatively impact USSOCOM’s ability 

to provide timely and essential mission support to deployed operators and sustainers. 

(U) DETAILS: USSOCOM has only examined potential sequester impacts at strategic levels. The following list is intended to capture probable impacts related to 

readiness reductions, reduced or eliminated growth in selected procurement programs and RDT&E and deferred critical facilities recapitalization on USSOCOM 

Headquarters entities, Components, and Sub-Unified Commands: 

(U) AFSOC: Severe cuts to Flying Hour Program (FHP) will degrade aircrew proficiency and qualifications—impacting safety, as well as slowed growth in RemotelyPiloted Aircraft (RPA), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and full 

motion video (FMV) processing, exploitation & dissemination (PED). 

(U) MARSOC: Unable to fully resource Military Intelligence Program (MIP) in 

support of intelligence collection (e.g., Joint Threat Warning System (JTWS), 

ATLAS STEALTH, Palantir and Hostile Forces Tagging, Tracking and Locating 

(HFTTL) operations). 

(U) NAVSPECWARCOM and USASOC: Reduced or eliminated training and ISR 

support drives high risk and safety/vulnerability issues to current and future deployed operations; results in units requiring additional time and resources above 

what is currently programmed to improve current readiness levels. 

(U) CLASSIFIED Operations: Will adversely impact classified activities. Details 

can be provided upon request. 

(U) HQ, USSOCOM and AT&L: Reduced or eliminated exercises and training on 

various platforms and simulators results in shutdown of both CONUS and 

OCONUS sites drives future redeployment and re-fielding costs upward. Reduced civilian labor and program management office personnel in various headquarters activities that directly support classified USSOCOM missions. 

(U) SUB–UNIFIED Commands: Reduced operating supplies/equipment for deployed operators and possible delays in establishing new teams at deployed locations 

impede relationships and preparation of the environment efforts within the GCC/ 

USSOCOM footprint. A loss in sustained field support capabilities elevates risk levels to the force and diminishes force protection benefits derived from better situational awareness. Reduced, delayed, or deferred critical C4I equipment maintenance 

and lifecycle replacements/upgrades directly impact network operations which increase network latency, degrade communication capabilities and constrain the ability to successfully perform mission essential tasks. Degraded intelligence support 

impacts the ability to provide timely and essential intelligence in support of missions, named operations and objectives. 

(U) In addition to the above impacts to USSOCOM equities, SOF readiness is directly linked to and dependent upon Service funding levels. While an MFP–11 sequester would present challenges, USSOCOM remains more concerned with the sequester impact on the Services’ ability to support SOF. The Services have not yet 

fully identified where they would absorb future budget reductions; therefore, impacts on support to SOF cannot be itemized or assessed. Given the historical impacts and lack of the Services’ ability to absorb reductions, it is highly likely that 

their ability to optimally support SOF will be diminished, further straining an already challenged support structure and eventually affecting SOF operations and 

training in an adverse manner. [See page 14.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 2, 2017 

(61) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK 

Ms. STEFANIK. What recommendations would you make to improve how we conduct building partnership capacity and security force assistance missions, especially 

when trying to train and equip partner forces? Are we investing in developing or 

acquiring tools and technical capabilities that we can share with our partners and 

allies that are both releasable and sustainable from a maintenance and support perspective. 

Ms. WHELAN. The Department greatly appreciates the expanded and consolidated 

security cooperation (SC) authorities in the new chapter 16 of title 10, as enacted 

by the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act. The Department shares the committee’s strong interest in providing capabilities to partners that they can absorb, 

apply, and sustain to support U.S. defense objectives. As we work to implement 

these new authorities, we are implementing a new assessment, monitoring, and 

evaluation (AM&E) policy. This new AM&E effort, along with the new requirements 

for all train and equip programs and activities to include a defense institution building focus, human rights training, and quarterly reporting requirements, will require 

the Department to work with your committee on future resourcing requests. These 

new AM&E efforts will inform additional Department recommendations for further 

improving our SC missions, which we will share with the committee. 

Ms. STEFANIK. What recommendations would you make to improve how we conduct building partnership capacity and security force assistance missions, especially 

when trying to train and equip partner forces? Are we investing in developing or 

acquiring tools and technical capabilities that we can share with our partners and 

allies that are both releasable and sustainable from a maintenance and support perspective. 

General THOMAS. (U) 4. USSOCOM recommends a holistic planning methodology 

to building partner capacity (BPC) that is consistent with a whole-of-government approach and can be executed in the context of other strategic security challenges. 

(U) 4a. Include the Interagency and the country-in-question’s U.S. Embassy Country Team (Office of Defense Cooperation, Defense Attache ́ Office, U.S. Agency for 

International Development, Political Counselor Office, etc.) in the early stages of 

planning to enhance the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and Theater Special Operations Command’s (TSOC) country engagement plans. The Interagency 

and, particularly, the Country Team can provide insights into suitable goals and objectives given a particular partner nation’s capability, capacity, and interests that 

will inform and influence the direction of long range planning. For the long-term 

success of an activity, we must understand our partners’ priorities, capabilities, and 

constraints from the outset. If U.S. planners assume our partners’ needs and desires 

are the same as our own, our expectations will be mismatched and the outcomes 

are unlikely to support U.S. national objectives in the long term. Early inclusion of 

the Country Team and Interagency not only provides key insights to direct planning, but it also permits the TSOC to better nest within the GCC’s theater campaign plan (TCP). At a transregional level, USSOCOM is able to advocate for BPC 

opportunities and benefits that are either unique to development of SOF-peculiar capabilities to support our objectives, or capacity that ultimately benefits the U.S. in 

areas of responsibility outside of the partner’s specific GCC-affiliation. 

(U) 4b. Invest more in the development of foreign defense institutions. A key element of DOD’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is building the capacity of partner 

nations to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. To implement 

this goal, the Under Secretary for Policy uses several security cooperation (SC) and 

security assistance (SA) programs to help partner countries build the capacity of 

their defense ministries. In addition and crucially important is that GCCs and services engage in defense institution building (DIB) in response to the SC focus areas 

in the Guidance for Employment of the Force. DIB includes activities that develop 

accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. Since these institutions will 

ultimately manage and sustain the capabilities we are helping to build, it is important to the success of our efforts that the foreign defense institutions with which 

we engage be accountable, effective, and efficient. USSOCOM relies on OSD, DSCA, 
62 

the Services and GCCs to provide defense institution building measures to complement operational level SOF BPC activities. 

(U) 4c. Utilize prior and routine assessments of ongoing SC activities to ensure 

progress toward goals and objectives is being realized. While SC remains an important instrument of the U.S. government and DOD, one key challenge for policymakers and GCCs is gaining a more complex understanding of the real value of 

those activities geared toward BPC. Assessments of BPC activities have become increasingly important, especially given the current fiscal climate and budgetary limitations, to ensure these activities are meeting their objectives. USSOF assessments 

have informed our decision making for the types of authorities and funding we have 

requested from Congress. 

Ms. STEFANIK. SOCOM has a lot of missions it is responsible for, and has had 

several new ones added to it. Are there any of those missions that should go away 

or be reassigned? 

General THOMAS. (U) 5. There are no missions that should go away or be reassigned. Missions assigned to USSOCOM are appropriate and commensurate with 

our skill set. The only new mission assigned to USSOCOM is the CWMD mission, 

which was directed by the President and Secretary of Defense and the mission 

transfer has been comprehensively coordinated with stakeholders from U.S. Strategic Command, the Joint Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense and our interagency 

partners, to include required transfer of resources. We have a process that 

prioritizes the many requirements that we receive for SOF capabilities in support 

of GCC requirements. I provide my best military advice to the SECDEF on which 

requirements I can meet, based on capacity, through the Global Force Management 

and Global Synchronization of SOF processes. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Are there policy concerns with adding responsibility of Global synchronization of all DOD activities to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction (CWMD) to a force that already bears unprecedented global demand of 

its resources? 

With this added responsibility, are you aware if there are moves at DOD to provide additional authorities to SOCOM to counter the five current and enduring 

threats of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), Russia, Iran, North Korea and 

China? 

Ms. WHELAN. There are no policy concerns with adding CWMD responsibilities to 

USSOCOM. The Department continually reviews our authorities to determine if 

there are gaps. We recently completed an authority review based on the President’s 

request to update the defeat ISIS strategy. We are working with the Office of Management and Budget to ensure the Department’s authorities are matched to current 

strategies. 

Mr. FRANKS. Considering Russia’s investment and continued increase in their own 

special forces totaling approximately 62,000 and likely growing, can we sustain our 

continued dependency on our SOF without further investment in personnel? 

General THOMAS. (U) 1. Under current mission prioritization, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) personnel growth is not required to off-set perceived numerical 

superiority by Russian Special Forces. Further, countering Russian SOF activities 

is not a U.S. unilateral action. USSOF, combined and synchronized with NATO allied and other partner nation SOF, with the global reach and complementary capabilities these alliances and partnerships provide, far outweigh any perceived numerical advantage. Any increase in investment in USSOF should focus upon force modernization and enabler support growth and technical evolution. Steady-state activities below the level of conflict represent the greatest SOF challenge against peer 

competitors and continuing to invest in advancing those capabilities is the best way 

to continue to outpace competitors. 

Mr. FRANKS. How should we counter the degradation of skill sets and training 

which ensure the dominance of our SOF community with their current OPTEMPO 

without decreasing deployments and allowing for necessary time to maintain critical 

proficiency in language skills, cultural training, and professional development? 

Typically Special Forces are inserted in order to minimize the U.S. footprint in 

a given area—only to end up increasing U.S. military presence in that area; would 

it make sense to reassess the conditions which dictate SOF requirements and the 

value of adding a larger more broadly specialized element, as opposed to inserting 

SOF? 

General THOMAS. (U) 2a. Although current demand for SOF is high and sustained 

OPTEMPO creates significant challenges to our force, USSOCOM has not observed 
63 

a degradation of skill sets or training that puts our dominance on the current battlefield at risk. Attaining and maintaining proficiency across the SOF enterprise in 

language, regional expertise and culture (LREC), professional development, and advanced SOF skills takes dedicated dwell time focused on training and remains a priority for USSOCOM. We continue to deliver highly skilled, proficient, and capable 

SOF ready to meet the demands of Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC). 

USSOCOM continuously explores and expands ways of reducing personnel tempo 

(PERSTEMPO) while maximizing training and professional development opportunities. Use and expansion of modeling and simulation and live, virtual, and constructive environments (LVC) ensures we continue to provide trained, educated, and combat ready SOF while reducing the impacts of high OPTEMPO. [J7–T&E] 

(U) 2b. USSOCOM and its Service Components manage OPTEMPO impacts 

through adherence to established force generation models and force element sustainable capacities. Limiting deployments in this manner provides units, generally 

speaking, between 12 and 18 months to reset and train to full spectrum readiness. 

This has not always been the case, but has received renewed emphasis and is closely monitored. [J32] 

(U) 2c. Combatant Command requirements for SOF are scrutinized at the Theater 

Special Operations Commands prior to submission to the Combatant Commands 

and at USSOCOM against Special Operations Forces Mission Criteria, the first 

being: Is it an appropriate mission or activity for Special Operations. While 

USSOCOM cannot dictate what requirements are submitted, we have emphasized 

that the Theater Special Operations Commands should request conventional forces 

and consider the potential for partner nation sourcing. On multiple occasions, 

USSOCOM has requested that the Joint Staff consider conventional force sourcing 

of requests for SOF. [J32] 

Æ