A National Defense University Special Report 

Affordable Defense Capabilities 

for 

Future NATO Missions 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

February 23, 2010 
ii
iii

 

This Special Report was produced by the National Defense University’s Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy to support the NATO Strategic Concept 

process. The study was directed by Hans Binnendijk in cooperation with Geoffrey 

Hoon. It has significant contributions by Geoffrey Hoon, Charles Barry, and 

Richard Kugler. It is the result of probing workshops with academic experts and 

detailed discussions with NATO and U.S. officials, including extensive 

consultations with the National Security Council staff and U.S. Department of 

Defense. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of the NATO Group of Experts, the National 

Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
iv
v

Contents 

Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ 1 

Part One 

NATO Future Missions and Capability Initiatives ......................................................................... 5 

I. Reassurance for Article 5 Missions......................................................................................... 5

A. Conventional Reassurance Initiatives ................................................................................ 5 

B. Strategic Reassurance Initiatives........................................................................................ 7 

C. Naval Situational Awareness Initiatives ............................................................................ 8 

II. Resilience for Transatlantic Homeland Security.................................................................... 9 

A. Counterterrorism Initiatives ............................................................................................. 10 

B. Consequence Management Initiatives.............................................................................. 10 

C. Cyber Defense Initiatives................................................................................................. 11

III. Responsibility to Undertake Expeditionary Crisis Response and Comprehensive Approach 

Stability Operations .................................................................................................................. 12 

A. Deployability and Usability Initiatives ............................................................................ 13 

B. C4ISR Interoperability Initiatives .................................................................................... 15 

C. Comprehensive Approach Initiatives............................................................................... 16 

D. SOF Interoperability Initiatives ....................................................................................... 17 

IV. Reengagement in Defense Diplomacy................................................................................ 18 

A. Partner Interoperability Initiative..................................................................................... 19 

B. Military Training and Defense Reform Initiatives........................................................... 21 

C. Military Cooperation with Former Adversaries Initiatives.............................................. 22 

Part Two 

Defense Reforms and Efficiencies................................................................................................ 25 

Force Structure Economies....................................................................................................... 26 

Reform Measure 1: National Force Restructuring................................................................ 26 

Reform Measure 2: New-Era Rationalization of Force Structures....................................... 26 

Better Use of National Funds.................................................................................................... 26 

Reform Measure 3: Common Funding and Pooling Arrangements for Equipment. ............ 26 

Reform Measure 4: Common Funding for Operations......................................................... 27 

Multinational Effectiveness ...................................................................................................... 27 

Reform Measure 5: Networked Forces................................................................................. 27 

Reform Measure 6: Force Interoperability. .......................................................................... 27 

More Efficient, Effective Commands....................................................................................... 28 

Reform Measure 7: NATO Command Structure Reforms. .................................................. 28 

Reform Measure 8: Headquarters Reform............................................................................ 28 

Support from Beyond NATO.................................................................................................... 28 

Reform Measure 9: Division of Missions between NATO and the EU. .............................. 28 

Reform Measure 10: Greater Armaments and Industrial Cooperation................................. 29 
vi
1

Executive Summary 

The new NATO Strategic Concept offers an important opportunity to strengthen 

efforts to reform and modernize NATO institutionally and develop new defense 

capabilities for the Alliance. To achieve these aims, NATO must begin a separate 

transformational process to assess current military capabilities and pursue future 

requirements over a 5–10 year period. The goal should be to develop specific sets of 

initiatives and reforms for approval by Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon 

Summit in November 2010. This process should be informed by the development of the 

new Strategic Concept and run parallel to it. In a rapidly changing security 

environment, postponing such a process until after the Strategic Concept is completed 

would increase risks for the Alliance. This report is designed to stimulate that parallel 

process. 

Given declining defense resources in a time of recession, the case for new defense 

capabilities and reforms must be compelling. New measures must take full advantage 

of efficiencies, common approaches, national specialties, and existing capacity. They 

also must tie to specific NATO missions that flow from the emerging Strategic Concept. 

And they must be approved and supported by Alliance Heads of State and 

Government. 

The four insights contained in the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Multiple 

Futures Project 2030 translate into four enduring Alliance missions, each reflecting a 

priority interest of Alliance members. These NATO missions of the future can be 

conceptualized as the “Four Rs” discussed below and illustrated on page four. 

Reassurance of the Article 5 commitment to act against an armed attack; 

Resilience against non-Article 5 attacks, nontraditional challenges, or 

humanitarian disasters that require some contribution from military forces; 

A sense of shared Responsibility that all NATO members will contribute to crisis 

management and crisis response when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agrees 

to undertake any mission, including especially expeditionary missions at 

strategic distance, and; 

Reengagement with partners and other nations beyond Alliance territory to shape 

the environment through defense diplomacy, military cooperation, and building 

and leveraging existing partner capacity. 

NATO's current capabilities are deficient in all four of these mission areas. Initiatives 

to improve capabilities are underway under the lead of ACT in Norfolk to deal with the 

2009 Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) 50 Priority Shortfall Areas, but they are ad hoc 

rather than concerted. Absent collective resolve and deliberate steps to remedy these 

deficiencies, NATO’s ability to meet future requirements is questionable. 

The 13 initiatives set out in part one of this paper build on existing NATO plans and 

programs to provide higher-leverage ways to improve future capabilities for these 
2

missions. Each of these initiatives makes sense on its own merits; together they add up 

to a powerful, coherent whole. Not all will be implemented, but each should be 

reviewed for its merits and affordability. The new Strategic Concept is the best 

opportunity to take NATO capabilities to a higher plateau and prepare the Allies to 

meet new missions. 

Most of the 13 initiatives presented in this report revolve around five sets of 

capabilities that should be considered NATO’s highest priorities: 

First, NATO’s military commands must reacquire and demonstrate a joint force 

capability to perform the core Alliance mission of collective defense under Article 5. 

This involves mainly a reorientation of commands and staffs toward planning, training, 

and exercising in support of Article 5. 

Second, to be useable, forces offered to NATO by members or partners for any 

mission within and beyond NATO territory must be both deployable and sustainable. 

These capabilities are fundamental in an enlarged Alliance with reduced forces such 

that any force must anticipate moving hundreds or thousands of kilometers to perform 

either Article 5 or non-Article 5 missions. Hence, the capabilities to deploy and sustain 

are central to NATO’s future. 

Third, common command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities are more essential than ever before 

to enabling the forces of members and partners to operate together. These capabilities 

should be the highest priority for future investment by members as well as NATO itself. 

Fourth, several years after the concept of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) was 

widely accepted as the best approach to conflict resolution, NATO efforts to operate 

with civilian partners remain disjointed. Therefore, second only to C4ISR, a major area 

of investment must be to make CA the central operational concept for all missions. 

Finally, the Alliance must develop a more robust “defense diplomacy” strategy 

using the full range of tools at its disposal designed to shape the environment by 

strengthening partnerships, stabilizing troubled areas, and developing cooperative 

approaches with past adversaries. 

NATO begins deliberations on a new Strategic Concept and efforts to stimulate 

future capabilities development at a time when all members face a global financial crisis 

and unprecedented costs of ongoing operations. Only three members of the Alliance are 

able to meet all four of the goals intended to give NATO the capabilities it needs to 

perform the missions assigned. Those four goals are to: devote two percent of GDP to 

defense spending; devote 20 percent of defense spending to investment; and maintain 

50 percent of operational land forces deployable and 10 percent sustainable. Strong 

measures need to be taken at the Lisbon Summit to reinforce these goals and to halt the 

near freefall in defense spending Alliance-wide. 

Given these resource realities, the critical three pillars of any NATO plan to realize 

the aforementioned high-priority capabilities will be implementing reforms, achieving 

greater efficiencies, and finding additional multilateral solutions. 
3

Part two of this paper explores 10 reforms that should be considered for greater 

NATO use. The most important of those reforms will be maximizing common funding 

for priority NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) C4ISR initiatives and providing 

greater common funding for intensive military operations. This will be a particularly 

difficult challenge given that the NSIP is currently overspent by more than half a billion 

Euros. This fund will need to be replenished and prioritized. 

Other concepts that promise efficiencies are: restructuring national forces to meet 

new requirements; developing new pooling arrangements and greater multinational 

acquisition; creating greater interoperability for equipment, doctrine, and training; 

encouraging greater intelligence sharing; rationalizing niche force contributions; 

creating both cooperation and a division of labor between NATO and the EU; 

streamlining NATO’s command structure and reforming headquarters processes; 

stimulating greater industrial cooperation; and building capacity with partner nations 

and institutions. New investment is equally important to the Alliance. If the twin pillars 

of greater efficiencies and new investments are supported by all members, NATO will 

provide defense and security to each member at substantially lower cost. 

If the 13 capabilities initiatives suggested in this paper are to be adopted, the new 

Defense Planning Process (DPP) welcomed at the 2009 Strasbourg-Kehl summit must be 

fully implemented and further honed. That means NATO and member nations must 

work toward greater overall planning synergy and capabilities transparency, ultimately 

in a single document that addresses military and non-military capabilities requirements, 

national force and resource targets, shortfall solutions, and risk assessment. Creating a 

joint NATO-EU capabilities mapping process with DPP and European Defense Agency 

cooperation would also be constructive. 

ACT’s role with respect to defense planning must necessarily become more salient in 

order to energize the process for the long term. While Allied Command Operations 

(ACO) identifies operational requirements, it is ACT’s role to develop requirements and 

identify what capabilities are needed to fulfill them within the DPP. Therefore, ACT 

should be responsible for overseeing the implementation of most of the initiatives 

suggested in this report. It should be the advocate and engine for new capabilities 

within NATO. New authorities and additional resources for ACT would be required. 

Leading the Alliance in lessons learned, doctrine development, training development, 

and education would be among its most powerful tools. ACT would also promote the 

military efficiencies and reforms needed to develop these capabilities in a resourceconstrained environment. 
4
5

Part One

NATO Future Missions and Capability Initiatives 

I. Reassurance for Article 5 Missions 

Deterrence and, should deterrence fail, defense of NATO territory has always been 

the core mission of the Alliance, and that has not changed. Preparedness for Article 5 

missions must be appropriate and apparent across every basic function of military 

enterprise, including training, exercising, planning, logistics, intelligence, and 

command. This has not been the case since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps most 

critical for an alliance that has transformed from maintaining a high level of readiness 

against a specific adversary to coping with emerging, diffuse threats, NATO must 

periodically demonstrate its capabilities to mobilize, deploy, and sustain forces across 

the strategic distances of NATO territory. These are essential and readily perishable 

skill sets for commands and staffs of all military forces, whether intended for land, air, 

maritime, space, or cyberspace missions. They require sustained attention by all Allies 

at all levels, military and political. NATO Article 5 preparedness has been called into 

question because of smaller forces, shrinking budgets, and pressing military tasks. To 

reassure Allies that the core mission can be executed successfully if required, NATO 

must redirect an appropriate level of effort toward maintaining the capacity to act on a 

NAC decision under Article 5. Reestablishing Article 5 preparedness must be 

undertaken openly and comprehensively, addressing the entire Alliance area. 

Article 5 protection requires continuous early warning as well as more robust 

situational awareness and strategic assessment capacities, plus new capabilities to 

extend operations well beyond the territorial boundaries of the Alliance, especially in 

the maritime domain, as well as in space and cyberspace. 

This section makes specific proposals to provide the capabilities for the Article 5 

mission area through wise use of existing resources and careful targeting of limited 

future investments. 

A. Conventional Reassurance Initiatives 

1. Create a revitalized, NAC-centric crisis management system. Allies would be reassured 

by a revitalized NAC-centric crisis management system for Articles 4 and 5 exercised on 

an annual basis. The NAC crisis management system has not yet been modernized, 

resourced, or prioritized as it should for an Alliance responsible for managing the full 

spectrum of crises that may emerge in the 21st Century. The NAC’s crisis management 

role should be revitalized and exercised, including Article 5 scenarios. NATO should 

hold annual crisis management exercises at the political level, focusing on declaration of 

alert measures in response to terrorism, possible use of WMD, or other 21st-century 

threats. NATO’s crisis management focus would demonstrate its relevance and 

readiness to address and respond to all crises. 
6

2. Create a new NATO Strategic Assessment Capability. In a fast-changing world, 

NATO has a better opportunity to manage crises and head off military confrontation if 

it not only has early intelligence on a building crisis, but also can assess the strategic 

impact and direction of that crisis. These capabilities must be developed through an 

institutionalized rather than an ad hoc process. NATO should create a Strategic 

Assessment Capability made up of intelligence, regional, and operations experts. This 

group should be charged with identifying crises early, suggesting courses of action, and 

stimulating discussion of developing crises in the NAC. This capability would be 

enhanced if nations contributed their best intelligence officers to NATO. 

3. Make permanent the reestablishment of routine, generic, regional Article 5 planning and 

exercising. Modeling and simulation technologies, map exercises, distributed computerbased exercises, and command post exercises should be the main methods; periodic 

field and fleet exercises also should be included. Given the strategic distances over 

which most forces must deploy to meet any Article 5 scenario, Article 5 and non-Article 

5 deployability have merged into a similar requirements profile. Restoring Article 5 

preparedness should be consistent with well-conceived mobilization criteria and the 

geopolitical reality that, in current conditions, there is no need to restore threat-based 

planning. 

4. Reorganize Multinational Corps Northeast (MNCNE) to create a Collective Defense 

Planning Staff (CDPS) directly under SACEUR. A standing CDPS would include robust 

joint staff representation. NATO member participation beyond the present three 

members in MNCNE (DA, GE, PL) should be encouraged, perhaps to include the 

United States, UK, FR, TU, NO, RO, CA, and Baltic members. The CDPS would stay in 

Poland, but its focus should be on contingency and exercise planning as well as 

coherent readiness levels for Article 5 missions throughout the NATO area and in all 

domains—a genuine joint operations, multinational planning staff. A key function of 

CDPS exercise planning should be to further interoperability. 

5. Make the NATO Response Force (NRF) the Article 5 first response force. The NRF has 

always been advertised as a force for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. Yet its 

Article 5 utility remains undeveloped, and its future existence is in danger. The NRF 

should be the central joint force exercise participant when Article 5 exercises are 

conducted. This proposal is not that the NRF be excused from crisis response missions, 

but that it should focus much more visibly on Article 5 operations in terms of planning 

and exercising. Allies should also consider designating an element of the NRF as a 

standing, ready force for immediate response, akin to the former ACE Mobile ForceLand (AMF-L). 

6. Create a long-term NATO Baltic air-policing requirement. NATO nations currently 

rotate responsibilities to provide air policing for the Baltic States. This ongoing program 

should be made a permanent NATO operation and enlarged as necessary. 

7. Provide coordinated military assistance to the Baltic States. NATO member military 

assistance efforts in all three states should be tracked closely by NATO, rationalized, 

and coordinated, where beneficial, to reduce redundancies and optimize resource 
7

effects. NATO should map out a prioritized infrastructure investment strategy focused 

on border states to improve their reception capacities and overall Article 5 

preparedness. As a key aspect of military assistance and mentoring, as well as 

reassurance, the United States should maintain current U.S. force levels in Europe to 

assist allies and exercise with them for Article 5 missions. Assistance could be shaped 

by establishing planning models and simulation exercises that would focus on Article 5. 

B. Strategic Reassurance Initiatives 

1. Maintain a credible nuclear deterrent posture consistent with the need to reassure Allies. 

The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil has led over the decades to 

several benefits for the Alliance. It has provided strategic stability and a strong 

deterrent posture against potential attack. It has reassured America’s Allies that their 

security is ultimately coupled to the extended deterrence provided by America’s 

strategic nuclear arsenal. It has created a system of nuclear consultations and burden 

sharing that has been critical to Alliance confidence and solidarity. And it has 

discouraged the ambitions of the Alliances’ non-nuclear members to acquire their own 

nuclear capability. 

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has reduced the number of its 

tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe by well over 95 percent. Now there is a new 

effort to reduce the legacy nuclear arsenal to even lower numbers or to zero. This effort 

is taking place at a time when several Allies are questioning the credibility of Article 5, 

when Russia is presenting a more assertive nuclear doctrine and is rejecting efforts to 

reduce its “sub-strategic” nuclear systems, when the risk of nuclear proliferation from 

Iran is great, and when some other Allies are considering reducing or abandoning their 

participation in nuclear deterrence. The risk that this situation presents is that some 

NATO nations will abandon their participation in nuclear burden sharing, while others 

will lose confidence in extended nuclear deterrence and possibly develop their own 

nuclear weapons capabilities. That combination could reduce the credibility of NATO’s 

nuclear deterrent posture and increase proliferation risks. Questions relating to 

readiness, modernization, surety, and security of nuclear weapons will need to be 

addressed. But NATO is now near or at the minimum deterrence required for the 

current international environment. Further reductions or consolidation could have 

negative consequences for Alliance cohesion. If further reductions should take place, 

they should be in the context of an arms control agreement with Russia. 

2. Develop contingency plans for an Article 5 deterrence regime for states that proliferate.

One example of this requirement is Iran. Should Iran continue with its efforts to build 

nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities, the Alliance will need to consider 

a deterrence regime, including missile defenses, designed to dissuade Iran from using 

that capability against Alliance members. This will require both conventional and 

strategic options. A NATO declaratory policy may be required. 

3. Expand NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) 

architecture to include territorial defenses and the rapid incorporation of the U.S. Standard 
8

Missile 3 (SM3) into the integrated test bed. An expanded ALTBMD system, incorporating 

all appropriate national and NATO systems within an integrated early warning and 

response network, should be capable of protecting not only deployed forces but all 

NATO territory and populations against an Iranian missile threat. NATO should 

expand the ALTBMD system to include upper layer capabilities and have the system in 

place when U.S. land-based SM3 deployments begin in 2015. NATO should keep Russia 

and other partners apprised and seek maximize feasible international cooperation. As 

soon as technology is available, the United States should integrate ascent phase 

intercept systems into the European territorial missile defense architecture via the 

NATO ALTBMD Integrated Test Bed (ITB). NATO Allies should be invited to 

participate in SM3 development, as Japan has done. 

4. Assure NATO access to space. NATO operations, both conventional and nuclear, 

demand assured access to space. NATO’s SATCOM Post 2000 program should 

accelerate progress toward realization of its extreme high frequency (EHF) capability. 

Given its dependency on leased national and international commercial satellites, NATO 

should sponsor an Alliance study of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of members’ 

systems. It should consult with the 13 members that have national space programs and 

seek new agreements for maximum NATO access to national ISR information. Allies 

should be encouraged to rationalize their space capability for complementarity and 

appropriate redundancy. NATO should capitalize on the emphasis placed on military 

space missions in France’s Defense and Security White Paper. It should develop a 

comprehensive Alliance communications and ISR space policy to determine its longterm, defense-related space requirements. 

C. Naval Situational Awareness Initiatives 

1. Enhance maritime situational awareness throughout the NATO area and beyond. 

Changing risks around the periphery of the NATO area and in the High North, Persian 

Gulf, Indian Ocean, and other areas call for a new level of sophisticated, persistent, and 

secure maritime situational awareness. ACT’s Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) 

programs and the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Center on Crete 

should be fully resourced. As an extension of current efforts, the NAC should task ACT 

to develop a strategic surveillance concept to harmonize diverse capabilities 

investments: space, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), 

land-based radars, surface and subsurface vessels, and robotic systems. NATO should 

agree on specific surveillance mission areas that underpin Article 5: pirate attacks on 

sovereign vessels, WMD proliferation, terrorist activities, and risks to energy platforms. 

NATO’s new AGS capability at Sigonella, Sicily, could provide the baseline for a NATO 

wide-area maritime surveillance capability. 

2. Integrate NATO and EU maritime operations. Enter into discussions to identify 

missions for integrated maritime operations, such as anti-piracy, search and rescue 

(SAR), counterterrorism, counter-trafficking, and countermine. Determine the potential 

to share common NATO-EU support requirements and potential sources for maritime 
9

sustainment, medical, intelligence, and command and control arrangements. Finally, 

look for interoperability solutions for, e.g., secure communications, replenishment 

procedures, and operational cooperation. 

3. Enhance shared intelligence. NATO should set more extensive goals for intraAlliance sharing of information about ongoing ship operations, intelligence, and after 

action reports (AAR). It should rapidly disseminate sensor information across ACO 

from all surface, undersea, aerial, and space platforms. NATO should open an EUNATO intelligence network for maritime operations and develop an EU-NATO 

common intelligence operating picture based on concepts of time sensitivity and need 

to share. 

II. Resilience for Transatlantic Homeland Security 

Our security can no longer be defined only in terms of the defense of territory. 

Terrorist attacks and disasters endanger every element of our societies: people, 

commerce, communications and information, critical infrastructure, and vital resources. 

These risks cannot be ignored by NATO, even where the first line of defense falls to 

members. NATO must stand ready to supplement efforts of members to prevent 

attacks, mitigate consequences, and help reconstitute damaged or destroyed systems 

throughout NATO territory. 

NATO’s tasks in this area are, first, to assure the resilience of its own systems for 

cyberspace, energy infrastructure, and force protection at home. Second, the Alliance 

must be able to use its capabilities to share information, intelligence, and early warning 

(e.g., CBRN detection) with member agencies responsible for civilian response. Third, 

NATO should have contingency plans, developed in concert with members, to 

supplement national consequence management capacity with NATO-owned or 

mobilizable assets for transport, communications, crisis management, medical, 

engineering, and other functions of disaster recovery or incident response. Finally, the 

crosscutting networks of national agencies engaged in various aspects of homeland 

security should be encouraged to use NATO as a forum to pursue coordinated “whole 

of government” approaches. 

The new Strategic Concept should also clarify the Alliance mission and the 

capabilities required to assist members in energy security. A bold Alliance plan would 

define a comprehensive role in maintaining secure energy supplies consistent with 

member capabilities and the roles of other international agencies and organizations, 

particularly the EU and the International Energy Agency (IEA). The Alliance role 

cannot stop at securing the fuel NATO needs for its own operations; it should include 

contributing to the security of maritime energy supply routes, critical energy 

infrastructure protection, and preparing for consequence management, with particular 

regard to undersea pipelines, vulnerable port facilities, and at-sea platforms. Working 

with the EU, the Alliance should support international and regional cooperation on 

energy security through Partnership for Peace (PfP) and other partnership 

arrangements. NATO should also include energy-related factors in its information 
10

fusion and intelligence sharing programs. Internally, NATO should examine and 

upgrade its own jet fuel pipelines and storage facilities and further analyze its roles in 

all energy-related areas, such as conservation and alternative energy for NATO 

systems. 

A. Counterterrorism Initiatives 

1. Expand NATO’s Defense against Terrorism (DAT) program. Grow DAT from its 

current focus on 10 lead-nation technology programs to include collaborative research 

on investigative techniques, deterrence, social networking, human behavioral modeling, 

and other areas. These expanded initiatives could be developed and managed under the 

Defense against Terrorism COE (DATCOE) in Ankara. As part of this effort, DATCOE 

should link these programs to members’ national counterterrorism experts by 

constructing a secure, NATO-wide counterterrorism network for real-time knowledge 

sharing. NATO should endorse the position that counterterrorism is mainly a national 

law enforcement and investigative mission for security services. However, NATO 

should define a supporting role in the areas described above, especially in the 

protection of critical infrastructure also used by NATO for such mission-related 

Alliance operations as deployment and sustainment. Airfields, seaports, and rail and 

pipeline networks could fall into this category. 

2. Strengthen counterproliferation initiatives. NATO should reenergize its 1999 WMD 

Initiative, confirmed at Prague in 2002, intended to commit allies to develop the 

capabilities to respond to WMD threats. The Alliance should expand and accelerate the 

work of its Science for Peace and Security (SPS) projects directed at the detection of 

atomic and chemical materials to incorporate the deployment of detection technologies. 

Other SPS programs can be scaled back to allow for expansion in this area. Since all 

NATO members have joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), NATO should 

endorse the PSI and consider hosting exercises to prevent smuggling of WMD materials 

in Alliance-patrolled waters. These projects should invite collaboration with partners, in 

particular Russia. 

3. Establish a counterterrorism intelligence cell within the Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) 

Molesworth. NATO should define a specific sub-agency within IFC Molesworth with a 

broad mandate and dedicated to counterterrorism intelligence sharing. 

B. Consequence Management Initiatives 

1. Strengthen WMD consequence management capabilities. NATO should prioritize 

exercising its headquarters, subordinate elements, and relevant agencies in capitals in 

response to WMD events and consequence management. The Senior Civil Emergency 

Planning Committee (SCEPC) and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination 

Center (EADRCC) are already engaged in an exercise regime that required sustained 

investment. NATO should designate prepositioned response packages and identify 

military requirements for response capabilities in an expanded version of the Defense 

Planning Process. Parallel to these initiatives, ACT and ACO should organize generic 
11

consequence management exercises to examine how forces must adapt to non-combat 

missions. Finally, NATO should review its Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) to 

determine whether they adequately cover force protection requirements for all WMD 

scenarios. 

2. Create a NATO-EU Joint Civil Emergency Planning Center (NATO-EU JCEPC).

NATO should study the potential to contribute the International Staff’s CEPD to the 

creation of a joint NATO-EU center for civil emergency response. A JCEPC would also 

serve as a consequence management center. It should be designed to accommodate 

representatives of the UN, EU, and appropriate external agencies, such as WHO. Other 

capability initiatives NATO should explore include conducting joint NATO-EU 

planning and simulations to develop consequence management interoperability goals 

and compiling a force capabilities list for civil emergency response. The JCEPC should 

also develop NATO and EU concepts for assistance during international responses to 

pandemics. 

C. Cyber Defense Initiatives 

1. Strengthen NATO’s network defense capability. NATO’s primary responsibility in 

cyber defense is to assure the protection of its own networks. Efforts to expand the 

capabilities of the NATO Computer Incident Response Center (NCIRC) are a crucial 

part of this broad effort. NATO should invest in the fullest complement of incident 

response teams, expert skills training, and the most up-to-date cyber defense 

technological resources. In addition, NATO should develop a continuity plan to 

prioritize information assurance across NATO systems and work with nations to ensure 

the prioritization of national systems linked to NATO communications and information 

systems (CIS). Finally, NATO should determine how to develop internal processes for 

rapid cyber defense operational decisionmaking that can be at least as responsive as its 

well-established air defense decision procedures (where rapid decisions are also critical 

to defense). 

2. Set up a NATO member/partner early warning cyber defense network. Given the great 

speed of cyber attacks, NATO should establish and exercise cyber early warning 

notification to all commands and agencies and dissemination to capitals. Early warning 

messages sent to the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) should be pushed with equal 

urgency down to all commands and deployed units. NATO should go further and seek 

MOUs to broaden early warning networks to ICI, MD, and global partners, in 

particular, those with forces deployed on NATO operations. 

3. Establish a world class CND training center at the Comprehensive Cyber Defense Center 

of Excellence (CCD-COE) in Estonia. After the full accreditation of the CCD-COE in 2008, 

NATO should take the next step. Through robust education and training, the CCD-COE 

should be among the best cyber centers globally and should spread its knowledge and 

expertise in computer network defense across NATO and to members and partners. 

ACT’s role with regard to COEs, while honoring their national basis, should be 

characterized by greater engagement, guidance, and collaboration. ACT should create a 
12

COE network to share knowledge and lessons learned and become a reachback 

reservoir of readily available skills for ACO and all deployed forces. 

4. Draw on the United States Cyber Command (following its stand-up) and other national 

expertise to review NATO cyber defense techniques and training. U.S. Cyber Command has a 

deep reservoir of effective techniques for defending against cyber attacks and reducing 

their impacts. It should evaluate NATO’s current defenses and recommend ways to 

strengthen them. NATO should tap into the new Cyber Command’s expertise. Other 

members also have invested in the development of cyber defense expertise that should 

be accessed to inform and collaborate with NATO. 

5. Exercise without the network. Exercises might be conducted periodically during 

which Alliance commands or agencies operate without key networks or with highly 

degraded networks. 

III. Responsibility to Undertake Expeditionary Crisis Response and 

Comprehensive Approach Stability Operations 

Allies expect the burden of military operations to be generally shared by most if not 

all members whenever the NAC agrees to act. This is the essence of collective defense 

and security: that there is value added and lower cost and risk in acting together rather 

than alone when collective interests are determined to be at stake. Nonetheless, due to 

limited military capabilities, constrained financial resources, or for political reasons, 

some Allies find themselves shouldering responsibilities unevenly, which causes 

problems at home for those bearing the highest cost and casualties. At least on the 

military capabilities side, there are steps NATO can take to overcome some obstacles to 

the commitment of forces. In broad terms, the one obstacle NATO must address is 

current rules for assigning the costs of operations. The Alliance should agree to an 

expansion of eligibility rules for common funding for selected operations, in particular 

with regard to NRF operational deployments. If operations cannot be commonly 

funded in full, NATO should look for additional phases or functions that can be 

commonly funded, such as deployment cost, logistics center operations, or no-cost 

support from Alliance agencies like NATO Consultation, Control and Command 

Agency (NC3A) to help sustain deployed national systems. 

Preparing NATO forces for expeditionary crisis response and warfighting missions 

will require continuing efforts to modernize European forces with C4ISR networks, new 

weapon systems, modern precision-strike munitions, WMD defense assets, logistic 

support assets, mobility assets, and other capabilities. Such ongoing European 

programs as acquiring new ground weapons, fighter aircraft, and naval combatants 

contribute importantly to this enterprise and should be continued in the coming years. 

NATO will need joint forces that can not only deploy rapidly to distant areas but also 

perform high-tech combat operations in demanding situations. This will require a 

capacity by NATO ground, air, and naval forces to employ strike, maneuver, and 

related operations in decisive, effects-based ways against well-armed opponents. 
13

Simultaneously, NATO will need combat and support forces capable of carrying out 

robust stability operations that include demanding stabilization, reconstruction, and 

counterinsurgency missions. Building adequate capability in both areas—modern 

combat operations and stability operations—is a core military challenge facing NATO 

and should be a key focal point of NATO headquarters and national defense ministries. 

Progress has been slow in recent years; it needs to accelerate if future NATO forces are 

to possess the full spectrum of military capabilities that will be needed in Europe as 

well as distant areas. 

A. Deployability and Usability Initiatives 

1. Strengthen NATO's High Readiness Forces (HRF). NATO should update its criteria 

for HRF to provide a valid profile not only of a unit’s readiness, but also the readiness 

of the associated assets on which it depends for deployment and sustainment in theater 

over the extent of its mission window. While nations identify HRF units by category, 

NATO has no way of tracking the actual readiness over time of forces designated as 

HRF in the DPP. Moreover, the readiness of essential transport and logistic units and 

stockage is not tracked and integrated. An initiative to strengthen the reliability of HRF 

designation is critical. This includes knowing the force readiness, training status, 

mission preparedness, and C4ISR network integration capacity of major HRF forces. It 

also means knowing these same preparedness factors for the operational enablers, 

deployment assets, and logistic units that are essential to the overall usability of major 

forces. Scarce investment funds should focus on improving the highest category HRF 

forces and expanding their number and diversity as needed. The goal should be a better 

prepared, enlarged, and more diversified pool of HRF forces and capabilities that 

can meet Alliance requirements for deployability and usability. 

2. Create a NATO Deployment Agency (NDA). Such an agency, located at Mons for 

close consultation with and support of SACEUR, would take responsibility for 

consolidating all Alliance-level aspects of rapid deployment (plans; transportation, 

logistic, and CIS arrangements; resources, etc.). The NDA would facilitate deployment 

for allies with limited capabilities. It would work with member staffs and network with 

relevant NATO centers and agencies. The NDA should have established expertise in 

aerial refueling and at-sea replenishment. It should have the highest competence in 

strategic lift across all transport modes and the resources to assist members and 

commands in real-time planning and execution of deployments. Beyond deployment 

skills, the NDA should take a broad view that includes sustainability solutions, e.g., 

multinational logistics, intra- and inter-theater transport services, and pooling of 

support, e.g., ATC, maintenance, and supplies, across forces with like systems, etc. 

3. Enhance the role of defense planning/force generation in getting nations to commit usable 

capabilities. Establish that only deployment-capable forces—land, air, or maritime—

should be offered in response to NATO requirements, whether for Article 5 or nonArticle 5 missions. The distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 deployability 

requirements has been reduced due to an enlarged NATO area and greatly reduced 
14

national forces. Defense planning should emphasize ready-to-deploy medical units 

capable of supporting more than one Ally by means of pre-operation agreements, 

4. Use the existing ACO command structure for deployments. NATO’s Military 

Command Structure under ACO needs to be more deployable and operationally usable 

for sustained missions like KFOR and ISAF. The Alliance must realize greater utility 

from its command structure investment. NATO needs an appropriate mix of fixed 

commands and deployable, highly capable command elements embedded within fixed 

commands. Deployable elements should be capable of joint C2 for several months, 

beyond which they should be designed to serve as the nuclei from which expanded 

commands such as those for KFOR and ISAF are built for long-term operations. The 

principal structure of such long-term headquarters must be designed by ACT, tested by 

ACO, and approved by HQ NATO. This would avoid the steep learning curves, ad hoc 

designs, wasted resources, and confusion associated with standing up a unique new 

headquarters, such as IFOR/SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF, while trying to execute 

operations. Meanwhile, fixed headquarters of the Command Structure often go 

understaffed and under utilized. 

5. Develop Alliance-wide doctrine, concepts, and interoperability standards for force 

identification and fratricide prevention. NATO leaders should press for investment in 

shared combat identification technologies across all SOF and land forces, with future 

efforts extending to air and naval forces. ACT should be tasked to provide rapid and 

widest dissemination of lessons learned related to combat identification and fratricide 

prevention. A system for rapid, Alliance-wide (including partners) dissemination of 

counter-IED lessons learned should be standard for all operations. ACT should also set 

standards for NATO forward air controller training that blend successful target 

engagement with fratricide avoidance. 

6. Revamp NATO education and training programs to support more-integrated 

multinational concepts, doctrine, and planning. NATO should task ACT to develop a 

cohesive NATO education system incorporating all NATO schools under its oversight, 

including the NATO Defense College. The goal should be to make every program 

available via distant learning to members, and most available to partners. In parallel, 

ACT should work with members and partners to incorporate NATO concepts and 

doctrine into national doctrine and link NATO and related national education systems. 

The NATO educational system should also establish ties to the EU’s new European 

Security and Defense College network. The two hubs of ACT’s multinational 

integration education strategy should be the NATO Defense College and the NATO 

School at Oberammergau, Germany. These schools should teach courses in the 

multinational aspects of deployment planning, logistics concepts, and operational 

doctrine development. 

7. Create a group of retired senior NATO officers to provide annual reports on progress.

Deployability, sustainability, and usability of NATO forces is so important that the 

Secretary General should consider establishing an Advisory Group on Deployability 
15

made up of retired senior officers. They would be charged with preparing an annual 

public report on progress toward NATO goals in this area. 

B. C4ISR Interoperability Initiatives 

1. Resource in full the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). NNEC is the Bi-SC 

top capabilities priority with the goal of providing NATO an Information Age military 

through programs to train personnel, embed information-sharing processes, and 

provide forces with deployable enabling technologies in the areas of command and 

control, intelligence, logistics, and joint force integration. The NAC should task ACT to 

prioritize development of the operational concepts, requirements implications, 

architectural specifications, and implementing strategies needed to stand up NNEC as 

the operational backbone for all Alliance forces. NC3A should assist in deploying and 

operationalizing enabling processes and technologies below its primary customer, 

ACO, down to at least brigade level. 

2. Establish Alliance-wide integration of C4ISR into a NATO Joint ISR Hub. NATO 

should regard C4ISR as the operational framework binding NATO and national forces 

together into an interoperable, agile, and cohesive whole. Nations should concentrate 

on compliance with both CIS system architectures and ISR platform standards across 

the NATO Force Structure. NATO should invest similarly in the systems equipping the 

new NATO command structure. NATO must encourage members and partners to 

prioritize scarce investments toward national systems at the tactical and operational 

levels that are able to link into NATO’s strategic-operational networks. In particular, 

NATO should encourage members and partners to invest in NATO interoperable 

standards for all new organizations and systems intended for NATO networks, 

including robotic vehicles, deployable CIS, deployable C2 elements, electronic warfare 

suites for ships, aircraft, and land forces, air traffic management, logistics, and medical 

tracking systems. All such systems should be capable of feeding essential information to 

every NATO user for real-time situational awareness. Function-specific software, such 

as supply chain management systems, collaborative planning tools, joint decision 

support systems, intelligence dissemination, and cultural understanding suites, should 

be cloud-based and accessible to any networked force. In the Defense Planning Process 

and in operational planning, NATO must enforce NATO architecture/standards on 

essential CIS to at least brigade level. Units should be certified for C4ISR 

interoperability prior to deployment into a theater of operation. 

3. Establish open architecture for sharing intelligence. Expand the role of IFC 

Molesworth to provide more and faster access to all information of use to operational 

forces. NATO should extend JISR dissemination to all levels where it is desired, with 

suitable protections. NATO should revise its intelligence estimates process to provide 

more genuine and timely intelligence to planners and operators across NATO and 

capitals. 
16

C. Comprehensive Approach Initiatives 

1. Set up a Comprehensive Approach Center of Excellence (CACOE). NATO must 

accelerate implementation of the CA, especially with regard to stabilization operations. 

A CA center of excellence should be stood up, possibly in Denmark, where the concept 

was born. A CACOE, networked with other COEs and overseen by ACT, should be 

used to bring the concept of civilian and military cooperation into all NATO planning 

and operating concepts. It should provide input to all NATO education and training 

programs, doctrine development, and exercises. It should offer to assist members and 

partners in constructing similar programs. It should build a reservoir of best practices, 

lessons learned, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for both military and 

civilian CA practitioners, including PRTs. All this information should be rapidly 

available online to everyone across NATO agencies and commands, as well as among 

members and partners, from the highest to the lowest level. The CACOE should 

especially be poised to provide reachback expertise to deployed commands and units 

engaged in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) tasks. The CACOE should invite 

resident representatives from the EU, UN, OSCE, and other agencies, such as the World 

Health Organization (WHO) and World Bank (WB), and from non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs). 

2. Define civilian CA requirements and develop a small NATO Civilian Response Corps 

available for all NATO operations. NATO cannot raise all or even much of the civilian 

capacity required to conduct S&R operations utilizing CA. However, it should 

catalogue available civilian expertise from among its own resources that could plan 

alongside military planners and accompany forces when they deploy to maintain a 

close relationship for CA operations. Members and partners should be invited to fill 

civilian requirements from their own resources by including requirements in a further 

modification of the DPQ. NATO’s readiest source of sizable civilian capacity remains 

international partner organizations, both governmental and non-governmental. The 

CACOE would also assist NATO in standardizing NATO reporting requirements for 

PRTs and rationalize NATO support to police missions, including broad security-sector 

reforms (e.g., judicial and penal systems and investigative forensics). 

3. Improve the performance of provincial reconstruction teams. NATO should charge ACT 

to develop a model for PRTs from on-site observations, lessons learned, and after action 

reports/interviews. ACT’s model should be broad and accompanied by a suite of 

common doctrine, concepts, training regimes, relevant standards, and a core structural 

design based on best practices from the field. ACT should establish teams to conduct, 

with nations, pre-deployment PRT certification, the criteria for which could be agreed 

in advance with ACO. Certification requirements should be expanded to partners. 

Finally, NATO and the members involved should devise tailored operational goals for 

each PRT prior to deployment. 

4. Develop better coordination for NATO civilian contributions. NATO member civilian 

contributions in ISAF are not well coordinated. A civilian coordination staff cell is 
17

needed in each complex operation to facilitate integrated results and advise NATO on 

closing the operational gaps in government and contractor civilian engagement. 

5. Standardize Alliance stabilization and reconstruction force requirements. NATO has 

been engaged in S&R operations since 1995, and members have developed a high sense 

of the capabilities and forces required. Some nations, such as Germany, have even 

designated a large part of their force structure to specialize in stability operations. 

NATO should analyze national S&R force designs to identify the most effective and 

efficient models for multinational operations based on adaptability and flexibility. The 

core of a standard design should be forwarded to member defense planners and NATO 

staffs and become a criterion of the Defense Planning Process for S&R improvement 

priorities. This work is another logical task for ACT. 

6. Improve coordination with NGOs and create new public-private partnerships. NATO should 

take steps to facilitate greater cooperation with responsible NGOs by reducing excessive 

classification of information, maximizing communications flows, and creating NGOfriendly operating procedures. Public-private partnerships offer exceptional 

opportunities for the Alliance to engage citizens and take advantage of the 

extraordinary energies and talents available from civilian coalitions in CA 

environments. As shown in Haiti relief and other stressed situations, civilian coalitions 

often can generate knowledge management capabilities and outreach to dispersed 

stakeholders more rapidly than governments. The Alliance should develop a portfolio 

of policies and structures to take advantage of these public-private, whole-ofgovernment and transnational capabilities. 

7. Enhance NATO strategic communications. NATO must invest in state-of-the art systems 

that are more responsive in providing NATO strategic communications capability. Such 

systems consist not only of technology but also, and even more importantly, of skilled 

people and sound processes and procedures. NATO must also resource quality 

education programs that utilize social media to inform its own forces as well as hostnation populations via a two-way cultural awareness strategy that gains and sustains 

public support/knowledge of NATO operations. Adjunct to this initiative, NATO 

strategic communications must reach out in parallel globally to inform audiences 

among allies, partners, neutral parties, and potential adversaries to provide the NATO 

side of newsworthy events related to operations. Finally, NATO’s investment should 

include requisite technologies and social media to achieve rapid dissemination of 

information. 

D. SOF Interoperability Initiatives 

1. Enhance integrated NATO SOF, consider creating a SOF Command, and expand to 

partners engaged in NATO operations. Much has already been accomplished to bring 

together the SOF capabilities of members and partners, including the establishment of 

the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) at SHAPE. However, more can be done. 

NATO should build on NSCC’s initial efforts to develop and strengthen common 
18

NATO SOF doctrine, and rapidly disseminate TTPs, lessons learned, and best practices 

regimes across the SOF community. These same TTPs, lessons, and practices should be 

reviewed with an eye to passing them on to conventional forces that may benefit from 

SOF breakthroughs. In keeping with paragraph 46 of the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit 

Declaration, the NAC should examine and make a decision on creating a special SOF 

command within ACO. 

2. Elaborate future SOF roles in NATO planning. SOF missions include special 

reconnaissance, military assistance and training of indigenous forces, and direct action. 

Most NATO SOF (other than the United States, UK, and France) concentrates on the 

reconnaissance mission. However, the training mission has grown exponentially, and 

mission requirements for direct action also have increased. NATO should task its SOF 

headquarters to define future NATO SOF requirements by mission category, in 

particular, the training mission. It should also determine what requirements can be 

filled by the several European SOF forces that are very small, and those that are solely 

responsive to member interior ministries. The goal is to determine how members can 

best contribute with forces that typically enjoy the highest level of investment, but may 

need pooled sustainment or to be given niche roles. 

3. Take on the issue of technology transfer for crucial SOF systems. The NAC, along with 

the DPC and CNAD, should lend its collective political capital to resolving the tough 

issues that stymie the sharing of SOF technologies, which are as essential to force 

protection as to mission accomplishment. Together, they may start a flow that will gain 

momentum. The NSCC has made important progress in enhancing tactical and 

operational intelligence sharing that should be expanded, and lessons learned should be 

made available to other NATO commands. Ultimately, NATO should seek to open the 

best SOF technologies to all forces. 

IV. Reengagement in Defense Diplomacy 

NATO has the inherent capacity to use what might be called “defense diplomacy” to 

help shape the environment in an increasingly unpredictable and dangerous world. 

These operations are what the U.S. military would call the “phase zero” mission. In 

many ways, this mission may be the most cost effective and important of all NATO 

missions. 

NATO is already deep in the defense diplomacy business. During the past decade 

and a half, NATO has: helped PfP countries reform and strengthen their armed forces to 

get many of them ready for NATO membership through Membership Action Plan 

(MAP) programs; developed greater interoperability with several global partners; 

developed the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Capabilities Initiative; 

strengthened the militaries of troubled states; and sought greater cooperation with 

Russia. A set of initiatives is suggested below for each of the three elements of defense 

diplomacy. 

The first element of defense diplomacy is to build the capacity of NATO’s many 

partners so that NATO will have broad international support when needed. NATO’s 
19

partners are evolving as the PfP changes and other partners emerge. These partnerships 

fall into five categories: 

• PfP nations that aspire to become members of the Alliance 

• PfP nations that have significant defense capabilities but are not seeking NATO 

membership 

• PfP countries that have niche capabilities but are unlikely to become members 

soon 

• Troop-contributing partners that are not European and will not become members 

• International organizations such as the UN, EU, OSCE, and AU. 

Specific initiatives should be designed for each category with the common goal of 

greater political consultation, military interoperability, and civilian contributions. 

The second element of environment shaping through defense diplomacy is 

enhancing regional stability. By strengthening democracies where they exist, promoting 

economic growth, and providing the right kind of military assistance, NATO nations 

can prevent conflict from breaking out. This is part of what the Alliance has called the 

3D approach, combining diplomacy, development, and defense. These tools need not be 

reserved for post-conflict situations; they can help keep the peace. 

The third element of defense diplomacy is the use of military cooperation to 

persuade former or potential adversaries to cooperate more closely with the Alliance 

and eventually bring them into closer partnership. 

A. Partner Interoperability Initiative 

1. Create a new partnership category for PfP non-aligned countries. Sweden and Finland 

in particular are fully engaged in several NATO operations and are directly affected by 

challenges to the Baltic States. Non-aligned states with PfP status and significant 

military capabilities, if they agree, might be given a new status with virtual NATO 

membership. They might be given non-voting membership in the NAC and full 

consultation rights under Article 4. Their military personnel could be given access to 

NATO training and educational facilities as if they were NATO members. They could 

be brought into NATO planning for operations that would affect their security. One 

goal would be to maximize military interoperability. 

2. Work with PfP members to develop niche capabilities. Many of the remaining PfP states 

have small military budgets and limited military capabilities. NATO should consult 

with these countries to find areas where their militaries can specialize and contribute to 

the common defense. 

3. Enhance military interoperability with non-European partners. NATO should hold an 

annual interoperability conference with key non-European coalition partners such as 

Australia, Japan, and South Korea to develop closer military cooperation. NATO 

schools and training programs should be open on a priority basis to key global partners. 

4. Establish a NATO-EU institutional partnership for civilian-military cooperation. This 

initiative should exploit all useful political paths to move toward more integrated 
20

NATO-EU operational planning, coordinated decisionmaking, and cooperative 

execution. NATO and the EU should develop formal and informal opportunities for 

cooperative security sector reform (SSR) and defense reform missions, essential and 

complementary missions in which the EU and NATO each have respective expertise. 

Both organizations should work together and with host-nation MOD and military staffs 

on institutional reconstitution under civilian control. In addition, the Alliance should 

seek agreement with the EU on common planning for police and SSR tasks related to 

NATO crisis response and other military missions. Together, they can also negotiate 

common NATO-EU standards for police operations and police training. Finally, NATO 

and the EU should develop complementary plans for a deployable civilian capacity. 

NATO should include operational requirements for civilian capabilities within its 

Defense Planning Process and ask members to submit their inputs along with their 

military responses to the DPQ. NATO will need to share this information appropriately 

with the EU. The EU could eventually be invited to submit its contributions, for NATO 

planning, in a like manner in order to provide for reforming and reconstituting national 

security structures in failed states. 

5. Create NATO-partner unit-level training initiatives. NATO has gained considerable 

experience with many partners in unit-to-unit operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Afghanistan. It is time to open opportunities to build on those lessons through 

combined NATO-partner training and exercises at the command and staff level, senior 

NCOs, and the appropriate tactical level to enhance interoperability and reduce blueon-blue incidents. While NATO countries already participate in pre-deployment 

training with global partners, this cooperation should expand to include joint exercises 

with all countries scheduled to deploy to the same geographic region. Best practices, 

including doctrine and tactics, should be a part of this training. This kind of activity 

could be conducted in operational theaters as well as by distant learning, modeling, and 

simulation. NATO could extend PfP programs to MD and ICI partners, building PfPlike relations with interested militaries, using operational need to establish priority 

countries. 

6. Establish an EAPC-like group with membership limited to those countries contributing to 

a current NATO operation. Membership would change depending on the operation and 

engagement of those partners. Thresholds for participation would be established and 

could include combat forces, substantive civilian personnel presence in running or 

assisting a PRT, civilian workers building infrastructure, etc. Limiting membership 

would permit implementation of intelligence sharing and briefings containing relevant 

information. Most NATO partners understand that there is a price for admission and 

may be far more willing to increase engagement in these operations if they are 

considered part of a “special” group. It would be prudent to include the relevant UN 

organization (e.g., UNAMA), the EU, if engaged, and other key international 

organizations with which NATO engages routinely in the specific operation. 

7. Create NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Councils. Upgrading the NATO-Ukraine 

and NATO-Georgia Commissions would put these countries at the same level of NATO 
21

partnership as Russia. Pending the outcome of Ukrainian national elections in 2010–

2011, the offer of a Council relationship similar to Russia could be the best means to 

deepen cooperation and trust with any future Ukrainian leadership. Georgia’s 

transition from an Individual Partnership Action Plan to implementation of Annual 

National Program (ANP) suggests both Georgian and NATO interests would be best 

served by a Council-level relationship over the period leading to potential NATO 

membership. 

B. Military Training and Defense Reform Initiatives 

1. Coordinate military assistance to key countries. NATO countries can do a better job of 

harmonizing member military assistance and training to key countries. The IS, in 

coordination with the Strategic Commands, should facilitate members’ sharing of 

information and working to coordinate bilateral assistance, perhaps through regular 

meetings open to interested members. The goal should be enhanced bilateral assistance 

by creating synergies and avoiding redundancies. Participation in particular programs 

could include NATO partners with assistance programs with those key countries. As 

part of this approach, NATO should facilitate identification of members’ and partners’ 

excess military equipment (e.g., the U.S. Excess Defense Articles program) available to 

be donated or sold at favorable prices to partners willing to engage in NATO 

operations. 

2. Establish a NATO security sector reform capability. NATO can develop a standing 

capability to advise nations on security sector reform, drawing from its experience with 

the MAP program and lessons learned with defense reform in Afghanistan. A group of 

civilian and military advisors offered by nations and organized under ACT as an 

external resource could deploy to countries that seek NATO’s advice on the 

establishment of NATO standard defense reforms. 

3. Create an African Union crisis response unit. NATO members might collaborate to 

create a helicopter-mobile and networked African Union rapid response team capable 

of intervening in regional crises. The initiative would require the provision of military 

equipment and considerable training. 

4. Establish a NATO operational concept for police and rule of law reconstitution in failed 

states. NATO operations have suffered from the absence of a well thought out program 

to reconstitute local police forces and legal institutions. NATO lacks police and police 

trainers, so this essential task increases force requirements. The NAC should task ACT 

and the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza, Italy, to 

analyze and recommend how NATO should be supported for law enforcement police 

reconstitution. Whether from its own members’ capabilities or from another 

international institution, such as the EU or UN, the Alliance should know prior to 

operations where police and legal system reconstitution will come from. Solutions that 

amalgamate contractors, lead-nation sponsorship, and international institutions have 

proven too slow and have a poor record of effectiveness. 
22

5. Define requirements in defense planning for new types of formations to train and rebuild 

local militaries. ACT should develop initiatives to amend and expand the Defense 

Planning Process to define requirements for multiple deployable training units to 

rebuild militaries of failed states. The DPP should also be modified to better develop the 

capability of any partner to participate in all Alliance missions, including humanitarian 

relief, S&R, and counterinsurgency operations. Finally, NATO should bring the DPP 

model to bear in building partner capacity to support security sector reform, especially 

for the African Union Standby Force, ICI, and MD partners. The proven DPP approach 

can enhance NATO’s relationship with the UN, which frequently calls on nations 

within the European theater and NATO’s Pacific partners to take the lead in these types 

of programs. 

C. Military Cooperation with Former Adversaries Initiatives 

1. Strengthen the NATO-Russia Founding Act. One way to seek a reset in NATORussian relations is to jointly rededicate the relationship to the goal of the 1997 

Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Mutual Security between NATO 

and the Russian Federation. A meaningful rededication to the goal of “a stable, peaceful 

and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its people” should include 

the political courage by both parties to amend the provisions of the Act to make the 

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) a genuine forum for consultation and cooperation. A 

useful place to start would be to ask the NRC to develop a common threat assessment 

that could be agreed to by both the Alliance and Russia. 

2. Raise the profile of the Russian flag officer billet at SHAPE and establish a Russian flag 

officer billet at ACT. NATO and Russia should renew military relations in areas that 

would complement a rejuvenated NATO-Russia Council. If security clearance issues 

can be resolved, NATO and Russia should agree to raise the profile of the Russian flag 

officer billet at SHAPE by more active engagement in ACO staff actions, including 

seeking Russian military input wherever possible. In parallel, NATO and Russia should 

establish a Russian flag officer billet at ACT to engage in select transformation matters, 

develop reciprocal education, training, and exercise opportunities, and foster 

confidence and security building though programs to share appropriate information 

and observe agreed military activities. 

3. Accelerate the cooperation between NATO and Serbia. NATO and Serbia should 

deepen their dialogue under IPAP/EAPC and agree to enter into an intensified 

dialogue soon. MAP should be an early goal. Bilateral efforts with Romania, Bulgaria, 

France, and the United States should be accelerated. Serbia should be encouraged to 

accept at Lisbon closer ties to NATO, perhaps through special partner liaison positions 

at ACT and/or ACO, as a way to focus on operational matters rather than political 

tensions. 

4. Develop NATO ties with China. NATO should remain open to new partnerships, 

including with China, a country with strategic interests in regions that are also of 

interest to NATO members, such as South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Initiatives 
23

should be explored for the exchange of important operational information such as 

search and rescue and air traffic procedures in disaster relief operations. Eventually, 

there could be of value to both NATO and China in educational exchanges and the 

observation of exercises on a reciprocal basis. NATO might also help members 

coordinate arms sale and technology transfer policies toward China. 
24
25

Part Two 

Defense Reforms and Efficiencies 

NATO has been pursuing defense reforms since the Cold War ended. The process of 

reform for new missions received a strong impetus in 1999, when NATO adopted a new 

strategic concept as well as the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI). In 2002, NATO 

crafted the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) to help chart future NATO force 

goals and created the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the Allied Transformation 

Command (ACT). In 2006, NATO’s Riga Summit called for improved capabilities for 

new expeditionary missions and issued the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), 

which spelled out in considerable detail how NATO forces and capabilities needed to 

improve. The CPG called for flexible forces for the full spectrum of missions as well as 

better capabilities in multiple specific areas. Owing to such guidance over the past 

decade, NATO forces have improved in key respects. 

But the pace of military reform across NATO needs to accelerate in order to realize 

greater actual mission capability from defense investments. This is most critical for 

many European NATO members. How can this be accomplished in a sustained period 

of slow growth or even declines in defense spending? Budgetary constraints are 

unlikely to disappear soon. Across Europe, total military investment budgets are only 

about one-third of the U.S. DOD investment budgets. NATO’s best course is to dedicate 

itself and its members to reforms and affordable, low-cost measures that enhance the 

efficient application of scarce resources. Reforms and judicious lower-cost initiatives 

such as those presented below can be potent capability multipliers. The goal should be 

to field, within existing budgets and resources, significantly greater capabilities for 

current missions than otherwise would be the case. If successful, NATO would have 

greater capacity to assure protection of Alliance borders and provide desired support to 

national homeland security, while also performing high-demand NAC missions and 

expeditionary operations beyond Europe. 

At least 10 possible reform measures can create efficiencies that will allow NATO to 

stretch its defense resources. These reforms can be pursued by reorganizing current 

manpower and units, transferring assets from one area to another, investing in low-cost 

force multipliers, trimming redundant and duplicative assets, and enhancing near-term 

readiness while delaying expensive modernization of non-deployable forces. Many of 

these proposals have been implemented successfully in the past and could be pursued 

in new ways. While the focus is on preparedness of NATO conventional forces, 

effectiveness-enhancing measures should apply to such important new missions as 

irregular warfare, stabilization and reconstruction, and the civilian capabilities required 

to implement the Comprehensive Approach concept. If all 10 reforms were pursued in 

concert, the consequence would be a more effective NATO within the budgets and 

resources likely to be available. But they do not have to be pursued simultaneously. 

NATO and its members have the option of treating them as a catalog of affordable, 
26

high-leverage measures that can be selected individually in whatever combination is 

desired. 

Force Structure Economies 

Reform Measure 1: National Force Restructuring. 

This measure seeks to increase the number and diversity of NATO combat forces 

that are usable for deployment missions. It does so by calling on nations to restructure 

their forces to make them more deployable and sustainable. Specific deployability 

targets already have been agreed, but they are arguably too low, apply to only limited 

forces, and lack the comprehensive scope necessary to ensure that forces can in fact 

perform their missions once deployed—given essential enablers, logistics, and other 

resources such as medical support. Even the limited targets already in place are not 

fully met by nations. There is much yet to do. More comprehensive targets should be 

defined and formalized at the Heads of State level. The cost of restructuring can be 

offset by appropriately reducing investments in low-priority infrastructure projects, 

legacy systems modernization, and, in some cases, manpower and readiness of national 

forces designed only for territorial defense. 

Reform Measure 2: New-Era Rationalization of Force Structures. 

This measure seeks to enhance NATO military preparedness by fostering 

organizational reforms and innovations in key niche areas. Rather than expecting all 

national militaries to be prepared for all missions, it encourages some countries to focus 

on role specialization and niche-area capabilities. For example, it might encourage new 

members to focus on critical combat support missions and other areas where they could 

have a relative advantage. This measure also pursues enhanced SOF assets, improved 

stabilization and reconstruction assets, and stronger civilian surge capabilities. 

Better Use of National Funds 

Reform Measure 3: Common Funding and Pooling Arrangements for Equipment. 

The pooling of limited national assets to generate a more affordable and usable 

aggregate capacity in such capabilities as strategic and tactical transport (air, land, and 

maritime), medical support, logistics center operation, and even UAV support may be 

the most cost-effective reforms available to the Alliance. NATO pooling arrangements 

are both formal and informal. NATO’s common infrastructure program has purchased 

AWACS, a common CIS structure, and now AGS. NATO infrastructure funding is 

under-resourced and nearly out of money. The funding needs to be significantly 

increased. With regard to informal arrangements, consortia of NATO members and 

partners have produced new pooling arrangements for airlift—the 12-nation Strategic 

Airlift Capability (SAC), based on the multinational acquisition of several C-17 aircraft, 

and the 18-nation Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), engaged in a multinational 

contract for use of An-124 airlifters. Given the budget problems inherent in today’s 
27

common infrastructure program, NATO should be supportive of more such pooling 

arrangements among members and partners. Multinational pooling initiatives should 

concentrate on enlarging NATO access to air transports and fast-deployment cargo 

ships, and on pursuing multinational logistic support assets. 

Reform Measure 4: Common Funding for Operations. 

Currently, most NATO operations are funded by Alliance members on a “costs lie 

where they fall” basis. This longstanding practice has the effect of making it harder and 

more expensive for individual nations to muster the resources and domestic political 

support to participate in expeditionary missions or contribute forces to the NRF. 

Common NATO funding for all transport of troops and equipment to a distant theater 

would be a useful place to start enhanced common funding for operations. 

Multinational Effectiveness 

Reform Measure 5: Networked Forces. 

Network enabled forces produce a “step change” in operational effectiveness, 

achieving better multinational force integration, clearer and more timely situational 

awareness, and enhanced flexibility in responding to operational change, whether to 

take advantage of opportunities or to react to threats. The number of new missions and 

proliferation of Information Age technology make reliable and secure networks 

essential to both mission accomplishment and force protection. The top priority of 

NATO strategic commanders is to field networked forces as described in the NATO 

Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) concept. That will require members and partners 

to give investment priority to information networks for their units, headquarters, and 

systems, both manned and unmanned. Information networks that realize more agile, 

flexible, and responsive forces support all military functions, from command and 

control and intelligence to logistics, search-and-rescue, and civilian-military operations. 

Network enabled capabilities must ultimately extend to the lowest tactical levels. 

Renewing NATO and member commitment to connecting forces and systems via the 

NNEC initiative should be among the highest priorities in seeking greater capabilities 

from present forces and constrained defense investments. 

Reform Measure 6: Force Interoperability. 

Interoperability across the NATO Force Structure is crucial to operational 

effectiveness and remains an enduring NATO requirement. The systems most critical to 

making forces interoperable are those providing for or interfacing with multinational 

command and control and intelligence, including reconnaissance and surveillance. 

Interoperable C4ISR creates the operational conduits that allow multinational forces to 

share information about friendly and enemy forces and the operational environment. 

However, interoperability will not result from information-sharing alone. It requires 

that forces from all member nations and partners share common doctrine for a wide 

range of multinational missions (e.g., from major combat to stabilization operations and 
28

irregular warfare). NATO must foster greater doctrinal and procedural harmony by 

engaging in designed multinational training, education, and exercise programs, and by 

encouraging member information-sharing on national practices. Fostering greater 

transatlantic doctrinal harmony should be a key part of this measure, as should 

improved doctrine for all members in the area of joint operations among ground, air, 

maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces. Finally, the new frontier of 

interoperability between manned and unmanned systems needs to come under the 

mantle of interoperable force employment. 

More Efficient, Effective Commands 

Reform Measure 7: NATO Command Structure Reforms. 

Over the past 20 years, the NATO Command Structure (NCS) has undergone major 

reforms, mainly through consolidation. Whether a still smaller command structure is 

militarily desirable is a matter for analysis. But steps could be taken to improve the 

readiness and capacities of current joint force commands to carry out future missions 

and operations. This reform should look at options to create a deployable C2 capability 

within the NCS for large as well as smaller operational contingencies. Initially deployed 

C2 elements should be under the close control of the JFCs for training and validation. 

Ways must also be found to transition from initial C2 to a better-established and 

sustainable C2 capability, based on a standard design for continuity of operations. 

Finally, while ACT is a functional, not an operational, command within the NCS, its 

role as catalyst for an improving and vigorous NATO military is critical to future 

mission success. ACT needs to assert its several roles in shaping NATO’s future and 

become far better appreciated by NATO as well as member nations. 

Reform Measure 8: Headquarters Reform. 

The Secretary General has no real authority over the structure of NATO 

Headquarters, the assignment of its personnel, or significant budget decisions. While 

there are few cost savings that might flow from Headquarters reform, there are 

significant efficiencies. The Secretary General should be seen as the CEO of NATO 

Headquarters and should be given much greater authority over organizational 

structure, personnel, and budget allocations. 

Support from Beyond NATO 

Reform Measure 9: Division of Missions between NATO and the EU. 

NATO and the EU recently have been drawing together in their security and 

defense policies, and operational experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan shows that 

much can be achieved on the ground. However, a great deal could be done to improve 

cooperation and strengthen the capacity of both organizations to respond. Based on 

their areas of long experience and acknowledged expertise, NATO and the EU should 

work toward a division of mission emphasis, priority areas for investment, and 
29

development of complementary capabilities. For example, NATO might take the lead in 

security missions in the Middle East, while the EU takes the lead role in Africa. 

Likewise, the EU could intensify its efforts on European armaments cooperation, and 

NATO could concentrate on improving transatlantic technology transfer processes and 

information-sharing modalities. With regard to implementation of the Comprehensive 

Approach concept for both organizations, the EU could design ways to provide its 

civilian expertise to NATO military operations, while NATO looks to revitalize 

agreements to provide NATO military assets to EU operations. 

Reform Measure 10: Greater Armaments and Industrial Cooperation. 

On both sides of the Atlantic, recent years have seen a major consolidation of 

defense industries, coupled with European collaboration on such common projects as 

the Eurofighter, plus transatlantic collaboration in creating subsystems for new weapon 

systems. The issue now is whether U.S. and European governments can take steps to 

foster improved collaboration among European countries and on a transatlantic basis. 

This measure seeks, for example, ways to lessen U.S. and European export controls on 

multinational sales of new technologies and weapons, plus establishment of a high-level 

dialogue between industry leaders and NATO via a reinforced NATO Industrial 

Advisory Group.