NURIEG/A-O 194

International

Agreement Report

Analysis of Inadvertent

Pr'essurizer Spray Valve

Opening Real Transient with

RELAP5/MOD3 .2

Prepared by

J. Blanco, L. Rebollo, E. Moralo, J. Pindado, P. Moreno

UNESA

C/ Francisco Gervas No. 3

28020 Madrid

SPAIN

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

January 2001

Prepared as part of

The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange

under the International Code Application and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NUREG/IA-0194

International

Agreement Report

Analysis of Inadvertent

Pressurizer Spray Valve

Opening Real Transient with

RELAP5!MOD3 .2

Prepared by

J. Blanco, L. Rebollo, E. Moralo, J. Pindado, P. Moreno

UNESA

C/ Francisco Gervas No. 3

28020 Madrid

SPAIN

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

January 2001

Prepared as part of

The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange under the International Code Application and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG/IA-0194 has been produced

from the best available copy.
ABSTRACT

This document presents the comparison between the simulation results and the plant

measurements of an actual event that took place in Jose Cabrera Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)

in August 30, 1984. The event was originated by a continuous and inadvertent opening, of

the pressurizer spray valve.

Jose Cabrera NPP is a 510 Mwth single loop Westinghouse PWR owned by UNION

ELECTRICA FENOSA, S.A. (UNION FENOSA), a Spanish utility that participates in the

Code Application and Maintenance Project (CAMP) as a member of UNIDAD

ELECTRICA, S.A. (UNESA).

The simulation has been carried out with the RELAP5/MOD3.2 code, iiunning on

aDigital AlphaServer 2000 4/200 computer under DIGITAL-UNIX operating, system.

The main phenomena of the transient have been calculated correctly and some

conclusions about the performance of new models and correlations incorpora.ted in the

MOD3.2 version, have been obtained. Several considerations about spray modelling in

RELAP5/MOD3.2 are given. Additionally, a comparison with the MOD2.5 version results

has shown some improvements and shortcomings of the new version.

iii

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................ M1

CONTENTS .......................................................... v

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................... vii

LIST OF TABLES ..................................................... ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................ xi

NOMENCLATURE................................................... xiii

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................... 1

2. NUCLEAR STATION DESCRIPTION .................................... 3

3. TRANSIENT DESCRIPTION .......................................... 7

4. PLANT MODEL AND CODE INPUT DESCRIPTION........................ 15

5. STEADY STATE CALCULATION....................................... 19

5.1 Steady-State Results .............................................. 19

5.2 Steady-State Peculiarities........................................... 20

5.2.1 Flow Regime Transitions....................................... 20

5.2.2 Pressure Losses ............................................... 21

5.2.3 Steam Generator Pressure....................................... 21

v
6. TRANSIENT ANALYSIS ............... ......................... 25

6.1 Sequence of Events..................

6.2 Plant Response to Control System Actuation

6.2.1 Turbine Control Valve ...........

6.2.2 Pressurizer Pressure Control .......

6.2.3 Pressurizer Spray Valve ..........

6.2.4 Pressurizer Level Control .........

6.2.5 Control Rod Motion.............

6.2.6 Steam-dump Control.............

6.2.7 Steam .Generator Level Control .....

6.2.8 RCP Manual Trip...............

6.3 Run Statistics ......................

7. SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS ..........

7.1 Flow Regime Transitions ..............

7.2 Level Tracking Option in PZR .........

7.3 Pressurizer Pressure Response ..........

7.4 Average Temperature Uncertainty .......

8. RELAP5/MOD3.2 - MOD2.5 COMPARISON ..

... 25

.................

.................

.................

.................

.................

.................

.................

.................

.................

.................

27

27

28

28

30

31

32

34

35

35

45

45

45

46

47

. . . . .53 

9. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 59

10. REFERENCES ..................................................... 63

vi
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1

Figure 3.1

Figure 3.2

Figure 3.3

Figure 3.4

Figure 3.5

Figure 3.6

Figure 3.7

Figure 3.8

Figure 3.9

Figure 3. 10

Figure 4.1

Figure 6.1

Figure 6.2

Figure 6.3

Figure 6.4

Figure 6.5

Figure 6.6

Figure 6.7

Figure 6.8

Figure 6.9

Figure 6.10

Figure 6.11

Figure 6.12

Figure 6.13

Figure 6.14

Figure 6.15

Figure 6.16

Figure 6.17

Figure 6.18

Jos6 Cabrera Nuclear Power Plant .................................. 6

Pressurizer Pressure (Kg/cm2 rel. narrow range) ........................ 10

Pressurizer Pressure(Kg/cm2 rel. wide range) & RCS Delta T (oC).............. 10

RCS Average Temperature (CC) & Programmed Avg. Temp. (CC)...........11

Cold Leg Temperature (CC) ...................................... 11

Pressurizer Level (% of span) & Programmed Level (% of span) ............ 12

RCS Charging Flow (liters per minute, 1pm) .......................... 12

Steam Generator Pressure (Kg/cm2 rel.) & Level (cm rel 'narrow range).......13

Feedwater & Steam Mass Flow Rate (Tonnelh) ........................ 13

Control Rod Position (% of withdrawal) & Insertion Limit (%) ............ 14

Generator Power (MWe) ...........

Jos6 Cabrera NPP Nodalization ......

Pressurizer Pressure...............

Pressurizer Level.................

Primary Average Temperature .......

Hot and Cold Leg (HL and CL) Temper,

'Steam Generator Pressure ..........

Steam Generator Level (Narrow Range)

Main Feedwater and Steam Flows ....

Make-up and Let-down Flows .......

Pressurizer Heaters Power ..........

Steam-dump, Tavg Control (0-580 s)..

Steam-dump, Pressure Control (from 581

Nuclear and Secondary Powers (0-520 s'.

Nuclear and Secondary Powers......

Primary-Secondary Temperature Differe

Pressurizer Spray Valve Flow.......

Primary System Flow .............

Primary System Delta T ...........

Feedwater Temperature............

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 ... 

itures ......................... 37

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 ... 

. . . . . . .. . . .. . . .38 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 ... 

D s)........................... 39

. . . . . .. . . . . . . .39 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 ... 

ncee.......................... 40

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 ... 

vii
Figure 6.19

-Figure 6.20

Figure 6.21

Figure 6.22

Figure 6.23

Figure 6.24

Figure 6.25

Figure 6.26

Figure 6.27

Figure 6.28

Figure 6.29

Figure 6.30

Figure 6.31

Figure 7.1

Figure 7.2

Figure 7.3

Figure 7.4

Figure 7.5

Figure 7.6

Figure 7.7

Figure 7.8

Figure 7.9

Figure 7.10

Figure 7.11

Figure 7.12

Figure 8.1

Figure 8.2

Figure 8.3

Figure 8.4

Figure 8.5

Figure 8.6

Figure 8.7

Figure 8.8

f','.~r "+f P 'D Pic~tq y Al % ~J 1J.J1 . . . . . . . . .L ... .. . .. .. .. .. .. ......... .. .. .. .......

Turbine Control Valve Opening .................................... 41

Core Reactivity Contributions...................................... 42

Vessel Head Flows ............................................. 42

Vessel Temperatures ............................................ 42

Steam Generator Levels (above the tube plate).......................... 42

Flow Regime in SG Riser (Part 1)................................... 43

Flow Regime in SG Riser (Part 2)................................... 43

Core Average Moderator Density ................................... 43

Fuel Average Temperature........................................ 43

Pressurizer Wall Steam Generation.................................. 44

Pressurizer Volume Steam Generation ............................... 44

Pressurizer Total (Wall + Volume) Steam Generation..........44

Sensitivity to smooth regime transition: SG Level........................ 49

Sensitivity to smooth regime transition: MFW Flow...................... 49

Sensitivity to level tracking: PZR Pressure............................. 49

Sensitivity to level tracking: PZR steam generation (volume) ................ 49

Sensitivity to level tracking: PZR steam generation (wall).................. 50

-Sensitivity to PZR nodalization: PZR Pressure.......................... 50

Sensitivity to PZR nodalization: Spray Flow........................... 50

Sensitivity to PZR nodalization: PZR steam generation (wall) ............... 50

Sensitivity to Tavg uncertainty: PZR Pressure.......................... 51

Sensitivity to Tavg uncertainty: PZR Level............................ 51

Sensitivity to Tavg uncertainty: Average Temperature .................... 51

Sensitivity to Tavg uncertainty: SG Pressure........................... 51

RELAYS MOD3.21M0D2.5 Comparison: PZR Pressure................... 56

RELAYS MOD3.21M0D2.5 Comparison: PZR Level..................... 56

RELAYS MOD3.2/MOD2.5 Comparison: Average Temperature ............. 56

R.ELAP5 MOD3.21M0D2.5 Comparison: SG Pressure.................... 56

RELAYS MOD3.2/M4OD2.5 Comparison: SG Level ..................... 57

RELAYS MOD3.21M0D2.5 Comparison: SG Level (0-600s) ........

RELAP5 MOD3.21M0D2.5 Comparison: PZR-vapgen (volume) ......

RELAYS MOD3.21M0D2.5 Comparison: PZR vapgen (wall) ........

.57 

.57 

.57 

viii
LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.1 Steady-state results at 96% nominal power ............................. 19

Table 5.2 Steam Generator Riser: Main Nodalization Parameters .................... 22

Table 5.3 Steam Generator Riser: Flow Regime Related Results ..................... 23

Table 6.1 Sequence of events for the simulated transient........................... 26

Table 8.1 MOD3.2/MOD2.5 comparison: Steady-state results ....................... 53

ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This work shows the results of the analysis with RIELAP5/MOD3.2 of an actual event that

took place in Jose Cabrera Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in August 30, 1984. The event was

originated by a continuous and inadvertent opening of the pressurizer spray valve.

Jose Cabrera NPP is a 5 10 Mwth single ioop Westinghouse PWvR. A general purpose

nodalization of the plant for RELAP5 has been used. This nodalization is being widely used in

thermal-hydraulic applications and has given good results.

The inadvertent opening of the spray valve caused a reactor coolant system depressurization,

producing a reactor trip. The reactor coolant pump was manually tripped half an h~our later to

stop the spray flow. Afterwards, the cooling of the primary system was due to natural

circulation. The safety injection system (9.7 MPa shut-off pressure) did not introduce water into

the primary circuit because the RCS pressure was stabilized at 10.0 MPa.

The main phenomena were reproduced in the simulation and the discrepancies were justified.

Some shortcomings of the new flow maps, and associated drag and heat transfer correlations,

incorporated in RELAP5IMOD3.2 for tube bundles have been identified. Several considerations

about spray modeling in RELAP5/MOD3.2 are given, including some sensitivity studies.

Additionally, a comparison with RELAP5IMOD2.5 results has shown the improvements of this

new version.

xi

NOM[ENCLATURE

AFWS Auxiliary Feedwater System

ANM Annular-Mist

BBY Bubbly

CCFL Countercurrent Flow

CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

EFWS Emergency Feedwater System

LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident

MEW Main Feedwater

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

PZR Pressurizer

RCP Reactor Coolant Pump

RCS' Reactor Coolant System

RHRS Residual Heat Removal System

RWST Refueling, Water Storage Tank

SG Steam Generator

SLG Slug

xiii

1. INTFRODUCTION

This report has been prepared by UNION FENOSA within the framewoik of the

Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP). It includes an assessment

calculation of RELAP5/MOD3.2 /4/ against an actual event occurred at Jos6 Cabrera

Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), a single-loop Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor (PWýR).

Additionally, some sensitivity calculations on model options, and a comparis~on with

RELAPSIMOD2.5 /3/ results have been included.

This transient was already analyzed within the frame of the International Code

Assessment and Applications Program (ICAP) /5/.

The simulated transient /2/ was initiated by an inadvertent opening of the pressurizer

spray valve while the plant was operating at 96 % of its nominal power. The conmequence

of this inadvertent opening was a continuous decrease of the pressurizer pressure. This

decrease was intended to be stopped by reducing, the turbine load, which finally did not

avoid the reactor trip by for reaching the low pressurizer pressure setpoint.'After the

reactor trip, it was also reached the safety injection (SI) starting setpoint, but tie safety

injection pumps did not introduce water because the primary system pressure w2s always

over the pumps shut-off pressure. The pressure decrease after the reactor trip was; initially

moderated by switching the steam-dump system to pressure mode, to increase the primary

circuit averagge temperature. That action was supplemented by manually starting a second

charging pump, to increase the pressurizer level. Those actions were not enough to stop the

pressure decrease, so the reactor coolant pump (RCP) was manually stopped, avoiding in

this way the water flow through the spray valve. From that moment on, the primary circuit

began a phase of natural circulation coolingr, with the pressure being, recovered by the

pressurizer heaters.

RELAP5/MOD3.2 code is implemented in a Digital AlphaServer 2000 4/200

computer under DIGITAL UNIX operating system, where all the calculations have been

carried out.

Josd Cabrera NPP, where the transient took place, is described in Section 2, and

the transient itself in Section 3. The model of the plant and RELAP5/MOD3.2 input deck

1
are briefly introduced in Section 4. The steady state results are explained in Section 5.

Section 6 includes a detailed analysis of the results and their comparison with available

plant data. Section 7 contains some interesting sensitivity calculations on model options.

Section 8 includes a comparison of RELAP5IMOD3.2 with RELAP5/MOD2.5 results.

Section 9 contains data on computer performance, and, finally, the main conclusions

obtained are summarized in Section 10.

2
2. NUCLEAR STATION DESCRIPTION

Jose Cabrer-a NPP (Figure 2.1) is a Westinghouse PWR commercial plan~t, sited in

Zorita de los Canes (Guadalajara), owned by UNION FENOSA, a Spanish utility /l/. The

plant reached its first criticality in 1968 and was the first nuclear station connected to the

Spanish electrical grid.

The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) has only one loop that includes a cold leg,

reactor pressure vessel, hot leg, pressurizer, steam generator tubes. cross-over leg, and

reactor coolant pump. The Chemical and Volume Control Systemn (CVCS) and th! Residual

Heat Removal System (RHIRS) are also connected to the reactor coolant loop.

A nominal reactor power of 510 Mwth is generated by the reactor core, which has

adesign of 69 fuel assemblies (14x 14) with 2.40 m of active lensah. The fuiel has an

average enrichment of 3.60% in U-235. There are two control rod banks (A and B) and two

scram banks. The nominal electrical power is 160 MA~c with a frequency of 50 Hz.

The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is connected to the downcorner of the

reactor vessel. This system includes one accumulator, two intermediate pressure safety

injection pumps, two recirculation pumps and a jet pump. The SI pumps take borated water

from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). In the recirculation phase of a Loss of

Coolant Accident (LOCA), the low pressure pumps feed the SI pumps taking water from

the containment sump.

The single steam generator, which thermally links the primary and secondary

systems, includes a downcomer annulus, riser boiling, chamber, separators and dryers.

The secondary side contains typical components: two 50% main feedwat~r pumps,

steam line, safety (4) and steam-dump (3) valves, main steam isolation valve, turbine trip

valves (2), main steam control valves (4), high (1) and low (1) pressure turbines, a

condenser, heaters (4), etc.

The main feedwater is connected to the upper part of the downcomer by a feeding

ring, without passing through any preheater section inside the steam generator. The

3
feedwater is previously heated by preheaters installed between the condenser and the steam

generator. The circulation ratio (downcomer flow/feedwater flow) in the seodarysieo

the steam generator is 1.96 at full power.

The SG auxiliary and emergency feedwater systems (AFWS and EFWS) include one

turbine driven and two motor-operated pumps. Both subsystems take cold demineralized

water from a tank and start their operation automatically. The turbine-driven subsystem

(EFWS) only injects water into the upper part of the downcomer after a manual action from

the turbine operator, who opens an isolation valve from the Control Room. The motoroperated subsystem (AFWS) injects water automatically into the lower part of the SG tubes

without operator intervention. Manual line up of this last subsystem with the upper part of

the downcomer is also a possibility.

The plant operates normally in automatic mode with a constant demanded turbine

power. The measured turbine power is a function of the pressure in the impulse chamber,

which depends on the steam flow. The error between measured and demanded turbine

power drives the turbine control valve position.

The reactor control system maintains the programmed coolant average temperature,

which depends on the measured turbine power, by acting on the control bank B position.

Average temperature is calculated by a combination of three thermocouples measurements

in hot leg and three in the cross-over leg. This fact produces some thermal streaming effect,

due to the turbulent mixing of the core outlet temperature distribution in the hot leg and due

to the different cooling lengths inside the steam generator tubes in the cross-over length.

The RCS pressure is controlled by the pressurizer pressure control system, which

acts on the PORV's, spray valve and heaters. The pressurizer level control system follows

a level program, which depends on the RCS average temperature, by acting on the speed

of one of two positive displacement charging pumps in the automatic control mode. The

second charging pump is operated manually if necesary. A usual operation practice for

pressurizer level recovering after reactor trip is operating with the first charging pump in

automatic control and the second one in manual at full speed.

The steam generator level control system follows a constant level program, actuating

4
on the feedwater control valve. The error signal is based on a combination of level

deviation and feedwater-steam flow mismatch.

Finally, the steam-dump system (two valves to the environment and one to the

condenser) controls the primary average temperature after a turbine trip. This system can

also work under secondary pressure control by following a manually sc:lected steam

generator pressure setpoint.

The safety of the plant is guaranteed by the Reactor Protection System and the

Emergency Safety System.

5
Figure 2. 1. Jos6 Cabrera Nuclear Power Plant

6
3. TRANSIENT DESCRIPTION

The selected transient is a reactor trip occurred at Josd Cabrera NPP, which

happened at 13:40 h, August 30, 1984 /2/. It was the 84th day of 251 nominal days at

effective full power operation predicted for that cycle. The incident was ji:.tiated by a

continuous and inadvertent opening of the pressurizer spray valve (PCV-4)OA), which

remained stuck open during almost half an hour. Until the beginning of the transient, the

plant had been operating at 96 % thermal power under automatic control, with all the main

parameters within their normal ranges.

The valve opening fault was not due to a failure of the pressurizer pre:;sure control

system, but to a failure in its driving mechanism. At that time, the only indicalion available

in the Control Room was the demanded position of the valve. Therefore, the indicated value

was 0 % opening during the depressurization transient, preventing a correct diagnosis of the

event. After the transient, the evaluation carried out by the NPP technical support center

resulted in the installation of a valve stem actual position indicator in the Control Room.

This solution was considered acceptable by the Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (Spanish

Nuclear Regulatory Commission).

Following the spray valve inadvertent opening, the primary pressure began to

decrease, which was announced by the corresponding low pressure alarm. The turbine

operator tried to control this decrease by means of a manual turbine load redaction. Then

the pressurizer relief and, spray valve indicators were checked, showing 0 'o demanded

opening. About one minute later the isolation valves of the relief lines were closed as a

preventive action.

In spite of the load reduction, the RCS pressure went on decreasing, fially rechn

the reactor trip low pressure setpoint. The reactor trip induced the as ~ociated and

simultaneous turbine trip. After this, the nuclear power reduction, together with the steam

relese trouh the steamn-dump, valves, caused a fast cooling of the primary circuit.

Because of the low pressure reached just before the reactor trip, the primary

pressure decrease after the trip reached the safety injection starting setpoint (120 kg/cm2

rel). The pumps did not introduce water into the primary system because the 1RCS pressure

7
was always over the pumps shut-off pressure (95.9 kg,/cm2 rel). The ECCS flow indicator

confirmed this fact, showing 0 m 3/h during the whole transient.

Just after the trip, two independent manual actions moderated the pressure decrease.

First, the steam-dump system was switched from temperature to pressure control mode, to

increase the primary average temperature over the no-load reference (275'C), which was

accomplished by manually rising the reference pressure. Second, the extra charging pump

begun to introduce water in the primary system at its maximum flow, to increase the

pressurizer level. This second charging pump was manually started some time before the

trip, but the increasing, pressurizer level did not make necessary to introduce more water

than that delivered by the automatically controlled charging pump.

Additionally, the operator ordered to close the MIFW isolation valve along with sto

ping one (of two) feedwater pump. Then the steam generator level was controlled manually

with the bypass valve. This action is usually taken after any reactor trip to avoid excessive

cooling.

Those actions were not enough to stop the pressure decrease. So, after a complete

verification of normal conditions in the containment building, an auxiliary operator came

into it. He confirmed that the spray valve was actually open.

Due to the mechanical nature of the failure, it was not possible to close the spray

valve from the Control Room, and first attempts to close it locally were not successful. It

was decided to trip the RCP to finish the depressurization, since this action ended the spray

flow. From that moment on, the primary circuit began a phase of natural circulation

cooling, and the pressurizer heaters recovered the RCS pressure.

That action, made around half an hour from. the beginning, of the transient, just

prevented the ECCS injection. Some time later, an auxiliary operator could locally close

that valve.

Throug.hout the incident, the operation team supervised the core behaviour by

*reading the core exit thermocouples temperatures to monitor the subcooling margin, which

was always higher than 201C.

8
The minimum measured levels were 25 % for the pressurizer and -80 cm rel. for the

steam generator.

About 40 minutes after the RCS depressurization was initiated, the event was

already solved and the pressure being recovered with natural circulation in ihe RCS. The

fan coolers of the vessel head were operating, without any pressurizer level s;ymptorn of a

steam bubble generation in the vessel head.

At that time it was not available a process computer, which prevented knowing

exactly the sequence of events and the precise chronology of the operators' intervention.

Both had to be deduced from several records and graphics available in tht trip report,

within the limits associated with their scales, speeds and accuracy. The knowledge of

systems response and operation practice had played a major role as well. In spite of these

difficulties, this transient was selected as an assessment case because of its time duration

and the amplitude of the variation of the main thermal-hydraulic plant variables.

Figures 3.1 to 3.10 show the available plant records, on which this va~idation study

is based. More information about this incident can be found in /2/.

In Figure 6.1 it is shown the complete sequence, with temporal details.

For convenience, it has been chosen to keep the actual plant variable units for better

comparison with the records.

9
Figure 3. 1. Figur 3.1.Pressurizer Pressure (Kg/cm2

' rel. narrow range).

Figure 3.2. Pressurizer Pressure (Kg/cm2

ý rel. wide range) & RCS Delta T (IC).

10
Figure 3.3. Figre RCS .3. Average Temperature (0C) & Programmed Avg. Temp. (IC).

- . --- - -- I

5 611165 215 42 31~ I 5

32-2L

Figure 3.4. Cold Leg Temperature C0C).

I1I
* so

M0 - 30 

Figure 3.5. Pressurizer Level (% Of span) & Programmed Level (% of span).

i4.

W174568-012-0011..* S*1

...i:.. r.i

I I

~.:.~2ii~jL~Tj

Figure 3.6. RCS Charging Flow (liters per minute, 1pm).

12
........... A J

.. ..... :- - .

Figure 3.7. Steam Generator Pressure (Kg/cm

2 

rel) & Level (cm rel rarrow range).

400 6 0 30.0 .. 1000 .

Figure 3.8. Feedwater & Steam Mass Flow Rate (Tonne/h).

13
Figure 3.9. Figur Control 3.9. Rod Position (% of withdrawal) & Insertion Limit (%).

Figure 3. 10. Generator Power (MWe).

14
4. PLANT MODEL AND CODE INPUT DESCRIMTON

For this assessment analysis, the RELAP5/MOD3.2 code /4/ running on a Digital

AlphaServer 2000 41200 computer, under Digital UNIX operating system, has been used.

The RELAP5 model of Jos6 Cabrera NPP /61, /7/ and /8/, depicted in Figure 4.1

is currently being used in Plant Transient and Safety Analysis. The model a~iso includes all

the logic necessary to simulate the automatic reactor protection and contr:)l system, and

many manual actions.

The plant nodalization comprises 167 control volumes or nodes, 29 of them are time

dependent volumes, 173 junctions and 109 heat structures. The systems and components

included are the following:

" Reactor Vessel

- Core and Hot Channel

- Core and Upper Head Bypasses

- Upper Head Fans

"Primary Loop

- Hot, Cross-over and Gold Legs

- Chemical and Control Volume System (charging) Pumps and Discharge

Orifices

" Reactor Coolant Pump

- Four Quadrant Homologous Curves

- Two-Phase Performance

"Pressurizer

- Surge Line

- Four Heater Banks

- Spray Line and Valves

- Heat Losses to Containment

- Relief and Safety Valves

"~ Steam Generator

- Tubes and Water Chambers

- Downcomer, Riser, Separator and Dome

15
" Steam Lines

- Safety Valves

- Steam Dump Valves

- Isolation Valve

- Turbine Control and Trip Valves

- Steam Consumption by EFW Turbine

" Main Feedwater

- Piping and Heaters (simplified)

- Motor Pumps

- Control, Isolation and Bypass Valves

" Emergency and Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

" Emergency Core Cooling System

- Safety Injection Pumps

- Accumulator Tank and Piping

The logic associated with the reactor protection and control system is described by

means of 366 control variables and 127 trips. The automatic control systems and signals

included are the following:

" Reactor Scram

" RCS Average Temperature

- Control Rod Movement

- Steam-Dump Valves (only after a turbine trip)

* Pressurizer Level

- Charging System

- Discharge Orifices

- Heaters

" Pressurizer Pressure

- Spray

- Heaters

- Relief Valves

" Steam Generator Level

- Main Feedwater Control Valve

- Isolation

16
" Turbine Power

- Turbine Control Valve

- Turbine trip

" Safety Injection

" Emergency and Auxiliary Feedwater

Besides the automatic behaviour, most of the above control systems have provisions,

within the model, to allow switching to manual operation mode.

For an easier comparison with plant measurements in assessment cases, the main

instrumentation signals in the Control Room have been simulated with their actual units and

delays.

17
CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMI

SPRAY STEAM

DUMP

v

ACCUMULATOR FANS XNDENSEn

CONTROL TURBINE TRIP

620

S.I. PUMPS

ACP

8 903 CvcS FW-10

CVCS AFW AFW

Figure 4. 1. Jos6 Cabrera NPP Nodalization

I8
5. STEADY STATE CALCULATION

5.1. Steady-State Results

The obtaining of a steady state calculation, as a starting point for the simulation of

any transient, is achieved in four steps. The first step is a "new transnt" calculation. The

input file contains almost the whole nodalization and fictitious, but faster thanm real ones,

control systems. Once stable and reached the desired conditions, a second step ("restart

stdy-st") reduces the restart file size, resets time to zero, and elimidnates the fictitious

control systems. The third step ("restart transnt") incorporates all the real control systems

and reactor kinetics with reactivity feedback coefficients. Finally, a fourth step ("restart

transnt") reduces again the restart file size and resets time to zero. After eveiy step, final

steady-state is checked.

Parameter Plant measures/D~esign values I RELAP.5JMOD3.2

Core Power (Mwth) 489.6 4:39.6

Average Temperature (K) 566 566

Delta T (AT, K) 24.2/I23 M* 24.3 (*

PZR Pressure (MPa) 13.83 13.83

PZR Level ()62 6Z. 14

RCS, Mass Flow Rate (Kg,,s) 3780 3769 (*

RCP speed (rpm) 990 (**)990 (**

Charging Flow (1pm) 62 6[.92

SG Pressure (MPa) 4.66 4.66

SG Level narrow range (cm rel) 0 0

Steam Mass Flow Rate (Kg/.-5 254.2 (*

MEW Mass Flow Rate (Kg,/s) 255 2-54.2 (*

MEW Temperature (K) 475.3 (')475.3 ("")

SG Circulation Ratio (-) (*)2.04 2.035 (*

M* The best-estimate value is 24.2K. The mismatch between the estimated and the registered value is

due to thermal streamning phenomena in hot and cross-over legsantomsuentrorswl.

The registered value is 23K.

(*) All the figures signed this way are calculated by the code. The other ones are imposed as conditions

in the initialization phase.

(*) Circulation ratio = rhidowncomcrlthvama , design value.

(**)Nominal design value

Table 5. 1. Steady-state results at 96 % nominal power.

19
Table 5.1 shows a comparison between plant measurements and steady-state

calculated results for this transient. Reference values for controlled variables are those

corresponding, to 96% thermal power. Where measurements were not available, design or

historical values were included. Some regristered values have been corrected taking, into

account pen displacements in registers with multiple pens.

5.2. Steady-State Peculiarities

5.2.1. Flow Regime Transitions

While trying to get steady-state conditions, some stability problems arose concerning

flow regime transitions. The problems appeared due to uncontrolled jumps from slug to

annular-mist flow regimes, just in the two nodes of the riser next to the "U" of the tubes.

Several solutions were tried, and the final solution was collapsing the above two nodes in

a single node containing entirely the "U" part of the tubes. This solution showed a good

behaviour for several steady-state power levels.

The above problem has been traced up to the calculated magnitude of the interphase

friction coefficients and interfacial heat transfer coefficients for the different nodes and

junctions of the steam generator riser. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show respectively the SG

nodalization parameters and the steady-state results related to this problem. As can be seen

within the tables, two abrupt chang.es exist: one of them between the higher node containing

the tubes (bundle flow regime map) and the downstream nodes (pipe flow regime map),

another one between the higher node in the straight part of tubes (slug regime) and the next

downstream node (annular-mist regime).

These abrupt trnsitions are responsible of the void fraction profile along the riser.

As can be seen in table 5.3, the void fraction is not uniformly increasing from bottom to

top. This results in an accumulation of liquid water in the four upper nodes. The total

secondary water mass calculated corresponds with the nominal SG water mass given by the

vendor, which is 10% greater than that obtained with RELAP5IMOD2.5 (see table 8.1).

20
5.2.2. Pressure Losses

Due to some changes in the way the pressure losses are calculated by

RELAP5/MOD3.2 with respect to those calculated RELAP5/MOD2.5, readjusting, the

overall pressure losses of both primary and secondary circuits was necessary. This was

accomplished by slightly changing the form loss coefficients at junctions.

5.2.3. Steam Generator Pressure

The secondary sides of heat structures representing the steam generator tubes were

modeled with bundle geometry. The hydraulic diameter for heat transfer was calculated,

as usual, considering only one quadrangular cell of four tubes. The pitch/diamreter ratio was

selected to be the actual one. Finally, the "fouling factor- was tuned to matc4i the nominal

steam generator pressure.

Secondary side pressure is a function of the operation power. SG tube fouling and

thermal streaming phenomena in the primary side. Thermal streaming is not :possible to be

simulated with a 1-D code, because of its 3-D intrinsic nature. This thermal streaming is

due to the turbulent mixing, of the core outlet temperature distribution in the hot leg and due

to the different cooling lengths inside the steam generator tubes in the cross-over leg. This

results in a difference between instrumented average temperature and "actual" average

temperature.

In order to get the correct value, the fine tunning of the secondary side heat transfer

coefficient was reached by a little adjustment of the so called "fouling factoi" to take into

account the aforementioned phenomena. That factor is actually a multiplier, so it can

increase or decrease the value of the calculated heat transfer coefficient.

21
______Node ______________ Junction Hent Structure (cylindrical) ______

Noinbcr A L (iii) V (1113) 4,(111) Option r Jb A (mn2

) j ~(in) j k Numbter 4~(in) Factor (in tubt))j Opt ion

400.08 2.87 0.724 .2.083 1.0095 pipe -

400.07 2.87 1.0095 2.64

400-07 4.91 0.636 3.128 2.51 pipe -

40-0 40 .7 .6 .35 bnde 400-06 4.06 0.0375 2.64 120-09 0.0375 1588 bundle

40-05 34 .35 26 120-08 120-t0 0.0375 2158 bundle

400-05 3.49 .8288 .893 .0375 undle 400-04 3.49 0.0375 2.64 100 2-1 007 18bnl

400.05 3.49 0.8288 2.893 0.0375 bundle -120-06 120-It 0.0375 2158 bundle - 400-04 3.49 0.0375 2.64- _ ___ 400-04 3.49 0.8288 2.893 0.0375 bundle 120-06 120-12 0.0375 2158 bundle - - 400-03 3.49 0.0375 2.64

400-03 3.49 0.8288 2.893 0.0375 bundle -120-04 120.13 0.0375 2158 Ibuictle

400-02 3.49 0.0375 2.64- _ ___

400-02 3.49 0.8288 2.893 0.0375 bundle - .120-03 120.14 0.0375 2158 bundle

401-02 3.49 0.8288 2.8931 0.0375 bundle 0.37 26 120-03 120.16 0.0375 1205 bundle

401-01 3.49 0.0375 2.64-

40.1 3.49 0.608 2.1225 0.0375 bundle 120-01 120.17 0.0375 1583 bunle

Table 5.2. Steam Generator Riser: Main Nodalization Parameters

22
__________Node_______________ ______ _____ JuncHtio ______Heat Stutr clindrical)

Nubr vlt qne vapgell 1till ( I lig Reim Nubr I veil' vg Regime Number 1 () IVInII2

) eln

Nub I I qine I gs.,in) j(w/m2*-K) j(whim'K) (NJ nfj. (mis) I(mis) ______ _________________________________

400-08 0.64 0.51 -0.002 7.116 4.2E5 ANM ____ ___

400-07 0.53 0.51 -0.001 4.203 1.3E4 SLG 40-0 E 0.2 -. 7.3 AN

400-06 1.4132 0.32 3.7 ANM 120-09 2.415 3 400-06 0.75 0.51 8.2 4.317 1.5E36 ANM -- -

I- - 120-08 120-10 2.513 2.3E35 3 3

400-05 1.4132 0.42 3.6 SLG 400-05 0.74 10.43 13.3 3.3 E 7 6.4r35 SLO G 120-07 120-11I 2.6E-5 2.2E35 3 3 400-04 1.5r-3 0.93 2.6 SLO 400-04 0.86 0.35 13.3 2.9E37 6.5E35 SLO G - 120-06 120-12 2.7135 2.03 4 4 - 400-03 1.2E34 0.91 2.1 SLO 400-03 0.84 0.28 13.4 2.5E37 4.35 SLO G - - 120-05 120-13 2.9015 1.9135 4 1 4

400-02 1.7E34 0.71 1.6 SLG 400-02 0.78 0.21 13.6 2.8E-7 3.75 SLG -- - 120-04 120-14 3.115 1.8E5 3 3 400-01 2.8134 0.52 1.2 SLG

400-01 0.68 0.13 13.2 1.9E-7 2.7E35 SLG 120-03 120-15 3.3E-5 1.7r135 3 3

369 5.013-4 0.35 0.74 SLG 401-02 0.49 0.005 10.5 9.7r-5 1.7E35 SLG 40-0 10 0.1 04- L 120-02 120-16 3.5E35 1.6E35 3 3

401_01] 0.11 -0.001 2.01 3.9E35 2.0135 BBY 11120-01 L20-17J 3.8E5 1.6E35 13 3

M* 3: subcooled nucleate boiling. 4: saturated nucleate boiling

M*) hr. bulk interracial beat transfer for liquid phase.

( h* ig: bulk interracial heat 1ransfer for vapor phase.

Table 5.3. Steam Generator Riser: Flow Regime Related Results.

23
24
6. TRANSIENT ANALYSIS

This section describes, with some detail, the transient simulation res;ults. It contains

an explanation of the evolution and behaviour of main variables, like pressures,

temperatures and levels.

The following three subsections, first, summarize the sequence of events, second,

analyze the plant response to control system actuation and manual actions, trying at the

same time to extract conclusions about RELAP5IMOD3.2 performance and about plant

model adequacy, and third collects some data about run statistics.

6.1. Sequence-of Events

Table 6.1 shows the timing of the transient and some comments with respect to the

plant'response after the initiating event and after every manual action.

The plant registers included in the "Reactor Trip Report" (Figures 3. 1 to 3. 10), as

was said above, are somewhat imprecise about the timing of the transient and about the

value of some variables. So, the timing of the transient included in Table 6.1 is a

compromise among different registers. This compromise was obtained after a careful

analysis of registers and after many calculations, accompanied by cross-comparisons

between calculated variables and registered ones.

25
Time (s) I Event IRemarks

Starting of PZR pressure decrease. Slight moderator density

0 PZR Spray valve decrease and therefore slight nuclear power decrease. This

opening produces a slight decrease of average temperature and SG pressure.

______________Slight opening of turbine control valve.

30 Backup Heaters ON PZR pressure < 13.58 MPa setpoint reached

4%/minute. Turbine control valve throttling. SG pressure increase

and MEW flow decrease to maintain SG level.

LoSadtn redTuctione Average temperature increase along with programmed temperature

decrease start control rod insertion.

PZR pressure continues decreasing.

Reacto SCRAM PZR pressure < 12.41 MPa. Associated turbine trip.

520 caused by low PZR Steam-dump in auto mode leads average temperature down to the

no-load reference (548.15 K).

pressure SI signal by PZR pressure < 11.72 MPa.

540 MEW isolation (valve closing time 139 s).

560 Manual actions PZR reference level to manual (35%)

570 immediately Steam-dump switched to pressure (manual) mode.

580 following reactor trip One MEW pump is tripped.

600 Second charging pump at max flow.

Manul cotrol MEW isolation bypass valve to recover SG level.

600-1493 trying to stop PZR Steam-dump to rise RCS average temperature.

pressure decrease Charging flow to recover PZR level.

PZR pressure continues decreasing.

Just before teaching,, SI pumps shut-off pressure (9.5 MPa).

1493 RCP trip Stops spray flow and therefore PZR pressure decrease. Natural

circulation.

2500 End f smulaion Main plant variables recovered and controlled.

_______________________PZR pressure being recovered by heaters.

Table 6. 1. Sequence of events for the simulated transient

26
6.2. Plant Response to Control System Actuation

Up to the reactor trip, the control systems worked in automatic mode. After the trip,

they worked in manual mode under operator control. Due to some uncertainties in the value

of reference points with which the control systems were operated, and the lack of some

references about the timing of manual actions, those parameters were deduced only after

many calculations and after a careful analysis of plant registers. The result of this process

has been a coherent and acceptable evolution of calculated variables in comparison with

registered ones.

The manual operation of some control systems was simulated to match registered

values of controlled variables (i.e. feedwater flow to match steam generator level), which

is summarized in the following parag~raphs. When differences between expected, or

registered, and simulated behaviours are important, they include a possible explanation of

those differences, whichever its cause will be: plant register uncertainties.. plant model

nodalization, or code performance.

6.2.1. Turbine Control Valve

During, the first 290 s of the transient, the control system of this valve -was operating

automatically with a constant reference power of 96 %. Therefore the valve slightly opened

(Figure 6.20) to maintain the steam flow (Figure 6.7), which tended to decreawe in response

to the nuclear power decrease (Figure 6.12), caused by the reactivity change (Figure 6.21)

derived from the RCS pressure decrease (Figure 6.1).

From 290 to 520 s the operator began a turbine load reduction at an average rate of

4 %/minute (from 96 to 81 % power). So, the throttling of the turbine control valve (Figure

6.20) produced a pressure increase in the secondary circuit (Figure 6.5). The only

indication about the load reduction rate, and its corresponding steam flow rate reduction,

is the output electrical power register (Figure 3.10), because the steam flow record (Figure

3.8) is very imprecise due to pen displacements. The agreement between calculated and

registered SG pressure before the reactor trip (Figure 6.5), certifies the ade-quacy of the

simulated flow reduction (from 96% to 80% flow rate).

27
The reactor trip, at 520 s, induced the turbine trip signal, which closed the turbine

stop valve (closing time of 0. 15 s). This steam flow cutting produced a calculated initial SG

peak pressure of about 5.79 MPa, which compares well with the plant record (Figure 6.5).

6.2.2. Pressurizer Pressure Control

The pressurizer pressure control system was operating automatically during the

whole transient. Its behaviour was as expected. From the beginning of the depressurization

transient, PZR control heaters increased their power continuously (Figure 6.9) following

the compensated pressure error signal. At a calculated time of 30 s, the PZR pressure

crossed the 13.58 Mpa setpoint, switching on the backup heaters.

After the activation of the SI signal (PZR pressure < 11.72 MPa), the backup

heater group "B2" is automatically disconnected (at 540 s). If the SI signal is not manually

reset, this situation would remain. This resetting was assumed to happen at 1600 s, which

is necessary to match the registered recovering slope of the PZR pressure (Figure 6.1).

After the RCP trip, the calculated pressure slope must follow the registered one, because

the spray flow has ceased (Figure 6.15) and the average temperature (Figure 6.3) and PZR

level (Figure 6.2) are nearly constant and stable, which are correctly reproduced.

6.2.3. Pressurizer Spray Valve

The spray valve behaviour during the transient was simulated taking into account

the following considerations: a) the initiating event was a failure in the driving mechanism

of this valve, the nature of this failure introduces a certain degree of uncertainty on the

actual valve position during the transient, because the only available indication is the

demanded position, which was always zero, b) the mass flow rate at its maximum openingZ

is not well known, and c) the timing of the main events is rather imprecise due to plant

reglisters uncertainties.

Therefore, it was decided to carry out the transient simulation without any

restriction on the spray valve position or mass flow rate. This valve position was adjusted

to match the registered PZR pressure evolution (Figure 6. 1). This strategy was

28
accompanied, to get some insights, with an acceptable simulation of the pres;urizer level

(Figure 6.2). The resultant spray flow is shown in Figure 6.15.

After the reactor trip, the PZR pressure decreases, and the subsequent evolution was

matched forcing the spray valve flow, increasing inmediately after trip and redicing it after

that. This fact could be attributed mainly (see Sections 7.3 and 7.4), without discarding the

influence of other effects (i.e. differences between the recorded and the actual average

temperature and timing uncertainties), to RELAP5 condensation modelling of the spray.

When the pressurizer level reach the node where the spray nozzle is lo:ated, this is

at a level of 71 % (Figure 6.2), the condensation due to the spray (Figure 6.28) does not

cease or become unstable, as in previous code versions (see Section 8), which is a clear

improvement of MOD3.2.

Section 7 below includes some sensitivity calculations on the PZR response, with

the intention of evaluating the influence of the various factors quoted at the beginning of

this subsection. Section 8 also includes a comparison with MOD2.5 results.

On the other side, it has to be taken into account that RELAP5 has not a specific

model for sprays. The spray real behaviour is a function of flow rate, water temperature,

initial droplet diameter and the nozzle elevation above the liquid surface. The droplets enter

into the pressurizer at cold leg temperature, and the vapor in the pressurizer condenses on

the droplets in their way to the level surface. The droplets temperature ri:;es up to the

saturation temperature, their condensation capability disappearing from that time on. In any

case, they also disappear when they reach the level surface. All these effects zre essentially

non-local. That means that there are spray effects between the spray nozzle and the level

surface, wich could affect several nodes. RELAP5IMOD3.2 does not have a representation

of droplets fields, being the spray inlet node properties an average of inlet spray flow and

vapor in PZR. The main effect is that this approach is not sensitive to PZR Il-vel position,

what makes necessary and justifies the strategy above described.

29
6.2.4. Pressurizer Level Control

The pressurizer level control system is composed of two charging pumps. One of

them operates automatically, being its velocity a function of the level error signal. The

other pump, which is normally stopped, can be manually started and controlled. The PZR

level follows a programmed level, which is a function of the RCS average temperature.

This reference level can also be switched to manual setting.

This control system was operating in automatic mode from the beginning of the

transient up to the reactor trip. During this time, the make-up flow decreased following the

level error signal, which increased continuously. The predicted values compare acceptably

with the registered ones (Figures 6.2 and 6.8).

After the reactor trip (occurred at 520 s), the system was operated in manual mode.

The exact timing of manual actions and the value of manual setpoints is not well referenced,

so they were deduced during the calculation process. The strategy was to match the

reggistered PZR level evolution (Figure 6.2) while maintaining an acceptable prediction of

the average temperature (Figure 6.3). This was accomplished by the following assumptions:

1) at time 560 s, the programmed level setpoint was fixed at a value of 35 %, 2) at time 600

s, the manual charging pump, which was started certain time before the reactor trip, begins

to introduce water at its maximum rate, 3) at time 900 s the automatic charging pump is

stopped, 4) from time 960 s on, with the PZR level at 64% and increasing, the velocity of

the manual charging pump is reduced and controlled to give a flow rate around the let-down

one.

Those above assumptions and strategy correspond to a charging mass flow rate

which compares acceptably with the measured one (Figure 6.8). For a better interpretation

and evaluation of the data included in this figure, the following remarks could be helpful:

a) the "net inflow", which equals the let-down flow in steady-state conditions, includes the

charging line flow and the fraction of the RCP seal flow leakage to the RCS, b) the

chargaing-flow represents the plant measurement, which does not include the seal flow, c)

the charging flow-meter (Figure 3.6) has an upper scale limit below the actual maximum

flow, this limit is overcome when both charging pumps operate together, d) the evolution

30
of seal flow and discharge flow during transient conditions is not included in the model,

introducingy a certain degree of uncertainty on the results.

Operator actions may be interpreted as follows. After the reactor trip, the operaton

began to introduce water in the RCS at the maximum possible rate, first to rapid~y recover

the PZR level and second to stop the pressure decrease. But the pressure (Figure A5. 1), after

a certain time of stabilization, went down again. This last fact is due to the

evaporation/condensation phenomena in the pressurizer (Figures 6.29, 6.30 and 6.3 1), as

is explained below.

After the trip, the depressurization due to the rapid level decrease, becaase of the

primary coolant contraction, is attenuated by a net evaporation rate peak. Then th,, pressure

is stabilized by the water incoming from the surge line and the evaporation rate a:: the wall,

which counteract the spray condensation. Then, with the level recovered at a tinie next to

1000.s, the make-up flow is reduced to letdown flow, but the surge line inflow remains

because of an increasing average temperature. In spite of this inflow, the pressure begins

to decrease again because the wall evaporation rate has diminished to that due only to

heaters, and both effects are unable to counteract the spray condensation rate.

The pressurizer level evolution after the make-up flow reduction follows the average

temperature evolution. The little make-up flow variations after that time are attributed to

variations in the RCP seal and return flows, which indeed are due to vaniations in the

CVCS Tank conditions.

The calculated minimum level after the reactor trip is somewhat higher, 5 %, than

that in plant data. This discrepancy could be attributed to the RCS average temnperature

uncertainty. As was said, after the reactor trip the actual average temperature could have

been less than the registered one.

6.2.5. Control Rod Motion

The average temperature control system is responsible of the control rod motion,

to maintain that temperature within the deadband margins (± 1.4K) of the reference

31
temperature, which is a function of the turbine load.

After the begginning of the turbine load reduction, the control rods began to be

inserted when the temperature error signal surpassed the deadband margin (Figures 6.3 and

6.19). The insertion velocity was the minimum, because it is determined by a combined

temperature error, composed of a temperature error term plus a pressure error term. The

sign of the last term was always opposite to the sign of the first, and its value high enough

to maintain the velocity at the minimum value (see Reference 1).

The reactor power response to the control rod insertion (negative reactivity) is not

a recorded data, so the goodness of the calculated one can only be indirectly evaluated

through the average temperature evolution (Figure 6.3), which compares well with that

registered.

The input reactivity feedback coefficients were calculated from reactor core design

data of the cycle corresponding to the present transient.

6.2.6. Steam-dump Control

The steamn-dump control system of Jos& Cabrera NPP only operates after a turbine

trip. It have two modes of operation: temperature or pressure control. The temperature

mode control is designed to get the no-load average temperature in the primary system

(548.15K). The pressure control mode is designed to follow a manually selected steam

generator pressure setpoint, and it can only be activated below 15 % turbine power.

For the present transient, the system was switched to pressure mode at a certain time

after the turbine trip. This time is not well referenced in the "trip report", so it was

deduced during the calculation process. This action was taken to rise the primary system

average temperature, trying to stop the pressurizer pressure decrease.

The strategy of the calculation was to match the RCS average temperature. This was

achieved (Figure 6.3) first by determining the time when the system was switched to

pressure mode, and then by finding the SG setpoint evolution during the transient.

32
The above strategy was adopted after a first round of calculations, which showed

a lack of coherence between both calculated and recorded SG pressure and average

temperature. If the SG pressure was matched, the average temperature resulted too low (2-

3K), and when matching temperature resulted in a SG pressure too high (2-3 bai). Those

differences were only significant in the time interval from the reactor trip to turbine trip,

while outside this time matching was acceptable.

On the other side, hot and cross-over leg streaming effects could have a major

influence in this behaviour. Average temperature is calculated by a combination of three

thermocouples measurements in the hot leg and three in the cross-over leg. The zaictioneer

logic takes the largest one (which is a conservative assumption to anticipate the actuation

of the Control and Protection System). Because of thermal streaming. there could be a bias

between measured and real average temperatures, this bias being a function of the nuclear

thermal power.

The average temperature measurement drives some important control systems, like

steam-dump and PZR reference level. So, it was considered necessary to maatch the

registered average temperature, at least up to the time those systems are switched i-o manual

mode after the reactor trip. Also, at the beginning of the calculation process, it was

unknown if the lack of coherence was due to the measurements. registers. nodalization or

code models. So, those reasons justified the adopted strategy.

Nevertheless, with that strategy, the steam generator pressure trends and slope

changes are well predicted (Figure 6.5) within the above explained time span.

Section 7 contains a sensitivity calculation with the recorded SG pressu.re as the

matching objective, it also includes some interesting comments about the uncertainty

associated with the average temperature measurement.

The temperature prediction while the system was in automatic mode, this -is between

the reactor trip (520 s) up to 570 s is quite good (Figure 6.3). The same can be said about

the steam generator pressure (Figure 6.5) including the peak that happen just after the

reactor trip.

33
The steam generator response to sudden changes in the steam-dump flow', which are

originated by setpoint changes, is predicted correctly. Those changes occur between 1450

and 1600 s (Figure 6.11) a. They promote rapid increases in the SG level which are well

predicted in comparison with plant data (Figure 6.6).

6.2.7. Steam Generator Level Control

This system is designed to maintain the steam generator level at a constant reference

level of 0 cm rel., which is equivalent to 8.931 mn over the tube plate. This is accomplished

by actuating the main feedwater control valve position. This position is a function of level

deviation and steam-feedwater flow mismatch.

When the plant is operating at power, this system operates automatically, but after

a turbine trip the system is usually operated under manual control to avoid excessive

cooling of the primary system. The following manual actions are taken immediately after

a trip: 1) one MFW pump, is stopped, 2) the MFW isolation valve is closed, 3) the MEW

control valve is fixed in its minimum position, and 4) the SG level is manually controlled

by opening the isolation bypass valve.

For the present transient, the system was operating automatically before the trip, and

all the above actions were taken after it. The timing of those actions was not referenced

with precise values in the "Trip Report". So, both timing and bypass valve opening were

deduced during the calculation, trying to match the recorded SG level after the reactor trip.

After the trip the calculated steam generator level follows acceptably the measured

one (Figure 6.6). Otherwise, the calculated level evolution during the turbine load reduction

phase of the transient could be unrealistic. As can be seen in Figure 6.6, the calculated level

has a sharp peak which does not appear in the plant record. After in depth analysis, it was

concluded that the abrupt transitions among flow regimes may be responsible of Uhs

behaviour (Figures 6.25 and 6.26). Section 7 contains a sensitivity analysis in which the

transition from slug to annular-mist flow regime has been smoothed, showing a better

behaviour of the level.

34
Therefore, with that level evolution before the reactor trip, the calculated main

feedwater flow also shows an abnormal behaviour (Figure 6.7). The registered steam flow

after the reactor trip is also shown in Figure 6.7.

It is important at this point to remember that, the MOD3.2 steady-state gives a SG

secondary water mass near to 10% more (which is the vendor figure) than MC)D2.5.

6.2.8. RCP Manual Trip

Once the PZR spray valve failure was clearly identified, the RCP wvas tripped

(1500 s) to stop the spray flow. After this trip, the primary system flow (Figure 6.16)

decreased following the coast-down curve. After approximately three hundred seconds a

stable natural circulation regime was established, being its flow high enough to maintain

an adequate subcoolincg margin (Figure 6.4).

As can be seen in Fig.ure 6.17, the Delta T plant data is well reproduced by the

code. The differences, even in the peak after the RCP trip, could be attributed to both hot

and cold leg thermal streaming. The largest difference between plant data and calculated

data is reached when the main coolant pump is restarted. This could be explained for the

transition between forced convection and free convection patterns, wich could affect the

cross-over leg temperature measurements.

After the RCP trip, the pressurizer pressure began to be recovered by PZR heaters

under automatic control (Figures 6.1 and 6.9). The initial hot leg temperature increase

(Figure 6.4) was manually mitigated by increasing the steam-dump flow (Figure 6.11).

Once obtained the desired subcooling, the average temperature was maintained around a

constant value (Figure 6.3).

6.3. Run Statistics

The base case of the transient was ran on a Digital AlphaServer 2000 4/200

computer under DIGITAL UNIX operating system.

35
The numerical scheme used in RELAP5IMOD3.2 was the one corresponding to the

number 7, this is semi-implicit and coupled thermaihydraulics.

The maximum timestep allowed during the calculation was 0.05 seconds, which was

always taken, except just after reactor trip. The consumed CPU time was 4258 seconds,

which gives a CPU to real time ratio of 1.7/1.

36
Figure 6. 1.- Pressurizer Prcssurc Figure 6.2.- Pressurizer Levcl

14.5

14.0

13.5

13.0

CL12.5

12.

b~12.0

0

11.0

10.5

560.

CL

5570

565

0

100

. . . . . . . . . . .............. ... . . . . . . . . . . . .

....... ........ ........... I ............

.. . .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .

*-* 11.5 M3.21 0--oplallt

.-0

500 1000 1500

Time (s) Figure 6.3.- Primary Avcragc I'diperiturC

2000 00

............. ............ ............. .............

......................

.............. ................ ... ......................

............. I ... ..... ............. ............. ............. owr

I*-* 10M 3.71

615

605

595

585

(1575

E565

555ý

-*R5 M3.2-HI.

O-0R5 M3.2-Cl.

... ... .. ... ..... ... ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... . -- plint-CL

0--* R5 M3.2-IfL sni

0 ...... 00 ... ... 1000 ..... 1500 ..... 2000 ... 2500

.......... .. ..... ... T im ... e .. .. ....

0qto

535

S00 1000 1500

Time (s)

2000 2500

37
Figure 6.5.- Steam Gcncrator Prcssure Figure 6.6.- Steamn Generalor Lcvcl (Narrow Range)

7.0

0.5

~?5.5

0. 5.0

4.5

4.0

275

250'

225

,0 200

.~175

1250

125

cf 100

50

25

0

.. .. . .. ... .. .. . . .. ... .. .. -.... .

............ . .. ..... ...... ......

I*-* It 5M3.21

-j

go

70

s0

30

130

-50

-70

-90

-110

.....................................................................

.. .. ... ... ... . .... .... ... . ... .. .... ... . .. ... .... ... . . ... .... .... .

.............. ............. ........................... .............

............. ......... .............

.............. ............. .... ... .. ........

.............. ......... . ....... . ...... ..........

.............. ............ ............. ...................

.............. . ........... .......................................... .............

............. ............. ............. ............ .............

1*-* RSM3.21

0G-0 lant I

0 500 1000 1500 2000

Figure 6.7.- Main Fccdwitcr alu Steamn Flows

00 -130 0 500 1000 1500

Time (S) Figure 6.8.- Makc-up and Let-d on Flows

2000 2500

*- 0R M3.2-sicauii

............................ 0O SM.-cdn~

...... . ..... ........ 0 -0)n-sci

4)

..............

(0

..... ..... .. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .L -~ 2

............. ............. ............. ............. .............

.............. .......................................................

................ ........ .........................................

.............. .. ......... ............. ......

. ........... ...................... ...............

*-* It5 Nl3.2-iiiakxup

0 500 1000 - 150

Time (s)

2000 2500 00 500 1000 1500

Time (s)

2000 2500

38
Figure 6.9.- Pressurizer Heaters Power Figure 6. 10.- Stcani-dump, Tavg Control

300

250

200

(DISO

0

EL

100

so

0

25

20

10

cui

(A

- *TW . IF-

.......... 4 *.. ..... .. ............

.~~~~ ~ ~ ~ . .

1*--* ciiIvnr-2R()

.00

45

40

35

-02)

C0)

30

~25

cc

o020

(A 15

10

............. ............. ........................... .............

. ... ... ..... . .. ... .... ..... ............. ..........................

....................................................................

............... ...................... ............. .......... -

............. ............. .............

............. .............

.............. ........ .. ... ................. .

............ ..... ... .. ... .. ...... ............ .............

* *0R5 M3.2-nomO-f 0R M3.2-cond-c

0 500 1000 1500 2000 0

Time (s)

Figure 6.11.- Steam-dump, Pressure Convrol

25 00 520 540 560 580 -

Time (s)

F~igure 6.12.- Nuclear and Secondary Powcrs (0-520 s)

..........

I*-* R.5 K43.2-stcnin genentor

10-0115 M3.2-reactor

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520

Time (s)

39
Figuire 6.13.- Nuclear and Secondary Powers Figure 6.14.- Pr-imnary-Secondariiy Tcmpcratuirc Diffecrncc

So00

400

300

o 200

100

. . . . ---------

..... ... . . ... ... . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .

1, *-* 10 M3.2-stni~n gclncrnt

O-0R5 IY3.2-reactor

0)

02

CL

E 0

ci)

F-.

.............

1*-* cclrtvir-56 I

0

0.0

500 1000 1500 2000

Time (s)

Figure 6.15.- Pressurizer Spray Valve Flow

2500

0

S00 1000 1500

Time (s)

Figure 6.16.- Primary System Flow

2000 00

-. 4.0

CC 2.0

0

LL

I.... ...... ........ . .. . ............. L .............

...........................

*--* R5 M3.2-conttinuicco

10--0R5 M3.2-confrol -

3000

M 2000

0

21000

............I ...... ............ ............. ....... 

..........................

.............

1I*--4 0 M3.2

e-- 0.

0l . A. .. I 8 A ~ L 1 a

-2.0 500 1000 1500 ~00

Time (s)

2000 2500 0 500 1000 1500

Time (s)

2000 25

40
Figure 6.17.- Primary System Delta T Figure 6.1I8.- Fccdwaic-r Tcmperalurc

35

30

25

.- 20

(1)

0. 15

10

500

.. . .. .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . .

....... ....... ....... .. .... ......

I *--*R5 M3.2I i9-JPi111i

475

2-450

V425

E

I-400

375

... ............... ............. F........... I .............

......................................... .............. " I,,**-**,-*,

....................... . .......... ............. ..............

............. ............. ...........

............. ............. ....... ............. .............

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DO R M.

350 0 500 1000 1500

Time (s) Figure 6.19.- Control Rod Position

2000 2! )0 0 500 1000 1500 2000

Time (s) Figure 6.20.- Turbine Control VWlve Opening

0

0

V

-C4-

1105..................... ........................

105..... ................................. ~..............

85 ... ~ ............. 

80 .. . .

........... .. . . . .

nOJ... . . . . . . . .

*-* R15 M3.2-deiiinad NAji

IG-O ptaw~-demaand bank 11

55

50

-. 45

C40

035

30

20

............ ..I...........

.1 .. .. . . . . .

I*--* R.5 M3.2 I

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520

Time (s)

40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520

Time (s)

41
Figure 6.2 1.- Core Rcaclivity Contributions

0.4

0.2

p

C.) (~1 0)

cr

0.0:

-0.2

.I....................

., . .I.. ...... ... ...

*-l~I(R5 M3.2)

0--0 Modsernior Density

C--1Doppfcr

0--OConfrl Rod

S10

(0

r 5

0

Lo

-5,

-10

Figure 6.22.- Vessel I-Icad Flows

..................

... ... ....... ... ... .... .. . . . .... .. .. .. ..

I*-* dowtieomer Oyplas's

10-0 from~ plienti

-0.4

-0.6

580

570

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 52

Time (s) Figure 6.23.- Vessel Temperatures

560

CL

E

.............. t...I..... ................. 

0

I0Oildtl

I 0----o vessel head

7

-j

3'

2

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Time (s) Figure 6.24.- Stcam Generator Levels (above the tube plate)

.............. . ...... ... ..

............. .......................... .. ........ ............

............. ........................................ .............

............. ............

............. ............

.. ............. ............. ............. .............

............. .............. I ............................ I .............

............. ........................... ............. .............

j*-*dn vnom~eCler

10*-0 riser

0 0 500 1000 1500

Time (s)

2000 2500 0 500 1000 500o

Time (s)

200D0 2500

42
Figure 6.25.- Flow Regimes in SG Riser (Part 1) Figure 6.26.- Flow Regime in SG Riser (Part 2)

10

9

8

A)

6

51

.............

.............

.............

...... ....... .............. ....

.. .. .. .. .. .. ..... .... ...

*-*-* nodeC 400-4

0-0 notoe 400-3

G--O node 400-2

0--0 node 400-1

A---A node 401-2

41-4---2ode 401 -1

Q)

'a

13..............0 90 000 --- O

t2 .... .. ... ... ...... ..............................

II........................... ...............

10.......................

9. ............. ........................ .

8.......................

7 .... ....

4......ZI.E.

0 500, 100502000 25'

Time (s) Figure 6.28.- Fuel Average Temperature

u-nodc4 10-1

0---0 nodeC 400-9

1---n mul~e 4010-7

0--* niodc 400-6

A-iS todc 400-5

U iee 00%

0 500 100 U50 FO0

Figure 6.27.- Core Average Mloderator Density

2! )0 00

I

7

7

S

(I) 7,

7

* node-209 I

0---Onode-2092

60 ... :............ ............... .....-...... ..... iodc-2093

0--0 Ilo(e-2094

A-- o n~de-2095

50 ........ 5....I.......... ~... -4--- 4 1de-2096

40................. ............... ......................

30 .. . . . .. . .I. . .I. . .I.. . ..

20 ... .. ... . ...... (

----- .- '-- ---- ... . . . ... .

00 Itt. .... tL8.a 844..Lt& & .. .~a... 8 *J..~.A...J4 I

920od-29

00nodc-2091

900 ~ a-nodc-2093

880~-- ~ -node-2094

A--A gnode-2095

n~duodc-2096

S840 .......

80 .. ........ ....... .

I 780 ... .... .. . ... ... .

760 ... . . .. .... 1 -

740 ....... ... ....... I..

720 8 *8ti....t a L. 8L.j. .*.C

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520

Time (s)

7

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520

Time (s)

43
Figure 6.29.- Pressurizer Wall Stcamn Genleraionl Figure 6.30.- Prcssiirizcr Volume Slertin Generationl

li)

0)

0)

W0

(0

nfl

0.0 ~ A.........J.. .. .&..L... ........ L.... . .L.L........ .. . . . .

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Time (s Figure 6.3 1.- Pressurizer Totnl (all + Volume) Steami Generation

1.2

0)

0

0)

4.0

2.0

0.0,

................ .. . ................ ........ 

I *-*~ R5 M3.21

-~ n -20 0 500 1000 1500

Time (s)

2000 2500

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0-

1000 1500

Time (s)

44
7. SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS

A set of sensitivity calculations have been carried out trying to identify the

importance of some factors on the calculated plant response. The analysis presented in the

following subsections cover the sensitivity of both PZR response to model qo)tions and

nodalization and SG level response to coded flow regime transitions.

7.1. Flow Regime Transitions

As was said in Section 6.2.7, the SG level abnormal behaviour during ihe turbine

load reduction phase of the transient, gave rise to a sensitivity calculation on c~oded flow

regime transitions. The aim of this calculation was to smooth the transition be-.ween slug

and annular- mist regimes. This was accomplished by increasing the size of the transition

region, from the "as coded" value of Acg =0.05 to a value of 0.2. The expressions of

variables "alphde" and "fanmn" in subroutines PHANTJ and PHANTV were modified in

that way.

As can be seen in figure 7.1 the modified code does not show the unrealistic level

peak from the base case and compares well with plant data. The same can be said about

the feedwater flow (Figure 7.2).

Therefore, it can be concluded that flow regime transitions should be smoothed or,

which is the same, the calculated value of both interphase friction and hNat transfer

coefficients may need to be reviewed.

7.2. Level Tracking Option in PZR

This model option was checked in the pressurizer nodes. Surprisingly, ihe obtained

results were worse than without activating it.

Figure 7.3 shows the calculated pressurizer pressure compared to both base case and

plant data. This pressure experience an abnormal increase when the PZR leval reach the

node where the spray junction is located (Figures 4.1 and 6.2). This fact is due to

oscillations in the condensation rate within the pressurizer (Figures 7.4 and 7.5),

45
particularly in the node cited above where the condensation is almost suppressed.

This kind of behaviour was also found in MOD2.5 version calculations, as will be

shown in Section 8.

Therefore, it could be recommended that care should be taken when using the level

tracking option.

7.3. Pressurizer Pressure Response

As was said in Sections 6.2.3 and scarcely along 6.2.4 to 6.2.8, the pressurizer

pressure (Figure 6.1) was matched to plant data by imposing a spray flow rate (Figures

6.14 and 6.15) higher than. design data. In order to identify the origin of that discrepancy

a series of three sensitivity calculations were carried out.

All of these calculations have a constant spray valve opening duringthwol

transient, this is the one necessary to match the depressurization rate before the reactor trip.

So, all of them give the same spray flow (Figure 7.7).

The first calculation quoted "R5 M3.2 rcte" is the base case with a constant spray

valve opening. The second one quoted "R5 M3.2 nod" has, in addition to the first, a finer

nodalization of both pressurizer and spray line. And the third one quoted "R5 M3.2 kSS",

in addition to the two above, has been built a decreased pressurizer wall thermal

conductivity, from 46 W/m-K (caron steel) to 16 W/ni -K (stainless steel). The actual

composition of pressurizer wall is carbon steel with a stainless steel liner, so this case is

supposed to bound the actual one.

Figure 7.6 shows the obtained results in comparison with plant data. As can be

observed a finer nodalization does not substantially affect the calculation. A modified wall

conductivity offers better results for the minimum pressure reached just after the reactor

trip, but at long term the pressure approaches the other calculations.

In fact, a less wall conductivity only slows down the heat transfer from the wall

inside. This gives a less wall evaporation peak (Figure 7.8) at the beginning but a greater

46
value from that moment on.

Therefore, it was concluded that the reason for a pressure evolution constantly

greater than plant data, with the spray valve fully opened and giving a mass flow rate

similar to that of design data, should be other than nodalization or wall thermal properties.

As was quoted above, an specialized model for spray could be a better solution, due to the

better efficiency of the spray when PZR level is lower. This fact would justify ,:he higher

flow required to match the pressure evolution after the reactor trip.

It was decided to run one more sensitivity calculation on the average temnperature

uncertainty, as it is explained in the next section, because it is the only remaining cause that

would have a major contribution right after reactor trip.

7.4. Average Temperature Uncertainty

As was said along Section 6.2 and after the abovbe series of sensitivity calculations,

there was a suspect of a large uncertainty on the average temperature measurement based

on the following reasons: first, the lack of coherence betu een SG pressure and average

temperature, second, the superimposing of a spray valve flow to match the PZR pressure

plant data, and finally that the calculated minimum PZR lce-el after the reactor trip is a 5 %

greater than reg.istered one.

Therefore, a sensitivity calculation was designed with the following restrictions: a)

the steam-dump flow would be as needed to match SG pressure plant data, b) it is assumed

that the registered average temperature was near 3K above the real average one, c) the

spray valve opening is maintained during the whole calculation.

The second assumption is supported by the existence of streaming effects, which

are of relevance due to sensors location, and by the data channel selection logic employed

in plant, which always selects the maximum of three independent channels .19/. These

factors appears to be magnified when the temperature jump across the SG tubes is low

(Figure 6.17). At least for this transient, the coherence between SG pressure and average

temperature is almost recovered after the RCP trip, when the AT returns to be high.

47
Figures 7.9 to 7.12 show the results of ths analysis. The data with a 3K shift in

average temperature have the word "tav" in their legend. As may be observed, it is possible

to match at the same time the SG pressure and the registered average temperature. With

regard to the PZR pressure, the effect of a lower temperature of the PZR inflow from the

surge line, even important, is not enough to get the correct pressure evolution between

reactor trip and pump trip.

Therefore, the remaining deviation between calculated and registered pressure

evolution could be attributed either to RELAP5 condensation models (more specifically, the

condensation due to spray flows) or to transient timing uncertities, or both. Further

studies are in course to assess the effect of a detailed spray simulation, and the possibility

of coupling these calculations to RELAP5.

The observed discrepancy in the PZR level evolution, can be explained by

introducing a correction due to level calibration. This correction would give an actual level

(as calculated) less than the measured one at pressures less than the nominal one. The

magnitude of the correction depends on the level, and would be near 7% for the maximum

level reached during the present transient, which compares well with the calculated one

(Figure 7.12).

48
Ea.

a.

g0

70

50

30

10

-10

-30

-50

-70

-90

-110

-130

Figure 7. 1.- Sensitivity to smooth regimec transifion: SG Level

*-0*RM3.2

..............................- ..........

-a105 M3.2 smoot

............... ~ .

..... .... .... .... ........

.. . .. . .. .. . . .. .. 7

0L

.........

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520

Time (s) Figure 7.3. Sensitivity to levcel tracking: PZR Piessure

Figure 7.2.- Sensitivity to smnooth regiimc transition: MFW Flow

275-4 11 M3.2

0O-0 R5 M 3.2st

260...... ............... *-i...... ............... ....

2300

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520

Time (s),

Figure 7-4. Sensitivity to level tiacking: PZR steamn generation (volumne)

I~10M3.2

IO- phintui

13.5---M3.1Iic

13.0 .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. .. . .........

12.5 .. .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .

12.0 . . ...... ...... .. ....... .............. c

0

11.5 . . .. .. . . .. ... ..... . ... . .. . ... . .. . .. L

11.0 .. .. .. . . .. . . . .. ... .......

10.5 ........ 4... ......

.10..........................

90.05............ 1............. ........... W............ ......... I

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Time (s)

4.0

2.0

0.0(

-2.0

. .. . . ... ... ....... . .... ...... ......

... ... ... ... ... .. .. ... ... ... ... ... ... ..

I

I*-t, R5 M3.2 0---- R5 M3.2 iirnckj

500 1000 1500

Time (s)

2000 2500

49
Figure 7.5.- Scnsitivity to level tracking: PZR stcamn generation (wall) Figure 7.6.- Scitsitivity to PZR nodalization: PZR Pressure

1.0

0.0

n~~0.0

0

0.2

0.0

3.0

2.0

I

.. . .. . .. .. . .. .

i .. ................

1*-#00 M3.2 lru

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2

Time (s) Figure 7.7.- Sensitivity to PZR nodalization: Spray Flow

DO

I14.5

14.0

13.5

13.0

(L 12.5

S12.0

11.5

1.

11.0

10.5

10.0

9.5

0

0.8

(0.6

0.4

0)

20.4

0.00

............. .............. I .............. I ............. I .............

.. ......... ............. ............. ............. .............

............. .......... ...........

.....................................

.......................................... .......... ............

................... ............. .................. .......

............. . ... .... ..... .... .. ...... . .. .........

............. ............ ....... . .............

............. ............ ........... ............. .. .... ..... ..

*-*IVlf'lhl

0--0OR5 M3.2 kSS

f3~RS M3.2 nod(

0--* RS M3.2 ruete

50o 1000 1500 2000 2500

Time (s) Figure 7.8.- Scnsitivity to PZR nodalization: PZR steain generation (wall)

UO

0)

Q)

1.0

0.0

............ ............

........... 7 ................................. .

........................... .............

............. .............. I ............. .

............ .............

..........................

RAD+00*-S(Zý EO CO

............ .............

10 R M.1.2 USS

0-0RS N13.2 nix]1

IG --- n15 M3.2 rule

..............

.............. .I........

0-- 1 M3.2 32n*-*-R5 kSS

ti--n RS M3.2 rude!

I21.

-20 1000 1500

Time (s)

200 2500 S00 1000 1500

Time (s)

2000 2500

50
Figure 7.9.- Sensitivity to 'ravg uncertainty: PZR prcssure Figure 7. 10.- Sensitivity to Tavg unccitainty: PZR level

(I)

a..

14.5

14.0

13.5

13.0

12.5

12.0

11.5

11.0

W0.5

10.0

9.5

570

............. ............. ............

............. ............. .............

............. ...........

..... ............

.............. ............ .............

.............. ........... ............. .... ......

............... ............. . ... ... A ... .. ... .........

............. ............. .... ... .............

.............. I ............... I ........... ........... .............

I

0-OPinni1 *-*4 R5 M3.2 Invg ut,

o-ao RS M3.2 kSS

;VV

80

60

-J1 40

i00

11.5 3.2 Inv

20

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Time (s) Figure 7.11.- Sensitivity to Tavg uncertainty: Average Temperaturc

01c

ý--r - .1

4

565

2560

E 55

IT

550

545I

0

............. 

.

.............

............. .. . .. . .. . . . ... 

.................

V .

*-* 115 M3.2 lay instrunl

0-O0 R5 M3.2 Inv nclittl

-6.0

5.5

0.. 5.0

4.5

............. ............. ............. ............. .............

............. ............. ....... . ............. .............

............. ........... .............

............. ............

.........

.............

............. .......................................

4.0 500 W0OO 1Soo

Time (s)

2000 2500 0 500 1000 1500

Time (s) 2000 2500

51
52
8. RELAP5JMOD3.2 - MOD2.5 COMPARISON

This section presents a comparison between the MOD3.2 and MOD2.5 iersions of

RELAP5. The aim of the analysis is to show major differences between both versions when

applying to the same transient.

The input deck for MOD2.5 is basically the same as that for MOD3.2 with only the

following modifications:

1) heat structure cards series lcccn8Ol and lcccn9Ol were modified to take into

account format differences

2) heat structures with boundary condition 110 (vertical bundle), this is th~e core and

secondary side of steam generator tubes, were returned to 1 (default),

3) new volume control flags (i.e. bundle) were eliminated,

4) new junction control flags (i.e. CCFL) were eliminated,

5) junction diameter and CCFL data cards were eliminated.

The nominal steam generator pressure in steady-state conditions, was a-.hieved by

only modifyinog the secondary heat transfer hydraulic diameter within the heal structures

representing the SG tubes. Table 8.1 shows a comparison of steady-state results between

MOD2.5 and MOD3.2, the table only gathers major differences.

Parameter T Plant data T MOD3.2 T MOD2.5

AT (K) 24.2 / 23 ()24.3 24.9

RCS Mass Flow Rate (Kg/s) 3780 3769 3670 (*

SG Circulation Ratio (-) (***) 2.04 2.035 2. 16

SG Seondary Water Mass -100 89

(% of vendor's nominal) _____________

() The best-estimate value is 24.2K, and the registered one is 23K. Thc: mismatch

between these values is due to thermal streaming phenomena in hot and cross-over

legs, and to measurement error as well.

(*) Obtained with the same input for RCS pressure losses

(*)Circulation ratio = rhdowncomer hhvapJr

Table 8. 1. MOD3.2 / MOD2.5 comparison: Steady-state results.

53
It is evident that the major difference between both versions is the secondary water

mass, which is 11 % less than vendor's nominal for MOD2.5. As was said in Section 5.2.1

the void fraction profile in the SG riser calculated by MOD3.2 is responsible of an

accumulation of liquid water in the upper nodes of the riser. This void profile is not

increasing uniformly with height as in MOD2.5. The problem was traced to the interphase

friction factor which greatly differs from one flow regime to another.

The PZR pressure calculated by MOD2.5 (Figure 8. 1) exhibits an abnormal

behaviour when the level (Figure 8.2) reaches the node where the spray junction is located.

The reason for this behaviour are oscillations in the condensation rate (Figure 8.7 and 8.8)

within that PZR node. The same was found when checking the level tracking option in

MOD3.2 (see Section 7.2).

Therefore, with respect to condensation/evaporation phenomena within the

pressurizer, one can conclude that MOD3.2 models have improved its predictions.

Moreover, taking into account the results obtained from the sensitivity calculations

presented in Sections 7.3 and 7.4, one can conclude that, for MOD3.2, a finer PZR

nodalization is not necessary to get good predictions.

The steam generator pressure peak just after the reactor trip (Figure 8.4) is near 2

bar greater thani plant data and 2.7 bar greater than MOD' .2. This means that, in spite of

a lower secondary water mass, the primary to secondary heat transfer is overestimated by

MOD2.5 correlations, at least after the reactor trip when the circulation loop within the

steam generator is broken. This fact is also reflected in the minimum average temperature

reached just after the reactor trip, which is lower in MOD2.5 (Figure 8.3).

Looking, to the steam generator level evolution before the reactor trip (Figures 8.5

and 8.6), it can be seen that MOD2.5 does not show the unrealistic peak showed by

MOD3.2, and that its behaviour is similar to the ad hoc smoothed version of MOD3.2

(Figure 7. 1). So, one can conclude the same than in Section 7. 1: in MOD3.2, flow regime

transitions should be smoothed or, which is the same, the calculated value of both

interphase friction and heat transfer coefficients may need to be reviewed.

As an overall conclusion, the MOD3.2 version has shown clear improvements in

54
comparison with MOD2.5, on the treatment of condensation/evaporation phencmena within

the PZR and on the prediction of primary to secondary heat transfer rates. On :he contrary,

MOD3.2 has also shown some unphysical results related to flow regime transitions which

does not appear in MOD2.5. The lack of modelling drop fields, as in sprays, -.ppears to be

a shortcoming that should be implemented in future versions of the code.

55
Figure 8. 1.- RELAP5 Mod3.2 / Mod2.5 Comparison: PZR Pressure Figureue82-RLP 8.2.- RELAP5 Mo(13.232IMd. / Mo(12.5 Coinprsn parison: PZR Levele

I-

()

14.5

14.0

13.5

13.0

12.5

12.0

11.5

11.0

10.5

10.0

9.5

570

565

100

.............. ............. ............. ............. .............

.. ......... ............. ......

...... ............................... ............. .............

............. ............ .........................................

.................... .............

............. ........... ............. ............

........... ............ ... ......... .......

.. ............

.............. ............. ....... ... ............. ........

1*-*, 1 M..21

0-0 R5 M2.51

0

ci)

-J

80

60

40

20

............. ............. ............. ............. .............

....... .... ........ .......... I ..............

............. ...... .............

................

............ ............. ............. .............

. . . . . . . . . . .

0-*I R5 M2.5

O---ORS M 321 G-13 ,AInII

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Time (s) Figure 8.3.- RELAP5 Mod13.2 IMod12.5 Comparison: Avcraigc Tcmipcratturc

U

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Time (s) Figure 8.4.- RELAP5 Mod3.2 / L1d2.5 Comparison: SO Pressure

E

0)

560

555

.. . .. .. .. .. ... ..

*- *~ 10N3.2

IG--O RS M2.51

6.5

46.0

0)

............. ............. .... ..................................

............. .... ............ ............. .........

........... ........................... ............

............. ............. ........................... .....................

............. .......... ......... ......... ..........

*-*-- 10 M3.21

tlaR5 M2.5

550

545 0 500 100 1500

Time (s)

2000 500 1000 M500

Time (s)

2000 2500

56
E

0)

U.

Figurc 8.5.- RELAP5 Mod3.2 I Mod12.5 Coinparison: SG lecvcl

900

7105010 .... 5.... 2000............ 500 o hn

6.0 .. .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. .. . .. ... .. ... .

Figurc 8.6.- RELAP5 Mod3.2/Mod12.5 Comparison:SG Lcvci (0-600s)

90 I*-*-R5M3.21 70....... ---.... 11

[R5AM2.5J

so 0. .. . . .. 5. .. . .. . . . .. . . . . ... .. ..

30........... .......

10 ......... .... .. ..... ... .. ... ... .. .... ..

-10 .......... ..... ..... .. .... .. ... .. . ....

-30 ....................... ..... .....

-50 .......... ..... .... .. ... .. .. ... . ....

-70 .......... ..... . .. .... ........ .. . -7

4.0

2.0

0.0(

-2.0

.................................. I ... I .....

0

M)

U)i

(U

-90 ...................... ........................

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Time (s) Figure 8.8.- RELAP5 Mod3.2/ IoL2.5 Comparison: PZR vipgcn (wall)

0.8-*U0 

M3.21 IO-- 0 10M2.5

0.. . . ... .... . .. ..

0.2 . . . .. . . . . .

500 1000 1500 Time (s) 2000 2500 0 Soo 1000 1500 Time (s) 2000 2500

57

9. CONCLUSIONS

The time duration of the analyzed transient and the variety of events and phe.nomena

implied, which include depressurization by spray, load reduction and reactor kinetics,

reactor and turbine trips, and natural circulation, have been very useful to check both plant

model fitness and RELAP5/MOD3.2 performance.

In spite of the difficulties encountered during the analysis, caused mainly by plant

data uncertainties, a coherent and quite accurate description of the evolution of plant

conditions has been obtained, in which sensitivity calculations have played an important

role.

RELAP5 calculations have helped in deducing. confirming or solving mayofp pat

data uncertainties. On its own part, plant data have helped to gain some insights about code

behaviour, enhancements and shortcomings.

In general, the Jos6 Cabrera plant model for RELAP5 MOD3.2. and the code itself,

reproduce adequately, with some few exceptions explained below. both plant and control

system behaviour and the different thermaihydraulic phenomena along the present transient.

As the majority of operational transient include some or all of the events in the analyzed

one, the good results obtained with the plant model support a wide range of applications

like, among others, development and checking of "Emergency Operational Procedures",

plant design review, or safety analysis.

The simulation of the present transient is, within the identified uncertaintes, quite

satisfactory because it has been possible to determine the sequence of events, phenomena

and control system actuation, which explain the registered plant behaviour.

The comparison, between calculated variables and plant data, taking also into

account sensitivity calculations, has shown a good agreement with regard to botht steadystate and transient. values, that is, maximum, minimum, slope and stationary values.

Nevertheless, in a few exceptions some discrepancies were not completely solved and were

assigned to more than one reason.

59
The following paragraphs summarize some useful conclusions, not only for the

model but also for RELAP5IMOD3.2 code, which can be concluded from the analysis.

1) The steady-state secondary water mass from MOD3.2 is near the vendor' s nominal

value. This extra mass is accumulated in the upper nodes of the riser. The new

interphase friction factor and heat transfer coefficient correlations incorporated in

MOD3.2 were identified as responsible of this fact.

This extra mass can be misdistributed, as is partly indicated by the SG level

evolution just after the reactor trip. This evolution was matched by imposing a

lower closure time for the MFW isolation valve, so introducing less water in the

steam generator. Nevertheless, abrupt flow regime transitions, which are

responsible of large variations in the head exerted by the riser, mask any conclusion

about the connection between the secondary water mass and level evolution after the

trip.

2) As was demonstrated in a sensitivity calculation with a modified RELAP5/MOD3.2

code, the smoothing, of slug, to annular-mist transition suppress unphysical steam

generator level behaviour during the load reduction phase of the transient. So, it is

considered important to review this transition or, which is nearly the same, to

review the calculated magnitude of interphase friction and heat transfer coefficients.

3) It is believed that condensation phenomena is underestimated by RELAP5/MOD3.2,

specially for geometries implying spray, like the pressurizer or steam generator

volume below the feedwater ring,. Several sensitivity studies have been carried out

to estimate the effect of the uncertainties in related variables, and it has been shown

that they failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the differences observed between

plant registers and simulation. These differences have been well correlated with the

effect of varying the PZR level in the spray efficiency. Further studies are in course

to assess the effect of a detailed simulation of the spray in condensation and

presssure transient evolution.

4) The level tracking option was checked within the pressurizer nodes obtaining worse

results, similar to those obtained with MOD2.5. When the PZR level reaches the

60
node where the spray junction is located, the condensation within that nod,! becomes

unstable or even suppressed, so the pressure experience an increase.

This problem does not appear in MOD3.2 without level tracking, which represents

a clear improvement with respect to MOD2.5 models. Care should be taken when

using this option.

5) Sensitivity calculations have shown the importance of correctly modeling. the

thermal properties of the pressuri~zer wall, to predict the minimum pressure after a

rapid depressurization.

6) Pressure losses due to wall frictionare, in MOD3.2, lower than in MOD2.5, giving

for the same values of rugosity a primary system flow 2% higher.

7) The streaming phenomena within the primary loop and the data selection logic for

the average temperature signal (maximum of three channels), was identified as

responsible of the lack of coherence between both calculated and registcred steam

generator pressure and average temperature. Assuming a difference of 30C between

actual and registered values of the average temperature, solves that problem.

As an overall conclusion, in spite of different shortcomings of the ::ode, this

transient study has shown the adequacy and accuracy of the actual RELAP5/MOD 3.2 Jos6

Cabrera NPP plant model for analyzing real plant transients, observing a clear imp~rovement

with respect to earlier versions of the code and the NPP model.

The particular behaviour of the spray valve in this transient has sho-An that the

model implemented for -MOD3.2 version do not succeed in simulate the pressure. response

in the plant, indicating a possible task for improving code capabilities.

61
62
10. REFERENCES

/l/ "Jos6 Cabrera-Nuclear Power Plant Final Safety Analysis Report", Revisi6n 8

(1995).

/2/ J.Fornieles, UNION FENOSA, "Central Nuclear Jos6 Cabrera: Informie de disparo

de ja central por disparo del reactor (motivado p2or baja p2resi6n. causada p2or ]a

apertura local de ]a PCV-400A)", (Trip Report) ID-95, Septiembre, 1 M84.

/3/ V.H. Ransom & R.J. Wagner. "RELAP5/MOD2 Code Manual", NLTREGICR4312, EGG-2396, INEL, USA, December, 1985.

/4/ "RELAP51MOD3 Code Manual", INEL-95/0174, NUREG/CR-5535, June 1995.

15/ R.Arroyo, L.Rebollo, "Assessment of RELAP5/MOD2 -Against a Pressurizer

Spray Valve Inadverted Fully Opening Transient and Recovery by Natural

Circulation in Jos6 Cabrera Nuclear Station", NUREG/IA-0124, ICSP-JC-SPRR, June, 1993.

/6/ Uni6n E16ctrica Fenosa, "Modelo de C.N. Jos6 Cabrera p~ara el c6dig2

RELAP5/MOD2", Revisi6n 2, 1996.

/7/ J.G.Pindado, E. Moralo, "Actualizaci6n del Modelo de Planta de la C entral

Nuclear Jos6 Cabrera- para el C6digo RELAP5/MOD3", UFISA-PMSA, Rev.1,

Febrero 1997.

/8/ J.G.Pindado, P.Moreno, J.Blanco, "Validaci6n del Modelo de Planta de la

Central Nuclear Jos6 Cabrera p~ara. el C6digo RELAP", UFISA-PMSA,

Diciembre 1995.

/9/ Blondiaux et al, "Central Nuclear Jose Cabrera Reactor Coolant Syst-m

Temperatures", WENX 96/14, Westinghouse, May 1996.

63

NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORTNIUMBER

(2-89) (AssIgned bINRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev., NRCM 1102. BILORPI AASETand Addenc.rni Numbers, It any.)

3201.3202 BBIGAHCDT HE

2. SUBTITLE(See TITLE AND instnuctions on the reverse) UE/A09

Analysis of Inadvertent Pressurizer Spray Valve Opening 3 AERPR ULSE Real Transient With RELAP5IMOD3.2 3 AERPR ULSE

MONTH Y[A

January 2001

4. FIN OR GFANT NUMBER

5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

J. Blanco, L. Rebollo, E. Moralo, J. Pindado, P. Moreno Technical

7. PERIOD COVERED (inclusive Dales)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (if NRC. provide Division, Office orRegion, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnmission, and mailitig eddress.,ff contractor,

provide name and mailing address.)

UNESA

C/ Francisco Gervas No. 3

28020 Madrid

SPAIN

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, typ 'Same as ab~ove. :ff contra clot. provide NRC Divisin. Office or Region. U.S. N4,clear Regulatory Coinmission.

and mailing address.)

Division of Systems Analysis and Regulatory Effectiveness

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

This document presents the comparison between the simulation results and the plant measurements of an actual event that

took place in Jose Cabrera Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in August 30, 1984. The event was originated by a continuous and

inadvertent opening of the pressurizer spray valve. Jose Cabrera NPP is a 510 Mwth single loop Westinghouse PWR owned by UNION ELECTRICA FENOSA, S.A (UNION FENOSA) a Spanish utility that participates in the Code Application and

Maintenance Project (CAMP) as a member of UNIDAD ELECTRICA, S.A. (UNESA). The simulation has Ix~en cardied out with

the RELAP5/MOD3.2 code, running on a Digital AphaServer 2000 4/200 computer under DIGITAL-UNIX operating system. The

main phenomena of the transient have been calculated correctly and some conclusions about the performance of new models

and correlations incorporated in the MOD3.2 version, have been obtained. Several considerations about spray modeling in

RELAP5/MOD3.2 are given. Additionally, a comparison with the MOD2.5 version results has shown some imiprovements and

shortcomings of the new version.

12. KEY WORDSIDESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that wiln assist researchers in locating the report.) 13. .WAILABILITY STATEMEN(T

Pressurizer Spray Valve unlimited

RELAP5/MOD3.2 14. :IEcuRrrY CLASSIFICATION

(ft. s Page)

unclassified

(ThIs Repoin)

unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE

NRC FORM 335(2-89)
Federal Recycling Program

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OPENING REAL TRANSIENT WITH RELAP5/MOD3.2

jtlllýrIAILI -;JUX

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