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ASSESSING THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 26, 2017

Serial No. 115–55

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D., senior vice president, Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies .......................................................................................................... 7

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director and Fromer-Wexler fellow, Stein Program 

on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy ............................................................................................................ 33

Mr. Ilan Goldenberg, senior fellow and director, Middle East Security Program, Center for a New American Security ....................................................... 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 10

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 36

Mr. Ilan Goldenberg: Prepared statement ............................................................. 47

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 88

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 89

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 90

(1)

ASSESSING THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes 

each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our 

witnesses. 

And without objection, witnesses, your prepared statements will 

be made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

We have many members of our subcommittee who are also on 

the Judiciary Committee, including Ranking Member Deutch, and 

there is an important markup happening as we speak. So you 

might see a lot of members moving back and forth, and we appreciate the time they can spare to come over here. 

Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Last month, this subcommittee convened a hearing on the challenges and opportunities for the United States Saudi Arabia bilateral relationship. Today, we focus on the U.S.-Qatar relationship 

and Qatar’s relationship with its neighbors. 

I think it is important to note that this rift in the Gulf is not 

new. Katherine Bauer, a former senior-level official at the Treasury 

Department stated earlier this month at a think tank event, ‘‘Saudi 

Arabia and the UAE have sought for years to kind of galvanize 

Qatar’s actions against the terrorist financiers that were operating 

and continue to operate in Qatar.’’

Qatar has been known to be a permissive environment for terror 

financing, reportedly funding U.S. designated foreign terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, as well as several extremist groups 

operating in Syria. 

In 2014, the former deputy director of CIA, David Cohen, called 

out Qatar publicly along with the Kuwaitis, because according to 

him, ‘‘The private engagement with these countries had not 

achieved what we were trying to achieve.’’

2

In fact, Qatar has openly housed Hamas leaders, Taliban leaders, 

and has several individuals who have been sanctioned by our U.S. 

Treasury Department, and it has failed to prosecute them. 

At least one high-ranking Qatari official provided support to the 

mastermind of the 9/11 terror attacks against our country, Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammad. Then, of course, there is Khalifa Mohammed, 

who is a U.S.-, EU-, and U.N.-designated international terrorist for 

his role in financing al-Qaeda and the 9/11 mastermind. 

In 2008, he was tried and convicted in absentia by Bahrain for 

his terrorist activity, and arrested later that year by Qatar only to 

be released by the Qataris 6 months later, and then openly financed by Doha. 

Can anyone guess what Khalifa Mohammed has been up to these 

days? He was implicated in terror financing activities in 2012, but 

more recently, he has been alleged to be financing and supporting 

terror in both Iraq and Syria with no response from the Qatari 

Government. 

Hamas leader, Khaled Meshaal, also made Doha his headquarters for years while the Qatari’s—with the Qatari’s Government support and even the Muslim Brotherhood has received significant support from Qatar. 

Of course, not all of this is supported by the government in Doha. 

Many individuals and charities in Qatar have been known to raise 

large sums of money for al-Qaeda, the Nusra front, Hamas, and 

even ISIS. In Qatar, there are three buckets: Terror financing by 

the government; terror financing done in Qatar through their own 

citizens that their government may not know about; and terror financing in Qatar that the government knows about but does nothing to stop. 

According to the 2015 country reports on terrorism, the State Department stated, ‘‘Entities and individuals within Qatar continue to 

serve as a source of financial support for terrorists and violent extremist groups, particularly regional al-Qaeda affiliates such as the 

Nusra front.’’

There is no excuse for openly harboring terrorist and supporting 

groups that seek to harm our allies, and the excuse by Qatar that 

it is harboring these nefarious actors is because the U.S. asked 

them to no longer stands up. 

Qatar should not be continuing this reckless policy due to past 

mistakes from previous Republican and Democratic administrations. We must not allow for our air base to be used as a means 

to justify this sort of behavior, and a lack of a more appropriate 

response. 

Doha’s behavior must change the status quo, and if it does not, 

it risks losing our cooperation on the air base. The truth of the 

matter is that none of the Gulf countries—none of the Gulf countries are without their issues. All of the nations have been involved 

in funding different groups at some point that we would not approve of. But it seems like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are making 

progress at a faster rate while Qatar is making some progress but 

still is lagging slowly behind. 

According to the Congressional Research Service, ‘‘In October 

2016, Daniel Glaser, then Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing in the Office for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, told the 

3

Washington, DC, Research Institute that over the past decade, 

Qatar has made less progress in countering terrorism financing 

than had Saudi Arabia.’’

We must analyze the totality of our relationship with these Gulf 

countries. While Qatar only helps to facilitate our operations at our 

air base, the UAE, for example, has spent 12 years with us fighting 

alongside in Afghanistan and has been involved in counterterrorism operations with the U.S. in Libya. 

So moving forward, one outcome that I hope comes out of this 

dispute is for the Gulf countries to work closely with our Treasury 

Department’s Financial Action Task Force to root out and disrupt 

terror financing streams. This uneasy time may just be an opportunity for us to take a long hard look at how, and for some, if, we 

can effectively address and stop terror financing in the region, and 

ultimately defeat the extremism that threatens the security of us 

all. 

And with that, I turn to my friend, the ranking member, Mr. 

Deutch, for his statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Thanks to the witnesses for being back before our committee. I 

thank the chairman for convening today’s timely hearing to explore 

our relationship with Qatar at a moment of great instability in the 

region. 

The ongoing diplomatic rift between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors 

is not good for the parties of the conflict; it is not good for the region; and it is not good for American interests. It is a distraction 

from today’s most pressing challenges, Iran’s destabilizing activities, the conflict in Syria, and the spread of terrorism. 

For most Americans who expect conflict in the Middle East to fall 

along sectarian lines, or between competing regional hegemons, it 

is confusing to see Sunni Arab neighbors in conflict. But this is a 

dispute over longstanding grievances, over Qatar’s support financially, and through its state-owned Al Jazeera news station, for actors and groups that Qatar’s neighbors and, in many cases, the 

United States, see as deeply problematic. 

This feud, like others in the region, is a nuanced and deeply complex matter, and our relationship with Qatar is no less complex. 

A tiny but immensely wealthy nation pursues an ambitious foreign policy of close relations with all actors in the region. Unfortunately, this includes terror groups like Hamas and the Afghan 

Taliban. Qatar has served as a financial and political lifeline for 

Hamas’ devastating rule in Gaza since the terror group took over 

more than a decade ago. 

Qatar has sent hundreds of millions of dollars into the Gaza 

strip, provides safe haven in Doha for Hamas leader, Khaled 

Meshaal, and helped legitimize Hamas rule in 2012 when the Emir 

became the first international leader to visit Hamas-led territory. 

Qatar has also supported other dangerous groups in the region, 

including sending advanced weaponry and financing to extremist 

elements in Syria and Libya, and Al Jazeera has given voice to 

clerics calling for suicide attacks against Americans and Israelis. 

These realities are troubling. But Qatar is also a close partner 

in our fight against terrorism in the region. Doha hosts and helps 

fund the largest U.S. military facility in the Middle East, essenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
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tially our forward operating base for U.S. Central Command. It is 

from this base that we supported the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are, today, flying air strikes against ISIS. 

Qatar has also helped to serve as regional mediator oftentimes 

to the benefit of the United States. Qatar has helped broker 

ceasefires between Hamas and Israel during periods of intense 

fighting. The Qataris also helped secure the release of Peter Theo 

Curtis, an American hostage held for nearly 2 years by the alQaeda linked Nusra front in Syria just days after that tragic beheading of fellow American journalist, James Foley. 

Qatar has also provided the U.S. with valuable and actionable intelligence on the financing streams for ISIS and has begun taking 

steps to hold Qatar accountable for terror financing. But they have 

got a lot more to do. 

While they have begun prosecuting Qataris for sending money to 

terror groups, they have done so in secret, hardly an effective deterrent, and it is unclear whether the outcomes of these prosecutions have led to any significant jail time or penalty. 

I was pleased to see the signing of a new memorandum of understanding with Secretary Tillerson earlier this month on terror financing, but we don’t yet know the details of how this agreement 

would be implemented, and we wait to see the results. 

Madam Chairman, it is important to note also, that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and other nations now isolating Qatar, face 

challenges as well. Two weeks ago, our subcommittee held a similar hearing on our relationship with Saudi Arabia, in which we explored both our strategic partnership as well as our deep concern 

over Saudi Arabia’s slow progress on human rights and continued 

exporting of fundamentalist ideology. 

Today’s hearing should not be about determining who is right. 

Today’s hearing should rather make it clear that this fighting 

among partners does not advance America’s interests. We should 

be pushing for unity among our allies to fight common threats. We 

should be pushing all of our partners in the region to cut off funding to terror groups. We should be urging every leader to curtail 

hate speech, and improve the records of human rights, including 

treating women as equal members of society. 

Madam Chairman, I hope that today we can assess our relationship with Qatar thoughtfully. I hope our witnesses can help us unpack how past diplomatic risk between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors can inform our path forward, and I hope that we can review 

the major demands made on Qatar to reduce relations with Iran, 

shut down the Turkish military base, sever all ties to terror organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and shut down Al 

Jazeera to understand the motivations behind these demands, and 

in an effort to see how a resolution might actually come. 

I trust that our witnesses today will lead us in an interesting 

and worthwhile conversation. And I appreciate—again, I appreciate 

them being here. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And now we will turn to our members for any opening remarks 

they might have, starting with Mr. Cook of California. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

5

This is going to be a very interesting hearing. It is almost similar 

to the one we had with Turkey. Friend or foe? And, obviously, as 

already been discussed, some of the issues that are going to come 

up, the relationship with Hamas, Taliban, financing and everything 

else, and now there is a new wrinkle, and that is the World Cup 

and the North Korean workers that are going to be paid for by that 

government there with the money going back to North Korea that 

is probably going to be used to finance more missile research. And 

I don’t think I have to tell the panel or anybody here that this is 

an even more troubling scenario than some of the others. We are 

talking about a large number of North Koreans, including the 

North Korean military that are going to be working on that. 

And I hope that our panel will also discuss that as well as the 

other issues that were just raised. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Suozzi of New York. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Suozzi. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Suozzi. I am so sorry. 

Mr. SUOZZI. It’s okay. I am used to that for a long time now. 

Madam Chairman and ranking member, I want to thank you so 

much for holding this hearing. It is very timely. It is very difficult 

for many of us to untangle all the complicated relationships that 

exist in this region. We simply don’t have the background that the 

witnesses do, and that is why we are so appreciative of them being 

here to testify today. 

Between the religious dispute and the tribal and family relationships and the historic disputes and people’s economic interests, it 

is sometimes difficult to untangle who the different parties are. 

And no one in the region really has clean hands. And we need to 

figure out how to promote our agenda in America and throughout 

the West, which is that we have to stand strong and hard against 

people who use propaganda and hate speech and economic warfare 

to promote extremism and violence. 

So I am excited to be here today and to listen to what the witnesses have to say. Thank you. 

Mrs. WAGNER [presiding]. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The Chair now recognize Mr. Zeldin for 5 minutes—oh, 1 minute. 

These are 1 minute that we are doing. Sorry. I have just taken over 

the chair. 

Mr. Zeldin, you are recognized. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And I am 

very much looking forward to today’s hearing and listening to our 

witnesses and being able to ask questions and getting feedback. 

A lot of great our thoughts are already shared, I especially like 

the ranking member’s opening testimony. He really touched on so 

much of what I, too, care deeply about. 

Recently, I was in Qatar, and I found them to be very welcoming. 

They were going as far out of their way as possible to make 

progress in our relationship. We visited the military base that was 

there, and our servicemembers were well taken care of in a good, 

strategic location. And at the same exact time, I am greatly concerned by the welcoming atmosphere that exists for Hamas. And I 

6

just want to better understand the future of this relationship, and 

the reasons why the reality exists as it does right now in 2017. 

So thank you, again, for doing this hearing. I look forward to the 

testimony. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Zeldin. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lieu for 1 minute, please. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Madam Chair, and ranking member, for 

holding this hearing. 

There have been a series of allegations between Qatar and the 

countries who are imposing a blockade, and it is hard for me to figure out what is true and what is false. 

But let me say what I do see. I do see a blockade that has resulted in some cruel consequences. From what I have read, you 

have families now being separated based on national origin, and 

that to me is highly troubling. 

I also see a Trump administration that is sending very mixed 

signals. At the same time, the Secretary of State is saying de-escalate, do not blockade, you have the President doing the opposite, 

essentially claiming credit for this blockade. Then you have also 

the United States sending $12 billion worth of fighter jets to Qatar. 

I would love to see the panel clarify that, and I want you to tell 

us not only what our policy toward Qatar should be, but what it 

actually is right now. 

I yield back. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Issa, for 1 minute. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

It seems like only yesterday that the President said, You are either with us or against us. And the world said, oh, it is too simple. 

But I think as we evaluate Qatar and the other Gulf states, we 

have to ask that basic question is, is Qatar with us? Are they moving toward being more with us? Are they cooperating? Are they 

moving toward Iran? Are they moving away from the U.S.? 

These are questions that I believe that we are going to be asking 

today that I am hoping to hear throughout the day, because I believe that although you are either with us or against us, there are 

shades of gray in all of our allies in the region. 

It is clear that Turkey has been moving away from us since 2003. 

It is clear that Qatar has not been the best of actors when it comes 

to taking away funding from those who support terrorism, and it 

is clear that if they are moving with us, we need to have that demonstrated just as we asked Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others to demonstrate on a regular basis. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Meeks, for 1 minute. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I would want to join with the statement of Mr. Lieu. I think 

what we have to talk about here is the issue of fairness, and we 

need to make sure, I think, that when you talk about Qatar and 

the other countries in the region, we as the United States, I don’t 

think, should be picking and choosing. We should be talking, beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
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cause we need them all, and we need to figure out how we work 

collectively together. 

Qatar has been—I think it is clear, they have shown that they 

have done some things that have very good for the United States 

with our military base, trying to make sure that working with us 

in regards to the war on terror. 

And I think what needs to happen here, and especially if you 

talk about Qatar, we need to bring in as a committee the individuals from both the Bush administration and the Obama administration, because there is deep dialogue and conversation that we 

could have with them to talk about the region and the people that 

they have asked, Qatar being one, to do certain things on behalf 

of the United States. And if that is the case, then those individuals 

should not be held responsible if they are working cooperatively 

with us. 

So I look forward to hearing the testimony from the witnesses, 

and I think that we just need to make sure that we have a level 

playing field here. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Meeks, for your opening statement. 

We will now turn to our witnesses. I would, first, like to welcome 

back Mr. Jonathan Schanzer, who is the senior vice president of research for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Dr. Schanzer 

serves as a counterterrorism analyst at the Department of Treasury, and prior to that, worked as a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Welcome back, Dr. Schanzer. 

I would also like to welcome back Dr. Matthew Levitt, who directs the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at 

the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Previously, Dr. 

Levitt served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence 

and Analysis at the U.S. Department of Treasury, and before that, 

as an FBI counterterrorism analyst. We are glad to have you back 

with us today, Dr. Levitt. 

Finally, I would like to welcome Ilan Goldenberg, who is a senior 

fellow and director of the Middle East Security Program at the 

Center for a New American Security. 

Prior to CNAS, Mr. Goldenberg served as the chief of staff of a 

special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at the U.S. Department of State. From 2012 to 2013, Mr. Goldenberg served as 

a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee covering Middle East issues. In that capacity, he acted 

as one of the lead drafters of the Syria Transition Support Act, 

which provided additional authorities to arm the Syrian opposition. 

The bill passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 

2013. And I thank you for being here with us today. 

Dr. Schanzer, we will begin with you for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHANZER, PH.D., SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. SCHANZER. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, and 

members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

As many of you know, FDD has been producing research and 

analysis on Qatar since the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011. 

8

Our critique has been consistent. We have pointed to Qatari support for Hamas, the Taliban, jihadists in Syria, jihadists in Libya 

and the Muslim Brotherhood. We have been critical of Qatar for 

the invective broadcast on state-owned Al Jazeera. We have 

tracked the many reports suggesting that Qatar paid ransom to 

terrorism groups, and we have noted through the work of my colleague, David Andrew Weinberg, that Qatar has failed to take action against U.S. and U.N.-designated terrorist financiers. In my 

written testimony, I document these problems, and I am happy to 

discuss them further. But for a moment, I would like to address 

how Qatar has responded to the allegations against it. 

After ignoring criticism from think tanks like FDD for the better 

part of a decade, Qatar now claims it is being unfairly singled out. 

To be sure, the other Gulf countries have their problems. A recent 

State Department report noted that U.N.-designated terrorist financiers continue to operate in Kuwait; Saudi Arabia continues to 

finance the spread of Wahhabism; and the entire Gulf suffers from 

a democracy deficit. 

But to understand why Qatar is identified first among Gulf 

states for terrorism financing, just imagine for a moment that you 

are a policeman, and you have just watched five cars speed past 

you going 80 miles per hour. And zooming past them is a red 

Ferrari going 90 miles an hour. Which car would you pull over? 

Well, that Ferrari is Qatar. Indeed, Qatar support is overt. It is 

egregious, and it is brazen. 

As the Gulf crisis has dragged on, Qatar has also been defiant, 

insisting its definition of terrorism differs from that of its critics. 

This is a particularly poor defense from a country claiming to be 

an American ally in the war on terrorism. As for the current crisis 

between Qatar and its neighbors, the Saudis and the Emiratis have 

been engaged in serious competition with Qatar for years. They attempt to outdo one another through foreign investment, domestic 

businesses, media interests, lobbying in western capitals, and other 

soft power. 

Since the Arab Spring, however, that rivalry has boiled over. 

Both sides have thrown their support behind various proxies representing their interests in the Middle East. The Qataris back the 

Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist actors, and for their part, 

the Saudis and the Emiratis are working to preserve the Arab 

world order, pushing for stability at the expense of the possibility 

for reform. These two visions of the Middle East are fundamentally 

at odds with one another. 

The wise U.S. policy is not to back one Gulf state or another. We 

must rather pursue policies ensuring that terrorism financing in 

the Gulf comes to an end. 

I offer you the following suggestions: First, Congress should assess whether Qatar should continue to host Al Udeid, our most significant air base in the Middle East. Fighting our war on terrorism 

from Qatar sends a convoluted message to our allies in the region. 

Congress should work with the Justice Department to ensure 

that Qatar not only adopts laws to combat terrorism financing, but 

also fully implements them. 

Congress should consider passing the bipartisan Stop Terrorist 

Operational Resources and Money, or STORM Act, of 2017. The 

9

bill, which was introduced in the Senate and not yet in the House, 

could label Qatar and other countries as Jurisdictions of Terrorism 

Financing Concern. 

Congress should press the State Department, pursuant to the 

State Department Authorization Act, to issue its report on which 

States paid ransom to terrorists over the last year. Congress should 

press for full implementation of the Export Administration Act, 

subjecting countries like Qatar that host terrorist operatives to certain licensing requirements for dual-use goods. 

Congress, of course, must continue to monitor Qatar’s neighbors. 

Indeed, even if Qatar’s problems were resolved tomorrow, the Gulf 

would remain an area of significant concern for terrorism finance. 

Finally, I believe it is time we have a frank discussion about Gulf 

money in Washington. Those who feed from this trough are often 

unable to engage honestly about the policies and behaviors of their 

benefactors, even when they fly in the face of U.S. interests. Indeed, I would be curious to hear how many of you have been approached by lobbyists since the Gulf crisis began, let alone in the 

lead up to today’s hearing. 

There are issues that I did not address in this testimony. If I 

miss anything you wish to discuss, I am happy to answer your 

questions. And on behalf of Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 

I thank you again for inviting me to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:]

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Jonathan Schanzer July 26, 2017 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify. My testimony today will look at the substance behind the current Gulf spat, 

with a focus on Qatar's support for a range of extremist groups and the grievances that the other 

Arab states harbor against Qatar. At the end, I will address the question of U.S. military assets in 

Qatar, as well as several policies that Washington should consider. 

Context 

Members of the committee, as you know, FDD has been producing research and analysis on Qatar 

since the eruption of the Arab Spring in 20 II. Our critique of Qatari foreign policy has been 

consistent. We have pointed to Qatari support for Ham as, the Tali ban, jihadists in Syria, jihadists 

in Libya, and the Muslim Brotherhood. We have been critical of the Qataris for the invective that 

is too often broadcast on state-owned AI-Jazeera. And we have noted through the excellent work 

of my colleague David Andrew Weinberg that Qatar has failed to take action against numerous 

U.S.- and UN-designated terrorist financiers living in Qatar. 1 

We have not singled out Qatar. Indeed, we have produced work that is critical of the other Gulf 

states, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, when it has been warranted. FDD's David Andrew 

Weinberg testified about Saudi Arabia's troubling educational curriculum before the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee just last week 2 But Qatar has been an obvious area of interest in light 

of its incredibly brazen and open support for terrorist groups designated by the United States. 

This support for terrorist groups is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that Qatar is home to 

the ai-Udeid air base, the launch point for thousands of strikes carried out by the U.S. in the war 

on terrorism. When confronted over its support for extremists, Qatar's response has been lax or 

dismissive, with little in the way of new commitments or follow-through. The fact is, Qatar has 

wielded its immense wealth and soft power to undermine U.S. interests, including America's allies 

in the region. 

FDD has worked hard to educate Congress, the executive, and the American public on the 

challenge of Qatar. We found that the previous administration was generally willing to listen, but 

was unwilling to redress the problem. Having failed to gain much traction for six years, we decided 

to hold a conference on U.S. Qatar policy with the arrival of a new administration. We held our 

event on May 23 here in Washington, DC.' 

Our conference was, I believe, the first major conference to shine a light on Qatar. It featured 

current and former officials, figures from both sides of the aisle, who expressed deep concerns 

1 David Andrew Weinberg ... Qatar and Terror Fimmce. Part 11: Funders of al-Qaeda in Syria.'' Foundation/(Jr 

Defense of Democracies, January 2017. 

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about Qatar, its support for extremist groups, and its long-term viability as a U.S. ally if that 

support continued. Shortly after the conference concluded, we learned that the Qatar News Agency 

was hacked. The Qatari response intimated that Doha saw our conference as part of a coordinated 

assault 4 To be clear: We had nothing to do with it. FDD strongly condemns hacking. Now, 

according to the Washington Post, the U.S. intelligence agency allegedly believes that the UAE 

was behind the hack against Qatar, although the Emirati ambassador to Washington vehemently 

denies this 5 

Several days after the Qatar News Agency hack, the Emirati ambassador was himself hacked. His 

emails were leaked to journalists worldwide. The U.S. intelligence community has yet to determine 

who was behind that attack. Several stories emerged featuring emails between my colleagues at 

FDD and the ambassador. The implication was that we were coordinating our efforts with the UAE 

or that we take Emirati money6 For the record, FDD took no direction from a foreign government. 

Nor did we take any foreign government money. Although many think tanks engage in this 

practice, we never have and never will. 

The hack and hack-back has since yielded a full-blown spat among the Gulf states. The Gulf and 

other Arab states cut diplomatic ties with Qatar on June 5, blocking maritime, land, and air routes 

for both traffic and trade 7 Qatar's financial ratings have dropped,~ and its currency has been under 

strain9 

Qatar has been defiant, insisting that its definition of terrorism differs greatly from its critics. 

Qatar's alternate view of reality and morality is a poor defense. It is reminiscent of the so-called 

"affluenza" teen who was charged with a drunk driving crash that killed four people, but whose 

defense team argued that the teen's life of privilege made it difficult for him to deterrnine right 

from wrong. 10 A country of great wealth, Qatar is now effectively arguing the same thing. But the 

Qataris fully grasp the list of grievances against them. I will summarize them below. 

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Support for Hamas 

Qatar is a top headquarters for Hamas, a Palestinian terrorist group designated by the State 

Department in 1997. 11 Ham as operatives work out of Qatar with impunity, where they fundraise 

and even plan terrorist attacks. 

When the Syrian civil war forced Ham as leaders like Politburo chiefKhaled Meshal to flee, Qatar 

offered him refuge, along with several other Hamas political leaders now living in Doha. 12 This 

includes Hamas' spokesman, Ezzat ai-Rishq. 13 

Husam Badran, a Hamas terrorist responsible for taking dozens of Israeli lives, has been living in 

Qatar since 2011 after being released from Israeli prison. 14 According to an Israeli Defense Forces 

website, Badran directed from Doha a 2013 Hamas plot to kidnap Israeli soldiers15 He also was 

responsible for directing the activities and recruitment for a Ham as headquarters in the West Bank 

that was broken up in 2015, and from providing that network with hundreds of thousands of dollars 

from his perch in Qatar16 He still appears to be residing in Qatar today. 17 

Hamas military official Saleh Arouri lived for a time in Qatar after being expelled from Turkey 

(he is now believed to be in Lebanon). Arouri is widely believed to have plotted the abduction and 

murder of the three Israeli teens in 2014. That event led to a war between Israel and Ham as in the 

summer of2014. 18 He is under U.S. sanctions for funding and directing Ham as terror operations, 19 

and also stands accused of plotting a Hamas coup against the Palestinian Authority in the West 

Bank20 

2013. 

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Qatar is further believed to be hosting Talal Ibrahim Abd al-Rahman Sharim, a member ofHamas' 

armed wing, the lzz ad-Din ai-Qassam Brigades, who reportedly played a role in financing Ham as 

cells in the West Bank from Qatari territory. 21 

In 2014, the Kuwaiti daily newspaper AI-Seyassah reported that Hamas was moving its financial 

operations to Qatar. 22 And there is ample evidence to support this. For example, it was reported 

that "Bakri Hanifa, who is a major financial operative for Hamas . moved 'tens of millions of 

dollars' to Turkey from Qatar before being sent onward to Ham as's political and military wings." 23 

Zahir ai-Jabareen is another Ham as official who worked out of Qatar to send money from Gulf 

countries to Hamas."24 

Maher Ubeid, "a member of Hamas's politburo who reportedly was put in charge of laundering 

tens of millions of euros from Turkish territory to Hamas's military and political wings in 

Gaza," was also based in Qatar25 

Video footage from 2015 showed Mohammed al-Qawasmi, whom AI-Seyassah identified as a 

Hamas officia1,26 was allowed to fundraise on state-controlled Qatari television. 27 

According to a leaked cable attributed to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the U.S. 

government pressed the Qatari government in 2009 on "terror finance related to Hamas." 2g Five 

years later, former Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen noted 

in 2014 that "Qatar, a longtime U.S. ally, has for many years openly financed Hamas, a group that 

continues to undermine regional stability."29 However, Husam Badran told AI-Monitorin 2014, 

Jonathan Schanzer. "Hamas Still Finds Harbor in Turkey," Ti1c Weekly Standard, Jtme 8. 20 lG. 

('c_'_i_"'0JY~Y(~e};_!_y5_l_~_t}fl_!F~L!=qgljh_t1_rn85-~t1_1l_:-DDlh:ll~Lt9I~l_l1_-t_1_l[};r::.:{;lJ1~;;l~~/::~l-~\2}-l:_r)) 

' 1 --_,.....)U"t....,.:i.S? Jl_,.i >.<-'!-;:11 ~ti.II:U...\SJit....iii .. «--'J~ _,\,(Abu Aref The Complete Story of the Mystenous 

Man Who Manages Hamas Movement's Money in Egypt):· L1 Mogaz(Egypt). December 21. 2013. 

!l_-,_y_Wl\~.gllJlQf}10._~~} liJLlJ.QQ_ell __ l:23I~_3_) 

.)c 4' _,b,., .J<j..:il '' .rt....,." J 4> y .>o '.J-"' -J_,J. 40 ( 40 Million Euros from Turkey to Hamas for Strengthening Its 

Control over GaLa),'' Palcslinc Press NcJ¥5 !lgcncy(UK), November 6. 2011. 

(hrtrr ~~_WY'ilYJl;Jhm~s._s,_GQ:lLt;/;:r;_~Jbi_c!?A~-;_t_jg:J=- Il~~t'Ul:;;_&J:t-£rl~}_-±-D 

'" ·'J,,W1\A.J'I_,> ,.i _).l ~I"'-! ".rt....,. .. J;.l,a,. ,:c1,\.i:ill "91,; j..:o.. (Mashal Faces Sharp Criticism inside Hamas after 

Qatar Arresls One of lts Financial Officers." Al-S(:yassah (Kuwait). January 28,2015. 

AlrayyanTV. "2014-08-06- w~~J'JI J .Y'Wil.:ihll- ~I 

You/ ·'Terrorist ube, August Finance: 7, 2014. JI (~~~~"~;;~r:;·~~~T~~·t~;~~~~~~;~;;;I~~~~J~•~~~~~~~~~~~~~-l 

IJ9STilTEI3180l_a. accessed 29 Under Secretary for Terrorism 

Financing:· Remai*s at the Centt'r for a ]llew American Secwi(F. March 4. 

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"There is no suspension of the Qatari financial support for the movement, since their relationship 

is ongoing." 30 

Qatari Support for al-Qaeda in Syria 

As a Gulf country seeking to influence the post-Arab Spring politics of the Middle East, Qatar is 

not unique. However, Qatar's desire to bring down the Assad regime ultimately gave way to 

backing ai-Qaeda in Syria. 

As early as 2012, ai-Qaeda's Jab hat ai-Nusra commanders met with senior Qatari military officials 

and financiers in Doha31 ln 2013, certain Qatari weapons shipments to militant groups were 

winding up in the hands of Jabhat ai-Nusra. It was for this reason that the Obama administration 

requested that Qatar halt the export of heat-seeking shoulder-tired missiles to Syrian militants32 

ln one very strange episode, a financier named Abd al-Aziz bin Khalifa al-Attiyah reportedly 

travelled to the Syrian-Lebanese border via Beirut to distribute funds to Jab hat ai-Nusra militants. 

Lebanese authorities arrested him but released him following a Qatari protest. Al-Attiyab is a 

Qatari sheikh and cousin of former Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid al Attiyah33 Upon his return, 

he received a lifetime achievement award from the Qatar Olympic Committee and appeared in a 

video for a Syria fundraising campaign with another Qatari who would later be sanctioned by the 

U.S. for funding ai-Qaeda34 

Broadly speaking, Qatar has worked to nonnalize ai-Qaeda in Syria Qatar reportedly promised 

additional financial backing should Jab hat al-Nusra rebrand and cosmetically distance itself from 

ai-Qaeda35 This likely explains the two rebrands of the ai-Qaeda affiliate, tirst as Jabhat Fateh aiSham (JFS) in July 2016, 36 and again as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in January 201737 

BBCNews(UK), Febmary 28,2017. 

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Impunity for Designated al-Qaeda Financiers in Qatar 

Qatar also has failed to prosecute many of the designated terrorist financiers, primarily al-Qaeda 

financiers, within its borders. FDD's David Andrew Weinberg has painstakingly documented 

this 3 g 

The problem has also been well documented by successive senior Treasury Department officials. 

For example, in March 2014, then-Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David 

Cohen called Qatar, as well as Kuwait, "pennissivejurisdictions" for terrorist finance, 39 and that 

October, he accused Doha of giving legal impunity to Khalifa ai-Subaiy and 'Abd ai-Rahman aiNu' aymi, Qatari nationals under U.S. and UN charges for raising millions of dollars for al-Qaeda. 

AI-Subaiy was identified as having close ties to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad 

before the latter's capture in 2003 and had apparently worked as a senior employee at Qatar's 

central bank40 

Cohen's successor at Treasury, Adam Szubin, stated in October 2016 that Qatar "still lacks the 

necessary political will and capacity to effectively enforce their CFT (combating the financing of 

terrorism) laws against all terrorist financing threats regardless of organization or affiliation." 41 

And in February 2017, the former Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, who had just stepped 

down, noted that designated terror financiers were still "operating openly and notoriously" in 

Qatar, as well as Kuwait42 

Hajjaj ai-Ajmi is one figure who regularly visited Doha to fundraise for Jabhat ai-Nusra. He 

encouraged Qataris to "Give your money to the ones who will spend it on jihad, not aid." The 

Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs reportedly invited ai-Ajmi to speak. 43 The U.S. 

Treasury designated al-Ajmi as a Jab hat al-Nusra funder in August 201444 According to the UAE, 

two Qatari nationals based in Qatar helped al-Ajmi with his fundraising there 45 

38 David Andre\v Weinberg, '·Qatar and Terrorism Finance. Part 11· Private Funders of al-Qaeda in Syria," 

f-'(mndation for /Jpfpns·p of /Jpmocmcfps·, January 2017. 

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Another Kuwaiti national, Shafi al-Ajmi, reportedly boasted on Twitter that he raised $52,000 for 

Jabhat ai-Nusra in Qatar. He instructed Qataris to route donations through the Foundation Sheikh 

Thani Ibn Abdullah for Humanitarian Services (RAF), a Qatati royal charity46 The U.S. Treasury 

designated ai-Ajmi as a Jab hat ai-Nusra funder in August 201447 

The U.S. Treasury designated Abd ai-Rahman bin Umayr ai-Nu'aymi for transferring $600,000 to 

al-Qaeda in Syria4 g AI-Nu'aymi previously served as an advisor to the Qatari government and 

founding member of Sheik Eid bin Mohammed ai-Thani Charitable Foundation, and he served for 

a number of years as the chairman of a state-funded Qatari think tank. 49 

The U.S. Treasury designated Hamid Abdullah al-Ali in 2006 for financially supporting al-Qaeda 

in Iraq 5° He was added to the UN's ai-Qaeda sanctions list as well in 2008, and would have been 

added sooner but Qatar blocked his designation while it was a member of the Security Council. In 

2012, the Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs invited him to deliver a Friday sermon at 

Doha's Qatar Grand Mosque, in which he extoled the jihad in Syria. 51 

The U.S. Treasury designated Sa'd bin Sa'd Muhammad Shariyan Al-Ka'bi in August 2015 for 

facilitating terrorist funding social networks and ransom payment benefiting al-Qaeda in Syria52 

He reportedly still resides in Qatar. 53 

According to the State Department's country reports on terrorism released last week, Qatar never 

prosecuted and convicted terror financiers before 2015 54 According to the Associated Press, five 

UN-designated terror financiers have since been prosecuted by Qatar, but for some reason "are not 

imprisoned " 55 This subcommittee might consider requesting an explanation from Qatar about its 

justice system relating to terrorist financiers. 

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Kidnapping for Ransom 

Qatar has repeatedly been accused of paying ransoms to terrorists. Fonner Libyan leader 

Moammar Qaddafi often engaged in this practice as a means to send funds to terrorist groups under 

legitimate cover 5 6 Of course, Qatar's government denies this 5 7 But FDD has identified eighteen 

different episodes in the last six years in which Qatar was reported as a participant in hostage 

talks 5 8 

In 2012 and 2013, Qatar and Oman were accused by sources cited by the New Ywk Times and 

Wail Street journal of paying roughly $20 million in ransoms for European hostages held by alQaeda in Yemen59 In 2013, McClatchy cited a Lebanese security official saying that Qatar paid a 

ransom for Lebanese pilgrims and Turkish pilots, the former of which was reportedly held by alQaeda in Syria. 60 In 2014, the Wall Street Journal reported that Qatar paid a $16 million ransom 

for Syrian nuns held by al-Qaeda in Syria61 The same year, Qatar reportedly paid $25 million to 

Jabhat al-Nusra for the release of 45 Fijian UN peacekeepers kidnapped near the Golan Heights62 

Qatar also was accused offacilitating a ransom to al-Qaeda related to the release of U.S. journalist 

Peter Theo Curtis, according to sources cited by the Daily Beast63 In 2015, Qatar was accused by 

Lebanese and Syrian sources of paying $25 million as part of a hostage deal Doha mediated 

between al-Qaeda's Nusra Front and Beirut for kidnapped Lebanese security officials. 64 

According to a source quoted by the Financial Times, "ransom payments are the straw the broke 

the camel's back" leading up to the current Gulf crisis with Qatar. That piece cited sources alleging 

that in April, Qatar had paid up to a billion dollars for the release of its citizens, including members 

of Qatar's royal family, who had been taken hostage by an Iraqi terrorist group. The sources stated 

that Qatar had given $200-$300 million to Sunni jihadists in Syria who were holding hostages, 

with most of the money going to Hayat Tahrir at-Sham. Another $700 million reportedly went to 

56 Jonathan Schanzer. "Terrorism· s Back Door." Los !J.ngdcs Times. August 2C1. 2003. 

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the Iranian-backed bloc in the region, with $300 million going to IRGC-backed Shiite militias in 

Iraq and Tehran taking a $400 million cut. 65 

Support for the Talibau 

In December 2009, the State Department listed Qatari cooperation on terrorism finance among 

"the worst in the region," noting that, "the Tali ban ... and other terrorist groups exploit Qatar as a 

fundraising locale."66 In 2010, members of the Taliban reportedly began to arrive in Qatar to 

establish an official presence. In 2012, the Taliban established a political office in Qatar to "spread 

understanding with the international community."67 When the Obama administration began its 

dialogue in 2013 with the Tali ban, Qatar permitted the group to open a diplomatic office in Doha68 

The Taliban presence increased further with a May 2014 Qatari-facilitated prisoner swap60 

involving Bowe Bergdahl, an American soldier captured by the Taliban after "wandering off an 

American outpost in the Paktika province in June 2009," 70 in exchange for five Taliban figures 

with "high-ranking positions in Mullah Omar's organization" and "noteworthy connections to AI 

Qaeda.'m The Taliban Five were released to Qatar "in coordination with the Qatari government, 

which pledged to enforce a temporary travel ban and provided assurances the men would not pose 

a threat to the US"72 

Troubling questions have been raised about the extent to which Qatar is monitoring or politicking 

the activities of the Tali ban Five. Fox News reported in 2015 that "at least three of the five Tali ban 

leaders . have tried to plug back into their old terror networks." 73 Reports indicate that at least 

one of the former Tali ban detainees may have been in contact with fighters from the Afghan terror 

group in January 2015 and encouraged attacks on U.S. forces 74 A top fundraiser for the Haqqani 

Spencer Aekennan. "One or 'Taliban Five' in Bowe Bergdahl 

Guanlian(UK). January 30,2015. 

s•.-vapHretl1m-mi1it;l,,c..-) 

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group was purportedly able to tly to Qatar, meet one or more of the five men, and tly out before 

he was captured in a third country75 

According to one Afghan official recently cited by the New York Times, "Doha is now is home to 

about 100 Taliban ofllcials and their relatives, who live comfortably at Qatari state expense." 76 

Under fire in recent weeks for its support of terrorist groups, the government in Doha insists that 

it hosted the Taliban with the pennission, or even encouragement, of the Obama administration. 77 

This may have been the case. But that does not mean that Qatar has upheld its end of the bargain. 

It also does not mean that the office has helped achieve U.S. objectives. One senior U.S. official 

told me earlier this year that he heard repeatedly from Afghan officials that the Tali ban office in 

Doha directly undermined the Afghan govemment. 78 This committee might consider investigating 

whether the Tali ban presence in Qatar ultimately helps or hurts our interests. 

Support for Libyan Islamists 

On June 5, 2017, Libya's eastern-based government joined other Arab countries in cutting ties 

with Qatar, with Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Deri asserting that Doha was "harboring 

terrorism." 79 The move retlected a longstanding frustration with Qatar's sponsorship of Islamist 

extremists in the war-tom country. Since the 2011 revolution, Libya has been the site of a Gulf 

proxy war. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have backed the eastern-based government and 

Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). By contrast, Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey have 

backed the Tripoli-based Presidency Council/Government of National Accord. 

Qatar's interference in Libya dates to the revolution against the Qaddafi regime, when Doha 

provided robust support to the rebels80 Since then, Qatar has reportedly sent massive amounts of 

weapons to Islamist militants battling the Western-backed government in Libya81 A March 2013 

UN report noted that in 2011 and 2012, Qatar violated the cJN arms embargo by "providing 

military material to the revolutionary forces through the organization of a large number of tlights 

and the deliveries of a range of arms and ammunition " 82 And according to the Libya News Agency, 

75 Margherita Stancati and Ehsanullah Amiri, ""Haqqani Leaders Detained in Persian Gulf, Not Inside Afghanistan:· 

The Wail Strcct.!ournaL October 19.2014. 

weapons to Tripoli,"' 

C.t~t1Q.!LJJ};:...Ltlli.f.~L~~~92J1l/J.l1L<£l~£;_Q_l-+IQ?l.l.:1l1ik:1iln:.J.:.S~r,;.ur_[Jy_.-.Q;!.Lo.L 

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Doha has provided more than 750 million euros to extremist groups in Libya since 20lls3 Arab 

officials l spoke to believe that these deliveries of anns and cash arrive to Western Libya by way 

of a commercial airline that is owned by Qatar. s-1 

According to Kristian Coates Ulrichsen of the Baker Institute for Public Policy, ''Qatar developed 

close links with key lslamist militia commanders [in Libya] such as Abdelhakim Belhadj, once the 

head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and, in 2011, the commander of the Tripoli Brigade.''85 

According to Arab officials, Belhadj was the Libyan apostle ofOsama bin Laden who maintained 

close and continuing ties to Qatars6 Belhadj launched Hizb al-Watan in 2012, 87 which Arab 

officials believed have maintained close ties to LIFG and received continued support from Qatar88 

Ulrich sen a! so notes the connection between Qatar and "lsmael ai-Salabi, the leader of one of the 

best-supplied rebel militias, the Rafallah al-Sahati Companies. Qatar was widely suspected of 

anning and funding ai-Salabi's group, whose sudden munificence of resources in 2011 earned it 

the nickname of the 'Ferrari 17 Brigade."' 89 

lsmael al-Salabi's brother, Ali al-Salabi, is a prominent Libyan cleric close to the emir of Qatar. 

One Egyptian source claims that he maintains close ties to the LIFG90 This is a claim echoed by 

Arab officials familiar with the situation in Libya91 

On June 8, 2017, the LNA held a press conference alleging proof of Qatar's malign role in Libya. 

The LNA charged that Qatari intelligence General Salim Ali al-Jarboui supported al-Qaeda, the 

Islamic State, and the Muslims Brotherhood by transferring $8 billion from the Qatari Tunisian 

National Bank to the Housing Bank of Tataouine Governorate in southern Tunisia. According to 

the LNA, Qatar supported the assassination of senior officials, facilitated training of lslamist 

extremists by Hamas, and helped transport Libyan Tslamists to Syria. Mesmari also presented a 

letter by Mohammed Hamad Al Hajri, acting charge d'affaires at the Qatar Embassy in Libya, 

supporting the notion that Qatar had deployed military units to the country92 

·\vill not pass \Yithout Hafter. .. Eg;pt lndrpcndcnt. June I. 

~-+ Tntenne\v with Summer 85 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Tllf• UnitPd Arab Fmirafps: Pm-ver. Politics ami Polic_ymnking, (London and NY· 

Routledge. 2017), page 197. 86 Tntervie\v with Arab officials, Summer 2017. 

Katenna Nikolas, Abdel to launch Hizb al-Watan Islamic party:· Digital]oumal, May 24, 

2012. 

:<:< Tntervie\v with Summer 2017. 89 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Power. Politics and Polic_ymaking, (London and NY: 

Routledge. 2017), page 197. 

lj(J ·'Ali Mohamed Mohamed Al-Salabi: Tamim·s man in Libya,'· June 1 L 2017. 

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When Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt issued a "terrorist list" of 59 individuals and 12 

entities linked to Qatar, it included one entity (the Benghazi Defense Brigades) and five individuals 

from Libya93 On June 12, the LNA released a second list of 75 Libyan individuals and 9 

organizations tied to Qatar94 One highlight of the first list includes Al-Sadiq Abd al-Rahman Ali 

ai-Ghiryani, who previously served the Grand Mufti of Libya, who has called for the destruction 

of the eastern government 95 

The Muslim Brotherhood 

Much of the current conflict between Qatar and its neighbors can be traced back to Qatari support 

for the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood's presence in Qatar dates back to 1974, 

when students studying in countries like Kuwait and Egypt returned and wanted to fonn their own 

chapter of the organization. Since then, Qatar has hosted the movement's leaders and supported 

its regional activities, particularly since the eruption of the Arab Spring96 That was when Qatar 

began to actively support Muslim Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and 

beyond97 

In Libya, Doha became the first Arab government to recognize the National Transitional Council 

(NTC) as the only legitimate representation of the people. It provided military and financial 

support to the rebels fighting against Moammar Qaddafi and created a pro-revolutionary channel 

that balanced Qaddafi 's propaganda. Some Libyans, however, like the former NTC Deputy Prime 

Minister Ali Tarhouni, suspected that Qatar was providing support to the Brotherhood. 98 

Qatar invested $18 billion in Egypt shortly after Morsi's election to support his Brotherhood 

regime, and it reportedly supplied funds to the Tslamist Tunisian Nahda Party, as we11 99 It also 

backed the Brotherhood-dominated Syrian National Council, founded in late 2011, despite other 

Arab states' hesitation. 100 

AI-Jazeera 

'>'l··saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt 1ssue Qatar-lmked terrorism list·· Tflf• l'lationai(VAE), June 9, 2017 

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Qatar's Arab neighbors are also deeply concerned about the broadcasts of Qatar-owned Al-Jazeera. 

Some of the concerns are shared here in Washington, as well. 

After the Egyptian coup against Mohammed Morsi, Al-Jazeera hosted exiled Brotherhood leaders 

at a five-star hotel in Doha and gave them airtime to advocate for their cause. Al-Jazeera also 

heavily aired the Brotherhood's protests against the new Egyptian government. 101 

The channel has a long history of incitement to violence, biased reporting, supporting lslamist 

ideologies, and acting as a tool of the Qatari government. I do not believe that the demand issued 

by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt to shut down Al-Jazeera is realistic 102 But 1 do 

believe Qatar needs to do more to ensure that the content on this state-backed channel is addressed. 

For example, in Syria, the channel has provided a platform to presenters who call for violence 

against Alawites. One host, Faisal al-Qassem, said of Alawites: "The Alawites don't need 

demonization, they are demons, even Satan, the Devil himself, is ashamed ofthem." 103 

Additional criticisms of Al-Jazeera include its reference to suicide bombers as "martyrs" and the 

Islamic State as "the state organization." 104 The channel has hosted figures who advocate for 

political Islam as well as more radical ones from al-Qaeda and Hezbollah who call for jihad. 105 

One of the London Bridge bombers, Youssef Zaghba, reported! y was inspired by A1-Jazeera. 106 

Al-Jazeera's reporting on Israel has been consistently egregious. Recently, the network's English 

affiliate reported on "three Palestinians killed," omitting the fact that they were armed with guns 

and shot two Israeli police officers to death before being killed107 The network's Arabic station 

J()t Eric Trager. "The Muslim Brotherhood ls the Root of the Qatar Crisis,'' The iltlantic. July :2, 2017. 

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went further, calling the three assailants "martyrs."108 Al-Jazeera Arabic does this virtually every 

time a Palestinian is killed in the act of attacking Israeli civilians or armed forces. 109 

AI-Jazeera has often featured Yousufai-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, 

who called the Holocaust "divine punishment," and has advocated on air for killing Jews. 110 

In Israel's most recent war with Hamas in 2014, AI-Jazeera Arabic's reporting mirrored Hamas' 

directives to observers on how to report on the conflict. The network followed Ham as' instructions 

to describe Palestinians as "martyrs" or "victims" of" Israeli oppression." Al-J azeera called all 

Palestinian casualties "innocent civilians," even if they were known combatants. 111 

During the Iraq War, AI-Jazeera received criticism for airing videos by ai-Qaeda's leadership, who 

called for violence against the U.S. and its allies.lt promoted the lslamist ideology of groups like 

ai-Qaeda by describing suicide bombings as "paradise operations" and terrorist activities as acts 

of"resistance." 112 ln April2013, lraq suspended the licenses of Al-Jazeera due to accusations of 

incitement. At that point, more than 170 people had been killed due to sectarian fighting, which 

the Communication and Media Commission attributed in part to Al-Jazeera's reporting. The 

regulatory group argued that the sectarian language used in their reporting created "criminal acts 

of revenge by attacking the security forces." 113 

These, of course, are just a few representative examples of the controversial material aired on AIJazeera. 

The Current Gulf Crisis 

Qatar's neighbors are justified in their concern about the aforementioned policies, particularly if 

their interests are in a stable Middle East. Yet, Qatar's Gulf neighbors are certainly not free from 

guilt. Based on conversations I have had with current and former Treasury officials, Kuwait ranks 

among the top terror finance concerns in the Gulf, alongside Qatar. According to the State 

Department's Country Reports on Terrorism for 2016, which were released last week, "a number 

ofUN-designated terrorist financiers continued to operate in Kuwait." 114 

J(£ '\J,.hly """' ~ ~~ J'-'! ;)!;""" 'l;l...oj J ~ j.,.::WI ,H,,~, •• ~oo• 

Soldiers in Car-Ramming OpcraLion in Hebron)." 

on 

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Jonathan Schanzer July 26, 2017 

Saudi Arabia continues to finance institutions that teach Wahhabi Islam and also foments religious 

incitement, thereby ensuring continued radicalization of Muslim youth. And all of the Gulf states 

suffer from a significant democracy deticit. 

To understand the current crisis, it is important to understand that the Saudis and the Emiratis have 

been engaged in a rather ruthless competition with Qatar for years. These three countries have 

wielded their immense wealth in an attempt to outdo one another through soft power by way of 

foreign investment, domestic businesses, media interests, lobbying in Western capitals, and more. 

ln the wake of the Arab Spring, as noted above, they began to throw their support behind various 

proxies representing their interests in the Middle East. Over the last six years, the rivalry has boiled 

over. 

Right now, Qatar's opponents say that Doha has broken its agreement, signed in November 2013, 

in which signatories pledged not to intervene in the internal affairs of other Gulf states, not to 

support the Muslim Brotherhood, and not to back opposition groups in Yemen. A second 

agreement also included provisions ensuring the stability of Egypt. The Gulf states say that Doha 

has given support to Hezbollah as well as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 115 The Gulf states 

recalled their ambassadors temporarily from Doha in protest in March 2014. 116 

Through Kuwaiti mediation, the countries signed the Riyadh Agreement in April, and then an 

extension of the Riyadh Agreement in November, which led to the reinstatement of the 

ambassadors and the GCC summit being held, as initially planned, in Doha. 117 

But Qatar's Arab neighbors are unsatisfied with Qatar's track record. Doha continues to support 

the aforementioned terrorist groups and extremists. Their focus has been on the Muslim 

Brotherhood, but Qatar has also failed to end the impunity of terror financiers and to stop 

promoting the ideology that underpins extremist groups, as it pledged it would do under the U.S.-

led Jeddah Communique of September 2014. 118 

Yet, the grievances run deeper. As far back as 2009, Abu Dhabi's crown prince complained to the 

U.S. officials that Qatar is "part of the Muslim Brotherhood" Other UAE officials privately 

described Qatar as "public enemy number 3," after Iran and the Brotherhood. 119 

Tensions escalated dramatically in the wake of the Arab Spring. In 2012, YusufQardawi criticized 

the UAE on Al-Jazeera, leading to a diplomatic spat with Qatar Tensions worsened when the UAE 

arrested a number of Emirati members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group known as the 

Association for Reform and Guidance (Jamiat al-Islah wa Tawjih). That crackdown was followed 

by the arrest of eleven Egyptians on January I, 2013 who were suspected of being members of the 

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Jonathan Schanzer July 26, 2017 

Muslim Brotherhood and conspiring to destabilize the UAE. It was then learned that several 

Emirati members of Al-Islah had escaped a crackdown in the UAE and found refuge in Qatarl 20 

In 2014, recordings acquired by Libyan rebels and subsequently posted to YouTube exposed the 

fonner emir of Qatar discussing with Moammar Gaddafi a plan to undermine and even overthrow 

the Saudi royal family. 121 

Most recently, reports have surfaced alleging that Qatar informed al-Qaeda of a military operation 

in Yemen, resulting in a suicide bomb attack that left Emirati troops injured. "Our Qatari allies 

informed al-Qaeda of our precise location and what we were planning to do. We then received 

four suicide bombers at our door," UAE ambassador to Russia Omar SaifGhobash told BBC. 122 

Other claims, conveyed by Arab officials, suggest that Qatar may have also shared similar 

information with Iran-backed Houthi fighters and forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, 

also direct! y leading to Emirati and Saudi deaths. 123 

ln other words, there are deeper reasons Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt decided to 

cut ties with Qatar on June 5. The Arab states released a list of thirteen demands that included 

severing ties with the Brotherhood and Hamas, the Palestinian ann of the Brotherhood. 124 But even 

if Qatar complied, additional challenges would remain. 

The AI-Udeid Air Base and Camp As Sayliyah 

Remarkably, despite the aforementioned Qatari support for jihadist groups, Qatar hosts America's 

most significant base in the Middle East: al-Udeid Air Base. The dissonance between American 

and Qatari policy is palpable. George W. Bush administration officials openly questioned this 

arrangement, 125 as have Obama administration officials. 126 

Those pushing for a tougher line with Qatar, however, have met with stiff resistance from the U.S. 

military. Since 2001, Qatar has hosted a significant portion of the U.S. military's forces and 

equipment in the Gulf. 127 Al-Udeid is home to a large number of the U.S. Air Force's forward 

deployed strike, logistic, and intelligence assets, which conduct over 15,000 missions per year. 128 

12° Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The United Arab Emirates: Pmvc1~ Politics and Polic_ymaking, (London and NY: 

Routledge, 20 17), pages I S9-20:l. 

t:::t Faisal J. Abbas, .. Qatar's 'Small State 

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Jonathan Schanzer July 26, 2017 

Nearby Camp As Sayliyah houses a major U.S. Army staging area and prepositioned stocks called 

Area Support Group-Qatar (ASG-Qatar)129 Qatar also hosts the major command centers for U.S. 

and allied forces for the region, including CENTCOM' s forward headquarters and the state-of-theart Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC). 

Qatar sees the U.S. presence on its soil as a significant asset. Following the first Gulf War, when 

Qatar realized how susceptible it was to regional aggression, the country's leaders sought closer 

defense ties to the United States. In 1992, the U.S. and Qatar signed a bilateral defense agreement 

granting America substantial access to facilities in Qatar. 130 As part of the deal, Qatar agreed to 

invest $1 billion to build ai-Udeid Air Base. 131 Doha, which was operating only about a dozen 

combat aircraft at the time, 132 welcomed the presence of the United States military to bolster its 

security. According to diplomatic cables, Qatar annually pays for 60 percent of ai-Udeid's "upkeep 

costs."Lu 

During the invasion of Iraq and subsequent operations there, thousands of sorties were flown from 

ai-Udeid. As of August 2015, the base hosted the U.S. Air Force's 3791

h Air Expeditionary Wing 

-the largest expeditionary air wing in the world. 134 U.S. B-1 bombers, originally stationed at the 

base to provide air support in Afghanistan, dropped nearly a third of all coalition weapons on the 

Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria from al-Udeid until they were rotated home in January 2016. 

Aerial refueling tankers and surveillance aircraft are still a constant presence at al-Udeid. 135 

The U.S. signed a 10-year defense cooperation agreement with Qatar in December 2013 to allow 

the U.S. to continue operating and stationing troops at ai-Udeid through 2024. 136 But this should 

not bind the United States. Tt is incumbent upon Washington to assess whether there are 

opportunities to operate out of regional countries more aligned with American goals and values. 

Such a move is not unprecedented. Once the most vital U.S. air installation in the region, Saudi 

Arabia's Prince Sultan Air Base supported 5,000 troops and 200 aircraft at its peak. 137 The U.S. in 

2003 decided to move its assets to al-Udeid. The move was prompted by a number of factors, 

including the Saudi refusal to allow American aircraft to launch strikes from the base during the 

ro le:lL:fl:}Yill:..1U.Q!~i;;l.) 136 "Qatar Signs Defense Accord Yvith U.S .. " Rcutcrs. December 10,2013. 

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second Iraq War. m But in the end, the Saudis at the time were uncomfortable with the presence 

of American forces on their soil. 

Just as the United States started building a backup CAOC in Qatar when its access to Saudi 

territory was become more tenuous, now would be the right time to begin thinking about a similar 

move. At the very least, it would give the U.S. sufficient latitude to get tougher on Doha when it 

misbehaves. 

Below are some options: 

AI-Dhafra. UAE: This base sits less than 20 miles southeast of Abu Dhabi. 139 Al-Dhafra has a 

number of attributes that make it a suitable location. With ai-Dhafra only about 200 miles from aiU deid, U.S. forces would retain the ability to quickly respond to crises throughout the Persian Gulf 

region. The base is also closer to the strategic Strait ofHormuz in the event of Iranian attempts to 

block the vital channel. 

Al-Dhafra's capacity and value to U.S. operations is evident by the fact that in the first months of 

the campaign against the Islamic State in the fall of2014, more coalition strike missions into Syria 

and Iraq were launched from the base than any other in the region. 140 Additionally, the base is 

regarded as the busiest in the world for U.S. Air Force surveillance missions. 141 Other missions 

conducted from ai-Dhafra include: bombing missions into Afghanistan, air patrols over the Gulf, 

and logistics and ISR flights supporting operations throughout the Central Command area of 

responsibility. 142 The U.S. holds the base and its partnership with the UAE in such high regard that 

al-Dhafra is used to host some of the U.S.'s most secretive and advanced aircraft, including being 

one of the few foreign-owned bases to host F-22 stealth fighter deployments 143 

Shaheed Mwaffaq (Mwaffaq Salti) Air Base. Jordan: This base has played a prominent role in the 

battle against the Islamic State. The base is located in Azraq, eastern Jordan, and was first used by 

U.S. aircraft in 1996 to support the no-fly zones over Iraq. Today, Mwaffaq supports a range of 

"Last American Combat Troops Qwt Saudi Arabia," The lVPw Ym* Tinu-•s, September 22, 

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Jonathan Schanzer July 26, 2017 

coalition aircraft striking the Islamic State. 144 The base has two runways capable of 

accommodating all aircraft in the U.S. inventory. 

A number of coalition partners have deployed aircraft to Jordan to support the fight against the 

Islamic State. Both the UAE and Bahrain deployed there to benefit from the country's proximity 

to the battlefield. 145 France, Belgium, and the Netherlands also deployed fighters to Jordan to 

conduct strikes within Traq. 146 

ln short, Mwaffaq is an ideal forward base geographically, and its facilities are robust, enabling a 

full spectrum of missions. No less important, Jordan is an eager partner in the fight against the 

Islamic State and its politics as a moderate Arab state are crucial for coalition building. 

Shaikh !sa Air Base. Bahrain: This is a relatively small air base; it has only one runway and limited 

ramp space. However, during the first Gulf War, as many as 250 Marine and Navy combat aircraft 

and 17,500 servicemen made use of the base. 147 lt continued to support U.S. operations in the 

region during the 1990s, hosting F -15s and F-16s flying missions during Operation Southern 

Watch. 14 ~ After the September II attacks, Bahrain permitted U.S. aircraft to fly combat missions 

out of the base to both Afghanistan and Iraq. The base additionally served as a key logistics hub, 

moving equipment for the U.S. "surge" in Iraq and operations in Afghanistan. 149 Most recently, 

the base hosted U.S. Marine Corps A V-8 Harriers and F/ A-18 Hornets conducting strike missions 

against the Islamic State inside lraq. 150 

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Jonathan Schanzer July 26, 2017 

Bahrain has expressed interest in keeping a long-tenn American presence to ensure its own 

security. The monarchy approved NATO E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and 

US. Navy surveillance aircraft to be stationed at Shaikh Isa in 2010. 151 

With Bahrain, of course, there are drawbacks. In response to the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 

2011, Bahrain's government cracked down brutally on demonstrators, resulting in the U.S. halting 

certain security aid to the country until June 2015. 152 The forecast for future instability in Bahrain 

prompted further concerns from U.S. lawmakers, who requested in 2015 that the Defense 

Department explore alternative locations in the Gulf. 153 Additionally, Shaikh lsa is relatively small 

and not designed to serve as a major air force installation. 

Irbil International Airport. Iraqi Kurdistan: The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which 

maintains a long and warm relationship with the United States, controls this facility. The airport 

hosts two runways. The longer runway, at 4,800 meters (15,700 feet), is one of the longest runways 

in the world154 The facility is large enough to service the largest aircraft in U.S. military service 

(the C-5 Galaxy) and commercial service (the AN-225). 155 The lrbil airport reportedly serves as a 

CIA station, which has expanded in recent years, and hosts a U.S. Combat Search and Rescue 

(CSAR) unit as of February 2015156 

However, with passenger and cargo traffic on the rise, there is potential for competition for limited 

resources. 157 Moreover, the airport's close proximity to lrbil, a major population center, raises 

operational security concerns that non-military personnel could observe sensitive American 

military activity and relay that intelligence to hostile forces. 

lam happy to provide members of this subcommittee FDD's full assessment of the bases in the 

region. But it is important to be clear: We should not undertake such a move without carefully 

studying the alternatives. On the other hand, the time for starting to seriously evaluate our options 

is now. 

151 Walter Pincus, ""State Department Cables Detail U.S. Links to Bahrain," Ti1C' Washington Post, Febmary :22, 

20JJ.Ji~~~~~~~~~~;;;~~~;~L~~~~~~~;~t,;;,;~~;~~~~fu~~=~~~~~c~~~2LJli,lllllliJ 

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Jonathan Schanzer July 26, 2017 

Should the U.S. redeploy assets from its bases in Qatar, it must be done in such a way that meets 

all the U.S. military's operational needs. One existing base may not be able to completely absorb 

all the manpower and assets. Indeed, dispersing U.S. assets across existing installations in the 

region could provide pennanent solutions. 

In the end, the Pentagon still may not wish to rebalance its assets in the Middle East. Should that 

be the case, the Pentagon will certainly have its reasons, and many of them may not be made 

public. But it is nevertheless valuable to ascertain whether other bases could better serve American 

interests. The House Anned Service Committee, Government Accountability Office, or the 

Congressional Budget Office have the opportunity to explore the strategic and budgetary costs of 

repositioning American forces in the region. Assessments and hearings would help air American 

concerns, and allow U.S. decision makers to gain a better understanding of the current challenges 

and opportunities. Above all, this exercise could send a message to our partners in Doha that our 

counterterrorism policies and strategic goals should align if they wish to continue cooperating. 

Additional Policy Recommendations 

The news that Qatar has reportedly agreed to the insertion of two Department of Justice officials 

in its public prosecution office 15g is a step in the right direction as a result of the external pressure 

on Qatar as a result of the current Gulf crisis. The real question is whether there will be additional 

prosecutions and enforcement, and enough political will in Doha to empower prosecutors to go 

after all relevant suspects in terrorism-related cases. Congress should exercise oversight of the 

DOJ in this respect, as well as over Qatar's record in choosing and pursuing such cases. 

More to the point, as Qatar takes steps to issue decrees and implement laws relating to terrorism 

and terrorism finance, it should be lauded. But it is the implementation of those laws and 

regulations that matter most. Qatar's efforts to combat terrorism finance must yield results. 

Congress should monitor those results. 

To that end, Congress should also consider legislation that stipulates closer oversight of Qatar 

terror finance. Until now, the specific challenges associated with terrorism finance in Qatar have 

been largely a private, bilateral matter. Tt may be time to increase the public profile of this problem. 

One way to do this is through the Stop Terrorists Operational Resources and Money (STORM) 

Act of2017, which was introduced in the Senate but not yet in the House. The bill would authorize 

the president to designate a country that is not adequately combating terrorism tinancing as a 

"Jurisdiction of Terrorism Financing Concern." Qatar would almost certainly qualify. 150 

Congress should also press the State Department, pursuant to the State Department Authorization 

Act, to issue its report on which states paid ransoms to terrorists over the last year. 16° Congress 

~x Tom Finn and Sylvia WestalL "U.S. to Reuters, 

J ul V 20, 20 17 \!!l'~"!L\:!c"-'C•.J .. '·:":"!>,\J,!!l."-"'''·'.'""'~::l;'dA!':.llil.,"'C:""''·:".',C"'-"''"'-'·':':'!_:0:~'.!! 159 David Andrew 

The HilL 

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Jonathan Schanzer July 26, 2017 

should further press for full implementation of the Export Administration Act, requiring countries 

like Qatar that host terrorist operatives to be subject to certain licensing requirements for dual-use 

goods we would not want falling into terrorists' hands. 161 

Moreover, even though Qatar remains the most brazen of the Gulf states in its support for terrorist 

groups, Congress must continue to monitor Qatar's neighbors. Indeed, even if Qatar's problems 

were resolved tomorrow, the Gulf would remain an area of major concern in the area of terrorism 

finance. 

Finally, it is time to face the fact that there is simply too much Gulf money sloshing around in 

Washington. The Qataris have invested untold millions in think tanks and universities, not to 

mention lobbyists and other influencers, and they are not the only ones. Qatar's Gulf neighbors 

are also major players in this game. The end result is that those who feed from this trough are 

unable to engage in an honest conversation about the policies and behaviors of their benefactorseven when they fly in the face of U.S. interests. Indeed, policymakers have all but given up on the 

human rights violations, democracy deficits, and terrorism finance challenges associated with this 

troubled region. Nowhere is that more glaring than with Qatar. 1 would therefore argue that even 

an honest conversation here in Congress about the problem would represent a significant step 

forward. 

Members of the committee, there are many issues that I did not address in this testimony. If I have 

missed anything you wish to discuss, Tam happy to answer your questions. 

On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, T thank you again for inviting me to 

testify. 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 23 www.defenddemocracy.org 
33

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Dr. Schanzer. 

Dr. Levitt, you are recognized for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND 

FROMER-WEXLER FELLOW, STEIN PROGRAM ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and assess the U.S.-Qatar relationship 

and Qatari counterterrorism efforts to date. 

Qatar has been a long-time ally of the United States and hosts 

the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East. But the U.S. has 

also long criticized the Qatari Government for its lax counterterrorism policies; in particular, shortcomings regarding efforts to 

combat terror financing. 

Moving forward, it is critical to bring this Gulf crisis to a close, 

and the best way to do that would be to find face saving but substantive and verifiable ways for Qatar to address the most serious 

shortcomings in its counterterrorism and counter extremism posture. Some of the recent accusations made against Qatar are exaggerated, but many of the claims against Qatar are substantive and 

focus on long-simmering issues that Doha should have addressed a 

long time ago. 

In recent years, Qatar has maintained an open-door policy for a 

wide range of Islamist extremism groups from Hamas to the 

Taliban and others. Most disturbing, however, is the tolerance for 

fundraising in support for al-Qaeda’s Syria branch, Al-Nusra. 

While Qatar has made previous efforts to halt terror financing, the 

efficacy of these efforts is questionable. 

For example, in 2014, the State Department credited Qatar with 

shutting down Saad al-Kaabis online fundraising platform for alQaeda and Syria called Madad Ahl al-Sham. But the following 

year, the U.S. Treasury designated Al-Kaabi, who was still operating as a financial supporter of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-Syrian affiliate, the Al-Nusra front. Al-Kaabi came up again in the context 

of a 2017 designation of a Kuwait-based terror financier, Mohammad al-Anizi. Evidently, Al-Kaabi continued to provide funding for 

Nusra even after Qatar supposedly shut down its fundraising platform in 2014, 3 years earlier, putting a pretty big question mark 

over the integrity of Qatar’s measures to stop terror financing. 

Doha has been particularly sketchy on the issue of the prosecution of terrorism financiers in Qatari courts. According to the State 

Department’s 2015 country reports, Doha had made efforts to prosecute significant terrorist financiers. As of 2016, Qatar had prosecuted five terrorist financiers: Ibrahim al-Bakr, Saad al-Kaabi, 

Abd al-Latif al Kawari, Abd al-Rahman al-Nuaymi, and Khalifa alSubaiey 

It is now clear that of these, two were acquitted, one was convicted but acquitted on appeal, and one was convicted in absentia. 

As a result, none were in jail when the current inter-Gulf spat 

broke out. The ones still resident in Qatar are reportedly under 

surveillance. 

34

According to recent reports, some new arrests may have been 

made since the current crisis began, likely involving some of those 

previously tried in Qatari courts. Qatar’s lack of transparency 

about these cases led to much speculation about the country’s commitment to these cases. And it is worth noting that just recently, 

the director of the Qatari Government communications office said, 

and I quote, ‘‘All individuals with links to terrorism Qatar have 

been prosecuted,’’ which would mean that the total number of suspects is five, which is not the case. 

Let me give you just a couple of examples of this odd history. 

This would have been the second time that Ibrahim al-Bakr was 

convicted following his 2000 arrest, in which he was subsequently 

released from prison after he promised not to do terrorist activity 

in Qatar. 

Or consider Khalifa al-Subaiey, who was originally arrested in 

January 2008 in Bahrain for financing terrorism, undergoing terrorist training, facilitating the travel of others abroad to receive 

terrorist training and more. 

He was arrested again in March 2008 by Qatar and served a 6-

month term in prison. He was supposedly under surveillance after 

he was released. But in 2015, the U.N. Committee on Al-Qaida 

Sanctions updated his listing with new information, which is no 

small matter, because it required a new vote of the full U.N. Security Council, and reported that al-Subaiey had resumed terrorist 

activity. 

According to the committee, ‘‘After his release, al-Subaiey reconnected with al-Qaeda financiers and facilitators in the Middle East 

and resumed organizing funds and support of al-Qaeda.’’

It is important to note that while terror finance prosecutions are 

difficult cases and acquittals are part of a normally functioning justice system, these are not the only tools available for Qatari officials to deal with financiers effectively serving as regional bundlers 

of terror funding from donors throughout the region to al-Qaeda 

and Syria in particular. 

The first big test for Qatar will be to populate the domestic designation list just created by Qatar’s Emir and to put people on that 

list. 

The U.S. just signed an MOU on counter terror financing with 

Qatar. It created a whole bunch of new authorities. These authorities need to be implemented in full. 

Qatar has a history of past counterterrorism and counterterrorism-related laws in 2004, 2006, 2010, 2014. They were either 

not implemented, or not implemented in full, and so, therefore, this 

time, we have to make sure that these are done and done effectively. 

Moving forward, the most important thing is that Qatar populates this designation list in a transparent manner, starting with 

those individuals already designated by the U.S. Treasury and 

United Nations, who remain at large, and may be continuing to 

fund and provide material support to al-Qaeda and other terrorist 

groups. 

There are several other recommendations I make in my written 

statement. I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before 

35

you today, and look forward to answering any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]

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26427b-1.eps

Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship 

Dr. Matthew Levitt 

Fromer-Wexler Fellow and Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

July 26, 2017 

ChaimKm Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of the MENA subcommittee, thank you 

for this opportunity to appear before you and assess the U .S.-Qatar relationship and Qatari counter 

terrorism efforts to date. 

Qatar has been a longtime ally of the United States and hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle 

East. However, the U.S. has also long criticized the Qatari government for its lax counterterrorism 

policies. and in particular shortcomings regarding efforts to combat terrorist financing. Since early June, a 

coalition of four Arab nations-Saudi Arabi~ the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain-has cut oil:' diplomatic and 

trade relations with Qatar over what they describe as Doha· s ·'financing, adopting. and sheltering 

extremists."'' The Qatar crisis has been exacerbated by contlicting statements coming out of the Trump 

administration, and threatens to undermine the sense of shared mission to counter terrorism that was the 

intended purpose of the recent Riyadh summit. Moving forward, it is critical to bring this Gulf crisis to a 

close and the best way to do that would be to find face-saving but substantive and verifiable ways for 

Qatar to address the most serious shortcomings in its counterterrorism and coLmtcr-cxtrcmisin posture. 

Some of the recent accusations made against Qatar arc exaggerated, blown out of proportion, or simply 

not based on fact-consider the release today of a documentary by a UAE-fi.mded media outlet alleging 

Qatari involvement in the September II attacks 2 But many of the claims against Qatar are substantive 

and focus on long-simmering issues that Doha should have addressed a long time ago. 1 will address some 

of these today. 

In recent years. Qatar has housed leaders from Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood. and the TaJibatl. and has 

also provided a platfom1 for extremist leaders to spread their ideology through shows on AI-Jazeera3 In 

2014, then-Treasury Under Secretary of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen reported that 

Qatar has openly financed Hamas for mwy years, and continues to contribute to regionaJ instability. 

Cohen also noted that Qatar has supported other extremist groups operating in Syria. 'To say the least," 

he concluded, '·this threatens to aggravate an aJready volatile situation in a particularly dangerous wd 

1 "Saudi Arabia Statement on Severing Qatar Ties.'' Safional, June 5. 2017. hHps:l/\\ \\ w.thenatioo.al.aeh\orld/saudiBethany Allen-Ebrahiminn, "Ne\v U AE Documental)' Clnims Qatar Complicit in 9/11 Attacks.'· Foreign Polic.v, 

2017. http://..forelgnpolicy .con:t/20 17/07 ;2-J./new-uae-docmnentary-claims-qatar-complicit -in-911-att.lcksdoln/?ntm_ coulent=l.,uffer969b S&nt111_ medh1m=socia 1 &utm _ sm1 rce=n.yjtter. com&utm_ campaign=bu±Ier. 3 Dec ian \Valsh, "Qatar Opens Its Doors to All, to the Dismay of Some:· .Ve11' rork Time.••, July 16, 2017, 

https://'"'Yl'L.IDiimcs.conflQJ1liF/16illQ!:h"Umkiill~ast/Qoha.:@Jar-b!g~ksdc.html. 
37


26427b-2.eps

unwelcome manner."4 While Cohen recognized that Qatar had made previous efforts to address terrorist 

financing, he called on the government in Doha to continue working with the U.S. to combat terrorist 

financing and, in particular. to deal with the ongoing solicitation of donations that fund extremist 

insurgents under the guise of humanitarian \Vork. According to Cohen, this phenomenon had become 

increasingly popular. 

Although in the past two weeks Qatar has signed a memorandum of understanding on combating terror 

finance with the U.S. and also refom1ed its 2004 anti-terrorism law, there arc still many of measures that 

the Qatari government should take to seriously combat terrorism. Qatar's new law allows for the creation 

of a national designation list. but it was published without an annex of persons or entities to be designated 

under that authority. Qatar should populate that list. in a transparent manner, starting with those 

individuals already designated by the U.S. Treasury and the United Nations who remain at large and may 

be continuing to fi.md and provide material support to al-Qaeda and other extremist groups. Qatar must 

continue to take steps to hold these individuals responsible. as well as impose and follow through with 

comprehensive legislation that \Vill prevent terrorist actiYity within and outside of its borders. 

Qatar's Open-Door Policy 

Qatar has welcomed in members of many extremist groups such as Hamas, al-Qaeda, and the Afghan 

Taliban, acting as a safe-haven and providing a platfonn for terrorist incitement. For example, for the past 

few years. Khaled Meshal, who stepped down as the senior leader ofHamas this past May. has been 

living in Doha-' Meshal, a U.S.-designated terrorist, served as the overall leader ofHamas for 21 years, 

and sought refuge in Qatar after moving around many Arab capitals. In J unc, media reports claimed that 

Qatar was expelling Hamas officials from the country as a result of "e:\1emal pressures,'' and apologized 

±or the movc 6 While is it not clear who pressured Qatar, or if the Qatari govcr11111cnt even asked Hamas 

leaders to leave, the amwunccment came just two weeks after President Trump met with leaders in Saudi 

Arabia, calling on them to jointly address Islamist extremism in the Gulf. It is unkno\\11 whether Meshal 

was among those deported, however, and Qatari Foreign Minister Dr. Khalid bin Mohan1mcd AI Attiych 

called Mcshal''a dear guest ofQatar."7 Beyond Mishal, Qatar also hosted several Hamas operatives 

involved in planning and directing terrorist attacks, including Salah al-Arouri and others \Vho are no\v 

believed to be based in Lebanon.' 

In addition to housing Hamas leaders. Qatar provided Sheikh AI Qaradawi, a proponent of the Muslim 

Brotherhood and head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars. witl1 air time on AI Jazeera9 

During his show. Sheikh AI Qaradawi legitimized suicide bombings against Israelis, inspiring many of 

4 "Remarks of Under Secretary of Terrorism and Financial Tntclligcncc David Cohen before the Center for a New 

American Security on ·confronting Ne\v Threats in Terrorist Financing,,,. U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 

4, 2014, bttps://\Y\HY.trcasun:.gm·/Q@SS··cen~r;press :r~leases/PJL~5LJJ1308.as.rrs. 

5 Dcclan Walslt "Hamas Leader Plays Final Hand: Trying to Lift Group's Pariah Status,'' New York Times, May 2, 

2017, https:/ J-\y-.,y;,-,.-.nytimes.co m/2 0 17/05!02/\vo rldln_Jiddleea5 . .tL'll.4.rna;,;-kl1aled-meshal-gdza.html. 

•~ Adnan Abu Amcr. "Hamas Could Be Next Victim ofQatari-GulfBrawl." Al-Monitor, June 8, 2017. 

on Arouri, sec MatthC\\ Levitt. ··Hamas' Not-so-Secret Weapon,'' Foreign .~[(airs, June 9, 200--1-, 

lillQ://\\ \V\'~-. \\·fl@i!J.£1Q1Jinsiillli.Q....Q.t:g{uQ.H.£1.::>.'1lli}h sis/\ lC\\/hama~-n.oJ:-.SQ:.£(:Crct -\:::£f!pon 9 \Valsh, "'Qatar Opens Its Doors to All,'' httn&:L'I¥TI:lY..,_!_n~!Un~s.s;_om/1,Q_!_2LQlU6/wQrJd/JJJi_QQlceJtit_d_Qb£L-Sill.t'li= 

hl_q;;Jmdc.httnl. 
38


26427b-3.eps

the attacks during the Second Tntifada. 10 Though the Sheikh later retracted his statement and stopped his 

show in 2014, he remains a controversial Islamist leader who was given a platform at the hands of Qatar. 

His name is included in the recent list of 59 people that the blockading countries hope Qatar will deport 

and hold responsible for inciting terrorism. 11 While not desi~o>nated himself Qaradawi heads the Union of 

Good which is a US-designated umbrella charity group specifically created by Hamas leadership in late 

2000 as a means ofbrokcring the transfer of ±unds raised for Hamas around the world to the terrorist 

group in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the Union of Good's 

executive leadership and board of directors includes Hamas leaders, Spcciallv Designated Global 

Terrorists (SOOTs), and other terrorist supporters."" 

Qatar has also hosted many leaders of the Afghan T aliban and bccan1c ±he group's center for diplomacy 

since the movement established an office in Doha in 2013. 13 l11at year, it was reported that more than 20 

high-raking Tali ban members and their families resided in Qatar14 In October 2016, Doha hosted 

meetings between the Taliban and representatives ±rom the Afghani government. Mullal1 Abdul Manan 

Akhund, brother ofthe forrner Tali ban chief Mullal1 Omar, was present at the meetings. 

Qatar sees its tics to groups like Hamas and the Taliban as part of its legitimate foreign policy cftorts. and 

notes that in both cases Westem countries have taken advantage of its relationship to such groups for 

purposes such as furthering Afghan diplomatic efforts or other efforts such as fi.mding for the Gaza Strip. 

And while that may be the case, it docs not excuse harboring extremists invohcd in acts of terrorism m1d 

other political violence. It is a fact that Doha has become the preferred safe haven for a wide array of 

Tslamist e:\iremists beyond what foreign policy needs could possibly excuse. 

Harboring Terrorist Financiers 

In addition to hosting leaders of terrorist organizations. Qatar has been complacent in pcnnitting terrorist 

financing within and outside of its border, despite signing agreements to curb such activity. While Qatar 

has made previous c±lorts to halt terrorist financing. the efficacy and sincerity of these cftorts arc 

questionable. In 2014, the State Department's Cmmtry Reports credited Qatar with shutting down Saad 

al-Kaabi's online fundraising platforrn for a! Qaeda in Svria. Madad Ahl al-Sham15 However, in 2015. 

±he U.S. Treasury designated al-Kaabi as a financial supporter ofal-Qaeda m1d al-Qacda's Syrim1 aftiliatc. 

Al-Nusral1 Front (ANF). 1

' Al-Kaabi was ±oLmd responsible for raising funds ±or ANF to purchase 

weapons and food, as well facilitating the ransom payment for a hostage held bv ANF in early 2014. AlKaabi worked for ANF in Syria since at least late 2012-" Al-Kaabi cm11c up again in the conte'-1 of the 

20 17 designation of a Kuwait -based terror financier, Mohmnmad al-Anizi, when Treasury· noted ±hat "in 

late 2015, ai-Anizi sought assistance from AQ financier and U.S.- and U.N.-designated sa·d ai-Ka.bi to 

10 "'The Cleric Who Legitimized Suicide Attacks against Israel Has 

Times oj1srae/. January 10, 2017.Jm:QJiY::Y!JL1i!JJ;;!i'!lli:iliJJ;l;::QJI!im~krK:cill>t:!l;gj]llinizl;~Jlli;iill:.:ill!ill:ko:]!g;Mli: 

Walsll "Qatar Opens Its Doors to All," https://\V\nY.llvtimes.com/2017/07/ltlh.vorld/middleeast/dolla-qatarblockadc.hrml. 

TI~//\"n:,·\Yl._~!.llirv.goy/rcsomce-c~ter/tm_g.r!sl:!lliclt-finnuce/P<Jges/prQ1~:-JlnioJ:tffi:@@_,_~. 1

' ·'Taliban and Afghanistan Restart Secret Talks in Qatar:· Guardian. October 18. 2016 . 

.hrms://n--.,v'\v.1heguardi~n.com/l:yorld/20 l 6/oct/1 ?Vtalib(l~s1nn-secret-ta!ks-gar(lr. 

14 ·'Hmv Qatar Came to Host the Taliban," BBC Ne\vs, Jtme 22, 2013, http://\V"\V\Y.bbc.com/nev;:st\•mrld-asia-

·'Countr~ Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview,'' U.S. Department of State. 2014, 

ht1ps ://''"''''7-; .star-2. gm·/j/ct irl s/ett 12014/23 940 7. htm. 

"'·'Treasury Designates Financial Supporters of Al-Qaida and Al-Nusmh Front.'. U.S. Department of the Treasmy. 

August 5. 2015, h.ttns://wwiYJr~nsm:r.gm·/p:yss-cQ]ltgLnrcss-rc!cnscs/PagcsijlOl43~. 

l' Ibid. 
39


26427b-4.eps

facilitate the travel of AQ-associated individuals.''18 Evidently, ai-Kaabi continued to provide funding for 

ANF even after Qatar supposedly shut down his fundraising platform in 2014, putting a large question 

mark over the integrity of Qatar's measures to stop terrorist financing. 

In another case. the U.S. Treasury sanctioned 'Abd al-Malik 'Abd ai-Salam (aka Umar al-Qatari). a 

Jordanian with Qatari residence. 1

'' h1 2011 and 2012. he worked with associates in Turkey, Syria, 

Lebanon, Qatar, and Iran to raise and move funds, weapons, and facilitate travel for fighters. For example, 

in 2012. Umar al-Qatari gave thousands of dollars and material support to an al-Qaeda associate in Syria, 

intended to assist ANF operatives. That same year. he also assisted with ANF recruitment in Turkey. He 

has used online sites to raise funds for al-Qaida and in 20 II he was part of an attack against U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan 2 u hl2014, the State Department's Country Reports on Qatar said that the Qatari govemment 

had deported a Jordanian terrorist financier living in Doha and employed by a Qatari charity. '

1 The report 

did not name the Jordanian deported. however, it is possible that they were referring to Umar al-Qatari. If 

it was in fact him. it is possible he continued to engage in terrorist financing for at least two years after he 

vvas designated by Treasury. 

Doha has been particularly sketchy on the issue of the prosecution of terrorism financiers in Qatari courts. 

According to the State Department's 2015 Country Reports. Doha had ''made efforts to prosecute 

si~,>nificant terrorist financiers''" As of 2016. Qatar had prosecuted five terrorist financiers: Ibrahim aiBakr, Saad ai-Kaabi,'" Abd ai-Latifal Kawari.'' Abd ai-Ralunan al-Nuaymi," ar1d Khalifa ai-Subaiey .

27 

It is now clear that of these. two were acquitted, one was cmwicted but then acquitted on appeal, ar1d one 

was convicted in absentia. As a result none were in jail when the current intra-Gulf spat broke out 

though the ones still resident in Qatar were reportedly under surveillance. According to recent reports. 

some ne\v arrests have been made since the current crisis began, likely involving some of those 

previously tried in Qatari courts. 

Despite shutting do\\n ai-Kaabi 's fi.mdraising platfonn in 2014. Qatar acquitted ai-Kaabi in 2016. along 

with Abd ai-Rallman al-Nuavmi-" Both were designated by the T rcasury for providing support to aiQacda." According to his Treasury designation, Nu 'aymi ordered the trm1sfcr of almost $600,000 to a!-

13 ··rreasm:~v Sanctions Prominent Al-Nusrah Front and Al-Qa 'ida Facilitator,'· U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

March 1-t. 2017, https:/i\V\V\Y .treasun· .gov/press~center/press-releascs/Pages/sm0027 .aspx 19 ·'Treasury Designntes T\velve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators," U.S. Depmtment oft he Trensury, 

https :/ /\1'\Y\Y. treo.SllfV. g;ov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2G5l.aspx. 20 1bid. 21 "Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Ovcrvie,,., .. U.S. Department of State. 2014, 

lW.s.//nmy.st:Jte.guv/j!Gi/rls/cr-JZ.Q.l:U2J.9407.htm. 

"··country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview," U.S. Department of State. 2015, 

https:/ /w\\·\V .stat::jllil_(ilcl/r!s/cn/20! 5/2575j_7 .him. 

"·'Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators.'· U.S. Department of the Treasury. September 

2-1-. 201-1-. httpG://\nY'iV.treasJJrY.goY/pres-;-cenler/press-releases/Pages/il2G51.aspx. 21 "Treasury Designates Financial Supporters of Al-Qaida and Al-NusrahFront," U.S. Department of the Treasury, 

August 5. 2015, J].ttps:l/,v\v}:Y;tre~sury.goy/press-c@.ter/prcss-r~lec:Jses/Pages/jlO 1-U.aspx. 

"Ibid. 

6 ·'Treasury Designates AI-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,'· U.S. Department of the Treasury·, December 

18. 20 13 _ https :/ /.,_n-.,.:vr. treastliY. goY/press-cenLer/press-releases/P£1 ges/]12 2 49 .aspx. 2

' ·'Treasury Designates Gulf-Based al Qaida Financiers," U.S. Department of the Treasury. June 5. 2008. 

ln_tp;;_;,0'~~ l\·J'!:-1J"Q<:JAU_f) ,gQYlln:Qs_;I:S:::Qtll~K{Qr~~-~:wl~~G~l~~Jgc:_s/!lQl(~l_l_._af;p_::;.. 8 ··counter Terrorism Designations." U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 5, 2015, 

https :/ ;\nv1.v. treasmv. gov/resmlrce-center/sanctions/OF AC -EnforcclTJ.ent/Pages/20 15080 5. aspx. 29 "Treasury Dcsignntcs AI-Qa'idn Supporters in Qatar and Yemen.'· U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 

18. 20 13 _ httus :1/Y'.l.l·'iY. treastrrY. guv/p:ress-ccmer/prcss-rcleases/Pagesfil22 -1-9 .aspx. 
40


26427b-5.eps

Qaeda through an al-Qaeda representative in Svria. He also assisted with the financing ofal-Qaeda in Iraq 

and was the middle-man between Qatari-based donors and al-Qaeda in Iraq.l" 

The tluee other individuals that Qatar prosecuted include Bakr, Kawari, and Subaiey. Bakr and Kawari 

were convicted in 2016 and Subaicy was convicted in 2008. l11is was the second time that Bakr was 

convicted, following his 2000 arrest in which he was subsequently '·released from prison after he 

promised not to conduct terrorist activity in Qatar."" In his latest conviction, he was convicted in absentia 

and remains at large outside of Qatar. According to tl1c 2008 Treasury designation. in 2006, Bakr assisted 

a terrorist cell that was plotting attacks against U.S. military bases in Qatar. Additionally. beginning in 

20 12, Bakr worked for al-Qaeda, serving as the link between Gulf-based al-Qaeda financiers and 

Afghanistan 

Abd al-Latif al-Kawari, arrested in 2016 in Qatar and supposedly serving his sentence under house arrest, 

was designated in 2015 by tl1c U.S. Treasury ±or coordinating the funding between Qatari fundcrs and alQaeda. He also served as an ai-Qaeda security official. 33 

Lastly, Khalifa al-Subaiey was originally arrested in January of2008 in Bal1rain for his "financing 

terrorism, undergoing terrorist training, facilitating the travel of others abroad to receive terrorist training, 

and for membership in a terrorist organization."'4 He was arrested again in March of 2008 by Qatar and 

served a six-montl1 tcm1 in prison. He is supposedly m1dcr surveillance; however. in 2015 the UN 

Committee on ai-Qaeda sanctions updated his listing with new information-which is no small matter 

because it required a new vote of the full UNSC-and reported that al-Subaiey had resumed terrorist 

activity. According to the Committee, "after his release, Al-Subaicy reconnected with Al-Qaida financiers 

and facilitators in the Middle East and resumed organizing funds in support of AI-Qaida. His involvement 

with Iran based facilitators continued in 2009. 2011 and throughout 2012 with money ±1owing to AIQaida leaders in Pakistan." 35 If he is in fact under Qatari surveillance, the Qatari autlwritics do not appear 

to be very vigilant. 

Despite Qatar· s half-hearted efforts to prosecute terrorist financiers, there arc many others who Qatar has 

failed to prosecute or desi~,>nate as terrorists. Eleven of the names from the U.S. lists also appear on the list 

ofthc Arab Quartet, and six of them overlap with tl1c UN lists. Qatari officials maintain there arc other 

cases oftcrror ±inancicrs-botl1 Qataris and non-Qataris-who arc resident in the com1try and arc the 

subject of investigations with an eye toward prosecuting them. 

It is important to note here that while terror finance prosecutions arc difficult cases. and acquittals arc part 

of a nonnally fi.mctioningjustice system, these are not the onlv tools available to Qatari officials to deal 

with fuc terror financiers cf±cctivcly serving as regional bundlers of terror funding from donors 

throughout the region to al Qaeda in Syria in particular. The first big test for Qatar will be to populate the 

domestic designated list created by the Emir's recent update to the country· s 2004 counterterrorism law. 

Qatari Counterterrorism Legislation and Agreements 

30 lbid. 31 ·'Treasury Designates T\velve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitntors:· U.S. Department oft he Treasul)·, September 

2-t. 201-J.. https://\Y'i\"\V.treasurv.gmr/prcss-center/press-rclcases!Pages/jl265l.aspx. 

"Ibid. 

"·'Treasury Desih'lJates Fimncial Supporters of Al-Qaida and AI-Nusmh Front,'. U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

August 5, 2015. h!!ps:Jh,·vr ,v. trcasun .go\·/prcss-ccntcr/prcss-rckascs/Pnqps/jlO 1·~3.aspA. 

34 ·'Trcasmy Designates Gulf-Based al Qaida Financiers," U.S. Department of the Trcasur)'. June 5. 2008. 

https://v.\v1v.trcasury.gm·/prco;;s-ccntcr/1UCS.S-rckascs/Pagcs/hp! 0 I ! .asp-..;:. 

'~ ·'Narrative Sununaries of Reasons for Listing,,. United Nations, Febmary 19, 2015, 

!m~DV\Y.H.D.Jl!'f!L.~snborg/cn/sancti_onsLl..fil7/aq sanctions listL52J.!!ll11MicsliJ1diYidunl/khnli-[n-muhnmn_lad-tmki_: 

al-subaiY. 
41


26427b-6.eps

During Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's visit to the Gulf this past month, Qatari Foreign Minister 

Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on countering 

terrorist ±lnancing." The memorandmn outlines a nmnber of steps that the U.S. and Qatari governments 

will each take in the coming months and years to further dismantle terrorist financing networks and 

address global terrorist activities more broadly. As part ofthe agreement, U.S. o±licials will be posted at 

the Qatari prosecutor's o±lice.37 

li1 addition to the recent MOU. the Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani issued a royal decree 

amending Qatar's anti-terrorism laws last TIULrsday. '' The decree. which amends a 2004 anti-terrorism 

lmv, provides definitions of terrorism. acts of terrorism. freezing funding. and terrorist financing. 

Furthemwre, the amendments create two national terrorism lists and establish rules for placing 

individuals and groups on each list.'' 

What is not clear. however, is what these lists will be used ±or, what the difference is between these two 

lists, what the criteria are for getting on or off the lists, or if any names have been put on these inau~,>1ual 

lists. While the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr. Anwar Gargash has called the legislation ''a 

step in the right direction.""" Qatar, however, has a history of failing to tallow tluough on its 

counterterrorism legisbtion. Passing the law is not sufficient-the laws must be fi.dly and effectively 

implemented. A look at the 2004 law here is instmctive. 

In 2004, Qatar passed a law criminalizing terror financing. established a Financial Intelligence Unit 

(FTU), and founded the Qatari Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) 41 The Law on Combatting 

Terrorism gave the state the autlwrity to prosecute individuals involved in terrorist activities, including 

providing material support, training and financing eAiremist groups. The FIU had a number of authorities, 

including tl1c authority to receive ''suspicious transaction reports related to money laundering and 

terrorism financing directly from all concemed entities in Qatar" and analyze "suspicious transaction 

reports and taking appropriate decisions thereon.''"'' The QACA was responsible specifically for screening 

financial transactions made by Qatari charities to certify that such donations and transactions were solely 

intended for humanitarian causes and not covertly funding terrorist activities." 

Despite the 2004 legislative e±lorts, there was little tallow through after the laws were implemented. 

According to the 2008 International Monetarv Fund's (IMF) Country Reports on Qatar, one of the six 

factors that contributed to the failure of the FlU included its failure to "regularly review its own 

effectiveness in combating terrorist ±lnancing and money laundering."44 Additionally, the administrative 

order creating tl1e FTU was inconsistent witl1 Qatar's anti -money laundering law. 

··u.S. to Deploy Officials in Qatar in C.ountertcrrorism Accord-Source." Reuters, July 211. 2017, 

!lli!lJiuk.JS'nters.comimticlelllk:W.f:ilil1ilL:nsa-idJ,JKKBNlA5JZJ. 

''Ibid. 

"Qal1ri Emir Amends Laws to Bolster Fight against Terrorism: Agency," Reuters, July 20. 2017, 

1:\IJQ/h.l.-Tn:y .reute~£QIDiat1iclg/~.:£lllf:gat:lr-ellJir:.kiJlSKBN i_A52J::.l. 19 Ibid. 40 ··u AE Hopes Pressure Bears Fmit after Qatar Changes Terror Laws." .Vational, July 21. 2017, 

https · //,-.,.,, .... :.,:. thenatio11Jl ach.vorld/uac-llopcs-pres~ure-bears-fmit -after -qatar-changes-tenor -lmv:-;-1_ (i 12 917. 

'

11 ·'Qatar: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Fimncing of Terrorism" 

lntcmatiomll Monetary Fund. October 2008, l_i!ffis;/j_,,l~:~i:._i_n!f.OJJ!/cml~IJbli_c_g_liQli~(CJY!s_~u~_$/21lli-.,_/1 2/3J{Qatm:_-

Dctai.lcd-A.sscssmcnt-Rcport-on-Anti-1\-Tonc-v-Lcnlndcring-and-Combating-1hc-Financing-of-22396. 

42 lbid. 4

·' Ibid. 4

" Ibid. 
42


26427b-7.eps

Another law, passed in 2006, expanded charitable oversight and gave additional authorities to the 

Ministry of Civil Service and Housing Affairs 4 ' This was a step in the right direction, however, when a 

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) mutual evaluation team came to inspect Qatar's anti-money 

laundering and counter-terror finance (AML/CFT) regime two years later, it found significant problems. 

The lMF reported that Qatar criminalizcd terrorist financing. "but in a very limited way.''46 TI1e lMF 

assessed Qatar's system requiring the disclosure of currency transported across the border as ··neither 

implemented nor effective.''47 And despite having authority to confiscate. freeze or seize fimds tied to 

money laundering or terror finance, not a single confiscation had been ordered because not a single 

money laundering charge had been brought before the courts. To the contrary: T11e lMF reported that it 

appeared that ·'on one occasion. the rQataril authorities offered safe harbor to a person designated under 

L United Nations terrorism designation listj UNSCR 1267. No actions were taken with respect to this 

person's funds or other assets."4

' 

In a surreal encounter in 2009. I experienced firsthand Qatar's penchant for passing legislation and 

considering the matter closed vv ithout any implementation or enforcement. In a meeting vv ith Qatari 

officials in Doha, I asked how the Qatari FIU assessed the compliance oflocal Haw alas (infonnalmoney 

transfer businesses common in the region) with a then-new law requiring Hawalas to register with the 

govenunent or shut down. The official explained-with a straight face-that there appeared to be no 

Hmvalas operating in the country since none had registered vvith the authorities as required under the ncvv 

law. In fact, the official had an identical conversation with TMF assessors just a few weeks earlier. Highly 

skeptical that not a single Hawala operated in the cmmtry, IMF experts retumcd to their hotels and asked 

expatriate foreign \Vorkers ho\v they sent money back to their families in their home countries. Their 

answers were hardly surprising: "Hawalas." The IMF team retumed to the official with a long list of 

Hawalas operating openly in Qatar. required the govcmment submit m1 updated section of its report on 

this issue to the IMF, and stressed the need to actually implement and enforce new laws. 

hl2010, Qatar passed the Combatting Money Lam1dering m1d Terrorist Finance Law which specifically 

required prosecutors to freeze fi.mds of UN-designated terrorist organizations. T11e law outlined penalties 

for terrorist financing and money laundering. including penalties and fines. Despite this positive step 

to"ards AMLICTF and trm1sparency, the law left the tenus, conditions. and time limits of the freezing of 

funds up to the Public Prosecutor's discretion. 50 In practice, this law was not fi.dly implemented in a 

timely marmcr. According to the State Depattment's 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism, ''the 

govemment has begun to distribute lists of UN-designatcd terrorist entities m1d individuals to finm1cial 

institutions. Implementation_ ho\vever_ remained inconsistent."51 

Up Lmtillast week, Qatar's most recent CT legislation was passed in September 2014. T11c Law 

Reh'lllating Charitable Activities, based on FA TF standards. created the Charities Commission as m1 

independent, interagency government board aiming to counter-terrorist finar1cing by monitoring 

·1' ·'Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview." U.S. Department of State. 201 ~­

https://1,, \'1-\\.Slatc.gm. lj/ct/rls/c:rt/20 l-+/219407.lum. 46 ·'Qatar: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering," 

http'! :/1\n"\·"\.V. i mf. org!cn/Puh licnt:iom.;;CH./lssues/20 1 6/12/J 1/0atar -Detailed -As~essJ nent -Report -on-Anti-!'vlouevLaundcring-and-Combatim:-thc-Fimmc.ing-of-22396. 

4 • Ibid. 

~ Ibid. 

'

19 ·'Combatting Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing." Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority.'' 2010. 

" ·'Countrv Reports on Terrorism 20 12." U.S. Department of State. 2012. https:!/www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/20 12/ 
43


26427b-8.eps

transactions of charity organizations. 52 This law was ready in draft form in 2013, but was only passed in 

2014 under significant international pressure. In 2013, the State Department noted that ''formally·· the 

Qatari Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitors and licenses nongovernmental charitable 

organizations and requires their foreign partners to submit to a \retting and licensing process. 53 In fact~ this 

has not happened, in part because so long as charities operated within the Qatar Financial Center (QFC), 

they were exempt ±rom having to register or be subject to supervision. 

li1 September 2014. Qatar also signed on to the Jeddal1 Communique. a U.S.-led agreement in which 

Qatar. in addition to several other Gulf States, pledged to "end impunity and bring perpetrators to justice" 

and "repudiate hatefi.1l ideology.''54 

Despite the above legislative efforts, according to fanner senior U.S. Treasury official Daniel Glaser. 

U.S.- and UN-designated terrorist financiers continue to operate ''openly and notoriously" in Qatar." In 

February 2017. Glaser lamented that Qatar had not yet made the kind of"fLmdamental decisions" on 

combating terror finance that would make the country a hostile environment for terror financiers~ 

concluding that the positive steps Qatar had taken were ''painfully slow."56 

In the just-released 2016 edition, the State Department noted that "Qatar has made significant 

progress on deficiencies identified in its MENAF ATF Mutual Evaluation Report in 2008," 

adding that "According to the Second Biennial Update Report, Qatar is deemed 'Compliant or 

Largely Compliant' with all but recommendation 26, which accounts for regulation and 

supervision of financial institutions."57 Regulation of Qatar's fonnal financial system is only part 

of the issue, however. As of the State Department's 2015 International Narcotics Control and 

Strategy Report, Qatar was at that time still listed as a country of primary concern. One reason, 

the department noted, was that "exploitation of charities to finance terrorism continues to be a 

concern, as does the ability of individuals to bypass the fonnal financial sector for illicit 

financing." 58 Moreover, that is not the only area demanding significantly more effort on the part 

of Doha to get up to speed on etl'orts to counter terror financing within the country. 

Moving Forward 

The recent MOU and amendments are important steps to ensuring Qatar seriously addresses the ongoing 

issue of terrorist ±lnancing happening within and beyond its borders. However, Doha has a weak track 

record of implementing and enforcing the tem1s of agreements. Moreover, the steps they have taken thus 

far are vague. and it is unclear to what extent they will actually address the ongoing issues in Qatar. 

There are other concrete steps that Qatar may take in the coming months. In early June, Saudi Arabia, the 

United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain collectively designated 59 individuals and 12 institutions 

52 ·'Country Reports on Terrorism 2016," U.S. Department of State. July 2017. 

http-;://\nY\V.statc.e:ov/documents/orgam?ation/272488.pdf. 

53 "Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview.'' U.S. Department of State, 2013. 

11r_tps..Jffi:::TI:·w.stnte.go.ffi/ct/r!s/crt/20 13/22.+823, htl1}. 

"·'Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview," U.S. Department of State, 2014, 

b.UJ2&Lfv.'W'iv.state.gmil&"!ftt~crt/20}_41239..J.07.htm. 

"Daniel Glaser. Fonndation for Defense of Democracies, Feb mary 7, 2017, 

s• "Country Reports: Qatar." U.S. Department of State, 2016. 

l~ltps:/t\n,·'i.v.st.Jte.gov/docmnenrs/organization/272-J.88.pdf. 

5

::.< ··countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern-Qatar," 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 

(INCSR), U.S. Department of State, httos://lvtY'\Y.stare. gov/ilinl/rls/nrcmtt20 15/suoplement:JJ239287 .htm. 
44


26427b-9.eps

accused of financing terrorist organizations and receiving support from Qatar:5"'' Many of these entities 

were previously designated by tbe United States and United Nations for financing al-Qaeda, tbough the 

list includes others witb tics to Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi extremists in Egypt Libya. and elsewhere_ 

Some of those listed are not Qatar residents. and according to a Qatari official, at least six of the people 

listed arc dead. 

The list prmides Doha an opportunity to help resolve its fight with its Gulf Cooperation Council 

neighbors, and a way to save face while doing so. It could immediately take action at least against those 

persons and entities on the list that arc already designated by the U.S. or U.N. and therefore should 

already haYe been targeted bv Doha. In particular, Qatar could focus on the many al-Qaeda financiers on 

tbe list, and take action based on their recent (re)commitment to counter terrorist finance at the recent 

Riyadh smmnit and in tbe MOU just signed with the United States_ 

Qatar must take the opportunity to change behaviors that ha\c been tolerated for far too long_ but the 

coalition of four conntries that haYe broken diplomatic and trade relations with Qatar mnst be flexible 

enough to allow Doha to do so in a manner that saws face for all parties in,-olved. Most importantlv, 

whatever laws arc enacted or agreements entered into must be fully implemented and enforced. Actions 

taken in the name of countering terrorism must be substantive and Yerifiable. which would be a welcome 

change from past pattenlS of behavior. 

59 "43 New Designations Specifically Address Threats Posed bv Qatar Linked and Based AI Qaida Terrorism 

Support Networks." Emirates News Agency, July 2~- 2017, http//wam aeien/detailsil 395302<)18259_ 
45

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Dr. Levitt, for your testimony. 

I now turn to Mr. Goldenberg for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ILAN GOLDENBERG, SENIOR FELLOW 

AND DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the U.S.-Qatar relationship and the 

implications of the current divisions within the Gulf Cooperation 

Council. My objective with this testimony is not to recount the various moves and countermoves each side has made in the past few 

weeks since the crisis erupted. Instead, I will provide some context 

as to what created this situation, the implications for U.S. interests, and the possible way ahead. 

Qatar is a complex American partner, to say the least. On the 

one hand, it has pursued a policy that has included building relations with a number of actors the United States finds problematic, 

including extremist groups in Syria, the Taliban, Hamas, and the 

Muslim Brotherhood. This approach has been part of an independent, and sometimes provocative Qatari foreign policy that has 

chaffed on some of its Gulf neighbors and, in some instances, these 

neighbors have viewed Qatari reactions as interfering in their own 

internal affairs, which infuriated them and been a major reason for 

the recent actions. 

From an American perspective, the Qatari policy in Syria and 

the slow response to terror financing were probably most problematic. When the Syrian civil war erupted, Qatar was on the forefront 

in providing financial aid and weaponry to the Syrian opposition 

groups of all stripes with little control or oversight. The Qataris 

were far from alone in committing this mistake as a number of 

other Gulf state-actors, as well as Turkey also pursued an anybodybut-Assad policy without fully vetting some of these anybodies. 

Certainly, the United States made its own share of mistakes during this time period. While Qatar and Turkey in particular were 

the most aggressive in funding some of the more ideologically extremist groups, including al-Qaeda affiliate, Jebhat al-Nusra, and 

we are still living with these mistakes in Syria and will be for 

years to come. 

But on some issues, Qatar has been a useful partner. Qatar hosts 

a critical U.S. air base with more than 10,000 American troops. Al 

Udeid Air Base is a central node from which the United States conducts air operations in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, as well as 

other operations across the Middle East. 

The bases hosted U.S. military aircraft for over 15 years, and 

during that time, has been a reliable partner, allowing access for 

a broad array of military operations. 

Moreover, Qatar’s flexible approach to problematic actors has, at 

times, made it a useful connector when the diplomacy inevitably requires negotiation and engagement with unsavory characters. 

Take for example, Qatar’s relationship with Hamas and the aid 

it provides in Gaza. On the one hand, both the United States and 

Israel designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. On the other, 

Israel has cooperated quietly with Qatar in recent years to ensure 

46

financial assistance gets into Gaza in order to try to improve the 

situation on the ground and avoid another conflict. Whether one 

chooses to view Qatar positively or negatively, what is clear is that 

the inter-GCC split that has emerged in recent weeks has not been 

good for U.S. interests. Only 2 weeks after President Trump visited 

Riyadh to unify the Arab world behind the common objectives of 

countering extremism and pushing back on Iran, America’s Gulf allies have launched into an internal feud that has largely distracted 

them and us. 

Meanwhile, the split has created new opportunities for Russia 

and Iran to increase their influence in the region. Going forward, 

the Trump administration should take a number of steps. 

First, settle on one consistent message and approach instead of 

open breaks between the President and the Secretary of State, 

which only cause confusion and undermine our ability to mediate 

in this crisis. 

Second, move away from viewing the Middle East through a pure 

black and white prism. The Trump administration focused so heavily on unifying and backing the Sunni, Arab states, they fail to recognize the internal splits among them. This inadvertently gave a 

green light to some of our Gulf partners to move ahead with these 

actions against Qatar. 

Third, settle in for the long haul, as this crisis is not going to 

be solved any time soon. We should clearly signal to our partners 

that we are still focused on the challenges posed by ISIS and Iran, 

and we expect them to do the same instead of focusing all their 

diplomatic energy on trying to convince Washington to take their 

side in this fight. 

Fourth, encourage de-escalation on all sides by at least getting 

them all to tone down their public rhetoric while emphasizing that 

the U.S. is willing to play a constructive mediating role. 

However, it is ultimately an inter-Arab disagreement that they 

will need to be out in front in solving. 

And, finally, fifth, I think we should use this crisis as an opportunity to engage with all the countries of the GCC to shine more 

of a light on the problem of terror financing. As some of the other 

witnesses and members have said, Qatar certainly is a major problematic actor in this space, but it is far from the only one, and this 

could actually be an opportunity, in terms of this crisis, to actually 

push all of them to be better on this issue. 

So thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldenberg follows:]

47


26427c-1.eps

July 26, 2017 

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee- Subcommittee on 

the Middle East and North Africa 

Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship 

llan Goldenberg, Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Security Program 

Center lor a New American Security 

Chairman Rm-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguisheclmembers of the committee, thartk 

you for the opportunity to te~tify 1uday un the T_LS-Qatar relationship and the in1plications of tbe 

current Ciivislrms "\vithin the GulfCt)operation Council (GCC).1 

On June 4, 2017, Sandi A1·abia, the Hnitecl Arah Emirates, Bahrain, anJ Egypt announced they 

would cut ties \Vith Qatar and take a number of steps against it; including cutcing off access to 

airspace and borders and ejecting Qatari diplornats and citizens from lhese countries. Since then, the 

war of words has escalated on all sides. The United States has tried tu play :.1 rn1e as a 1nediMor, hut 

thus far ·with little success. My objective with this testimony ls nor to recount the various 1noves anJ 

counter moves each side has made in the past few \Veeks, but instead to provide some context as to 

what created this situation, the implications for U.S. interests, and the poten6al way ahead. 

Qatar is a complex American partner. On one hand, it has pursued a policy rhat has included 

building relations with a number of actors that the United States finds highly problematic, including 

extremist groups in Syria, the Taliban, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other, it is host 

to a critical U.S. airbase and its flexible approach to these actors has made it a useful connector 

when diplomacy inevitably requires negotiation and engagement with unsavory characters. 

1 CNAS 11ccepterl contrihurions from the Embassy of the United Amb Emirates in fiscal rears 2016 and 2017 for thetotal amount of $250,000 in support of a project evaluating the pt:os and cons of dte United Arab Emi~~.te.s' seeking.; -'"-• 

membership in the 1VHssilc Technology Control Re.gime (MTCR). CNAS produced a briefing for t~c UAE E:nbassy on 

the MTCR 'The background research on the MTCR also informed an already ongoing C:KAS prqfed 011: s.{.rone 

prolifer-ation policy. The [_Jublic repoJ:t can be found at h.u.tr.L.Q.irones {'n0s.otg-/:rcports/clrone-prolifemrinn/. CNAS i"S. ll 

national security research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational) intellectual, and 

personul integrity. The Center retains sole editorial control over its idf'as., projer.ts, ~od proclnctions> and the content t?f 

its publications reflects only the Yiews of their authors, In keeping "\vith its mission and Yalucs) CNAS docs not engage in 

lobbying activity and complie<> fully with all applicable federal, state, and locallmvs. Accordingly) CNAS will nor engage 

in an;r representation or advocacy oh behalf of any entities. or jntcrcsts and, tQ the e-xtent that the Center accept"> funding 

ftom foreign sources, its activities will be limited to bona fide scho:astic, academic~ and rese::uch-relateO activities, 

consistent -..vith applicable fedctallaw. A full list of CNAS supporters and the ccntcr1

s funding guidelines can be found 

here: http"'://wrr./w.cnas.orvJsupport-cnas 
48


26427c-2.eps

But whether one chooses to view Qatar po:sitivdy or negatively, it is dear is that the 1nua-GCC splil 

tha.t has emerged in fecent weeks has not heen good for IJ.S. interests. Only two weeks after 

President Trump visited Riyadh to unify the Arab world behind tlte common objectives of 

countering ext.remisnt and pusbing back on Iran, America's Gulf allies have launcheJ an internal 

feud that has latgely distracted them and the United States. Meanwhile, this split has created new 

t>pp(lrtunlties ft)t Russia ancl Tran. 

Going forward, the Trump adrnirlistrat1rm should ta1;;e a numher uf steps. l"irst, il' should se1 tle on 

one consistent tnc:--:-;age and approach, as confliuiug tnessagcs fnnn the President anJ Secretary of 

Srate cause cc1nfusicm $lnrl nnciermine rhe TJnitecl St!-l.tes' ahility t<> mediate. Sec<md, it should II HIVe 

:.t\vay fro-m viewing the "Mick1le Fast through a purel}r hl~ck anrl white prisrrt, as this approach 

focused so heavily on 11nifying and backing the Sunni Anlb states that it f'{Jilcd to recognize the 

lnkfnal split~ anmng them and inadvertently gave a green l1ght to sutm-: U.S. G·ulf parlners to tn-rJve 

ahe~Hi with these ::~ctions ~gainst Qatar. Thircl} as this crisis is not gnlng to he ">lllved anytime soon, 

the administration should settle in for the long haul and push all of the artors to start putting more 

of theh: energies hack into the ISIS and Iran challenges. And fourth, it should enmmage 

deescalation on all sides by at least getting U.S. partners to tone down their public rhetoric and 

maximalist public ultima rums and emphasize that while the U.S. is willing to play a constmccive 

mediating role this is ultimately an intra-Arab disagreement that they wm need to be at the forefront 

of solving. 

Sources of Disagreement Between Qatar and Its GCC Neighbors 

Qatar is far from an ideal partner and a number of its actions over the years h_ave fn1strated rnany of 

its Gulf ndghbors as well as the United States. Indeed, Qatar has long been the black sheep of the 

Gulf Cooperation Council due to the independent foreign policy that it has pursued for the past 

twenty years often in direct competition with Saudi Arabia and other GCC neighbors. 

One of the most significant disagreements between Qatar and its neighbors has been over differing 

perspectives on the Muslim Bmtherhood. Wid1 the start of protests across the Arab world in 2011, 

the Qataris supported Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements, while the Em.iratis and Saudis 

viewed them as a major threat to regional stability. In Egypt, Qatar supported the then-elected 

Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi, providing his government with $8 billion 

during its one year in office2 Meml\vhile, the odrer Gulf states supported Gen. Alxlel-Fatlah el-Sissi, 

who overthrew 1 he Brotherhood and initiated a broad crackdown against it. They infused $23 billion 

of aid into Egypt in d1e 18 montl1s after the Brotl1erhood was overthrown.' 

Qatar's support for Islam.ist groups also extends tD Hamas. Qatar has hosted Hamas's political 

leadership in Doha since 2012 and been a major contributor of aid into Gaza- a fair amount of 

which gets diverted by Hamas for nefarious purposes. And the disagreement over lslamists has also 

2 RoLt:rl F. \\-' orlh, "Egypt b Att:Im for lufiuem.:e of A tab Rivals.'' T!Je Neu: Ywk Titlft~,] uly 9 ~ 2013. 

http://"V1'.vw.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/wodd/:tniddleeast/aid-to-egypt-from-saudls-and-emiratJs-ls-part-of-strugg:lew1th-qatar-for-influence.htm1. 

3 Andrew Torchh; "Egypt Got S23 .Billion in Aid from Gulf in 18 Months: Minister.'~ Rnllers, :Match 2, 2015. 

http:/ /'vww.reuters.com/ artide/us-et,rypt-investrnent-gulf-idCSKBNOLYOV 620150302. 
49


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flowed into Qatari willingness to host lslamist dissidents that have been ejected from some of its 

regional partners. Additionally, Qatar's use oftheA!Jazeera television station to attack Saudi Arabia 

and the UAE has infuriated Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 4 

From an American perspective, Qatari policy in Syria and its slow response to terror financing are 

even more problematic. When the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, Qatar was at the forefront of 

providing financial aid and weapomy- with little control or oversight- to Sytian opposition groups 

of all stripes. The Qataris were far from alone in committing this mismke, as a numbet of other Gulf 

state actors as welt as Turkey pursued an "anybody but Assad" policy without fully vetting some of 

these "anyhodies." Certainly the United States made its own share of mistakes during this time 

period. If it had taken on a mote hands-on tole in supporting the opposition, it may have been able 

to steer some of its partners to invest more wisely in gtoups more amenable to its jnterests. And 

even when the United States did engage more in supporting opposition groups, Amedcan weapons 

found their way into extremist hands 5 But Qatar and Turkey in particular were the most aggressive 

in funding some of the more ideologically extremist groups including the al Qaeda affiliate Jebhat a1 

Nusm. This caused a significant increase of Jihadist influence inside the Syrian opposition.' And 

more bmadly beyond Syria, the Qataris have been slower tban other Gulf states in taking steps to 

curb terror fmancing.7 It is important to note, howevet, that other Gulf partnets continue to exhibit 

problematic behavior. 

Qatar and its neighbors have dashed over differing '~ews on Tran. Saudi i\rahia views Tran's Tslamic 

Republic as an implacable enemy and the greatest threat in the Middle T\ast. On the other hand, for 

practical econon1ic reasons Qatar takes a more accommodationist approach to Imn. Qatar and Iran 

share the world's largest offshore gas field, which Doha calls the North Field and Iran calls South 

Pars. Tlus field accounts fi>r nearly all of Qatar's gas production and nearly 60 percent of its export 

revenue. 8 Thi~ does not mean that the Qataris have been completely sanguine about some of Iran's 

problematic regional behavior and support for various proxies in the Mlddle East. And the Qataris 

have not aligned with Iran. But they simply are not in a position tn take as a hard of a line as some 

of their GCC partners. Though it is important to note that some other members of d1e GCC- most 

notably Oman - also pursue a strategy similar to Qatar's. 

Qatar's Value as a U.S. Partner 

Despite disagreements on some important issues, Qatar has been a valuable U.S. pattner. Most 

importantly, Qatar's Al-Udeid Air Force base hosts more than 10,000 American troops and is a 

4 Ktistian Coates Ulrichsen, '~Qatar: The GulPs Problem Child." ThcAtlaHiic,June 5, 2017. 

h ttps:/ /www.theatlantic.com/lnternat:iooal/ archive/2017 /06/ qatar-gee-saudi-arabia-yemen-bahrain/ 529227/. 5 Bradford Richardson, "US-Train_ecl Syrian Rebels Ga•d:: '\!{/capons loAl QacJa, PcJ.ltagoaAdm.iL<>." Tbe Hiil, Seplt!tuber 

26,2015. http:/ /thehill.com/policy/defcnse/255055-us-trained-syrian-rebels~gav-e-weapons-to-al-qaeda-pentagor..­

admits. 

6 Liz Sly, and Zakaria Zakaria1 '«Al-Qaeda ls Hating Us': Syrian Rebels Are Losing out to Extremists," 'J 'he !Varbiilglon 

J>ost, Fel>ruary 23, 2017. hups:/ /www.washingtunpmt.com/world/middle_ea::.t/ al-qaeda-is-eBring-us-syrian-rebels-arelosing-out-to-extrcmists/2017 /0'2/23/f9c6dld4-tHH5-11e6-aa1e-5f735ce31334_story.l-,tml?utm_term=.40846df6e6f1. 7 Matthew Levitt, anJ Kalherinc Bauer, uQatar Doesn't Nt:nl a Bluckm .. l.t:. It Needs an Audit!' Forcig11 Poliry,June 15, 

2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017 /06/15/ qatar-doesf' .. t-need-::;-blockade-it -needs-an-audit -al- qaeda/. 8 1'om Pinn~ "Qatar Restarts Development ofWorld's Biggest Gas Field after 12-Year Freeze." Reuters~ April3~ 2017. 

http:/ /v.n.vw.reuters.com/ a.ttide/us-gatar-gas-id USKHN 1751.81, 
50


26427c-4.eps

central node from which the United States conducts air operations in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan as 

well as other operations across the Middle East? It is the home of USCENTCOM's Combined Air 

Operation Center (CAOC) from which all American air operations are coordinated. And 

USCENTCOM's forward headquarters is also in AI Udeid- making it an important command and 

control bub in the event of a major military contingency in the Middle East. The base has hosted 

U.S. militaty aircraft for over 15 years and during that time has been a reliable parmer, allowing 

access fot a broad array of military operations. 10 This is one of the central rmsons why Secretary 

Tillerson and Secretaty Mattis have been so reluctant to take sides in the cutrent lntra-GCC dispute 

and have instead sought to mediate an end to the disagteement. 

It is important to note that the base does not give Qatar absolute leverage over the United States, 

and indeed, the Qatatis have traditionally refrained trom ttying to use the base as leverage or 

bringing it into broader political discussions. If the United States were to lose access, it would still 

have a number of major military bases in the Gulf and Central Asia that it could use to offset this 

loss. It could also seek to build new facilities in partner nations or, in the event of an emergency, rely 

on resources like an additional carrier strike group to offset these losses. But ci1e reality is that these 

types of steps would be fmancially costly. They would also likely im•olve at least some reduction in 

U.S. capacity to conduct strikes against ISIS and in Afghanistan. And if the United States moved 

other nayal assets into the region to compensate, those assets would have to come from elsewhere -

most likely the Padt1c. This would then hurt the U.S. ability to counter or deter China and North 

Korea. So, while the ai-Udeid airbase is not an absolute necessity, losing it would come with a very 

real cost. 

In addition to the importance of al-Udeid, Qatar has also sometimes played a useful role as a 

connector because of its willingness to host gtoups that the Untied States finds problematic. Take 

for example Qatar's relationships with Barnas and its role in Gaza. Even while Israeli oHicials 

continue to strongly oppose Qatar's relationship with Hamas, they acknowledge that the Qataris 

have played a constructive role in !lowing aid to Gaza.11 Because of intra-Palestinian politics, the 

Palestinian Authority and Fatah have taken a completely uncompromising position toward Hamas 

and have done all they can to squeeze Gaza. The lsraeli government on the other hand has started 

to recognize that this policy leads to an unsustainable situation. There is a danger that if pressure in 

Gaza becomes too intense, the people turn on Hamas, creating political incentives for Hamas to 

provoke a conflict with Israel that allows it to regain political support but ouly at a great cost to all 

the parties involved. lsracl has seen this cycle before and does not want to repeat it. Therefore, in 

recent years, lsrael has looked the other way and in some cases worked quledy with the Qataris to 

ensure aid gets into Caza, even 1·ecognizing that pmtions of it get diverted to support IIamas. If this 

Qatari aid were to evaporate the likelihood of another war in Gaza would increase. 

9 'l'ara Cnpp, "Pentflgon: Al-L deid Air B:tse Stilt Open~ hut l.7S Prepared in Case Qatar Rlft Escalates." };li/itary Timer, 

.Jul); 18, 2017. http:/ hwtw.militarytimcs.com/ncws/pentagon-congress/2017 /07/17 /pentagon-al-udcid-air-basc-stillopen-hnt-ns-prepatcd-in-mse-qatat-rift-escal:ttes/. 

1'1 Greg J affc, and Thomas Gibbons-::"'·kff, "for Qataris, a U.S. Air Base Is Best Defe11se against Trump AlLacks." Tbt 

If/"irihiNgtrm Pn_rt, Jtlne 6, 2017. https://\v\vw.washingtonpost.com/ news/checkpoint{\'vp/201? /06/06/fot-qataris-a-u-sair-base-is-bcst-dcfcnsc-against-trump-attacks/?utm_term=.475a80a48f81, 

11Bathara Tasch, "Here's \V'hy 1sraells Helping Qatar Aid Hamas in the Gaza Strip." B1;.ri1tess I!wdo; J u11e 18, 2015. 

http://w\vw.busincssinsidcr.com/why-ismel-aUows-qatar-to-suppott-hamas-in-gazz-2015-6. 
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26427c-5.eps

Qatar has also come under cr-iticism for allowing a permissive environment forT ali ban 

representatives to operate in. But at the same time, it has hosted peace talks with the Taliban and 

often acted as a conduit for the United States in efforts to negotiate agreements to end the Afghan 

war.12 From Libya, to Sudan, to Lebanon, Qatar's willingness to host various groups and take all 

sides has made Doha a useful location for holcling peace talks and trying to reach agreements to end 

various regional conflicts. 

Implications for the United States and the Way Ahead 

Overall, frmn the Atnerlcau per::-,pect.ive the picture of Qatar is one of an itnperfecl parlner. The 

United State~ has real ancl important disagreen1ents \vith Q::~tar and would like to see its behavior on 

some issues change, but on orh~r matters Qatar has been ;:J v:.:Jluahle partner who has helped 

promote U.S. iutetests. Tn this cunte).t, the recent public split- between Qa.!at and its neigbhors has 

been datnaging to C.S. interests, yet it is han] Losee any resolution in the near fulure. 

The most imporumt consequence of the GCC split is th~t it has created~ new m;::tssive fiisuactitm in 

the Middle East. In May, President Trump traveled to Saudi Ambia where he brought leaders from 

across the Antb \X'orld together to focu~ on twu priorities: 1) fightJng TSTS ;-md other extremist 

groups; and 2) countering Iran. And yet two months later many of the United States' most 

important partners in this fight are declicating the majority of their diplometic efforts not ro those 

objectives, but instead to com1tering each other and making the case in Washington for their 

positions. Meanwhile, even SecretatyTillerson has focused most of his diplomatic efforts in the 

Middle East on mediating an end to this conflict, which means he has less time dedicated to the 

challenges posed by ISIS nnd Iran. 

The cli'~des within d1e Arab world also give Russia and Iran more room to meddle in Arab politics 

and to insen themselves into regional affairs as is evident from Moscow's assertive cliplomacy with 

Doha and Tehran's offer to airlift food into Qatar to compensate for the Saudi blockade. 13 The 

intra-Arab spilt futther reduces American influence. Indeed, numerous regional actors have already 

taken sides. Turkey has weighed in on Qatar's behalf and deployed forces to Qatar, Iraq has found 

itself awkwardly stuck in the middle. Iran has taken advantage of the cli\~sion and ali~-,med itself with 

Qatar in an attempt to draw it closer. And Moscow is clearly pleased to see this clivision among 

Atnerican partners. 

Going forward, the Trump administration should take yarious steps to adjust its current policy and 

respond to this crisis. First, it needs to have one clear message to all of its partners. The President 

cannot publicly criticize Qatar while the Secretary of State simultaneously assumes the posture of an 

objective mecliator. Tllis simply undercuts any efforts at cliplomacy, as all the players are confused 

about U.S. policy and choose to hear what is most in their interest. Indeed, the Saudis and Emimtis 

tz Derhm W~lsh~ "Qatar Opens Its Doors to Atl, to the Dism~y of Some-~~· 1'he Nelli "York Time.r,July 1 h, 2017. 

https:/ /·ww'iv.nytimes.com/2017/07 /16/world/middlccast/ doha-qatar-blockadc.html?_r:::O, 13 "Russi.1.n, Qa.tari Foreignl:viinisters to Discuss Diplomatic Crisis in ]}fiddle East." TASS,] nne 10,2017. 

http:/ /tass,com/politics/950827, 
52


26427c-6.eps

primarily have tried to go through a more sympathetic White House, while the Qataris engage with 

the Pentagon and the State Department. 

Second, the administration must stop viewing the Middle East through a simple black and white 

perspective. It was no coincidence that Saudi Arabia, the U"'V.l, Egypt, and Bahrain decided to act 

against Qatar only weeks after the President's visit to Riyadh. These countries walked out oflliyadh 

believing that they had a blank check from the President ancl that he woultl support them no n1atLer 

what. And while this crisis is not the Trump aclministration's fault and is ultimately about intra-i\rab 

disagreements, this sense of jmpunity undoubtedly played a role in these states' decision to sever ties 

with Qatar. 

Instead of a blank check, a better approach would be to offer Saudi Arabia a clear quid pro-quo: the 

United States will recognize Riyadh's leadership in the region am! will do more to counter Iranian 

influence if the kingdom will do more get its own house in order by setting aside intra-Arab 

disputes, mitigating the fierce polari'<ation (mostly over Islamism) within and between Arab 

societies, and focusing Arab efforts directly on Iran and the Islamic Stale- the threats Loth agree are 

top priorities. 

Third, the United States shoulcl accept the fcality thai this split is going to be around for a while and 

start preparing to Jeal -...vitb it as a kmg-lerm, persistEnt prnb1em instead of just a crisis to be solved. 

All parties have taken public anJ uncomprornising positiuns, which melins resnbtlon anytime in the 

near future is milikely.lnstead of high-profile shuttle diplomacy, what is needed is quieter work 

behind the scenes anrl a resumed focu:-; on other major challenges rhat the United States shmes with 

its GC:C. partners. 

The first message to U.S. partners neerls to he that it is still focused on the challenges posed by ISIS 

and Tran and tber the United States expects them to remain focused on those challenges as well. 

F.ven as the United States continues to manage this disagreement, its focus is retutning to the bigger 

challenges the region faces. And it expects its parmers to do the same instead of focusing theit 

diplomatic energy on trying to convince Washington to take their side in this fight, 

At the same time, the United States should emphasize to all sides that it expects them to deescalate 

the public rhetoric surrounding the disagreement and stop the media war. If the United States can 

persuade them to tone down the rhetoric and public stodes, then over time there may be mote 

political flexibility to reach an agreement. The United States should dso make clear that it is willing 

to play a cemrru role in any mediated outcome and essentially act as a guarantor of any agreement. 

However, it must recognize that this is ultimately an intra-Arab disagreement and they mnst take the 

lead in solving it. 

Finally, the United States can use this crisis as an opportnnity to engage with all of the GCC actors 

in trying to change behavior that it finds problematic. When it comes to terror t1nancing, there is 

now an opportunity to create one level bar that the United States expects all its regional partnets to 

abide by. Qatat may have been slower than some of the other GCC partners to address terror 

financing challenges, but the reality is that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular still haYe huge 

challenges. The United States should use this crisis to press all of them to clean up their acts. 
53

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Goldenberg. 

And I thank all of our witnesses for their opening statements. 

I would like to open up my line of questioning by recognizing the 

fact that I think this hearing is very timely. Both Qatar and the 

Gulf countries have been important partners, and we would like to 

see a constructive, honest resolution to the crisis. 

Qatar is a military ally of the United States, but has simultaneously supported Hamas and al-Qaeda. We have a role in easing 

tensions in the region, but not at the expense of our national security interests and our values. Qatar must cut ties with terrorists; 

our allies cannot provide support to our enemies. 

Dr. Schanzer, I have no sympathy for supporters of Hamas, nor 

do you. 

You have called the U.S. base in Qatar an ‘‘insane arrangement,’’ 

I think is the quote. Do you believe the base location is dangerous? 

And how would you propose safely moving the base in such a way 

that doesn’t compromise operations in the region? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Congresswoman Wagner, thank you for the question. Look, I would probably put it this way: First of all, it is an 

insane arrangement. The idea that you have this forward air base 

that is conducting the most crucial operations in the war on terrorism, and that is it mere miles away from the Taliban presence, 

Hamas presence where there are designated terror financiers from 

the Nusra front running around in Doha. This sends the wrong 

message. It sends the wrong message to the United States and to 

our allies in the coalition to fight ISIS and al-Qaeda. It sends the 

wrong message to our Middle East allies as well. 

In other words, when we tell them that we are going to hold 

them to account for their terror financing issues, and then they 

look at what is going on in Qatar, the optics, I think, are really 

rather terrible. 

As for the safety of our troops, so far I would say, so good. We 

have not had incidents where it appears that our troops are being 

threatened. I would actually say that is not the case with Incirlik 

Air Base in Turkey, which is another country that supports some 

of these terror groups. 

But at the end of the day, our recommendation has been that we 

begin to assess what it would take to move the base. Maybe not 

all of it. Maybe not all of it at once, but we need to take a look 

regionally at the other areas where we may be able to base some 

of these assets and to signal to the Qataris that we are willing to 

move. We don’t need to do it. We may decide at the end of the day, 

the Pentagon may decide they can’t afford to do it, it is too difficult, 

but in the meantime, it is important to message to the appropriate 

people in Qatar that we are willing to look at this problem and to 

reallocate assets as necessary. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. 

Dr. Levitt, can you discuss what actions the Saudis and other 

Gulf states have taken to combat terror financing that the Qataris 

have not? 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you for the question. You know, terror financing is a problem throughout the Gulf, and it took the Saudis some 

time to get on top of this problem. 

54

For a long time, U.S. Treasury pointed to Saudi Arabia as the 

epicenter of this problem, but the Saudis turned a corner. There is 

more that they can do, but the Saudis now run intelligence operations. They prosecute people. They work with us in designating 

people. There have even been joint U.S.-Saudi designations including of charities and individuals in Saudi Arabia. 

That is domestically difficult politically for them, but they have 

done it. There is more that they can do, but we now tend to point 

to others within the GCC toward Saudi Arabia, and we are trying 

to show them what we would like them—the types of things we 

would like to do more. 

There is an irony that Kuwait is the country that is kind of playing the middleman on this, and Kuwait is often described as being 

just as bad as Qatar on terror finance. And that is something that 

we need to recognize as well. But the fact is that there are things 

that Qatar should have done a long time ago, and that they have 

not done, and that we have, frankly, tolerated them not doing. And 

the overt financing of effectively the most important al-Qaeda entity in the world, al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia, is completely beyond 

the pale. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Goldenberg, in my limited time here, one of the demands 

from the Gulf states was that Qatar must close down the Turkish 

military base. I get that they are concerned about the Muslim 

Brotherhood’s influence. But how important do you think this demand is in terms of regional stability and security, and is this one 

that should be dropped? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. 

I think that on the list of demands, the Turkish air base is probably lower—the base is lower on the list of demands that the 

Emiratis and the Saudis and others are leveling. In most conversations, what you hear them really focusing on is, more has to do 

with what the Qataris might be doing in the press, than some of 

the sort of the personal attacks at certain point that the different 

sides are launching at each other right now. I think that is much 

more the source of the issue, and the terror financing issue that we 

have been talking about has been much more central to the debate 

than this Turkish base, that, frankly, there have been already a 

move for the Turks to deploy some forces there a couple of years 

ago, and then when this crisis erupted, they moved everything up; 

they moved it very quickly to sort of a symbolic step. It is a good 

example of an opportunity, or the crisis, and the move has actually 

backfired on some of our partners, if what they were trying to do 

was isolate Qatar. What they actually managed to do is strengthen 

the Turkey-Qatar relationship instead. 

So I would put this one probably as not as central as some of the 

other questions that have been out there before, but something 

that we will see as time goes on if they walk away from. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you for that insight. My time has elapsed. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Deutch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Goldenberg, you referred to the flexible approach to problematic actors. And—so the question I have for you and for the panel 

is, how can—what is that? How is it—here is how it is characterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
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ized. Right? It is characterized as, well, yes, we know that Hamas 

is a terrorist organization, but if our ally has a relationship, then 

perhaps that can help us somehow. 

Dr. Schanzer, I presume, would argue that Hamas is Hamas, and 

we should have nothing to do with them and our allies shouldn’t 

either. Yet, the question is what does that flexible approach get us? 

And, Dr. Schanzer, if Qatar acted to move all of these terrorist 

groups out of Qatar, out of Doha altogether, where do they go? And 

to Mr. Goldenberg’s point, is there some—is there some benefit to 

having them there instead of in the arms of ISIS or in Tehran? 

Mr. Goldenberg, can you help us sort this out? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Sure. Thank you, Ranking Member Deutch. 

And exactly, I think this is precisely sort of the point. It is complicated, but what I would say is—well, maybe I will start with the 

example of Hamas. And I will actually quote an Israeli former head 

of research, Josi Kuppelwieser, the former head of research for 

Israel’s military intelligence who has been up here a lot, I believe, 

also in the past talking about incitements saying, just a year ago 

publicly, nobody else is ready to help out but Qatar when it comes 

to Gaza. 

So here is a perfect example of the situation we are dealing with. 

We have had three wars with Israel and Hamas over the few years 

in Gaza, with large casualties for Palestinians, large casualties for 

the IDF. And the Israelis have started to realize, well, maybe we 

should not be—sort of this approach was trying to squeeze Hamas 

and Gaza doesn’t seem to be working. So maybe we need to think 

about a different approach and trying to at least alleviate the humanitarian situation and find ways to quietly establish channels 

with these guys so as to keep the situation calm and not have another conflict. 

Who is the only real channel that they have to do that, the 

Qataris. And so they have been using that channel, and we have 

been helping in some cases to facilitate that channel. So that is an 

example. 

And so, if Hamas was instead sitting in Tehran, which is a likely 

outcome of what would happen if they were kicked out of Doha, 

then I think what you would see is no ability to actually communicate in that way, and probably Hamas taking more aggressive action and less ability to squeeze them. 

So this isn’t to justify the Qatari relationship with Hamas. I 

don’t agree with that, necessarily. I think it is a problem. It is not 

something the U.S. should not have any kind of direct relationship 

with Hamas. Hamas is a terrorist organization bent on the destruction of Israel. But we sort of found that this approach by the 

Qataris at least has some benefits, and we should at least recognize that as opposed to just vilifying them, because we would like 

them to behave differently, but at the same time, they end up—

when we ask them to do things that sometime are in our interest, 

they are able to push certain levers we are not able. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Schanzer? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Thank you, Congressman Deutch. 

I am not even sure where to begin. In terms of the potential benefits from Qatar working with Hamas or allowing Hamas to operate out of there, it is sort of a counterfactual. We have yet to actuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
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ally see what the benefits are, other than the fact that the Israelis 

have allowed the Qataris to provide assistance to Gaza, not to 

Hamas, but to the people of Gaza for reconstruction. On that, I 

think the Israelis would agree that it has been positive. I think we 

would all agree that it has helped, perhaps, forestall a major humanitarian disaster, and I think for that we should be thankful. 

But from there, I do have to question. 

I mean, it is not like Hamas doesn’t have other places where it 

can operate. It has base in Turkey, for example. It has its home 

base in the Gaza strip. It operates out of the West Bank. It operates out of Sudan and Lebanon. It has a major presence across the 

Middle East. Why does it have to operate inside Doha where it gets 

a certain amount of legitimacy for this? 

And then perhaps one other thing to note here is that when people talk about how Qatar may have helped, perhaps, bring the conflict to an end in 2014, if you speak to the other actors in the region, they will tell you, whether it is the Egyptians or the Israelis 

or even others, they will tell you that is was actually the Qataris 

and the Turks that forestalled an end to the conflict. That they 

continued to negotiate on behalf of Hamas, and I think that they 

probably, in doing so, probably led to the loss of many, many more 

lives. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Unfortunately, I am out of time. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Cook, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

In my opening remarks, I talked about this news story about the 

North Koreans working on a World Cup and figures that I read 

were about 3,000. 

And in the article it talked about the possibility of whether they 

can be militarized. And this is a scenario that is kind of scary. We 

talk about the fact that we have our largest military base there, 

which is, as you said, insane. 

Can you just comment on that possibility where this is another 

dimension, another threat to this? Because every week it seems we 

have to re-evaluate which is the number one enemy? 

Dr. Levitt, could you start? 

Mr. LEVITT. So I haven’t seen this report, so I don’t want to comment on a report I haven’t seen, other than to say the North Korea 

issue is a very important pressing issue. In some ways, it is much 

more important than this one, to be sure. But in general, I think 

we need to learn ways to be able to leverage conversation, and if 

necessary, pressure on Qatar on a wide array of issues that we 

have with them. And this would be one more. And you have to do 

that in a way that is flexible, because we have many very positive 

relationships with Qatar. 

I would argue the way to be flexible, though, is not to say it is 

perfectly okay to have X number of North Koreans in the country 

working in ways we don’t know, or to host anybody you want from 

Hamas. Certainly, for example, I would make a difference between 

hosting certain leaders of Hamas who are sitting in a hotel room, 

as opposed to people like Saad al-Hariri, who is now believed to be 

57

in Lebanon but was sitting comfortably in Qatar for quite some 

time where he was literally plotting attacks against Israelis civilians. That should be completely beyond the pale. 

Again, I haven’t seen this report, but this would be another thing 

that we have to figure out how do we have multiple conversations 

with a country at the same time on some issues you have agreement, on some issues you have great disagreement. I think we 

have done that very poorly across administrations. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Any others want to comment on this? Doctor? 

Mr. SCHANZER. I will comment for a moment, sir. I think it is important to talk about when you talk about foreign workers in 

Qatar. The 3,000 that you mentioned are actually—it is a very 

small number, relatively speaking, in relation to this 800,000-plus 

foreign workers that are active right now in Qatar. 

I have seen the reports of the North Korean workers there. The 

concern actually was not that they would be potentially operational, but rather, that they were effectively slave labor. 

Mr. COOK. Yes, exactly. 

Mr. SCHANZER. It was given to the Qataris, and that whatever 

they were being paid was being remitted back to North Korea, and 

that this was an inadvertent way, or a backdoor way of financing 

North Korea. 

So these are the concerns that we have. I believe that the 

Qataris have addressed this problem last I heard. I have not seen 

a lot of updates on this. 

Mr. COOK. The reason I ask that question, because we are having 

the debate and everything else about the sanctions against North 

Korea, and this might be another variable that would be included 

in this. 

Any comments on what happened last year? I was over in that 

area, and the State Department was, quite frankly, at that time—

this is about a year ago, maybe a year and a half—they were arguing on behalf of Qatar for the upgrade for the F-15s. They thought 

it would be in the best interest. And I was kind of shocked at that 

in terms of foreign military sales. 

Do you have any comment on that? I almost—when I was there, 

viewed it as almost Middle East Stockholm syndrome, because they 

were very, very supportive of Qatar with all its problems, and it 

kind of shocked me at least from a military standpoint. 

Doctor? Either one? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Sir, I actually had served in the Pentagon for 

a few years on the Middle East issues, so I can maybe talk a little 

about this. From my perspective, look, I mean, this is a problem 

we have with all the Gulf states. On the one hand, I mean, the arm 

sales are very useful to our industry——

Mr. COOK. Yes. I understand that. But I am talking about the 

F-15 upgrade. This is a significant—I understand your expertise in 

the Pentagon. I have spent a few years in the military myself, although I certainly cannot fly an airplane. But in regards to that 

particular weapon system, which is kind of more sophisticated than 

some of the others. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Well, sir, I was just going to say that my issue 

with—I can’t tell you about that specific weapon system, and that 

specific upgrade. I can tell you that, generally, I think we have an 

58

issue where we probably sell these countries too much weaponry 

because they have the money. And what they really need is, sort 

of, lower-end technology to deal with counterterrorism problems 

and things like that, which are much more important, I think, for 

their interest and ours. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman’s time expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Lieu, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

On June 9, our Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, stated, ‘‘We call 

on the king of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 

and Egypt to ease the blockade on Qatar.’’ Later that same exact 

day, Donald Trump referred to the decision to initiate the blockade 

as hard but necessary. And then, as you know, a few days later, 

the United States sells $12 million of fighter jets to Qatar. 

So my question is to the panel, what is your understanding of the 

current U.S. position on this so-called blockade? Do we support it? 

Do we oppose it? What is the answer to that? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I will start, I guess. And I think others also 

have comments. 

From my perspective, I think we have a disagreement inside the 

administration, and for the most part, have seen this disagreement. 

I am not 100 percent sure. I do think that what it does do, it 

causes some confusion, because you can’t really—Secretary 

Tillerson is clearly trying to act as a mediator, and he is going out 

there and trying to do that. He had a trip just last week, or a couple of weeks back to do that. And meanwhile, you have some of 

these other comments coming from elsewhere, so the Qataris will 

then go to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense 

would seem to have positions more in line with their own, and the 

Emiratis and the Saudis and others will go the White House, who 

seems to have positions more in line with their own. And that is 

really not an effective way to sort of try to conduct and mediate 

this conflict. I think it is causing some problems. 

So I would say it is ambiguous right now what the policy is. 

Mr. LIEU. So let me ask you another question. There have been 

various media reports that the Trump organization has lots of businesses in Saudi Arabia and some of these other countries but not 

Qatar. Do you think that plays any role, or could it? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Honestly, Congressman, I don’t know. I don’t 

know their motivation, what is behind it. 

Mr. LIEU. That is fine. I will ask you another question. 

There have been various reports that Jared Kushner basically 

got stiffed by some folks in Qatar. Do you think this could play any 

role in that? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. It is certainly a possibility, but it is not something that I, again, have any knowledge of. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. Let me move on to a question I had mentioned in my opening statement. 

Are there families being separated because of this so-called 

blockade based on their national origin, or any panel member? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. My understanding is at least that, yes, there 

are issues where the Qataris and the—we have a lot of people who 

59

are moving between the Qataris, the Emiratis and the various GCC 

states, and so you are going to end up in situations where all GC—

all, I believe, Qatari nationals had 2 weeks to get out of certain 

GCC states. 

Mr. LIEU. So you would be separating husband and wife from 

each other if they happen to be a different national origins, correct? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. That is what I have seen in the press. Beyond 

that, you know—and I have heard concerns about that, but I can’t 

really speak for their policy, obviously. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. 

I have met with various representatives from these Gulf state 

countries, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar. One of the things 

that the residents from Qatar said is with respect to Taliban, they 

said it is true there is a Taliban office in Qatar, but that the U.S. 

asked them to open it. Is that true? Anyone on the panel. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I will maybe take a first stab at that one. 

As I understand it, there was a Taliban presence that was already there in Doha, that there were representatives of the Taliban 

who had come there before the opening of this office. Then came 

the initiative by the Obama administration to negotiate with the 

Taliban in an attempt to find pragmatic members of the group. 

And so, they essentially authorized what became the Taliban Embassy. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, this was something that was 

very frustrating to those within the Afghan Government, who were 

struggling for their own recognition of legitimacy. They felt that 

this undermined them, and I have heard this from a number of 

U.S. officials on both sides of the aisle. 

What happened after that was the trade for Bowe Bergdahl, the 

American serviceman who had gone missing in Afghanistan, and 

he was traded for the Taliban Five. This was facilitated by the 

Qataris. The Taliban Five are high ranking Taliban officials and 

operatives, ultimately came to Qatar as well, and so they augmented the presence that had already been there. 

And since that time, the concern has been not just that there has 

been an official presence of the Taliban inside Doha, but rather 

also Taliban officials, Taliban militants, have come in and they 

have reconnected with the Taliban Five and some of the others. So 

there is concern that it is not just that the presence that was first 

blessed by the Obama administration, but that there have been 

some operational concerns as well. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Zeldin, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

This is a question for anyone who is able to answer. Does Qatar 

view Hamas as a terrorist organization? Or I can—maybe a multiple choice, or does Qatar view Hamas as a legitimate resistance, 

or would you give it some other characterization? How does the 

Government of Qatar view Hamas? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Maybe I will start. The Government of Qatar 

does not see Hamas as a terrorist organization. It sees the violence 

that Hamas carries out as being legitimate, and it continues to inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
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sist that overall, the critique that has been leveled at the Qataris 

over the last several weeks as this crisis has unfolded, they continue to say that they do not agree with the definition of terrorism 

that their critics are using. 

Again, I see this as a very poor defense. They know exactly how 

we view the problem, and they are allies of the United States. They 

are hosting our air base. They know the difference between right 

and wrong, at least in the way that the West views it, and they 

refuse to recognize it, and that is one of the problems that we have. 

And I think, maybe just a post script, that if this is the case with 

Hamas, who else might they view differently? How do they view 

the Taliban? We just talked about the base. How do they view the 

Nusra front? Do they see them as terrorists? Probably not. And so 

what we see is a growing list of actors where we would disagree 

on whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, terrorists or not terrorists. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Does anyone disagree with that? What options do we 

have, if at all, to get Qatar to change their view of Hamas as a legitimate resistance? 

Mr. LEVITT. Like in the first instance, there are already reports 

that Qatar has asked at least six Hamas members to leave the 

country. That is good. That means some pressure works. So long 

as there is no consequence, this is a no-brainer for Qatar. Qatar is 

a small but rich country, and if it wants to box out of its weight 

class, it can either spend money or do other things that make it 

more of a player. It has been able to make itself more of a player 

in part by reaching out to Islamist groups that are beyond the pale 

for most. And, therefore, being a key intermediary, we collectively, 

especially coming right after the European Court of Justice’s ruling 

just now upholding the EU’s designation of all of Hamas, not some 

wings and others but all of it, we in the West collectively need to 

make it clear to Qatar that hosting and providing services to a 

group that is committed to the destruction of a U.N. member state 

and to civilians is unacceptable. 

And I put that in a different basket from Qatar’s support to citizens in Gaza, which the Israelis fully support. In fact, it is done 

through Israel. That is a different issue. If Qatar wants to be a responsible player in that regard, fine, but hosting and providing safe 

haven to the leaders of a U.S.- and EU-designated terrorist group 

is a problem. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Has Qatar weighed in, to the best of your knowledge, with regards to the U.S. moving its Embassy from Tel Aviv 

to Jerusalem? Are you aware of the nature of Qatar helping in the 

mission to defeat ISIS? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Well, I think that, yes, in that Qatar hosts, 

you know, our forces at Al Udeid Air Base, which is where the—

you know, we have the CAOC, which is the central coordinating 

function that then allows—basically is responsible for coordinating 

all of our operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, and especially 

Iraq and Syria, where ISIS is primarily based, you know as a central element of our strategy, and you know I just would——

Mr. ZELDIN. I really should have clarified. I mean, other than the 

obvious that, you know, we have a base there, but the nature of 

61

these relationships with other terrorist organizations, and they are 

very welcoming to just about everyone, it seems, in the region. 

So, outside of the obvious, what other—what can we add, what 

could you add as far as Qatar’s other efforts? Not supporting, not 

allowing us to operate there, but what else are they doing? 

Mr. LEVITT. I am not entirely sure I understand the question, but 

Qatar is a member of the counter-ISIS coalition. Its commitment 

has been somewhat limited. It has flown some missions, but it has 

refused to drop bombs, so it has flown behind other airplanes in 

case something happens to them. That it is not nothing, but it is 

not as much as others. I think the biggest issue is that now across 

administrations of different political persuasions we have been 

more interested in getting another number to add to the number 

of coalition members adding Qatar without insisting that, to be a 

part of it, you also have to meet a certain threshold. And it seems 

crazy to me they should be able to be part of the counter-ISIL coalition while still supporting other equally dangerous radical Islamist 

groups like al-Qaeda in Syria. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I would love to get into that further, but I notice 

that I am out of time, so I have to yield back. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. 

Gabbard, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I am wondering if you can address the double standard that exists and that we are confronted with with all of this attention being 

focused on Qatar with different members of the administration 

very strongly calling out Qatar for its support of terrorism, yet on 

the same—almost in the same breath embracing Saudi Arabia and 

lauding their counterterrorism efforts, when I think some of you 

have mentioned in your opening comments Saudi Arabia’s long history of supporting terrorism and exporting the Wahhabi Salafist 

ideology around the world that really creates these fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS—what to 

speak of Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s support of different terrorist 

groups in places like Syria, Saudi support for al-Qaeda in Yemen 

and their fight in Yemen. So all of this attention is focused on 

Qatar with very little if no passing mention of Saudi Arabia’s role 

in all of this. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I want to make sure my colleague Matt Levitt 

gets a moment to speak, but maybe just a couple of quick thoughts. 

Number one, you mentioned Turkey. I think that probably a whole 

other hearing should be done on Turkey that the same sorts of behaviors that we are seeing exhibited by the Qataris we have seen 

with the Turks and we have seen them in very similar ways. 

In fact, I think it was just yesterday, I don’t know if he is still 

there, but the President of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan, was in Doha, and 

they are strategic partners. And I think we need to address this. 

And I think I mentioned before that the Incirlik Air Base, we have 

very similar issues with Incirlik that we do with Al Udeid. I see 

them really as mirror images of one another. The Turks host a 

Hamas base. They have been known to open up their borders to 

allow for Nusrah fighters to go back and forth, possibly ISIS fightVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
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ers, as well, so there is a lot of problems with the Turks that I 

think probably deserve some attention. 

Ms. GABBARD. I agree. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Then I think the other thing that both Matt and 

I mentioned today is the problem of Kuwait. The fact that Kuwait 

has become a mediator in this is somewhat ridiculous, that the Kuwaitis have been identified time and again by our former and current colleagues at the Treasury Department that Kuwait is a huge 

problem when it comes to terror finance probably rivaling that of 

Qatar, and so that should be addressed. 

As for Saudi Arabia, I would agree with the assessment that it 

has turned a corner. It is not out of the woods, but it has gotten 

a lot better. It is not best in breed. I think that distinction probably 

goes to the Emirates right now in the Gulf states, but they still 

have their problems, too. 

What I started to say at the beginning of my testimony and prepared remarks is that all of these—the entire Gulf is a problematic 

region. I think the Saudis were seen as the number one producer 

of radicalism and radical ideology. I think it has been eclipsed, and 

as they are trying—it looks as though, right now, they are looking 

to get better at this. And they still have problems with teaching 

radicalism and spreading radicalism, but as they improve, we are 

seeing some of these other countries double down. And Qatar I 

think has really been the most prominent among them. 

Ms. GABBARD. I think—and I have got about a minute and a half 

if others want to comment—but the issue of Saudi Arabia, we have 

heard that, yes, they are making progress, and, yes, there is 

change occurring, but I and others have asked this administration 

for very specific examples, data, benchmarks, changes, and to date, 

we have not gotten any kind of specifics, either in writing or in person. And, frankly, what we have gotten is a lot of lip service. So, 

you know, the question of how long this has been going on with 

Saudi Arabia casts a huge amount of doubt on saying, yeah, okay, 

well we think they are improving in this. 

Mr. LEVITT. I will just add that Qatar in the here and now, right 

now, is doing things that have to stop. There is no question——

Ms. GABBARD. I agree. 

Mr. LEVITT [continuing]. That the Saudis for a very long time did 

a whole lot of things that not only caused problems then but are 

still causing problems now. And I am not going make excuses for 

them. They have turned corners, and I can’t explain why the administration wouldn’t provide some information about that, which 

is not to say that there is not a lot more that they could do. 

But as several members of the committee have said, several of 

you have been approached by different members of GCC states recently, So have those of us in think tanks. And I have mentioned 

to some of my Saudi and Emirati colleagues in particular: Beware 

pushing too hard on general ideas of extremism, because it is not 

like you haven’t had problems of your own. Beware of pushing too 

hard on the issue of the Taliban in Qatar, UAE, because for a period of time, Taliban officials were strolling into Dubai with suitcases of cash, and so long as that was invested in real estate, no 

one cared. 

63

So the UAE and the Saudis, despite what they have done in the 

past, have turned corners. We need Qatar to do the same. We 

shouldn’t expect that Qatar will suddenly be perfect in the same 

way that its neighbors are not yet perfect, but we cannot tolerate 

some of the most egregious behavior that they have done even, as 

I said in written and oral testimony, some of the charges that have 

been arrayed against them are simply untrue, but some of them 

are very true. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Mrs. WAGNER. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mast, 

for, 5 minutes. 

Mr. MAST. I want to thank you for taking the time to come here 

and sit with us today. I want to get to something very quickly. You 

know, we have been discussing the support of terror from different 

actors. Terrorism—I have heard it said before, terrorism isn’t an 

enemy. Terrorism is a tactic that is used by an enemy. 

So, to that end, I would like to hear from each one of you, what 

is it that you think is trying to be achieved by the tactic of supporting—by supporting that tactic, by supporting terror? What is 

the end that each one of you see as being played out? 

Mr. LEVITT. So, as answered to another question, I think Qatar 

is trying to make itself a bigger player in the world stage than it 

otherwise would be by being a small peninsula, almost an island, 

of a very small population. A vast majority of people on the island 

are foreign workers. But it happens to be very, very wealthy, the 

wealthiest nation on planet earth per capita, and it has also found 

another way to kind of punch beyond its weight, and that is 

through making relationships with other Islamist groups that it 

has been able to use to its own benefit and sometimes being out 

to reach out to others and say: Hey, I can be a middle man for you 

too. 

That has proved to be very, very dangerous. And so Qatar has 

never had a situation where there was a cost to having the kind 

of relationship it wants and needs with us, which we would like to 

have with them too, at the same time they are having very close 

relationships with some of the worst of the worst. 

Mr. MAST. Mr. Schanzer? Mr. Goldenberg? 

Mr. SCHANZER. I agree with Matt. I think that, overall, Qatar realizes that it is extremely vulnerable, that it is tiny, and that it 

doesn’t have the means to push back on some of its very tough 

neighbors. 

It shares natural gas wealth with the Iranians, and they have to 

figure out how to get along. And so having some of these proxies 

available to them is a useful thing. By the way, so is having an 

American air base where they can sort of bare their teeth at the 

Iranians. 

But at the end of the day, what they are trying to do or what 

has happened over time is they have become very wealthy, and 

they have tried to use whatever means they have to purchase 

power. And so you see them buying up large chunks of London, 

large chunks of Washington. You see them paying for proxies 

across the Middle East, trying to push the Muslim Brotherhood 

into positions of power so that they, too, would be able to ride the 

64

waves of power. This is a lot of what drives them right now.I think 

they have taken this way too far.

Mr. GOLDENBERG. And just to add, and I agree a lot of what Jonathan and Matt have said, Qatar is also just traditionally pursued 

sort of a third way foreign policy in the Gulf. You know, a lot of 

the smaller Gulf states choose to align themselves with Saudi Arabia. Qatar basically, since 1995, when there was a turnover and a 

sort of a palace coup and the emir took over, the father of the current emir chose a different approach which involved not just going 

along with the Saudis. And if you are a very small country with 

a much bigger one sitting right next to you who sort of is running 

a lot of the region, if you are going to go with that contrary policy, 

you try to find every division that you can and every opportunity 

that you can to influence. And so it builds relationships oftentimes 

with other actors. 

I think this is also is part of the reason they have a slightly different approach to Iran, which is probably a little more 

accommodationist, although I think that it also has a lot to do with 

sharing the gas field, as Jonathan said. So I think this is—it is, 

partially, it is about increasing their influence, but it is also about 

increasing their influence and being independent of Saudi Arabia 

within the context of the GCC. 

Mr. MAST. Okay. So you have each mentioned what you thought 

to the end was, and we are talking about terrorism, support of terror. We are talking about a very kinetic action. We are not talking 

about something cyber. We are not talking about something economic. We are talking about a very kinetic action. 

So, in that, being that Qatar has been purchasing foreign military or our military equipment to the tune of $10 billion in 2014, 

$17 billion in 2015, what is the jump that you make connecting the 

dots to that end? Do you make a jump there? Do you fear moving 

from the tactic of terror to a conventional tactic? Is that the assessment that you make? 

Mr. LEVITT. No. They are still a small country. They don’t want 

to get into a fight with anybody. I think, in their mind also, this 

is not a kinetic. They are just supporting groups, and they make 

a distinction in their own mind this kind of cognitive dissonance 

between other things they might be doing. They are supporting the 

political office of Hamas in their mind. They are supporting 

Islamists who are effective in fighting Assad and nothing else in 

their mind. It is not quite so simple, but that is what I—I don’t 

think this is at all a threat of regular military-military conflict.

Mr. SCHANZER. I would just add, when you look at Qatar—and 

we have been having this conversation for the last, you know, hourplus—I think it is important to note that Qatar is a country of 

roughly 300,000 people. It is tiny. It has more foreign workers in 

the country than actual nationals. They are incredibly vulnerable. 

They are not picking a fight directly with anyone, and this is why 

they have chosen that soft power approach. They bring the conflict 

away from them. They cause problems for other people that only 

they can solve. This is the Qatari way. 

Mr. MAST. My time has expired. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you so much, Mr. Mast. 

65

And God has granted me another opportunity to make good on 

the pronunciation of Mr. Suozzi’s name, so I am pleased to yield 

time to Mr. Suozzi of New York. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I am going to pick up on something you just said about 300,000 

people that live in Qatar. And I am going to change my line of 

questioning based on that. There are 1.5 billion Muslims in the 

world, and the challenge that we face in today’s world is—you 

know, most Muslims don’t participate in this awful, horrific activity 

of terrorism and trying to promote terrorism and extremism and violence, and the challenge is, you know, who is winning in this battle to try and promote extremism and violence? And, you know, 

there are 750,000 Muslims that live in Indonesia, Pakistan, India, 

and Bangladesh. The other 750—what did I say 750 million, did I 

say that? Another 750 million who live outside of those countries. 

So the question is: Things are dynamic. Congresswoman Gabbard 

was talking about, you know, Saudi Arabia’s activities over decades 

and promoting Wahhabism and building madrassas and promoting 

extremism all over the world, but things are dynamic and things 

are changing. And some people are moving closer to our way of 

thinking, not to promote violence and extremism, and some people 

are moving further away and continuing to promote violence and 

extremism. So where would you place Qatar on where they are 

right now? 

Mr. SCHANZER. It is a great question, and I would say they have 

got one foot in one camp and one foot in the other. And this is really what is maddening about Qatar. All right. So, on the one hand, 

they are hosting our forward air base, and they are a vital partner 

on the war on terrorism, and they are investing through their sovereign wealth. They are investing here in the U.S. and across the 

West. They are investing in legitimate investments, and they have 

provided a crucial service in terms of providing hard capital, especially when things got rough about a decade ago; they were there, 

and they were helping. 

The problem is, is that they have used that as leverage. So, when 

we come to them and we talk to them about their support for the 

various groups that we have mentioned, the jihadists in Syria, the 

jihadists in Libya, the Taliban and Hamas, and we go and we talk 

to them about this, they just don’t listen. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So, if the people from Qatar wanted to clearly demonstrate to us that they are moving away from promoting any kind 

of extremism and they are moving closer to our way of thinking, 

the West way of thinking, what would be the two or three things 

that they would have to do to demonstrate that in a clear way? 

Mr. SCHANZER. We should be providing Qatar with a list of people that they should expel. It should include people who are part 

of the Taliban, part of Hamas, part of these various Syrian jihadi 

groups. 

Let me put it this way: I have heard from diplomats in Doha that 

the Qataris can’t do that because it would really upset the Qatari 

population, that it would really be very unpopular. We are talking 

about 300,000 people who live in an absolute monarchy. If the emir 

wants them gone, they will be gone. It is that simple. And we can 

ask. 

66

Mr. SUOZZI. Okay. I only have 1 minute and 55 seconds left, so 

Dr. Levitt? 

Mr. LEVITT. We are not talking about 300,000 people when we 

are talking about the problems in Qatar. We are talking about a 

much, much, much smaller number. In fact, when it comes to the 

al-Qaeda financiers, we are talking about probably two to three 

dozen people max that we are truly concerned about. And we are 

talking about a small number of people in government who need 

to act. 

So this is actually—one of the reasons it is so frustrating is it 

is so doable. This is an absolute monarchy. They have a respectable 

security service. They have no tolerance for this type of activity targeting them within the kingdom, but so long as activity that is 

happening within the kingdom is targeting others, they are okay 

if it gives them some type of leverage. We need to make clear that 

there is more leverage to be had in having a wholesome relationship with us, with the Europeans, with the West, and that there 

are consequences in terms of that relationship if they don’t. This 

is fixable. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. If I can just add one point, Congressman. I 

think this crisis actually gives us an opportunity to build some leverage and go to all of these countries, to go to the Qataris and say: 

Okay, here is our list. You really want our support in this crisis? 

Like we need to see your action on this. 

And also to go against the Saudis and the Emirates and—it is 

the exact same thing. 

Mr. SUOZZI. I agree with that. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. And so I think there is this real opportunity 

now, you know, as sort of the silver lining of this crisis of having 

our partners all at each other’s throats instead of focusing on what 

we would want to see them focus on because I would rather see 

them more focused on Iran—I would rather see them focused on 

the counterISIS fight, not in spending their time in Washington 

trying to get all of us, you know, on their side—but hereis an opportunity. Let’s turn it on them and say: Let’s see all of you live 

up, here is the standard we want to go by, and we want all the 

countries of the Gulf to go by this standard, and here is what we 

expect from you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, please, go right ahead. 

Mr. LEVITT. I realize we are over, but along these lines, there is 

a mechanism to do that. At the Riyadh summit, we created something called the Terror Finance Tracking Center. There is no meat 

on those bones yet. No one knows, including the Secretary of the 

Treasury who just testified about it, no one really knows what that 

is going to be yet, but it is a potential structure. We could put some 

meat on those bones. That is a GCC-wide effort, and we should be 

acting and demanding participation from all the GCC countries because these are problems that are happening within all of them, 

even if Qatar and Kuwait are the biggest problems right now. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So thank you, Madam Chair. You know, there is a 

real battle in the world going on between stability and instability, 

and it is not necessarily ideology. It is criminals that are participating in murder and extortion and kidnapping and drug dealing 

67

and trying to promote extremism ideology. And it is not a group; 

it is individuals, as you are pointing out, that we need to target. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

And now we turn to Mr. Issa of California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Just for the record briefly, Mr. Schanzer, last time you were in 

the administration? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Ten years ago. 

Mr. ISSA. Ten years ago, Bush, right? 

So, Levitt, last time? 

Mr. LEVITT. Bush. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Goldenberg, State Department, when? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. 2014. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. So very recently, all facts considered. So all of 

you have been in a position that this committee oversees. We actually don’t oversee Qatar. We don’t oversee Kuwait. We oversee the 

places you were. 

So I am going tell you a story. It is a Bush era story. Sixteen 

years ago there was a hearing in this room, and we were evaluating the incredibly unreasonable activities of Kazakhstan, because 

they had the audacity to want to sell their MiG-21s to a hostile nation. The other side of the story was they had come to the State 

Department, they had come to our Government in the Bush administration, and they said: Look, we are a poor country. We are trying 

to become a rich country. We have got oil. We want to turn—we 

want to turn these weapons into plowshares. We want to actually 

sell them off. We are not replacing them. We simply want to raise 

some cash. And they said: Who can we sell them to? 

Mr. Goldenberg, oddly enough, State said: We can’t give you a 

list. 

Clearly Lockheed wasn’t interested in buying them unless they 

were trade-ins and neither was Boeing or others. 

So my question to you is—each of you—because I have been 

through these hearings on country after country, and we are going 

to see whether it is the Palestinian Authority and including 

Hamas, whether it is Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, we are going 

to keep having these hearings, and we are always going to find one 

thing. Money is leaking to bad people from within these countries, 

either by individuals or, in fact, there may be a nexus to the government in some way. 

What I want to know is, what are each of you prepared to do and 

should this administration do under our auspices—and I think, Mr. 

Schanzer, you alluded to this—to make a list of who you can give 

to, to make list of who you want out, to make list—in other words, 

how do we get the administration to set solid, predictable standards, so we know it is not a mixed message, please? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Thank you, Congressman. What I would say is, 

A, I think we can provide lists and say these people shouldn’t be 

here or they should be in jail and that you need to take action. And 

I think that is a very, you know, straightforward approach. There 

are other things that I mentioned. 

Mr. ISSA. And I will commit that if you provide that list I will 

forward, and I hope my chairperson will actually do it on my beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
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half, but I will commit to forward it to the administration asking 

them, have they and will they make that request? 

Mr. SCHANZER. We will take you up on that. 

What I would also add, though, is there are other ways of putting 

pressure on countries like Qatar that don’t involve the individuals 

themselves but that make it more painful. So I mentioned the 

STORM Act, which was introduced in the Senate. 

Mr. ISSA. Right. 

Mr. SCHANZER. And is yet to be introduced in the House, but this 

would potentially label Qatar and/or any other country a jurisdiction of terrorism finance concern, which would then have a chilling 

effect on those who would be interested in doing commerce. 

Mr. ISSA. But my question was more narrow. It is, how do we 

get, like those lists, specifics to the administration? One of the 

challenges we have: We pass these various acts, and then there 

gets to be all kind of debate about it. But what I think I have 

heard throughout the day, both here and when I was in the back, 

is that there are specific asks that we should be asking countries 

to do, including in this case Qatar. 

Now there are things that they can’t undo. The emir visiting 

Hamas and giving money for a hospital, we can’t unring any of 

that. We can only feel that it was not helpful, to say the least. 

So one of my questions to each of you with the limited time is, 

can you briefly tell us additional acts, and can you agree to give 

us lists of things that you believe we should work with the administration to get done? My hope is that it will not be pass a law that 

ties this and future administration’s hands, but, rather, things you 

know should be done that we need to ask them, why aren’t they 

doing it? 

Mr. LEVITT. So to be perfectly blunt, sir——

Mr. ISSA. I love blunt. 

Mr. LEVITT. I know you do. They know, because we have told 

them. I am happy—I will speak for all three of us. We are happy 

to provide you information. We have a Treasury attache in Doha. 

He works real hard all the time. This new MOU is going to send 

a Department of Justice OPDAT official, a prosecutor, to help them 

with the prosecutions. There is no question about the names, not 

only because we have designated many, because we have this very 

open conversation with them many times. In one of my recent conversations with the senior Qatari official, the official said to me: 

Look, Matt, you are former FBI. We need the FBI to tell us. 

I said: No, sir. You have a really good security service. I know 

because I have worked with you in the past. I know that our people 

are working with you on a regular basis. You know that I know 

that you know exactly who we are talking about. 

And, therefore, it is frustrating, as I mentioned earlier, when a 

senior Qatari official says just yesterday: All of the terror financier 

subjects in our country have been subject to prosecution. 

That is not true, nor is prosecution the only tool in the tool chest. 

So I would argue that the problem here is not the lists. The problem here is that they refuse to do it, and we haven’t had any type 

of consequence for that because we need them for other things. We 

want them for other things, but we have to be able to balance that. 

69

Mr. ISSA. Well, that is why I believe our list forwarded will have 

more of a, why not? 

And I want you to answer, but my question was broader. It 

wasn’t just Qatar. It is very clear that we have similar requests 

from other allies or semi-allies throughout the Gulf, yes. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Thank you, Congressman. Just one quick 

point. I know we are over time, but I think one thing the committee could do is, for example, ask for a report on what it would 

mean to actually diversify away from the Qatari air base, not because I necessarily recommend doing that. I actually think it would 

end up being very expensive and difficult, and if we can, we should 

could keep that base. It is a valuable asset. But I also don’t think 

it is a point of leverage to the point that we just mindlessly say, 

‘‘Well, we are just going to keep doing this because we are doing 

it right now,’’ and it keeps a gun to our head. And I think, unless 

you sort of push the Pentagon or the State Department to at least 

start creatively thinking about alternatives, the answer you will always get from any administration is, ‘‘We have zero leverage here, 

we need this space,’’ which is isn’t actually the case. So that would 

be another area which would also I think send an interesting——

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Issa. 

And now we turn to Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you to our witnesses for your testimony. 

Dr. Levitt, I just want to just start with you. You served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and so you understand the 

critical role that our agencies play in advancing and implementing 

U.S. foreign policy, and as I am hearing your testimony, it just reminds me how disturbing it is and how much more complicated it 

is that this administration has not only called for a 30-percent cut 

in funding to the State Department but has left really important 

positions vacant and without nominees. At a moment that we are 

trying to manage this crisis and this very serious conflict in the 

Middle East, we are still waiting on nominees for the Assistant 

Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and USAID Assistant Administrator for the Middle East, and at a time when terror groups continue to talk about efforts to pursue weapons of mass destruction, 

it is really baffling to me that we would leave vacant the position 

of Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. I 

take it you all are equally mystified by that? 

Mr. LEVITT. It would be much better if we had these positions 

filled. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Great. Thank you. 

I want to first talk about Turkey. One of the demands on Qatar 

has been to close the Turkish military base located in Qatar, and 

Turkey has responded, of course, by bolstering its military presence 

as a strong show of support. And my question really is, is this a 

real demand? What is the purpose of it? And what would be the 

implications if this base closed? 

Mr. SCHANZER. I will let Ilan speak in a sec, but what I would 

just say is you have to understand: We talk about the politics of 

this region, and overall, these countries are upset with Qatar for 

its financing of Muslim Brotherhood groups across the Arab world. 

70

And they see it as a challenge to their view of the region, in which 

they would like to maintain something of the status quo. The 

Turks have been strategic partners with the Qataris. There is no 

question about it. And so they see this as doubling down on that 

sort of Muslim Brotherhood Axis, if you will, and so they see it as 

a threat. I don’t think they want to open up another front on this. 

I think they are focusing on Qatar for a reason, but when you 

speak to representatives of these countries, they will tell you that 

they see the Turks as perhaps second in line in terms of a challenge to the regional order that they seek. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And is your assessment that this has pushed 

Qatar closer to Turkey, this blockade? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Oh, they didn’t need to be any closer. They were 

already strategic partners, but now I think—I mean, as I see it 

right now, Qatar has very few friends, so they have reached out to 

the Turks, and they have drawn closer to the Turks. And alarmingly, they also appear to have drawn closer to the Iranians, which 

is one of the things that Qatar’s adversaries were warning about 

in the first place. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Congressman, if I can add one point on Turkey, there was this initial list of 13 demands by the countries that 

implemented the blockade. That list has since been narrowed down 

to six and was last week in a statement that they put out, and the 

Turkish base is no longer on that list of demands. And so I think 

that the Turkey issue is an issue for them precisely for the reasons 

that Jonathan talked about, but it is, I think, a lesser priority for 

them than some of the issues on counterterror financing, their concerns about whether Qatar’s meddling in their own internal affairs, 

which they consistently talk about Al Jazeera, things like that I 

think really what they care alot more about than the Turkey issue. 

And on Iran, I would only add I think it is true that, yeah, Qatar 

has a more accommodationist approach than some of the other Gulf 

states, but I think there is a real mix across the Gulf on Iran that 

is important to recognize. The GCC—if anything, we have learned 

from this crisis, the GCC is not homogeneous. The Saudis take the 

hardest line on Iran. Even within the UAE, Abu Dhabi takes a 

hard line; Dubai much less so in terms of trade. So, you know, I 

do think there is this diversity of views. Oman obviously played a 

very different role on Iran, more as a mediator, particularly during 

the nuclear talks. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I would like to follow up on Iran. The Qataris 

have obviously been trying to counter Iran’s strategically while at 

the same time trying to kind of continue to maintain a dialogue 

with their Iranian counterparts. What do you think is the rationale 

for that decision and the kind of long-term implications? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. So I think they are a country of 300,000 people, as we have talked about, and all of their wealth—the majority 

of their wealth comes from this huge gas field that they share with 

the Iranians. You know, they own half of it; the Iranians have the 

other half. So this is a reality of geopolitics that they are living 

with, and you are never going to get them to, I think, pull away 

completely. 

At the same time, at least my engagement with Qatari Government officials, you don’t hear a lot of love for the Iranians necVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
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essarily. You do hear some angst, but they are not going to take 

a hard-line approach like the Saudis. I just don’t think they can afford to, given like the position that they are in. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I would agree with that. I think a lot of this is 

driven by the Qatari need for survival. But I have heard from some 

of our friends in the region in recent months a concern that the 

Muslim Brotherhood and Iran are not exactly at odds with one another. I think we have this sort of preconceived notion that, because the Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni organization, a Sunni 

network, it is fundamentally at odds with Iran. That has not been 

the case historically. Looking just at Hamas, for example, you have 

this confluence of both Qatari support and Iranian support there, 

so there may be more than meets the eye, and this is, I think, 

something that is worthy of perhaps additional research. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you so much. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and I appreciated 

your insights that you have provided us today. I have got a long 

history in dealing with Qatar and with those other countries. I 

have been here 30 years now, and I worked with the White House 

before I got here. 

And what I—I can’t help but lament that things seem to be going 

in the opposite direction than what we had as a positive potential 

20 and 30 years ago. It really did look like Qatar and some other 

countries in that region were going to go in a more positive direction, and now what we see is basically they are—schizophrenia on 

their part trying to play both sides against all sides, or these people think that they can just juggle. They think they are the world’s 

greatest jugglers in that they can handle both groups of enemies 

and friends. 

So let me ask this: When you talk to the people from Qatar, and 

I have, and they will tell you every time that they—and, again, one 

other—there was one question earlier on this—that they were 

asked to bring in the Taliban, that they were asked to bring in alQaeda and Hezbollah and these various groups, by the United 

States Government. Did—even during the last administration, did 

we indeed ask them to bring in the Taliban and have a greater opportunity for the Taliban to use their area there in Qatar as a base 

of dealing with the world? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. So I didn’t work—I was in the last administration, but I did not work on issues having to do with the Taliban. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Can anyone answer that question? They are 

telling us we asked them to do it. Did we ask them to do it? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. But I do think—I can answer, from my understanding, which is I do think we asked them to do it, but I do think 

it also goes back to this point that part of the reason we asked 

them to do it is because the Taliban were already operating there 

in some form or capacity already. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So there is some verification that perhaps the 

United States Government did ask them to get involved with some 

of these what we consider to be terrorist elements. We know that 

the deal for the Taliban Five leaders, terrorist leaders, were traded 

72

for one traitor to our Government, and which I thought was the 

worst raw deal that we could have ever possibly have gotten, that 

was something our administration did, and it would happen via 

Qatar. 

Now, let me just ask this, and I am going to be very pointed 

here, and, look, the Clinton Foundation has received millions of 

dollars of contributions, we know, from Russian oligarchs. Is there 

any—how much has the Clinton Foundation received from Qatar? 

Do we know of any—or maybe Qatar has not given any money to 

the foundation. Is that right? 

Mr. LEVITT. None of us have those figures, but I just want to correct one thing. There is some debate as to what the United States 

might have asked Qatar to do or not regarding the Taliban, and 

I think it is now clear. They asked Qatar to allow this office to be 

open since the Taliban was already there, but this was not Hamas. 

You had mentioned Hamas. This was not Hezbollah. This was not 

al-Qaeda. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am sorry. I have 1 minute left, and let me 

just note, Madam Chairman——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You have more time. Don’t worry about it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, I think it would be fitting, 

Madam Chairman, that we make a request to find out if Qatar has 

been the source of major donations to the Clinton Foundation, and 

if, indeed, our Government, during the time when Hillary Clinton 

was our Secretary of State, did indeed ask Qatar to permit some 

of these what we consider terrorist organizations into their country. 

This needs to be looked at very closely because we know that the 

Clinton Foundation was certainly in Russia receiving tens of millions of dollars from Russian oligarchs. 

Let’s just note that whether it is al-Qaeda or the Muslim Brotherhood, the jihadists and Hezbollah, Qatar has to make its choice. 

And by the way, just one point that was made here earlier: I do 

not consider the rebuilding of Gaza to be a positive act. If, indeed, 

the Palestinians are shooting rockets into Israel and Israel retaliates, for Qatar just to step forward and to rebuild everything that 

has been destroyed by Israeli retaliation, what we are really doing 

is encouraging the people in Gaza to permit the shooting of rockets 

from their territory into Israel. 

No, the fact is that, if, indeed, Israel is retaliating against an attack, we should not be cleaning up the mess. Those people who actually permitted the attacks in the first place should be paying a 

price for it. Because we don’t want attacks. We want there to be 

peace. This is the two-state solution was supposed to come out of 

this, and instead, the Palestinians ever since then have just been 

shooting rockets and creating terrorist attacks against Israel. Now 

let’s discourage that by not rebuilding their buildings if they have 

been destroyed as a retaliation against this type of terrorist attack 

on Israel. 

Let me just say again, and I agree with this, that this has not 

been a hearing about all the rest of these states. Frankly, I don’t 

find Qatar any worse than our Saudi friends, and there is, again, 

schizophrenia going on there. But we look at the Muslim Brotherhood and the impact that it is having throughout that region, and 

we realize that, both in Qatar and in Saudi Arabia, they embrace 

73

the Muslim Brotherhood philosophy, which has served as basically 

the intellectual foundation for these terrorists, wherever they are, 

whatever you want to call them, al-Qaeda or Hezbollah or jihadists 

or Taliban or whatever we want to call them, ISIL. We need to 

make sure—it is a time of choosing right now that the juggling has 

got to stop, and I would hope that the royal family in Qatar and 

the people of Qatar decide to be our friends because they have that 

choice, but if they continue down this path, they will be deciding 

not to be our friends and decide instead with the Muslim Brotherhood and the terrorists. So I hope that this hearing today sends 

that message. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

And Mr. Schneider is recognized for the same amount of time. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I will apologize in advance, I have a concurrent markup in judiciary. If I jump 

up and leave, it is because I have to go vote. Please don’t take it 

personally. But thank you for your time here for sharing your perspectives, but also for the work you do on this and other important 

issues. 

There is so much here and so much to understand. I think my 

colleagues have touched on some of the intuitive and 

counterintuitive aspects of our relationship with Qatar and the difficulties in fully defining the parameters. I will ask a leading question. Would it be better for us and the region if Hamas, the 

Taliban, al-Qaeda weren’t raising finances in Doha? 

Mr. LEVITT. Yes, it would be better. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Schanzer? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Yes, it would, and it would also be better if they 

didn’t have a presence there that was legitimized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Goldenberg? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And the reason I ask the question is you can 

make lemonade out of lemons. You can find, in a difficult or a bad 

situation, something to pull out of it, but I think what I am hearing 

is a broad consensus that we are looking to the Qataris to end the 

financing of terror in their country and to be a full partner in fighting terrorism in the region. Is that a fair summary? 

Mr. LEVITT. It is, but I think it is just as important to that we 

finish off today by noting that we need the other GCC countries, 

this kind of coalition of four in particular to be flexible and allow 

Qatar some face-saving ways to do this. And so far, they seem to 

be pretty kind of hardline that nothing is good enough. And so we 

absolutely must demand that Qatar make real substantive and 

verifiable change, but in order for that to happen, we are going to 

have to have, you know, honest conversations with our other allies 

in the region and kind of insist that they be flexible enough to find 

a way that Doha can do this, and that is going to have to involve 

some face-saving gestures, and that is okay so long as the changes 

are substantive and verifiable. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. 

And that is where I was trying to get to. So I appreciate that 

sentiment because it is a matter of we have a base in Qatar. It is 

an important base to the work we are trying to do in the region. 

74

The work we are doing is longitudinal. It is not going to be solved 

overnight, and we need to have a long-term strategy. 

Mr. Goldenberg, you referenced and others did, as well, the issue 

that we have options to look at other places besides Qatar to place 

our assets, and to the whole panel, as you look at the region, what 

would be the benefits to us to having a more diverse platform, diversified platform, than just the base in Qatar? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I think there is definitely, Congressman, a 

benefit—there is always a benefit to having more diverse options. 

We have other options in the region. We have options in Central 

Asia. We have a base in the UAE. We have a base in Bahrain. So 

the more options you have, the less leverage any one of these actors has over us. At the same time, I think we would have to do 

a real evaluation because if we lost the base in Qatar, I mean, they 

even invested $1 billion in that base during the nineties. That is 

a ton of money. They do have technology there and sort of runways 

and space and things we don’t necessarily have elsewhere. 

And so I think it would be—and on top of that, if you end up in 

a situation where we lose access to the base, then you also start 

running into questions of not being able to conduct as many operations in Iraq, in Syria, and Afghanistan and elsewhere and also 

a problem where we could bring in a carrier or something like that 

to offset some of those problems, but then you lose the ability to 

do things in the Asia Pacific or in Europe. So it is a very complicated question, but it is worth—it is certainly worth exploring, 

instead of making it just a sacred cow, because whenever you make 

something a sacred cow and it becomes invaluable to you, then you 

have a lot less leverage over everything else. 

One other point, if I can just add on to what Matt was saying, 

which I think is just important to also weigh, I really do think we 

need to focus on getting all of our friends in the region to deescalate this crisis, because you just go back and look at it: You know, 

the President went in May, and the whole conference in Riyadh 

was about ISIS, Islamic extremism, and Iran. And what have we 

been doing for 2 months now with these guys? What is Secretary 

Tillerson doing when he goes out for a week to the GCC? What are 

we talking about here today? We are talking about the fight they 

are having amongst each other. 

You know, if they are spending 90 percent of their time, which 

I have had diplomats telling me, ‘‘I am spending 90 percent of my 

time on this issue,’’ you know, they are not spending time thinking 

about all of the other things we want them to think about and 

what we want to think about. So I think that is a really important 

piece of trying to deescalate this and trying to find a solution, even 

as we push them on the terrorism. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I think that is an important point. 

My last line is, as we are doing that, as we are balancing all 

these different issues, consistency of message on our part, transparency on the part of the Qataris, what is the impact of the divergent message or inconsistent messages coming out of the administration having on our ability to move forward in this region? 

Dr. Schanzer. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I think it is clear that we have a couple of different messages that are coming out. We are hearing, on the one 

75

hand, that this crisis is not an urgent issue for the administration 

and, at the same time, that it is something that we do want to 

have handled. 

I think perhaps some of the actors in the region believe they 

have a free hand to act when they hear parts of the administration 

speak and then perhaps feel more constrained. I think consistency 

is going to be important here. I personally believe that we should 

be sending a message to the Qataris that we demand change. And 

that ought to be the first thing that we say and then to follow up 

with that by saying: And as we demand this change of you, the 

other four actors involved in this crisis can stand down while we 

take over. 

And that I think would be the way to get this to a soft landing 

and perhaps would be one of the face-saving sort of mechanisms 

that Matt discussed here today. But I would like to see more American leadership on this, if possible. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. To use your analogy, though, as well, the Ferrari 

and the other car is also speeding. Is it fair to say that we need 

to have expectations of all of our allies in the region that they are 

addressing the terror issue? 

Mr. SCHANZER. 100 percent. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Okay. Dr. Levitt, to you. 

Mr. LEVITT. I just say, in my conversations with officials of the 

past few weeks, it is very clear that the conflicting messages coming out of the administration are affecting them. I have spoken to 

people on both sides of this intra GCC conflict, and each clearly feel 

that they can listen to the part that is saying what they want to 

hear. I have also been in Europe recently and in conversations with 

counterterrorism officials there, they have been asking me—and I 

am no longer a government official—what does Washington really 

think? And so our allies are confused as to what our position is. 

I think there are other ways that we can do face-saving gestures. 

I think Jonathan is absolutely right. If we play more of a role, 

there is more likelihood that things will move forward. We just 

agreed on a memorandum of understanding with Qatar. Again, 

there is not a lot of meat on the bones of that. That is fine. Let 

this be a mechanism to which we say, through guarantees to us—

and let’s bring others in, the EU others—Qatar is going to make 

the following changes. Qatar has to be willing to agree to make 

those changes and to do it in verifiable ways, and then we can go 

to the Emiratis and the Saudis in particular and say: Hey, this is 

how it is going to be done, and this is what the verification is going 

to look like. 

But the Qataris have to be willing to make those changes and 

to do it in such a way that will be verifiable. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. I see that I am out of time. I appreciate 

the extended time. I do agree we do have to be clear in our expectations, clear in our strategy in working with all our allies in the region. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. Mr. DeSantis of 

Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the chairman. 

76

Dr. Schanzer, how would you describe Qatar’s relationship with 

Iran? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Uneasy. Although also a bit more ambiguous 

than perhaps what has been previously described. Uneasy in the 

sense that they are a small country, they are a weak country, and 

they are looking across the Persian Gulf at a powerful country that 

is on the precipice of a nuclear weapon, and they need to figure out 

a way to get along with this neighbor, especially one where they 

share this natural gas field. 

So that I think explains in general the dynamic, but we have 

been hearing that there could be more cooperation than was previously seen. I mean, this is essentially what the Gulf quartet has 

been alleging against Qatar, that it has been working with the Iranians or perhaps with its proxies. I have heard allegations, not just 

of Hamas, where we know there has been sort of, you know, a cooperation on all fronts, but also potentially Hezbollah, potentially 

the Houthis in Yemen. We have heard these things. There is not 

a lot of evidence yet to prove these things, but it is certainly something worth watching. 

Mr. DESANTIS. There are also reports I think that Qatari money 

has ended up in Iraq with some of the Iranian-backed militia 

groups there? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Correct. 

Mr. DESANTIS. What about the Muslim Brotherhood and the relationship that Qatar has with the Brotherhood? I read your testimony, and you had wrote about some of the people that they 

were—Qatar was really supportive of the Morsi government in 

Egypt after Mubarak was pushed out, but then when General elSisi took over, that Qatar was kind of a haven for some of these 

people, and I have heard reports that some of these really radical 

clerics like Sheikh Qaradawi, who is one of the biggest Muslim 

Brotherhood clerics, is in Qatar. So is that true, a lot of those folks 

who were involved with the Brotherhood government now have refuge in Qatar? 

Mr. SCHANZER. A hundred percent, and in the previous Gulf crisis, there was one 3 years ago, one of the demands of Qatar was 

that they exile some of these Muslim Brotherhood figures, that 

they expel them from the country. But when you look at what the 

Qataris invested in Egypt during that 1 year plus of Morsi rule, it 

was reportedly $18 billion. It was a real significant investment. 

You look their support for various actors in Syria; they were definitely throwing their weight behind the Brotherhood there. In the 

early years of the uprising, the Ennahda Party in Tunisia. Qataris 

are big supporters there. The Muslim Brotherhood in Libya. It is 

I think at this point undeniable that the Qataris are the number 

one supporter financially and politically of the Muslim Brotherhood 

in the Muslim world. I think Turkey is probably number two, not 

as much financially but more politically, although perhaps a bit of 

both. But this is really the cornerstone of the debate as I see it between Qatar and its neighbors, that the neighbors are furious because they do not want to see the Muslim Brotherhood come to 

power, and they believe that the Qataris have continued to finance 

and support the Brotherhood in many theaters. 

77

Mr. DESANTIS. So what is their reason for doing that? I mean, 

there it is a very wealthy country, the—I mean, just the royal family, huge wealth. Is it just idealogically that is what they want to 

do because it seems like it has caused them a lot of problems in 

the region. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I agree it has caused them problems, and I would 

say that, at this point, when you look at what has happened 

throughout this crisis, it looks like a gamble that has not paid off, 

and I think many of the other gambles throughout the Arab 

Spring, it looks like a lot of money has effectively gone to waste, 

but they see this as their leverage, a counterleverage to their Gulf 

neighbors with whom they have a pretty significant rivalry, and it 

is their way of I think punching above their weight, as Matt had 

mentioned, and so they continue to pursue this. 

I think there is certainly an ideological approach here, though, 

as well. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I am sorry. I actually have run out of time, but 

do you guys have any insights into the Brotherhood relationship, 

or did he cover everything? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I mean, I think, as Jonathan described, there 

is this relationship. It is a long historical relationship. I think—you 

know, I am more skeptical about how much of it is ideological and 

how much of it is more just geopolitical playing, you know, the 

Qatari overall third way. You know, if it was really deeply ideological, why would they also build a strong relationship with us at the 

same time? To me, it is more of like they don’t want to play the 

same role, they don’t want to just follow the Saudis, they want to 

be an independent actor in the Gulf. So they are going to just pursue an open-door policy that welcomes all kinds of different players, some of which we can work with, including ourselves, some of 

which are a huge problem. And so that is the motivation. It doesn’t 

necessarily explain the behavior which—or excuse the behavior, 

which I think, again, sometimes they can be useful to us on some 

of these things, but a lot of times, we need to press them harder 

to stop. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I am out of time, and I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. DeSantis. 

Sheila? And now we are so pleased that two members who are 

not on our subcommittee, but I know that they are very interested 

in this issue, and I am very pleased to yield to them, and we will 

start with Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the chairwoman for her leadership and the ranking member for their leadership of this committee 

and the important testimony that has been given by the witnesses. 

I am in the same predicament. Though I have been able to listen 

to the testimony for a while, I am in the markup and may be called 

to a vote as I speak. But I will rush very quickly to thank the witnesses. 

But I really want to speak to Mr. Goldenberg, if I might. I notice 

that the title of the hearing is ‘‘Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship,’’ which I think is extremely important. So, if you might bear 

with me, I am going to ask questions more or less in a lawyerly 

factor. 

78

Would you indicate or confirm that—and I am just going to go 

back as far as the Clinton administration, the Bush administration 

and Obama—in those administrations, would you venture to say 

that Qatar engaged positively with the United States in Bill Clinton? I am just going to get you, yes or no. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. George W. Bush? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And President Obama? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So, if you just wanted a blanket assessment, 

that was a positive relationship between the United States and 

Qatar on some of the issues they were discussing? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I would say yes. I would say that they are—

you know, look I think, Congresswoman, I think that we have a 

good relationship with them on a number of issues, the most important I think being the air base, but beyond that, you know, 

when we ask them to do things, they often do them. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And let me—forgive me, I am called to a vote. 

During the Bush administration, do you have a recollection or by 

news or your research that then Secretary of State asked them to 

engage with Hamas? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I don’t know, but one of my colleagues might 

know better than me. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. So you mentioned or in the discussion, 

we have mentioned that the region is an important region. I, from 

the lawyer’s perspective, say that none of them in the court of equity are there with totally clean hands, and I would offer to say 

that stability is important. Security is important. And in your testimony, I would like you to repeat what you said about engaging so 

that we can encourage the stability—I understand the list has now 

been in essence pared down to about six of the demands, but how 

would it be best for us to effectuate that engagement where all of 

the parties recognize that there are elements of their policy dealing 

with terrorists that should be eliminated? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Sure. I mean, I think that the most important 

thing—and Matt’s brought this up a couple times during the hearing, this question of the MOU being a good starting point. Setting 

one bar for everyone to meet on the question of terror financing 

would be, I think, very valuable because there is—the Kuwaitis are 

a problem. The Qataris are a problem. Maybe the Saudis are getting better, but there is a long history there and a long way to go. 

The UAE has also had its issues. And so holding them all and saying the United States will hold them all to one standard and applying that standard across all of them I think becomes beneficiary to 

us in terms of dealing with the overall challenge and also helps to 

alleviate this crisis amongst them. And then I think also just in 

terms of dealing with stability and dealing with the region, it is 

really hammering home the point that we are not going to want to 

like want to spend all of our time dealing with this internecine conflict that they have amongst themselves. It is time to get back to 

the bigger issues that threaten their stability and threaten our stability, you know, the things that really draw us into the region, and 

whether that is ISIS, you know, extremism, you know, some of the 

79

things that Iran does in the region that are problematic, but that 

is where I would really like to see the relationship——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So any interjection by Congress for placing 

punitive measures on one of the other, in this instance, maybe 

Qatar, would you view that as a positive act? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I wouldn’t recommend doing that. I would recommend having a standard that Congress applies to everyone 

across the board. And Qatar might—you know, as Jonathan said, 

you know, that analogy, Qatar might have the fastest—you know, 

might be the 90 miles per hour Ferrari, and so they are going to 

have longer to go. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And let me follow-up with, I think, almost 

concluding question. Emboldening one over the other, I happened 

to have been in the region during the visit of the administration, 

and meeting with, at that time, the President of Egypt and discussing these issues. I have a very strong commitment to the region for its security relationship to Israel, which we want to ensure 

their safety. And would you make the argument that, as you just 

said, focusing our attention on the larger picture, and trying to ensure the stability of the region by way of setting a certain standard, would that be helpful in terms of making sure the region remains stable for other big fights, and, also, the security of Israel? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yeah, I think it would, and I think also, Congresswoman, you mention the issue of emboldening. I do think 

that—you know, we made a mistake by essentially signaling a 

green light and a blank check to the Saudis with the President’s 

visit to the region, and basically led them to believe that there was 

nothing they could do wrong, so they did this. Where the stronger 

message I think would have been, you know, we will take a tougher stance on the issues you care about, whether it is Iran—or I 

would not advocate for walking away from the nuclear deal. I think 

we should stick to the nuclear deal. But, you know, you want to 

take a harder stance toward Iran’s behavior in the region, you 

want us to do more on counterterrorism, we will do that, but we 

also expect you to clean up some of your act. And we have expectations of you. This isn’t a blank check. This is a quid pro quo or an 

agreement between a relationship between two partners. And so I 

think that was part of the problem out of that trip. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the chairlady——

Thank you all for your testimony. Forgive me for my focused 

questioning. But let me thank of the chairlady for her kindness. 

And I like the blank-check analysis that we should not give, and 

that we should work together for harmony—I like that word as 

well—in the region. I thank you so very much, and I yield back to 

the gentlelady. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We are thrilled that you were 

able to join us. 

And Mrs. Maloney, if you could hold your fire for a just few minutes, because Mr. Connolly, who is on our subcommittee, is back 

with us, so we are going to yield time to him right now. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr.—Dr. Schanzer, when you were—in your opening statement, 

you made some allusion to—a reference to maybe paid lobbyists for 

80

governments in the region had descended on our offices or paid a 

visit. I am not sure I understood the point of that, or what you 

were getting at, but I wanted to give you an opportunity to explain. 

Because, I mean, there are a lots of lobbyists, for lots of countries, 

including Israel, that descend on our offices, and we don’t necessarily import to that anything negative by way of inference. Were 

you suggesting——

Mr. SCHANZER. No, Congressman Connolly. There is nothing illegal or unseemly about it. I think the point that I am trying to 

make is that there is a lot of it right now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That what? 

Mr. SCHANZER. There is a lot of it right now. There is a lot of 

noise. We are seeing a lot of different actors. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am sorry, because I only have—do you mean 

about Oman—excuse me, Qatar? 

Mr. SCHANZER. About this Qatar conflict. But I think in general, 

when we look at the permissive nature of what we have allowed 

to take place across this region, in my view, it has been the direct 

result of yielding to these actors. In other words, over time, this 

has become sort of the boiling frog, although I heard the other say 

that actually is not scientific, that frogs actually can be boiled. 

They won’t jump out. 

But regardless, what I would say is that over time, we have come 

to just accept the fact that there are terror financiers running 

around in Qatar, that there are terror financiers running around 

in Kuwait, and we are being asked to look the other way. And over 

time, we have grown used to this because they have engaged with 

us on deals to buy weapons, on investments here in the United 

States, and because they have a face here in Washington. And 

what I would like to do is to try to look beyond the messaging and 

get back to the facts here, which is that we have problematic relations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. But could it not also be because we also 

have bases? Could we have troops stationed there? And we have 

the largest base in the region in Qatar? 

Mr. SCHANZER. We do. And the question——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I mean, maybe we have conflicting interests here. 

I am not testifying to that behavior, but it is not a simple matter 

of paid lobbyists who are influencing us here, there is a lot of 

money flowing around. It is because, actually, we are looking at 

U.S. interest in the region, and we see a conflict. 

Mr. SCHANZER. But I would actually argue in response to that 

that one of the reasons why we have been able to keep the base, 

or how the Qataris have been able to keep that base, is that we 

continue to hear, Well, gosh, they are doing all these wonderful 

things, and they are helping us out. So, you know, we will deal 

with this terror finance problem quietly over here. Let’s not deal 

with it. Now, look 10 years later, and we still have this problem. 

We now have a full-blown crisis. 

My argument is, is that we have not dealt honestly with the 

problem of terrorism finance in Qatar for a long time, and I would 

argue that we probably haven’t dealt honestly with the terror finance problems of some of those other countries as well. 

81

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah, I—I mean, if we are going to go that route, 

I would add to your list. I mean, I would add the Saudis, financing 

Wahhabism and madrassahs all over the world that have fomented 

enormous amounts of terrorism and extremism, one can argue. 

Okay. 

Mr. Goldenberg, you talked about the conflicting messages from 

the President and Secretary of State with respect to this conflict. 

And I have to agree with you. I am just wondering, adding to that, 

like, what is the policy? And should we be doing it by tweet? Different. But how about the State Department, only two of 22 Assistant Secretaries even nominated, the Ambassador in Doha resigning 

and arguing because increasingly, it is difficult to wake up overseas 

and try to explain what the hell is going on in Washington, DC, 

and what it means as the Ambassador. And of course, a proposed 

32 percent cut to State and aid, just spitballing here, could that 

have something to do with our inability to effect some kind of understanding and agreement and reconciliation among the GCC? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Well, I will say this: Yes, I think it is a huge 

problem that you have all these vacancies. And it is a good example of the fact that Secretary Tillerson had to go over there on his 

own for 4 days. 

I am not sure I would have recommended that. I don’t think this 

issue necessarily merits that, unless you actually think you are 

going to have some agreement, or unless you are going to have 

some kind of a breakthrough. And it is very obvious to those of us 

watching it, that you weren’t going to have an agreement. 

So I do think that in a situation like that, who else do you send, 

though? You pretty much have nobody, especially the Assistant 

Secretary. As you know, somebody who worked for the State Department for a number of years. 

You know, in every department and in every agency, and I have 

worked in a couple, there is that key level in the middle, that the 

individual who is senior enough to be able to reach up to the Secretary of State and, like, get in front of them immediately and inform them, and still close enough for the worker bees and the people working, and the experts in the agency who can reach down 

and pull in. 

At the State Department, those are the Assistant Secretaries. 

They are the key, in my view, node. And the fact that they don’t 

exist means there is no connectivity between the entire Department and the expertise and the Secretary. 

So, yes, I think it harms us on this issue, and pretty much all 

issues. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And, Madam Chairman, Lois Frankel had a 

question. If I could ask it on her behalf and that way——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, we would be honored to have you ask 

it on her behalf. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. We shave 5 minutes, you know? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Please go ahead. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. 

So Lois’ question, Ms. Frankel’s question, and I will put it to you 

first, Mr. Goldenberg: Would the removal of our military base give 

license to or make worse the behavior in question? 

82

Mr. GOLDENBERG. It is an interesting question. I hadn’t thought 

about it precisely that way. 

It may. I think the—I think the bigger challenge logistically 

would be that if we were to remove the military base, we—it would, 

first of all, be incredibly costly. The Qataris spent $1 million on 

that base. Yet, look at what the alternatives are. It would then 

strain our ability to conduct operations, the same tempo in Iraq, 

Afghanistan——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don’t think that is the question. I think the 

question is——

Mr. GOLDENBERG. By leverage. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. Implied here, by having the military 

base in Qatar, does it moderate behavior? Would it be worse without it, assuming there is any bad behavior at all? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Maybe. I mean, I—so yes, but I would argue—

it sort of works both ways. I agree with the notion that if we had 

no relationship—this would basically dramatically shrink our relationship with Qatar, and then reduce our leverage over them. It 

would also reduce their leverage over us, so there is a bit of two 

sides to it. So it is a hard sort of hypothetical to make. 

But I think the better option at this point is now that the military base is there, to not walk away from it for all those reasons. 

But to also clarify that we have other options, so this isn’t a gun 

they could just hold to our head. I think that is where we need to 

be on this question. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Levitt. 

Then my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEVITT. So right now, we often look at the base as too big 

to fail, and we need it so badly that we don’t really use it as much 

leverage, and we need to begin to use it at some leverage. 

If we suddenly woke up tomorrow and there was no base, we 

would lose a lot of leverage, yes, but we would still have plenty of 

areas where we a relationship with Qatar. 

In the best of circumstances, I certainly hope that we don’t move 

the base. But I think Ilan is right, that we should start looking at 

what other options there might be to move some or all of it, not 

because we want to, but just to signal that it is not us who are over 

a barrel by virtue of having the base there, they are not necessarily 

over a barrel either, but it is a relationship. And I don’t think we 

really use it for very much leverage right now. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I would agree that we need the leverage. And 

what I recommend in my written testimony is that we need to do 

an assessment. It is not to say that we need to leave, although I 

think the arrangement is not sustainable. It is not, I think, the 

right message that we should be sending to the rest of the region. 

But this does not have to be binary. We can move some assets out 

of that base because we decide we need to redistribute, and we 

can’t ever rely too much on the Qataris, or we might say, look, we 

can’t move anything. But at the very least—and I think, by the 

way, this hearing is doing a lot of good. The Qataris know right 

now that we are talking about whether or not we should move the 

base, whether we should assess moving the base. This is incredibly 

important. It takes leverage away from them and puts it back in 

our court. 

83

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, on behalf of myself and Congresswoman Frankel. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. We love to hear Lois’ 

voice, even in absentia. 

And now we are so pleased to turn to Mrs. Maloney. Thank you 

for your patience in sitting through the subcommittee to be able 

ask your question. 

Thank you, Carolyn, you are always welcome to be a part of our 

sub. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for allowing me privileges to attend your committee meeting and giving 

me the opportunity to ask a question. 

And thank you for having a hearing on a very important issue, 

which is a top concern to Secretary Tillerson. That is why he personally went to the region, and he has expressed his deep concern 

about peace and security in the region, not only for Americans and 

our base, but also for all of our allies. 

And he publicly expressed his concern that our allies, all of the—

these are all allies of America, and that he is concerned that it—

if it continues, it will break up the Gulf Cooperation Council that 

has been an important area of cooperation with United States and 

our ability to collectively combat ISIS. 

He also has called for the embargo, or the easing of the embargo, 

as it is harmful to the stability of the region, stability of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council, and it is difficult for our base. The embargo 

affects also the American base. 

So his vision, I believe, is a good one, would you say, that we 

should figure out how to work together? We are all allies, and the 

enemy is not each other, but the enemy is ISIS and other terrorist 

activities in the region. Would you agree with Secretary Tillerson, 

Mr. Goldenberg? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Yes, I would. I think that this whole crisis has 

been a distraction from other things we should be dealing with. 

You know, I am not sure I would have put as much into it has he 

has, necessarily, because I think that, you know, part of this is 

these parties have to also solve it themselves, and be responsible 

about that, but we can play I think a very positive role and also 

try to get them to de-escalate and guaranteeing any agreement and 

trying to push all of them in terror financing questions. 

So, you know, I—I agree. For our interests, for the U.S. interests, 

the fact that the last 2 months in the Gulf have been spent on this 

instead of on all the things we prefer to be spending their time on 

is not good. That is the bottom line. So it would be better if we can 

find a way to get over this. 

Sadly, I think right now, there are no indicators in the near term 

that is going to happen, so that we start managing the situation 

and also getting awful these different actors to at least tone down 

their public rhetoric and maximalist demands so that a few months 

from now, after things cool down, maybe privately they can cut 

some deals. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, he has begun focusing on terrorism financing, which, I believe, is a way forward, and I understand that he 

has created certain criteria already for the Gulf nations to cooperate with them. And I hope that they all will. That would be a huge 

84

step forward on allowing access to their financial tracking of where 

money is going, if you crack down on the terrorism financing, then 

you are cracking down on terrorism. 

Are you aware of any agreements that the State Department has 

made with these countries to combat terrorism financing? I was 

told that Qatar has entered into an agreement to share their database, to share their information to combat terrorism financing. Are 

you aware of that? 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. I am, but I think, Matt, you want to——

Mr. LEVITT. Sure. 

Mr. GOLDENBERG. Matt is a real expert on this. 

Mr. LEVITT. So first of all, thank you for your questions. 

I want to start by pointing out that there is complete consensus 

across this table in the need to de-escalate this crisis. And as Ilan 

said, we need to be focusing on the other more important issues. 

Several of us have also said that some of the charges already 

against Qatar are baseless, but some of them are very much 

grounded in truth, and they affect all those other issues. 

Mrs. MALONEY. But my question is, are you aware of agreements, concrete agreements, between Qatar and the United States, 

or Saudi Arabia and the United States, or Bahrain, or the UAE——

Mr. LEVITT. Getting to that. 

Mrs. MALONEY [continuing]. Or any of the countries specifically 

to work together to combat terrorism financing? 

Mr. LEVITT. Yes. So that is what I was getting at. There are 

many agreements. There have been several of them going on for 

years, bilateral and otherwise. There are two new ones. One came 

out of the Riyadh summit, which was the agreement to set up a 

terror finance tracking center, the TFTC. There is no meat on those 

bones yet. If you look at the Treasury statements, they have lots 

of great ideas, I have spoken to some people who wrote those statements; they are aspirational. But there is great foundation there 

upon which we can build. 

And in my previous statements, I have already pointed to that 

as something we can use as a face saving gesture to move forward 

and out of this crisis. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I think that is a great idea, Dr. Levitt. We 

should appeal to all of these countries to join us and combat the 

specifics on how we would fight terrorism financing. 

And I personally want to thank Secretary Tillerson for entering 

in with his entire effort to personally try to solve this. 

We are talking about allies. We need to get together. And I am 

not aware of any other country that wants to host the U.S. military. 

I just recall being invited to leave one country very quickly. We 

were told to leave Saudi Arabia, and I am not aware that any other 

country in the region wants to host a U.S. military. 

Are you aware of any other country that wants us to come in and 

be there, Dr. Levitt? 

Mr. LEVITT. Well, we do have bases in the UAE and Bahrain, so 

it is not like this is the only base we have. And I don’t think the 

base is the ultimate issue. 

If I could just add, there is one other agreement. As you noted, 

Secretary Tillerson signed an MOU, Memorandum of UnderVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:08 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072617\26427 SHIRL
85

standing, with Qatar. This too, there is absolutely no meat on these 

bones, but they are very good bones, and there is more that can 

be built on them. I don’t want people to walk away thinking, now 

there is an MOU, so now we can cooperate. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I think that is a very important issue, Dr. Levitt. 

And what you could do to help us is give us exactly what kind of 

meat should be added to that bone, and then we should present a 

detailed agreement on combating terrorism financing to all of the 

countries in the region and see who will cooperate with us in a specific way. 

I must tell you, it is deeply important to me. I represent the 

great city of New York, and lost 500 friends. We lost 3,000 on that 

day, but literally thousands and thousands more that were exposed 

to the deadly fumes from the terrorist attack. 

So we know that there are efforts to attack New York and other 

cities in our—including this city. We have intelligence on that and 

other cities, and anything we can do with our allies to combat terrorism can save future lives in America and other places. 

And I for one support Secretary Tillerson’s effort to end the crisis. Let’s join hands. Let’s combat terrorism. Let’s combat terrorism 

financing. Because if they can’t finance their activities, they can’t 

attack us. 

I represent a district that just 6 months ago, two bombs went off. 

You ask where did they get the money for the bombs? How did they 

learn how to put them together? Who helped them? So terrorism 

financing is very important, I think, to the world, and especially to 

the United States and especially to New York City, which remains 

the number one terrorist target in the country. 

So I want to thank all of you for your work in combating terrorism financing, and I would welcome any ideas of how we could 

put more strength behind efforts to combat it. And I think that if 

we combat it, we would also strike against the financing of terrorism activities in other countries, which allegedly, I was listening 

to my colleagues and their questioning, were very concerned about, 

and where they are teaching, you know, terrorism and we need to 

stop it. 

My time is way, way over. I want to thank you for being here, 

and thank you for your work, and thank you for everything you 

have done to make the world safer. And thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mrs. Maloney. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Madam Chair, I don’t know if I will have the 

chance to publicly say in your committee meeting how very, very 

sad you have decided to retire and leave us. You have been an incredible leader. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am going to miss all of our colleagues. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Wonderful, your leadership on this committee 

and as chairman of this committee has been extraordinary. First 

woman to head this as the chair. We are very proud of you, Ileana. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mrs. Maloney. Thank you so 

much. And feel free to come back to our subcommittee. You are a 

valuable member. We will make you an ex officio member. Thank 

you. 

I have just one last wrap-up question. I know you gentlemen 

have been testifying for hours now. 

86

But, Dr. Schanzer, this tension has been going on for such a long 

time. Why do you think that its neighbors decided to take action 

only now? Is there something else that you believe precipitated 

this? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Madam Chair, thank you for the question. It is—

it is really one of the questions that I think we all should have 

been asking all along. I think when you talk to most analysts in 

this town, they tell you, Well, they hate each other, it was the 

Brotherhood, it was the Arab Spring. Well, what made this thing 

erupt in the spring? There were some reports that it was, perhaps, 

because the Qataris paid ransom and money went to Shiite militias 

as well as to bad actors in Syria. But there has also been reports 

surfaced recently and there is a little bit of confusion over this. But 

I think it is worth unpacking. 

There is a report from the UAE Ambassador to Russia, he went 

on BBC and claimed the Qataris provided intelligence about 

Emirati and Saudi troop movements in Yemen, and that this led 

directly to the death of dozens of Gulf soldiers in the Yemeni operation. I have also heard from three different sources since then 

that it may not have been al-Qaeda that they shared this information with but rather the Houthis and the Saleh forces in Yemen. 

This would be devastating for Qatar if this were to be true, because, of course, it would mean they were sharing information with 

Iranian proxies, which is an absolute red line for the Gulf States. 

So this allegedly happened in the spring. I have not been able to 

confirm it with a U.S. official. All I can tell you is this is what I 

have been hearing from people who generally know in this town. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you very much. 

And I thank the audience and the witnesses for their patience, 

excellent testimony. You will forgive me that I was gone a little bit 

from the podium. We had our bill up on the floor calling upon Iran 

to release the hostages, the American hostages, who are citizens 

and residents, and we were overwhelmingly approved. So that is 

why I was absent. 

And with that, our subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you to all. 

[Whereupon, at 4:38p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(87)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chai•·man 

July 21,2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the 

Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

http://www. Forei gnA ffai rs.house. gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, July 26, 2017 

2:00p.m. 

Assessing the U.S. -Qatar Relationship 

Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D. 

Senior Vice President 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Matthew Levitt, Ph.D. 

Director and Fromer· Wexler Fellow 

Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Mr. llan Goldenberg 

Senior Fellow and Director 

Middle East Security Program 

Center for a New American Security 

By Direction of the Chairman 
89

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ______ th_e_M._id_lf_le_E_a_st_a_,_d N._or_tl_• Acclfi_ri_ca ______ HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date, ___ .::.O:c71."''2"'61-=1-'-7 ___ ,Room, ___ ~2"-l'-'72:__ __ 

Starting Time 2:16p.m. Ending Time 4:38p.m. 

Recesses[~ L_to _)(_to_) (_to_) (_to __ ) (_to __ ) (_to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Ros-Lehtitten, Rep. Wagner 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session 0 Executive ~sed) Session 0 Televised l..:L.J 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically RecordWJtaped) 0 

Stenographic Record LLJ 

GOP- Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Reps. Issa, Cook, DeSantis, Zeldin, Wagner, Mast, Fitzpatrick 

Dem- Ranking Member Deutch, Reps. Connolly, Cicilline, Frankel, Gabbard, Schneider, Suozzi, Lieu 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an *if they are nat members of fit!/ committee.) 

GOP- Rep. Rohrabacher 

Dem- Rep8. Meeks, Jackson Lee*, Maloney* 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached'! Yes m NoD 

(lf "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submittedfor the record.) 

Statement by Mr. Connolly 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 4:38p.m. 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginiu 

Since the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Doha in 1973, bilateral relations between the United States 

and Qatar have grown to encompass significant security, economic, and diplomatic dimensions. While 

Washington and Doha cooperate closely on many issues such as counterterrorism, the relationship is not 

without tension. The recent diplomatic dispute between some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 

members and Qatar has highlighted some of these concerns, particularly regarding Qatar's financial 

support for terrorist groups. Nonetheless, it is not in the United States' interest for this dispute to 

escalate and risk broader regional instability. 

Following close defense cooperation between the United States and GCC during Operation Desert 

Storm, Washington and Doha signed a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on June 23, 

1992. In December 2013, the two countries renewed the DCA for another ten years. Approximately 

10,000 U.S. forces are currently deployed in Qatar, most of which are based at AI Udeid air base, 

working as part of the Coalition Forward Air Component Command (CFACC). The air field also hosts 

the forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The U.S. military's strategic 

facilities in Qatar were key to Operation Iraqi Freedom and remain critical to Operation Inherent 

Resolve, which is combatting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Qatar has been a large consumer of 

U.S. foreign military sales, including a purchase in November 2016 of up to 72 F-15QA aircraft worth 

more than $21 billion. 

Despite close U.S.-Qatari security relations, on June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, 

Bahrain, and Egypt cut otT diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar, citing Doha's close ties with 

Iran and support for terrorism. The GCC states assert that Qatar continues to support Islamist extremist 

groups in the region, including al-Qaeda, Ham as, the Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood, in violation 

of a series of secret agreements with its Gulf neighbors. The United States has also designated several of 

these groups as foreign terrorist organizations, and has pressured Doha to punish individual terrorist 

financiers and pursue systemic solutions to terror financing originating within its borders. 

This month, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson traveled to the region to attempt to negotiate a resolution to 

the crisis. Rather than helping to broker a solution to this dispute among our GCC partners, President 

Trump has only exacerbated the situation by choosing sides. Trump has stoked regional rivalries and 

inflamed conflict in an already volatile part ofthe world. Criticism of Qatar is valid. They should be 

doing more to combat terrorism. However, uninformed missives that do not take into account the 

location and well-being of 10,000 U.S. service members are reckless and disturbing. I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses regarding how the United States can play a moderating role in the ongoing 

Qatar-GCC dispute and seize opportunities to promote U.S. interests in our relationship with Qatar