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i 

25–048 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–16] 

CRAFTING AN INFORMATION WARFARE 

AND COUNTER–PROPAGANDA STRATEGY 

FOR THE EMERGING SECURITY 

ENVIRONMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 15, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

KEVIN GATES, Professional Staff Member 

LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 13 

Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Chairwoman, 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Armstrong, Matthew, Associate Fellow, King’s Centre for Strategic Communications, King’s College London ........................................................................ 3 

Lumpkin, Michael D., Principal, Neptune ............................................................. 5 

Thomas, Timothy L., Senior Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort 

Leavenworth ......................................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Armstrong, Matthew ........................................................................................ 37 

Lumpkin, Michael D. ........................................................................................ 50 

Stefanik, Hon. Elise M. .................................................................................... 35 

Thomas, Timothy L. ......................................................................................... 62 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 81 

(1) 

CRAFTING AN INFORMATION WARFARE AND COUNTER– 

PROPAGANDA STRATEGY FOR THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 15, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:16 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M. Stefanik 

(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Ms. STEFANIK. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing of the Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the very timely topic of information warfare and 

counter propaganda. Although the subcommittee has met several 

times already in closed classified sessions, today is our first open 

and public hearing. As such, I would like to take a moment to welcome and thank our new and returning subcommittee members. 

Our topic today is incredibly important. Cyber warfare and influence campaigns that are being waged against our country represent a national security challenge of generational proportions. In 

talking about influence campaigns, we too often focus on the digital 

and technical aspects on the internet and social media. While those 

aspects are critical and indeed have served as an accelerant to 

speed up communications and effects, we should remember to take 

a step back and keep in mind that information warfare is about information, not just the medium. And our understanding of this 

form of warfare should also include the psychological, cognitive, 

and cultural aspects of the messages bombarding us from all 

sources. 

I would like to read a quote I recently reviewed. Quote, ‘‘There 

has never been a time in our history when there was so great a 

need for our citizens to be informed and to understand what is happening in the world. The cause of freedom is being challenged 

throughout the world today and propaganda is one of the most 

powerful weapons they have in this struggle. Deceit, distortion, and 

lies are systemically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy,’’ 

end quote. 

Those were the words of President Harry Truman in 1950. He 

spoke of a conflict of ideas that is still occurring today. And, unfortunately, it is a conflict we have largely ignored. I chose this quote 
2 

as a reminder that information warfare and propaganda efforts are 

not new. The tools have changed, but enemy doctrine has not. Information warfare is shaping the international environment. There 

may not be overt and open fighting, but there is certainly open conflict. 

Information warfare is being waged in an aggressive ongoing 

competition over territory, resources, and people in the Crimea, in 

the South China Sea, in Iraq, and in Syria. People are being desensitized to the reality of actions around them, increasing the likelihood of misunderstanding and miscalculation. 

Our core values of truth, democratic principles, and self-determination are under assault. While the Department of Defense 

[DOD] plays a critical role in this form of warfare, it cannot bear 

responsibility alone. Countering adversarial propaganda requires a 

whole-of-government strategy using all instruments of national 

power to harness the authorities, tools, and resources required to 

mitigate and marginalize its harmful effects. With this in mind, the 

National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] last year authorized 

and expanded the mission of the State Department’s Global Engagement Center [GEC] to counter state-sponsored propaganda efforts such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. 

We look forward to continuing to work with the center and the 

Department of Defense this year as we craft an information warfare and counter-propaganda strategy for an emerging security environment. 

Before I turn to the ranking member for his comments, I would 

like to highlight a few questions for our witnesses and members to 

consider as we proceed throughout the hearing. First, do we have 

an adequate strategy for countering the blatant lies and mistruths 

being promulgated by sophisticated nation-state actors that have 

both resources and political will? Second, do we truly understand 

the information warfare and propaganda strategies of our enemies, 

be they state or nonstate actors? And lastly, since the United 

States remains a technological leader and innovator with tremendous creativity, how do we better harness our advantages to 

counter our adversaries? 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. In the future, when the ranking member arrives, 

I will turn to him for his opening statements, but in the meantime, 

I am going to introduce our witnesses. 

We welcome three distinguished witnesses here this afternoon. 

First, the Honorable Matt Armstrong, an associate fellow at the 

King’s Centre for Strategic Communications, King’s College London. Next, the Honorable Michael Lumpkin, formerly an Assistant 

Secretary of Defense and coordinator of the Global Engagement 

Center, now a principal at Neptune Strategies. And finally, Mr. 

Timothy Thomas, a senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies 

Office at Fort Leavenworth, and the author of several books and 

articles on Russian and Chinese information operations [IO] and 

cyber policy, one of which I have here. 

Welcome to all of our witnesses. I would like to remind you that 

your testimony will be included in the record, and we ask that you 

summarize key points from that testimony in 5 minutes or less. We 
3 

will wait for Mr. Langevin’s arrival, but in the meantime, Mr. Armstrong why don’t you go ahead with your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW ARMSTRONG, ASSOCIATE FELLOW, 

KING’S CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS, KING’S 

COLLEGE LONDON 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you. Chairwoman Stefanik, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to speak on information warfare and countering propaganda. 

This is an important conversation as information and informational 

activities create both opportunities and threats to our Nation’s 

physical, societal, and economic security. This is a strategic problem requiring a strategic review of not just the threat, but also of 

our constraints. We may develop good tactics, but any success from 

these will be undone if we fail to get the strategy right, as well as 

properly align our efforts toward our objectives. Be confident that 

our adversaries are doing this realignment and using our doctrine 

and our public writings as their starting point. 

The information domain is not a nuance at the margins, but a 

central facet of international affairs. We have known this for a long 

time, even if we need constant reminding. A 1918 report by the U.S 

Army General Staff recognized that in the, quote, ‘‘strategic equation of war, there are four factors: Combat, economic, political, and 

psychologic, and that the last of these is coequal with the others,’’ 

end quote. 

Today, we refer to this as the DIME model of national power: diplomacy, information, military, economic. A July 1945 report from 

the State Department recognized that the, quote, ‘‘nature of 

present day foreign relations makes it essential for the United 

States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral 

part of the conduct of our foreign affairs.’’ Two years later, a joint 

congressional report elucidated on this point: ‘‘Europe today has 

again become a vast battlefield of ideologies in which words have 

replaced armaments as the active elements of attack and defense,’’ 

end quote. 

Today, as the traditional barriers of influence and disruption are 

obliterated by modern communication and transportation networks, 

the role of information is more important than ever. 

Understanding and elevating the appreciation of the informational or psychological affect of our words and deeds can make for 

more effective, more enduring, and less expensive outcomes. Every 

situation is unique and sometimes you need to put two in the heart 

and one in the mind, but between increasingly transparent battlefields and adversaries intentionally operating below or outside of 

our escalation ladders, we must be more adept in this environment. 

We may call this affair information warfare, but this is too narrow 

and too shallow, and it inhibits appreciating the psychological affects of actions. It also encourages the false concept of a battle of 

narratives as if there is a magic combination of nouns and verbs 

that will win the day. We may use more inclusive labels, like political warfare or hybrid warfare, two terms with subtle yet possibly 

useful distinctions. 

Putting aside the label, we fail to appreciate how the success of 

our adversary’s propaganda supporting their agenda or targeting 
4 

our activities, whether military, economic, or political, often rest on 

our credibility. Its effectiveness is often influenced by the degree to 

which people believe what we say, how much they trust what we 

do, and how the audience perceives the two as consistent and 

aligned. 

Abroad, we face a situation which our adversaries are often perceived as more credible than us as they spotlight, exploit, and often 

outright manufacture gaps between what we say, what we do, and 

our national values. Proof of this is when our adversaries are given 

the benefit of the doubt, while our word is questioned, our actions 

subjected to charges of hypocrisy and aggression. This is magnified 

by failing to understand the local information environments. 

There are several challenges hindering our credibility and the 

ability to be effective in today’s environment. First, our messages 

and actions are generally disunified. We have a competitive advantage in terms of resources, people skills, and scale. Yet our various 

government departments and agencies are organized in such a way 

that makes coordination nearly impossible. 

Beyond the obvious, this includes failing to understand, coordinate, or support programs that may develop and strengthen local 

defenses, even inoculation, against adversarial influence. Lesser 

known examples include fish and wildlife services, helping game 

wardens in Africa, exchange programs, and the U.S. Navy tenders 

helping local harbor masters and mechanics. And then there is the 

damaging divide between defense public affairs and other defense 

information professionals, as well as the segregation of public diplomacy inside the State Department. 

The lack of coordination and bureaucratic cultural divides contribute to our second challenge, which is that our response to adversarial propaganda is almost invariably reactionary. When our 

adversaries explain their actions to the world or make claims about 

us, we find ourselves scrambling to prove them wrong. This keeps 

us on our heels and requires us to overcome the narrative set by 

others. It also means limited consideration of the psychological affect of actions, which the Chinese appear to be overcoming in their 

recent reorganization of their cyberspace operations forces. 

The third challenge is the militarization of our foreign policy. In 

the absence of a clear strategy and organizing principles, the Department of Defense has by default taken the lead in much of our 

foreign policy efforts. The very term ‘‘strategic communication’’ reflects this role as it was born out of the need to fill a gap left by 

the State Department. But placing our military as our primary implement of foreign policy also promotes a perception that we are an 

insecure Nation. 

We have remarkably little relevant experience in combatting the 

political warfare being waged against us. We may imagine that the 

United States Information Agency [USIA] and the Active Measures 

Working Group are guideposts, but they were never intended or fit 

for purpose for this action and they were relatively small and reactionary. Neither is a useful model for proactive and unified defense, 

let alone offense. 

We must change our mind-set about adversarial propaganda and 

subversive actions, especially those carried out below or outside the 

military’s phasing construct. This starts with changing the lan-
5 

guage we use. We need to think and speak in terms of undermining 

adversarial psychological influence which will guide us toward preemptive behavior and messages. We need to think and speak in 

terms of a communication environment which will guide us toward 

a preemptive interactivity that can establish, preserve, and 

strengthen our credibility so that we set the narrative that must 

be displaced by our adversaries. We must think about why adversarial propaganda has traction, and accept that we cannot bomb 

our way to success. We must organize in a way that aligns our efforts for credible, smart, preemptive action and swift, credible, 

trusted reactions. 

In addition to internal reorganizations addressing cultural divides, departments and agencies beyond Department of Defense 

and State bring skills and expertise to this struggle. 

I am thankful that this committee has convened this hearing as 

I am thankful for past amendments from this committee that have 

affected the State Department, but in many ways this discussion 

is happening in a vacuum. Are other committees exercising their 

oversight to inquire about this topic, set priorities, or hold their respective departments and agencies accountable? And we must understand the role of society in our foreign policy and the permeability of our borders and the marketplace of loyalty, which I described elsewhere. There is a vulnerability, not just political support for our efforts, but what might be considered within organizational security parlance as insider threats. Consider Major Nidal 

Hasan, Jihad Jane, and other so-called lone wolves who are inspired often through sympathy or empathy with our adversaries. 

I will close with another quote, this one from 1963: ‘‘Some day, 

this Nation will recognize that global nonmilitary conflict must be 

pursued with the same intensity and preparation as global military 

conflicts.’’ Unfortunately, that day has yet to come, but I hope this 

hearing is the start of setting us on the right path. Continuing to 

get this wrong is a threat to our national security, to our economic 

growth, and to our very standing as a world leader. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this important 

topic. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. Lumpkin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, PRINCIPAL, NEPTUNE 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today as a private citizen in an individual capacity. Thank you very much. 

I trust my experience as a career special operations officer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, and special 

envoy and coordinator at the Global Engagement Center will be 

helpful in providing perspective on the current state of the U.S. 

Government’s [USG’s] strategy, capabilities, and direction in information warfare and counterpropaganda. 

The previous administration and the 114th Congress demonstrated clear commitment to this issue, as evidenced by President 
6 

Obama’s executive order that established the Global Engagement 

Center and the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act that expanded the center’s mission. 

The NDAA expanded the GEC’s mandate to include counter-state 

propaganda, as Chairwoman Stefanik mentioned, and disinformation efforts. This is well beyond the original charter which limited 

it to diminishing the influence of terrorist organizations such as 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] in this information domain. This is a big step in the right direction, but the sobering fact 

is that we are still far from where we ultimately need to be to operate in the modern information environment. 

As I said, I am very pleased to be joined by Matt and Tim, two 

of the most experienced people in this space, who I think collectively, we should be able to answer most of this committee’s questions. 

Since the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, which was 

largely—arguably, the last period in history when the U.S. successfully engaged in sustained information warfare and counter-state 

propaganda efforts, technology and how the world communicates 

has drastically changed. We now live in a hyperconnected world 

where the flow of information moves in real time. The lines of authority and effort between public diplomacy, public affairs, and information warfare have blurred to the point where, in many cases, 

information is consumed by U.S. and foreign audiences at the same 

time via the same means. 

To illustrate this fact, as this committee is aware, it was a 33- 

year-old IT [information technology] consultant in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that first reported the U.S. military raid against Osama bin 

Laden in 2011 on Twitter. This happened as events were still unfolding on the ground and hours before the American people were 

officially notified by the President of the United States address. 

While the means and methods of communication have transformed significantly over the past decade, much of the U.S. Government thinking on shaping and responding in the information environment has remained largely unchanged, to include how we manage U.S. Government information dissemination and how we respond to the information of our adversaries. We are cognitively 

hamstrung for a myriad of reasons, to include lack of accountability 

and oversight, bureaucracy resulting in insufficient levels of resourcing, and inability to absorb cutting-edge information and analytic tools, and access to highly skilled personnel. This while our 

adversaries are increasing investment in the information environment, while not being constrained by ethics, the law, or even the 

truth. 

The good news is that we have good people working this effort. 

The workforce is committed and passionate and recognize why this 

is important and why we as a nation need to get it right. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lumpkin can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Lumpkin. 

I now recognize Mr. Thomas. 
7 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY L. THOMAS, SENIOR ANALYST, 

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE, FORT LEAVENWORTH 

Mr. THOMAS. Chairwoman Stefanik, distinguished members of 

the House Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to talk 

about Russian concepts and capabilities for information warfare. 

By way of disclaimer, while I work for the Department of the 

Army as a senior analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, 

which does unclassified work, I am appearing today in my capacity 

as a subject matter expert and not as a person who can speak in 

an official capacity about Army or defense policy. As such, the 

views I express today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the 

views of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense. 

Russia’s information warfare approach is holistic. It is focused 

not only on media and propaganda, but on information technologies 

that fit weaponry as well. Ever since the 1990s, Russia has divided 

its information warfare concepts into two parts: Information technical and information psychological. Social media and cyber have 

tended to blend the two and caused a significant change in how 

Russia views the emerging trends in the character of warfare. 

First, they note that nonmilitary activities, such as media use or 

information deterrence capabilities, are being used more often, they 

say by a ratio of four to one, than military ones. 

And second, they note that information technologies reduce distance and make remote engagement, whether it be by international 

media, infiltration abroad, or the use of high-tech weapons to be 

considered as a principal tactic or means. 

Forecasts are made after these trends are studied that reflect 

how conflict might unfold, which appears to be the general staff’s 

development of a new type warfare scenario, the diagram of which 

was part of the written testimony. This new type warfare includes 

disorienting a victim state’s leadership, creating dissatisfaction in 

the populace, intensifying diplomatic pressure and propaganda, applying cyber attacks and software effects, covertly deploying special 

forces, and using weapons based on either new physical principles, 

robotics, or other issues. 

After trends and forecasts are made, a military strategy encompassing all aspects of military and state activity is established to 

take advantage of the forecast. An information strategy, according 

to one Russian source, is a state’s use of information technologies 

and effects to attain information superiority over competitors in 

several areas. Evolving science and technology developments potentially alter the correlation of information-based forces along strategic sectors or in space. 

Finally, forms and methods of employing the strategy are developed. The chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov has 

stated often that the production of new forms and methods of warfare is an urgent task for military academies to develop. A form is 

an organization which in regard to information warfare could include international media elements such as Russia Today [RT] or 

Sputnik, or military developments, such as the creation of science 

companies or information operation forces. 

These forms or organizations implement methods. Methods are 

composed of two parts: Weaponry and military art. Weaponry can 
8 

include hackers, reflexive control techniques, trolls, disinformation, 

deterrence capabilities, and other agents of destruction or influence. Military art includes the use of indirect and asymmetric capabilities to achieve specific goals, such as the exploitation of the 

West’s free press or an indirect attack on the cyber infrastructure 

of another nation. Russian’s excellent contingent of algorithm writers ensures that the nation will be strong for years to come in writing software as weapons that could eavesdrop, persuade, or destroy. 

To summarize, the effort is holistic, it follows trends, makes forecasts, strategies, and force correlations, and develops forms and 

methods to implement the strategy. 

I thank you for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Thomas. 

My question, I actually would like to start with you in regards 

to your testimony. When it comes to Russian propaganda and disinformation activities against NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the EU [European Union], how damaging are their 

propaganda campaign against these organizations? And what impact is that having on U.S. national security and economic ties to 

Europe? And then the second part of my question is, knowing that 

I would like to focus on Russian propaganda dealing with NATO 

and the EU, can you also add another layer, you referenced the exploitation of the Western free press, how is that a part of their 

broader propaganda strategies? 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you. The first part of your question with regard to propaganda, propaganda is usually associated with emotional content. It varies from what you might call the disinformation aspect, which is designed to focus more on the logic of decision 

making. So what you will have as a combination of these two, the 

emotional aspect is aimed, I believe, more at the population of the 

country, whereas the disinformation aspect is aimed more at decision makers within the EU or NATO. The final goal would be, 

clearly, to disrupt or destroy the relationships among NATO and 

members of the EU. 

The second part of your question which addressed Western 

thought and how Russia might take advantage of it, back in 1946, 

George Kennan noted that Russians do not believe in objective 

truth. If you fast forward ahead to about 2014, and you listen to 

some of their commentators, like Dmitry Kiselyov, Kiselyov noted 

that objectivity is a myth being imposed upon us. So what you have 

within the Russian information domain, if you want to call it that, 

is no real truth. You just have the ability to create an alternate reality, which doesn’t coincide at all with the Western understanding 

of information in a free press. 

Perhaps the best example of that was the downing of the Malaysia airliner. Immediately, we had our own understanding of what 

had happened. We had the intercepts. We had the images of the 

air defense platform leaving the area, yet for the next 3 or 4 years, 

we listened incessantly to Russian alternate views of what had 

happened, with the last one coming the day before the Netherlands 

released their report. They attempted to create an alternate reality. 
9 

This seems to be the focus of the propaganda effort there as they 

study us and they study audience behavior. 

Thank you. 

Ms. STEFANIK. I want to broaden my followup to Mr. Armstrong 

and Mr. Lumpkin. So what strategies do we need to pursue to 

counterbalance the example that Mr. Thomas just laid out? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think we need to do—because we can develop 

strategies, we have to have a strategy for respective countries. One 

thing that I have learned in my time is that like all politics is local, 

all messaging is local as well. So a strategy that works for Russia, 

for example, countering their disinformation propaganda efforts, 

may or may not work in another nation, but each one has to be tailored. For example, if you were going to do counter-propaganda disinformation against Russia, you would want it to have a different 

strategy, for example, with Iran or any other nations that we were 

going to work with. And it is not just a nation-state issue; it is also 

true against violent extremist groups as well. 

So I think the key is you have to understand the audience, have 

clear goals set out of what you want to achieve, and then develop 

a strategy that is unique to that particular audience. 

Ms. STEFANIK. And that is something that Russia does, unfortunately, effectively. They have country-specific strategies when it 

comes to their disinformation and propaganda. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Absolutely. And I do believe that we have to think 

about information in the same way when you are going against 

other nation-states’ efforts. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So to add to Michael’s comments, we need to 

understand the local information environment. I think one of the 

problems we suffer is that we mirror-image. We pretend that the 

local audiences know what we know, that they have the same access to the information, and that is simply often not the case. We 

have to pay attention that the Russians will make fake—not just 

deliver fake stories, whether it is a rape or some other abhorrent 

action to spur up local concerns and issues, but they will put fake 

experts on the air and they will create fake groups. 

So it is one thing for us to come from the outside and probe into 

a country and say, this is what we need to say and what we need 

to do, but we need to help those nations and those markets, if you 

will, understand and be more critical about the information that 

they are getting. 

One of the things that the Russians take advantage of is the lack 

of critical thinking. They don’t want a critical thinker. A critical 

thinker is not the audience for a Russian media product. That is 

why they will throw out three or four, five, six, in the case of 

MH17, eight different stories lines at one time, maybe even within 

the same hour of broadcast, because it will resonate with different 

people in different ways. But they also have a tolerance for failure. 

So they will drop a story line if it is not working or they will drop 

an effort. 

And that is one of the challenges that we have is that we have 

almost zero tolerance for failure. So we delay, we wait until we 

have it perfect, whereas our adversaries are spinning and trying 

and trying and trying until something actually works. So I would 
10 

say we need to partner with local capacity and help develop local 

capacity. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong. 

I now recognize Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank you for 

having this hearing. I think this is really a critical area that we 

spend really too little time and underfund our efforts mightily. 

I was struck when reading through the list of Russian military 

tactics for offensive media campaigns: Lies for the purposes of disinformation; focusing on the negative, which is more readily accepted than the positive; simplification, confirmation, and repetition; 

introducing taboos on categories of news. It sounds to me a lot like 

the 2016 Presidential campaign. 

Now, don’t get me wrong. I do firmly believe, based on all the 

available evidence, that Russia played a heavy hand as well, but 

as we have seen this behavior during the campaign continue in the 

Presidency, I am forced to wonder how much additional damage 

has been self-inflicted. 

So, Mr. Thomas, would you assess that the undermining of public 

confidence in domestic and international institutions, attacks on 

the free press, are all consistent with Russian information warfare 

objectives? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, I think that they are consistent. I think what 

you see when you listen to the Russians, is at home they have 

what I would call an echo chamber in that everything they say is 

being said by the same people over and over. The way they have 

tried to handle their audience vulnerabilities is they have stopped 

allowing surveys like we would have with a Gallup Poll so that 

they can limit vulnerabilities to that audience. Meanwhile, as Matt 

and Michael have said, they are studying the vulnerabilities in 

other countries to the best of their ability to find those—they look 

at the Gallup Polls and find where they might be able to place 

some important information. 

Ms. SPEIER. So if you were to identify what our vulnerabilities 

are as seen by the Russians, what would they be? 

Mr. THOMAS. I don’t think I would be a person who could answer 

that particular question. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do any of you have a comment on that? Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So I think it is really important. I think there 

are some good, obvious examples over in Europe right now. But 

with regard to the United States, I had a conversation with a senior Russian involved in their information activities, and they made 

a comment that there would not be a market in the United States 

for RT if the American media was doing their job. And I think 

there is some legitimacy to that, is that the polarization of our 

news has created some gaps and has—there is an interesting thing 

that RT has done, I believe. Where we perceive a linear spectrum, 

there is a far left and a far right, RT has managed to bend that 

so that they are addressing the far right and the far left simultaneously. 

Now, they are generally on the fringes and it is easy for us to 

overestimate their impact, but their true impact, I think, is their 

seepage of their stories, of their messages, of their questioning that 
11 

gets into our conversations. So I think that’s where we should be 

looking at. But RT is not alone in that space. 

Ms. SPEIER. So Mr. Clapper has suggested, as you pointed out in 

your testimony, re-creation of the USIA, although I guess one of 

you indicated not in its original form. I think that was you, Mr. 

Lumpkin. How would you see an agency that is robust in terms of 

putting out information in localities around the world, what would 

that look like to you? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Just to kind of follow up on my written statement 

is, I do believe that, based upon the complexity of the information 

environment, the numbers of actors and players within the U.S. 

Government, that there is a lot of people working hard, everybody’s 

rowing the boat, not necessarily in the same direction. And I do believe that the creation of the GEC, the Global Engagement Center, 

was a step in the right direction on trying to coordinate, synchronize, and ultimately lead U.S. Government efforts. 

Ms. SPEIER. But you said that, in the end, was suggestive. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yes, and I believe that. Unfortunately, it is too 

mired in the bowels of the bureaucracy that it doesn’t have the 

ability to direct the interagency nor advocate for resourcing. I believe if you elevated an entity to something similar to the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence that could effectively coordinate and direct the interagency, you would be able to garner more 

resources, better synchronize the efforts, and have better endstates over U.S. information efforts against—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. I have 15 seconds, and I have one more question for you, Mr. Lumpkin. Do you believe the hiring freeze is having a deleterious effect on our ability to respond? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think it will. I do believe it will. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. I now recognize Dr. Abraham. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for the 

very sobering testimony. I hope we and the Department of Defense 

take heed. 

It appears that Russia and other state players are—have a lot 

of smoke and mirror-type technology where, unfortunately, we in 

America have to adhere just because of moralistic standards to a 

more rigid structure. 

Mr. Lumpkin, you referenced a particular strategy for a particular state or a particular country. The problem is, as we all 

know, is that now there is a mixture and a menagerie of all these 

states and terrorist organizations that sometimes certainly cloud 

the picture. And I totally agree that, unfortunately, the way our 

laws and somewhat our citizenship, as far as being basic good people, we are restricted somewhat to being more of a reactionary 

than a proactive state. And I think we saw that in the OPM [Office 

of Personnel Management] breach. 

The question I have is why has the USG been unable to unify 

and orient its various interested organizations and capabilities to 

compete in this broader information environment? What is the disconnect there? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I wish I could say that there was one thing that 

was the causal agent, but if we—I have had many jobs in my life. 

The most complicated and complex environment I ever operated in 
12 

was being the special envoy and the coordinator at the Global Engagement Center, because the stakeholders are vast, budgets are 

all over the map, authorities are not aligned with the current environment between public affairs, information operations, and public 

diplomacy and—nor are the efforts. And I think it is, we are at the 

point where we need to take a step back, especially while technology in the world is continuing to advance and become more hyperconnected, to look at how we can effectively do this. 

But I do believe we can have an overarching strategy in organization structure and then come up with substrategies for specific 

countries or groups. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. So do you think maybe the DOD needs a global 

nonkinetic-type coordinator to kind of herd the cats? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Well, I don’t know that it should be DOD that is 

leading the effort, and here is why: Because the information operations efforts are generally focused on title 10, support of military 

objectives. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. And this is much larger than the military. They 

are a key stakeholder and a key component and probably the best 

resourced, but that doesn’t mean that they should be leading the 

effort, because there are limitations to their authorities on how and 

where they can operate. 

Dr. ABRAHAM. That is a little bit unsettling. The next question 

for you again, Mr. Lumpkin. And, Mr. Armstrong, please chime in, 

and Mr. Thomas, if you have comments. 

What do you see as the major challenges for the Department of 

Defense today in conducting information operations and counterpropaganda within the structure that they now have? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think that they continue to have resourcing challenges. Again, lots of good people working on this issue, just not 

enough of them. I think that is one part that they have got as far 

as people. There is the budget levels. As Mr. Armstrong mentions, 

there is also the tolerance for risk. We have to increase our acceptance of a risk and be able to iterate very rapidly when we do a— 

try to come up with a messaging program or strategy and we find 

it not effective, we have to iterate and move very rapidly. We have 

to build agility, which means that most of our work has to be 

underpinned with data analytics. It has to be an analytics-based 

structure, which means we have to have the analytic tools, capabilities, and access to talent that knows how to use them. 

Dr. ABRAHAMS. And other state players, such as Russia, they 

don’t even pay attention to the analytics; they just kind of throw 

them out of the window and say they really don’t exist at all sometimes. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I am sure that is the case, but I would argue that 

because our adversaries have a very high threshold for risk, they 

can get it wrong a lot and still just inundate the airwaves and the 

information space. 

Dr. ABRAHAMS. Anything to add, Mr. Armstrong, right quick? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I do, thank you. So I would rephrase the same 

thing that Mr. Lumpkin said: There is an acceptance of a threat 

that is absent, there is a prioritization that is absent, and there is 

a strategy that is absent. So put another way, the combatant com-
13 

mander or the commander on the ground is going to be more concerned with LOAC, law of armed conflict, rather than the informational or psychological effect of an activity, which means in this 

transparent battlefield environment, the psychological effect of an 

action may be more narrow than what the legal—what the law allows. But yet they will have the lawyer there rather than the psyop 

or information officer there. 

Dr. ABRAHAMS. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Langevin, for his opening statements and then the opportunity to ask questions. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome to our 

witnesses here today. I apologize that I was late. My plane just 

landed a little while ago, and got here as quick as I could. But I 

am sorry I missed your opening statements, but we have your 

statements for the record, and I appreciate your being here today. 

So, Mr. Lumpkin, in particular, it is nice to see you again. Welcome back. And as the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as well as the prior 

special envoy of the Global Engagement Center at the Department 

of State, you certainly have valuable insight. I know that we have 

benefited, the government can benefit from his work to understand 

information operations conducted by our adversaries and improve 

U.S. efforts to counter propaganda and other activities under the 

IO umbrella. 

Our other two witnesses, of course, also bring extraordinary perspectives. Mr. Armstrong was previously with the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors [BBG], and Mr. Thomas has spent his career 

in the IO fields and earned his expertise on Russia through extensive study. So I appreciate your perspectives and taking the time 

to be here today. 

As the witnesses’ robust backgrounds demonstrate, U.S. information operations require what I believe is a whole-of-government approach. This subcommittee has worked tirelessly on U.S. IO policy 

and capabilities over the years, and more recently focused on fine 

tuning our ability to counter propaganda. One such effort is a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2017 that expands the scope of the Global Engagement Center to 

include countering propaganda of nation-state actors, which is the 

focus of today’s hearing. 

Nation-states, like the Russian Federation, use the information 

environment outside of a combat zone in a strategic effort to intimidate, to undermine, and control allies, as well as stymie U.S. objectives. They are doing so in an increasingly aggressive and overt 

manner as evidenced by Russia’s recent acknowledgment of the formation of new IO troops. 

IO is only one component of Russia’s strategy to achieve objectives, but their tactics, their techniques and procedures often executed with complete disregard for international norms have proven 
14 

effective at achieving favorable conditions for their underlying intentions and their motivations. 

The United States is not a nation that will disregard the law or 

compromise basic values. Data collection, analysis, and storage required to inform our own counter-propaganda and information operations writ large, especially outside the combat zone and using 

social media, must continue to comply with domestic and international law. The United States overt messaging must always be 

delivered consistently and maintain a truth and integrity. 

In accordance with our values, we must improve the U.S. Government and our allies’ ability to counter IO of other actors and 

take back the narrative in order to promulgate truth. This effort 

will require us to ask hard questions, such as, is the government 

organized for and prioritizing effective IO? Is the Department of 

State force structure which—I am sorry. Is the Department of Defense force structure, which currently aligns IO capabilities to 

many commands, conducive to effective employment of information 

operations in concert with other interagency efforts outside of an 

area of active hostilities? 

The U.S. must leverage technological advancements and other 

new capabilities in a timely manner. The Department of Defense 

must also be able to effectively employ such capabilities with operational funding authorities that allow for flexibility in an everevolving information environment while still maintaining transparency and oversight of activities. 

Finally, and most importantly, U.S. strategies and military commander objectives for addressing threats must be realistic and holistic. We must leverage all tools at our disposal for disruption, deterrence, and response, while mitigating conflict escalation in the 

development of ever more pernicious techniques for conducting influence campaigns. 

So with that, I will stop there and go to questions. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Yes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. So again, thanks to our witnesses. 

Mr. Lumpkin, if I could, based on your experience in the DOD, 

what role should Cyber Command [CYBERCOM] have in countering IO of nation-state military or nonmilitary actors outside of an 

area of hostilities? And does that change if the IO is being conducted on U.S. soil? And is there more that can be done to leverage 

the capabilities of this command consistent with international and 

other laws? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I believe that CYBERCOM is a key player in this 

space. When you look at—and this is why in the language of the 

2017 National Defense Authorization Act it was critical that it said 

countering—to go against—counter-state propaganda and disinformation efforts. It allowed us to think differently about the problem 

set, to look at this—this isn’t a tit for tat in the information space, 

but rather looking at the entire tools of government that can be applied against this problem set. And I think CYBERCOM is a key 

player in this space. 

Now, I do recognize and appreciate the lines of authority of operating domestically for CYBERCOM, and I respect those lines. But 

that said, it is becoming much more difficult to see where information starts and where it stops. It is very difficult to see whether 
15 

somebody is an American citizen when they are using a computer 

in a nation outside of the United States. There is no passport with 

an IP [internet protocol] address. So as we look to what affects U.S. 

citizens and what affects domestic policy, the lines are very gray 

and very blurred right now. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thomas, you stress in your testimony that Russia perceives 

it is under attack from the West. If the U.S. ramps up its own IO 

and other efforts to counter their indirect warfare activities, how 

do we do so in a manner that decreases the risk of conflict escalation and modern warfare arms race? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, the first—the very first thing that I would be 

thinking of is for us to counter what Russia is doing, you really 

have to understand what they are doing. And what I mean by that 

is the tools that they have, the tools they use are different than 

some other nations, specifically because of their ability to use half 

truths or lies and get away with it, because they have, as we have 

said, an echo chamber that everybody’s kind of on the same page 

when you listen to the evening news. But you have to understand 

what they mean when they say, I am employing information deterrence, when they say I am employing reflexive control, when I am 

using trolls. People really have to understand the lay of the land. 

Probably the best issue you can think of is if two teams are playing basketball and—we are into the Final Four here of March Madness—one team is not practicing against its own offense in practice. 

It is practicing against what the other guy is set up for offense and 

what kind of defense they play. And it is kind of the same way 

with looking at Russian propaganda and disinformation activities. 

You have to understand what it is objectively that sits behind the 

way they do business. It is different than us. And once that is understood, you have a base from which you can then begin to respond. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Okay. And to all of our witnesses, in your opinion, what are the 

most effective capabilities and activities the U.S. can employ to 

deter, disrupt, and counter IO of nation-states, specifically propaganda, for deterrence and disruption? Is it disruption or denial of 

service to our adversary or dissemination of truthful narrative or 

are sanctions outside of the IO space most effective, for example, 

sanctions? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So if—before I answer that question, if I can go 

back to your previous question to Mr. Thomas. I think there is a 

challenge here that we must not be accepting the Russian narrative, that they say that they are perceiving being attacked by the 

West is part of Putin’s game. So I think part of the problem is we 

are too quick to accept their narrative and to undermine that narrative. He is riding a tiger that he has to keep finding an outside 

target for everybody. 

And that leads into the answer to your question. I think that you 

gave several options, and I think the answer is yes, it depends on 

the situation. There is certainly an issue that we have with regard 

to Russia, as well as China, as reciprocity. We permit Russian 

media to operate here freely just as we would because that is our 

principles, those are our principles, and we allow Chinese media to 
16 

operate freely. However, both countries deny our access, either our 

commercial media or our government media. For example, the 

BBG, for Voice of America [VOA], Radio Free Europe, are denied 

access to Russia, and China denies VOA and Radio Free Asia. 

So I think there is an issue of reciprocity, but I also think there 

are elements where there needs to be, if you will, a more cyber— 

or rather a more physical type of attack response to their various 

activities. This is an incursion, it is a digital incursion, but I think 

there are times where a similar response is needed, just as much 

we need to get our message out there and make our statements. 

So the answer would be yes to all. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I agree that all of those are very important and 

need to be an area of focus. I would add one more, if I could. It 

would be leveraging our partners. We have many partners who see 

the Russian threat in particular as existential, as something they 

live with every day. 

Last year, I was in Lithuania and had some opportunity to talk 

to people and to get to understand the problem set and how they 

see the world. They have some very talented people who, frankly, 

there are many folks that are just looking for a little leadership. 

And I think it is one of the things we can do is to work with our 

partners to make sure we help build their capabilities, because this 

is a problem much bigger than just with us here in the United 

States. But I think we can leverage and lean heavily on our allies 

to carry a lot of water for us. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Agreed, agreed. Thank you. Well said. All of you, 

thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And, Mr. Armstrong, you talked about a lot of the issues that I 

had written down, state-owned media versus free press, that 24- 

hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week news cycle where sensationalizing and 

getting it fast is more important to the news channels than getting 

it right. I can’t name a journalist anymore, to be honest with you. 

I think that is a greater threat to our country than any outside influence. 

But with regard to this type of warfare, if you will, it is the exact 

opposite from a strategy standpoint as traditional war from what 

I can tell. I mean, we have always had—a country’s capabilities 

were typically limited by their capacity. Capacity could be money, 

it could be the ability to get food and ammo to your soldiers, it 

could be manpower. Geography in and of itself limits a country’s 

capacities. We are talking about Russia. You know, I don’t think 

Russia has the ability to carry out operations in the Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic States, Syria. I don’t think their economy allows 

them to do that right now. But their economy does allow them to 

create chaos, and then wherever they see the weakest point or the 

cheapest opportunity, if you will, to take advantage of it. 

And so I have two questions, specifically with offense is cheap in 

this type of warfare and defense is expensive. So with that said, 

how do you limit the capacity of your adversary if you are not playing offense? And then two is, do you think that Russia has an end-
17 

game in mind or do you think that their goal is to create chaos and 

then simply take advantage of whatever weak points they see? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you for that question. Starting with your 

second question, yes. I think they have an endgame, and I think 

you answered that. I think it is the chaos to allow them—they 

would prefer to set up bilateral relations. They would prefer their 

adversaries or the other nations, Europe, not just us, to be in turmoil so that they can seed any message they want in there and 

they can get whatever they want to achieve out. 

As far as what is a good defense to an aggressive offense, I think 

this is something where a good offense is a good defense. We are— 

as I said in my testimony, we are on our back feet. We are on our 

heels. We are responsive and reactive. And as the comment I made 

earlier about the Russian media leader, we are creating all sorts 

of opportunities for them. We don’t have a strategy. As I said in 

my testimony, we have a credibility gap, and that creates not just 

a domestic vulnerability but a foreign vulnerability. When we don’t 

have—this has been going on for years. When we don’t have a 

clear, concise strategy and our adversaries are able to exploit that 

or when they manufacture a gap and we are unable to defend that 

and close that gap by exposing the truth, it is a vulnerability. 

So I would go back to my earlier comment that we need to understand that this is a priority. This is asymmetric warfare. This is 

on the cheap. It is an ability to gain your foreign policy objectives 

very easily. As the chairwoman said in her opening statement, that 

this is the ability to reach into another nation very freely, very easily. So I think we need to prioritize this and we need to understand 

that this is a risk. And we can’t, as Mr. Lumpkin said, we cannot 

separate cyber data, as I would call it, and cyber psychological. 

This is a merged environment. 

Mr. SCOTT. So the only way to limit their capacity is for us to 

be on offense, not defense? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, yes. And I would add, undercut their will 

to act in that way. 

Mr. SCOTT. Fair enough. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. If they don’t perceive value, there is no risk, 

there is no cost. So I think part of this too is our lack of strategy 

is we have not established an escalation ladder. We don’t necessarily need to publish that because somebody will come right up 

to it, as they are in hybrid warfare. 

Mr. SCOTT. Someone may publish it for us. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. But we don’t know when it is too much. We 

haven’t decided that. So we don’t know when we are going to react. 

And I think the Russians are a perfect example of a group that is 

willing to keep literally and virtually pushing—— 

Mr. SCOTT. I am down to 20 seconds. Would you agree then that 

they are not going to stop until we stop them? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Agree completely. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the country. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mrs. Murphy. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Thank you all for being here. 

Mr. Lumpkin, you were recently leading the Global Engagement 

Center at the State Department, an organization that was created 
18 

last year to lead and coordinate the Federal Government’s counterpropaganda efforts. In your written testimony and as you have discussed a bit here today, you suggest that the center should be elevated above the assistant secretary level at State in order to give 

the organization more authority to direct the interagency. 

What sort of resources and authorities would it take to elevate 

the center to something akin to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence? And do you have examples of how the current 

interagency structure prevents us from having an effective governmentwide information warfare and counter-propaganda strategy? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. First, I think, let me take the second part of that 

first. What I found as the special envoy and coordinator for Global 

Engagement Center, I had so many peers, so my position was relegated to suggesting action. I had no influence over budgets, how 

they spent their money, where they put their people, and what was 

a priority and what was not. In order for me to—I had a very good 

working relationship and we were able to do a lot based on power 

of personality, and based on me coming directly from the Department of Defense previously. But there are a host of different players in this. You have got USAID [United States Agency for International Development], the regional bureaus at the State Department, you have got the intelligence community [IC], you have 

CYBERCOM, you have many different organizations that have a 

role here to play. And it is just trying to herd those cats to get 

them to actually do what you need to do. That is the problem set 

as far as organization. 

Again, using my analogy, is everybody is rowing the boat really 

hard, just not necessarily in the same direction, which impedes forward progress. 

I do believe there are several ways this could be done. I think 

it is best done through legislation, just as what was done with the 

GEC being codified and expanding its mission set to include the 

counter-state and disinformation efforts. I think that is generally 

the best mechanism to get things changed to be enduring. So that 

would be my first—and also make sure everybody’s got skin in the 

game, which I think is important from a resourcing perspective, 

and not just leaving it up to the executive branch to sort this out, 

because we all own this problem set. 

Mrs. MURPHY. And then my second question is about our efforts 

to counter ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] propaganda 

on the internet and to make it harder for them to recruit online. 

To be successful, this effort requires U.S. personnel, military and 

civilian, with the proper linguistic skills as well as cultural skills 

to be able to understand what they are reading and engage. 

A recent article about the CENTCOM [Central Command] program to counter ISIL’s online propaganda indicated that our efforts 

may not be effective or at least as effective as they could be. I 

raised this issue at a previous hearing with Michael Sheehan, who 

ran NYPD’s [New York Police Department’s] counterterrorism operations. Mr. Sheehan said that the Federal security clearance 

process is the real obstacle, which makes it hard for qualified linguists to get cleared to do this critical work for the Federal Government. He noted that at NYPD, they put their linguists in a box, 

as he put it, so that they could do their work without having access 
19 

to classified information. He suggested the NYPD model could be 

replicated on the Federal level. Would you comment on this idea? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think there is some merit to it. One of the authorities that was granted to the Global Engagement Center was 

access—it is leveraging what they call section 3161, which is a hiring authority, which allowed the GEC to hire people to work in the 

U.S. Government uncompetitively based on their skill sets for a 

limited term. 

For example, it gave me access to folks in Silicon Valley, Madison Avenue, people who were pros in this space, in addition to folks 

who have unique cultural or language capabilities that I could—the 

challenge I always ran into is the security clearance requirement, 

because what I found within the Department of State, it takes 

about the same time to get somebody a top secret access to sensitive compartmented intelligence as it does a confidential clearance. 

So normally it takes about, I am told, a year to 18 months. What 

I was able to do is, one individual, we were able to fast track it, 

we put a lot of pressure on the system, and we did it in 5 months. 

I know it can be done, but that was a one-off. It doesn’t happen 

every time. 

Mrs. MURPHY. And do you think that there is a way to hire some 

of these people and box them in such that they don’t need a clearance? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think it depends on—I think it can be done. It 

is problematic, especially if you are looking in collaborative work 

environments, where—an information space that is very dynamic 

and is moving in real time. It is very hard to go out to a box and 

get somebody’s—it is difficult. 

So, I mean, it is a short-term solution, but it will have long-term 

consequences of not being as productive as it could be. A better option would be to find ways to fast track the security clearance process to bring the right people in to do the mission set that needs 

to be done. 

Mrs. MURPHY. Great. Thank you. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

You know, I think there is consensus that on the tactical level 

America has very effectively engaged the terrorist groups throughout the world. We win the battle on the battlefield, but we really 

haven’t engaged them on the strategic level as effectively as we 

should, namely their narrative of global jihad. 

And I guess my first question is related to the Global Engagement Center. Do you believe that we need to encourage or to make 

sure that the GEC places a greater emphasis on Islamist theology 

and jihadist ideology if it is to effectively counter the propaganda 

success of jihadi groups like ISIS, or is the problem just a lack of 

money? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Well—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Lumpkin, yes, sir—— 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yeah, no, I have looked at this problem set quite 

a bit. And as I look at ISIS, if I look at ISIS and I see how they 
20 

recruit and who they recruit, when they are recruiting from 

abroad, they are generally going after vulnerable populations. 

The way I kind of do the math, is there is about 7 billion, 7.5 

billion people on the planet, okay. At the height of ISIS, there was 

about 30,000 of them, 30,000 people. We know how many people 

have been killed, how many people have been wounded, and how 

many people have defected from the battlefield, plus or minus, 

which leads us to a number between 9,000 and 19,000 that joined 

this organization per year. 

When I simplify it like that and I look at—so we have 7.5 billion 

people being held hostage by 9,000 to 19,000 recruits every year. 

In order to find those people, we have to use scalpel-like messages 

that resonate with those individuals instead of just going after one 

broad of a—Islamic messages, because people join ISIS for different 

reasons. 

The best study I have seen was done by the group called Quantum out of Lebanon, which basically binned those people who 

joined ISIS into nine different bins, everything from death seekers 

to thrill seekers, some are hardcore fundamentalists, some are 

looking for redemption. But each one of those groups, when you understand the recruit and you understand the audience, you have to 

target why they joined, and you have to come up with messaging 

strategies against each and every one of those groups. 

Mr. FRANKS. So do you believe that the challenge is just a lack 

of funding or more specifically focusing on those messages that you 

have cited? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think you have challenges in both. I will tell you, 

in 2015, we—the U.S. Government, did a single kinetic strike 

against a high-value target that cost the U.S. taxpayers—when you 

look at the intelligence gathering before and after the strike was 

about $250 million that had about 2 weeks of difference of impact 

on the battlefield to take out one high-value target. That same year in messaging, we spent about $5.6 million in 

base funding. So we have a discrepancy in where we want to put 

our money. Because I will tell you, I can tell you what your priorities are based on where you put your money and where you put 

your people. And in 2015, we weren’t resourced appropriately. We 

have made huge strides in a short amount of time, but we still 

have a ways to go. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Well, let me shift gears on you here just 

a little bit. 

To combat the Russian hybrid warfare, do we merely need to 

park armored brigade combat teams in Eastern Europe without improving our cyber capabilities or hardening our space assets, in 

order to deter Russia, or do we have to sort of have a mirror effort 

to be able to engage them at and oppose them at every stage of 

their hybrid warfare? 

And that would be Mr. Thomas, I think. 

Mr. THOMAS. Congressman, first of all, this is just my own personal opinion. I don’t think Russia does hybrid war. I know a lot 

of people think they do. 

What we see when we read their press, initially they were doing 

something called new generation war, and that had to do a lot with 

initially pressuring the leaders and then gradually working into a 
21 

regular warfare-type scenario where they deployed special forces 

and then they had more traditional combat. 

That term went away in 2013 and has been replaced by the diagram that I put in the testimony of new type warfare. I think why 

it is important is because that diagram enables you to see a scenario finally, a template of how Russia does envision what a future 

war might look like. 

I certainly understand why many people still ascribe Russian efforts as hybrid, because they, from our definition, it appears that 

way. But as we study them, we tend to look at the Russian version 

because that is our job, you know, we look at what they write all 

the time. But ever since that moment in 2013 or 2015 when this 

template was proposed, they have been using that and the guys 

who talk new generation now talk new type as well. 

So what have they done that would answer your question, they 

tend to—as you know, in this coming year they are going to have 

a big exercise in the western district. They have increased their— 

the number of divisions there; in other words, they have increased 

the correlation of forces there with three new divisions. 

I think that General Hodges and others in Europe are doing 

what they can to offer a counter, let them know that if they did 

try to provoke actions or if they did try to come across the border, 

there would be a deterrent to that activity. 

So I think what we are doing at the moment is absolutely what 

is needed. The question becomes when can both sides start to pull 

back, you know, when can we talk about equal security where we 

both feel secure. And like Michael said, how do we get them out 

of this feeling of this existential situation where everybody, on both 

the Baltic side, they feel like they are being—their survival is 

under threat and the Russians basically feel the same way. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Madam Chair, for an excellent hearing, 

and thank the witnesses. 

Mr. Armstrong, you had mentioned in your answer to, I think, 

Ms. Speier’s question that there are other RTs operating in the 

U.S. Can you describe them, list them? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Sure. Thank you. 

So you have RT, you have Sputnik, you have Ruptly, and then 

I think you have them feeding other entities, Infowars comes to 

mind, where those are echo chambers for those modalities. I would 

suspect that you have a variety of other groups. There was a 

project I was looking at with some colleagues. We were looking at 

VK, VKontakte, the social media site, the Russian social media site 

where American white supremacists were flocking to VK because 

social media sites in the U.S., like Facebook, were kicking them off. 

And what we found was, it appeared that American white supremacists were happily involved in discussions there, and there 

were very Russian, not cloaked but Russian actors in those spaces 

as well. So I think this is another insidious way of spinning or getting into the conversation. So I think besides these larger organizations, there is a lot of stuff that they are doing on the margins. 

Mr. COOPER. Are Chinese efforts in any way comparable to this? 
22 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I think the Chinese are more sophisticated. RT 

is willing to play on the margins and play at the extremes, and 

China is a much more sophisticated actor. They are—I think if you 

want to compare which one lies more, which one distorts the truth 

more, I think RT’s slogan of ‘‘question more’’ fits them because they 

don’t want you to find an answer. They just want you to be confused. 

And CCTV is a much more intellectual and they are trying to 

push the Chinese view, but I think they do tend to be a more professional operation. So I wouldn’t equate them, per se, on the same 

level. I don’t think that either of them are particularly good for the 

American market. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Thomas, I appreciated your detailed knowledge 

of Russian techniques, particularly reflexive control. I think you 

quoted Kennan as saying that the Russians don’t believe in objective truth. Was that from the Long Telegram or some other of 

Kennan’s writings? Do you remember? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, it was. 

Mr. COOPER. How many other countries do you think have leaders that share a similar philosophy of not believing in objective 

truth, whether they articulate that or not? 

Mr. THOMAS. Uh-huh. Well, I do think that that is probably the 

situation in China as well because they are strongly Marxist as 

well, and anytime that you look at what is being taught in the 

schools, especially in the propaganda schools, they are looking, first 

of all, at how do I visualize objective reality, and then subjectively, 

how do I manipulate those factors to my benefit. That basically is 

their definition of strategy, by the way. So we do see that. 

One other thing I could add to what Matt said is that when you 

look at Chinese propaganda in the United States, it is interesting 

that you do see a subtler aspect like Sun Tzu institutes where language is being taught in 39 or so universities. 

And you also see—I remember the last time I stayed at a hotel 

here in Washington. There were two newspapers offered to me in 

the morning, the Washington Post and the China Daily. And when 

you start to see that, you realize that there—in one of the books 

I wrote the Chinese did say point-blank that they needed to take 

over the cultural environment in other countries. And so there is 

an effort underway, with CCTV and others, to more gradually, I 

think, than the Russian version, which is quite dramatic and offensive. 

Mr. COOPER. I don’t know if any of you gentlemen have seen the 

movie ‘‘Occupied.’’ It is a 10-part European series about the takeover of Norway by Russia on energy issues. It was very subtly 

done. I find when I am explaining defense policy to folks back 

home, it is easier if I refer to a movie they might have seen because 

they tend to have such disbelief and they don’t read newspapers. 

So any popular materials you could suggest to us that might help 

average people understand would be very useful. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

We will now go to the second round of questions for those members who want another opportunity. 
23 

My question, I will start with Mr. Lumpkin. Some have advocated for the creation of a U.S. Information Agency 2.0, bringing 

together the technical capabilities of cyber with some of the traditional information and communications component. Is that something that GEC, the Global Engagement Center, can build into? 

What is your opinion on that, having headed the Global Engagement Center, on whether that is a viable proposal? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think that there is merit to a USIA, U.S. Information Agency-like organization. I am loathe for more bureaucracy. 

So what I would like to do is to envision something that is more 

above the bureaucracy that can leverage what is already happening 

in government and get it to work better together and to make sure 

it is fully resourced, both in moneys and people. 

But I do believe that we have significant capability in the U.S. 

Government; we just have to harness it, and, again, do that without creating too much bureaucratic tension or significant expense. 

Ms. STEFANIK. And just to delve a little bit further into that, harnessing the capabilities we have today, can you talk about specific 

steps we can take to continue to mature the Global Engagement 

Center or continue to provide the resourcing that is necessary; and 

then the third piece is making sure that there is interagency communication rather than interagency friction. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think you can do that by elevating the Global 

Engagement Center within the Federal Government and increase 

its authority by doing so. I think that will do that. I do believe that 

there are several other things that can be done. I think having access to key talent, the 3161 hiring authority, which is only through 

the executive order, so if that executive order were to go away, the 

3161 hiring authority would go away as well. 

So—and that authority, because the executive order was only for 

the countering violent extremist mission set, the interpretation is 

that it can only be used for that mission set. So you cannot use the 

3161 hiring authority for the counter-state and disinformation efforts mission set within the Global Engagement Center. 

So I think those are some key things that can be done. The other 

thing of significance is the GEC does not have a dedicated budget 

line. So it was funded largely through public diplomacy dollars, but 

it was up to the discretion of the senior leadership at the State Department on what that budget line would be from year to year. And 

there is a lack of stability in that funding, so it is hard to make 

long-term decisions, and it is also difficult to use that color of 

money, that type of money, that public diplomacy money to build 

partner capacity, to teach our partners and make our partners effective in this space. Because the more they do, the less we have 

to. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Armstrong or Mr. Thomas, do you have comments on that line of questioning? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I do. Thank you. 

The notion of a new USIA I found very difficult to stomach, because as I have written about, USIA was created as a part two of 

a two-part reorganization of government by Eisenhower. And unless we are going to reorganize government, it is going to be really 

difficult to just recreate this thing because it was a simpler commu-
24 

nication environment. It was also a simpler government. We have 

a much more complex space. 

I would echo Mr. Lumpkin’s comments, but I would also add that 

we are ignoring that there is an office in the State Department now 

that I think GEC, in some ways, and its predecessor CSCC [Center 

for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications], was trying to not 

just augment but in a way bypass or replace, and that is the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and its operation the 

Bureau of International Information Programs, which is the true 

legacy of United States Information Agency in that it was a global 

information center. 

It does not have the flexibility either because of authority or 

leadership to do these things, and so CSCC was stood up and I 

think this recent GEC amendment, which originally took shape as 

the Portman-Murphy amendment, which was intentionally bypassing R, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, I think it should 

be a wakeup call that R is not executing within the Department, 

it is marginalized within the Department. It is not executing what 

you need as far as foreign policy and national security. 

And as Mr. Lumpkin just said, even the money within there and 

with the—both the authorities and the leadership, it has been a 

challenge to properly support GEC. 

And what is interesting, and this goes into what Ranking Member Langevin started to—accidentally started to say ‘‘State force 

structure,’’ I think there is a need to dramatically review the State 

Department’s force structure along these lines, because one of the 

realities is that State Department has forward presence everywhere, everywhere. They have local expertise everywhere, and they 

are dramatically underfunded, undersupported. They are not experiencing these type of hearings. They don’t have the same oversight. And, you know, they are out there on the ground utterly 

underfunded, undersupported, and not trained. 

I would like to add too, is that while the Russians are training 

their foreign service in—we can call it next generation warfare or 

we can call it hybrid warfare, but they are training their foreign 

service in this regard. 

And I met with some of their version of FSI [Foreign Service Institute], MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations], and they were citing Frank Hoffman, one of our military 

writers on this, and they were wondering why Frank is so militaristic. But this is their civilian side, and we have no comparable 

support to our foreign service or our foreign ministry. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. That was an interesting perspective. 

And on that, I would ask Mr. Lumpkin if he had anything to add 

to what Mr. Armstrong just had to say about the State Department? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I only have 1 year of experience at the State Department, so my perspective is probably not—it is not as robust as 

my time in the Department of Defense. That said, people who know 

me know that I am not a huge fan of bureaucracy. I am not. I appreciate the need for it to standardize routine tasks. 
25 

I had thought I had seen bureaucracy at the Department of Defense until I got to the State Department. It is much thicker, much 

more ingrained. Wicked smart people, amazingly smart people, but 

I affectionately refer to the State Department as a 19th century bureaucracy using 20th century tools against a 21st century adversary. And we have to do better. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

This is a question for all of our witnesses: How can we better leverage technological advancements to counter IO activities of other 

nations? Specifically, how can the U.S., particularly the Department of Defense, spur innovation and obtain new technological capabilities? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I would like to take that one. There is a lot of— 

especially in the world of analytics, there are tremendous number 

of tools. Last time I looked, there was between 3,400 and 3,800 analytic tools just on social media alone. It is an area of technology 

and science that is emerging every day, that is continuing to advance and to iterate itself. 

What we have to do is to find ways to streamline access to those 

tools so we can get them put on U.S. Government systems. We are 

talking information technology systems, computer software, to get 

those implemented. So we need to fast track or streamline access 

to those because they are changing so fast. 

And the social media environment and the media environment 

writ large is changing so rapidly, what we find ourselves frequently 

doing is putting 2-year-old tools into the workforce because that is 

how long it takes to get approvals to use them in many cases. So 

we have to find and streamline to keep up with technological advancements and leverage those things that can make our workforce 

more productive, more effective, and so we can speed our messaging capabilities. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Can I add to that. I would say, one, we have 

to understand what we want to achieve. I think simply ‘‘stop it’’ is 

inadequate. I think we need to have a broader strategy, and I think 

we need to have a cost. We need to impose a cost on them to continue to conduct these activities, and I don’t see that that is part 

of our process. 

Mr. THOMAS. If I might add just one or two things quickly. Russia has developed what they call science companies. They have got 

about 10 or 11 of them now within the military. Those science companies unite new, young brains with the older guys, and they are 

learning from one another about electronic warfare and programming and these sort of things. 

They also have an advanced research foundation, which is—they 

have created. It is similar to DARPA [Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency]. But they are into all of the things that DARPA 

is and robotics and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] and all of 

these type of issues as well. 

And perhaps most important of all has been the Russian education system. They continue to churn out incredible mathematicians and algorithm writers. And as anyone knows, you know, the 

key to software is in search engines, is algorithms and what it produces. And those are the—there is a high-tech capability there that 

they have invested in for sure. 
26 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Sure. I don’t disagree with that at all. Point well 

taken. 

So this is more of a longer term issue, well short and long term. 

But to all witnesses, so the U.S. has struggled with gauging the effectiveness of our own messaging and other IO efforts. In your 

opinion, how can we improve U.S. ability to measure effectiveness 

of IO activities and overall impact of operations? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. This goes back to the analytic tools I was talking 

about, is to making sure we have access to them and also make 

sure that any strategies we develop and as we move forward especially in the counter-state propaganda and disinformation space is 

that they have to be underpinned with analytics. 

And it is not just assessing whether your message is effective; if 

it is not, is how are you going to change it rapidly, reassessed 

and—and change and change. Because at the speed of information 

it has to constantly be iterated for the consumer to keep up with 

the 24-hour, 7-days-a-week, 365-days-a-year news and information 

cycle that is out there. 

So I think the data is key to both what we do every day and how 

you stay relevant in this space. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. 

I would like to explore for a second the extent to which your 

worlds intersect with liberal arts academics in this country. Like, 

there are lots of theories on social cohesion, social capital, trust in 

the society, things like that. The work of Robert Putnam or anybody like that mean anything to you guys, or is that just—— 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think one of the keys for the Global Engagement 

Center is there is several academic affiliations where you look at— 

because this is about behavior, right, when it is all said and done. 

It is about creating cognitive realities for people, whether it is 

based on logic or it is based on emotion, to change their ultimate 

behavior. So the behavior aspects of this are pretty much everything when it is said and done. 

Mr. COOPER. That is why I am asking the question. He is more 

on the sociology side. On the behavioral economics side there are 

folks like Daniel Kahneman, won the Nobel Prize. There are theorists like Jonathan Haidt wrote the ‘‘Righteous Mind: Why Good 

People Fight Over Politics and Religion.’’ Do you intersect with 

these worlds at all? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. The GEC does, absolutely, and myself as a recovering anthropologist before I actually joined the United States 

Navy many years ago, so I have a deep-seated appreciation for the 

impacts of anthropology, sociology, and the other liberal arts, and 

the effects of what we are trying to actually do, so yes. 

Mr. COOPER. So it’s true that you can’t conduct a public opinion 

poll in Russia or presumably in China? Is that right? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So because they are difficult spaces to get into, 

there is one—I think there were two, but there was one, Levada, 

which was essentially the well-known Russian independent public 

opinion center. If memory serves, there was something that happened that caused relatively recently that they are no longer 
27 

viewed that way, because—so it is difficult to do surveys in Russia. 

And China, I am not sure what our capacity is. 

Mr. COOPER. It seems like an environment in which there is no 

trusted source, and that seems to be increasingly true in this country, like I spoke at Rotary in Nashville this Monday, and I have 

said that, well, 17 U.S. intelligence agencies agreed there was some 

sort of Russian involvement in our election. We don’t know the extent or whether anybody was persuaded, but at least they tried. 

And I got a lot of pushback from Rotarians who said, well, why do 

you believe those guys. Like shouldn’t unanimity among 17 U.S. intelligence agencies mean something to the average patriotic citizen? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So going to your earlier question, I think there 

is a marketplace for loyalty that is evolving here, and there is a 

redefinition of citizenship and national security and nationalism, of 

who do you trust? Where is your alignment? In that particular situation, what I am about to say doesn’t apply, but in the broader 

sense, you can now test drive another identity. 

This goes into your behavioral concepts. You can now test drive 

an identity, and nobody has to know about it. You can reconnect 

with a vast culture that you have no connection. As I mentioned 

in the opening remarks about Jihad Jane, you can have no affiliation, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and decide you want to be part of 

something. 

So there is an element here that is evolving our notion of hyphenates to commas where you can carry multiple identities at once. 

And from a marketing perspective, each one of those is an opportunity for me to subvert you and do something. 

So I think that there is a challenge here that is playing within 

our trust scheme as well, even if it is not an outside actor, but who 

do we trust. I think this goes into the polarization of news. So we 

are continuing to subdivide, and I see nothing that is moving to reverse that pathway right now. 

Mr. COOPER. In the newspaper today, they say that the German 

Government is considering imposing a 50,000 euro fine or something for fake news on the German internet. Do you know of any 

country that has done something like that? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, one, each nation has a different relationship to the news. Our—such an act in our society would be very, 

very difficult. There is a comparable—each of the Baltic States, I 

think, have similar. They have tried—was it Estonia? No, it was 

Latvia that actually shut down Russian TV, and they continued to 

make efforts like that. 

Britain has Ofcom, which is their regulatory for TV broadcast. 

They recently shut down RT’s London U.K. bank account under 

those regulations. Now, that just covers broadcast so it doesn’t 

cover internet. 

So each nation has a different relationship to what news is flowing within their environment, so the answer is, yes, it does pose interesting challenges in various places because it can become a 

propaganda coup against that state. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I see I have used my 

time. Thanks. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Ms. Speier. 
28 

Ms. SPEIER. We just got word that the President has recommended a 28 percent cut in the State Department. 

Mr. COOPER. Thirty seven percent. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, I heard 28, but—and I think there is a belief 

by some that by cutting that and cutting foreign aid that we are 

somehow not impacting our national security. And I think, Mr. 

Thomas, you had commented earlier, and I would like you to explore for us the impacts on national security, cuts to foreign aid 

and information distribution in foreign countries, as anemic as it 

is for us, how that will affect our national security. 

Mr. THOMAS. Congresswoman, I don’t think I can answer that 

question properly. I think I would rather defer to a State Department person. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Mr. Lumpkin. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I think a cut of that magnitude would have devastating consequences on everything from the goodness that the 

State Department does from Fulbright scholarships that help, you 

know, bring people and access people and bring the world closer together and have people understand who we are as a nation and 

what our values are and what we believe. 

I know that on—I just look at, from my time at DOD in conjunction with the State Department, we are not going to kill our way 

to victory. We are not going to message our way to victory. This 

is about having a layered approach to what we do, and you cannot 

cut—make a 37 percent cut to a single department that has such 

a crucial role without having devastating consequences. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. So I think, like Mr. Lumpkin, we would both 

say that the State Department is a dysfunctional place and full of 

bureaucracy. That said, it needs to be revamped rather than massive cuts. Even elements such as exchanges, they historically have 

been part of the United States Government’s efforts to win or engage in the struggle for minds and wills by developing local capacity. 

Getting them to understand—getting the exchange participants 

to understand the United States better is really secondary or even 

tertiary. It is about building local capacity, inoculating against adversarial information or experiences. 

So you add to that various other efforts, even the broader public 

diplomacy realm or the various efforts in global affairs or even 

their elements of counterterrorism or the narcotics, INL [Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs], there are a 

tremendous number of activities there that are operating in a silo. 

And I think they do not just further our foreign policy in the economic sense and societal sense but definitely contribute to developing partner capacity on the ground. 

Ms. SPEIER. I am going to interrupt you for a moment because 

I have only got a minute 30, and I want you each to answer this 

question. I serve on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as does Ms. Stefanik. What message would you want to 

convey to the members of that committee in terms of the Russian 

influence and its potential impacts in this country? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That it is severe, we are underestimating it, 

and there is no cost to the Russians for them doing it. 
29 

Mr. LUMPKIN. And mine would be to reinvest the IC in their capabilities to monitor, detect, and understand what the Russians are 

doing. 

Mr. THOMAS. And I would add that it is probably just unknown 

here just how insidious, if that is the right word, the effort is in 

other countries overseas. I know there was one country in the Baltics who said propaganda and information influence is like carbon 

monoxide. It is colorless, it is odorless, and it comes in and does 

its job. 

And it is a very interesting way to think about how propaganda 

is being used over there, especially in those countries where when 

a TV, a cable package is put together and within that package is 

Russian TV so that those people are getting simply a different 

point of view that is in key areas too, it is along the borders there 

with Russia. So there is much to consider there. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you to all of the members from both sides 

of the aisle for such thoughtful questions. As you can see, there is 

an increased interest in these important issues. 

I want to also thank our witnesses, Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Lumpkin, and Mr. Thomas. We look forward to continuing working with 

you as we begin the process of this year’s NDAA, and thank you 

very much for your testimony today. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 15, 2017 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2017 

(81) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. If we are to take seriously the threat posed by Russian, Chinese, and 

jihadi information operations seriously, is the GEC the appropriate institution to 

combat these aggressive (and successful) information operation strategies? What reforms or changes should be made to the GEC to make it more effective—or should 

we create a new entity for this mission? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you for this question. The informational element is not 

a sideshow. It is at the heart of international affairs. The kinetic effect of a bullet 

or bomb is often secondary to the informational effect. At its core, terrorism is an 

informational act. Our adversaries, from Russia to China to Iran to ISIS, understand that success in the informational, or more specifically the psychological or cognitive, domain is central to a successful offensive and defense. We must begin to 

accept this reality. 

The GEC was established as an interagency hub within the State Department to 

provide a point of leadership—and accountability—for the Government’s response to 

adversarial information activities. The majority of the staff are from the interagency—mostly from the Defense Department—with few from the State Department. Its ability to coordinate, let alone affect and effect, actions within the State 

Department and the interagency is limited. 

The GEC has and continues to face resistance from elements within the Department that perceive GEC as not a part of the Department’s mission. Several functional and geographic bureaus do not understand or accept how the GEC supports 

the Department. The reasons are numerous: an ossified State Department bureaucracy and operational culture; confusion over the Department’s role in national security; questions over authorities, questions on what tactics may and should be used; 

and, a remarkable lack of leadership support from outside of GEC, including from 

past Secretaries, senior staff, and other Under and Assistant Secretaries. 

These challenges will not be irrelevant by creating yet another new entity without 

addressing the fundamentals that led to the creation of CSCC and GEC, based on 

a faulty vision of tactics and poorly defined mission, both of which limited any possible effectiveness. These same barriers caused ripples that negatively influenced 

interagency partners’ willingness to work with and support the GEC. At this time, 

there are no indications that any of the GEC’s limitations have been removed or 

will be soon. 

The function of an organization like GEC (though GEC’s mission, in all aspects, 

is too narrowly defined) should remain inside the State Department. The expeditionary, long-term approach of the State Department, it’s ground presence in nearly 

every nation on the planet, and its fundamental role in our foreign policy and national security makes the Department the best location for an operation like the 

GEC. 

I have two recommendations. They are not exclusive in that they may, and 

should, be pursued simultaneously. 

First, there is an existing operational and integrative hub for global informational 

and in-person engagement in the Department: the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. However, only one of the eight persons to hold the office 

since it was established in 1999 (the office has been vacant for nearly 30% of the 

time since then), none have been adequately prepared, directed, or supported to fulfill a role of coordinating, integrating, and supporting U.S. Government-wide global 

engagement. An Under Secretary will wield substantially greater influence than a 

‘‘coordinator’’ or ‘‘Special Envoy.’’ This existing Under Secretary has direct or indirect control over a nearly $1b budget, which contains the bulk of the USIA’s former 

informational (short-term and long-term) engagement capabilities. However, this 

Under Secretary faces similar redundancies and turf-protecting (and building) that 

the GEC met, and has done so without leadership support to overcome these limits 

to better support our foreign policy, national security, and support to interagency 

partners for the same. 

Congress must address the systemic deficiencies at the State Department as it is 

the right home for the required hub. The original Portman-Murphy proposal in the 

Senate was intriguing as it could have been a spark to cause a substantial reconsid-
82 

eration of the poor organization, misalignment, and disconnectedness of various 

overlapping Department efforts while undoing the forced segregation of ‘‘information’’ from the rest of national security and foreign policy structures and bureaucratic cultures. 

I am not aware of a single Congressional hearing or clear mandate by a Secretary 

of State or President to empower and hold accountable this Under Secretary to fulfill the role embedded in it when it was created following the abolishment of USIA 

in 1999. The GEC, like the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication 

it replaced, and the Portman-Murphy bill proposed in the last Congress, are direct 

responses to the failure of this Under Secretary to perform a function too many have 

forgotten it is positioned and resourced to execute. 

Second, I recommend the Congress reconsider the ‘‘Political West Point’’ idea of 

an organization that provides analysis and training for adversarial informational activities that State Department, Defense Department, and other agencies, as well as 

relevant private sector and friendly nation governments and civil society actors, can 

attend. The name for this ‘‘Political West Point’’ was the Freedom Academy when 

it was introduced in Congress in the late 1950s, though a different name may be 

useful today. Such an organization would address the underlying resistance derived 

from a denial that information is anything but a sideshow to the other three core 

elements of national power: Diplomacy, Military, and Economic. The ‘‘D,’’ ‘‘M,’’ and 

‘‘E’’ are not coequal with the ‘‘I’’ of information, but rely on Information for their 

effect. Further, on the military side, the lack of appreciation of the centrality of informational activities have permitted, if not encouraged, military public affairs officers to aggressively segregate themselves, and their advice, from the military’s 

trained information professionals. At the State Department, this will help break 

down the cultural divide between the Public Diplomacy cone (where ‘‘cone’’ is the 

Department’s loose equivalent the military’s ‘‘MOS’’) that information is a key facet 

of international affairs. It would also benefit the military through an increase informational training for MOSs not directly involved in information (i.e. look beyond Information Operations, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs), as would other 

agencies, from Agriculture to Treasury to AID. This would provide some of the analytical support GEC presently strives to deliver, and operate similar to and likely 

with West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center. This Academy would be a repository 

for the collection and analysis and training on adversarial tactics, techniques, and 

procedures across the psychological and cognitive domains, including the cross-over 

to the physical domain. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the question. I look forward to discussing this issue in greater detail with you. 

Mr. FRANKS. If we are to take seriously the threat posed by Russian, Chinese, and 

jihadi information operations seriously, is the GEC the appropriate institution to 

combat these aggressive (and successful) information operation strategies? What reforms or changes should be made to the GEC to make it more effective—or should 

we create a new entity for this mission? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. The GEC is currently the most viable institution in the Executive 

Branch of government to lead and direct efforts to counter the threat posed by Russian, Chinese, and Jihadi information operations. That said, the GEC continues to 

face significant challenges to fully realize its potential in addressing these threats. 

Insufficient funding, manpower, and support coupled with the thick bureaucratic 

layers at the State Department have historically hampered effective operations. 

Four principle things can be done to make the GEC significantly more effective; 

1. Increase funding to the GEC and provide it a dedicated funding line. 

2. Significantly increase the assigned manpower. 

3. Elevate the GEC in status at both the Department of State and within the 

Interagency and authorize it to ‘‘direct’’ U.S. government efforts to counter both 

State and non-State actor threats in the information environment. 

4. Ensure the GEC has aggressive leadership with a proven track record of success operating in the interagency. 

Mr. FRANKS. What specific steps must we take to combat Russian hybrid warfare: 

Do we ultimately need to oppose them at every stage? For example, if we merely 

park armored brigade combat teams in Eastern Europe but do not improve our 

cyber capabilities or harden our space assets, will Russia be deterred? 

Mr. THOMAS. The basis for my response utilizes contemporary Russian open 

source military thought, and not the mirror-imaging of U.S. concepts onto Russian 

activities, which is the type of analysis many U.S. analysts incorporate. Russia’s 

military leaders state often that it is the U.S. who developed the term hybrid war, 

and it is the U.S. who is using this concept to confront Russia. Westerners, on the 

other hand, state that Russia is using hybrid techniques. The Russians themselves 

state that they tend to depend on ‘‘new-type’’ warfare methods, the outline of which 
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is attached [see graphic below]. Russia’s chief of its Main Operations Directorate 

stated in 2015 that ‘‘nonstandard forms and methods are being developed for the 

employment of our Armed Forces, which will make it possible to level the enemy’s 

technological superiority. For this, the features of the preparation and conduct of 

new-type warfare are being fully used and ‘asymmetric’ methods of confronting the 

enemy are being developed.’’ After determining vulnerable areas, Special Forces, foreign agents, information effects, and other nonmilitary forms of effects are used in 

each conflict, with each involving a different set of asymmetric operations (coordinated with respect to targets, location, and time, a combination of asymmetric and 

indirect actions).’’ 

Russia’s new-type warfare method has several apparent phases (none of which are 

numbered) that ratchet up confrontations incrementally. The U.S. should confront 

Russia at every stage of this template and attempt to ensure the phase involving 

classical war methods is never reached. The initial phase of new-type warfare would 

be the best time to confront Russia, when we are only dealing with various types 

of deterrence methods (information, psychological, etc.), diplomatic pressure, and 

propaganda means before actual confrontation evolves. We are clearly in this phase 

now, which involves posturing and threats. We should do all in our power not to 

move beyond this phase. However, if this phase fails, then new-type war’s next 

phase involves the covert deployment of special operations forces and cyber-attacks, 

and the use of heretofore unnamed types of new weapons systems. This would be 

a real step toward actual fighting and the absolute last chance before, according to 

the Russian General Staff’s new-type warfare scenario, classical warfare methods 

begin. As long as President Putin views an existential threat to Russia, I do not 

believe that Armored Brigades in Eastern Europe will deter him, nor will hardening 

space assets. He will find a way to asymmetrically, as the Russian military has stat-
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ed, threaten the U.S. Perhaps these ways have already been prepared and are ready 

for use or exploitation. I do not believe he wants his military to conduct combat operations against NATO or the U.S., but I also believe he is prepared to use them 

if necessary. Of recent importance is that a major discussion of the term ‘‘war’’ is 

underway among Russia’s military elite. This debate must be followed closely as 

perhaps new types of warfare methods are under serious consideration. For example, the military’s emphasis on ‘‘nonstandard,’’ ‘‘asymmetric,’’ and ‘‘nonmilitary’’ 

methods should be watched closely for indications of their future application in war. 

The views expressed in this response are my own and do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense—Mr. Timothy 

Thomas. 

Æ