CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

China’s Evolving Surface Fleet

www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx

Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, 

Editors
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

China Maritime Study No. 14

July 2017

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Jeffrey A. Harley, U.S. Navy

Provost

Dr. Lewis M. Duncan

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Thomas J. Culora

Director of China Maritime Studies Institute and 

editor-in-chief of the China Maritime Studies

Peter A. Dutton

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ISSN 1943-0817

ISBN 978-1-935352-45-7

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dutton, Peter, editor. | Martinson, Ryan D., editor.

Title: China’s evolving surface fleet / Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, editors.

Description: Newport, Rhode Island : Naval War College Press, 2017. | Series:

 China maritime studies, ISSN 1943-0817 ; no. 14

Identifiers: LCCN 2017030967 | ISBN 9781935352457 (perfect bound booklet)

Subjects: LCSH: China. Zhongguo ren min jie fang jun. Hai jun. |

 Sea-power—China. | Navies—China.

Classification: LCC VA633 .C554 2017 | DDC 359.8/30951—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017030967


Contents

CHAPTER ONE The PLA Navy’s Yin and Yang: China’s Advancing

Amphibious Force and Missile Craft......................................1

by Dennis J. Blasko

CHAPTER TWO What Do China’s Surface Fleet Developments Suggest

about Its Maritime Strategy?................................................17

by Bernard D. Cole

CHAPTER THREE A Japanese Perspective on China’s Evolving Surface Fleet.......31

by Yoji Koda

CHAPTER FOUR Why Is the Surface Fleet Gaining Importance? Insights

from PLA Doctrinal Writings..............................................43

by Nan Li

CHAPTER FIVE The Modern PLA Navy Destroyer Force: Impressive

Progress in Achieving a “Far-Seas” Capability .......................55

by Michael McDevitt

CHAPTER SIX China’s Evolving Surface Fleet: Its Possible Roles and

Missions in the Indian Ocean Region and Its Impact

on Regional Security and Stability........................................67

by Sureesh Mehta

CHAPTER SEVEN An Assessment of Chinese Aircraft Carrier Aviation..............81

by Robert C. Rubel

CHAPTER EIGHT China’s Auxiliary Fleet: Supporting a Blue-Water

Navy in the Far Seas?..........................................................93

by Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix

CHAPTER NINE Sustaining the Surface Force: Developments in PLAN

Logistics and Maintenance................................................ 111

by Dale C. Rielage

About the Contributors.......................................................................................... 129

About the Editors................................................................................................. 131

The opinions expressed in this publication are the perspectives of the authors and do 

not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its 

components or the views of the government of the People’s Republic of China or 

any of its components.

From a military perspective, the best way to avoid war is to 

prepare for it.

GEN. MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The missile fast-attack craft and amphibious fleets of the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) Navy (PLAN) have undergone significant modernization over the past 

fifteen years. The capabilities of both categories of vessels have improved even if their 

actual numbers have not increased dramatically. Examined from the perspective of PLA 

doctrine and training, the missions of these forces represent the PLAN’s past, present, 

and future.

Taken together, these two categories of ships and boats enhance China’s deterrence posture, help defend its coastal waters, warn Taiwan of the dangers of further moves toward 

independence, add to China’s long-range sealift capacity, and assist in the PLA’s ability to conduct nontraditional security tasks. In the newer ships entering the inventory, 

we see both capabilities to conduct the PLA’s traditional mission of defense of China’s 

18,000-kilometer coastline and 6,500 islands and hints of the missions of the future. 

These two fleets represent the yin and yang of the PLAN: its enduring “offshore operations” missions and its future “blue-water” or “far-seas” tasks.

The Missile-Craft Fleet

China’s naval missile-craft force consists of a variety of small vessels, each displacing about five hundred tons or less. They usually are called daodan kuaiting (导弹快

艇), daodanting, or just kuaiting. These terms are translated variously as “patrol boat,” 

“patrol craft,” “missile fast-attack craft,” “fast-attack craft,” “missile escort boat,” “missile 

speedboat,” “missile boat,” or “fast boat.” Some vessels of this size are called huweiting (护

卫艇), sometimes imprecisely translated as “corvette.”1

 This paper focuses on fast, small 

vessels equipped with antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and uses the abbreviation FAC 

(for “fast-attack craft”) to refer to the various types of missile speedboats in the PLAN. 

Dennis J. Blasko

China’s Advancing Amphibious Force and Missile Craft

CHAPTER ONE

The PLA Navy’s Yin and Yang
2 china maritime studies

In addition to FACs armed with ASCMs, The Military Balance 2013 lists three types of 

coastal-patrol craft and one type of patrol boat in the PLAN that are not equipped with 

missiles and perform antisubmarine or other missions. These will not be discussed in 

this treatment.2

The first missile FACs in the PLAN, the Type 021 Huangfeng and Type 024 Houku 

classes, were based on Soviet designs (the Osa/Komar class). Because of their small size 

and lack of seaworthiness, these early FACs were employed relatively close to shore. 

They took advantage of their speed, but were limited in the length of time they could 

stay at sea and by adverse weather. Two versions of a more modern FAC (based on the 

Type 037 submarine chaser), the Type 037II Houjian class and Type 037IG Houxin 

class (often called corvettes, but displacing only slightly more than five hundred tons), 

were introduced in the early 1990s. About a decade later the stealthy, 220-ton Type 022 

Houbei-class catamaran entered the force.3

The Military Balance 1996/97 estimated there were “about 185” missile craft in the 

PLAN. These numbers included “some 100” Type 021 Huangfeng-class, “about 75” Type 

024 Houku-class, nine Type 037IG Houxin-class, and one “Huang-class [sic]” FAC.4

 In 

the subsequent fifteen years, nearly all those craft were retired and replaced by a smaller 

number of more-modern, more–technologically advanced, and more-capable vessels.

Current estimates of the size of the missile FAC fleet vary among sources. The Pentagon 

reports a total of “roughly” eighty-five “coastal-patrol (missile)” craft. It counts sixty 

Type 022s, but does not specify the other types of FAC in service. It also states that the 

new Type 056 Jiangdao-class corvettes will “augment” the Type 022s in the fleet.5

 The 

new Type 056 corvettes provide the PLAN the capability to patrol China’s littoral waters 

for several days or weeks, while the Type 022s are optimized for fast attack at high 

speeds for shorter periods.

The Military Balance 2013 lists four types of FAC in the inventory, totaling over one 

hundred vessels; however, its count of sixty-five Type 022s is higher than the Pentagon’s 

and its figures do not account for the likely retirement of the older Type 021 from the 

active inventory.6

Type Number Missile

Type 022 Houbei 65+ (60 reported by U.S. Department of Defense)two quad YJ-83 launchers

Type 021 Huangfeng 11 (likely no longer in the fl eet) two twin HY-2 launchers

Type 037II Houjian 6 two triple YJ-8 launchers

Type 037IG Houxin 20 two twin YJ-8 launchers

Table 1. FACs in the PLAN
china

s evolving surface fleet 3

With about eighty-six vessels, the PLAN FAC fleet has a higher percentage of modern 

boats (Type 022) in operation (about 70 percent) than the percentage of modern equipment in most other units and services. In 2011, the Pentagon reported that, as of 2010, 

only about 26 percent of the PLAN surface fleet was considered “modern,” compared 

with about 56 percent of the submarine force, 25 percent of the air forces, and 40 percent 

of the air-defense forces.7

 The percentages of modern systems in the PLA have increased 

in recent years as newer equipment is commissioned and older weapons are retired, but 

the FAC force is better off than most units, and its equipment is better than most sectors’, 

in the PLA. Throughout the PLA, advanced systems must operate in conjunction with 

legacy platforms, logistics must support both old and new, and doctrine and tactical 

techniques must be developed that incorporate all existing capabilities and units.

The PLAN’s FACs are distributed to units in all three fleets. Five division leader–grade 

FAC units (kuaiting zhidui, 快艇支队), often called flotillas, have been identified. Each 

flotilla is composed of multiple (probably up to three) regiment leader–grade dadui, variously translated as squadrons or groups, each with six to twelve vessels. A FAC flotilla 

may command sub chasers, patrol boats, and amphibious vessels in addition to its missile boats. Each FAC flotilla probably commands twelve to eighteen FACs.8

 Both Type 

022 and Type 037IG FACs are found in each of the three fleets. The five FAC zhidui and 

the locations of their FAC squadrons are listed in table 2. Two additional FAC squadrons 

have been identified subordinate to the Shantou Naval Garrison.9

Type 037IG Houxins have three-digit pennant numbers (images show them ranging 

from the 750s through the 760s), indicating they are battalion leader–grade vessels, 

and are named after counties in China, such as Fuqing or Dong’an.10 Four Type 037II 

Houjians are assigned to the naval component of the Hong Kong garrison, with pennant 

numbers 770 through 773.11

Type 022 Houbeis have four-digit hull numbers, indicating they are company leader–

grade units.12 Boat number 2208 (2208艇) was the first Type 022 to enter service; it was 

Unit Designator Fleet Location of FAC 

Squadrons (dadui)

1st FAC zhidui 91208 budui North Sea Fleet Qingdao, Shandong

16th FAC zhidui 91765 budui East Sea Fleet Ningbo-Shipu, Zhejiang

21st FAC zhidui 91792 budui East Sea Fleet Fuding, Fujian

11th FAC zhidui 91367 budui South Sea Fleet Sanya-Yulin, Hainan

26th FAC zhidui 92962 budui South Sea Fleet Shangchuandao, 

Guangdong

Shantou Naval Garrison 91960 budui South Sea Fleet Shantou, Guangdong 

(two squadrons)

Table 2. FAC Units
4 china maritime studies

delivered to the East Sea Fleet (ESF) in 2004.13 Hull numbers for other boats of this type 

begin with 21 for North Sea Fleet (NSF) vessels and 23 for South Sea Fleet (SSF) craft.

In a 2009 report, the Office of Naval Intelligence issued what is perhaps the most succinct description of the mission of the FAC fleet: “[T]he Houbei’s ability to patrol coastal 

and littoral waters and react at short notice allows the PLAN’s larger combatants to 

focus on offshore defense and out-of-area missions without leaving a security gap along 

China’s coastline.”14 The Pentagon concludes, “These boats have increased the PLA Navy’s littoral warfare capabilities.”15 Andrew Erickson observes: “The Houbei’s impressive 

anti-surface weapons system, consisting of 8 YJ-8A ASCMs fired from stern-mounted 

canisters, each with a range of approximately 50 nautical miles, would be highly effective 

in attacking surface warships in the waters around China, though the catamaran’s limited 

endurance (300 nautical miles) would not allow it to operate for extended periods at 

much greater distances.”16

These statements all point to the role of the PLAN’s FAC fleet in offshore defense (近海

防御), the naval component of the PLA’s “military strategy” or “military strategic guideline” of Active Defense (积极防御). In 2000, China’s defense white paper announced 

the PLAN had “acquired the capability of offshore defensive operations.”17 The 2013 

white paper stated that as “the PLAN endeavors to accelerate the modernization of its 

forces for comprehensive offshore operations,” it is developing “blue-water capabilities of 

conducting mobile operations, carrying out international cooperation, and countering 

nontraditional security threats.”18 Owing to the requirement to operate relatively near 

the coast (at most a couple of hundred miles from shore) and probably only in relatively good weather, the PLAN FAC fleet therefore will be employed mainly to conduct 

“offshore operations,” while other PLAN ships and aircraft operate farther out at sea in 

“blue-water” or “far-seas” operations.

According to doctrine, offshore defensive operations will include surface, subsurface, air 

(fixed- and rotary-wing), cruise- and ballistic-missile, and electronic-warfare capabilities 

and units, supported by People’s Armed Police, militia, and civilian assets. PLAN FACs 

are expected to work in groups, operating on multiple vectors, in conjunction with other 

forces, taking advantage of the range of their missiles. Their effectiveness will depend on 

the ability of other Chinese assets to provide them accurate and timely intelligence and 

targeting data for enemy warships beyond the horizon. Throughout their operations at 

sea, the PLAN FAC fleet will be vulnerable to enemy air forces and electronic-warfare 

operations. Chinese FACs have some short-range air-defense and electronic countermeasures capabilities of their own; for example, the Type 022 mounts a 30 mm close-in 

weapons system and two four-cell launch tubes for smoke and chaff. However, the key to 

their survivability and success is realistic training.
china

s evolving surface fleet 5

PLAN FAC training has been reported widely in the Chinese civilian and military media, including several television reports about the telegenic Type 022 as well as the older 

Type 037IG. Exercise reports usually reveal FACs operating with other surface vessels, 

such as minesweepers and frigates. The FACs perform both offensive and defensive tasks 

and are themselves frequently the target of “enemy” air and electronic-warfare attacks. 

Exercises reportedly take place both during the day (including in light fog) and at night, 

although exactly how much time is spent in night training is not specified. Live-missile 

launches and live-ammunition antiaircraft drills using drones as targets are reported 

frequently.19 Coordinated attacks by FACs and PLAN aviation units on enemy forces also 

have been reported. One report describes a naval aviation and FAC attack following a 

first wave of attacks performed by other surface and air forces. Helicopters provided targeting information for enemies beyond visual range; however, details of exactly how that 

information was passed and processed among units were not provided. Another report 

indicates coordination for a missile attack in conjunction with an aviation unit while 

experiencing enemy jamming within the context of a larger ESF exercise.20

It should come as no surprise that the first Type 022 FAC, Boat 2208 of the ESF, has been 

the subject of numerous media reports. According to one article, Boat 2208 conducted 

its first missile live fire in the Yellow Sea in the winter of 2006—approximately two 

years after it entered the fleet.21 Another report, from Xinhua, noted that when the first 

“new type missile fast boat squadron” was formed, it faced many issues, particularly 

concerning the complex technology of the new equipment. As a result, the unit underwent a two-year training period, which included sending personnel to the shipyard that 

produced the boats (a technique used by many PLA units that have received new equipment).22 In the ten years it has been in the force, Boat 2208 has participated in more 

than twenty exercises and has developed “more than fifty combat methods and training methods,” something one might expect the first vessel of its type to do. It has been 

named “‘first sharp sword’ (第一利剑) of the Chinese Navy’s fast-attack craft forces.”23

While this seems like a lot of training, the numbers reported average out to two or three 

exercises per year.

It is difficult to judge the quality of FAC training, exercise realism, and crew proficiencies on the basis of Chinese media reporting. But since these units mainly will operate 

relatively close to shore, it would seem possible that they could practice many of their 

tasks in short exercises and drills that last no more than a day or two. These units are 

focused on protection of China’s littoral; other units look more toward the far seas.

The Amphibious Ship Fleet

The PLAN amphibious or landing ship (登陆舰) fleet has undergone significant modernization over the past fifteen years, but these efforts have not resulted in as much of an 
6 china maritime studies

increase in sealift capacity as might be expected. The force also has been active in training exercises and has begun to be used in operations far from China’s coasts.

Estimates of the size of the amphibious ship fleet vary among sources. Estimates are 

complicated further by inconsistency in what exactly should be reported. In 2013, 

the Pentagon listed fifty-five medium and large amphibious ships, consisting of three 

amphibious transport docks (LPDs), twenty-six tank landing ships (LSTs), and twentysix medium landing ships (LSMs), but did not break them down by class.24 The Military 

Balance 2013 counted two LPDs, twenty-six LSTs, and fifty-nine LSMs, for a total of 

eighty-seven large and medium amphibious ships.25 Most of the twenty-eight Type 079 

Yulian-class LSMs included in The Military Balance have been retired, leaving only 

about five in service.26 When these twenty-three ships are subtracted, the numbers from 

The Military Balance and the Pentagon are much closer. Table 3 compares the numbers 

found in The Military Balance from 1996 with those from various sources in 2013.

Calculating the maximum troop capacity for the ships in 2013 yields a result of fifteen to 

sixteen thousand personnel, although the number would vary according to the amount 

of equipment transported in addition to personnel. This total (fifteen to sixteen thousand personnel) represents at least a 50 percent increase from the Pentagon’s judgment 

from 2000 through the following decade that the PLA is capable of sealift of one infantry 

division of approximately ten thousand troops and equipment at a time.27 Current PLAN 

amphibious lift capacity would be sufficient to lift the PLAN’s two marine brigades (ten 

Ship Type Number 

1996

Number 

2013

Capacity

Type 071 Yuzhao LPD 0 3 500–800 troops, 15–20 amphibious 

vehicles, 4 landing craft

Type 072 Yukan LST 7 7 200 troops, 10 tanks

Type 072-II Yuting LST 4 9 250 troops, 10 tanks

Type 072-III 

Yuting II

LST 0 10 250 troops, 10 tanks

US LST-1 Shan LST 13 0 150 troops, 16 tanks

Type 073 Yudeng LSM 1 0 180 troops, 6 tanks

Type 073A Yunshu LSM 0 10 180 troops, 6 tanks

Type 074 Yuhai LSM 0 11 250 troops, 2 tanks

Type 074A Yubei LSM 0 10 150 troops or 10 tanks

Type 079 

Yulian/Yuling

LSM 32 5 250 troops, 5 tanks

Table 3. PLAN Amphibious Fleet, 1996 and 2013

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1996/97, p. 180, and The Military Balance 2013, p. 290, with the number of LPDs found 

in U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments 2013, p. 6. Information on the numbers of Type 074 and Type 079 

comes from Graae e-mail, May 20, 2013. Also used in compiling this table was the “Naval Vessels” page of the website 

SinoDefence.com, available at www.sinodefence.com/navy/vessel.asp.
china

s evolving surface fleet 7

to twelve thousand personnel) assigned to the SSF or one Army infantry division, but 

not much more—not enough for a major cross-strait operation.28

The PLAN has two landing ship flotillas (登陆舰支队), one in the SSF and the other in 

the ESF, and a landing ship squadron (登陆舰大队) in the NSF subordinate to the 1st 

FAC Flotilla.29 Each flotilla has two or three subordinate squadrons, with the SSF flotilla 

being larger than the ESF’s. The 16th FAC Flotilla in the ESF and the 11th FAC Flotilla 

in the SSF each command a landing ship squadron. Each landing ship squadron in the 

SSF and ESF probably commands about six large or medium landing ships, while the 

NSF squadron has two LSTs and eight LSMs.30 Major PLAN amphibious units and their 

locations are listed in table 4.

A variety of smaller landing craft are used to transfer personnel and equipment from 

ship to shore. These include many small ten-man boats with outboard motors and a 

few small and medium-sized air-cushioned craft. In April 2013, the PLAN received (in 

Feodosiya, Ukraine) the first of four Zubr air-cushioned landing craft to be built (two in 

China and two in Ukraine). These large craft can carry up to three tanks or five hundred 

troops at more than sixty knots over land and water.31

Most large PLAN amphibious ships and some medium-sized landing ships have threedigit pennant numbers beginning with the numeral 9, indicating they are battalion 

leader–grade vessels; they are named after mountains (shan). However, the three Type 

071 LPDs are regiment leader–grade ships. Some medium-sized landing ships (Type 074 

and Type 074A) and smaller vessels, including air-cushioned craft, have four-digit bow 

numbers, indicating company leader–grade vessels.

The three Type 071 Yuzhao-class amphibious transport docks, Kunlunshan (No. 998), 

Jinggangshan (No. 999), and Changbaishan (No. 989), represent the most significant 

Unit Designator Fleet Location Comments

1st Amphibious Ship 

dadui

Not known NSF Qingdao, 

Shandong

Subordinate to the 1st FAC

zhidui

5th Amphibious Ship 

zhidui

91860 budui ESF Shanghai (Qiujiang 

wharf)

Two dadui

3rd Amphibious Ship 

dadui

92529 budui ESF Ningbo-Shipu Subordinate to the 16th FAC 

zhidui

6th Amphibious Ship 

zhidui

92692 budui SSF Zhanjiang and 

Guangzhou, 

Guangdong

Three dadui

4th Amphibious Ship 

dadui

91782 budui SSF Haikou, Hainan Subordinate to the 11th FAC 

zhidui

Table 4. PLAN Amphibious Units

Sources: Directory of PRC Military Personalities, October 2011, pp. 41, 47, 53, and 54; Graae e-mail, May 18, 2013.
8 china maritime studies

upgrade to the PLAN’s amphibious fleet.32 In addition to their troop and vehicle capacity, these ships are capable of supporting flight operations for four medium helicopters 

and launching up to four air-cushioned craft.33 All are assigned to the SSF and, as the 

Office of Naval Intelligence has noted, they signal “a developing capability for expeditionary warfare and over-the-horizon amphibious assault.”34 They also have the potential 

for use in nontraditional security missions, such as international disaster relief. Unlike 

the LST fleet, these ships give the PLAN the capacity to perform missions requiring 

extended periods at sea (months instead of weeks) far from China’s shores. Kunlunshan

was deployed on antipiracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden in 2010. Jinggangshan, along with 

three other surface combatants, was involved in a high-profile exercise to the southern 

limits of the South China Sea (James Shoal) in March/April 2013, which included both 

amphibious operations and nontraditional security tasks.35

SSF amphibious ships train mostly with the two marine brigades, but also can support 

army training. PLAN amphibious units in the ESF and NSF train more with army units, 

because no marine units are assigned to those fleets. Amphibious training usually begins 

in the spring and continues through the fall. The Chinese media frequently highlight 

this training, which can be exploited, as necessary, for its propaganda and deterrence 

value.36

The PLA ground forces have approximately fifteen transport ship squadrons or groups 

(船运大队), each with from five to twenty landing craft assigned to two or three smaller 

units (中队). These units appear to be equipped mostly with Type 271–series and Type 

068 (Yuqing-class) landing craft and are found in the army coastal-defense force, some 

joint logistics subdepartments, and the Nanjing Military Region Army Reserve Logistics Support Brigade. Additionally, a ship group (船艇大队) is located at the Dongshan 

Island training area and provides support to army amphibious training. These units 

potentially add about another two hundred small landing craft for amphibious operations in coastal waters. Army landing craft can be identified by bow numbers that start 

with the Roman letter for the military region to which they are assigned (B, G, N, J, or 

S), followed by another letter and three numbers.37

PLAN amphibious assets may be augmented by incorporating civilian vessels into operations. Maritime militia units have organized ship units, and civilian fishing and transport vessels also may be mobilized. In many cases civilian ships require modifications 

to transport military equipment. Civilian ships also could secure artillery and rocket 

launchers to their decks to provide fire support for landing operations. Under most 

conditions, civilian shipping would not be suitable for conducting amphibious assaults; 

they would be more appropriate for landing in ports or at piers captured in the early 

phase of an operation. In 2012, the first civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ship designed 

to national defense specifications made its maiden voyage out of Yantai, Shandong. The 
china

s evolving surface fleet 9

36,000-ton Bohai Emerald Bead is the first of four such ships to be built. Each can carry 

over two thousand personnel and more than three hundred vehicles.38 Perhaps a dozen 

or more smaller civilian RO/RO ships could be made available to the PLA. While these 

ships were not designed specifically to transport military vehicles, they could add significantly to the PLA’s lift capacity if a port was available for off-loading.39

Analysis

The Science of Military Strategy, published by the Academy of Military Science, states, 

“Warfighting and deterrence are two major functions of the armed forces.”40 The PLAN 

FAC and amphibious fleets have important roles in China’s war-fighting and deterrence posture. Both fleets demonstrate the continuing relevance of People’s War theory 

to the PLA. More than the FAC fleet, the amphibious force, particularly the Type 071 

LPDs, also has a role in nontraditional security missions, such as sea-lane protection (as 

demonstrated in Kunlunshan’s antipiracy deployment), and potentially in international 

disaster relief or civilian evacuation missions.

Although most foreign analysis that addresses China’s deterrence posture focuses on its 

nuclear dimension, the Chinese doctrine subsumes many more deterrence objectives 

than simply deterring nuclear war, including deterring a land or sea invasion of China; 

protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; deterring further steps toward 

Taiwan independence, along with the related mission of deterring U.S. military support 

to Taiwan in the event of conflict; and deterring “terrorism, separatism, and extremism.” 

Deterrence is based on possessing an “adequate deterrent force,” having the will to use 

that force, and ensuring the opponent understands China’s capabilities and will. The Science of Military Strategy states that “[t]he more powerful the warfighting capability, the 

more effective the deterrence.” Military forces must be capable and well prepared; “those 

making purely bluffing threats and intimidations hardly can afford deterrence.”41

The modernization of the FAC and amphibious fleets meets all three requirements for 

deterrence. An “adequate force” has been built, and China’s will to use it has been publicized through the Chinese media. There is little doubt that those China seeks to deter 

have understood the war-fighting potential these forces represent.

The Science of Military Strategy states that deterrence is considered a means of attaining 

both military and political objectives, but war fighting is to be used “only when deterrence fails and there is no alternative.”42 Moreover, caution is emphasized in making the 

decision to go to war: “Therefore, imprudent decision to use force is never permitted. . . . The 

reason for the existence of the army is to prevent and win a war. . . . We may not launch 

a war in a hundred years but we can never be unprepared for war for even one day. . . . 
10 china maritime studies

Only when an army is fully prepared for war, can it be prudent to start a war and react 

quickly in war.”43

People’s War is closely related to China’s deterrence posture. The Science of Military Strategy states that China has a “massive capability” for deterrence through People’s War.44

The book’s final chapter on guidance for future high-technology wars describes “five 

combinations” of People’s War that mix (1) regular troops with the masses, emphasizing China’s inland and coastal border regions; (2) regular naval warfare with guerrilla 

warfare on the sea, developing the strategy and tactics of People’s War on the Sea 

(海上人民战争); (3) “trump card” (杀手锏) weapons with flexible strategy and tactics, 

especially in playing “hide and seek” with the enemy; (4) high-tech weapons with legacy 

weapons, understanding the “phenomenon that several generations of weapons and 

equipment” will “coexist” for a long time; and (5) military warfare with political and 

economic warfare to present the widest front possible to the enemy.45 Both the FAC and 

amphibious fleets display these elements of People’s War as adapted for the twenty-first 

century. 

The PLA FAC and amphibious forces are “regular troops” that would be supported by 

the militia and civilian forces in their operations. FAC units especially would be involved 

in “guerrilla warfare on the sea” using hit-and-run, ambush-style tactics. The Type 022 

Houbei force, with its stealth and missile capabilities, can be considered a “trump card” 

weapon, which demonstrates that the “concept of People’s War is not confined to the war 

of low technology.”46 As with nearly all other PLA units, both fleets also illustrate how 

more-advanced weapons are integrated with older legacy systems.

But the FAC fleet will be used primarily in China’s coastal waters as an essential element 

of offshore defensive operations. While the amphibious fleet can be used in offshore operations, its newest additions, the Type 071 Yuzhao LPDs, are joining other surface combatants in operations and training in distant waters. These ships, along with the civilian 

RO/RO ships and other transport capacity, are an important development in overcoming 

the PLA’s well-recognized shortcoming in long-distance sealift capacity.

In coming years, we can expect to see more far-seas training, with the Type 071s being 

active participants. At the end of 2012, ESF deputy commander Qiu Yanpeng noted that 

the PLAN had conducted seven “open-sea training” exercises that year.47 This doubled 

the operations tempo that PLA Navy commander Wu Shengli described in 2009 of more 

than thirty combat group operational/campaign exercises (作战集团战役演习) over the 

previous ten years.48 The earlier numbers equated to an average of one such exercise per 

fleet per year—a tempo that now has more than doubled.

This increase in training is necessary, however, because the PLA and PLAN leadership 

sees PLAN capabilities as falling short of those displayed by other modern navies. Qiu 
china

s evolving surface fleet 11

Yanpeng said so directly at the same time he noted the increase in training for 2012: 

“There is still a considerable [sic] room for improvement in the intensity and effectiveness of our open-sea training, whether it is compared to the naval forces of other countries or concerned with the requirements of Chinese navy building and development.”49

That same day, the Chinese-language PLA Daily newspaper carried an article stating that 

the level of naval training is incompatible with the requirements of winning naval battles 

in a local war under informationized conditions (海军军事训练水平与打赢信息化

条件下海战的要求不相适应). The article stressed the need to improve navy training 

through the “2015 Naval Military Training Reform Implementation Program” (《2015

年前海军军事训练改革实施方案》).50

The need for more training, along with the size of the amphibious fleet, suggests that the 

PLAN still sees itself preferring to play its deterrent role and participating in nontraditional security missions in the near future. Nonetheless, as a loyal servant of the Chinese 

Communist Party, the PLA will obey the orders of the Party leadership and seek to conduct any assigned mission to the maximum extent possible with the forces and capabilities at hand.

The 2004 white paper described the Chinese government’s general intentions for PLAN 

modernization:

In accordance with the principle of smaller but more efficient troops, the PLA Navy compresses [i.e., reduces or flattens] the chain of command and reorganizes the combat forces 

in a more scientific way while giving prominence to the building of maritime combat 

forces, especially amphibious combat forces. It also speeds up the process of updating its 

weaponry and equipment with priority given to the development of new combat ships as 

well as various kinds of special-purpose aircraft and relevant equipment.51

That statement was consistent with the general policy of making the PLA smaller and 

more technologically advanced, and specifically identified the aim of improving amphibious capabilities and developing new combat ships, although it did not mention the FAC 

fleet. Over the past decade, the PLAN has done what the white paper stated it would do.

The modernization of the PLAN’s FAC and amphibious fleets has resulted in an increase 

in the PLA’s lethal and assault capabilities in China’s immediate offshore regions and at 

greater distances from the Chinese coast. The two forces, which will be used in coordination with other naval units and civilian assets, add to China’s capabilities for both 

deterrence and war fighting. However, the PLA leadership understands that more needs 

to be accomplished, especially in both the quality and quantity of training, before these 

forces are on par with those of other advanced navies.
12 china maritime studies

The introduction of the Type 022 Houbei FAC has improved China’s coastal-defense capabilities greatly, making it more dangerous for enemy surface vessels to conduct combat 

operations within a few hundred miles of China. But for these craft to be effective they 

must be integrated with other PLA capabilities, particularly intelligence, command-andcontrol, and air-defense units. These boats illustrate the Chinese leadership’s continued 

concern for defense of the mainland. It therefore is not surprising that more Type 022s 

have been built than any other single naval ship or craft. The Houbei exemplifies the 

adaptation of People’s War to twenty-first-century requirements.

The existing amphibious fleet apparently is considered sufficient for China’s deterrence 

requirements. It is too small for a major campaign across the Taiwan Strait unless augmented by large numbers of civilian ships and other craft. The distribution of the force 

along the entire coast minimizes the chance for strategic surprise, as units would have to 

be assembled from all over the country to prepare for a large-scale amphibious operation. Chinese shipyards could surge amphibious craft production, but that too would be 

discovered easily. The size of the force is sufficient for smaller operations along China’s 

east coast or in parts of the South China Sea. The Pentagon concludes: “With few overt 

military preparations beyond routine training, the [People’s Republic of China] could 

launch an invasion of small, Taiwan-held islands such as Pratas Reef or Itu Aba. A PLA 

invasion of a medium-sized, defended, offshore island such as Mazu or Jinmen is within 

the mainland’s capabilities.”52

Currently, major PLAN amphibious operations are constrained by the requirement 

to stay within the range of land-based air support. The range of such operations will 

increase when an amphibious task force can operate under the cover of carrier-based 

aircraft.

While the Type 071 Yuzhao has some utility in a Taiwan scenario, it better represents the 

PLA’s vision for longer-range operations in far seas. The appearance of Jinggangshan at 

the southernmost extent of the South China Sea in March 2013 demonstrated these new 

capabilities, although the Chinese leadership recognizes the need for more training before the PLAN is ready to tackle the full scope of its potential future missions. The PLA 

has announced that there will be more far-seas training, which is expected to increase 

PLAN readiness levels and also contribute to the PLAN’s deterrence posture and the 

pursuit of other national security objectives.

The PLAN FAC and amphibious fleets are likely to continue to modernize and improve 

their capabilities. They will focus on operations in both the near seas and more-distant 

waters. They constitute both soft (deterrence and nontraditional security) and hard 

(war-fighting) elements of Chinese military power.
china

s evolving surface fleet 13

Notes

Birger Graae, a former NATO country intelligence officer who follows PLA developments, 

reviewed the first draft of this paper and made 

substantial contributions improving its content, 

for which I am extremely grateful. The epigraph 

comes from Karen Parrish, “Dempsey Visits 

South Korea, China on Weeklong Asia Trip,” 

American Forces Press Service, April 21, 2013, 

available at www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle

.aspx?id=119830.

1. “Corvettes” fall between “fast-attack craft” and 

“frigates” in displacement. Corvettes usually displace one thousand tons or more and are larger 

than the FACs addressed in this paper. Chinese 

sources use the term huweiting for the Type 

037II Houjian and Type 037IG Houxin, both 

of which the U.S. Navy classifies as “fast-attack 

craft.”

2. International Institute for Strategic Studies 

[hereafter IISS], The Military Balance 2013,

ed. James Hackett (London: 2013), p. 290, lists 

seventy-five coastal patrol craft and thirty-fourplus patrol boats. The PLA ground forces also 

have several patrol craft groups (巡逻艇大队) 

that patrol inland waters, lakes, and rivers in 

border regions.

3. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s 

Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed. 

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 

p. 104; Gao Xiaoxing, The PLA Navy (Beijing: 

China Intercontinental, 2012), p. 116.

4. IISS, The Military Balance 1996/97 (London: 

1996), p. 180.

5. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2013 (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 

pp. 7 and 76. The Type 056 corvette is not considered a “fast-attack craft.”

6. IISS, The Military Balance 2013, p. 290. David 

Axe, “China Builds Fleet of Small Warships 

While U.S. Drifts,” Wired Danger Room, August 

4, 2011, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/

china-builds-warships/all/, states that eightythree Type 022s have been built at a cost of forty 

million dollars per boat.

7. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2011 (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011), p. 

43.

8. The number of boats per flotilla is extrapolated from numbers found in Office of Naval 

Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: 

A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics

(Suitland, MD: 2009), p. 13, with fifteen FACs in 

the NSF, thirty-two in the ESF, and thirty-three 

in the SSF.

9. The designators (budui, 部队) for each zhidui

are from the Directory of PRC Military Personalities, October 2011, pp. 41, 47, 53, and 54, and 

Birger Graae, e-mail to author, May 18, 2013. 

FAC squadron locations have been identified 

using Google Earth and may be found at installations other than their zhidui headquarters. 

Each squadron has a separate five-digit unit 

designator different from its zhidui’s designator.

10. Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007

(Suitland, MD: 2007), p. 40; Gao, The PLA Navy,

p. 117.

11. “Type 037-II (Houjian Class) Missile Corvette,” 

SinoDefence.com, March 1, 2009, available at 

www.sinodefence.com/navy/littoral/type037ii

_houjian.asp.

12. Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007,

p. 40.

13. 英媒:中国海军隐身舰 现代海军史上的突破

[“British Media: PLAN Stealth Ship Breakthrough in Modern Naval History”], 中国军网

[China Military Online], April 13, 2008, available 

at pic.chinamil.com.cn/news/2008-04/13/

content_1229764.htm.

14. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 20.

15. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 

Military and Security Developments Involving 

the People’s Republic of China 2012 (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012), p. 

23.

16. Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-ship Cruise 

Missile Firing as Part of Combined Arms Anticarrier Exercises in East China Sea, 30 June–5 

July,” Andrew S. Erickson, July 6, 2010, www

.andrewerickson.com/2010/07/combined-arms

-anti-ship-exercise-in-east-china-sea-30-june

-5-july/. The reported range of the YJ-83 varies 

from 180 kilometers (about 97 nautical miles) 

for the surface-launched version to 225 to 250 

kilometers (about 121 to 135 nautical miles) 

for the air-launched variant. See Christopher 

Carlson, “China’s Eagle Strike-8 Anti-ship 

Cruise Missiles,” Clash of Arms, February 2013, 

www.clashofarms.com/files/Eagle_Strike_8.pdf. 

For additional discussion of the Type 022’s capabilities, see Axe, “China Builds Fleet of Small 

Warships,” and John Patch, “A Thoroughbred 

Ship-Killer,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
14 china maritime studies

136/4/1,286 (April 2010), available at www

.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-04/

thoroughbred-ship-killer.

17. Information Office of the State Council, China’s 

National Defense in 2000 (Beijing: September 

2000), available at english.gov.cn/official/

2005-07/27/content_17524.htm.

18. Information Office of the State Council of the 

People’s Republic of China,“The Diversified 

Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” April 16, 

2013, available at eng.chinamil.com.cn/news

-channels/china-military-news/2013-04/16/

content_5301637.htm.

19. A few examples of FAC exercise reporting 

include 南海舰队新型导弹快艇演练 隐

身战法曝光 [“SSF New Missile Fast Boat 

Exercise Exposes Stealth Tactics”], CCTV, 

December 29, 2009, available at news.cntv.cn/

china/20091229/104394.shtml; 海军:新型

导弹快艇进行编队攻防训练 [“Navy: New 

Missile Fast Boats Conduct Formation Offense 

and Defense Training”], CNTV, January 18, 

2013, available at news.cntv.cn/2013/01/18/

VIDE1358469921190917.shtml; 军事报

道 [Military Report], CCTV-7, February 16, 

2013, available at military.cntv.cn/program/

jsbd/20130216/105165.shtml; “PRC: JFJB Details Tri-service Exercises Aiming at Defending 

National Sovereignty,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 

12, 2012, Open Source Center [hereafter OSC] 

CPP20120912787012; and “CCTV-Xinwen: PLA 

Navy SSF Missile Corvettes Formation Conduct 

Maritime Drills,” CCTV-Xinwen, March 29, 

2013, OSC CPP20130401075001.

20. “PRC: Air Force, Navy, 2nd Artillery Corps 

Conduct Live-Fire, Simulated Drills,” 

Jiefangjun Bao, September 15, 2012, OSC 

CPP20120915704006; “East Sea Fleet Holds 

Joint Exercise to Test New Information Warfare 

Tactics,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 26, 2012, 

OSC CPP20120926787022.

21. “PLA East Sea Fleet Missile Speedboat Explores Covert Navigation Ability,” Zhongguo 

Qingnian Bao, September 14, 2012, OSC 

CPP20120914787016.

22. “Xinhua: PLA Carries Out Exercise with 1st 

New Missile Speedboat Regiment,” Xinhua, 

April 9, 2009, OSC CPP20090409136012.

23. “PRC: JFJB on Combat Effectiveness of PLA 

Navy’s New-Generation Missile Speedboat,” 

Jiefangjun Bao, September 13, 2012, OSC 

CPP20120913787007.

24. U.S. Defense Dept., Military and Security Developments 2013, pp. 4, 7, and 74.

25. IISS, The Military Balance 2013, p. 290.

26. The Type 079 Yulian-class LSM has variously 

been called Yuliang, Yuling, or Yulin. Numbers 

from Birger Graae, e-mail to author, May 20, 

2013.

27. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: 

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 

2009 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009), pp. VIII and 38. The 

Pentagon’s very first report to Congress, in 1997, 

contained the same judgment.

28. Over the past fifteen years, the PLA ground 

forces have created two amphibious mechanized 

infantry divisions, one in the Nanjing Military 

Region (MR) and one in the Guangzhou MR, 

in addition to the previously existing single 

amphibious armored brigade in the Nanjing 

MR, for a total of about twenty-five thousand 

personnel. In addition to army amphibious 

units, which consistently train each year for 

landing operations, many other army units have 

trained to some extent, but less frequently, in 

landing operations.

29. 北海舰队某部官兵住上了舒适温馨的 “水

兵之家” [“NSF Sailors Live in a Comfortable 

Home”], China Military Online, January 27, 

2012, navy.81.cn/content/2012-01/27/

content_4775324.htm.

30. These numbers are derived from U.S. Defense 

Dept., Annual Report to Congress 2012, p. 28. 

Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 13, counts nine amphibious 

ships in the NSF, nineteen in the ESF, and thirty 

in the SSF; updated in Graae e-mail, May 20, 

2013.

31. “Ukraine Delivers First Air-Cushioned Landing 

Craft to Chinese Navy,” Interfax News Wire, 

April 19, 2013, www.interfax.co.uk/russia

-military-news/ukraine-delivers-first-air

-cushioned-landing-craft-to-chinese-navy/.

32. The name of the third LPD is found at the 

webpage www.freewebs.com/riverman/

flottaplan.htm. The Chinese defense industries 

are believed also to be working on helicopter 

landing dock (LHA/LHD) amphibious assault 

ships. However, none have been reported 

launched yet.

33. Birger Graae estimates the Type 071 can accommodate about seventy amphibious vehicles, 

considerably more than other estimates of the 

ship’s capacity. Graae e-mail, May 20, 2013.

34. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy, p. 20.

35. Qian Xiaohu et al., “Chinese Naval Taskforce 

in Beach-Seizing and Landing Training,” 

China Military Online, March 22, 2013,
china

s evolving surface fleet 15

eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/

photo-reports/2013-03/22/content_5274829 

.htm; Qian Xiaohu and Song Xin, “Chinese 

Naval Task Force Patrols Meiji Reef,” China Military Online, March 29, 2013, eng.chinamil.com 

.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2013-03/29/

content_5282808_5.htm; Gan Jun, “‘Jinggangshan’ Ship Force Group in Maritime RightSafeguarding-Oriented Training,” China Military 

Online, April 2, 2013, eng.chinamil.com.cn/

news-channels/photo-reports/2013-04/02/

content_5287519.htm; Calum MacLeod and 

Oren Dorell, “Chinese Navy Makes Waves in 

South China Sea,” USA Today, March 27, 2013, 

available at www.usatoday.com/story/news/

world/2013/03/27/china-military-south-china

-sea/2023947/.

36. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century,

2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 185–90.

37. Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Amphibious Capabilities: 

Structured for Deterrence,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 10, no. 17 (August 19, 2010), 

available at www.jamestown.org/single/?no

_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36770.

38. Hu Haijun and Yang Zurong, “Launch of New 

Civilian Ship Helps PLA Enhance Strategic 

Projection Capability,” China Military Online, 

August 9, 2012, eng.chinamil.com.cn/news

-channels/china-military-news/2012-08/09/

content_4987597.htm.

39. “Ro-ro Passenger Ship Makes Maiden Voyage,” People’s Daily, July 12, 2006, available 

at english.peopledaily.com.cn/200607/12/

eng20060712_282368.html; “China’s Largest 

Locally Produced RO-RO Passenger Ship Makes 

Debut,” Shandong on Internet, October 19, 2009, 

www2.china-sd.com/News/2009-10/19_3727 

.html; Chen Li and Du Mingjun, “Advanced Passenger Ro-ro Ship Commissioned in Shenyang 

MAC,” China Military Online, January 19, 

2012, eng.mod.gov.cn/Photos/2012-01/19/

content_4339129.htm.

40. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2001 [Chinese edition] / 

2005 [English edition]), p. 213. Page numbers 

are for English edition.

41. Ibid., p. 228.

42. Ibid., p. 224.

43. Ibid., p. 468.

44. Ibid., p. 222.

45. Ibid., pp. 456–57. Likewise, the 2006 white 

paper specifically states, “The Navy is enhancing 

research into the theory of naval operations and 

exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime 

people’s war under modern conditions.”

46. Ibid., p. 454.

47. Sun Yanxin and Ju Zhenhua, “Chinese Navy 

Normalizes Open-Sea Training,” China Military 

Online, December 12, 2012, eng.chinamil.com 

.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/

2012-12/12/content_5138811.htm.

48. 30多次军演提升综合作战能力 [“More Than 

30 Exercises Improve Comprehensive Combat 

Capability”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], 

April 15, 2009, pic.chinamil.com.cn/zt/2009

-04/15/content_1727697.htm.

49. Sun and Ju, “Chinese Navy Normalizes OpenSea Training.”

50. 海军:勇闯大洋苦练硬功 持续大抓军事训练

[“Navy: Marching into the Ocean Working Hard 

to Continuously Grasp Military Training”], 中

国军网 [China Military Online], December 12, 

2012, chn.chinamil.com.cn/zghj/2012-12/12/

content_5137937.htm.

51. Information Office of the State Council, 

China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing: 

December 2004), available at english.gov.cn/

official/2005-07/28/content_18078.htm.

52. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress 

2012, p. 19.

A maritime strategy is designed primarily to defend a nation’s homeland and associated vital national security interests on the oceans and seas. It also may incorporate 

nontraditional naval missions, which seek to maintain the security of the commons 

against threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy and 

international criminal activity, and terrorism, and to perform humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief ashore.

But maritime strategy is not simply a matter of naval forces and national security objectives; a nation’s domestic political priorities and economic demands are major, indeed 

vital, influences on developing and executing a maritime strategy. Maritime strategy subsumes naval strategy. Developing effective strategy does not result primarily from composing “overarching, erudite strategic theories” but from “day by day policy and program 

choices, backed up by thorough training and experience . . . and by a modern, multifaceted fleet capable of swift deployment and effective employment” of naval forces.1

Elements of China’s Maritime Strategy

China has not promulgated a formal maritime strategy, a failure criticized by representatives at the spring 2012 meeting of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. They 

called for the government to “formulate and promulgate a complete, comprehensive, and 

systematic maritime development strategy, with all the national political, economic, and 

military factors being brought into consideration!”2

But important Chinese governmental and Communist Party documents do address 

maritime strategic issues. One is the 1998 National Ocean Policy of China.

3

 The 1998 

Ocean Policy identifies several maritime concerns that remain pertinent today. These 

tasks have been placed within a framework of “four coordinations”: between national 

and international maritime law; among China’s many agencies concerned with the management of maritime issues; between traditional and nontraditional maritime security 

issues; and between national priorities and international paradigms.

Bernard D. Cole

What Do China’s Surface Fleet Developments Suggest 

about Its Maritime Strategy?

CHAPTER TWO
18 china maritime studies

Another is the series of biennial defense white papers first published in 1998, the most 

recent of which at this writing was published in early 2015. These papers contain important indicators of maritime strategic thought.4

 The concept of “offshore defensive operations” was addressed in the 2004 white paper, which stated that “the Navy has expanded 

the space and extended the depth for offshore defensive operations.” This verbiage was 

repeated in the 2006 iteration, then expanded in the 2008 white paper: “[S]ince the 

1980s the Navy has realized a strategic transformation to offshore defensive operations.” 

The 2010 paper discussed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) strategy 

in terms of “the requirements of offshore defensive operations” in three maritime areas 

of concern: the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. Sometimes referred to as the 

“three seas” or the “near seas,” these waters clearly are considered by Beijing to form the 

maritime arena of greatest strategic concern to the nation.5

“Offshore defensive operations” within the three seas represent a formidable national 

strategic focus. For instance, on July 8, 2010, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson 

stated, “We resolutely oppose foreign military ships and aircraft coming to the Yellow 

Sea and other Chinese adjacent waters and engaging in activities that influence China’s 

security interests.”6

 This view, combined with aggressive actions against foreign fishing craft in the South China Sea and against U.S. surveillance aircraft and ships, points 

toward a view of these waters as “sovereign” and of vital strategic concern to China.

The 2013 white paper continued to emphasize the PLAN’s responsibility “to protect the 

seas and oceans, and build China into a maritime power.” The navy was “responsible for 

safeguarding [China’s] maritime security and maintaining its sovereignty over its territorial seas” while executing “its offshore defense strategy.”

Additionally, China’s civilian and military leaders have addressed maritime strategy in 

speeches and articles. President Hu Jintao’s “Four Historic Missions” speech in 2004, for 

instance, reflected important maritime strategic interests. These included Taiwan’s status, 

maritime border issues, and “protection of China’s expanding national interests,” including missions other than war.7

 Hu returned to these themes in a December 2006 speech 

to the Party’s Central Military Commission, in which he urged the PLA “to develop 

capabilities to deal with many kinds of security threats and complete diversified military 

tasks . . . in distant waters.”8

Adm. Liu Huaqing, who may be called the father of modern China’s first global navy, 

developed a strategic plan of sorts in the 1980s. His program for modernizing the navy 

was well thought out, recognized internal PLA budget priorities (and his goal to alter 

those to increase PLAN funding), and was essentially defensive.

Liu’s “island chains” construct is best viewed as a reactive strategic paradigm, as he responded to perceived U.S.-imposed lines at sea. Liu viewed the island chains as barriers 
china

s evolving surface fleet 19

to be overcome, not as limits on China’s maritime objectives or as bases for maritime 

defensive perimeters.9

In sum, China’s “maritime strategy” is traditional: it is concerned primarily with defense 

of the homeland. Secondarily it is concerned with the other missions addressed above: 

defense against threats on the maritime commons; safeguarding economic interests, 

including the security of sea lines of communication; and responding to humanitarian 

crises afloat and ashore. Beijing’s “maritime strategy” also supports the continued rule of 

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), suggesting that China would employ its navy in 

situations for political reasons that other nations might not anticipate.

The Strategic Maritime Missions

Although China’s maritime strategy is not formally promulgated, it includes traditional 

naval missions. These support both domestic political goals, especially sovereignty concerns, and traditional economic objectives.

Defending China’s Littoral

Defense of the homeland and its littoral waters is Beijing’s number one strategic priority 

for its navy. The U.S. Navy is concerned with the regional plan of operations China apparently is developing, what non-Chinese analysts describe as antiaccess and area-denial 

(A2/AD). This plan is intended to guarantee China control of the sea in the maritime 

area deemed vital to its national security. More specifically, it is intended to prevent an 

opponent—the United States—from intervening in a scenario involving armed conflict 

with Taiwan, or other military operations in the three seas.

China presumably would rely primarily on submarines, antiship cruise missiles 

(ASCMs), and antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) to defend its maritime interests in the 

area between the Chinese coast and the second island chain, a distance of approximately 

1,600 nautical miles (nm).10 This would constitute an application of China’s policy of 

“Active Defense,” in its own view—whereas a U.S. analyst might well consider it “offensive.” The PLAN’s surface combatants likely would be responsible for a defensive line 

relatively close to the coast.

The PLAN will not be constrained by lines or Western defensive concepts in defending China’s maritime interests. Its doctrine is one of “strategically defensive and active 

self-defense counterattack,” which could be triggered “as soon as the enemy splits and 

invades China’s territory, severely harming China’s interests, . . . equivalent to firing the 

first shot at China at the strategic level.” Furthermore, the PLA’s mission is “to do all we 

can to dominate the enemy by striking first . . . as far away as possible.”11
20 china maritime studies

The 2006 Science of Campaigns ascribed to maritime operations shifting battle lines and 

the maneuverability and offensive power of naval forces. It discussed naval campaigns 

at length, noting the sea’s characteristics of openness and lack of defensive lines, which 

require taking the initiative with offensive operations to neutralize enemy forces. The 

volume emphasized flexibility and the clever employment of tactics and forces, with 

asymmetric operations on, above, and beneath the sea. Even naval defensive operations, 

in the PLAN’s view, should be imbued with an offensive spirit based on taking the initiative and attacking the opponent’s weak points.12

PLAN strategists are focused on mobile, noncontiguous, nonlinear operations that bypass the island chains to achieve specific objectives for specific periods.

Sea Lines of Communication Defense

Chinese analysts have expressed concern that the United States might intervene in 

navigational choke points to intercept seaborne energy supplies destined for Chinese 

ports. From a naval operational perspective, this so-called Malacca Dilemma is baseless, but apparently real at least to some in Beijing, and might provide maritime strategic 

rationale for PLAN planners. Maritime sovereignty disputes are a more serious strategic 

concern. So the region presents a Chinese maritime strategist with serious maritime 

security concerns, most of them attributed to U.S. containment.

Military Operations Other Than War

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) form a relatively new mission for the 

PLAN. The 2013 defense white paper assigned the navy responsibility for “law enforcement, fisheries, [and securing] oil and gas exploitation” as well as ensuring “the safe flow 

of traffic in sea areas of responsibility.” The navy also regularly performs one traditional 

naval mission not specifically addressed in these documents: presence, or naval support 

for diplomacy.

13

On a cooperative tack, the white paper touted the PLAN’s role in UN peacekeeping 

operations (UNPKOs), as well as its exercises with foreign navies. The paper took a positive slant on events and was worded for the public, but remains an important document, 

reflecting China’s maritime security concerns.

Despite the lack of a single authoritative description of China’s maritime strategy, a 

review of various Chinese documents and speeches reveals the missions that form a de 

facto maritime strategy for Beijing. This strategy seems to be driving PLAN modernization, particularly in terms of the surface ships being acquired.
china

s evolving surface fleet 21

Who Is the Strategic Opponent?

It is clear the PLAN views the U.S. Navy as “a strategic opponent of the Chinese Navy.” 

In addition, a 2012 article written by a nongovernmental analyst described Japan as an 

immediate concern, noting “naval hatred stretching over one hundred years, Diaoyu 

Islands sovereignty, maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, and the possibility of 

Japanese military interference in the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea.” Vietnam 

and the Philippines were categorized as “local tactical opponents” and India as a “potential blue-water opponent.” Summing up the strategic situation, the author concluded that 

the “Chinese navy now faces a maritime competition structure that involve[s] a broad 

maritime region, great depth, and multiple opponents.”14

The Fleet

China’s continuing economic growth, so crucial to continued CCP rule, is supported by 

one of the world’s largest and most modern merchant marines. Its effectiveness depends 

to a significant degree on the security of the maritime commons. Beijing believes that 

security requires a strong, capable navy.

For it to perform the strategic maritime missions that policy makers have outlined, they 

have directed the PLAN to continue developing and deploying “new types of submarines, frigates, aircraft, and large support vessels” while building “a shore-based support 

system which matches the deployment of forces and the development of weaponry and 

equipment.” Particularly important is “the Navy [accelerating] the building of surface 

logistical platforms [and] working to improve its surface support capabilities,” to include 

“new methods of logistics support for sustaining long-time maritime missions.”15

Purchasing Soviet combatants in the 1950s and copying Soviet models in the 1960s and 

1970s marked the first era of PLAN growth. China’s maritime strategy during this period 

focused on coastal defense or army support.

The second era was marked by acquisition of the Sovremennys from Russia and Chinese 

construction of the Luhu and Luhai classes. In the 1990s, China made a commitment to 

build a navy with a new strategic mission, usually described in the United States as “missions other than war.”

China moved into a third and most significant period of naval surface ship modernization after the turn of the twenty-first century, with indigenous construction of four 

new classes of guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) and several classes of guided-missile 

frigates (FFGs). This latest phase of ship acquisition is equipping the PLAN with its first 

warships able to support a maritime strategy focused beyond China’s littoral, throughout 

the three seas.16
22 china maritime studies

The navy’s most recent addition to the PLAN’s auxiliary forces is China’s first dedicated 

hospital ship, the Type 920, named Peace Ark, commissioned in 2008. This 23,000-tondisplacement ship has a combat mission, but to date has been Beijing’s primary platform 

for pursuing soft power, making humanitarian cruises to the western Indian Ocean and 

to the Caribbean Sea.

Future Intentions at Sea?

The decision early in the current decade to build additional underway replenishment 

ships indicates Beijing’s inclination to deploy a navy capable of operating at sea for extended periods. Two Fuchi-class oilers joined the fleet in 2005; one each was assigned to 

the East and South Sea Fleets. These are the first PLAN logistics-support ships capable 

of simultaneously providing destroyers and frigates with fuel, provisions, and ordnance. 

Two more of this class joined the fleet in 2013.17

Beijing has emphasized the navy’s increasing role in international efforts in general, 

striving “to maintain maritime security through multiple peaceful ways and means.” It 

highlighted PLAN ship visits to foreign ports, with “more than twenty naval ships” visiting “more than thirty countries.”18 Additionally, the PLAN played its first prominent role 

in MOOTW in 2011, when the frigate Xuzhou, on antipiracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden, 

was dispatched into the Mediterranean to assist in evacuating Chinese citizens trapped 

by the civil war in Libya.19 That this frigate did not actually evacuate any Chinese citizens 

is not as significant as the fact that Beijing had the confidence to dispatch a warship on 

such a mission and that the PLAN was able to execute the mission successfully.

China’s naval building program remains focused on missions in the three seas, but the 

PLAN is adapting gradually to new missions in distant seas. Only the newer destroyers and frigates are being deployed on the Gulf of Aden mission. These are the PLAN 

surface combatants well suited to escorting China’s developing carrier fleet.

During the past two decades, the PLAN has added to its fleet approximately seventeen 

DDGs, twenty-four FFGs, at least ten corvettes, and more than sixty Houbei-class patrol 

craft capable of firing cruise missiles. Additionally, three Yuzhao-class amphibious 

transport docks (LPDs) and twenty-four tank landing ships (LSTs) have been added to 

China’s amphibious force.

China’s program of naval modernization has accelerated since 2000, with most of these 

new ships commissioned during that period. This pace reflects Beijing’s expanding but 

carefully modulated strategic maritime ambitions.

As the new century’s second decade proceeds, China is deploying ships capable of 

operating in coherent, if not yet integrated, naval task forces able to project power on the 

seas. These new platforms are the beginning of the first really modern Chinese navy that 
china

s evolving surface fleet 23

may serve to deter Taiwan, thwart U.S. intervention, and secure China’s territorial claims 

in the East and South China Seas.

New Destroyers. The PLAN continues to acquire new classes of frigates and destroyers, each more technologically advanced and capable than its predecessors. These ships 

remain few in number, although not as few as the support ships necessary for the PLAN 

to execute long-range, long-term deployments on a regular basis.20

China’s new DDG classes—which should give pause to the U.S. and other navies—began 

with the Luzhou class, or Type 51C. The first ship in this class is Shenyang (DDG 115), 

launched in 2003 and commissioned in 2004. The second class member is Shijiazhuang

(DDG 116), also launched in 2003 but commissioned in 2005. The ship’s formidable 

antiair warfare (AAW) system is built around the Russian SA-N-20 Rif-M missile, the 

naval version of the S-300; acquired by China in 2002, this is a twenty-year-old but still 

daunting missile system, with an 81 nm range and maximum speed of Mach 6.

The Luzhous are also equipped to participate in the antisurface warfare (ASUW) mission area, armed with eight potent C-803 surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). The ship 

exhibits the typically limited PLAN antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability. Its primary 

ASW weapon should be the helicopter it is capable of embarking, but operating this 

aircraft is limited by the lack of a hangar.

Joining the fleet contemporarily with the Type 51C are the three Luyang ship classes, 

the Types 52B, 52C, and 52D, displacing approximately the same seven thousand tons as 

the 51C. The 52s appear to be a Chinese version of the Soviet Sovremenny-class DDGs, 

intended as a multimission naval task group’s primary ASUW platform. Their main battery is the same box-launched C-803 SSM found on the 51C.

The several Type 52C and 52D DDGs appear to be built on the same hull as the 52B 

and equipped with the same propulsion plant, guns, and ASW and electronic countermeasures capabilities. However, their primary mission is AAW; the ships’ most notable 

topside feature is an Aegis-like phased-array radar system. They apparently are armed 

with the Hongqi (HQ-9) AAW missile system, with a range of 54 nm and speed of Mach 

3, relying on semiactive radar homing. The ship also has a very capable ASUW suite, 

composed of eight C-802 SSMs in two cylindrical launchers amidships. These are the 

first Chinese combatants capable of area AAW, a key requirement for operating multiship formations.

New Frigates. The PLAN is acquiring the Jiangkai I and II–class FFGs, which, while 

significantly less capable than the DDGs, exhibit the most “stealthy” characteristics of 

any PLAN ship.They may have been designed to operate primarily in littoral waters, but 

apparently have been performing very well during extended operations in the Gulf of 

Aden.
24 china maritime studies

China also is building a new, smaller class of multimission-capable escort, the Type 056 

corvette. This 1,300-ton-displacement warship will be ideal for sale to foreign nations, 

but also provides the PLAN with an escort vessel well suited to coastal waters.21

New Amphibious Warfare Ships. Since 2000, the PLAN’s shipbuilding program has 

included modernization of its amphibious force, without significantly expanding that 

force’s capacity—the PLAN is still limited to transporting approximately one mechanized division of fully equipped troops.22

China has built more than twenty new LSTs and smaller medium landing ships (LSMs) 

since 2000, all capable of landing troops and equipment directly on a beach, over a bow 

ramp, and all equipped with a flight deck. However, all these ships have been built without hangars or aviation maintenance facilities.

These ships could serve in a Taiwan scenario, but the paucity of suitable landing beaches 

on that island and the positive trend at this writing in the relationship between Beijing 

and Taipei make an amphibious assault unlikely. Instead, recent events in the South 

China Sea and the new PLAN bases in that theater indicate that China’s amphibious 

force has a strategic focus on the disputed land features south of Hainan.

New Fast-Attack Craft. China’s newest class of small combatant is the Houbei-class catamarans, which the PLAN began building in 2004. At least sixty are now in commission 

or under construction. They are small, displacing just 250 tons, but remarkably seaworthy because of their wave-piercing hull. Each Houbei is armed with eight C-803 SSMs.

If equipped with a datalink capability, they provide the PLAN with a new capability to 

deploy anti–surface ship barriers in coastal waters that would be nearly immune from 

submarine attack and would offer a difficult target to attacking aircraft.23

Mission Capability

The surface combatant force has made major strides in the past decade, now mustering 

its first area AAW defense destroyers and more-capable ASW ships. The next destroyer 

class is reportedly well into the design process and will represent a significant increase 

in size, perhaps displacing over ten thousand tons, matching the size of the U.S. Arleigh 

Burke–class destroyers. The PLAN is focusing on the Luyang and Jiangkai classes as its 

primary surface combatants.24 The Chinese navy is building a numerically large class for 

the first time since the Luda DDGs.

Despite its new platforms, the PLAN’s command-and-control (C2) information management remains problematic, although “link” systems are in place, allowing coordinated 

operations both among ships and between a ship and its embarked helicopter. It seems 

clear that the PLAN, even in its newest ships, has yet to demonstrate the C2 capability 
china

s evolving surface fleet 25

necessary to conduct net-centric operations successfully in the twenty-first-century 

maritime battle space.

In sum, the Chinese navy at the beginning of the century was still severely limited in 

several warfare areas necessary to a modern strategic maritime force. Currently the 

PLAN is developing that credibility in all warfare areas—even if it remains marginal in 

AAW, antimine warfare (AMW), and force integration, and simply inferior in ASW.

State Oceanic Administration

China deploys a large number of smaller vessels organized under various national ministries. Beijing is attempting to increase the utility of these organizations, marked by the 

March 2013 announcement that the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) would retain 

or take administrative control of the coast guard, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, 

China Marine Surveillance, and Border Maritime Police.25 This very logical step potentially will provide a single national ministry, Land and Resources, with the capability and 

authority via which Beijing can exercise rational control over its maritime enforcement 

organizations.

Several points of uncertainty remain, however. First is the as yet unclear role of the State 

Oceanic Commission, also recently announced. Second is the unclear role and chain 

of command of the Maritime Safety Administration. Third is the issue of operational 

control of the SOA’s newly assigned units. Will the coast guard, for example, no longer be 

operationally controlled by the Ministry of Public Security? Finally, and most importantly, will the newly authoritative SOA be able to maintain its independence from the 

PLAN, which reportedly for many years has sought the ability to call on China’s “coast 

guard” forces and resources to supplement its maritime missions?

PLAN Strategic Readiness Today

The PLAN’s number of state-of-the-art ships does not yet give it the ability to dominate 

East or South Asian waters, when measured against the U.S. Navy, the Japan Maritime 

Self-Defense Force, or possibly even the Indian navy. However, measuring total naval 

forces against one another is not particularly useful in strategic terms; what is more 

meaningful is a Clausewitzian measure: How large and effective a naval force can China 

deploy against a given objective at a time of Beijing’s choosing? Whether this mission 

concerns Taiwan or an East or South China Sea objective, Beijing likely will be able to 

seize the initiative when employing its new navy.

China’s recent naval exercises and deployments have demonstrated the PLAN’s ability to 

employ twenty-first-century ships on operations to far seas. More significant than the 

number of advanced technology platforms joining the PLAN, however, is the strategic 
26 china maritime studies

maritime direction they indicate Beijing has adopted. As discussed above, the shorthand 

by which U.S. observers refer to this perceived goal is A2/AD.

The PLAN presumably is writing operational doctrine to enable its ships to play an 

important role in accomplishing A2/AD in the three seas. This comprises a coherent 

maritime strategy that reflects PLAN capabilities.

China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, joined the fleet in 2012. The ship has yet to receive 

a full carrier air wing, but organization of the PLAN’s first such wing was announced in 

May 2013.26 Beijing almost certainly will build two or more additional carriers, possibly nuclear powered. More important than the carriers themselves is their symbolism 

of Beijing’s apparent intention to deploy a navy capable of out-of-area operations on a 

sustained basis.

Beijing’s focus on maritime issues is understandable, given China’s dependence on 

seaborne trade, its 10,250 nm of coastline, and its more than 6,500 claimed islands. 

China is also the world’s leading shipbuilder and its shipping fleet is the world’s fourth 

largest. China has eight of the world’s ten largest harbors, and its “ocean-related activities” constituted almost 10 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 

2009.27 Finally, while Chinese government officials have listed as “core interests” only the 

sovereignty status of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, classifying the East and South China 

Sea disputes as “sovereignty issues” suggests that these also could be considered “core 

interests.” These disputes would then rise significantly in Beijing’s priorities and pose a 

greater chance that the PLAN would be employed to enforce strategic policies.

In a long 2011 article, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Dai Bingguo argued that China 

had been following and would continue to follow a national policy of “peaceful development” rather than following “the western powers’ practice of invasion, plunder, war, and 

expansion.” That is a very selective view of China’s history. Furthermore, as a professor 

at China’s National Defense University noted, “peaceful development . . . does not mean 

that military means are not employed.” 28

Will the beliefs embodied in Dai’s discourse affect the PLAN’s future composition, 

capability, and strategic employment? China’s mantra about future naval modernization 

includes the claim that the country never has been expansive or aggressive, nor has it 

stationed military forces overseas. All these claims are extremely debatable, given China’s 

dynastic history of expansion and foreign expeditions, but it is too soon to know to what 

extent current PLAN modernization will take Chinese forces overseas.

The PLAN’s near-term strategic focus will remain on potential Taiwan scenarios, which 

include U.S. naval intervention. East and South China Sea concerns are secondary. Future out-of-area PLAN operations likely will expand, particularly after the Taiwan issue 
china

s evolving surface fleet 27

is resolved. Such operations may focus on sea lines of communication security, but more 

practically will reflect the historically typical move by a nation gaining global economic 

status: deploying a global navy.

Two issues of particular concern to the PLAN are, first, India’s apparent maritime 

strategy of effectively controlling the Indian Ocean and, second, the potential for the 

United States to control navigational choke points crucial to China’s trade, and hence to 

its economy. Beijing may be exaggerating both concerns, but that does not reduce their 

influence in China’s maritime strategic thought, which seems to assume that the United 

States is determined to contain and encircle China. One analyst at the influential PLA 

Academy of Military Science has described the PLAN as “relatively weak,” with “China’s 

maritime security at the mercy of . . . the United States Navy.”29

Future Chinese maritime expansion will depend in large part on the nation’s continuing GDP growth and lack of serious threat to its very long land borders. In fact, China is 

already a global maritime power when one considers the nation’s existing navy, globally 

ranked merchant fleet, shipbuilding industry, and cargo-handling seaports.

Beijing must be reassessing continually how much to invest in the PLAN and how to 

employ its modernizing capabilities. Previous examples of developing nations emerging 

as global powers indicate that if China’s global economic impact continues to grow, so 

will its navy.

Beijing’s national security concerns are traditional, including defense of the homeland 

and against potential threats in the near seas, especially relating to Taiwan’s status. Additionally, the PLAN already has demonstrated its ability to conduct noncombat naval 

missions, including counterpiracy operations, evacuation of Chinese citizens from 

danger zones, disaster relief, presence, and UNPKOs.

China views the United States as the primary strategic threat to its national security 

interests, especially in view of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the 1996 Taiwan Strait 

crisis, as well as updated U.S. defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, 

and Australia. The U.S. determination to strengthen relations with Vietnam, Singapore, 

and India also causes concern in China. U.S. treaties and special relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific area paint an unfavorable strategic picture for Beijing.

China apparently is trying to beat the historical odds by transitioning from a continental to a concurrent maritime power, so as to gain the latter without losing the former.30

History does not offer ready examples of land powers also becoming sea powers, with 

France, Germany, and Russia having failed to do so. If China succeeds in building and 

deploying an effective global navy, it will have beaten the historical odds.

The PLAN has progressed from operating obsolete Soviet ships to building near-stateof-the-art combatants able to play their role in a formidable defensive maritime strategy. 
28 china maritime studies

It is deploying ships that are suitable for multimission task groups. However, Beijing 

remains focused on the three seas—while looking toward wider horizons.

Despite the lack of a public document with that title, China does have a maritime strategy. It is unremarkable and traditional for a large, wealthy nation that is expanding its 

sea power. The PLAN surface fleet is an integral component of Beijing’s maritime strategy. That strategy begins with defense of the homeland—defending the coast and littoral 

waters. For China, this encompasses a huge maritime area extending approximately 

1,600 nm from its coastline. The responsibility includes not just defense of those waters 

but defense of the extensive maritime trade on which China’s economy depends.

Second is strategic deterrence, a maritime capability the PLAN is well able to execute in 

conventional terms. The nuclear part of deterrence remains one for which China is still 

striving, but that appears to be on this side of the PLAN’s horizon.

The third element in Beijing’s maritime strategy is the ability to conduct long-range 

power projection on a situational, but if necessary recurrent, basis. The counterpiracy 

deployments to the Gulf of Aden since 2008 show that the PLAN is making progress 

toward achieving this capability.

Fourth is presence, the maritime diplomatic mission that China’s navy has demonstrated 

for the past quarter-century or more, as both warships and auxiliaries—from guidedmissile destroyers to hospital ships—visit foreign ports and participate in exercises with 

foreign navies.

Fifth, and most important, is conducting combat operations at sea. This obviously is the 

first reason for which navies are created.

Former U.S. commander of Pacific forces Adm. Robert Willard stated that China “aspires to become a ‘global military (power)’ by extending its influence beyond its regional 

waters.”31 Some believe that a Chinese drive to global power will lead to conflict with 

the United States.32 That is far from certain, but the possibility must influence U.S. naval 

strategic thought.

China is building and deploying a twenty-first-century navy to be able to defend its 

interests at sea. A new force of surface combatants armed with impressive ASCMs and 

with growing AAW capabilities is emerging rapidly to serve Beijing’s maritime strategy.

Notes

1. Adm. Arleigh Burke’s thoughts, restated by David Alan Rosenberg in “Process: The Realities of 

Formulating Modern Naval Strategy,” in Mahan 

Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference 

on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral 

Sir Herbert Richmond, ed. James Goldrick and 

John B. Hattendorf, Historical Monograph 10 

(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1993), p. 

144ff.

2. See, for instance, Fei Shiting and Chen Xiaojing, 

“Enrich and Strengthen the Nation through 

Maritime Development—PLA Deputies to the 

NPC Call for Introducing a Maritime Strategy,” 
china

s evolving surface fleet 29

Jiefangjun Bao, March 9, 2012, Open Source 

Center [hereafter OSC] CPP20120309787007, p. 

7; Rear Adm. Yin Zhou’s statement in “China’s 

Maritime Strategy Being Tested amid South 

China Sea Disputes,” Caijing, October 24, 2011, 

available at english.caijing.com.cn/2011-10

-24/110914257.html; and Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, 

quoted in Russell Hsiao, “Military Delegates 

Call for National Maritime Strategy,” Jamestown 

Foundation China Brief 11, no. 4 (March 10, 

2011), www.jamestown.org/. The degree of 

policy-making incoherence in Beijing was indicated in a July 2011 speech by Maj. Gen. 

Zhu Chenghu, reported at opinion.huanqiu

.com/roll/2011-07/1792964.html (no longer 

available online). Zhu called for a South China 

Sea strategy “where the lead agency is the State 

Oceanic Administration with input from the 

PLA, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], [Public 

Security Bureau], [Ministry of Commerce], 

Ministries of Agriculture, Transportation, Defense, Customs, and coastal provinces.”

3. This is an old document, but it still seems to 

describe China’s current maritime policies accurately. Information Office of the State Council, 

National Ocean Policy of China (Beijing: May 

1998), available at www.jodc.go.jp/info/ioc_doc/

Technical/158387e.pdf. But also see “China 

Issues Plan for Maritime Development,” Xinhua,

April 26, 2012, news.xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2012-04/25/c_131551501.htm.

4. Found at china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/

node_7114675.htm.

5. See Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Near 

Seas ‘Anti-navy Capabilities,’ Not Nascent Blue 

Water Fleet, Constitute China’s Core Challenge 

to U.S. and Regional Militaries,” China SignPost, no. 55 (March 6, 2012), available at www

.chinasignpost.com/wp-content/uploads/

2012/03/China-SignPost-55_Strategic-Horizon

_1A_Near-Seas-Are-The-Real-Challenge

_20120306.pdf.

6. Statement is at www.mfa.gov.cn/chngxh/tyb/

fyrbt/jzhsl/t714888.htm.

7. Discussed in James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu 

and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Mission,’” China 

Leadership Monitor, no. 27 (January 9, 2009), 

available at www.fnvaworld.org/download/

tibet-related-oc/Hu-PLAs-missions-2008.pdf.

8. Quoted in “Chinese President Meets Deputies 

for Military Meetings,” Xinhua, December 7, 

2011, news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/

2011-12/06/c_131291648.htm.

9. See Bernard D. Cole, “Drawing Lines at Sea,” 

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137/11/1,305 

(November 2011), available at www.usni.org/

magazines/proceedings/2011-11/drawing-lines

-sea.

10. Sixteen hundred nautical miles is the approximate distance from Shanghai to Palau, 

from Shanghai to Brunei, and from Shanghai to 

Guam (1,670 nm).

11. A2/AD apparently is not discussed, per se, in Chinese literature, although in Shi Xiaoqin, “Boundaries and Directions of China’s Seapower,” in 

Twenty-First Century Seapower: Cooperation and 

Conflict at Sea, ed. Peter Dutton, Robert Ross, 

and Oystein Tunsjo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 137, the author advocates 

that the PLAN develop “the capacity to deny 

access to the [U.S.] navy to China’s sea territory.” 

The PLA’s “Active Strategic Counterattacks on 

Exterior Lines” approximates that operational 

policy and is discussed in Anton Lee Wishik II, 

“An Anti-access Approximation: The PLA’s Active Strategic Counterattacks on Exterior Lines,” 

China Security, no. 19 (2011), pp. 37–48. Peng 

Guangqian [Maj. Gen.], Research on China Military Strategy Issues (Beijing: PLA Press, 2006), 

p. 248, quoted in Wishik, “An Anti-access Approximation,” p. 41, and in Michael A. McDevitt, 

“The PLA Navy Anti-access Role in a Taiwan 

Contingency” (paper prepared for the 2010 Pacific Symposium, “China’s Naval Modernization: 

Cause for Storm Warnings,” National Defense 

Univ., Washington, DC, June 10, 2010), p. 3.

12. 张玉良 [Zhang Yuliang], ed., 战役学 [The Science of Campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense 

Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 52, 577–79. Excerpt 

furnished by Dennis Blasko.

13. A useful summary is in Ni Eryan, “Putting 

Weapons Down to Achieve Peace: The Calmness of PLA Diplomacy,” Feng Huang Chou 

Kan (Hong Kong), no. 378 (October 15, 2010), 

OSC CPP20101018787005, pp. 42–43; also see 

Kamlesh K. Agnihotri, “Military Operations 

Other Than War: PLA Navy’s Role in ‘Peaceful 

Development’ of China,” National Maritime 

Foundation, n.d., www.maritimeindia.org/

CommentryView.aspx?NMFCID=1230; and 

Taylor Fravel, “Why ‘Non-combat’ PLA Operations Are Vital for China’s Regime Stability,” 

Global Asia 6, no. 2 (June 2011), available at 

www.globalasia.org/V6N2_Summer_2011/

M_Taylor_Fravel.html.

14. Hai Tao, “The Chinese Navy Has a Long 

Way to Go to Get to the Far Seas,” Guoji 

Xianqu Daobao (Beijing), January 6, 2012, OSC 

CPP20120109671003; PLAN officers, discussions with author, various dates and locations. 

Hai is a nongovernmental analyst.
30 china maritime studies

15. “Chinese Navy Sees Role Further Afield,” 

Xinhua, April 22, 2009, OSC CPP20090422968187.

16. “China Takes a Proactive and Open Attitude 

toward Intl. Escort Cooperation,” Xinhua, March 

31, 2011, news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/

china/2011-03/31/c_13806943.htm.

17. Ship and weapons systems information comes 

from various Jane’s Information Group 

publications.

18. People’s Republic of China Ministry of National 

Defense, China’s National Defense in 2010, available at eng.mod.gov.cn/.

19. Xinhua, “China Evacuates 12,000 from Libya, 

Sends Frigate to Help,” China Daily, February 25, 

2011, available at www.chinadaily.com.cn/

china/2011-02/25/content_12075249.htm; 

Xinhua, “Chinese Navy Frigate Arrives Waters 

off Libya for Escort Mission,” People’s Daily,

March 1, 2011, available at english.peopledaily 

.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7305215.html.

20. Ship and weapons systems information in this 

section comes from various Jane’s Information 

Group publications.

21. The U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ship pales in 

comparison with the Type 056 in every category 

except speed and endurance.

22. Ship and weapons systems information in this 

section comes from various Jane’s Information 

Group publications.

23. Ship and weapons systems information in this 

section comes from various Jane’s Information 

Group publications.

24. Ship and weapons systems information in this 

section comes from various Jane’s Information 

Group publications.

25. This reorganization is reported in “China to 

Restructure Oceanic Administration, Enhance 

Maritime Law Enforcement,” Xinhua, March 10, 

2013, news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013

-03/10/c_132221768.htm.

26. On Liaoning (ex-Varyag), see Norman Friedman, “A Long Wait,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 137/10/1,304 (October 2011), pp. 

88–89. Friedman provides an excellent analysis 

of this ship’s history and problematic future, 

noting that it has been under construction 

since the early 1980s. An indigenously built 

carrier is discussed in Kathrin Hille, “China 

Reveals Aircraft Carrier Plans,” Financial Times,

December 17, 2010, available at www.ft.com/

cms/s/O/fa7f5e6a-09cc-11e0-8b29-00144feabdc0 

.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz18NkTvXM6; Lin Liyao, 

“Ex-Varyag Carrier May Join PLA Navy in 

2012,” China.org.cn, March 10, 2012, www.china

.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2012/2012-03/10/

content_24860546.htm. Also see “China’s 

Aircraft Carrier Finishes 9th Sea Trial,” Xinhua,

July 31, 2012, news.xinhuanet.com/english/

photo/2012-07/31/c_131749394.htm; and 

“PLAN Establish Carrier Air Wing,” Malaysia 

Flying Herald, May 13, 2013, available at 

malaysiaflyingherald.wordpress.com/

2013/05/13/plan-establish-carrier-air-wing/.

27. These data are from Yang Mingjie, “Sailing 

on a Harmonious Sea: A Chinese Perspective,” Global Asia 5, no. 4 (Winter 2010), 

p. 24, also at www.siis.org.cn/Sh_Yi_Cms/

Mgz/.../20121916530B210.pdf.

28. Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the 

Path of Peaceful Development” (Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs statement, Beijing, September 

15, 2011), available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/

zxxx/t860218.htm. The latter quote is from Han 

Xudong, “Peaceful Development Also Requires 

Military Support,” Liaowang, no. 27 (July 4–10, 

2011), p. 68, available at www.9abc.net/index 

.php/archives/5711.

29. Shi, “Boundaries and Directions of China’s 

Seapower,” p. 67.

30. See Gong Jianhua, “Sea Dispute a Real Test for 

China,” China Daily, June 8, 2011, available at 

usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011/06/08/

content_12656288.htm. Historically, only the 

United States has been able to exercise both continental and maritime power; Moscow’s attempt 

to do so in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to 

the Soviet Union’s downfall.

31. Quoted in Yoichi Kato, “U.S. Commander Says 

China Aims to Be a ‘Global Military’ Power,” 

Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 2010, available 

at www.asahi.com/english/TKY201201270279 

.html.

32. See, for instance, John J. Mersheimer, “China’s 

Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 

(April 2006), pp. 160–62, and Robert S. Ross, 

“China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, 

and the U.S. Response,” International Security

34, no. 2 (Fall 2009), pp. 46–81. On the Chinese 

side, see Yang Yi, “China Must Have Strong 

Navy,” Xinhua, December 5, 2011, available at 

www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-12/02/

content_14200571.htm. A more questioning 

position is offered in Bernard D. Cole, The Great 

Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First 

Century, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), and in Liu Zhongmin, “Some 

Thoughts on the Issue of Sea Power and the Rise 

of Great Nations,” World Economy and Politics,

no. 12 (December 2007), p. 22 note 24.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) forces are organized into three fleets: 

the North Sea Fleet (NSF), the East Sea Fleet (ESF), and the South Sea Fleet (SSF). 

Together they are charged with covering and protecting waters extending from China’s 

lengthy coastline.

The NSF is responsible for defending the Bo Hai (Gulf of Chihli) and Yellow Sea, and its 

nations of responsibility are North Korea and South Korea. Since this maritime area is 

closest to Beijing, China’s capital, naval specialists sometimes call the NSF the “Imperial 

Guard Fleet.”

The area of responsibility of the ESF is the East China Sea and the northeasternmost 

area of the South China Sea. So the ESF is believed to be tasked with preparing for a 

Taiwan crisis, operating around Japan’s southwestern island chain, and patrolling the 

Bashi Channel / Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippine Islands. The ESF’s 

hypothetical adversaries long have been both the robust naval forces of the Self-Defense 

Fleet (SDF) of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the mighty Seventh 

Fleet of the U.S. Navy, which have been close naval partners under the Japan–United 

States alliance for decades.

The SSF long has been charged with protecting China’s national interests in the South 

China Sea, where the maritime security situation has been complicated by maritime 

disputes among the coastal states in the area. In particular, China’s varied and unique 

unilateral claims in the South China Sea make the roles and mission of the SSF very 

complicated. The scope of the SSF’s operations is broad, from the most difficult antisubmarine warfare (ASW) against submarines belonging to regional navies and the U.S. 

Navy to potentially complex amphibious warfare landings to seize remote and isolated 

islands.

Thus, to support China’s strategic objectives and protect its national interests, the PLAN 

has to maintain three separate fleets. The nature of China’s geopolitical situation makes 

integrated operations and mutual support efforts among them difficult to conduct in 

general.

Yoji Koda

CHAPTER THREE

A Japanese Perspective on China’s Evolving Surface Fleet
32 china maritime studies

The PLAN Destroyer/Frigate Force

From 1990 to the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the PLAN tried 

to find the best solution for its fleets by building as many types of destroyers (DDs) as 

possible, but in small numbers. The PLAN has commissioned eight types of destroyers since 1990. These included two 4,700-ton Luhus (052A) in 2004 and one 6,100-ton 

Luhai (051B) in 1999. China also purchased two sets of two Russian-built Sovremennys, 

Type Is in 1999/2001 and Type IIs in 2005/2006. All four were assigned to the ESF as 

“pinch hitters,” ready to fill a naval resource gap revealed during the 1996 Taiwan crisis. 

In parallel with the Russian purchase, two 7,000-ton Luyang Is (052B) were completed in 

2004, followed by two 7,200-ton Luzhou I (051C) sisters in 2006 and 2007.1

From this experience, the PLAN ultimately decided to build a single class of destroyers—the Luyang II (052C) sisters—in great numbers.2

 The PLAN commissioned two 

7,200-ton Luyang IIs (052C) in 2005. They greatly resembled the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh 

Burke–class guided-missile destroyer (DDG 51).3

 Follow-on ships were not built during 

the next eight years, but eventually construction resumed, with a new ship (DD 150) 

commissioned in 2013.

The reason for this interruption is unknown, but it probably was necessary for the 

PLAN to conduct at-sea system qualification tests, fleet acceptance tests, and fleet 

tactical-operational evaluations in realistic, even fierce, simulated combat environments. 

These tests and evaluations always take time; in cases of complicated and sophisticated 

systems, they can take two to three years to complete. Then it can take many years to 

implement corrective measures to the malfunctions or shortcomings discovered during 

the tests and evaluations. So it is not unusual to see a period of interruption during the 

construction timeline. There are also rumors that improvements to facilities at construction dockyards were another reason for the six-to-eight-year Luyang II “construction 

holiday.”

In the renewed construction period, the PLAN has shifted to an improved and more 

modern Luyang III (052D). The first ship of this class was commissioned in early 2014. 

It looks as if the PLAN, like the U.S. Navy, finally has started to build a single class of 

destroyer in large numbers.

Frigate (FF) construction has proceeded in a very similar fashion, albeit at a faster pace. 

After the construction of fourteen Jiangwei Is and IIs (2,300 tons) in the 1990s and the 

first half of the first decade of the 2000s and two Jiangkai Is (4,000 tons) in 2005 and 

2006 as intermediate transition ships, the PLAN started quantitative production of its 

latest Jiangkai II–class frigates (4,000 tons). Since 2008, sixteen Jiangkai II frigates have 

entered fleet service. The Jiangkai II is a handsome ship, with good stealth design, and its 

combat systems look modern.
china

s evolving surface fleet 33

There are about fifteen old Luda-family (modified ex-Soviet Kotlin) destroyers and 

about twenty-five obsolete Jianghu I/II–family frigates in fleet service today. However, 

given their long service lives and outdated combat systems, all these aged destroyers and 

frigates are likely to be retired by 2020.

Destroyer/Frigate Force Strength in 2020

What might the PLAN’s surface fleet look like five to ten years from now? A March 

2013 edition of the Japanese publication Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World) provides 

estimates of the likely order of battle of the PLAN fleet in 2020. It will serve as a basis for 

discussion in the sections below.4

North Sea Fleet. According to Sekai no Kansen, the NSF likely will have six destroyers 

and five frigates in 2020. Both destroyers and frigates will be of the most modern classes 

of these ships in the PLAN. Table 1 provides details.5

East Sea Fleet. The ESF, which has been the PLAN’s largest and most capable fleet, 

likely will be upgraded with six Aegis-like ships, i.e., four Luyang II and two Luyang III 

destroyers. Adding these to the four Russian-built Sovremenny sisters will improve the 

ESF’s destroyer force substantially. One noteworthy element of the Sovremenny destroyer 

is its formidable antisurface warfare (ASUW) capability, provided by SS-N-21 antiship 

missiles. The Mach 2-plus–capable SS-N-21 has been regarded as the toughest surfaceto-surface missile (SSM) threat against the surface forces of free-world navies since Cold 

War days. In this regard, the combination of the ASUW capability of the Sovremennys 

and the antiair warfare (AAW) capability of the Luyang sisters will provide wellbalanced combat capabilities to the ESF, whose potential opponents long have been the 

SDF of the JMSDF and the Seventh Fleet of the U.S. Navy. Four old Luda destroyers 

most likely will be decommissioned.

In 2013, the ESF operated sixteen new frigates and about ten old frigates. However, 

unlike the destroyer forces, no new frigates will be added to the inventory. Instead, it is 

likely that about ten aging frigates will be taken out of service by 2020. As a result, in 

2020 the ESF will comprise ten destroyers and sixteen frigates. Table 2 provides details.

Type Class 2013 2020

DD 051C Luzhou 2 2

052A Luhu 2 2

052D Luyang III 0 2

FF 054A Jiangkai II 0 5

Table 1
34 china maritime studies

South Sea Fleet. The SSF has been in the spotlight owing to the intensification of South 

China Sea maritime sovereignty issues. For the PLAN to protect China’s national interests and fully support the country’s South China Sea policies, it must improve and maintain a robust and capable SSF. The estimated force strength of the fleet in 2020 will be 

only a bit smaller than that of the ESF. In 2020, the SSF likely will have eight destroyers 

and twelve frigates.

The SSF likely will possess six total Luyang II and III DDs, equal to the ESF’s. Its frigate 

force will be a little smaller than the ESF’s; however, the newest eight Jiangwei IIs will 

provide more operational flexibility in relation to the many Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) navies operating in the South China Sea.

The absence from the inventory of the SSF of the ASUW-oriented Sovremenny provides 

a striking contrast with the ESF. However, if we take into account the importance of 

ASW in SSF operations, it is natural for the PLAN to assign only Luyang-family destroyers and Jiangkai II frigates to the SSF.

Like the other two fleets, the SSF likely will decommission five Ludas and twelve 

Jianghus of multiple variants by 2020. Table 3 provides details of force compositions.

Type Class 2013 2020

DD Sovremenny I/II 4 4

052C Luyang II 0 4

052D Luyang III 0 2

FF 054A Jiangkai II 4 4

054 Jiangkai I 2 2

053H3 Jiangwei II 6 6

053H2G Jiangwei I 4 4

Table 2

Type Class 2013 2020

DD 052B Luyang I 2 2

052C Luyang II 2 2

052D Luyang III 0 5

FF 054A Jiangkai II 6 8

053H3 Jiangwei II 4 4

Table 3

Note: Obsolete destroyer and frigate classes are not included.

Note: Obsolete destroyer and frigate classes are not included.
china

s evolving surface fleet 35

The PLAN’s DD/FF Fleets in Comparison

How do the PLAN’s three fleets compare with the navies of major regional states—especially the JMSDF’s SDF and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Fleet (ROKF)? Table 4 

provides a detailed comparison of the three navies in 2020, as projected.

Even in 2020, each Chinese fleet still will be inferior in destroyer and frigate strengths to 

either the Japanese or Korean fleet’s. For example, the ESF will be only about 28 percent 

(10/36) the size of the SDF in numbers of destroyers, and 62 percent (26/42) in total 

destroyer and frigate numbers. Similarly, the NSF will be much smaller than the ROKF 

in 2020. Nonetheless, each PLAN fleet generally will be of good quality and capable of 

meeting mission requirements for each region.

The PLAN will continue to face several challenges, the most fundamental being the 

PLAN’s surface force allocation problem. Owing to China’s geopolitical realities, the 

PLAN needs to maintain three separate fleets on its three maritime fronts. In most of the 

possible national maritime crises of the future, it still would not be strategically feasible 

to concentrate destroyers and/or frigates from the different fleets into one force to take 

care of the problem in question. In the near future, the PLAN cannot resolve this classic 

military challenge of dispersion versus concentration of force. So the strength of each 

PLAN fleet will remain inferior to that of the SDF or the ROKF, to say nothing of the 

combined power of the SDF and the U.S. Navy (USN) Seventh Fleet.

The next challenge is resource allocation for new requirements. At some point in the future, the PLAN will operate aircraft carriers as part of carrier battle/strike groups (CVB/

SGs). When this happens, it will need destroyers and frigates to form screening forces 

for CVB/SGs.

Another new future problem will be providing a force for Indian Ocean deployments. 

China’s dependence on sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that pass through the Indian Ocean likely will increase substantially, so the PLAN very likely will be tasked with 

operating and safeguarding them.

However, the total force strength of the PLAN’s DD/FF force in 2020 barely will meet the 

requirements of the three regional fleets. Because of the time-consuming nature of surface force buildup, a rapid and substantial increase of the DD/FF force is not likely. Even 

more worrisome for China, taking some of the already-assigned DDs/FFs from each 

Fleet PLAN SDF ROKF

NSF ESF SSF

Strength 6 DDs 10 DDs 9 DDs 36 DDs 12 DDs

5 FFs 16 FFs 12 FFs 6 FFs 6 FFs

Table 4
36 china maritime studies

mission-challenged fleet to create new CVB/SG screening forces and an Indian Ocean 

SLOC patrol force would end up creating more risk for the PLAN. In sum, establishing 

by 2020 any new add-on forces—e.g., organizing new fleets with the same force strength 

as the three current fleets—will be difficult. This could pose a serious dilemma for the 

PLAN.

The fourth challenge involves the actual capabilities of the new equipment. The PLAN’s 

modern destroyers and frigates—especially the Luyang II/III destroyers and Jiangkai II 

frigates—operate lots of new equipment and systems. However, on the basis of available 

information, such as observations of the PLAN’s at-sea training and exercises conducted 

around Japanese waters, it is doubtful that the systems’ true capabilities, especially for 

extreme performance in a realistic combat environment, have been tested effectively. 

The same goes for the tactics for fully employing the new equipment—it is unlikely they 

have been developed properly. These are many unknowns, but generally speaking the 

PLAN’s new equipment and the tactics for employing them, especially to conduct ASW, 

AAW, antiship missile defense, and electronic warfare (EW), may not be well tested or 

sufficiently developed.

The Aegis System as a Comparative Case Study

The history of the U.S. Navy’s development of today’s Aegis combat systems and their 

Burke-class platform sheds light on how difficult this process can be. Aegis represents 

the summit of USN AAW development, which began in December 1941. After the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific, USN fleet air defense had great difficulty stopping 

the naval aviation of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). In particular, after late 1944, the 

protection of surface forces, especially carrier task forces, from fierce, massive kamikaze 

air attacks provided the U.S. Navy one of its most severe challenges.

However, after suffering bitterly from casualties resulting from IJN air attacks, the U.S. 

Navy became able to protect its surface forces by developing AAW networks that consisted of radar picket ships with air-surveillance radars; the carriers’ own radar; combat 

information centers; radar-directed combat air patrol fighters providing distant AAW; 

and layers of different kinds of antiaircraft guns (5-inch, 40 mm, 20 mm), with firecontrol systems providing terminal air defense.

However, the debut of jet fighters after World War II fundamentally changed the game; 

the effectiveness of using gun systems to provide terminal air defense came into question. To resolve this challenge, the U.S. Navy started to develop surface-to-air missile 

(SAM) systems. This involved fully integrating the infant computer and rocket technologies from the mid-1940s into developmental efforts. By the mid-to-late 1950s, three sets 

of first-generation SAM systems (Talos, Terrier, and Tartar) began fleet service, with 
china

s evolving surface fleet 37

Western navies widely referring to them as 3-T systems. These 3-T systems were considered the most successful SAM systems in the 1960s and ’70s.

As Soviet air threats against USN surface forces, especially carrier battle groups, became 

tougher and more complex, the U.S. Navy launched a new development attempt, nicknamed “Typhon,” that incorporated a revolutionary technological breakthrough. The 

basic idea of this AAW system was to engage multiple targets simultaneously at long 

distance. However, the attempt failed because of too many technological challenges, and 

the program was abandoned.

Around the same time, in parallel with the Typhon development, the U.S. Navy started 

improving SAM systems to meet the new threats fully by integrating the most sophisticated missile technologies of the time. One measure was integrating Terrier and Tartar 

into the Standard Missile System (SMS). The attempt was successful, and the first generation of standardized SAM, SM-1, went into fleet service in the early 1970s.

However, the Soviet air threat in the 1970s and ’80s also made a jump in progress 

by introducing various longer-range, very capable SSMs, air-to-surface missiles, and 

underwater-to-surface missiles. In this extremely difficult environment, even the latest 

SM-1 system was considered insufficient to meet new Soviet air threats. Therefore, the 

U.S. Navy had no alternative to developing new shipboard AAW systems with revolutionary concepts and ideas.

New technology and, more importantly, huge lessons learned from Typhon development 

supported this new attempt. The resultant shipboard AAW system, having the capability to engage multiple targets simultaneously at long distances, was named Aegis. Major 

areas of development included command and control, phased-array radar, and the nextgeneration SM-2 SMS.

During the late 1970s and early ’80s, extensive at-sea tests were conducted on board USS 

Norton Sound (AVM 1), a World War II seaplane tender converted into a missile test 

ship. Without this at-sea testing, the development of the Aegis system might have experienced serious troubles or even failed.

The first operational Aegis cruiser (CG), USS Ticonderoga (CG 47), was commissioned 

in 1983. Even after the commissioning of the early production groups of Aegis CGs and 

DDGs, the Aegis combat system was improved and updated continuously by collecting 

data and deriving lessons learned from thousands of live-firing tests and exercises. Without these lessons learned from a long operational history and uninterrupted improvements, supported by state-of-the-art technologies and a robust industrial base, today’s 

Aegis systems might have been impossible.

There are so many unknowns about the PLAN’s Aegis-like ships and systems. But the 

JMSDF has been keeping a keen, intense watch over all naval activities in Chinese waters 
38 china maritime studies

for some time, and there have been very few confirmed at-sea testing operations associated with the development of the PLAN’s systems. Thus, it may be fair to conclude that 

the PLAN’s Aegis-like systems are untested at sea.

The Remaining Challenges

The fifth challenge is the training posture, especially for ASW and AAW, of the PLAN’s 

surface force. On the basis of the JMSDF’s accumulated surveillance experience, the 

sophistication and maturity of the PLAN’s at-sea exercises and training events are far 

below Western navies’ standards. These criticisms apply to all elements of naval training basics, such as the training ranges around Chinese (Yellow Sea and East China Sea) 

and Japanese waters (northwestern Pacific), training support postures, and exercise 

scenarios.

The PLAN—especially its DD/FF force—likely has been making its best effort to correct 

these shortfalls and will continue to do so. However, it will not be easy for the PLAN, 

which is somewhat isolated owing to China’s nonaligned policy, to make rapid and 

meaningful progress in a short, limited time.

Regarding the JMSDF, which has had the world’s best allied partner-navy (the U.S. Navy) 

as an instructor and mentor since its founding, it is fair to say that it took twenty or even 

thirty years to grow into a really capable and functioning maritime partner. One striking 

difference between the JMSDF and the PLAN in this regard is that the JMSDF was built 

on human resources inherited from the IJN, which had seventy-six years of history and 

experience as a blue-water, oceangoing navy, with skills in all the conventional naval 

warfare areas. The PLAN is a growing and robust navy, but it is still a kind of branch 

service of the huge PLA, which is still largely focused on land power.

Last but not least are PLAN ASW capabilities, which must face the growing submarine 

forces of other Asian navies. Some regional navies have been undergoing ambitious submarine buildup programs since the turn of the century. For example, it is public knowledge that Indonesia’s navy has a plan to introduce about ten submarines, and Vietnam’s 

navy already has received three of six Russian Kilos.6

 The Singaporean navy already 

operates four submarines. In addition to a training submarine in France, the Malaysian 

navy has two operational submarines in its fleet inventory.

In addition to these ASEAN navies in the South China Sea, the ROK Navy reportedly 

plans to build about twenty submarines, and in December 2010 the JMSDF announced 

plans to increase the number of its operational submarines from sixteen to twenty-two. 

In addition to these submarine forces of regional navies, it is clear that the U.S. Navy 

is prepared to deploy its nuclear-powered submarines—the finest in the world—to the 

region when necessary.
china

s evolving surface fleet 39

When the fundamental nature of ASW—i.e., 24/7 warfare—is taken into account, the 

PLAN will face a serious and complex ASW challenge in its surrounding waters, especially in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

Having said all the above, we should not underestimate the PLAN’s capabilities. Similarly, overestimation without concrete evidence is also a dangerous thing.

Aircraft Carriers

For China and the PLAN, having aircraft carriers (CVs) clearly has been an enduring 

dream, a symbol of having a world-class navy and being a superpower. For the PLAN, 

the carrier will be a key asset to complete missions successfully so as to support national 

objectives, especially strategic and tactical strikes, sea control, fleet air defense to support 

ASW, and noncombat missions. These represent the elements of a carrier’s added value 

that so attract today’s force planners and strategic thinkers.

However, this being said, what is the operational relationship between a carrier’s capability and China’s antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy? Is the carrier an essential 

element of China’s A2/AD strategy or not? In open-source information on China’s A2/

AD posture, antiship ballistic missiles and submarines often are discussed as the primary 

enablers of the strategy, with no mention of the carrier. What, then, is the PLAN’s rationale for having two or more CVs in the future?

Another factor that may mitigate the effectiveness of the PLAN’s carrier is weak and 

insufficient CV-protection capability. Of course, the carrier has been a magnificent military asset for almost all naval warfare since 1941. But a carrier is also a high-value asset 

that must be protected. During World War II, the IJN and U.S. Navy contrasted strikingly in this regard. After 1943, the U.S. Navy was extremely successful at protecting its 

overwhelming CV forces from both air threats and submarine attacks. The IJN, however, 

did an extremely bad job at CV protection, and ultimately lost twelve carriers to USN air 

attacks and eight to submarine attacks, out of a total force of twenty-four carriers.

If we consider the PLAN’s current and near-future AAW and ASW capabilities in light 

of the rapidly expanding submarine forces of regional navies, the PLAN surely will 

face serious problems in the area of CV protection. The PLAN has been taking steps 

to remedy these deficiencies. However, considering the JMSDF’s experience improving 

its own ASW and AAW capabilities, it may take decades for China to improve them 

significantly.

Amphibious Ship Force

The PLAN has been constructing the 19,000-ton Yuzhao-class amphibious ship (071) 

since 2008.7

 Three ships are in fleet service now, with one more currently fitting out. In 
40 china maritime studies

addition to these ships, the PLAN operates a total of seventeen 5,000-ton tank landing 

ships (LSTs) of three different classes (Yuting II, Yuting I, and Yukan). Moreover, six 

medium landing ships (LSMs) (2,000 tons) and forty-four mechanized landing craft 

(LCMs) are in active service. Table 5 shows estimated amphibious ship assignments to 

the three fleets through 2020.

This table clearly projects that in 2020 the PLAN will be focusing its amphibious ships 

on the South China Sea, where many territorial disputes remain unsettled. At the same 

time, however, the SSF’s DD/FF component, which will be tasked with escorting the 

large amphibious ships, will be relatively small. This may be another problem for the 

PLAN should it attempt to conduct amphibious operations in the South China Sea. The 

growing number of submarines in Southeast Asian navies will make the PLAN’s forceprotection equation more difficult than before.

Another related element is the PLAN’s capability to conduct an opposed amphibious 

landing in a hostile threat environment. Currently, only the U.S. military is capable of 

doing so. The U.S. Navy–Marine Corps (USN-USMC) team established and polished 

this type of operation, including its tactics and equipment, through the island-hopping 

operations in the Pacific during World War II, and in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. 

But it took a long time before the USN-USMC team became an amphibious combat 

force to be reckoned with, and the capability was purchased at an extremely high cost 

during the war in the Pacific.

The PLAN’s capability to conduct this type of operation should be examined carefully. It 

would be a lot easier for the PLAN to conduct an opposed amphibious operation against 

islands in the South China Sea if the U.S. Navy were not in the area. This is one of the 

reasons China developed the PLAN’s A2/AD strategy, which tries to exclude the U.S. 

Navy from this area.

NSF ESF SSF

Kunlunshan 4

Yuting II 2 2 10

Yuting I 5 5

Yukan 7

LSM 4 6

Capacity (personnel) 500 5,000 7,000

DD/FF force 6 DDs, 5 FFs 10 DDs, 16 FFs 9 DDs, 12 FFs

Table 5
china

s evolving surface fleet 41

Fast-Attack Craft

In recent years, the PLAN’s new fast-attack craft (FAC), the Houbei-class missile boat, has 

attracted the attention of regional and U.S. navies. The Houbei-class FAC incorporates 

many new features into its design, such as stealthy construction and shape, a wave-piercing 

catamaran hull with a top speed of more than thirty-five knots, and two sets of quad 

launchers for the YJ-83 antiship cruise missile (100 nm range, Mach 1.5 top speed). This 

boat is likely the most suitable terminal-defense asset against an incoming enemy surface 

force of any kind. The PLAN likely has built more than sixty Houbei FACs to date.

However, considering the research and experience of the JMSDF, there are several 

aspects to consider with respect to the real operational capability of this new equipment. 

For perspective: The JMSDF established a goal of building a robust coastal-defense force 

to counter a possible Soviet army landing on Japanese territory, especially the northern 

part. At the same time, the FAC also seemed as if it would be effective at conducting 

coastal defense and supporting straits-blockade operations. In the late 1980s the JMSDF 

selected several types of high-speed SSM boats as strong candidates to perform these 

missions.

In those days, aside from antilanding operations, one of the JMSDF’s strategic tasks was 

to control three straits: Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya. Such control would turn them into 

bottlenecks for the Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet, homeported at Vladivostok. For years the 

JMSDF conducted in-depth and precise war-gaming and scientific research as well as 

mathematical and operational analyses. It concluded that the FACs were so vulnerable to 

air threats that their survivability in combat situations would be extremely low.

In addition to this, targeting information on enemy ships, which would be a key to 

successful operations by the surviving small number of lucky boats, constituted another 

serious problem. It became clear that in many combat scenarios the JMSDF’s fleet of one 

hundred P-3C aircraft would not be able to provide sufficient target information.

To achieve its coastal-defense posture under the alliance, the JMSDF had a plan to 

introduce three sets of six-missile-boat squadrons in three areas. However, the abovementioned research and examinations showed that about four boats would be destroyed 

before they could reach missile firing points. The remaining two boats would be able—

barely—to fire eight missiles against enemy combatants, but also would be destroyed, 

while returning to base. So a six-boat squadron would disappear after a single sortie. 

P-3Cs conducting the surveillance and targeting mission also would suffer substantial 

losses during their operations.

The JMSDF’s appetite for this type of small FAC faded very quickly, so it stopped its program after building three hydrofoil boats in the early 1990s. Then, in the early part of the 

following decade, it built six high-speed SSM boats with a gliding-hull design. However, 
42 china maritime studies

the main mission of the latter FACs was not SSM attacks against enemy landing forces 

but quick reaction to North Korea’s covert seaborne infiltration attempts against Japan’s 

coastal waters.

Of course, FACs have other capabilities, especially in peacetime, such as offshore patrol. 

The PLAN seems to have launched an ambitious FAC production program; however, the 

FAC is one of the most difficult naval assets to operate, and it is doubtful the PLAN has 

undertaken the types of in-depth analyses the JMSDF conducted.

In recent years the PLAN has pursued an ambitious surface force buildup program. 

However, over the next ten years the PLAN’s surface force strength will remain insufficient even to fulfill all the PLAN’s requirements for the three regional fleets. This is the 

time-consuming reality of naval surface force buildup, which is true for all navies in the 

world, including today’s U.S. Navy. Because the PLAN has to maintain three separate 

fleets, it may take two decades or more to build up a surface force sufficient to provide 

for them, provide an escort force for carriers, and support Indian Ocean deployments. 

However, we should be careful neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the future 

capability of the PLAN.

Notes

1. In spite of their recent construction, the two 

Luzhou I sisters are obsolete steam-propelled 

DDs, the only ones the PLAN built during this 

period.

2. It follows standard practice to count some 

improved ships of the same variant as members 

of the Luyang II class. Even in the U.S. Navy, for 

instance, there are at least four different groups 

of Aegis DDGs: Basic, Flight I, Flight II, Flight 

IIA, and the upcoming Flight III.

3. There has been some speculation about the 

origins of the Chinese DDs’ Aegis-like weapons 

system on the Luyang IIs. While the real capabilities of its onboard combat systems are unknown 

to outsiders, the Luyang II markedly resembles 

the U.S. Navy’s Aegis DDGs. Some even have 

said that the class is a clone of the USN DDG 51 

class. However, there is no evidence of copying 

by the PLAN, and it is also clear that the PLAN 

has developed, on its own, some programs to 

build the ship and its combat systems. Waiting 

to observe the Luyang II’s actual performance 

while gathering more information from various 

sources is preferable to engaging in unfounded 

speculation or prejudice on the subject.

4. Sekai no Kansen [Ships of the World] 774 (March 

2013), special edition for the PLA Navy.

5. Four old Luda DDs and four Jianghu I FFs are 

obsolete and are not represented in the table. 

Two of the latest 052Ds, improved with the 

Chinese, purportedly “cloned[,] combat system,” 

à la USN Aegis ships, and five Jiangkai II FFs 

will replace these obsolete ships.

6. Sam Lagrone, “Report: Vietnam Receives Third 

Kilo Attack Boat,” USNI News, February 3, 2015, 

news.usni.org/2015/02/03/reports-vietnam

-receives-third-kilo-attack-boat.

7. Its characteristics: speed of twenty knots; 

capacity of five to eight hundred soldiers, four 

transport helicopters, and four air-cushion landing craft (LCACs).
For several decades the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) was considered to be a small coastal-defense navy comprising a large number of conventional 

submarines and fast-attack craft (FACs) with limited operational radius. The naval 

modernization that began in the late 1990s seems to have continued the emphasis on 

submarines and FACs. For instance, China has acquired a total of twelve Kilo-class 

diesel-electric submarines from Russia. It also has built and commissioned thirteen Type 

039G diesel-electric submarines and added three Type 093 nuclear attack submarines 

and three Type 094 nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Since 2005, thirteen Type 041 

diesel-electric submarines that are probably more capable than the Kilos have been 

launched or commissioned, and more are planned.1

Between 2004 and 2008, the PLAN also commissioned more than sixty Type 022 FACs. 

Featuring a wave-piercing catamaran hull, the Type 022 reportedly travels at a maximum 

speed of thirty-six knots and has an operational range of three hundred nautical miles. 

It also incorporates stealth features that reduce radar, visual, acoustic, infrared, and electronic emission signatures. Moreover, it is armed with eight 100 nautical mile–range YJ-83 

antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and a datalink antenna that can receive off-board 

sensors for over-the-horizon targeting information.2

 Their high speed, small profile, and 

stealth features enable these craft to approach a target quickly and quietly from multiple 

directions. The operational range combined with the missile range, together with the 

datalink antenna, enables the Type 022 to cover most of the sea area near China’s shores. 

These features increase the craft’s probability of succeeding in engaging a superior opponent, thereby raising the cost to the opponent of operating in the near seas.

During the period in which the PLAN emphasized submarines and FACs in the order 

of battle, it conspicuously neglected procurement of major surface combatants—aircraft 

carriers and guided-missile destroyers and frigates. As recently as the middle of the last 

decade, Chinese holdings of these ship types consisted of four Sovremenny-class destroyers acquired from Russia, two Type 051C destroyers, two Type 052B destroyers, two 

Type 052C destroyers, and two Type 054 frigates. This acquisition of a small number of 

Nan Li

Insights from PLA Doctrinal Writings

CHAPTER FOUR

Why Is the Surface Fleet Gaining Importance?
44 china maritime studies

various types of ships led analysts to believe that the PLAN approach to its surface fleet 

was largely experimental, on the principle of “more research, more technological accumulation, but less armament” (多研制, 多技术储备, 少装备). That is, a small number 

of hulls are built for test and trial, followed by construction of another small number that 

incorporate remedies to the defects identified during the test and trial. Beyond that, after 

launching the first two 052Cs in 2003, the PLAN constructed no new 052Cs for about 

seven years, leading some analysts to conclude that the PLAN would no longer acquire 

major combatant ships for its surface fleet.

Since late in the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, construction of major 

surface combatants has gained momentum. The PLAN’s first Type 001 aircraft carrier, 

purchased from Ukraine and refurbished with modern systems, was commissioned on 

September 25, 2012, and more reportedly are planned. Moreover, construction of Type 

052C destroyers resumed in late 2010, resulting in four new hulls. Furthermore, since 

2012, six Type 052D destroyers—an upgraded variant of the Type 052C—have been 

launched or commissioned or have begun construction. The Type 052D has a larger active phased-array radar system than the Type 052C. Rather than the forty-eight surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs) embedded in eight revolver-type six-cell vertical launching 

systems (VLSs) on the 052C, the Type 052D has two canister-type thirty-two-cell missile 

VLSs. A total of sixty-two missiles reportedly includes a mixture of SAMs, ASCMs, antisubmarine missiles, and land-attack cruise missiles. If this is true, the Type 052D may be 

China’s first dedicated multirole destroyer. Construction of more hulls is expected.

Finally, a large number of new frigates are being added to the PLAN’s surface fleet. Since 

2006, twenty 4,000-ton Type 054A frigates have been launched or commissioned, and 

more reportedly are planned. Furthermore, twenty-three Type 056 light frigates were 

launched or commissioned during the 2011–14 period. This 1,400-ton ship features a 

deep-V hull, sloped surface, and reduced superstructure clutter; a 150 kilometer (km)–

range air- and sea-search radar; and a helipad at the stern. It is armed with a 76 mm gun, 

two two-cell YJ-83 ASCM launchers, one eight-cell FL-3000N short-range SAM system, 

and two three-cell antisubmarine torpedo tubes.3

 These features clearly are intended to 

enhance the speed, stealth, and versatility of the ship. The relatively simple and conventional nature of the weapons systems and sensors reduces the production cost so a large 

number of ships can be acquired. Even though the Type 056 is not a major ship class, it 

can fulfill many surface warfare missions in the near seas.

The above account shows that the PLAN’s surface fleet is gaining importance. What can 

account for this new emphasis within China’s naval modernization? Conventional explanations include the availability of funding and shipbuilding infrastructure and technologies and the need to replace a large number of obsolete surface ships. But because major 

surface ships such as aircraft carriers are perceived as vulnerable targets when facing a 
china

s evolving surface fleet 45

superior opponent, the PLAN could have chosen to shift scarce funding and available 

technologies to constructing more and better submarines and FACs, which have the sort 

of stealth capabilities that give the PLAN asymmetrical advantages. In short, surface 

ships need not be replaced when they become obsolete; resources could be shifted to 

constructing more submarines and FACs.

This essay shows that two conceptual developments by PLA analysts account best for 

this new emphasis on the surface fleet. The first is the notion of “balanced development,” 

a lesson PLA analysts learned from modern Western naval history and from Soviet 

naval development during the Cold War. The second is the need to develop the PLAN’s 

“system of systems,” a major requirement for conducting “information systems–based 

system-of-systems operations” (基于信息系统的体系作战), a new concept that Hu 

Jintao endorsed in 2005 to guide PLA development in general and PLAN development 

in particular.

“Balanced Development”

The notion of “balanced development” is a lesson PLA analysts learned from two sources: 

modern Western naval history and Soviet naval development during the Cold War. PLA 

analysts also have suggested a few additional specific lessons related to balanced development for China’s naval development.

Learning from Western Naval History

By examining the modern history of Western naval powers, PLA analysts have discerned 

two distinct models of fleet development. The first is the large surface fleet centered on 

battleships in the early days and aircraft carriers in modern days. Contributing to and 

shaped by the classical theory of sea power developed by Alfred Mahan, such a fleet is 

associated mostly with traditionally dominant sea powers such as Great Britain and the 

United States, and distinctively manifested in the British and U.S. navies. According to 

this analysis, the primary mission of such a fleet is to mass, maneuver to seek the enemy, 

then fight the opponent frontally and directly in a “decisive fleet engagement” (舰队决

战) or impose a “forceful blockade” (强势封锁). Victory in a decisive fleet engagement 

accomplishes the ultimate objective of a sea power: command of the sea. For this fleet, 

missions such as sea-lane operations, maritime commerce raiding, and amphibious 

operations are mostly secondary, and can be accomplished best after seizing command 

of the sea. Similarly, in such a fleet other, smaller-sized vessels such as submarines have 

only secondary importance, generally playing a supportive role to battleships and/or 

aircraft carriers.4

The second model is the smaller or asymmetrical fleet, composed mainly of submarines and FACs. Such a fleet largely is associated with continental powers with maritime 
46 china maritime studies

aspirations that seek to challenge the status quo sea powers. Because of its inferiority, 

such a fleet would avoid a direct, frontal fight with the large fleet of a dominant sea 

power, eschewing the decisive fleet engagement that would surely doom it. Instead, it 

would pursue asymmetrical strategies. Even though such a fleet also might acquire some 

major surface ships, their purpose is not to participate in a decisive fleet engagement; 

instead, such ships mostly would coordinate and support submarine and other asymmetrical operations.5

French naval strategists of the late nineteenth century argued for a small or asymmetrical fleet that would exploit new technologies such as submarines, automated torpedoes, 

and torpedo boats and other light, fast ships. Rather than accepting a frontal fleet engagement that favored the comparative advantages of an opponent such as Great Britain, 

this small fleet would target the chief vulnerability of the opponent as a maritime trading 

and colonial power: its merchant fleet. By raiding the opponent’s maritime commerce, 

the French hoped to create chaos in Great Britain and eventually force it to negotiate on 

terms favorable to France. This French Jeune École (Young School) of thought influenced not only French naval development but the naval thinking of other continental 

powers, such as Germany, which prioritized submarines among its naval acquisitions 

during the later phase of World War I.

While the Jeune École emphasized the offensive use of the small fleet, the “small war 

strategy” school of the Soviet navy in the 1930s emphasized the defensive value of a 

small or asymmetrical fleet. The central premise of this school was that submarines and 

shore-based aircraft make close blockade difficult for traditional sea powers. Command 

of the sea was not the objective of the Soviet navy; therefore it would employ its small, 

submarine-based fleet to counter amphibious landings of the opponent, forcing the latter to retreat.6

According to this analysis, as a result of the advancement of ship-protection technologies against torpedoes and improvements in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) technologies, 

particularly after the failure of German submarine warfare in World War I, the role of 

surface ships in coordinating with submarines and the need for a balanced fleet capable 

of raiding the opponent’s maritime commerce drew more attention. The interwar German navy, for instance, built high-speed “pocket battleships” or “heavy cruisers,” whose 

primary purpose was to conduct sea-lane operations. They were designed to be fast 

enough to outrun the opponent’s more-powerful battleships so as to avoid a frontal fleet 

engagement, but their stronger armor and firepower would enable them to defeat the 

opponent’s cruisers and destroyers escorting convoys of merchant ships as protection 

against German submarines.
china

s evolving surface fleet 47

Despite some successes, this strategy did not achieve the desired results during the 

early stages of World War II owing to a lack of coordination between surface combatants and submarines. The German navy then adopted a “wolf pack” strategy, employing its submarines en masse in attacking the opponent’s merchant shipping in convoy. 

The Germany strategy failed partly because of a lack of sufficient submarines. But a 

more important reason, according to this analysis, was the German inability to coordinate surface combatants and submarines effectively, that is, to employ surface ships to 

protect submarines and use submarines to support surface ships. The German experience apparently had an impact on later Soviet naval development, because Soviet navy 

commander Sergey Gorshkov allegedly believed that the Germans’ mistake was their 

“unbalanced fleet structure” (失衡的舰队结构).7

Learning from Soviet Naval Development

PLA analysts believe that Soviet naval development in the late 1950s and early 1960s 

was highly “unbalanced” or “deformed” (畸形), with a narrow focus on acquiring 

submarines, particularly strategic nuclear submarines. This largely was owing to Soviet 

leader Nikita Khrushchev’s view that in the nuclear age “cruisers are good only for state 

visits,” “aircraft carriers are moving targets for nuclear rockets,” and the only effective 

naval weapons were nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles. The lack of major 

surface combatants and naval aviation, however, seriously hampered the comprehensive 

operational capabilities (综合作战能力) of the Soviet navy. This weakness was made 

starkly evident during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, during which the Soviet navy had 

no major surface combatants to deploy against the U.S. naval blockade, and deployed 

submarines were mostly locked on (锁定) by the U.S. Navy’s ASW forces. As a result, the 

U.S. Navy stopped, boarded, and inspected Soviet cargo ships carrying missiles to Cuba.8

According to PLA analysts, after Leonid Brezhnev succeeded Khrushchev as the Soviet 

leader in 1964, he highlighted the role of conventional war and military intervention 

in Soviet foreign policy, which elevated somewhat the role of the Soviet navy. But more 

importantly, guided by the notion of balanced development that Admiral Gorshkov 

endorsed and sustained by Soviet economic and technological strength, the Soviet navy 

was able to expand from its narrow focus on nuclear submarines to developing a substantial surface fleet capable of naval aviation. This expansion helped to achieve a balanced fleet of both surface and submarine forces capable of challenging Western naval 

power. By 1981, the number of Soviet submarines reached 342, including strategic nuclear submarines, nuclear attack submarines, and conventional attack submarines. The 

Soviet surface fleet also boasted fifty guided-missile cruisers and five heavy air cruisers, 

or Soviet-style aircraft carriers. However, according to PLA analysts, this balanced fleet 

continued to regard submarines as providing its core capabilities. Because the surface 
48 china maritime studies

fleet worked primarily to protect submarines, particularly strategic nuclear submarines, 

its offensive power for fleet engagement clearly was constrained and limited.9

Lessons for the PLAN

PLA analysts acknowledge that, like the navies of other continental powers, the PLAN 

began as a small or asymmetrical fleet centered on submarines, FACs, and shore-based 

aircraft (潜, 快, 飞). While the PLAN deployed some major surface combatants, they 

were not designed to coordinate with submarines on matters of command and control, 

mutual protection, or offshore supply. On the other hand, this force structure was largely 

consistent with the earlier strategy of “maritime sabotage and raid guerrilla warfare” 

(海上破袭游击战), which highlighted the use of separate, well-concealed, and flexible 

small-force groups (小兵力群) capable of quick concentration to conduct surprise raids 

against an opponent’s vulnerabilities, followed by quick dispersion. The goal of such a 

strategy, according to PLA analysts, was to weaken the opponent through protracted, 

small-scale operations rather than a direct frontal fleet engagement. This strategy also 

entailed coordination with land operations, and required the PLAN to play a supportive 

role in an overall land war.10

The near-seas defense strategy that has evolved since the mid-1980s, however, has 

aimed to expand the PLAN’s maritime operational space and shift the service away from 

merely supporting land operations. To deal with the long-range strike capabilities of the 

opponent, for instance, this strategy requires the PLAN to expand its defensive depth in 

the near seas and develop naval combined-arms capabilities extending from subsurface 

to surface, air, and outer space. Similarly, the naval modernization that began in the late 

1990s has enhanced the surface fleet’s air and missile defense. The current PLAN acquisition of major surface combatants, including an aircraft carrier, shows that the PLAN 

is “following the historical path that the German and Soviet Navies traveled”: increasing 

the proportion of surface combatants in the fleet and adding big-deck naval aviation. 

Consequently, the “PLAN is standing at a crossroads, and needs a fundamental reevaluation of both its strategic thought and fleet structure” to determine whether it wants a 

carrier-centered fleet or a Soviet-style, submarine-based fleet in which carriers serve 

more to support submarine operations than to fight a fleet engagement.11

To guide the PLAN’s future development, PLA analysts have proposed a few specific 

lessons learned, particularly from earlier continental powers with maritime aspirations. 

First, as both German and Soviet naval histories show, balanced development is both 

desirable and necessary. This is because different types of naval combatants deployed 

to different spatial spectra (e.g., subsurface, surface, and air) can support and protect 

one another to reduce each other’s vulnerabilities. These “balanced capabilities” are also 
china

s evolving surface fleet 49

useful for coping with “many types of security threats” and for fulfilling “diversified military missions,” a task that China’s top civilian leadership assigned to the PLA.12

Furthermore, for this balanced development to succeed, it is necessary to have top-level 

design (顶层设计), long-term planning (长远规划), and institutionalized implementation. Top-level design and long-term planning are needed mainly because naval development is capital and technology intensive, and therefore requires consistent, long-term, 

and heavy investment through long shipbuilding and personnel-training cycles. Institutionalized implementation, on the other hand, can help to avoid major disruptions 

resulting from any change in top leadership. From the Soviet case, PLA analysts concluded that the ascendance of erratic leaders such as Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev 

caused “big losses” associated with either “unbalanced development” or naval decline.13

Finally, Gorshkov’s notion of balanced development not only broadened the Soviet navy 

from its narrow focus on nuclear submarines to include major surface combatants but 

expanded its role in Soviet foreign policy through activities such as ocean naval maneuvers, port visits, export of submarines and other warships, and transport operations to 

support client states that included Cuba, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Vietnam. Also associated with naval expansion was the expansion of the Soviet shipbuilding industry, fishing 

fleet, and other maritime capabilities. According to PLA analysts, however, the critical 

driving factors behind the Soviet naval expansion were largely political and ideological, “not economic in the traditional sense of the term” (that is, related to maritime 

commerce). As a result, Soviet naval development went “beyond the defensive needs” 

and embarked on a path to “seek hegemony” beyond the country’s means, contributing to a weakening of the Soviet economy that ultimately caused the regime’s decline. 

PLA analysts believe that this is where China’s naval development has been and should 

continue to be different from the Soviet experience. That is, it always should be closely 

associated with trade-based maritime activities, reflecting the integration of the Chinese 

economy with the global economy. While this driver is similar for both China and the 

United States, PLA analysts differentiate China from both the United States and the 

Soviet Union in that the focus of China’s naval development should “not be competition 

and contest against a certain opposing force” (不是与某一对立力量的竞争和较量) 

but rather the cultivation of a maritime environment and order that can benefit China’s 

development.14

Constructing the PLAN’s “System of Systems”

The need to develop the PLAN’s system of systems, a major requirement for conducting 

“information systems–based system-of-systems operations,” also helps to explain the 

PLAN’s new emphasis on its surface fleet.
50 china maritime studies

Defining “Information Systems–Based System-of-Systems Operations”

The notion of information systems–based system-of-systems operations (ISSSO) first 

was endorsed by Hu Jintao at an “important army conference” in December 2005, but 

PLA analysts did not articulate it fully and operationalize it until after early 2010. By 

then, the policy to “informatize” the PLA, which Jiang Zemin had endorsed earlier, had 

produced a few unintended but serious consequences.15

According to PLA analysts, one consequence involved interservice integration. Because 

“informatization” was “service-centered” rather than “system of systems–based,” each 

service (军种) became more informatized, leading to more powerful stovepipes, or “isolated information islands” (信息孤岛), due to lack of collateral information networking 

across the services. Also, each service tends to be “self-serving” (自我完备). That is, 

under the pretext of enhancing joint operations, each concentrates on becoming an “allaround service” (全能军种): ground forces expand air, shore-defense, and ship capabilities; the navy expands air and land capabilities; and the air force expands land capabilities. This causes not only unnecessary redundancy and waste of resources but erosion 

of each service’s comparative advantage. Moreover, service-centered “informatization” 

leads to a lack of common information standards and results in a monopolization of 

information by each service, which not only may contribute to interservice tension but 

may cause a loss of initiative in wartime.16

PLA analysts believe that correct implementation of ISSSO may help to resolve this interservice issue. This is because ISSSO requires fostering a consciousness that war can be 

fought and won by a PLA system of systems, but not by individual services. Therefore, 

the emphasis of military modernization should shift from “forging all-around services 

to constructing an all-around system of systems” (从打造全能型军种转向建设全能型

体系). This means that services should transfer ownership (所有权) and command and 

control of their operational elements and resources to the PLA system, while retaining 

the usage right of these resources. Services also should become open and transparent to 

one another and “share the usage right” (军种共享使用权) of each other’s and the PLA 

system’s resources, because services constitute and are the builders of the PLA system 

of systems. “Transferring communications bandwidth and satellites to the system, for 

instance, can give full play to the utility of these elements.” In return, services benefit 

from system construction by retaining the usage right to all the resources the system 

offers.17

Generally speaking, future “integrated operations” (集成作战) would “reinforce services’ functions for force construction and management, but weaken their role to command such operations.” “Services will supply functional units and essential elements to 

integrated operations command according to operational needs.” To optimize the use of 
china

s evolving surface fleet 51

these units and elements, the integrated operations command would rely on information 

systems such as the all-army, unified (全军统一) command-and-control network, earlywarning and reconnaissance network, communications grid network, weapons-control 

network, and comprehensive support (综合保障) network.18

According to PLA analysts, ISSSO also requires “construction of collateral, integrated 

system-of-systems operations capabilities centered on integrated networks” (以集成网

络为中心, 建设横向一体的体系作战能力) across services. This “net-centered” approach leverages information technologies and networks to permeate (渗透), fuse 

(融合), and connect (连通) all forces (力量), units (单元), and essential elements (要

素) deployed at different distances and in different spatial spectra, to achieve interconnectedness (互联), intercommunications (互通), interoperability (互操作), and mutual 

complementarity (互补), particularly in terms of early warning and reconnaissance, 

command and control, communications, weapons control, and combat support. This 

interconnectivity should enable synchronized joint action (同步联动), thus enhancing 

precision, coordination, efficiency, and orderliness of actions and strikes.19

How does the concept of ISSSO enhance military operations? First, such system of 

systems–based synergy not only surpasses what an individual service, unit, or weapons 

platform is capable of achieving; it also helps to reduce the vulnerability of any individual platform. For instance, “employing information systems to permeate, fuse, and 

connect weapons systems can accomplish operational effectiveness that far exceeds what 

a single weapons platform such as an aircraft carrier can accomplish. At the same time, 

this integration can reduce the risks to an aircraft carrier.”20

Moreover, information systems–based integration leads to real-time and common battlefield transparency, reduces reaction time, and enables more-precise strikes, thus creating 

conditions for dispersed (分散) and pointed (点状化) force deployment but concentrated firepower. This deployment can expand from traditional spatial spectra such as land, 

sea, and air to new spectra such as outer space, electromagnetic space, and cyberspace, 

exhibiting a trend toward “comprehensive spatial spectra” (全域性). These deployment 

patterns of different distances, altitudes, and visibilities should enhance not only force 

survivability but multispatial, spectra-based battlefield versatility and flexibility.21

Finally, PLA analysts believe that information systems integration enables real-time, 

synchronized target acquisition, decision making, mobility, strikes, and control. These in 

turn shorten decision cycles and increase operational tempo, making it possible to conduct parallel operations, achieving “all-dimensional superiority” (全维优势) over the 

opponent by “maximizing the comprehensive effects of system-of-systems operations.”22
52 china maritime studies

ISSSO and the Surface Fleet

ISSSO requires the PLAN to contribute to the construction of the PLA’s system of 

systems. A small or asymmetrical fleet centered on conventional submarines and FACs 

may constitute the most appropriate contribution, because such a fleet primarily focuses 

on coastal and near-seas defense and the support of land operations, and therefore can 

integrate better with other services that are mostly land based. Since the middle of the 

first decade of the twenty-first century, however, China’s naval strategy has integrated the 

new concept of “far-seas operations.”23 China’s most recent defense white paper reiterates the need to “enhance capabilities for far-seas mobile operations, and for far-seas 

cooperation and coping with nontraditional security threats” (提高远海机动作战能力, 

远海合作与应对非传统安全威胁能力). It also has added, for the first time, sections on 

“safeguarding China’s overseas interests” and “enhancing the security of international sea 

lanes”—new missions for the PLAN to fulfill in the far seas.24 To the extent that “far-seas 

operations” are conducted in waters remote from China’s shores, the PLAN may have to 

develop its own system of systems. This is because it no longer would be able to count on 

support from the PLA’s land-based system of systems.

A small or asymmetrical fleet is clearly not appropriate for far-seas operations, because of 

its limited operational radius and sustainability. This fleet also constitutes an incomplete 

system of systems, because it cannot reach all spatial spectra, particularly the air spectrum, in the far seas. It may possess major surface ships such as destroyers and frigates 

that can be deployed to the far seas, but these ships would be left exposed, vulnerable 

to air, missile, and submarine attacks. Aircraft carrier capabilities, however, can reduce 

these vulnerabilities. Carriers can provide air resources that can compete for air superiority and provide air cover for surface operations in the far seas. These air capabilities 

also can be deployed against the opponent’s air-based ASW capabilities, thus protecting 

one’s own submarines operating in the far seas. Carriers’ air-based ASW capabilities 

also can be deployed against the opponent’s submarines, thus providing protection for 

China’s own surface ships and submarines operating in the far seas. Finally, with the 

PLAN’s lack of overseas naval bases, carriers can serve as sea bases to sustain the PLAN’s 

system-of-systems operations in the far seas.

Furthermore, as discussed earlier, an information systems–based system of systems can 

become a force multiplier, not only because it can accomplish what an individual weapons platform such as an aircraft carrier cannot accomplish otherwise, but also because 

it helps to reduce the vulnerability of that individual weapons platform. PLA analysts 

believe that a carrier battle group (CVBG) is an ideal “maritime operations system 

of systems” (海上作战体系). With escorts such as destroyers, frigates, nuclear attack 

submarines, and oceangoing replenishment ships, this system of systems is capable of air 

operations, strikes, submarine warfare and ASW, air and missile defense, and electronic 
china

s evolving surface fleet 53

warfare, thus possessing the “five integrated operational capabilities” (五为一体作战能

力). If well integrated by the information systems, a CVBG represents a “fully functional 

and optimally combined” (功能完备, 优化组合) system of systems, in which all individual weapons platforms not only work together to create operational synergy against the 

opponent but offer mutual support and protection by reducing each other’s vulnerabilities. On the other hand, analysts also recognize that a CVBG is too massive to conceal, 

making it easy, under certain conditions, for an opponent to detect and attack it.25

Finally, the versatility of a system of systems is reflected in the system’s deployability 

not only to different distances and spatial spectra but at different times and for different 

purposes. In spite of their different roles and functions, all naval weapons systems are 

designed to fight wars. But some systems may be more appropriate for peacetime missions than others. To the extent that a navy can play an important role in serving a state’s 

foreign policy in peacetime, performing this role may require either substantial surface 

capabilities or a visible naval presence in the far seas, and a major surface fleet may be 

more appropriate to accomplish this. Peacetime missions that require substantial surface 

capabilities may include provision of sea-launched humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief to a foreign country, evacuation of nationals from a foreign country by sea in times 

of crisis, and naval deployment to secure international sea-lanes against pirates and terrorists. Peacetime missions requiring visible naval presence also may include port visits 

and naval maneuvers, many of which serve the purpose of reassuring allies and deterring opponents from engaging in risky behavior. By contrast, because of their less-visible 

features and lower profile, submarines and FACs are probably less appropriate for such 

peacetime missions.

Notes

1. For information on the PLAN’s acquisition of 

new submarines and major surface combatants 

as discussed in this essay, consult China Defense

at www.china-defense.com/smf/.

2. See Nan Li, “China’s Navy Develops Fast Attack 

Craft,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 

2009.

3. See 王进 [Wang Jin], 新时期新使命, 中国

056型轻型护卫舰 [“New Mission in the New 

Period, China’s Type 056 Light Frigate”], 舰载

武器 [Shipborne Weapons] (August 8, 2012); 

烽火 [Feng Huo], 056型轻型护卫舰的思考

[“Reflections on Type 056 Light Frigate”], 现代

舰船 [Modern Ships], no. 07B (2012). Shipborne 

Weapons and Modern Ships are publications of 

the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.

4. 师小芹 [Shi Xiaoqin], 小型舰艇的历史定位

与中国式均衡海军 [“Historical Position of 

Small Ships and Craft and a Balanced Navy with 

Chinese Characteristics”], 军事历史 [Military 

History], no. 1 (2011), p. 33; 理解海权的另外

一条路径 [“Another Path to Understand Sea 

Power”], 和平与发展 [Peace and Development], 

no. 1 (2011), p. 56. Military History is a bimonthly journal published by China’s Academy 

of Military Science (AMS). Shi is an analyst in 

the War Theory and Strategy Studies Department of AMS, author of 论海权与中美关系

(On Sea Power and Sino-U.S. Relations) (Beijing: 

AMS, 2012), and deputy editor in chief of 战略

研究 (Strategic Studies), a publication of AMS. 

5. Shi, “Historical Position of Small Ships and 

Craft,” p. 33.

6. Ibid., pp. 35–36. For Soviet “small war theory,” 

see also 张晓林 [Zhang Xiaolin], 王攀 [Wang 

Pan], and 张忆南 [Zhang Yi’nan], 苏联远洋海

军建设的启示 [“Revelations from the Soviet 

Construction of a Far-Oceans Navy”], 军事历
54 china maritime studies

史研究 [Military History Studies], no. 4 (2011), 

p. 98. Military History Studies is a quarterly 

journal published by the PLA Political College in 

Nanjing. Zhang Xiaolin is an associate professor 

at the Naval Command College in Nanjing and 

Wang is a doctoral student there.

7. Shi, “Historical Position of Small Ships and 

Craft,” pp. 36–37.

8. Zhang, Wang, and Zhang, “Revelations from the 

Soviet Construction of a Far-Oceans Navy,” pp. 

97–98; Shi, “Historical Position of Small Ships 

and Craft,” pp. 37–38.

9. Zhang, Wang, and Zhang, “Revelations from the 

Soviet Construction of a Far-Oceans Navy,” p. 

98; Shi, “Historical Position of Small Ships and 

Craft,” pp. 37–38.

10. Shi, “Historical Position of Small Ships and 

Craft,” pp. 38–39; 周德华 [Zhou Dehua], 胡

鹏 [Hu Peng], and 喻永红 [Yu Yonghong], 

人民海军海上破袭游击战思想的历史回

顾 [“Historical Retrospect on the Thought of 

Maritime Sabotage and Raid Guerrilla Warfare 

of the People’s Navy”], 军事历史研究 [Military 

History Studies], no. 1 (2011). Zhou is an associate professor at the Naval Command College 

in Nanjing and Hu is a staff officer in the Command Department of Unit 92674.

11. Shi, “Historical Position of Small Ships and 

Craft,” pp. 39–40.

12. Zhang, Wang, and Zhang, “Revelations from the 

Soviet Construction of a Far-Oceans Navy,” p. 

100.

13. Ibid., pp. 99–100.

14. Ibid.; Shi Xiaoqin, cited in 吴挺 [Wu Ting], 

中国应学会合理运用海军力量支撑其全球

秩序 [“China Should Learn to Employ Naval 

Forces Rationally to Sustain Its Ideal of a Global 

Order”], 东方早报 [Oriental Morning Post] 

(Shanghai), August 1, 2011.

15. See 任连生 [Ren Liansheng], 对基于信息系统

的体系作战能力的初步认识 [“A Preliminary 

Understanding of Information Systems–Based 

System-of-Systems Operations Capabilities”], 

中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 4 

(2010), p. 26. Major General Ren is director of 

the Scientific Research Guidance Department of 

AMS.

16. 林东 [Lin Dong], 基于信息系统的军事力量

体系的发展理念 [“Development Concepts 

for Information Systems–Based Military Force 

System of Systems”], 中国军事科学 [China 

Military Science], no. 1 (2011), pp. 19–20; 张宏

[Zhang Hong] and 于召 [Yu Zhao], 基于信息系

统锻造新型作战力量体系 [“Forge New-Type 

Operational Force System of Systems Based on 

Information Systems”], 中国军事科学 [China 

Military Science], no. 5 (2010), p. 12. Senior Colonel Lin is an associate professor in the Strategy 

Teaching and Research Department of China’s 

National Defense University in Beijing. Colonel 

Zhang is an associate professor and director of 

the Combined Arms and Tactics Teaching and 

Research Office of the Army Command College 

in Shijiazhuang, and Captain Yu is a master’s 

student there.

17. Lin, “Development Concepts,” pp. 20–21.

18. Ibid., p. 22.

19. Ibid.; Ren, “Preliminary Understanding,” pp. 

27–29; 蒋磊 [Jiang Lei], 提高基于信息系统的

海上体系作战能力的思考 [“Reflections on Enhancing Information Systems–Based Maritime 

Systems of Systems Operations Capabilities”], 

中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 

5 (2010), pp. 27–28. Senior Captain Jiang is a 

professor and director of the Navy Development 

and Construction Studies Office of the Naval 

Command College in Nanjing.

20. Lin, “Development Concepts,” p. 22.

21. See 平志伟 [Ping Zhiwei], 曾筱晓 [Zeng 

Xiaoxiao], and 张学辉 [Zhang Xuehui], 基于

信息系统的体系作战机理研究 [“A Study of 

Mechanisms for Information Systems–Based 

Systems of Systems Operations”], 中国军事科

学 [China Military Science], no. 4 (2010), p. 41. 

Ping is a professor and deputy director of the 

Campaign and Tactics Department of the Army 

Command College in Shijiazhuang, and Majors 

Zeng and Zhang are lecturers in the Combined 

Arms and Tactics Teaching and Research Office 

of that department.

22. Lin, “Development Concepts,” p. 22.

23. “Near seas” refers to the three seas near China, 

that is, the South China Sea, East China Sea, and 

Yellow Sea. “Far seas,” on the other hand, refers 

to the seas beyond the near seas, or the western 

Pacific and Indian Oceans. See Nan Li, “The 

Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far 

Seas,’” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), pp. 144–69.

24. See 中国武装力量的多样化运用 [“Diversified 

Employment of China’s Armed Forces”], 新华社

[Xinhua], April 16, 2013.

25. PLA analysts cited in 中国航母, 从今天驶向

未来 [“China’s Aircraft Carrier, from Today to 

the Future”], 解放军报 [Liberation Army Daily], 

September 26, 2012.
J

ust a few years ago few people cared very much about any People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) Navy (PLAN) destroyer, much less with what it was armed. That was because 

the central problem the PLAN posed for the United States in East Asia had nothing to 

do with destroyers. Instead, the focus of attention was China’s “antiaccess” strategy, the 

military objective of which is to keep U.S. naval and air forces as far away from China as 

possible.1

The PLAN’s surface force (its destroyers, frigates, and amphibious ships) plays a small, 

even marginal, role in the PLAN’s wartime counterintervention operations. To execute 

this objective, the PLAN’s most important arm is its submarine force, along with its 

land-based air arm operating in conjunction with the PLA Air Force. In fact, the counterintervention arsenal capability that justifiably has received the most attention in the 

Western press—the DF-21 antiship ballistic missile—does not belong to the PLAN at all; 

it is a PLA Second Artillery weapons system.

In a conflict with the United States over Taiwan, for example, the surface forces of the 

PLAN would have two missions, neither directly related to keeping U.S. forces from 

interfering with Chinese operations. The surface force would be responsible for getting 

the army safely across the Taiwan Strait and conducting sea-control missions in the East 

China Sea. Its ships also might make contributions as seaward extensions of China’s air 

defenses, while remaining close to China. The surface force would be very unlikely to 

venture out from under land-based air cover (i.e., beyond the first island chain). If it did, 

it would be very vulnerable to U.S. submarines and air attack. In short, during a major 

conflict over Taiwan, the PLAN surface fleet would stay close to home, while U.S. surface 

forces would operate in the Philippine Sea.

On the other hand, when China is not at war, which is to say virtually all the time, the 

surface fleet becomes the most significant element of China’s navy. During the last halfdozen years, the PLAN has performed missions that are not directly related to the territorial defense of China and its claimed island possessions.2

 The best way to characterize 

these new (for China) “far-seas” missions is as peacetime operations. In 2009, the PLA 

Michael McDevitt

Impressive Progress in Achieving a “Far-Seas” Capability

CHAPTER FIVE

The Modern PLA Navy Destroyer Force
56 china maritime studies

defense white paper applied a U.S. Department of Defense term to these new missions: 

“military operations other than war” (MOOTW).3

With its expanding global economic interests, China has developed global political 

interests as well. This has created a “demand signal” for a PLAN that can support UNsanctioned missions, protect People’s Republic of China (PRC) interests abroad with a 

show of force, respond to situations in which PRC citizens are in jeopardy or require 

evacuation, protect sea lines of communication, respond to natural disasters, and, if 

necessary, demonstrate PRC resolve in support of embattled friends in Africa and along 

the South Asia littoral—in other words, the typical mission set that traditional naval 

powers have practiced for centuries.

These new missions require a mix of naval capabilities different from those needed to 

conduct wartime offshore active defense. A navy that is expected to operate in “far seas” 

requires more logistics-support ships; amphibious ships with helicopter facilities; and 

large destroyers with good sea-keeping characteristics, better endurance, helicopter 

hangars and facilities, and longer-range air defenses. Far-seas operations also rationalize a requirement for a modest aircraft carrier force.4

 Carrier-based aircraft will provide 

the PLAN with sea-based air cover for its distant operations; eventually yield a credible 

power-projection, limited-war capability; and, most importantly for the topic of this 

article, generate a requirement for a number of multimission destroyers to escort the 

carrier and provide air and submarine defense.

Any study of the PLAN destroyer force has two basic problems: the lack of really credible open-source information on the specific capabilities and performance of combat 

systems, and the fact that until very recently China approached its surface combatant 

force as a two-decade-long research-and-development project. In effect, the PLAN has 

been executing a long-running experiment to marry a suitable hull and propulsion plant 

to effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antiair warfare systems.

This has made it difficult to keep track of the differences among the various iterations 

of destroyer classes. The basic challenge that Chinese designers faced with the “build 

a little, test a little” approach to developing surface combatants was to try to find a hull 

form and propulsion plant suitable for distant operations. The PLAN desired a ship 

large enough to accommodate a helicopter detachment and with the volume to house 

magazines that could store a significant number of missiles along with the necessary 

radar and electronics. The other challenge was to ensure that over time it could develop 

modern combat systems indigenously, or reverse engineer modern combat systems from 

France, Russia, Italy, and the United Kingdom, then integrate them with unique Chinese 

systems. China overcame these two challenges relatively quickly.
china

s evolving surface fleet 57

The First Modern Destroyers

The now-obsolete Luda (Type 051) class (3,700 tons full-load displacement) comprised 

the early test platform used to mix and match combat systems. Its design was derived 

from an early Cold War–era Soviet ship. The sixteen ships of this class entered PLAN 

service over a twenty-year period (1971–91). The experience seems to have confirmed 

for the PLAN that steam plants and the associated rotating machinery simply created 

too much self-noise for the sonar systems to be effective.5

 The PLAN, like the U.S. Navy 

and other global navies, learned that changing from steam propulsion to either gas turbine or combined diese–gas turbine propulsion had advantages not only in self-quieting 

but in reliability, ease of maintenance, and performance as well. Moreover, the PLAN 

learned that, at just 3,700 tons, the Luda class was relatively small, so sea keeping in 

rough blue water was a challenge. During a 1997 transit to Honolulu, a three-ship PLAN 

task force ran into ten consecutive days of heavy weather, during which it encountered 

a great deal of difficulty refueling the small Luda. Because the class has limited fuelstorage capacity, the PLAN found the Luda needed to be underway replenished every 

three days, and high seas made that very difficult.6

 In sum, just short of two decades ago 

the PLAN destroyer force consisted of eighteen ships—sixteen of which had capabilities 

closer to the World War II–vintage “tin can” in which I served during the 1960s than to 

the state-of-the-art destroyers China’s northeast Asian neighbors and the United States 

were operating in the western Pacific.

That began to change with the introduction of the Type 052 series of destroyers, which, 

according to the NATO classification system, comprise the Luhu (Type 052—two ships), 

Luhai (Type 052A—one ship), Luyang I (Type 052B—two ships), Luyang II (Type 

052C—eight ships), and Luyang III (Type 052D—one commissioned and up to twelve 

planned) classes. Commissioned in 1994, the Luhu marked the transition of Chinese 

destroyers from steam to gas turbine propulsion—in fact, both ships of the class were 

equipped with General Electric LM2500 gas turbine engines, the same engines that have 

powered all U.S. destroyers since the late 1970s. But it was the Type 052B that marked 

the advent of the PLAN’s first truly modern destroyer.7

Combat Systems

Starting with the Type 052B Guangzhou (hull number 168), commissioned in 2004, 

all Chinese destroyers have used roughly the same hull design: a 508-foot-long, 

6,500–7,300-ton-full-load-displacement ship, with a combination diesel–gas turbine 

propulsion system.

Guangzhou and all the subsequent Type 052 series are handsome warships that incorporate a hull form and superstructure designed to reduce the radar cross section of the 
58 china maritime studies

ship. But, as attractive as Guangzhou is, its war-fighting capabilities were outdated the 

day it was commissioned.

Antiair Warfare

Although the ship’s primary mission was air defense, it carried the short-range (twenty 

nautical miles [nm]) Russian SA-N-12 surface-to-air missile (SAM). At best, the ship 

could defend only itself, and even then not very well, because of the short range of its 

missiles. Aircraft easily could remain outside its SAM envelope and launch a variety of 

weapons with impunity, overwhelming its defenses because it depends on four individual fire-control radars to control the semiactive SAMs. It uses rotating 3-D radar as its 

primary air-search radar, which is inferior to the phased-array systems that are state of 

the art. For comparison, phased-array systems such as the SPY-I Aegis radar have been 

in use in the U.S. Navy since 1983. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force had phasedarray systems in service for over a decade by the time Guangzhou was commissioned. 

Norway commissioned its first Aegis-equipped ship in 2004, the same year Guangzhou

entered the PLAN.

This is a noteworthy reference point, because it took China only ten years to close the 

radar gap by introducing its own phased-array radar system. Phased-array systems 

search and track simultaneously, an important capability in the antiship cruise missile 

(ASCM) era. One needs quick reaction time, firepower, and good reliability to survive 

in today’s precision-weapon environment—and Guangzhou has none of that. Reaction 

time and firepower come with a phased-array system mated to a vertical-launch system 

(VLS) firing long-range SAMs. So, while this ship was the beginning of a truly modern 

air-warfare destroyer for the PLAN, it had a long way to go to match the capabilities of 

the ships of other modern navies.

Anti–Surface Ship Warfare

In terms of anti–surface ship warfare (ASUW), Guangzhou packs a punch, with sixteen 

YJ-83 cruise missiles in four quad box launchers located aft of the engine room exhausts. 

This missile has a 120 nm range with a 420-pound warhead. Like the U.S. Harpoon, it 

is a subsonic fire-and-forget missile.8

 With the YJ-83, Guangzhou could outrange many 

U.S. surface combatants.9

 The PLA has been good at fielding an impressive array of 

ASCMs that can be launched from aircraft, submarines, or surface combatants. Although there is scant open-source information on how effective this missile has been 

in testing, one must assume the PLAN has confidence in its capabilities. We do know 

that a Chinese export C-802 ASCM, which Iran purchased in numbers in the 1990s, 

does work: in July 2004, during Israel’s war with Hezbollah, the Israeli corvette Hanit

was hit by a truck-mounted C-802. A two-missile salvo had been fired; one hit Hanit’s
china

s evolving surface fleet 59

stern crane, while the other overflew the target and hit a Cambodian-flagged Egyptian 

freighter some sixty kilometers downrange.10

Antisubmarine Warfare

Since the Type 052s are intended primarily to be missile-defense ships, they are 

equipped with a short-range (15,000 yards), medium-frequency, chin-mounted sonar 

(SJD-8/9), which is based on a French Thales DUBY-23-series sonar. The PLAN apparently has adopted the Russian navy’s approach to destroyer ASW, in which the intent 

is ASW self-defense.11 This is unlike the U.S. approach, which for decades has tried to 

achieve much-longer-range detection because it assumes U.S. Navy (USN) destroyers 

will operate as screening forces for aircraft carriers and contribute to the submarine 

defense of the carrier.

Like USN destroyers, Guangzhou has two triple-tube ASW torpedo launchers. Unlike 

USN ships, it is also equipped with short-range (1,000 yards) ASW rockets that, if nothing else, will put a “bang in the water” that can be very distracting to a submarine. All 

Type 052 classes have a helicopter-capable flight deck and a hangar for Ka-27 helicopters. These aircraft are equipped with dipping sonar derived from Russian systems.

Getting a Lot Better in a Hurry: The Type 052C (Luyang II)

While the Type 052B represented impressive improvement toward a state-of the-art destroyer, the ships the PLAN really wanted were the two successor classes, the 052C and 

052D. That they are both in series production is the best evidence of PLAN satisfaction. 

And the PLAN has reason to be satisfied, because not only are they handsome ships, but 

on paper their combat capability is impressive.

The first two Type 052Cs were commissioned in 2004 and 2005, in parallel with the two 

Type 052Bs.12 This was followed by a long—eight-year—hiatus, apparently caused by the 

relocation of the building yard to the Shanghai area. Unlike the earlier Type 052s, which 

combined Russian and Chinese systems, the Type 052C uses primarily Chinese systems 

derived from earlier foreign technology.13

Antiair Warfare

The Type 052C marks a big jump for the PLAN into phased-array air-search radars. The 

eight ships of this class have electronically scanned array radar (AESA), which, when 

combined with vertically launched missiles, greatly improves firepower. These eight 

ships permit the PLAN to narrow dramatically the capability gap with the United States, 

Japan, and South Korea, all of which operate Aegis-equipped destroyers in the western 

Pacific.
60 china maritime studies

The Luyang II is generally similar to the 052B, with the notable addition of four fixed 

phased-array antennae in the forward superstructure. Two antennae cover the forward 

hemisphere, while the other pair covers the rear hemisphere—the same arrangement 

adopted on the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke class. Reports indicate that this radar may be 

the outcome of a codevelopment program with a Ukrainian company.14

These ships mark the PLAN’s first venture into VLSs, which, along with the AESA radar, 

improve the Type 052C’s antiair firepower by allowing it to track and shoot more rapidly. 

The VLS is made up of eight six-cell components. All are assumed to be filled with longrange HHQ-9 SAMs. The HHQ-9 has a maximum slant range of approximately 110 

nm. Although this constitutes a dramatic improvement, any aircraft carrying long-range 

variants of the air-launched Harpoon ASCM still can remain outside a 052C’s missile 

envelope and engage the ship. Thus, the U.S. Navy, which relies on sea-based airpower to 

contribute to gaining sea control, retains an important tactical asymmetry.

During the Cold War the U.S. Navy concluded that the best way to defend against 

massive Soviet air raids that would involve the launching of ASCMs was to destroy the 

launching platform before it reached its launch range—colloquially known as “shooting at the archer, not at the arrow.” Until the PLAN can field a SAM system that can 

outrange most air-launched antiship weapons, it will remain condemned to “shooting 

at arrows.” Of course, this is why the Aegis system was developed in the first place—to 

ensure the air defenses around an aircraft carrier could shoot down arrows.15

The Luyang II’s terminal air defense is provided by two Type 730 close-in weapon 

systems (CIWSs). This CIWS can fire at a rate of 4,600–5,800 rounds per minute up to a 

range of 2,700 yards.16

Antisurface Warfare

Like the earlier Type 052s, the Type 052C carries ASCMs in separate launch canisters 

(two four-cell launchers). That these cruise missiles are in canisters rather than boxes 

suggests they are the indigenously produced YJ-62 (C-602) ASCMs. This is a subsonic 

missile that flies at an altitude of one hundred feet during the cruise phase of an engagement. It has an impressive range of about 250 nm. On paper, this is a formidable system; 

but trying to target individual ships at very long, over-the-horizon ranges is difficult. It 

almost certainly requires third-party assistance, often from the embarked helicopter, to 

make certain of the target and to ensure that other ships are not in the vicinity, lest they 

become unintended targets. In the terminal phase, the missile descends to twenty to 

thirty feet. The active radar seeker has an acquisition range of up to 22 nm.17

The 052C also carries one main gun, a single-barrel, 100 mm gun “derived” from a 

French Creusot-Loire weapon. The fully automatic gun can engage surface and aerial 
china

s evolving surface fleet 61

targets such as aircraft and low-speed missiles. It has a maximum rate of fire of ninety 

rounds per minute.

Antisubmarine Warfare

Like those of the Type 052B class, the eight ships of the Luyang II class apparently are 

equipped with derivative French sonar suites, manufactured in China under license, and 

identified as SJD-8/9. For twenty years, from 1972 to 1993, France provided modern sonar technology to China; the post–Tiananmen Square arms embargo that the European 

Union still maintains apparently has brought that to a halt. This medium-frequency 

sonar has a surface duct range of ten thousand to eighteen thousand yards, again suggesting that the primary purpose of the ASW suite on these ships is self-defense rather 

than “main body defense.”18 The relatively short range of the hull-mounted sonars on 

these air-defense destroyers has interesting implications for how many escort ships will 

be required to provide adequate ASW protection for China’s aircraft carrier(s).

The Luyang IIs are not fitted with a hull-mounted, variable-depth sonar or a towed array, 

and experts speculate that so equipping them would entail both a major hull redesign 

and a dramatic increase in processing power in the ships’ integrated command-andcontrol system.19

In terms of ASW weapons, the 052Cs are outfitted with the standard six ASW torpedo 

tubes. ASW rockets, however, are apparently not part of the suite.

An embarked helicopter, either the export version of the Russian Kamov Ka-28 or the 

Chinese version of the Eurocopter Dauphin (AS-365N), known as the Z-9, constitutes a 

significant element of the ASW capability of this ship. Both aircraft have a dipping sonar 

capability, but the Z-9 is probably the more desirable since it has an onboard processor, 

whereas the Ka-28 has to datalink its acoustic information to the ship for processing. In 

either case, the helicopters perform a vital function in providing self-defense ASW for 

the ship.20

“Red Aegis”—the Type 052D (Luyang III)

A September 5, 2012, Global Times article created quite a stir among PLAN watchers 

when it revealed that a new destroyer was under construction at the ChangxingdaoJiangnan shipyard, near Shanghai, identifying it as “the Type 052D, the 052C’s successor.”21

The article went on, “As the most sophisticated combat ships, Aegis destroyers are commonly referred to as air-defense destroyers equipped with phased-array radars and modern ship-to-air missiles, which enable the ships to provide regional air-defense shields 

for the entire fleet.”22
62 china maritime studies

Photos of the ship turned up shortly thereafter in the blogosphere. They reveal that the 

Type 052D appears to be a more handsome Chinese cousin of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh 

Burke–class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs). Designers have adopted the flat-panel 

phased-array radar, similar to U.S. and allied Aegis systems. The ship apparently is fitted 

with two thirty-two-cell VLSs as well, one forward and one aft. Exactly what SAM they 

will carry is open to question, as is the nature of the rest of the combat systems suite, 

except for the gun—the 100 mm gun of the 052C class has been replaced with a largercaliber 130 mm weapon.

In recent years, China has demonstrated an impressive ability to construct complex 

warships in large numbers. For example, it has launched four Type 052Cs since 2010. 

The new Changxingdao-Jiangnan yard where the 052Ds are building has the capacity to 

build several warships simultaneously.23 According to some accounts, at one point this 

yard had eight ships of the Type 052C/D classes in various stages of construction.24 I 

suspect that the 052D will go into series production to provide the most capable escort 

force available for the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier strike group. In other words, the world 

will begin to see this ship in numbers in two years or so when the PLAN carrier Liaoning

transitions from testing and training and begins to conduct more routine operations at sea.

The Sovremenny Class

No discussion regarding China’s modern destroyer force would be complete without addressing the four Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers that entered the PLAN force 

structure in the early years of the twenty-first century. While for a brief moment they 

were the most capable surface combatants in the PLAN, these were “old” ships: old in 

design; old in hull, mechanical, and electrical structures; and old in combat systems.

In 1996, the PLAN decided to purchase two unfinished ex–Russian navy Project 956 

destroyers, one two-thirds complete, the other one-third complete. Both ships were laid 

down in the late 1980s by the North Shipyard in Saint Petersburg, but their construction 

was suspended in 1995 owing to a lack of funds. The first hull, renamed Hangzhou (136), 

was delivered in December 1999, followed by the second hull, renamed Fuzhou (137), in 

December 2000.

In 2002, the PRC signed a contract with Russia to purchase an additional two ships of 

this class. The first to be delivered was Taizhou (138), in 2005; the second, Ningbo (139), 

was delivered in September 2006. These dates are significant: Taizhou and Ningbo were 

delivered after the first two Type 052Cs. Why China thought it needed two more of this 

class is a bit of a mystery. The blog SinoDefence.com asserts, “The Sovremenny-class destroyers provided a balanced platform that vastly exceeds [sic] the capabilities of Chinese 

domestic designs at the time of delivery.”25 That may have been what the senior officials 
china

s evolving surface fleet 63

in Beijing concluded, but it was not an accurate judgment—perhaps reflecting their lack 

of confidence in China’s own design abilities.

In any case, the contemporaneous Type 052B/C models had SAM systems of range equal 

to the Sovremennys’, and their French-based ASW capabilities were slightly superior. 

The one unique capability the Russian ships did bring to the table was a long-range 

(195–210 nm), high-speed (Mach 3) ASCM, the Moskit, or SS-N-22. This is an impressive weapon, and when mated to a large (8,000 tons full load) hull, the class provides the 

PLAN with a good sea-keeping ship that it could employ against U.S. carrier forces.

On the other hand, short-range SAMs and mediocre ASW capabilities make ships of this 

class extremely vulnerable when operating beyond the PLA’s land-based air cover, which 

they would have to do to get within range of U.S. carrier forces in a Taiwan scenario. 

Beyond these shortcomings in self-defense capabilities, they are steam-powered ships 

that use unreliable pressure-fired boilers.26 This was a design the United States tried, 

unsuccessfully, in two classes of frigates (FF 1040 and FFG 1), both of which had trouble 

staying at sea because of the fickle engineering plants.

Given how far the PLAN design and production capabilities have come in less than a 

decade, to some analysts the Sovremennys appear to be the PLAN’s “white elephants.” 

That they are not interoperable with the PLAN’s own datalink standard, combat control 

systems, and communications systems makes their deployment especially anomalous.27

Large, reliable, long-endurance, multimission destroyers are essential for any navy that 

aspires to conduct sustained operations an ocean away from its home waters. Modern 

destroyers are expected to provide air defense for themselves and other ships in company, defend against submarines, and use embarked helicopters to find and attack hostile 

submarines before they can close to firing range. Destroyers also are expected to prevail 

in encounters with other ships, using ASCMs and helicopters with antiship missiles. 

Finally, modern destroyers are expected to be able to project power ashore, employing 

land-attack cruise missiles, and if necessary using their gun batteries to provide fire support for forces ashore.28

Over the last ten years, China has demonstrated, at least to outward appearances, that 

it has the ability to produce a state-of-the-art, multimission destroyer. The PLAN has at 

least eleven in commission or at various stages of construction, with an unknown total 

inventory objective. It joins Japan’s (six Aegis destroyers) and South Korea’s (three Aegis 

destroyers) as the only Asian navies with an Aegis, or Aegis-like, capability actually at 

sea, and by 2020 seems likely to have around twenty ships with this type of system. At 

that point, the PLAN’s destroyer force will be far and away the second most capable (on 

paper) in the world. However, perspective is important: American destroyer capabilities 
64 china maritime studies

still will be unmatched. With the Arleigh Burke, or DDG 51, class, the U.S. Navy currently has sixty-three state-of-the-art destroyers in commission, with a total of at least 

seventy-five planned.

Finally, it is of course unclear how effective the combat systems of China’s ships are, and 

how competent the crews will become. China is still dependent on Russian or Western 

“assistance” in the development of its most advanced weapons and combat systems; but 

so too are the Japanese and South Koreans. The reality is that China has joined the ranks 

of a handful of countries that have the money, infrastructure, design talent, and national 

strategic demand signal to build credible modern destroyers. Watching this incipient 

transregional Chinese navy develop will continue to be a fascinating occupation.

Notes

1. See Michael McDevitt, “The PLA Navy’s Antiaccess Role in a Taiwan Contingency,” in The 

Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving 

Roles, ed. Phillip Saunders et al. (Washington, 

DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2011), pp. 

191–214.

2. See Michael McDevitt and Frederic Vellucci, 

“The Evolution of the People’s Liberation Army 

Navy: The Twin Missions of Area-Denial and 

Peacetime Operations,” in Sea Power and the 

Asia-Pacific: The Triumph of Neptune?, ed. Geoffrey Till and Patrick C. Bratton (Abingdon, U.K.: 

Routledge, 2012).

3. Information Office of the State Council of the 

People’s Republic of China, China’s National 

Defense in 2008 (Beijing: January 2009), p. 12.

4. Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update,” Naval War 

College Review 63, no. 1 (Winter 2010), p. 15, 

available at www.usnwc.edu/publications/Naval

-War-College-Review/2010---Winter.aspx.

5. See the entry for the Luda class at the Military 

Today website, www.military-today.com/navy/

luda_class.htm. Also, an extensive and credibly 

detailed discussion of the Luda class as a test 

platform is found in Wikipedia, s.v. “Type 051 

Destroyer,” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_051

_destroyer.

6. Huang Li, Sword Pointed at the Gulf of Aden: The 

PLAN’s Far Seas Shining Sword (Guangzhou: Sun 

Yat-sen Univ. Press, 2009).

7. From 1980 to 1982 I commanded a Spruanceclass destroyer (USS Oldendorf, DD 972) with 

an LM2500 propulsion system. The Spruanceclass ships were the U.S. Navy’s first gas turbine–

powered major warships. I suspect, but do not 

know for certain, that the LM2500s in Qingdao

(DDG 113) and Harbin (DDG 112) have been 

replaced by Ukrainian-designed gas turbines, 

since spare parts for the General Electric 

engines would be hard to come by because of 

sanctions the United States imposed following 

the Tiananmen Square massacre. Both of these 

ships have participated in antipiracy patrols in 

the Arabian Sea.

8. Christopher P. Carlson, “China’s Eagle StrikeEight Anti-ship Cruise Missiles: The YJ-83, 

C803, and the Family Tree,” Defense Media 

Network, www.defensemedianetwork.com/

stories/chinas-eagle-strike-eight-anti-ship 

-cruise-missiles-designation-confusion-and-the 

-family-members-from-yj-8-to-yj-8a/.

9. For Harpoon data, see Wikipedia, s.v. “Harpoon Missile,” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/harpoon

_(missile).

10. According to Carlson (see note 8), the C-802 

was an export-only cruise missile marketed 

to provide funds for the PLAN to develop the 

YJ-83; apparently the seeker of the YJ-83 was 

derived from the C-803. Dov S. Zakheim, The 

United States Navy and Israeli Navy: Background, 

Current Issues, Scenarios, and Prospects, CNA 

Research Paper COP D0026727.A1/Final (Alexandria, VA: CNA, February 2012), p. 27, available at www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/

The%20United%20States%20Navy%20and

%20Israeli%20Navy%20D0026727%20A1.pdf.

11. James C. Bussert, “China Pursues Antisubmarine Warfare,” Signal: On Line, November 2004, 

www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/509; James C. 

Bussert, “Chinese Naval Sonar Evolves from 

Foreign Influences,” Signal: On Line, December 

2002, www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/279.

See also Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute 

Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), p. 612.
china

s evolving surface fleet 65

12. The discussion of the Type 052C class is based 

on Wikipedia, s.v. “Type 052C Destroyer,” 

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_052C_destroyer/,

and “Type 052C (Luyang-II Class) Missile 

Destroyer,” SinoDefence.com, www.sinodefence 

.com/navy/surface/type052c-luyang2.asp. There 

are a number of other Google results for this 

class, but they all repeat the same information 

regarding weapons systems. See also Ronald 

O’Rourke, “The PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, and Aircraft,” in The Chinese Navy,

ed. Saunders et al., pp. 141–74.

13. James C. Bussert, “China Debuts AEGIS Destroyers,” Signal: On Line, July 2005, www.afcea 

.org/content/?q=node/992.

14. “Luyang II/Type 052C Multi-role Destroyer, 

People’s Liberation Army Navy,” Global Security,

www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/

luyang-ii.htm. This report suggests the radar 

resulted from a codevelopment program with 

Kvant-Radiolokatsiya Company of Ukraine.

15. Norman Friedman, “Aegis Air Defense System at 

Thirty,” Defense Media Network, April 23, 2013, 

www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/aegis

-air-defense-system-at-thirty/.

16. Jeff Head, “PLAN-USA DDG Compare,” 

JeffHead.com, www.jeffhead.com/PLAN-USA

-DDGCompare/.

17. Dennis Gormley, Andrew Erickson, and 

Jingdong Yuan, “JFQ-75: A Potent Vector—Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments,” 

NDU Press, September 30, 2014, ndupress.ndu 

.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/

Article/11240/jfq-75-a-potent-vector-assessing

-chinese-cruise-missile-developments.aspx; 

Carlo Kopp and Martin Andrew, “CASIC YJ62/C-602 in PLA Cruise Missiles,” Air Power 

Australia, www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA

-Cruise-Missiles.html#mozTocId32149.

18. James Bussert and Bruce Elleman, People’s 

Liberation Army Navy: Combat System Technology, 1949–2010 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

Press, 2011), pp. 132–33.

19. Wikipedia, s.v. “Type 052C Destroyer.”

20. Ibid.

21. Xu Tianran, “China Launches New Destroyer,” Global Times, September 5, 2012, www 

.globaltimes.com.cn/content/731150.shtml. 

Global Times is owned by People’s Daily, and 

hence is considered an official, although not an 

authoritative, source.

22. Ibid.

23. Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, “New Destroyer a Significant Development for Chinese 

Sea Power,” China Real Time Report (blog), Wall 

Street Journal, October 8, 2012, blogs.wsj.com/

chinarealtime/2012/10/08/new-destroyer-a

-significant-development-for-chinese-sea

-power/.

24. “2012 in Review,” Information Dissemination 

(blog), December 28, 2012, www.information

dissemination.net/2012/12/2012-in-review.html.

25. “Project 956/EM, Sovremenny-Class Missile 

Destroyer,” SinoDefence.com, www.sinodefence 

.com/navy/surface/sovremenny.asp.

26. Robert O. Work, “Winning the Race: A Naval 

Fleet Platform Architecture for Enduring 

Maritime Supremacy” (briefing, Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 1, 

2005), available at www.csbaonline.org/. Work, 

who at time of writing was Deputy Secretary of 

Defense, makes specific reference to the boiler 

problems associated with Sovremenny.

27. “The White Elephants of the PLAN,” Information Dissemination (blog), September 29, 2012, 

www.informationdissemination.net/2012/09/

the-white-elephants-of-plan.html.

28. As of this writing, the best open-source information indicates that the Luyang III (Type 052D) 

class will at some point be fitted with the DH-10 

land-attack cruise missile (LACM), which will 

mean that China’s most modern destroyers will 

carry a land-attack weapon with an approximate 

range of 1,900 nm. See Gormley, Erickson, and 

Yuan, “JFQ-75: A Potent Vector,” p. 102.

Sureesh Mehta

China’s naval modernization program is driven by three primary factors: potential 

conflict within the Taiwan Strait; the increased challenge posed by the significant 

U.S. naval presence in the Pacific Ocean; and the desire to develop a blue-water fleet to 

secure China’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that pass through the Indian Ocean 

and the South China Sea.1

 This modernization involves naval hardware accretion, additional infrastructure to support the growth of naval forces, and a matching manpower 

profile. The latter two aspects are contingent on the modernization of naval hardware.

The major naval hardware elements being modernized consist of the surface combatant 

forces—destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, patrol craft, and, above all, China’s aircraft carrier—as well as submarines, antiship ballistic missiles, and antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). While submarines and long-range missiles unquestionably complement a 

country’s surface fleet and synergistically increase overall naval capacity, it is the surface 

fleet that provides the primary and most visible indicator of national naval capabilities.

Developments in the PLA Navy’s Surface Fleet

Since the start of the new millennium, modernization of the People’s Liberation Army 

(PLA) Navy (PLAN) has received a huge impetus. Within that larger effort, the pace of 

surface fleet modernization can be gauged by the increase in the portion of surface combatants qualifying as modern from less than 10 percent in 2004 to more than 30 percent 

in 2011.2

 While certain advanced platforms were acquired from Russia, surface fleet 

modernization has relied largely on indigenous production of a wide variety of ships.

The Liaoning Aircraft Carrier

Any discourse on PLAN modernization has to begin with the Chinese aircraft carrier 

program. Chen Bingde, the PLA chief of general staff, acknowledged for the first time in 

June 2011 that the former Varyag, after undergoing a ten-year refit, was being readied in 

the Dalian shipyard.3

 After extensive machinery and navigational equipment checks and 

deck landing trials by PLAN helicopters, the carrier was commissioned into the PLAN 

Its Possible Roles and Missions in the Indian Ocean Region and Its 

Impact on Regional Security and Stability

CHAPTER SIX

China’s Evolving Surface Fleet
68 china maritime studies

on September 25, 2012. The first deck landing and takeoff of J-15 fighter aircraft from 

Liaoning were accomplished at the end of November 2012. Since then, the carrier has 

been based at the North Sea Fleet base of Qingdao for operational workup and exploitation.

Chinese media releases suggest that the planned “way forward” for consolidation of a 

Chinese carrier task force will be carried out in phases. A Xinhua report, for instance, 

speculates that, “restricted by the number of main PLA naval ships, China’s aircraft carrier formation will be kept in an appropriate scale, and mainly be composed of Liaoning,

four to six guided missile destroyers and guided missile frigates, one to two nuclear 

attack submarines or new-type conventional submarines, and one comprehensive supply 

ship.”4

As for its air wing, China intends to operate two types of fixed-wing aircraft from the 

carrier. Beyond the already-tested J-15 fighter aircraft, it projects the J-31 as the nextgeneration carrier-borne fighter. The Chinese consider the fifth-generation J-31 to have 

three traits that will make it suitable for service on the aircraft carrier: medium size, 

reliability, and multirole functionality. The PLAN hopes that these two aircraft operating 

together will provide “comprehensive time-domain and airspace coverage, and greater 

combat radius” around the carrier.

Unsubstantiated media discourse assesses that the PLAN may construct up to two more 

carriers by 2020. One might be of Liaoning’s follow-on class. The other could have an 

improved design, with heavier displacement (seventy thousand tons), steam catapults 

and conventional steam power, and the capability to carry domestically manufactured 

advanced fighter and fixed-wing airborne warning and control system (i.e., AWACS) 

aircraft.5

Destroyers and Frigates

China has acquired four Sovremenny-class destroyers and advanced Kamov-28 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters from Russia. Indigenous production includes the 

building and commissioning of the Luyang I and II–class destroyers and Jiangkai I and 

II–class frigates. The Chinese regard Luyang II (052C)–class destroyers as Chinese 

“Aegis” destroyers. To augment further its surface vessels to meet escort requirements 

for an aircraft carrier task force, the PLAN commissioned the first of its Type 052D airdefense destroyers, named Changchun (150), on January 31, 2013.6

 Displacing about six 

thousand tons, it has greater long-range air-warning and regional air-defense capabilities 

than earlier destroyer classes.

Building of Jiangkai-class frigates has proceeded at a rate of one per year, and several 

more of the same class likely will be built. The commissioning of the new-class destroyer 

was followed in quick succession by the introduction of the first Type 056 advanced 

ASW frigate on February 25, 2013, again primarily for carrier escort tasks. Bengbu (582) 
china

s evolving surface fleet 69

was commissioned on March 12, 2013. It reportedly integrates different types of weaponry and equipment of advanced technologies and features good stealth performance 

and high electromagnetic compatibility.7

Missile Boats

Through 2013, China had built roughly seventy Houbei-class attack craft. It may have 

plans to build as many as one hundred of these stealthy boats. They have a wave-piercing 

catamaran hull design. Each is armed with eight YJ-83 ASCMs.

Amphibious Ships

Amphibious warfare capabilities also are being augmented through significant equipment upgrades, including introduction of new Yuzhao (071)–class amphibious ships 

(LPDs) and their integral air-cushion landing craft. China has built three Type 071 

LPDs, with at least one more to be commissioned. More multimission amphibious platforms are likely to be built to enable the PLAN to fulfill both traditional missions and 

requirements for military operations other than war.

Assessed Roles and Missions in the Indian Ocean Region

Chen Mingyi, a member the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, laid out the role of the PLAN quite aptly when in March 2009 he 

exhorted it to “move to oceans and shoulder the tasks of safeguarding territory, development of national economy and overseas interests.”8

 This suggests that China looks at the 

Indian Ocean region (IOR) in light of two imperatives. The first concerns the security of 

China’s SLOCs, on which its growing economy is so dependent. The second is the need 

to expand its operating space, striving for presence in all global hot spots, so as to be able 

to influence events in favor of its national interest.9

Answering these imperatives—involving distant-area operations, far and wide—may 

have led China to strengthen the capacity of its surface fleet. In this context, the PLAN’s 

evolving surface fleet’s roles and missions in the IOR may be viewed from three distinct 

perspectives: traditional, nontraditional, and support of extended Chinese maritime 

interests and endeavors.

Traditional Military Role

The Chinese vision of expanding the country’s maritime frontiers in accordance with the 

“three island chain” construct entails establishing a blue-water presence within the “first 

island chain” of the Pacific Ocean by 2010; gaining the capability to exercise presence out 

to the “second island chain” by 2025; and possessing a true blue-water fleet with credible 

presence in the Pacific to the “third island chain,” extending from the Aleutian Islands 

to Antarctica, by 2050.10 Considering the PLAN’s current growth and modernization 
70 china maritime studies

trajectory, once the PLAN’s reach has passed the “second island chain” credibly, projecting itself toward the IOR would be well within its capabilities.

One hopes that opportunities for the PLAN surface fleet to engage in its conventional 

role of war fighting will not present themselves readily. Nevertheless, the mere presence 

of “men-of-war” implies an offensive and coercive capability, whether used or not. At 

present levels of surface fleet evolution, the PLAN would find it difficult to carry out 

the traditional naval role at the high end of the spectrum of warfare in the IOR, mainly 

because of its lack of integral air-defense capability. However, the situation will change 

substantially within a decade or so, by which time the gap between the Chinese intent 

of “conducting operations in distant waters” and its aircraft carrier task force–based 

“power-projection” capabilities will have narrowed substantially.11

The intervening time also will enable Beijing to gain relevant technical expertise in 

carrier construction and aircraft manufacture, learn the highly specialized art of carrier 

air operations, and acquire enough influence over its regions of interest to transform 

one or two “influence-heavy places” into bases for supporting such a force at extended 

ranges. The most probable locations for the latter are Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota 

in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. But the Chinese 

maritime options may not be limited to these “pearls” alone. The PLAN’s current tasking 

and China’s future naval vision may warrant the exploration of other suitable sites deep 

into the Indian Ocean, such as Mauritius, Seychelles, one of the East African littorals, or 

ports in the Gulf of Aden.

In fact, Liaoning’s political commissar forecast the shape of things to come when he 

reportedly stated that “as the first generation of Chinese aircraft carrier crew, we must 

. . . ensure early establishment of our high-sea combat capability, making due contributions to safeguarding our national maritime rights and interests, and building up China 

into a marine power.”12 While the PLAN assiduously works toward that vision, the ongoing capability accretion of the PLA naval surface fleet could be used appropriately for 

nontraditional activities that project a benign face for the state while keeping the force 

well trained and equipped and operationally active.

Nontraditional Roles

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) now form an important component of 

the application of military forces. Chinese doctrine governing this area directs the PLAN 

to “defend the country’s maritime rights, interests, and security, safeguard its economic 

development, and serve its peaceful diplomacy” by engaging in maritime operations in 

offshore areas.13 The IOR has provided numerous opportunities for the PLAN to engage 

in these activities. The most important has been the PLAN’s antipiracy escort mission, 

which (as of early 2014) the service has been conducting for more than six years. The 
china

s evolving surface fleet 71

PLAN has sent nineteen naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden and has performed more 

than eight hundred escort missions.14

But the real and invaluable gains for China from these missions have extended far 

beyond the safety of the merchant ships escorted. China has undertaken many maritime 

and diplomatic activities either associated with or complementing the presence of its 

ships in the Gulf of Aden. While on deployment, PLAN ships have increased their interoperability by jointly operating with other countries’ ships, conducting joint exercises, 

and exchanging visits of task force commanders and other personnel from NATO, the 

European Union, and Combined Task Force 151.

Warships of different task forces also have been “showing the flag” in various IOR littorals, including those of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Malaysia, while 

proceeding to or returning from antipiracy mission deployments. The PLAN’s postdeployment arena has expanded progressively as its escort mission has endured. Ships of 

the eleventh task force transited the Suez into the Mediterranean and ventured into the 

Black Sea for the first time, making maiden visits to Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Romanian ports. These ships subsequently docked at Istanbul and the Israeli port of Haifa, 

thus remaining in a potentially volatile area—considering the ongoing Syrian turmoil 

and the Israel-Lebanon standoff—for close to a month in July–August 2012. The warships of the twelfth task force reached out even farther by routing themselves home via 

Australia. The thirteenth task force ships sailed into the Atlantic in the first half of April 

2013 and visited Moroccan, Portuguese, and French ports in that ocean. They called at 

Mediterranean Sea ports in Malta and Algeria en route. The emergent pattern resembles 

a wheel, with the hub at the Gulf of Aden and the spokes fanning out across the globe in 

all directions.

Other nontraditional PLAN activities in the IOR merit mention: 

• The PLAN hospital ship Peace Ark sailed across the Indian Ocean on Mission 

Harmony from September to November 2010, visiting Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, 

Seychelles, and Bangladesh. It also operated in the Gulf of Aden for a few days with 

the sixth escort task force.

• The PLAN training ship Zheng He, while transiting through the Gulf of Aden as part 

of its around-the-world training mission, also effected a rendezvous with the Yantai

frigate of the eleventh task force on May 17, 2012, with the ships operating together 

for a day.

• Diversion of the frigate Xuzhou from the antipiracy task force to the Libyan coast 

in February 2011 to assist in the withdrawal of Chinese citizens from crisis-struck 

Libya—the first role of this kind for the PLAN—is well documented.
72 china maritime studies

• Three PLAN warships participated in the Pakistan-initiated multilateral maritime 

Exercise Aman in March 2013 prior to service as the fourteenth task force in the Gulf 

of Aden. This represented the second time the PLAN followed this sequence, the 

first being when the frigate Ma’anshan joined Exercise Aman in March 2011, then 

proceeded to join in escort operations in the Gulf of Aden.

All these nontraditional activities have accorded the PLAN an unprecedented opportunity to perform operational tests, showcase the frontline units of all three of its fleets, 

and provide the bulk of its manpower with hands-on workup in distant-area operations, 

in a theater it did not have to create. While these are the visible dividends, the biggest 

gains have accrued in the PLAN’s institutionalization of back-end logistical, administrative, and infrastructural setups, which have evolved into well-coordinated mechanisms 

for supporting the pre-, post-, and actual deployment activities of the successive task 

forces.

Supporting Extended Maritime Interests and Endeavors

On November 8, 2012, during his final keynote address at the National Party Congress 

in Beijing, then–Chinese president Hu Jintao called for “enhancing the Chinese capacity for exploiting marine resources, resolutely safeguarding China’s maritime rights and 

interests, and building China into a maritime power.”15 These comments represented 

the first time the country’s topmost leader had enunciated clearly in a party congress a 

decisive road map for maritime development.

As part of its marine resources exploration policy, China has been extending its deepsea exploration activities in the Indian Ocean since 2005. In July 2011, the International 

Seabed Authority granted the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association exclusive rights to explore an area measuring ten thousand square 

kilometers (3,800 square miles) of the sub-ocean Southwest Indian Ridge.16 China also 

has dispatched its oceanographic-survey and intelligence-collection vessels to the IOR 

on a regular basis. The large-scale, China-bound, seaborne trade and energy flow needs 

no further elaboration. In addition, a large Chinese diaspora inhabits the IOR littorals, 

engaged in varied economic activities. For instance, Chinese people—including technical reserve PLA troopers—are carrying out uranium, mineral, metal, and oil exploration, 

infrastructure development, and humanitarian-assistance activities in about twentyeight African countries.

In keeping with the oft-repeated dictum that “the flag follows economic interests,” it 

appears quite logical that the PLAN surface fleet would feel, sooner rather than later, 

the need to secure the above-mentioned maritime endeavors and interests of the Chinese state. The presence of PLAN ships in proximity to the Gulf of Aden—albeit for a 
china

s evolving surface fleet 73

different task, antipiracy escort—does imply an unstated and notional sense of security 

assurance for Chinese economic and personnel interests.

Impact on Stability and Security in the IOR

To the other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the 

important oceanic areas; to India, it is a vital sea. Her lifelines 

are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the 

freedom of that coastal surface. No industrial development, no 

commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her 

unless her shores are protected.

 K. M. PANIKKAR, INDIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

Although the noted Indian maritime historian Sardar Panikkar expressed the prophetic 

words of the epigraph above in 1945, they remain relevant. In the contemporary era of 

globalized economic interdependence, predicated on uninterrupted traffic along maritime sea-lanes, the existing myriad security challenges in the IOR could have a decided 

impact on the security and stability of the entire region.

Impact in the Indian Maritime Domain

While the extent and intensity of future instability in the region are debatable at present, 

there is no denying that any such instability would affect Indian maritime interests and 

activities immediately, and to a considerable degree. India has a coastline of 7,516.6 km 

and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 2.013 million sq. km. The outlying Indian islands; offshore assets, fisheries, and deep-sea interests within the EEZ; major and minor 

harbors; and the overall seaward security of the vast coastline are other vital aspects of 

the Indian maritime dimension and responsibilities. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 

which serve as strategic outposts for India, have to be defended against various threats 

from state and nonstate actors. The main missile and rocket test launch centers connected to the Indian space and strategic-missile programs are located on India’s east coast. 

The Bay of Bengal, particularly the area around the Andaman Sea, is used extensively 

for experimental missile tests and operational rocket launches for placing various kinds 

of satellites into space. These activities entail deployment of maritime assets, including 

those of the navy, over a large area, necessitating wide-area communications, data transfer, and relaying, both terrestrially and through satellites.

In recent years, there have been reports of PLAN intelligence-gathering ships being 

deployed in the Bay of Bengal.17 Such ships easily would be able to monitor the entire 

gamut of India’s scientific activities related to its space and missile program by intercepting the ongoing communications and transmitting them to China for intensive analysis. Further, the presence of Chinese listening posts in the Myanmar-controlled Coco 

Islands (which has been reported in the global media, accompanied by a fair amount of 
74 china maritime studies

speculation) would present Beijing with permanent infrastructure to conduct communications and signals intelligence.

Additionally, when PLAN ships regularly start visiting ports such as Chittagong, 

Kyaukpyu, and Yangon in the Bay of Bengal, and Hambantota, Karachi, and Gwadar in 

the Arabian Sea, they would be right in the midst of a maritime area critical to Indian 

maritime interests. While transiting the region, these warships, along with research and 

intelligence-collection vessels, surely would indulge in activities such as seawater and 

atmospheric profiling, weather pattern observation, and routing and navigational familiarization. The increased data collection resulting from this ongoing presence combined 

with diligent management of such data would enable the PLAN to identify emerging 

patterns, which it could exploit in future maritime confrontations.

The institutionalization of the Aman series of multilateral exercises also has enabled the 

PLAN to plant its footprint regularly in the close vicinity of the Indian seaboard. The 

scope of the exercises themselves and the extent of PLAN participation therein have 

been expanding over time. From the presence of one warship and the conduct of basic 

naval drills in 2007, the activities have increased to three PLAN ships participating in 

tactical surface interception exercises, formation helicopter flying, and coordinated 

weapon firings. Asked by the media to comment on the enhanced participation of PLAN 

ships, Rear Adm. Khan Hasham Bin Saddique, commander of Pakistan’s fleet, said: 

“Given the kind of relationship between Pakistan and China as well as between the Pakistan Navy and PLA Navy, we expect this level of participation from our Chinese friends. 

It could give us the opportunity to further refine our procedures and enhance cooperation between the two navies.”18

Implications for the Indian Navy

To be sure, China definitely will not be able to “project power” in as comprehensive a 

manner as the United States defines it—as the ability “to rapidly and effectively deploy 

and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises and contribute to deterrence”—even should it gain the three medium-sized aircraft carriers and 

supporting hardware expected in the 2020 time frame.19 However, the PLAN is making 

steady progress in its aircraft carrier program, with the stated aim of “developing its 

naval capabilities of conducting operations in distant waters.” Assuming that eventually 

this will lead to a Chinese carrier formation deploying in the Indian Ocean, the Indian 

navy has reason to be concerned.

As an integral part of such a future Chinese carrier formation, nuclear attack submarines 

(SSNs) will bring about a quantum change in the undersea security paradigm for the 

Indian navy. Since the submarine-detection problem in the IOR is rather complex—the 

tropical seawater conditions complicate the sound-propagation profile—submarines 
china

s evolving surface fleet 75

occupy an inherently advantageous position. In such an environment, Chinese SSNs 

armed with ASCMs and modern torpedoes effectively would be able to achieve sea 

denial while posing a credible threat to IOR SLOCs.20 A disproportionate ASW effort 

would be required for the Indian navy to detect and prosecute such SSNs. The recent 

hype created around media reports of Chinese submarines being detected in the 

Indian Ocean demonstrates the challenges such submarines would pose in the region. 

The media also have highlighted Indian concerns—for instance, citing an Indian Ministry of Defence document to the effect that “the implicit focus of the Chinese navy 

appears to be undermining the Indian navy’s edge to control highly sensitive sea lines 

of communication.”21

In addition to Chinese SSNs, the Chinese surface fleet (whether operating independently; or in the traditional role as part of a carrier group, likely a decade from now; or 

continuing the current engagement in nontraditional MOOTW activities) definitely will 

impact the operational pattern of the Indian navy. With PLAN ships crisscrossing the 

northern Arabian Sea for purposes of transit, passage, joint exercises, antipiracy patrols, 

and postdeployment activities, the availability of maritime space for the Indian navy 

to conduct operations, exercises, and training could be constrained somewhat, with its 

intentions and movements open to monitoring and possible interdiction. In such a constricting environment, the policies, plans, and procedures of the Indian navy will have to 

be transformed accordingly.

Pakistan’s acquisition of Chinese frigates and patrol craft, and possibly Chinese submarines, in addition to the two countries’ extensive maritime cooperation, may lead 

progressively to the positioning of Chinese maritime assets and expertise in Pakistan. 

Moreover, the handing over of Gwadar port operations to a Chinese company makes it 

easy for the PLAN to gain a foothold there eventually. Such a presence may merely facilitate training and “enhance[d] cooperation between the two navies,” as the Pakistani fleet 

commander has articulated, but the Indian naval establishment will have to be cognizant 

of this potential when planning its maritime mission profiles, operational doctrines, and 

tactical plans.22 In any period of heightened tensions, the possibility of active or tacit 

cooperation between the two forces will have to be factored in.

Impact on Regional Security

The naval forces of most maritime nations, including many extraregional powers, are 

undertaking antipiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. In “A Cooperative Strategy for 

21st Century Seapower” (October 2007), the U.S. Navy articulated its intent to maintain 

a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean, officially reiterating that “[c]redible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf / 

Indian Ocean to protect [America’s] vital interests . . . and deter . . . potential adversaries 
76 china maritime studies

and peer competitors.”23 The 2010 American Naval Operations Concept further elaborated that for the foreseeable future, the U.S. Navy will maintain continuous presence 

of one carrier strike group and one amphibious readiness group in the Arabian Gulf / 

Indian Ocean.24

Chinese strategic discourse indicates that Beijing’s strategic elite is debating seriously the 

possibility of China’s future energy security in the Indian Ocean being affected by India’s 

maritime strategy.25 As part of the larger energy security effort in the IOR, during one 

meeting of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction organization on streamlining antipiracy patrols and escort duties in the Gulf of Aden, China suggested that the sea-lanes 

currently being patrolled be divided into separate national sectors.26 Similar proposals—to the effect that various countries’ naval forces should define individual areas of 

responsibility to improve the efficiency of escort operations—also were floated by the 

Chinese representative at the UN Security Council.27 Had the participating nations approved such a proposal for implementation, the PLAN would be sitting pretty by now in 

a legitimately allotted “maritime slice” of the Arabian Sea.

The PLAN’s sustained naval presence in the IOR also allows Beijing’s foreign ministry to 

delve into regional diplomacy and test out foreign policy overtures. A case in point was 

the reported Chinese offer to mediate in the long-running sovereignty dispute between 

the United Arab Emirates and Iran over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa 

Island in the Persian Gulf.28 This mediation offer, if accepted by one or the other party, 

could go a long way toward establishing China’s credentials as a preeminent player in 

the Gulf region. Yet another facet of the Chinese naval presence in the region came into 

focus when certain countries sought to leverage that presence to create an impression of 

overt Chinese support in their favor. When the ships of the eleventh Chinese task force, 

after completing their tenure in the Gulf of Aden, were transiting through the eastern 

Mediterranean Sea on their way to the Black Sea, local-language articles in Syrian and 

Iranian media averred that the Chinese and Russian navies would conduct joint exercises with Syria and Iran. Although both China and Russia rejected such a possibility out 

of hand, the PLAN ships’ mere presence in the vicinity raised undue concerns at a time 

of great and ongoing regional turbulence.29

The above instances indicate that even the PLAN’s currently limited presence in the 

IOR is being leveraged by either China or others in various nuanced ways. Hence, 

even if the problem of piracy in the Arabian Sea hypothetically were to be resolved, the 

PLAN might not return to China, especially after investing so much in the way of effort, 

resources, and international relations capital, and having gained strong sea legs, vital lessons in interoperability, and, above all, a say in global maritime matters.
china

s evolving surface fleet 77

An Indian scholar argues that “the continued presence of these two extraregional navies 

[i.e., the U.S. Navy and the PLAN] in the Indian Ocean with the similar stated motives 

of ‘SLOC security’ and ‘freedom of the seas’ but diametrically opposite ways of thinking, does have portents for instability. Rising capabilities of the Indian navy also adds 

the third dimension into the regional power matrix.”30 The Indian navy’s assigned role of 

“safeguarding India’s national interests encompassing sovereignty, territorial integrity, secure maritime environment conducive to safety, security, and development of the nation 

and its citizens” is quite similar to what members of the Chinese political elite want their 

navy to do.31 Thus, when the PLAN’s assigned task of “safeguarding . . . development of 

national economy and overseas interests” overlaps with the charter of the Indian navy, 

there are bound to be conflicts of interest. The resultant maneuvers aimed at convincing each other—and the larger IOR littoral—of the seriousness of their imperatives 

could cause internecine fault lines, which, if not adroitly managed, could widen with 

time. Robert Kaplan in fact identifies the “Indian Ocean [as the place] where the global 

struggles will play out in the 21st century.”32 One Chinese author also suggests that since 

India perceives the Indian Ocean as a guarded sphere of influence, it offers an important 

arena for Beijing and New Delhi to “display their strategic muscle.”33

One of the scenarios that two Indian strategists have painted predicts that China will 

manage to find a military base on the East African coast and will station an air expeditionary wing there to provide air cover for PLAN ships deployed in the region. In that 

scenario, India would find itself isolated with regard to its strategic interests in the IOR.34

India would have to generate alternatives to reverse this “isolation” predicament, and 

many other Asian countries would have to seek options for a power balance vis-à-vis the 

proactive Chinese presence in the region. These dynamics and any counterresponses 

obviously would impact regional stability.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has manifested a gradual doctrinal shift from its 

previous continental focus to a maritime one and the notion of outward expansion, 

leading to a stress on naval modernization. As a result, the contours of the PLAN have 

undergone considerable change, transforming both its force composition and its maritime strategy. While the numbers of surface combatants likely will remain more or less 

constant, as new ships are commissioned and older ones get phased out more modern 

weapons systems and sensors will find their way into the inventory, so the force capability will keep on rising.

The relevance of the PLAN’s conducting far-seas operations and its increasing necessity 

may be explained in terms of the increasing vulnerability of the Chinese energy flow 

through the Indian Ocean and the need to secure China’s maritime areas of interest. 
78 china maritime studies

The theaters associated with such a far-seas operations strategy appear to be the western 

Pacific Ocean, followed by the eastern IOR.

The PLAN’s enhanced capabilities, combined with the desire to “operate in distant waters,” suggest an eventual permanent Chinese presence and power projection in the IOR. 

The PLAN’s current capabilities may not match its intent yet, but its rapid progress in acquiring these capabilities and the current Chinese maritime orientation do raise security 

concerns for India, and may pose questions regarding the future stability quotient in the 

IOR.

Therefore, maintaining a clear perspective on the PLAN’s evolving surface fleet and its 

accompanying shift in strategic focus will serve the interests of the larger global community well.

Notes

1. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: 

Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report 

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, December 10, 2012), p. 5, available at 

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf.

2. Ibid., p. 15.

3. See “China’s Aircraft Carrier May Undergo 

Sea Trials from July,” Wantchinatimes, June 

22, 2011, www.wantchinatimes.com/news 

-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=&

id=20110622000062.

4. “PLAN Makes Preparations for Aircraft 

Carrier Formation,” People’s Daily Online,

December 14, 2012, english.peopledaily.com 

.cn/102774/8058419.html.

5. “Future of Chinese Navy Aircraft Carrier 

Development,” China Defence Mashup, October 

16, 2012, www.china-defense-mashup.com/

the-future-of-chinese-navy-aircraft-carrier 

-development.html.

6. “‘Changchun’ Warship Commissioned to PLAN,” 

China Military Online, February 4, 2013, eng

.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china

-military-news/2013-02/04/content_5208440 

.htm.

7. “New Frigate Delivery in Line with Procedure: 

Spokesman,” Xinhua, February 28, 2013, available at news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013 

-02/28/c_132199281.htm.

8. “Chinese Navy Urged to Go from Coastal 

Waters to Oceans,” China Internet Information 

Center, www.china.org.cn/government/NPC 

_CPPCC_2009/2009-03/07/content_17397799 

.htm. This is basically quite similar to the Indian 

navy’s mandated constitutional role “to ensure 

peace and stability in the waters around us, so 

that economic development can proceed ahead 

uninterrupted.”

9. Kamlesh Kumar Agnihotri, “Modernisation of 

the Chinese Navy, Its Strategic Expansion into 

the Indian Ocean Region, and Likely Impact on 

the Regional Stability,” Maritime Affairs: Journal 

of the National Maritime Foundation of India 7, 

no. 1 (Summer 2011), p. 54.

10. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (New 

Delhi: Bookmart, under arrangement with Univ. 

of California Press), p. 67.

11. “PLAN Makes Preparations.”

12. “Political Commissar of ‘Liaoning’ Ship: 

Safeguarding China’s Maritime Territory, 

Sovereignty, Rights, and Interests,” People’s Daily 

Online, January 18, 2013, english.people.com.cn/

90786/8097202.html.

13. See “National Defense Policy,” sec. 2 of the white 

paper China’s National Defense in 2010, available 

at news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011 

-03/31/c_13806851.htm.

14. “Chinese Navy Completes 800th Escort Mission 

in the Gulf of Aden,” China Military Online,

english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china 

-military-news/2015-01/04/content_6294429 

.htm.

15. “Hu Calls for Efforts to Build China into 

Maritime Power,” Xinhua, November 8, 2012, 

available at news.xinhuanet.com/english/

special/18cpcnc/2012-11/08/c_131959403.htm.

16. Decision ISBA/17/C/16 dated July 19, 2011, 

in International Seabed Authority, Selected 
china

s evolving surface fleet 79

Decision and Documents of the Seventeenth 

Session (11–22 July 2011) (Kingston, Jam.: 2011), 

p. 109, available at www.isa.org.jm/files/

documents/EN/SelDecisions/SD17/EN-1.pdf.

17. “Suspected Chinese Spy Ship near Andamans,” 

Hindustan Times, August 30, 2011, available 

at www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/

NewDelhi/Suspected-Chinese-spy-ship-near 

-Andamans/Article1-739769.aspx.

18. “Naval Powers for Peace: Sino-Pakistani Maritime Partnership,” Beijing Review Online, March 

21, 2013, www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2013 

-03/18/content_527956.htm.

19. U.S. Defense Dept., Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: 

Joint Staff, April 12, 2001), p. 367.

20. Kamlesh Kumar Agnihotri, “The Chinese Navy’s 

Submarine Arm: Lynchpin of ‘Active Defence,’” 

Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 8, no. 2 (Winter 2012), 

p. 114.

21. “China’s Submarines in Indian Ocean Worry 

Indian Navy,” China Daily Mail, April 7, 2013, 

available at chinadailymail.com/2013/04/07/

chinas-submarines-in-indian-ocean-worry 

-indian-navy/.

22. “Chinese Navy Completes 800th Escort 

Mission.”

23. See J. T. Conway, G. Roughead, and T. W. Allen, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower,” October 17, 2007, available at www 

.navy.mil/; repr. Naval War College Review 61, 

no. 1 (Winter 2008), p. 7.

24. See U.S. Navy Dept., “Forward Presence,” chap. 

4 in Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy (Washington, DC: n.d. 

[2010]), p. 30.

25. See Zhang Li, China-India Relations: Strategic 

Engagement and Challenges, Asie.Visions 34 

(Paris: IFRI, September 2010), p. 28, available at 

www.ifri.org/downloads/asievisions34zhangli 

.pdf.

26. Richard Weitz, “Priorities and Challenges in 

China’s Naval Deployment in the Horn of 

Africa,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9, 

no. 24 (December 3, 2009), available at www 

.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx 

_ttnews%5Btt_ news%5D=35795.

27. “China Calls for Integrated Solution to 

Somali Piracy,” People’s Daily Online, November 19, 2009, english.peopledaily.com 

.cn/90001/90776/90883/6817473.html.

28. T. S. V. Ramana, “Chinese Diplomatic Riposte in 

the Gulf?,” Maritime India, September 25, 2010, 

www.maritimeindia.org/sites/all/files/pdf/

Commentary_China_Gulf_Diplomacy.pdf.

29. Joanna Paraszczuk, “Russia, Syria Deny War 

Games with China, Iran,” Jerusalem Times, June 

19, 2012, available at www.jpost.com/Middle 

-East/Russia-Syria-deny-war-games-with 

-China-Iran.

30. Agnihotri, “Modernisation of the Chinese Navy,” 

p. 60.

31. “New Frigate Delivery.” For elaboration of 

how the role of the Indian navy flows from the 

national aim, national interests, and national 

security objectives and policy, see Ministry 

of Defence, Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009

(Sivakasi, India: Standard Press [India], 2009), 

pp. 6–11.

32. Robert Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign 

Affairs 88, no. 2 (March–April 2009), p. 23.

33. Zhang, China-India Relations, p. 28.

34. See Raja Menon and Rajiv Kumar, The Long 

View from Delhi (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2010), p. 161.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) aircraft carrier Liaoning is now 

afloat and conducting initial operations to develop its deck-aviation capability. The 

PLAN has demonstrated on several occasions an ability to outstrip the projections of 

Western analysts; and the Chinese themselves, while asserting that Liaoning is a developmental platform, nonetheless tout their entry into the club of navies that have aircraft 

carriers.1

 Now that Liaoning is conducting sea trials and an initial series of flight operations with the J-15 fighter (a derivative of the Russian SU-33), it is appropriate to assess 

the prospects that the PLAN will achieve a useful deck-aviation capability.

The U.S. Navy’s development of carrier aviation has been well chronicled, and of course 

is a success story of legendary proportions. However, this development process required 

two decades leading up to World War II and four decades afterward to achieve a true 

marriage of jet propulsion and aircraft carriers.2

 The PLAN can leapfrog much of the 

agony and bloodletting the U.S. Navy experienced in that process, but certain aspects of 

carrier aviation are inherently challenging and must be confronted through an institutional learning process. The PLAN will not be able to proceed solely on the basis of 

adopted technology, U.S. Navy (USN) doctrine, or stolen patents and secrets. It will have 

to learn on its own, and its ability to do so is not a given.3

The Limits of Leapfrogging

There are big lessons the PLAN does not have to learn that have contributed and will 

contribute to a massive leapfrog. First and foremost is the adoption of the angled flight 

deck. All aircraft carriers that employ an arrested landing system have this feature. The 

angled deck was not a self-evident solution to the catastrophic accident rates the U.S. 

Navy experienced from the late 1940s through the early 1960s; however, the introduction of the angled deck led to an almost halving of the USN aviation accident rate, from 

776 in 1954 to 360 in 1960. Other technological developments such as the optical landing system also contributed.4

 Moreover, early jets had difficult handling characteristics 

and poor engine response; these caused many mishaps. The PLAN will be able to avoid 

all these problems. Looking at videos of flight operations on Liaoning, one clearly sees 

the adoption, almost from whole cloth, of USN flight deck procedures.5

 Thus, in many 

Robert C. Rubel

CHAPTER SEVEN

An Assessment of Chinese Aircraft Carrier Aviation
82 china maritime studies

fundamental ways the PLAN will be able to enter the deck-aviation business at a technically sophisticated level and avoid the costs the U.S. Navy incurred.

While technical leapfrogging is a considerable advantage, in a number of areas the 

PLAN will be on its own—no amount of imitation will help. The first is night and allweather operations. Up through World War II, aircraft carriers generally operated only 

during the day and in good weather. With the advent of nuclear weapons and the U.S. 

Navy’s desperation to make its aircraft carriers viable nuclear strike platforms, night and 

all-weather operations were initiated—also at a terrible cost in aircraft and lives.6

 Of 

course, the technology for conducting such operations has gotten vastly better, both in 

the aircraft and on the ship, but “come-last” crews actually have to develop proficiency in 

such operations, and they are anything but risk-free.

To understand the challenges and risk of all-weather and night carrier operations, we 

have to examine the USN experience. Night operations are perhaps the easier of the two 

conditions, assuming the weather is decent: ceiling and visibility are sufficient for pilots 

on final approach to sight the landing area visually from at least three-quarters of a mile 

behind the ship on glide path; and the seas are relatively smooth.7

 Before digital cockpits 

and heads-up displays, pilots had to become proficient at scanning a least five separate 

gauges (instruments) to keep the airplane upright and on the desired course, altitude, 

and speed. Instrument (or “blind”) flying is not easy and requires constant practice to 

maintain proficiency. This is especially the case at sea, where, except for clear, moonlit 

nights, there is no discernible horizon to orient the pilot. Digital cockpits and heads-up 

displays consolidate information and ease the challenge quite a bit, but disorientation is 

still a constant threat, and any electronic or other system failure raises the risk level considerably. However, for night operations the Chinese at least have the leapfrog advantage 

of adopting the latest Western technology for cockpit displays, navigation, and precision 

final landing approach. Yet even with all this equipment, the U.S. Navy has experienced 

multiple losses of planes and aircrews: an aircraft launches, goes out on a mission, and 

is not heard from again. Pilot disorientation is a suspected cause. Moreover, ejection or 

ditching at night reduces the prospects for crew recovery.

Adverse weather is the real foe of carrier operations. Day or night, rough seas will cause 

even a hundred-thousand-ton Nimitz-class carrier to roll, pitch, and heave. The lastnamed term refers to the vertical up-and-down motion of a ship—the brute lifting and 

dropping of the ship by the sea. This movement creates difficulties for pilots on final 

approach, as optical glide-slope indicators, even if stabilized, have limited ability to compensate for heave. The ship’s roll further complicates the difficulties of heave because the 

glide-slope indicator is located over a hundred feet from the ship’s centerline. Pilots who 

“chase” the resulting errant glide-slope indications—a reflexive tendency—risk going too 

low and crashing into the ship’s stern or going too high and missing the arresting wires. 
china

s evolving surface fleet 83

In the U.S. Navy, a landing signal officer (LSO) is positioned near the landing area to talk 

the aircraft down under these conditions.8

 Still, even with a reasonably good landing approach, a little too much aircraft sink rate combined with an upward-moving ship’s deck 

can collapse landing gear at touchdown.

The other hazard is missing the wires. Because fighter jets can only have so much fuel 

aboard when they land on a carrier and because they use that fuel rapidly, failure to 

catch a wire more than once can lead quickly to a fuel emergency. USN carriers have 

tanker aircraft that can conduct air-to-air refueling, and normally one orbits overhead 

during landing operations to refuel aircraft that have trouble getting aboard. If the 

Chinese do not have such a capability, the risks of operating at night or in rough seas 

escalate considerably. The alternative is to have a “divert airfield” available on shore. In 

this case a “bingo” fuel state is calculated that, when reached, causes the pilot to abandon 

attempts to land on the ship and instead head to shore. However, linking carrier operations to a divert field limits the operational maneuverability of the carrier.

In theory, U.S. carriers can operate in zero-ceiling, zero-visibility conditions. Whether 

owing to low clouds, fog, or heavy rain, pilots are unable to see the landing area until at 

or just before touchdown. They rely on a combination of radar guidance, a microwave 

glide-slope indicator, and verbal commands from the LSO, who actually can see the 

airplane’s landing light well before the pilot can see the ship. In practice, carrier skippers 

are reluctant to operate in these conditions, because of the increased risks, but doing so 

is occasionally necessary if the weather worsens while aircraft are in the air. Even with 

the most sophisticated equipment, success requires the utmost in pilot proficiency and 

complete trust and confidence between pilots and LSOs. This results only from extensive 

experience. This is the problem: weather conditions can change rapidly at sea and the 

carrier moves, so unless a commander takes an ultraconservative approach to operations, at some point conditions likely will deteriorate while aircraft are airborne, and if 

the ship and air wing are not proficient, losses will result.

Although it occurred in 1950, an incident involving several U.S. carriers in the Far East 

is still a good illustration of how quickly things can go wrong. The battle force was 

attempting to swap out sixty-four jet fighters from one carrier to another when bad 

weather moved in, both at sea and at shore-divert fields. An officer who was on the battle group staff at the time relates: “We had a lot of these fighters in the air. Then we tried 

to bring them down and it was a tough job of getting them on board. They were running 

out of fuel and there was no base on the beach to send them to. We had to get them back 

on board those two carriers, and we broke up those planes in some numbers.”9

The discussion of flying in adverse conditions leads to consideration of the matter of 

aircrew and ship’s crew proficiency. To assess the overall capability of a force, it must be 
84 china maritime studies

understood as a system that is composed of both human and machine elements. The 

human element must be understood as a composite of selection, training, and culture—

especially organizational culture. Proficiency at the “tip of the spear” is the result of the 

influences of all these factors, and more. This article will focus on just two. First, what 

degree of risk will the PLAN accept to generate true proficiency in its forces? Second, 

will the PLAN be able to move beyond a relatively small elite cadre of crews to a larger 

force that must count on “average” pilots?

Modern technology has produced high-quality aircraft simulators. These machines are 

being used more extensively all the time to substitute for actual flying time, and in some 

cases, especially in the airlines, crews can qualify on a new airplane using only simulators. In carrier operations, however, no simulator can substitute for the kind of actual 

situation described previously. Individuals can be partially trained in simulators of 

various kinds, but night and foul-weather operations at sea require the development of 

teamwork and confidence that only actual operations in these conditions can produce. 

This imposes on any navy the requirement to accept risk in a peacetime training environment. Conditioned by World War II to embrace risk, the U.S. Navy could tolerate the 

grievous losses experienced as its aviation arm endeavored during the 1950s to develop 

an endemic night/all-weather capability. The question is whether the PLAN organizational culture, corporately, is capable of accepting these risks, and whether, on an officerby-officer basis, it can produce leaders with sufficient nerve to make risk-incurring 

decisions. If it cannot, PLAN naval aviation operations will be constrained severely.

The second issue includes but transcends night and foul-weather flying. It is one thing 

to have a small, elite cadre of highly selected and trained aircrews, but quite another to 

field a large force that is populated by average personnel. Military flying is a Darwinian 

activity; the weak or maladapted either die or drop out. The more challenging the flying 

environment, the fewer crews will make it to highly experienced and proficient status. 

The Israeli Air Force is an example of an almost pure meritocracy in which brutal selection, training, and evaluation produce a relatively small corps of truly outstanding fliers. 

Fielding one or two small air wings can be pursued on this basis, but at some larger force 

size the selection and evaluation criteria must be relaxed enough to produce sufficient 

training throughput.

The challenge then becomes how people with second- or third-tier talent levels can be 

made useful members of the force. Here again risk is introduced. It permeates decision 

making from top organizational levels down to unit commanding officers, and corporate 

culture is paramount. Is the PLAN still a centralized and risk-averse organization, or can 

it change its stripes and empower both itself as an institution and its individual leaders 

to accept risk? There is a recent Chinese movie called Skyfighters that is a knockoff of the 

American movie Top Gun. In it, the analogue of Tom Cruise’s “Maverick” character is an 
china

s evolving surface fleet 85

aggressive, risk-taking commander who tries to push the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) into 

becoming a more progressive organization. The fact that the PLAAF saw fit to sponsor 

such a film indicates that there are indeed cultural problems to overcome within the 

Chinese military.10

Armed with an understanding of how organizational culture, with its effect on training, 

can empower or constrain the proficiency of a carrier aviation force, we can evaluate 

better the prospects for PLAN carriers being able to adopt various operational roles and 

contribute to the achievement of presumed Chinese strategic missions.

Doctrinal Roles

Since the conversion of the collier Jupiter into the first U.S. aircraft carrier, Langley,

the operational doctrinal roles of the ship type have evolved and proliferated. Aircraft 

carriers represent a concentration of both national resources and offensive combat 

power, so the conditions and circumstances under which they are committed to use 

and potentially subjected to risk must be understood clearly and reconciled with both 

their characteristics and the benefits to be gained from their use.11 The articulation of 

doctrinal roles is a way of analyzing capabilities, benefits, and risks. While the U.S. Navy 

has never published such a categorization formally, most naval aviation flag officers have 

a tacit grasp of them. Whether PLAN leadership will develop a similar understanding 

is open to question at this point. U.S. aircraft carriers, over their history, have played six 

doctrinal roles. The prospects for the adoption of each role by a force of Chinese carriers 

will provide some insight into how the PLAN might use them and perhaps also about 

the practical limits of Chinese sea power.

The first doctrinal role to examine is that of capital ship. The term “capital ship” is used 

quite often in conjunction with aircraft carriers—naturally enough, given the history of 

the epic sea battles in the Pacific between the navies of Japan and the United States. Traditionally, the capital ship has been that ship type capable of defeating all other types—

typically the ship with the most guns, in the age of sail, or the biggest guns, in the age of 

dreadnoughts. Once naval aircraft attained sufficient performance capability to deliver 

bombs that were the equivalent of major-caliber gun shells, the aircraft carrier became 

the principal arbiter of what floated and what did not, submarines notwithstanding. 

Aircraft carriers became true capital ships: those that, when concentrated, could defeat 

an opposing fleet and seize command of the sea.

After World War II, by virtue of America’s unchallenged dominance of the seas and the 

particular characteristics of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, the nature of command 

of the sea and the concomitant role of capital ships changed. Instead of being concentrated to defeat an enemy fleet, U.S. aircraft carriers were dispersed along the Eurasian 
86 china maritime studies

littoral to deter war and to provide security for the international order.12 Thus, the U.S. 

aircraft carrier became a capital ship insofar as it was a concentration of resources and 

power; but it was its ability to bombard inland targets, not its ability to sink other ships, 

that associated it with the exercise of command of the sea.13

In an age of nuclear submarines, long-range antiship missiles, and lethal antiaircraft defenses, it is hard to envision the PLAN being able to employ its carriers in the doctrinal 

role of capital ship in either sense of the term. Submarines are the likely arbiters of what 

floats and what does not. In addition, there is virtually no prospect of China finding 

itself in a set of strategic circumstances analogous to those of the United States in the 

post–World War II period. Thus, regardless of the number of aircraft carriers China 

builds or their pattern of operations, the doctrinal role of capital ship is likely to be irrelevant to them. Moreover, the risk profile of the capital ship role does not seem to be 

compatible with the risk-averse culture of the PLA. In the traditional capital ship mode, 

one must risk all to win all. In decisive sea battles from Salamis to Midway, at least one 

admiral was reluctant to seek battle but either was ambushed or was pushed into battle 

by a higher commander; or, when opportunity offered, as it did at Jutland in World 

War I, he bailed out. Given modern means of search, it is doubtful any Chinese admiral 

would allow himself to be drawn into a fight “for all the marbles,” so the capital ship role 

has no strategic meaning for him.

The dropping of two nuclear bombs on Japan precipitated the end of World War II in 

the Pacific. After the war a nasty internecine struggle broke out within the U.S. military 

between airpower advocates and the Navy. The U.S. Navy—desperate to fend off the 

arguments of those who believed the strategic bomber would render the aircraft carrier 

obsolete, and possessing a genuine belief that the large, slow, long-range bomber would 

not survive Soviet air defenses—pushed ahead, at dreadful cost in aircraft and lives, to 

establish carriers as nuclear-strike platforms. By the late 1980s this role had been made 

obsolete by the robust nuclear triad, and nuclear weapons were removed from carrier 

magazines. However, this capability remains inherent in the aircraft carrier, and we 

cannot discount the possibility, admittedly highly unlikely, that a desperate future China 

might put nuclear bombs on its carriers, perhaps hoping that we would not consider this 

option, allowing them to sidestep robust U.S. missile defenses.

Early in World War II, U.S. carriers were dispatched on hit-and-run raids at various 

points within the Japanese oceanic defensive perimeter, the most notable being the 

Doolittle raid on Tokyo. These operations were meant to disrupt Japanese rear-area 

operations, provide intelligence on Japanese dispositions, and boost the morale of the 

American public. In this way the carriers functioned not unlike the cavalry of Civil War 

general Nathan Bedford Forrest. Although this doctrinal role slid into the background 

after the war, there were still instances during the Cold War when American carriers 
china

s evolving surface fleet 87

would dodge around and show up by surprise somewhere within Soviet ocean surveillance zones in an effort to shake the USSR’s confidence in its ability to find and attack 

U.S. naval forces. One also might regard the 1986 El Dorado Canyon strike on Libya 

as a form of augmented cavalry raid from the air. PLAN carriers might be able to pull 

off this kind of raid on an unsuspecting neighbor; but it seems unlikely, as U.S. reconnaissance probably would be used to tip off the incipient victim. Generally speaking, a 

sky full of satellites, an increasingly instrumented ocean, and the proliferation of drones, 

cell phones, and over-the-horizon radar will make it very hard for any carriers to “get 

lost” at sea and show up by surprise somewhere. On the other hand, if the Chinese could 

manage the operational security and deception, this role is suited to a small, elite aircrew 

cadre, which would be easiest for the PLAN to establish.

The original doctrinal role envisioned for the aircraft carrier, especially by battleship 

officers, was to serve as the “eyes of the fleet.” Carrier aircraft not only would scout 

ahead to locate the enemy fleet so our own battle line could maneuver to engage with 

advantage; they also would spot the fall of major-caliber shells so as to correct aim more 

rapidly and accurately. As the carrier assumed more-critical doctrinal roles, scouting was 

subsumed into the overall security posture of the carrier task force, where it remains to 

this day. However, the advent of networked warfare, with its dependency on satellites, 

may serve to resurrect this doctrinal role. Assuming a capable enemy can neutralize 

satellites, the need arises for line-of-sight relay services. It is not difficult to envision 

long-endurance drones being launched off carriers to provide these services as well as 

persistent, long-range reconnaissance and surveillance. Presumably the PLAN would be 

as interested in this role and as capable of performing it as the U.S. Navy, so we should 

not be surprised, given the superior agility of the Chinese procurement system, to see 

unmanned aircraft operating from PLAN carriers sooner rather than later.

Although Horatio, Lord Nelson, advised that “a ship’s a fool to attack a fort,” when conditions are right, i.e., there is little or no threat, the carrier may be employed usefully as 

an airfield at sea to support landward operations. The carrier’s big advantage in this role 

is that it carries its own logistics, so it is “ready on arrival.” This characteristic proved 

critical in the defense of the Pusan perimeter in the early going of the Korean War and 

in the first weeks of Operation Desert Shield, right after Saddam invaded Kuwait. 

U.S. carriers functioned frequently in this role during the Vietnam War and Operations 

Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, among others. This could be 

a natural role for PLAN carriers—but they would have to deal with a number of caveats 

and challenges.

The first issue is the total force requirement. Unlike hit-and-run raids, an airfield at sea 

presumably either is supporting troops ashore or is conducting some type of air campaign. The amount of firepower the carrier can put over the beach per unit time must 
88 china maritime studies

be sufficient, and the level of effort must be sustained for a possibly indefinite period. To 

supply enough airpower, U.S. practice has been to group two to six carriers—but these 

carriers carry seventy to eighty aircraft, fifty of which are strikers. Liaoning can carry 

perhaps thirty planes—but not the additional support aircraft such as early warning, 

electronic warfare, and tanking. Such support functions, along with logistics and combat 

search and rescue, are critical for sea-based airfield combat operations. The first generation of Chinese carriers will fall short in this aspect. Moreover, depending on the nature 

of operations ashore, around-the-clock operations as well as sustained bad-weather 

flying may be required, thus invoking all the cultural and training issues previously 

discussed. Even to have a chance at successfully fulfilling this doctrinal role, the PLAN 

would need at least two and more likely three carriers operating as a cohesive group, 

something that is likely a decade or more away.

Sustained airfield operations demand a constant flow of logistics. Nuclear-powered 

Nimitz-class carriers do not compete with their air wings for fuel tankage aboard, but 

the Liaoning class will. Refueling interrupts flight operations, and the smaller the total 

fuel capacity, the more often this happens. Assuming robust usage of weapons, these also 

will have to be replenished. If Chinese carriers operate relatively close to base, maintaining the supply train of fuel, weapons, food, and parts may be feasible; but any attempt 

to adopt this doctrinal role outside the first island chain would require a substantial logistics infrastructure. Aircraft maintenance and battle damage repair constitute another 

challenge of sustained airfield operations. A small wing of thirty fighters can shrink 

quickly to impotence through equipment malfunctions that cannot be made good.

Finally, there is the matter of force protection for the “sea base.” When a carrier acts as 

an airfield at sea, it loses its protective mobility. Limited aircraft range imposed by skijump launch constricts movement even more, as does the requirement to turn into the 

wind at regular intervals for launch. The proliferation of modern area-denial weapons 

will make this role increasingly dangerous, at least in certain waters. In the Falklands 

War, the Royal Navy was forced to keep its carriers far enough from the amphibious 

landing site to avoid detection and attack by Argentine Exocet missiles. This meant 

that its Harriers were unable to set up defensive patrols and could launch only on alert, 

preventing them from intercepting Argentine air raids until after they pulled off target. 

There is increasing recognition even in USN circles that a carrier no longer may be able 

to set up in an optimum position to function as an airfield; PLAN carriers, with their 

short-range aircraft, will be in a worse situation.

The final role of the aircraft carrier is that of geopolitical chess piece. The symbolic 

nature of the aircraft carrier was well established over the course of the Cold War and 

afterward. President Obama directed the Navy to maintain eleven carrier groups despite 

the service’s recommendation to drop to a lower number because, reportedly, he found 
china

s evolving surface fleet 89

them “broadly useful.” U.S. carriers have been a staple of naval diplomacy, and there 

is every reason to think that China eventually will use its carriers in a similar way. On 

the benign side of this role, port visits, joint exercises, disaster relief, and humanitarian 

assistance are all elements of naval diplomacy that can be undertaken without having to 

face the rigorous operational demands the other roles impose. Liaoning and its sisters 

can operate in conditions of their choosing, and the logistics are manageable wherever in 

the world they elect to cruise.

The coercive side of the role gets more complicated. The most benign element of this 

side of the role would be general deterrence deployments, and this is the most likely 

use of the Chinese carriers—to complicate the calculations of Vietnam, India, or other 

nations that have conflicting territorial claims or other issues with China. However, 

when a crisis erupts, the calculus gets more difficult for an aircraft carrier. To be effective 

at deterrence or posing a threat, the ship must be visible and in a position from which 

its airpower plausibly could be brought to bear. However, it is in precisely this position 

that it becomes vulnerable to the kinds of area-denial weapons that even a weak nation 

might bring to bear. This sets up a difficult dilemma for the nation using its carrier as 

a crisis-management tool. Keeping the carrier on the required station to threaten other 

states makes it vulnerable and potentially a political hostage. On the other hand, moving it to a safer position means abandoning, at least temporarily, the threat position, 

which may be seen as evidence of weakening resolve. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 

U.S. carrier groups found themselves in this kind of dilemma when face-to-face with a 

strong, missile-equipped Soviet fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Whether Chinese 

naval and political leadership will be sufficiently astute to avoid such dilemmas or will 

have enough nerve to manage carrier movements properly during a crisis is anything but 

certain.

Building and maintaining a deck-aviation capability that is more than symbolic are an 

expensive and risky business, even with today’s advanced technology. The United States 

committed to an aircraft carrier–centric fleet structure as a matter of strategic imperative, and now must decide whether that legacy structure will remain viable in the future. 

China is coming from the opposite direction. There is little in the way of external threat 

driving it toward deck aviation. Rather, it is a combination of nationalistic pride and 

niche functionality that seems to be propelling the development of Chinese aircraft 

carriers.14 Once some minimum level of credible operational capability is attained—and 

that may await the launch of Chinese carriers with catapults—the push and pull of specific events will shape the trajectory of Chinese carrier aviation development thereafter. 

What that trajectory will look like is harder to predict than it would have been to forecast the vector of American carrier development during the 1920s.
90 china maritime studies

Technology evolution tends to produce a seesaw relationship between defense and offense. George Friedman, in his book The Future of War, advanced the notion of weapons 

system senility: the erosive process in which the cost of protecting a weapons system 

such as an army tank or aircraft carrier comes to outweigh the value of the system’s 

offensive capability.15 The proliferation of quiet diesel submarines armed with potent 

antiship missiles, unmanned systems, smart mines, and other ambush-type weapons 

may constitute an environment, especially in the littorals, that brings on a case of aircraft carrier senility. If we took this seriously, we would seek ways of distributing naval 

power-projection capability into a larger number of smaller platforms—missile ships, 

perhaps—and cease building carriers. In any case, whether owing to increasing threat or 

increasing cost, it is hard to predict a future of ascendancy for the aircraft carrier. Thus 

we might envision a graph on which the horizontal axis is time and the vertical axis is 

aircraft carrier strategic utility. Following Friedman’s argument, we would draw a line 

starting way up on the vertical axis and sloping down to the right over time to a point at 

which the carrier has gone the way of the dreadnought. A second line would start at the 

intersection of the two axes and slope up to the right, representing the thrust of Chinese 

carrier development. Where these lines cross would constitute the point at which China 

should cease investing in carriers.

Chinese geopolitical imperatives also will modulate the ultimate character of PLAN 

carrier aviation. The U.S. carrier force became a strategic tool for maintaining a liberal 

world order and defending the global system of commerce and security from various 

kinds of disruptions.16 It is hard to envision any such expansive role for the PLAN’s carriers. More likely, the PLAN will attempt to establish security barriers within the first or 

second island chain and support territorial claims. It also on occasion may sortie into the 

Indian Ocean to counter what China sees as threats to its interests. These strategic tasks 

require a lesser naval aviation establishment than that of the United States, and quite 

possibly one that is feasible, at least in structure, for China to build.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has chosen to make the aircraft carrier a potent 

symbol of national pride. This will spur the construction of more and presumably moreadvanced hulls and the development of more-balanced and more-capable air wings. We 

must understand that Chinese foreign policy and security strategy are intimately connected to a more central CCP objective: maintaining power. This connection deepens 

the influence of corporate culture and ethos on the difficult leadership decisions at all 

levels needed to move Chinese naval aviation from a symbolic and niche force to an 

actual operational and strategic fighting asset. This eventuality is anything but certain.
china

s evolving surface fleet 91

Notes

1. Adm. Robert Willard, quoted by Drew Thompson in “Think Again: China’s Military,” Foreign 

Policy (March/April 2010), available at www 

.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think 

_again_chinas_military. On the Chinese side, 

see, for example, Xu Qi, “Enlisting of an Aircraft 

Carrier Starts a Blue Journey” [in Chinese],

Liaowang, October 8, 2012, CPP20121018787020.

2. Robert Rubel, “The Transition to Swept-Wing 

Jets,” in One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air 

Power, ed. Douglas Smith (Annapolis, MD: 

Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 241.

3. John Garnaut, “Can China’s Top Guns Fly?,” 

Foreign Policy, April 30, 2013, foreignpolicy 

.com/2013/04/30/can-chinas-top-guns-fly/.

4. Rubel, “The Transition to Swept-Wing Jets,” p. 

242.

5. See YouTube video at www.youtube.com/

watch?v=l9CDW4tlgOU.

6. Gerald O’Rourke [Capt., USN (Ret.)], “We 

Get Ours at Night,” in Into the Jet Age, ed. E. T. 

Wooldridge [Capt., USN (Ret.)] (Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 31–32.

7. The author has over three hundred night carrier 

landings.

8. The author also served as LSO.

9. Gerald E. Miller [Vice Adm., USN (Ret.)], 

“Transition to the Jet Age,” in Into the Jet Age, ed. 

Wooldridge, pp. 12–13.

10. Garnaut, “Can China’s Top Guns Fly?”

11. Robert C. Rubel, “The Future of Aircraft 

Carriers,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 

(Autumn 2011), pp. 13–27.

12. Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and 

the Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 80/4/614 (May 1954), pp. 483–93.

13. Robert C. Rubel, “Command of the Sea: An Old 

Concept Resurfaces in a New Form,” Naval War 

College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012), pp. 

21–33.

14. Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri M. Zhukov, “A Tale of 

Two Fleets: A Russian Perspective on the 1973 

Naval Standoff in the Mediterranean,” Naval 

War College Review 57, no. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 

27–63.

15. George Friedman, The Future of War: Power, 

Technology and American World Dominance in 

the Twenty-First Century (New York: Griffin, 

1998).

16. Robert Rubel, “Show of Force—or Just for 

Show?,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

139/4/1,322 (April 2013), pp. 16–20.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has the third-largest fleet of auxiliary 

and logistic-support vessels in the world, just behind those of the United States and 

Russia.1

 An examination of the PLAN’s order of battle reveals that development of this 

fleet began more than three decades ago with the completion of four fleet-support ships 

and similar numbers of large submarine tenders and oceanographic vessels.2

 Despite the 

coastal and defensive nature of the Chinese navy, a number of oceangoing auxiliaries 

were needed to support growing numbers of destroyers, frigates, and submarines at their 

bases or at sea within their two-hundred-nautical-mile operational range.

For many years, this auxiliary fleet did not seem to change much. But in its 2009 public 

assessment of the PLAN, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) noted an evolution 

over the previous decade, with newer and larger auxiliaries: Anwei (oceangoing hospital ship, for humanitarian relief), Danyun (for island resupply), Dalao (for submarine 

rescue), Wuhu (a test platform), and Fuchi (for fleet support).3

 The planned completion 

of four additional Fuchis in the 2013–16 period seems to confirm this trend and foretell 

more blue-water operations.

But for what purpose? Trends in naval auxiliary vessel construction appear to reflect 

both China’s naval capabilities and its intentions. More fleet-support ships reveal China’s 

commitment to robust naval diplomacy aimed at cultivating naval “soft power” while 

providing effective means to protect Chinese trade, as exemplified by the Gulf of Aden 

patrols since 2008. The trend toward larger intelligence-collection vessels points to a 

change in policy toward monitoring developments in distant waters, out of necessity 

or in retaliation for U.S. intelligence operations near China, or both. However, a lack of 

large, seagoing repair ships suggests that the PLAN, despite mounting far-seas operations, will continue to focus its combat capabilities on the near seas.

Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix

Supporting a Blue-Water Navy in the Far Seas?

CHAPTER EIGHT

China’s Auxiliary Fleet
94 china maritime studies

Categories of and Designations for PLAN Support Vessels

Chinese auxiliary vessels are divided into two main categories: large, oceangoing vessels—numbered since 2007 in the 800- and 80-block series—and smaller support vessels 

designated by function and fleet.

The large, oceangoing vessels are subdivided into six categories, with three-digit or twodigit numbers, all starting with 8:

• Intelligence and survey ships, named after planets and stars (numbers in the 850s, 

with one vessel in the 900s)

• Hospital ships and submarine tenders (潜艇招标), named after islands (860s)

• Oceanographic research ships, named after scientists (870s)

• Fleet-replenishment ships (补给舰) and supply ships, named after lakes (880s)

• Experimental ships, named after inventors and scientists (890s)

• Training vessels (in the 80 series)

This numbering system seems to restrict the large auxiliary category to a maximum of 

about fifty ships. So far, fewer than half of those numbers are being used, although the 

fleet-support ship category now seems to be full, the PLAN having so far not reused 

pennants of decommissioned ships.

The smaller, or coastal, support vessels are divided into categories whose characters 

follow the fleet designations bei (北), north; dong (东), east; and nan (南), south. Fifteen 

categories have been identified.

The PLAN also has a number of fishing vessels it uses for reconnaissance and intelligence. They wear pennant numbers with the prefix zhanyu (湛渔) for deepwater 

fishing.

Organization and Order of Battle

Overall, major auxiliary vessels are distributed equally among the three fleets. Missiletest ships are concentrated in the North Sea Fleet (NSF) and acoustic-research vessels 

in the South Sea Fleet (SSF). More reconnaissance vessels are based in the north and in 

the south, where they can deploy better (bearing in mind that the PLAN also fields a 

number of smaller trawlers dedicated to intelligence collection whose whereabouts are 

more difficult to follow).

In 2004, the PLAN altered its organizational structure to improve its logistics support to 

its combat units by creating one combat-support ship flotilla (作战支援舰支队) in each 
china

s evolving surface fleet 95

fleet. Existing support-ship squadrons (大队) were resubordinated to combat-support 

ship flotillas to serve the PLAN’s three fleets better.4

The NSF, headquartered in Qingdao, is responsible for the Bo Hai Sea, the Yellow Sea, 

and the northern portion of the East China Sea. Since 2004, the NSF has been supported 

by the 1st Combat Support Ship Flotilla, headquartered in Qingdao. This flotilla comprises five dedicated squadrons.5

 The Reconnaissance Squadron’s presence in Qingdao 

gives it easier access to the Sea of Japan and the western Pacific.

The East Sea Fleet (ESF), headquartered in Ningbo, covers the majority of the East 

China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Created in 2004, the ESF’s 2nd Combat Support Ship 

Flotilla is headquartered in Zhoushan. It comprises five squadrons.

The 264th Auxiliary Squadron in Zhoushan is by far the largest in the PLAN. See “Main 

Auxiliary Vessels of the East Sea Fleet” in the sidebar for a list of ESF auxiliary vessels.

The SSF, headquartered in Zhanjiang, is responsible for the South China Sea. The SSF is 

assisted by the 3rd Combat Support Ship Flotilla. It is headquartered in Zhanjiang and 

comprises six squadrons.6

See “Main Auxiliary Vessels of the South Sea Fleet” for a list of SSF auxiliary vessels.

Hull Pennant Pinyin Function U.S. Designation U.S. Abbreviation

测 ce survey surveying ship AGS

测量 celiang research/measure oceanographic research ship AGOR

调 diao signal intelligence collection ship AGI

交 jiao transport cargo ship AK

救 jiu salvage submarine tender AS

浚 jun dredge dredger

康 kang hospital hospital ship AH

缆 lan cable cable repairing ship ARC

勤 qin degaussing degaussing ship ADG

水 shui water distilling ship AWT

拖 tuo tug oceangoing tug AT

修 xiu repair repair ship AR

研究 yanjiu research surveying ship AGS

油 you oil light oiler AOL

运 yun transport torpedo retriever AT/YT

Table 1. Characters Displayed on the Hulls of Smaller Auxiliary Vessels
96 china maritime studies

Type NSF ESF SSF

Replenishment oiler (AOR) 2 3 2

Oiler (AO) — 5 2

Light oiler (AOL) 13 20 14

Repair ship (AR) — 1 2

Submarine tender (AS) 9 7 8

Hospital ship (AH) — 1 —

Ambulance vessel (YH) 1 2 4

Water tanker (AW) 6 10 7

Cargo ship (AK) 8 4/8? 3?

Oceanographic-survey-intelligence ship (AGOR/AGS/AGI) 7 5 9

Cable ship (ARC) 5 5 4

Degaussing vessel (ADG) 2 4 2

Torpedo retriever (AT/YT) 4 4 4

Test ship (AGE) 2 — 2

Fleet tug 4 — 3

Table 2. Distribution of PLAN Auxiliary Vessels

Squadron Location

251st Reconnaissance/Survey Squadron (侦测船大队) Qingdao

254th Auxiliary Squadron Qingdao

188th (or unknown) Salvage Squadron Qingdao

257th Auxiliary Squadron Lüshun

188th (or unknown) Salvage Squadron Lüshun

Table 3. NSF Auxiliary Organizational Units

Squadron Location

264th Auxiliary Squadron Zhoushan

223rd Reconnaissance/Survey Squadron Ningbo

258th Auxiliary Ship Squadron Shanghai

263rd Auxiliary Ship Squadron Ningde

188th Salvage Squadron Fenghua

Table 4. ESF Auxiliary Organizational Units

Squadron Location

224th Reconnaissance Squadron Zhanjiang

255th Auxiliary Squadron Zhanjiang

225th Survey Squadron Guangzhou

236th Auxiliary Squadron Guangzhou

221st Auxiliary Squadron Yulin

188th Salvage Squadron Yulin

Table 5. SSF Auxiliary Organizational Units
china

s evolving surface fleet 97

Category (designation) Class Tons 

(full load)

Vessels (year commissioned, 

if known)

9 submarine tenders (AS)

1 Dajiang 925 11,975 Changxingdao 861 (1979)

1 Zhonghua 922 3,400 Bei Jiu 403

2 Dalang 922 II 4,200 Bei Jiu 122 (1987), 138 (1988)

2 Dalao 926 9,500 Haiyangdao 864 (2010), 

Liugongdao 865 (2013)

1 Dazhou 946 1,100 Bei Jiu 137 (1977)

2 replenishment oilers (AOR) 1 Fuqing 905 21,740 Hongzehu 881 (1979)

1 Fuchi 903A 23,500 Taihu 889 (2013)

13 light oilers (AOL)

3 Fuzhou 2,100 Bei You 555, 560, 563

10 various 2,200 Bei You 400, 561, 562, 565, 

566, 571, 576, 581, 590, 593

6 water tankers (AW)

1 Fuzhou 2,100 Bei Shui 557

5 various 2,200 Bei Shui 572, 576, 581, 582, 

583

8 cargo ships (AK)

1 Yantai 073 II 2,000 Luliangshan 938 / Lushun

(1979)

2? Hongqi 1,950 Bei Yun 443, 528

4? Danlin 1,290 Bei Yun 531, 591, 592, 594

1 Sichang 9,105 Dalian 82 (1996)

1 carrier-support ship (AG) 1 Dagan 16,500 88

1 hospital ship (AH) 1 Nankang 300 Bei Yi / Qingdao

4 torpedo retrievers (AT) 4 Damen/

Dandao 917

 1,600 Bei Yun 455, 484, 485, 529

5 cable ships (ARC)

2 Youdian 911 II 1,350 Bei Lan 764, 765

3 Yunan 135 Bei Lan 767, 768, 769

2 degaussing vessels (ADG) 2 Yanci 912 III 750 Bei Qin 735, 736 (1976)

7 survey-intelligence ships

(AGS/AGOR/AGI)

1 Yanlai 635 III 1,100 Bei Ce 943

1 Type 639 1,500 Bei Diao 991

1 Type 992 Bei Diao 992 / Shiyan 1

1 Type 993 2,300 Bei Diao 993

1 Type 814 2,500 Bei Diao 900 (1987)

1 Type 636A 6,000 Qian Sanqiang 873

1 Xiangyanghong 4,445 Xiangyanghong 09

2 test ships (AGE) 2 Dahua 909 6,000 Bi Sheng 891 (1997), 

Hua Luogeng 892 (2008)

4 tugs

1 Tuzhong 3,600 Bei Tuo 710

3 Hujiu/Dinghai

837

1,500 Bei Tuo 622, 711, 717

Main Auxiliary Vessels of the North Sea Fleet

Sources: Stephen Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014–15 (Coulsdon, Surrey, U.K.: IHS Jane’s, 2015); Prézelin, Flottes de 

Combat 2012.
98 china maritime studies

Category (designation) Class Tons 

(full load)

Vessels (year commissioned, if 

known)

7 submarine tenders (AS)

1 Dajiang 925 11,975 Chongmingdao 862 (1976)

2 Dalang 922 4,200 Dong Jiu 311 (1987), 332 

(1989)

1 Dadong 946A 2,800 Dong Jiu 304 (1982)

3 various Dong Jiu 331, 333, 334

3 replenishment oilers (AOR)

1 Fuqing 905 21,740 Poyanghu 882 (1979)

2 Fuchi 903/

903A

20,500

23,500

Qiandaohu 886 (2004),

Chaohu 890 (2013)

5 oilers (AO)

3 Jinyou 4,800 Dong You 622, 625, 675 (1990)

1 Type 640 Dong You 640 (2003)

1 Dong You Dong You 637 (2004)

20 light oilers (AOL)

1 Shengli 5,000 Dong You 620 (1981)

5 Fuzhou 2,100 Dong You 606, 607, 626, 628, 

629

14 various 2,200 Dong You 609, 624, 630, 631, 

632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 638, 

639, 641, 642, 645

10 water tankers (AW)

2 Fuzhou 2,100 Dong Shui 643, 644

8 various 2,200 Dong Shui 610, 636, 641, 648, 

646, 647, 649, 650

4 (8?) cargo ships (AK)

1 Dayung 904 10,575 Jingpo Hu 884 (1992)

1 Yantai 073 II 2,000 Dong Yun 757 (1979)

2/3? Hongqi 1,950 Dong Yun 755, 756, 771

3? Danlin 1,290 Dong Yun 827, 834, 835

3 hospital ships (AH)

1 Anwei 920 14,000 Daishandao 866 (2008)

2 Nankang 150 Dong Yi 12, 13

4 torpedo retrievers (AT) 4 Damen/

Dandao 917

 1,600 Dong Yun 758, 759, 802, 803

5 cable ships (ARC)

4 Youdian 911 II 1,350 Dong Lan 868, 873, 874, 882

1 Yunan 135 Dong Lan 884

2 Youzhong 750 N2304, N2404

1 repair ship (AR) 1 Type 648 3,500 Dong Xiu 911

4 degaussing vessels (ADG) 1 Type 911 2,000 Dong Qin 870

3 Yanci 912 III 750 Dong Qin 860, 863, 864

5 survey-intelligence ships (AGOR/

AGS/AGI)

1 Type 636A 5,800 Zhu Kezhen 872

2 Yanlai 635 III 1,100 Dong Ce 226, 227

2 Dongdiao 

815/815G

 6,000 Beijixing 851 (2000), 

Tiangwangxin 853 (2013)

Main Auxiliary Vessels of the East Sea Fleet

Sources: Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014–15; Prézelin, Flottes de Combat 2012.
china

s evolving surface fleet 99

Category (designation) Class Tons 

(full load)

Vessels (year commissioned, if 

known)

2 repair ships (AR) 2 Dayung 904A 10,975 Yangcheng 883, Jingpo 884

1 cargo ship (AK) 1 Dayung (Mod.) 

904B

16,500 888 (ex-88)

8 submarine tenders (AS)

1 Dajiang 925 11,975 Yongxingdao 863 (1982)

1 Dalang 922 4,200 Nan Jiu 510 (1990)

1 Dalao 926 9,500 Changdao 867 (2012)

1 Dazhou 946 1,100 Nan Jiu 502 (1977)

1 Hudong 930 2,500 Nan Jiu 512

3 various Nan Jiu 507; Yulin 508, 509

2 replenishment oilers (AOR)

1 Komandarm Fedko 37,000 Qinghaihu 885 (1996)

1 Fuchi 903A 23,500 Weishanhu 887 (2004)

2 oilers (AO) 2 Type 640 Nan You 968, 972 (2003)

14 light oilers (AOL)

3 Fuzhou 2,100 Nan You 932, 940, 941

11 various 2,200 Nan You 954, 957, 958, 959, 

961, 962, 963, 969, 970, 973, 

976

7 water tankers (AW)

3 Fuzhou 2,100 Nan Shui 913, 937, 938

4 various 2,200 Nan Shui 963, 964, 965, 967

3? cargo ships (AK)

1 Yantai 073 II 2,000 Nan Yun 745 (1979)

1 Hongqi 1,950 Nan Yun 835

1? Danlin 1,290 Nan Yun 975

4 hospital ships (AH) 2 Nankang 150 Nan Yi 10, 11

2 Qiongsha 150 Nan Yi 9, 832

4 torpedo retrievers (AT)

3 Damen/

Dandao 917

 1,600 Nan Yun 841, 844, 845

1 various Nan Yun 846

4 cable ships (ARC)

2 Youdian 911 II 1,350 Nan Lan 233, 234

1 Yunan 135 Nan Lan 235

1 Youzhong 750 G2693 (1982)

2 degaussing vessels (ADG) 2 Yanci 912 III 750 Nan Qin 203, 205

9 survey-intelligence ships 

(AGS/AGI)

1 Xiangyanghong 

645/813

4,435 Qimingxing 852 (1982)

1 Yanlai 635 III 1,100 Nan Ce 427

3 Ganzhu 635 II 1,000 Nan Ce 420, 426, 428

2 Type 625C 3,320 Nan Diao 411, 412

1 Kanhai Nan Ce 429

2 acoustic test ships (AGE) 2 Type?

5,800 Zhan Tianyou 893 (2012)

6,080 Li Siguang 894 (2014)

3 tugs

1 Tuzhong 3,600 Nan Tuo 154

1 Hujiu II (Mod.) 837 1,495 Nan Tuo 185

1 Tuqian 3,800 Nan Tuo 181

Main Auxiliary Vessels of the South Sea Fleet

Sources: Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014–15; Prézelin, Flottes de Combat 2012.
100 china maritime studies

Supporting Far-Seas Operations

Four classes of auxiliary ships provide especially useful insights into Chinese intentions 

in the far seas: replenishment ships, hospital ships, surveillance ships, and submarine 

tenders.

Replenishment Ships

China constructed its first fleet-support ships in the late 1970s. Each of the four 21,740-

ton Fuqing-class replenishment oilers (AORs) is capable of carrying 10,550 tons of fuel 

oil, one thousand tons of diesel fuel, two hundred tons of feed water, two hundred tons 

of potable water, and fifty tons of lube oil. Four oil-refueling stations and two stores stations allow replenishment of three vessels simultaneously. However, China transferred 

one AOR to friendly Pakistan and another to the merchant fleet, signaling a relative lack 

of interest in blue-water operations.7

To have at least one large support ship in each fleet, in 1988 China launched a program 

to develop a new-generation multiproduct replenishment ship (AOE). According to 

retired chief designer Zhang Gang, costs delayed the program, so in November 1992 

China decided instead to acquire a very capable uncompleted former Soviet Komandarm 

Fedko–class AOR from Ukraine. Towed to Dalian Shipyard in May 1993, the AOR was 

commissioned in 1996 as Nancang (later renamed Qinghaihu) and was transferred to 

the SSF.8

Thailand placed an order for China to build it a support ship for its light aircraft carrier 

group, giving chief designer Zhang Gang an opportunity to complete the designing of an 

AOE. Delivered in 1996, Similan served as a basis for China’s current six Type 903/903A 

Fuchi-class AOEs, built in Shanghai and Guangzhou in 2004–2005 and 2011–15, respectively.9

 The Fuchis’ primary role is to provide underway replenishment for destroyers 

and frigates. They are the first Chinese multiproduct replenishment ships capable of 

resupplying fuel, water, stores, and ammunition.

The Fuchis’ main differences from ships of the Fuqing class lie in their multiple functions (missiles, ship and helicopter fuel), increased capacities (four times more solid 

cargo and three times more liquids), compartmented design (double-hull structure and 

separate, optimized ammo and oil compartments), and better equipment (stabilized 

cranes, advanced alongside-replenishment system). Notwithstanding the impressive 

capabilities of these six new ships, they are only up to the task of supporting near-seas 

operations, a conclusion made obvious when we consider the PLAN’s large numbers of 

destroyers and frigates and the future enormous needs of the fossil-fueled aircraft carrier 

Liaoning.
china

s evolving surface fleet 101

The PLAN’s distant deployments started in 1980 for research and development and missile tracking and increased in 1985 with the beginnings of China’s naval diplomacy. With 

their large displacements and ability to operate helicopters, Fuqing supply ships and 

Dajiang submarine tenders were the PLAN’s first auxiliaries to operate in the far seas. In 

May 1980, Fuqing X615 (ESF) and its sister ship X950 (NSF), together with the then J121 

Changxingdao (NSF) and J302 Chongmingdao (ESF), participated in an eighteen-ship 

deployment to recover China’s first DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile in the South 

Pacific.10 In November 1984, Changxingdao accompanied the research vessel Xiangyanghong 10 to Antarctica to establish China’s first scientific station there.11

In November 1985, the Fuqing-class AOR X615 and two destroyers were the first PLAN 

vessels to cross the Strait of Malacca and enter the Indian Ocean, on an inaugural goodwill tour. Between 1985 and 2012, the PLAN made forty-eight deployments with one 

hundred port calls in forty-three countries.12 Auxiliaries played a key role. Eighteen of 

those deployments were supported by an AOR, with eight deployments supported by an 

older Fuqing, five by newer Fuchis, and five by the former Soviet Komandarm Fedko / 

Qinghaihu (ex-Nancang). Since its commissioning, Qinghaihu has set sixteen PLAN records, including visiting twenty-five countries successively while completing China’s first 

circumnavigation of the globe. On this voyage, stretching over 132 days from May to 

September 2002, the ship sailed a total of 33,000 nautical miles, during which it transited 

the Panama Canal, the first PLAN ship to do so.13 Between 1989 and 2014, another auxiliary, the training ship Zheng He, made seven out-of-area cruises without a support ship.

Since 2008, consecutive antipiracy patrols have tested the PLAN’s auxiliary fleet’s ability 

to support long-distance deployments. Only the new Fuchi-class fleet-support ships 

and Qinghaihu have been used. The support ship generally remains in the Gulf of Aden 

for two consecutive tours. As of February 2015, AOR Qinghaihu (885) had made three 

deployments (ninth to tenth and thirteenth patrols); AOR Fuchi Weishanhu (887) 

had made seven (first to second, fifth to sixth, eleventh, fourteenth, and nineteenth); 

its sister ship Qiandaohu (886) had made five (third to fourth, seventh to eighth, and 

twelfth); and the newest, Taihu (889) and Chaohu (890), had made two each (fifteenth 

to sixteenth and seventeenth to eighteenth, respectively). The PLAN has combined its 

antipiracy missions with classic naval diplomacy, taking advantage of the deployment of 

its flotillas to send them to the Mediterranean as a symbolic gesture, including a single 

frigate’s presence during the 2011 Libyan evacuation, and as ambassadors of goodwill in 

the Black Sea (2012), in the Mediterranean (April 2013), and around Europe (December 

2014–February 2015).14

The PLAN’s permanent antipiracy patrol has given and continues to give opportunities 

to expand China’s soft power through naval diplomacy and military operations other 

than war (MOOTW). Liu Jingjin and Qiu Caizhen, from the Wuhan Naval University of 
102 china maritime studies

Engineering, explain that “escort operations have provided a new platform for the military diplomacy of our navy, helping to enhance trust and clear up doubt between China 

and other countries, furthering mutual understanding and cooperation and building the 

international image of China as a peace-loving and civilized force and as a responsible 

stakeholder.”15 Chinese researchers also point out the necessity of shaping an external 

environment favorable to the PLAN via the “harmonious ocean philosophy,” in which 

the navy and its auxiliaries—including its hospital ships—play a central role.16

Hospital Ships

Following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, when the world was watching, China 

was unable to participate in the naval assistance effort led by the United States, which 

deployed one of two large Mercy-class hospital ships. This deficiency was remedied by 

the commissioning of the 23,369-ton Anwei (Peace Ark) hospital ship. Laid down in 

2006, in the context of mounting pressure against independence-leaning Taiwan, Anwei

apparently was not built with MOOTW as a primary focus. However, its MOOTW role 

was acknowledged at commissioning:

In wartime, the “maritime field hospital” can provide early treatment and some special 

treatments to the wounded, while in peacetime, it can serve as a permanent medical 

mechanism for middle- and long-distance waters, being able to sail to military ports in 

various sea areas for medical exchanges, play an important role in supporting the local 

government in disaster rescue and relief, participate in international medical cooperation, 

fulfill international humanitarian aid missions, and undertake the task of international 

humanistic medical rescue [sic].17

On September 1, 2010, Anwei initiated this new kind of naval diplomacy during a 

three-month mission to the Gulf of Aden called Mission Harmony 2010. With its 

428 crew members, including one hundred medical personnel, Anwei visited Djibouti, 

Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Bangladesh.18 In October 2011, Anwei embarked on a 

three-month deployment to the Caribbean—Mission Harmony 2011—involving port 

calls in Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica.19 In both instances, Anwei

provided medical support to local populations, while collecting data on foreign bloodsupply programs.20 In November 2013, Anwei deployed to Tacloban, Philippines, to 

assist in the recovery from Typhoon Haiyan.21 The ship also participated in exercises at 

RIMPAC 2014, alongside its American counterpart USNS Mercy.

According to Chi Zhiyan, Shao Ren, and Shi Jiazhu from the department of political science of the Dalian Naval Academy, Anwei inaugurated a new kind of naval 

diplomacy. These scholars see the “harmonious ocean philosophy”—exemplified by 

Mission Harmony 2010 and 2011—as “an ideological weapon for shaping a favorable 

environment for the PLAN.”22 Liu Hui and Liu Jiefeng from the Wuhan Naval University 
china

s evolving surface fleet 103

of Engineering stress the need to develop military soft power in MOOTW to augment 

China’s influence in the world and improve its standing in world opinion.23

Surveillance Ships

In response to the West’s growing strategic submarine fleet and nuclear-armed aircraft 

carriers in the 1960s, the Soviet navy converted survey ships (AGSs) and fishing trawlers 

before building dedicated platforms to conduct ocean surveillance and reconnaissance. 

Displacing 1,200–5,000 tons, the new ships were seaworthy, relatively fast, and able to 

conduct long deployments. They packed aboard radio, electronic, acoustic, and nonacoustic sensors to intercept signals and signatures emitted by ships and submarines. 

From 1961 to 1975, the Soviet fleet of intelligence collectors (AGIs) grew from five to 

fifty, reaching over sixty by 1991. The results of their close-range surveillance off Western naval ports and other key facilities, such as Cape Canaveral, allowed the Soviet navy 

to monitor space launches and study Western tactics, operational patterns, underway 

replenishment, and carrier flight operations. The trawlers were tasked by their respective fleet intelligence departments with maritime reconnaissance or by the central Soviet 

military intelligence agency (known as the GRU) with general intelligence collection.24

By contrast, China’s maritime intelligence surveillance has remained focused mainly on 

the country’s immediate neighbors. In 1976, China’s Central Military Commission and 

the State Council approved a project to build a dedicated electronic surveillance ship 

(Type 813) after a failed attempt at converting a survey ship.25 Designed by the No. 708 

Institute and completed at Hudong Shipyard in September 1980, the 4,445-ton Xiangyanghong 21 (later Qimingxing [852]) successfully completed its trials in April 1983 

before joining the SSF (and later China Marine Surveillance).26 On March 25, 1980, the 

PLAN agreed to a follow-on 1,500-ton (later 2,500-ton) project (Type 814 Dadie class), 

laid down on December 22, 1983, in Wuchang as Xiangyanghong 28 (now Bei Diao

90027) and completed in October 1986.28 One hundred seventy specialists from the NSF 

and civilian agencies tested the ship’s optical, acoustic, radar, and radio communications 

systems, drawing experience from the first two Yuanwang space-event ships to resolve 

acute electromagnetic compatibility issues. Commissioned in 1987, Dadies became 

frequent observers of U.S.–South Korean Team Spirit exercises.29

Follow-on reconnaissance vessels appeared less sophisticated. Completed during 

1982–87, Xing Fengshan (5,500 tons) and the armed icebreakers Yanbing 723 and Yanha

519, 721, and 722 initiated regular patrols, including ice patrols, into the Sea of Japan 

and the Yellow Sea, monitoring U.S., South Korean, Japanese, and Russian naval activities, together with the NSF oceanographic vessel Xiangyanghong 09 (4,445 tons).30

Meanwhile, Xiangyanghong 14, attached to the South China Sea Branch of the State 

Oceanic Administration, focused on the Taiwan Strait. In 2002, Xiangyanghong 14 was 
104 china maritime studies

found inside Taiwanese waters and was driven away by the Republic of China’s navy.31

Deployed in October 1987 to the South China Sea together with Xiangyanghong 05, 

Xiangyanghong 09 played an important role in preparing for China’s successful occupation of Yongshu / Fiery Cross Reef in March 1988. Operated in conjunction with the 

China Academy of Sciences, Xiangyanghong 10 (10,975 tons) occasionally used its large 

log-periodic antennae for communications intelligence (i.e., COMINT).32 In July 1999, 

Xiangyanghong 10 was recommissioned as a space-tracking ship under the name of 

Yuanwang 4.

While junks and fishing boats long have constituted the core of Chinese coastal surveillance assets, survey vessels also have been used for oceanographic and acoustic research. 

The main classes of survey vessels were built in 1970–72 (Type 635 and Type 635 I [A] 

Yanlai class), 1975 (Type 635 II [B] Ganzhu class), 1982–83 (Type 635 III [C] Yanlai 

class, and Type 646 Yankang class),33 and 1998–2008 for the three large (six-thousandton) Type 636As: Li Siguang (871), Zhu Kezhen (872), and Qian Sanqiang (873), one for 

each fleet. In February 2012, the catamaran survey ship Nan Ce 429 was commissioned 

into the Ocean Survey Squadron at Guangzhou. Three vessels built in Dalian—the 

catamarans Bei Diao 991, 992, and 993—are subjects of speculation. Their prefix—

“diao” (调), instead of “ce” (测) for naval research vessels—suggests a role as acoustic 

intelligence vessels, the better to protect China’s approaches in the context of reported 

American and Australian submarine activities in a very noisy underwater environment. 

Bei Diao 991, 992, and 993 and their towed arrays may operate in conjunction with the 

old Soviet Volkhov harbor defense active/passive sonar sensors (built for China by the 

Leningrad hydroacoustic institute Morphyspribor in 1959) or more likely with successor 

fixed-array systems on the sea bottom.34 An interesting development would be future deployments near U.S., Japanese, South Korean, Vietnamese, and Indian submarine bases, 

following the practices of U.S. Military Sealift Command ocean surveillance (T-AGOS) 

vessels.

Since 1999, Japan’s defense yearbook, published by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, has 

reported annually on Chinese reconnaissance activities taking place within forty nautical 

miles of Japan’s coasts—well within the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ), contravening China’s own position rejecting foreign military activities in its EEZ. However, 

most of those activities have taken place near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands claimed by 

China and now are being performed by China’s coast guard. Japan claimed that those 

patrols increased from four in 1997 to thirty in 1999.35 In May 2000, Yangbing 723 

passed for the first time through the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido and 

through the Tsushima Strait off Kyushu, two very important international sea-lanes.36

In the last fifteen years, the PLAN has completed five state-of-the-art signals intelligence 

(i.e., SIGINT) and electronics intelligence (i.e., ELINT) collection vessels, and one more 
china

s evolving surface fleet 105

may be under construction. Commissioned into the ESF and SSF in 1999 and 2009, 

respectively, the six-thousand-ton Dongdiao 851 (ex-232, renamed Beijixing) and 

Tiangwangxin 853 (Type 815 and 815G) are both capable of tracking missiles and 

satellites.37

In 2011, the Indian media accused China of sending trawlers as well as an unnamed 

larger intelligence-collection vessel to the Bay of Bengal to monitor India’s missile tests. 

The unnamed alleged Chinese spy ship purportedly was detected in July near the coast 

of Little Andaman Island within India’s EEZ—again, in contravention of China’s own 

policy. Indian sources claimed the ship had spent more than twenty days in the sensitive 

location before being located. Then the ship—which had always remained in international waters—supposedly docked in Colombo. Again, neither the ship’s name nor any 

photographs taken at sea or in Colombo were made public, although the ship was said 

to have had twenty-two laboratories, suggesting a large oceanographic vessel. An Indian television program added that the United States had warned India of the spy ship’s 

presence.38

Beijixing frequently has operated near and within Japan’s claimed EEZ and was an 

uninvited guest at RIMPAC 2014, in which three other Chinese vessels participated for 

the first time.39 Beijixing’s deployment likely reflected a long-standing frustration at continual American maritime surveillance off Chinese coasts and a new policy of reciprocity despite the technological inferiority of the PLAN’s surveillance platforms. Three more 

Type 815s were launched in 2014 at Hudong Shipyard in Shanghai, signaling a probable 

intention to conduct more intelligence collection in distant waters, most likely around 

Guam and Hawaii—within America’s unclaimed EEZ.40

Submarine Tenders

With the largest conventional submarine force in the world—and the second largest 

during the last two decades of the Cold War—it is no surprise that the PLAN made a 

huge investment in submarine salvage vessels and tenders: sixteen major units have been 

completed since 1966, including three in the 2010–13 period. However, in tonnage, most 

of those tenders cannot compare to their U.S. and Soviet/Russian counterparts, confirming that China would use them mainly in its near seas.

The first purpose-built submarine tender was the Type 922 Bei Jiu 403, built by 

Zhonghua in 1966 (Zhonghua class), followed by the smaller Type 930 Nan Jiu 512, built 

by Hudong in 1969 (Hudong class).41 Both were scrapped and succeeded by the Type 922 

II Nan Jiu 503 (Dalang class).42 Guangzhou built two smaller Type 946 (Dazhou class) 

in 1977–78, while Jiangnan produced the three largest Type 925s (Dajiang class, 11,975 

tons)—Changxingdao (861), Chongmingdao (862), and Yongxingdao (863)—followed 

by four smaller Type 922 IIIs (Dalang class) and a single Type 946A (Dadong class) in 
106 china maritime studies

1982.43 Zhonghua and Hudong also delivered twenty-five ocean salvage tugs (three 

Tuzhong class,fourteen Hujiu/Dinghais,five modified Hujiu IIs, and three Tuqians).44

Construction resumed on larger submarine tenders late last decade at Guangzhou. The 

9,500-ton Haiyangdao (864) (Type 926 Dalao class) was commissioned in 2010, followed 

by two more in 2013–15 to replace the Dazhou and Dadong classes. Despite these additions, the PLAN still lacks the numbers of oceangoing repair ships that would be necessary to establish distant stations and support combat operations in distant waters.

When the Soviet navy started to deploy overseas in 1964, it had many more repair ships 

than the PLAN currently possesses. These included six Don-class, nine-thousand-ton 

submarine tenders (supplemented during 1963–72 by seven Ugra-class, 9,500-ton 

variants), five Dniepr-class (5,300-ton) repair ships, supplemented by forty-one followon ships of the Oskol and Amur classes during 1964–88, fifteen small rescue ships 

(supplemented by four more during 1964–68), and six 6,700-ton Andizhan-class missile 

transports (supplemented by eleven more of the Lama, Amga, and Brykin classes during 1964–87).45 Chinese submarines now have been deployed at least three times to the 

Indian Ocean, with the second Han nuclear attack submarine calling in Colombo, Sri 

Lanka, in November 2014, together with one of the three largest submarine tenders, the 

Dajiang-class Changxingdao.

46 While the PLAN’s newest class of submarine tenders (the 

9,500-ton Haiyangdao/Dalao class) matches in tonnage the Soviet Don and Ugra classes, 

the ship’s low freeboard and high superstructure do not suggest the good sea-keeping 

qualities that characterized its Soviet equivalents in their day, nor those of the three 

Dajiangs.

At first glance, the PLAN’s current situation appears similar to that of the Soviet navy 

in 1964 when Moscow started to deploy its forces worldwide. Both navies were born as 

coastal-defense forces, progressively expanding their areas of operations by use of large 

auxiliary vessels that made up for a lack of foreign bases. Soviet out-of-area operations 

grew from fewer than four thousand ship-days in 1964 to about 48,000 in 1976.47 With 

China’s permanent deployment of three vessels to the Gulf of Aden and its hyperactive 

naval diplomacy, the PLAN’s current out-of-area deployments probably approach the 

1964 Soviet figure of four thousand ship-days.

But will the PLAN follow the Soviet curve? Despite a shortage of large AORs in 1964, 

the Soviet auxiliary fleet was by then three to four times the size of the current Chinese 

auxiliary fleet, with numerous oceangoing tenders and repair ships that could support 

continuous nuclear and conventional submarine deployments.

At this point, the PLAN does not have sufficient support ships to help sustain a permanent combat-ready presence in distant waters, starting with the Indian Ocean and the 

eastern and western coasts of Africa. While the newest Fuchis may be replacements for 
china

s evolving surface fleet 107

the older Fuqings, the construction of a follow-on AOR/AOE in Shanghai (perhaps of 

the rumored forty-thousand-ton class) would allow the PLAN to match the numbers 

of its destroyer/frigate flotillas and help support the deployment of one carrier group. 

If China wishes to acquire three to four carriers, as rumored, it would need at least one 

dedicated AOR/AOE per carrier group, and more if China wanted to change its selfimposed restrictive policies and maintain fleets in distant waters. The PLAN also would 

need more and larger submarine tenders and rescue ships if it wished to deploy submarines overseas continuously.

On the basis of currently available evidence, China’s ultimate aspirations may align 

most closely with the French model: supporting a distant presence for low-tier police 

operations that can be augmented in times of need to deal with a regional crisis via 

deployment of a carrier air group. Such a model is not sufficient to support an overseas 

confrontation with the surface fleet of a major international actor such as the United 

States, or even a major regional actor such as India.

The PLAN surveillance fleet also has a long way to go to achieve the capabilities of the 

Soviet Union in the Cold War era. With about twenty AGIs/AGSs, mainly used for 

coastal surveillance or operations against its neighbors, China has not yet embarked 

on the massive maritime collection effort that characterized the Soviet navy and that 

indicated global operations. China’s AGI deployments in the Bay of Bengal or off Hawaii 

mark a departure from the self-imposed restrictive policy that conformed to China’s 

interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the country’s opposition 

to intelligence operations in its EEZ. And yet it can be argued that those Chinese AGI 

deployments serve defensive purposes against India’s new nuclear strategic submarine 

program and U.S. maritime dominance in the western Pacific.

Notes

1. The French biennial volume by Bernard 

Prézelin, Flottes de Combat 2012 (Rennes: Editions Ouest-France, 2012), p. 20, even rates the 

Chinese auxiliary fleet as the second largest. It 

lists eighteen major Chinese auxiliary vessels 

displacing a total of 206,930 tons, putting China 

in the world’s second position—in front of 

Russia’s forty-one auxiliary vessels in tonnage 

(203,020 tons), but still far behind the United 

States’ thirty-five vessels representing 494,360 

tons.

2. The author is grateful to Birger Graae and 

Werner Globke for sharing their research on the 

PLAN’s organization and order of battle.

3. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese 

Characteristics (Suitland, MD: 2009), available at 

www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf.

4. Ibid.; Birger Graae, “2014 PLAN Order of Battle” 

(unpublished manuscript).

5. Graae, “2014 PLAN Order of Battle.”

6. Ibid.

7. Two of four ships remain in service: Hongzehu

(881) (ex–Dong Yun 615, ex-X615, ex-Fengcang); 

Poyanghu (882) (ex–Bei Yun 575, ex-X575, exTaicang); Nan Yun 950 (ex-X950)—decommissioned; Nasr (A47)—Pakistani navy.

8. Johnathan Weng, “Chief Designer Talks about 

PLA Navy Replenishment Ship,” China Defense 

Mashup Report Beijing, February 12, 2009, www 

.china-defense-mashup.com/chief-designer 

-talks-about-pla-navy-replenishment-ship.html.
108 china maritime studies

9. Qiandaohu (886) and Weishanhu (887) were 

built in Shanghai, with Taihu (889), Shaohu

(890), and two more launched or building in 

Guangzhou.

10. Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A 

History of China’s Quest for Seapower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 285; 

Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici, with 

Isaac Kardon and Joshua Wiseman, China’s Out 

of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ., Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, 2010), pp. 9–11.

11. Yung and Rustici, China’s Out of Area Naval 

Operations, p. 12.

12. Ibid., p. 13.

13. Ibid., p. 15.

14. “19th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Sets 

Sail from Qingdao,” China Military Online, December 3, 2014, english.chinamil.com.cn/news 

-channels/china-military-news/2014-12/03/

content_6253028.htm.

15. Zhao Lei, “Setting Sail against a Sea of Troubles,” 

China Daily, February 12, 2015, available at 

www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-02/12/

content_19561275.htm.

16. 迟志艳 [Chi Zhiyan], 邵仁 [Shao Ren], and 石

家铸 [Shi Jiazhu], 以和谐海洋理念塑造人民海

军发展有利外部环境 [“On Shaping a Favorable 

External Environment for the PLAN with the 

Harmonious Ocean Philosophy”], 海军工程大

学学报( 综合版) [Journal of Naval Engineering 

(Comprehensive Edition)] 2 (2012), pp. 67–70.

17. “First China-Made 10,000-DWT Hospital Ship 

Sails to Sea,” PLA Daily, December 5, 2008, 

english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/news-channels/

2008-12/05/content_1573778.htm.

18. “Chinese Navy Hospital Ship Peace Ark

Concludes ‘Mission Harmony–2010,’” People’s 

Daily Online, November 15, 2010, en.people 

.cn/90001/90783/91300/7199893.html.

19. Xinhua, “PLA Naval Hospital Ship to Provide 

Medical Treatment to Latin American Nations: 

Spokesman,” People’s Daily, November 30, 2011, 

english.people.com.cn/90786/7661785.html.

20. 成海 [Cheng Hai] et al., “和谐使命-2011”对外

医疗服务中血液保障方案的研究 [“Research 

on Blood Supply Program in Overseas Medical 

Support during ‘Mission Harmony–2011’”], 

海军医学杂志 [Journal of Navy Medicine] 2 

(2014), pp. 108–10.

21. “Chinese Hospital Ship Peace Ark’s on ‘Friendship’ Mission to Philippines,” South China Morning Post, November 21, 2013.

22. Chi, Shao, and Shi, “On Shaping a Favorable 

External Environment for the PLAN,” pp. 67–70.

23. 刘慧 [Liu Hui] and 刘杰峰 [Liu Jiefeng], 提

高国际舆论影响力 推进我军“软实力”建设

[“Enhancing the World Opinion Influence to 

Develop Military Soft Power”], 海军工程大

学学报(综合版) [Journal of Naval Engineering

(Comprehensive Edition)] 4 (2011), pp. 13–16.

24. Peter A. Huchthausen and Alexandre SheldonDuplaix, Hide and Seek (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 

2008), pp. 181–88.

25. A Type 812 on the hull of a Type 635 (1,100 

tons). 军事论坛 » 三军论坛 » 海军版 » 精! 中

国舰艇锦集 [“Military Forum—Armed Forces 

Forum—Navy Version—Fine Chinese Warships!”], Sina, p. 4, club.mil.news.sina.com.cn/

thread-87564-4-7.html; Desmond Ball, Signals 

Intelligence in the Post–Cold War Era: Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region (Singapore: 

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Regional 

Strategic Studies Programme, 1993), pp. 53–56.

26. Ex-V350; excessive vibrations led to cancellation 

of the project.

27. Ex-814.

28. “Fine Chinese Warships!”; Ball, Signals Intelligence, pp. 53–56.

29. “Fine Chinese Warships!”

30. Ibid. Xing Fengshan is ex-V856.

31. Ibid.

32. Ball, Signals Intelligence, p. 54.

33. Built respectively at Zhonghua (Dong Ce 226, 

227), Guangzhou (Nan Ce 420), Jiangzhou/

Jiangxi (Nan Ce 427, Bei Ce 943), and Guijiang/

Wuzhou (Nan Ce 426, 428).

34. Oleg A. Godin and David R Palmer, History of 

Russian Underwater Acoustics (Singapore: World 

Scientific Publishing, 2008), p. 612.

35. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2003

(Tokyo: 2003), pp. 67–68.

36. Ibid.

37. A laser electro-optical turret was visible forward 

of the bridge of 853 before its refit. “Fine Chinese Warships!”

38. Sudhi Ranjan Sen, “Chinese Ship Caught Spying 

on India,” NDTV, August 31, 2011, www.ndtv 

.com/article/india/china-ship-with-22-labs 

-spied-on-india-130174; “Navy Spots Chinese 

‘Spy’ Ship near Andamans,” YouTube video, 

4:27, posted by “inKhabar,” April 7, 2013, www 

.youtube.com/watch?v=0VCaUA7mFC8.
china

s evolving surface fleet 109

39. Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La Bruyere, 

“Crashing Its Own Party: China’s Unusual Decision to Spy On Joint Naval Exercises,” China Real 

Time Report (blog), Wall Street Journal, July 19, 

2014, blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/19/

crashing-its-own-party-chinas-unusual

-decision-to-spy-on-joint-naval-exercises/.

40. 专家:中国新电子侦察船下水猛增远海斗争优

势 [“Expert: China’s New Electronic Surveillance 

Ship Launched for Sea Superiority Struggle”], 

China.com, January 29, 2015, military.china 

.com/important/11132797/201501.

41. Ex–Dong Jiu 301.

42. Transferred to China Fisheries Law Enforcement 

in 2008 as Yu Zheng 311.

43. Dazhou class: Nan Jiu 502 and Bei Jiu 137, 

ex–Nan Jiu 504. Dajiang class: ex–Bei Jiu 121, 

ex–Dong Jiu 302, ex–Nan Jiu 506. Dalang class: 

Bei Jiu 122, Bei Jiu 138, Dong Jiu 332, and Nan 

Jiu 510. Dadong class: Dong Jiu 304.

44. Tuzhong class: Nan Tuo 154, Bei Tuo 710, and 

Dong Tuo 830. Hujiu/Dinghais: Nan Tuo 147, 

155, 156, 164, 174, and 175; Bei Tuo 622, 711, 

and 717; and Dong Tuo 837, 842, 843, 875, and 

877. Hujiu IIs: Nan Tuo 185; Bei Tuo 635, 712, 

and 715; and Dong Tuo 836. Tuqians: Nan Tuo

181, Bei Tuo 721, and Nan Tuo 189.

45. Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to 

the Soviet Navy, 5th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 1991).

46. “Chinese Submarine Docks in Sri Lanka despite 

Indian Concerns,” Reuters, November 3, 2014.

47. Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, 

Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon, 

1979).

As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) works to meet the PLA’s “New 

Historic Missions” and protect Chinese interests abroad, the PLAN surface force 

has confronted the challenge of sustaining a growing number of ships on extended operations away from home port. Since 2008, the PLAN has supported units in operational 

deployments lasting, in some cases, over six months without the benefit of a network of 

permanent overseas bases. Images of PLAN logistics vessels replenishing PLAN surface 

combatants under way at sea, seldom seen before 2010, have become routine, a staple of 

PLA press releases.

Most studies of PLAN sustainment have focused on either PLAN mastery of underway 

replenishment techniques or the adequacy of the logistics vessels that support underway 

delivery of fuel and stores. These units are the critical last step in delivering logistics 

support at sea, and the ability to employ them consistently represents a fundamental 

level of seamanship accomplishment. However, mobile logistics forces are only the most 

visible expression of the PLAN’s efforts to adapt its logistics support to a higher tempo 

of operations at greater distances from the Chinese mainland. The PLA recognizes that 

changes in the logistics-support structure ashore are also a key part of meeting this challenge. The service’s official newspaper, People’s Navy, describes the overall PLAN support 

construct as “a shore-sea integrated support system with strategic home ports at the core 

and with at-sea comprehensive support groups as the focal points.”1

Extended deployments and an increasing emphasis on regular, year-round surface-force 

readiness have placed new demands on the PLAN surface-force maintenance system as 

well. Combined with the growing technical complexity of PLAN surface-force payloads 

and platforms, these extended deployments have caused the PLAN to develop new 

maintenance approaches. This chapter examines the PLAN’s systematic effort to address 

its logistics and maintenance challenges and the place of these initiatives within larger 

efforts to improve logistics and maintenance throughout the PLA.

In studying recent conflicts, the PLA has recognized the centrality of logistics and maintenance support to modern combat operations.2

 Chinese military studies of the British 

Dale C. Rielage

Developments in PLAN Logistics and Maintenance

CHAPTER NINE

Sustaining the Surface Force
112 china maritime studies

naval campaign to retake the Falkland Islands discuss the importance of the Royal Navy 

logistics train in supporting combat operations.3

 The U.S. ability to amass an “iron 

mountain” of supplies before each Gulf war, much of which was transported by sea, as 

well as the ability of the U.S. Navy and other coalition navies to sustain naval forces on 

sanctions duty indefinitely, reinforced the PLA’s impression that its logistics support 

required a new reach and tempo. “Winning local wars under the conditions of informatization” is only possible if the PLA can deliver material support to the fight of the type 

and quantity that modern operations require. The Chinese military press reported that 

the PLA made logistics reform a key element of the eleventh five-year plan (2006–10). 

In 2007, the Central Military Commission (CMC) issued an Outline for Building Modern 

Logistics in an All-Around Way. The document remains the senior-level guidance to the 

PLA on logistics support. Many key PLAN reform initiatives—including informatization 

of logistics functions and “military support socialization”—are guided by this document.4

The PLAN faces an additional challenge distinct from the overall question of support 

modernization that the PLA faces. The PLA is still wedded to a geographic command 

structure. Despite the promise of recent reforms to the PLA’s organizational structure, 

it remains a challenge to support robust operations away from China’s coastline.5

 Other 

than the most basic coastal-defense functions, the PLAN’s missions—whether characterized as New Historic Missions or as traditional naval missions in “distant seas”—take 

place at increasing ranges from the Chinese mainland and require surface forces to 

remain on station for extended periods. These new requirements must be met with 

forces that deploy from all three fleets, crossing oceans and sometimes combining forces 

to carry out their missions. Even regional surface-force missions, such as assertion of 

Chinese maritime claims in the South and East China Seas, require year-round responsiveness and sustained operations beyond what is required of other arms of the PLA. 

PLAN surface-force support must move beyond the strictures of the larger PLA system 

if it is to enable these mobile operations.

Taking its guidance from larger efforts to reform PLA logistics, the PLAN has focused 

since 2006 on creating administrative frameworks, shore structures, and at-sea capabilities that allow its forces, including the surface force, to conduct a full range of missions. 

Both PLA and PLAN logistics and maintenance efforts have been characterized by three 

significant lines of effort: 

• Informatization. The PLAN recognizes that modern information technology enables 

logistics and maintenance agility and efficiency. The 2011 PLAN work plan called for 

the PLAN to “quicken the process of logistics informatization building in the Navy.”6
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s evolving surface fleet 113

• Attention to regulatory, budget, and audit controls. PLAN logistics and maintenance 

modernization has included efforts to create a regulatory framework to guide PLAN 

efforts, apportion resources, and monitor the use of money and assets.

• Reliance on civilian support. For its first fifty years, China’s low level of development 

and the Maoist “People’s War” doctrine placed the PLA in the position of manufacturing and supplying its own stores and arms. Since the end of “PLA Inc.” in the late 

1990s, the PLA has moved away from being the creator of its own support to managing the acquisition of support from other sectors of society. In recent years the PLAN 

has embraced “military support socialization”—essentially privatization—of key support services as a means of creating efficiencies and improving service to the fleet. 

Service-Level Logistics

The PLAN Headquarters Logistics Department establishes policy and regulations for 

budgets and resources and thus is a critical node in modernizing the naval logistics system. During the eleventh five-year plan, the department reported that it “implemented 

reform of the budget system, centralized the disbursal of funds, and tied together asset 

management and budget management.”7

 The theme of administrative rectification 

continued in the twelfth five-year plan (2011–15). In 2011, the CMC issued “opinions 

on further strengthening the military’s asset management” that provided direction to 

the PLA on the administration of military resources, both physical and budgetary.8

 In 

a late 2011 interview, Chen Yihao, director of financial affairs in the Navy Logistics 

Department, explained that the PLAN’s goal in implementing this CMC guidance was 

more-efficient use of existing resources and control and supervision of assets. This effort 

was challenged by what Chen called “prominent contradictions in budgetary supply 

and demand”—budget shortfalls—that required improved efficiency. Toward that end, 

the director indicated that the PLAN Logistics Department would standardize support 

measures for major tasks, such as antipiracy deployments, extended operations, and 

joint military exercises.9

Conservation of Resources—Addressing Corruption

The handling of money and resources naturally creates opportunities for illegal personal 

enrichment. Most Western observers agree that corruption within the People’s Liberation Army is endemic and has a significant impact on resources and personnel policy, 

and thus military readiness.

The PLAN is no stranger to high-level corruption. In 2006, Vice Adm. Wang Shouye, 

PLAN deputy commander, was arrested for “economic crimes” allegedly involving land 

deals. Wang was sentenced to death, a penalty later commuted to life imprisonment.10
114 china maritime studies

Chinese sources on naval logistics only hint at corruption issues, but a measure of official concern can be found in their reports of ongoing progress against corrupt practices. For example, a 2009 report noted that the Navy Logistics Department had “banned 

and punished the lawbreaking activities of issuing and using false purchase receipts and 

invoices, examined and rectified the practice of handling and managing assets, [and] 

tightened supervision over financial management.”11 The management of military real 

estate, a key element of numerous military corruption scandals, appeared to receive special attention. One of the key tasks completed in 2009 was a review of unused PLAN real 

estate, followed by realignment of these assets under correct management. The PLAN 

reported that these efforts “returned 1,600 units of housing inappropriately occupied by 

cadres and other personnel at and below the division level.”12

President Xi Jinping has made the fight against official extravagance one of his most 

public policy initiatives. His most prominent efforts to curb PLA abuses have centered 

on lavish official entertainment and abuse of military license plates. However, an expanded government-wide anticorruption campaign will both push PLAN headquarters 

logisticians to take a more central role in regulating PLAN assets and place the regulators themselves under increased scrutiny.

Fleet-Level Logistics Support

In late 2011 the PLAN established a fleet logistics department in each of its three fleets. 

In many ways, this reform marked a return to a previous pattern of PLAN organization. The three fleets had logistics departments until 1985, when PLAN commander 

Adm. Liu Huaqing ordered them disestablished. Liu also moved responsibility for shore 

installations as well as surface-force shore support to shore-based support commands, 

allowing fleet headquarters and subordinate operational units to focus on at-sea operations.13 This construct functioned well in a service that was tied closely to shore, conducting distant voyages only in exceptional cases. People’s War coastal-defense concepts 

emphasized small combatants conducting operations from numerous dispersed locations 

along the entire coast; specialized, geographically based support commands could focus on 

mobilizing wartime resources. However, the increase in PLAN distant-seas operations argues strongly for integrating logistics by operation rather than geography. Establishing fleet 

logistics departments while reducing the shore logistics command structure aligns logistics 

support directly with the commanders responsible for conducting naval operations.

The task of integrating logistics with operations is challenging in any navy, and the new 

fleet logistics departments have confronted issues of authority, duplication, and training. 

One of the new East Sea Fleet Logistics Department’s first tasks was to issue regulations 

establishing the relationship among the fleet, the shore-based vessel-service commands, 

and the subordinate operational units. The department reported that many cadres 
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s evolving surface fleet 115

initially did not believe the new department would lead to fundamental changes in the 

logistics process. Reportedly, efforts to introduce new directives rapidly changed this 

view.14

Centralized control of fleet logistics also appears to be driving centralization of some 

support functions. In one example, the East Sea Fleet Logistics Department assessed that 

among members of medical staffs assigned to afloat units “enthusiasm toward their work 

was low.” Given their extended at-sea assignments, afloat medical cadre had no opportunities for advanced education. In response, the new logistics department removed afloat 

medical personnel from surface units and assigned them to two local hospitals, dispatching them to afloat units as required to support operations.15

The fleet logistics departments also focused on increasing the level and fidelity of 

logistics play in PLAN exercises. People’s Navy reported that only two weeks after its 

establishment the East Sea Fleet Logistics Department confronted a major exercise in 

which most logistics support was assumed or scripted rather than exercised in earnest. 

Participating vessels would be supplied fully before departing port and would not require resupply during the exercise. While the exercise plan called for logistics personnel 

to accompany the ships, the exercise manning document was incomplete. The exercise 

was cited in the official PLA press as an example of the scope of change necessary for the 

PLA to implement the training required to conduct modern logistics operations.16

Development of the Comprehensive Support Base

Shortly after the reestablishment of the fleet logistics departments the PLAN created a 

number of comprehensive support bases. The exact number of these new commands 

is unclear, but there is likely at least one per fleet. The North Sea Fleet Comprehensive 

Support Base, headquartered in Qingdao, has received the most attention in the Chinese 

military press, largely owing to its mission of supporting the new aircraft carrier Liaoning.

The comprehensive support bases differ from the bases established in the mid-1980s. 

Until recently, bases formed the bulk of the PLAN surface-force shore-support structure. 

These older-pattern bases could be compared more properly to a U.S. naval district or 

maritime defense zone. They controlled not only installations and tenant logistics units 

but also small combatants, and appeared to have a coastal-defense function.

In contrast, the comprehensive support bases have been modeled on the “large strategic 

mother ports” that major foreign navies tend to use. People’s Navy reported that the staff 

of the North Sea Fleet Comprehensive Support Base repeatedly consulted an intelligence 

database on foreign ports to discern the essential functions the new PLAN base would 

need to provide.17
116 china maritime studies

Investment in Shore Support to the Surface Force

In setting out to provide Liaoning, the PLAN’s highest-profile surface platform, with a 

world-class level of support infrastructure, the PLAN is continuing a long-term investment in improving surface-ship shore support. Modern naval bases provide to ships not 

only moorage and shelter from the sea but utilities necessary for basic maintenance and 

housekeeping on board. During the eleventh five-year plan, the PLAN established the 

goal of providing these utilities (commonly referred to as shore services) to PLAN surface units in their home ports. The PLAN dubbed these services—fuel oil, potable water, 

shore electrical power, heat (steam), high-pressure air, and air-conditioning—the “six 

supplies.”18 People’s Navy emphasized that providing the six supplies in PLAN ports was 

a personal goal of PLAN commander Adm. Wu Shengli. In many cases, the provision of 

these services required extensive renovation or complete replacement of piers, as well as 

construction of central facilities for utilities management and distribution.19

Providing these essential services from central locations has a number of advantages for 

the surface force. First, it reduces wear and tear on the ships’ own equipment. In its extensive coverage of this effort, People’s Navy suggested that, prior to these improvements, 

much of the surface force was continually “auxiliary steaming”: generating its own 

utility services using the ship’s engineering plant. Second, central utilities reduce crew 

workload. If electrical power or water is provided from a pierside connection, the crew 

is not required to maintain an around-the-clock watch on generators or distilling plants. 

Third, shore services allow ships to resupply faster. In one case, hard potable water 

lines replaced two trucks that had shuttled water to surface ships, allowing the units to 

resupply with water in half the time. Fourth, the six supplies save money. Bases reported 

consistent savings under the new program, largely because central production of utilities is more efficient than burning fuel oil on board each vessel to provide services. In a 

number of cases, shore-power risers are connected to centralized energy-management 

systems. Shipboard personnel use smart cards to authorize closing the breakers after 

connecting shore-power cables, and the base centrally monitors the amount of power 

each unit uses. If the central base notes excessive consumption, it notifies the shore 

support centers in near-real time and puts controls in place. By 2011, the PLAN could 

report with pride that “six-supply support” was available for all major combatants at 

their home ports.20

Beyond providing better support to PLAN surface units, the PLAN recognizes the role 

of its bases in supporting the quality of life for its personnel. In an increasingly prosperous China, PLAN personnel have expectations for their material comfort and standard 

of living that are vastly different from those of their Maoist-era predecessors. As the 

PLAN works to attract high-quality volunteers to replace its conscript personnel, it recognizes that quality-of-life matters affect the retention of long-service personnel.
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s evolving surface fleet 117

Housing is recognized as an important quality-of-life element. When not at sea, PLAN 

surface-force sailors are housed in barracks ashore. A retrospective of the accomplishments during the eleventh five-year plan noted significant improvement in these 

facilities: the PLAN reported completion of 244 billeting-support projects in sixty-three 

different units. People’s Navy reported that the investment in these quarters had “brought 

to an end the era of officers and sailors from surface ships ‘arriving in port but not going 

ashore, eating while squatting on deck, hanging up a hammock to sleep.’”21 However, 

room for improvement remains, and the 2011 PLAN logistics work meeting made 

improving living-support conditions for personnel one of the five priority areas for the 

year.

In addition to housing, the PLAN’s efforts to improve base infrastructure have included 

better laundry facilities—in some cases, covered areas to line-dry laundry—as well as 

telephone and Internet access. In many cases, provision of these amenities has been 

contracted to civilian providers.

Food services—both dining facilities and supplying of food to naval units—have been 

a focus of logistics-improvement efforts, with fifty-six new-model canteens built in 

nineteen naval units during 2009 alone.22 Since military food services have few unique 

requirements not found in civilian institutional food services, there are few barriers to 

PLAN units “relying on society for support.” During the eleventh five-year plan, the 

PLAN civilianized seventy dining facilities located in thirty-three units.23 Food services 

have been cited consistently as a successful example of military-support socialization.

However, reliance on civilian suppliers makes food services more sensitive to increases 

in food prices. In late 2011, People’s Navy reported that at some PLAN commands inflation in food prices had caused meals to be reduced from the normal three meats and two 

vegetables to two meats and two vegetables. In this case, People’s Navy commended the 

solution of one East Sea Fleet unit, which lowered its food costs through open bidding 

with local firms and supermarkets, gaining the added benefit of direct delivery of food 

to the units.24

Relying on the civilian food supply carries real concerns over quality and safety. Underscoring its concern for the welfare of sailors, the Yulin Support Base Coastal Logistics 

Department reported in 2011 that it had issued food-testing devices at the unit level. Additionally, the base employed eight food inspectors and had a military depot doing some 

food processing for the service. While having military facilities pickling vegetables for 

the PLAN is contrary to the idea of military-support socialization, it may increase the 

confidence of the troops that their food is safe, fresh, and professionally prepared.25
118 china maritime studies

Asset Management

Like any military, the PLAN faces the challenge of efficiently and effectively managing large amounts of property and equipment. Chinese businesses export goods to 

cost-conscious importers across the globe and have developed logistics expertise while 

participating in highly developed state-of-the-art global logistics chains. The PLA is 

interested in applying this commercial expertise to military asset management.

Key to commercial logistics agility is maintaining real-time visibility on the total assets 

of an organization through modern information technology. One of the PLAN’s goals in 

the twelfth five-year plan was to implement a Navy Asset Management Informatization 

System that integrates the inventory management functions of all levels of command.26

At the base level, the system appears to be managed by the base Integrated Support 

Command Center. This center, which monitors and coordinates all logistics functions, is 

the same base center that monitors electrical power consumption and other six-support 

services to surface units. To illustrate the center’s role in resolving routine logistics problems, a reporter recounted that during his visit to the center the watch received a report 

that a computer belonging to the political department of a flotilla had broken. After 

receiving the application for a new computer, the base finance section checked the Navy 

Asset Management Informatization System, discovered the computer was past its service 

life, and approved the new purchase in about thirty seconds.27

Maintenance Support to the Surface Force

The growing technical complexity of PLAN surface vessels and the requirement to conduct year-round operations have increased demands on the PLAN maintenance system. 

In 2011, the PLAN put in place a “Ship Support Path with Chinese Characteristics.” This 

plan outlined responsibilities for both maintenance management and the conduct of the 

actual maintenance across the PLAN.28

Maintenance management is conducted at three levels within the PLAN. At the highest 

level—likely within the Naval Armament Department—the PLAN conducts the policy 

and force-wide planning work that facilitates maintenance across all three fleets. These 

efforts include the following: 

• Programmatic planning

• Equipment work program planning

• Issuance of rules and regulations

• Aircraft carrier repairs at the ship-equipment level

• Plans for major ship repairs
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s evolving surface fleet 119

• Coordination of major imported and domestic parts and materials

The national importance of the PLAN aircraft carrier program is reflected in the fact 

that ship-equipment-level repairs for Liaoning are managed at the navy headquarters 

level.

Each fleet has a fleet armament department that implements PLAN policy and plans for 

its assigned forces. These functions include these elements: 

• Planning management

• Planning of campaign-oriented equipment work

• Refinement and execution of rules and regulations

• Implementation of repairs

• Organization of materials sourcing

The fleet armament departments were established in late 2011 at the same time as the 

fleet logistics departments. They have similar responsibilities for integrating support 

with military operational planning for both peacetime and wartime operations. The East 

Sea Fleet’s Fleet Armament Department has established three major “expert groups” to 

manage fleet-support operations: two equipment technical support groups, dedicated 

to surface ships and submarines, respectively, and a ship-equipment repair office. In 

February 2013, these three groups were augmented by six system-technology units, each 

dedicated to the inspection and assessment of a specific category of shipboard equipment. These six units comprised over 180 experts and technicians.29

Under the fleet armament departments, individual units manage the execution of 

planned and emergent repairs. This includes both execution management and ship-level 

repair work through at-sea support. Under the 2011 system, actual maintenance is conducted at three levels, paralleling the maintenance-management system. In this construct, 

bases provide the highest level of maintenance support. Assigned tasks include these: 

• Dry dock repairs

• Assistance to “relay-level” repairs

• Embarking support ships accompanying ships carrying out major missions

• Undertaking wartime repairs, as directed by higher authorities

The “relay level” likely refers to specialized personnel from ship-equipment repair offices. While these units are subordinate to the fleet armament departments, there may 

be a separation between fleet-subordinate planning functions and base-subordinate 

maintenance execution. The relay level will

• Use shore bases to provide at-sea mobile repairs
120 china maritime studies

• Work difficult issues that are beyond a ship’s force

• Machine parts for crew-level repairs

• Repair equipment removed and turned in by a ship’s force

• Provide initial charge to and overhaul of storage batteries

• Assist ship’s force maintenance

• Embark in support ships accompanying ships carrying out major missions 

A number of PLAN sources reference the responsibility of ship-equipment repair offices to provide specialists to deploying ships. It is not clear to what extent this reflects 

internal assessment that PLAN crews have a limited capability to conduct their own 

maintenance. In the case of the PLAN, it appears that these specialists will deploy both 

to support vessels and to deploying combatants, augmenting their ability to assess and 

repair equipment casualties. While it is possible that PLAN surface ships are limited by 

their onboard repair capabilities, it is also important to remember that most navies rely 

on shore assistance for complex surface-ship repairs and scheduled maintenance.

Members of the crew of each PLAN surface vessel are the critical deckplate-level 

stewards of their ship and equipment. Shipboard personnel are tasked with conducting 

maintenance in accordance with the Naval Vessel Repair Regulations and the Naval Vessel 

Equipment and Technology Management Work Regulations. Accounts of shipboard maintenance suggest that there are three levels of ship’s force repairs: peacetime maintenance, 

repair-period maintenance, and “wartime crew-level maintenance.” The latter suggests 

that PLAN surface units are authorized in combat situations to undertake maintenance 

that otherwise would be referred to a higher-level maintenance organization.30

When official Chinese media discuss surface-ship maintenance, their stories generally 

center on “heroic repairs” a ship’s crew has made in the face of considerable challenges 

or urgent operational need. For example, in 2012 People’s Navy highlighted Jiangkai II 

guided-missile frigate (FFG) 572. Frigate 572 suffered a casualty to its number 2 auxiliary engine, resulting in excessive vibration and high exhaust temperature. The crew 

spent nine hours in a successful effort to repair the machinery, allowing the ship to make 

a scheduled replenishment the next day.31

While heroic repairs make good headlines, good maintenance management seeks to 

minimize catastrophic equipment failure and maximize equipment availability. It is 

not clear from PLAN accounts to what extent the PLAN has implemented a system of 

planned scheduled maintenance, or whether such a system is standardized across surface 

platforms. A planned-maintenance regime can be implemented with little or no automation, but requires a high degree of attention to the administration of the work at the unit 

level.
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s evolving surface fleet 121

What is clear from PLAN sources is that surface-force maintenance in the future 

increasingly will be based on automated equipment diagnostics. The Luyang-class 

destroyers, and likely the Jiangkai II–class frigates, are equipped with an electronic 

equipment-management system, and such systems likely will be standard on all future 

PLAN surface combatants. The system monitors and collects key equipment parameters 

such as oil quality, bearing vibration, noise, temperature, and rotation rate. The maintenance history files are used to provide feedback to equipment manufacturers.32 Shorebased equipment technical-support groups also can access this information and manage 

dynamically the maintenance requirements of key pieces of shipboard equipment. In one 

East Sea Fleet frigate flotilla, implementation of this dynamic maintenance management 

model reportedly increased equipment readiness rates by 20 percent.33

When equipment does fail unexpectedly, the crew may not have the expertise to effect 

repairs. In some cases, it may not be able even to determine the nature of the fault. When 

the ship is in port, expert assistance can be accessed from higher-level maintenance 

activities or industry. Coordinating access to these experts is the responsibility of the 

fleet armament departments. In March 2012, the East Sea Fleet Armament Department 

signed an agreement with thirty-six local support units. It also established relationships 

with more than a hundred civilian firms and institutions for on-call equipmentsupport. 

These firms are “able to quickly transition from peacetime to wartime activities to serve 

as a backup force for when emergencies arise.” A Fleet Civil-Military Combined Equipment Support Command Center provides access to these resources when required.34

During at-sea operations, these shore-based experts are not close at hand. In these cases, 

the PLAN surface force is increasingly able to rely on “reach back” support using modern communications links to provide virtual assistance. The PLAN maintains a “blueprint and information center” that is able to provide repair blueprints electronically to 

deployed units.35 For more-complex repairs, assistance from shore-based naval experts 

and manufacturers is available. One South Sea Fleet–associated electronics factory established an “emergency response support team” that could assemble within ten minutes to 

provide remote technical support to PLAN surface units deployed to the Gulf of Aden. 

In 2010, the factory reported providing remote assistance for ten technical casualties on 

units conducting distant operations. The North Sea Fleet reported that prior to supporting its first Gulf of Aden deployment it worked with the PLAN Navy Equipment Department to assemble a network of over four hundred technical experts from military shore 

commands, institutes, and industry who were available to provide remote maintenance 

advice. As a result, when the Jiangkai II FFG Yantai suffered an automatic radar plottingaid failure while in the Gulf of Aden in May 2012, experts based in Shanghai—outside 

the North Sea Fleet’s usual support base—were available to assist in resolving the fault.36
122 china maritime studies

As People’s Navy crowed, “the use of long-distance diagnosis is like putting wings on the 

factory.”37

Underway Support

To provide both logistics and maintenance support to deployed units, the PLAN is moving to comprehensive support groups. Called the “focal points” of the “shore-sea integrated support system,” these groups appear to integrate shoreside support centers with 

an at-sea component of underway logistics vessels and support ships. Their development 

is a key element of improving all aspects of surface-force combat support.

Each comprehensive support group is intended to integrate multiple support specialties within its afloat group. This includes logistics, maintenance technical support, and 

medical services as well as reconnaissance, survey, and search-and-rescue functions. 

Support-group units will vary their support pattern to fit the operational requirement, 

in some cases accompanying combat formations and in other cases acting as a logistics 

shuttle between the underway formation and the shore infrastructure. PLAN commentators note that for the units to integrate with combat formations, they must possess a 

command-and-control capability that integrates seamlessly with the operations command system.

Support groups also must be prepared to embed with combat forces operating in highthreat environments and to share in the force’s defense. One East Sea Fleet Comprehensive Support Group political officer noted, “In a condition of fighting against an opponent that uses large quantities of long-range precision-guided weapons . . . the maritime 

operation logistic support forces may be facing serious threats. . . . It is necessary to 

establish an integrated defense system to merge the operation logistic support forces and 

the combat forces into a whole entity.”38

Logistics and Maintenance in Combat

A key distinguishing characteristic of PLAN logistics and maintenance planning is its 

emphasis on carrying out support functions while under direct attack. Judging from the 

official press, PLAN logistics and maintenance exercises routinely are carried out under 

conditions of simulated air raids in which key roads and piers are destroyed or damaged. 

In other cases, simulated special operations forces menace the prompt deployment of 

critical support to PLAN units. In one case, People’s Navy cited the increased integration 

fostered by the new East Sea Fleet Logistics Department as essential for success in a base 

damage-repair exercise that featured bomb damage affecting pierside services.39

This emphasis on support under direct attack creates an ongoing emphasis on deployable support services. To some extent, this emphasis is likely a legacy of a heritage of 
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s evolving surface fleet 123

supporting a navy comprising mainly small coastal patrol boats. Under the Maoist 

People’s War at Sea model, during a conflict these small combatants would disperse 

away from their bases, requiring their support to travel to them and operate from crude 

or unimproved coastal locations. However, the PLAN continues to invest in deployable 

support systems, indicating a belief that offering a potential adversary a moving target 

and having the ability to reconstitute damaged services remain worthwhile investments. 

Naval logistics units possess at least one mobile field headquarters, and such complex 

services as degaussing have been made mobile and can be offered when piers are not 

available.40

Ship-repair shelters are a key element of deployable maintenance support. Managed by 

the ship equipment–repair offices, these modified shipping containers appear to be deployed by truck in groups to offer advanced repair capabilities in remote locations. One 

South Sea Fleet group reportedly included ten trucks and sixty personnel. The shelters 

offered hull repair and welding capability as well as the ability to conduct specialized 

repairs of weapons and electronics. While the shelters could have a role in bringing 

advanced repair equipment pierside during routine operations, PLAN media emphasize 

these systems’ capabilities for conducting battle-damage repair.41 As the PLAN surfaceforce shore-maintenance infrastructure becomes more advanced, these shelters likely 

will shift to a strict battle-damage repair role.

Embarked Aviation Support

As the PLAN builds larger, multimission surface combatants equipped with flight decks 

and hangars, embarked aviation support has become a critical function for the PLAN 

surface force. In earlier years, helicopters were visitors, spending minimal time aboard 

the surface unit and drawing their logistics and maintenance support from their home 

airfields. Today, surface action groups conducting operations beyond the “first island 

chain” or in fleet training areas routinely feature embarked helicopters and, in some 

cases, unmanned aerial vehicles, all of which must be supported for months on board.42

Successful maintenance and logistics support requires cooperation between the aviation 

and surface forces.

In any navy, small aviation-capable vessels are challenged to hold sufficient spare parts 

on board to keep their helicopters operational. After two years of antipiracy operations, 

the South Sea Fleet made a concerted effort to rationalize the spare parts supply on 

board its deploying units. The fleet realized that deploying units too often were requiring repair parts to be sent from China to repair aircraft. Less than 10 percent of the 

spare parts held on board were being expended during a deployment, but the availability 

rate of the helicopters suggested much more extensive repairs. In one case, an aircraft 

cracked a tail-drive shaft. The replacement was sent from China. When the same aircraft 
124 china maritime studies

cracked a tail-drive shaft again, a spare still was not held on board. Aircrews were taking 

as many spare parts as possible—even spare engines and rotor blades—but were not 

taking the correct parts. In many cases, items with limited shelf lives were being wasted 

because they “expired” before being used. On the basis of lessons learned, the South Sea 

Fleet compiled a detailed plan for spares support. This Standards for Helicopter Parts, 

Components, and Material to Be Taken on Long Voyages is now the standard reference for 

surface units preparing for antipiracy operations.43

In the ability of shipboard personnel to support flight operations—representing a more 

complex challenge than stocking the right spare parts—the PLAN surface force has 

faced fundamental shortcomings. For example, ship’s company personnel have been 

unfamiliar with the exacting fuel-testing requirements necessary to ensure the quality of 

aviation fuels delivered to embarked aircraft. In a shipboard environment, it is easy for 

fuel to become contaminated, which becomes a serious safety problem that can result in 

the loss of aircraft and lives at sea. The PLAN’s solution has been to embark an aviationfuels expert from the fuels department of the helicopter unit’s home airfield. However, 

surface units on extended operations struggled because airfield personnel were not part 

of the helicopter unit and there were no regulations covering their deployment to the 

surface vessel. While this problem was addressed on a case-by-case basis, similar problems were encountered supporting flight meteorology, aviation medicine, communications, and navigation for embarked flight crews—all essential functions of an air-capable 

surface unit.

Ultimately, the PLAN recognizes that these problems represent a surface-force training 

issue. Ensuring that PLAN surface units have the ability to embark and support helicopters without dedicated personnel augmentation means the PLAN must—in the words of 

one South Sea Fleet aviation political commissar—“get one person to act as two.” Until 

that is achieved, guided improvisation appears to be the order of the day.44

How Effective Is PLAN Surface Logistics and Maintenance?

The most difficult question in assessing PLAN surface-force logistics and maintenance is 

effectiveness. Short of gaining access to the PLAN equivalent of the U.S. Navy’s Board of 

Inspection and Survey reports, estimates of PLAN logistics and maintenance rely on impressions, anecdotes, and Chinese accounts of the navy’s efforts to improve its systems.

In the end, the measure of maintenance and logistics is in the sustainment of fleet operations. Since the first task force left China on December 26, 2008, the PLAN has sustained a constant deployed presence supporting antipiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. 

While the PLAN had conducted previous long-range “goodwill” cruises, the antipiracy 

operations represented China’s first-ever effort to maintain a naval presence beyond its 
china

s evolving surface fleet 125

own coast. Not surprisingly, initial efforts to sustain the formation did not go well. Basic 

lessons about food preservation, overseas support contracting, and replenishment methods were learned through hard experience. Through this process, the PLAN avoided 

catastrophic material casualties or complete logistics failure, while improvising a support 

system on the fly. The ultimate arrangement, characterized by People’s Navy as “supply 

ships as the platform, foreign ports as the backing, domestic cargo ships as the supplement,” has become routine. In many ways, the system is as robust as those of U.S. allies 

deployed to the region, if not more so.45

It is possible, however, that operations in the Gulf of Aden represent an exceptional 

case, a single focus of national effort that is not reflective of the PLAN surface force’s 

capabilities. However, the scope and tempo of recent PLAN surface operations belie that 

suggestion.

In March and April 2013, a four-ship task force made up of the Yuzhao (Type 071)–class 

dock landing ship Jinggangshan, the Luyang II–class destroyer Lanzhou (DDG 170), and 

the Jiangkai II–class frigates Hengshui (FFG 572) and Yulin (FFG 569) made an extended 

patrol in the South China Sea. The force conducted a well-publicized small-island 

seizure exercise and a ceremony at James Shoal—the submerged feature that marks the 

southernmost limit of China’s South China Sea claims. On their return, the ships were 

visited by President Xi Jinping and PLAN commander Wu Shengli. Seven days later, 

Lanzhou and Hengshui departed port for an eleven-day patrol that included passage 

through the Miyako Strait and near the disputed Senkaku Islands.

Lanzhou’s political officer recalled to People’s Navy that in the 1990s ships were permitted an extended in-port period to prepare for each underway operation. “Now, our highsea training missions are all scheduled so densely that we are required to have sustained 

combat capabilities.”46

The ability to support a rapid turnaround of high-end naval combatants in support of 

national requirements—in this case, enforcement of Chinese maritime claims—is an 

indication that the PLAN surface force is increasingly ready to conduct operations. That 

force will continue to be challenged by the level of maintenance its complex new systems 

require, as well as by the logistics demands imposed by increasing operations in distant 

seas. These are, however, challenges that the PLAN has identified and will address on a 

basis of solid progress established over the last two decades.
126 china maritime studies

Notes

1. 余华梁 [Yu Hualiang], 现代保障直通海天—

“十一五”期间海军后勤建设成就回眸 [“A 

Look Back at Achievements in the Navy’s Logistical Construction during the 11th Five-Year 

Program: Modern Support Connects Directly 

with the Sea and Sky”], 人民海军 [People’s 

Navy], October 29, 2010, p. 7.

2. See Lonnie Henley, “PLA Logistics and Doctrine 

Reform, 1999–2009,” in People’s Liberation Army 

after Next, ed. Susan M. Puska (Carlisle, PA: U.S. 

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 

2000), pp. 55–77; and Abraham M. Denmark, 

“PLA Logistics 2004–11: Lessons Learned in the 

Field,” in Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at 

Home and Abroad, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David 

Lai, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 

pp. 297–335.

3. Christopher D. Yung, “Sinica Rules the Waves? 

The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Power 

Projection and Anti-access/Area Denial Lessons 

from the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict,” in Chinese 

Lessons from Other People’s Wars, ed. Andrew 

Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen 

(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2011), pp. 75–114.

4. 徐壮志 [Xu Zhuangzhi], 国防新成就之一: 战

斗力, 在变革中跃升 [“Achievements in National Defense: Raising PLA Combat Power”], 

新华网 [Xinhua], June 12, 2012, news.xinhuanet 

.com/mil/2012-06/12/c_123270605.htm; see also 

廖锡龙 [Liao Xilong], 加快推进军队保障社会

化走出一条军民融合式发展路子 [“Accelerate 

Promotion of Military Support Socialization and 

Take the Development Path of Civil-Military 

Integration”], 求是 [Qiushi], May 16, 2012,

www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2012/201210/201205/

t20120511_157242.htm. 

5. For more on PLA reforms, see Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “China’s GoldwaterNichols? Assessing PLA Organizational 

Reforms,” Strategic Forum, no. 294 (April 2016), 

available at inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/

stratforum/SF-294.pdf.

6. 加快海军发展, 建设强大海军—2011年海军

机关四大部工作展望 [“Quicken the Navy’s 

Development, Build a Powerful Navy—Preview 

of the 2011 Work for the Four Primary Departments of the Navy”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 

December 31, 2010, p. 1.

7. Ibid.

8. 杜龙 [Du Long] and 刘文平 [Liu Wenping], 切

实提高海军资产管理效益—就贯彻落实《关

于进一步加强军队资产管理的意见》访海

后财务部陈义浩部长 [“Earnestly Raising the 

Efficacy of the Navy’s Asset Management—Interview with Chen Yihao, Director of Financial 

Affairs at the Navy Logistics Department, 

on Implementing the ‘Opinions on Further 

Strengthening the Military’s Asset Management’”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], December 

30, 2011, p. 3.

9. Ibid.

10. James Mulvenon, “So Crooked They Have to 

Screw Their Pants On: New Trends in Chinese 

Military Corruption,” China Leadership Monitor,

no. 19 (Fall 2006), www.hoover.org/.

11. 王伟亚 [Wang Weiya] and 余华梁 [Yu Hualiang], 

直面海战场提升保障力—2009年海军后勤

工作综述 [“Raising Support Capability with 

Endeavor Being Oriented to Maritime Battlefields—Comprehensive Review of the Navy’s 

Logistic Work in 2009”], 人民海军 [People’s 

Navy], January 6, 2010, p. 1.

12. Ibid.

13. 刘华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清回忆录 [Memoir 

of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: People’s Liberation 

Army Press, 2004), p. 429.

14. 封志远 [Feng Zhiyuan] and 谭依娜 [Tan Yina], 

而今迈步从头—东海舰队后勤部加快破解后

勤保障难题纪史 [“Stride Forward Now to Surpass What Was Achieved in the Beginning—an 

Eyewitness Account of the Efforts Made by the 

East Sea Fleet Logistics Department to Speed Up 

the Resolution of Challenging Problems Related 

to the Provision of Logistic Support”], 人民海军

[People’s Navy], March 30, 2012, p. 1.

15. Ibid.

16. 封志远 [Feng Zhiyuan], 方立华 [Fang Lihua], 

and 谭依娜 [Tan Yina], 巧借东风破浪行

[“Cleverly Borrow East Wind to Sail by Cleaving 

through Waves”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], October 27, 2012, p. 6.

17. 刘黎新 [Liu Lixin] and 王鹏 [Wang Peng], 锤

炼铁肩担重任—北海舰队某综合保障基地加

强保障能力建设纪事 [“Temper the Troops to 

Enable Them to Competently Shoulder Heavy 

Responsibilities—an Account of the Efforts 

Made by a North Sea Fleet Comprehensive Support Base to Strengthen Its Support-Providing 

Capability”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 28, 2012, p. 3.

18. While People’s Navy consistently refers to 

potable water, context suggests that, at least in 

some cases, the base is providing feed water for 

surface-ship propulsion boilers. Naval boilers require treated, distilled water for proper function, 
china

s evolving surface fleet 127

some of which is lost in normal operations and 

must be replenished.

19. 李义军 [Li Yijun], 李瑞祥 [Li Ruixiang], and 杨

玉文 [Yang Yuwen], 给 “蓝鲸” 输送源源不断

的动力 [“Infuse Impetus for the ‘Blue Whale’”], 

人民海军 [People’s Navy], September 10, 2008, 

p. 2.

20. Yu, “A Look Back at Achievements.”

21. Ibid.

22. Wang and Yu, “Raising Support Capability.”

23. Yu, “A Look Back at Achievements.”

24. 刘春晖 [Liu Chunhui] and 贾永强 [Jia Yongqiang], 巧解物资采购中的不等式 [“Skillfully 

Resolving Inequalities in Supply Procurement”], 

人民海军 [People’s Navy], September 2, 2011, p. 

1.

25. 鲁鹏程 [Lu Pengcheng], 榆林保障基地岸勤

部 严防劣质食品流进军营 [“Yulin Support 

Base Coastal Logistics Department Takes Strict 

Precautions against Inferior Food Coming into 

the Barracks”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], July 

15, 2011, p. 2.

26. 刘鸿 [Liu Hong] and 胡天祥 [Hu Tianxiang], 

海军召开后勤工作会议 [“Navy Holds Logistics 

Work Conference”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 

January 17, 2011, p. 1.

27. 由利生 [You Lisheng], 阎勇政 [Yan Yongzheng], 

and 王亚军 [Wang Yajun], 在创新发展中提升

保障力—喜看海军推进现代后勤建设试点新

成效 [“Enhance Support-Providing Capability 

amid Innovations and Development—Looking 

with Delight at the New and Marked Successes 

Achieved by the PLAN in Pushing Forward 

Modern Logistics Building”], 人民海军 [People’s 

Navy], March 9, 2012, p. 3.

28. 我国特色的舰船保障之路 [“A Ship Support 

Path with Chinese Characteristics”], 人民海军

[People’s Navy], December 11, 2012, p. 4.

29. 陈雄 [Chen Xiong] et al., 砺剑, 在制胜航线上:

东海舰队装备部发挥新体制优势提高装备

保障能力纪实 [“Sharpening Their Sword, on 

Course for Victory: An Account of the Armament Department of the East Sea Fleet Leveraging the Advantages of the New System in Order 

to Improve Equipment Support Abilities”], 解放

军画报 [PLA Pictorial], no. 7b (2013), pp. 6–17.

30. “A Ship Support Path with Chinese Characteristics,” p. 4.

31. 计如林 [Ji Rulin], 何巍 [He Wei], and 王亚军

[Wang Yajun], 大海上犁出忠诚航迹—北海舰

队某大队572船远海执勤纪事 [“Sailing Tracks 

of Loyalty Are Left at Sea—a Record of Events 

When Ship 572 in a Certain North Sea Fleet 

Group Is on Duty in Distant Seas”], 人民海军

[People’s Navy], August 20, 2012, p. 2.

32. 乔昶超 [Qiao Changchao] and 肖德伦 [Xiao 

Delun], “广州”舰装备管理走进“电子时

代”—精细化呵护, 现代战舰亮剑信息战场

[“‘Guangzhou’ Ship Enters ‘Electronic Era’ in 

Equipment Management—With Sophisticated 

Protection, Modern Warship Flashes Sword on 

Information Battlefield”], 人民海军 [People’s 

Navy], October 26, 2011, p. 1.

33. 方钊 [Fang Zhao] and 王春风 [Wang Chunfeng], 东海舰队某大队研发装备信息监测

与管理系统, 为远洋装备保障注入信息元素

[“East Sea Fleet Flotilla Researches and Develops Equipment Information Monitoring and 

Management System, Adding an Information 

Component to Open-Ocean Equipment Support”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 27, 

2012, p. 3.

34. Chen et al., “Sharpening Their Sword,” pp. 6–17.

35. 于洋 [Yu Yang] and 周怀平 [Zhou Huaiping], 

海军建成装备维修远程技术支援系统 [“Navy 

Builds Long-Distance Technical Support System 

for Armaments Maintenance and Repair”], 人民

海军 [People’s Navy], August 30, 2011, p. 1.

36. “Long-Range Diagnosis Done for Chinese Naval 

Escort Ship,” People’s Daily, May 28, 2012, 

english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7827774 

.html.

37. 古领华 [Gu Linghua], 黄海鹏 [Huang Haipeng], 

and 胡志亮 [Hu Zhiliang], 让战舰时刻 “耳聪

目明”—湛江保障基地705厂提升装备保障能

力纪实 [“Letting Battleships Always ‘See and 

Hear Clearly’—Record on Zhanjiang Support 

Base No. 705 Factory’s Improvement to Technical Support Capability”], 人民海军 [People’s 

Navy], April 2, 2010, p. 3.

38. 雷根法 [Lei Genfa], 加强海上作战支援力量

建设的思考 [“Thoughts on Strengthening the 

Building of the Maritime Operation Support 

Forces”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], January 28, 

2011, p. 3.

39. 沙志亮 [Sha Zhiliang], 险象环生—目击海

后某基地支援保障远程指挥演练 [“Fraught 

with Danger—Seeking with One’s Own Eyes the 

Long-Distance Assistance and Support Commander Exercise of a Certain Naval Logistics 

Base”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 8, 

2010, p. 2; see also Feng, Fang, and Tan, “Cleverly Borrow East Wind,” p. 6.

40. “China’s New Vehicle-Mounted Degaussing 

Station Enters Naval Service,” PLA Daily, May 

24, 2011, accessed via China Defense (blog),

china-defense.blogspot.com/2011/05/larger 

-navy-requires-greater-logistic.html.
128 china maritime studies

41. 南海舰队配新型舰艇修理方舱装备抢修时间

缩1/3 [“South China Sea Fleet New Equipment 

Shelters Reduce Repair Time by 1/3”], 新浪

[Sina], October 19, 2009,mil.news.sina.com 

.cn/2009-10-19/0652570525.html. 

42. National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 

NIDS China Security Report 2011 (Tokyo: 2012), 

p. 11, www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/

chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2011 

_A01.pdf.

43. 杨斌 [Yang Bin] and 蔻永强 [Kou Yongqiang], 

保障线, 飞越障碍向深蓝—南航破解舰载机远

航保障难题提升保障力纪实 [“South Sea Fleet 

Aviation Solves Tough Problems in Long-Range 

Support to Shipborne Aircraft, Upgrades Support Capabilities”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 

March 22, 2011, p. 3.

44. Ibid.

45. 郭益科 [Guo Yike], 曹海华 [Cao Haihua], and

侯亚铭 [Hou Yaming], 远洋保障之路越走越

宽敞—海军赴亚索海域护航编队后勤保障

启示录 [“The Path of Oceangoing Support Is 

Getting Broader—a Record of Lessons Learned 

about Logistics Support by the Escort Task 

Force Operating in Somali Waters”], 人民海军

[People’s Navy], July 22, 2009, p. 3. For a detailed 

examination of the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden operations and associated support, see Andrew S. 

Erickson and Austin M. Strange, “Learning the 

Ropes in Blue Water: The Chinese Navy’s Gulf 

of Aden Deployments Have Borne Worthwhile 

Lessons in Far-Seas Operations—Lessons That 

Go beyond the Antipiracy Mission,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings 139/4/1,322 (April 2013), 

pp. 34–38, and Andrew S. Erickson and Austin 

M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience: Chinese 

Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden, China 

Maritime Study 10 (Newport, RI: Naval War 

College Press, 2013), available at www.usnwc 

.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime 

-Studies-Institute/Publications.aspx.

46. “Chinese Navy Continues High-Sea Training,” 

China Military Online, April 16, 2013, en.people 

.cn/90786/8208844.html.
About the Contributors

Lt. Col. Dennis J. BLASKO, USA (Ret.), served twenty-three years as a military intelligence officer and foreign area officer, specializing in China. Mr. Blasko was an 

Army attaché in Beijing from 1992 to 1995 and in Hong Kong from 1995 to 1996. He 

also served in infantry units in Germany, Italy, and Korea and in Washington at the 

Defense Intelligence Agency; Headquarters, Department of the Army (Office of Special 

Operations); and the National Defense University War Gaming and Simulation Center. 

Mr. Blasko is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and the Naval Postgraduate 

School. He has written numerous articles and chapters on the Chinese military and 

defense industries and is the author of the book The Chinese Army Today: Tradition 

and Transformation for the 21st Century, second edition (Routledge, 2012).

Dr. Bernard D. COLE teaches courses on Sino-American relations and maritime strategy at the U.S. National War College, Washington, DC. He served thirty years in the 

U.S. Navy, retiring as a captain; commanded USS Rathburne (FF 1057) and Destroyer 

Squadron 35; and served with the Third Marine Division in Vietnam from 1967 to 

1968. He is the author of many articles, book chapters, and seven books, the most recent of which is Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters (Naval Institute 

Press, 2013). Dr. Cole holds an AB in history from the University of North Carolina, 

an MA in national security affairs from the University of Washington, and a PhD in 

history from Auburn University.

Vice Adm. Yoji KODA is a retired commander in chief of the Japanese Self-Defense 

Fleet and a 1992 graduate of Japan’s Naval Command College. From 2010 to 2011 he 

was a senior fellow in the Asia Studies Group at Harvard University. Admiral Koda’s 

scholarly work includes “The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success,” which is used as a primary reading in the Strategy and Policy and Strategy and 

War courses at the Naval War College. Since October 2008, Vice Admiral Koda has 

served as an adviser to IHI Marine United Inc.

Nan LI is a senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute of the National University 

of Singapore. He has published extensively on Chinese security and military policy. 

His writings have appeared in China Quarterly, Security Studies, China Journal, Asian 
130 china maritime studies

Security, Armed Forces & Society, Issues and Studies, Naval War College Review, U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings, and many others. He has contributed to edited volumes 

from Stanford University Press, Clarendon Press, M. E. Sharpe, RAND Corporation, 

National Defense University Press, U.S. Army War College Press, National Bureau 

of Asian Research, Naval Institute Press, and Defense Group Inc. He has published 

monographs with the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Naval War College Press. He is the 

editor of Chinese Civil-Military Relations (Routledge, 2006) and coeditor of China, the 

United States, and 21st Century Sea Power (Naval Institute Press, 2010). Mr. Li received 

a PhD in political science from Johns Hopkins University.

Rear Adm. Michael MCDEVITT, USN (Ret.), is a senior fellow with CNA Strategic 

Studies. Over his fifteen years at CNA, as both a vice president and a fellow, he has 

published a number of papers dealing with security issues in Asia. His most recent 

research focus has been maritime security issues along the Indo-Pacific littoral and the 

maritime dimension of China’s national strategy. During his Navy career, McDevitt 

spent his operational time in the Pacific, including a two-year assignment in Sasebo, 

Japan. He held four at-sea commands, including that of an aircraft carrier battle group. 

He was director of the East Asia Policy office for the Secretary of Defense during the 

George H. W. Bush administration. He also served for two years as the director for 

Strategy, War Plans, and Policy (J-5) for Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. 

McDevitt concluded his thirty-four-year active-duty career as commandant of the 

National War College in Washington, DC. He is a graduate of the University of Southern California and has a master’s degree in U.S. diplomatic history in East Asia from 

Georgetown University. McDevitt spent a year in residence at the Naval War College 

as a member of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group. He is also a 

graduate of the National War College.

Adm. Sureesh MEHTA is chairman of India’s National Maritime Foundation, a position to which he succeeded in January 2012. The admiral served as chief of the naval 

staff from November 2006 to August 2009, and concurrently as chairman of the Chiefs 

of Staff Committee. After retirement he was appointed India’s high commissioner to 

New Zealand. An alumnus of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India, 

and the National Defence College, New Delhi, Admiral Mehta was a naval aviator who 

flew Sea Hawk jets from the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. He went on to skipper INS 

Beas, INS Godavari, and INS Garuda. He served as deputy chief of the naval staff and 

chief of personnel; commanded the Western Fleet and the Indian Coast Guard; and as 

a flag officer was commander in chief of the Eastern Naval Command.
china

s evolving surface fleet 131

Capt. Dale RIELAGE, USN, is the U.S. Pacific Fleet director of intelligence and information operations. He is a career intelligence officer who is in his sixth consecutive tour 

focused on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Capt. Robert C. “Barney” RUBEL, USN (Ret.), professor emeritus, is retired from the 

Naval War College, where, from May 2006 to August 2014, he was dean of the Center 

for Naval Warfare Studies. Prior to that Captain Rubel was chairman of the Wargaming Department at the College. A thirty-year Navy veteran, he received his commission through the Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps at the University of Illinois. 

Subsequently he became a light attack naval aviator, flying the A-7 Corsair II and later 

the F/A-18 Hornet. He commanded Strike Fighter Squadron 131 and also served as 

inspector general at U.S. Southern Command.

A graduate of the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Public Service) and of the 

Sorbonne (a master’s degree and two predoctoral memoirs in history and political 

science), Alexandre SHELDON-DUPLAIX has worked as a naval analyst at the French 

Defense Ministry (1987–99) before joining in 1999 the French Navy Historical Service 

(later Defense Historical Service) in Vincennes, near Paris. He has authored or coauthored Histoire des sous-marins (History of Submarines) with Rear Adm. Jean-Marie 

Mathey, FN (ETAI, 2002); Hide and Seek with the late Capt. Peter Huchthausen, USN 

(Wiley, 2009); and Histoire mondiale des porte-avions (World History of Aircraft Carriers) (ETAI, 2006). He lectures on Russian, Chinese, and Asian navies at the French 

war college in Paris and at the French naval academy in Brest. He is also a speaker on 

Chinese naval issues at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and at the European 

Institute of Public Administration in Brussels.

About the Editors

Peter DUTTON is a professor of strategic studies and director of the China Maritime 

Studies Institute in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College. He 

served in the Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps and as a naval flight officer, retiring in 2006 with the rank of commander.

Ryan D. MARTINSON is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the 

Naval War College. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, 

and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. He previously served as deputy director of the China 

Exchange Initiative.