U.S. Department of Justice

GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW 

ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES REGARDING 

THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, 

NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL 

ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY

December 2014 
INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Guidance supersedes the Department of Justice’s 2003 Guidance Regarding the Use 

of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies. It builds upon and expands the framework of 

the 2003 Guidance, and it reaffirms the Federal government’s deep commitment to ensuring that 

its law enforcement agencies conduct their activities in an unbiased manner. Biased practices, as 

the Federal government has long recognized, are unfair, promote mistrust of law enforcement, 

and perpetuate negative and harmful stereotypes. Moreover—and vitally important—biased 

practices are ineffective. As Attorney General Eric Holder has stated, such practices are “simply 

not good law enforcement.”

Law enforcement practices free from inappropriate considerations, by contrast, 

strengthen trust in law enforcement agencies and foster collaborative efforts between law 

enforcement and communities to fight crime and keep the Nation safe. In other words, fair law 

enforcement practices are smart and effective law enforcement practices. 

Even-handed law enforcement is therefore central to the integrity, legitimacy, and 

efficacy of all Federal law enforcement activities. The highest standards can—and should—be 

met across all such activities. Doing so will not hinder—and, indeed, will bolster—the 

performance of Federal law enforcement agencies’ core responsibilities. 

This new Guidance applies to Federal law enforcement officers performing Federal law 

enforcement activities, including those related to national security and intelligence, and defines 

not only the circumstances in which Federal law enforcement officers may take into account a 

person’s race and ethnicity—as the 2003 Guidance did—but also when gender, national origin, 

religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity may be taken into account. This new Guidance 

also applies to state and local law enforcement officers while participating in Federal law 

enforcement task forces. Finally, this Guidance promotes training and accountability, to ensure 

that its contents are understood and implemented appropriately.

Biased law enforcement practices, as the 2003 Guidance recognized with regard to racial 

profiling, have a terrible cost, not only for individuals but also for the Nation as a whole. This 

new Guidance reflects the Federal government’s ongoing commitment to keeping the Nation safe 

while upholding our dedication to the ideal of equal justice under the law.

Two standards in combination should guide use by Federal law enforcement officers of 

race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity in law 

enforcement or intelligence activities:

• In making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions, such as ordinary traffic 

stops, Federal law enforcement officers may not use race, ethnicity, gender, national 

origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity to any degree, except that 

officers may rely on the listed characteristics in a specific suspect description. This 

prohibition applies even where the use of a listed characteristic might otherwise be 

lawful.
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• In conducting all activities other than routine or spontaneous law enforcement 

activities, Federal law enforcement officers may consider race, ethnicity, gender, 

national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity only to the extent that 

there is trustworthy information, relevant to the locality or time frame, that links 

persons possessing a particular listed characteristic to an identified criminal incident, 

scheme, or organization, a threat to national or homeland security, a violation of 

Federal immigration law, or an authorized intelligence activity. In order to rely on a 

listed characteristic, law enforcement officers must also reasonably believe that the 

law enforcement, security, or intelligence activity to be undertaken is merited under 

the totality of the circumstances, such as any temporal exigency and the nature of any 

potential harm to be averted. This standard applies even where the use of a listed 

characteristic might otherwise be lawful.

DISCUSSION

The Constitution protects individuals against the invidious use of irrelevant individual 

characteristics. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Such characteristics 

should never be the sole basis for a law enforcement action. This Guidance sets out 

requirements beyond the Constitutional minimum that shall apply to the use of race, ethnicity, 

gender, national origin,1 religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity by Federal law 

enforcement officers.2 This Guidance applies to such officers at all times, including when they 

are operating in partnership with non-Federal law enforcement agencies.

I. GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

A. Routine or Spontaneous Activities in Domestic Law Enforcement

In making routine or spontaneous law enforcement decisions, such as ordinary 

traffic stops, Federal law enforcement officers may not use race, ethnicity, 

gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity to any 

degree, except that officers may rely on the listed characteristics in a specific 

suspect description. This prohibition applies even where the use of a listed 

characteristic might otherwise be lawful.

 1 As used in this Guidance, “national origin” refers to an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, country of birth or 

origin, or an individual’s possession of the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics commonly associated with a 

particular country. It does not refer to an individual’s “nationality” (i.e., country of citizenship or country of which 

the person is deemed a national), which may be relevant to the administration and enforcement of certain statutes, 

regulations, and executive orders. 2 This Guidance is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch. It is not intended to, 

and does not, create any right, benefit, trust, or responsibility, whether substantive or procedural, enforceable at law 

or equity by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, entities, officers, 

employees, or agents, or any person, nor does it create any right of review in an administrative, judicial, or any other 

proceeding. This Guidance does not apply to Federal non-law enforcement personnel, including U.S. military, 

intelligence, or diplomatic personnel, and their activities. In addition, this Guidance does not apply to interdiction 

activities in the vicinity of the border, or to protective, inspection, or screening activities. All such activities must be 

conducted consistent with the Constitution and applicable Federal law and policy, in a manner that respects privacy, 

civil rights and civil liberties, and subject to appropriate oversight. 
3

Law enforcement agencies and officers sometimes engage in law enforcement activities, 

such as traffic and foot patrols, that generally do not involve either the ongoing investigation of 

specific criminal activities or the prevention of catastrophic events or harm to national or 

homeland security. Rather, their activities are typified by spontaneous action in response to the 

activities of individuals whom they happen to encounter in the course of their patrols and about 

whom they have no information other than their observations. These general enforcement 

responsibilities should be carried out without any consideration of race, ethnicity, gender, 

national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

• Example: While parked by the side of the George Washington Parkway, a Park 

Police Officer notices that nearly all vehicles on the road are exceeding the posted 

speed limit. Although each such vehicle is committing an infraction that would 

legally justify a stop, the officer may not use a listed characteristic as a factor in 

deciding which motorists to pull over. Likewise, the officer may not use a listed 

characteristic in deciding which detained motorists to ask to consent to a search of 

their vehicles.

Some have argued that overall discrepancies in certain crime rates among certain groups 

could justify using a listed characteristic as a factor in general traffic enforcement activities and 

would produce a greater number of arrests for non-traffic offenses (e.g., narcotics trafficking). 

We emphatically reject this view. Profiling by law enforcement based on a listed characteristic 

is morally wrong and inconsistent with our core values and principles of fairness and justice. 

Even if there were overall statistical evidence of differential rates of commission of certain 

offenses among individuals possessing particular characteristics, the affirmative use of such 

generalized notions by law enforcement officers in routine, spontaneous law enforcement 

activities is tantamount to stereotyping. It casts a pall of suspicion over every member of certain 

groups without regard to the specific circumstances of a particular law enforcement activity, and 

it offends the dignity of the individual improperly targeted. Whatever the motivation, it is 

patently unacceptable and thus prohibited under this Guidance for law enforcement officers to 

act on the belief that possession of a listed characteristic signals a higher risk of criminality. This 

is the core of invidious profiling, and it must not occur.

The situation is different when an officer has specific information, based on trustworthy 

sources, to “be on the lookout” for specific individuals identified at least in part by a specific 

listed characteristic. In such circumstances, the officer is not acting based on a generalized 

assumption about individuals possessing certain characteristics; rather, the officer is helping 

locate specific individuals previously identified as involved in crime.

• Example: While parked by the side of the George Washington Parkway, a Park 

Police Officer receives an “All Points Bulletin” to be on the lookout for a fleeing 

bank robbery suspect, a man of a particular race and particular hair color in his 30s 

driving a blue automobile. The officer may use this description, including the race 

and gender of the particular suspect, in deciding which speeding motorists to pull 

over.
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B. All Activities Other Than Routine or Spontaneous Law Enforcement Activities

In conducting all activities other than routine or spontaneous law enforcement 

activities, Federal law enforcement officers may consider race, ethnicity, gender, 

national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity only to the extent 

that there is trustworthy information, relevant to the locality or time frame, that 

links persons possessing a particular listed characteristic to an identified 

criminal incident, scheme, or organization, a threat to national or homeland

security, a violation of Federal immigration law, or an authorized intelligence 

activity. In order to rely on a listed characteristic, law enforcement officers 

must also reasonably believe that the law enforcement, security, or intelligence 

activity to be undertaken is merited under the totality of the circumstances, such 

as any temporal exigency and the nature of any potential harm to be averted.

This standard applies even where the use of a listed characteristic might 

otherwise be lawful.3 

As noted above, there are circumstances in which law enforcement officers engaged in 

activities relating to particular identified criminal incidents, schemes, organizations, threats to 

national or homeland security, violations of Federal immigration law, or authorized intelligence 

activities may consider personal identifying characteristics of potential suspects, including race, 

ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Common sense 

dictates that when a victim describes the assailant as possessing a certain characteristic, law 

enforcement officers may properly limit their search for suspects to persons possessing that 

characteristic. Similarly, in conducting activities directed at a specific criminal organization or 

terrorist group whose membership has been identified as overwhelmingly possessing a listed 

characteristic, law enforcement should not be expected to disregard such facts in taking 

investigative or preventive steps aimed at the organization’s activities.

Reliance upon generalized stereotypes involving the listed characteristics is absolutely 

forbidden. In order for law enforcement officers to rely on information about a listed 

characteristic, the following must be true: 

• The information must be relevant to the locality or time frame of the criminal activity, 

threat to national or homeland security, violation of Federal immigration law, or 

authorized intelligence activity;

• The information must be trustworthy; and

• The information concerning identifying listed characteristics must be tied to a 

particular criminal incident, a particular criminal scheme, a particular criminal 

organization, a threat to national or homeland security, a violation of Federal 

immigration law, or an authorized intelligence activity. 

 3 This Guidance does not prohibit the accommodation of religious beliefs and practices consistent with the U.S. 

Constitution and federal law. The Guidance also does not prohibit officials from considering gender when “the 

gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly 

situated.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 79 (1981).
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Because law enforcement and intelligence actions are necessarily context-specific, in 

applying each of these factors, law enforcement officers may properly account for relevant facts 

and circumstances, such as any temporal exigency and the nature of any potential harm to be 

averted. However, in all cases, law enforcement officers must reasonably believe that the law 

enforcement or intelligence activity to be undertaken is merited under the totality of the 

circumstances.

The following policy statements more fully explain these principles.

1. Law Enforcement Officers May Never Rely on Generalized Stereotypes, 

But May Rely Only on Specific Characteristic-Based Information

This standard categorically bars the use of generalized assumptions based on listed 

characteristics.

• Example: In the course of investigating an auto theft ring in a Federal park, law 

enforcement officers could not properly choose to target individuals of a particular 

national origin as suspects, based on a generalized assumption that those individuals 

are more likely to commit crimes.

This bar extends to the use of pretexts as an excuse to target minorities. Officers may not 

use such pretexts. This prohibition extends to the use of other, facially neutral factors as a proxy 

for overtly targeting persons because of a listed characteristic. This concern arises most 

frequently when aggressive law enforcement efforts are focused on “high crime areas.” The 

issue is ultimately one of motivation and evidence; certain seemingly characteristic-based efforts, 

if properly supported by reliable, empirical data, are in fact neutral.

• Example: In connection with a new initiative to increase drug arrests, law 

enforcement officers begin aggressively enforcing speeding, traffic, and other public 

area laws in a neighborhood predominantly occupied by people of a single race. The 

choice of neighborhood was not based on the number of 911 calls, number of arrests, 

or other pertinent reporting data specific to that area, but only on the general 

assumption that more drug-related crime occurs in that neighborhood because of its 

racial composition. This effort would be improper because it is based on generalized 

stereotypes.

• Example: Law enforcement officers seeking to increase drug arrests use tracking 

software to plot out where, if anywhere, drug arrests are concentrated in a particular 

city, and discover that the clear majority of drug arrests occur in particular precincts 

that happen to be neighborhoods predominantly occupied by people of a single race. 

So long as they are not motivated by racial animus, officers can properly decide to 

enforce all laws aggressively in that area, including less serious quality of life 

ordinances, as a means of increasing drug-related arrests. See, e.g., United States v 

Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9thCir. 2000) (“We must be particularly 

careful to ensure that a ‘high crime’ area factor is not used with respect to entire 

neighborhoods or communities in which members of minority groups regularly go 
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about their daily business, but is limited to specific, circumscribed locations where 

particular crimes occur with unusual regularity.”).

By contrast, where law enforcement officers are investigating a crime and have received 

specific information that the suspect possesses a certain listed characteristic (e.g., direct 

observations by the victim or other witnesses), the officers may reasonably use that information, 

even if it is the only descriptive information available. In such an instance, it is the victim or 

other witness making the classification, and officers may use reliable incident-specific 

identifying information to apprehend criminal suspects. Officers, however, must use caution in 

the rare instance in which a suspect’s possession of a listed characteristic is the only available 

information. Although the use of that information may not be unconstitutional, broad targeting 

of discrete groups always raises serious fairness concerns.

• Example: The victim of an assault describes her assailant as an older male of a 

particular race with a birthmark on his face. The investigation focuses on whether 

any men in the surrounding area fit the victim’s description. Here investigators are 

properly relying on a description given by the victim, which included the assailant’s 

race and gender, along with his age and identifying personal characteristic. Although 

the ensuing investigation affects individuals of a particular race and gender, that 

investigation is not undertaken with a discriminatory purpose. Thus use of race and 

gender as factors in the investigation, in this instance, is permissible.

2. The Information Must be Relevant to the Locality or Time Frame

Any information that law enforcement officers rely upon concerning a listed 

characteristic possessed by persons who may be linked to specific criminal activities, a threat to 

national or homeland security, a violation of Federal immigration law, or an authorized 

intelligence activity must be locally or temporally relevant.

• Example: Five years ago, DEA issued an intelligence report that indicated that a 

drug ring whose members are known to be predominantly of a particular ethnicity is 

trafficking drugs in Charleston, SC. An agent operating in Los Angeles reads this 

intelligence report. In the absence of information establishing that this intelligence is 

also applicable in Southern California or at the present time, the agent may not use 

ethnicity as a factor in making local law enforcement decisions about individuals who 

are of the particular ethnicity that was predominant in the Charleston drug ring.

3. The Information Must be Trustworthy

Where the information relied upon by law enforcement officers linking a person 

possessing a listed characteristic to potential criminal activity, a threat to national or homeland 

security, a violation of Federal immigration law, or an authorized intelligence activity is 

unreliable or is too generalized and unspecific, reliance on that characteristic is prohibited.

• Example: ATF special agents receive an uncorroborated anonymous tip that a male 

of a particular ethnicity will purchase an illegal firearm at a Greyhound bus terminal 
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in an ethnically diverse North Philadelphia neighborhood. Although agents 

surveilling the location are free to monitor the movements of whomever they choose, 

the agents are prohibited from using the tip information, without more, to target any 

males of that ethnicity in the bus terminal. Cf. Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 

1254 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no reasonable basis for suspicion where tip “made all 

black men suspect”). The information is neither sufficiently reliable nor sufficiently 

specific.

In determining whether information is trustworthy, an officer should consider the totality 

of the circumstances, such as the reliability of the source, the specificity of the information, and 

the context in which it is being used. 

• Example: ICE receives an uncorroborated anonymous tip indicating that females 

from a specific Eastern European country have been smuggled into Colorado and are 

working at bars in a certain town. Agents identify a group of women wearing t-shirts 

with the logo of a local bar who seem to be speaking an Eastern European language. 

The agents approach the group to ask them questions about their immigration status. 

Because the women match the specific information provided by the tipster, the 

information is sufficient under the circumstances to justify the agents’ actions.

4. Characteristic-Based Information Must Always be Specific to Particular 

Suspects or Incidents; Ongoing Criminal Activities, Schemes, or 

Enterprises; a Threat to National or Homeland Security; a Violation of 

Federal Immigration Law, or an Authorized Intelligence Activity

These standards contemplate the appropriate use of both “suspect-specific” and “incidentspecific” information. As noted above, where a crime has occurred and law enforcement officers 

have eyewitness accounts including the race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, sexual 

orientation, or gender identity of the perpetrator, that information may be used. Law 

enforcement officers may also use reliable, locally or temporally relevant information linking 

persons possessing a listed characteristic to a particular incident, unlawful scheme, or ongoing 

criminal enterprise, a threat to national or homeland security, a violation of Federal immigration 

law, or an authorized intelligence activity—even absent a description of any particular individual 

suspect. In certain cases, the circumstances surrounding an incident, ongoing criminal activity, 

threat to national or homeland security, or violation of Federal immigration law will point 

strongly to a perpetrator possessing a specific listed characteristic, even though law enforcement 

officers lack an eyewitness account.

• Example: The FBI is investigating the murder of a known gang member and has 

information that the shooter is a member of a rival gang. The FBI knows that the 

members of the rival gang are exclusively members of a certain ethnicity. This 

information, however, is not suspect-specific because there is no description of the 

particular assailant. But because law enforcement officers have reliable, locally or 

temporally relevant information linking a rival group with a distinctive ethnic 

character to the murder, the FBI could properly consider ethnicity in conjunction with 

other appropriate factors in the course of conducting their investigation. Agents 
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could properly decide to focus on persons dressed in a manner consistent with gang 

activity, but ignore persons dressed in that manner who do not appear to be members 

of that particular ethnicity.

• Example: Local law enforcement arrests an individual, and in the course of custodial 

interrogation the individual states that he was born in a foreign country and provides 

other information that reasonably leads local law enforcement to question his 

immigration status. Criminal background checks performed by the local law 

enforcement agency reveal that the individual was recently released from state prison 

after completing a lengthy sentence for aggravated sexual assault. Local law 

enforcement contacts ICE to inquire as to the individual’s immigration status. When 

ICE’s database check on the immigration status of the arrestee does not locate a 

record of the individual’s lawful immigration status, ICE sends an officer to the jail to 

question the individual about his immigration status, whereupon the individual states 

that he entered the United States without authorization and has never regularized his 

status. ICE assumes custody of the individual and processes him for removal from 

the United States. ICE properly relied on the facts presented to it, including that the 

arrestee was born in a foreign country, in searching its immigration database and 

conducting its subsequent investigation.

In addition, law enforcement officers may use a listed characteristic in connection with 

source recruitment, where such characteristic bears on the potential source’s placement and 

access to information relevant to an identified criminal incident, scheme, or organization, a threat 

to national or homeland security, a violation of Federal immigration law, or an authorized 

intelligence activity. 

• Example: A terrorist organization that is made up of members of a particular 

ethnicity sets off a bomb in a foreign country. There is no specific information that 

the organization is currently a threat to the United States. To gain intelligence on the 

evolving threat posed by the organization, and to gain insight into its intentions 

regarding the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests, the FBI may properly consider 

ethnicity when developing sources with information that could assist the FBI in 

mitigating any potential threat from the organization.

5. Reasonably Merited Under the Totality of the Circumstances

Finally, when a law enforcement officer relies on a listed characteristic in undertaking an 

action, that officer must have a reasonable belief that the action is merited under the totality of 

the circumstances. This standard ensures that, under the circumstances, the officer is acting in 

good faith when he or she relies in part on a listed characteristic to take action.

• Example: A law enforcement officer who is working as part of a federal task force 

has received a reliable tip that an individual intends to detonate a homemade bomb in 

a train station during rush hour, but the tip does not provide any more information. 

The officer harbors stereotypical views about religion and therefore decides that 

investigators should focus on individuals of a particular faith. Doing so would be 
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impermissible because a law enforcement officer’s stereotypical beliefs never provide 

a reasonable basis to undertake a law enforcement or intelligence action.

Note that these standards allow the use of reliable identifying information about planned 

future crimes, attacks, or other violations of Federal law. Where officers receive a credible tip 

from a reliable informant regarding a planned crime or attack that has not yet occurred, the 

officers may use this information under the same restrictions applying to information obtained 

regarding a past incident. A prohibition on the use of reliable prospective information would 

severely hamper law enforcement efforts by essentially compelling law enforcement officers to 

wait for incidents to occur, instead of taking pro-active measures to prevent them from 

happening.

• Example: While investigating a specific drug trafficking operation, DEA special 

agents learn that a particular methamphetamine distribution ring is manufacturing the 

drug in California, and plans to have couriers pick up shipments at the Sacramento, 

California, airport and drive the drugs back to Oklahoma for distribution. The agents 

also receive trustworthy information that the distribution ring has specifically chosen 

to hire older women of a particular race to act as the couriers. DEA agents may 

properly target older women of that particular race driving vehicles with indicia such 

as Oklahoma plates near the Sacramento airport.

 

6. National and Homeland Security and Intelligence Activities

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Federal law enforcement agencies have 

used every legitimate tool to prevent future attacks and deter those who would cause devastating 

harm to our Nation and its people through the use of biological or chemical weapons, other 

weapons of mass destruction, suicide hijackings, or any other means. “It is ‘obvious and 

unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” 

Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 

509 (1964)).

The years since September 11 have also demonstrated that Federal law enforcement 

officers can achieve this critical goal without compromising our cherished value of equal justice 

under the law. Every day, Federal law enforcement officers work to keep our Nation safe, and 

they do so without invidious profiling. The standard embodied in this Guidance thus applies to 

Federal law enforcement agencies’ national and homeland security operations, which will 

continue to focus on protecting the public while upholding our values.

National security, homeland security, and intelligence activities often are national in 

scope and focused on prevention of attacks by both known and unknown actors, not just 

prosecution. For example, terrorist organizations might aim to engage in acts of catastrophic 

violence in any part of the country (indeed, in multiple places simultaneously, if possible). 

These facts do not change the applicability of the Guidance, however. In order to undertake an

action based on a listed characteristic, a law enforcement officer must have trustworthy 

information, relevant to the locality or time frame, linking persons possessing that characteristic 
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to a threat to national security, homeland security, or intelligence activity, and the actions to be 

taken must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

• Example: The FBI receives reliable information that persons affiliated with a foreign 

ethnic insurgent group intend to use suicide bombers to assassinate that country’s 

president and his entire entourage during an official visit to the United States. Agents 

may appropriately focus investigative attention on identifying members of that ethnic 

insurgent group who may be present and active in the United States and who, based 

on other available information, might be involved in planning some such attack 

during the state visit.

• Example: A citizen of Country A, who was born in Country B, lawfully entered the 

United States on an F-1 student visa. The school that the individual was supposed to 

attend notifies ICE that he failed to register or attend the school once in the United 

States, in violation of the terms of his visa. ICE has intelligence that links individuals 

with ties to Country B who have registered at that school to a designated terrorist 

organization that has made statements about launching an attack against the United 

States. ICE selects the individual for investigation, identification, location, and 

arrest. Once taken into custody, the individual is questioned and a decision is made 

to place him in removal proceedings and to detain him during those proceedings.

ICE’s decision to prioritize this immigration status violator for investigation and 

arrest was proper because it was based upon a combination of the factors known 

about the individual, including his national origin, school affiliation, and behavior 

upon arrival in the United States.

Good law enforcement work also requires that officers take steps to know their 

surroundings even before there is a specific threat to national security. Getting to know a 

community and its features can be critical to building partnerships and facilitating dialogues, 

which can be good for communities and law enforcement alike. Law enforcement officers may 

not, however, target only those persons or communities possessing a specific listed characteristic 

without satisfying the requirements of this Guidance.

• Example: An FBI field office attempts to map out the features of the city within its 

area of responsibility in order to gain a better understanding of potential liaison 

contacts and outreach opportunities. In doing so, the office acquires information from 

public sources regarding population demographics, including concentrations of ethnic 

groups. This activity is permissible if it is undertaken pursuant to an authorized 

intelligence or investigative purpose. The activity would not be permitted without 

such an authorized purpose or in circumstances that do not otherwise meet the 

requirements of this Guidance.

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

In order to ensure its implementation, this Guidance finally requires that Federal law 

enforcement agencies take the following steps on training, data collection, and accountability.
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Training

Training provides agents and officers with an opportunity to dedicate their attention to a 

task, to learn about the factual application of theoretical concepts, and to learn from their 

colleagues. Training also provides an opportunity to ensure that consistent practices are applied 

across the agency.

Law enforcement agencies therefore must administer training on this Guidance to all 

agents on a regular basis, including at the beginning of each agent’s tenure. Training should 

address both the legal authorities that govern this area and the application of this Guidance. 

Training will be reviewed and cleared by agency leadership to ensure consistency through the 

agency.

Data Collection

Data collection can be a tremendously powerful tool to help managers assess the relative 

success or failure of policies and practices. At the same time, data collection is only useful to the 

extent that the collected data can be analyzed effectively and that conclusions can be drawn with 

confidence.

Each law enforcement agency therefore (i) will begin tracking complaints made based on 

the Guidance, and (ii) will study the implementation of this Guidance through targeted, datadriven research projects. 

Accountability

Accountability is essential to the integrity of Federal law enforcement agencies and their 

relationship with the citizens and communities they are sworn to protect. Therefore, all 

allegations of violations of this Guidance will be treated just like other allegations of misconduct 

and referred to the appropriate Department office that handles such allegations. Moreover, all 

violations will be brought to the attention of the head of the Department of which the law 

enforcement agency is a component.