39–114 

109th Congress EXEC. REPT. " ! SENATE 1st Session 109–01 

THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WITH RANK 

OF AMBASSADOR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE 

AS U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

MAY 18, 2005. — Ordered to be printed 

Mr. Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[together with minority views] 

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the 

nomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to The 

United Nations with Rank Of Ambassador and U.S. Representative 

to the United Nations Security Council and to be U.S. Representative to Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly during his 

tenure of service as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, 

having considered the same, reports without recommendation his 

nomination to the Senate. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Committee Action .......................................................................................... 1 

II. Committee Comments ................................................................................... 2 

III. Report on the Investigation .......................................................................... 2 

IV. Minority Views ............................................................................................... 276 

I. COMMITTEE ACTION

The nomination of John R. Bolton, to be the U.S. Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations was submitted to the Senate 

by President Bush and referred to the committee on March 17, 

2005. A hearing was held on April 11, 2005. An additional hearing 

was held as part of the nomination process on April 12, 2005, when 

the committee heard the views on the nominee from Mr. Carl W. 

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Ford, Jr., a former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 

Research. 

The committee again considered Mr. Bolton’s nomination at a 

business session held on April 19, 2005 where the committee by 

general agreement, postponed the vote on the nominee until May 

12, 2005 in order for committee staff to investigate various allegations raised at the meeting. 

At its business meeting on May 12, 2005, the committee voted by 

a vote of 10 to 8, with a quorum present and a majority of those 

members physically present and voting in the affirmative, to report 

the nomination without recommendation. The following Senators 

voted in the affirmative: Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, 

Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, and Martinez. The following Senators voted in the negative: Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, 

Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama. Senator Biden requested that a report be prepared to which members of the committee could submit addition views on the nominee. 

II. COMMITTEE COMMENTS

On May 12, 2005, the committee carefully considered the nomination of Mr. Bolton. It recognized his many years of public service 

and depth of knowledge on matters of foreign policy and the United 

Nations, as well as his responses to Questions for the Record 

(QFRs) submitted by various committee members. The full text of 

Mr. Bolton’s own opening statement to the committee as presented 

at his nomination hearing (see Annex A), his response to those 

QFRs are included in Annex (D). A sampling of the numerous letters of support are included in Annex C including letters signed by 

five former Secretaries of State, Margaret Thatcher, and former 

USAID and Department of Justice officials including Ed Meese and 

Richard Thornburgh. 

During the committee’s consideration of the nomination of Mr. 

Bolton, Senator Biden and other members of the minority raised 

concerns about the nominee related to his interactions with various 

staff of the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency as 

well as various speeches and testimony related to his capacity as 

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. 

The committee determined that Secretary Bolton is a highly 

qualified nominee with deep experience in UN affairs. There was 

a consensus on the committee that the United Nations is in need 

of reform. The scandal afflicting the UN’s Oil for Food Program has 

revealed serious dysfunction within the United Nations bureaucracy. President Bush nominated Secretary Bolton to help facilitate 

reform at the UN in addition to representing the American perspective. The President specifically chose Secretary Bolton for the 

position with this goal in mind. 

III. REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION

The first business meeting on Secretary Bolton’s nomination, 

where a vote had been scheduled, was adjourned without a vote 

after some Senators said the committee needed more time to look 

into allegations regarding Secretary Bolton’s character and his ethical behavior while in office. An intense period of investigation by 

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joint Majority and Minority staffs ensued. The committee sought 

and received some 800 pages of emails, memos and draft speeches 

from the Department of State, the Agency for International Development and the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the committee staffs jointly conducted some 35 interviews which produced 

some 1,000 pages of transcripts. It is important to understand the 

context and the results of that investigation. 

In the days immediately following Secretary Rice’s March 7 announcement of Secretary Bolton’s nomination, most Democratic 

members of this committee expressed their opposition to the nomination on policy grounds. A March 8 T3Associated Press report 

states, ‘‘Almost immediately after Bolton’s nomination was announced, Democrats objected.’’ The March 8, edition of the 

T3Baltimore Sun said, ‘‘Reaction from Senate Democrats promised 

contentious confirmation hearings for Bolton when he goes before 

the Foreign Relations Committee.’’ 

In several cases the statements by Democrats were unequivocal 

in opposition. In several other cases, statements were very negative, leaving open only the smallest of possibilities that the Senator 

would ultimately support the nominee. In all of these cases, objections were based on Secretary Bolton’s supposed attitudes toward 

the United Nations. By March 31, still almost two weeks before the 

Bolton hearing, a T3Los Angeles Times report noted, ‘‘Democrats 

are likely to vote unanimously against John R. Bolton when his 

nomination to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations comes before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—according to Democratic and Republican lawmakers and aides.’’ 

Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of his substantive views and his past statements. However, the ethical inquiry into Secretary Bolton’s background was pressed by members 

who planned to vote against him even before the committee began 

interviewing witnesses. They had the right to ask questions, and 

the committee had a responsibility to follow up credible allegations. 

But it also important to understand that at times the inquiry followed a more prosecutorial path than most nominees have to endure. 

The committee staff worked long and hard to run down allegations that were raised at the first business meeting, and they 

checked others that arose during that process. 

The end result of all this is that Secretary Bolton emerged looking better than when it began. Some allegations turned out not to 

be as serious as they first appeared, new information has cast others in a different light, most have proven to be groundless or, at 

best, highly overstated, while some were apparently judged by the 

Democratic Members as not even worth looking into. The interviews and documents showed Secretary Bolton to be a hardworking 

public servant, a pro-active policymaker eager to implement President Bush’s agenda, with strong views and a blunt style that, 

frankly, sometimes rubbed people the wrong way. 

But there was no evidence to support the most serious charge, 

that Secretary Bolton sought to manipulate intelligence. He may 

have disagreed with intelligence findings but in the end, he always 

accepted the final judgment of the intelligence community. 

One of the most sensationalized accusations against Secretary 

Bolton is that 11 years ago, he chased a woman around a Moscow 

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hotel throwing things at her. This is problematic first because the 

behavior described seems so out of place. But secondly, because it 

was very difficult for committee staff, despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to ascertain just what happened. 

The woman, Melody Townsel, who lives in Dallas, admits that 

she is a liberal Democrat who worked for Mothers Opposing Bush 

in the last election. Ms. Townsel also stated that her original accusation, contained in a letter that was made public, may have been 

too strong in some places. She said: ‘‘ ‘Chasing’ may not be the best 

word.’’ What she meant was that Secretary Bolton would approach 

her whenever he saw her at the hotel where they were both staying 

because, as she describes it, she did not want to meet with him 

over a legal matter. It is important to remember that Secretary 

Bolton was a private lawyer at that time. He was not representing 

the U.S. government. He was working for a company against which 

Ms. Townsel had made some very serious charges—charges which 

proved unfounded—that could have cost his company an important 

USAID contract in the former Soviet Union. 

Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents, which are 

said to have occurred in public or open areas of the hotel. Moreover, although she claimed this was a highly traumatic encounter 

and that she told several people about it, staff had difficulty finding others who knew about it. Three people whom Ms. Townsel 

identified as having heard her complaints at the time of the events 

told staff that they had no recollection of Ms. Townsel mentioning 

Secretary Bolton. Her boss, Charles Black, of Black, Manafort, 

Stone and Kelly, who hired her for the post, said she never mentioned it to him. Neither did her immediate supervisor back in 

Washington. An employee of a sister company who assisted Ms. 

Townsel in making her charges against the prime contractor on her 

project and with whom she said she was in close touch at the time, 

also knows nothing about it. Staffs talked to three representatives 

of the contractor, a small Virginia firm which has long experience 

working for USAID overseas. Those officials also heard nothing 

about this encounter. They said that Secretary Bolton was in Moscow at that time, but he was working as a consultant for a health 

project they were involved in, not doing legal work for them. Staff 

did find one of Ms. Townsel’s friends and co-workers from that 

time, who was not in Moscow, who recalls talking with her by telephone about it, as well as a subordinate of hers in a later USAIDfunded project who recalls her mentioning it. 

Ultimately, the results of the lengthy investigation into this isolated, long-ago incident were, at most, inconclusive. On this point, 

Sen. Biden, the ranking member, concurred with the judgment of 

the chairman. At the second business meeting, Sen. Biden, the 

ranking member, said the charges remained ‘‘unsubstantiated.’’ Ms. 

Townsel went on to another USAID project in the former Soviet 

Union, and the company she accused of mismanagement was 

awarded more USAID contracts and continues to be well regarded. 

The original charge against Secretary Bolton appeared to be overstated. On the basis of what is known, there was nothing to offset 

Secretary Bolton’s long record of public service in several different 

administrations. 

It has been charged that Secretary Bolton sought to retaliate in 

some way against analysts and others with whom he disagreed. 

5 

Committee staff looked into these cases thoroughly, and in each 

one the allegations proved to be overstated. In the case of Christian 

Westermann, the INR analyst whom the committee heard about 

from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a procedural issue and Mr. 

Westermann continued in his job. The focus of Mr. Ford’s complaint was that Secretary Bolton should not have raised his objections directly with Mr. Westermann, not that Mr. Bolton was 

wrong to raise the issue. Democratic members at the first business 

meeting made much of the fact that after this incident Secretary 

Powell had to go all the way down to INR to boost morale. But Secretary Powell’s chief of staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, told staff that 

such visits were not uncommon. It was part of the Secretary’s leadership style to visit with staff in the ‘‘bowels of the building,’’ including INR. 

In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the committee 

staff viewed make it clear that Secretary Bolton’s primary objection 

was over disparaging and inaccurate comments the analyst made 

to members of Congress about a speech. Secretary Bolton took his 

complaint to the CIA. Although the NIO has said he feels his career was damaged by Secretary Bolton, his superiors fully backed 

him at the time, and other witnesses told the committee that if he 

did not get the promotions he felt he deserved, it was for other reasons. Again, as far as Secretary Bolton was concerned, the dispute 

was procedural. There was no attempt to fabricate intelligence. 

Other allegations related to managerial style show the same pattern upon examination—disagreement over procedure, not policy. 

In the case of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in the non-proliferation bureau under Secretary Bolton, no policy issues were involved at all. Secretary Bolton believed—incorrectly, according to 

Mr. Ryu’s supervisor—that Mr. Ryu had deliberately neglected to 

share information with Bolton’s office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu 

was up for a job that would have required him to work closely with 

Secretary Bolton. Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed 

his opposition to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another 

prized post instead, an assignment to the deputy secretary. 

The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by the 

minority, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully supported 

what Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only because of 

miscommunication that Secretary Bolton thought the attorney had 

given out wrong information on a case involving sanctions against 

a Chinese company. The State Department Legal Advisor, Will 

Taft, told committee staff that he quickly straightened things out. 

The attorney stayed on the case, and he even wrote the affidavit 

that Secretary Bolton later submitted to court. 

Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary Bolton’s 

chief of staff, it was learned during the investigation, went to an 

INR analyst to complain that he had inappropriately attached to 

a CIA document a cover memo that took exception to some of the 

CIA’s findings regarding China. Further inquiry revealed that no 

action was sought against the analyst and none was taken. The 

issue was procedural, no intelligence was manipulated, and Secretary Bolton was not even directly involved, because he was out 

of the country at the time. 

Secretary Bolton’s credibility has also been called into question 

regarding his testimony before the committee on April 11. Members 

6 

questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to the CIA to learn 

about the National Intelligence Council. Stuart Cohen, the acting 

head of the NIC, said that while he could not recall exactly why 

Secretary Bolton wanted to come, it was ‘‘perfectly reasonable’’ to 

believe that was the reason. In fact, he added, ‘‘I was delighted at 

the prospect that somebody would come out wanting to know more 

about the NIC.’’ He also said that Secretary Bolton only talked 

about reassigning, not firing, the NIO, just as Mr. Bolton testified. 

The investigation has found nothing contrary to Secretary Bolton’s 

claim that his dispute with Mr. Westermann was over procedure, 

not policy. 

Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard called the 

committee after Secretary Bolton’s testimony about a controversial 

speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton testified that Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the speech afterwards. The 

ambassador told committee staff he indeed had thanked Secretary 

Bolton afterwards, but only for making certain changes in the 

speech that he had requested. Ambassador Hubbard told staff that 

he wanted to correct the record on that point, but he was not accusing Secretary Bolton of being deliberately misleading. 

That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that opponents of the nomination have questioned. The investigation showed 

that many of these speeches and Congressional testimony were preceded by strong policy debates within the administration. As one 

witness told staff, ‘‘That’s how good policy is made.’’ In each case 

it was found that, in the end, Secretary Bolton delivered a speech 

that was properly cleared and that expressed official U.S. policy. 

Finally, it is important to note while these are the major allegations that the committee has investigated against Mr. Bolton, they 

are not the only ones raised during the first business meeting by 

Democratic Members when they asked for a delay. For instance, 

one member said there were allegations ‘‘that he harassed a career 

Justice Department attorney while he was serving as the Attorney 

General for the Civil Rights Division—in that case Mr. Bolton allegedly went to the lengths to deny a career Justice Department attorney’s request for additional unpaid maternity leave—ultimately, 

the Deputy Attorney General stepped in and overruled Mr. Bolton; 

that he may have blocked important information from going to senior members of the State Department, including Secretary Powell, 

Secretary Armitage, and even Secretary Rice—information that has 

been characterized, and I quote ‘As vital to the U.S. strategies on 

Iran,’ and related to the lack of international support for Mr. 

Bolton’s effort to have the head of the IAEA removed.’’ Yet even 

though the Chairman granted every witness interview request, and 

did not oppose any document request, these other charges remain 

both unsubstantiated—Secretary Rice, for instance, has said she 

got all the information she needed from Mr. Bolton in a timely 

way—and uninvestigated because Democratic members apparently 

did not feel they were worth the trouble. The ranking member, 

when he said he would pursue the issue of getting full access to 

the NSA intercept information that Secretary Bolton had sought, 

stated that he believes that the results will be inconsequential for 

the nominee. 

Despite the fact that many charges were not proven or even investigated, it has been charged that collectively the allegations 

7 

against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable pattern of behavior. 

This is an unfortunate argument by opponents, because it depends 

on doubts arising from an intense investigation of accusations, 

many of which had no substantiation. By its nature, it also discounts the dozens of positive testimonials on Secretary Bolton’s behalf from former co-workers who attest to his character and effectiveness. 

It is important to be clear about the context of the allegations 

leveled against Secretary Bolton. First, this has been an extremely 

public inquiry. By its nature, it has encouraged anyone with a 

grudge or disagreement with Secretary Bolton stretching back to 

1983 to come forward and tell their story. There have been no thematic limits on the allegations that opponents of the nominee have 

asked to be investigated. No one working in Washington in highranking positions for that long would come out unscathed from 

such a process. Any assertive policy-maker will develop opponents 

based on stylistic differences, personal disputes, or partisan disagreements. Most members of this committee have been in public 

life for decades. If they were nominated for a similar position of responsibility after their terms in the Senate, how many would want 

the same standard to be applied to their confirmation process? How 

many of them would want any instance of conflict or anger directed 

at their staffs or colleagues to be fair game? 

Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all the 

way to 1983. Thus, the committee subjected 22 years of Secretary 

Bolton’s career to a microscope. This included service in many government jobs, as well as time spent in the private sector. Given the 

length of John Bolton’s service in high-ranking positions, it is inevitable that he would have conflict with co-workers of various ranks 

and political persuasions. He would have had literally thousands of 

contacts, meetings, and issues to deal with during his career. In 

this context, the volume of alleged incidents is not that profound. 

Third, in John Bolton’s case unsubstantiated charges may seem 

more material than they are because he has a reputation for being 

an aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should not be a disqualifying factor, especially for a post that historically has included 

a number of blunt, plain-spoken individuals, including Jeane Kirkpatrick and our former colleague Pat Moynihan. In fact, President 

Bush has cited John Bolton’s direct style as one of the reasons that 

he has picked him for this particular job. 

ANNEXES 

ANNEX A 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON

NOMINEE FOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

T3Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

T3April 11, 2005 

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, I am honored to appear before 

you today as President Bush’s nominee to be the U.S. Permanent 

8 

Representative to the United Nations. I am grateful for your consideration and I look forward to discussing the critical leadership 

role that the United States plays in the United Nations. I would 

like to extend my warm thanks to Senator Warner for his kind 

words and introduction. He is a true and valued friend, and his remarks are all the more appreciated given his long history of service 

to our nation. 

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunities that I have 

had to work with this Committee over the years. This is the fourth 

time I have appeared before this Committee in a confirmation 

hearing. If confirmed, I pledge to fulfill the President’s vision of 

working in close partnership with the United Nations. 

The United States is committed to the success of the United Nations and we view the UN as an important component of our diplomacy. As the President stated before the UN General Assembly 

last September, ‘‘Let history show that in a decisive decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our duties, or 

waver in meeting them.’’ 

The Secretary has made this a top priority as well. She was unequivocal in her remarks about how, ‘‘The American people respect 

the idealism that sparked the creation of the United Nations and 

we share the UN’s unshakable support for human dignity. At this 

time of great opportunity and great promise, the charge to the 

international community is clear: we who are on the right side of 

freedom’s divide have an obligation to help those who were unlucky 

enough to be born on the wrong side of that divide. The hard work 

of freedom is a task of generations; yet, it is also urgent work that 

cannot be deferred. . . . Now, more than ever, the UN must play 

a critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding generations from 

the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental human 

rights and to promote social progress and better standards of life 

in larger freedom.’’ 

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this Committee to forge a stronger relationship between the United States 

and the United Nations, which depends critically on American 

leadership. Such leadership in turn must rest on broad bipartisan 

support in Congress that must be earned by putting to rest skepticism that too many feel about the UN system. 

Through the course of three decades of public service, both in 

and out of government, I have learned that this consensus is not 

only essential, but possible. Working together, in the spirit of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we can take important steps to restore confidence in the United Nations. Mr. Chairman, we are at 

a critical juncture, and I fully share the sentiments you expressed 

in 1997, when you remarked that, ‘‘It is time to decide if we want 

a strong and viable United Nations that can serve United States 

interests, or a United Nation that is crippled by insolvency and 

hobbled by controversy and uncertainty.’’ 

A Stronger, More Effective United Nations 

The President and Secretary Rice believe that a stronger, better, 

more effective United Nations is one which requires sustained and 

decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and the 

support of the American public. If confirmed, that would be my obVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
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jective as well. Walking away from the United Nations is not an 

option. I undertake to do my utmost to uphold the confidence that 

the President, Secretary Rice, and the Senate will have placed in 

me if confirmed. 

Mr. Chairman, now more than ever, the United Nations needs 

American leadership. President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill promoted a post-war international organization to avert another world war when they envisioned a collective 

security organization that would resist aggressor states that 

threatened international peace and security. Accordingly, the UN 

Charter lists as its first objective, ‘‘to save succeeding generations 

from the scourge of war.’’ 

If the UN is to play a role in fulfilling that mission, however, it 

is not enough that it reform its internal structures. It must also 

clearly and forcefully address the new challenges we face. Rogue 

states, which do not necessarily subscribe to theories of deterrence, 

now threaten the global community as both possessors and 

proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. These weapons could 

also be transferred to terrorist organizations that would have no 

compunction about using them in cold blood against innocent civilian populations. 

I believe my past government experience and writings reflect my 

awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations. I learned much about the UN’s potential when I served for 

four years as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs in 1989–1993, and again later when I worked for the 

United Nations pro bono between 1997 and 2000, assisting former 

Secretary of State James Baker in his capacity as the Secretary 

General’s Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara. I saw firsthand 

the impact of armed conflict and repression, and the devastating 

consequences this can have on innocent civilian populations. 

I therefore wish to assure the Committee, the American people, 

and potential future colleagues at the United Nations that, if confirmed, I will strive to work with all interested parties to build a 

stronger and more effective United Nations. Doing so will promote 

not only American interests, but will inevitably improve and enhance the UN’s ability to serve all of its members as well. 

Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I pledge to bring my strong record 

of experience of working cooperatively within the United Nations to 

fulfill the intentions and aspirations of its original promise. In particular, I will work closely with the Congress and this Committee 

to achieve that goal. In attempting to strengthen the UN’s effort 

to promote international peace and security, I would like to identify 

several priorities. 

Supporting Freedom and Democracy 

One priority is to strengthen and build institutions that serve as 

the cornerstone of freedom in nascent democracies. I am proud of 

my record in this regard. In 1981, as General Counsel of the Agency for International Development, I proposed that we fund international observers to witness upcoming elections in El Salvador so 

that there would be an independent assessment of whether those 

elections would be free and fair. Many experts at the time thought 

that the Government of El Salvador would not accept this idea, 

but, with the support of USAID Administrator Peter McPherson 

10 

and Deane Hinton, then our Ambassador to El Salvador, I was encouraged to raise the possibility with President Jose Napoleon 

Duarte in late 1981. I did so and we were able to fund international election observers through Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, very likely the first such assistance provided by 

USAID, thus leading to further success stories in legitimizing and 

instilling confidence in democracy in countries once torn apart by 

violence. 

During my service in IO in President George H.W. Bush’s Administration, I personally observed the legislative elections in Namibia in 1989 as part of a presidential delegation led by former 

Senator Edward Muskie, the largest effort to organize elections by 

the United Nations in its history to that point. It constituted a 

major test of UN capabilities and resources, and served as a successful model for future elections in Nicaragua, Cambodia and elsewhere. 

Some of these earlier missions have no doubt helped pave the 

way for the recent and remarkable success stories we have observed in Afghanistan and Iraq, where UN assistance in both countries played a critical role. Many of us today, myself included, still 

marvel at the success of those elections—elections which are having repercussions throughout the region and beyond, as they are already doing in Lebanon. We appreciate that the United Nations is 

committed over the long-term to respond positively to the elected 

Iraqi Government’s request for help with its constitutional process 

and subsequent elections, as laid out in Resolution 1546. 

Mr. Chairman, we should never underestimate the impact of free 

and fair elections on a country. I look forward, if confirmed, to 

working with relevant UN agencies to enable them to contribute 

further to democratic institutions in countries freed from the bonds 

of oppression. I am sure that many of you are aware of our support 

for programs such as the Community of Democracies. If confirmed, 

I also look forward to working with you on President Bush’s request for $10 million in the Fiscal Year 2006 budget to set up a 

Democracy Fund within the United Nations, and I am grateful to 

Secretary General Annan for endorsing the President’s proposal in 

his new report on UN reform. This fund would have a lean staff 

of experts who identify carefully tailored projects for strengthening 

democratic institutions, political parties, administration of justice 

programs and respect for human rights advocacy. If successful, the 

Fund will be among the best diplomatic tools we have in the global 

war on terrorism. 

While the UN has had its successes in the human rights field, 

there have been problems as well, such as in the United Nations 

Commission on Human Rights (‘‘UNHRC’’). For too long, some of 

the most egregious violators of human rights have undercut the 

UNHRC’s principles and its effectiveness. The consequence, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said, is that the Commission’s important work has ‘‘been increasingly undermined by its declining 

credibility and professionalism.’’ We must work with our friends 

and allies to keep those who would usurp the moral authority of 

this Commission off of it, and we must send clear and strong signals that we will not shy away from naming human-rights violators. 

11 

We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus its attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there have been times 

when the General Assembly has gone off track. In my view, one of 

the greatest stains on the United Nations was the abominable Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. This canard for many 

years distracted the General Assembly from focusing its attention 

on the very real problems confronting the international community. 

I am proud to have been an active player in getting this resolution 

repealed. I recall fondly the day of December 16, 1991, when the 

General Assembly voted 111–25 to repeal this odious resolution, 

when our delegation was led by Acting Secretary of State Lawrence 

Eagleburger, accompanied in the General Assembly by Senator 

Moynihan. I was proud to have served also as one of the original 

members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom from 1999–2001. 

Stopping the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Mr. Chairman, a second priority should I be confirmed will be 

stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to ensure that terrorist organizations and the world’s most dangerous 

regimes are unable to threaten the United States, our friends, and 

our allies. 

As Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 

Security, I have worked with our friends and allies to press states 

that have violated important treaties to stop WMD proliferation 

such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, to live up 

to their obligations or face a referral to the UN Security Council. 

I have worked hard to promote effective multilateral action to curb 

the flow of these dangerous weapons. I served as the lead U.S. negotiator in the creation of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the 

Proliferation of WMD, through which we aim to add an additional 

$10 billion in Nunn/Lugar type programs through contributions by 

other nations. In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity to work 

in close consultation with our British colleagues in diplomatic efforts to secure the verifiable elimination of their weapons of mass 

destruction programs. 

I helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to help combat the spread of dangerous weapons through President Bush’s 

Proliferation Security Initiative (‘‘PSI’’). The Administration welcomes the endorsement of this initiative in the recently published 

Secretary Generals’ Report, ‘‘Strengthening the United Nations: an 

agenda for further change.’’ And despite fears that the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would result in a new 

arms race, exactly the opposite occurred. I was proud to serve as 

the Administration’s chief negotiator for the Treaty of Moscow, 

signed by Presidents Putin and Bush in 2002, which reduced operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds. 

Effective multilateral solutions reflect a commitment on the part 

of this Administration to use the best tools in our arsenal. Activities such as these are helping to create a new international consensus that recognizes the danger posed by these weapons of terror. I have no doubt these efforts played a crucial role in enabling 

the United States to lead the Security Council to pass Resolution 

1540, first suggested by President Bush in his speech to the GenVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
12 

eral Assembly in September, 2003. This resolution calls upon ‘‘all 

Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control 

and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of 

all weapons of mass destruction.’’ Resolution 1540 was the first of 

its kind focusing on WMD proliferation, and I am proud that our 

strong leadership contributed to its unanimous adoption. I am 

happy to report that as of March 15, over 80 countries have submitted reports required by the resolution outlining their plans to 

enact and implement measures to stop WMD proliferation. I look 

forward to working with Security Council members to achieve 

100% compliance with the Resolution. 

We also cannot ignore the real possibility that countries may be 

brought before the Security Council if they do not cease the pursuit 

of weapons of mass destruction. Failure of the Security Council to 

act on such fundamental threats to international peace and security will only weaken the Council’s role in security issues more generally. If confirmed, I would make it a top priority to work with the 

Security Council to take meaningful action in the face of these 

grave threats. 

Winning the Global War on Terror 

A third priority that I would pursue if confirmed is supporting 

the global war on terror. As we all learned on September 11, 2001, 

no one is safe from the devastating effects of terrorists’ intent on 

harming innocent people. Confronting and triumphing in the global 

war on terror remains a central priority of the Bush Administration, and to win this war requires long-term cooperation with all 

like-minded nations. 

The President is firmly committed to working with the United 

Nations to make this shared goal of the civilized world a reality. 

As he noted in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2003, ‘‘All governments that support terror are complicit in 

a war against civilization. No government should ignore the threat 

of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance 

to regroup, recruit and prepare. And all nations that fight terror, 

as if the lives of their own people depend on it, will earn the favorable judgment of history.’’ 

The United Nations has taken positive steps to support the war 

on terror, but more of course remains to be done. In the wake of 

September 11th, we have been actively encouraging Member States 

to become parties to the UN Conventions on Terrorism. I have been 

personally involved in the past four years as well in working to 

complete the negotiations on a Nuclear Terrorism Convention. We 

must build upon Security Council Resolution 1368, passed one day 

after the tragic events of September 11th, which for the first time 

classified every act of international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. We must also work together to help 

Member States build capacities to combat terrorism as outlined in 

Resolution 1373, passed on September 28, 2001. This resolution obligates all UN member states to use their domestic laws and courts 

to keep terrorists from sheltering resources or finding safe haven 

anywhere in the world and to cooperate in investigating, prosecuting, and preventing terrorism wherever it may spring up. The 

UN Security Council is monitoring compliance with the requirements of this resolution, with impressive results: to date 142 counVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
13 

tries have issued orders freezing the assets of suspected terrorists 

and terrorist organizations; accounts totaling almost $105 million 

have been blocked—$34 million in the U.S. and over twice that 

amount in other countries. Overall, Resolution 1373 has been the 

framework for unprecedented international consultation and coordination against terrorism, including the provision of technical assistance to governments that want to do the right thing, but may 

not have the specialized expertise necessary. 

International Humanitarian Efforts 

Mr. Chairman, a fourth priority of mine should I be confirmed 

is addressing humanitarian crises. Following the successful prosecution of the first Gulf War, we worked through the Security 

Council to address the humanitarian disaster caused by Saddam 

Hussein’s repression of Shiites in southern Iraq and the Kurdish 

population in the north and east of that country. As we are all 

aware, this was a thorny and delicate issue—one that required 

carefully calibrated coordination within the Security Council. 

During 1990, we were successful in having the United Nations 

impose its most comprehensive economic sanctions package ever, in 

Resolution 661, against Iraq. We were also successful in passing 

the first Security Council authorization for the use of force since 

Korea in Resolution 678. It was not lost upon us, however, that a 

humanitarian crisis was beginning to erupt. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Iraq into other countries would certainly 

have had a dramatic and destabilizing effect, in addition to the humanitarian costs of lives lost and displaced. 

As a result of our leadership and collaborative efforts, we secured 

the adoption of Resolution 688, which decided that internal repression causing substantial refugee flows could be a threat to international peace and security. This gave the Security Council jurisdiction to approve intervention into Iraqi territory to aid displaced 

persons. The United States took the lead in implementing this Resolution, under the name ‘‘Operation Provide Comfort.’’ Success stories such as these are a direct result of decisive American leadership and our effective multilateral diplomacy. 

Of pressing urgency now is stopping the genocide and violence 

devastating the Darfur region in the Sudan. The United Nations 

has already played a critical role in bringing attention to this crisis. But we all know there is much more to be done. If confirmed, 

I pledge to work with our partners in the Security Council to pressure parties to stop the violence in Darfur, deploy the new peacekeeping mission to secure implementation of the comprehensive 

North-South peace agreement, and to assist the African Union mission in Darfur to punish those responsible for the genocide. My 

hope is that we can build upon the United Nation’s considerable 

success record in helping to ensure free and fair elections in the 

Sudan despite its tortured past of violence and strife. 

Careful oversight of such operations is critical, particularly in 

light of recent reports concerning abuse by UN peacekeepers themselves. If confirmed, I will make every effort to see that the Secretary General’s new zero-tolerance policy of such behavior by UN 

personnel is enforced. There is a pressing need to do so. In light 

of the current global situation, we anticipate that 70,000 peacekeepers will be deployed by the end of 2005, compared with 39,000 

14 

by the end of 2002. Since October 2003, the UN has created four 

new missions including Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Haiti 

and has expanded the Congo mission. In addition to the proper 

oversight of such troops, there are additional concerns about capacity and stressing the UN system too far. This is not lost upon UN 

officials either. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under Secretary-General for 

Peacekeeping Operations, acknowledges the system is getting 

stretched to its limits, and that, in his own words, ‘‘It is difficult 

to run and tie your shoelaces properly. I sincerely hope that the organization will not be required to deploy any new complex peacekeeping operations in 2005, beyond what is already on our plate or 

in the pipeline.’’ Currently, we pay roughly 27% of the costs of 

these operations. 

Other humanitarian crises demand our attention as well. It is 

not just the scourge of war we must confront. We must confront the 

scourge of disease and afflictions such as HIV/AIDS through strong 

U.S. leadership in the United Nations system. We strongly support 

the UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and are working 

to ensure resources from the Global Fund for AIDS, Malaria and 

Tuberculosis are available to countries most severely affected. We 

are actively pursuing the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a five-year $15 billion investment, the largest commitment 

ever by a nation toward an international health initiative for a single disease or affliction. 

I will make it a key priority as well to improve programs that 

have been involved in the tsunami relief effort, so that we can enhance and build upon structures and institutions already in place. 

Doing so will not only help current victims and communities, who 

will surely need help for years to come, but will help prepare for 

the next time a natural disaster of this magnitude strikes. More 

broadly, we must confront the scourge of poverty, which leaves 

hundreds of millions on the margins of societies scrambling for food 

or shelter with little opportunity to improve their lives or those of 

their children. 

We also must make sure that the UN acts effectively in promoting the economic and social advancement of all people. For far 

too long, the UN promoted statist solutions to the problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Today, we know the private sector can 

do the best job in generating flows of investment capital and encourage small entrepreneurship, as set out in the remarkable report of the Commission on the Private Sector and Development, 

chaired by President Zedillo and Martin, and in the consensus results of the Monterey Conference on Financing for Development. 

Policy reform, institution building, appropriate technology transfer 

and private sector involvement are all necessary for underpinning 

sustained economic growth. We will continue to support the contribution of women to economic growth and development as well as 

their critical role in the growth of democratic institutions worldwide. 

The UN, in conjunction with U.S. leadership, is hopefully now 

recognizing that the traditional models of development are insufficient to achieve development objectives and better the lives of people around the world. The Partnership for Maternal, New Born and 

Child Health, The Global Alliance for Vaccinations & Immunizations, and Roll Back Malaria, are all examples of how UN agencies, 

15 

such as UNICEF, are working along side the private sector, charitable organizations, and foundations, such as the Gates Foundation, to leverage resources, generate new activities and impact the 

lives of millions in developing countries. 

To enhance these efforts, if I am confirmed, I hope I would have 

your support in increasing the level of American representation in 

UN agencies and affiliated organizations. This is not a question of 

simply getting our fair share of positions. Americans have the skills 

and training to contribute significantly to making the UN more efficient, effective, and accountable. 

A More Efficient UN Will Make a Stronger UN 

Accountability and reform of the United Nations is something I 

know this Committee has encouraged, including by holding a hearing on this important question just last month. This will be a top 

priority of mine if confirmed. During the first President Bush’s Administration, I worked hard to secure appropriations to repay U.S. 

arrearages. Working with the Congress, we also made sure that the 

United Nations would target these arrearages to effective programs 

rather than treating them as a ‘‘windfall.’’ If confirmed, I would 

look forward to working with the Congress again to make certain 

that the money you allocate is spent wisely and accountably. 

I look forward if confirmed to reviving the concept of the ‘‘Unitary UN,’’ which served as a guiding analytical construct during 

our work under Secretaries Baker and Eagleburger. As the system 

has grown, there has been too little attention paid by member governments to coordinating their efforts in key programs. The consequence is a tremendous waste of resources due to duplication, 

overlap and inefficiencies, all of which can be corrected if member 

governments have the political will. 

The Administration welcomes the Secretary-General’s new report 

on UN Reform, and we are examining carefully its many recommendations. I hope to work closely with the Secretary-General 

and my colleagues if confirmed to bring greater accountability and 

transparency to the United Nations. The key is to implement 

changes to the UN structure and management, including budget, 

personnel, and oversight reforms. Scandals, such as those we have 

witnessed with the Oil-for-Food program, undermine not only 

America’s confidence in the United Nations, but the confidence of 

the international community as well. They must not recur. To 

make this outcome a reality, we must recognize the proper roles 

and capabilities of UN agencies, funds and programs. Some have 

all but concluded that the Oil-for-Food scandal was bound to happen because it was beyond the UN’s capabilities. Even the Deputy 

Secretary-General Louise Frechette, has lamented, ‘‘Personally, I 

hope to God we never get another oil-for-food program or anything 

approaching that kind of responsibility, which was tantamount to 

trying to oversee the entire import-export regime of a country of 24 

million people.’’ Whether or not this is so, we must never lose sight 

of the reality that ultimately it is member governments that must 

take responsibility for the UN’s actions, whether they be successes 

or failures. 

The successful implementation of any reform will require broad 

consensus among member states. If confirmed, I will work actively 

16 

with my colleagues at the United Nations and with Congress to 

help restore confidence in the organization. 

Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating what I said at the beginning. If confirmed, I will work closely and effectively with this 

Committee and both Houses of Congress. The President and Secretary Rice are committed to building a strong, effective United Nations. The United Nations affords us the opportunity to move our 

policies forward together with unity of purpose. Now, more than 

ever, the UN must play a critical role as it strives to fulfill the 

dreams and hopes and aspirations of its original promise to save 

succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith 

and fundamental human rights and to promote social progress and 

better standards of life in larger freedom. This effort demands decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and the backing of the American public. I will undertake to do my utmost to uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary Rice, and the 

Senate will have placed in me. 

Thank you, and I would welcome the opportunity to answer your 

questions. 

17 

ANNEX B 

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

(HIGHLIGHTS)

NAME: 

• John Robert Bolton 

POSITION FOR WHICH CONSIDERED: 

• Representative of the United States of America to the United 

Nations 

PRESENT POSITION: 

• Under Secretary of State (Arms Control and International Security Affairs) 

LEGAL RESIDENCE: 

• Maryland 

OFFICE ADDRESS: 

• Washington, DC 

DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH: 

• November 20, 1948—Baltimore, Maryland 

MARITAL STATUS: 

• Married 

NAME OF SPOUSE: 

• Gretchen Louise Bolton 

NAMES OF CHILDREN: 

• Jennifer Sarah Bolton 

EDUCATION: 

• J.D., Yale Law School, 1971–1974; 

• B.A., Yale College, 1966–1970 

MILITARY SERVICE: 

• U.S. Army Reserves, 1974–1976; 

• U.S. Army National Guard, 1970–1974 (Honorable Discharge) 

FOREIGN LANGUAGES: 

• French 

EXPERIENCE: 

• 2001–present—Under Secretary of State (Arms Control and 

International Security Affairs) 

• 1997–2001—Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC 

• Dec 1999–2001—Of Counsel Kutak Rock LLP, Washington, 

D.C. 

18 

• May 1999–2001—Commissioner, U.S. Commission on International Religion Freedom 

• 1995–1996—President, National Policy Forum, Washington, 

D.C. 

• 1994–1996—Adjunct Professor, George Mason University 

School of Law, Arlington, Virginia 

• 1993–1999—Partner, Lerner, Reed, Bolton & McManus (and 

predecessor firms) Washington, D.C. 

• Jan 1993–July 1993—Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute, 

Washington, D.C. 

• 1989–1993—Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs 

• 1988–1989—Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 

• 1985–1988—Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 

• 1983–1985—Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. 

• Aug 1993–Sept 1993—Consultant, Republican National Committee, Washington, D.C. 

• 1983–1983—Assistant Administrator for program and Policy 

Coordination, U.S. Agency for International Development, 

Washington, D.C. 

• 1981–1982—General Counsel, U.S. Agency for International 

Development, Washington, D.C. 

• 1974–1981—Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC 

• June 1973–Aug 1973—Summer, associate Lord, Day & Lord, 

New York, N.Y. 

• June 1972–Aug 1972—White House summer Intern, Office of 

the Vice President 

• 1970–1971—Executive Director, Lux et Veritas, Inc. New 

Haven, Connecticut 

HONORS/AWARDS: 

• U.S. Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award, 1998 

• U.S. Department of State Distinguished Service Award, 1993 

• Tree of Life Award, Northern and Southern New England Regions of Hadassah, 1990 

• Editor, Yale Law Journal 

• Phi Sigma Alpha 

• Phi Beta Kappa 

• Scholarships to McDonogh School, Yale College and Yale Law 

School 

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS: 

• Member, Subcommittee on International Law, Federalist Society, 1999–2001 

• Member of Board of Directors, Project for a New American 

Century, 1989–2001 

• Advisory Board Member, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1994–2001 

19 

ANNEX C 

BUSINESS MEETING TO CONSIDER AND VOTE 

ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON 

TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 

UNITED NATIONS 

THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2005 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room SD– 

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, 

Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

The CHAIRMAN. This business meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. 

Before beginning our testimony and our debate today, I would 

like to lay out for members how we will proceed. Democratic members have requested a 5-hour debate on the nomination of John 

Bolton to be Ambassador to the United Nations, and we have 

agreed to that request. I have agreed to hold this debate to give 

all members of the committee an opportunity, once again, to explain their views, and we look forward to an enlightening and 

thoughtful debate. 

Now, in the interest of decorum and order, it’s my intention to 

manage this debate much like a debate on the Senate floor. I will 

control 21⁄2 hours of time—that is, of the 5 hours allotted to the debate—yielding time to Republican members. Senator Biden, the 

distinguished ranking member, will control the other two and a 

half hours, yielding time to Democratic members. 

Republicans will lead off the debate with approximately 1 hour 

of time, to be controlled by myself and my designees, to be followed 

by an equal amount of time, another hour, under the control of 

Senator Biden or designees. At that stage, we will alternate between Democrats and Republican members until all time on both 

sides is consumed or given back. 

Now, as chairman and manager of the nomination, I’ll reserve 

the final 10 minutes of our time, on the Republican side—that is, 

about 150 minutes—for myself. Throughout this process, members 

should request time through the chairman or through the ranking 

member. Senator Biden and I will be responsible for apportioning 

the time on our respective sides. 

Since 5 hours of debate time has been requested, and we have 

an abundance of speakers on both sides, I will not entertain motions or other business during the 5-hour debate. If floor votes intervene, I believe we can continue the debate without interruption 

20 

by voting in shifts, as we frequently do. I would, likewise, say, as 

members have need to have a bite to eat or to drink a sip of water, 

they can proceed to do that. Hopefully, our debate will continue on 

in some responsible way throughout that period of time. 

My hope is to complete the meeting by close to 3 p.m., as members will have invested 5 hours of valuable time during this experience. And I would just say, at that point that I begin my statement, I will ask the Clerk to be, again, counting the time so that 

our 150 minutes will begin to diminish as I make an opening statement to open the debate this morning. 

The Foreign Relations Committee meets today—— 

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, could I just—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator Dodd. 

Senator DODD. Senator Biden’s not here yet, so I’m reluctant— 

was this something we agreed to, between the Chair and the Ranking Member? I’m just unclear as to the—how the procedures will 

work. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, I have not asked for agreement. I’m just indicating the structure of our morning. I’m trying, at least, in fairness, to allocate 21⁄2 hours to both sides, indicate that Senator 

Biden and I will manage the 21⁄2 hours. During that time, I hope 

we can continue the time running while we go to vote. We will 

have a closure vote at 11:30, more or less. In other words, I think 

these are reasonable statements, but, nevertheless, the prerogative 

of the Chair, I think, is to structure a debate in a fair manner, 

which I’m attempting to do. 

Senator DODD. Fine. By the way, I’d ask consent that the—this 

discussion here not be time taken away from the chairman’s—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank—— 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. With the same caveat. Just because you went— 

I was confused—it went on awhile. Now Senator Biden is here. 

Would you please go over—I hate to do this, but could you go over 

this one more time, what your plan is for how we’re going to take 

this five hours, so that Senator Biden may hear it? 

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. 

Senator BIDEN. The staff has informed me, but, please—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ll proceed, once again, through the statement, 

so there can be no ambiguity. 

Before beginning, I would like to lay out for all members how we 

will proceed today. Democratic members have requested a 5-hour 

debate on the nomination of John Bolton to be Ambassador to the 

United Nations, and I have agreed to that plan. I have agreed to 

hold this debate to give all members of the committee a chance to 

explain their views, and I look forward to an enlightening and 

thoughtful debate. 

In the interest of decorum and order, it’s my intention to manage 

the debate much like a debate on the Senate floor. I will control 

21⁄2 hours of time, yielding time to Republican members. Senator 

Biden will control the other two and a half hours, yielding time to 

Democratic members. 

Republicans will lead off the debate with approximately 1 hour 

of time, to be controlled by myself and by my designees, to be followed by an equal amount of time—that is, an hour, more or less— 

21 

under the control of Senator Biden or his designees. At that stage, 

we would alternate between Democrat and Republican members 

until all time is consumed or yielded back. 

As chairman and manager of the nomination, I would reserve the 

last 10 minutes of our Republican time—that is, of our 150 minutes—for myself. Throughout this process, members should request 

time through the chairman or through the ranking member. Senator Biden and I will be responsible for apportioning the time on 

our respective sides. 

Since five hours of debate time has been requested, and we have 

an abundance of speakers on both sides, I will not entertain motions or other business during the five-hour debate. If floor votes 

intervene, I believe that we can continue the debate without interruption by voting in shifts, as we frequently do. My intention is to 

complete the meeting as close as possible to 3 p.m. 

But, with that, I would instruct the Clerk to begin keeping time 

now as I begin the opening segment, which I will do shortly. 

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I think it’s good to proceed like 

we do on the floor, but the way usually do it on the floor is, the 

manager of the bill and the opponent of the bill—the manager 

speaks and then the opponent gets to speak—and then they control 

the remaining time. So, I would prefer, if you’re willing, after you 

speak, for me to be able to—allowed to make my opening statement, and then you control the time. Otherwise—I mean, it’s not 

usual, on the floor debate, that we would have an hour of Republican or Democratic testimony—or, not testimony—debate, other 

than if it’s—if you wish to take an hour, that’s fine by me, but I 

would like to be able to open at the time when you finish, and then 

you control the debate, in terms of the remaining time, if that’s appropriate. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate the Senator’s suggestion. I 

would like to follow the path I set forth, because the—in the first 

hour, I will try to make a case for the nominee, but then I will 

yield the remainder of that hour to Senator Voinovich, who will approach the case of the nominee in his own way, so that members 

and, I think, the public will have perspective of our debate from 

that hour. And so, I would ask the cooperation of the ranking member in allowing us to proceed in that way. 

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want this committee to 

look like we’re just tied up in parliamentary problems. I will not 

object, but that is not how we do it on the floor. And I understand 

your wishing to set the terms of the debate. I got that part. And 

that’s okay by me. But let’s just not kid ourselves; this is not how 

we do it in the Senate floor. But it’s okay if you want to do it that 

way. I understand the deal. And I hope you’ll be as accommodating 

to me if I decide to do this if I ever become chairman again, and 

you’ll allow me to do things that we don’t do on the floor. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Senator knows that I will be accommodating and as reasonable as possible, and I thank the Senator for 

his accommodation and his good humor. 

Now, I will—— 

Senator BIDEN. I might have objected if it weren’t going to be 

Voinovich second, but that’s all right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. 

22 

We will begin now, and I will ask, as I’ve mentioned before, for 

the countdown. And we’ll make available to the ranking member 

and the chairman at various times, at our request, how many minutes remain on both sides, so that the management may continue 

as smoothly as possible. 

The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to vote on the 

nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United 

Nations. In this capacity, he would play an important role in securing greater international support for the national-security and the 

foreign-policy objectives of the United States. 

The Foreign Relations Committee has reviewed Secretary 

Bolton’s actions with respect to several allegations. In the process, 

we have interviewed 29 witnesses, producing approximately 1,000 

pages of transcripts. We have received and reviewed more than 830 

pages of documents from the State Department, USAID, and the 

CIA regarding the Bolton nomination. We have questioned Secretary Bolton in person for seven hours. We have received responses to nearly 100 questions for the record, many containing numerous subparts. 

This effort represents one of the most intense and far-reaching 

examinations of a nominee in my experience. The depth and 

breadth of the inquiry is particularly notable given that Secretary 

Bolton has been confirmed four times by the Senate already and 

that most of us have had personal experiences with him. 

After reviewing this material, it’s my judgment that Secretary 

Bolton should be confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. I do not believe that the evidence supports a disqualification 

of the President’s nominee. 

I was struck by the portrait of Secretary Bolton that emerged 

from interviews of witnesses that shows him serving in a job where 

some of his ideas and strategies were at odds with those above and 

below him at the State Department. It is clear from the transcripts 

that he was combative in defense of his perspectives. In some 

cases, this led to split memos fed up the policy chain, communicating multiple points of view. Secretary Bolton’s actions were 

not always exemplary. On several occasions, he made incorrect assumptions about the behavior and motivations of subordinates. At 

other times, he failed to use proper managerial channels or unnecessarily personalized internal disputes. 

The picture is one of an aggressive policymaker who pressed his 

missions at every opportunity and argued vociferously for his point 

of view. In the process, his blunt style alienated some colleagues, 

but there is no evidence that he has broken laws or engaged in serious ethical misconduct. 

At the core of any nomination process is the question of whether 

the nominee is qualified to undertake the task for which he or she 

is nominated. I have no doubts that Secretary Bolton is extremely 

well qualified. He has just served four years in a key Under Secretary position that technically outranks the post for which he is 

now nominated. He has succeeded in several high-profile negotiation settings. He was the primary negotiator in the creation of the 

successful Proliferation Security Initiative and the landmark Moscow Treaty. He played a large role in the agreement with Libya on 

the surrender of that nation’s WMD programs and the ‘‘10 Plus 10 

Over 10’’ agreement that resulted in $10 billion in pledges from the 

23 

other G8 countries to secure the Soviet weapons-of-mass-destruction arsenal. These are among the Bush administration’s most important and indisputable foreign-policy successes. 

Opponents have argued that Secretary Bolton’s personality will 

prevent him from being effective at the U.N., but his diplomatic 

successes over the last four years belie that expectation. 

Few people in government have thought more about U.N. reform 

than John Bolton. He served 4 years as the Assistant Secretary of 

State overseeing international organizations under the first President Bush. He has written and commented extensively on the subject. 

Senator Biden acknowledged to the nominee at the hearing, and 

I quote, ‘‘There is no question that you have extensive experience 

in U.N. affairs,’’ end of quote. 

Deputy Secretary Rich Armitage recently told reporters, and I 

quote, ‘‘John Bolton is eminently qualified. He is one of the smartest guys in Washington,’’ end of quote. 

Secretary Bolton also demonstrated his ability to get things done 

prior to becoming Under Secretary of State. Perhaps the best example is his initiative to repeal U.N. Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism. In May 1991, as Assistant Secretary of 

State for International Organizations, John Bolton refused to accept the common wisdom that repealing this infamous resolution 

was impossible. He and his staff initiated a campaign to change 

votes in the General Assembly, even though they were advised that 

they would not be successful. Within a few months, they had made 

substantial progress. And, by the fall, the State Department put its 

full weight behind the effort. On December 16, 1991, the U.N. General Assembly voted to repeal the resolution, by a vote of 111 to 

25. 

In the private sector, Secretary Bolton made some blunt statements about the United Nations, and many of these statements 

were made in academic or think-tank settings where debate on 

these subjects was encouraged. Many of the quotes that have been 

repeated by opponents came in the context of much larger speeches 

that were more nuanced. In fact—or the fact that he has strong 

views and a long record of commentary on the job that he is about 

to undertake should not be disqualifying. 

During our hearing, Secretary Bolton spoke of the United Nations’ important role in international security. He has emphasized 

that he wants the institution to work well on behalf of international security and the interests of the United States. 

Beyond qualifications, we should recognize that Secretary Bolton 

has the confidence of the President and the Secretary of State. The 

President has made it clear that this is not a casual appointment. 

He wants a specific person to do a specific job. President Bush has 

a reform agenda in mind at the United Nations. This reform agenda is generally supported by the U.N. Secretary General, who has 

put forward a reform plan of his own. The President wants John 

Bolton, an avowed and knowledgeable reformer, to carry out that 

reform agenda. Kofi Annan has welcomed John Bolton’s appointment. 

I would emphasize that Secretary Bolton is being appointed to a 

position that is within the chain of command of the President and 

the Secretary of State. The Ambassador to the U.N. reports directly 

24 

to the President and to the Secretary of State. In fact, historically, 

this ambassadorship has reflected directly on the President. The 

Ambassador is seen as the President’s voice at the U.N. Consequently, there are few positions in government where the President should have more latitude in choosing the nominee. 

In my judgment, it would be absolutely extraordinary circumstances for the Senate to say, quote, ‘‘Mr. President, you can’t 

have your choice to carry out your directive at the U.N., even 

though the Senate has approved him for four other high-ranking 

positions and he is extremely knowledgeable about the task that 

you are giving him,’’ end of quote. 

At times during this process, opponents have suggested that Secretary Bolton sits outside the mainstream in the Bush administration. Senator Biden devoted several minutes of his opening statement at Secretary Bolton’s hearing to this point, saying that, quote, 

‘‘Your views, based on what you’ve said in the past, seems to be 

contrary to the direction the President the Secretary now want to 

take this administration,’’ end of quote. 

The problem with this assertion is that President Bush is telling 

us that this is not so. President Bush is telling us that Secretary 

Bolton accurately represents his views about the U.N. and how 

that institution should be reformed. President Bush is saying that 

Secretary Bolton is his considered choice to implement his policies 

and diplomatic initiatives at the U.N. 

Some observers, who want a different program than the President’s, may not agree with the President’s choice, but the results 

of the 2004 election give the President the responsibility and the 

right to nominate like-minded representatives, and to define who 

a like-minded representative is. 

We have ample evidence that the United Nations is in need of 

reform. The Foreign Relations Committee held the first congressional hearing on the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food scandal more than a year 

ago. Since that time, through the work of Paul Volcker and our colleague, Senator Coleman, and many others, we have learned much 

more about the extent of that corruption and mismanagement, and 

this knowledge has supported the case for reform. We know that 

billions of dollars that should have been spend on humanitarian 

needs in Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam Hussein’s regime 

through a system of surcharges, bribes, and kickbacks. This corruption depended upon members of the U.N. Security Council who 

were willing to be complicit in these activities. It also depended on 

U.N. officials and contractors who were dishonest, inattentive, or 

willing to make damaging compromises in pursuit of the compassionate mission. 

United Nations reform is not a new issue. The structure and role 

of the United Nations have been debated in our country almost 

continuously since the U.N. was established, in 1945. But, in 2005, 

we may have a unique opportunity to improve the operations of the 

U.N. The revelations of the Oil-for-Food scandal and the urgency 

of strengthening global cooperation to address terrorism, the AIDS 

crisis, nuclear proliferation, many other international problems, 

have created momentum in favor of constructive reforms at the 

U.N. 

Secretary General Kofi Annan has proposed a substantial reform 

plan that will provide a platform for further reform initiatives and 

25 

discussions. The United States must be a leader in the effort to improve the United Nations, particularly its accountability. At a time 

when the United Nations is appealing for greater international 

help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in trouble-spots around the world, 

the diminishment of U.N. credibility because of scandal reduces 

U.S. options and increases our own burdens. 

Secretary Bolton has become closely associated with the United 

States efforts to reform the U.N. If he goes to the U.N. and helps 

achieve reform, the U.N. will gain in credibility, especially with the 

American people. If reform moves forward, Secretary Bolton will be 

in an excellent position to help convince skeptics that reform has 

occurred and that the United Nations can be an effective partner 

in achieving global security. If we reject Secretary Bolton without 

even granting him a vote on the Senate floor, President Bush’s 

hand will be weakened at the U.N. We will recover, but we will 

have wasted time, and we will have strengthened the position of 

reform opponents. 

In the days immediately following Secretary Rice’s March 7 announcement of Secretary Bolton’s nomination, most Democrat 

members of this committee expressed their opposition to the nomination, on policy grounds. 

A March 8th Associated Press report states, quote, ‘‘Almost immediately after Bolton’s nomination was announced, Democrats objected,’’ end of quote. 

The March 8 addition of the Baltimore Sun said, quote, ‘‘Reaction 

from Senate Democrats promised contentious confirmation hearings for Bolton when he goes before the Foreign Relations Committee,’’ end of quote. 

In several cases, the statements by Democrats were unequivocal 

in opposition. In several other cases, statements were very negative, leaving open only the smallest of possibilities that the Senate 

would ultimately support the nominee. In all of these cases, objections were based on Secretary Bolton’s supposed attitudes toward 

the United Nations. 

Senator Dodd said that Secretary Bolton’s, quote, ‘‘antipathy to 

the U.N. will prevent him from effectively discharging his duties as 

our ambassador,’’ end of quote. 

Senator Kerry says the Bolton nomination, quote, ‘‘was the most 

inexplicable appointment the President could make to represent 

the United States in the world community,’’ end of quote. 

Senator Boxer said of Secretary Bolton, quote, ‘‘He’s contemptuous of the U.N.’’ 

By March 31, still almost two weeks before the Bolton hearing, 

a Los Angeles Times report noted, quote, ‘‘Democrats are likely to 

vote unanimously against John R. Bolton when the nomination to 

the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations comes before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, according to Democratic and Republican lawmakers and aids,’’ end of quote. 

Now, Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of his 

substantive views and his past statements. However, it’s important 

to acknowledge that the ethical inquiry into Secretary Bolton’s 

background has been pressed by members who had planned to vote 

against him even before we began interviewing the witnesses. They 

have the right to ask questions, and the committee has a responsibility to follow up credible allegations. But we should also underVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
26 

stand that, at times, the inquiry has followed a more prosecutorial 

role than many nominees have had to endure. 

The committee staff has worked long and hard to run down the 

salvo of unsubstantiated allegations that were leveled at Secretary 

Bolton at the last business meeting. The end result is that many 

of the accusations have proven to be groundless or, at worse, overstated. New information has cast others in a different light. 

With regard to the most serious charge, that Secretary Bolton 

sought to improperly manipulate intelligence, the insights we have 

gained do not support that conclusion. He may have disagreed with 

intelligence findings, but, in the end, he always accepted the final 

judgment of the intelligence community, and always delivered 

speeches in their cleared form. 

During this inquiry, there has been the implication that if nominee challenged or opposed the conclusions of intelligence analysts, 

he somehow committed an ethical violation. I think we need to be 

very precise that arguing in favor of one’s own reading of intelligence within the context of an internal policy debate is not wrongdoing. Intelligence reports are not sacrosanct. They involve interpretations, and they are intended to stimulate debate. 

This committee has held numerous classified briefings. The word 

‘‘briefing’’ is perhaps a misnomer, because, as Senators, we spent 

much of the time during those briefings questioning the panel. We 

probe to determine not just what analysts think, but why they 

think it, and often we challenge their conclusions. 

Earlier this year, for example, our committee held a highly classified briefing on North Korea, in which one of our members pointedly disputed the conclusions of the briefer. There was a blunt exchange of views, and no resolution to this disagreement was 

achieved. And I am doubtful that any of us who have attended a 

good number of intelligence briefings have not done the same 

thing. My point is that the act of challenging or disputing intelligence conclusion is not, in and of itself, wrong. 

Some have appeared shocked that Secretary Bolton might have 

challenge intelligence conclusions or advanced alternative interpretations, even though the same thing happens every day in multiple 

departments and agencies. 

Congress has the benefit of something called the, quote, ‘‘speech 

and debate clause,’’ end of quote. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution states that Members of Congress, quote, ‘‘shall, in all 

cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged 

from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses. And, in going to and returning from the same, and for 

any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned 

in any other place,’’ end of quote. 

The Founders put this extraordinary provision in the Constitution because they saw the value in debate. The context surrounding 

arguments within an administration over intelligence is different, 

but the principle is the same. Policymakers should be free to exert 

opinions and interpretations during the policymaking process. 

Clearly, there are lines that should not be crossed. Some may 

argue that Secretary Bolton crossed these lines, but the proof is in 

the result. After fighting for his interpretation, Secretary Bolton 

conformed to the clearance process and gave the speeches as they 

had been approved. 

27 

It has been charged Secretary Bolton sought to retaliate in some 

way against analysts and others with whom he disagreed. Our 

staffs have looked into these cases thoroughly; and, in each one, I 

believe the allegations are overstated. In the case of Christian 

Westermann, the INR analyst whom the committee heard about 

from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a procedural issue, and Mr. 

Westermann continued in his job. We should recall that the focus 

of Mr. Ford’s complaint was that Mr. Bolton should not have raised 

his objections directly with Mr. Westermann, not that Mr. Bolton 

was wrong to raise the issue. 

Our Democratic colleagues, last month, made much of the fact 

that, after this incident, Secretary Powell had to go all the way 

down to INR to boost morale. But we heard, last week, from Secretary Powell’s chief of staff, that such visits were not uncommon, 

that it was part of the Secretary’s leadership style to visit with 

staff in the bowels of the building, including INR. 

In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the committee 

staff has viewed make it clear that Secretary Bolton’s primary objection was over disparaging and inaccurate comments the analysts 

made to Members of Congress about a speech. Secretary Bolton 

took his complaint to the CIA. Although the NIO has said he feels 

his career was damaged by Secretary Bolton, his superiors fully 

backed him at the time, and other witnesses have told the committee that if he did not get the promotions he felt he deserved, 

it was for other reasons. Again, as far as Secretary Bolton was concerned, the dispute was procedural; there was no attempt to fabricate intelligence. 

Other allegations related to managerial style show the same pattern, upon examination: disagreement over procedure, not policy. 

In the case of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in the Nonproliferation Bureau under Secretary Bolton, no policy issues were 

involved at all. Secretary Bolton believed, incorrectly, according to 

Mr. Ryu’s supervisor, that Mr. Ryu had deliberately neglected to 

share information with Bolton’s office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu 

was up for a job that would have required him to work closely with 

Secretary Bolton. Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed 

his opposition to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another 

prized post instead, an assignment to be Deputy Secretary. 

The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by the 

other side, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully supported 

what Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only because of 

miscommunication that Secretary Bolton thought the attorney had 

given out wrong information on a case involving sanctions against 

a Chinese company. The State Department legal advisor, Will Taft, 

told our staff that he quickly straightened things out. The attorney 

stayed on the case, even wrote the affidavit that Secretary Bolton 

later submitted to the court. 

Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary Bolton’s 

chief of staff, we learned, went to an INR analyst to complaint that 

he had inappropriately attached to a CIA document a cover memo 

that took exception to some of the CIA’s findings regarding China. 

No action was sought against the analyst, none was taken. The 

issue was procedural. No intelligence was manipulated. And Secretary Bolton wasn’t even directly involved, because he was out of 

the country at the time. 

28 

Secretary Bolton’s credibility has also been called into question 

regarding his testimony before our committee on April 11. Senator 

Biden questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to the CIA to 

learn about the National Intelligence Council. Stuart Cohen, the 

acting head of the NIC, said that, while he could not recall why 

Secretary Bolton wanted to come, it was, quote, ‘‘perfectly reasonable,’’ end of quote, to believe that was the reason. In fact, he 

added, quote, ‘‘I was delighted at the prospect that somebody would 

come out wanting to know more about the NIC,’’ end of quote. He 

also said that Secretary Bolton only talked about reassigning, not 

firing, the NIO, just as Mr. Bolton testified. 

Our investigation has found nothing contrary to Secretary 

Bolton’s claim that his dispute with Mr. Westermann was over procedure, and not policy. 

Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard called the 

committee, after Secretary Bolton’s testimony, about a controversial speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton testified that 

Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the speech afterwards. 

The Ambassador told us he, indeed, had thanked Secretary Bolton 

afterwards, but only for making certain changes in the speech that 

he had requested. Ambassador Hubbard told our staff that he 

wanted to correct the record on that point, but he was not accusing 

Secretary Bolton of being deliberately misleading. 

That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that opponents to the nomination have questioned. Our investigation has 

shown that many of these speeches and congressional testimony 

were preceded by strong policy debates within the administration. 

As one witness told our staff, quote, ‘‘That’s how good policy is 

made,’’ end of quote. In each case, we’ve found that, in the end, 

Secretary Bolton delivered a speech that was perfectly cleared and 

that expressed official U.S. policy. 

One of the most sensationalized accusations against Secretary 

Bolton is that, 11 years ago, he chased a woman around a Moscow 

hotel, throwing things at her. This is problematic, first, because the 

behavior described seems so out of place, but, secondly, because it 

has been very difficult for our staffs, despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to ascertain just what happened. The woman, 

Melody Townsel, who lives in Dallas, admits that she is a liberal 

Democrat who worked for Mothers Opposing Bush in the last election. Ms. Townsel also told our staffs that her original accusation 

contained a letter, that was made public—may have been too 

strong in some pieces. She said, quote, ‘‘chasing,’’ end of quote, may 

not be the best word. What she meant was that Secretary Bolton 

would approach her whenever he saw her at the hotel where they 

were both staying, because, as she describes it, she didn’t want to 

meet with him over a legal matter. It’s important to remember that 

Secretary Bolton was a private lawyer at the time. He was not representing the U.S. Government; he was working for company 

against which Ms. Townsel had made some very serious charges, 

charges which proved unfounded, that could have cost this company an important USAID contract in the former Soviet Union. 

Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents, which are 

said to have occurred in public or open areas of the hotel. Moreover, although she claimed that this was a highly traumatic encounter and that she told several people about it, staff had difVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
29 

ficulty finding others who knew about it. Three people whom Ms. 

Townsel identified as having heard her complaints at the time of 

the events told us they had no recollection of Ms. Townsel’s mentioning Mr. Bolton. Her boss, Charles Black, of Black, Manafort, 

Stone & Kelly, who hired her for the post, said she never mentioned it to him. Neither did her intermediate supervisor back in 

Washington. 

An employee of a sister company who assisted Ms. Townsel in 

making her charges against the prime contractor on her project, 

and with whom she said she was in close touch at the time, also 

knows nothing about it. 

Staffs talked to three representatives of the contractor, a small 

Virginia firm, which has long experience working for USAID overseas. These officials also heard nothing about this encounter. They 

said that Secretary Bolton was in Moscow at the time, but that he 

was working for a consultant for a health project that they were 

involved in, not doing legal work for them. 

We did find one of her friends and coworkers from that time, who 

was not in Moscow, who recalls talking with her by telephone 

about it, as well as a subordinate of hers in a later USAID-funded 

project who recalls her mentioning it. 

Now, ultimately, the results of a lengthy investigation into this 

isolated, long-ago incident are, at most, inconclusive. Ms. Townsel 

went on to another USAID project in former Soviet Union, and the 

company she accused of mismanagement was awarded more 

USAID contracts and continues to be well regarded. The original 

charge against Secretary Bolton appears to be overstated. 

On the basis of what we do know, there is nothing to offset Secretary Bolton’s long record of public service in several different administrations. 

It’s been charged that, collectively, the allegations against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable pattern of behavior. This is an 

unfortunate argument by opponents, because it depends on doubts 

arising from an intense investigation of accusations, many of which 

had no substantiation. By its nature, it also discounts the dozens 

of positive testimonials on Secretary Bolton’s behalf from former coworkers, who attest to his character and his effectiveness. 

We need to think clearly about the context of the allegations leveled against Secretary Bolton. 

First, this has been an extremely public inquiry. By it’s nature, 

it has encountered anyone with a grudge or a disagreement with 

Secretary Bolton, stretching back to 1983, to come forward and tell 

their story. There have been no thematic limits on the allegations 

that opponents of the nominee have asked to be investigated. 

I would simply submit that no one working in Washington in 

high-ranking positions for that long would come out unscathed 

from such a process. Any assertive policymaker will develop opponents based on stylistic differences, personal disputes, or partisan 

disagreements. Most members of this committee have been in public life for decades. If we were nominated for a similar position of 

responsibility after our terms in the Senate, how many of us would 

want the same standard to be applied to our confirmation process? 

How many of us would want any instance of conflict or anger directed at our staffs or our colleagues to be fair game? 

30 

Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all the 

way to 1983; thus, we are subjecting 22 years of Secretary Bolton’s 

career to a microscope. This included service in many government 

jobs, as well as time spent in the private sector. And given the 

length of John Bolton’s service in high-ranking positions, it’s inevitable that he would have conflict with coworkers of various ranks 

and political persuasions. He would have had literally thousands of 

contacts, meetings, and issues to deal with during his career. In 

this context, the volume of alleged incidents is not that profound. 

Third, in John Bolton’s case, unsubstantiated charges may seem 

more material than they are, because he has a reputation for being 

an aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should not be a disqualifying factor, especially for a post that, historically, has included a number of blunt, plainspoken individuals, including Jeane 

Kirkpatrick and our former colleague, Senator Pat Moynihan. In 

fact, President Bush has cited John Bolton’s direct style as one of 

the reasons that he’s picked him for this particular job. 

It is easy to say that any inquiry into any allegation is justified 

if we are pursuing the truth. But, as Senators who are frequently 

called upon to pass judgment on nominees, we know reality is more 

complicated than that. We want to ensure that nominees are qualified, skilled, honest, and open. Clearly, we should pursue credible 

reports of wrongdoing; but, in doing so, we should understand that 

there can be human and organizational costs if the inquiry is not 

focused and fair. We have all witnessed quality nominees who have 

had to endure a contentious nomination process that opened them 

up to any charge leveled from any directions. 

Both Republicans and Democrats have been guilty of employing 

prosecuting tactics to oppose nominees with whom they did not 

agree. Some would say that nominees are fair game. If they accept 

an appointment, they enter the public arena, where no quarter will 

be given. But we need capable people who are willing to serve our 

government and the American people. And among all the other 

qualifications, it seems that we require nominees to subject themselves and their families to partisan scrutiny. This has implications 

well beyond the current nomination. 

Our Democrat colleagues have recognized this fact when they 

have defended Democrat nominees in the past. With respect to one 

nominee, in October 1993, Senator Biden said, quote, ‘‘The Senate 

does nothing to fulfill its responsibility to advise and consent on 

presidential nominations, and does nothing to enhance its reputation as the world’s greatest liberty body, by entertaining a long and 

disagreeable litany of past policy disagreements, not by entertaining anonymous and probably false allegations,’’ end of quote. 

With regard to a troubled 1999 nomination, Senator Dodd, quite 

insightfully, stated, quote, ‘‘I am one, Mr. Chairman, who worries 

deeply about our ability to attract the best our society can produce 

to serve our country. It is not easy to submit yourself and your 

family to the kind of public scrutiny that a nomination of this magnitude involves. We have got to sort out some ways in which we 

can go through this process without making it so discouraging to 

people that—those watch the process, think one day they might 

like to serve their country—will be discouraged from doing so, in 

any administration. And I am deeply worried that if we do not get 

31 

a better handle on this, that that will be the net result of what we 

accomplish,’’ end of quote. 

Senator Dodd also provided comments for a March 1, 1997, 

Washington Post article about the travails of a different nominee. 

He said, and I quote, ‘‘It’s getting harder and harder to get good 

people to serve in government. Advice and consent does not have 

to be abuse,’’ end of quote. 

In an investigation of this type, we constantly have to ask where 

we draw the line. Where does legitimate due diligence turn into 

partisanship? Where does the desire for the truth turn into a competition over who wins and who loses? Not every line of inquiry is 

justified by our curiosity, or even our suspicions. 

The committee has focused a great deal of energy examining several accusations against the nominee. And this may leave some observers with the false impression that John Bolton’s service has 

been dominated by discord and conflict. We need to acknowledge 

that a great many officials with whom he has worked have endorsed him, and that many subordinates have attested to his managerial character. 

In the interest of fairness, I would like to cite just a few of the 

comments received by the committee in support of Secretary 

Bolton. Former Secretaries of State James Baker, Larry 

Eagleburger, Alexander Haig, Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz; 

former Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci, and James Schlesinger; former Ambassadors Jeane Kirkpatrick and Max 

Kampelman; former National Security Advisor Richard Allen; 

former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth 

Adelman; former Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire; and 

former Department of State Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt strongly endorsed Secretary Bolton in a letter to the committee, saying, 

and I quote, ‘‘It is a moment when we must have an ambassador 

in place whose knowledge, experience, dedication, and drive will be 

vital to protecting the American interests in an effective, forwardlooking United Nations. Secretary Bolton, like the administration, 

has his critics. Anyone as energetic and effective as John Bolton is 

bound to encounter those who disagree with some, or even all, of 

his administration policies. But the policies for which he is sometimes criticized are those of the President and the Department of 

State, which he has served with loyalty, honor, and distinction.’’ 

Andrew Natsios, the current USAID administrator, and Mr. 

Peter McPherson, a former USAID administrator, along with 37 officials who worked with John Bolton during his years at USAID, 

wrote, quote, ‘‘We know John to be a forceful policy advocate who 

both encourages and learns from rigorous debate. We know him to 

be a man of balanced judgment. And we know him to have a sense 

of humor, even about himself. John leads from in front, with courage and conviction, especially positive qualities, we believe, for the 

assignment he is being asked to take on. He is tough, but fair. He 

does not abuse power or people. John is direct, yet thoughtful, in 

his communications. He is highly dedicated, working long hours in 

a never-ending quest to maximize performance, yet he does not 

place undue time demands on his staff, recognizing their family obligations. What he does demand from his staff is personal honesty 

and intellectual clarity,’’ end of quote from that letter. 

32 

Another letter, from Former Attorneys General Ed Meese and 

Dick Thornburgh, former Governors William Weld and Frank 

Keating, former Counselors to the President C. Boyden Gray and 

Arthur Culvahouse, Jr., and 39 other distinguished officials stated, 

quote, ‘‘Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know him to 

be a man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply devoted to 

the service to this country and the promotion of our foreign-policy 

interests, as established by this President and Congress. Not one 

of us has ever witnessed conduct on his part that resembles that 

which has been alleged. We feel our collective knowledge of him 

and what he stands for, combined with our experiences in government and in the private sector, more than counterbalances the 

credibility of those who have tried to destroy the distinguished 

achievements of a lifetime,’’ end of quote from that letter. 

Another letter came from 21 former officials who worked with 

John Bolton in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Organizational Affairs, and states, quote, ‘‘Despite 

what has been said and written in the last few weeks, John has 

never sought to damage the United Nations or its mission. Quite 

the contrary, under John’s leadership the organization was properly challenged to fulfill its original charter. John’s energy and innovation transformed IO from a State Department backwater into 

a highly appealing workplace in which individuals could effectively 

articulate and advance U.S. policy and their own careers, as well,’’ 

end of quote. 

A letter also arrived from 43 of John Bolton’s former colleagues 

at the American Enterprise Institute. It stated, and I quote, ‘‘As we 

have followed the strange allegations suddenly leveled at Mr. 

Bolton in recent days, and reflected among ourselves on our own 

experiences with him, we have come to realize how much we have 

learned from him, and how deep and lasting were his contributions. 

Contrary to portrayals of his accusers, he combines a temperate 

disposition, good spirit, utter honesty with his well-known attributes of exceptional intelligence and intensity of purpose. This is 

a rare combination and, we would think, highly desirable for an 

American Ambassador to the United Nations,’’ end of quote. 

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote, in a recent letter to Secretary Bolton, quote, ‘‘To combine, as you do, clarity of thought, courtesy of expression, and an unshakeable commitment to justice is rare in any walk of life, but it’s particularly so 

in international affairs. A capacity for straight-talking, rather than 

peddling half-truths, is a strength, and not a disadvantage, in diplomacy. Particularly in the case of a great power like America, it 

is essential that people know where you stand and assume that you 

mean what you say. With you at the U.N., they will do both. These 

same qualities are also required for any serious reform at the 

United Nations, itself, without which cooperation between nations 

to defend and extend liberty will be far more difficult,’’ end of quote 

from Mrs. Thatcher. 

Now, during this inquiry, we have spent a great deal of time 

scrutinizing individual conversations and incidents that happened 

several years ago. Regardless of how each Senator plans to vote 

today, we should not lose sight of the larger national-security 

issues—U.N. reform and international diplomacy—that are central 

to this nomination. 

33 

The President has tasked Secretary Bolton to undertake this urgent mission. Secretary Bolton has affirmed his commitment to fostering a strong United Nations. He has expressed his intent to 

work hard to secure greater international support at the U.N. for 

the national-security and foreign-policy objectives of the United 

States. He has stated his belief in decisive American leadership at 

the U.N., and underscored that an effective United Nations is very 

much in the interest of U.S. national security. 

I believe that the President deserves to have his nominee represent him at the United Nations. I am hopeful that we will vote 

to report this nomination to the whole Senate. 

At this time, I would like to yield to—the first Republican segment—to Senator Voinovich for his comments. 

Senator Voinovich. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM OHIO 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me take this opportunity to thank you and your staff 

for your graciousness and hard work on this nomination. You have 

made strong arguments in favor of the nominee throughout this 

process. Additionally, thank you for providing all of the members 

of this committee with timely information related to Mr. Bolton. I 

believe that the inquiry has been fair and exhaustive. I’m confident 

that I have enough information to cast my vote today. Again, I appreciate your staff’s hard work, as well as the administration’s efforts. 

Since our last meeting on this subject, I have pored over hundreds of pages of testimony, have spoken to dozens, or so, of individuals regarding their experiences, interactions, and thoughts 

about John Bolton. Most importantly, in addition to the meeting 

that I had with Mr. Bolton prior to the official business meeting 

that we had on his nomination, I, once again, met with Mr. Bolton 

this week, personally, to share my concerns and to listen carefully 

to his thoughts. 

After great thought and consideration, I have based my decision 

on what I think is the bigger picture. Frankly, there is a particular 

concern that I have about this nomination, and it involves the big 

picture of U.S. public diplomacy. 

It was not long ago when America’s love of freedom was a force 

of inspiration to the world, and America was admired for its democracy, generosity, and its willingness to help others in need of protection. Today, the United States is criticized for what the world 

calls arrogance, unilateralism, and for failing to listen and to seek 

the support of its friends and allies. There has been a drastic 

change in the attitude of our friends and allies in such organizations as the United Nations and NATO and in the countries of 

leaders that we need to rely upon for help. I discovered this last 

November, when I met—when I was in London with people in the 

Parliament there—I found that to be the case when we visited the 

NATO meeting in Italy—that things have really changed in the 

last several years. 

It troubled me deeply that the United States is perceived this 

way in a world community, because the United States will face a 

steeper challenge in achieving its objectives without their support. 

34 

We will face more difficulties in conducting the war on terrorism, 

promoting peace and stability worldwide, and building democracies 

without the help from our friends to share the responsibilities, 

leadership, and costs. 

To achieve these objectives, public diplomacy must once again be 

of high importance. If we cannot win over the hearts and minds of 

the world community, and work together as a team, our goals will 

be more difficult to achieve. Additionally, we will be unable to reduce the burden on our own resources. The most important of these 

resources are the human resources, the lives of the men and 

women of our Armed Forces who are leaving their families every 

day to serve their country overseas. Just this last Tuesday, we passed an $82 billion supplemental 

bill for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is clear that the 

costs of this war are rising all the time, and they are not expected 

to go down anytime soon. There are not many allies standing up 

to join us in bearing the costs of these wars, particularly Iraq. We 

need the help of other countries to share the financial burden that 

is adding to our national debt, and the human-resource burden 

that our Armed Forces, national guardsman, and contractors are 

bearing so heavily now, including the deaths of over 1500 American 

service men and women. 

And the key to this, I believe, is public diplomacy. Mr. Chairman, 

I applaud the President and Secretary of State for understanding 

that public diplomacy is an important objective and beginning this 

new term with an emphasis on repairing relationships. I applaud 

the President and Secretary Rice for reaching out to our friends in 

the world community and articulating that the United States does 

respect international law and protocol. And I also applaud the 

President’s decision to appoint Karen Hughes to help take the lead 

in this effort. 

Though the United States may have differences with our friends 

at times, and though we may need to be firm with our positions, 

it is important to send the message that we’re willing to sit down, 

talk about them, discuss our reasoning, and to work for solutions. 

The work of the President and Secretary of State Rice is a move 

in the right direction, but what message are we sending to the 

world community when, in the same breath, we have sought to appoint an Ambassador to the United Nations who, himself, has been 

accused of being arrogant, of not listening to his friends, of acting 

unilaterally, of bullying those who do not have the ability to properly defend themselves? These are the very characteristics that 

we’re trying to dispel in the world community. 

We must understand that, next to the President, the Vice President, Secretary of State, the next most important prominent public 

diplomat is our Ambassador to the United Nations. It is my concern that the confirmation of John Bolton would send a contradictory and negative message to the world community about U.S. intentions. I’m afraid that his confirmation will tell the world that 

we’re not dedicated to repairing our relationship or working as a 

team, but that we believe only someone with sharp elbows can deal 

properly with the international community. 

I want to make it clear that I do believe that the U.N. needs to 

be reformed if it’s to be relevant in the 21st century. I do believe 

we need to pursue its transformation aggressively, sending the 

35 

strong message that corruption’s not going to be tolerated. The corruption that occurred under the Oil-for-Food Program made it possible for Saddam’s Iraq to discredit the U.N. and undermine the 

goals of its members. This must never happen again, and severe reforms are needed to strengthen the organization. And, yes, I believe that it will be necessary to take a firm position so we can succeed. But it will take a special individual to succeed at this endeavor, and I have great concerns with the current nominee and his 

ability to get the job done. 

And to those who say a vote against John Bolton is against reform of the U.N., I say, nonsense. There are many other people 

who are qualified to go to the United Nations that can get the job 

done for our country. 

Frankly, I’m concerned that Mr. Bolton would make it more difficult for us to achieve the badly needed reforms to this outdated 

institution. I believe that there could even be more obstacles to reform if Mr. Bolton is sent to the United Nations than if he were 

another candidate. 

Those in the international community who do not want to see the 

U.N. reformed will act as a roadblock, and I fear that Mr. Bolton’s 

reputation will make it easier for them to succeed. I believe that 

some member nations in the U.N. will use Mr. Bolton as part of 

their agenda to further question the integrity and credibility of the 

United States, and to reinforce their negative U.S. propaganda— 

and there’s a lot of it out there today. 

Another reason I believe Mr. Bolton is not the best candidate for 

the job is his tendency to act without regard for the views of others, 

and without respect for the chain of command. We have heard that 

Mr. Bolton has a reputation for straying off message on occasion. 

Ambassador Hubbard testified that the tone of Mr. Bolton’s speech 

on North Korea hurt, rather than helped, efforts to achieve the 

President’s objectives. According to several respectable sources, Mr. 

Bolton strayed off message too often, and had to be called on the 

carpet quite often to be reprimanded. In fairness, those sources 

said that, once reprimanded, Mr. Bolton got back on track, but that 

he needs to be kept on a short leash. 

However, this leaves me a very uneasy feeling. Who is to say 

that Mr. Bolton will not continue to stray off message as Ambassador to the U.N.? Who is to say he will not hurt, rather than help, 

U.S. relations with the international community and our desire to 

reform the U.N.? 

When discussing all these concerns with Secretary Rice—John 

Bolton’s propensity to get off message, his lack of interpersonal 

skills, his tendency to abuse others who disagree with him—I was 

informed by the Secretary of State that she understood all these 

things, and, in spite of them, still feels that John Bolton is the best 

choice, and that she would be in frequent communication with him, 

and he would be closely supervised. My private thought at the 

time, and I should have expressed it to her, is, Why in the world 

would you want to send somebody up to the U.N. that has to be 

supervised? 

I’m also concerned about Mr. Bolton’s interpersonal skills. Mr. 

Chairman, I understand there will be several vacant senior posts 

on the staff when Mr. Bolton arrives in his new position. As a matter of fact, I understand all the senior people, five of them, they’re 

36 

leaving right now. For example, Ann Patterson, who is highly regarded, is moving to another position. And I’ve been told by several 

people that, if he gets there, to be successful he’s going to need 

somebody like Ann Patterson to get the job done for him. 

As such, Mr. Bolton’s going to face a challenge. These people are 

gone right now. He’s going to have to find some new ones. But his 

challenge right now is to inspire, lead, and manage a new team, 

a staff of 150 individuals that he will need to rely on to get the 

job done. 

We have all witnessed the testimony and observations related to 

Mr. Bolton’s interpersonal and management skills. I have concerns 

about Mr. Bolton’s ability to inspire and lead the team so that it 

can be as effective as possible in completing the important task before him. And I’m not the only one. I understand that 59 U.S. diplomats, who served under administrations from both sides of the 

aisle, sent a letter to the committee, saying that Mr. Bolton is the 

wrong man for the job. 

I want to note that the interview given by Colin Powell’s chief 

of staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, has said that Mr. Bolton 

would be—would make an abysmal ambassador, that he is, quote, 

‘‘incapable of listening to people and taking into account their 

views.’’ 

I would also like to highlight the words of another person that 

I highly respect, who worked with Mr. Bolton, who told me that if 

Mr. Bolton were confirmed, he’d be okay for a short time, but, within 6 months his poor interpersonal skills and lack of self-discipline 

would cause major problems. 

Additionally, I wanted to note my concern that Colin Powell, the 

person to whom Mr. Bolton answered to over the last four years, 

was conspicuously absent from a letter signed by former Secretaries of State recommending Mr. Bolton’s confirmation. He’s the 

one that had to deal with him on a day-to-day basis. He’s the one 

that’s more capable of commenting about whether or not he’s got 

the ability to get the job done. And he—his name was not on that 

letter. 

We are facing an era of foreign relations in which the choice for 

our Ambassador to the United Nations should be one of the most 

thoughtful decisions we make. The candidate needs to be both a 

diplomat and a manager. A manager is important. Interpersonal 

skills are important. The way you treat other people—Do you treat 

them with dignity and respect?—very important. You must have 

the ability to persuade and to inspire our friends, to communicate 

and convince, to listen, to absorb the ideas of others. Without such 

virtues, we will face more challenges in our efforts to win the war 

on terrorism, to spread democracy, and to foster stability globally. 

The question is, Is John Bolton the best person for the job? The 

administration has said they believe he’s the right man. They say 

that, despite his interpersonal shortcomings, he knows the U.N., 

and he can reform the organization and make it more powerful and 

relevant to the world. 

Now, let me say, there’s no doubt that John Bolton should be 

commended and thanked for his service and his particular achievements. He has accomplished an important objective, against great 

odds. As a sponsor of legislation that established an Office on Global Anti-Semitism in the State Department, legislation that I 

37 

worked very hard to get passed, I am particularly impressed by his 

work to combat global anti-Semitism. I wholeheartedly agree with 

Mr. Bolton that we must get the U.N. to change its anti-Israeli 

bias. Further, I am impressed by Mr. Bolton’s achievements in the 

areas of arms control; specifically, the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global Partnership Fund, and the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative. 

Despite these successes, there is no doubt that Mr. Bolton has serious deficiencies in the areas that are critical to be a good ambassador. As Carl Ford said, ‘‘He is a kiss-up and kick-down leader, 

who will not tolerate those who disagree with him, and who goes 

out of his way to retaliate for their disagreement.’’ As Ambassador 

Hubbard said, ‘‘He does not listen when an esteemed colleague offers or suggests changes to temper language in a speech.’’ And, as 

I’ve already mentioned, former Secretary of State Powell’s chief of 

staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, said, ‘‘He would be an abysmal ambassador.’’ 

As some others who have worked closely with Mr. Bolton stated, 

‘‘He’s an ideologue, and fosters an atmosphere of intimidation. He 

does not tolerate disagreement. He does not tolerate dissent.’’ Another esteemed individual who has worked with Mr. Bolton told me 

that, ‘‘Even when he had success, he had the tendency to lord if 

over and say, ‘Hey, boy, look what I did.’ ’’ Carl Ford testified that 

he had never seen anyone behave as badly in all his days at the 

State Department, and that he would not even have testified before 

this committee if John Bolton had simply followed protocol and 

simple rules of management. You know, just followed the procedure. 

Mr. Chairman, I have to say that, after poring over the hundreds 

of pages of testimony—and, you know, I wasn’t here for those hearings, but I did my penance; I read all of it—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. I believe that John Bolton 

would have been fired—fired—if he had worked for a major corporation. This is not the behavior of a true leader, who upholds the 

kind of democracy that President Bush is seeking to promote, globally. This is not the behavior that should be endorsed as the face 

of the United States to the world community in the United Nations. Rather, Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that John Bolton is 

the poster-child of what someone in the diplomatic corps should not 

be. I worry about the signal that we’re sending to thousands of individuals, under the State Department, who are serving their country in Foreign Service and Civil Service, living at posts across the 

world, and, in some cases, risking their lives, all so they can represent our country, promote diplomacy, and contribute to the safety 

of Americans everywhere. 

I just returned from a trip to the Balkans. I had a chance to 

spend four days with people from the State Department. He’s not 

what they consider to be the ideal person, Mr. Chairman, to be our 

Ambassador to the United States—or to the United Nations. And 

I think it’s important that we think about the signal that we send 

out there to those people that are all over this world, that are 

doing the very best job that they can to represent the United 

States of America. This is an important nomination by the PresiVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
38 

dent. What we’re saying to these people, when we confirm such an 

individual to one of the highest positions—what are we saying? 

I want to emphasize that I’ve weighed Mr. Bolton’s strengths 

carefully. I have weighed the fact that this is the President’s nominee. All things being equal, it is my proclivity to support the President’s nominee. However, in this case, all things are not equal. It’s 

a different world today than it was four years ago. Our enemies are 

Muslim extremists and religious fanatics who have hijacked the 

Koran and have convinced people that the way to get to heaven is 

through jihad against the world, particularly the United States. We 

must recognize that to be successful in this war, one of our most 

important tools is public diplomacy. 

After hours of deliberations, telephone calls, personal conversations, reading hundreds of pages of transcripts, and asking for 

guidance from above, I have come to the determination that the 

United States can do better than John Bolton. The world needs an 

ambassador who’s interested in encouraging other people’s points of 

view and discouraging any atmosphere of intimidation. The world 

needs an American Ambassador to the U.N. who will show that the 

United States has respect for other countries and intermediary organizations, that we are team players and consensus builders, and 

promoters of symbiotic relationships. 

In moving forward with the international community, we should 

remember the words of the great Scot poet, who said, ‘‘Oh, that 

some great power would give me the wisdom to see myself as other 

people see me.’’ 

That being said, Mr. Chairman, I am not so arrogant to think 

that I should impose my judgment and perspective of the U.S. position in the world community on the rest of my colleagues. We owe 

it to the President to give Mr. Bolton and up or down vote on the 

floor of the U.S. Senate. My hope is that, on a bipartisan basis, we 

can sent Mr. Bolton’s nomination to the floor without recommendation, and let the Senate work its will. 

If that goes to the floor, I would plead to my colleagues in the 

Senate to consider the decision and its consequences carefully, to 

read all the pertinent material—so often we get nominees, and we 

don’t spend the time to look into the background of the individuals—and to ask themselves several questions: 

Will John Bolton do the best job possible representing a transatlantic face of America at the U.N.? 

Will he be able to pursue the needed reforms at the U.N., despite 

his damaged credibility? 

Will he share information with the right individuals, and will he 

solicit information from the right individuals, including his subordinates, so he can make the most informed decision? 

Is he capable of advancing the President and Secretary of State’s 

efforts to advance our public diplomacy? 

Does he have the character, leadership, interpersonal skills, selfdiscipline, common decency, and understanding of the chain of command to lead his team to victory? 

Will he recognize and seize opportunities to repair and strengthen relationships, promote peace, uphold democracy as a team with 

our fellow nations? 

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this. I have met with 

Mr. Bolton on two occasions, spent almost two hours with him. I 

39 

like Mr. Bolton. I think he’s a decent man. Our conversations have 

been candid and cordial. But, Mr. Chairman, I really don’t believe 

he’s the best man that we can send to the United Nations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 

I now turn to the distinguished ranking member for his statement and disposition of an opening hour of debate. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

DELAWARE 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I don’t know why I thought for a moment that maybe Senator Voinovich shouldn’t go second. I should have reconsidered that 

position. [Laughter.] 

So much for partisanship. 

Look, I don’t—quite frankly, much of what I was going to say 

would be redundant and not as eloquent as what we just heard. 

And I have great respect for every one of my colleagues on this 

committee, on both sides of the aisle. And I do respect the fact that 

many of you may reach a conclusion different than I have reached 

and, based on what I just heard, Senator Voinovich has reached. 

I happened to reach the same conclusion—and I’m not being solicitous—for the same reason, the same basic, fundamental reason. 

I cannot think of a time in my career here where I’ve heard 

someone so succinctly state in one sentence what really should 

have been the question: Why would you send someone to the 

United Nations that needed to be supervised? I did ask a similar 

question, that question, to the Secretary of State, when she had the 

courtesy, which I appreciate, of calling me before—before—the 

nominee was announced. At that time, she asked me—and this is 

not violating any confidence, that—would I withhold stating anything publicly until I had a chance—she had a chance to talk with 

me more? And if you go back, you notice what you’ve read about 

what Senators said, my name does not appear there. I did withhold, until the day of the hearing, any comment—to the chagrin, 

I suspect, of some of my Democratic colleagues—my attitude and 

views and concerns about Mr. Bolton. 

I realize there is a very strong—we all are elected officials in the 

most significant legislative body, I would say, in the history of the 

world. And we all know, though, that each of our parties have overwhelming requirements, sometimes, to meet the concerns of portions of our party. That was implied to me as one of the reasons 

why Mr. Bolton was being nominated. 

The question I asked was, ‘‘Do you know, Madam Secretary, how 

much difficulty Mr. Bolton caused for Secretary Powell, your predecessor?’’ And the answer was, ‘‘Yes.’’ But there had been a discussion, and there was a need to find an important post for Mr. 

Bolton, who’s been an admirable and bright and patriotic servant 

of this country for a long time. And I asked a rhetorical question, 

‘‘If you couldn’t say no now to that nomination, how are you going 

to say no if, in fact, he breaches the control that you indicate to 

me that will be imposed upon him?’’ I don’t know the answer to 

that, but I would suggest that if there is a need to appoint him for 

reasons, including and beyond his capacity, then it may be difficult 

if, in fact, he strays. But that is not for me to decide. 

40 

Mr. Chairman, you and I have worked together for a long time. 

I think it’s fair to say we’ve never had a cross, harsh word. And 

we will not, as far as I’m concerned, have one over this. But your 

opening statement makes it sort of sound that it’s self-evident that 

Mr. Bolton was going to be the guy to be nominated to the United 

Nations. I would ask a rhetorical question. Was anyone here in the 

Senate when Bolton’s name was mentioned, unless you had been 

briefed ahead of time? Did anyone of you say, ‘‘Ah, that fits. That’s 

just what I was thinking. That’s just what I was thinking—U.N.— 

Bolton, U.N.’’? [Laughter.] 

I’m not being facetious. I being deadly earnest. I think it goes to 

this whole question of whether or not everybody’s out just on a 

witch hunt to go after Mr. Bolton. You must admit that this was 

an unusual, if not surprising, nomination. If someone had said Mr. 

Bolton was going to head up—he was going to be brought in—I 

would have been less surprised, myself, if he had been—if he was 

going to be—have the spot Mr. Hadley has, a more—in some 

senses, a much more critical spot. I would have been less surprised 

about that. But it’s a little bit like if one of us announced we’re 

going go back and run for the state legislature. It would kind of 

surprise me. It wouldn’t fit. 

I want to make a second point. We did not seek out any witnesses. I don’t know whether you meant to imply, Mr. Chairman, 

but it sounded—it might sound to some like the Democrats are out 

there trying to dig up all they can on Bolton. I had nothing to do, 

nor did any of you, with what now is 102 former career ambassadors—Republican, Democratic; Republican appointees, Democratic appointees. To the best of my knowledge, my word as a—I 

know of no Democrat that had anything to do with getting those 

folks to write us a letter. 

Tom Hubbard, the Ambassador to South Korea, he contacted us 

after hearing Mr. Bolton’s testimony. We did not contact Mr. Hubbard. 

Mr. Westermann—nobody contacted Mr. Westermann first. That 

came from Mr. Westermann in an inquiry by the Intelligence Committee as to whether or not anyone had been—felt intimidated. Mr. 

Westermann came forward to the Intelligence Committee. We 

found out from the Intelligence Committee. We did not go to Mr. 

Westermann. 

Ms. Townsel—and, I agree, the evidence is not absolutely conclusive. I agree with you. I think you honestly stated it, as you always 

do. But we didn’t go to Mrs. Townsel. She wrote an open letter to 

us. I never met the woman, had never even heard of her before. 

So, I want to make the point that not only did we not seek out 

these witnesses, it would have been irresponsible, in terms of out 

constitutional responsibility, not to talk to them as they came forward, or seek our corroboration and/or contradictory statements 

relative to what they had to say. 

And I might point out, the primary witnesses that we interviewed, who had the most incredibly damaging things to—let me 

rephrase that—who had some very damaging things to say about 

Mr. Bolton’s actions, are all in a Republican administration. We did 

not go to a former administration. We did not go to the Clinton administration to find former assistant secretaries or heads of NIR— 

41 

or INR. These are all Republicans; if not Republicans, appointees 

and/or serving under a Republican administration. 

And, further, the argument that we need John Bolton for reform 

at the U.N., and comparing him to Pat Moynihan—I’m reminded 

of that famous phrase of our friend from Texas, Senator Bentsen, 

‘‘I knew Pat Moynihan, and he’s—and I know John Bolton—and 

he’s no Pat Moynihan.’’ I mean, I find that the biggest stretch—you 

know that old phrase we Irish say, ‘‘Pat’s probably rolling over in 

his grave hearing that comparison.’’ 

And so, we’re not saying—one last point before I get into the detail—we’re not saying Mr. Bolton is not a patriotic American, has 

not done very good things in his career, has been a failure. We’re 

not saying that. What we’re saying is, he’s done some very good 

things. One that comes to mind, referenced by our colleague from 

Ohio, the anti-Zionist resolution, getting it repealed. That’s a big 

deal. That’s a big deal, a notable accomplishment. But that does 

not a U.N. Ambassador make. A lot of people have done very good 

things who turn out not to be qualified or the right person for other 

assignments. 

Mr. Chairman, my intention, obviously, is not to keep our committee vote beyond the 3 p.m. agreement we have decided on, but 

I feel obliged to lay out for the record one of my institutional concerns here. 

I recognize that the State Department, the CIA, and AID have 

provided hundreds of pages of documents, and declassified many of 

them. I don’t minimize that. State and CIA have made government 

officials available for interviews, and more than once. But this cooperation has been grudging, to say the least. 

Prior to the April 11th hearing, very little cooperation was provided to the Democratic requests, until you, Mr. Chairman, stepped 

in. After our first meeting, on April 19th, we made additional document requests to the Department. The chairman intervened again 

to help. But he also implicitly invited the Department to ignore 

part of our request, saying that some of our request were, quote, 

‘‘extremely broad and may have marginal relevance to specific allegations.’’ The letter then expressed hope that certain specific requests would be fulfilled, a list that omitted four parts of the Minority request. The Department took the hint, and it has failed to 

turn over some important materials related to preparation of 

speeches and testimony. 

Even after—even after we narrowed our request, at the urging 

of the State Department, only a relatively small amount of material that we narrowed the request for was provided. In rejecting the 

request, the Department’s offered an extraordinary rationale. I 

think it’s important, as a committee, that we understand this. They 

said, in rejecting some of the information we sought, quote, The 

Department,’’ quote, ‘‘does not believe the request to be specifically 

tied to the issues being deliberated by the committee,’’ end of quote. 

As my mom would say, ‘‘Who died and left them boss?’’ 

Think about it for a minute. First, the Department is responding 

only to the requests endorsed by the Majority, and, second, the executive branch is deciding, for itself, the issues which are relevant 

to this committee’s review of a nomination. 

I believe this is an very important issue before the committee. I 

believe it’s very important whether or not Mr. Bolton sought to 

42 

stretch intelligence, to say things in public statements that the intelligence would not support, and to keep going back to the intelligence community again and again to get answers he wants, not 

the answers the facts support. Put another way, Did he attempt to 

politicize the intelligence process for two former—as two former administration officials have testified? That’s why we requested this 

information. 

I’m also concerned that the nominee may have given the committee some misleading testimony. The material that was not provided would shed further light on both these concerns. And it relates to the preparation of congressional testimony on Syria, their 

weapons-of-mass-destruction program. The preparation of this testimony occurred in the summer of 2003. Remember, we already 

know from intelligence officials that there was an intense debate 

about what Mr. Bolton wanted to say and whether he should be 

able to say it. And this was a time when there was open discussion 

about, Is Syria next? Mr. Bolton told us he didn’t—hadn’t seen the 

draft, and the Department told us, in—later—in the letter yesterday, that he was not personally involved in drafting the testimony. 

But this committee has a right and a duty to look at the evidence. 

The Department’s letter, yesterday, saying that the material is 

highly classified and compartmentalized, and the Department is 

not prepared, quote, ‘‘to share these deliberations that cut across 

the intelligence community,’’ as their rational. This answer is unsatisfactory, as a matter of principle, for future inquiries by this 

committee. We’ve already received deliberative-process materials, 

some of which are highly classified. Why won’t the administration 

give us this other material? Are they holding back relevant information? Could it be that Mr. Bolton was, in fact, involved in drafting the testimony? I don’t know. But there’s no cogent rationale 

why they give us some of this, and not others. 

The Department’s attitude during the course of this nomination 

is a significant departure—significant departure—from past practice, including the past four years. It’s been the kind of—if this is 

the kind of cooperation we can expect in the future, we may have 

a long three and a half years. 

I’m even more concerned about the failure of the committee to receive information relating to Mr. Bolton’s request for NSA information, and to identify U.S. persons that he wanted to know in those 

intercepts. On April 13th, Senator Dodd made the first request for 

this information. By a letter dated April 28, Senator Lugar made 

a request for the information through the Intelligence Committee. 

Specifically, Senator Lugar asked Senators Roberts and Rockefeller, to seek, quote, ‘‘all information related to Mr. Bolton’s request and the responses thereto, including the unredacted contents 

of the documents in question.’’ Unredacted. And the letter said that 

the chairman was, quote, ‘‘prepared to follow the guidance of the 

Select Committee with respect to,’’ quote, ‘‘access and storage of 

such materials, as well as the provisions under which such materials will be shared with members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.’’ 

Clearly, the chairman was pointing out that the past practices 

mean that we have access to that information, and we expected 

that access. That’s why the reference to ‘‘storage material and the 

nature of the access’’—not ‘‘if’’ we could have access. In other 

43 

words, Mr. Chairman, you made clear our expectations that NSA 

would provide, quote, ‘‘all the information’’ to the Intelligence Committee, which, in turn, would share it with us. 

And I understand that the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee were briefed Tuesday by General Hayden. I 

understand that they were not given the identities of U.S. persons 

that Mr. Bolton requested and received. And I have no information 

on when, or whether, this committee or Senator Lugar or I will be 

given access to the same information given to the Intelligence Committee. So far as I can tell, Mr. Chairman, your request has not 

been fulfilled. And I don’t know why. I think it’s unacceptable. We 

have a right to this information, not only as members of this committee, but in our specific responsibility of exercising our adviceand-consent responsibility. 

Mr. Bolton has seen this information, but we cannot? Mr. Bolton 

could see this information, but a 32-year Senator, who never had 

once in his entire career had anybody raise a question about his 

treatment of secret or classified data—I’m not entitled to see it? 

I would like someone to explain that to me. Can Ambassador 

Negroponte explain it? Can General Hayden explain it? Can someone at least do us the courtesy of telling us why this information 

has not been provided? 

After all the work we’ve done in the past decade to strengthen 

the role of this committee, it is a serious mistake, in my view, for 

all of us to acquiesce when the administration is withholding the 

relevant information, whether they think it is relevant or not. The 

integrity of the nominating process and our constitutional role is 

being challenged, in my view. Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President ‘‘shall nominate and, by and with 

the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, 

other public ministers and counsels, judges of the Supreme Court, 

and all other officers of the United States,’’ end of quote. 

The failure of this administration to cooperate with this committee, and the rationale offered for this failure, that the Department does not believe these requests to be specifically tied to issues 

being deliberated by the committee, it has no constitutional justification, and it does damage to the standing and the ability of this 

committee and other committees to perform its function of oversight and advice and consent. 

What makes this administration think that it has the right to determine what the U.S. Senate needs in order to perform its constitutional responsibility? It has asserted neither executive privilege, nor any constitutionally based rationale for not cooperating 

with this committee. It has no right under past practices, no right 

under the Constitution, to offer as a rationale that, quote—they ‘‘do 

not believe the request to be specifically tied to the issues being deliberated by the committee.’’ I repeat what my mother says, ‘‘Who 

died and left them boss?’’ 

I do not work for the President of the United States of America. 

None of you work for the President of the United States of America. We are a coequal branch, equally powerful and important, with 

a specifically assigned constitutional responsibility that only we 

have a right to determine whether information is relevant or not. 

Period. 

44 

The doctrine of separation of powers. It’s within our power, and 

ours alone, to decide what we think is relevant to our deliberations 

in the exercise of our responsibility. 

With due respect, Mr. Chairman, I think we’re making a big mistaken by not insisting that this information come forward. And I 

might say, for the record, I don’t think the information requested 

is going to shed much light on anything. My guess is—I’ve gone out 

and asked former Republican—present Republicans—former Democrat administration officials, ‘‘Is this unusual to ask for this information?’’ The answer I got was, no, it’s not that unusual. But I 

think this is a matter of principle. 

Mr. Chairman, I realize you’re in a difficult position. I’ve been 

there. Seventeen years, I was the chairman or ranking member of 

the Judiciary Committee. I remember a President named Clinton 

contacting me, through his staff and directly. He wanted to have 

a woman named Zoe Baird to be Attorney General. It was his first 

appointment. He needed it badly. Politically, it was devastating to 

lose. I knew what my party would think about me, but I insisted 

that all relevant information be made available, even though they 

argued that it is not relevant to the inquiry. I made it clear to the 

President, ‘‘We will not go forward.’’ And we defeated—not an act 

I loved doing—the first major appointee after Secretary of State?— 

we defeated, in the Committee, Judiciary, the Attorney General of 

the United States of America, headed by a Democrat and the Majority Democrats. 

Then along came a woman named Zoe Baird. And I asked for 

other—I mean, excuse me, Kimba Wood—and we jointly, Republicans and Democrats, said, ‘‘We insist on information relating to 

not only her, but her husband, as related to an accusation.’’ The 

administration plead, ‘‘Do not do this.’’ And, adding insult to injury, 

a senior Democrat was the guy who defeated the second nominee 

of a first-term President. That’s our constitutional responsibility. 

Whether or not it causes defeat or not is not relevant. The relevant point is, no administration, Democrat or Republican, has the 

right to tell me or this committee or any other committee, what is 

relevant. If they think it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, 

state it, exert executive privilege, state a constitutional basis, but 

don’t tell me, don’t tell this Senate, ‘‘We, the administration, do not 

think it is relevant.’’ 

As I said, we don’t work for the President. And no President is 

entitled to the appointment of anyone he nominates—no President 

is entitled—by the mere fact he has nominated someone. That’s 

why they wrote the Constitution the way they did. It says ‘‘advice 

and consent.’’ And I think we have undermined our authority, and 

we have shirked our constitutional responsibility. And I intend, 

even if, tomorrow, there is a vote in the Senate and they defeat it— 

John Bolton—I would continue to insist we’re entitled to that information. It’s just a matter of principle. 

Let me now turn to the nomination. [Laughter.] 

By the way, this is a big deal to me. I think it’s a big deal to 

this committee. We’ve fought so long and so hard to regain—and 

you’ve established the stature of this committee, Mr. Chairman, 

under your leadership. It feel in some, what you might call, disrepair in the ’70s and ’80s. We weren’t taken seriously by Armed 

Services, by the Intelligence Committee, by the Appropriations 

45 

Committee. And, because of your statute, Mr. Chairman, and, I 

hope, with a little bit of help from me, we’ve reasserted the role, 

responsibility, and place of this committee. And the idea that two 

guys in the Intelligence Committee are going to tell me I can’t see 

this information? Give me a break. Give me a break. 

My concern is not about the United Nations. My concern is about 

the U.S. interests at the United Nations. And I believe it will be 

damaged if John Bolton is sent to the United Nations. 

Based on the hearings we’ve held and the interviews we’ve conducted and the documents we’ve examined, it is clear to me that 

John Bolton is engaged in four distinct patterns of conduct that 

should disqualify him from this job. 

First, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of intelligence 

analysts who disagreed with him. The removal of them. Taking 

away their portfolios. 

Second, in speeches and in testimony Mr. Bolton repeatedly tried 

to stretch the intelligence to fit his views, and repeatedly went 

back to the Intelligence community to get the facts he wanted, or, 

as one witness said, ‘‘politicizing the process.’’ 

And, lest you think that’s an exaggeration, let me ask all you— 

a rhetorical question of all you reporters out there. You write a report about this hearing, and you go back, and it’s for a major Sunday piece, and your editor says, ‘‘Do you really have to mention 

Lugar or Biden or Jones or whoever in that?’’ And you say, ‘‘Yeah, 

I think it’s relevant to the story.’’ And then this afternoon he says 

to you, ‘‘Now, are you sure you really have to mention those two 

guys?’’ And tomorrow morning you come in, and he says, ‘‘Look, I 

read it again. Are you sure—are you sure, you reporter, you have 

to mention this?’’ And you say, ‘‘Yeah, I think so.’’ And then he 

comes to you in the afternoon, before you leave—or evening—and 

says, ‘‘Look, I’m going to ask you one more time, are you sure?’’ 

Now, I know many of you want to appear in the second edition 

of Profiles in Courage at your newspaper, but I suspect it would 

have a chilling effect on you, especially if you were not a nationally 

known, highly valued at-the-moment reporter at your newspaper. 

That’s what I mean by ‘‘politicizing.’’ 

Third, in his relations with colleagues and subordinates in and 

out of government, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited abusive behavior and an intolerance of different views, as my friend from Ohio 

has said. 

And, fourth, Mr. Bolton repeatedly made misleading, disingenuous, or nonresponsive statements to this committee. 

But don’t take my word for any of this. Look closely at the senior 

Republican—senior officials in this Republican administration who 

have testified before this committee and its joint staff. Carl Ford, 

a respected intelligence professional with three decades of government service, who described himself as a huge fan—quote, ‘‘huge 

fan of Vice President Cheney.’’ He described for us not only the attempt by Mr. Bolton to remove Mr. Westermann, one of his analysts, who worked for Mr. Ford, but the unprofessional manner in 

which he treated his analysts. Quote, ‘‘Secretary Bolton chose to 

reach five or six levels below him in the bureaucracy, bringing an 

analyst into his office and giving him a tongue-lashing. He was so 

far over the line that he’s one—that he’s one of the sort of memorable moments in my career.’’ Continuing the quote, ‘‘I’ve never 

46 

seen anybody quite like Mr. Bolton—doesn’t even come close; I 

don’t have a second, third, or fourth, in terms of the way he abuses 

his power, authority—and authority with little people,’’ end of 

quote. 

Afterwards, Mr. Ford said the news of Mr. Westermann’s incident, quote, ‘‘spread like wildfire,’’ end of quote, in the bureau; so 

much so that Secretary Powell made a special point of coming 

down to an assembled group of people at NIR—or INR, and pointing out the analyst by name, and saying to the other analysts that 

he wanted them to continue, in essence, to speak truth to power. 

Let me go right to the testimony here that was before us, Mr. 

Wilkerson’s characterization of this, which is that Powell always 

went down. This was nothing unusual. 

Powell’s chief of staff, what did he say before our joint staff? He 

said, ‘‘That is to say, one of his leadership’’—referring to Powell— 

‘‘one of his leadership techniques was to walk around the building. 

He went to the basement and talked to the men who clean up in 

the basement to find out how they felt, how his morale was, and 

so forth. And he’d do it periodically throughout the building. This 

was not that sort of unprompted trip. This was a trip because several of his subordinate leaders—in this case, I think, Carl Ford, in 

particular—had indicated to him that he thought it might be necessary.’’ 

So much for the fact that he was just wandering down there and 

did this all the time. He may have, in the context that his chief 

of staff—Powell’s chief of staff said he went down. 

Listen to John McLaughlin, a career CIA professional, who 

served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and, for a time, 

as Acting Director—both positions under President Bush. When 

Mr. McLaughlin was told that Mr. Bolton was seeking to have a 

national intelligence officer for Latin America transferred, Mr. 

McLaughlin recalls that he firmly rejected, and I quote, ‘‘the request by saying, ‘Well, we’re not going to do that. Absolutely not. 

No way. End of story.’ ’’ Mr. McLaughlin explains why he’s so adamantly opposed the request, and it’s important to his rationale why 

he opposed this request. He said, ‘‘It’s perfectly all right for a policymaker to express disagreement with NIO or an analyst, and it’s 

perfectly all right for them to challenge their work vigorously, but 

I think it’s different to then request, because of a disagreement, 

that the person be transferred. And unless there is a malfeasance 

involved here—and in this case, I had a high regard for the individual’s work; therefore, I had a strong negative reaction to the suggestion of moving him.’’ Hear what he said, ‘‘it’s different to then 

request transfer because of disagreement.’’ 

Listen to Robert Hutchings, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, from 2003 to 2005. These are high-level intelligence analysts who do the national intelligence estimates that administration people get, and we get. He said, in the summer of 

2003, Mr. Bolton and his team prepared a speech on Syria and 

weapons of mass destruction that, quote, ‘‘struck me as going well 

beyond where the evidence would ultimately take us. And that was 

the judgment of the experts on my staff, as well. So I said that— 

under these circumstances, that we should not clear this kind of 

testimony.’’ 

47 

Hutchings said—went on to say Mr. Bolton took, quote, ‘‘isolated 

facts and made much more of them to build a case than I thought 

the intelligence warranted. It was, sort of, cherry-picking of little 

factoids, and little isolated bits were drawn out to present the 

starkest possible case,’’ end of quote. 

Let me make it clear. No one is saying Mr. Bolton could not have 

his own views on intelligence. All this is about is Mr. Bolton, when 

he—when he made an intelligence analyst—analysis in public, had 

to say, ‘‘I believe this to be case, notwithstanding the intelligence 

community doesn’t.’’ No one ever said a policymaker should be 

muzzled by the intelligence community. 

Let’s get this straight, what we’re talking about here. This is all 

about whether Mr. Bolton can say the ‘‘intelligence community 

thinks.’’ That’s the only reason the intelligence community’s in this. 

I can stand up, as my friend from—my chairman indicated, and 

say, ‘‘We vigorously disagree.’’ We can vigorously disagree, but I 

would never walk out of a hearing, nor would any member of this 

committee, after being briefed by the intelligence community, saying that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Xanadu, the 

nonexistent country, and walk out and say, ‘‘You know, I just got 

briefed. There are weapons of mass destruction in Xanadu.’’ I’m allowed to walk out and say, ‘‘Speaking for myself, notwithstanding 

the fact that the intelligence community doesn’t believe Xanadu 

has weapons of mass destruction, I think they do, and here’s why.’’ 

That’s what this is about. 

I used to have a friend named Sid Bailick, who was a great trial 

lawyer, and I went to work with him early on, as a young man, 

and he’d say to a jury all the time, back in the days where—you 

know, Mitch Miller’s long gone, and Lawrence Welk—he’d say, 

‘‘Follow the bouncing ball. Don’t take your eye off the ball here.’’ 

The ball is not, Are we attempting—or anyone attempting to muzzle Mr. Bolton as to what his opinion is? That’s not what the intelligence community was doing. It was attempting to say, ‘‘Don’t say 

we believe that.’’ 

Listen to Larry Wilkerson, the chief of staff of the Secretary of 

State, a retired marine colonel. He said that Mr. Bolton, quote— 

and I’m quoting—not my quote; his quote—‘‘is a lousy leader,’’ end 

of quote, and had objected to him being U.N. Ambassador because, 

quote, ‘‘there are,’’ quote, ‘‘100 to 150 people in New York that have 

to be led, and led well,’’ end of quote. He described Mr. Bolton as 

a man who, quote, ‘‘counts beans,’’ continue to quote, ‘‘with no willingness, and, in many cases, no capacity, to understand that other 

things that were happening around those beans. And that is just 

a recipe for problems at the United Nations,’’ end of quote. A Republican, colonel, chief of staff for the Secretary of State, with indirect responsibility of supervising Mr. Bolton. Mr. Wilkerson knows 

of what he speaks, as chief of staff. He kept, as everyone said, and 

he said, an open door, literally an open door, and he describes a 

regular flow of officials walking through it to complain about Mr. 

Bolton’s behavior. 

These aren’t anecdotal incidences. Mr. Wilkerson told us that because of the problems with Mr. Bolton’s speeches not always being 

properly cleared, that Deputy Secretary Armitage, quote, ‘‘made a 

decision that John Bolton would not give any testimony, nor give 

any speech, that wasn’t cleared first by Rich,’’ referring to the DepVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
48 

uty Secretary of State, Rich Armitage. And he later told—that is, 

Mr. Wilkerson told the New York Times, and I quote, ‘‘ that, if anything, the restrictions on Mr. Bolton got more stringent as time 

went on.’’ Quoting, ‘‘No one else was subjected to these type restrictions,’’ end of quote. 

Listen to John Wolf, a career Foreign Service Officer for 35 

years, who worked closely with Mr. Bolton during two different 

tours. His most recent tour was from 2001 to 2004, when he was 

Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. Mr. Wolf told the 

committee staff, Republicans and Democrats, that Mr. Bolton 

blocked an assignment of a man he described as a truly outstanding civil servant some nine months after an inadvertent mistake by that officer. Mr. Wolf says that Mr. Bolton asked him to 

remove two other officials because of disagreements over policy. 

And then Mr. Bolton, quote, ‘‘tended not to be enthusiastic about 

alternative views,’’ end of quote. Talk about State-Departmentspeak. 

Listen to Mr. Wil Taft, who served as the State Department’s 

legal advisor under Secretary Powell, and, before that, as general 

counsel in two other government departments, as well as Deputy 

Secretary of Defense and as former Ambassador to NATO. He told 

the committee that he had to take the extraordinary step—the extraordinary step—of going to Deputy Secretary Armitage to have 

Armitage remind Mr. Bolton that Mr. Bolton was required to work 

with Mr. Taft on lawsuits in which the State Department was the 

defendant. Why? Because Mr. Bolton decided he could deal with 

the Justice Department himself on the case and unilaterally decided to tell one of Mr. Taft’s attorneys, working for Mr. Taft, that 

his attorney was, quote, ‘‘off the case.’’ 

Mr. Bolton is an attorney, and a very good attorney. He was once 

an attorney—he was one general counsel to AID, an assistant attorney general in the civil division. He should have understood the 

simple concept that the lawyers for Colin Powell would need to 

work on the lawsuit that was filed against Colin Powell. Yet, he 

had the arrogance to think that he knew better, and dismissed the 

State Department’s own lawyer, and, consequently, had to be reminded, by Mr. Armitage, who was boss. 

Read the memo from Mr. Rich Armitage to Mr. Bolton in the 

package of documents the State Department gave us last Friday. 

Then ask yourself whether this is a guy who’s likely to follow directions from Washington. 

Listen to Tom Hubbard, another career Foreign Service Officer 

of long service, whose last post was as Ambassador to South Korea. 

And I have never heard—nary a negative word, that I’ve heard, 

has been said about him. 

During the hearing on April 11, Senator Chafee asked Mr. Bolton 

about a speech in Seoul on the eve of the Six-Party talks. Mr. 

Bolton replied, quote, ‘‘And I can tell you what our Ambassador to 

South Korea Tom Hubbard said after the speech. He said, ‘Thanks 

a lot for the speech, John. It’s helps us a lot out here.’ ’’ 

What did that trigger? Mr. Hubbard contacting the committee. 

He either read it or heard the answer to your question, Senator 

Chafee, and felt obliged to contact the committee. Nobody contacted 

Ambassador Hubbard, to the best of my knowledge. 

49 

He comes to us, Democrat and Republican, and he says, basically, ‘‘Let’s get the facts straight. I remember it quite differently.’’ 

And he volunteered—and when he volunteered, he made it clear 

that he disagreed wholesomely with the tone of Mr. Bolton’s 

speech, thought Mr. Bolton’s speech was unhelpful to the negotiation process, and felt that Mr. Bolton surely knew that. 

According to a memorandum for the record prepared by the Republican staff of the committee who first interviewed Mr. Hubbard, 

on April 26th, without a Democratic staff present, Hubbard said 

that he felt compelled to contact the committee, felt compelled to 

contact the Republican staff. So much for Democratic, you know, 

digging things up here. He felt compelled to go to the Republican 

staff. And he said that he’s—because, quote, ‘‘It’s misleading, to say 

the least, to have me praising him for the speech.’’ Let me read 

that again. Mr. Hubbard said, on his own initiative contacting the 

Republican staff, quote, ‘‘It’s misleading, to say the least, to have 

me praising him for the speech,’’ end of quote. 

If you’re keeping track, now, that’s seven senior officials who 

have served at the Department of State or the CIA in this administration, who have testified to the committee about Mr. Bolton’s actions. They told us that Mr. Bolton, one, seeks retribution against 

intelligence analysts or policy officials who disagree with him. They 

told us he pushes the envelope on intelligence information. 

I don’t recall—I’ve been here for seven Presidents. I’m not going 

to embarrass any of my colleagues what they recall; I’ll tell you 

what I don’t recall. I don’t recall, ever, a senior official in a State 

Department, or Defense Department, for that matter, being told by 

the Secretary of State and/or the Deputy Secretary of State or Defense, that you cannot say a single thing before a—before the Senate 

Committees or House committees, or make a single public speech 

without clearing it first. Maybe that’s happened. If it is, it’s the 

best-kept secret in 32 years, since I’ve been here. 

Thirdly, what did they say, these seven senior officials? He 

doesn’t like to hear dissent. He doesn’t like to follow rules. He’s a 

bad manager of people. He can’t see the forest for the trees. And 

he mischaracterizes the views of his colleagues. 

This is neither hearsay nor innuendo; as suggested in our prior 

meeting, that it was hearsay or innuendo. This is what a judge 

would call direct evidence and testimony and documentary evidence—direct evidence. And it’s all there for every Senator to see. 

Some people might ask, as Senator Lugar did, and may assert, 

that none of this matters. Nobody lost a job. Mr. Bolton gave these 

speeches he was authorized to give—after yelling at the State Department lawyer, the lawyer is put back in the case. And the young 

career officer that Mr. Bolton blackballed from a career-advancing 

assignment ultimately landed on his feet. No harm, no foul. 

If you think his actions don’t matter, then why would so many 

serious people, not working in the government, come forward, with 

little to gain and a lot to lose, to tell their stories? We didn’t subpoena a single person. We didn’t pursue anyone to come. We asked, 

they came. And they came forward either without being asked or 

being asked because their name came up. They came forward because they think Mr. Bolton actions matter a lot. 

50 

If you think his actions don’t matter, why was it necessary for 

Rich Armitage to issue a special decree applied to Mr. Bolton’s 

speeches? Because words matter, especially when spoken by a highgovernment official. 

If you think his actions don’t matter, why did Armitage, according to Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff of the Secretary of State, get 

mad at his Asian expert, Jim Kelly, for clearing the Seoul speech? 

Because it almost impeded the Six-Party talks, led Secretary Powell having to send an envoy to New York after that speech to encourage the North Koreans to come to the talks. 

If you think his actions don’t matter, why did Mr. Armitage postpone Mr. Bolton’s testimony on Syria? By the way, Mr. Bolton told 

us that he canceled his own testimony. But Larry Wilkerson said 

that Secretary Armitage is the one who canceled it, because there 

was, quote, ‘‘some diplomacy at the time that might not have 

served us well, and, also, the testimony was a bit off the policy line, 

and so, needed to be corrected somewhat.’’ In other words, we 

didn’t let him make the—give the testimony. 

Remember, this is summer of 2003, when Iraq—when we’re in 

Iraq. Some people are talking about who’s next. Syria’s high on the 

list. Mr. Bolton wants to give a statement about Syria’s alleged 

weapons-of-mass-destruction programs that Mr. Hutchings says 

was not supported by the intelligence. This is just a few months 

after faulty intelligence helped make the case for the war in Iraq, 

and Mr. Bolton is trying to push the intelligence envelope on Syria; 

and Armitage intervenes to stop it, thank goodness. 

Connect the dots, folks. Of course it matters. We don’t know exactly what Mr. Bolton wanted to say, because these are among the 

documents the State Department’s refused to turn over. But we do 

know the—what the intelligence community said. They said, ‘‘No 

way. Don’t characterize us that way.’’ Why are they hiding, not providing those documents? 

If you think these actions didn’t matter, then why did Colin Powell make a special point, to use Carl Ford’s words, to go down to 

the Intelligence Bureau to tell—INR—to tell them do their jobs? 

Carl Ford said that he made visits to INR before, but both Ford 

and Larry Wilkerson, who was chief of staff, said this instance was 

a special trip. 

If you think these actions don’t matter, why did John Wolf have 

to assign a brilliant mid-level officer to another bureau? Because 

he said, quote—he, Wolf, said—‘‘He didn’t want this brilliant young 

analyst manning an empty desk.’’ He stayed on a good career tack 

only because Mr. Wolf worked to secure him an assignment away 

from Mr. Bolton’s reach, according to Mr. Wolf. 

If you think actions don’t matter, then listen to Mr. Hutchings 

on the dangerous policymakers—on the dangers of policymakers 

pushing to stretch the intelligence, even if they fail. Here’s what 

he said, ‘‘When policy officials come back repeatedly to push the 

same kind of judgments and push the intelligence community to 

confirm a particular set of judgments, it does have an affect of politicizing intelligence, because the so-called correct answer becomes 

all too clear. And even when it’s successfully resisted, it has an effect.’’ Continuing to quote, ‘‘It creates a climate of intimidation and 

a culture of conformity that is damaging,’’ end of quote. 

It matters, even if they didn’t get fired. 

51 

Is Mr. Bolton really worthy of this trouble? Is this really the best 

we can do? Are there no other tough-minded professionals in the 

Republican party? 

It’s been said, usually in the same breath about Mr. Bolton’s reputation of straight talk, that if you oppose Mr. Bolton, you oppose 

U.N. reform. Let me remind you all, it was Joe Biden and Jesse 

Helms—Joe Biden and Jesse Helms—over the objection of the 

chairman and my colleague, Mr. Sarbanes, their objection, that got 

tough on the U.N., wrote the reform legislation that the chairman 

and my senior member opposed. I don’t need a lesson, from Mr. 

Bolton or anybody else, how to get tough with the U.N., nor does 

Senator Helms. 

Mr. Bolton isn’t the only guy who can push the U.N. reform. 

Matter of fact, he’s the worst guy. In fact, the Secretary of State 

has said as much, because—no one talks about this—I wanted to 

get that—I know the vote’s almost over—four days after Mr. 

Bolton’s nomination was announced, the Secretary of State appointed someone else to handle the issue of U.N. reform. On March 

11th, the Secretary appointed Dr. Tahir Kheli to, quote, ‘‘serve as 

the Secretary’s senior advisor and chief interlocutor on U.N. reform 

in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations.’’ Dr. Tahir Khalid reports directly to the Secretary of 

State. Continuing, the Secretary said, ‘‘She will engage the U.N. 

Secretary General and the Secretary on U.N. reform efforts, including the high-level panel report and the report of the Secretary General on Reform. She will coordinate within the State Department 

and the interagency community the U.S. Government’s position on 

reform.’’ 

So much for that being the rationale for why Bolton was appointed. I understand why people would say that. It’s the last 

straw I think you can grasp at. 

The press release makes no mention—the Secretary’s press release makes no mention of Mr. Bolton or the U.N. Ambassador. So 

let’s not kid each other. It’s not about U.N. reform; it’s about 

whether the appointment of Mr. Bolton is in the national interest. 

Is it in the national interest to have, as some Republican administration officials have characterized, have a bully—their words—and 

a lousy leader—their words—running our mission in New York, 

with 150 people who need strong leadership? 

Concluding, Mr. President—Mr. Chairman, I don’t believe it’s in 

the interest, the national interest, to have an ideologue who appears to have no governor on his internal engine representing the 

United States at the U.N. 

Is it in the national interest to have someone who has a reputation for exaggerating intelligence, seeking and speaking for the 

U.N. when the next crisis arises, whether it’s Iran or Syria? And 

it will arise. We have already lost a lot of credibility at home and 

abroad after the fiasco over the intelligence on Iraq, and Mr. Bolton 

is not the man to help us to rebuild it. He’s the wrong choice. We 

can do a lot better. And I think an awful lot of our colleagues know 

that, notwithstanding the administration wanting him. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know how much time is left 

of the hour we had. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator has at least 13 minutes, but we just 

said ‘‘more or less,’’ and—— 

52 

Senator BIDEN. Well, I would yield to my friend, Senator Specter—not Senator Specter—Senator Sarbanes—he’s my friend, 

too—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. To Senator Sarbanes, as much time 

as he needs. 

I’m going to vote. 

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

MARYLAND 

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I want to take just a moment 

or two of the committee’s time, at the outset, to read the names of 

those who have served as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in order to set some context in thinking about this nomination: Warren Austin, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., James Wadsworth, 

Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg, George W. Ball, James Russell 

Wiggins, Charles Yost, George Bush, John Scali, Daniel P. Moynihan, William W. Scranton, Andrew J. Young, Donald F. 

McHenry, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Vernon Walters, Thomas Pickering, 

Edward Joseph Perkins, Madeleine Albright, Bill Richardson, Richard Holbrooke, John Negroponte, and John Danforth. 

Now, I do this to underscore the importance of the U.N. ambassadorship, and it’s an importance that I think has been recognized 

in prior administrations. In fact, in some administrations the U.N. 

Ambassador has been given Cabinet status—not in all, but in 

some, the position has been elevated to Cabinet status. It’s a very 

highly-visible position. In the U.N., our Ambassador to the U.N. is, 

in effect, our spokesman, in so many ways, to the world. 

Now, this has been underscored, the importance of the U.N., by 

these selections. The U.N. makes decisions that affect war and 

peace. It has a vital role in advancing U.S. foreign-policy objectives, 

if we are skillful in exercising our leadership at the U.N. It helps 

to determine whether the United States will have international 

support and allies, or will be forced to undertake difficult missions 

on its own, in the face of broad opposition across the globe. The 

United Nations is a forum for making our case to the world, for 

demonstrating international leadership and building multilateral 

cooperation. 

Our representatives at the United Nations must be men and 

women of exceptional integrity and credibility who can listen and 

persuade, whose counsel and leadership other nations will seek and 

rely on. This is a very important position. And the quality of the 

previous ambassadors demonstrates that that is how it’s been so 

regarded in administration after administration, whether Democratic or Republican. 

Now, over a number of years, Mr. Bolton has demonstrated outright hostility for the United Nations as an institution and for the 

legitimacy of international law. He has argued repeatedly that the 

United States has no legal obligation to pay its dues to the United 

Nations, that treaties are nothing more than political commitments. He called the Law of the Sea Treaty, which has been endorsed by our military and submitted by President Bush as an urgent priority for Senate advice and consent, an illegitimate method 

53 

of forcing fundamental policy changes on the United States outside 

the customary political process. He is quoted as saying that, ‘‘It is 

a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law, even 

when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so, because, over 

the long term, the goal of those who think that international law 

really means anything are those who want to constrict the United 

States.’’ 

To send someone as our Ambassador to the United Nations who 

does not demonstrate a basic respect for the institution and its 

legal foundations is a disservice to our national interests. This has 

nothing to do with whether you’re going to carry out reforms at the 

U.N. or more closely monitor its activities. This represents very 

basic questions about one’s mindset about the United States, about 

the United Nations, and about international law. 

Secondly, I think it’s very clear that Mr. Bolton does not have 

the diplomatic skills or, indeed, the demeanor to represent our 

country effectively. There are certainly moments when the situation may call for bluntness, when abandoning diplomatic niceties 

can convey the urgency of a particular issue or position; however, 

Mr. Bolton has shown a propensity for making extreme and provocative statements that have caused unnecessary conflict and confrontation. 

Does it help us in trying to shape the direction in which the U.N. 

is to move when Mr. Bolton says that the Security Council should 

have one permanent member—the United States—because that’s 

real reflection of the distribution of power in the world? 

Does anyone think that Mr. Bolton’s assertion that if the U.N. 

Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn’t make 

a bit of difference? Does that help us in persuading other countries 

to support U.N. reform efforts? 

These are not isolated misstatements or slips of the tongue, but, 

rather, his customary and consistent approach to dealing with others who disagree with him. Even given the opportunity to demonstrate a less confrontational approach, he has repeatedly declined to do so. Mr. Bolton, time and time again, has shown himself 

singularly lacking in the willingness to hear, to consider, and to respect opposing points of view. 

Contrast that attitude with these comments to the committee, in 

their confirmations hearings, by Ambassador Moynihan and by 

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. 

Now, I might note, Mr. Chairman, that all of these previous 

nominees to be U.N. Ambassadors were approved by overwhelming 

votes in the committee and on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Not a 

one of them had a close vote; many of them, unanimous; and in the 

instances where it wasn’t, only a handful of votes. 

Pat Moynihan, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—and I set out these quotes to contrast 

them with all the testimony we received about how Mr. Bolton carries on his activities—said, and I quote, ‘‘A certain principal statement of views on both sides can be useful. It requires that we respect what others think, and try to understand what they think, 

and ask that they do the same in return. Things where we disagree 

are marginal compared with where we do agree, and yet it is so 

easy to grow estranged at the first problem. The first question is 

how to get away from the confrontation system, back to the quest 

54 

for understanding in a situation where this is wholly possible and 

entirely necessary.’’ 

And Ambassador Kirkpatrick, in her confirmation hearing before 

this committee, said, and I quote, ‘‘I do not think that one should 

ever seek confrontation. What I have every intention and hope of 

doing is to operate in a low-key, quiet, persuasive, and consensusbuilding way.’’ 

Now, thirdly—and I want to speak to the prospects of Mr. 

Bolton’s credibility as our spokesperson at the United Nations—the 

material has been quite extensively developed—and I’ll not go into 

it in detail here—but it’s clear that he’s attempted to politicize intelligence in a way that I think has harmed our nation’s diplomacy. 

He sought to transfer two intelligence analysts who disagreed 

with him on substantive matters. There was such a feeling of fear 

and intimidation in the Department that the Secretary of State actually visited with the analysts to give them reassurance. He’s repeatedly attempted to stretch the facts to back his own ideological 

predispositions. 

You know, in testimony here, when he had the hearing, he denied that he tried to have analysts punished, or to discipline a CIA 

employee, or that he thought—or sought retribution against employees with dissenting views. He told us, and I quote, ‘‘I shrugged 

my shoulders, and I moved on,’’ when his attempts to have them 

reassigned were rebuffed. And yet we have learned, from extensive 

interviews with numerous administration officials, he did try to 

have the analysts removed from their positions, he did seek to punish people for disagreeing with him, and he did persist in his efforts for many months after he supposedly made his point and 

moved on. 

That he was ultimately unsuccessful does not speak for Mr. 

Bolton. The question is not solely whether the truth is in the results. What it speaks to is the steadiness and determination of 

those professionals who withstood his demands and refused to bend 

to this inordinate pressure that he was applying. 

Given this conduct, when he goes before the U.N. to make a 

statement about evidence of nuclear weapons production or a terrorist plot, or whatever it may be, who’s going to believe him, 

knowing that he repeatedly punished intelligence analysts who delivered contradictory information, knowing that he is the kind of 

person who, as Robert Hutchings, the former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, put it, ‘‘took isolated facts and made 

much more of them to build a case than I thought the intelligence 

warranted. It was a cherry-picking of little factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to present the starkest possible 

case.’’ 

We need a credible spokesman at the United Nations, and this 

past conduct on his part casts serious doubt. 

Finally, Mr. Bolton’s poor administrative and management skills, 

in my view, make him unfit to exercise a senior leadership role. 

The testimony from Carl Ford, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, has previously been referred to. He said 

that, ‘‘In my experience throughout my time in the executive 

branch, I have really never seen someone so abusive to such a subordinate person.’’ He said he didn’t have anyone else in mind who 

55 

even comes close to John Bolton, in terms of the way that he 

abuses his power and his authority with little people. 

Larry Wilkerson, who was Secretary Powell’s chief of staff, described to the committee staff the kind of problems he had on a 

daily basis in dealing with Bolton, ‘‘Assistant secretaries, principal 

deputy assistant secretaries, acting assistant secretaries coming 

into my office and telling me, ‘Can I sit down?’ And I would say 

to them, ‘Sure. Sit down. What’s the problem?’ ‘I’ve got to leave.’ 

‘What’s the problem?’ ‘Bolton.’ ’’ When asked if he got similar complaints about other under secretaries, he replied, ‘‘On one occasion, 

on one particular individual. The rest were all about Under Secretary Bolton.’’ In summarizing his experience with Bolton, 

Wilkerson stated, ‘‘I think he’s a lousy leader. And there are 100 

to 150 people up there that have to be led. They have to be led 

well, and they have to be led properly.’’ 

Being Ambassador to the United Nations is not just a representational job, it’s also a managerial job. There are 125 full-time permanent State Department employees working there at our mission, 

alongside of numerous detailees from other agencies and departments. The Ambassador has supervisory responsibility over all 

these people. Most are career civil servants, and they are there to 

represent the policies of our President and to serve the interests of 

our nation. What are they going to do up there in New York if John 

Bolton repeats the kind of abusive behavior that led people in the 

State Department, under incredible duress, to seek the support and 

counsel of their assistant secretaries and the Deputy Secretary and 

the Secretary’s chief of staff? There will no one in New York to 

shield them from the wrath and vindictiveness of John Bolton. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just say, because, to some now, it’s a favorite pastime to assault the United Nations, but the United Nations 

has a very important role to play. 

Skillful U.S. leadership can enhance our national interests in 

very significant ways. And part of that skillful leadership is to send 

an ambassador who has the skill and the wisdom and all of the 

other talents that are essential to carrying out his responsibilities 

in an effective manner. I think this nominee falls far short of that 

standard, and that is why I oppose his confirmation. 

And let me just add a word on my respect for those witnesses 

who came forward. Now, Senator Biden is absolutely right, these 

people, in effect, volunteered themselves to give what they felt 

would be an accurate view of Mr. Bolton’s behavior, particularly 

the interpersonal behavior. It took a lot of courage, in my view, for 

people like Carl Ford and Mr. Wilkerson, Mr. Hutchings, Ambassador Hubbard, and others to come forward. I’m concerned that 

they’re going to pay a price for that, for a very brave action. I deeply regret if that should turn out to be the case. I think they—their 

motive in coming was the national interest of their country. In that 

sense, I think they were true patriots. They had nothing to gain 

by opposing the nomination; in fact, they may have much to lose. 

They clearly were not ideologues with an ax to grind. In fact, they 

were very supportive of the policies of the President. But they felt 

that it was their duty, as loyal Americans and as public servants, 

to tell the truth and to take the—and to follow their consciences. 

And I respect that. And I want to place that on the record and to 

thank them for this service to their country. 

56 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes. 

Let me ask the Clerk how much time now remains on both sides? 

An hour and 32 minutes remains on both sides. Each? Okay. Very 

well. 

I’d recognize Senator Allen, the distinguished Senator from Virginia. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

VIRGINIA 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

your patience and the professional manner in which you have handled this nomination. You’ve maintained, I believe, a great sense 

of fairness and full disclosure, which I think is in the interest of 

this committee, the American people, and also this nominee. 

The situation here is one where I know some of the other side 

of the aisle will be quoting Senator Voinovich, and some seem to 

worry about these interpersonal skills. You hear worries and concerns about John Bolton’s speech characterizing living in North 

Korea as ‘‘a hellish nightmare.’’ I will remind folks that then the 

North Koreans said that he was ‘‘human scum.’’ 

The reality is, as I—I would think that it is a hellish nightmare 

to have to live in North Korea. And this committee has had hearings about how awful it is for those who actually do get to escape. 

They go to China, then China sends them back to be tortured, or 

worse. 

I also will note, just for the history, in some of the cases, from 

some of the colleagues on this committee, in 2001, when John 

Bolton was nominated for Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, before all these concerns about 

speech-writing and—‘‘interpersonal skills’’ was the phrase used— 

arose, many of them voted against him then. And I would take note 

of that. 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss John Bolton and his 

qualifications actually to serve as Ambassador to the United Nations. What has been lost, Mr. Chairman, though, in this debate, 

virtually from the very beginning, is the desperate need for reform 

in the United Nations. The testimony before the committee, and 

subsequent interviews conducted by staff, in all of this there’s virtually no mention or discussion of what needs to be done to reform 

the United Nations. 

I do believe, contrary to my colleague from Maryland, Senator 

Sarbanes, that John Bolton does have the skills. He has the wisdom to effectuate these changes. More importantly, he also has the 

principles. I think he’s the right person to unflinchingly lead those 

changes as our representative. 

Rather than focusing on all these innuendos and assertions 

against John Bolton and worrying about, gosh, people whose sensibilities are easily offended and this fascination with how speeches 

are crafted and noting that he said the same thing about Cuban 

biological weapons capabilities as did Mr. Ford, we ought to focus— 

the one who really ought to be getting the scrutiny is the United 

Nations. The United Nations is the one that we need to be worrying about them straying. And, rather than worrying about controlling John Bolton, I’d prefer to pursue the U.N. abuse and their 

57 

anti-Americanism. And I’m much more concerned about the United 

Nations being used as a front for dictatorships and terrorism. 

The United Nations—you know, we’ve just witnessed scandal 

after scandal being uncovered. Unfortunately, these are not things 

that can be addressed very easily by internal changes. They are 

issues that have shaken the credibility of the United Nations body 

and caused many of our citizens here in the United States, and, indeed, people around the world, to wonder whether the United Nations has any real relevance or redeeming role in world affairs. 

The United Nations was founded on many principles, one of 

which was to promote universal human rights and freedoms for all 

people. And while the United Nations does a number of admirable 

things, it’s also beholden to tyrants and dictators and repressive regimes in certain circumstances. 

Not considering even the scandals, this is an organization that 

has allowed the world’s worst violators of human rights to chair the 

Commission on Human Rights. When the United States has made 

a commitment to the spread of freedom and justice throughout the 

world, it’s difficult for our citizens to see the United Nations as 

anything but a waste of their tax dollars when countries like Libya 

and Sudan chair the Human Rights Commission. And, just recently, just last week, Zimbabwe selected as a member of the 

Human Rights Commission. Surely, not an indication that Secretary General Kofi Annan’s call for reform on the Commission of 

Human Rights is being heeded. 

We’re public servants. Obviously, we have to make decisions 

here. We’re also stewards of the taxpayers’ money. The United 

States is the largest contributor. And it was something that Senator Helms and Senator Biden worked out in the funding of the 

United Nations. Over $2 billion a year. Just for their regular budget, it’s $439 million; but over $2 billion a year go to the United Nations. Twenty-two percent of their funding comes from American 

taxpayers. 

As the largest contributor to the United Nations, we ought to 

hold them accountable to certain principles and certain policies. 

One principle surely should be the Commission on Human Rights, 

and to have reasonable requirements that human rights are actually honored in the countries who serve on that commission. 

I think all Americans want reforms enacted that would prevent 

future abuse programs, such as the Oil-for-Food scandal that 

plowed in—allowed Saddam and his thugs to skim off $20 billion. 

We ought to hold the U.N. peacekeepers who commit crimes 

against children accountable. The American people, I think, demand swift and severe action against this. And, indeed, if our U.S. 

Government had ever done anything like this, our citizens would 

certainly hold our government accountable for it, and we certainly 

ought to do the same with the United Nations. 

We have to look—to work with like-minded reformers at the U.N. 

to make sure policies are implemented to prevent similar abuses in 

the future. And reform is what is necessary. The United Nations 

is in a crisis, and our country and our taxpayers have a strong interest in seeing that it emerge as a credible and relevant institution once again. 

The U.N. Security Council and International Atomic Energy 

Agency, IAEA, they need—they’re very needed in—for discussing 

58 

the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the actions that are needed to be taken to ensure that rogue nations do not acquire those 

weapons. 

We have seen, in recent years, that the United Nations can provide an important role in helping spread democracy and build societies that have been ruined by decades of repression and tyranny. 

The United Nations has an important role to play in the future of 

global affairs and security. But it only can do so if it takes serious 

steps to reform from the extraordinary corruption and ineptitude 

that has plagued it in recent years. 

Now, John Bolton’s qualifications. He comes to this nomination 

with a broad and deep knowledge of international affairs, from his 

early days as general counsel to the U.S. Agency for International 

Development under the Reagan administration, to his most recent 

post, of course, as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Affairs. In all these situations, Mr. Bolton has spent 

a great deal of time and his professional life working on U.S. foreign policy and devising strategies to carry out effectively that policy. 

Some have criticized John Bolton as being a rigid unilateral— 

unilateralist who’s incapable of building consensus with allies. 

However, his service in this administration shows otherwise. 

Mr. Bolton led the U.S. negotiations to develop President Bush’s 

Proliferation Security Initiative. That brought in 60 countries to 

work with us to help stop, or interdict, the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction and related materials worldwide, and also delivery systems. 

To further combat nuclear proliferation, Mr. Bolton helped create 

the Global Partnership at the G8 Summit in Canada. This partnership doubled the size of the nonproliferation effort in the former 

Soviet Union by committing our G8 partners to match the United 

States $1 billion per year Cooperative Threat Reduction, or NunnLugar, Program. 

He also played a central role in negotiating the treaty of Moscow, 

which will reduce operationally deployed nuclear weapons by twothirds. 

As Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, 

John Bolton led an effort to have the United Nations change its 

odious resolution which likened Zionism to racism. And it is hard 

to get the United Nations, or any group, to rescind a resolution, but 

he was able to do that. 

So, he does have the knowledge, he does have the experience to 

effectively represent the United States in the United Nations, and 

also negotiate the changes that need to be made to ensure its relevancy in the future. 

Now, a few of us—a few here may not agree with his forthright 

critique of the United Nations and its failings, but it’s clear to me 

that Mr. Bolton has placed a great deal of thought into his views. 

And, in fact, I think his views are borne out by the actions, or lack 

of actions, by the United Nations. I think the American people 

want someone at the United Nations who pushes strongly for reform and is not going to be seduced by flowery, evasive pontifications from those bureaucrats. 

Senator Biden said, ‘‘Well, who was he thinking of? And maybe 

Mr. Bolton should have had another position.’’ Well, President 

59 

Bush was elected, and that’s who he thought should be in this position. And I think that—I’ll say for myself—I think John Bolton is 

the type of person, or someone like him, should be in this position. 

We are not electing Mr. Congeniality. We do not need Mr. 

Milktoast in the United Nations. We’re not electing Mr. Peepers to 

go there and just be really happy and drinking tea with their pinkies up and just saying all these meaningless things, when we do 

need a straight-talker and someone who’s going to go there and 

shake it up. And it needs shaking up. It needs reform. We can’t just keep spending $2 billion a year of the taxpayers’ 

money and have the sort of fraud, abuse, lack of accountability, 

propping up dictators, funneling money to corrupt regimes, whether it’s Saddam’s or others. 

And so, I know that this has been a confirmation process that we 

haven’t seen—at least I haven’t. I haven’t been here as long as 

many in the Senate. And we’ve pursued all these wild claims. 

They’ve been exaggerations. The concerns of Mr. Westermann or 

any of these folks, and the speech-crafting—the point of the matter, 

they’re all in their jobs. I think they’re more secure and safe now. 

But if any of them ever had anyone reduce their position, it would 

be looked upon as retribution, so I think, in the grievance procedures, they’re safer than ever. I thought Mr. Ford was a very engaging, likeable individual, but the bottom line was, he wasn’t in 

the meeting when the supposed finger-wagging was going on. He 

couldn’t remember whether or not the word ‘‘fire’’ was used. The 

bottom line is, all these people are still in their positions. 

The exaggerated innuendo that came up in the last hearing from 

Ms. Townsel, I’m not going to repeat all the adequately rebutted 

arguments of our chairman, but Ms. Townsel certainly had—did 

not have much credibility, and the facts simply were not as she 

represented—in fact, clearly were not true. 

So, while we’ve gone through these overly hyped charges, I think 

they have been refuted, and, really, they don’t have much bearing, 

at least in my view, to say there’s any compelling reason that John 

Bolton is not the right person to actually represent the interests, 

the principles, and desires of the American people in the United 

Nations. I do think the President has selected wisely in John 

Bolton. 

Now, the way that this is going to proceed—after the last hearing we had, where we played for second down—as I understand it, 

the goal here, Mr. Chairman, is to somehow vote on John Bolton’s 

nomination and to get him to proceed to the Senate floor, where 

this debate will continue for all of our colleagues. And so, I’m encouraged that, notwithstanding some of the concerns the Senator 

from Ohio has about Secretary Bolton, I thank him for allowing 

this nomination to proceed to the Senate floor. And we have moved 

the ball downfield. 

And I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy and 

your steady, fair leadership on this issue, as well as others. 

Senator BIDEN. We’re looking for an on-sides kick. [Laughter.] 

Senator ALLEN. Say, what? 

Senator BIDEN. We’re looking for an on-sides kick. 

Senator ALLEN. No, we just got a first down. [Laughter.] 

Haven’t scored yet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Allen. 

60 

Senator Biden, would you designate—— 

Senator BIDEN. Yes. Senator—we have—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd? 

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. As I say to my colleagues, we have, 

as I understand it, roughly 15 minutes for all the remaining members, each. And if others don’t show, then the time can be—we can 

move back. So, if we can try to stay at 15. 

Senator DODD. Thank you. In fact, if you would put the clock on 

here, and we may try to make it even briefer than that. 

Senator BIDEN. Is that possible, to stick the clock on—— 

Senator DODD. Clock on, so we can keep an eye on our—why 

don’t you put it on for 10. 

Senator BIDEN. Put it on for 10, and we’ll see. 

Senator DODD. And then—try and wrap it up there. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator DODD. First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me begin by thanking you, Senator Biden, and your respective staffs. It’s been over 

a month—a month ago, yesterday—that we had the public hearing, 

and then, of course, this month-long period in which a tremendous 

amount of work has been done by the committee staff. And I would 

not want the moment here to pass without expressing our gratitude to the people who sit behind us here, who spent a lot of long 

hours over the last month in gathering the information they have. 

So, I want them to know how much I appreciate the efforts that 

you’ve made on behalf of us, who sit here in the front seats. 

I appreciate, as well, the chairman’s comments during his opening remarks about some of my views regarding presidential appointees and the process of confirmation. 

I went back and tried to calculate, because of some accusations 

that I was a serial abuser when it came to presidential nominees, 

and, over the 24 years serving under—eight years under Republican administrations, and eight years under a Democratic administration—in senior-level people I’ve voted on one way or another, 

close to 7,000 presidential appointees. And of those 7,000, there 

were 52 that I voted against. Three or four of those, I’ve written 

letters and apologized to them because I voted against them, and 

I shouldn’t have. And I wrote them letters. Everett Koop is one 

that comes to mind immediately. I voted against Everett Koop, and 

regretted, afterwards, having done so, and expressed to him in the 

letter some months later. 

So, I am of a mind, not unlike my friend and colleague from Ohio 

and, I think, most of us here—I think we generally like to be supportive of presidential choices. I think that’s—doesn’t mean you 

shouldn’t object where you think it’s appropriate to do so, but, as 

a general matter, I think we like to defer, particularly when it 

comes to a Cabinet or people who are going to be part of the official 

family, if you will, of an administration. And so, I want to be on 

record as still subscribing to the views that the chairman ascribed 

to me in talking about how we ought to handle these matters. 

This is uncomfortable. None of us enjoy this. I think we’d much 

rather be debating policy issues than the fate of one individual 

here to hold a high-level position. We have an awful lot of work to 

do. There are important issues that I think the general public 

61 

would like to see us address. And so, it’s somewhat disappointing 

that we find ourselves in this situation. 

As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I’ve been here for 24 years. And 

tonight—I keep a, as I think most of us do, a little journal. It’s not 

every day. But with my two young children, two young daughters, 

I try to record moments that I think are of significance during my 

tenure here. And I’m going to go home tonight and write in my 

journal about a senatorial moment. We don’t have them every single day around here, but we had one this morning. We had a senatorial moment. And I want to tell my colleague from Ohio what 

a privilege it is to serve with him. I’ve been where you’ve been on 

nominations on these matters. It’s not comfortable. But I look back 

on those moments, and they’re some of the proudest moments I’ve 

had as a Senator, when you stand up against the flow of events 

and your own party—and Senator Biden mentioned moments that 

he’s had as—on similar cases. So, I thank him for what he did. 

I want to point out, as well, here that—and Senator Sarbanes did 

this, but I think it’s worth noting here—this will be resolved in this 

committee and on the floor of the Senate, I presume, in the next 

number of days. And another issue will come along. And those of 

us who have disagreed on this will find matters which we agree on 

with each other, and we’ll go about our business. But for an awful 

lot of people, roughly—almost 20 individuals, either presently serving or recent appointees of the Bush administration, have either 

sat at this table or sat with our staffs and have done something 

you rarely see. It wasn’t just one or two. It’s—in my experience, I 

can’t think of another example, in my 24 hours on this committee, 

to see as many people of like political stripe, of common ideological 

and philosophical viewpoints, willing to come forward and say to 

us, as a committee, ‘‘Please be careful about what you’re doing.’’ 

This is a rare moment. And our colleagues here need to take note 

of this. 

And I think it’s worth just describing who these people are, and 

quickly going down the list: Stuart Cohen, Acting Chairman of the 

National Intelligence Council at the CIA; Alan Foley, former Head 

of WINPAC at the CIA; John McLaughlin, Director of Central Intelligence—Deputy Director and Acting Director; Jamie Miscik, 

former Deputy Director of Intelligence; Thomas Hubbard, former 

U.S. Ambassador to South Korea; John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Christian Westermann, whom 

we’ve talked about, the INR analyst; Tom Finger, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; Beth Friesa, immediate supervisor to Mr. Westermann; a man who’s asked that his 

name not be made public here, but an attorney at the State Department who was involved in the issue involving Mr. Bolton’s efforts to move one of the employees there; William Taft, a legal advisor at the State Department; Fred Fleitz, the Acting Chief of 

Staff for Mr. Bolton; Neil Silver, the INR Office Director supervising Mr. Westermann; Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to 

Secretary Powell; Robert Hutchings, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. 

These are all significant people, who have all said to us, in their 

own words, one way or the other, ‘‘This is a bad choice.’’ And I just 

think it’s important that these people—whether you agree with 

them or not, that it’s important that we encourage people who feel 

62 

like this to express themselves to a committee like us here. And so, 

I hope that—regardless of the outcome of this, that there will be 

an appreciation of the work that they’ve done. 

And, Mr. Chairman, my—as you know, the very first question I 

asked on the April 11th hearing—in fact, it was the very first question the chairman asked at that hearing—had to do with what has 

been my principal concern from the very beginning. It’s been said 

by others here today, but let me just repeat it. I have—if this were 

a question of a person’s style—I think Senator Voinovich made as 

strong a case that could be made about whether or not this kind 

of a style is what you want for someone serving as an Ambassador 

to the United Nations. 

But that’s not my objection. I’m—I think if we get into the business here of deciding to be for or against people because of their 

styles, this is not going to be terribly successful, in terms of how 

we relate to them, depending upon the position, although I don’t 

disagree with his concerns about public diplomacy, as my colleague 

has expressed. 

My concern is that we’ve just come through an incredible period 

in American history where major decisions were made about this 

nation’s foreign policy based on the intelligence we are receiving. 

People are losing their lives every single day in a far-off land here, 

because there was a firm belief, based on the intelligence we had, 

that weapons of mass destruction existed. Now, put aside whether 

or not you think it’s right or wrong for us to be there today. The 

reason—the reason—that we voted the way we did on that issue 

was because it was the collective wisdom of the intelligence community that weapons of mass destruction existed. We now know 

that not to be the case. 

In the case of Mr. Bolton—putting aside his personality, putting 

aside his style—the fact that he tried to fire—and there is just— 

I don’t know how many witnesses you need to have stand up here 

to tell that that’s exactly what he did, despite what he claimed to 

do. He tried to fire—fire—intelligence analysts because they would 

not conform to what he wanted to say that represented the position 

of the United States in a public speech. We now have further evidence—my colleagues and some of them said, ‘‘I need further information.’’ During the 30 interviews that occurred over the last 30 

days, we discovered e-mails and additional information that, in 

fact, contradict rather significantly what Mr. Bolton said before 

this committee on April 11th, that it wasn’t just a casual trip to 

the CIA, it wasn’t just ended there. In fact, there were significant 

efforts to penalize, in fact, some of these people including taking 

away their building privileges or their identification to go into the 

State Department. It was—got so petty that it went beyond just a 

casual conversation at the CIA. 

That’s my major concern here. If we can’t make a statement to 

all future nominees who may be serving in critical positions today, 

‘‘If you do this, you disqualify yourself, in my view. Whatever other 

issues may arise, if you do this, if you try to fire people because 

you didn’t like what they had to say, in a supervisory position, that 

disqualifies you, in my view. I don’t care whether you’re a Democrat in the White House, a Republican in the White House. Anyone 

who does that.’’ 

63 

And my concern is not just that they may be rewarded with a 

position, but what it does down in the positions. Mr. Bolton said, 

‘‘I lost confidence in Mr. Westermann.’’ To lose confidence in someone presupposes you had confidence in them previously. There’s no 

evidence at all that Mr. Bolton had any idea who Mr. Westermann 

was. In fact, on the chart back here, as I pointed out to the committee back on the day we had the markup on this nomination, Mr. 

Bolton’s position is a senior policy position. Mr. Westermann was 

down as a GS–14 in the analyst office. He didn’t know Mr. 

Westermann. How do you lose confidence in someone you have no 

idea even exists, until you’ve discovered they told you you can’t say 

what you want to say? 

Losing confidence in someone. That wasn’t the reason that he decided he wanted to fire him. He didn’t want some GS–14 telling a 

presidential appointee that he couldn’t say what he wanted to say. 

And he said, ‘‘I’m going to fire you, or try to fire you, for doing it.’’ 

That’s what Carl Ford said he did. That’s what the chief of staff 

of Mr. Bolton said. That’s what every single person who had any 

knowledge of this case told this committee, either in testimony provided to the staff or in front of this committee, itself. That’s why, 

more than any other reasons I can think of, this nominee does not 

deserve the support of this committee. 

Now, let me just make one further point here, and I won’t go into 

all the details. The information is there. The interviews are public. 

I gather, based on what my colleague from Ohio has said here— 

and I know he’s—notice he’s left the room here, so I—I’m going to 

talk about something he said. But, Mr. Chairman, there’s a reason 

why committees exist in the Senate. And that is—and I’d ask to be 

able to go on here a couple of minutes yet. There’s a reason why 

committees exist in the Senate. Our colleagues—we defer to each 

other, because there’s no way a hundred people can sit and be busy 

on every single issue. And so, we are asked to draw judgments. I 

only know of one case—and I’m sure the staff will contradict me 

if I’m wrong here—but only one case in my 24 years where the 

committee has sent, without recommendation, a nominee to the 

floor of the Senate. I think it was the case of Kenneth Adelman, 

I believe. Now, maybe there are—I’m told that’s not the case, but— 

maybe someone has a different example. 

The point is, it’s, then, very, very rare, in my experience, because 

we’re the ones who have to do the work here. And our colleagues, 

I think, would like to rely on us, to some degree. Now, I know it’s 

done from time to time; it’s not without precedent. 

But I think it’s deluding ourselves to think that our colleagues 

are going to spend as much time as we have on this issue. They 

may listen to us on the floor. But, in some ways, these matters are 

painful and difficult to deal with. 

But we bear responsibility to our colleagues, and, I think, to the 

public, to move on here. I don’t think we’re serving the President 

well. I don’t think we’re serving our role at the United Nations 

well. This is going to drag on. This nominee may go to the floor. 

We’re going to be on the floor with this. And it’s not going to be 

a short debate on the floor. It’s going to go on. And I don’t think 

our interests are being well served by doing that. This is a painful 

choice to have to make of someone, painful for their families. I understand that. 

64 

But I would hope the committee might reconsider. If the decision 

is not to support this nominee, then it ought to end here. End here. 

And invite the President to send us someone. 

And let me say to my friend from Virginia, who’s also left the 

room—I don’t—shouldn’t take this as an insult—there are plenty 

of good people to fill this job. The idea that there’s only one individual who can do the job that needs to be done at the United Nations is—to quote my friend from Ohio, is nonsense. I can think of 

five or six names, off the top of my head, that are bona fide, conservative, blunt Republicans, who would serve well in the United 

Nations and help do the things that need to be done there. The 

idea that John Bolton’s the only person is an insult, in a way, to 

the leadership of the Republican party that no one else could possibly fulfill this role at all. 

And we owe it to the American public, we owe it to ourselves, 

let’s end this matter, and let’s move on to the more serious business we must deal with, major policy issues and filling these jobs 

that need to be filled to get the job done. 

I thank the Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd. 

The Chair recognizes, now, Senator Chafee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM RHODE ISLAND 

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

This has been a difficult few weeks as we have exercised our 

duty of advice and consent on President Bush’s nominee to be the 

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton. There have 

been many charges and accusations, and I do agree with Senator 

Dodd that any intimidation of intelligence analysts is wrong. And 

I’m apprehensive that by promoting John Bolton, we’re signaling 

an endorsement of that intimidation. 

And I am particularly concerned with the speech that Mr. Bolton 

gave in Seoul, South Korea, in the midst of those six-nation talks. 

That speech was cleared—Mr. Bolton says that speech was cleared 

by the highest level of our government. True though that may be, 

it does not diminish the questionable wisdom of his having delivered it at such a sensitive time. There have been other instances 

where I’ve had reservations about Mr. Bolton’s decision-making. 

I also recognize the diplomatic successes Mr. Bolton has had. The 

Proliferation Security Initiative is one. And, as Senator Allen said, 

this is a global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of 

mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials 

worldwide. The PSI uses existing authorities, national and international, to defeat proliferation. Mr. Bolton worked in a multilateral fashion on this proposal. Ten other countries—Australia, 

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 

Spain, United Kingdom—initially agreed to PSI, and 60 more have 

agreed since. 

I do want to take, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bolton at his word as to 

how he will perform as our Ambassador to the United Nations. He 

testified, under oath, that, ‘‘If confirmed, I pledge to fulfill the 

President’s vision of working in close partnership with the United 

Nations.’’ And that vision is that the United States is committed 

65 

to the success of the United Nations. And we view the U.N. as an 

important component of our diplomacy. 

Mr. Bolton said that he will work for a stronger, better, more effective United Nations, one which requires sustained and decisive 

American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and support of the 

American public. He said walking away from the United Nations 

is not an option. 

He also said that he assures the committee, the American people, 

and potential future colleagues at the United Nations that, if confirmed, he will work to—with all interested parties to build a 

stronger and more effective United Nations. He said, ‘‘Doing so will 

promote not only American interests, but will inevitably improve 

and enhance the U.N.’s ability to serve all of its members, as well.’’ 

He went on to say, ‘‘I pledge to bring my strong record of experience in working cooperatively within the United Nations to fulfill 

the intentions and aspirations of its original promise. In particular, 

I will work closely with the Congress and this committee to achieve 

that goal.’’ I will repeat that, ‘‘In particular, I will work closely with 

the Congress and this committee to achieve that goal.’’ 

So, I want to take him at his word, and I will support Chairman 

Lugar and Senator Voinovich’s motion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee. 

Senator Biden, would you designate—— 

[Pause.] 

Senator BIDEN. Senator Kerry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me 

begin, first of all, by echoing the comments of other colleagues. And 

I thank you, personally, for the way in which you’ve defended this 

process. And I think you’ve handled that with great grace, and I 

think you’ve been terrific at helping the committee to fill out the 

record here, though I certainly concur with Senator Biden, I wish 

we were able to have that full record. I think that remains something that we hope we can work out with you. 

Secondly, I also want to say to those people who came forward, 

I think this is a very serious moment for the committee. And it’s 

hard sometimes to convey that to people, because a lot of what happens around here gets politicized, as well as trivialized. But this 

should not be. I regret that some have, sort of, circled political wagons in this effort, and I think this is one of the most conscientious, 

legitimate processes of the committee that I’ve been engaged in, in 

the time that I’ve been here. And it’s not party interest; it’s America’s interest. And I think Senator Voinovich articulated that. And 

others, I think, in their statements have tried to articulate that, or 

have articulated it. 

And those people who have come forward, I mean, you just can’t 

dismiss that. You can’t reduce this, somehow, to politics, when people have spontaneously come forward, particularly people from the 

same workplace, people from the same ideology, people from the 

same background, people who are invested in the same goals as 

John Bolton, but who have spontaneously come forward to, from 

66 

their gut, and at great risk, put their views on line here. And I 

think that does raise the level of scrutiny that each of us, as Senators, ought to be giving this. 

Thirdly, there’s this assumption that is thrown out so easily by 

a lot of people that we ought to give a President the person the 

President puts forward. Well, generally speaking, we do. But the 

whole concept of advice and consent embodies in its—in the term, 

not just that we give advice and walk away, but that we have to 

consent, that we do consent. And, as Senator Biden, I thought, very 

forcefully stated, this is within the constitutional requirement of 

us, as Senators, of the Senate, and the Congress as a separate and 

equal branch of government. And that consent should not be automatic. It is not automatic. It has never been automatic when we 

conduct ourselves properly and do our duty to its fullest. 

Now, I wanted to comment—I’m glad Senator Voinovich is back 

here, because, you know, this puts him in a difficult situation, and 

probably our saying something nice about it puts him in a difficult 

situation. [Laughter.] 

But what I want to say, I think, is not directed only at him; it’s 

directed at all of us, as Senators. I was really struck, at the meeting we had before, when Senator Voinovich stopped the proceedings, rewrote the script, based on his conscience. I mean, he 

just sat up and said, ‘‘I’m uncomfortable with this.’’ And, lo and behold, people were amazed, Washington was amazed, the country 

was amazed. And I was amazed that everybody was amazed, because what is going on that a Senator doesn’t act according to 

script, acts according to conscience, and everybody is taken aback? 

I think Senator Chafee said this is the first time this has happened 

in the four years that I’ve been here. Well, then something is 

wrong with ‘‘here,’’ not with Senator Voinovich. 

And I was struck that he was, you know, set upon by certain 

automatic forces in the country that are then unleashed to vilify 

him for acting as a Senator ought to act. When I first came here, 

that’s the way almost everybody did. That’s the way it worked. And 

we shouldn’t be so amazed that somebody, in fact, stops and thinks 

about something, and responds according to their conscience. 

Now, what is at stake here is not party, not Democrat, not Republican. What is at stake here is our national interest, our security interest, our ability to advance our interests within the United 

Nations. 

And I take exception with Senator Allen. You know, long before 

he was on this committee, a lot of us were working with Senator 

Kassenbaum, with Senator Helms, Senator Biden, and others to reform the United Nations. We were among the first to withhold the 

dues. We were among the first to withhold the peacekeeping 

money. We worked hard to try to advance the cause of reform, and 

we got some distance in that. But there’s, of course, an enormous 

amount more to be done. 

This is not about reform at the United Nations. This is about 

who is the best person to advance the serious interests of our country in one of the most important fori in the world. And a lot of us 

approached this, indeed, I may comment, skeptical, because I think 

everybody was taken aback, as Senator Biden said. I mean, this appointment, on its face, struck a lot of people as odd. I respectfully 

67 

submit that it struck a lot of Republican Senators as odd. But then 

the political wagons, kind of, circled. 

I think this is bigger than that now. And the question is whether 

between now and a vote on the floor of the Senate, people on the 

floor of the Senate—people are really going to take stock of the full 

measure of what is at stake here. 

Mr. Chairman, you made the right decision, in the last weeks, 

to keep this process open and to make judgments. And I think the 

record that has been compiled, the additional witnesses and testimony that has been compiled, underscores the difficulties that this 

nomination presents on the merits, on an apolitical, meritorious 

judgment of whether or not this is the best person to carry out this 

job, and whether or not this person can now, under the circumstances of what we’ve learned, actually advance the cause and 

our interests at the United Nations. 

I mean, imagine when he walks into the—one of the first meetings, if he’s confirmed. People will sit there and say, ‘‘Well, here’s 

Ambassador Bolton. Is he sitting on one of the floors that he wanted to eliminate?’’ ‘‘Here’s Ambassador Bolton. Is he, today, telling 

us intelligence that’s his view or someone else’s view?’’ And when 

he makes his view known, almost to a certainty, it’s going to be 

second-guessed, and people are going to back and say, ‘‘Well, is 

this—you know, are we getting the full speech? Is this what the intelligence community says?’’ It’s going to have to be rechecked. It’s 

going to have to be double-efforted in every case, because that 

question is there. 

In fact, Ambassador Bolton, himself, to my astonishment—I 

mean, here he is seeking to represent the country at the United 

Nations, where the views you express have to be those of the administration and the others, and he’s reserving—he’s busy reserving the right—in answer of the question I submitted he said, ‘‘I understand that, as a policy, official statements identifying the views 

of the Intelligence Committee have to be fully vetted. I’ve submitted to this process throughout my tenure. Your question, however, fails to recognize a second principle; namely, that a policy official may state his own reading of the intelligence as long as he 

doesn’t purport to speak for the intelligence community.’’ So every 

time he speaks up there, he’s going to have to clarify, ‘‘I’m not 

speaking for the intelligence community,’’ or, ‘‘I am speaking for 

the intelligence community.’’ 

But, even more disturbing, he also said, quote, ‘‘The intelligence 

community needs to be pushed. It will not do its best unless it is 

pressed by policymakers, sometimes to the point of discomfort.’’ 

Now, his version of doing that, we have seen, puts people at risk, 

changes the consensus of the intelligence community itself, and 

will, in every instance in which he speaks, my colleagues, leave 

people asking the question of who he is speaking for. He has, himself, reiterated that and underscored that in this statement. 

Now, I think—you know, let—you know, let me just share with 

colleagues what a prior ambassador to the United Nations said 

about this job. I quote, ‘‘I do not think that one should ever seek 

confrontation. What I have every intention or hope of doing is to 

operate in a low-key, quiet, persuasive, and consensus-building 

way. I think a principal objective should be to try to communicate 

effectively with the representatives of as many nations as possible 

68 

to broaden a bit the areas of mutual understanding. We should try 

to extend a bit the frontiers of reason and cooperation. And I think 

we should work to that end, and we should work to establish the 

patterns of consultation and trust.’’ These are the words of Jeane 

Kirkpatrick during her January 1981 confirmation. 

Can I continue? 

Senator BIDEN. Please. 

Senator KERRY. I don’t know, how much time have I taken? 

Senator BIDEN. You’ve got another 5 minutes. 

Senator KERRY. So, no one’s every going to accuse Jeane Kirkpatrick of shying away from her views. And, like John Bolton, she’s 

a staunch conservative who speaks her mind. But she understood 

and respected the value of diplomacy, negotiation, listening to—listening to—and respecting other views, seeking a broad point of 

view. 

And the question is, clearly, on the basis of this record, whether 

you can say that about John Bolton, whether he sees the big picture, whether he seeks those views. Could he handle opposing 

points of views? Does he have the leadership skill? And, interestingly enough, it was Jeane Kirkpatrick, herself, who said of John 

Bolton that he is not a diplomat. 

Now, the larger issue, I’m not going to go in, because I don’t have 

the time, but, you know, you can take Lawrence Wilkerson, who 

was quoted in the New York Times as saying that John Bolton— 

he is the former chief of staff to the Secretary of State—who said 

he thought he would be—John Bolton would be an abysmal ambassador to the United Nations. Jeane Kirkpatrick, who said, ‘‘He 

loves to tussle. He may do diplomatic jobs for the U.S. Government, 

but John is not a diplomat.’’ 

Now, more disturbingly, there are a pattern of things that have 

been laid out here, and I don’t have time to go into all of them. 

One is this berating of analysts and what it does to intelligence at 

a time where intelligence needs to be trusted. That’s one very serious question. The other is the question of how he treated people 

and what that does, in terms of leadership. But most importantly, 

I think, is the question of credibility, itself. 

Credibility. When United States speaks to the world, we’ve got 

to be believable. We have an extraordinary message about democracy, about transformation of the world, about our leadership. And 

we need somebody there who is not going to be questioned in that. 

We may have to make the case about Iran or North Korea or Syria. 

But, in each of those cases, North Korea and Iran, Mr. Bolton has 

already made statements that have been questioned by the highest 

officials in our government. And, more importantly, he tried to 

stretch the intelligence to fit his own views in each of those cases. 

Again and again. He tried to inflate language about Syria’s nuclear 

activities, beyond what intelligence analysts saw. The chairman of 

the National Intelligence Council ordered his staff to resist Mr. 

Bolton’s efforts. This is a man who’s going to speak for America 

with credibility about Syria? 

Former National Intelligence Council Chair Robert Hutchings 

said, quote, ‘‘Let’s say that he took isolated facts and made much 

more of them to build a case than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was, sort of, cherry-picking of little factoids and little isoVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
69 

lated bits that were drawn out to present the starkest possible 

case.’’ 

I could go on about that, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have time to do 

it, because I want to get to one of the most important things of all 

for each of us to think about. 

Not only have you questions about Mr. Bolton’s credibility on the 

subject of intelligence and his voice at the U.N., but, frankly, we’ve 

got serious questions about his credibility before this committee, 

itself. 

In the case of Christian Westermann, he denied trying to have 

him disciplined. He denied, before this committee, under oath, trying to have him disciplined. He said, ‘‘I mentioned it to Mr. Finger. 

I may have mentioned it to one or two other people.’’ ‘‘I may have 

mentioned it to one or two other people.’’ This is an intelligent 

man. This is a man who’s been cited by everybody as having a 

steel-trap mind, one of the best minds of all. ‘‘But then I shrugged 

my shoulders and moved on,’’ he said. That is not true, folks. That’s 

not what he did. The testimony of Mr. Westermann and all of his 

superiors, all of his superiors at INR—Ford, Finger, Silver, as well 

as the recollection of his own chief of staff, Mr. Fleitz—make it 

clear that removing Westermann is exactly what he sought. There 

was no if, ands, and buts, no ‘‘may have,’’ no ‘‘might have talked 

to somebody.’’ He wanted him removed, and that was clear, and he 

wasn’t candid with this committee. 

The dispute went on for months. There was no shrugging of his 

shoulders and moving on. It went on for months. And it had a lasting impact on Mr. Bolton’s relationship with INR. 

Bolton said to this committee, quote, ‘‘I basically thought the 

matter was closed when I got Mr. Finger’s e-mail saying, ‘It won’t 

happen again.’ ’’ But a few days later, Bolton took up the issue with 

Carl Ford, and then he took it up with Neil Silver. And, despite 

his characterization to this committee, he hardly considered it 

closed. 

This was not the only time he was not candid with the committee, Mr. Chairman. Regarding his efforts to have the NIO for 

Latin America removed, he told the committee, ‘‘I had one part of 

one conversation with one person, one time on Mr. Smith, and that 

was it, I let it go.’’ Not true. That wasn’t it. He didn’t let it go. Documentary evidence shows that he took steps to remove the NIO, 

and it was under active discussion for four months. 

Letters were drafted that would be signed by Mr. Bolton and 

Otto Reich, the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere, demanding the NIO’s removal. On one subsequent occasion, he was 

reported to have told his staff, quote, he didn’t ‘‘want the matter 

to slip any further,’’ end quote. 

So, Bolton’s distortions before the committee weren’t limited even 

to these two cases. He told the committee he didn’t threaten or try 

to have anyone punished because of their policy views, but several 

witnesses have personally said, directly, that he did. 

So, Mr. Chairman, again, you know, he told the committee that 

U.S. Ambassador Hubbard approved and supported his speech, but 

you now know directly from Hubbard, that was not true. 

Does it matter whether you tell the truth or don’t tell the truth 

in your confirmation hearings to a committee of the U.S. Senate, 

or doesn’t it matter? And if you can’t tell the truth to this comVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
70 

mittee, are you going to tell the truth to the other people? And will 

they believe him when he goes to the United Nations? 

Senator, you weren’t here. This is not about whether or not we’re 

all for reform of the United Nations as it is; it’s about whether or 

not this is the best person to effect that reform. And I don’t think 

that you begin by not being candid to a committee of the U.S. Senate, under oath. 

So, there are these serious issues, and more, many more. And I 

hope—I don’t think we ought to send it out of this committee, personally. I think it ought to end here, because this isn’t the right 

person. Now, if it doesn’t end here, we are going to have a serious 

debate on the floor of the Senate, and that debate will not improve 

Mr. Bolton’s standing at the United Nations. So, I think we would 

be better off doing what is appropriate to the record. The record 

speaks for itself. And now this committee ought to speak for itself. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry. 

Senator Coleman, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

MINNESOTA 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I do think it’s appropriate to acknowledge the extraordinary steps that you have taken to work with Majority and 

Minority members in building an incredible record to bring us to 

the point we’re at today. 

I also want to compliment you on your statement. I hope that all 

our colleagues on both sides of the aisle read the chairman’s opening statement. 

I also appreciate your strong statement about U.N. reform. I’ll 

talk about that later. I think we all agree on that. 

And I guess the question, in the end is, Is this the right guy? 

And who makes that decision? Who makes that judgment? I think 

we had an election that said who makes that judgment, who is 

weighing, I’m sure, all the stuff that we’re weighing here, and has 

come to a conclusion about John Bolton’s, and it’s a conclusion, Mr. 

Chairman, that I support. 

We’ve had, over the course of the last 3 weeks, 35 separate interviews, 29 different people testifying, 1,000 pages of transcripts, I 

think 7 to 800 pages of documents. And when you get through the 

whole process, where are at? I think we’re probably right back 

where we started in this process. I don’t know if there’s anything 

new that any of us have seen that would say that—certainly from 

my perspective, that John Bolton is not qualified to serve in this 

position. He continues to have the support of the President. He continues to have the support of the Secretary of State. 

My concern is a little bit about the process. And I’m—I think 

some of the allegations, clearly, are patently false; some have been 

blown wildly out of proportion. My concern is about the—as we 

look to the future, the chilling effect of what’s going on here and 

the impact it will have on good people. Senator Dodd, in the past, 

has talked about the—how it’s getting harder and harder to get 

good nominees who want to serve. 

At the last hearing we had, my colleagues on the other side of 

the aisle raised a concern about an incident that apparently took 

71 

place a number of years ago, when Bolton was in private practice. 

It had to do with an incident that—regarding a contractor and 

then—that he worked for and—doing some work in Kyrgyzstan. 

And, you know, what we heard were all the allegations about chasing somebody down in a hotel in Moscow, and harassment. I didn’t 

have it at that time, but I think I had read a newspaper article 

that, in fact, the person who owned the company, the subcontractor 

who was, in effect, Bolton’s boss, had submitted a letter to the committee. I know my colleagues on the other side had a copy of that 

letter. What we heard and what the public heard, without refutation, are instances about outrageous conduct on the part of John 

Bolton without any retort, without folks saying, ‘‘Hey, this’’—you 

know, not only, maybe this isn’t the case, but the folks who knew 

the principals and said it wasn’t the case, and said it in some very, 

very strong terms. 

And so, I do worry about the chilling effect that we’re having 

here. This is certainly not a court of law, and it certainly doesn’t 

have the same standards. And, certainly, it’s a world we have to 

live with. But I am concerned about what Mr. Bolton has gone 

through, and the nature of these allegations. And, as I said, I 

think, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, you did a good 

job of responding and rebutting. 

I do want to talk a little bit about the Cuba speech and the conversation between Mr. Bolton and Mr. Westermann. 

Bolton, himself, told Christian Westermann, I quote, ‘‘You are 

welcome to disagree with me, just not behind my back.’’ And during 

Westermann’s staff interview, when asked about whether Bolton 

made such a statement, he replied, ‘‘That does ring a bell.’’ 

And what happened there—and, again, this one of the cases 

where you get kind of two sides of the story—from Bolton’s perspective, he was going to give a speech, it was supposed to be circulated, it was supposed to be circulated to other agencies, and 

they would make a judgment—intelligence agencies—about whether what he’s saying was accurate. He didn’t know that Westermann 

had put a—had torpedoed it as it went out. He didn’t know that. 

My colleague from Connecticut has asked, you know, ‘‘On what 

basis does he have to lose confidence in Westermann? He didn’t 

have it to begin with.’’ The basis is pretty clear, and it’s in the 

record, it’s in the e-mail that Bolton got from Finger when he 

raised the issue of what happened. And what did Mr. Finger—Mr. 

Westermann’s sup-—what did he say? He went on to say that, 

‘‘INR has no position on what a principal—in other words, we 

shouldn’t have made the judgment about whether this was good or 

bad information, the right thing, and not to say—choice of phrase, 

‘‘does not concur, was entirely inappropriate.’’ And these are Mr. 

Finger’s words, not mine, ‘‘We screwed up.’’ ‘‘We screwed up.’’ 

So, if you’re John Bolton, do you have a reason to lose confidence? I guess so. The record would demonstrate that. 

And, again, we can each bring our own take to this, but the 

record clearly shows that, from Mr. Bolton’s perspective, somebody 

did something they shouldn’t have done. That was reaffirmed to 

him. And then the question becomes—raised is whether there 

was—somehow he was not being candid with us. Mr. Bolton says, 

‘‘I didn’t pursue it.’’ 

72 

And I would ask the question, Where is the record that the dispute went on for months, as some of my colleagues on the other 

side of the aisle have talked about? There isn’t any. The reality is, 

is—what you have is, you have Bolton having a conversation with 

Ford that took place over a water fountain, that lasted about two 

minutes, and then a conversation down the road with Silver, in 

which Silver says, ‘‘I asked the issue. Is there any other things that 

you’re upset about?’’ And then Bolton volunteered that. 

This is not the pattern of behavior intent on penalizing and hurting somebody, somebody obsessed with ‘‘getting at’’ somebody because they disagree with them over policy. It’s consistent with everything John Bolton said. 

There has been no lack of candor here, Mr. Chairman, and I 

think the record is very, very clear on that. 

We talked about the incident in dealing with Melody Townsel, 

and the allegation that she was harassed and had had things 

thrown at her. I think her own testimony challenged that. The letter from Jaylon Kalotra, who was the head of the company that 

Bolton was working for, and he was very, very clear. He indicated, 

by the way, that Ms. Townsel had made inaccurate and misleading 

statements. He said he didn’t hear anything contemporaneously 

about the incident. He says that her recollection didn’t square with 

the facts. He indicated that, as a team leader, she attempted, unsuccessfully, to charge the U.S. Government for disallowable costs, 

and she became enraged and abusive; and that he found Bolton to 

be highly intelligent, hardworking, entirely ethical. 

And so, what you have there, again, was an incident laid out in 

public to disparage the reputation and the name of John Bolton, 

and then you’ve got evidence, substantial evidence, on the other 

side, something to the contrary. And we don’t know. I wasn’t there, 

Mr. Chairman. You weren’t there. But to use this as a basis for 

somehow saying that John Bolton’s not qualified to be U.S. Ambassador is not only wrong, it is another example of the kind of 

chilling impact that I think folks looking at this process, who may 

be called upon to serve, are going to ask themselves, ‘‘What am I 

going to be—what I am going to be subject to? And will that be 

fair?’’ 

So, what have we done? We’ve put under the microscope every 

contentious interaction John Bolton had within the State Department, and even outside of it. There was an interesting editorial. 

And I’m not always a big fan of the Washington Post, but I could 

say these words—they said it, and I’ll say it as I said it—talking 

about—the editorial, about a vote on Bolton, and he said, ‘‘The 

committee interviews have provided some colorful details without 

breaking new ground. What has long been a well-understood split 

in the first Bush administration, a split between those who saw 

themselves as pragmatic diplomats, the power camp, and those like 

Mr. Bolton, who saw themselves are more willing to bruise feelings 

here and abroad in standing up for U.S. interests.’’ 

And they go on to say, as I would say, that, ‘‘The President is 

taking risks, maybe, but, in the end, the President knows the role 

that Mr. Bolton is to play. The nominee is intelligent and qualified. 

We should support him.’’ I think that’s a pretty fair summary. 

Is John Bolton strong-willed? Darn right. There’s no question 

about that. But—and it’s interesting, because you look at the 

73 

record, and, you know, I guess it depends, you can look at all the 

criticism that are there. 

One of my concerns about this process, Mr. Chairman—and, you, 

again, in your opening statement, lay it out—when this nomination 

was put on the table, it was almost unanimously objected to by the 

other side. And it was about policy. It was about policy. Substantial 

policy disagreements with John Bolton and that he shouldn’t serve 

as U.N. Ambassador. And then as the process went on, it went 

from policy to procedure, from policy to personality, from policy to 

the ability to interact and deal well with others. 

When I was a prosecutor, we used say—on closing arguments, I’d 

stand in front of the jury, and I’d say, ‘‘You know, you’ve got to 

watch out for the rabbit-out-of-the-hat’s trick.’’ And what happens 

is that the defense would come in, they’ve got a hat, a magician’s 

hat, and they’ve got lots of rabbits, and they go running around. 

And they hope that one member of the jury chases one of those rabbits and takes their eye off the goal, the main thing—being the 

main thing. 

And so, we have the rabbit of personal relations, and we have the 

rabbit of violating procedure, and we have the rabbit of lack of candor, we have the rabbit of bad policy judgments. But the bottom 

line is that in each and every instance, despite every measure of 

conflict, John Bolton delivered the approved speech. He never maliciously impacted the career of a single employee. We could just as 

well have spent this time simply reading the record, all the comments made by John Bolton for those who worked with him. 

There’s a question about whether he can put together a team or 

work well with others. You had 37 officials who worked with him 

at USAID. They worked with him. They know him. And their judgment was that, ‘‘John leads in front with courage and conviction. 

He doesn’t abuse power. He’s direct, yet thoughtful, in communication. What he does is demand from his staff personal honestly and 

intellectual clarity.’’ 

And then the letter from 39 other former attorney generals, distinguished citizens, again, who know John Bolton, again, being extraordinarily positive. Twenty-one former presidential appointees, 

career and noncareer Civil Service and Foreign Service employees, 

again, who worked and know John Bolton. Forty-three of John 

Bolton’s former colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute. All 

saying the same thing, that, ‘‘We know this guy, that we work with 

him, and he does have the ability and the skill that’s needed.’’ 

And then, in addition to that, the statements of former Secretaries of State who also worked with John Bolton. They didn’t just 

know him. They worked with him. He’s got a long and distinguished career. And they were very, very clear about his ability to 

do what has to be done. 

I think the issue here, Mr. Chairman, is what my colleague from 

Virginia has raised. It is about U.N. reform. That’s the issue in 

front of us today. The—and I have to say, it’s interesting, because 

there are a couple of folks who have been at the U.N. who have 

been pretty blunt on occasion, and one of them was Jeane Kirkpatrick, who once said that what takes place in the Security Council, and I quote, ‘‘more closely resembles a mugging than either a 

political debate or an effort a problem-solving. 

74 

And I would note that my colleague from Massachusetts quoted 

Ms. Kirkpatrick, who said that, you know, we need low-key, quiet 

consensus way. And, by the way, Ms. Kirkpatrick supports John 

Bolton. Jeane Kirkpatrick signed a letter in support of John Bolton. 

She knows what the job needs. Jeane Kirkpatrick was Ambassador 

to the U.N. at a time before we had evidence of U.N. employees 

raping and being involved in child prostitution in South—in Africa. 

She was our U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. before we had evidence 

of sexual harassment and abuse by senior U.N. officials that went 

undealt with for over 8 months. She was Ambassador to the United 

Nations before Oil-for-Food scandal, which—where Saddam Hussein was able to rip off that program for billions of dollars. 

Just today, Mr. Chairman, the committee that I chair, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, released reports of payoffs 

to folks who are—British members of Parliament, former French 

foreign ministers, interior ministers, documenting a system of them 

receiving oil allocations and payoffs going back to Saddam and then 

being in a position to enrich their own pockets. 

Clearly, clearly, the U.N. needs reform. And I think we’ve got to 

get back to what my colleague, Senator Chafee, in the end, quoted, 

and that is that statement of John Bolton pledging—and I’m going 

to quote one part of it, ‘‘to fulfill the aspirations of its original 

promise.’’ That’s what we want the United Nations to do. 

My challenge to the United Nations—it’s not about attacking the 

United Nations or tearing it down, but it certainly needs some 

strong—right now, it needs strong leadership from the United 

States, working in concert, but strong leadership with an individual, John Bolton, who’s demonstrated that capacity. And I’ve got 

to believe that that’s what the President is looking for, Mr. Chairman. That’s what he’s looking at. 

You know, is John Bolton the nicest guy in the world? He’s not 

going to win that prize. Not going to win that prize. But look at 

the challenge that we’re faced with, with U.N. reform. Just last 

week, Zimbabwe put on the Human Rights Commission. We need 

a kind of strength. And it’s interesting, I’m saying ‘‘we.’’ In the end, 

Mr. Chairman, I do believe that John Bolton is the best person, the 

best person that the President has picked for this job. Because 

that’s what it’s about. Elections do have consequences. And the 

President has made a judgment, and he’s weighed the good, and 

he’s weighed the bad, and he’s looked at the tough-minded negotiations, how it played a key role in Libya’s change of heart in achieving the Treaty of Moscow. He’s looked at what—he’s look at the difficulty of getting 191 member nations of the United Nations, the 

number of states that changed their ways. And that’s not going to 

be very, very easy, Mr. Chairman. 

So, in the end, as I said, in—most importantly, the President 

needs to have the right to appoint members of his team. John 

Bolton has the confidence of the President. In the absence of any 

wrongdoing, there’s nothing on this record that demonstrates any 

wrongdoing. We may have disagreements about how he interacted 

with staff. We may have disagreements about what’s appropriate, 

in terms of dealing with folks who you think back-doored you. But, 

in the end, the President should have the team he wants. He’s 

made the determination that John Bolton is the right person to finally bring about U.N. reform. And I look forward, Mr. Chairman, 

75 

when John Bolton is confirmed, to be able to work with him in the 

Permanent Subcommittee, and to work with folks at the U.N. to 

bring about reform. 

I urge my colleagues to support the President’s choice for U.N. 

Ambassador. No one is better qualified to bring about U.N. reform 

than John Bolton. In the words of my colleague from Connecticut, 

the place clearly needs cleaning up. John Bolton represents our 

best chance to shape a credible, effective world body for the next 

generation. And like my colleague from Rhode Island, I’m willing 

to take him at his word. I’m willing to take him at his word. 

There’s nothing in this hearing that should have undermined our 

confidence in taking him at his word that what he wants to do is 

bring back—get the U.N. to fulfill its original aspirations. That’s a 

noble goal. He’s made that commitment. Let’s give him a chance. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, the committee congratulates you on your very conscientious work as the s 

I07ubcommittee chairman looking into U.N. reform. And we wish 

you well as you—— 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Continue to proceed. 

Let me just mention that, at this point, there are 58 minutes remaining to the Republican side, 63 minutes available to the Democratic side. 

And I call upon my distinguished ranking member to designate 

a speaker. 

Senator BIDEN. I would designate Senator Feingold. And if he 

could stay within 15 minutes—— 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Certainly. I thank the chairman. I thank the 

ranking member. 

Mr. Chairman, in 2001, this committee voted to confirm John 

Bolton to be the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security. I voted for Mr. Bolton at that time, despite 

many strong disagreements with his views on arms control and security policy, generally. In fact, it’s my understanding I was the 

only Democrat on this committee to vote for Mr. Bolton for that position. I did so because I generally believe that the President has 

the right to choose executive branch nominees who share his overall world view, even when I do not. So, barring serious ethical 

lapses or a clear lack of appropriate qualifications for a give job, 

I tend to give the President a great deal of latitude in making 

these appointments. 

Mr. Chairman, I will vote to oppose—oppose—the confirmation of 

John Bolton to be the next U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. 

As I indicated last month, Mr. Bolton is simply unsuited for the job 

to which he has been nominated. His blatant hostility toward the 

institution at which he would serve, and his history of pursuing his 

personal policy agenda while holding public office, indicate that he 

would be ill-equipped to advance U.S. interests as our Ambassador 

to the United Nations. 

I share the views of many who are insisting on reform at the 

U.N. The U.N. must become more effective and more accountable. 

76 

And, as stewards of the American taxpayers’ dollars, we must insist on that point. 

Mr. Bolton’s record suggests that his personal animosity toward 

the United Nations is so great that he would rather see the institution dramatically weakened, rather than strengthened through reform. He seems to view the U.N. as an instrument to be used when 

it suits only our immediate interests, but one best ignored, or even 

undermined, the rest of the time. His failure to grasp the give and 

take required for effective multilateralism makes him a real obstacle to any hope of pursuing vital U.S. interets and increasing burden-sharing and marshaling a global force strong enough to defeat 

the terrorists networks that seek to do us harm. Mr. Bolton’s idea 

of U.N. reform would hurt, rather than help, U.S. interests. 

Mr. Bolton’s record also reveals many, many instances of intemperance and rash decisionmaking. At least two senior intelligence 

officials told committee staff that Bolton’s draft testimony prepared 

for a House hearing on Syria in 2003 went well beyond what the 

intelligence community could clear. This wasn’t a case in which 

INR alone had concerns about Bolton’s proposed language. The 

CIA, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all objected. And according to interviews conducted by the committee staff, Bolton’s office, quote, ‘‘pushed back,’’ unquote, resisting the intelligence community’s efforts to alter problematic provisions. 

Bolton was determined to be such a loose cannon that the Deputy Secretary of State instituted an extraordinary policy to address 

the problem, requiring all of Mr. Bolton’s public presentations to be 

cleared by Larry Wilkerson, Secretary Powell’s chief of staff, or 

Deputy Secretary Armitage, himself. 

Given this record, I do not have confidence that Mr. Bolton’s personal agenda would always be subordinated to that of the Secretary of State, who, in testimony before this committee and in her 

first days in office, has placed such a premium on restoring frayed 

diplomatic ties. 

Additional information that has come to light since our last 

meeting has simply affirmed my conclusion that this is one of the 

rare cases in which I must oppose the President’s nomination for 

a position in the executive branch. 

First, the record indicating that Mr. Bolton was in the business 

of suppressing dissent has only gotten stronger. It’s a matter of 

record that Bolton sought to retaliate against intelligence analysts 

when their work did not suit his policy inclinations. 

Now, this is not about careless remarks simply made in the heat 

of a tough bureaucratic dispute. The evidence shows that over a period of many months, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought Mr. 

Westermann’s removal from his portfolio at INR, which would 

mean, effectively, ending his career. Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought 

the removal of Mr. Smith from his post as the National Intelligence 

Officer for Latin America, again pursuing this vendetta for 

months—not just of heated minutes, but for months—going so far 

as to consider blocking country clearance for Mr. Smith to travel 

abroad. 

In both cases, the offense that so incensed Mr. Bolton appears to 

be that the analysts did their jobs, they presented the facts as they 

saw them, and they declined to keep silent when the facts did not 

77 

support what Mr. Bolton wanted to say. And, in both cases, senior 

officials with decades of experience in government, who were involved in these episodes told committee staff that Bolton’s actions, 

his attempts to retaliate against these analysts, were absolutely extraordinary. 

In addition to these disturbing incidents, other interviews revealed a broader pattern of—to simply cut out those who disagreed 

with his policy views, or those who he believed disagreed with his 

policy views, from the policymaking process entirely. This kind of 

tunnel vision, everyone-else-out-of-the-room approach, was summed 

up by Secretary of State Powell’s chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, 

who told the committee staff, quote, ‘‘When people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at dealing with’’—referring to North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons development problem—‘‘in order to push their pet 

rocks in other areas, it bothers me, as a diplomat and as a citizen 

of this country.’’ And then, when asked specifically if he thought 

that Mr. Bolton had done that, Wilkerson said, ‘‘Absolutely.’’ 

Mr. Wilkerson ended his interview with the committee with the 

following comments, quote, ‘‘I would like to make just one statement. I don’t have a large problem with Under Secretary Bolton 

serving our country. My objections to what we’ve been talking 

about here—that is, him being our Ambassador to the United Nations—stem from two basic things. One, I think he’s a lousy leader. 

And there are 100 to 150 people up there that have to be led. They 

have to be led well, and they have to be led properly. I think in 

that capacity, if he goes up there, you’ll see the proof of the pudding in a year. Second, I differ from a lot of people in Washington, 

both friend and foe of Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, quote, 

‘brilliance,’ unquote. I didn’t see it. I saw a man who counted 

beans, who said, ‘98 today, 99 tomorrow, 100 the next day,’ and 

had no willingness, and, in many cases, no capacity, to understand 

the other things that were happening around those beans. And that 

is just a recipe for problems at the United Nations, and that’s the 

only reason I said anything,’’ end of quote. 

Some have suggested that because Mr. Bolton did not succeed in 

his attempts to end the careers of analysts whose dissenting views 

angered him, and because he did not succeed in his attempts to 

manipulate the government’s processes to shut out voices of disagreement, caution, or dissent, that, in the end, as I think the 

phrase that has been used, no harm, no foul, or that there’s no 

problem here. 

I cannot believe that any of my colleagues actually believe that’s 

true. Why, after all that we have learned about the vital importance of dissent in the intelligence community from the 9/11 Commission, the Silverman-Robb Commission, and numerous other investigations into the major intelligence failures that have gravely 

harmed our credibility and our security over the past year, why 

would we choose to promote to a position of prominence and trust 

and individual who has tried strenuously to manipulate intelligence? 

Finally, in recent weeks serious concerns have been raised regarding Mr. Bolton’s understanding of his obligations to be forthcoming with this committee. Several of Mr. Bolton’s answers to 

Senators’ questions were misleading, and several were quite blatantly nonresponsive. In light of the evidence this committee has 

78 

seen in recent weeks, most of us can probably agree that if Mr. 

Bolton does end up being our next Ambassador to the United Nations, extremely careful oversight will be required. But our oversight responsibilities depend, in many instances, upon the executive branch officials who come before us understanding that they 

have a constitutional obligation to be forthcoming with Congress. 

I have no confidence that Mr. Bolton intends to adhere to this obligation. 

Mr. Bolton’s nomination raises fundamental questions regarding 

both credibility and accountability. The credibility of our representation at the U.N., the credibility of intelligence, the credibility of 

the oversight process are all at stake. And the question of whether 

or not this committee will hold officials who seek to dissent—suppress dissent accountable for their actions is before us today, as 

well. 

I, like many other members of this committee, deeply appreciate 

the extraordinary courage of the many people who came forward to 

share with this committee their own concerns about Mr. Bolton’s 

fitness for the U.N. post or to correct inaccuracies in the record, in 

some cases at real risk to their careers. I am grateful for their efforts, and I deeply appreciate their honesty. And so, Mr. Chairman, 

after listening to them, I’m all the more certain I cannot support 

this nomination. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Hagel. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

NEBRASKA 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I would like to add my thanks to you and to the ranking member 

for the work that you have produced, contributions you’ve made, 

the leadership you’ve shown at a difficult but important time. I 

would add, also, my thanks to the staff, both Minority and Majority, for their work. 

There have been some references today to the relevancy and the 

importance of this committee. I believe it was Mr. Biden who 

noted, as others on the Democratic side, their years of service on 

this committee and how, over those years, unfortunately, the Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. Senate has diminished, not 

only in stature, but in importance. 

I make this point, because I recall, when I was elected in 1996, 

and I was given, as all new Senators are, their choice of committees—limited—and the committee that I asked to be considered for 

first was the Foreign Relations Committee. And I was questioned 

by the political experts at the time, ‘‘Why in the world would you 

waste your time on the Foreign Relations?’’ Not was only was it a 

committee that could not raise money, but where is the constituency in America for foreign relations? Where is the constituency for 

diplomacy? Where is the constituency for the United Nations, their 

problems. ‘‘They’re drains on our budget, they’re drains on our energy, so why in the world would you do that?’’ 

The second ‘‘Why would you do it?’’—because it was not an important committee. Maybe it once was. I remember Ted Kennedy 

telling me, years ago, that his brother, John Kennedy, wanted to 

79 

be on the Foreign Relations Committee when he came to the Senate, but he couldn’t get on it. It took him a few years to get on it, 

because it was then regarded as one of the most important committees in the U.S. Senate. Why was that? It was after World War II, 

and we were literally restructuring the world. We. I emphasize 

‘‘we.’’ The United States led, but we did it with alliances and coalitions and friends and strong allies, who believed in our purpose. 

I also mention this point, not only to, again, acknowledge you 

and the ranking member for what you have done to make this a 

relevant committee once again, but, in fact, it is the committee— 

and this was my answer to those who asked me the question about 

why I would want to be on this committee. My answer was, it is 

the committee that is the framework that represents America’s interests around the world. When you look at the jurisdiction of this 

committee, is it wide, deep, and relevant, and it is becoming more 

and more so. 

So, therefore, this nomination that we are meeting to discuss 

today, and will vote on later, is important, and this committee is 

important, and, therefore, should never, ever be framed up by either the Democratic party or the Republican party as a partisan 

issue. It has never worked that way, nor should it ever. And the 

groups on both sides of this issue do a great disservice to our country when they try to simplify it into a political common denominator issue. It is not. 

This position, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 

Nations, is one of the most important jobs in our government. It 

is the face, the American face, to the world. That’s important. A 

hundred and ninety-one nations. No body in the world like the 

United Nations. And who structured and framed and led to put the 

United Nations together after World War II? The United States. 

The United Nations, like all multilateral institutions that we led 

on, we framed, we put together after World War II, have been extensions of America’s purpose and our power, not limitations. It’s 

given us alliances. It’s given us opportunities to promote who we 

are. And it has, quite frankly, served our foreign-relations objectives. 

Now, is the United Nations in need of reform? Of course it is. Of 

course it is. And it has wandered from its original charter. And I 

do not believe that necessarily is the core issue here that some 

have tried to frame up, that if you’re against John Bolton, you’re 

against reforming the United Nations. That’s patently ridiculous. 

That makes no sense. That is not the issue. 

And I would say to my friend from Virginia, I would think that 

Mr. Negroponte and our former colleague, Mr. Danforth, who have 

been recent U.N. Ambassadors, would not consider themselves as 

tea-drinkers and milktoasts, nor would I think that the first President Bush would consider himself as a milktoast and a tea-drinker. 

Maybe they drink tea. Nor Jeane Kirkpatrick. We’re talking about 

something bigger and wider here than just those easy characterizations. 

Ladies and gentlemen, we’re living through a transformational 

time in the history of man. This is one of the most defining, important times in the history of the world. That’s the bigger picture 

here. Now, whether Mr. Bolton is qualified or not, obviously, is our 

more concise challenge for this committee. 

80 

I have had long conversations with Secretary Rice about Mr. 

Bolton. I have known Mr. Bolton, I have worked with Mr. Bolton, 

and I have had long conversations with Mr. Bolton. As has been 

noted here, mainly on our side of the committee, he has assured 

me, he has assured the President and Secretary Rice, that he will 

carry out the policy of this administration, that policy set by the 

President. Foreign relations is set by the President—not the Secretary of State, but the President. And President Bush has been 

forceful, over the last few months, talking about the importance of 

the United Nations. I take the President at his word. I take the 

Secretary of State at her word, and Mr. Bolton, in saying that he 

will be—my words, I asked—a uniter, a builder, someone, in fact, 

not only who will carry out the interests of the United States at 

the United Nations, but will go beyond that. 

The expectations are high for Mr. Bolton. And they should be. 

Anyone we send to the United Nations to represent this great country to the world should be held to very high expectations. But, in 

the end, he is the agent of the President. 

I have enough confidence in this President, this Secretary of 

State, to take them at their word, and Mr. Bolton at his word, 

when he says that, ‘‘I will be a uniter. I will be a builder,’’ and do 

the things that will be required, not just to reform the United Nations, but to go beyond that. 

This isn’t just about reforming the United Nations. This is about 

extending America’s purpose and the optics and who we are, and 

reaching out. If there was ever a time in history that the United 

States requires friends and alliances and coalitions, it is now. The 

world is too complicated to do otherwise. It is too dangerous to do 

otherwise. 

Many of you have read Tom Friedman’s new book, and I recommend it highly. Tom Friedman captures the essence of the world 

that we live in today, but, more importantly, the world our children 

will live in, in the next few years. The name of that book is, ‘‘The 

World is Flat.’’ There’s a diffusion of power in the world today that 

we’ve never seen, and I think that’s good for America. But we’ve 

worked for that. That means we carry less burden. Hopefully, we 

will become less and less the world’s policemen. That means now 

we’ve lost—over 1600 dead in Iraq, and over 12,000 wounded. 

Hopefully, there will be a time when that won’t occur, because we 

are sharing responsibilities in the world. 

These are the big issues that we’re talking about in this committee, and, specifically, for this nominee. Mr. Chairman, I am, like 

all on this committee, grateful to be on the committee. I am privileged to serve in the U.S. Senate. And as long as I am an elected 

official in the U.S. Senate, I will do what I think is right—not for 

my party, not for my President—but for the country that I take, 

as all my colleagues do, an allegiance to when I swear to the Constitution of the United States. 

I say this, again, because there is afoot in this land a dangerous, 

dangerous move, in both extremes of the political parties, to make 

foreign policy and everything a political issue. We will not only 

debase our system and our process, but we will make the world far 

more dangerous than it is at a complicated historic transformational time in our history. We must stop it and get above it. 

81 

We’re dealing with other issues like this in the U.S. Senate. We are 

elected to uphold the interests of this country first. 

We will all make our vote today on the Bolton nomination. I will 

support the President, I’ll support the Chairman’s motion to move 

this nomination out onto the floor of the Senate. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. 

Senator Biden, will you designate your speaker? 

Senator BIDEN. My colleague from California. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you, Senator Biden. Thanks to all the members of the committee 

who feel very strongly about this, one way or the other. 

And I do agree with what Senator Hagel said, that we are at a 

critical moment in U.S. foreign policy—we are a critical moment in 

U.S. foreign policy, a time where we need to lead the world to a 

better place. It is that fork in the road where one place is dark and 

one place is light. And, to do that, we need the world with us, so 

much, or the burdens on our people will just be too much to bear. 

And I think Senator Voinovich said that in a magnificent way. I 

think Senator Hagel also said that in a beautiful way, and other 

members said it in their way. And that’s why this debate is so important, and that’s why the U.N. Ambassador is to important. Will 

this individual unite the world with us so that we can move to that 

better place? 

I was sort of stunned at Senator Coleman, when he asked a rhetorical question. ‘‘Who makes the judgment about who is the best 

person to represent the U.N.,’’ he asked, rhetorically, and then 

went on to answer his question, ‘‘There was an election.’’ But, Senator, you forgot something. There was an election for individual 

Senators, too. And maybe it’s because—I remember it because I, 

also, was on the ballot at the same time as the President. 

And I would just urge the Senator to look at Article 2, Section 

2 of the Constitution, ‘‘The President shall nominate and, by and 

with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors.’’ It doesn’t say, ‘‘With the advice and consent of the President if he feels like it, or if he’s in the mood for it, or he should 

turn to the Senate on Monday at 3:00.’’ It’s pretty clear here. It’s 

in the same sentence. And I hope that you will have more pride 

in this institution and your responsibility not to say that it is the 

President, alone, regardless of whether the President is a Democrat 

or a Republican. It is a shared responsibility, and that’s why this 

debate is so important. 

It also is not about whether Mr. Bolton is nice, as my friend said. 

He said it certainly shouldn’t be about that, and he’s right. It is 

about many other things of deep importance, where my friend just 

doesn’t want to go. And I understand it. 

I do want to pick up on something Senator Dodd said, because 

I think it’s key. There is not a majority on this committee in favor 

of Mr. Bolton right now. There is not. And it is our job to send a 

signal to our colleagues. And, I think, to send a signal that we’re 

moving this forward would be the wrong signal. It’s not true. There 

82 

is not a majority on this committee who supports John Bolton 

today, so I will not be voting to move this forward without recommendation. 

And there’s another point, Mr. Chairman, and it really involves 

you and Senator Biden more than it involves me. But I am deeply 

disappointed that we have not gotten all the information we requested. And I agree with my leader on this committee, Senator 

Biden, that this is a matter of principle. Perhaps there’s nothing 

in there, perhaps there’s something, but there are several areas— 

the intercepts, that’s one area; Mr. Freedman and his potential 

conflicts, we’ve asked for that information; and there’s some information about Syria. And I will just say, because I’m—Mr. Chairman, I have such respect for you, I would never blind-side you— 

that I am going to do all I can to see that we get this information 

before this moves out of here onto the floor—or let me say before 

this gets onto the floor, because it’s not right to cast a vote where 

you really don’t have the full information. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think there are many reasons to oppose 

Mr. Bolton, and I’m going to lay them out, but I’m not going to go 

on, hopefully not, for the full 15 minutes, but it may happen. Sometimes I forget to watch the clock. But I would ask that my full 

statement be placed in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full. 

Senator BOXER. Thanks. 

So, I will skim through it, and I will not reiterate what other 

people have. 

First, and, to me, the most important, is the politicization—and 

I didn’t say it right—of intelligence. This is the most important 

issue, when we see what phony and exaggerated intelligence can 

lead to. It can lead to war. We’ve seen it. It’s happening every day. 

It is tragic. Thousands of deaths and injuries—1600 deaths, plus. 

And in my state we have about 25 percent of those deaths, people 

who were born in California or were activated from California, so, 

wear that heavily our state. So, why on earth would we want to 

hire someone who has shown he’s willing to put political pressure 

on independent intelligence analysts? 

We know about Westermann. We know about Mr. Smith. I’m not 

going to go through that. We know about it. 

Robert Hutchings, Chairman of the NIC, described the risk of 

this politicizing intelligence in this way, ‘‘I think every judgment 

ought to be challenged and questioned, but when it goes beyond 

that to a search for a pretty clearly defined preformed set of judgments, then it’s politicization. And even when it’s successfully resisted, it creates a climate of intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging.’’ 

So here we take someone who put pressure on these people—you 

saw the chart that Senator Dodd had—reached down. This is not 

a person that we should be promoting when we have the war in 

Iraq that was based on this faulty intelligence. We shouldn’t do it. 

Second reason, disdain for the U.N. I know that doesn’t get a lot 

of votes around here, but, it seems to me, putting someone into 

that situation who has said, ‘‘There is no United Nations,’’ it just— 

it is shocking. I mean, Senator Biden said ‘‘surprising.’’ It was 

shocking to me. 

83 

I think, in that regard, there are inaccurate comparisons to Moynihan and Kirkpatrick. I think Senator Kerry pointed that out. 

And I will let that go into the record. 

International law. John Bolton’s comments versus Senator Moynihan—it’s not even in the same league. 

Then there’s three, a pattern of retribution and abuse. And, 

again, we know about what he tried to do. So, it’s not only that he 

tried to twist arms to get, you know, faulty intelligence forward, 

but he actually exerted retribution on people. That’s wrong. And 

someone like that should not be promoted. 

And, again, I’ll put all of that into the record. 

But I’m going to close with two areas, one that Senator Kerry 

touched on, the failure to be candid with this committee. My God, 

we ought to at least believe that we deserve someone to tell us the 

whole truth. And I want to go through this on a chart here, because I can’t do it any other way. So, bear with me. 

Bolton, ‘‘I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired at all. I, 

in no sense, sought to have any discipline imposed on Mr. 

Westermann.’’ 

Carl Ford, responding to that, ‘‘I remember going back to my office with the impression that I had been asked to fire the analyst. 

Now, whether the words were ‘fire,’ whether that was, ‘Reassign. 

Get him away from me. I don’t want to see him again,’ I don’t remember. I do remember that I came away with the impression that 

I had just been asked to fire somebody in the intelligence community for doing what I considered their job.’’ 

Bolton, quote, ‘‘I may have mentioned the Westermann issue to 

one or two people, but then I shrugged my shoulders and moved 

on.’’ 

Several months later, Bolton raised Mr. Westermann with the 

INR director, Neil Silver. According to Mr. Silver, quote, ‘‘To the 

best of my recollection, Bolton raised Mr. Westermann’s name, and 

he asked or indicated that he would like me to consider having him 

moved to some other portfolio.’’ 

Bolton, ‘‘So I basically went out to pay a courtesy call on Mr. 

Cohen, and, it’s true, I drove my own car out there. I have to make 

a confession here, the CIA is, sort of, more or less, on the way 

home for me, and, from time to time, when I’ve gone out there, I’ve 

driven my own car, I’ve had my meetings—I hate to say this, but 

I left and went home.’’ He takes a long time to describe how he just 

dropped by on the way home. He says, ‘‘I didn’t go back to the office.’’ 

Well, we have Secretary—we have Secretary Bolton’s calendar 

here. For the day in question, the meeting with Mr. Cohen was 

scheduled, it was on his schedule for 9:30, and he had other meetings scheduled that afternoon. 

And I think we go on with some other charts here. Is that the 

10 minutes or the—— 

Senator BIDEN. That’s ten. 

Senator BOXER. Ten, okay. 

Bolton: ‘‘I went out to pay a courtesy call, and my recollection is, 

the bulk of the meeting was composed of Mr. Cohen explaining to 

me what the NIC did, and told me what their complications were 

and how it had been created, and gave me some background on it. 

84 

Committee staff member asks, ‘‘Do you remember giving Bolton 

a primer about the NIC?’’ 

Mr. Cohen, ‘‘No. I just don’t recall the details of the meeting, 

other than the fact that there was a focus on Mr. Smith.’’ 

Bolton, ‘‘I didn’t seek to have these people fired. I didn’t seek to 

have discipline imposed on them. I said I’ve lost trust in them, and 

there are other portfolios they could follow.’’ 

Carl Ford, ‘‘I do remember that I came away with the impression 

that I had been asked to fire somebody in the intelligence community.’’ 

John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA—‘‘Do you 

recall other—do you recall other requests similar to this, to remove 

one of your analysts?’’ John McLaughlin, ‘‘No, this is the only time 

I had ever heard of such a request. I didn’t think it appropriate.’’ 

Bolton, ‘‘And I can tell you what our Ambassador to South Korea, 

Tom Hubbard, said after the speech. He said, ’Thanks a lot for that 

speech, John. It’ll help us a lot out here.’ ’’ 

Hubbard, former Ambassador to South Korea, quote, ‘‘At the very 

least, he greatly, greatly exaggerated my comments. I told the committee that if you’re basing your vote on Bolton’s assertion that I 

approved his speech, that is not true.’’ 

So, we see here lack of candor, misleading statements. It’s absolutely shocking to me that more people on the committee aren’t disturbed with this. 

I also would say this. The strongest opposition to Mr. Bolton, outside of members of this committee, comes from the people from the 

Bush administration. And I don’t have time to read everything, but 

here we have, again, Carl Ford, Lawrence Wilkerson. He says—I 

won’t repeat that quote, because somebody else gave it. 

Elizabeth Jones, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, ‘‘I don’t know if he’s capable of negotiation, but he’s unwilling.’’ 

John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, ‘‘I believe it would be fair to say that some of the officers within my bureau complained that they felt undue pressure to conform 

to the views of the Under Secretary, versus the views that they 

thought they could support.’’ 

And, again, John McLaughlin, ‘‘It’s perfectly all right for a policymaker to express disagreement with an NIO or an analyst, and it’s 

perfectly all right for them to challenge such an individual vigorously, challenge their work, but I think it’s different to then request, because of the disagreement, the person be transferred. I 

had high regard for the individual’s work; therefore, I had a strong 

negative reaction to the suggestion about moving him.’’ 

So, here you have people from the Bush administration, who 

served there proudly, in many cases saying—they’re conservative, 

they’re Republican, they’re proud to support the President, the Vice 

President—coming out against this nominee. It is hard for me to 

understand why the President didn’t simply say he’s going to send 

down somebody else. 

I guess he wants a fight. I guess he’s asking people to walk the 

line. And if that’s where we’re going, that’s where we’re going, because we’re going to have a fight. If this comes to the floor, we’re 

going to have a fight. And the American people are going to engage 

in it, and they’re going to look at it. And I guess, at the end of the 

85 

day, their sentiments may be able to sway some of my colleagues 

on both sides of the aisle; frankly, I don’t know even where my 

Democratic colleagues are on this, except for the ones in the committee. But that’s the greatness of this place. We’ll take this to battle. We’ll take these quotes, we’ll take these interviews down to the 

floor. And we’re going to ask the American people to help us on this 

one. 

And I thank you all. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator Boxer. 

The Chair would like to recognize Senator Alexander. 

Let me just add, before you commence, Senator Alexander. Fortyeight minutes remain on our side, so this means, hopefully, framing of 10-minute speeches, more or less. And if you would proceed 

on that basis, I would appreciate it. 

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Senator BIDEN. Without us asking for any more time—we 

won’t—if you need more time, it’s fine by us for your people to be 

able to speak. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it. 

Senator Alexander. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden. 

That should be plenty of time. And if you could let me know 

when that’s about expired, I’ll expire, as well. 

I’d like to insert my full statement in the record, if I may. 

The CHAIRMAN. It’ll be included in full in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Alexander follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALEXANDER

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to take a few moments to talk about the nominee before 

the committee, his qualifications, the importance of the post to which he’s been nominated, and some of the charges made against him by the other side. 

I believe John Bolton will do a fine job as our next Permanent Representative at 

the United Nations. 

John Bolton has a distinguished background: 

• Last four years as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International 

Security; 

• Assistant Secretary for International Organizations (like the UN) under the 

first President Bush 

• Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, 1985–1989; 

• Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Agency for 

International Development, 1982–1983; 

• General Counsel, U.S. Agency for International Development, 1981–1982; and 

• He graduated with a B.A., summa cum laude, from Yale University and received his J.D. from Yale Law School. 

Solid Accomplishments: 

• Helped lead the American effort to repeal Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism (under Bush Sr.); 

• As Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, steered a critical series 

of resolutions supporting our liberation of Kuwait in 1991 through the U.N. Security Council; 

• Joined former Secretary Jim Baker in supporting the UN’s work in Western Sahara in the 1990’s—pro bono; and 

86 

• Designed this administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative, under which 

more than 60 nations now share intelligence and take action to stop the transfer of dangerous weapons. 

Impressive Appearance Before the Foreign Relations Committee 

• Demonstrated command of the issues facing the United Nations; 

• Despite intense questioning that lasted more than seven hours, Bolton was calm 

and collected; and 

• He focused on the need for reform of the United Nations 

Strong Support: 

• Endorsed by five former Secretaries of State: James Baker, Lawrence 

Eagleburger, Al Haig, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz; 

• Also endorsed by more than 50 former Ambassadors 

I was with one of those former ambassadors a couple weeks ago, the former majority leader of this body, Ejpward Baker, with whom I and other members had 

lunch. He remarked about how he had dealt with Secretary Bolton over the last 4 

years in Tokyo, when Senator Baker was our Ambassador to Japan. Senator Baker 

liked Bolton. He was impressed with him. He said he spoke frankly, that he would 

be a good ambassador. 

Intelligence Charges Against Bolton 

The second day of hearings was a little different than the first. I was surprised 

and disappointed by what I heard. There was a man named Carl Ford, the former 

Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, who was well respected 

by members of the committee, who presented evidence that John Bolton had 

‘‘chewed out,’’ to use colloquial words, intelligence analysts in the State Department. 

Mr. Ford, to his credit, didn’t like that because those persons were down the line. 

Mr. Ford was a pretty good witness because he didn’t overstate his case. He acknowledged that it wasn’t unusual for policy people and intelligence analysts to 

argue, for policy people to hope for intelligence that supported their positions. He 

just didn’t like the fact that in this case he had heard about—he wasn’t there, he 

had heard about—that Mr. Bolton in effect chewed out one of Mr. Ford’s employees, 

and Mr. Ford didn’t like it. He told Mr. Bolton so, and they exchanged words. 

That is what Mr. Ford said. 

There have been some other things said about Mr. Bolton. It was suggested that 

Mr. Bolton was misusing or compromising intelligence. But Mr. Ford himself said: 

‘‘In this particular case’’—the one Mr. Ford was led there to complain about—‘‘there 

wasn’t politicization [of the intelligence].’’ 

Mr. Ford was very clear on that point in his testimony to the committee. 

In interviews conducted by this committee’s staff since that time, another issue 

was raised where there was a disageement over intelligence. One of Mr. Bolton’s 

subordinates, who was on detail from the CIA, sent a report to the Deputy Secretary 

of State for review and was unhappy that another bureau had put a memo on top 

of that report that said the report was incorrect. This sounds like a simple disagreement to me, a disagreement over intelligence that is quite common from what we’ve 

been told even by Mr. Ford. And in this case, there’s no evidence Mr. Bolton was 

even aware of the dispute at all. So, again, there is no evidence of politicization of 

intelligence. Rather, it appears that different staff members were arguing for their 

own point of view, which shouldn’t surprise anybody. 

Other Questionable Charges: 

He is accused of trying to have analysts removed, or reassigned, in whom he had 

lost confidence. But there is no evidence any of these individuals suffered in their 

career path whatsoever—o one was fired or reassigned. 

He was accused by a former USAID contractor of ‘‘chasing’’ her around a Moscow 

hotel to stop her from damaging his client, but in her interview with committee 

staff, the accuser later admits that perhaps ‘‘chasing’’ wasn’t the best word. Rather 

she ‘‘felt chased’’ because he kept tryjng to talk to her. Her employer at the time 

also failed to corroborate her story. 

In the end, only one charge appears to have any substance: John Bolton has been 

rude to staff members below him in the bureaucracy. 

I imagine Mr. Bolton is embarrassed by those charges. I didn’t like to hear them. 

And perhaps he deserves to be embarrassed by the charges and perhaps he has 

learned a lesson. But what I heard doesn’t change my vote, even though I hope it 

might change some of Mr. Bolton’s ways of dealing with people with whom he 

works. 

87 

How significant is this charge that he was rude to people in the bureaucracy? As 

has been mentioned by others, if that were the standard for remaining in the Senate, we would have a hard time getting a quorum. 

There are regularly occasions when busy Senators, eager to make their own point, 

are rude to their staff and even shout at one another. In fact, the shouting was so 

loud in the last business meeting of this committee by some of the Senators that 

I could barely hear the charges against Mr. Bolton. That is not attractive, and I 

don’t endorse it. It even caused me to think back about times that I may have become angry or impatient or startled in dealing with a staff member or another person, and made me redouble my efforts to make sure I swallow my pride and think 

about what I say and not do that anymore. It’s not good business. 

But how significant is this? Here is what former Secretary of State Larry 

Eagleburger had to say about it a couple weeks ago in the T3Washington Post . This 

deserves special attention. Larry Eagleburger was Secretary of State for the first 

President Bush, but in a way he was more than that. He had 27 years in the Foreign Service. We hear that a football player is a football player’s player or a man 

is a man’s man or a woman is a woman’s woman. Larry Eagleburger is a Foreign 

Service officer’s Secretary of State. He had and has enormous respect from all those 

men and women who put their lives on the line around the world and in the United 

States in support of our diplomacy and foreign policy. Here is what he said: 

As to the charge that Bolton has been tough on subordinates, I can say 

only that in more than a decade of association with him in the State Department I never saw or heard anything to support such a charge. Nor do 

I see anything wrong with challenging intelligence analysts on their findings. They can, as recent history demonstrates, make mistakes. And they 

must be prepared to defend their findings under intense questioning. If 

John pushed too hard or dressed down subordinates, he deserves criticism, 

but it hardly merits a vote against confirmation when balanced against his 

many accomplishments. 

That is where I am. I think the benefit of hearing Mr. Ford’s testimony might 

be a little bit of a lesson to Mr. Bolton and a reminder to the rest of us of how unattractive it is to shout at an associate or unnecessarily dress down a staff member. 

I agree with Secretary Eagleburger. John Bolton has a distinguished background 

and record. He has dedicated himself to improving our country’s foreign policy. His 

action toward subordinates might have been inappropriate. Perhaps he has learned 

a lesson, but it doesn’t cause me to change my vote. I am glad to support him. 

This is a critical time for the United Nations. Even the Secretary General acknowledges it is in need of reform. Billions of dollars filtered from the UN’s coffers 

to Saddam Hussein’s pockets in the oil-for-food scandal. Top human rights abusers 

such as Sudan and Zimbabwe sit on the Human Rights Commission. United Nations 

peacekeepers in Africa have been found to rape and pillage. 

Now the United Nations has many important roles in the world. I am glad we 

have it. I want it to work, but I believe the President is right in his thinking, that 

we need to take action to help the UN reform itself, and that a frank-talking, experienced diplomat named John Bolton is an excellent candidate for that commission. 

I intend to vote for him in committee and on the floor. It is my hope that we will 

report Mr. Bolton’s nomination to the floor and the Senate will approve it and give 

him a chance to go to work in reforming the U.N. 

In Defense of the Chairman 

Mr. Chairman, I’d also like to take a moment, if I may, to comment about the 

decorum with which this committee has proceeded in considering Mr. Bolton’s nomination. I want to compliment you, Mr. Chairman, because I think you have shown 

incredible patience and diligence in making sure that all Senators have the facts 

and are able to make a well-informed decision. 

Seldom has there been a more thorough investigation of a nominee. The committee has heard more than seven hours of sworn testimony from Mr. Bolton. Ninety-four questions for the record were further submitted to Mr. Bolton in writing, 

many with multiple parts, and he has responded. We heard sworn testimony from 

Mr. Ford, someone who opposed the President’s nominee—which is a rarity in itself. 

Further, the committee has conducted 35 additional interviews that has resulted 

in over 1,000 pages of transcripts which are publicly available. At the Chairman’s 

insistence, 700 pages of documents have been turned over to the committee from 

various related agencies, including the State Department, the CIA, and USAID. 

I have seen in the press some comments that suggest the Chairman has somehow 

‘‘stonewalled’’ efforts to investigate Mr. Bolton. That’s an outrageous claim, especially when compared to just how far the Chairman has bent over backwards to get 

answers to questions by members of the minority. The Chairman supported numerVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
88 

ous requests by the other side for more information. Indeed, we wouldn’t have nearly 2,000 pages of documentation without his active leadership. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And I would like to thank the chairman for 

this opportunity. I’d like to summarize a few points in my remarks. 

I’ve said what I had to say before in this committee. And after 

reviewing the evidence and listening to the hearings, which I did, 

I made a statement just before the recess, about 10 days ago, about 

how I felt. So, I’d like to summarize those thoughts. 

And, basically, since I think Mr.—I’m convinced Mr. Bolton’s credentials for the position are well-established, superior credentials, 

and I’d like to try to put in context the charges that have been 

made against him and the conclusion I’ve come to and I evaluate 

those charges. 

It’s important, even though it’s been repeated many times, to remind ourselves of the credentials. Because of those credentials, I 

expected to be impressed by Mr. Bolton when he appeared before 

the committee, and I was. I mean, not many people have been, as 

the chairman indicated in his remarks, confirmed four times by the 

U.S. Senate for major positions—Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice— 

that was in another administration; that was in the 1980s. Those 

are big jobs. Those are jobs that manage large numbers of attorneys in complex cases. And then his academic record is unusually, 

unusually good. And many of the Senators have recited his accomplishments in professional life—the U.N. resolution on Zionism, the 

work he did in the U.N. helping—with the U.N. helping to shepherd the resolutions about Kuwait in 1991, the fact that the Secretary General asked former Secretary of State Jim Baker to help 

with Western Sahara, and Baker invited John Bolton. All of those 

activities suggested a very accomplished nominee. 

And so, I was not surprised when, on the first day of our hearings, his performance was impressive. I listened. I was here for 

most of it. I thought he displayed a good command of the issues, 

extremely detailed knowledge of the United Nations, and that, 

while he got hard questions, as nominees are supposed to get—I 

was—once had the honor of being—going through a confirmation 

process before a committee of the U.S. Senate. It’s a very special 

experience. And I thought he handled that experience very, very 

well. He handled it calmly, he answered the questions, he wasn’t 

combative. I went home that day very impressed. 

I was impressed by the strong support from the former Secretaries of State, who have been mentioned, by the number of ambassadors, who have been mentioned. And I had lunch with one of 

those ambassadors the other day who’s well known to this group, 

Senator Howard Baker, who was Ambassador to Japan, and he volunteered to me, this former Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate, 

how he had dealt with Secretary Bolton over the least four years 

while Senator Baker was in Japan, and how impressed he was with 

him. He said, ‘‘He’s a good man. He’d make a good ambassador. He 

spoke frankly. I enjoyed working with him.’’ 

So, after one day, I was very impressed. 

I was surprised and disappointed by the second day of testimony. 

It was a little different. Carl Ford, who’s been mentioned here, was 

a good witness. Very believable. He didn’t overstate his case. He acknowledged it wasn’t unusual for policy people and intelligence 

89 

people to disagree. He was really mad about the fact that John 

Bolton, in his words, ‘‘had chewed out somebody way down the 

line.’’ He didn’t like it at all, and he felt it was important to come 

before the committee and say so. Many members of the committee 

know and respect him. I found his testimony believable, and I was 

disappointed by it. 

There have been some other things said about Mr. Bolton, which 

Mr. Ford, himself, dismissed. Mr. Ford, himself, said there was a 

politicization of the intelligence that Mr. Bolton was accused of 

misusing. 

There was other testimony, which has been dealt through here. 

Senator Lugar and others have talked about it. 

But it was about—as I’ve listened very carefully to all of the 

charges, in the one—in the end, only one charge, to me, seemed to 

have any substance, and that is that John Bolton has been rude 

to staff members who had subordinate jobs to his in the U.S. Government. 

I imagine Mr. Bolton is embarrassed by those charges. I didn’t 

like to hear them, and perhaps he deserves to be embarrassed by 

those charges. And perhaps he’s learned a lesson. 

What I heard didn’t change my vote, but I hope it might change 

some of Mr. Bolton’s ways and dealings with his colleagues and 

with other people in the bureaucracies with which he will be working. 

How significant is this charge of rudeness? As has been mentioned by others, if it were the standard for remaining in the U.S. 

Senate, we probably wouldn’t be able to get a quorum. There are 

regular occasions—all of us know about them—when Senators 

eager to make their own points are rude to their staffs and even 

occasionally shout at one another. In fact, the noise was so loud in 

our first hearing, I was not sure I would be able to hear the 

charges against Mr. Bolton above the shouting. It’s not attractive. 

I don’t endorse it. It’s even caused me to think back over times I 

may have become impatient or angry or startled in dealing with a 

staff member or another person, and it’s redoubled my efforts to try 

to make sure I swallow my pride, think about what I say, and not 

do that anymore. It’s not good business. 

But how significant is this?—is the question. Given such a distinguished, credentialed person, with such broad experience, who this 

body has confirmed four different times, how big a problem is this? 

Here’s what former Secretary Larry Eagleburger had to say 

about it. Now, Larry Eagleburger’s comments deserve special consideration in this—in this discussion. We often hear about a man 

being a football player’s football player, or a woman who’s a woman’s woman. Well, Larry Eagleburger is a Foreign Service’s—Foreign Service Officer’s Secretary of State. 

Now, for 27 years he was in the Foreign Service. He has enormous respect from all those men and women around the world who 

put their lives on the line in support of our diplomacy and foreign 

policy. And here is what Larry Eagleburger had to say about John 

Bolton, ‘‘As to the charge,’’ quoting, ‘‘that Bolton has been tough on 

subordinates, I can say only that in more than a decade of association with him in the State Department, I never saw or heard anything to support such a charge. I never saw or heard anything to 

support such a charge. Nor do I see anything wrong with chalVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
90 

lenging intelligence analysts on their findings. They can, as recent 

history demonstrates, make mistakes, and they must be prepared 

to defend their findings under intense questioning. If John pushed 

too hard or dressed-down subordinates, he deserves criticism, but 

it hardly merits a vote against confirmation when balanced against 

his many accomplishments,’’ unquote. 

Mr. Chairman, that’s where I am. I think the benefit of hearing 

Mr. Ford’s testimony might be a little bit of a lesson to Mr. Bolton 

and a reminder to the rest of us of how unattractive it is to shout 

at an associate or a colleague or unnecessarily dress-down a staff 

member in a moment of impatience or disagreement. 

I agree with Secretary Eagleburger, though. John Bolton has a 

distinguished background and record, he has dedicated himself to 

improving our country’s foreign policy. His action towards subordinates might have been inappropriate. Perhaps he has learned a lesson. But it doesn’t cause me to change my vote. I’m glad to support 

him. 

This is a critical time for the United Nations. It has many important roles. I’m glad we have it. I believe a frank-talking experienced diplomat named John Bolton is an excellent candidate for 

the commission. And I’m glad—I hope that he will move out of this 

committee to the floor so we can discuss it. 

Two more brief things I would like to say about members of the 

committee. I especially appreciated the comments of the Senator 

from Nebraska as he talked about the role of this committee and 

the importance of our looking at our responsibilities in the world 

on the basis that puts our allegiance first to the country. And I’ll 

do my best to do that. 

I want to express to Senator Voinovich of Ohio my respect for his 

careful thinking about this. I know him well, and have for a long 

time. He’s always been dedicated to civil servants, those who work 

for the government, and he would be the first to be offended by 

rudeness to anyone down the line. I’m not so surprised that he reacted strongly to this, and I respect his thoughtful statement. 

And I’d like to say to the chairman, who has great patience, that 

he’s demonstrated almost all of it during this—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ALEXANDER [continuing]. During this consideration. 

Ninety-four questions for the record, testimony from Mr. Ford, 700 

pages of documents, some people suggesting you’re stonewalling. 

You have, with the cooperation of Senator Biden, over time, 

helped this committee be an outpost of decency and thoughtfulness 

in a time of increased partisanship. And for that, I thank you, and 

I appreciate your patience, which has been more than almost any 

of the rest of us would likely have had. 

Thank you for the time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator. 

Senator Biden, you designate—— 

Senator BIDEN. Senator Obama. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Obama. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

ILLINOIS 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Biden. 

91 

I was extraordinarily impressed with the presentation that Senator Voinovich made, and I think that he expressed a number of 

the concerns that many of us share on this committee. So, I’m not 

going to reiterate all my points. I would like to have my statement 

placed in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full. 

There are a couple of issues that I think are important to touch 

on. The first is, I think the tendency in this debate to suggest that 

opposition to Mr. Bolton’s nomination is based on the fact that he 

is occasionally rude, he showed some bluster, he got mad—the previous speaker is exactly right, if that’s the only criteria by which 

we would oppose the nomination, then most of us might not qualify, because, at any point in time, we’ve displayed probably inappropriate behavior or anger that we regret afterwards. And I think 

if somebody was to look at our life’s work and behavior, and was 

able to scrutinize it, that a lot of us would have problems. 

That, unfortunately, is not, I think, the basis for our objections. 

I think the basis for the objections have to do with very specific, 

credible allegations that Mr. Bolton reached down, not to immediate subordinates of his, but reached far afield to attempt to have 

fired intelligence officers that would not support statements that he 

was making on behalf of the U.S. Government, or wished to make 

on behalf of the U.S. Government. 

Now, we can define ‘‘politicization’’ in various ways. What I do 

know is that there is substantial credible evidence from Republican 

appointees serving in the Bush administration that Mr. Bolton 

sought to massage intelligence to fit an ideological predisposition. 

Now, it’s been stated that intelligence officers are often wrong 

and their analysis should be challenged. In fact, our recent history 

indicates that, where intelligence officers are wrong, it primarily 

has to do with the fact that they succumb to the temptation to tell 

the folks higher up what they want to hear. That appears to be 

part of what happened with respect to our failed intelligence in 

Iraq. And at a time when it is critical for us to have sound intelligence, we should be sending a message to our intelligence officers 

that, in fact, we want them to play it straight and to tell us stuff 

even when we don’t necessarily want to hear it. And that is not 

what Mr. Bolton appears to do. That’s now how he operates. And 

that is credible evidence. There may have been some other evidence 

of allegations with respect to Mr. Bolton’s behavior that were not 

supported. His attempt to reach down and have intelligence officers 

removed from their positions because they provided analysis that 

was not what he wanted to hear, that does not appear to be largely 

disputed. 

Now, I think the President is entitled to the benefit of the doubt 

when appointing senior members of his team. To that end, I supported a number of the President’s choices for top foreign-policy positions, including Secretary Rice and including Robert Zoellick to be 

her deputy. 

But, as has been emphasized previously, the Constitution gives 

the Senate the power to advise and consent. This is a responsibility 

I take very seriously. I think that the breach of the line between 

politics and policymaking and intelligence, in and of itself, renders 

Mr. Bolton less than credible in his position to the United Nations. 

92 

Let me add one additional point that I think may not have been 

touched on in the hearing this morning. It’s been suggested that 

perhaps we should vote for Mr. Bolton anyway, even if he has a 

bad temper, even if he showed some poor judgment with respect to 

how he handled intelligence, because he is so highly qualified for 

the job. The suggestion is, is that his competence is such, is so 

unique, that we are willing to overlook some of his warts. 

I’m a little bit baffled as to that assertion. This is not a line of 

inquiry that we really pursued much during the course of our discussions here. But when I look at the record of Mr. Bolton during 

the last four years at the State Department as the top Arms Control and Nonproliferation official for the United States, I am not 

impressed with that record. 

Let’s just examine some of the things that he was responsible for. 

The approach that was advocated by Mr. Bolton, with respect to 

North Korea, and the administration has simply not worked. Here’s 

the bottom line. Under Mr. Bolton’s watch, there are no longer 

international inspectors and cameras at any site in North Korea. 

The North Koreans have withdrawn from the NPT. We believe that 

North Korea has developed six to eight nuclear weapons during 

Mr. Bolton’s watch. 

Now, when North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons, the situation is critical. They can test one weapon and hold one weapon. 

When it has six to eight, the situation is terminal. It can test one, 

hold a couple, sell the rest. And we all know that North Korea will 

do virtually anything for money. 

That’s not a record that I’m wildly impressed with. 

And when I hear Mr. Bolton testify, to my questioning, directly, 

and say—when I asked him, ‘‘Do you think that your approach 

with respect to engaging in name-calling with—towards North 

Korea in a speech was helpful?’’—and he says, ‘‘The Ambassador of 

South Korea told me, ‘Thank goodness. You really helped out.’ ’’— 

and that same Ambassador, a Bush appointee, Ambassador Hubbard, has to say, publicly, in the newspapers, ‘‘I never said such a 

thing’’—that indicates to me a problem. 

Another area that he was responsible with—for, Nonproliferation 

Treaty. There is little doubt that the NPT is a critically important 

tool for combating nuclear proliferation. At the same time, it needs 

to be strengthened. The President recognized this reality and 

pledged to do so, in a 2004 speech at National Defense University. 

A week later, Mr. Bolton pledged to do the same. 

What’s happened in the interim? Virtually nothing. The administration has made very little progress on this issue. The NPT Review Conference, currently under way, is not going well. Newsweek 

reports that, quote, ‘‘The United States has been losing control of 

the conference’s agenda this week to Iran and other countries, a potentially serious setback to U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran.’’ 

Where’s Mr. Bolton been throughout this process? In this same 

article in Newsweek, they state, ‘‘John—since last fall, Bolton, 

Bush’s embattled nominee to be America’s Ambassador to the 

United Nations, has aggressively lobbied for a senior job in the second Bush administration. ‘During that time, Mr. Bolton did almost 

no diplomatic groundwork for the NPT Conference,’ these official 

say. ‘Everyone knew the conference was coming and that it would 

93 

be contentious,’ says a former senior Bush official, but Bolton 

stopped all diplomacy on this six months ago.’’ 

This notion that somehow Mr. Bolton is uniquely qualified for 

this task, and we should overlook some of these problems with respect to intelligence because he is uniquely qualified to reform the 

United Nations, doesn’t seem to be borne out by his track record 

doing his current job. 

Mr. Chairman, I know I’m running out of time, but let me just 

make a couple of other points on this. 

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me, Senator. You can have some of my 

time. 

Senator OBAMA. Okay. 

The administration holds up Libya as its biggest success in nonproliferation. This is something that Mr. Bolton touts. It appears 

that this deal with respect to Libya was struck in spite of Mr. 

Bolton, not because of Mr. Bolton. There are credible reports that 

he was sidelined from the negotiations by the White House, and 

the British Government did not want him to play a role. I’ve got 

an article right here, stating—this is from MSNBC—‘‘Bolton, for instance, often takes, and is given, credit for the administration’s 

Proliferation Security Initiative, an agreement to interdict suspected WMD shipments on the high seas, and the deal to dismantle 

Libya’s nuclear program, a deal that Bolton, by the way, had 

sought to block. But the former senior Bush official who criticized 

Bolton’s performance on the NPT conferences says that, in fact, 

Bolton’s successor, Robert Joseph, deserves most of the credit for 

these achievements. This official adds that it was Joseph, who was 

in charge of counterproliferation at the NSC, who had to pitch in 

when Bolton fumbled preparations for the NPT conference, as 

well.’’ 

Last point, along these same lines. Economic Support Fund. ‘‘Mr. 

Bolton’s predecessors were responsible for administering and overseeing around $2 billion in annual Economic Support Fund assistance. Secretary Bolton and his staff, during 2001, brought the utilization of a large portion of Economic Support Fund assistance to 

a near halt as he and his staff sought to micromanage virtually 

every obligation from the ESF fund—assistance. It appeared that 

Under Secretary Bolton was seeking to redirect ESF on his own, 

without consulting other bureaus of the Department or, as required 

by custom and law, the Congress. In 2001, a bipartisan group in 

Congress, completely fed up with his management of this money, 

passed legislation which stripped Mr. Bolton’s ability to manage 

this money. The provision originated with the House Republicans.’’ 

Now, here’s my point. If we thought that Mr. Bolton was a terrific diplomat, maybe some on this committee would choose to overlook what I consider to be actions with respect to analysts that I 

think disqualify him from the job. But I could understand why 

some people would say, ‘‘You know what? This is the guy to reform 

the U.N.’’ But the record indicates that in his current job he has 

not had much success, which then asks me, Why is it that we’re 

so confident that this is the person who’s going to reform the U.N.? 

I would love to see the U.N. reformed. The notion that we have 

people like Zimbabwe—countries like Zimbabwe and Libya on the 

Human Rights Commission is an insult to all the people who are 

being oppressed in those countries. What happened with respect to 

94 

the Oil-for-Food Program deserved to be investigated. Some people 

on this committee have done good work. We need to do some serious cleanup of the United Nations. 

Why is it that we think that this is the best qualified person to 

accomplish that? Do we really believe that there is not a tough, 

straight-talking, conservative, Republican diplomat somewhere out 

there who has credibility and who can accomplish this task, other 

than Mr. Bolton? 

Throughout this testimony, there was a lot of badmouthing of the 

United Nations. I did not hear a single actual plan for how Mr. 

Bolton was planning to reform the United Nations. I still don’t 

have a plan from the Bush administration, in terms of how this reform is going to take place. And I would argue that, as a consequence of Mr. Bolton’s diminished credibility, I think he is going 

to be less effective in reforming the U.N. than if somebody else was 

selected. That’s the irony of this process. I think countries like 

Zimbabwe and Libya and others, who don’t want to see reform take 

place—when Mr. Bolton says something, they are going to be able 

to dismiss him as a U.N.-basher, somebody who’s ideologically disposed to dislike the U.N., and use that as a shield to prevent the 

very reforms that need to take place. 

This is a bad choice. 

And let me just close by saying this. You know, in my opening 

testimony, I mentioned the fact that there was a gentleman with 

credibility, temperament, and the diplomatic skills to guide us 

through some very difficult times in the United Nations, and that 

was Adlai Stevenson, a great citizen of the state of Illinois. After 

the Bay of Pigs, despite the fact that he had been misinformed 

about intelligence, he still had the credibility to allow the United 

States to isolate the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis, 

and advance U.S. interests at the U.N. 

Given the issues that have surfaced surrounding Mr. Bolton’s 

nomination, I’d simply ask my colleagues this. If a crisis were to 

occur with North Korea or Iran right now, are we sure that the integrity and credibility of Mr. Bolton would command the respect of 

the rest of the world? Would Mr. Bolton, like Adlai Stevenson, be 

able to convince the world that our intelligence and our policies are 

right and are true? Would Mr. Bolton be able to isolate our enemies and build a coalition that would ultimately make our troops 

safer and our mission easier? 

Regrettably, Mr. Bolton’s testimony leaves me with serious 

doubts that he would be the kind of representative we need in the 

United Nations, and that’s why I feel compelled to vote no with respect to his nomination. 

Thank you for your forbearance, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama. 

The Chair now recognizes Senator Sununu. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think it is instructive to note that the opponents of John Bolton 

cannot decide whether it is behavior or policy or management skills 

that bother them so much about the nominee. And—— 

Senator SARBANES. All of the above. 

95 

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. And I—well, I will address each of 

the above, but let’s start with behavior. 

Adlai Stevenson was mentioned. I believe it was Adlai Stevenson, 

in his capacity as Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 

that shouted across the room at the Russian representative not to 

dare wait for the translation, because he knew what the question 

was, and he ought to be able to answer it right away regarding 

missile placements in Cuba. Bad behavior in diplomatic circles, if 

there ever was such a thing. But was it effective? Was it probably 

the right thing to do at the time for the United States and the 

United Nations and international security? I think so. 

So, you know, I think we need to be careful about reading too 

much into an individual’s behavior at a particular time or a particular place and suggesting that that renders them disqualified for 

any particular position. 

Second, with regard to the United Nations, Senator Hagel made 

an important point, that a vote against John Bolton isn’t a vote 

against reform in the United Nations. This is true. But, at the 

same time, the suggestion that has been made, that John Bolton 

is hostile to the United Nations, that John Bolton would like to 

weaken the United Nations, is demonstrably false. It simply cannot 

be justified, I believe, by any reasonable interpretation of the 

record. 

Cathy Bertini, supporting the nomination of John Bolton, underscores the work that he did to strengthen the World Food Program, 

to make the World Food Program work better. And anyone that 

has spent time in New York talking to United Nations administrators about their organizations around the world would underscore 

that the World Food Program is probably the one that works best 

and delivers the most important and greatest benefit more effectively than any other U.N.-sponsored organizations. 

As was pointed out by Senator Coleman and others, the Anti-Defamation League strongly is supporting John Bolton, because he 

worked effectively within the United Nations dealing with the controversial Zionism-is-racism resolution. 

John Bolton worked to build an organization—or helped put together a coalition of 60 states—60 countries opposing the proliferation of weapons. And now to suggest that the lead State Department official responsible for nonproliferation shouldn’t really be 

given any credit at all for the nonproliferation achievements with 

regard to Libya is simply ridiculous. 

I think we need to understand and recognize that he has worked 

effectively on a bilateral basis, but John Bolton has always worked 

very effectively with the United Nations to make it more effective. 

And in his—in capacity as a Permanent Representative, I think we 

can expect that kind of an approach to continue. 

Second, let me touch on two issues about policy, policy that was 

made—policy that was referenced in two speeches, Syria and North 

Korea. We have heard quotes offered by opponents of Mr. Bolton 

that suggest somehow that the speeches on North Korea and Syria 

were not cleared by the State Department. The suggestion that 

Ambassador Hubbard was—had a quote that he didn’t agree with 

the tone of the speech, that is—that suggestion is misleading. The 

suggestion that these speeches were not clear is misleading, at 

best. 

96 

In both cases, the content of the speeches were cleared fully and 

appropriately through the channels in our State Department. Period. The speech on North Korea was cleared. The testimony on 

Syria was cleared. Cleared not just by State, but also through 

Homeland Security and the CIA and the NSC. If we want to quibble about the timing or the process, that it was slower than it 

should be, well, we can do that, but was the testimony cleared? 

Yes. Was the speech in Korea cleared? Absolutely. 

Which brings us to this—the issue, the very specific issue of policy versus procedure. And this is important, because, again, suggestions were made that simply aren’t accurate. In particular, I think 

the phrase was just used that he attempted to fire, or have fired, 

intelligence officers that would not support his interpretation of 

analysis. I think ‘‘arm-twisting’’ was also used, that he twisted the 

arms of those that did not agree with his analysis. It’s wrong. 

In two cases in particular, and the two that we’ve spent the most 

time on here, the Westermann case and the Smith case. In the 

Westermann case, Mr. Ford, in his testimony, said that the disagreement—the controversy, if you will—quote, ‘‘had nothing to do 

with intelligence analysis. It had to do with the procedures that 

were used.’’ In the Smith case, as well, the confrontation wasn’t 

around disagreements on analysis—and there may have been disagreements on substance; I’m sure there have been many disagreements on substance—but the controversy, the argument, the bad 

behavior centered around disagreement in process and procedure. 

Now, let me touch on both of those. 

In the Smith case, there was a concern that Mr. Smith misrepresented the truth when he claimed that the—Mr. Bolton’s speech on 

Cuba had not been properly cleared within the intelligence community. Now, what does that mean? What that means is, an intelligence officer, analyst, actually made reference in a hearing to, I 

believe, Senators, but certainly to other staff members, and suggested that it hadn’t been properly cleared, that the proper procedures weren’t used. What kind of an allegation is that? That’s a 

very serious allegation, suggesting that John Bolton didn’t properly 

handle intelligence, didn’t properly handle information that may or 

may not be classified, that he was cavalier with intelligence. 

Now, I asked a simple question. Senator Lugar, in his opening 

statement, said, ‘‘You know, would we want to be held to the same 

standard that some are placing on John Bolton?’’ Well, let’s look at 

this case, in particular. What if a staff member—we found out that 

a staff member or a fellow member of the Senate were making accusations against us that we couldn’t properly handle intelligence, 

that we were not going through the proper procedure in dealing 

with important intelligence analysis? Would we be angry? I think 

some of us would be angry. Would we try to have staff fired? I believe I would not. But I don’t think it’s too strong a statement to 

say that there may be members of the U.S. Senate that would actually try to have staff fired. Not necessarily the right thing, not good 

behavior. And maybe none of the hundred Senators would do so. 

But what if someone had made such an allegation? And it is not 

a matter of speculation that this allegation was made; it is not a 

matter of speculation that this individual made a—suggested that 

proper procedure wasn’t used; it’s a matter of public record. 

97 

Second, the Westermann case. I think the chairman’s opening 

statement, and Senator Coleman, highlighted a couple of important 

points here. But, again, this was a question of procedure, not a— 

the confrontation with Mr. Westermann wasn’t based on a disagreement on analysis or the intelligence, itself, even though there 

may have been a different approach that the two have taken. But 

the argument, the berating, if you will, had to do with the fact that 

Mr. Westermann failed to follow proper clearance procedures regarding the declassification of this language. That’s why there was 

an e-mail that same day that said this was inappropriate, quote, 

‘‘We screwed up.’’ That refers to the fact that the proper procedures 

weren’t followed. 

Now, here’s the irony. What if John Bolton was the one that 

failed to follow the proper procedure? What would we be talking 

about then? Of course, his opponents would be criticizing him mercilessly for failing to follow proper procedures dealing with intelligence analysis. 

So, here we have—his opponents would clearly criticize him if he 

didn’t use the proper procedure, and they’re criticizing him for 

criticizing someone else for not using the proper procedure. This is 

a double standard, at best; and it is hypocrisy, pure and simple, at 

worse. 

But the point to underscore is that these are questions of procedure, where, in the cases of Syria and Korea, his speeches, he followed the proper procedure. In the case of his disagreement with 

Mr. Smith, it had to do with the fact that Smith accused him of 

not following procedure, when he did. And, in the case of 

Westermann, it’s clear from the record that Mr. Westermann did 

not follow proper procedure. 

This isn’t about firing intelligence—members of the intelligence 

community that happened to disagree with him. This is serious 

concerns about using the right procedure. We can talk about—and 

certainly we’re raising the issue of whether he handled all cases 

the way he would have preferred to, in hindsight. But, I think, 

when we’re making allegations or throwing out quotes, we need to 

make sure we’re putting them in their proper context. We need to 

make sure that we understand the facts of each of these incidents 

before we try to cut short what has been, I think, a very strong and 

distinguished career. 

Mr. Chairman, you’ve been very gracious with the time. I thank 

you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sununu. 

Now, let me ask the permission of the distinguished ranking 

member to—— 

Senator BIDEN. Yes, please. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Recognize—— 

Senator BIDEN. Please continue. We only have one more member 

that wishes to speak, and he’s in another—he has another appointment. He said he will be here shortly, so—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. 

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Whatever time that comes, we’ll—I’ll 

yield to him. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murkowski. 

98 

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

ALASKA 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know that this has been a long process, not only for Mr. Bolton, 

but for the committee, as well, and I thank you for your indulgence, your patience. 

I also want to thank you for the delay, if you will, the time that 

we have had, since this committee last met, to do just exactly what 

Senator Sununu was talking about, was to get to the facts. There 

were things that were raised at the last business meeting, and it 

was probably your prerogative, as the Chair, to move forward at 

that point in time, but I appreciate the chance that you gave this 

committee to go out and do its homework. 

I, as a committee member, undertook that willingly, and perhaps—you know, my eyes are paying for it now, but I appreciate 

that you gave us that opportunity, because it is important to go 

into some of the allegations, to go into the background. 

I also want to thank the committee staff, who probably spent 

most of their recess going through with the interviews and providing the transcripts so that we could then review them. That was 

tough. 

The challenges and the opportunities that face the next U.S. Representatives to the U.N. here are incredibly significant, and we’ve 

heard that repeated here this afternoon. But we are at a point— 

a point in time where real reform can take place, where countries 

that are habitual abusers of human rights do not find seats on the 

Human Rights Commission, and that investigations into the Oilfor-Food Program are given the real consideration that they deserve. So, this is not the time for us—this is not the time for the 

United States to send an individual to the U.N. that is just going 

to be a caretaker, but one who will be proactive in pushing the 

United States agenda. 

So the question that we are faced with today, that has been 

raised by several, the question before us is, Is John Bolton the 

right individual for that particular job? 

Now, prior to the President’s nomination of Mr. Bolton to be the 

Representative to the U.N., I had not had any personal dealings 

with this gentleman, I hadn’t had an opportunity to meet him, to 

interact with him, so what I knew was really what I had heard 

from the media, fortunately or unfortunately, and comments from 

my colleagues. And since this intervening time in this past couple 

of months, I have come to know a great deal about Mr. Bolton. And 

as I—I told him yesterday, ‘‘I probably know far more about you 

than I had ever hoped to.’’ But I think it’s fair to say that one of 

the things that I have learned about him is that Mr. Bolton has 

a management style that is perhaps far different than my particular management style. 

Now, there’s been discussion about behavior, about management 

style, about how one conducts oneself. And, as you go through the 

transcripts, as you listen to the testimony that we have heard, and 

as I have talked to individuals who have had the opportunity to 

work with Mr. Bolton, you hear some words that describe him. He 

has been described as overcharging, hard-charging, overbearing, 

and confrontation. Now, there are some here that view these characteristics, as—hard-charging, as exactly what we need in the U.N. 

99 

right now, a no-nonsense, straight-talking, you know, this-guy’snot-going-to-take-bull-from-anybody type of a representative. 

I’ve also had conversations with people, and read the testimony 

from those who have interacted with the nominee that have used 

the word ‘‘brilliant’’ when they have described him. But they also 

use the term—they say he’s very difficult to work with. He can be 

focused, but he can be over-aggressive. 

It’s also become clear to me that when Mr. Bolton has made up 

his mind about an issue, he can be very—it can be difficult to 

change that mindset. 

And I, too—I guess I’ve paid my penance, as Senator Voinovich 

said, for going through all of the pages and pages, the hundreds of 

pages of testimony. Fortunately, I’ve got a long plane ride between 

Alaska and D.C., so I had a lot of time to do the reading. But I 

also had a lot of time to do the thinking. 

You know, when I first met with Mr. Bolton in our courtesy 

visit—this was prior to the time that any allegations had come out 

that he had been abusive toward staff members, and so, it was a 

topic that we did not discuss. What we did discuss at that meeting, 

though, was his role in New York. We talked about some of the inflammatory statements that he had made in the past. And the 

question that I asked him was, Whose opinion would he be presenting at the U.N.? Would it be the President’s, the Secretary of 

State’s, or would it be his own? 

And I bring this up for a couple of reasons. When he made his 

comments about North Korea’s leader in his speech in North 

Korea, this became part of the committee’s focus during that interview process. And we, in Alaska, spend a lot of time and energy 

looking and focusing on the North Korea issue. 

I found Mr. Bolton’s comments to be inflammatory at a time 

when we were trying to promote diplomacy in the region, and it 

seemed to me that if he was willing to fan the flames with disparaging rhetoric at that point in time, it was a question to me as to 

how he would conduct himself in New York. And it was an issue 

that we brought up at that initial meeting. 

I also understand that Mr. Bolton remarked during his confirmation hearing that he received a thank you, from then-Ambassador 

Hubbard, for his speech, saying that the speech had been helpful, 

and it would do them some good in South Korea. And yet, when 

I reviewed the transcript from the interview with Ambassador 

Hubbard, it was very clear that Hubbard’s intent had not been to 

thank Mr. Bolton for the speech, itself, but for making some factual 

changes to the speech so as not to spread the flames any further. 

And I have to agree with Ambassador Hubbard’s assessment that 

the speech did not advance the President’s objective of verifiably 

dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program through negotiation. 

A second matter, I had had concerns that Mr. Bolton might get 

out ahead of instructions while stationed in a post outside of Washington. And in reviewing the transcripts, and in conversations that 

I have had with individuals, I believe that there is a pattern of Mr. 

Bolton pushing that envelope on whether he could or could not say 

in trying to push policy that was perhaps more ambitious than the 

administration might be willing to go. But then you dig deeper into 

the evidence. You find out Mr. Hubbard’s suggestion that it was 

100 

possible that Mr. Bolton may have misinterpreted his remarks 

leading to his comments at the hearing. 

And then we’ve got Secretary Powell’s letter to Senator Kyl stating very clearly that Mr. Bolton’s speech had been fully cleared by 

the State Department. 

Then you look at the transcript from Lawrence Wilkerson’s interview, and it was very clear that Bolton went through the appropriate hoops and hurdles to have his speech cleared, even if those 

who cleared it may not have given it the attention that it needed. 

We saw that there had been e-mails released indicating the appropriate officials had signed off on that speech. 

So, whether you support or don’t support the content of the 

speech—and I do question the language that was used at that particular time—the reality is that Mr. Bolton did what he was supposed to do in getting the speech cleared, which was approved by 

those at a higher paygrade. 

Now, when the committee, at the business meeting that we had 

last, learned of the allegations that Mr. Bolton had berated an INR 

analyst in his office, an individual who was not directly working for 

Mr. Bolton, that concerned me. It concerns me a great deal. And 

the additional charges of trying to get other personnel removed 

from their positions only added to that concern. Because I do believe that how one treats, not only those on in a similar level of 

authority, but also those with not as much power, it says a lot. It 

says a lot about them as a person and how they will work with others. And in this position in the U.N., our representative needs to 

be able to work with others to build that—those relationships. 

But, at the same time, I recognize that this is the President’s 

nominee. The President deserves to be surrounded by individuals 

that he trusts, by individuals that he selects, and by individuals 

who will advance the interests of the administration. And that’s a 

high bar to overcome. 

When it comes down to—right down to it, it’s not about Mr. 

Bolton’s intelligence. He’s certainly demonstrated that he has intellectual prowess. It’s not about his capability, as he’s clearly demonstrated, in a number of global projects, he’s advancing the U.S.’s 

interests. There’s no question in my mind that Mr. Bolton has the 

ability to effectively represent the United States in a beneficial 

manner if that ability is directed appropriately. 

My concern, as you can probably tell, has more to do with the 

conduct, how Mr. Bolton conducts himself, how he treats those who 

disagree with his assessments, how he conducts himself with his 

superiors, his equals, and those below him on the totem pole. So, 

it’s not how John Bolton treats Lisa Murkowski; it’s how John 

Bolton will interact with other representatives and their staff in 

the U.N., and how he represents the United States. 

So, ultimately, in a position assigned by the President, that conduct is going to reflect on the President and the head of the Department. It’s the President’s responsibility to ensure that his 

nominee is part of the team, he’s not a freelancer, and that the 

nominee abides by the chain of command, receives the appropriate 

input, and listens to that input. The President has put his trust in 

John Bolton. Secretary Rice has put her trust in John Bolton. The 

President deserves to have an individual that he believes will be 

most effective in that position. And with the understanding that 

101 

how Mr. Bolton conducts himself at the U.N. reflects directly on 

the President of the United States, I will support moving Mr. 

Bolton’s nomination to the Senate floor. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator Murkowski. 

Senator Biden, may I recognize Senator Martinez? 

Senator BIDEN. Sure. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Martinez, you’re recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

FLORIDA 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to, in the interest of time, have my entire statement 

placed in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Martinez follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MEL MARTINEZ

Chairman Lugar, I would like to thank you and your staff for the continued time 

and effort you have put forth on this nomination. You and your team have completed an exhaustive review of Mr. Bolton, and I commend you for your continued 

effort on this important nomination. 

Over the years I have observed the work of the Foreign Relations Committee, and 

I have to say one of the reasons I was so drawn to working on the Foreign Relations 

Committee as a new Senator was the bipartisan nature of the work done here. So 

I have been a little disappointed by the events of the past several weeks—by what 

appears to be a departure from that proud tradition. 

This is an important appointment at a crucial moment in the history of the U.N. 

Our debate should be about how the U.S. should and can contribute to the reform 

of the United Nations, but I have not heard much conversation on the specifics of 

United Nations reform during this process. 

I wholeheartedly agree with the recent remarks made by Deputy Secretary of 

State Richard Armitage, ‘‘John Bolton is eminently qualified. He’s one of the smartest guys in Washington.’’ 

Mr. Bolton’s legal background, tenure at USAID, experience at the State Department, and extensive research and related writing work makes him an ideal candidate to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. I cannot think of 

a more qualified individual and it appears that this very committee is also aware 

of Mr. Bolton’s qualifications, having advanced Mr. Bolton’s nomination three times 

before. 

In 1982, this committee voted in favor of naming Mr. Bolton Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination at USAID. In 1989, this committee voted 

in favor of naming Mr. Bolton Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs. And, in 2001, this committee voted in favor of naming for Under 

Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. All three of these 

previous nominations were advanced by this committee and confirmed by the United 

States Senate. 

During each of these nominations, this committee undertook a very thorough look 

at Mr. Bolton’s qualifications and experience. On January 27, 1982, the committee 

received testimony on Mr. Bolton’s first nomination to be Assistant Administrator 

for Program and Policy Coordination at USAID. Mr. Chairman—Even then, Mr. 

Bolton already possessed an impressive resume, which included General Counsel for 

USAID, and Legal Counsel for the White House and a graduate of Yale College, and 

Yale Law School. And because of this experience and background, the Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton’s nomination, and Mr. Bolton did an honorable job of carrying out 

that policy during very uncertain Cold War times. 

In 1989, this committee again reviewed Mr. Bolton—this time for his nomination 

as the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs. In fact, 

our distinguished colleague from Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, presided over his nomination hearing. As Mr. Kerry explained in his opening remarks, as the Assistant 

Secretary, Mr. Bolton would be responsible for U.S. relations with the United Nations. 

Mr. Bolton shared his views on the UN system and why it was important to build 

upon then-recent improvements to its effectiveness. Mr. Bolton relayed that the 

102 

then ‘‘44-year old Charter of the United Nations embodies those values which have 

guided this nation during the course of more than two hundred years of our development.’’ He identified the essence of the U.N. Charter to be a ‘‘Respect for the supremacy of law above individuals, for the peaceful resolution of disputes between 

men and nations, and most importantly, the faith that mankind can peacefully build 

a better world for succeeding generations.’’ 

More than 15 years ago, Mr. Bolton was already was talking to this Committee 

about tangible ideas to strengthen and improve the United Nations and make sure 

it was a viable part of our international community. This is a man who believed— 

and still believes—in the mission of the UN more than 15 years ago he was already 

presenting solid ideas about how to make the U.N. work and make it better. This 

is a man who fifteen years ago could see both the strengths and the weaknesses 

of the United Nations and identify a positive way ahead. 

For example, Mr. Bolton talked about the quiet day-to-day work the UN did to 

improve the welfare of poverty stricken women, children, the sick, and refugees 

around the world. And he explained that these efforts deserve the fullest possible 

extent of support from us and other nations. 

Yet, and I will quote Mr. Bolton’s testimony: ‘‘While we seek to support the many 

worthy efforts of the United Nations and its specialized agencies we must not turn 

a blind eye to some excesses and poor management that have undermined UN effectiveness. Politicization and mismanagement have robbed the UN and some of its 

agencies of the moral high ground in recent years.’’ 

It is disappointing to me that fifteen years later, Mr. Bolton’s warning about turning a blind eye remains so fitting to the environment we find ourselves in today at 

the U.N. Rampant corruption, waste and ineffectiveness are the norm at the United 

Nations, and we have an institution failing in its mission. 

During the same hearing, the presiding Chairman, our distinguished colleague— 

Mr. Kerry—discussed with Mr. Bolton his qualifications for the Assistant Secretary 

position and Mr. Bolton, I think very eloquently, outlined his respective experience. 

How his background as a lawyer would prepare him for the international law and 

legal procedures, which govern the UN. How his years at the Justice Department 

in the Legislative Affairs shop would give him insight in the Western-styled legislatures of the General Assembly and the various governing councils of the specialized 

agencies. 

And how his time as the General Counsel, and then as Assistant Administrator 

at USAID, gave him the opportunity to learn a considerable amount about economic 

development in the Third World and had an opportunity to work with a number of 

UN agencies, the Rome Food Agencies, and others. And because of this experience, 

Mr. Chairman, the Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton’s nomination by Unanimous Consent. 

So, now we are spring of 2001—when Mr. Bolton was again before this Committee—this time with a nomination to be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. 

Interestingly, a principal concern about Mr. Bolton’s nomination for the Under 

Secretary position was the strength of his background in arms control. Ironically, 

the concern was that Mr. Bolton’s background was principally in international development, multi-national organizations, and foreign assistance. The very background that makes him ideal for the position he is being considered for today. 

In fact, as my distinguished colleague from Connecticut remarked during the floor 

debate on Mr. Bolton’s nomination, ‘‘there is no question that Mr. Bolton is an individual of integrity and intelligence.’’ Mr. Dodd even said Mr. Bolton had a ‘‘distinguished record.’’ And as Senator John Warner reported in his introduction of Mr. 

Bolton to the committee, ‘‘he is a seasoned negotiator who knows how to represent 

American national interests in the toughest of situations,’’ and ‘‘has extensive personal and professional experience dealing with multinational organizations.’’ 

But, similar to today, the heart of the debate was whether or not you agreed with 

John Bolton’s thinking and views. 

I think former Chairman Jesse Helms summed up the debate quite well when he 

remarked to Mr. Bolton during his nomination hearing, ‘‘This ought not to be a partisan thing . . . Whether they like you or not is irrelevant. What should be decided 

here is whether you are a competent man.’’ I couldn’t agree more. 

Equally intriguing were the subsequent remarks by the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Biden. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, I will quote the distinguished Ranking Member directly: 

I want to make it clear, this is not about your competence. My problem 

with you over the years has been you have been too competent. I mean, I 

would rather you be stupid and not very effective. I would have been had 

a better shot over the years. But I really mean it sincerely,—none of this, 

my questions, nor do I believe any of my colleagues questions, relate to any 

103 

personal animus about you as a person. I think you’re an honorable man 

and you are extremely competent. It’s about how different your views are. 

And this is the very same debate we are facing today. 

This isn’t a debate about Mr. Bolton’s qualifications or expertise. This isn’t about 

whether he has the right experience and background for the job the President has 

nominated him for—what we’re dealing with today is a very partisan political effort 

to disqualify Mr. Bolton’s nomination. 

This is about John Bolton’s personality. And, at the risk of oversimplifying, 

whether he is a nice guy. And whether we like him. I think the majority of my colleagues—Republican and Democrat alike—agree that Mr. Bolton is a competent 

man. His record speaks for itself. Previous attempts at discrediting his views, experience, and qualifications have failed, so now, all there’s left to talk about is whether 

or not he is a nice guy. 

Mr. Chairman, the fact is, even the allegations against Mr. Bolton’s character are 

very weak. And they surely haven’t revealed any pattern of inappropriate conduct. 

I reinforced this point during the last month’s hearing with Mr. Ford. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to recount my exchange with Mr. Ford, specifically his 

broad sweeping statement, under oath, regarding Mr. Bolton’s character. 

Senator MARTINEZ. In other words, there was a confrontation between 

you and he in a hallway which, admittedly we have to say, you had a pretty 

good falling out or pretty good discussion, it was heated, it was emotional, 

it was confrontational. 

Mr. FORD. That’s correct, sir. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Okay, and that arose out of the same circumstance, 

the same event which was the conversation between the analyst and Secretary Bolton, correct? 

Mr. FORD. That’s correct. 

Senator MARTINEZ. But you really cannot, in good faith, under oath, suggest that you have the ability to tell this Committee that this now represents a broader character flaw in Mr. Bolton’s part, can you? 

Mr. FORD. You’re absolutely correct in terms of I have absolutely—beyond 

what I’ve talked to you about, and admittedly extremely limited—right or 

wrong, good or bad, I still believe that this was not an exceptional day, or 

out of the ordinary in terms of his normal management style. 

Senator MARTINEZ. That’s your sense, that’s your opinion. But that’s not 

something you can really provide. 

Mr. FORD. No, sir. 

Senator MARTINEZ. In the nature of testimony under oath. 

Mr. FORD. No, certainly not from me, you can’t get that. 

Mr. Chairman, one incident does not constitute a pattern. And you surely can’t 

speak of something being a pattern if you haven’t personally witnessed it, even once. 

Fundamental fairness requires that hearsay be discounted. It’s just unacceptable 

that this instance has received as much attention as it has. 

Turning to another topic that I believe has been extremely inaccurately portrayed, 

Mr. Chairman, I want to clear up any misunderstandings surrounding a supposedly 

controversial statement that Mr. Bolton has made previously, which is that the 

United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare 

research effort, and that Cuba has provided dual-use bio-technology to other rogue 

states, and a concern that such technology could support bio-weapons programs in 

those states. 

Let me set the record straight: It is the U.S. position today—as it has been since 

March 2002 when Carl Ford testified before this committee that the U.S. believes 

Cuba does indeed have some biological warfare capabilities. 

In February, 2002, there was on all accounts a heated confrontation between John 

Bolton and intelligence analyst, Christian Westermann. At issue was Mr. 

Westermann’s attempt to block Mr. Bolton’s request to have Cuba biological warfare 

related language declassified for speech purposes. 

Specifically, Mr. Westermann went behind Mr. Bolton’s back and sent a biased 

and confusing declassification request to the intelligence community. He subsequently misled the Under Secretary’s office about his actions. In a nutshell, because 

Mr. Westermann did not agree with the ‘‘message’’ of the requested language, he 

sought to have it changed. Despite Mr. Westermann’s efforts Bolton’s language was 

ultimately approved for declassification and was included in his May 6, 2002 Heritage Foundation speech. 

As Mr. Ford confirmed for this committee, that very same statement appeared in 

Mr. Ford’s own testimony before this committee during March. That very same language was cleared by Mr. Ford’s office, as well as other intelligence agencies. 

Former Otto Reich has also used the same statement in subsequent remarks. 

104 

This had nothing to do with John Bolton trying to skew intelligence on Cuba’s 

biological warfare program. This language was approved by the intelligence community and has been used by several sources since its approval. And per Mr. Ford, this 

multiply issued statement reflected the correct belief of the United States, as it 

stood at that time. 

The dispute with Mr. Westermann as the language was developed in February 

2002 had to do 100% with Westermann’s conduct—not a dispute over his analysis. 

I don’t see any real issue here, Mr. Chairman. 

One final matter I discussed with Mr. Ford, which I’ll briefly share with the Committee, was Mr. Ford’s concern about how that information ultimately became a 

part of his Mr. Bolton’s speech. Initially, Mr. Ford suggested to this Committee that 

the entire controversy related to the analyst would have been avoided if Mr. Bolton 

had merely come to Mr. Ford first. Mr. Ford identified this as a central cause of 

the problem. However, when questioned, Mr. Ford admitted that Mr. Bolton had, 

in fact, tried to contact him initially—but that Mr. Ford was out of the building that 

day. As such, Mr. Bolton didn’t reach Mr. Ford. But he got his Principal Deputy, 

Mr. Fingar. And the response from this Principal Deputy was that the behavior by 

his analyst was inappropriate, and that they ‘‘screwed up.’’ That ‘‘it won’t happen 

again.’’ We have all seen copies of the actual email Mr. Fingar sent to Mr. Bolton 

with these remarks. 

Mr. Chairman, this was all contemporaneous with the events. Mr. Bolton did, in 

fact, try to reach Mr. Ford. And in Mr. Ford’s absence, Mr. Bolton handled the situation with Ford’s Principal Deputy. And, the Principal Deputy confirmed that the 

anaylyst was in error. Point being, this was a red herring. And the other allegations 

unearthed against Mr. Bolton carry similar meaning and weight. This is merely a 

collateral attack against Mr. Bolton. 

You need more than hearsay, more than unsubstantiated rhetoric to carry 

through—to destroy a person’s reputation and character. We should be operating on 

a standard of fundamental fairness. We simply haven’t met that threshold. We 

haven’t even come close. Interestingly, what we do have, is a growing list of individuals coming forward with an opposite account of Mr. Bolton’s personality and management style. 

I’d like to share, for a moment, what some people who’ve actually worked for John 

Bolton had to say. In an April 22nd letter to Chairman Lugar, 43 former associates 

of Mr. Bolton at the American Enterprise Institute wrote: 

The various allegations that have been raised before your Committee, 

concerning Mr. Bolton’s management style and conduct in other organizations and circumstances, are radically at odds with our experiences in more 

than four years of intense, frequent, and continuous interaction with him. 

He was unfailingly courteous and respectful to us regardless of our (AEI) 

positions or seniority. 

John Bolton’s management style (at AEI) became legendary for its crispness, openness, fairness, and efficiency. 

In the T3Washington Post, on April 24, 2005, Former Secretary of State Lawrence 

Eagleburger remarked: 

[A]s to the charge that Bolton has been tough on subordinates, I can say 

only that in more than a decade of association with him in the State Department, I never saw or heard anything to support such a charge. 

Mr. Chairman, I am sure you have seen a similar outpouring of remarks in favor 

of Mr. Bolton—outlining a ecidedly positive pattern of behavior. That said, I think 

we have to ask ourselves, isn’t this a very bizarre discussion to be having when it 

comes to the nomination of our Ambassador to the United Nations? We’re not voting 

on his popularity for homecoming court—we’re looking at his ability to get the job 

done for which he has been nominated—the very important job of representing the 

United States as Ambassador to the United Nations. 

This debate has been hijacked to rehash different allegations about personality 

and whether or not we approve of John Bolton’s management style, rather than reviewing his respective qualifications, and talking meaningfully about how he would 

tackle some of the key issues confronting the UN. 

Contrary to Mr. Bolton’s three previous nominations before this committee—when 

committee members questioned Mr. Bolton about everything from the CTBT to 

USAID’s partnership with PVOs), there is a noted absence of substantive dialogue 

about key issues. There has been no real debate about his qualifications or ability 

to get the job done. 

For example, what should the future role of the UN be in Haiti? What steps would 

Bolton take to move the UN out of the costly and dangerous mission in Ethiopia 

and Eritrea? And towards a final and binding decision of the Boundary CommisVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
105 

sion? Also absent is meaningful dialogue about Mr. Bolton’s writings related to the 

UN and its reform. 

In addition to the congressional testimony I already referenced, Mr. Bolton’s research and writings have long advocated a stronger UN. 

For example, in 1997, Mr. Bolton wrote that ‘‘traditional peacekeeping, together 

with the often-important role the agencies of the U.N. system play in international 

delivery of humanitarian assistance, can work and should be continued.’’ He added 

that the United Nations can be a ‘‘useful tool in the American foreign policy kit.’’ 

To me, we should have been using recent hearings and time spent in countless 

interviews talking about John Bolton’s ideas for the future of the U.N. To talk, in 

detail, about how we can work with the Secretary General and his desire for reform. 

The fact is, President Bush chose John Bolton because he knows how to get things 

done. This nomination is a direct reflection of the President’s determination to make 

the UN work. And the President should have this push for reform given a chance 

to succeed. 

Mr. Chairman, I think you would agree that Mr. Bolton’s remarks, writings, and 

action over the past twenty plus years, beginning with his first nomination hearing 

before this committee in January, 1982, reveal a very comprehensive understanding 

of the UN—an understanding of both its strengths and its weaknesses. 

John Bolton has long been a strong voice for UN reform and effective 

multilateralism, and will continue to be a strong voice at a time when the UN is 

undertaking essential reform initiatives. President Bush wants John Bolton as part 

of his foreign policy team and to represent the United States at the United Nations. 

He is qualified and prepared. 

The issues raised questioning his qualifications and character have failed to come 

anywhere close to the level of disqualifying him from this position. 

There is no compelling reason to deny the POTUS his choice of nominee for this 

position. I look forward to voting to confirm Mr. Bolton and supporting this nominee. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I want to thank the Chair and the ranking 

member for the manner in which you’ve conducted all of these deliberations. 

I want to also compliment the Chair for the very thoughtful 

opening remarks, which I thought were comprehensive in nature 

and covered the—in a wonderful way, and, I think, also put perspective and fairness into a process that I, frankly, at times, have 

wondered about. 

Let me also say that, as Senator Hagel commented, this is a committee that has been revered through the history of our nation. 

And as a person not born to this land, but one who’s adopted it as 

his own land, I must say that I always remarked and marveled at 

the bipartisan nature of American foreign policy and the way in 

which folks with very different thoughts and ideas would come together for the greater good of the country. And I would hope, as 

we go forward in this committee, Mr. Chairman—and I know how 

important that is to you and to the ranking member—that we can 

always keep that in mind, because I think in the difficult days in 

which we live, and the difficulties the world faces, and our nation 

faces in the world, it is vitally important that we always keep in 

mind the importance of us to all pull together as Americans—not 

Democrats, not Republicans, but as Americans. And I—my hope, in 

that spirit, is that this committee will always conduct its deliberations—— 

As I look at the nominee, I believe, first and foremost, the President of the United States has nominated him. I think, secondarily, 

our advice and consent responsibility, which I, too, take seriously, 

begins by analyzing the qualifications of the candidate. And as it 

relates to the qualifications of this particular nominee, I take a lot 

of comfort from the comments of Under Secretary of State Richard 

Armitage, who very directly worked with Secretary Bolton, who 

106 

said, ‘‘John Bolton is eminently qualified, and he’s one of the 

smartest guys in Washington.’’ 

And, Mr. Chairman, I know that coming in the order of the lineup in which I do, there’s a tendency to think of myself as cleanup. 

I’m also thinking, though, that I may be hitting number nine, 

which is a very different statement than cleanup. But, be that is 

it may, I want to, maybe, summarize a little of what’s transpired. 

And I think, you know, looking at his background at USAID, his 

experience in the State Department, and extensive research and 

writing relating to many different subjects, which I think prepared 

him for this role at the United Nations. And then, of course, we 

move on to the various nominations that he has received in the 

past, and confirmations by this committee, in 1982, as Assistant 

Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination at USAID; in 

1989, this committee in favor of naming Mr. Bolton Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs; and, in 

2001, voted in favor of naming him Under Secretary of State for 

Arms Control and International Security. 

All three of these previous nominations were advanced by this 

committee and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. During each of these 

nominations, this committee undertook a thorough look at Mr. 

Bolton’s qualifications and his experience. The committee received, 

on January 27 of ’82, Mr. Bolton’s first nomination for Assistant 

Secretary of Policy of USAID. And, even at that time, Mr. Chairman, he already had a distinguished record of accomplishment. 

And he, in addition to that, did a very honorable job in carrying 

out his assignments during the difficult years of the Cold War. 

In 1989, this committee again, reviewed Mr. Bolton; this time, 

for Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations. 

And my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, 

presided over his hearing at that time. And, as Mr. Kerry explained in his opening remarks, the Assistant Secretary, Mr. 

Bolton, would be responsible for U.S. relations with the United Nations. 

At that time, Mr. Bolton shared his views on the U.N. system, 

on why it was important to build upon the then-recent improvements to its effectiveness. And Mr. Bolton then relayed—the 44- 

year-old charter of the U.N. embodies those values which have 

guided this nation during the course of more than 200 years of our 

development, and he identified the essence of the U.N. charter to 

be a respect for the supremacy of law above individuals, for the 

peaceful resolution of disputes between men and nations, and, most 

importantly, the faith that mankind can peacefully build a better 

world for succeeding generations. 

This doesn’t sound to me, Mr. Chairman, as far back as 15 years 

ago, as someone who was bent upon the destruction of this organization, but someone who held it in high esteem and high regard. 

This is a man who, 15 years ago, could also see the strengths and 

the weaknesses of this organization. Mr. Bolton talked quietly— 

talked about the quiet day-to-day work of the U.N. that it did to 

improve the welfare of poverty-stricken women and children, the 

sick, and refugees around the world. And he explained that these 

efforts deserve the fullest possible extent of support from us and 

other nations. 

107 

And yet I will quote from Mr. Bolton’s testimony, ‘‘While we seek 

to support the many worthy efforts of the United Nations and its 

specialized agencies, we must not turn a blind eye to some excesses 

and poor management that have undermined its effectiveness. 

Politicization and mismanagement have robbed the U.N. and some 

of its agencies of the high moral ground in recent years.’’ 

And, Mr. Chairman, 15 years later, it’s disappointing to know 

that Mr. Bolton’s warning about turning a blind eye remains so fitting to the environment we find ourself today in the United Nations. Rampant corruption, waste, and ineffectiveness are the norm 

at the U.N., and we have an institution that, in many ways, is failing in its mission. 

Because of this experience, Mr. Chairman, the United States— 

because of his experience, the U.S. Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton’s 

nomination by unanimous consent. 

And now we’re in the spring of 2001, when, again, Mr. Bolton 

was before this committee. And this time the nomination for Under 

Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. And, interestingly enough, at that time, the concern about Mr. Bolton’s nomination for this particular position was the strength of his background in arms control. It was then said that his background was 

in international organizations, where he had spent so much of his 

time worrying about the world’s poor and USAID, worrying about 

the U.S. relationship with the U.N. and other international organizations, and whether or not, in fact, he had the sufficient background in the arms-control arena. 

And, as my distinguished colleague from Connecticut remarked 

during the floor debate on Mr. Bolton’s nomination, ‘‘There is no 

question,’’ he said, ‘‘that Mr. Bolton is an individual of integrity 

and intelligence.’’ Mr. Dodd even said Mr. Bolton had a distinguished record. 

Similar to today, the heart of the debate of whether or not you 

agree with—is really about whether you agree with Mr. Bolton’s 

thinking. At that time, at that hearing, the remarks by the ranking 

member, Mr. Biden—and, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I’ll quote again 

from the ranking member directly—he said, ‘‘I want to make it 

clear that it’s not about your competence. My problem with you 

over the years has been that you’ve been too competent. I mean, 

I would rather you be stupid and not very effective. I would have 

been—it would have been—it would have been—had a better shot 

over the years. But I really mean it sincerely. None of this—my 

questions, nor do I believe any of my colleagues’ questions, relate 

to any personal animus about you as a person. I think you’re an 

honorable man, and you’re extremely competent. It’s about how different your views are.’’ 

And, Mr. Chairman, that’s the very same debate we face here 

today. This is not a debate about his qualifications or expertise; 

this is about a debate of whether he has the right experience and 

background for the job. What we’re dealing here today is a debate 

that has gotten somewhat partisan, and it really has to do about 

Mr. Bolton’s views. The majority of my colleagues, Republicans and 

Democrats alike, agree that Mr. Bolton is a competent man, and 

I believe his record speaks for itself. And previous attempts at discrediting his views, experience, and qualifications have failed. So 

now we’re talking in another direction about—a collateral attack 

108 

about things that cannot be as easily discussed on the record, but 

about his demeanor and so forth. 

And so, I go to Mr. Ford’s testimony, here in the committee, who 

made the broad, sweeping statement, under oath, regarding Mr. 

Bolton’s character. He simply said that Mr. Bolton did not have the 

temperament necessary, and sweepingly attempted to attack his 

character. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I want to just briefly quote from this soliloquy that took place between Mr. Ford and myself. 

I asked the witness, ‘‘In other words, there was a confrontation 

between you—in the hallway, in which—between the two of you in 

the hallway, which you admittedly have to say you had a pretty 

good falling out, a pretty good discussion. It was heated. It was 

emotional. It was confrontational.’’ 

Mr. Ford, ‘‘That is correct.’’ 

And then I asked, ‘‘Okay, and that arose out of the same circumstance, the same event, which was the conversation between 

the analyst and Secretary Bolton, correct?’’ 

‘‘That’s correct,’’ was his answer. 

And then I asked, ‘‘But you really cannot, in good faith, under 

oath, suggest that you have the ability to tell this committee that 

this now represents a broader character flaw in Mr. Bolton’s part, 

can you?’’ 

Mr. Ford—and Mr. Ford answered, ‘‘You’re absolutely correct. In 

terms of—I have absolutely—beyond what I’ve talked about, and 

admittedly extremely limited, right or wrong, good or bad, I still 

believe that this was not an exceptional day or out of the ordinary, 

in terms of his normal management style.’’ 

And then I asked him, ‘‘That’s your sense. That’s your opinion. 

But that’s not something you can really provide’’—— 

He interrupted and said, ‘‘No, sir. 

‘‘—in the nature of testimony under oath.’’ 

And then he said, ‘‘No, certainly not. Not from me. You can’t get 

that.’’ 

One incident does not constitute a pattern. One event does not 

constitute a way of life. And I believe, Mr. Chairman, that one of 

the things that has been absent from this discussion is the principles of fundamental fairness. We have a man with a long and distinguished record of public service to his country, of dedicated service, of mostly competent service, and that it cannot be said that, 

by the failure of a few incidents, it’s now without merit and someone whose entire career should be diminished by those comments. 

Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up, and I realize that we’re very 

short on time, but I believe, in closing, that I would say that the 

fundamental fairness standard is what we should operate by. It 

should not be about hearsay. 

You detailed very well in your statement many of the charges 

that were then rebutted. I do not believe that it can ever be said 

this gentleman was guilty of massaging intelligence. That simply 

does not meet the test of the facts. 

And I would just finish by saying, Mr. Chairman, that one thing 

that should be crystal clear is that Mr. Bolton’s statement before— 

the speech that he gave was the very same information regarding 

bioweapons in Cuba than had been given by Mr. Ford to the committee here three months earlier, and that, undisputed, continues 

109 

to be the view of the U.S. Government today, that Cuba held a potential for biological weapons, and that it shared that information 

with rogue states. That is not changed, and that is not any different. That continues to be the view of the U.S. Government 

today. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I’m prepared to support Mr. Bolton’s nomination. I’m prepared to move it forward. I think he’s a dedicated and 

qualified man, who will make us an excellent Representative at the 

United Nations. I look forward to working with him, as I know the 

President has the confidence in him to put the United Nations in 

a better place, take it to a better place. It takes someone who will 

have the courage and the forcefulness of Mr. Bolton to help us fix 

the United Nations, because it is important that we have it there 

for us and the rest of the world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

Senator Biden. 

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the staff how much 

time that’s in the control of the Senator from Delaware is still left? 

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty-four minutes. 

Senator BIDEN. Twenty-four minutes? I will yield ten minutes to 

my friend from Florida. Actually, I’ll yield 15 minutes to my friend. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t need that much time. I 

can make my statement very clear to the committee in a very short 

period of time. 

This, to me, is about performance. This, to me, is one of the most 

important jobs that we have representing our country to the world 

body of nations of which we so desperately need their help at this 

time. Look at our position in Iraq and Afghanistan. We bemoan the 

fact that it’s mainly us and the British that are there, and we need 

to bring others to table to support us, not only in Iraq, but around 

the world. 

And so, when we’re talking about a representative of the United 

States of America to the United Nations, we’ve got to have the best 

and the brightest, and someone who can reach out and bring people 

together. The good book says, ‘‘Come, let us reason together.’’ 

That’s the kind of person that we ought to have. 

So, to get a clue, we have a saying in the South, ‘‘You can tell 

about where a fellow’s going by where he’s been.’’ Well, let’s look 

at his job. Does he deserve being promoted because of the job that 

he’s done as arms-control negotiator? Where are two of the hotspots 

in the world where the biggest threat to the interest of the United 

States is today? It’s North Korea and Iran. And, in four years, how 

much progress have we made in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons in those two countries? And who was the person that 

was charged with, in fact, that arms-control negotiation? And now 

we are asked to promote him to a position representing us in front 

of the world body? It just doesn’t make sense to me. And so, I’m 

going to vote no on the nomination. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

110 

Senator Biden, you have at least 20 minutes—— 

Senator BIDEN. Oh, I won’t take that long, but I’m going to—at 

your—whenever your suggest, Mr. Chairman, I will sum up, knowing—leaving the remainder of the time—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will leave that to you, because—we have 

four minutes on our side, so I will use that as a summing-up—— 

Senator BIDEN. Well, obviously, Mr. Chairman, you take as much 

time as you want to sum up. I don’t—it’s fine by me and my side. 

Let me state what I hope is the obvious. Our disagreement over 

Mr. Bolton in this committee, the disagreement you and I have 

over Mr. Bolton, and even the disagreements we’ve had internally 

about how to proceed, sometimes, I want to make it absolutely 

clear, I pledge that’s not going to affect at all, regardless of the outcome of this, the continued cooperation, as I think it’s fair to say 

we have cooperated, on every major foreign-policy issue that has 

come before this committee. This is about an individual, whether 

he should be in the position for which he’s nominated. It is not 

about our willingness to cooperate, an attempt to maintain, as best 

we can here, a bipartisan foreign policy. 

And I have been proud, as I know you have, and I hope all members have been, that—and it’s not a criticism of other committees 

directly, but this has not been a committee that has been contentious. This is the most contentious thing we’ve had in recent times, 

although there was a fairly contentious debate over Mr. Holbrooke, 

which was when you were not chairman, and a fairly contentious 

debate over Mr. Negroponte. 

And, I might add, it’s been repeatedly stated here—or, excuse 

me, sorry—several times it’s been stated that this has taken an extraordinarily long time. Well, obviously, it’s been stated by those 

people, understandably, who haven’t been here. This is not long at 

all, even for this committee. 

Let me just remind folks, you had, in May of the first year, Mr. 

Holbrooke’s name floated to be the nominee. He did not get a hearing until the following February. He didn’t get nominated until the 

following February. He did not get confirmed until the following 

June. Okay? It was August? August. Excuse me. He didn’t get—so, 

February to June—I mean, February to August. I’ve got June on 

my mind, my wife’s birthday. Anyway. 

Secondly, Mr. Negroponte. His name came up here in May, and 

he was confirmed in September. So, let’s get the record straight. 

Let’s get the record straight. 

And in the case of Mr. Holbrooke, he had—three separate hearings we brought him back. Three separate times. And none of my 

colleagues were arguing then, including us, that he wasn’t—he was 

being brought back too many times. 

So, for the record—for the record—just taking the recent history—the recent history—this is not a long time, number one. 

Now, the second point that I’d like to make is, I am confident 

that our two colleagues in the Intelligence committee are going to, 

at some point, produce a letter saying they looked at the information coming from the so- called intercepts, and that they see no pattern that would raise any alarm. But they will also tell you they 

were not given what Mr. Bolton was given. Notwithstanding the 

fact that they reach that conclusion—I believe they will reach that 

111 

conclusion—they were redacted files. They did not have the name 

of, quote, ‘‘the American.’’ 

Call home. [Laughter.] 

And so, I don’t have any doubt. But it doesn’t, in any way, undercut the argument that we’re entitled to see what they saw, and 

they were entitled to see more. And, as I said to you all the beginning, I’m not at all sure—I think it’s kind of a blind alley. I don’t 

think there’s probably anything there, based on my going to 

present administration officials who I respect and past administration officials. But the facts are that we’re not—we don’t have that 

information. 

Now, I may be mistaken, but I don’t ever recall—at least in my 

tenure on this committee, which is embarrassingly long—I don’t 

ever recall a nominee being put forward by a President that had 

so many people who worked for that President come forward and 

say, ‘‘That nominee should not be confirmed.’’ I don’t ever recall 

that. My friend from Maryland’s been here almost as long as I 

have. I’m not being—and my friend from Indiana has been here almost as long as I have—I would—I stand to be corrected, but I 

don’t think it’s ever happened. Ever. At least in the last 32 years. 

I would note, that’s mildly remarkable. 

And I would also point out that notwithstanding the fact—let’s 

assume—let’s grant—as my friend from Florida, the great trial 

lawyer that he was and is, might say, let’s argue this in the alternative here. Let’s assume every one of us are being totally partisan. Even if that were true, it doesn’t undercut a single thing 

we’re saying. Sometimes even when you’re partisan, you’re right. 

And I would argue that just look at the number of significant 

present and former administration officials who said, ‘‘Uh-uh. Bad 

idea.’’ 

Now, I go back to a version of what was stated by one of my Republican colleagues earlier today. I’m sure—I shouldn’t say I’m 

sure—the Secretary of State has indicated to me—she has indicated at least one other member of this committee, based on what 

they said today, and, I suspected, indicated to a lot of you, ‘‘Don’t 

worry. He won’t go off the reservation.’’ I’m paraphrasing. ‘‘It won’t 

happen like it has happened at State. It won’t happen. We’ll control 

him.’’ Wow. 

Question that was asked by one of my colleagues, Why would you 

send someone to the United Nations at this moment that you acknowledge you’re going to need to control? Can you think of any 

time in the recent past where our interests are more at stake than 

this moment at the United Nations? Does anybody within earshot 

think that in the next three years we are not going to have to attempt to bring North Korea and Iraq before the Security Council? 

I suspect that may happen. Is there any time we might need an 

Adlai Stevenson, whose effectiveness in looking across and say, 

‘‘Don’t wait’’—paraphrasing—‘‘Don’t wait for the translation.’’ Why 

was it so effective? Because that was not his style. It was so remarkable that he did that. It was such an exception. A little bit 

like me being calm. [Laughter.] 

So, I just think that we can’t really kid ourselves here. And I 

think—and I—and, by the way—I mean this sincerely—I’ve worked 

with a lot of you in this committee a long time. I hope my bona 

fides have—with you, personally, are real. And I respect your arguVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
112 

ments that you’ve all made. But, as I listen to you all, it comes 

down to one really compelling argument: the President’s entitled to 

his man. I respect that. I disagree with that. Unfortunately, Democratic President’s have found out I disagree with that—Mr. Carter, 

Mr. Clinton. They found out I don’t share that view. I don’t share 

the view: because he wants it—the President wants it, that he 

should get it. Although I do believe—to quote my—paraphrase my 

friend from Illinois—that, on matters of assembling your Cabinet 

around you, you should give deference—we should give deference, 

as opposed to a life-time appointment to a third branch of the government. 

But that seems to be the strongest argument for Mr. Bolton. I 

notice no one has said, on either side of the aisle, either side of this 

committee, that the assertions of Mr. Bolton’s behavior and management style are not true. They argue that it shouldn’t matter, or 

it doesn’t matter as much. I didn’t hear anybody come in here and 

say, ‘‘No, no, no, this is all wrong. You’ve got this guy wrong. 

You’ve got this guy all wrong.’’ I didn’t hear anybody say that he 

didn’t—wasn’t aggressive on his point of dealing with the intelligence community. Some say he’s aggressive, and that’s good. 

Some say, he’s aggressive, that’s bad. But nobody suggests that 

this is a fellow who doesn’t push his point to the point of exhaustion. 

Now, we can disagree on whether or not that is good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate. I think it’s inappropriate. But no one’s 

saying he didn’t do that. 

And, again, I want to make clear, those in the intelligence community, or formerly in the intelligence community, who are opposed to Mr. Bolton and suggest he should not go forward, are not 

suggesting Mr. Bolton, in his previous position, is not entitled to 

his own opinion. What this was always about was whether Mr. 

Bolton could assert a governmental position that was inconsistent 

with, or at odds with, the intelligence community’s opinion. In the 

end of the day, he didn’t. That shouldn’t be remarkable. Because 

had he—had he done it, he would have—I assume he would have 

gotten fired. 

But, as I say, again, how many times do you have to be told, as 

a subordinate, or at least in a subordinate position, by a superior 

that, ‘‘Are you sure you got that right? Are you sure it’s not that? 

I think it’s that,’’ to not get the message? 

Now, the remarkable thing is, most of these folks had the political and personal gumption to stand fast. But, more importantly, 

they had men and women of character, who were equal to or superior in political strength to Mr. Bolton, to tell them to go back sand. 

They had their protector in each of these instances. But the remarkable thing is that, even in the first instance, none of these 

folks caved. 

And I want to mention two things. I won’t take any time, I’ll just 

put them in the record. 

With regard to the Townsel matter, Senator Coleman made much 

of the unsubstantiated allegations by Mrs. Townsel having been 

discussed at a meeting April 19th. I’ll remind everybody, that’s why 

I made a motion to go into closed session. Because they were unsubstantiated at that moment. That’s why I wanted to go into 

closed session. 

113 

Again, I don’t recall—it probably has happened, but I don’t recall 

a time when a Senator has said to his colleagues, ‘‘Let’s go into 

closed session for a little bit. I want to tell you something I know, 

an allegation,’’ or, ‘‘I want to discuss something.’’ Speaking of comity, not say, ‘‘Okay, we’ll recess for 20 minutes and go into closed 

session.’’ 

The second point I’d make is, nobody on this side that I heard 

today used as a rationale for voting against Mr. Bolton the alleged 

conduct with regard to Mrs. Townsel. And I’ll remind everyone that 

when the chairman raised it, and I—in my opening statement, I 

said what he said—it’s he-said/she-said, and it’s unsubstantiated. 

I would also like to put in the record what we actually learned 

from Mrs.—from the witnesses we, the staff, Minority and Majority 

staff, interviewed with regard to that allegation. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be put in the record in full. 

Senator BIDEN. Secondly, the issue of whether or not Mr. Bolton 

obeyed the rules on clearing speeches. It’s been asserted, flatly, 

that he has. I would like to put in the record—not take the time 

now—what was stated by witnesses and those familiar with how 

the community works in clearing those speeches. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full. 

Senator BIDEN. And, thirdly, the assertion that Mr. Bolton went 

behind—or, excuse me, Mr. Westermann went behind Mr. Bolton’s 

back and lost his trust. I just note, and I’ll put it in the record, the 

testimony of Carl Ford, Tom Finger, Carol Rodley, Neil Silver, and 

Christian Westermann, confirming that Mr. Westermann followed 

standard operating procedure. And I’d ask that be put in the 

record. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full. 

Senator BIDEN. And, Mr. Chairman, I understand, when we finish, after you conclude your statement, you’re going to make a motion. And, in keeping with what we committed we will do, we will 

not make—unless I’m unaware of something one of my colleagues 

is going to do, we will not make any competing motion, if it’s the 

motion that the Senator from Ohio indicated he would support, 

and—in order to move this, out of committee in almost the exact 

time—we said by 3 o’clock, but within the time that we were allotted at the beginning here. 

But I would repeat to my colleagues—and I mean this sincerely—I think I’ve demonstrated this—all of whom I respect—that 

I can understand how there is disagreement if you start off with 

this overwhelming presumption that the President’s entitled to his 

person. But there are two things that seem to me to be operative 

here. One is that that is the controlling rationale for why Mr. 

Bolton should move forward by a majority of members of this committee, if he should move forward. And, secondly, that we may be 

‘‘damning with faint praise’’ here. 

And one of my colleagues said, earlier today—and, obviously, it 

is not for me to decide, or the colleague who said this—but I truly 

believe that, in light of what I expect is about to happen, the President, in the interest of the United States would be better served 

by Mr. Bolton’s nomination being pulled down. I don’t expect that 

to happen. But I honestly believe he would be better served if that 

were the case. And it—there is precedent for that, in Democratic 

administrations and in Republican administrations. 

114 

I might add, there’s also precedent—on our watch, we were in 

charge, the Democrats, we voted out—someone out of the committee with a negative recommendation. We have voted people out, 

I would submit for the record, without recommendation. And we’ve 

voted people out with a favorable recommendation. But it is somewhat unusual. It is somewhat unusual to move that way. 

And I’m not, in any way, questioning the majority’s right to do 

that, but I would suggest that it doesn’t appear that Mr. Bolton has 

the confidence of the majority of this committee. And I would suggest that it may be worth the President’s interest to take note of 

that. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your cooperation. 

And I still will, on another matter, pursue those issues—not in 

terms of stopping the nomination, but as a matter of policy and 

principle that we should be able to, you and I and this committee, 

have access to the information that we sought. I think that is an 

institutional issue. 

So, I thank you, and I yield back our time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank the distinguished ranking member. 

I thank all members. All 18 of us have spoken. The statements 

were, I believe, thoughtful, well-drafted issues expressed as the debate continues. 

Let me just take this moment to thank the distinguished ranking 

member, in particular, because I can recall, although it is not a 

comparable moment, when we had debates over several weeks and 

months prior to American being engaged in Iraq. And we had a 

very difficult time wrestling with those issues in the committee. 

Now, the chairman was then Senator Biden. The ultimate conclusion was that we would support the President. But it was not 

unanimous in this committee, nor on the floor. And, indeed, historians, I suspect, will still argue some of the points that were argued in the committee at that point. 

I mention that because we have work to do. The chairman has 

mentioned North Korea, Iran, just to think of two, quite apart from 

the work—support in the peace process in the Middle East, tremendously important deliberations before this committee. The need for 

unity, insofar as we can have it, is imperative. 

And I appreciate very much the fact that members on both sides 

of the aisle were here for this business meeting, and stayed, and 

participated. That, I appreciate. I appreciate we were not challenged by the parliamentary procedure on the floor. It would have 

prevented us from meeting. Now, I’m sure that was not by chance. 

I thank the distinguished ranking member for making that possible. 

But we now have had an important debate, in which I believe we 

must move forward. The chairman has indicated the motion that 

I’m about to make. It was, I suspect, more than hinted by Senator 

Voinovich’s comments earlier this morning. The Chair has listened 

carefully, has attempted to find a motion that a majority of our 

committee can agree upon. 

And so, I will say now, the question is on the nomination of John 

R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations, with 

rank of Ambassador. The vote will be to report the nomination 

without recommendation. 

The Clerk will call the roll. 

115 

The CLERK. Mr. Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chafee. 

Senator CHAFEE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Allen. 

Senator ALLEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Sununu. 

Senator SUNUNU. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Martinez. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Biden. 

Senator BIDEN. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Sarbanes. 

Senator SARBANES. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Dodd. 

Senator DODD. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. No. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Obama. 

Senator OBAMA. No. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Aye. 

Will the Clerk please report the tally? 

The CLERK. Ten aye, eight nay. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ten ayes, eight nays. And, therefore, the nomination is reported, and the business meeting is concluded. 

Senator BIDEN. Wait, wait, wait. Mr. Chairman, before we conclude, I want to state to my colleagues what I said to you privately. 

We will have—so there is no delay, we will have the Minority views 

written and available to the committee by Monday. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. 

Senator BIDEN. And so, we—— 

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, right at the end you said, 

‘‘The nomination is reported to the floor’’—but without recommendation, is that—— 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s correct. That was the motion. 

I thank the distinguished ranking member once again—— 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And all members. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

116 

ANNEX D 

MATERIAL IN SUPPORT OF JOHN BOLTON’S NOMINATION

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR: The attached letter is co-signed by former 

presidential appointees, career and non-career Civil Service and 

Foreign Service employees who knew and worked with John Bolton 

from 1989–1993. These people and many more have indicated their 

strong support for Secretary Bolton. For example, John’s former supervisors including former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, 

former Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, and 

I, have publicly expressed our foil confidence and support for John, 

and our belief that he will be a superb representative of the United 

States in the United Nations. 

The attached letter demonstrates that many of those who worked 

for or with him share this belief. Ipersonally know if others who 

now hold positions in the United Nations or the State Department 

who support John, but for ‘‘conflict of interest’’ reasons prefer to express that support through private letters to you and your colleagues. 

Sincerely, 

LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER. 

May 6, 2005. 

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We are former presidential appointees, career and non-career Civil Service and Foreign Service employees 

who knew and worked with John Bolton in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs under 

the leadership of Secretaries James A. Baker III and Lawrence S. 

Eagleburger from 1989–1993. While we have followed John’s nomination to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations with 

great interest and enthusiasm, the recent and unreasonable attacks on his character and integrity during his Senate confirmation 

process have precipitated this letter of support; we only regret that 

we did not act sooner in conveying our views and strong support 

for his nomination. 

Despite what has been said and written in the last few weeks, 

John has never sought to damage the United Nations or its mission. Quite the contrary—under John’s leadership the organization 

was properly challenged to fulfill its original charter. John’s energy 

and innovation transformed 10 from a State Department backwater 

into a highly appealing work place in which individuals could effectively articulate and advance U.S. policy and their own careers as 

well. During the Persian Gulf War, John played a significant and 

substantive role in achieving the numerous Security Council resolutions adopted during the first Bush administration. He was also 

deeply engaged in matters beyond the spotlight of the Security 

Council, including refugees, human rights, development, democVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
117 

racy, food aid, UN management and budgets. His call for a ‘‘unitary 

UN’’ guided and motivated the 10 bureau to promote consistent 

and piuductive practices across the entire gamut of UN organizations. John championed this concept in order to fashion a more effective United Nations, and a signal achievement in this regard 

was his effort to repeal the execrable ‘‘Zionism is Racism’’ resolution, which was a stain on the credibility of that institution. It is 

this laudable record of professional achievement in IO that we were 

privileged to witness, as well as over three decades of public service 

to this country, which define his character and capabilities. 

We are proud to have served with John, and grateful for his leadership, integrity, and vision. The allegations about his abuse of 

subordinates simply do not accord with our experience while he 

was Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs. His 

treatment now before the Committee on Foreign Relations is thus 

particularly disturbing and disheartening to those who have been 

fortunate enough to work for and with him. We hope this letter will 

help set the record straight and inform your committee’s decision. 

Sincerely yours, 

Margaret D. Tutwiler, Former Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Spokesman 

John F.W. Rogers, Former Under Secretary for Management 

Ambassador Dennis Ross, Former Director of Policy Planning, 

Former Special Middle East Coordinator 

Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs 

Sonia Landau, Former Assistant Secretary of State, rank of Ambassador 

Richard Burt, Former Assistant Secretary of State 

Randall M. Fort, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Analysis and Research 

Richard Schifter, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Human 

Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 

Catherine Bertini, Former Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of 

Agriculture 

Richard T. Miller, Former U.S. Observer to UNESCO 

Caroline Weil Barnett, Former Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary John R. Bolton 

Christine E. Samuelian, Former Confidential Assistant to Assistant 

Secretary John R. Bolton 

David A. Schwarz, Former Special Assistant to U.S. Permanent 

Representative to the European Office of the United Nations 

John M. Herzberg, Former Public Affairs Officer, Bureau for International Organization Affairs 

C. Craig Smith, Former Confidential Assistant to the DAS, International Organization Affairs 

Frederick H. Fleitz, Intelligence Analyst, Central Intelligence 

Agency 

Fran Westner, Former Director of Public Affairs, International Organization Affairs 

Thomas A. Johnson, Counselor for Legal Affairs, U.S. Mission, Geneva 

M. Deborah Wynes, Former Civil Service Employee, U.S Department of State 

118 

Lena Murrell, Former Secretary to Deputy Assistant Secretary, 

International Organization Affairs 

Sam Brock, Former Action Officer, Office of UN Political Affairs, 

Bureau for International Organization Affairs 

Antonio Gayoso, Former Agency Director, USAID 

May 6, 2005. 

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR: We write to express our full confidence in 

the professionalism and integrity of John R. Bolton and to offer our 

strong support for his nomination to be permanent representative 

of the United States at the United Nations. 

As signatories we are diverse; career and non-career, Republican 

and Democrat, employed and retired. Many of us worked directly 

with John Bolton during his service at USAID under President 

Reagan. Some of us have served at USAID following his legacy. All 

of us deeply respect and admire John Bolton as a leader who exhibits the utmost integrity, fairness, intellect, and sense of America’s 

national interests. Based on this personal experience, we know the 

caricature drawn of Secretary Bolton in this confirmation process 

is unrecognizable and grossly unfair. 

We know John to be a forceful policy advocate who both encourages and learns from rigorous debate. We know him to be a man 

of balanced judgment. And we know him to have a sense of humor, 

even about himself. 

John leads from in front with courage and conviction—especially 

positive qualities, we believe, for the assignment he is being asked 

to take on. He is tough but fair. He does not abuse power or people. 

John is direct, yet thoughtful in his communication. He is highly 

dedicated, working long hours in a never-ending quest to maximize 

performance. Yet, he does not place undue time demands on his 

staff, recognizing their family obligations. What he does demand 

from staff is personal honesty and intellectual clarity. 

Throughout his illustrious career John Bolton has been an energetic change agent. As such, he has made enemies, for there are 

always those who abhor and resist change. But John is known 

more for his friends than his enemies. We ask that you listen to 

his friends, giving them at least equal weight. 

We highly recommend Secretary Bolton to you with the full confidence that be will serve his country as U.S. Ambassador to the 

United Nations with honor and great distinction. 

Respectfully, 

M. Peter McPherson, Former Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International 

Development 

Frederick W. Schieck, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Kate Semerad, Former Assistant Administrator, External Affairs, 

USAID 

Michelle D. Laxalt, Former Director, Legislative Affairs, USAID 

119 

Frank Ruddy, Former Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID, 

Former General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy, Former 

U.S. Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea 

Elise du Pont, Former Assistant Administrator (and founder) for 

Private Enterprise, USAID 

Charlotte Norwood Walker, Former Secretary to Elise du Pont, Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID 

Otto J. Reich, Former Assistant Administrator of USAID, Former 

U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, former Assistant Secretary of 

State, former Special Envoy of the President for Western 

Hemisphere Initiatives. 

Marc Leland, Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs 

Molly Hageboeck, Former Chief of Staff, USAID 

Mary Beth Allen Yarbrough, Commissioned Foreign Service Officer, USAID) 

Franklin L. Lavin, Special Assistant Bureau for Asia, Bureau for 

Africa, USAID 

Barbara A. Upton, Former Director, Office of International Donor 

Coordination, USAID 

Sarah Tinsley Demarest, Former Director, Office of Women in Development, USAID 

Caroline Weil Barnett, Former Special Assistant to General Counsel and Assistant Administrator John R. Bolton 

Kevin E. Rushton, Former Special Assistant, USAID, Former Economic Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank 

R. Blair Downing, Former Special Assistant USAID, Former Executive Secretary, Department of Treasury 

Patrice Malone Pisinski, Former Special Assistant, USAID 

Liliane Willens, Ph.D., Former Desk Officer for Indian Ocean 

States, Africa Bureau, USAID 

Clark D. Horvath, Horvath and Associates 

Michael Ussery, U.S. Ambassador (Ret.) 

John L. Wilkinson, Brigadier General, USAFR (Ret.), Former Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and Near East; 

Former Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Private 

Enterprise, USAID 

Joseph P. Duggan, Formerly U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 

Department of State; White House Staff; USAID 

Richard Derham, Former General Counsel, UDAID, Former Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination 

Kay Davies, Former Director, Office of Women in Development 

Dee Ann Smith Shuff, Executive Officer, Foreign Service (Ret.) 

Carole Neideffer Gallagher, Confidential Assistant to Administrator McPherson (Ret.) 

David M. Rybak, U.S. Agency for International Development, Retired Foreign Service 

Rick Endres, Former Special Assistant, Office of Interbureau Affairs and Officer, Office of Foreign, Disaster Assistance, 

USAID; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 

Technology Policy 

Matthew C. Freedman, Former International Development Advisor, 

USAID 

120 

Sean Walsh, Former Director of Office of Urban Programs for the 

NIS 

Kimberley McGraw Euston, Former Interim Program Officer for 

the Caribbean—Bureau of INM, U.S. State, Department, 

Former Confidential Assistant to the Vice President’s National 

Security Advisor 

Nadine M. Hogan, Former Mission Director, USAID 

Dr. Edwin W. Hullander, Former Associate Assistant Administrator for Policy, Programs and Project Review; Coordinator for 

Counter-Terrorism Programs, AID 

Ed Lijewski, Program Analyst, USAID 

Bob Hawkins, Chairman, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs, President of The Institute for Contemporary 

Studies 

Neal S. Zank, Former policy analyst, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, USAID 

Richard Sheppard, Former Office Director, Bureau for Program and 

Policy Coordination, USAID 

Emily Leonard, USAID (FEOC) Ret. 

Peter K. Monk, Formerly Keene-Monk Associates 

THE RT. HON. THE BARONESS THATCHER, 

HOUSE OF LORDS, 

London, England, May 4, 2005. 

Hon. JOHN R. BOLTON, 

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Washington, DC. 

DEAR JOHN: I am writing this letter in order to let you know how 

strongly I support your nomination as U.S. ambassador to the 

United Nations. On the basis of our years of friendship, I know 

from experience the great qualities you will bring to that demanding post. 

To combine, as you do, clarity of thought, courtesy of expression 

and an unshakable commitment to justice is rare in any walk of 

life. But it is particularly so in international affairs. A capacity for 

straight talking rather than peddling half-truths is a strength and 

not a disadvantage in diplomacy. Particularly in the case of a great 

power like America, it is essential that people know where you 

stand and assume that you mean what you say. With you at the 

UN, they will do both. Those same qualities are also required for 

any serious reform of the United Nations itself, without which cooperation between nations to defend and extend liberty will be far 

more difficult. 

I cannot imagine anyone better fitted to undertake these tasks 

than you. 

All good wishes, 

Yours ever, 

MARGARET THATCHER. 

121 

April 22, 2005. 

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hart Senate Office 

Building, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We, the undersigned, have been appalled 

at the charges that have been leveled at John Bolton during the 

course of his nomination hearing to be this country’s ambassador 

to the United Nations. Rather than a rational, mature discussion 

about the future course American policy should take with respect 

to the United Nations, or whether and to what extent Mr. Bolton’s 

extensive knowledge and experience with the UN further that 

course, what we have witnessed instead has been a character assassination masquerading as a nomination hearing. Mr. Bolton 

spent a full day before your Committee prepared to delve deeply 

into issues of foreign policy, and yet all but a sliver of the Committee’s time was devoted to unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct. 

Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know him to be a 

man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply devoted to the 

service of this country and the promotion of our foreign policy interests as established by this President and the Congress. Not one 

of us has ever witnessed conduct on his part that resembles that 

which has been alleged. We feel our collective knowledge of him 

and what he stands for, combined with our own experiences in government and in the private sector, more than counterbalances the 

credibility of those who have tried to destroy the distinguished 

achievements of a lifetime. 

President Bush and Secretary Rice have personally expressed 

confidence in Mr. Bolton’s ability to effectively represent this country in the United Nations. And for those of us who have worked 

with and known John Bolton for decades, we urge you and the 

Committee to consider our views. We believe John Bolton deserves 

to have the Foreign Relations Committee’s vote of confidence and 

support as well. 

Sincerely, 

Ed Meese, Former Attorney General of the United States 

Dick Thornburgh, Former Governor of Pennsylvania, Former Attorney General of the United States, Former Under Secretary 

General for Administration and Management, The United Nations 

Frank Keating, Former Governor of Oklahoma, Former Associate 

Attorney General, Former General Counsel, Department of 

Housing and Urban Development, Former Assistant Secretary 

of the Treasury 

William F. Weld, Former Governor of Massachusetts, Former Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division 

Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Former Counsel to President Ronald 

Reagan 

C. Boyden Gray, Former Counsel to the President George H.W. 

Bush 

T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr., Former Assistant to the President, for Domestic Affairs 

Richard Willard, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division 

122 

Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil 

Rights Division 

Douglas W. Kmiec, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legal Counsel 

Thomas M. Boyd, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legislative Affairs, Former Director, Office of Policy Development 

James F. Rill, Former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division 

Charles J. Cooper, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legal Counsel 

Becky Norton Dunlop, Former Senior Special Advisor to the Attorney General 

Eugene W. Hickok, Former Special Assistant, Office of Legal Counsel, Former Deputy Secretary of Education 

Mark R. Levin, Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General 

John Richardson, Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General 

William P. Cook, Former General Counsel, U.S. Immigration & 

Naturalization Service 

Steve Calabresi, Former Special Assistant to the Attorney General 

Murray Dickman, Former Assistant to the Undersecretary General 

of the United Nations, Former Assistant to the Attorney General 

Terry Eastland, Former Director of Public Affairs 

Roger Pilon, Former Director, Asylum Policy and Review Unit 

Lee Liberman Otis, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General, 

Former General Counsel, Department of Energy 

C.H ‘‘Bud’’ Albright, Jr., Former Deputy Associate Attorney General 

Gary L. McDowell, Former Associate Director of Public Affairs 

Laura Nelson, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legislative Affairs 

Michael Carvin, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office 

of Legal Counsel 

Mark R. Disler, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil 

Rights Division 

Brent 0. Hatch, Former Associate White House Counsel, Former 

General Counsel National Endowment for the Humanities, 

Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division 

Steven R. Valentine, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 

Civil Division 

David B. Rivkin, Jr., Former Deputy Director, Office of Policy Development, Member, U.N. Sub-commission on the Promotion 

and Protection of Human Rights 

Lee A. Casey, Former Attorney Advisor, Office of Legal Counsel, 

Member, U.N. Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 

123 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, Washington, DC, April 22, 2005. 

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MEMBER BIDEN: We were 

close colleagues of John Bolton during his tenure as senior vice 

president of the American Enterprise Institute from January 1997 

through May 2001. (Our positions at AEI during Mr. Bolton’s tenure are given below our signatures.) We are writing to tell you and 

your colleagues that the various allegations that have been raised 

before your Committee, concerning Mr. Bolton’s management style 

and conduct in other organizations and circumstances, are radically 

at odds with our experiences in more than four years of intense, 

frequent, and continuous interaction with him. 

Mr. Bolton was a demanding colleague—and was always at least 

as demanding of himself as of those around him. He was 

unfailingly courteous and respectful to us regardless of our AEI positions or seniority. Several of us were Mr. Bolton’s subordinates, 

and the idea that he would seek to punish or settle scores with 

those who disagreed with him seems particularly preposterous to 

us. At AEI, whenever uncertainties or disagreements arose concerning research or administrative matters, the Bolton style was 

clear and consistent: he would state his own views openly and directly, expect others to be equally open and direct, and go out of 

his way to encourage subordinates to be open and direct, all in the 

service of arriving at the best possible decision. Disagreement was 

never discouraged and often led him to revise his own views; once 

a decision was reached, he expected subordinates to follow the decision with the same alacrity with which he followed the decisions 

of his peers or superiors. 

For these and other reasons, John Bolton’s management style at 

AEI became legendary for its crispness, openness, fairness, and efficiency. As we have followed the strange allegations suddenly leveled at Mr. Bolton in recent days and reflected among ourselves on 

our own experiences with him, we have come to realize how much 

we learned from him, and how deep and lasting were his contributions to improving AEI’s management and esprit de corps as well 

as the substance of our research programs. Contrary to the portrayals of his accusers, he combines a temperate disposition, good 

spirit, and utter honesty with his well-known attributes of exceptional intelligence and intensity of purpose. This is a very rare 

combination and, we would think, highly desirable for an American 

ambassador to the United Nations. 

We respectfully request that this letter be shared with the other 

members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and entered into 

its records. 

Yours truly, 

Leon Aron, Resident Scholar 

Douglas Besharov, Resident Scholar 

Claude Barfield, Resident Scholar 

Frances Bolton, Assistant to the Senior Vice President 

124 

Steven Berchem, Vice President 

Elizabeth Bowen, Director of Conferences 

Walter Berns, Resident Scholar 

Karlyn Bowman, Resident Fellow 

Montgomery Brown, Director of Communications 

Mark Falcoff, Resident Scholar 

Virginia Bryant, Director of Publications, Marketing 

Isabel Ferguson, Director of Conferences 

Seth Cropsey, Visiting Fellow 

David Gerson, Executive Vice President 

Aimee Dayhoff, Assistant to the Senior Vice President 

Newt Gingrich, Senior Fellow 

Christopher DeMuth, President 

James Glassman, Resident Fellow 

Nicholas Eberstadt, Resident Scholar 

Jack Landman Goldsmith III, Adjunct Scholar 

Bob Hahn, Resident Scholar 

Danielle Maxwell, Marketing Manager for Donor Relations 

Kevin Hassett, Resident Scholar 

Allan Meltzer, Visiting Scholar 

Robert Helms, Resident Scholar 

Michael Novak, Resident Scholar 

R. Glenn Hubbard, Visiting Scholar 

Richard Perle, Resident Fellow 

Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senior Fellow 

Jeremy Rabkin, Adjunct Scholar 

Marvin Kosters, Resident Scholar 

Robert Riley, Computer Operations Specialist 

Michael Ledeen, Freedom Scholar 

Ve ́ronique Rodman, Director of Public Affairs 

Nicole Ruman Skinner, Director of Marketing 

Audrey Williams, Training Manager and Research/Staff Assistant 

Kathryn Staulcup, Communications Assistant 

Joanna Yu, Staff Assistant 

Tarn Sweeney, Marketing Communications Manager 

MangHao Zhao, Research Assistant 

Peter Wallison, Resident Fellow 

Scott Walter, Senior Editor, The American Enterprise 

Ben Wattenberg, Senior Fellow 

April 12, 2005. 

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hart Senate Office 

Building, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR: Your Committee will soon be reasoning 

together on the nomination of John R. Bolton as our country’s next 

Ambassador to the United Nations. We urge you to give special 

weight at this time to the explosions of freedom now taking place 

in Ukraine, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Zimbabwe, to name 

just a few. We believe that these early stirrings of courageous 

groups within countries that for too long have held on to rigid authoritarian or in some cases totalitarian rule reflect in large measure the policies and optimistic realism of President George W. 

Bush. 

125 

No one in the world of diplomacy and geo-political policy has a 

better grounding of proven experience than John Bolton. He was on 

hand as an active participant during the period of the break-up of 

the Soviet Union and made important contributions to policy-making at a time of total ambiguity when the world of two superpowers 

was morphing into what we have today. 

We believe it is in the best interest of the community of nations 

as represented by the United Nations, for the maintenance of world 

peace and security, that the views of America’s President be clearly 

and directly presented in both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN. 

It is for this reason more than any other that we urge you to 

quickly and clearly approve John’s nomination. 

Sincerely, 

Bruce S. Geib, former Director of USIA; former Ambassador to Belgium 

Anne L. Armstrong, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom 

William S. Farish, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom 

Walter J.P. Curley, former Ambassador to France and Ireland 

Richard R. Burt, former Ambassador to Germany 

Edward N. Ney, former Ambassador to Canada 

Chic Hecht, former Ambassador to The Bahamas; former U.S. Senator 

Alfred H. Kingon, former Ambassador to the European Union; 

former Assistant Secretary of Commerce 

Thomas Patrick Melady, former Ambassador to The Vatican, Uganda and Burundi 

Frank Shakespeare, former Ambassador to Portugal and The Vatican 

Michael Sotirhos, former Ambassador to Greece and Jamaica 

Robert D. Stuart, Jr., former Ambassador to Norway 

Weston Adams, former Ambassador to Malawi 

Everett E. Bierman, former Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, the 

Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 

Stephen F. Brauer, former Ambassador to Belgium 

Nancy G. Brinker, former Ambassador to Hungary 

Keith L. Brown, former Ambassador to Denmark and Lesotho 

Richard W. Carlson, former Director of VOA; former Ambassador 

to Seychelles 

Gerald P. Carmen, former Ambassador to the United Nations 

Sue McCourt Cobb, former Ambassador to Jamaica 

Charles E. Cobb, Jr., former Ambassador to Iceland 

Peter H. Dailey, former Ambassador to Ireland and Special Envoy 

to NATO 

Diana Lady Dougan, former Ambassador—U.S. Coordinator for 

International Communications and Information Policy 

Richard J. Egan, former Ambassador to Ireland 

William H.G. Fitzgerald, former Ambassador to Ireland 

Joseph Ghougassian, former Ambassador to Qatar and Senior 

member in Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq 

Joseph B. Gildenhorn, former Ambassador to Switzerland 

Glen A. Holden, former Ambassador to Jamaica 

Richard L. Holwill, former Ambassador to Ecuador 

Charles W. Hostler, former Ambassador to Bahrain 

Roy M. Huffington, former Ambassador to Austria 

126 

O. Philip Hughes, former Ambassador to Barbados, Dominica, St. 

Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 

Lester B. Korn, former Ambassador to the United Nations Economic and Social Council 

Paul C. Lambert, former Ambassador to Ecuador 

L.W. Lane, Jr., former Ambassador to Australia and Nauru 

Ronald S. Lauder, former Ambassador to Austria 

John Langeloth Loeb, Jr., former Ambassador to Denmark 

Gregory J. Newell, former Ambassador to Sweden; former Assistant 

Secretary of State for International Organizations 

Julian M. Niemczyk, former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia 

Sally Z. Novetzke, former Ambassador to Malta 

Penne Korth Peacock, former Ambassador to Mauritius 

Joseph Canton Petrone, former Ambassador to the United Nations 

European Office (Geneva) 

Charles J. Pilliod, Jr., former Ambassador to Mexico 

James W. Rawlings, former Ambassador to Zimbabwe 

Frank Ruddy, former Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea 

Paul A. Russo, former Ambassador to Barbados, St. Kitts, Antigua, 

St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica 

Ronald J. Sorini, former Ambassador and Chief Textile Negotiator 

Timothy L. Towell, former Ambassador to Paraguay 

Helene van Damm, former Ambassador to Austria 

Leon J. Weil, former Ambassador to Nepal 

Faith Whittlesey, former Ambassador to Switzerland 

Joseph Zappala, former Ambassador to Spain 

April 5, 2005. 

Senator RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We write to urge that the Senate act expeditiously to confirm John Bolton as our ambassador to the United 

Nations. This is a moment when unprecedented turbulence at the 

United Nations is creating momentum for much needed reform. It 

is a moment when we must have an ambassador in place whose 

knowledge, experience, dedication and drive will be vital to protecting the American interest in an effective, forward-looking 

United Nations. 

In his position as Undersecretary of State, John Bolton has taken 

the lead in strengthening international community approaches to 

the daunting problem of the proliferation of nuclear and other 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a result of his hard work, 

intellectual as well as operational, the G–8 has supported U.S. proposals to strengthen safeguards and verification at the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Proliferation Security Initiative was launched and established within three months—a world 

speed record in these complex, multilateral matters. Moreover, Secretary Bolton led the successful effort to complete the negotiation 

of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously in 

April, 2004. UN 1540 called on member states to criminalize the 

proliferation of WMD—which it declared to be a threat to international peace and security—and to enact strict export controls. 

127 

Secretary Bolton, like the Administration, has his critics, of 

course. Anyone as energetic and effective as John is bound to encounter those who disagree with some or even all of the Administration’s policies. But the policies for which he is sometimes criticized are those of the President and the Department of State which 

he has served with loyalty, honor and distinction. 

Strong supporters of the United Nations understand the challenges it now faces. With his service as assistant secretary of state 

for international organizations, where he was instrumental in securing the repeal of the repugnant resolution equating Zionism 

with racism, and as undersecretary for arms control and international security, we believe John Bolton will bring great skill and 

energy to meeting those challenges. 

Sincerely yours, 

The Honorable David Abshire, former Assistant Secretary of State 

The Honorable Kenneth Adelman, former Director, Antis Control 

Disarmament Agency 

The Honorable Richard Allen, former Assistant to the President for 

National Security 

The Honorable James Baker, former Secretary of State 

The Honorable Frank Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense 

The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, former Secretary of State 

The Honorable Al Haig, former Secretary of State 

Ambassador Max Kampelman, former Ambassador and Head of the 

U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations with the Soviet Union on 

Nuclear and Space Arms. 

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the United 

Nations 

The Honorable Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State 

The Honorable James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense 

The Honorable George Shultz, former Secretary of State 

The Honorable Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former Counselor, Department 

of State 

Washington Post, May 12, 2005] 

A VOTE ON MR. BOLTON

On April 19 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unexpectedly postponed a vote on the nomination of John R. Bolton as ambassador to the United Nations, citing concerns that he had engaged in a pattern of abuse of subordinates and manipulation of intelligence. Three weeks of further digging, mostly by Democratic 

committee staff members, have not produced evidence of such a 

pattern. The committee ought to give Mr. Bolton a vote today. Ours 

would be an unenthusiastic, deference-to-the-president yes. 

It’s as clear now as it was on April 19 that Mr. Bolton is a contentious figure who has both strong admirers and impassioned critics in Washington. He engages in hand-to-hand bureaucratic combat, and on a couple of occasions he pushed too hard. He challenged intelligence analysts, but it’s naive to think that such analysts are always ideologically neutral and beyond politics—that 

they should never be challenged. What emerges from the interviews conducted by committee staffers is how intensely policy-driven, as opposed to personal, were most of Mt Bolton’s clashes in the 

128 

State Department, during President Bush’s first term, under Secretary of State Colin L. PowelL 

If anyone might have been expected to provide evidence of dysfunctional behavior, for exaniple, it would be Lawrence B. 

Wilkerson, who was Mr. Powell’s chief of staff. Mr. Wilkerson has 

said that he does not believe Mr. Bolton is fit to be U.N. ambassador, and by his description he knew pretty much everything that 

was happening at Foggy Bottom: ‘‘I was also a sponge, sopping up 

everything! could about the Department, about its efficiency; about 

its effectiveness, about its people . . . and reporting to Powell.’’ 

Yet in an interview last Friday, Mr. Wilkerson was unable to 

provide any fresh examples of misbehavior by Mr. Bolton. Instead 

he complained about policy differences: Mr. Bolton was too eager 

to sanction Chinese companies that violated the nonproliferation 

regime, thereby making diplomacy more difficult. He was too zealous in carring out his mission to persuade other countries to exempt U.S. soldiers from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. When Mr. Bolton delivered a speech vilifying North Korean leader Kim Jong II, ‘‘Rich was very angry’’—that would be 

former deputy secretary Richard L. Armitage—but, Mr. Wilkerson 

acknowledged, he was angry because the speech had been cleared 

by the assistant secretary for Asia, a Powell ally. 

The committee interviews have provided some colorful details 

without breaking new ground on what has long been a well-understood split in the first Bush administration: a split between those 

who saw themselves as pragmatic diplomats (the Powell camp) and 

those, like Mr. Bolton, who saw themselves as more willing to 

bruise feelings here and abroad in standing up for U.S. interests. 

Our view was that Mr. Bolton often, though not always, had the 

worse end of those arguments; he helped hamstring diplomacy toward Iran and North Korea, and his single-minded focus on the 

International Criminal Court endangered relations even with allies 

who were supporting the United States in Iraq. 

Moreover, the first-term divisions themselves were harmful to 

U.S. policymaking. Will Mr. Bolton perpetuate the divisions from 

a new perch in New York? That seems to us a risk. But it also 

strikes us as a risk that a president is entitled to take on if he 

wants. Mr. Bush surely knows what role Mr. Bolton played in the 

first term, and he says he wants to put Mr. Bolton’s bluntness to 

work at the United Nations. The nominee is intelligent and qualified, we still see no compelling reason to deny the president his 

choice. 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 

Washington, DC, August 26, 2003. 

Hon. JON KYL, U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR JON: I am pleased to reply to your recent letter concerning 

John Bolton’s speech in Korea and our reaction. 

Undersecretary Bolton’s speech was fully cleared within the Department. It was consistent with Administration policy, did not 

really break new ground with regard to our disdain for the North 

Korean leadership and, as such, was official. The speech was given 

129 

during a time of delicate negotiations on the part of the Chinese 

government to arrange six-party multilateral discussions. As a result, it got a lot of attention in the regional press and drew a sharp 

North Korean reaction directed towards Secretary Bolton. 

My acting spokesman, Phil Reeker, and the president’s press officer, Scott McClellan, both supported Mr. Bolton. Mr. Bolton even 

cleared the response Phil Reeker used at his press conference. We 

refused to be drawn into a debate with the North Koreans, noting 

that Mr. Bolton spoke officially and the Secretary and the President would decide who would represent the United States in the 

talks. If you read the full text of Mr. Armitage’s statement in Australia, you will see that he also supported that line. Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly, during a background briefing on August 22, got 

the question yet again and gave the same response. 

Mr. Jack Pritchard, who you mentioned in your letter, from time 

to time meets with the North Korean Ambassador to the UN. His 

job is to listen to whatever they have to say, tell them whatever 

we want them to hear. He does not debate with them or even engage them beyond seeking clarification of their remarks. I’ve read 

the transcript of his recent meeting. They complained about Mr. 

Bolton. Mr. Pritchard took note of their complaint and said they 

were aware of U.S. policy. He did not say or imply that Mr. Bolton 

was speaking only in a personal capacity. 

We know who we are dealing with when we deal with the North 

Koreans. The President has given me solid guidance how to manage this difficult account and I believe we are making progress. I 

am fortunate to receive informed advice and judgment from Mr. 

Bolton, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Pritchard. Mr. Pritchard has just resigned having requested retirement some months ago. I am pleased 

I was able to keep him on a while longer and grateful for his many 

years of dedicated service to our country. 

With best wishes, 

Sincerely, 

COLIN L. POWELL. 

A DICTATORSHIP AT THE CROSSROAD

BY JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, EAST ASIA INSTITUTE, SEOUL

HILTON, SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA, JULY 31, 2003

Distinguished guests, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to 

speak to you again. Since I last spoke here in Seoul nearly 1 year 

ago, the United States and the Republic of Korea have forged 

ahead in strengthening our alliance and friendship. The foundation 

for this was made all the stronger by the extremely successful summit last May between President Bush and President Roh. At that 

summit, our two presidents made the firm commitment to move in 

lock-step to meet our shared challenges and opportunities. I am 

happy to say that we are taking the shared vision of our presidents 

and putting it into action. 

Indeed, action is needed. As we stand here today having just 

celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Armistice agreement that 

ended combat on the peninsula, the threat to the North posed by 

130 

the Kim Jong Il dictatorship is a constant reminder of a powerful 

truth—freedom is not free. 

In preserving freedom, it is important for all to have a shared 

understanding of the threats we face. Unfortunately, the last year 

has seen a dizzying whirlwind of developments on the threat posed 

by the Kim Jong Il dictatorship. Being so close to North Korea, 

there is no doubt that the threat posed by Kim Jong Il must weigh 

heavily on you. While it would be naive and disingenuous for me 

to dismiss the danger, let me start off by striking a positive note: 

The world is united in working together to seek a peaceful solution 

to the threat posed by Kim Jong Il. Rarely have we seen the international community so willing to speak with the same voice and 

deliver a consistent message on an issue. In addition to consistency, there is a striking clarity to this message as well: The world 

will not tolerate Kim Jong Il threatening international peace and 

security with weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear 

weapons. 

The brazenness of Kim Jong Il’s behavior in the past year is 

striking. While nuclear blackmail used to be the province of fictional spy movies, Kim Jong Il is forcing us to live that reality as 

we enter the new millennium. To give in to his extortionist demands would only encourage him, and perhaps more ominously, 

other would-be tyrants around the world. One needs little reminding that we have tested Kim Jong Il’s intentions many times before—a test he has consistently failed. Since 1994, billions of dollars in economic and energy assistance have flowed into the coffers 

of Pyongyang to buy off their nuclear weapons program. Nine years 

later, Kim Jong Il has repaid us by threatening the world with not 

one, but two separate nuclear weapons programs—one based on 

plutonium, the other highly enriched uranium. 

If history is any guide, Kim Jong Il probably expects that his current threats wit! result in newfound legitimacy and billions of dollars of economic and energy assistance pouring into his failed economy. in this case, however, history is not an especially good guide— 

a page has been turned. Particularly after September 11, the world 

is acutely aware of the danger posed to civilian populations by 

weapons of mass destruction being developed by tyrannical rogue 

state leaders like Kim Jong Il or falling into the hands of terrorists. 

Simply put, the world has changed. Consider that in 1994, I could 

have used the term ‘‘WMD’’ and most audiences would have stared 

at me blankly. In 2003, we all know it is shorthand for ‘‘weapons 

of mass destruction.’’ Clearly, this is a sad reflection on the dangerous times we live in. 

Let us also consider the fact that in 1994, North Korea could 

have chosen to enter the international community on a new and 

different footing. While communist dictatorships were collapsing or 

reforming across the globe, there was even hope that Kim Il Sung’s 

North Korea would follow suit. When power passed to Kim Jong Il, 

the world hoped he would be more enlightened and recognize the 

benefits of participating in the global community—as opposed to 

threatening and blackmailing it. 

Unfortunately; this still has not come to pass. Even a cursory 

glance of the first decade of Kim Jong Il’s dictatorial reign suggests 

that he has done nothing but squander opportunity after opportunity, olive branch after olive branch. Sadly, as an editorial carVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
131 

toon in The Economist recently expressed so well, Kim Jong Il 

seems to care more about enriching uranium than enriching his 

own people. 

Kim Jong Il, of course, has not had to endure the consequences 

of his failed policies. While he lives like royalty in Pyongyang, he 

keeps hundreds of thousands of his people locked in prison camps 

with millions more mired in abject poverty, scrounging the ground 

for food. For many in North Korea, life is a hellish nightmare. As 

reported by the State Department Report on Human Rights, we believe that some 400,000 persons died in prison since 1972 and that 

starvation and executions were common. Entire families, including 

children, were imprisoned when only one member of the family was 

accused of a crime. Consider the testimony of Lee Soon-ok, a 

woman who spent years in North Korean prison camps. She testified before the U.S. Senate that she witnessed severe beatings and 

torture involving water forced into a victim’s stomach with a rubber hose and pumped out by guards jumping on a board placed 

across the victim’s abdomen. She also reported chemical and biological warfare experiments conducted on inmates by the army. 

And while Kim Jong Il is rumored to enjoy the internet so he can 

observe the outside world, he does not afford that right to his own 

people who are forced to watch and listen to only government television and radio programs. 

Why is Kim Jong Il so scared of letting his people observe the 

outside world? The answer, of course, is that they will see the freedom enjoyed by much of the world and what they have been denied. They will see their brothers and sisters in Seoul, the capital 

of a booming vibrant democracy. They will see that there is a world 

where children stand a good chance to live to adulthood—a dream 

of every parent. More important, they will see that the excuses for 

their failed system provided by Kim Jong Il don’t stand scrutiny. 

It is not natural disasters that are to blame for the deprivation of 

the North Korean people—but the failed policies of Kim Jong Il. 

They will see that, unless he changes course, his regime is directly 

responsible for bringing economic ruin to their country. The world 

already knows this—which is why we will continue to give humanitarian food aid to the starving people of North Korea. But let there 

be no doubt about where blame falls for the misery of the North 

Korean people—it falls squarely on the shoulders of Kim Jong Il 

and his regime. 

There is still hope that Kim Jong Il may change course. All civilized nations and peace-loving people hope this to be true. But 

Kim Jong Il must make the personal decision to do so and choose 

a different path. 

It is holding out this hope that has prompted the United States, 

in lock-step with our friends and allies in the region, to pursue the 

multilateral negotiations track. Let me be clear: the United States 

seeks a peaceful solution to this situation. President Bush has unambiguously led the way in mobilizing world public opinion to support us in finding a lasting multilateral solution to a problem that 

threatens the security of the entire world. 

The operative term is ‘‘multilateral.’’ It would be the height of irresponsibility for the Bush administration to enter into another bilateral agreement with the Kim Jong Il dictatorship. The Clinton 

administration bravely tried with the Agreed Framework but failed 

132 

because Kim Jong Il instructed his subordinates to systematically 

violate it in secret. To enter into a similar type of agreement again 

would simply postpone the problem for some future administration—something the Bush administration will not do. 

Postponing the elimination of Kim Jong Il’s nuclear weapons program will only allow him time to amass even more nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and to develop even longer range missiles. Any doubts that Kim Jong Il would peddle nuclear materials 

or nuclear weapons to any buyer on the international market were 

dispelled last April when his envoy threatened to do just that. 

This will not stand. Some have speculated that the U.S. is resigned to nuclear weapons on the peninsula and we will simply 

have to learn to live with nuclear weapons in the hands of a tyrannical dictator, who has threatened to export them. Nothing could 

be further from the truth. 

This is why we are working so hard on pursuing the multilateral 

track in Beijing. Having just been in Beijing, I can confirm that we 

all believe this track is alive and well, but the ball is North Korea’s 

court. The key now is to get South Korea and Japan, and ultimately Russia and others, a seat at the table. We know that as crucial players in the region, and the countries most threatened by 

Kim Jong Il, the roles of Seoul and Tokyo are vital to finding any 

permanent solution. Those with a direct stake in the outcome must 

be part of the process. On this point we will not waver. 

While the Beijing track is on course, prudence suggests that we 

pursue other tracks as well. We have been clear in saying that we 

seek a peaceful solution to resolve the threat posed by Kim Jong 

Il, but that all options are on the table. I would like to discuss two 

complementary tracks that we are pursuing now. 

The first is action through the United Nations Security Council. 

As the UN body charged with protecting international peace and 

security, it could play an important role in helping to reach a 

peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, the Council is not playing the 

part it should. It was 6 months ago that the Board of Governors 

of the International Atomic Energy Agency voted overwhelmingly 

to report North Korea’s violations to the Security Council. 

To date, virtually nothing has happened. We believe that appropriate and timely action by the Security Council would complement 

our efforts on the multilateral track in Beijing. Just as important, 

it would send a signal to the rest of the world that the Council 

takes its responsibilities seriously. I would note that when North 

Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty the first 

time in March 1993, the Council took action within a month. Ignoring this issue will not make it go away—it will only reduce confidence in the Council and suggest to proliferators that they can 

sell their deadly arsenals with impunity. 

The other track we are pursuing now is through the Proliferation 

Security Initiative, or PSI. When I spoke in Seoul almost a year 

ago, I detailed at length the WMD programs actively being pursued 

by Kim Jong Il. The last year has seen Kim Jong Il accelerate 

these programs, particularly on the nuclear front. Brazenly threatening to demonstrate, even export, nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Il 

and his supports have defied the unanimous will of the international community. 

133 

If Pyongyang thought the international community would simply 

ignore its threats—it was mistaken. Recently, I attended the second meeting of the PSI, held in Brisbane, Australia and met with 

officials from 10 other countries on the threats posed by dictators 

like Kim Jong Il. As the Chairman’s Statement underscores, ‘‘the 

PSI is a global initiative with global reach.’’ And we ‘‘agreed to 

move quickly on direct, practical measures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related items.’’ 

Specifically, we are working on ‘‘defining actions necessary to collectively or individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles 

and related items at sea, in the air or on land.’’ 

While global in scope, the PSI is cognizant of the reality that different countries pose different degrees of threat. Just as the South 

Korean Ministry of National Defense recently defined North Korea 

as the ‘‘main enemy,’’ the nations participating in the PSI put 

North Korea and Iran at the top of the list of proliferant countries. 

That North Korea has earned this dubious distinction should come 

as little surprise in light of Pyongyang’s trafficking in death and 

destruction to keep Kim Jong Il in power. It is practically their 

only source of hard currency earnings, unless of course you add 

narcotics and other illegal activities. 

Hopefully, initiatives such as PSI will send a clear message to 

dictators like Kim Jong Il. In his specific case, we hope to communicate that while actively pursuing and believing that multilateral 

talks are a preferable way to find a lasting solution to the situation, we are not going to allow the DPRK regime to peddle its deadly arsenals to rogue states and terrorists throughout the world. 

Our national security, and our allies, as well as the lives of our citizens are at stake. Already, we are, planning operational training 

exercises on interdiction utilizing both military and civilian assets. 

Kim Jong Il would be wise to consider diversifying his export base 

to something besides weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 

missiles. 

The international community’s tolerance for actions that defy 

global norms is fast shrinking. There is growing political will to 

take concrete steps to prevent dictators such as Kim Jong Il from 

profiting in ill-gotten gains. We are moving to translate this political will into action. 

This choice is Kim Jong Il’s and his alone. In coordination with 

our allies, we are prepared to welcome a reformed North Korea into 

the world of civilized nations. This would mean, however, that Kim 

Jong Il makes the political decision to undergo sweeping reforms. 

A good start would be to respect the human rights of his people 

and not starve them to death or put them in death camps. He 

should allow the families of the Japanese abductees to be reunited, 

and he should provide a full account of the cause of death for the 

eight deceased abductees. 

It would also mean respecting international norms and abiding 

by international commitments and giving up their extensive chemical and biological weapons programs. And it will certainly require 

Kim Jong Il to dismantle his nuclear weapons program—completely, verifiably, and irreversibly. 

The days of DPRK blackmail are over. Kim Jong Il is dead wrong 

to think that developing nuclear weapons will improve his security. 

Indeed, the opposite is true. As President Bush has made clear: ‘‘A 

134 

decision to develop a nuclear arsenal is one that will alienate you 

from the rest of the world.’’ Kim Jong Il has already squandered 

the first decade of his rule. To continue down the path toward nuclear weapons will squander his legacy as well. The choice is his 

to make—but whichever path he does choose—the United States 

and its allies are prepared. Let us hope he makes the right choice. 

BEYOND THE AXIS OF EVIL: ADDITIONAL THREATS FROM WEAPONS

OF MASS DESTRUCTION

BY JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, REMARKS TO THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 6, 2002

Thank you for asking me here to the Heritage Foundation. I’m 

pleased to be able to speak to you today about the Bush Administration’s efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to 

state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups is, in my estimation, the gravest security threat we now face. States engaging 

in this behavior—some of them parties to international treaties 

prohibiting such activities—must be held accountable, and must 

know that only by renouncing terrorism and verifiably forsaking 

WMD can they rejoin the community of nations. 

The New Security Environment 

Eight months into the war on terror, the United States and its 

partners have made great strides. We have helped the Afghan people overthrow an oppressive, terrorist-harboring regime in Afghanistan, foiled terrorist plots in places such as Germany, Yemen, 

Spain and Singapore, and stanched the flow of funds that allowed 

Al-Qaeda’s schemes to come to fruition. We have captured the number three man in Al-Qaeda, and will bring him to justice. And this 

is just the beginning. 

The attacks of September 11 reinforced with blinding clarity the 

need to be steadfast in the face of emerging threats to our security. 

The international security environment has changed, and our 

greatest threat comes not from the specter of nuclear war between 

two superpowers, as it did during the Cold War, but from 

transnational terrorist cells that will strike without warning using 

weapons of mass destruction. Every nation—not just the United 

States—has had to reassess its security situation, and to decide 

where it stands on the war on terrorism. 

In the context of this new international security situation, we are 

working hard to create a comprehensive security strategy with 

Russia, a plan President Bush calls the New Strategic Framework. 

The New Strategic Framework involves reducing offensive nuclear 

weapons, creating limited defensive systems that deter the threat 

of missile attacks, strengthening nonproliferation and 

counterproliferation measures, and cooperating with Russia to combat terrorism. It is based on the premise that the more cooperative, 

post-Cold War relationship between Rissia and the United States 

makes new approaches to these issues possible. 

In preparation for the summit meeting in Moscow and St. Petersburg later this month, we have been working closely with the RusVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
135 

sians to embody the reductions in offensive warheads into a legallybinding document that will outlast the administrations of both 

Presidents. We are also working to draft a political declaration on 

the New Strategic Framework that would cover the issues of strategic offensive and defensive systems, nonproliferation and 

counterproliferation. We are optimistic that we will have agreement in time for the summit in Moscow, May 23rd to 25th. 

Strengthening the U.S.-Russian relationship has been a priority 

of the Bush Administration, even prior to the September 11 attacks. In the current security climate, cooperation with Russia becomes even more important, so that we can work together to combat terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, 

which threaten both our countries. 

Preventing Terrorism’s Next Wave 

President Bush believes it is critical not to underestimate the 

threat from terrorist groups and rogue states intent on obtaining 

weapons of mass destruction. As he said on the six-month anniversary of the attacks, ‘‘Every nation in our coalition must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a catastrophic scale—terror 

armed with biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.’’ We must not 

doubt for a moment the possible catastrophic consequences of terrorists or their rogue state sponsors who are willing to use disease 

as a weapon to spread chemical agents to inflict pain and death, 

or to send suicide-bound adherents armed with radiological weapons on missions of mass murder. 

Every nation must commit itself to preventing the acquisition of 

such weapons by state sponsors of terrorism or terrorist groups. As 

President Bush said: ‘‘Our lives, our way of life, and our every hope 

for the world depend on a single commitment: The authors of mass 

murder must be defeated, and never allowed to gain or use the 

weapons of mass destruction.’’ To this end, we use a variety of 

methods to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction, including export controls, missile defense, arms control, nonproliferation and counter-proliferation measures. 

In the past, the United States relied principally on passive measures to stem proliferation. Arms control and nonproliferation regimes, export controls, and diplomatic overtures were the primary 

tools used in this fight. But September 11th, the subsequent anthrax attacks, and our discoveries regarding Al-Qaeda and its 

WMD aspirations has required The U.S to complement these more 

traditional strategies with a new approach. The Bush Administration is committed to combating the spread of nuclear, chemical, and 

biological weapons, missiles, and related equipment, and is determined to prevent the use of these deadly weapons against our citizens, troops, allies, and friends. While diplomatic efforts and multilateral regimes will remain important to our efforts, we also intend 

to complement this approach with other measures, as we work both 

in concert with likeminded nations, and on our own, to prevent terrorists and terrorist regimes from acquiring or using WMD. In the 

past, we looked at proliferation and terrorism as entirely separate 

issues. As Secretary Powell said in his Senate testimony April 24, 

‘‘There are terrorists in the world who would like nothing better 

than to get their hands on and use nuclear, chemical or biological 

136 

weapons. So there is a definite link between terrorism and WMD. 

Not to recognize that link would be foolhardy to the extreme.’’ 

America is determined to prevent the next wave of terror. States 

that sponsor terror and pursue WMD must stop. States that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our effort. 

But those that do not can expect to become our targets. This means 

directing firm international condemnation toward states that shelter—and in some cases directly sponsor—terrorists within their 

borders. It means uncovering their activities that may be in violation of international treaties. It means having a direct dialogue 

with the rest of the world about what is at stake. It means taking 

action against proliferators, middlemen, and weapons brokers, by 

exposing them, sanctioning their behavior, and working with other 

countries to prosecute them or otherwise bring a halt to their activities. It means taking law-enforcement action against suspect 

shipments, front companies, and financial institutions that launder 

prollferator’s funds. And it requires, above all, effective use, improvement, and enforcement of the multilateral tools at our disposal—both arms control and nonproliferation treaties and export 

control regimes. 

The Problem of Noncompliance 

Multilateral agreements are important to our nonproliferation 

arsenal. This Administration strongly supports treaties such as the 

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 

Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. But in order to be effective and provide the assurances 

they are designed to bring, they must be carefully and universally 

adhered to by all signatories. Therefore, strict compliance with existing treaties remains a major goal of our arms control policy. 

This has been our aim in particular with the Biological Weapons 

Convention (BWC). In 1969, President Nixon announced that the 

United States would unilaterally renounce biological weapons. The 

U.S. example was soon followed by other countries, and by 1972 

the BWC was opened for signature. This international treaty, to 

which more than 140 countries are parties, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological 

and toxin weapons. 

While the vast majority of the BWC’s parties have conscientiously met their commitments, the United States is extremely concerned that several states are conducting offensive biological weapons programs while publicly avowing compliance with the agreement. To expose some of these violators to the international community, last November, I named publicly several states the U.S. 

government knows to be producing biological warfare agents in violation of the BWC. 

Foremost is Iraq. Although it became a signatory to the BWC in 

1972 and became a State Party in 1991, Iraq has developed, produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents and weapons. The 

United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken advantage of 

more than three years of no UN inspections to improve all phases 

of its offensive BW program. Iraq also has developed, produced, 

and stockpiled chemical weapons, and shown a continuing interest 

in developing nuclear weapons and longer range missiles. 

137 

Next is North Korea. North Korea has a dedicated, national-level 

effort to achieve a BW capability and has developed and produced, 

and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the Convention. Despite the fact that its citizens are starving, the leadership 

in Pyongyang has spent large sums of money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of 

biological agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to 

do so, and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering 

these deadly weapons. 

In January, I also named North Korea and Iraq for their covert 

nuclear weapons programs, in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This year, North Korea did not meet Congressional certification requirements because of its continued lack of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, its failure 

to make any progress toward implementing the North-South Joint 

Denuclearization Declaration as called for under the Agreed 

Framework, and for proliferating long-range ballistic missiles. Finally, we believe that North Korea has a sizeable stockpile of chemical weapons, and can manufacture all manner of CW agents. 

Then comes Iran. Iran’s biological weapons program began during the Iran-Iraq war, and accelerated after Tehran learned how 

far along Saddam Hussein had progressed in his own program. The 

Iranians have all of the necessary pharmaceutical expertise, as 

well as the commercial infrastructure needed to produce—and 

hide—a biological warfare program. The United States believes 

Iran probably has produced and weaponized BW agents in violation 

of the Convention. Again, Iran’s BW program is complemented by 

an even more aggressive chemical warfare program, Iran’s ongoing 

interest in nuclear weapons, and its aggressive ballistic missile research, development, and flight testing regimen. 

President Bush named these three countries in his State of the 

Union address earlier this year as the world’s most dangerous 

proliferators. ‘‘States like these, and their terrorist allies,’’ he said, 

‘‘constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the 

world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose 

a grave and growing danger.’’ 

Trouble Ahead 

Beyond the axis of evil, there are other rogue states intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction—particularly biological weapons. Given our vulnerability to attack from biological agents, as 

evidenced recently in the anthrax releases, it is important to carefully assess and respond to potential proliferators. Today, I want 

to discuss three other state sponsors of terrorism that are pursuing 

or who have the potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction 

or have the capability to do so in violation of their treaty obligations. While we will continue to use diplomatic efforts and multilateral regimes with these countries, it is important to review the 

challenges we face and to underline the issues that these states 

must address. As the President has said, ‘‘America will do what is 

necessary to ensure our nation’s security. We’ll be deliberate. Yet 

time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers 

gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer.’’ 

138 

First, Libya. There is no doubt that Libya continues its longstanding pursuit of nuclear weapons. We believe that since the suspension of UN sanctions against Libya in 1999, Libya has been 

able to increase its access to dual use nuclear technologies. Although Libya would need significant foreign assistance to acquire 

a nuclear weapon, Tripoli’s nuclear infrastructure enhancement remains of concern. Qaddafi hinted at this in a recent (25 March) 

interview with Al-Jazirah when he said, ‘‘We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction that the Israelis have; 

we must continue to demand that. Otherwise, the Arabs will have 

the right to possess that weapon.’’ 

Among its weapons of mass destruction programs, Libya—which 

is not a party to the CWC—continues its goal of reestablishing its 

offensive chemical weapons ability, as well as pursuing an indigenous chemical warfare production capability. Libya has produced at 

least 100 tons of different kinds of chemical weapons, using its 

Rabta facility. That facility closed down after it was subject to 

media scrutiny, but then re-opened as a pharmaceutical plant in 

1995. Although production of chemical agents reportedly has been 

halted, CW production at Rabta cannot be ruled out. It remains 

heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, 

technical expertise, and other key chemical warfare-related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, 

Libya has reestablished contacts with illicit foreign sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals in the Middle East, Asia, 

and Western Europe. 

Conversely, Libya has publicly indicated its intent to join the 

CWC. While our perceptions of Libya would not change overnight, 

such a move could be positive. Under the CWC, Libya would be required to declare and destroy all chemical weapons production facilities and stockpiles, make declarations about any dual use chemical industry, undertake not to research or produce any chemical 

weapons, and not to export certain chemicals to countries that have 

not signed the CWC. Libya would also be subject to challenge inspections of any facility, declared or not. 

Significantly for predictive purposes, Libya became a State Party 

to the BWC in January 1982, but the U.S. believes that Libya has 

continued its biological warfare program. Although its program is 

in the research and development stage, Libya may be capable of 

producing small quantities of biological agent Libya’s BW program 

has been hindered, in part, by the country’s poor scientific and 

technological base, equipment shortages, and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999. 

Libya is also continuing its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign 

sources. Outside assistance—particularly Serbian, Indian, North 

Korean, and Chinese—is critical to its ballistic missile development 

programs, and the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 has allowed 

Tripoli to expand its procurement effort. Libya’s current capability 

probably remains limited to its Scud B missiles, but with continued 

foreign assistance it may achieve an MRBM capability—a long desired goal-or extended-range Scud capability. 

Although Libya is one of seven countries on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terror 1 N, the U.S. has noted recent 

positive steps by the Libyan government that we hope indicate that 

139 

Tripoli wishes to rejoin the community of civilized states. In 1999, 

Libya turned over two Libyans wanted in connection with the 

bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, for trial in 

the Netherlands. In 2001, it condemned the September 11 attacks 

publicly and signed the twelve terrorist conventions listed in UN 

Security Council Resolution 1273. And, as I have already mentioned, Libya has also announced its intention to accede to CWC. 

N1 ‘‘Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000,’’ U.S. Department of State, April 20, 2001. 

However, as I have also said, words are not enough. The key is 

to see clear, hard evidence that Libya will, in fact, live up to the 

public standards it has set for itself. Libya can make a positive gesture in this regard by fulfilling its obligations under WMD treaties 

and becoming a party to the CWC. Moreover, Libya must honor the 

relevant UN Security Council Resolutions relating to the resolution 

of Pan Am 103, arguably the worst air terrorist disaster prior to 

September 11. Libya has yet to comply fully with these resolutions, 

which include accepting responsibility and paying compensation. It 

is past time that Libya did this. 

The United States also knows that Syria has long had a chemical 

warfare program. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and 

is engaged in research and development of the more toxic and persistent nerve agent VX. Although Damascus currently is dependent 

on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment, we are concerned about Syrian advances in its indigenous 

CW infrastructure which would significantly increase the independence of its CW program. We think that Syria has a variety of aerial 

bombs and SCUD warheads, which are potential means of delivery 

of deadly agents capable of striking neighboring countries. 

Syria, which has signed but not ratified the BWC, is pursuing 

the development of biological weapons and is able to produce at 

least small amounts of biological warfare agents. While we believe 

Syria would need foreign assistance to launch a large-scale biological weapons program right now, it may obtain such assistance by 

the end of this decade. 

Syria has a combined total of several hundred Scud B, Scud C 

and SS–21 SRBMs, It is pursuing both solid- and liquid-propellant 

missile programs and relies extensively on foreign assistance in 

these endeavors. North Korean and Russian entities have been involved in aiding Syria’s ballistic missile development. All of Syria’s 

missiles are mobile and can reach much of Israel, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country. 

In addition to Libya and Syria, there is a threat coming from another BWC signatory, and one that lies just 90 miles from the U.S. 

mainland—namely, Cuba. This totalitarian state has long been a 

violator of human rights. The State Department said last year in 

its Annual Report on Human Rights Practices that ‘‘the Government continued to violate systematically the fundamental civil and 

political rights of its citizens. Citizens do not have the right to 

change their government peacefully. Prisoners died in jail due to 

lack of medical care. Members of the security forces and prison officials continued to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners . . . The Government denied its citizens the freedoms of 

speech, press, assembly and association.’’ 

140 

Havana has long provided safehaven for terrorists, earning it a 

place on the State Department’s list of terrorist-sponsoring states. 

The country is known to be harboring terrorists from Colombia, 

Spain, and fugitives from the United States. We know that Cuba 

is collaborating with other state sponsors of terror. 

Castro has repeatedly denounced the U.S. war on terrorism. He 

continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives. Last year, Castro visited Iran. Syria and 

Libya—all designees on the same list of terrorist-sponsoring states. 

At Tehran University, these were his words: ‘‘Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. 

regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from 

close up.’’ 

But Cuba’s threat to our security often has been underplayed. An 

official U.S. government report in 1998 concluded that Cuba did 

not represent a significant military threat to the United States or 

the region. It went only so far as to say that, ‘‘Cuba has a limited 

capacity to engage in some military and intelligence activities 

which could pose a danger to U.S. citizens under some circumstances.’’ However, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen 

tried to add some balance to this report by expressing in the preface his serious concerns about Cuba’s intelligence activities against 

the United States and its human rights practices. Most notably, he 

said, ‘‘I remain concerned about Cuba’s potential to develop and 

produce biological agents, given its biotechnology 

infrastructure . . .’’ 

Why was the 1998 report on Cuba so unbalanced? Why did it underplay the threat Cuba posed to the United States? A major reason is Cuba’s aggressive intelligence operations against the United 

States, which included recruiting the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 

senior Cuba analyst, Ana Belen Montes, to spy for Cuba. Montes 

not only had a hand in drafting the 1998 Cuba report but also 

passed some of our most sensitive information about Cuba back to 

Havana. Montes was arrested last fall and pleaded guilty to espionage on March 19th. 

For four decades Cuba has maintained a well-developed and sophisticated biomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the Soviet 

Union. This industry is one of the most advanced in Latin America, 

and leads in the production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines that 

are sold worldwide. Analysts and Cuban defectors have long cast 

suspicion on the activities conducted in these biomedical facilities. 

Here is what we now know: The United States believes that 

Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research 

and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology 

to other rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could 

support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all 

BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply 

with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention. 

Conclusion 

America is leading in the fight to root out and destroy terror. 

Our goals are to stop the development of weapons of mass destruction and insure compliance with existing arms control and nonproliferation treaties and commitments, which the Bush AdminisVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
141 

tration strongly supports, but experience has shown that treaties 

and agreements are an insufficient check against state sponsors of 

terrorism. Noncompliance can undermine the efficacy and legitimacy of these treaties and regimes. After all, any nation ready to 

violate one agreement is perfectly capable of violating another, denying its actual behavior all the while. And so I close with four fundamental conclusions. First, that global terrorism has changed the 

nature of the threat we face. Keeping WMD out of terrorist hands 

must be a core element of our nonproliferation strategy. 

Second, the Administration supports an international dialogue on 

weapons of mass destruction and encourages countries to educate 

their publics on the WMD threat. We must not shy away from 

truth telling. 

Third, the Administration will not assume that because a country’s formal subscription to UN counterterrorism conventions or its 

membership in multilateral regimes necessarily constitutes an accurate reading of its intentions. We call on Libya, Cuba, and Syria 

to live up to the agreements they have signed. We will watch closely their actions, not simply listen to their words. Working with our 

allies, we will expose those countries that do not live up to their 

commitments. 

Finally, the United States will continue to exercise strong leadership in multilateral forums and will take whatever steps are necessary to protect and defend our interests and eliminate the terrorist threat. 

Thank you. 

ANNOUNCEMENT OF NOMINATION OF JOHN BOLTON AS U.S. 

AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. 

BY SECRETARY CONDOLEEZZA RICE, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ROOM, 

WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 7, 2005

SECRETARY RICE: Good afternoon. This past September at the 

United Nations General Assembly, President Bush spoke of our nation’s commitments to working in close partnership with the 

United Nations. The United States is committed to the success of 

the United Nations and we view the U.N. as an important component of our diplomacy. The American people respect the idealism 

that sparked the creation of the United Nations and we share the 

UN’s unshakable support for human dignity. 

At this time of great opportunity and great promise, the charge 

to the International community is clear: we who are on the right 

side of freedom’s divide have an obligation to help those who were 

unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side of that divide. The 

hard work of freedom is a task of generations; yet, it is also urgent 

work that cannot be deferred. 

We have watched in awe in Afghanistan, as men and women 

once suppressed by the Tatiban walked miles and stood for hours 

in the snow just to cast a ballot for their first vote as a free people. 

We have watched as millions of Iraqi men and women defied terrorists and cast their free votes and began their nation’s new history. We have seen determination in the faces of citizens in places 

like Ukraine and Georgia and the Palestinian territories, as they 

have stood firm for their freedom. 

142 

We are seeing political reforms begin to take place in Qatar and 

Jordan and Egypt and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and this very 

morning we applaud the courage of those on the frontlines of freedom in Lebanon who are seeking free and fair elections. In this era 

of expanding freedom, there is room for optimism but much hard 

work lies ahead. The international community has a challenging 

agenda before it, from the Middle East to Sudan to Haiti to the 

Balkans from Iran to the Korean Peninsula and on many other 

issues. 

Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical role as it 

strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 

war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental human rights and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. 

President Bush has sent our most skilled and experienced diplomats to represent the United States at the U.N. Today, I am honored to continue that tradition by announcing that President Bush 

intends to nominate John Bolton to be our next Ambassador to the 

United Nations. 

The President and I have asked John to do this work because he 

knows how to get things done. He is a tough-minded diplomat, he 

has a strong record of success and he has a proven track record of 

effective multilateralism. For the past four years John has served 

as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. In that position, John has held primary responsibility for the issue that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has 

identified as one of our most crucial challenges to international 

peace and security: stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction. 

John helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to help 

combat the spread of WMD through the President’s Proliferation 

Security Initiative. John played a key diplomatic role in our sensitive negotiations with Libya when that nation made the wise 

choice to give up its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. And 

John was the chief negotiator of the Treaty of Moscow, which was 

signed by Presidents Putin and Bush to reduce nuclear warheads 

by two-thirds. 

In President George H.W. Bush’s Administration, John served as 

Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations and 

worked on several key diplomatic initiatives with the U.N., including work on U.N. reform and work on the repayment of arrearages 

and assessments. In 1991, John was the principal architect behind 

the initiative that finally led the United Nations General Assembly 

to repeal the notorious resolution that equated Zionism and racism. 

And few may remember this, but John worked between 1997 and 

2000 as an assistant to former Secretary James Baker in his capacity as the Secretary General’s personal envoy to the Western Sahara. John did work pro bono. If few Americans have direct experience working for the United Nations, I’m confident that fewer still 

have gained that experience on their own nickel. Through history, 

some of our best ambassadors have been those with the strongest 

voices, ambassadors like Jeane Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick 

Moynihan. 

John Bolton is personally committed to the future success of the 

United Nations and he will be a strong voice for reform at a time 

143 

when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to help meet 

the challenging agenda before the international community. John 

will also help to build a broader base of support here in the United 

Nations for the U.N.—in the United States for the U.N. and its 

mission. As Secretary General Annan has said, ‘‘U.S. support the 

U.N. is critical to the success of this institution.’’ The United States 

will continue to do its part. 

John, you have my confidence and that of the President. We 

thank you for the work you have done on behalf of our nation. To 

John’s wife, Gretchen, and daughter Jennifer Sarah and other 

friends of John who are here with us today, we thank you for all 

that you do. But John, your most important work is yet to come. 

And I look forward to working closely with you on behalf of our nation and the international community in support of the United Nations. 

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Madame Secretary, you and 

the President have done me a great honor in nominating me to be 

the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. If confirmed by the Senate, I will continue to work closely 

with members of Congress and our colleagues both in the Foreign 

Service and in the civil service to advance President Bush’s policies. 

As you know, Madame Secretary, I’ve worked in the government 

for many years, at the Agency for International Development, the 

Department of Justice and here at the Department of State. This 

work has afforded me the opportunity to learn from some of our nation’s finest public servants. It has been an honor and a privilege 

to represent the United States Government in crafting many multinational and bilateral agreements to further our National Security 

objectives. 

Madame Secretary, my record over many years demonstrates 

clear support for effective multilateral diplomacy. Whether it be the 

Proliferation Security Initiative, the G–8 global partnership or 

adopting UN resolutions, working closely with others is essential to 

ensuring a safer world. We all agree that there are numerous challenges facing the United States and the security of our country and 

all freedom-loving peoples must be protected. Close cooperation and 

the time-honored tradition of frank communication is central to 

achieving our mutually-held objectives. The United Nations affords 

us the opportunity to move our policies forward together with unity 

of purpose. 

As you know, I have over the years written critically about the 

U.N. Indeed, one highlight of my professional career was the 1991 

successful effort to repeal the General Assembly’s 1975 resolution 

equating Zionism with racism, thus removing the greatest stain on 

the U.N.’S reputation. I have consistently stressed in my writings 

that American leadership is critical to the success of the U.N., an 

effective U.N., one that is true to the original intent of its charter’s 

framers. 

This is a time of opportunity for the U.N. which, likewise, requires American leadership to achieve successful reform. I know 

you and the President will provide that leadership. If confirmed by 

the Senate, I will roll up my sleeves to join you in that effort which 

will require close, bipartisan Congressional support. 

144 

Finally a personal note, I’d like to thank two very special people 

who have been with me for many years, my wife Gretchen and our 

daughter Jennifer Sarah, who have endured my many foreign trips 

and long absences in the service of our country. 

Madame Secretary, again, I want to thank you and the President 

for your confidence and for your support. 

MEMO RE: UNCLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON THE PROCESS OF GETTING

IDENTITIES FROM NSA INTERCEPTS

On Friday, May 6, officials from the State Department’s bureau 

of Intelligence and Research (INR) gave a briefing to majority and 

minority staffs on how policymakers and others can obtain the 

blacked-out names of Americans in intercepts from the National 

Security Agency (NSA). The NSA regularly sends relevant, highlyclassified reports to various policymakers, as well as to INR, as 

part of the normal intelligence briefing process. The volume of reports depends on both availability of information and the interest 

of the policymaker. Sometimes those reports will include excerpts 

of intercepted conversations between foreigners that mention U.S. 

citizens. By law, the American names are blacked out, and it is 

noted that speakers are referring to ‘‘named U.S. person’’, ‘‘named 

U.S. official’’ or ‘‘named U.S. company.’’ 

If the person receiving the NSA report wants to know the identity of the ‘‘named’’ person, he or she contacts the relevant INR analyst and asks for it. INR prepares a formal request for NSA, 

signed by INR’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. The requester needs to give no special reason other than he/she needs the 

name ‘‘to assess the intelligence value of the report.’’ INR rarely if 

ever questions the requester. The request is sent over to the NSA, 

and the name comes back, sometimes overnight, or a day or so 

later. No request has ever been denied by NSA, as far as we were 

told. The analyst is shown the ‘‘ident’’, and then goes and informs 

the requester. Requesters can be ‘‘any policy customer who has the 

authority to see the report.’’ Typically the individual is at the Deputy Assistant Secretary rank or above, sometimes office director or 

above. 

The briefers said they receive ‘‘two or three’’ such requests a 

week, especially from INR analysts, who need the information to 

understand better the intelligence they are analyzing. The Committee has been told that during Secretary Bolton’s tenure, 400 

such requests were made by the State Department, including 10 by 

Secretary Bolton. An estimated 50% of the 400 requests come from 

INR; an almost equally large number are requested by officials 

from Diplomatic Security. 

By law, the NSA may not eavesdrop on the conversations of a 

U.S. citizen, even if that citizen is abroad. Therefore, any blackedout names would be Americans who are being talked about, not 

Americans who are talking on the intercept. 

The NSA reports are typically so highly classified that they do 

not stay with the requester once he or she has read it. They must 

be stored in more secure facilities than most officials have in their 

offices. When the name comes back from NSA (via secure e-mail), 

the analyst is shown the name, but apparently is not given it on 

a piece of paper. The analyst then takes the original intercept reVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
145 

port to the requester, discloses the ‘‘ident’’, then takes the report 

back again. 

There is some discrepancy about how many requests have been 

made. If the requester asks for two different names on the same 

report, INR counts that as two requests, NSA counts it as one. 

Therefore, INR counts somewhat more requests than NSA’s 400. 

INR assumes that if a request comes from the chief of staff or some 

other top person in an official’s office, it is coming from the official. 

The briefers did not believe INR’s records are scrupulous in recording whether the request came directly from the principal or from 

staff. The INR records of the idents are destroyed within nine 

months. 

Like any SCI material, the NSA reports are available only a need 

to know basis. Someone with a clearance can’t simply go rooting 

around NSA reports. A person requesting an ident on a report 

clearly outside his/her area would raise a red flag. 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, April 28, 2005. 

Hon. PAT ROBERTS, 

Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, 

U.S. Senate, Washington DC. 

Hon. JAY ROCKEFELLER, 

Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, 

U.S. Senate, Washington DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN/VICE CHAIRMAN: As part of the Committee 

on Foreign Relations’ due diligence process, in connection with the 

nomination of John Bolton to be the United States Representative 

to the United Nations, questions have arisen with regard to requests by the nominee in his capacity as Under Secretary of State 

for Arms Control. More specifically, Mr. Bolton has testified that, 

on approximately ten occasions between 2001 and 2004, he requested the names of U.S. persons that were redacted in the release to policymakers of various intelligence products. 

A number of questions have been raised regarding these types of 

requests, including the process by which such requests are made, 

transmitted, and approved. There is also concern as to whether information regarding Mr. Bolton’s specific requests has been handled appropriately by those with knowledge of such requests. 

Therefore, the Committee, working with and through the Select 

Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, hereby requests that you solicit from the appropriate intelligence agencies or 

elements thereof all information related to Mr. Bolton’s requests 

and the responses thereto, including but not limited to, the 

unredacted contents of the documents in question, the process by 

which Mr. Bolton’s requests were handled, the contents of the responses and the process by which they were communicated, as well 

as any conclusions reached by the appropriate intelligence agencies 

or elements thereto as to any violations of procedures, directives, 

regulations, or law by those with knowledge of Mr. Bolton’s requests. 

Assuming the provision of such material, the Committee on Foreign Relations is prepared to follow the guidance of the Select ComVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00145 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
146 

mittee on Intelligence with access and storage of such material, as 

well as the provisions under which such materials will be shared 

with Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations. 

Thank you for your consideration of this request. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Chairman. 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC, May 5, 2005. 

Hon. RICHARD LUGAR, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate, Washington DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Committee has received your letter of 

April 28, 2005. As you requested in that letter, the Select Committee on Intelligence is prepared to assist the Foreign Relations 

Committee in its review of specific Intelligence Community holdings as they relate to the nomination of John Bolton to be the U.S. 

Representative to the United Nations. 

The Select Committee on Intelligence looks forward to working 

with you and your Committee in order to facilitate this request. 

Sincerely, 

PAT ROBERTS, 

Chairman. 

ANNEX E 

HEARING ON NOMINATION OF JOHN R. 

BOLTON TO BE U.S., REPRESENTATIVE TO 

THE UNITED NATIONS 

MONDAY, APRIL 11, 2005 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, 

Chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Alexander, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and 

Obama. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee is called to order. 

The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider President George W. Bush’s nomination of John Bolton to be United 

States Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Bolton has served 

the last four years as the Under Secretary of State for Arms ConVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
147 

trol and International Security Affairs. In this capacity, he has 

played an important role in several of the Bush administration’s 

most notable diplomatic successes, including the President’s proliferation security initiative, the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global 

Partnership Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the opening of Libya’s WMD programs. 

Secretary Bolton also served for four years in the administration 

of George H.W. Bush, as the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations. In this position, he was heavily involved in 

matters related to the United Nations, including United Nations financing and reform proposals. He also assisted former Secretary of 

State James Baker in his role as the Secretary General’s personal 

envoy for the Western Sahara. 

In announcing this nomination, Secretary of State Condoleezza 

Rice stated, and I quote, ‘‘John Bolton is personally committed to 

the future success of the United Nations, and he will be a strong 

voice for reform at a time when the United Nations has begun to 

reform itself to help meet the challenging agenda before the international community,’’ end of quote from Dr. Rice. 

Perhaps no organization is so frequently oversimplified by both 

its proponents and its detractors as the United Nations. The 

United Nations is not a monolithic entity controlled by a Secretary 

General; rather, it’s a complex collection of agencies, programs, diplomatic venues, traditions, and agreements that depend on the actions of the individual member states. As such, the various parts 

of the U.N. often work independently from one another with little 

coordination or oversight. 

The U.N. has produced great accomplishments, even as some of 

its structures have experienced episodes of corruption, mismanagement, contentiousness, or timidity. Some agencies and programs, 

like the World Health Organization, the World Food Program, and 

UNICEF, have a proven record of achievement and are trusted by 

people and nations around the world. Other endeavors, like the Oilfor-Food Program or the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, have 

been gravely flawed and suffer from severe organizational deficiencies. 

Foreign Relations Committee held the first congressional hearing 

on the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food scandal a year ago this month. At that 

hearing, I said, and I quote, ‘‘Billions of dollars that should have 

been spent on humanitarian needs in Iraq were siphoned off by 

Saddam Hussein’s regime through a system of surcharges, bribes, 

and kickbacks. This corruption was not solely a product of Saddam 

Hussein’s machination; he depended upon members of the U.N. Security Council who were willing to be complicit in his activities, 

and they needed U.N. officials and contractors who were dishonest, 

inattentive, or willing to make damaging compromises in pursuit of 

a compassionate mission,’’ end of quote. 

During the last year, we have learned much more about the extent of that corruption and mismanagement involved, and this 

knowledge has supported the case for reform. 

United Nations reform is not a new issue. The structure and role 

of the United Nations has been debated in our country almost continuously since the U.N. was established, in 1945. But in 2005 we 

may have a unique opportunity to improve the operations of the 

U.N. The revelations of the Oil-for-Food scandal and the urgency 

148 

of strengthening global cooperation to address terrorism, the AIDS 

crisis, nuclear proliferation, and many other international problems 

have created momentum in favor of constructive reforms at the 

U.N. 

Secretary General Annan has proposed a substantial reform plan 

that will provide a platform for further reform initiatives and discussion. The United States must be a leader in the effort to improve the United Nations, particularly its accountability. At a time 

when the United Nations is appealing for greater international 

help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in trouble spots around the world, the 

diminishment of U.N. credibility because of scandal reduces U.S. 

options and increases our burdens. 

Secretary Bolton has thought a great deal about this subject, and 

we are anxious to listen to his ideas for reform, as well as his evaluation of the Secretary General’s plan. We want to know what specific parts of that plan deserve United States support. Beyond substantive evaluation, we want to know how the nominee intends to 

pursue these reform ideas. What strategy does he propose for making constructive changes a reality? How will he apply the substantial experience in this area? 

Even as reform must be a priority, the world will not stop while 

we attempt to improve the structures of the U.N. The next U.S. 

Ambassador to the U.N. must pursue reform without diminishing 

the effectiveness of its core diplomatic mission; namely, securing 

greater international support for the national-security and foreignpolicy objectives of the United States. 

During the last several months, President Bush and Secretary 

Rice have undertaken important missions designed to reinvigorate 

relations with allies and partners. This is an urgent national-security imperative that cannot be neglected by the next ambassador 

to the U.N. The United States does not possess infinite financial 

and military resources. We need help to advance security, democracy, and human rights. This fact should not preclude us from taking unilateral action when it is in our interest, but it does require 

that we be persistent and imaginative in our pursuits of international support. 

The nomination of Secretary Bolton to be Ambassador to the 

United Nations has generated public debate on U.S. policies toward 

the United Nations and on the degree to which the United States 

should embrace multilateralism. In this context, opponents of Mr. 

Bolton have criticized some statements of the nominee as abrasive, 

confrontational, and insensitive. Some of these same statements 

have been celebrated by supporters of the nominee as demonstrating a tough-minded, refreshingly blunt approach to diplomacy. But in the diplomatic world, neither bluntness nor rhetorical 

sensitivity is a virtue, in itself. There are times when blunt talk 

serves a policy purpose. Other times, it does not. 

When President Ronald Reagan stood before the Brandenburg 

Gate in 1987 and said, ‘‘Mr. Gorbachev, tear down that wall,’’ blunt 

speech was serving a carefully planned diplomatic purpose. It reflected broader themes of democracy that had been nurtured for 

years by the Reagan administration. It reaffirmed to Germany, on 

both sides of the wall, the United States would have staying power 

in Europe. It underscored to the Kremlin, in a personal, tangible 

149 

way, that the United States and its allies were intent on achieving 

the peaceful transformation of Eastern Europe. 

Blunt as it was, there was nothing gratuitous about President 

Reagan’s statement. Diplomatic speech by any high-ranking administration official has policy consequences. It should never be undertaken simply to score international debating points, to appeal to 

segments of the U.S. public opinion, or to validate a personal point 

of view. 

As President John Kennedy once said, and I quote, ‘‘The purpose 

of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments 

of hope or indignation; it is to shape real events in a real world,’’ 

end of quote. 

I believe that diplomats serving under the President and Secretary of State can apply a basic three-part test to almost anything 

they utter in a diplomatic context. First, is the statement true? 

Second, is the statement consistent with the policies and directives 

of the President and the Secretary of State? And, third, is there a 

rational expectation that the statement will advance or support 

U.S. interests? 

It is particularly important that the statements of our ambassadors to the U.N. meet this test, because, more so than any other 

American ambassadors, they are perceived as speaking directly for 

the President of the United States. 

President Bush has selected John Bolton, a nominee of experience and accomplishment, to be his spokesman and representative 

at the United Nations. Given the importance of the position, it is 

vital that we act both expeditiously and thoroughly in evaluating 

the nominee. We look forward to hearing the nominee’s insights 

and learning how he will work on behalf of the President and the 

Secretary of State in fulfilling this duty. 

I’d like to turn now to the distinguished Ranking Member of the 

committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR 

FROM DELAWARE 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, 

Mr. Secretary. 

Let me say, at the outset, I’m probably—of all the people up 

here, I’m going to be the least critical of anyone who’s blunt. I don’t 

like to indict myself publicly that way. But—I hadn’t planned on 

starting this way, but I think that the—to state my grave concern 

with this appointment, Mr. Chairman, I think that the test you set 

out for diplomacy is the accurate one: true, consistent with the policy of the administration, and a rational expectation that it would 

be in U.S. interests. 

Obviously, all of this is subject to explanation and rebuttal and— 

by our friend, Mr. Bolton, but I think that my problem with your 

statements about the U.N. is, I don’t think they’re true, I don’t 

think they’re consistent with U.S. policy, and I don’t think—I clearly believe they do not advance U.S. interests. And, you know, you 

can be blunt. President Reagan was blunt about the Berlin Wall, 

because it was, in fact, clear to the whole world that it was an odious thing. I think your statements, which I’ll go into in a minute, 

about the U.N. are a little bit like being blunt about NATO. If you 

had said, which you haven’t, to the best of my knowledge, ‘‘NATO 

150 

forces can’t keep with us—up with us. The French air force can’t 

fly on our wing,’’ et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. That would be 

blunt. That be also clearly against U.S. interests to say those 

things. But it would be blunt. And I would think that’s more akin 

to my criticism of what you will soon hear of your statements about 

the U.N. than the Berlin Wall. 

I don’t believe—well, I should point out, at the outset, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you for your cooperation. You have been, 

as always, straightforward and honorable and fair to both the witness and to the minority. I don’t believe this hearing, quite frankly, 

is ready to be conducted today, because we’ve not completed the review of certain allegations, none of which go to the integrity, the 

honesty, the personal conduct of the nominee. When I say ‘‘allegations,’’ I’ll get into what I mean by that, allegations involving the 

nominee. They all relate to whether or not he attempted to use his 

influence unfairly to get certain analysts fired because they didn’t 

agree with his assessments. That’s what I mean, at the outset, so 

the press doesn’t think there’s anything nefarious about this. 

That’s the issue that’s going to be discussed here, among others. 

On March 21st, I asked the State Department for access to certain individuals and documents related to an incident involving the 

nominee and a State Department employee relating to whether or 

not that person should or should not have been fired. For two 

weeks, the Department stonewalled. It was only after you, Mr. 

Chairman, intervened, last Thursday—and we sent repeated letters 

to the State Department—last Thursday that you intervened, that 

we received some cooperation. 

On Thursday, last, at 1:45 p.m., the Democratic staff was informed that two individuals—we asked for four—would be made 

available that afternoon, starting at 3:00 p.m. On Friday morning, 

some of the documents we requested began to arrive, but the committee was not allowed to retain them or make copies of them, but 

only take notes, further handicapping our ability to review the materials. 

Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides—this has been on 

both sides—I asked my chief of staff to correct me—on every interview, there’s been a majority member staff person there, so this 

isn’t a—this isn’t—the Democrats are asking for it, but this—none 

of this has been done absent a majority staff person being present. 

Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides have worked diligently to interview the witnesses and review materials. And so, I’m 

grateful for your intervention at the time that you intervened, because I was having no success with Secretary Rice. But the committee’s work to investigate this matter, which would have proceeded over the past two-week period, was compressed into 90 

hours. The staff still only—has at least two more interviews to conduct, and I don’t believe that all documents responsive to the request have been provided. 

And because many of the documents are classified, they could not 

be made available to Senators to review unless they happened to 

be in Washington during this period. Many of us were—the reason 

it was initially postponed is, many of us were in Rome with the 

President’s funeral. Excuse me. Freudian. I beg your pardon. At 

the Pope’s funeral that the President attended. 

151 

This is not a way that we should do business. The Department’s 

lack of cooperation—this is not Mr. Bolton; he did not fail to cooperate, the Department did not cooperate until the last possible 

minute—stands in marked contrast to the nomination four years 

ago for this same position. In that case, involving John Negroponte, 

the committee reviewed, with full cooperation, and obtained hundreds of pages of documents without delay or resistance. And my 

friend from Connecticut was a prime mover in dealing with that 

nomination. 

The fact is that, unlike four years ago, Under Secretary Bolton, 

when he came before this committee, had little background in 

Arms Controls, and we confirmed him. But there’s no question that 

he comes before us today with extensive experience in U.N. affairs. 

He served as the Assistant Secretary of State during the first Bush 

administration, supervising policy regarding the United Nations. 

And he has written and testified frequently about the subject. And 

it is precisely the record in his first part of this—the first Bush 

term that concerns me. 

I believe the President is entitled to significant deference in his 

appointment of senior personnel, and I’ve —but I have opposed 

nominees, however, who I believe were hostile to the mission for 

which—to which they were assigned. For example, I voted against 

two—one Secretary of the Interior who was—clearly had an animus 

toward that Department, under the Reagan administration. And I 

voted against Secretaries of Education appointed by Reagan, because he said he was appointing them for the express purpose of 

doing away with the Department of Education. 

And so, this will—not the first time I have voted against a—if 

I vote against John—it would not be the first time that I voted 

against a nominee for—that the President has put forward that’s 

not a member of the judiciary. 

And, quite frankly, I’m surprised that the nominee wants the job 

that he’s been nominated for, given his—the many negative things 

he had to say about the U.N., international institutions, and international law. Now, you’ve going to have an opportunity to respond 

to all these kinds of things. They’re taken—they’re attempted to be 

in context, but they’re—but I’m just going to cite some of the things 

you said, and they’ll be put in context during the question-and-answer period. 

You said, there’s no such thing as the United Nations —quote, 

‘‘There’s no such thing as the United Nations.’’ 

You said, and I quote, that—excuse me—you said, If they removed ten stories from the 38-story U.N. headquarters, quote, ‘‘it 

wouldn’t make a bit of difference,’’ end of quote. 

You said that if the Security Council were to be made today, that 

you would have only one permanent member, the United States. 

You said that international law really isn’t, quote, ‘‘It’’—that it 

really isn’t law, and that, quote, ‘‘While treaties may well be politically or even morally binding, they are not legally obligatory,’’ end 

of quote. 

You said the International Court of Justice, a body created under 

the U.N. Charter, is a, quote, ‘‘travesty and a pretend court,’’ end 

of quote. 

You said that the peace-enforcement operations of the United— 

of nation and nation-building should, quote, ‘‘be relegated to hisVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
152 

tory’s junk pile at the first opportunity,’’ end of quote, because they 

resulted in, as you said, quote, ‘‘American personnel and resources 

being committed to U.N. operations far removed from America’s 

vital interests,’’ end of quote, even though they wouldn’t be there 

unless we—if we didn’t want them there, we could veto the effort. 

I want to give you a chance to explain, clarify, and possibly, 

hopefully, repudiate these and other statements you’ve made over 

the years, but, for now, let me point to two things. 

First, the logical conclusion of your views is that—in my view, is 

that if the U.S. Embassy is sacked by a foreign state, or a U.S. soldier tortured, then this country and its citizens have no recourse 

under international law, because, in your view, there’s no such 

thing as international law. How can that possibly be in America’s 

interest? 

Second, it seems to me your views about the U.N. treaties and 

international law are out of sync with those of the President of the 

United States and Secretary Rice. Soon after his election, the President stated that one of his priorities for the second term was, 

quote, ‘‘to defend our security and spread freedom by building effective multinational and multilateral institutions and supporting effective multilateral action,’’ end of quote. 

The President, right now, is demanding, to his great credit, Syria’s full withdrawal from Lebanon, under the authority of a U.N. 

Security Council Resolution. The administration has finally joined 

the European effort to convince Iran to forego nuclear weapons. 

Quote, ‘‘We’re working closely with Britain, France, and Germany,’’ 

the President said, continuing the quote, ‘‘as they insist that 

Tehran comply with international law.’’ 

The President recently decided the United States, quote, ‘‘will 

discharge its international obligations,’’ end of quote, under decisions of the International Court of Justice by having several state 

courts, including courts in Texas, give effect to the decision of that 

court in certain death-penalty cases. Does he know that he’s implementing an order that is from a ‘‘pretend court’’? 

The administration strongly endorses the U.N. decision to send 

10,000 peacekeepers to Sudan to help secure a North-South peace 

agreement, a mission your statements about peacekeeping suggest 

that you’d have trouble supporting. 

During her confirmation hearing, Secretary Rice told this committee, quote, ‘‘that the time for diplomacy is now,’’ end of quote. 

This month, speaking before the American Society of International Law, she said, and I quote, ‘‘One of the pillars of that diplomacy is our strong belief that international law is a vital and 

powerful force in the search for freedom,’’ end of quote. 

I suspect that if President Clinton’s Secretary of State had made 

that same statement, you might have been leading the charge that 

this was an ill-founded statement. I could be wrong. I’m anxious to 

hear what you have to say. 

In the past two months, the President and the Secretary have 

made clear that there is a new-found commitment to work closely 

with others, including the United Nations. And I’m hopeful that 

they’re trying to return America to its historic role in building a 

strong international system that serves our interests, rather than 

running roughshod over it. 

153 

Your views seem, based on what you’ve said in the past, John, 

to be contradictory and contrary to the direction the President and 

the Secretary of State now want to take this administration, which 

leads me to believe that it must mean that you no longer agree 

with those statements, because they appointed you. I wonder, as I 

did in 2001, about your diplomatic temperament. You have a habit 

of belittling your opposition, and even some of your friends. 

You said that, quote, ‘‘Republicans are adults on foreign-policy 

questions, and we define what we’re willing to do militarily and politically by what is in the best interest of the United States.’’ I wonder what you think of the motives of some of us who aren’t Republicans. 

You once quoted that the head of the International Law Commission—you once quoted the head of the International Law Commission as evidence of the grandiose ambitions of supporters in the 

International Criminal Court by saying, quote, ‘‘That’s not the 

same as knuckle-dragging’’—excuse me—‘‘That’s’’—excuse me—of 

the International Criminal Court by saying, quote, ‘‘That’s not 

some knuckle-dragging Republican from some southern state, it’s 

the head of the International Law Commission,’’ end of quote. I 

don’t think that’s the kind of attitude that is going to serve us very 

well in the United Nations if it continues. 

The U.N. needs reform. Lots of it. I work with former Chairman 

Jesse Helms to promote such reforms. The Helm-Biden amendment 

was—the legislation was part of that reform. That work’s not finished. We need a strong voice in New York who knows the U.N. 

and who can advance our reform agenda, but we don’t need a voice 

which people may not be inclined to listen to. And I fear that, 

knowing your reputation, and your reputation known well at the 

U.N., people will be inclined to tune you out. Above all, we need 

an able diplomat skilled in working the corridors of a complex 

international institution. Some have said that sending you to New 

York would be like sending Nixon to China. I’m concerned it’ll be 

more like sending a bull into a china shop. 

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who served at the U.N. under President Reagan and strongly supports you, may have summed it up 

best in describing you in the New York Times. She said, ‘‘He may 

not—he may do diplomatic jobs for the U.S. Government, but John 

is not a diplomat,’’ end of quote. 

So we’ll want to spend some more time exploring your views on 

the United Nations and how you approach the job, if confirmed. We 

also have an obligation to assess your performance in your current 

job, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 

Security. The fact is that, on your watch, in areas in which you are 

responsible, the world has gotten more, and not less, dangerous. 

Not your fault, but that’s a fact. We didn’t create these threats, but 

it’s our responsibility to contend with them wisely and effectively. 

And, in my judgement, your judgement on how to deal with the 

emerging threats have not been particularly useful. 

Over the past four years, Korea has increased its nuclear-weapons capacity by as much as 400 percent. It may now have as many 

as eight nuclear weapons, which it could test, hide, sell, or sell to 

the highest bidder. During your 2001 confirmation hearing, you 

highlighted a danger posed by North Korea 27 times. You were 

154 

right. But the record suggests that your approach has undermined 

the efforts to address the growing threat posed by Pyongyang. 

Over the past four years, Iran has accelerated its own nuclear 

program. It’s much closer to the bomb than when the President 

took office. The record suggests you opposed the President’s policy, 

the one finally adopted by President Bush. He’s come around to, 

after several years, a coordinated strategy of carrots and sticks 

with our European partners. No one can guarantee it will work. We 

do know that the approach you apparently advocated has not 

worked. 

Over the past four years, the invaluable program Chairman 

Lugar started to help Russia account and destroy excess nuclear 

weapons and a complementary program to deal with its chemical 

arsenal has to withstand efforts by some in this administration to 

cut it. Now these programs have become mired in red tape, and despite the fact that loose Russian weapons pose one of the greatest 

potential threats to our security, we still haven’t cut through that 

red tape. 

The administration did succeed in convincing Libya to give up its 

weapons of mass destruction, but, according to press accounts—and 

I’d like to hear what your view is—that only happened after you 

were taken off the case. And that success was the result of a policy 

begun by a previous administration that you roundly disparaged. 

Finally, a serious concern has been raised about your attitude toward dissenting views. Specifically, it has been alleged that, on at 

least two occasions, you sought to have removed from their positions officials who disagreed with your assessment of critical intelligence matters. After all this country has been through with Iraq 

and faulty intelligence, if that’s true, that’s not the approach we 

should be rewarding. You’ll have a full opportunity to address 

these complaints. 

John, I have great respect for your abilities and your intellectual 

capacity. It’s your judgement and temperament, as well as your approach to many of these issues, that give me great pause. 

Let me conclude with this. After a necessary war in Afghanistan 

and a optional war in Iraq, Americans are rightly confident in the 

example of our power. But I’ve been concerned that many in this 

administration have forgotten the power of our example. Foreign 

policy is not a popularity contest. We must confront hard issues. 

Sometimes they require hard choices that other countries don’t 

like. But, above all, they require American leadership. That’s the 

kind that persuades others to follow. And I’m not convinced this 

nominee has that as his strongest suit. 

I thank the Chair, and I yield back to the Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the distinguished Ranking Member. 

I would mention that when the hearing was originally scheduled 

for Thursday of last week, our distinguished colleague, Senator 

Warner, had planned to join us to introduce Secretary Bolton. With 

the rescheduling of the hearing for this morning, Senator Warner 

is unable to attend because of commitments in his state. He’s asked 

me to convey to the committee his strong support for the nominee. 

And I would ask unanimous consent that Senator Warner’s statement be included in the record. [The prepared statement of Senator 

Warner follows:] 

155 

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify the point I made? 

I said ‘‘every witness has been interviewed jointly.’’ Three weeks 

ago, the Democratic staff interviewed one witness alone, and then, 

I believe, notified—am I correct?—notified the majority staff, who 

then interviewed that nominee, which began this ball rolling. So 

there was one interview, that I’m aware of, that the initial interview did not take place with both majority and minority in the 

room. That was the only one. I just wanted to clarify the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator for the clarification. 

Let me say, at the outset, that we have good attendance this 

morning, for which the Chair is grateful, and I would ask that 

Members limit their questions to ten minutes. We will have a tenminute round, followed by an additional ten-minute round. I would 

just simply announce my willingness to preside over the committee 

throughout the afternoon and into an evening session, if that is required, for Members to have opportunity to ask all the questions 

that they wish to ask. I want to make that clear at the outset, that 

Members will have that opportunity throughout the morning, the 

afternoon, and the evening, but I would ask Members to respect 

the ten-minute time limit. 

Now, the Chair will not stop the witness from responding when 

the ten minutes comes to a conclusion, but I will ask the Senator 

involved to restrain from further doing business during that period 

until another turn comes around, in fairness to most Members who 

have changed their plans in order to be here today and have come 

at least to do business, to participate in the hearing. 

Having mentioned that, I will ask the Clerk to start the clock on 

my questioning, and I will ask the first ten minutes of questions 

and then yield to my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden. We’ll 

go back and forth, then, with our questions. 

Excuse me, I’ve jumped the gun. We’ve not heard from the nominee. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And we do want to hear from the nominee. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We were so excited about asking you questions, 

Secretary Bolton—[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. —that we just wanted to get right into it. But, 

nevertheless, we do look forward to your statement. Please take the 

time that is required, really, to fully express your views, and then 

I’ll start the clock on my ten minutes of questioning. 

Secretary Bolton? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. 

REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE RANK 

OF AMBASSADOR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES 

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you, Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden. 

I am honored to appear before you today as President Bush’s 

nominee to be U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I’m grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to discussing the critical leadership role that the United States plays in 

the United Nations. 

156 

I’d like to thank Senator Warner, who would have been here, as 

you suggested, had the schedule not changed, and my wife Gretchen, who is here with me today. 

I do have a longer statement, Senator, if I could, I’d submit for 

the record, and I’ll just read a shorter version of it. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be published in the record in full. 

Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunities 

that I have had to work with this committee over the years. This 

is the fourth time I have appeared before this committee in a confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I pledge to fulfill the President’s vision of working in close partnership with the United Nations. 

The United States is committed to the success of the United Nations, and we view the U.N. as an important component of our diplomacy. As the President stated before the U.N. General Assembly 

last September, ‘‘Let history show that, in a decisive decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our duties or 

waver in meeting them.’’ 

The Secretary has made this a top priority, as well. She was unequivocal in her remarks, and I quote, ‘‘The American people respect the idealism that sparked the creation of the United Nations, 

and we share the U.N.’s unshakeable support for human dignity. 

At this time of great opportunity and great promise, the charge to 

the international community is clear. We, who are on the right side 

of freedom’s divide, have an obligation to help those who were unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side of that divide. The hard 

work of freedom is a task of generations, yet it is also urgent work 

that cannot be deferred. Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play 

a critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding generations from 

the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 

and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 

freedom.’’ 

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee to forge a stronger relationship between the United States 

and the United Nations, which depends critically on American 

leadership. Such leadership, in turn, must rest upon broad bipartisan support in Congress. It must be earned by putting to rest 

skepticism that so many feel about the U.N. system. 

Through the course of three decades of public service, both in 

and out of government, I have learned that this consensus is not 

only essential, but possible. Working together in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we can take important steps to restore 

confidence in the United Nations. 

Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical juncture, and I fully share the 

sentiments that you expressed in 1997 when you remarked, and I 

quote, ‘‘It is time to decide if we want a strong and viable United 

Nations that can serve United States’ interests, or a United Nations that is crippled by insolvency and hobbled by controversy and 

uncertainty.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, there are four priorities that I believe are important to pursue if confirmed as U.S. Representative to the U.N. One 

priority is to strengthen and build institutions that serve as the 

cornerstone of freedom in nascent democracies. Mr. Chairman, we 

should never underestimate the impact of free and fair elections on 

a country. I look forward, if confirmed, to working with relevant 

157 

U.N. agencies to enable them to contribute further to the growth 

of democratic institutions in countries freed from the bonds of oppression. 

I also look forward to working with you on President Bush’s request for $10 million in the fiscal year 2006 budget to set up a democracy fund within the United Nations. I’m grateful to Secretary 

General Annan for endorsing the President’s proposal in his new 

report in U.N. reform. 

While the U.N. has had its successes in the human-rights field, 

there have been problems, as well, such as the United Nations 

Commission on Human Rights. For too long, some of the most egregious violators of human rights have undercut UNHRC’s principles 

and its effectiveness. The consequence, as Secretary General Annan 

has said, is that the Commission’s important work has, and I 

quote, ‘‘been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility 

and professionalism,’’ close quote. We must work with our friends 

and allies to keep those who would usurp the moral authority of 

this Commission off of it, and to send clear and strong signals that 

we will not shy away from naming human-rights violators. 

We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus its attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there have been times 

when the General Assembly has gone off track, such as with the 

abominable Resolution 3379, equating Zionism with racism. I am 

proud to have been an active player in getting this resolution repealed. 

Mr. Chairman, a second priority, should I be confirmed will be 

stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to ensure that terrorist organizations and the world’s most dangerous 

regimes are unable to threaten the United States, our friends, and 

our allies. As Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, I have worked hard to promote effective multilateral action to curb the flow of dangerous weapons. As you know, 

I served as the lead U.S. negotiator in the creation of the G8 Global 

Partnership Against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of 

Mass Destruction, which will add an additional $10 billion over ten 

years in Nunn-Lugar-type programs. 

In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity to work in close consultation with our British colleagues in diplomatic efforts to secure 

the verifiable elimination of Libyan weapons of mass destruction. 

I also helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to help 

combat the spread of dangerous weapons through President Bush’s 

Proliferation Security Initiative. 

I have no doubt that these efforts played a critical role in enabling the United States to lead the Security Council to pass Resolution 1540, first suggested by President Bush in his speech to the 

General Assembly in September 2003. This resolution calls upon 

‘‘all member states to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms 

control and disarmament, and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction.’’ 

Resolution 1540 was the first of its kind focusing on WMD proliferation. I am proud that our strong leadership contributed to its 

unanimous adoption. I’m happy to report that, as of March 15, over 

80 countries have submitted reports required by the resolution, 

outlining their plans to enact and implement measures to stop 

158 

WMD proliferation. I look forward to working with Security Council members to achieve 100 percent compliance with the resolution. 

A third priority that I would pursue, if confirmed, is supporting 

the global war on terror. As we all learned on September the 11th, 

2001, no one is safe from the devastating effects of terrorists intent 

on harming innocent people. Confronting and triumphing in the 

global war on terror remains the central priority of the Bush administration. To win this war requires long-term cooperation with 

all like-minded nations. 

The President is firmly committed to working with the United 

Nations to make this shared goal of the civilized world a reality. 

As he noted in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2003, ‘‘All governments that support terror are complicit in 

a war against civilization. No government should ignore the threat 

of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorists the chance 

to regroup, recruit, and prepare. And all nations that fight terror 

as if the lives of their own people depend on it will earn the favorable judgement of history.’’ 

The United Nations has taken positive steps to support the war 

on terror, but more, of course, remains to be done. In the wake of 

September the 11th, we have been actively encouraging member 

states to become parties to the U.N. conventions on terrorism. I 

have been personally involved, in the past four years, as well, in 

working to complete the negotiations on a Nuclear Terrorism Convention. We must built upon Security Council Resolution 1368, 

passed one day after the tragic events of September 11, and which, 

for the first time, classified every act of international terrorism as 

a threat to international peace and security. 

We must also work together to help member states build capacities to combat terrorism, as outlined in Resolution 1373, passed on 

September 28th, 2001. This resolution obligates all U.N. member 

states to use their domestic laws and courts to keep terrorists from 

sheltering resources or finding safe havens anywhere in the world 

and to cooperate in investigating, prosecuting, and preventing terrorism wherever it may spring up. 

The U.N. Security Council is monitoring compliance with the requirements of this resolution, with impressive results. To date, 142 

countries have issued orders freezing the assets of suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations. Accounts totaling almost 105 million have been blocked; 34 million in the U.S., and over twice that 

amount in other countries. 

Overall, Resolution 1373 has been the framework for unprecedented international consultation and coordination against terrorism, including the provision of technical assistance to governments that want to do the right thing, but may not have the specialized expertise necessary. 

Mr. Chairman, a fourth priority is addressing humanitarian crises. It is not just the scourge of war we must confront. We must 

confront the scourge of disease and affliction, such as HIV/AIDS, 

through strong U.S. leadership in the United Nations system. 

Along with the President’s emergency plan for AIDS relief, a fiveyear, $15 billion investment, we are strong supporters of the U.N. 

declaration of commitment on HIV/AIDS and are working to ensure 

resources from the global fund for AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis 

are available to countries most severely affected by the disease. 

159 

I will make it a key priority, as well, to improve programs that 

have been involved in the tsunami relief effort so that we can enhance and build upon structures and institutions already in place. 

More broadly, we must confront the scourge of poverty, which 

leaves hundreds of millions on the margins of societies scrambling 

for food or shelter, with little opportunity to improve their lives or 

those of their children. 

We must also make sure that the U.N. acts effectively in promoting the economic and social advancement of all people. Policy 

reform, institution-building, appropriate technology transfer, and 

private-sector involvement are critical for sustained economic 

growth. We will continue to support the contributions of women to 

economic growth and development, as well as their critical role in 

the growth of democratic institutions worldwide. 

The U.N., in conjunction with U.S. leadership, has recognized 

that the traditional models of development have been insufficient 

to achieve development objectives and better the lives of people 

around the world. The Partnership for Maternal, Newborn, and 

Child Health, the Global Alliance for Vaccinations and Immunizations, and Rollback Malaria are all examples of how U.N. agencies, 

such as UNICEF, are working alongside the private sector, charitable organizations, and foundations such as the Gates Foundation, 

to leverage resources, generate new activities, and impact the lives 

of millions in developing countries. We support these new and innovative structures that rely less on bureaucracy and more on putting 

resources into the field, aiding results-based performance standards. 

This brings me to the issue of accountability and reform. The administration welcomes the Secretary General’s new report on U.N. 

reform, and we are examining carefully its many recommendations. 

I hope to work closely with the Secretary General and my colleagues to bring greater accountability and transparency to the 

United Nations. 

On a personal note, I should mention that Secretary General Kofi 

Annan and I have had a relationship that goes back 16 years, 

based on mutual respect and friendship, and I was pleased to receive a call from him last week. 

The key is to implement changes to the U.N. structure and management, including budget, personnel, and oversight reforms. Scandals such as those that we have witnessed with the Oil-for-Food 

Program, undermine, not only America’s confidence in the United 

Nations, but the confidence of the international community, as 

well. They must not recur. And we must never lose sight of the reality that ultimately it is member governments that must take responsibility for the U.N.’s actions, whether they be successes or 

failures. 

Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating what I said at the beginning. If confirmed, I will work closely and effectively with this 

committee in both houses of Congress. The President and Secretary 

Rice are committed to building a strong, effective United Nations. 

The United Nations affords us an opportunity to move our policies 

forward together with unity of purpose. Now, more than ever, the 

U.N. must play a critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and 

hopes and aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding 

generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundaVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00159 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
160 

mental human rights, and to promote social progress and better 

standards of life in larger freedom. This effort demands decisive 

American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and the backing of 

the American public. I will undertake to do my utmost to uphold 

the confidence that the President, Secretary Rice, and the Senate 

will have placed in me. 

Thank you, and I would welcome the opportunity to answer your 

questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Bolton, for your 

opening statement. 

I’d like to mention that Mrs. Bolton is with us today, on the front 

row, and we’re delighted that you are here, and we appreciate your 

coming to the hearing. 

Now, as I mentioned earlier, and prematurely, we’ll have a tenminute round of questioning, and we’ll begin the clock now, as I 

commence my ten minutes of questioning. Then I will yield to Senator Biden. 

Secretary Bolton, as Senator Biden has mentioned in his opening 

statement, prior to this hearing staff on both sides of the aisle have 

visited with Mr. Carl Ford. Carl Ford was supervisor for Christian 

Westermann, who is an INR biological warfare analyst. Now, I 

mention this because the allegation has been made that, in a 

speech that you were preparing for the AEI on Cuba, and which, 

I might mention, was on television this morning in its entirety, 

that you wished to change some language. Christian Westermann, 

the analyst, refused to change the language. You were severe in 

your criticism of him. And so, herein lies at least what appears to 

be a major flap for the last 90 hours, as Senator Biden has pointed 

out. 

Now, staff has, in fact, interviewed Mr. Westermann and Carl 

Ford, who will be appearing before the committee, as I understand, 

tomorrow morning, at our hearing at 9:30, Mr. Fred Fleitz, the 

Bolton special assistant, who might know something about this, 

Tom Fingar, the INR Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary at the 

time, Fulton Armstrong, National Intelligence Office for Latin 

America at the NIC at the time, Stuart Cohen, Mr. Armstrong’s supervisor at the NIC at that time. These interviews took place, aside 

from the Carl Ford interview, which Senator Biden has pointed out 

occurred earlier, on April 5, the other interviews on April 7 and 

April 8, and lasted, in most cases, for two hours, although the 

Fingar interview was only an hour and a quarter, and 30 minutes 

devoted to Stuart Cohen. 

Now, I mention all of this because, very clearly, there has been 

at least an allegation that pressure was applied, and, as Senator 

Biden suggested, making a transfer, that I think is a stretch. But 

we are very sensitive in this country about reports given on Iraq 

intelligence and how accurate, or how comprehensive, our intelligence agencies were, whether anyone distorted that, or misused 

that, or went beyond that intelligence with regard to public policy. 

Nonetheless, you were talking about biological warfare in Cuba. 

Your suggestions for change were not accepted. The speech, therefore, did not have words that you wanted, but it had the official interpretation. And, as a matter of fact, no one was discharged, although feelings may have been hurt. 

161 

I raise all of this, in this context, simply to give you an opportunity to explain, if you can, what the flap is about. In essence, 

who said what to whom, and for what reason? And if you had it 

to do all over again, would you do it the same way? In essence, give 

your side of the story. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the 

couple of points I’d want to stress from the outset is that all of 

these allegations have been reviewed in the past by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the committee found that there 

was no evidence of any indication of an attempt to influence or 

pressure analysts in their professional conclusions. 

Second, with respect to the speech, which was in May of 2002, 

and was entitled ‘‘Beyond the Axis of Evil,’’ it was a discussion of 

WMD efforts in a number of countries—really had preparations 

begun earlier in the year, just a few months after September the 

11th, when I think we all conclude that, however horrible September the 11th was, it could have been far worse had the terrorists had access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. And it 

was our feeling in the administration that we wanted to talk seriously to the American public about these kinds of threats. 

The intelligence community gave appropriate clearance to declassified language and to the text of the speech itself. The speech was 

cleared throughout the State Department, including the Office of 

the Deputy Secretary, throughout the interagency. Assistant Secretaries Ford and Otto Reich used essentially the same declassified 

language in testimony in March, before the speech; in June, after 

the speech; and elsewhere. 

And I wanted to say, also, Mr. Chairman, as you say, there have 

been a lot of interviews and transcripts and documents produced. 

I haven’t seen all of them. But I want to say to the committee, 

right here, unequivocally, I’d be happy if all of that were made public right now. There are problems with classifications. Some of it, 

I think, we need to be concerned about privacy for people who are, 

sort of, collaterally involved, the issues that have to be worked out. 

Mr. Chairman, there is nothing there, there, and I would put it all 

out on the public record. All of it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would indicate, Secretary Bolton, that 

State Department and CIA representatives stayed with the materials as they were made available in the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee offices. There were a number of pages that were classified, and that, I think, is an important point. But, at the same 

time, I appreciate your forthcoming desire that all of this be made 

public. And I suspect that that can be accommodated. 

Now, I simply want to know, with the specific allegation of pressure and discharge and those specific thoughts surrounding Mr. 

Westermann, specifically, what is the case? What happened? 

Mr. BOLTON. I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired, at 

all. And, in fact, you have e-mail from the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Intelligence Research Bureau the day 

of the conversation, Tom Fingar; his e-mail to me that day that 

said that Mr. Westermann behavior was, and I quote, ‘‘entirely inappropriate,’’ close quote. Mr. Fingar said, referring to INR, quote, 

‘‘We screwed up,’’ close quote. And he said, twice in a relatively 

short e-mail, quote, ‘‘It won’t happen again,’’ close quote. 

162 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you for that clarification. I suspect 

that we will hear more about it throughout the hearing. But, at the 

outset, I wanted to raise it, because it appears to me to have been 

the source, really, of almost half of the controversy about your 

nomination thus far. 

Now, let me get into the second half. What are you going to do 

about reform at the U.N.? You have mentioned specific desirable 

aspects, but clearly one of the rationales given by the President, 

and, even more emphatically, by the Secretary of State, is that you 

are a person who is going to be able to bring about reform of the 

institution so it will be strengthened. The United Nations is important for our foreign policy. It’s more important if, in fact, it’s a 

strong organization, with greater integrity, in terms of its activities. What do you have in mind as you approach this task? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think there are—analytically, there are basically 

two categories of reform that one can consider. The first category 

is the reform of governance structures in the U.N., how the member governments of the U.N. carry out their business. The second 

analytical category, I would call management, budget, and personnel, actual operation, actual delivery of product from U.N. agencies. And I think that there’s a lot of work to be done in both categories. 

And I mentioned, in my prepared remarks, the widespread feeling, including as shared by Secretary General Kofi Annan himself, 

that the U.N. Human Rights Commission had come close to completely crashing. That definitely needs to be fixed. 

We must address, I think, the most important question, governance question in the U.N. system, the composition of the permanent membership of the Security Council. This is an issue that I 

faced, myself, going back to the first Bush administration, when 

Japan made a very strong case for its becoming a permanent member, a case which has grown even stronger over the years, and 

which Secretary Rice commented on during her recent trip. 

There are a lot of very complex and competing claims for change 

in the composition of the Security Council. It’s going to take time 

to work that out. I think one rule I hope we can all agree on one 

objective to achieve in working on that structure is that we not 

make the Council less effective than it is now, and that’s going to 

be, I think, a very arduous task. 

I think, just quickly, on the management side, back in the first 

Bush administration I developed a concept called the ‘‘unitary 

U.N.,’’ which was a way of trying to look at the U.N. system as a 

whole, not bits and pieces; not loosely structured, unconnected specialized agencies, but looking at the system as a whole to try and 

rationalize its delivery of services, the research that it carries out, 

the work of the various specialized agencies and funds and programs that, on an organizational chart, are really quite complex. 

These are some of the things I hope to get into, if confirmed, and 

I think I’ve had the benefit of, as you mentioned, four years of service as Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, and the 

chance to work for the U.N. on a pro-bono basis, myself. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for those responses. My time is up. 

And I recognize the distinguished Senator from Delaware, Senator Biden. 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

163 

There’s a number of things, Mr. Secretary, I’d like to discuss 

with you. I’m going to try to do it in sort of an orderly way. 

I will be asking you a number of questions this afternoon, and 

as long as we go, about the issue of trying to have professionals removed from—I don’t think anybody’s ever said you tried to have 

them fired—‘‘have them removed from your portfolio,’’ I think is 

the term of art. Did you ever ask anyone to remove Mr. 

Westermann from your portfolio? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think, as the interviews that your staff conducted 

show—and that’s one reason why I want to get them all out in public—we believe Mr. Westermann had behaved in an underhanded 

fashion. And I think I—as my assistant mentioned to your staff, I 

said to him at the time, ‘‘I don’t care if you disagree with me, just 

don’t do it behind my back.’’ I mentioned it—— 

Senator BIDEN. Well, that’s not my question. I only have ten 

minutes, so I don’t want you to be a Senator and filibuster me. 

Did you attempt to have him removed from your portfolio? 

Mr. BOLTON. I mentioned it to Mr. Fingar. I may have mentioned 

it to one or two other people. But then I shrugged my shoulders, 

and I moved on. He was—— 

Senator BIDEN. So the answer is, yes, you did. 

Mr. BOLTON. And he was not moved, and I did not—— 

Senator BIDEN. Okay, and that’s all I wanted—I just wanted to 

make sure we’re talking about the same thing. 

Let me talk about the U.N. I’ll go back to—— 

Mr. BOLTON. I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline imposed on Mr. Westermann. 

Senator BIDEN. Other than removed from your—— 

Mr. BOLTON. No. 

Senator BIDEN. —portfolio. 

Mr. BOLTON. No. I said, to at least one of his supervisors, that 

I specifically had no intention whatever to cause him any ill will, 

but I—— 

Senator BIDEN. I’m not suggesting that. 

Mr. BOLTON. —had lost trust and confidence in him. And I think 

in any professional relationship, you need trust and confidence. 

Senator BIDEN. No, I got that. I just want to make sure our terminology is—we’re all using the same terminology when I talk 

about this with you this afternoon. 

But let me speak about the U.N., if I may, for a moment. As you 

know, Chairman Lugar and I have been working to improve the 

Federal Civilian Response to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization crises that we now face, and will face in the future, and 

we strongly support the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization of the State Department, which, really, 

the overwhelming credit should go to my colleague from Indiana. 

The mission statement of that office outlines, and I quote, ‘‘Failing 

in post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national, international security—and international security challenges of our day. 

Struggling states can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, 

crime, trafficking, and human catastrophes, and can destabilize an 

entire region.’’ 

Now, that’s the statement, the mission statement of the office. 

You have stated, on the record, unrelated to that office, before— 

and, as a matter of fact, in your capacity—well, I believe the date 

164 

was in ’97. You said, quote, ‘‘We should be relegated—what should 

be relegated to history’s junk pile at the first opportunity is this 

chimerical Clinton notion of U.N.,’’ quote, ‘‘peaceful enforcement 

and nation-building and enlargement. Those unworldly concepts 

have resulted in American personnel and resources being committed to U.N. operations far removed from vital American interests.’’ And that was in the ‘‘Creation, Fall—Rise and Fall of the 

United Nations’’ speech I believe you delivered. 

How do you define, in that context, ‘‘America’s vital interests’’? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I don’t—I don’t think you have that quote accurately, Senator, but I won’t slow down—— 

Senator BIDEN. Well, no, that’s very important. I do not want to, 

in any way, misrepresent what you say. Let’s get everything really 

straight. 

Mr. BOLTON. And I would—— 

Senator BIDEN. Because now—with all due respect, I don’t want 

to—I don’t want to put you in a spot to say something you didn’t 

say. ‘‘Creation, Fall, and Rise of the United Nations,’’ John R. 

Bolton—where was this speech made? Pardon me? And what’s the 

name of the book? It’s chapter 3 of a book entitled ‘‘Delusions of 

Grandeur.’’ And I want to read it again so we’re— 

It says, ‘‘Traditional peacekeeping, together with the often important role of agencies of the U.N. system play in international delivery of humanitarian assistance can work and should be continued. 

Although peacekeeping has only been limited—has had only limited use throughout much of U.N. history, it is an option that we 

should preserve for appropriate use, such as U.N. disengagement 

observer force along the Golan Heights, between Israel and Syria. 

What should be relegated to history’s junk pile at the first opportunity, however, are’’—am I pronouncing it correctly?—c-h-i-m-e-ri-c-a-l, chimerical? 

Mr. BOLTON. Chimerical. 

Senator BIDEN. —‘‘Clinton notions of U.N.’’—internal quotes, 

‘‘’peace enforcement,’’’ comma, quote, ‘‘’nation-building,’’’ comma, 

‘‘and,’’ quote, ‘‘’enlargement’’’ period. ‘‘Those unworldly concepts 

have resulted in American personnel and resources being committed to U.N. operations far removed from vital American interests. These concepts are based on misreadings of what happened in 

the world and in the U.N. in the late ’80s and early ’90s,’’ end of 

quote. 

Now, my question to you is—and here’s the cover—title of the 

book, ‘‘Delusions of Grandeur, the United Nations and Global Intervention,’’ edited by Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘‘Why We Shouldn’t Give 

the U.N. More Power,’’ Cato, 1997. 

Now, my question is, to you—and I’m going to run out of time 

very quickly, obviously—and let me be more precise—the United 

States strongly endorses the recent U.N. Security Council resolution to send 10,000 U.N. peacekeepers to Sudan to support NorthSouth peace agreement. Is this an example of an operation far removed from the vital interests of the United States? 

Mr. BOLTON. Absolutely not. And, in fact, in the passage you 

read, the second time you read, you referred—you read what I had 

written about the effectiveness, the historical effectiveness of U.N. 

peacekeeping operations, citing the example of the U.N. disengagement observer force along the Golan Heights. 

165 

At least part of the distinction I was making there was between 

peacekeeping, as that term has been historically defined in U.N. 

operations, and peace enforcement. Traditionally, peacekeeping relies on the consent of the parties to the conflict, the consent to U.N. 

involvement, and U.N. neutrality, as between the parties, and the 

very limited rules of engagement for the peacekeepers, essentially 

being authorized to use force only as a means of self defense. 

By contrast, peace enforcement, as envisaged conceptually, would 

give the—would give U.N. forces a role without the consent of the 

parties. The U.N. would not act in a neutral fashion, and the U.N. 

rules of engagement would be much more robust. 

Senator BIDEN. Which is—— 

Mr. BOLTON. The situation in the Sudan is a peacekeeping role, 

as traditionally defined. We have a historic agreement between the 

government in Khartoum and the rebels in the south that Senator 

Danforth and many others worked on. The force to be deployed, 

pursuant to the recently adopted resolution, I would say, is clearly 

a traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation. 

Senator BIDEN. Now, is that—do you support it, or not? I thought 

I—I thought you said peacekeeping and peace—what’s the other alternative? 

Mr. BOLTON. The analytical terms—— 

Senator BIDEN. It’s enforcement, right? 

Mr. BOLTON. —that are implied are peace-—— 

Senator BIDEN. Keeping and enforcing. 

Mr. BOLTON. —-keeping versus peace enforcement. And those 

imply separate kinds of operations. The force to be deployed in 

Sudan is a peacekeeping force. 

Senator BIDEN. And do you support the peacekeeping—— 

Mr. BOLTON. Absolutely. 

Senator BIDEN. If it had been a peace-enforcement operation? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think that’s a hypothetical, because—— 

Senator BIDEN. Okay, take Kosovo. 

Mr. BOLTON. But it’s an important—— 

Senator BIDEN. Let’s take Kosovo. Now, it didn’t involve the U.N. 

It involved NATO. 

Mr. BOLTON. Right. 

Senator BIDEN. In terms of Kosovo. That was a—would that be— 

if that had been a U.N. operation, would that have been called a 

peace-enforcement operation? 

Mr. BOLTON. That would have been called peace enforcement, I 

think, that’s correct. And that’s—I think that’s one reason why it 

never—it never achieved the approval of the Security Council. 

Senator BIDEN. That’s true. Now, would you not have supported 

that? 

Mr. BOLTON. I did not feel, at the time, that that was an appropriate action. 

Senator BIDEN. Was—what was the U.N. role in Korea? Was that 

peace enforcement or peacekeeping? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, the—that was very definitely a kind of peace 

enforcement, but one that the U.N. has only engaged in essentially 

twice in its history, once in Korea, when the authorization to use 

force was adopted, because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council in protest of the continued presence of the Republic 

of China holding the Chinese permanent seat. When the RusVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00165 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
166 

sians—Soviets realized that their absence from the Council and 

their inability to veto resolutions was allowing coalition resistance 

to the North Korean invasion, they returned, and that ended the 

effectiveness of the Security Council in the Korean incident. 

The second, of course, was in the first President Bush’s administration, in the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when President Bush and Secretary Baker led the successful 

effort through a series of Security Council resolutions, ultimately 

resulting in Resolution 678, which was only the second authorization to use force in U.N. Security Council history. 

Senator BIDEN. So when you say that—is peace enforcement associated with nation-building? 

Mr. BOLTON. No, I think it’s very separate concepts. 

Senator BIDEN. And so, the peace enforcement and nation-building and enlargement are things we should stay out of, not be involved with, with the United Nations. Is that right? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think they’re very—I think they’re very separate 

contexts. I was writing, at that point, specifically critiquing the 

Clinton administration policy, yes, sir. 

Senator BIDEN. I’ll come back to that. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. 

Senator Hagel? 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Secretary Bolton, welcome. Thank you for agreeing to take on a 

big job if this committee and the United States Senate work its will 

and send you to that big job. We appreciate what you’re doing. 

I have been a United States Senator who has strongly supported 

the United Nations. It’s an imperfect institution, like all institutions are, but if the world had not had this body over the last almost 60 years, I don’t think we would have seen the kind of 

progress in the world that we’ve seen that’s occurred in a complicated post-World War II community. Much yet to be accomplished, and you’ve noted some of those challenges in your statement. But the entire purpose, the focus on the United Nations, as 

you have also alluded to, was to bring the world community together in common purpose to deal with common challenges in a 

common-interest way. It hasn’t always worked. There have been 

difficulties. Obviously, reform is a dimension of institutions, every 

institution, that is always in play. 

And I want to start with the reform part of this and then work 

our way down into a couple of the specific questions I have for you. 

You noted in your four principles, which I agree with, where you 

would focus your priorities, where America should focus its priorities, working with our allies at the United Nations. And you talk 

about reform. You talk about the Secretary General, who you have 

a relationship with. Give me some sense of the larger context of reforming that institution, without getting into a lot of the specifics, 

because I suspect we will get into those when Senator Coleman’s 

time is here. We will talk about Oil-for-Food and other issues. But 

I’m interested in your philosophy about the future of the United 

Nations. How should it be reformed? Less power? More power? 

More engagement? Less engagement? Give this committee some 

sense of your own feeling about that issue. 

167 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think that there is enormous potential in 

the institution that is often not allowed to be developed, in part because of the attitude of member governments. And this is one of 

the points, I suppose, will come to a little bit later in some statements I’ve made over the years. But I alluded to this in my opening statement. I think it’s important. The United States puts an 

enormous amount of resources at the State Department and its 

missions around the world to working on U.N. matters. And I think 

that it’s because we believe that, as the largest paying member 

government, that we have a big responsibility for what goes on in 

the United Nations. 

I think, though, even within the United States and in a number 

of other countries, there’s sometimes the temptation to say, ‘‘Well, 

if we, sort of, give a problem to the United States—to the United 

Nations, it takes it off our plate, and that people can say, ’Well, the 

United Nations is handling it.’’’ 

Fundamentally, talking about any element of reform is to recognize that the United Nations is made up of member governments, 

and the United Nations does what member governments want it to 

do. And reform in the U.N. means member governments have to 

take their responsibilities seriously. That’s something I think that 

we have historically done here. I think it’s important that all member governments do that. 

I think that in implementing, then, the policies that we’re trying 

to pursue, that you have to take into account what’s possible in the 

real world, and you have to be realistic about what can be done 

through, not just the United Nations, but through any institution, 

any international organization we’ve set up. And I think that the 

sustained attention to these kinds of issues is required. 

This is nothing that can be overcome in a matter of a few 

months, or even a few years; this is something that’s going to take 

a lot of work over a long period of time. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

Let me ask about a specific area of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency. I’d like to hear your thoughts 

about the relevancy, the effectiveness of the IAEA, Director 

Baradei, what you think of him. I think most who are following 

your nomination are aware—certainly, this panel is aware—that as 

we have seen the results of more of our internal intelligence reports, the Senator Intelligence Committee, the recent SilvermanRobb Commission report, the 9/11 Report, what we’ve seen is that 

Hans Blix and the United Nations inspectors had it right in Iraq; 

we had it wrong. I would like you to work your way into that. How 

could they, the United Nations inspectors, be so right and our Intelligence Committee be so wrong? And that cuts to the bigger 

question of the future of the IAEA. Do you support the IAEA? Do 

you support Mr. Baradei’s continuation as director? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, perhaps I could address the IAEA question 

first, and then try to come to your larger question. I have been, 

since the first Bush administration, a supporter of the IAEA. I remember the first President Bush, in the hours before giving one of 

his speeches to the General Assembly, saying how much he wanted 

to strengthen the hand of the IAEA. It’s been a phrase that has 

stayed in my mind ever since then. And I think we’ve seen, just 

in the first four years of this administration, that the level of coVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
168 

operation with the IAEA on the question of North Korea, before 

North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was very 

good. 

I think that we have had a number of transactions with the 

IAEA involving Iran, involving sharing some pretty sensitive information that’s been very helpful. We have maintained our contributions to the IAEA. We are—we’ve had numerous voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s work. 

Our feeling on the Director General is that we support the longstanding policy of two terms for Director Generals. That’s been the 

policy. We’ll—there are no—currently, there are no candidates to 

oppose him, so we’ll have to see how that policy plays out. But 

we’ve said repeatedly that’s not a policy aimed at him or anybody 

else, it’s a policy that we think is good for the U.N. system as a 

whole. 

On your larger question, I don’t think there’s any doubt that 

what we’ve learned about—what we’ve learned post-war in Iraq 

about our intelligence is the kind of lesson that we need to address, 

and in a very serious way, in a very urgent manner. 

I think the Silverman-Robb Commission—and I haven’t—I don’t 

want to say I’ve carefully studied all of it, including the classified 

portions, but I have read large parts of it, and particularly the 

parts on Iraq, and I think that the Silverman-Robb Commission 

really captured quite well many of the failings that, not just our 

intelligence community, but many of us had. 

And I would describe the principal insight that they had that I 

think is just very clarifying of what the problem was, that reasonable hypotheses about what Saddam was up to and what Iraq’s capabilities were became hardened in the minds of the intelligence 

community over the years into assumptions and then presumptions 

that were not subjected to repeated scrutiny and verification by 

hard facts, and that then were not really corroborated in more recent years by hard intel on the ground in Iraq. 

So there are two basic failings, among others. One, the belief, the 

reasonable belief, that Saddam Hussein’s inability, for example, to 

account for large stocks of chemical-weapon agent that he had declared in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, his inability to prove 

he had destroyed those stocks led to the hypothesis that they still 

existed. 

Senator HAGEL. May I interrupt you? And I apologize for this, 

but I have very little time left. 

Let me ask you, in following along with your point here, How 

could the United Nations inspectors be right? And why didn’t we 

listen to them? Which cuts right to the question that you answered 

about the credibility, and are they important, should we continue 

to strengthen them? But following along with your point here, how 

did we miss it, and they told us? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yeah. 

Senator HAGEL. In fact, I was briefed many times by the U.N. 

inspectors. And so, how could we miss it? 

Mr. BOLTON. I would say two things, if I could. And I see your 

time is short here. 

On the chemical-weapons point, Hans Blix, himself, took seriously the absence of records that Saddam had actually destroyed 

the chemical weapons. And he said—it was reported publicly, he 

169 

had said to the Iraqis, ‘‘Look, this stuff isn’t marmalade. You must 

have records that you’ve destroyed it.’’ Now, that—it still hasn’t 

been found. And his conclusion, that the hypothesis that the chemical agents still existed was wrong, was probably right. 

On the IAEA, you know, the IAEA was pretty clear that they did 

not see evidence of a revived uranium enrichment program. And 

contrary to what some press reports have indicated, I think we believe that that was right. It’s very hard to hide an extensive uranium enrichment program. It’s much easier in the case of chemical 

or biological weapons, because of the inherent dual-use nature of 

that sort of thing. But I don’t really think that the IAEA conclusions on the absence of an ongoing Iraqi uranium enrichment program were really disputed by the administration. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. 

Senator Sarbanes? 

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bolton, what’s your position on the Law of the Sea Treaty? 

Mr. BOLTON. The administration has submitted the Law of the 

Sea Treaty as one of its priorities, and I support that. 

Senator SARBANES. That’s simply because it’s an administration 

position, or does that represent your own view of it? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I haven’t personally read the Law of the Sea 

Treaty. I don’t think I’ve ever read it, to be honest with you. The 

issues that—concerning the Law of the Sea Treaty that came within the cognizance of bureaus operating under my supervision this 

time, the—basically, Law of the Sea aspects dealing with military 

use of international waters—the Pentagon approved, and I had no 

reason to dispute them. 

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, in an article in a book entitled 

‘‘Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations,’’ 

published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 

you called the Law of the Sea Treaty not only undesirable as a policy, but also illegitimate methods of forcing fundamental policy 

changes on the United States outside the customary political process. Am I correct about that? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t—I don’t have the article in front of me, Senator. It was—this was a Chatham House publication? 

Senator SARBANES. I assume so, yes. 

Mr. BOLTON. Yeah. The issue that I believe led President Reagan 

to oppose the Law of the Sea Treaty in the first instance was the— 

were the provisions having to do with the undersea mining issue 

that were—and that’s why President Reagan withdrew American 

support for it. Those issues were addressed later during the Clinton 

administration, and reviewed by people, not including myself. During this administration, a decision on—the decision was that the 

provisions had been adequately fixed. I—— 

Senator SARBANES. But you wrote this article in 2000. 

Mr. BOLTON. Right. 

Senator SARBANES. That’s after these problems had been addressed, by your own statement, just now. 

Mr. BOLTON. Right. I have not—— 

Senator SARBANES. Well, if the problems had been addressed, 

which you just suggested made the treaty acceptable, how could 

you, at that point, be writing that it was a—not only undesirable 

170 

as a policy, but also illegitimate methods of forcing fundamental 

policy changes on the United States outside the customary political 

process? 

Mr. BOLTON. That was my opinion at the time, based on what 

I knew at the time. 

Senator SARBANES. But you just told me that you were —that 

you thought the problems that President Reagan found had been 

addressed by that point, correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. The analysis—— 

Senator SARBANES. You were still holding to a position regarding 

this as illegitimate and undesirable. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think what I said, Senator—I hope that I said 

this—if I didn’t, if I was unclear, I apologize—I think what I said 

was, those who had—those in the Bush administration who reviewed these particular provisions of the charter—and that did not 

include me, because they were not part of my responsibility—concluded that the issues had been successfully addressed, and that, 

therefore, they were to recommend to the President that he support 

the treaty. 

I’ve not independently gone back into that, because I’ve been 

busy with other things, frankly. But if it’s the opinion of my colleagues in the administration who are expert in these matters that 

it’s satisfactory, I accept that. 

Senator SARBANES. What’s your view of the NGOs and their involvement in the U.N. system? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think that, in terms of delivery of humanitarian services, and in disaster situations, in work in international 

development, my own experience, in two and a half years of the 

U.S. Agency for International Development has given me a view 

that they can be—they can be very effective. 

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, in an article you wrote for the Oxford Companion, ‘‘The Politics of the World,’’ in 2001, you stated, 

and I quote, ‘‘The penetration into the U.N. system by NGOs has 

had profoundly undemocratic consequences by giving some, but not 

all, interest groups a second bite at international decision-making.’’ 

How do you square that with the—what you just said about—— 

Mr. BOLTON. I think—— 

Senator SARBANES. —the role of the NGOs? 

Mr. BOLTON. It’s two separate issues, Senator. The question of 

the role of the NGOs goes to—and there’s a huge literature on this, 

both in the academic world and in the policy world—that goes to 

how decision-making in an organization composed of member governments should be made, that the—in my judgement, member 

governments should make the decisions, member governments 

should set the policy. NGOs, in democratic societies, have every 

right, and should be encouraged, to make their voices known within their democratic societies. And through elections, and through 

all of the political processes that we’re familiar with, governments 

come up with policies. Those policies are then negotiated out by the 

governments that are members of the international organization. 

The second-bite-at-the-apple concept comes when some NGOs 

that are perhaps disappointed in their ability to influence policy 

within their own—within their own government, try and come back 

at it again. They are not accountable to anybody. Nobody elected 

them. That’s what the basic problem of democratic theory is there. 

171 

Senator SARBANES. Well, then how would they—I thought, at the 

outset, you wanted to encourage the NGOs’ involvement in the 

U.N. process. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think, as I said—I hope I was clear; let me try 

it again—the NGOs, as deliverers of services providing humanitarian assistance, for example, in the case of the recent tsunami 

and other natural disasters, in civil conflicts, their contribution in 

the longer-term effort of international development, as recipients of 

grants or contracts by USAID, The World Bank, or the U.N. Development Program—I think these are all very desirable, and should 

be encouraged. The issue is not their participation in the economic 

and social and humanitarian operational side of things. It’s the 

democratic theory question about whether they should have influence outside of, and above, member governments. 

Senator SARBANES. In other words, their influence has to go 

through the member governments? Is that the way you see it? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think, as a matter of democratic theory, 

within the United States we have interest groups that cover the 

entire spectrum, and they can, and should, under our system of liberty, make their influence felt any way they choose, that they can 

participate in elections, they sponsor seminars, they engage in public education. And out of this process that we’re all familiar with 

comes a United States Government position. 

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, it’s not just the U.S. Government. 

You took the further—you made the statement to the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade and Small Arms and Light Weapons, 

in 2001, ‘‘We do not support the promotion of international advocacy activity by international or nongovernmental organizations.’’ 

Is that your position? 

Mr. BOLTON. That was a statement that was cleared within the 

United States Government and reflected our view of what the 

U.N.’s role in the small arms and light weapons arena should be. 

That is a reflection of—— 

Senator SARBANES. Let me broaden it beyond that issue. Is that 

your position with respect to advocacy activity by international or 

nongovernmental organizations? 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, that was in the context of a larger statement, which, again, I don’t have in front of me, but which explained the circumstances that we faced at that conference, in 

2001. 

Senator SARBANES. Well, I’m trying to get you to go outside of 

that particular issue. You’re not prepared to do that, I take it? 

Mr. BOLTON. Not without the document in front of me, Senator. 

You know, that—— 

Senator SARBANES. What’s your general position on the 

NGOs—— 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think people——- 

Senator SARBANES. —and advocacy? 

Mr. BOLTON. I mean, I think anybody is free to advocate anytime 

they want. 

Senator SARBANES. But you don’t think they—you think it 

counters democratic theory if they do that, not working through the 

country, is that correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think—well, I think this is an important question 

of democratic theory. 

172 

Senator SARBANES. All right, now, who speaks for people in undemocratic countries? 

Mr. BOLTON. The issue—— 

Senator SARBANES. If the NGOs can’t present an advocacy position because they have to work through their government, who 

speaks for the people in undemocratic countries? 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, the context—well, I think it’s permissible 

for them to speak for people in nondemocratic countries. The precise context I was speaking of was in democratic countries, where 

NGOs participate in the broad political process. I’m not confining 

it to the electoral process. They participate in the broad political 

process. The result is a policy that the government, of which they 

are citizens, espouses. And then the question is whether, having 

participated in that democratic process, they get a second bite of 

the apple. 

Senator SARBANES. Well, now, in the past, the U.S. has been at 

the forefront of encouraging the United Nations and other multilateral institutions actually to invite and welcome the participation of 

civil-society groups, albeit outside the formal decision-making process. I take it, from what you’re telling me today, you have difficulty 

with that encouragement. 

Mr. BOLTON. I have difficulty when international organizations 

try to influence opinion within democratic societies. And I think 

some of the groups, not all of them, have that in mind. That’s been 

very evident in some of their public statements. And I do think this 

is a—this is an important question of democratic theory. Responsible government, representative government, rests on constitutional structures that define who participates, and how. And, for 

us, as Americans, those structures are the foundation of legitimacy 

in government. And I think if those structures are disregarded, we 

have a potential problem. 

Senator SARBANES. So would you welcome—I’ll close with this 

question, Mr. Chairman; I see the red light is on—would you welcome the participation of an NGO in the U.N. process if the NGO 

was speaking on behalf of peoples in an undemocratic country? 

Mr. BOLTON. I would not object to that. 

Senator SARBANES. You wouldn’t. 

Mr. BOLTON. I would not. 

Senator SARBANES. Uh-huh. What is it you would object to? 

Mr. BOLTON. The second bite at the apple. In other words, the— 

as I said before—I guess that’s about as clear as I can be on it. 

Senator SARBANES. Would you welcome an NGO from a democratic country speaking on behalf of the peoples of an undemocratic 

country? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t have any trouble with that. 

Senator SARBANES. Even if it runs counter to the policy of the 

democratic country? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think—I think that’s a different circumstance. 

What I’m talking about is the challenge to legitimacy—— 

Senator SARBANES. All right—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —of representative—— 

Senator SARBANES. —thank you. 

Senator SARBANES. —government. 

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes. 

173 

Senator Chafee? 

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Welcome, Mr. Bolton. You said all the right things in your opening statement. And one of them, you said that Kofi Annan—Secretary General Kofi Annan had called. I’m curious, did he endorse 

your candidacy? [Laughter.] 

Mr. BOLTON. He said—well, I probably shouldn’t get into it, but 

he said, ‘‘Get yourself confirmed quickly.’’ 

Senator CHAFEE. Well, I think that’s important. 

My question is having to do with your confirmation hearing in 

2001, and you said that you felt that the admission of Taiwan to 

the United Nations would be consistent with this administration’s 

‘‘one-China policy.’’ You explained how Taiwan meets the requirements of statehood, and, therefore, entrance to the U.N. And you 

went on to compare our government’s position on Taiwan to our 

prior positions on Germany and the two Koreas. 

The one-China policy has been successful due to consistent and 

partly ambiguous statements by government officials. A careful balance of words has to be struck in order to help preserve the relationships we have with both countries, and their confidence that 

current actions on our part are intended to help strike a balance 

across the Straits. 

I would like to know how you would balance these competing interests of wishing to support our democratic ally, Taiwan, and trying to gain various concessions from the People’s Republic of China. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, Senator, perhaps I could answer your question by falling back a little bit on the subject of the comments I had 

made on Taiwan during my time as a private citizen in think-tanks 

and so on, where I was expressing my opinions as a private citizens 

on—and without the responsibility of being a government official. 

And I think I was—in the 2001 hearing, I still had the luxury of 

being a private citizen, and I was discussing it at that point. I 

think I can say that this is a good example of something where I’ve 

had an opinion, and I’ve expressed it. I don’t back away from the 

opinion. But time and tide have moved on. President Bush has expressed his view on the relationship between Taiwan and China. 

He’s made it clear the administration has supported Taiwan as observer in the World Health Organization, but that he doesn’t go beyond that. And I accept that. 

I think when a person comes into the government, either fresh 

or when you go into a new position, just because you’ve had an 

opinion ten years before doesn’t give you the chance to say, ‘‘Okay, 

let’s start over at square one and talk about my opinions.’’ I’m not 

a golfer, but I think the metaphor is, you have to play it as it lays. 

And I know what the President’s policy is, and I’m prepared to follow it. 

Senator CHAFEE. Well, thank you very much. 

As the Six-Party talks commenced with North Korea, you gave 

a speech that some would say undermined the stated policy of the 

State Department at the time. And there was a bit of a dispute 

with Mr. Pritchard and him saying, ‘‘Those are your own personal 

views.’’ Ultimately, he resigned. Can you tell us what happened 

there? Especially in view of saying that you like to play it as it lies, 

using the golf metaphor. 

174 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, on that speech, I can assure you that 

speech was fully cleared within the appropriate bureaucracy and 

was given in Seoul. People knew it was coming for weeks, and the 

timing of it. And I can tell you what our Ambassador to South 

Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after the speech. He said, ‘‘Thanks a lot 

for that speech, John. It’ll help us a lot out here.’’ 

Senator CHAFEE. Why would Mr. Pritchard take exception to 

that? 

Mr. BOLTON. Probably his—— 

Senator CHAFEE. His position at the time was Special Envoy for 

Negotiations with North Korea. He’s the point man. 

Mr. BOLTON. Probably for the same reason he resigned from the 

administration. I don’t think he agreed with the President’s policy. 

I respect Mr. Pritchard, but I don’t think he agreed with the President’s policy. 

Senator CHAFEE. Was the State Department policy at odds with 

the President’s policy? 

Mr. BOLTON. Not at that point, no. I think—and, as I say, the 

speech was cleared within the State Department and throughout 

the interagency. 

Senator CHAFEE. Well, the ramifications from that dispute were 

that, at the time, some of the top diplomats in China were saying 

that United States does not have a negotiating strategy, and they 

considered the United States their main obstacle—these are their 

quotes, back at the time—to progress on these Six-Party talks. And 

one of their diplomats, Chinese—People’s Republic of China diplomats said, ‘‘How the U.S. is threatening the DPRK, this needs to 

be further discussed in the next round of talks.’’ He says, ‘‘Washington’s negative policy towards North Korea is an impediment.’’ So 

the ramifications of this dispute seem to be impeding our progress 

as we try and work with North Korea. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think that North Korea has taken exception 

to a number of things that we’ve said. They took exception to the 

President putting them in the ‘‘axis of evil.’’ Most recently, they 

took exception to Secretary Rice calling them an ‘‘outpost of tyranny.’’ I think that the fact is, though, that, as I say, the speech 

was in preparation for quite some time. It was known within the 

Department of State. Everybody who should have had a chop on it, 

did have a chop on it. And it was given with the full knowledge 

and understanding of the Department, as a whole. 

I think—I don’t mean to underestimate, at all, the difficulty of 

working these Six-Party talks. It’s something that the President is 

very committed to. We’ve worked hard on it. We’ve worked particularly hard with China, which has been the host of three rounds of 

the Six-Party talks. Secretary Rice, as you know, was recently 

there, and worked hard with China to try and get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table. It’s now been ten months since 

the last round of Six-Party talks, and we’ve been prepared, for 

quite some time, to sit down and resume those talks. 

Senator CHAFEE. Well, very good. On the positive side, certainly 

one of the initiatives you had at the State Department, which you 

were rightfully praised for, is the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

And the PSI is a global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction, the delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI uses existing authorities, national and 

175 

international, to defeat proliferation. And you worked in a multilateral fashion on this proposal. Ten other countries—Australia, 

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 

Spain, United Kingdom—all agreed initially to PSI, and 60 more 

have signed on since. 

But you have said that you are loathe to call it an organization. 

You call it an activity. And you said, in Tokyo, ‘‘Our goal with the 

PSI is based on an equally simple tenet, that the impact of states 

working together in a deliberatively cooperative manner would be 

greater than the states alone in an ad-hoc fashion.’’ And this statement would seem to point to your support of the kind of cooperation a body like the U.N. can foster. 

Can you outline your feelings on the best way to set up multilateral agreements? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think PSI is an example of a flexible approach to a very serious problem. And, as you indicated, there’s no 

doubt in our minds that international trafficking in weapons and 

materials of mass destruction can only be addressed in a multilateral fashion. The United States acting alone simply is unable to 

stop that international trafficking. That’s why we began with our 

original 11-country core group to put together the statement of 

interdiction principles and then to try and persuade others to accept the PSI. 

I think that—and we’ve had some notable successes, not least of 

which was the interception of the ship, the BBC China, which I 

think played a material role in Libya’s strategic decision to give up 

the pursuit of nuclear weapons. And I think the lesson that I derived from PSI and from the G8 Global Partnership is that you can 

conduct multilateral activity effectively without large bureaucracies. That’s not to say that, in some cases, you don’t need bureaucracies. The IAEA that Senator Hagel asked me about a 

minute ago is an example. You need experts in an organization like 

that to build up their knowledge and conduct operations over a 

long period of time. But surely you can do this without large bureaucracies that don’t deliver effectively. 

And so, I think there’s always room for improvement in bureaucracy, and the lesson I draw from PSI is, the leaner you make the 

operation, the more successful you’re likely to be. 

Senator CHAFEE. And can you make some relationship to how 

you’ll work now with the United Nations, which is a gigantic bureaucracy? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yeah, well, I hope—I hope the lesson of PSI is that 

you can take what many people thought at the time was a pretty 

controversial idea, the physical interdiction of weapons or materials 

of mass destruction in international commerce, explain that we 

were prepared to do it entirely consistently with existing international and national authorities, and rally support for it. I think 

that’s the kind of thing that I had a small hand—I was a junior 

official at the time in first President Bush’s administration, when 

he and Secretary Baker rallied the Security Council and the international community to the series of resolutions that led to the ouster of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. But I think that is possible. 

I think that’s what our objective should be. 

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee. 

176 

Senator Dodd? 

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair calls for order. The hearing is adjourned until order is restored. [Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the 

hearing was adjourned.] [Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the hearing 

was resumed.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will recommence. 

I now call upon the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, Senator Dodd. 

Senator DODD. Does that come out of my time, by the way? 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The full ten minutes are restored. 

Senator DODD. Timing’s everything. 

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have some opening comments, but I’d like to ask unanimous consent they be included in 

the record, if I may—— 

The CHAIRMAN. They will be included in the record in full. 

Senator DODD. —and lay out some thoughts on this, on the nomination, generally, if we could. 

Secondly, let me just say, I think most of my colleagues—I’ve 

been on this committee for 24 years. I’ve enjoyed working with several Members here during that entire period of time. I was trying 

to recall other occasions in this committee when I’ve opposed a 

nominee, and I can’t recall one. There have only been a handful. 

In fact, many of my colleagues on this side, I know, are disappointed from time to time when I’ve supported nominees of the 

administration, not because I agreed with their views, but because 

I’ve generally embraced the view that Presidents, once elected, 

have a right to put together their official families, people who share 

their views. So I—others have a different criteria, but that’s generally been my point of view. 

So I begin, Mr. Chairman, as I think you do, and others have 

over the years, with the assumption that if a President sends up 

a nominee here, that the Presidents begin, with my view, anyway, 

to be able to have that team, unless there are reasons which would 

disqualify an individual under any set of circumstances, not just 

their views with particular matter of policy; in this case, foreign 

policy. 

I’d ask, as well, Mr. Chairman—Mr. Bolton has made the request, and I don’t think it’s an unfair one at all—you may want to 

evaluate how to do this—but I think all of these interviews and emails and so forth ought to be made a part of the public record. 

And I’ll make the request. If you want to think about that, Mr. 

Chairman, I’ll—before you want to respond to it, but I’d make the 

request, because I think it deserves to be out there in the public 

domain so that people can have a full opportunity to review what’s 

been said, what are in e-mails, what other witnesses—we’ve interviewed some; I think the staff have jointly—some six different people, who bring a particular set of facts regarding what I think are 

the most serious allegations about your nomination, and that is the 

allegation that you tried to have two analysts removed from their 

jobs because you disagreed with their intelligence conclusions. 

That, to me, is, in this environment we’re in today, Mr. Bolton, I 

would say, putting aside your views about the United Nations and 

other things—if that is true, then I don’t think you have a right 

to serve in a high post. I think it would be unfortunate to set the 

177 

example, in this day and age, when we’re trying to get the best intelligence we can, if you tried to remove someone. Whether or not 

you were successful or not is not the issue. Trying to rob a bank 

and failing to do so is not—is a crime, in my view. Trying to remove someone, as an analyst, from their job, because you disagree 

with what they’re saying, I think, is dreadfully wrong. And you’ve 

got an opportunity to defend yourself here, and I want to get to the 

bottom of it if we can. 

Now, you’ve made the statement, in response to Senator Biden, 

that you did not try to—or you did try to remove —or at least you 

recommended that these two individuals—one we’ve talked about, 

Mr. Westermann; the other we’ll just call an intelligence officer, because his name should be kept private. Is that—did I hear you correctly when you responded to Senator Biden? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t think so, Senator, respectfully. The way you 

put it, at the beginning, was that I tried to have people removed 

because of their—because I disagreed with their intelligence conclusions, and that’s not true. 

Senator DODD. You thought because they went behind your 

back—— 

Mr. BOLTON. I thought in—I thought, in both cases, if I may say 

so, their conduct was unprofessional and broke my confidence and 

trust, which I think—I think is important in all professional relationships, especially in ones involving intelligence. 

Senator DODD. Let me address that particular point. Now, as I 

understand it, Mr. Westermann, who, by the way, has a distinguished background, is highly regarded by his peers—and I’ll lay 

that out for the record hearing here, going back and interviewing 

his superiors and others over the years. As I understand it—and 

you correct me if I’m wrong, now—that this going behind your 

back—Mr. Westermann sent an e-mail to your Chief of Staff, as I 

understand it now, Frederick Fleitz—is that how you pronounce his 

name? 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s correct. 

Senator DODD. He sent an e-mail in February to your Chief of 

Staff that tried to alert your assistant that you were probably going 

to have trouble getting the language cleared that you wanted to include, and suggested alternative language, at that time, to him. 

Your assistant, Mr. Fleitz, pressed to have the language sent out 

for clearance. So Mr. Westermann did so, at the suggestion of your 

Chief of Staff. The submission to the Intelligence Committee made 

clear the language that you wanted cleared. It was also—contained 

Mr. Westermann’s suggested alternative language. Now, all due respect, how is that going behind your back? 

Mr. BOLTON. You know, Senator, a lot of the material that’s in 

the—— 

Senator DODD. Well, am I correct in my assessment of what occurred, that he did send an e-mail? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t—I don’t know what the circumstances were. 

I’ve seen a lot of it, after the time. What I did was talk to Mr. 

Westermann’s supervisor. I first called Mr. Ford. He was not in the 

office that day. I forget the reason why. Carl Ford, the Assistant 

Secretary, the head of the Bureau. I then asked to speak to Tom 

Fingar, who was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

178 

Bureau, the senior career official. And I said, basically—I said, basically, ‘‘What’s going on here?’’ And—— 

Senator DODD. Did you call Mr. Westermann? 

Mr. BOLTON. I called—I called him to find—and he—and he basically said he had—he had sent something out into the clearance 

process without notifying us. So I put this to Mr. Fingar—— 

Senator DODD. Well, you’ve made a statement he went behind 

your back. 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes, and—— 

Senator DODD. Have you checked? 

Mr. BOLTON. I did. That’s why I asked Mr. Fingar. I didn’t know 

what the facts were. I asked Mr. Fingar, the senior career officer 

in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and he came back a 

couple of hours later with—he didn’t know what the circumstances 

were, which is understandable, I think—but he came back to me 

a couple of hours later with an e-mail that said that Mr. 

Westermann’s behavior was, quote, ‘‘entirely inappropriate,’’ close 

quote. He said—meaning—referring to INR—he said, quote, ‘‘We 

screwed up,’’ close quote. And he said, twice, ‘‘It won’t happen 

again.’’ 

Senator DODD. Let me—let me just—because I think that’s important. You said that earlier. Mr. Brannigan, who is a staff member of the Chairman of this committee, had an interview with Mr. 

Fingar over the last several days, and let me quote Mr. 

Brannigan’s question to Mr. Fingar regarding this very point. 

Mr. Brannigan, speaking now to Mr. Fingar, ‘‘You said that what 

Mr. Westermann did was entirely within the procedure. He was 

never disciplined. It was perfectly normal. That the only failure of 

his was lack of prudence. And then there is the e-mail to Mr. 

Bolton. You say it’s entirely inappropriate, and we screwed up, and 

it won’t happen again. That seems like a rather different assessment.’’ 

Mr. Fingar, responding to this question, in the last 72 hours or 

so, ‘‘Well, I knew I was dealing with somebody who was very 

upset,’’ speaking about you, sir. ‘‘I was trying to get the incident 

closed, which I didn’t regard as a big deal. I knew John Bolton was 

mad. I assume when people are mad, they get over it, so I did lean 

over in the direction of, ’Sure, we’ll take responsibility.’ He thanked 

me for it. At least as far as I’m concerned in my dealings with Mr. 

Bolton, that closed it.’’ 

That’s a different assessment. In fact, what Mr. Fingar is saying 

is that the reason he said what he did was because you were furious. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think the—I mean, I basically thought the 

matter was closed when I got Mr. Fingar’s e-mail saying, ‘‘It won’t 

happen again.’’ And I—— 

Senator DODD. Well, then—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —take his—— 

Senator DODD. Let me move you forward. 

Mr. BOLTON. May I just add one point? 

Senator DODD. Yeah, go ahead. 

Mr. BOLTON. The comments Mr. Fingar made the day of the incident, I took to be his opinion at the time. And I think that’s the 

relevant point in time to look at. But I —— 

Senator DODD. Yeah, well—— 

179 

Mr. BOLTON. —but I agree with his point—I agree with his concluding point. 

Senator DODD. Well, then Mr. Brannigan asked him again, 

‘‘Were there any policies or procedures changed as a result of this 

incident?’’ Answer: ‘‘No.’’ 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, I have no idea what INR’s policies are. 

That’s why we gave it to INR, and that’s why I asked Mr. Fingar 

to look into it. And his response back to me was, what happened 

was entirely inappropriate—— 

Senator DODD. Well, let me take—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —and that they—— 

Senator DODD. —you seven months forward. 

Mr. BOLTON. —screwed up. 

Senator DODD. Let me take you to September 2000. That’s February. So the matter’s over with in February, in your mind. And 

yet in September of 2000, in a conversation that you had with— 

let me get the quote here if I can—here it is now, in September, 

with Mr. Neil Silver. Do you know who Mr. Neil Silver is? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes, I do. 

Senator DODD. Right. He was the direct supervisor for Mr. 

Westermann. 

Mr. BOLTON. One level up, right? 

Senator DODD. Right. Okay? So, in September, seven months 

later, now, all right? Mr. Silver is in your office. All right? And, 

again, here—now, this is an interview done in the last few days 

here by the joint staff of this committee. September 2002, I think. 

‘‘Neil told me that, at the end of the meeting that he had with Mr. 

Bolton, Mr. Bolton took him aside and, out of the blue, said, ’And 

that Westermann fellow, we really would like him removed from 

his portfolio, and transferred.’’’ 

Mr. BOLTON. This is Mr. Silver testifying? 

Senator DODD. Well, this is Mr. Westermann talking about his 

interview with Mr. Silver. By the way, that is also corroborated in 

other documents we have here, from this, right here. This is also 

included, if you will, in the Report on U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessment on Iraq, page 278, paragraph 

(u), the third paragraph on that page. The analyst said, ‘‘Six 

months later, after the incident, with his new office director, met 

with the Under Secretary,’’ speaking about yourself, ‘‘the Under 

Secretary asked to have the analyst removed from his current 

worldwide chemical and biological weapons portfolio. The analyst 

said he was not removed from his portfolio and did not suffer any 

negative effects professionally.’’ That’s seven months later, Mr. 

Bolton. 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes. And have you interviewed Mr. Silver? 

Senator DODD. Not yet. We’ve tried to. We’re going to try interview—— 

Mr. BOLTON. My recollection is that, for some period of time—— 

Senator SARBANES. You do think he should be interviewed, right? 

Mr. BOLTON. I have—absolutely. 

Senator DODD. Yeah. 

Senator SARBANES. Uh-huh. 

Mr. BOLTON. The—for some period of time, there had been a vacancy. Mr. Silver came in to be the office director, and he asked 

to come up to pay a courtesy call on me. I didn’t ask for the meetVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00179 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
180 

ing. And he wanted to come up and introduce himself. And I think 

my schedule was such that several months went by. But he came 

in September, and my recollection is that he said, you know, he 

hoped his office would work with the bureaus that reported to me, 

and asked if there had ever been any problems. And I thought, he 

had asked an honest question, I ought to give him an honest answer, which I did, and that—— 

Senator DODD. So in September, it still bothered you. 

Mr. BOLTON. It was a—it was a one-on-one meeting. It was a 

courtesy call. He said, ‘‘Have you ever had problems?’’ And I said, 

‘‘Yes.’’ 

Senator DODD. Yeah. 

Senator SARBANES. And did you say—— 

Mr. BOLTON. But I had done nothing—— 

Senator SARBANES. —did you say to him you thought 

Westermann should be removed? 

Mr. BOLTON. I thought he should be given other responsibilities. 

I do recall, very specifically, with Mr. Silver, since he had obviously 

had no contact with this episode before. I said, ‘‘I wish Westermann 

no ill will. I’m not trying to affect him. I just have lost trust in 

him.’’ 

Senator DODD. Well, let me tell you we’ve talked in the last few 

days. Now, you’ve made the statement—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just ask—— 

Senator DODD. Let me just finish on this, if I can, Mr. Chairman. 

We’ve talked to Thomas Fingar, who is presently the Assistant 

Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. We’ve talked to 

your Acting Chief of Staff, Mr. Fleitz. We have reports, at least, 

about the Neil Silver conversation. We’ve also spoken with Carl 

Ford. We’ve talked with Stuart Cohen, former Chair of the International Intelligence Council and the former boss of the nameless 

NIO. In every one of those instances, they claim, independently, 

that you asked for this man, Mr. Westermann, or this NIO, to be 

removed from their job. Every one of them have said this. These 

are your people, in some cases, who have said it. I’ll quote ’em for 

you here. 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, and that’s one reason why I’d like all these 

transcripts to be released. 

Senator DODD. Well, I’ve asked unanimous consent they all be 

laid out there. 

Mr. BOLTON. So that the—— 

Senator DODD. So I’m going to ask you once again, Did you ask 

for these two people to be removed from their jobs? 

Mr. BOLTON. No. I said that I wanted the—in the case of Mr. 

Westermann, that I had lost trust in him, and thought he should 

work on other accounts. 

Senator DODD. What other portfolio did he have? 

Mr. BOLTON. In the case within INR, I think they’re—— 

Senator DODD. What’s his portfolio? 

Mr. BOLTON. A lot of—— 

Senator DODD. What’s his—— 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t know what his portfolio was. 

Senator DODD. He has one portfolio, biological weapons and 

chemical weapons. 

181 

Mr. BOLTON. If you say so, Senator. I don’t—I don’t know what 

his portfolio is. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. And the—— 

Senator DODD. In the case—— 

The CHAIRMAN. —Chair would like to ask that we continue this, 

maybe, in the next round. 

And I’d like to recognize, now, Senator Allen. 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Bolton, for being here. And I look forward 

to all the questions, back and forth. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I’d like to be made part of the 

record. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made in part—made in the record in 

full. 

Senator ALLEN. For those who are watching this hearing, you 

can cross-examine people in such a way that it makes it act as if 

it’s something more than it is. The—I don’t think all of this questions on these individuals, and e-mails, would matter if Members 

didn’t have, really, a disagreement with you, let’s say, on what 

really matters. You are—you have been appointed, or nominated, 

by the President to be our representative, the United States Representative to the United Nations. And I think we ought to focus 

on the big picture, and your record of performance on the big picture. 

Senator Chafee brought up the admirable leadership you provided in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which garnered 60 nations in this effort. And that is something that showed initiative on 

your part, obviously essential to get other countries involved in it, 

and I think that’s part of your record of performance, which I find 

very salutary, that, as you talked in your opening statement about 

supporting freedom and democracy, we want to, in my view, advance freedom and justice and, obviously, our security, and when 

the United Nations can be helpful, they can be; if not, find a method—a way of doing it. And you have done that. As well as the G8 

Summit, where you got other countries to match the United States’ 

$1 billion in the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar Program. 

You also played a central role in negotiating the Treaty of Moscow, which will reduce operationally-deployed nuclear weapons by 

two thirds. You also, in previous years, served in a variety of 

fronts, but one of the best things you did was—is get the United 

Nations to repeal that odious U.N. resolution that likened Zionism 

to racism. And that’s why I think groups like B’nai Brith and others are supporting you, as well. 

You, I think, have the experience, you have the knowledge, you 

have the background and the right principles to come into the 

United Nations at this time. There’s scandals right now. The Oilfor-Food scandal that I know Senator Coleman has just been a lead 

in the Senate in addressing. It is important that we have, for the 

United States, someone who will be advocating, forthrightly and 

honestly, the views of the American people. I guarantee you, the 

taxpayers out in the real world aren’t so concerned about e-mails 

back and forth, and personnel disagreements, here, there, and the 

other; they care about what’s going on with the money we’re putting in the United Nations. Is the United Nations helpful for the 

182 

advancement of freedom and justice? Can it be made into an organization more relevant to real people in the real world? 

And I think the President, in selecting you, Mr. Bolton, has selected the absolute perfect person. The fact that there has been 

controversy, the American people, they think that’s probably good, 

because you’ll bring a credibility to the United Nations that they 

sorely need. And I like the fact that you’ll advocate our principles, 

you’re not going to be seduced by empty, meaningless, courteous 

pontifications by international bureaucracies. And I like that. And 

that’s important for the advancement of our ideals, and it—as well 

as for others in the world. 

Now, as has been discussed in a variety of ways, the United Nations—even Kofi Annan has put forward some recommendations to 

reform and bring greater efficiency to the United Nations. Let me 

ask you how you would prioritize many of these needed changes at 

the United Nations, and how do those relate to the interests of the 

United States? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, many of the governance changes discussed 

previously—the Security Council, the reform of the Human Rights 

Commission—these are all things that need attention. But I think, 

in terms of the management side of reform, one of the aspects that 

we tried to emphasize in the first Bush administration, Bush 41, 

under the concept of ‘‘unitary U.N.,’’ was to avoid the duplication 

and overlap and waste of resources that existed in many of the 

U.N. specialized agencies, funds, and programs, where many different agencies are doing the same thing, and, in effect, duplicating 

work, and in a very inefficient way. And I think—and I don’t want 

to anticipate questions that may come later, but the Oil-for-Food 

Program, as it has evolved, has taught us a lot, I think, about the 

culture of the bureaucracy at the U.N. And just as we’ve learned 

through the Silverman-Robb report, and others, about the culture 

of some of our practices on the intelligence side, I think Oil-forFood has told us a lot about the culture of the bureaucracy at the 

U.N., and emphasized why management reform is needed there. 

And I think working with the other principal contributors in the 

Geneva group—this is the group of countries that supply, typically, 

more than one—each of them supplies, in the assessed budget, 

more than 1 percent of that budget—and working with other concerned countries, that this is a real moment of opportunity to eliminate waste and duplication and overlap in the U.N. system, and to 

concentrate on performance-based evaluation for the services and 

the activities that the various U.N. agencies are involved in. 

Senator ALLEN. Well, thank you. I’d—the American people would 

never tolerate that sort of fraud and abuse that was in the Oil-forFood Program in our own government, nor should we tolerate it in 

any organization that we fund with the taxpayers’ money. And I 

think the concept of accountability and measurement—or, you call 

it ‘‘performance-based’’—is very important. I think it—what gets 

measured, gets better. And to the extent that that can be done with 

the United Nations, that’s helpful. 

Let me ask you this, since you worked on some of the proliferation issues. How do you envision the United States working with 

the United Nations, if possible, to realize a solution to the nuclear 

concerns that we have with North Korea, as well as with Iran? 

183 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, on those two, specifically, when North Korea 

withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we worked in the 

IAEA Board of Governors and got a unanimous agreement that the 

question of North Korea should be referred to the Security Council, 

as the IAEA statute provides. Now, the Council has not taken action on North Korea, because of the pendency of the Six-Party 

talks. But I think the fact that the Security Council is there as a 

possibility is an important point to make, not just to North Korea, 

but to other countries that would attempt to achieve weapons of 

mass destruction. 

In the case of Iran, we have worked hard, at the IAEA, to have 

the matter of Iran referred to the Security Council, because its pursuit of nuclear weapons, as North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, amounts to a clear threat to international peace and security. 

And I think one of the important steps that Secretary Rice was 

able to make, in just her first couple of weeks on the job in providing certain commitments we made to the Europeans, was to receive, from the EU-3 in return, their very clear public statement 

in a report to their EU colleagues that they, too, would support a 

referral to the Security Council at an appropriate time if Iran did 

not make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons. 

I think that weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and the 

confluence of those two things, are the biggest threat to international peace and security that the civilized community faces. And 

the Security Council should play a role in that. That’s the position 

I’ve taken within the administration, within this—within this administration from the get-go. 

Senator ALLEN. Well, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate those remarks, because I think that 

these are the issues that matter most with the United Nations and 

for our own security. It will be proliferation of arms, weapons of 

mass destruction, as well as nuclear proliferation. 

Your record is one that is exemplary in that area. Also, that of 

advocating freedom for all people, regardless of their background 

and culture, throughout the world, which I think can be very— 

where the United Nations could be very helpful. If they’re not, then 

we have to find other approaches to doing so. And I think you’ve 

shown that, that capability. 

Finally, just to follow up—I think it was Senator Chafee, or 

maybe it was Senator Sarbanes—insofar as Taiwan joining the 

World Health Organization, you support Taiwan joining the World 

Health Organization? 

Mr. BOLTON. The administration’s position has been to support 

Taiwan becoming an observer in the WHO. 

Senator ALLEN. Right. Good. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SARBANES. Is that your position? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes. I support that position. 

Senator SARBANES. I thought you supported their being a member. 

Mr. BOLTON. When I—as I said before, when I wrote, as a private citizen, during the 1990s, that’s what I said. And when I wrote 

it then, I understood it. The President has made his policy on this 

very clear, and I support his policy. 

184 

Senator ALLEN. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I’d be, personally, happy if they were a member, but if we can have them as 

an observer, they certainly ought to be involved, especially with the 

SARS epidemic. They can be very, very helpful. And the fact that 

China is so paranoid about it should not be of any consequence 

when we’re concerned about world health. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Allen. 

Senator Kerry? 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With all due respect to Senator Allen, I just don’t think that one 

can dismiss, or should dismiss, how one interprets intelligence and 

how one operates within a position of high responsibility as somehow not important to the American people. We’ve just come off the 

most massive intelligence failure in our history, and we recognize 

that there are serious questions still outstanding about the degree 

to which that intelligence was manipulated, or the degree to which 

a predetermined position determined the outcome of that intelligence. And so, it is vital to the security of the American people, 

whether or not Mr. Bolton, in his position, was party to the same 

kind of activities. And that’s the question with respect to Mr. 

Westermann. 

The fact is that on September 18th, in 2004, the Bush administration using stringent standards—and I’m quoting from the New 

York Times—adopted, after the failure to find banned weapons in 

Iraq, conducted a new assessment of Cuba’s biological weapons capacity, and concluded that it is no longer clear that Cuba has an 

active offensive big-weapons program. And so, that directly contradicted the position that Mr. Bolton took. And, in fact, Mr. 

Westermann, was correct. And I think the American people deserve 

to have people, who are correct, not fired, but rewarded. 

So that’s what’s at issue here. And it is in the interest of the 

American people to know that their intelligence is being properly 

sifted and vetted and listened to. 

Now, I don’t think that’s the only reason to have questions and 

doubts about this nomination. I want to make that clear. It’s only 

one of the issues. It’s not the prime issue in my mind. There are 

much more serious and significant issues. 

The ambassadorship to the United Nations is one of the most important, foremost diplomatic positions in the world today. And I 

think that it is critical that we have someone there who comes with 

both the respect for that institution and the reputation for diplomacy that is vital to American interests at this point in time. 

I think we need somebody who believes in the United Nations, 

despite its flaws, and believes in that diplomacy and negotiation, 

and has a track record of effectiveness. And that track record of effectiveness is what we need to measure here today. 

There are questions about Mr. Bolton’s commitment to the 

United Nations, and his effectiveness. I’m not going to go in—I’d 

like to ask unanimous consent that the full text of my opening 

statement be put in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Put in the record in full. 

Senator KERRY. But, you know, we’ve seen, certainly, some instance where, when Mr. Bolton wants to, he’s effective. I think the 

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185 

ical proliferation issues facing us, both North Korea and Iran, Secretary Bolton opposed the idea of direct negotiations with each of 

these countries, even when our allies were asking us to do so. And 

that’s an important part of the diplomatic effort that we’re going 

to have to engage in, going forward. 

At a critical moment with North Korea, in a speech that he gave 

in Seoul, that he attacked Kim Jung-Il, whom we all attacked, we 

all dislike, we all recognize is, you know, someone we’d love to see 

removed or in a different—you know, not leading that country; but, 

on the other hand, at this critical moment, to almost 50 times in 

one speech personally vilify him, was to almost guarantee the outcome of the diplomatic effort that he was engaged in. 

In North Korea, I think Mr. Bolton deserves a lot of the credit 

for the abandonment of the efforts that the Clinton administration 

had made that effectively froze Pyongyang’s plutonium program. 

Now, whatever you want to say about the cheating—and we all understood that that was probably going on, including Bill Perry, who 

was negotiating it at the time—nevertheless, we knew where that 

plutonium was. We had inspectors in the reactor. We had television 

cameras in the reactor. Today, we don’t. 

There’s been a huge increase in the nuclear capacity of North 

Korea, on your watch. And the question, legitimately, ought to be 

asked why you ought to be rewarded to go to an increasingly important position, given that. In fact, Senator Domenici raised those 

questions. Threat reduction programs are spread over the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy. I’m not going to belabor the 

administration’s refusal to heed the advice of the Baker-Cutler 

Commission to increase funding for threat reduction, but when the 

committee met last year to hear from Mr. Bolton about threat reduction, the fact is that there’s been a failure to dispose of nearly 

70 tons of plutonium. That’s enough for thousands of weapons. Our 

colleague, Senator Domenici, said, at that hearing, quote, ‘‘Why a 

program of this much global importance should be blocked by something as basic as liability remains beyond me. I’ve been amazed 

that the leadership of the United States and Russia cannot resolve 

this issue. Failure to resolve this issue is simply not consistent 

with the urgency that the administration has attached to nuclear 

proliferation.’’ 

Senator Domenici took specific issue with Mr. Bolton’s performance. He said, ‘‘I submit that Mr. John Bolton, who has been assigned to negotiate this, has a very heavy responsibility, and I hate 

to say that I’m not sure, to this point, that he’s up to it. If he 

doesn’t think it’s important enough to solve this issue of liability, 

then I submit that you ought to get somebody who can.’’ 

I also believe Mr. Bolton has made a selective reading of recent 

events. For instance, he frequently refers to the Libya model of 

counterproliferation. By his interpretation of events, a proliferating 

country makes a strategic decision on its own just to abandon nuclear weapons. And he suggests that that’s what Iran and North 

Korea ought to do. Well, it would be wonderful if they did. But 

that’s a distortion of the reality of what happened. 

The fact is that the Clinton administration and the British were 

long involved prior to this administration and engaged in a dialogue with Libya. Libya was prepared to move, some time ago. And 

the fact is that the Libyan model represented a willingness of the 

186 

United Kingdom to engage in a patient, frank, and secret dialogue 

that ultimately resulted in their giving it up. And some people 

have suggested publicly that Mr. Bolton engaged in an effort to try 

to scuttle that particular initiative. 

So when you add the totality of statements made and beliefs 

about the United Nations, I think there are serious questions about 

the nomination. 

Mr. Bolton, let me just ask you, Is it fair to say that you really 

don’t respect or believe in the institution of the United Nations? 

Mr. BOLTON. No, I think it’s very inaccurate, and I’ll just give 

you one example to show why it’s not accurate. During the period, 

roughly, 1997 to 2000, I served, without compensation, as an assistant to former Secretary of State Baker, who, at that time, had 

been asked by Secretary General Annan to be his personal envoy 

for the Western Sahara. The U.N. peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara, MINURSO, which is—it’s a Spanish acronym—had 

been created during the first Bush administration, in the late 

spring or early summer of 1991, but had not been successful. And 

Secretary General Annan wanted to take advantage of Secretary 

Baker being out of office to see if he couldn’t help resolve the matter. And Secretary Baker called me—I think it was in January of 

1997—and asked if I would be willing to assist. He said, ‘‘I’m going 

to do this pro bono, so if you want to help, you’re going to have to 

do it pro bono, too.’’ And I said that I would. And Secretary—— 

Senator KERRY. But that’s—sorry, go ahead. 

Mr. BOLTON. Secretary Baker has just recently resigned his position; unfortunately, in my judgement. He devoted an awful lot of 

time to it. 

The reason I worked for him again, for the United Nations, for 

free was not because I ever expected to use it in a confirmation 

hearing, or because I expected anybody to give me a pat on the 

head; I did it because I thought that the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Western Sahara could bring a resolution to the uncertainty of the status of that territory and get those tens of thousands of refugees who have been in the Sahara Desert for decades—— 

Senator KERRY. But my question to you—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —back to their homeland. 

Senator KERRY. —is not—— 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s what I worked for. 

Senator KERRY. My question to you is not whether or not you 

have selectively chosen, here and there. As I said a moment ago, 

there’s a selectively to your approach, as there was, evidently, in 

your belief about the intelligence with respect to Cuba. When it 

serves a particular purpose, you adopt it; but, generically, over the 

long history, your writings, your comments, your public statements, 

your speeches, your interviews about the United Nations have been 

disdainful of it. 

I mean, you have said, ‘‘There’s no such thing as the United Nations.’’ 

You’ve said, ‘‘There’s an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power in the world,’’ and you point 

to the United States as essentially being the United Nations. 

You’ve said, ‘‘If the U.N. Secretary building in New York lost ten 

stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference.’’ 

187 

You’ve said that you would have one permanent member of the 

Security Council, because that’s the real reflection of the distribution of power in the world. 

You’ve said that you not only don’t care about losing the General 

Assembly vote, but it actually—you see it as a ‘‘make my day’’ outcome. 

How do these statements reflect a respect for the United Nations 

and empower you to go there and have other people believe you’re 

there to enhance it? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, first, Senator, a lot of those statements are 

not accurate reflections of what I’ve said. Second—— 

Senator KERRY. You said them. Do you deny saying them? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes. I can—I can think of several that are—— 

Senator KERRY. You didn’t say those statements. 

Mr. BOLTON. —quoted out of context, and I’d be happy to address 

them. But my larger point is—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, they’re direct quotes. They’re right off 

tapes. There’s—I mean, how is the context out of context? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, for example, the last—I believe, the last one 

you mentioned had to do with the loss of the U.N. vote, which 

comes from an article that I wrote in the 1990s at a time when, 

under the U.N. financial regulations, U.S.—— 

Senator KERRY. But that’s precisely what you wrote. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, and—— 

Senator KERRY. I can quote the whole article for you. 

Mr. BOLTON. —and—— 

Senator KERRY. —I have it here. 

Mr. BOLTON. I would like to put the whole article in the record, 

because, at the end of the article, what I say is, there is a solution 

to this problem of the U.S. arrearages that can result in the U.S. 

not losing its vote. And the solution, if I may just elaborate on it, 

was to take the very extensive in-kind contributions that the Department of Defense had made to U.N. peacekeeping operations beginning in the early 1990s, but for which we had not charged the 

United Nations, and, in effect, restate the books of the U.N. to reflect that reality. This is analogous to things that were done for 

China, Russia, and France, in circumstances over the years, to 

bring—to eliminate their contested arrearages account. So, in that 

case, I wasn’t say it would ‘‘make my day’’ to lose the vote; I proposed a way to—so as not to lose the U.S. vote. 

Senator KERRY. Well, we need to come back to this. My time is 

up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry. 

Now, the Chair would just like to outline the roadmap until we 

recess. 

Senator SARBANES. Another roadmap? 

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. This is the Bolton-hearing roadmap. 

Senator SARBANES. I’m not sure we can handle the roadmap 

we—— 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Senator SARBANES. —already have. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will hear from Senator Coleman, in order, 

and then each of the four Democratic Senators who are here, because you’ve patiently waited for this period of time. And by 12:30 

188 

or 12:40, we’ll have been three hours in the hearing. Then we will 

commence again this afternoon with another round of ten-minute 

questioning. 

Senator Coleman? 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I really want to talk about U.N. reform. I’d like to get, if I can, 

kind of, the nitty-gritty of—but before I do, I want to just—kind of, 

for the purpose of clarifying the record, I want to go over a couple 

of things, just to make sure that I understand them. 

We’ve had a lot of discussion about Westermann. And, for some, 

the issue is whether you lost confidence in someone, and the ramifications of that. For others, it may be how one interprets intelligence. If I can just walk through it. 

As I understand, 2002, you were going to give a speech on weapons of mass destruction in countries on the terrorist list. 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s correct. 

Senator COLEMAN. And, at that point, was that the process is, if 

you’re going to give a speech, you’ve got to run it through folks to 

make sure that it’s—if there’s classified information on that, that 

that’s not in there; if anything has to be declassified—but you run 

it through a process, and part of that is intelligence services, including those within the State Department, get a chance to review 

that. Is that the way the process works? 

Senator BIDEN. Will the Senator yield on an important point? 

The speech doesn’t have to be reviewed, does it? Only the portions 

of the speech that cite intelligence—— 

Mr. BOLTON. There are two—there are two issues here. The first 

is, in the case—can I say one thing first? This speech was not 

about Cuba. It was about a whole range of countries—Libya, Syria, 

Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The question, in the case of Cuba, 

arose because the U.S. Government had not said anything publicly 

about Cuba’s BW efforts in a number of years. There was classified 

information in various publications of the intelligence agencies that 

discussed that. So to say anything about Cuba, you have to—it was 

necessary to get agreement by the intelligence agencies—— 

Senator BIDEN. Right. 

Mr. BOLTON. —that they would declassify it. And this is—this is, 

I want to say, is an entirely legitimate and important step, because 

the sensitivity of sources and methods that might be involved, particularly at a time, you know, when we just had the arrest and 

then confession of the spy, Ana Balen Montes, a Cuban spy—the 

intelligence agencies were going to be concerned that nobody say 

anything in an unclassified environment that would compromise 

sources and methods. 

And so, the first step, Senator, was, in the case of language about 

the Cuba BW situation, to see if there—frankly, if there was anything that the intelligence agencies would agree upon to say. 

Senator COLEMAN. And your concern with Mr. Westermann was 

that, in his review of it, he offered his own views, he indicated INR 

does not concur, added some alternative language, and you found 

out about that after the fact? 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s correct. That’s what I thought was ‘‘behind 

my back.’’ 

Senator COLEMAN. So you—— 

189 

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me, if I can ask—this is—I’m not taking 

issue; I just want to make sure—I’d ask unanimous consent that 

this not be on the Senator’s time—and that is, I want to make 

clear, Mr. Westermann did not have access to your whole speech, 

did he? 

Mr. BOLTON. The question at the time was the declassification. 

The whole speech was later cleared by the Bureau of Intelligence—— 

Senator BIDEN. That’s not my—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —and Research. 

Senator BIDEN. —question. I just—I’m not taking issue—— 

Mr. BOLTON. The whole speech wasn’t written then. 

Senator BIDEN. No. 

Mr. BOLTON. It wasn’t a speech then, basically. 

Senator BIDEN. But if the process—it’s really important we’re all 

on the same page and understand the process, to give you a fair 

shake here—the process is, your staff sends to INR the portion of 

what you’re considering saying about biological weapons relating to 

Cuba. They do not send the whole speech, right? It’s just—it’s—in 

fact, it was basically a paragraph, is that not correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. It was language taken from existing intelligence reports—— 

Senator BIDEN. Right. 

Mr. BOLTON. —put together. And this was—— 

Senator BIDEN. Right. 

Mr. BOLTON. —to be—the declassification procedures. This is 

then, in turn, sent to INR, which is—— 

Senator BIDEN. Gotcha. 

Mr. BOLTON. —the function within the State Department that 

deals with—— 

Senator BIDEN. Last interruption—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —intelligence. 

Senator BIDEN. —Mr. Chairman. The only point I want to make 

is, there was—Mr. Westermann was not commenting on your 

speech; he did not have a copy of a speech. He had a copy of the 

material that had been gathered by the intelligence community relative to BW, biological weapons, in Cuba that you might or might 

not be attempting to use in a public way, and this had to be 

cleared, correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. No, no, no. I mean, had the language been declassified, that would have been the language used in the speech. 

Senator BIDEN. No, I got it. But it wasn’t. 

Mr. BOLTON. And so—— 

Senator BIDEN. That’s the point. 

Mr. BOLTON. —it was—but the—— 

Senator BIDEN. It needed to be cleared, right? 

Mr. BOLTON. It needed—it’s a two-step process. First was, the 

language had to be declassified. And, because of the sensitivity of 

intelligence—— 

Senator BIDEN. Right. 

Mr. BOLTON. —sources and methods, the—what was agreed to be 

declassified was the only intelligence material that I would use. So, 

in a sense, had they declassified what was derived from their own 

reports, that would have been what was in the speech. 

190 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, now, that the Chair has felt 

these questions were relevant, but I’m hopeful that we can stay 

within our time limit. We’re going to have more opportunities. And 

in fairness to each one of us, we ought to observe that. 

Back to Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Just to conclude, then. So, Westermann has this piece of this— 

does he send this request to other agencies with his own notations 

in it? 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s my understanding. 

Senator COLEMAN. And that—and you found out about that after 

the fact, and so you lost confidence in him. 

Mr. BOLTON. Yeah. I mean, occasionally there’s—another way to 

have done this would be—it’s not unheard of; it does happen once 

in awhile, for the State Department to have one view. If he had 

had a different—he could have come to my office, to my staff, and 

said, ‘‘Look, let’s work this out,’’ and he didn’t—that’s what caused 

me to lose confidence—— 

Senator COLEMAN. This is not an issue of interpreting intelligence, is it? 

Mr. BOLTON. It has nothing to do with the substance of intelligence, the analysis, or anything—there’s no substantive disagreement here. 

Senator COLEMAN. And, in fact, as I understand it, the speech actually was supposed to be given on May 6th. It was ultimately 

given later. But the information in question, was that actually— 

that information the language delivered to the Foreign Relations 

Committee on March 19th—— 

Mr. BOLTON. Essentially—— 

Senator COLEMAN. —by Assistant Secretary of State Carl Ford? 

Mr. BOLTON. —essentially, exactly the same language, yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. So, again, we’re not talking about interpreting 

intelligence here. 

Mr. BOLTON. It’s not a disagreement about the substance of the 

intelligence. In fact, when Assistant Secretary Ford testified again 

before this committee in June, he was—he said that the language 

in my speech—he said, ‘‘That language was our language, the intelligence-community language, not his,’’ meaning not mine. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Bolton—Secretary Bolton, is there any 

question—do you have any question whatsoever about your commitment to the mission of the United Nations in taking this position? 

Mr. BOLTON. Absolutely not. 

And to finish, in part, if I can, and answer to Senator Kerry, the 

consistent theme of my writings, consistent theme of my writings, 

is that for the U.N. to be effective, it requires American leadership. 

I say it over and over again. I deeply believe it. 

My criticisms during the 1990s were, in large measure, because 

of what I thought was the lack of effective American leadership. 

Senator COLEMAN. And in terms of the U.N., itself, it’s fair to say 

that it’s legitimate to be disdainful of the United Nations action of 

comparing Zionism with racism. 

Mr. BOLTON. Yeah, I thought—I don’t think there’s any doubt, 

that is the greatest mistake the United Nations ever made. And I 

can tell you, it was very much my view, but also the view of SecVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00190 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
191 

retary Baker and President Bush 41, we wanted to repeal ‘‘Zionism 

is racism’’ because it was the right thing to do, to—it was—it needed to be expunged. But we also knew that many Americans, across 

the political spectrum, understood ‘‘Zionism is racism’’ to be an emblem of the U.N. When they thought of the U.N., they thought ‘‘Zionism is racisim.’’ And repealing that resolution was a prerequisite 

to getting past the—in the minds of many Americans, the idea that 

the U.N. could be useful for anything. So it had a very important 

operational role, as well. 

Senator COLEMAN. And, in fact, you know, as we kind of move 

to the present time, the Secretary General, himself, has said the 

U.N. needs reform. And I wanted to repeat what Senator Hagel 

said. I’m going to make the same comment. I strongly believe in 

the United Nations, but I think it’s very legitimate to raise—to 

criticize the United Nations that has Libya, at one time, as the 

Chairman of the Human Rights Commission, or a Human Rights 

Commission that has Zimbabwe or the Sudan or Cuba, as part as 

the Human Rights Commission. They’ve been working the last couple of weeks, right now. And in 2005 we’re finally hearing discussion from the Secretary General that maybe something—not 

‘‘maybe’’—that something is wrong. Does—when Cuba or Zimbabwe 

or the Sudan are part of the Human Rights Commission, do you 

think that undermines the credibility of the United Nations? 

Mr. BOLTON. I do. And I thank Secretary General Annan does, 

as well. I don’t think there can be any question about it. That’s 

why we need reform. 

Senator COLEMAN. And let me focus, in the time I have in this 

round, a little bit on Oil-for-Food. You made the comment that it 

taught us about the culture of the bureaucracy. And let me back 

it up. You have a scandal, and one could argue about the amount 

of dollars, but it’s all in the B’s, with billions, that Saddam was 

able to put in his pocket because the Oil-for-Food Program was in 

effect. And it’s pretty clear, from the first Volcker report, that 

Benon Sevon, who was in charge of the program, Kofi Annan’s personal point person in charge of—was on the take from Saddam 

Hussein. It’s pretty clear, from the Volcker reports, that Secretary 

General’s Chief of Staff destroyed three years’ worth of documents. 

It’s pretty clear from the OIOS audits that were done, that what 

you saw was massive mismanagement, massive mismanagement. 

You made the comment that it taught us about the culture of the 

bureaucracy of the United Nations. What did you mean by that? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think—in terms of some of the specifics, I 

think it’s important, from the administration perspective, that we 

wait for the final Volcker report, and we wait for the results of the 

investigations of all six of the—I think it’s six congressional committees that are looking—that are looking into the matter. But I 

know, going back to my own time serving in the first President 

Bush’s administration, that the potential of the United Nations is 

often sadly diluted by the encrustations of bureaucracy that have 

grown up over the years. And it’s very important that, in order to 

be able to justify the large amounts that administrations every 

year request for Congress to appropriate, that we can make the 

case that we are acting to make the United Nations a more efficient and uncorrupt organization. And the United Nations, itself, is 

obviously concerned. The Deputy Secretary General Louise 

192 

Frechette, said, a few weeks ago, ‘‘We hope we never get another 

Oil-for-Food assignment.’’ I, personally, disagree with that. There 

may come a time when we want the United Nations to undertake 

something like this. 

We had—in the first Bush administration, we imagined the Oilfor-Food Program, as set up under Resolution 706 and 712, as very 

different from the program that was actually carried out. Saddam 

Hussein rejected 706/712. If it had, it would have been an even 

larger U.N. operation, because we didn’t want to have the distribution of humanitarian assistance inside Iraq, in Iraq hands. We 

wanted it in U.N. hands. 

But if you can’t—if you don’t have the basic support and belief 

that the United Nations will function in an uncorrupt and effective 

fashion in the Congress of the United States, we’ll never have the 

opportunity to do something potentially even bigger than the Oilfor-Food Program. So this is—this, to me, is an urgent matter. 

Senator COLEMAN. And reform really has to be in two parts. 

There’s both the structural reform nature of the Security Council 

who’s involved—who are the members—Human Rights Commission, other things like that—but then there’s also the management 

side. 

I’m going to just read a list of areas where it would be—it’s clear 

to me that the U.N. has to improve: performance measurement, 

program management, procurement, evaluation, monitoring. Are 

there—can you respond to those? And are there things that are 

needed, in terms of a comprehensive management strategy that the 

U.N. should be looking at, or that we, in Congress, should be urging the U.N. to look at? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think both of those are true. It think one 

thing that you might find interesting is, if you went back to the 

Thornburg report of 1993, when, again, the first President Bush 

persuaded former Attorney General Thornburg to become Under 

Secretary General for Management at the U.N. And after President 

Bush lost the ’92 election, Dick Thornburg was—his one-year appointment was not extended. I guess that’s the way I should put 

it. But before he left, he produced a report on his year experience 

at the U.N. and the kinds of management changes that he would 

recommend and that he would have endeavored to carry out, had 

he been there—had he been able to stay. And it makes for—it 

makes for good reading today. 

I’m not saying that there aren’t good people at the U.N., who 

work hard. And, in fact, the current Under Secretary General for 

Management, Cathy Bertini, is an American citizen and a longtime friend of mine. She’s worked herself to the bone. But it requires a sustained effort of a long period of time, and I am very 

optimistic that, with the Secretary General, himself, weighing in, 

we’ve got a major chance of success here. 

Senator COLEMAN. I’d like to continue that discussion in the next 

round, and also talk about the role of Congress. 

Just one other thing for the record. There was a comment made 

that you didn’t respond to. Is it your belief that, in the Clinton administration, that North Korea froze its nuclear development program? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think the evidence is overwhelming that, while 

the United States and others were, sort of, looking down a soda 

193 

straw at the plutonium facility, the plutonium storage—the spentfuel storage and reactors at Yongbyon, the North Koreans had embarked on an aggressive procurement program to acquire uranium 

enrichment capability that would take them on a different road to 

nuclear weapons. And the intelligence is far from clear, there’s 

much that we don’t know. The only, I think—but one—the only 

real question is, How early in time did the North Koreans begin 

violating the agreed framework? It’s something that we talked 

about in 2001, Senator Kerry, as you remember. 

Senator KERRY. Yeah, let me just make clear, if I can insert, I 

didn’t suggest they froze the nuclear program. I said the plutonium 

program. Everybody knew the uranium program was on the side. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. 

Senator Feingold? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Bolton, in your testimony you indicate that, if confirmed, you will make it your objective to provide sustained and decisive leadership to create a stronger, better, more effective U.N. In 

the same spirit as Senator Kerry’s opening remarks, I’m trying to 

square this idea with your past statements, which really do suggest 

that you view the U.N. as a deeply flawed institution. And I agree 

with you, with that part of your assessment. It can sometimes 

serve as a useful instrument for U.S. policy. But, otherwise, you 

appear to believe that the U.N. is, at best, irrelevant, and, at worst, 

harmful. 

Now, I believe that we cannot effectively fight the terrorist threat 

before us without a strong multinational commitment to doing so. 

I also believe that getting the rest of the world to invest in what 

is our top priority, fighting terrorism, means that we probably have 

to convince them that we are also invested in their top priorities, 

like fighting poverty, fighting poverty in the developing world. But 

you have suggested that the United States should engage with the 

United Nations only when our vital interests are at stake. 

Secretary Bolton, I think we have a vital interest, all of the time, 

in sustaining an effective institution where states can engage in 

the bargaining and the give and take necessary to sustain some 

sense of a shared global enterprise. 

My first question is sort of a case in point. I understand that just 

last week in a public discussion among various countries at the 

Commission on Human Rights, a United States delegate objected 

to some language in the annual torture resolution. In particular, 

the delegate objected to language stressing that, quote, ‘‘Each state 

shall take effective measures to prevent acts of torture and other 

cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in any territory under its jurisdiction,’’ unquote. 

The delegate argued that, while the United States has an obligation under the Torture Convention to take effective measures to 

prevent torture, there is no obligation, no obligation, to take effective measures to prevent cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 

in the text of the treaty. Apparently, the Government of Pakistan 

was the only government present that actually supported this 

United States view. 

Do you believe that the United States delegate took an appropriate, or even accurate, position in this case? 

194 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, Senator, my honest answer is, this is the first 

I’ve heard of it. I don’t—I’d have to—I’d have to look at the words 

of the convention, and I’d have to understand what the nature of 

the debate was. And I will endeavor to do that and maybe try and 

get something over the lunch hour. I’m not—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —I’m not familiar with the—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Secretary, I gave you the words. The words 

state, ‘‘Each state shall take effective measures to prevent acts of 

torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in any territory under its jurisdiction.’’ Our delegate, our 

representative from the United States, did not adhere to that position. That’s very simple and straightforward. It’s not a language 

issue. I want you to tell me whether you believe that this is in the 

national security interest of the United States to take this kind of 

position. 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, it’s hard for me to believe that it is, but 

I think that—but that’s my opinion, sitting here today. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me switch to another issue involving 

issues concerning the U.N. in the past. We recently observed the 

11th anniversary of the start of the Rwandan genocide. Much has 

been written about the decisions made by U.S. policymakers in the 

spring of 1994, when the Rwandan genocide began. I’d like you to 

comment a bit, if you could, on the manner in which the United 

States chose to use its influence at the U.N. in response to the 

emerging crisis, and on the manner in which the U.N. reacted to 

developments in Rwanda in 1994. Do you think that the U.S. and 

U.N. policymakers made mistakes in their responses? What should 

they have done differently? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think there were mistakes all around, both 

on the part of the member governments and on the part of the 

United Nations. And I think that this is a case where the fallacy 

of false concreteness applies with particular force. I don’t think 

that this is something that the United Nations, alone, was responsible for. I think the member governments had to take that responsibility. 

Now, there is a lot of debate, and I’ve read articles on both sides 

about, logistically, when there was awareness of the genocide, what 

steps could have been taken, what our military could have done, 

that I think are unresolved. But, while there were clearly failures 

within the U.N. secretariat, I think that it’s ultimately the Security 

Council that’s responsible. The Security Council deployed the force 

into Rwanda, not the secretariat. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I want to pursue this more. I’m interested in 

how you think we should have done things differently. If you are 

confirmed, you would be at that Security Council. 

Mr. BOLTON. Yeah. 

Senator FEINGOLD. There are situations in Africa, at this moment, that some would argue—in fact, our previous Secretary of 

State referred to it as genocide. What would you have done differently? Give me some sense of what you would do in these currently situations differently to try to avoid this kind of disaster. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think the question, if you look at the contrasting situations in Burundi and Rwanda at about the same time, 

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195 

ritania, in Burundi, was actually much more successful in working 

the politics inside Burundi and preventing the kind of tragedy that 

occurred inside Rwanda. 

I don’t think that the dispatch of a U.N. peacekeeping force, 

alone, is indicative of—necessarily, of success or failure. And I 

think, obviously, what happened inside Rwanda was a failure on 

multiple levels. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me try one more time. If you had been 

United States Ambassador to the U.N. at that time, knowing all 

that you know now, what action would you have taken? 

Mr. BOLTON. I’m not sure that I can honestly answer that, Senator, because we don’t know, logistically, whether it would have 

been possible to do anything different than what the administration did at the time. It is—I think you have to ask the predicate 

question, What could have been done in the years beforehand that 

might have avoided the triggering of the genocide, itself? Once it 

started, as I say, there are serious people who argue that the bulk 

of the genocide was, and would have been, concluded before any 

outside presence could have been brought to bear. And I don’t—I 

know there are disagreements with that. I think it’s not something 

I have the capability to—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Secretary, in theory, you could be sitting 

at that table very soon. I must say, your answer is amazingly passive considering what happened ten years ago and what may be 

happening in Sudan at this point. 

Mr. Secretary, how do you think Secretary Powell’s dramatic 

2003 presentation to the United Nations regarding Iraq’s weaponsof-mass-destruction programs affected United States credibility at 

the U.N. and in the international community? And what lessons 

can we draw from that episode? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, if I could just add one word on the earlier 

point, on Sudan, I think the administration has taken substantial 

effort. It was a very extensive diplomatic project to get the agreement between north and south that’s now been signed, and the dispatch of the U.N. peacekeepers. And I think that’s the kind of activity that was—that might have made the difference in Rwanda. 

It’s very hard to go back and secondguess, especially given the information that people had at the time. 

In terms—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I don’t—let me just say, I don’t think our actions to date—this administration’s actions with regard to Sudan 

rise to that level, or even approach the efforts that need to be 

taken. But if you’d answer the question regarding Secretary Powell? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think, unquestionably, the failure to find 

weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has led some people to question our goodwill and our credibility. We have worked hard, in the 

case, for example, of Iran and North Korea, to assure other governments that the information that we have is the best that there is 

available. And I think that—for those who deal with weapons-ofmass-destruction issues, that there is an understanding that the 

circumstances, the threat that we see from North Korea and Iran, 

is as real as is humanly possibly to know. But I also agree with 

the Silverman-Robb Commission conclusion that there is too little 

196 

that we know about North Korea and Iran. That absence of information doesn’t make me feel more comfortable, however. 

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s a general answer, but I want to know, 

specifically, your reaction to the spectacle of Secretary Powell having presented this incorrect information to the world at—in the 

United Nations, and what consequences that has had. 

Mr. BOLTON. I felt very sorry for him, after the fact. And I think 

it has had consequences. I think that there’s no adverse consequences. There’s no way of getting around it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. One more question. Are you arguing—back to 

the Darfur issue—are you arguing that the administration has 

taken any effective action to stop genocide in Darfur? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think the actions that have been taken have 

focused largely on locking in the North-South Agreement. I think 

that’s critical, because the—what’s happening in Darfur is not a 

subset of the North-South dispute, but that North-South dispute, 

as you know, went on for years and years and years. The question 

of the accountability of the government in Khartoum is critical, I 

think, to getting the situation in Darfur resolved, and it’s why, contrary to what some have said, we did have, and pushed vigorously 

for, a mechanism to bring accountability. But we also pushed for 

the deployment of AU forces into the Darfur region, which was 

logistically the only option that we had available. And it would 

have been helpful, I think, if some of our colleagues on the Security 

Council had been more forthcoming on that score. 

But this is something that the President has been—paid very 

close personal attention to. It’s a matter—it was a matter of highest priority for Secretary Powell, and it is for Secretary Rice. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I know my time’s up, but let me just finish 

by saying, I happen to think that, as important as the North-South 

Agreement is with regard to Sudan, and it was very important that 

we focus on it, too often it’s used as a reason not to address the 

Darfur issue, rather than as a foundation for dealing with it. So 

the notion that somehow this has been effective, in terms of putting in a situation to stop the genocide in Darfur, I think, is simply 

untrue. 

Mr. BOLTON. No, but I—if I could, I think I agree with you on 

that point, Senator. I’m not saying that working about—worrying 

about the North-South situation is an excuse for not doing anything in Darfur. I’m saying that if the North-South Agreement 

were to come unstuck, we would lose the advantage of that agreement and make it even more difficult than it’s been to do anything 

about Darfur. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, that’s a red herring. I asked about 

whether we’ve taken any effective action with regard to Darfur, 

and you did not indicate that we had, so I’m taking that as a no. 

Mr. BOLTON. But, if I could, because I think—if I could just continue the answer—I think that we have worked, in the Security 

Council and diplomatically, and certainly applied pressure to the 

Government of Khartoum. It’s one of the reasons why we wanted 

the resolution on sanctions adopted by the Security Council, and 

why the Council’s decision to adopt that resolution was so important. 

I don’t think we’re satisfied. I don’t want to leave the impression 

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197 

quately. We’ve made some progress, but there is no dispute, Senator, that much more needs to be done. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Boxer? 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Dodd is right when he said that we don’t often vote no. 

I, myself, went back to the record. I’ve voted no three times out of 

hundreds that have come through this committee, ambassadors 

and the rest, in the Bush administration. So this is a serious moment for a lot of us. And I know it’s difficult for you, Mr. Bolton, 

but—but we are where we are. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m bewildered by this nomination, given the situation in the world, where the President has gone around the world 

to try to rebuild relationships, Secretary Rice has done that. 

Mr. Bolton, I respect your commitment to public service—I do— 

and the good things you’ve done, among a whole list of things that 

maybe I didn’t think were as good as some. But I have spent the 

last month extensively reviewing your writings, your public statements about the United Nations. And my overall assessment, Mr. 

Bolton, is that you have nothing but disdain for the United Nations. 

Now, you can dance around it, you can run away from it, you can 

put perfume on it, but the bottom line is the bottom line. And I— 

as Senator Biden said in his opening, it’s hard for me to know why 

you’d want to work at an institution that you said didn’t even exist. 

You said, ‘‘It doesn’t even exist.’’ And you want to work there. 

Now, there’s a three-minute tape I would like to show, and use 

those three minutes of my time, because I think the American people need to see you away from this hearing, where you’re parsing 

your words, and see you at this conference, where you were talking 

about the United Nations, Global Structures Convocation, Human 

Rights, Global Governance, and Strengthening the U.N. So I’d like 

us to watch that for the next three minutes and also make a point 

that I have all your whole statement here. They’re brief. Everything you see here is not taken out of context at all. And I just 

think it’s important for people to see this. So if we could roll that, 

it would be great. [Presentation of video:] 

Mr. Bolton [video]: Let me start off with what may seem a somewhat radical—— 

Senator BOXER. Louder, please. 

The CHAIRMAN. Turn the volume up. 

Senator BOXER. Louder. 

Mr. Bolton [video]: —if we could consider potential roles for the 

United Nations—— 

Senator BOXER. More. 

Senator BIDEN. Get it all the way up. 

Mr. Bolton [video]: —that proposition is, there is no such thing 

as the United Nations. There is an organization, which is composed 

of member governments. It does have an entity called the Security 

Council, which is principally responsible for international peace 

and security under the charter. But there is no ‘‘being’’ out there 

called the ‘‘United Nations.’’ There is simply a group of member 

governments, who, if they have the political will every once in 

198 

awhile to protect international peace and security, they’re able to 

do it. 

The point that I want to leave with you in this very brief presentation is where I started, is that there is no United Nations. There 

is an international community that occasionally can be led by the 

only real power left in the world, and that’s the United States, 

when it suits our interest and when we can get others to go along. 

And I think it would be a real mistake to count on the United Nations as if it’s some disembodied entity out there that can function 

on its own. When the United States leaves, the United Nations will 

fall. When it suits our interest to do so, we will leave. When it does 

not suit our interest to do so, we will not. And I think that is the 

most important thing to carry away tonight. 

Second, if you think that there is any possibility in this country 

that a 51,000-person bureaucracy is going to be supported by most 

Americans, you’d better think again. The secretariat building in 

New York has 38 stories. If you lost ten stories today, it wouldn’t 

make a bit of difference. 

The fact of the matter is that the international system that has 

grown up—and, again, I leave out the World Bank and the IMF, 

because I do think they’re in a separate category—has been put 

into a position of hiring ineffective people who do ineffective things 

that have no real-world impact, and we pay 25 percent of the budget. 

The League of Nations was a failure, because the United States 

did not participate. The United Nations would be a failure if the 

United States did not participate. And, in fact, I remember as vividly as if it were yesterday, right after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Jim 

Baker said to me, ‘‘We’re going not make this United Nations work. 

We’re going to find out whether it’s a League of Nations or the 

U.N.’’ 

And that’s the fact. And if you don’t like it, then I’m sorry. The 

United States makes the U.N. work, when it wants to work, and 

that is exactly the way it should be, because the only question— 

the only question for the United States is, What’s our national interest? And if you don’t like that, I’m sorry, but that is the fact. 

[End of video presentation.] 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, the reason I wanted to show that 

is many-fold. First, I think there’s a little bit of revisionist history 

going on here, in terms of the nominee’s attitude toward the United 

Nations. I mean, I watch this, just as a human being, forget about 

the Senate part, and I see an anger, a hostility. Who would ever 

dream of saying, ‘‘If ten floors of a building were to disappear’’? I 

mean, I wonder if you thought about the fact that 1400-plus Americans work in that building, who chose to in that building because 

they believe it’s a worthy thing to try and bring peace to the world? 

So I just feel that this nominee could do lots of other things for 

President Bush, I’m sure, and do them really well, but I don’t see 

this. It just doesn’t make sense. 

And I guess, you know, this comparison that Secretary Rice 

made when she endorsed you and announced your appointment, 

she compared you to Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel Moynihan. 

And I’d like to show you this comparison and see whether you 

think some of the things you said were inappropriate, wrong, or 

whatever. 

199 

This is what Dr. Rice said, ‘‘Through history, some of our best 

ambassadors have been those with the strongest voices, ambassadors like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.’’ 

And this is what Jeanne Kirkpatrick said, in 1981, ‘‘I do not 

think that one should ever seek confrontation. What I have every 

intention and hope of doing is to operate in a low-key, quiet, persuasive, and consensus-building way.’’ 

And this is what you say, ‘‘The Secretariat building in New York 

has 38 stories. If you lost ten stories, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference.’’ You said, ‘‘There is no United Nations.’’ ‘‘If we were 

redoing the Security Council, I’d have one permanent member, because that’s the real reflection of the distribution of power in the 

world.’’ 

Now, do you disagree—now, do you disagree with the statements 

that you made? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, the tape that you just showed, and some of 

those statements, come from a panel discussion—I think it was in 

1994—before the World Federalists. The World Federalists believe 

in world government. And I do not. 

Senator BOXER. I’m not interested in them. I’m interested in you. 

Mr. BOLTON. I was talking to that audience at the time, so that’s 

what I’m trying to explain. 

Senator BOXER. Well, you don’t say different things to different 

audiences. 

Mr. BOLTON. I was—no, I don’t. What many of the World Federalists believe is that the U.N. is the nascent world government 

coming into being. And I don’t agree with that, either. So what I 

was trying to do to that audience of World Federalists was get 

their attention, and the comment about—— 

Senator BOXER. So you don’t—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —the ten stories was a way of saying there’s not 

a bureaucracy in the world that can’t be made leaner and more efficient. I was—— 

Senator BOXER. Well, that isn’t—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —trying to get their attention. 

Senator BOXER. —what you said. You said, ‘‘It wouldn’t be 

missed.’’ We can look at—you know, what wouldn’t be missed? Talk 

to us about that. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think a reduction in personnel is something that 

every manager and every government organization, every international organization should strive for, and that was the metaphor 

I was trying to come up with, as I say, to get their attention. 

The question about—as the—you cut off the middle of my presentation in your showing of—— 

Senator BOXER. Well, I asked—— 

Mr. BOLTON. —the tape. 

Senator BOXER. —unanimous consent to put the entire statement 

in the record. 

Mr. BOLTON. I appreciate that. 

The concept that I was addressing there is the problem of false 

concreteness, where many people say, ‘‘Well, the U.N. did that,’’ or, 

‘‘The U.N. did that.’’ ‘‘The U.N. failed here,’’ or, ‘‘The U.N. succeeded here.’’ And in the vast majority of cases, it’s not a question 

of the U.N. qua U.N. succeeding or failing. It’s a question of whether the member governments of the United Nations have made the 

200 

correct decision. And that problem of false concreteness is something that I think is a very real problem. It’s a—— 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Bolton, I don’t mean—I don’t mean to cut 

you off, but you’re getting away from the point. I read everything 

in here. You didn’t talk about there being—you need to fire certain 

people. You say, ‘‘The point I want to leave with you in this very 

brief presentation is where I started, there is no United Nations. 

There is an international community that occasionally can be led 

by the only real power left in the world, and that’s the United 

States, when it suits our interest and when—and when we can get 

others to go along. And I think it would be a real mistake to count 

on the U.N. as if it’s some disembodied entity out there that can 

function.’’ 

Now, the point is, that’s what you want to leave these people 

with, and we will put this in the record. So if this afternoon—I 

want to be fair to you. I honestly do. There is nothing in there that 

I believe would change, in any way, your main points here. But, 

you know, I’m looking over the building, the secretariat building. 

The 36th floor where the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is located, that is the office that coordinates U.N. assistance in response to emergencies, like the recent tsunami that 

devastated part of Asia. Maybe they have too many people working 

there? Should they maybe fire the receptionist who’s not good, just 

like we could do that around here, or you could in your office? That 

wasn’t the stuff of what you were talking about. You said, ‘‘If there 

were ten floors gone.’’ 

And then I wonder if you were talking about the 31st floor, the 

U.N.’s Department for Disarmament Affairs, which works to 

strengthen the disarmament regimes with respect to weapons of 

mass destruction and promotes disarmament in the area of conventional weapons. 

I wonder if you were talking about the Office of the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict that works to stop the 

use of child soldiers. 

So the point is that what we saw here, I think, is the real John 

Bolton. You know, basically, this is who—what you believe. And for 

you to be going go the United Nations, when everyone knows you 

said these things, you know, ‘‘Hi, I’m John Bolton. I’ve come to the 

U.N.’’ It’s a very tough thing for those at the other end. And I think 

it would be a very tough thing for you, when you put so much of 

your passion and your anger into bringing down this particular institution. 

Is my time up? I will save the rest. I’m sure you’re delighted to 

know that. 

Thank you. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BOLTON. No, but I think that—the Chairman’s very courteous decision at the beginning was that I could answer the question even if the red light was on, and I will just say, in 25 words 

or less, the passage that you left out of the tape is my description 

of President Bush and Secretary Baker’s very effective creation of 

the coalition after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, in 1990, 

and their use of the Security Council to repel the invaders. 

Senator BOXER. Well, if I—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The entire statement—— 

Senator BOXER. —if I might say—— 

201 

The CHAIRMAN. —will be put in the record. 

Senator BOXER. —everyone should read it. It has nothing to do 

with your—what you’re leaving the people with. It is a small part 

of this. It is not the main body of this. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator. 

Senator Obama? 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bolton, thank you very much for appearing here. I know this 

is right before the break, so just bear with me. 

First of all, I’d like unanimous consent to place my written statement into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in full. 

Senator OBAMA. You know, I was reflecting on the fact that some 

of the most distinguished Americans, Democrats and Republicans— 

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, George H.W. Bush, Henry Cabot 

Lodge—have served in the position to which you’re now seeking 

confirmation. There’s one particular person that I would like to 

mention, not only because he’s an Illinoian, but because I think he 

speaks to how important this position can be, and that’s Adlai Stevenson. 

I think some people may be aware of the fact that Adlai Stevenson served in this position during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And, 

as we all know, it was Stevenson’s presentation to the U.N. Security Council that proved to the world that the Soviets were moving 

intermediate-range missiles into Cuba. He used charts and photos 

to build a compelling case, declared to Soviet Ambassador Zorin 

that he was prepared to wait until hell freezes over for Zorin’s response to the U.S. charges. 

You know, what many people don’t recall is that Stevenson’s 

presentation came on the heels of what might be considered a substantial intelligence failure on the part of the U.S. Government. A 

year earlier, Stevenson had been misled by the White House and 

the CIA into publicly stating that the United States was not behind 

the Bay of Pigs invasion. And you probably are aware of the fact 

that Stevenson almost resigned over that incident. 

The reason I think that this is worth keeping mind is that, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, we were able to succeed diplomatically because of the stature and integrity of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations. In fact, President Kennedy 

said—I’m quoting here—‘‘The integrity and credibility of Adlai Stevenson constitute one of our greatest national assets.’’ And, as a result of that credibility, Stevenson was able to get tough, isolate the 

Soviets, be blunt, and convince the world that we were right. 

I, personally, think we’re facing a similar situation today with 

the rest of the world questioning our intelligence capabilities and 

nuclear proliferation threats from Iran to North Korea that may require action by the Security Council. We have to be able to convince the world that we’re right. 

And so, you know, we had occasion to meet in my office, and I 

very much appreciated our dialogue. You know, my overall impression is that you are extraordinarily capable, extraordinarily intelligent. And I have to say that most of the provocative statements 

that I’ve heard are ones that—some of them, I probably subscribe 

to; others, which, you know, I take as being part of an academic 

exercise or, you know, the process of speaking in panels. You’re 

202 

outside of government, you’re speaking your mind. I don’t hold each 

and every one of these statements against you. The overall portrait, 

though, is of someone who may not be in a position to do what Stevenson did, which is persuade the world that America is right, and 

not simply partisan. 

And I have to say, there’s one quote in that tape that particularly disturbed me, and that was, ‘‘subscribe to the notion that we 

will lead when it suits our interests,’’ the implication being that 

when it’s convenient for us to engage in the United Nations, we 

shall do so; and when it’s not convenient, we won’t. As I think Senator Feingold mentioned, if that ends up being the standard, then 

it’s going to be pretty hard for us to gain the kind of cooperation 

that we need on important issues like the war on terror. 

But let me focus just on a couple of specific questions that may 

help clarify the record here. 

I thought that you made an interesting statement, one that I 

was—I actually wanted to get the precise transcript on—in your assessment of the Silverman-Robb report, because you said that the 

principal problem that you gleaned from the report was that reasonable hypotheses became hardened in the minds of certain administration analysts, intelligence officers, and so forth, that those 

then turned into presumptions that remained, despite the fact that 

they were not corroborated by hard facts. I don’t have the precise 

statement in front of me, but I think that was a pretty accurate— 

I tried to write it down as fast as I can, because I thought it made 

a lot of sense. Would you say that’s an accurate—— 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that’s a fair characterization. 

Senator OBAMA. Okay. I think that the concern that—the concerns that have been raised with respect to these e-mails going 

back and forth and your relationship with Mr. Westermann and so 

forth is not a bunch of cheap shots. It’s not bureaucratic infighting 

that we’re trying to disclose. What—it has to do with whether this 

is an example exactly of what you said the Silverman-Robb report 

warns against, which is that you had a particular perspective, you 

had an intelligence analyst who was concerned that your perspective was not quite right, and that, in that context, you were interested in shading or shaping the analysis to fit your reasonable 

hypotheses. That’s, I think, the reason that we’re concerned. Applying your test, that we don’t want our intelligence to be not corroborated by hard facts. 

And so, I understand that you’re going to get the record of all the 

statements that have been made available. At this stage, since you 

haven’t had a chance to review them all, I guess I would just ask 

you, If the record indicates that you were seeking to reject hard 

facts because they didn’t neatly fit into a speech that you were 

making on behalf of the United States Government, is it fair to say 

that that would be something that this panel should be concerned 

about, and that that might undermine your capacity to be a credible advocate for the United States in the United Nations? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yeah, I think failure to pay attention to reality and 

facts, however unpleasant they are, is an extremely undesirable 

characteristic. In this case, I don’t remember what the alternative 

formulation was. It was not anything having to do with the substance of whatever it was; it was the fact I didn’t think I had been 

dealt with squarely. 

203 

Senator OBAMA. Fair enough. I just want to pinpoint, though— 

it may be that there’s a dispute on the facts. But what I want to 

do is establish a common principle, which is that we want our intelligence analysts to give us information that’s based on their best 

assessment of the facts, even if it doesn’t fit our hypotheses. Is that 

a—— 

Mr. BOLTON. I absolutely—— 

Senator OBAMA. —fair principle? 

Mr. BOLTON. —I absolutely agree with that. 

Senator OBAMA. And if we have a situation where the higher-ups 

in our foreign-policy community are squelching dissent—albeit internal—squelching dissent that might impede the American people 

from getting the best possible intelligence information to the people 

who are in decision-making positions, then that could potentially 

hamper our ability to fight the war on terrorism. 

Mr. BOLTON. We have to have the facts as they are, whether 

they’re pleasant or not. 

Senator OBAMA. Okay. 

Mr. BOLTON. There’s simply no doubt about it. 

Senator OBAMA. We don’t have time before the break to make 

this determination. I think one of the things that we’ll want to pursue, then, after the break, is whether that is, in fact, what happened here. My understanding is, you don’t feel that’s what happened here. I think some of the panel, based on the interviews 

we’ve seen, feels that it is what happened. But I just wanted to establish the principle that it would be troubling if we are discouraging analysts from giving us the best possible information. 

Let me just move to a couple of other points. I have to watch out 

for my time here. 

I want to talk to you a little bit about Iran, because that’s obviously an area where, along with North Korea, we’re going to have 

a lot of interest in making sure that the international community 

joins us in expressing concern and impeding the development of 

nuclear weapons there. What’s your assessment, at this point, of 

our administration’s position with respect to the European efforts 

of diplomacy with Iran and the fact that it appears, at least, that 

the President’s made some contradictory statements with respect to 

whether or not we should be engaging in Iran? 

And, finally, just let me close the loop by saying, What do you 

think the Security Council’s role in this overall process should be? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think, from the outset of our focus on Iran, 

there has been agreement between the United States and the EU3 on the overall objective. And that is to say, it was unacceptable 

for Iran to have a nuclear weapons capability. There had been, for 

the past year and a half, roughly, tactical disagreements between 

the EU-3 and the United States about how to proceed. There had 

also been discussions that we had conducted with Russia, in terms 

of the fueling or the Bushehr reactor in Iran, and discussions we’ve 

had with Japan and China on their interest in access to Iran oil 

and gas reserves. And one of the things that I think has troubled 

us from the outset on this is that Iran has split all of these different powers that I’ve mentioned, among which I think there really is broad agreement on the unacceptability of Iran achieving a 

nuclear-weapons status. 

204 

Now, it had been our view, and remains our view, that the Iranian effort to achieve nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security, which is the triggering threshold for 

Security Council jurisdiction. 

What the President and Secretary Rice have accomplished in the 

past two months, I think, is a substantial closing of the tactical gap 

with the Europeans, and indirectly with the Russians, on that 

point. Having made a number of modifications in our position, we 

achieved from the European—the three European foreign ministers, I think, a pretty clear statement that utilization of the Security Council at some point in dealing with the Iranian nuclearweapons program was something that they would be willing to undertake. 

The issue about the Security Council, from the outset, has been 

exactly what role it would have. And we have, over the course of 

the past year, roughly, exchanged thoughts with the three European countries, with Japan, with Russia, and with China, over how 

the Security Council might engage if the issue with Iran’s nuclearweapons program got on the Council’s agenda. It was not a question simply of automatic resort to sanctions. There is a—I think, 

a large measure of additional sunlight and pressure that’s brought 

to bear by having Iran to try and answer in the Security Council, 

and that’s been one of the reasons why it’s been our view that it 

needs to get to the Security Council at some point. That’s why 

we’ve been pressing in the IAEA Board of Governors for that referral. 

Now, I think the ball is really in Iran’s court at this point, that 

the Europeans have delivered the message about the what the 

President and the Secretary have said, they’ve made it clear that 

they need to see something from Iran, in terms of demonstrating 

that it’s prepared to make the strategic decision to forego to the 

pursuit of nuclear weapons. I think there’s some feeling that it’s 

unlikely we will get a major substantive response from the Iranians before their elections in June. I don’t know whether that’s 

right or not. That’s the feeling of many people. And that it may be 

that we’re going to have to wait for some period of time after the 

elections. 

So, we may be in something of a period of indeterminancy, but 

I do think that the President and the Secretary have achieved a 

significant success in closing the tactical gap that existed. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’ll seek 

to pursue this a little bit longer next round. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, am I the only thing standing between us and lunch? [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be brief. 

Mr. Bolton, I’m sure we would agree that it is important for us, 

the United States of America, to have the best representative for 

America to represent the interests of the U.S. in the world body, 

the United Nations. And I think ambassadors such as Ambassador 

Negroponte and Ambassador—former Senator John Danforth, were 

forceful and effective advocates of U.S. interests in the United NaVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00204 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
205 

tions. And what I worry about in your confirmation is that your 

history of somewhat inflammatory rhetoric and your speaking style 

is going to create an incentive for other nations to oppose us at the 

U.N. 

Would you comment, please? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I hope that would not be true, Senator. I 

think—as I believe Senator Lugar said in his opening remarks, I 

think you have different styles of speaking, depending on different 

circumstances. In close, tense, hard negotiations, I think you’re 

pursuing one approach. I think if you’re trying to engage in public 

diplomacy, you may engage in another approach. 

You know, I can speak as a former Assistant Secretary of State 

for International Organizations. It’s hardwired in me that the Permanent Representative in New York needs to follow instructions. 

And many of the statements that are made on the record in New 

York are actually written here in Washington, written and cleared 

around here in Washington. And I don’t anticipate that’s going to 

change. 

I think this is a heavy responsibility. I have no doubt about it. 

If confirmed, it would be a major task for me. But I think that, 

looking at the record that I’ve achieved in other diplomatic areas— 

in the negotiation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the negotiation of the Treaty of Moscow that President Bush and President 

Putin signed in May of 2002, the successful withdrawal from the 

ABM Treaty, the repeal of the Zionism is Racism Resolution, the 

G8 Global Partnership, and other things—that that is a—that is an 

indication of what is possible in New York. 

Senator NELSON. Well, let’s talk about that. Your job, for the last 

four years, has been arms negotiator. What success can you point 

to with regard to those negotiations in one of the major interests 

of the United States? And that is the nonproliferation of North 

Korea? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that the policy that the President has pursued to have the major regional powers surrounding North Korea 

engaged in what we now call the Six-Party talks, as opposed to 

having the United States engaged bilaterally with North Korea, is 

precisely the right way to go. We’ve been trying now for two years 

to persuade the North Koreans that no one accepts that they are 

to have nuclear weapons. The North Koreans have been refusing 

to negotiate. They have clearly not made the strategic choice to 

give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. And, as I said a few moments ago, Secretary Rice, in her recent trip to Asia, I think, 

stressed, in China, South Korea, and Japan, the importance that 

we attach to getting North Korea back to the negotiating table. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Bolton, over the course of the last four 

years, has North Korea increased in its nuclear capability and/or 

increased its possession of nuclear warheads? 

Mr. BOLTON. There are some estimates to that effect, but I don’t 

think we know for sure. The original estimate of North Korea having sufficient fissile material for one to two plutonium-based nuclear weapons was in, actually, 1991 to 1992, based on open 

sources. What we don’t know is how many—how much fissile material for plutonium weapons they now may have, or whether any of 

it’s been fashioned into weapons. 

206 

The major development, I think, in the North Korea matter, the 

tectonic shift that occurred, came in the summer of 2002, when all 

of our intelligence agencies concluded that North Korea had been 

engaged, for some period of time, in a production scope procurement to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, given them a 

separate route to nuclear weapons. We don’t know a lot about that, 

but it’s a very troubling development, because a lot of this is simply—involves processes that we don’t know much about. We don’t 

know what the real North Korean capacity is. And that’s one of the 

reasons why President Bush has made the Six-Party talks the priority that he’s had, why he’s had any number of discussions with 

the Chinese leadership about the importance of pursuing it. 

Senator NELSON. And the Six-Party talks are stalled, and we are 

getting nowhere, and the nuclear clock continues to tick, and, increasingly, North Korea gains the capability as a nuclear power, 

and we’ve seen that they have already had a history of peddling 

any kind of weapons system. And if we keep going on and don’t 

draw to a successful conclusion, whether it be Six-Party or one-onone negotiations, it’s not a very good result for the United States. 

What makes you think that the current policy will change the 

North Koreans’ minds over the next four years? 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, I don’t disagree at all with your assessment of the North Koreans and their propensity to proliferate 

weapons and technology of weapons of mass destruction. That is 

one of the most disturbing aspects about that government. We 

know, already, that the revenues that they obtained from the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, for example, they used to 

support their nuclear-weapons program. So—and it was the North 

Korean activity, in large part, that led to the idea that became the 

Proliferation Security Initiative. That’s why, over a year ago, I 

think, Dr. Rice was asked, ‘‘How long do you anticipate the SixParty talks will go on?’’ And this was over a year ago. But she said, 

‘‘As long as they’re productive.’’ 

The real issue here, at the moment, is whether North Korea is 

going to come back to the table, because, obviously, if they’re not 

there negotiating, we’re not making much progress. And I don’t— 

you know, I don’t—there’s no deadline or anything like that, but 

I also think it’s manifest that if we are not making progress, at 

some point you have to look at other possibilities. 

We’ve been—I don’t mean to run on this answer; I’d just say one 

more thing—we’ve been very grateful for the effort the Chinese 

have made to make the Six-Party talks effective. They’re not the 

problem. The problem is North Korea. 

Senator NELSON. I wanted you to run on, and I wasn’t going to 

interrupt you, because I wanted to hear your answer as to why you 

think your job, as a negotiator, has been successful with regard to 

North Korea over the last four years. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity. 

And I told you I’d stay, not only within, but less than the allotted 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

And the hearing is recessed until 2:00 p.m. 

[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

207 

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room SH– 

216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Sununu, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama. 

Also present: Senator John Warner. 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee is called, again, to order. Secretary Bolton, it may have 

been a lapse on my part this morning, but there have been requests that you be a sworn witness, so if you would rise now, I 

would like to swear you in. 

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 

the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. BOLTON. I do. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, sir. 

We will commence another round of ten minutes for each Senator, and I will begin now and ask the clerk to start the clock running on these questions. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDERSECRETARY OF 

STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Bolton, do you believe that U.N. reforms should include a look at the internal structures of the United 

Nations to see whether there are opportunities to streamline them 

and their procedures? There are five committees, for example, that 

report to the General Assembly. The suggestion has been made 

that, perhaps, the second and third committees—those that deal 

with economic and social issues on the one hand, and social and 

humanitarian and cultural matters on the other—might be combined and that’s a more obvious choice, perhaps, but have you 

given thought, getting into the nitty gritty details of the U.N. 

structure, during this time the Secretary General has called for a 

general reform, and you’ve mentioned specifically this morning Security Council reform, I ask if the committees or other structural 

situations you would like to lay before us in laying down this 

record today? 

Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, this is really, I think, a very important point about internal U.N. procedures. You know, the Charter 

sets up the Economic and Social Council as one of the principle organs of the United Nations, along with the General Assembly, the 

Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. The Economic and 

Social Council, or ECOSOC as it’s called, has oversight responsibility for all the U.N. specialized agencies, or at least the principle 

specialized agencies that deal with economic and humanitarian affairs. So, that you have a situation where the work of the second 

and third committees of the General Assembly, in very large measure—not entirely, but in very large measure—overlaps what 

ECOSOC does. And as with all of the six principle committees of 

the General Assembly, the second and third committees are committees of the whole, so that the—all 191 members—are involved 

in their work. I think a question of what to do with the, first, the 

overlap between the responsibility, the second and third committees is important to take a look at, and then second, to see what 

208 

might be possible with respect to ECOSOC. In the first Bush Administration, we made an effort to revive ECOSOC that I’d have 

to say was only partially successful, at best. 

That’s one example. Another example would be the fourth committee of the General Assembly, which deals with special political 

and decolonization questions. Decolonization is not exactly a major 

topic of debate these days, and one would have to ask whether the 

fourth committee, in its present form, should not be reviewed as 

well. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I thank you for those constructive suggestions, 

and I know maybe other members will want to follow up in that 

area of reform. 

Let me comment that I appreciated your response to the senior 

Senator from Maryland, Senator Sarbanes, on the Law of the Sea 

issue. It is one that I have raised with you prior to the hearing, 

in which you have given extensive answers that are not identical, 

certainly follow very much what the Secretary of State has given 

to the Committee in her testimony. And my question, more recently, the Council for the State Department, specifically, I raise 

the Law of the Sea question in the context of this hearing because 

some critics of the Law of the Sea have contended that—in the 

event that we ratify the treaty—our sovereignty would be compromised, that we would, in fact, become part of a United Nations 

organization that, in fact, taxes might be levied on the United 

States through the United Nations, through the Seabed Commission, or through other aspects of this. And, in essence, that the 

Law of the Sea situation embroils us in the sort of world governments business that you were discussing this morning, as opposed 

to facilitating our military—as we’ve heard testimony from the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and, for that 

matter, specific endorsement of the President of the United States 

who asked us to ratify that treaty as one of five treaties that he 

felt was especially important. 

I mention all of this in preface to ask from your own experience 

as a person involved in the United Nations or from the outside, in 

the State Department or so forth, do you see any potential entanglement of the United States with the Law of the Sea Treaty, and 

loss of sovereignty to the U.N. or to any other world body? 

Mr. BOLTON. No, I don’t see that the Law of the Sea Treaty implicates the United Nations in any material respect, and those that 

have gone over the question of the seabed conclude that there’s no 

risk of taxation or anything like that. As I say, my own review— 

and that of the bureaus that report to me—was on the importance 

that our military attached to it. I will say, perhaps one related 

point—a number of people have asked about the relationship of the 

Law of the Sea Treaty to the Proliferation Security Initiative—and 

you know, I don’t think that if the Senate were to ratify the Law 

of the Sea Treaty and it were to, the President were to make the 

Treaty, that it would have any negative impact whatever on PSI. 

One of the things that PSI’s Statement of Interdiction Principles 

says that there clearly is that any actions taken pursuant to PSI 

would be done in accordance with existing national and international authority. And of course, all of our other core group members of PSI are states party to the Law of the Sea Treaty, we would 

209 

not ask them, obviously, to do anything that would violate their obligations, so in effect we built that into the PSI base, as it were. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the question, the Committee is continuing to pursue the Law of the Sea Treaty, because of the request 

of our Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. There 

are a lot of other reasons to do so, obviously, in terms of our international cooperation, as well as our fishing industry, and others 

who have testified, but in terms of national defense—and that is 

what we’re talking about today, and I say security and international relations—I wanted to raise the question, I thank you for 

your responses. 

Let me ask, in the event that the United States takes issue with 

the United Nations—from time to time there are motions that come 

before the Senate, indeed we did not have a chance to dispose of 

these amendments last week, and the State Department authorization which may or may not have been an appropriate time to do 

so—but there were amendments suggesting reduction of dues to 

the U.N., or generally, a reduction of our support altogether. What 

is your view as you hear arguments about the dues reduction? 

Dues withholding, impounding and so forth? Can you give us any 

overall view? You must have thought about the problem of finance, 

our responsibilities, either pro or con, in terms of whether we do 

more or less. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that as a general proposition, the United 

States should pay its assessed contributions. I think that’s what 

the expectation is. During the first Bush Administration, President 

Bush followed through on President Reagan’s commitment to repay 

the arrearage that had been built up in the 1980’s over a five year 

period at the rate of 20 percent a year, which we were not entirely 

successful in doing for a variety of reasons, but that was the position we took, and I supported that internally. 

At the same time, there have been circumstances—and again, I 

recur to the first President Bush Administration where the financial issue has been important—and I can think, specifically, of the 

case in 1989 when the PLO was trying to become a member of the 

World Health Organization, as the WHO charter requires statehood as a precondition, the PLO was, in effect, trying to create 

facts on the ground, and Secretary Baker, we were in pretty tough 

shape. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, the PLO was basically winning that fight and we were basically losing, just before the World 

Health Assembly in May of 1989, Secretary Baker issued a statement at the time that said if any U.N. body changed the status of 

the PLO, he would recommend to the President that we withhold 

our assessments. And, obviously, Secretary Baker would not have 

made such a statement unless he had conferred with his boss. That 

was dispositive in convincing the members of the World Health Assembly not to admit the PLO, and in fact, we achieved both of our 

objectives—we kept the PLO from achieving state status, but we 

also avoided having to cut our assessments—which I think almost 

certainly would have happened if we had failed diplomatically, and 

Congress had responded. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for those responses. 

I now turn to my distinguished colleague, Senator Biden, for his 

round of questions. 

210 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that 

Mr. Bolton be sworn. 

The CHAIRMAN. He had been sworn. 

Senator BIDEN. Oh, he has been, great, thank you very, very 

much. I apologize for my being late and not knowing that. 

Let me make two comments, if I may, at the outset. 

Senator SARBANES. Was he sworn at the outset of the hearing? 

The CHAIRMAN. He was sworn about fifteen minutes ago. 

Senator SARBANES. Presumably, though, that covers the morning’s testimony as well? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Senator BIDEN. Let me say at the outset—with regard to the Intelligence Committee having already investigated these matters 

about whether or not pressure was put upon, or attempted to be 

put upon, as alleged, on government officials who, with whom the 

nominee has thought either went behind his back or went around 

him, or just simply disagreed with him—the Intelligence Committee did not look at that. What the Intelligence Committee did, 

they started to look at that, and when they were assured that had 

nothing to do with Iraq—it had to do with Cuba—they ceased their 

investigation. And so, our staff—yours and mine—went to the Intelligence Committee, got the Intelligence Committee records. Now 

that does not mean that the allegations made subsequently are 

true or not true, it just means it was not—was not, emphasized— 

was not thoroughly investigated by the Intelligence Committee. So, 

we’re not repeating, we’re not repeating work that has already 

been done, that’s the first point that I’d like to make. 

The second point I’d like to make is that there are—as we mentioned this morning—at least one witness that we have not had an 

opportunity, because he’s been out of the country to have majority 

or minority staff interview him, and that—as we mentioned this 

morning—that it would be essential that we have that in order to 

give, as well, Mr. Bolton the opportunity to either corroborate or 

disagree with whatever Mr. Silver would say, and I have not—nor 

has anybody to the best of my knowledge—spoken to Mr. Silver. 

And there are, there is at least one other witness that I’m aware 

of that we have not had an opportunity to interview. I’m assuming 

we get to interview these people very quickly, and now that Mr. 

Silver’s being made available, hopefully that can be done today, but 

until those witnesses have been interviewed, there will be no possibility—in my view—to end the hearing. I expect we can do that— 

if they’re made available today and tomorrow—to do that in a timely fashion, because these interviews have all taken place just since 

you intervened, Mr. Chairman, last Thursday. And, as evidence of 

the fact that we’re not trying to slow anything up, they were done 

during the weekend, and they were briefed during the weekend, 

and we’re not even fully—the entire Committee staff hasn’t been, 

I mean the entire membership of the Committee—has not had the 

opportunity to read all of that, and we have yet to agree to go forward. So there’s no attempt to slow this up, I just want to make 

it clear. There’s at least one, and probably two additional witnesses 

staff must interview. 

And if I can, I’d like to take three minutes, Mr. Chairman, to 

kind of lay out what our collective concern is here. And that is, to 

review, a very serious matter. Namely that Mr. Bolton, the allegaVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00210 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
211 

tion is, sought to have intelligence analysts removed from their positions—not fired—removed from their positions. And the obvious 

reason for that is, we saw how intelligence was—at least alleged— 

to have been not fully vented during the Iraq, the lead up to the 

war in Iraq; we’ve seen how it has been, was fundamentally flawed, 

and there were no weapons of mass destruction, and there is a— 

stating this bluntly, Mr. Bolton—a concern that your ideological 

predisposition relating to some of these issues is one that has 

clouded your judgment. That’s what we’re talking about here, and 

that’s what we’re investigating. 

And this is what we know from interviews thus far. We know 

that in—I say we know, we believe based on interviews that were 

conducted—that February of ’02, Mr. Bolton summoned a line analyst from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research into his office, 

and according to this analyst, Mr. Bolton got quite angry and red 

in the face. Mr. Bolton berated him for allegedly taking action to 

rewrite language for a speech he wanted to give that had been 

transmitted to the CIA for clearance by the Intelligence Community. Then it’s alleged Mr. Bolton threw him out of his office and 

summoned his boss, the acting Assistant Secretary. We know that 

Mr. Bolton—it was stated to us—that Mr. Bolton then asked the 

Assistant Secretary, Mr. Fingar, to remove the analyst from his position. We know that some days later—when he returned from 

being out of office—Mr. Bolton asked the Assistant Secretary, Carl 

Ford, who’s Fingar’s boss, to remove the analyst from his position. 

We know that several months later Mr. Bolton, once again, asked 

the new Office Director in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

at the State Department, to remove the analyst from his position. 

We know from the interviews that sometime in the summer of ’02, 

Mr. Bolton got into his automobile and drove out to CIA headquarters. He had an appointment with Stewart Cohen, then the 

acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. We know 

from Mr. Cohen that Mr. Bolton asked him to remove the National 

Intelligence Officer for Latin America from his position. The dispute here is whether Mr. Bolton was asked by Mr. Cohen—well, I 

won’t get into that now. And we know this much—Mr. Bolton deserves an opportunity to be heard in these matters, and we have 

a responsibility to review them. As I said earlier, the idea that government officials might be suppressed from dissenting views in intelligence matters is a very, very serious matter in these days. 

Fortunately, neither of the two men who are alleged to have been 

asked to be removed from the position by Mr. Bolton, neither of 

them were removed, their bosses protected them from the attempted intervention, but there is a danger that such action can 

cause a chilling effect, an effect that may ripple across the Intelligence Community, and thereby contribute to the politicizing of intelligence. 

No, I want to also make it clear who Mr. Westermann is, the fellow we’re talking about. Now, I realize we only have ten minutes 

here, I hope we are able to expand the rounds so that we can have 

some continuity in this pursuit. Mr. Westermann is a senior analyst from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He served 23 years in the United States Navy as a combat 

officer, with an intelligence subspeciality. Several tours made use 

of his subspecialty including two as an Arms Controller, inspecting 

212 

the Soviet Union. His last tours were on detail with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department Bureau of 

Non-Proliferation, and then INR. He retired from the Navy in 2000 

with a rank of Lieutenant Commander, was hired by INR as a GS– 

14 analyst, the top grade for any analyst, in January of 2001. He 

got every within-grade pay raise for which he was eligible and received outstanding job performance evaluation during ever year of 

his employment at the Department of State. He’s received numerous awards during his tenure as a Navy officer and at the State 

Department. He received an Honorable Discharge from the Navy, 

and he was awarded the Defense Superior Service Medal from the 

Secretary of Defense, for exceptionally meritorious serve in the 

United States Navy. He served under hostile fire, and he’s been responsible for men’s lives. He was hand-selected by Jack Daley, 

Vice-Commander of the—Commandant of the Marine Corps—to 

serve as his assistant and also serve as Special Assistant to Ambassador Ralph Rowe, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

He received meritorious honor award from the Department of 

State, as well as awards for his work on terrorism, his involvement 

in the operation Iraqi Freedom, and for his efforts to combat proliferation throughout the world. 

It is unusual for me to read this background. But obviously, 

there is a question here of credibility, and I want to make sure that 

we’re not talking about some new bureaucrat, hired on by a department. This is a man with a distinguished, distinguished background. 

And the same in Tom Fingar, his boss, on Westermann, he has— 

according to the Assistant Secretary of State this morning, let me 

read for the record what Mr. Fingar says about Mr. Westermann. 

Question of staff, ‘‘Did INR keep Mr. Westermann on the account 

because you had confidence in his ability to perform the job?’’ 

Fingar, ‘‘Yes.’’ Staff, ‘‘So, there was nothing about the incident in 

February when Bolton tried to have Westermann removed from his 

job that caused INR management to lose confidence in Mr. 

Westermann as an analyst, or in his integrity as an employee of 

the State Department?’’ Fingar, ‘‘None whatsoever.’’ Staff, ‘‘Do you 

have the impression of how Mr. Westermann is regarded both by 

his colleagues, within INR, and by his colleagues in the larger Intelligence Community with whom he interacts.’’ Fingar, ‘‘By everything I know, he’s highly regarded. Certainly the NIO, the National 

Intelligence Officer, for Strategic Systems who then picked up the 

WMD account, Bob Walpole, pled with me, twisted my arm, over 

an extended period, for me to persuade Christian,’’ that’s 

Westermann, ‘‘to accept the invitation that he had been extended, 

that had been extended to Westermann, to become the Deputy National Intelligence Office for BW/CW.’’ Staff, ‘‘Is it fair to say that 

it was an offer that would be made only to someone who is held 

in high esteem by the National Intelligence Officer?’’ Fingar, ‘‘Absolutely. The position would have been the Intelligence Community’s 

ranking analyst on CBW.’’ 

I realize my time is up, but I’m going to come back at the appropriate time, Mr. Chairman, and go into some considerable detail as 

to what appeared to be different interpretations, and different assertions relative to what Mr. Westermann did, and the reason why, 

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213 

fidence, is accurate, and what he did, or didn’t do, after he reached 

the conclusion he no longer had confidence in Mr. Westermann, 

and the NIO Officer whose name we cannot reveal because he is 

in a covered position right now, I’m also, I’m going to speak to that 

as well. 

I’m sorry to take this preliminary time to lay this out, but I want 

to make it clear. The two men of three that we are talking about 

here, are men who have impeccable reputations, and have made assertions fundamentally at odds with what Mr. Bolton is saying, 

based upon the testimony taken by staff, to the best of my knowledge and recollection as made available to me by staff. I thank you. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I thank you, Senator. 

Senator Chafee. 

Senator CHAFEE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Maybe I’ll yield 

some of my time to have Mr. Bolton at least respond in some way 

to Senator Biden before I ask a question. 

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you, Senator, go ahead. I’ll try to respond to 

your questions, I’m sure Senator Biden will ask me again. 

Senator CHAFEE. I’ll give you the opportunity one more time—— 

Mr. BOLTON. Okay, well then, I’ll just say one thing. Thank you, 

by the way. 

The report from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

pages 277 to 279 covers the Westermann question, and I’ll just 

quote from the conclusion of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who was dealing with stories about five individuals, one of 

whom was Mr. Westermann, and the SSCI said, ‘‘None of these individuals provided any information to the Committee that showed 

that policy makers had attempted to coerce, influence or pressure 

analysts to change their analysis or that any intelligence analyst 

changed their intelligence judgments as a result of political pressure.’’ 

Senator BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for a brief comment? 

Senator CHAFEE. A brief comment, yes. 

Senator BIDEN. The Select Committee on Intelligence possesses 

only a handful of documents, they interviewed only the INR analyst, Mr. Westermann, the Select Committee did not interview the 

analysts’s supervisor, or people under the Secretary’s office. They 

did not review any original documents from the Department except 

two electronic messages sent to the Select Committee by a member 

of Undersecretary Bolton’s staff as a part of a process for a factchecking of a draft report. And the staff of the SSCI itself, agrees 

that their review is limited for the simple reason that the main 

focus of their effort was prewar intelligence about Iraq. 

Mr. BOLTON. If you’ll give me one more chance to respond, that’s 

why I said this morning: Let’s make all this public. Let’s put all 

these interviews, let’s put everything out. I’m ready. 

Senator BIDEN. I agree. I would ask unanimous consent we do 

that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Unanimous consent is granted, given the fact 

that obviously the Committee would not wish to declassify material, we would exempt those persons and those documents that 

have classification. But those things that are a part of the open—— 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, on this point—— 

Senator DODD. Some of those documents came up here ‘‘unclassified’’ and have now been stamped ‘‘classified.’’ So, some of the 

214 

very—we would have to go back in, we’d have to look at some of 

these things that go back and trace this a little bit to make sure 

we’re not excluding documents from the record that otherwise 

would have been allowed a few days ago. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would respond to the member by saying the 

members who are cleared and staff who are cleared would be able 

to examine those documents, but the request was for general public 

publication, and I’m indicating those documents that are not classified would be published. 

Mr. BOLTON. If we could go beyond that, I think there’s some of 

the classified documents I would see to have declassified, frankly. 

Senator BIDEN. It should be. It should be. There are State Department documents, you could help us in that regard by contacting the State Department, and we have no authority to declassify documents they send to us classified. We can, immediately, and 

with your permission, Mr. Chairman, release the transcript of and 

the notes on all the interviews conducted by each of the individuals 

we have interviewed. We can so that. But we cannot declassify 

memos sent to us, or documents sent to us by the State Department, that they marked classified. 

Senator DODD. Let the record show these were unclassified documents until we made the request. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry, if I 

might? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? 

Senator BOXER. I’m just trying to get a word in because Mr. 

Bolton, to his credit, says he wants everything on the table. That 

means we need some time here to interview some of the folks that 

are deeply involved before we have a vote on this nominee, and I’m 

just saying I hope that, as you work with our ranking member 

here, you will allow us that opportunity, because there are a couple 

of people—one is in New York—it’s hard to get to these people, but 

since Mr. Bolton himself says it all should be on the table, I think 

we all agree we’re going to need a little time to—not a lot of time— 

just to find a couple of these people who feel that they have been 

in a situation where pressure was put upon them by Mr. Bolton, 

and we need to question them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Senator makes an excellent point. Let 

me just say from the standpoint of the Chair that we have attempted to move as expeditiously as possible to make available, not 

only to Senators, Senator’s staffs and that would be members of 

staffs who are not part of the official Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, Republicans, Democrats. Mr. Bolton has been available. I’m hopeful that Senators have some sense of reason about 

this because we clearly could get into a study period—— 

Senator BOXER. No, I know. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That was extensive, and I think in 

fairness to the President, who needs to have an Ambassador to the 

U.N., to our witness today who aspires to that position, and to the 

American people who anticipate that we ought to be doing our job. 

I appreciate there have been extenuating circumstances of the very 

important funeral services for John Paul II, which has led to our 

initial postponement of the hearing which would have occurred last 

Thursday, until today. We have another hearing tomorrow for Carl 

Ford, which I gather—because of the nature of the witness—will be 

215 

back into these issues which are circulating today. So, I would hope 

that members would avail themselves at least to the calendar day 

today and tomorrow to exhaust whatever their curiosity might be. 

But I’m hopeful we can pursue, at least, a decision. I think that’s 

very important. And I think most of the American public anticipates that we will do that. 

Senator BIDEN. On that point, Mr. Chairman, I want to make it 

clear. The best of our knowledge is only two witnesses we have had 

to interview, they are both in the employ of the State Department, 

they’re both able to be made available by the State Department. 

My staff tells me the one, Mr. Silver, whose name has already been 

invoked, is not available until tomorrow afternoon, we have been 

under the assumption—we’re prepared, I’m not taking issue with 

that, but just so you know—it’s not us delaying that. We thought 

it would be today, it won’t be until tomorrow, and there’s one other 

witness—who I’d rather not name at the moment—we let Mr. 

Bolton and you know, I’m not sure whether he is under cover or 

not, I don’t think he is, but I don’t want to make a mistake, who 

is a State Department employee as well. They are the only two witnesses at this moment, to the best of my knowledge that the minority is seeking to interview, and they’re both within the employ of 

the State Department, I think both are in country, if I’m not mistaken. 

Senator DODD. Just one caveat again, there’s a third one, Mr. 

Chairman, who would be someone who is under cover, and it would 

be highly inappropriate for that individual to testify in a public setting, but has expressed a willingness to testify if he is so directed, 

in a closed session. 

Senator BIDEN. Two different issues, I don’t want to confuse this, 

Mr. Chairman. One, is interviews that have not taken place yet; 

two, is additional witnesses among those were interviewed who 

may or may not be asked to call or Secretary Bolton may or may 

not wish to have called. The State Department may conclude they 

want Mr. Silver called, because he corroborates what Mr. Bolton 

said. We may ask Mr. Silver to be called if, in fact, he says what 

he think he is going to say, but don’t know. And so, but right now, 

the only two additional witnesses seeking to be interviewed by the 

minority are both State Department employees. And among those 

who have been interviewed it is possible, although there is no plan 

at this moment, to ask that one of them testify as Mr. Ford is testify. That could all be done immediately, it could be done quickly, 

this is not next week, or two weeks or three weeks down the road. 

This is all able to be wrapped up very clearly, and Mr. Bolton’s answer to much of what we have—when we get a chance to go 

through it—may satisfy us there’s no need to call anymore witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, everyone has had discussion for the moment of the situation, and let me just indicate that I think we’ll 

want to consult with all members of the Committee, I’ve attempted 

to be as accommodating as I could for requests that are coming, but 

I would just have to say to Senators—and I’m one of these Senators—having read all the material that has thus far been exhumed, 150 pages from the State Department, additional measure 

from the CIA, the interviews with these five people, and maybe 

six—that I am not impressed with the gravity that is being sugVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00215 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
216 

gested. Now, I appreciate an important argument is being made, 

namely the Iraq failure of intelligence, and the question of whether 

this activity by Mr. Bolton a while back shows some manifestations 

of something that was very, very serious, Iraq. But, that is a matter of judgment of Senators, so we will all read everything, we will 

try to get the people as rapidly as possible, but at some point, we’re 

going o try to bring this to conclusion, and so I hope the members 

understand that, that there is a disagreement over how grave the 

alleged offense may have been, and finally—even if it was substantial—whether that would influence the Senators’ vote for or against 

Mr. Bolton. 

So, we will try to make available all of the record that is not classified, we will try to make available the classified persons and/or 

materials as rapidly as possible. I know Mr. Bolton and the State 

Department will cooperate in attempting to expedite that situation. 

And we know we have ahead of us, still, questions this afternoon, 

and then another hearing tomorrow. 

Having said that, we’re back to Senator Chafee, to reclaim him 

time. 

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

But continuing on the same theme—maybe you could detach 

yourself, if possible, from this furor about influence over individuals and the threatening of their positions, if you could detach 

yourself—how serious are these accusations? What do you think, in 

the abstract? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think, fundamentally, there’s nothing there. The 

issue here has nothing to do with intelligence analysis, has nothing 

to do with the substantive positions taken by either of the two individuals in question, has nothing to do with whether they agree or 

disagree with me on what I said about Cuba’s BW efforts—it has 

nothing to do with the political construct about, the allegations 

about political pressure on analysts dealing with Iraq, it has nothing to do with that at all. It has to do with a question of straightforward behavior, and open and honest dealings. And, you know, 

as I said earlier this morning—when you lose trust and confidence 

in somebody in a professional environment—it’s a problem, especially when it’s in the intelligence area. I didn’t see to have these 

people fired, I didn’t seek to have discipline imposed on them, I 

said, ‘‘I’ve lost trust in them,’’ and are there other portfolios they 

could follow, it wasn’t anything to me that I followed at great 

length, I made my point and I moved on. 

If I can just address on thing that we referred to, this other analyst at the CIA whom I’ll try and call ‘‘Mr. Smith’’ here, I hope I 

can keep that straight, you know, the other analyst, ‘‘Mr. Smith,’’ 

I’d never even heard of him, I didn’t know who he was until after 

the Heritage speech. When I heard that somehow he was saying he 

hadn’t been involved in the clearance process, as a member of the 

National Intelligence Council—as I say, I’d never heard of this individual, I didn’t know his name, I frankly didn’t understand what 

the National Intelligence Council did. I checked with the CIA and 

they said they had, indeed, they had cleared the speech with the 

National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, who has 

cognizance over biological warfare issues, and therefore was the 

right NIO to clear. When I heard all of these things, and I said, 

‘‘I’m a State Department person, I don’t fully understand, I want 

217 

to go out and talk to the gentleman,’’ who at that point was the 

Chairman or maybe it was the Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and find out what this instrument was. So, I 

went out to basically pay a courtesy call on Mr. Cohen, and it’s 

true—as Senator Biden has found out—that I drove my own car 

out there, I have to make a confession here, the CIA is sort of more 

or less on the way home for me, and from time to time when I’ve 

gone out there I have driven my own car, I’ve had my meetings and 

then, I hate to say this, but I left and went home, I didn’t go back 

to my office. So, I went out to pay a courtesy call, and my recollection was that the bulk of the meeting was composed of Mr. Cohen 

explaining to me what the NIC did, and told me what their publications were and how it had been created, and gave me some background on it. 

I also knew that in the weeks and months previous thereto, dealing with this ‘‘Mr. Smith,’’ Otto Reich, who is the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, had told me and 

told other he had very grave problems with Mr. Smith, on a range 

of issues—Cuba BW being one of the least of his concerns. And 

dealing, not just with Cuba, but with other matters—and that he 

had told Mr. Cohen, he thought—he was not satisfied with Mr. 

Smith’s performance. And I think I said to Mr. Cohen, Stewart 

Cohen, in the course of the conversation, that based on what I had 

seen in my limited area, that I agreed with them. And that was 

it, I had one part of one conversation with one person, one time on 

Mr. Smith, and that was it, I let it go. 

Senator CHAFEE. I’ll try and rephrase my question. If you remove 

yourself, the personal involvement, and the facts of personally 

being involved in this incident, incidents, I think the accusation 

from your opponents is that you’re trying to influence people to try 

to change their assessments, which they didn’t believe—to change 

their assessment, essentially falsifying evidence with the threat to 

their job, but do you see it that way, and how serious do you feel 

these accusations are? Not to you personally, but just as someone 

that’s applying to be the Ambassador to whatever, in this case, the 

United Nations, but it could be for any promotion. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that is part of the allegation, it’s false, I 

have never—— 

Senator CHAFEE. How serious? If it were true. 

Mr. BOLTON [continuing]. Tried to do that. I think it’s, intelligence analysts should give their honest assessment, I have tried 

in four years in this job—in fact that’s something that I’ve seen in 

the press—I’ve tried in four years in this job to get as much intelligence as I could from as many different sources as I could. I 

brought in, from the CIA, and put on my staff, an intelligence analyst, precisely so that I would have better access to the broader Intelligence Community. I welcome—I probably met dozens, scores, 

maybe hundreds of intelligence analysts in the course of my four 

years; I’ve got out to NSA, I’ve gone out to CIA, I’ve met with people involved and intelligence activities at the Los Alamos and 

Sandia and Lawrence Livermore laboratories, I’ve talked to them 

in my office—I welcome the interchange, I respect the positions 

they take, I think it’s critically important to the formation of American Foreign Policy, and I’ve never tried to change anybody’s position through any kind of improper influence or pressure, that’s not 

218 

my style. My style is to say, ‘‘Here’s what I think, what do you 

think?’’ 

Senator CHAFEE. Okay, thank you. I’ll change tacks a little bit, 

in the morning session you—I believe, correct me if I’m wrong— 

said you didn’t necessarily criticize the United Nations through the 

years, it’s been our role, the United States’ role, do I have that 

right? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes, that’s correct. 

Senator CHAFEE. And then said we did not exhibit good leadership in the nineties, do I have that right? 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s correct. 

Senator CHAFEE. Can you be more specific about failure through 

the nineties? 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, through roughly the late 1980’s, I think it 

is fair to say that the Security Council was grid locked by the Cold 

War. In fact, grid locked almost from its formation in 1945. 

In the mid and late-10980s, as what was called ‘‘new thinking’’ 

developed in Soviet foreign policy, the possibility that that grid lock 

could be broken in the Security Council began to be apparent. And 

it was—as is almost always the case in the Security Council—what 

became possible there was a reflection of changes in the larger 

geostrategic environment, so that in the Soviet Union, as I say, 

new thinking was beginning to play out and policy makers began 

to look at their foreign policy through the interests of the Soviet 

Union, as opposed to the prism of Communist philosophy. And, 

they began to say, ‘‘What exactly are our interests, from a Soviet 

point of view, in Angola? Why, exactly, are we subsidizing Cuba, 

through the barter of oil at well below market prices? What is 

this,’’ and, to be candid, ‘‘What is this from a Russian point of view 

that’s really involved here?’’ So that in the late-1980s, a number of 

new peace keeping operations became possible in areas that had 

been cockpits of Cold War conflict, and I can think specifically of 

the case of the link between Namibia and Angola. Whereby very 

effective diplomacy of the United States and others—myself not involved, I should say—we were able to work out in Angola the withdrawal of Cuban forces, and a—the first election, the first free and 

fair election in Namibia on a multiracial basis. This was an example of the Soviet Union—as it was still there, through Russia— 

playing out a normal nation’s foreign policy. And the real test of 

that occurred at the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when I 

remember distinctly Jim Baker, I think, was hunting in Mongolia, 

and instead of coming home, he went to Moscow, and he and 

Shevardnadze worked out a very important statement in opposition 

to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that was the fundamental basis for the 

cooperation between the Soviet Union, as it was still then, and the 

United States in the Security Council. It was the first, really, major 

manifestation of the end of Security Council grid lock after the 

Cold War, and the whole series of Iraq-related resolutions in the 

Council. It was a very optimistic time, and I think I mentioned earlier, we set up other peacekeeping operations—MINURSO in the 

Western Sahara in the late spring/early summer of 1991—and I 

think this optimism was misread by many people, unfortunately, to 

believe that somehow the United Nations was back in 1945, and 

that a lot of the constraints that, unfortunately, still existed, had 

disappeared. And that, that led to the United Nations being put 

219 

into a lot of situation where, frankly, there was no clear political 

resolution in sight, member governments didn’t provide adequate 

support, the United Nations didn’t have adequate guidance, and it 

did not contribute to a resolution of threats to international peace 

and security. 

In many respects, the handing over of these kinds of disputes to 

the U.N. was a way for some policy makers to say, ‘‘That’s off my 

plate,’’ and I think it was dereliction in the responsibility of member governments to do that. And it led to, what many people called, 

failures by the United Nations. That’s why—I come back to my 

point about false concreteness—there’s failures by member governments. And not directly due to mistakes by the Secretariat, but by 

policies that the member governments have created. 

I think now we’ve got a—both the opportunity and the responsibility—in a way, I can see almost going back to the days right after 

the successful resolutions in Iraq in the early 1990’s, and seeing if 

we can’t avoid the mistakes that were made. It’s always easy in 

hindsight to see the mistakes, we should at least try to benefit 

from them—that, at least, is the attitude that President Bush 

brings to this question about how to move the U.N. forward. 

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee. 

Senator Dodd. 

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me—again, if 

I can—Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, first of all, for your 

comments this afternoon on how we ought to proceed, I think all 

of us here have no problem with that whatsoever, this is not a delaying tactic at all, but really trying to get to the bottom of issues, 

and I—— 

Senator BIDEN. By the way, if we wish to delay, under Senate 

rules we could call for the hearing to end right now. Because the 

Senate’s in session, you can’t go two hours beyond the Senate’s in 

session. I offer that as evidence of the fact that we have no desire 

to delay this. 

Senator DODD. I think you for that, I’ll agree with that. Secondly, 

I want to thank you for your statement this morning, your opening 

statement, Mr. Chairman, as always, just excellent. And ones that 

I couldn’t agreement with more—I think, your closing words here 

because I think they, in a sense, go to the heart of what our colleague from Illinois raised with his questions at the end of the session this morning about this particular point, it’s causing some of 

us to have some real concerns about. And that is the—and I quote 

from your opening comments here this morning—‘‘diplomatic 

speech by any high-ranking administration official has policy consequences. It should never be undertaken simply to score some 

international debating points to appeal to U.S. public opinion, or to 

validate a personal point of view.’’ And you quoted President Kennedy, once saying, you quoted him, ‘‘The purpose of foreign policy 

is not to provide an outlet for our own sentiments, or hopes, or indignation. It is to shape events in the real world,’’ end of quote. It’s 

an excellent statement to have as we talk about the subject matter. 

So, I want to make that statement again. 

The point is, there’s nothing at all wrong, for any official—Mr. 

Bolton, or anyone else, for that matter—to stand up and give a 

speech, and say what they believe to be the case. I believe, in this 

220 

particular case, the issue was about Cuba at the time, I believe, 

that Cuba has biological weapons—has every right in the world to 

do that—you may disagree with it. The problem occurs when a Mr. 

Bolton, or anyone else in the government gets up and says what 

the U.S. believes. And you go to the Intelligence Community to get 

corroboration. And that’s what this is really all about. And, let me, 

just so that it’s on the record, I’ll ask unanimous consent that this 

language be included in the record. What Mr. Bolton wanted to 

say, in February of 2002, is the following, ‘‘The analysts,’’ that’s the 

Senate Intelligence Committee Report, excuse me, this is the proposed cleared text from the Senate Intelligence Committee. 

Senator BIDEN. That’s the actual language from the Senate Intelligence Committee looking into this matter, in their report. This is 

what they said. 

Senator DODD. The sentence would say, ‘‘The United States believes that Cuba has a developmental offensive biological warfare 

program and is providing assistance to other rogue state programs.’’ The text also call for international observers. 

What was approved, what Mr. Westermann suggested, he said, 

is ‘‘The United States believes that Cuba,’’—that was the, ultimately approved, this was what was ultimately approved. What 

was ultimately approved was, that ‘‘Cuba has, at least, a limited 

offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba 

has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states. We’re 

concerned that such technology could support BW programs in 

those states. We call on Cuba to cease all biological applicable cooperation with rogue states, and to comply fully with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention,’’ end of quote. 

And there are various—it may not sound like a big difference to 

those who have just heard this—but there are significant differences. 

One is, of course, what the U.S. believes, and that’s the important point here. And the salient differences are one, limited, the 

word limited, which is not insignificant; ‘‘research and development,’’ instead of ‘‘developmental program,’’ which would have implied a far more structured activity; ‘‘Cuba has provided dual-use 

technology that could support BW programs,’’ that’s a carefully 

caveated phrase, obviously. Rather than just ‘‘providing assistance 

to other rogue states,’’ and it deleted any reference to inspections 

that the U.S. government believes it would be ineffective, and does 

not warrant a greater precedent for inspections there. So, there is 

a difference, a significant difference, that’s important to note. 

Let me say also as well, I think some of my colleagues may have 

made this point as well. If this were a one-time event, you might 

be upset about it, but I don’t think it would warrant, necessarily, 

taking the time of this confirmation out of the confirmation process. All of us have been in situations where staff or others have 

said or done things that we’ve disagreed with, and we might have 

said or done things in retrospect that were probably not terribly 

wise. The question is, is there a pattern here, Mr. Bolton? And 

that’s what’s worried many of us here. And so that’s why we raise 

these issues. 

Again, this morning, we’re quoting here, I’m quoting from these 

interviews that occurred just a few days ago. Mr. Fleitz, ‘‘All I can 

remember, and this is from Mr. Bolton,’’ I’m quoting him now, ‘‘is 

221 

that he spoke to Mr. Fingar to express his concern over what happened, and said that Mr. Westermann had lost his confidence, and 

he should have been given a new portfolio.’’ Mr. Fleitz again, 

‘‘When Silver was there, Bolton relayed the fact that he had lost 

confidence in Mr. Westermann, and asked that he be given a different portfolio.’’ That’s in September. Mr. Fingar, I mentioned this 

morning, is Assistant Secretary for State, for INR, again, being 

interviewed, ‘‘Bolton said that he wanted Westermann taken off his 

accounts.’’ He said, that is, Fingar said, ‘‘He’s our chemical weapons/biological weapons specialist, that is what he does. He expressed again,’’ Mr. Fingar speaking, Mr. Bolton says, ‘‘He expressed again, as I remember it, that he was the President’s appointee, and he could say what he wanted.’’ End of quote, Mr. 

Fingar. Let me add here, I’m going to ask you whether or not you 

recall saying this at all, but Mr. Fingar, when asked, Mr. Fingar 

what Mr. Bolton had to say about Mr. Westermann, Mr. Fingar 

said, and I quote him again in the interview several days ago, 

‘‘That he was the President’s,’’ talking about you, ‘‘that he was the 

President’s appointee, that he had every right to say what he believed, that he wasn’t going to be told what he could say by a midlevel INR munchkin analyst.’’ End of quote. 

Again, then there’s several others here, it just seems to me here, 

you’ve got a number of people now who believe that you’re, you 

were so upset with what Mr. Westermann was doing, that you 

wanted him removed, and that’s my concern—even if you were 

right about the substance, in this case, it’s not the case, I think it 

ultimately proved that the INR’s assessment was a more appropriate assessment on what Cuba’s situation was—but even if you 

were right and they were wrong, the point that Senator Obama 

made this morning, the point the Chairman made in his opening 

comments—it is deeply disturbing to me in the environment we’re 

in, where it is so important for us who sit on this side of the table, 

for those of you who sit on the side of the table you’re on—that we 

have factual information coming from our Intelligence Community. 

And if, at any point, we begin to suspect that that information is 

being tailored to serve, what Senator Lugar talked about this 

morning, a personal point of view, then I think it’s dangerous. And 

that’s why we’re spending so much time on this. 

Mr. BOLTON. May I respond? 

Senator DODD. Absolutely. 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, he wasn’t straight with me. And that’s 

what I expressed—— 

Senator DODD. This is good, but tell me about the process in this, 

now I understand the process, you tell me where I’m wrong. That 

your office says to them, ‘‘This is what we want to say, the three 

sentences,’’ and then, then, it would come back to Mr. Westermann 

anyway, at some point, to make a determination as to whether or 

not that was right or not. Where’s the backstabbing here? If, in 

fact, in sends the language he would suggest to you, how is that 

backstabbing you? 

Mr. BOLTON. Senator, I don’t know the ins and outs of the process, I don’t pretend to, it is what staff does, I’m not an expert on 

it. That’s why, as I said this morning, and I don’t really have anything to add to what I said this morning, but it’s why I went to 

Mr. Fingar and said, ‘‘What’s going on here?’’ And at the time, the 

222 

day of the incident, Mr. Fingar said that Westermann’s behavior 

was, ‘‘entirely inappropriate,’’ he said, ‘‘we screwed up,’’ and he 

said, twice, ‘‘it won’t happen again.’’ That’s, I didn’t try to have Mr. 

Westermann removed—— 

Senator DODD. Do you recall saying that to Mr. Fingar? That you 

were the President’s appointee, that you had every right to say 

what you wanted to? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t, no, I don’t recall the conversation in any 

substance, what I wanted to know was what, what exactly happened. I wanted to know why this process was happening the way 

it was, I wanted to hear from somebody at the top of INR, and 

that’s what Mr. Fingar said back to me. But I did not, look, I didn’t 

try to have disciplinary action imposed on Westermann, I just 

didn’t feel that he had been straight with me, and I don’t know 

what INR did, apparently they didn’t do anything, and I haven’t 

complained about it since then. I made my point, and moved on. 

Senator BIDEN. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Secretary, you say 

you don’t know this clearance process for a speech, after all these 

years? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t, no, no, no. What I said was, that, I thought 

what Senator Dodd was asking was, who had done what to whom 

at the staff level, and I don’t know, no, I don’t know that—— 

Senator BIDEN. I thought you were asking how something gets 

cleared in a speech. You send it to your guy at INR, the INR guy 

then sends it to the CIA, the CIA then circulates it throughout the 

entire Intelligence Community. 

Mr. BOLTON. Right. 

Senator BIDEN. Each of those people, including the guy who 

heads up INR, get back to them and say, ‘‘this is good, or bad, or 

indifferent,’’ then it gets back to you. That’s the process, right? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think, as I’ve learned now, that’s what the process 

is, it’s also possible because INR is part of the State Department 

that INR could have—at a staff level—come to us first before they 

had done that. I thought that he had gone behind my back, that’s 

why I asked Mr. Fingar, and I thought Mr. Fingar’s response that 

the behavior was entirely inappropriate supported—— 

Senator DODD. You heard, you know what Mr. Fingar says 

today? 

Mr. BOLTON. I knew what he said at the time. 

Senator DODD. But most recently you know what he said, we 

went over that this morning, let me tell you what Mr. Westermann 

said, because he was asked by the Committee in the last couple of 

days. He’s quoting again, he said, ‘‘He’s,’’ meaning by that you, Mr. 

Bolton, ‘‘was quite upset that I had objected, and he wanted to 

know what right I had trying to change an Undersecretary’s language, and what he would say, or not say, on something like that. 

And I tried to explain to him a little bit of the same thing about 

the process and how we clear language, and I guess he wasn’t really in a mood to listen. And he was quite angry, and basically told 

me that I had no right to do that. He got very red in the face, and 

shaking his finger at me, and explained to me that I was acting 

way beyond my position, and for someone who worked for him. I 

told him I didn’t work for him.’’ He goes on to talk about waving 

your finger at him and so forth. His recollection is not you saying 

to him ‘‘you went around my back, you should have come to me,’’ 

223 

and so forth, which I think they did in the e-mail exchange, but 

his point is, you didn’t say that, you said he had no right to correct 

your language, you were the Undersecretary, he’s just a mid-level 

analyst. Who’s he to be telling a Presidential appointee what to 

say? 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s why I called Mr. Fingar. 

Senator DODD. But did you say this or not? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t recall saying that, what I recall saying is 

that he was out of line and that he had gone behind my back and 

I said, ‘‘I don’t care if you disagree with me, I just think you 

shouldn’t do it behind my back.’’ 

Senator DODD. Well, let me ask you again about the, because, as 

I say, if this were one event, you know, I’ll be the first one to tell 

you, you probably shouldn’t have done this, but I wouldn’t spend 

thirty seconds on this issue. But what concerns me is that there’s 

the second incident that we have involving the ‘‘Mr. Smith,’’ as 

you’ve called him, our unnamed intelligence officer. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you summarize this? 

Senator DODD. I’m sorry. Well just, again, you know, the question arises because, again, we’ve had testimony from this individual, from people at the agency that, in fact, you, you and Otto 

Reich both went out to the Agency and raised the issue about 

whether or not this individual was going to be removed as an intelligence officer for Latin America, did that or not, happen? 

Mr. BOLTON. I went out to the Agency to meet with Mr. Cohen 

to get a, an understanding of what the NIC was, and to follow up 

on trying to get a better understanding of what the clearance process was, and I mentioned—as I said before—that I had lost confidence in Mr. Smith, and that I knew Otto Reich had been out 

there before on a much larger series of concerns, I can’t really 

speak to those concerns, because they weren’t in my area of responsibility. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. 

Senator DODD. Well, Mr. Chairman, just so the record is clear, 

Mr. Cohen was visited by Otto Reich at the office, Friday afternoon 

in 2002, Reich wanted to make the case for removing the NIO from 

Latin America from his position, he presented two lines of argument and said he was speaking, not only on his own behalf, but 

on behalf of Mr. Bolton. Mr. Reich has said this again in public, 

publications, that that was what he was there for. A week later, 

Mr. Bolton called and asked to meet Mr. Cohen as well, traveled 

to the Agency on his way home or whatever, the case is here, 

Cohen did not recall specifics, but believed his intent was clear. 

This is Mr. Cohen, now, I mean, this is all these people lining up 

here. At some point you’ve got to say, ‘‘This is not enemies of yours 

that are doing this,’’ Mr. Cohen said intent was clear, namely, he 

wanted the NIO removed. Cohen described both meetings as ‘‘amicable.’’ But you wanted him removed. That’s what worries me. Exactly the point Barack Obama made about credible intelligence, the 

point the Chairman made in his opening comments. It’s a significant issue, this—in all due respect to the Chairman—I think this 

is the most profound question. I, frankly, kind of agree with a lot 

of your statements about the United Nations, candidly. I think 

you’ve been on the mark with many of them. I might disagree with 

some of the rhetoric you’ve used, but I don’t have a substantive 

224 

problem with that. My problem is this: we’re suffering terribly 

when the Senate, we sent the Secretary of State to the United Nations to make a case for the presence of weapons of mass destruction, it was wrong. Terrible information. We were damaged terribly 

by that. If this is true that you tried to remove an analyst because 

you disagreed with their conclusions about this, that is going to 

hurt us further at the—that’s my concern. 

Mr. BOLTON. If I could just say, I have never done anything in 

connection with any analyst’s views. Nothing. 

Senator DODD. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dodd. 

Senator Allen. 

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bolton, a lot of this has gotten off to this tangent of this 

speech, and I find it interesting this fascination of the process of 

speech composition. But I do like to have it somehow relevant to 

the major issues that you will address as Ambassador to the 

United Nations, and I have a hard time determining how this has 

anything to do with advancing freedom and Democracy, Senator 

Dodd mentioned he agreed with all of your statements, your advocacy, your characterization—maybe he doesn’t like some of the adjectives, I like adjectives, I like your adjectives as well, that you 

used—but regardless, the issue is stopping proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction, the issues are reducing Russian nuclear warheads, advancing freedom, and of course, efficiency and accountability in the United Nations. And trying to figure out once—and 

I’m glad to hear that we’re going to read all this testimony, and 

I hope it’s done quickly so that we’re not off on too long of a detour 

off the main track here, and I think that we shouldn’t be slowing 

up a vote on a tangential issue, at best—I’m trying to discern the 

essence of this concern, and it seems to me that at the end of the 

day, it’s going to come down to, and Senator Biden who I have a 

great deal of respect for, is talking about whether it clouds your 

judgment or not, and the question of credibility, and I think it’s 

probably going to come down to differing interpretations of your 

loss of confidence, or trust, in some of these individuals, and you’re 

saying you never tried to have them change positions, but you lose 

confidence in people. I think all of us, from time to time, may have 

that, realized that some people who are advising us, you say, ‘‘Wait 

a second, this isn’t researched properly,’’ and that’s normal. I’m 

wondering how much it really matters. Now, all it’s gotten down 

to, and I hate to get into it, but seeing how this tangent, or this 

issue, is important to some members on this Committee—the issue 

is Cuba’s biological capabilities, and how they might be transferring it to rogue states. It would be helpful to say which rogue 

states these are, because I remember we had a briefing on it, and 

it was, it wasn’t absolutely clear, but we knew they had biological 

weapon capability, and they had, actually, a fairly good bio/tech infrastructure in Cuba. And then the question wasn’t just the biological and the pharmaceuticals, but which ones of those could be dualuse, and which countries, which are also countries which are on the 

State Department’s list of those that are sponsors of state terrorism, which were involved. 

Now, so you can through all of that, and which states we’re concerned about, but ultimately, would you characterize—in your 

225 

view—the difference between what you were proffering, as to 

whether or not that could be stated, versus what was an approved 

statement. And, granted, there were some qualifications, Senator 

Dodd said that there’s a qualification here, there, but in essence, 

was there all that much of a difference from what you wanted to 

say, I know there’s a lot of questions in there, but I just wanted 

to allow you to give your point of view of this particular detour. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that the main point was that we realized 

in late 2001, as I say, within a couple of months after September 

the 11th, that the United States government had not said anything 

publically about Cuba’s BW effort in some time, and that, in the 

wake of September the 11th, where the terrorist attacks has awakened all of us, unfortunately, to how much danger we were in, and 

how much it would have been worse if the terrorists used biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, we had to have a discussion—a 

public discussion—in the United States about the nature of the 

threat that we faced. And I wouldn’t have been surprised, frankly, 

if the Intelligence Community had said, ‘‘We’re not going to agree 

to declassify anything about Cuba,’’ because the nature of the 

sources and methods was potentially so sensitive that it was simply 

too risky to do. And this was all in the context of the arrest and 

then confession and conviction of Ana Belan Montes, a Cuban spy, 

who had been the senior Cuba analyst in the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, and it’s a frightening thing when you think about it, what 

she could have been transmitting back to Cuba and what—and I’ll 

just say this in an abstract sense, if somebody knows, some other 

country knows a little bit about what we know, their ability to conduct denial and deception activities increases remarkably. So, I felt 

it was important to discuss this issue, and based on what the Intelligence Community had already written, we started a process to see 

what would come out. And I was satisfied with the end result— 

Senator Dodd quoted a series of differences, I don’t recall, I didn’t 

really, frankly, get into the back and forth, it was done at the staff 

level—but I felt that the language that I used, which turned out 

to be—I felt the language I used on the Cuba BW effort was about 

right. And it turned out that—— 

Senator ALLEN. Are you talking about the—Senator Dodd quoted 

the language which was approved, which I assume that you espoused in this speech, is that right? 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s correct, yeah. 

Senator DODD. If the Senator would yield—I quoted the language 

that Mr. Bolton wanted to use, and what was approved, and what 

the differences were between what he wanted to say, and what was 

actually approved to be said, and the difference is significant. 

Senator DODD. I’m going to ask Mr. Bolton to say, and there may 

be—whether you want to call them nuance differences, or qualitative difference, or significance—I would like you to share with us 

whether you think that what was ultimately approved, which I assumed is what you said in your speech, I don’t think there’s any 

question in that regard, but how would you characterize the differences in what was approved, versus what you had proffered as 

a general concept to include as part of the speech? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, this was sort of a moving process, and I’m not 

sure exactly where it was, but I was content to have, I wanted to 

say what was accurate. I didn’t want to go through what we’re 

226 

going through now, and that’s why we went through this extensive 

clearance process, and I’ll tell you—the thing that probably I’ll 

never forget all of this—when I gave this speech at the Heritage 

Foundation and it got attention the next day, I talked about a lot 

of other countries, Cuba was what got attention, but I was sitting, 

reading the morning Washington Post the day after the speech, 

reading through the story about the speech, and I came to the very 

last paragraph, and what it says is, ‘‘As it happens, Bolton was not 

the first official to make a public statement on the subject. Carl W. 

Ford, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, used identical language in March 19 Congressional testimony, that largely went unnoticed.’’ So, that’s the language we’re 

talking about, it was used several times by a number of different 

people, Assistant Secretary Reich, I think, used it, I used it, Assistant Secretary Ford—— 

Senator KERRY. Which language? Can we get that clarified? 

Senator ALLEN. There’s the language that—fair enough—it’s the 

language that we’re referring to as again, similar to what Senator 

Dodd—— 

Mr. BOLTON. It’s essentially the same, right? It’s essentially the 

same. 

Senator ALLEN. And, do you find that to be—how would you describe the difference between what you said in that speech—which 

apparently was the same as what others had said in previous 

speeches, folks just pay attention when you speak, folks listen— 

which is good, we expect them to in the United Nations. Especially 

when you’re representing Americans, but how would you characterize the difference from what your inquiry was, or your proffered 

language, versus what was approved? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that there were some language changes, but 

that basically what we were, what was eventually cleared was to 

make the point that Cuba had a research and development effort. 

And I think that was the point to be made, and I was happy to be 

able to make it. 

Senator ALLEN. Do you see any reason why this discussion on 

crafting speeches and the process of speeches will have any impact 

on your ability to assist and lead the United Nations to greater reforms and efficiency, or stopping the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t think it will have any impact one way or the 

other, to tell you the truth, the process of clearances is an important process, and I think when you’re speaking on behalf of the 

United States, you should speak with all of the equities in the government covered, that’s what we tried to do in this speech, that’s 

what I’ve tried to do in all of my speeches. 

Senator ALLEN. Well, I think we all will, and in fact, any intelligence we receive, regardless of party, in the future we’re going to 

all look at it with greater scrutiny after the information and decisions made on evidence before the military action in Iraq. But I 

agree with you, I don’t see where this nuance difference in crafting 

a speech, stating the same things that have been stated by others, 

will have any impact whatsoever on your ability to lead this country, and lead also, the United Nations toward greater reforms while 

representing our values and principles. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

227 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen. 

Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me make it clear that this language that’s being referred to, 

that other people have said, is the approved language. That’s what 

Carl Ford said, the approved language. Carl Ford did not say what 

you were proposing to say, which was corrected by the review process. Now, a moment ago you said, the reason that you did the corrective process was to avoid all of this. That’s not accurate. The 

reason you did the corrective process is because it’s standard operating procedure that anything that involves intelligence that is to 

be spoken by a national public official, goes to the Intelligence 

Community for review, correct? It’s normal procedure, correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. If it involved intelligence, yes. 

Senator KERRY. The clearance procedure—— 

Mr. BOLTON [continuing]. Is much broader than just clearance in 

the Intelligence Community. 

Senator KERRY. I understand that. But this paragraph by normal 

operating procedure of the department, had to go and be cleared, 

correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. Let me try and separate, we’ve got two different 

things that’s being, that are being talked about here. The first was 

that the language that we talked about had to be declassified. Now, 

had it then, once declassified, then—— 

Senator KERRY. What I’m getting to is the judgment, the substance, the assessment. 

Mr. BOLTON. Right. 

Senator KERRY. You were proposing to say the words, ‘‘A developmental, offensive, biological warfare program,’’ and ‘‘is providing 

assistance to other rogue state programs,’’ implying that the developmental offensive biological warfare program was developmental—not research—but developmental, and being provided to 

other rogue state programs. Now, substantively, the analyst who 

worked with you disagreed with you, and you knew that. You knew 

that ahead of time. In fact, your own staff Chief Fleitz, in the interview with the Committee, said very clearly that—I think I have it 

hear—right here. You summoned Mr. Westermann to your office on 

February 12, after you learned that he’d expressed INR’s objection 

to parts of what you wanted to say. And Mr. Fleitz, who is your 

Chief of Staff, requested that Mr. Westermann bring his comment, 

along with the original language that you proposed, up to your office, and he did so. And Fleitz said, I quote Fleitz, ‘‘Well, I sent an 

e-mail to Mr. Westermann, as I had said, and when he came up 

to the front office, I had instructions from Mr. Bolton to bring him 

into Mr. Bolton’s office, and Christian went into Mr. Bolton’s office, 

and I accompanied him. And Mr. Bolton looked at the e-mail, or 

the document, and he said something like, ‘What gives? What did 

you do?’ But he didn’t defend what he did, he argued on the substance of what we had asked to be declassified.’’ So it was not procedural, as you said this morning. He disagreed with you on the 

substance of what you were saying, correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. Let me just say, I—— 

Senator KERRY. Is that correct or isn’t it? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t remember the conversation, what I remember was—— 

228 

Senator KERRY. You don’t remember whether he disagreed with 

you on the substance? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t remember enough about the conversation—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, how can you say that it wasn’t substantive, 

then, that it was procedural, if you don’t remember. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think it was procedural. For me, he had—— 

Senator KERRY. What do you mean, for you it was procedural? 

Either it involved substance, or it doesn’t. 

Mr. BOLTON. For me it was procedural. 

Senator KERRY. I see. The substance of whether or not Cuba had 

a developmental program, versus the substance of whether it’s research and how they’re helping rogue states is procedural, not substantive? 

Mr. BOLTON. The process that I was concerned about was to get 

an honest assessment within the Intelligence Community of what 

could be declassified, and I felt that by the method that 

Westermann had used, he was not being straightforward with me. 

That’s why I, I wanted to be sure, that’s why I called Mr. Fingar. 

Senator KERRY. Mr. Bolton, let me go to that right now. Well, 

that’s really at the heart of this. You’re smarter than that. And you 

know what substance is, you know what process is. What you 

didn’t like was the fact that he disagreed with you. 

Mr. BOLTON. Simply not true, Senator. 

Senator KERRY. Well, let’s get to that. On February 10th, this is 

when this took place. And your Chief of Staff is the one who asked 

him to go get the clearance. He was following the normal standard 

procedure as requested by your Chief of Staff, and you already 

knew he disagreed with you. 

Mr. BOLTON. I did not—— 

Senator KERRY. But he’d expressed that. 

Mr. BOLTON. I had no idea. 

Senator KERRY. He then followed the instructions of your Chief 

of Staff, now your Chief of Staff said it was necessary to do it in 

a hurry. Now, if he follows procedure, he sends it over to INR for 

clearance. INR’s going to come back, to the CIA, excuse me. And 

they’re going to come back to him and request his opinion. He simply sent his opinion along at the same time, knowing that they 

would come back to him, in order to expedite your request. Now, 

he did nothing that was outside of the normal procedures of the 

State Department and of the clearance process. 

Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Fingar, at the time, said what he had done was 

entirely inappropriate. 

Senator KERRY. Why was it inappropriate? 

Mr. BOLTON. I went to, first I called Carl Ford, the Assistant Secretary, and—— 

Senator KERRY. What was inappropriate about putting his opinion that he was going to be asked for anyway? 

Mr. BOLTON. Then I called Mr. Fingar to say, ‘‘What is going on 

here, can you explain this to me?’’ And I recall Tom saying, basically, ‘‘I don’t know anything about it,’’ basically, ‘‘I’ll check and get 

back to you,’’ and later in the day, he sent me an e-mail that said, 

‘‘We screwed up, Westermann’s behavior was entirely inappropriate,’’ and he said twice, it won’t happen again. 

229 

Senator KERRY. Well, let me just say that the formal process of 

the State Department is that when there is a proposed text, if it 

is derived from intelligence information, it gets submitted to the 

State INR bureau and that was done. The INR then sends the proposed text to the demarche coordinator in WINPAC, which is the 

DCI’s Weapons Intelligence Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Intelligence Center, that’s what he did. WINPAC then sends the proposed text to over a dozen Intelligence Community offices, one of 

which would have been Mr. Westermann, for his opinion, only he 

sent it right up front, including any relevant National Intelligence 

Officers for their review and clearance. The Intelligence Community considered whether the proposed would expose sensitive intelligence sources and methods, and whether, if it cites U.S. intelligence, it is consistent with U.S. intelligence analysis. 

Now, this is not a one-time incident. Which is what disturbs us. 

Senator BIDEN. Would the Senator yield—the whole Intelligence 

Community reached the same conclusion. 

Senator KERRY. The whole Intelligence Community came to the 

same conclusion as Mr. Westermann, a 23-year veteran of the 

Navy, who had no other purpose here except to be accurate. And 

you, and this will come up more, were not in accord with this judgment. 

Now, subsequent to that, you said this morning, that you had 

this one confrontation with him, and you dropped the matter. This 

was February. But, in fact, with the Mr. Smith/NIO officer, you 

had another confrontation on this issue of intelligence, why? Because the speech that you wound up giving to the Heritage Foundation caused a stir, Senator Dodd was going to have a hearing, 

in the process you sent that speech around, or you were planning 

a statement that was going to be made to the Committee, you sent 

that statement around to the various Intelligence Community entities to get it cleared, and it couldn’t get cleared. Because you were 

making statements in that testimony that were not in accord with 

the judgments of the Intelligence Community. In the end, you 

didn’t appear, and the hearing didn’t take place, because the Secretary didn’t allow your appearance, I believe, and subsequent to 

that, in July, you didn’t let it drop, you in fact, went out there in 

your own car, and expressed your displeasure with the Intelligence 

Community that wouldn’t ratify your judgments which were, in effect, wrong. Now, that’s an accurate reflection of a timetable and 

a sequence of events here, is it not? 

Mr. BOLTON. It is not. 

Senator KERRY. Well, tell me where we’re wrong. You didn’t go 

out in July? Let’s just review it. Did you go out in July, in your 

car? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t recall when I met with Mr. Cohen. 

enator KERRY. If I tell you it was, in fact, in July, would you accept that? 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t have any reason to accept it or reject it, I 

just don’t know. 

Senator KERRY. Maybe you could check your calendar, but for the 

purposes of this, we’ll say it is July and I believe the record will 

show it is July. Now, the purpose of going out there was to complain, which you did, did you not—— 

Mr. BOLTON. That was not the purpose. 

230 

Senator KERRY. Well, it’s what you did. 

Mr. BOLTON. The purpose of the meeting with Mr. Cohen was a 

courtesy call on him in his capacity as Chairman—— 

Senator KERRY. But you hadn’t let the matter drop, it was in 

your head, and you raised your displeasure with the Intelligence 

judgments, correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. I wanted to find out more about what the NIC was, 

because I didn’t, I had never encountered it before. 

Senator KERRY. Well, could you tell me, and the Committee, 

what the process issue was, then, that you were unhappy with? 

Particularly with the NIO officer? What was his process violation? 

Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Smith had said that the speech was not cleared 

by him. And I didn’t know who Mr. Smith was. So, I talked to the 

person who was at the head of WINPAC, and I said, probably 

something like, ‘‘What’s the National Intelligence Council?’’ And he 

said, ‘‘That’s who it is, you ought to come out and talk to him.’’ And 

I said, ‘‘Did you clear the speech with the National Intelligence 

Council?’’ And he said, ‘‘Yes, in fact, we did. We cleared it with the 

National Intelligence Officer who has cognizance over BW programs worldwide, the National Intelligence Officer for Science and 

Technology. And this is a case where we sent this thing out to INR 

and out to the Intelligence Community, I didn’t ask anybody in 

particular to clear it, I didn’t know who was supposed to clear it. 

We wanted INR to perform its function of liaison with the Intelligence Community, and we thought they had, and then somebody 

else raises his hand and says, ‘‘Hey, I didn’t clear that speech.’’ So, 

I wanted to find out what the purpose was. 

If I could just mention one other point here, on the question of 

whether or not I testified. I’d like to, I think you’ve got this, I’d 

offer it for the record if you don’t have it, a letter to Senator Dodd 

from Secretary Powell, dated July 23, 2002, it says, ‘‘Dear Senator 

Dodd, This is a follow up to our conversation after a June 5 briefing on my recently completed Moscow trip. At that time I acknowledged your concerns on Cuba and bioterrorism. My decision to send 

Assistant Secretary Ford to testify was based on the purpose of the 

hearing as expressed in your letter, and in my judgment regarding 

the most appropriate witness for the purposes of your hearing, 

which focused on intelligence findings. At that time, I agreed to 

make Undersecretary Bolton available, to discuss separately, the 

policy implications behind Cuba’s biological capabilities. Undersecretary Bolton stands ready to appear before the Foreign Relations 

Committee for this purpose. The Department puts a high value on 

its relationship with the Committee, and will work to accommodate 

your oversight responsibilities. We look forward to working with 

you, and other members of the Committee. Sincerely, Colin L. Powell.’’ 

Senator KERRY. I respect the letter, but it doesn’t do anything to 

address the fact that the Intelligence Community did not, and 

would not, clear the testimony that you proposed. 

Mr. BOLTON. May I then quote Assistant Secretary Ford’s testimony at the June hearing, and he is addressing the question of 

how is it that he used the words that turned out to be in my 

speech. So, I will quote Assistant Secretary Ford—— 

Senator KERRY. But that doesn’t—— 

231 

Mr. BOLTON. This goes directly to your question, Senator. ‘‘Mr. 

Ford, the history of the words on BW in that speech were, as I understand it, Secretary Bolton invited the Intelligence Community to 

provide him with some words that he could use in a speech on BW. 

He was very careful, I think, not to suggest words to the Community for clearance, he asked them, ’What do you think? What do 

you say?’ So that they came up with the lines in the speech, and 

presented those back to INR to take back to Secretary Bolton for 

his use. As I understand it, his speech was postponed. I wasn’t 

aware of this. I had a requirement on short notice to come up and 

brief the Committee on CW/BW worldwide. Apparently those words 

that had been approved for Mr. Bolton were picked up by my staff 

to insert in my presentation to the full Committee, and so that I 

then presented that information that had been cleared by the IC. 

When it came time for Mr. Bolton to give his speech a month or 

two later, he then took the same language that had been approved 

earlier by the Community, and stuck it into his Heritage speech. 

But those words were our words, the Intelligence Community’s 

words, not his.’’ 

Senator KERRY. There’s no question about that, nobody is, Mr. 

Chairman, nobody even questions that. That is one of the great 

sidesteps of all time. I asked you about your testimony before Senator Dodd, whether or not it was cleared. You still haven’t answered it, it was not cleared, was it? 

Mr. BOLTON. The testimony was never finished, I—— 

Senator KERRY. But it was never cleared, that’s why it wasn’t 

finished. 

Mr. BOLTON. I’m not sure I ever saw a draft of it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry—— 

Senator KERRY. Oh, what about Cohen, what did you say to Mr. 

Cohen? 

Mr. BOLTON. I said—as I testified earlier—that I went out to see 

Mr. Cohen to pay a courtesy call on him, to get a better understanding of the National Intelligence Council, I won’t—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, what did you did say to him about the personnel that you wanted removed? 

Mr. BOLTON. I said, I was aware that Assistant Secretary Reich 

had been out to see him a short period before that, and that Assistant Secretary Reich had very substantial concerns with Mr. Smith, 

and what I said was, that in my dealings with him I had, his behavior was unprofessional, and that I had lost confidence in him 

and supported Mr. Reich. 

Senator KERRY. Well, let me just say, Mr. Cohen says he didn’t 

recall many of the specifics of the Bolton meeting, but believed his 

intent was clear, namely that he wanted the NIO removed. That’s 

Mr. Cohen’s recollection. 

Mr. BOLTON. My recollection is that I—as I’ve just—— 

Senator KERRY. And your Chief of Staff said the same thing. 

Mr. BOLTON. As I’ve just said, that his behavior had been unprofessional and that I’d lost confidence in him. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we can sit here—— 

Mr. BOLTON. I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KERRY. May I just take one moment? Thirty seconds, 

Mr. Chairman. This is reading from Mr. Fleitz’s interview, where 

he said, ‘‘Did Otto Reich share his belief that Fulton Armstrong 

232 

should be removed from his position? The answer is yes. Did John 

Bolton share that view?’’ Mr. Fleitz said, ‘‘Yes.’’ 

Mr. BOLTON. As I said, I had lost confidence in Mr. Smith, and 

I conveyed that. I thought that was the honest thing to do. 

Senator KERRY. You lost confidence because you didn’t agree 

with him. 

Mr. BOLTON. No, absolutely not, Senator, confidence because he 

was claiming a process foul that was inaccurate and untrue. 

Senator ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, when I was asking Mr. Bolton 

what was the difference from what he was proposing to talk about 

insofar as Cuba, and their biological capabilities with rogue states. 

And Senator Kerry said, we all agreed on what he said, what was 

the difference, and you characterized it as ‘‘not much of a difference.’’ What you’re trying to do is just point out that concern, 

and wanted to have approved language. You characterized answers 

to my question that there really wasn’t much of a difference in 

what you wanted to say, or proffered as a concept, versus what was 

actually enunciated in the Heritage Foundation speech, isn’t that 

correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that’s basically correct. 

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, it’s important, the facts here. 

Let’s say, the Select Committee on Intelligence, reporting on the 

U.S. Intelligence Community’s prewar intelligence assessment on 

Iraq, the very report that Mr. Bolton quoted, is saying they had 

cleared, they had investigated this issue on page 277 said, ‘‘The analyst,’’ referring to Mr. Westermann, ‘‘The analyst told the Senator 

Intelligence Committee,’’ this is a quote from the report by our Intelligence Committee, ‘‘The analyst,’’ Mr. Westermann, told the 

Senate Intelligence Committee staff, that ‘‘the text of the Undersecretary’s speech contained a sentence which said the U.S., not Mr. 

Bolton, the U.S. believed that Cuba has a developmental offensive 

biological warfare program, and is providing assistance to other 

rogue state programs. The text also called for international observers of Cuba’s biological facilities.’’ End of quote. That is fundamentally different than what got cleared. What got cleared was ‘‘The 

United States believes that Cuba has a limited offensive biological 

warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dualuse biotechnology to other rogue states.’’ Very different than saying 

it has provided offensive biological warfare program, and is providing assistance to other states. Fundamentally different. 

Senator ALLEN. Dual-use means dual-use. 

Senator BOXER. Computers could be called dual-use, you know 

that, Senator. We work on that all the time, there’s big difference. 

Senator BIDEN. The Intelligence Committee paragraph reference 

I would ask be placed in the record at this point, as well as the 

language that was ultimately approved to be able to be used by Mr. 

Bolton in his speech. 

The CHAIRMAN. Both will be put in the record. 

The Chair would just observe, the Chair has heard this language 

at least four times, at least that amount. So, fair enough, so we 

proceed on to Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, thank you Mr. Chair. I will spend 

about three minutes on this, and seven on the work I hope you’re 

going to be doing, that any ambassador to the United Nations has 

to be doing. 

233 

I do want to say that I appreciate and respect the sensitivity of 

all my colleagues on this issue. The reality is, when Colin Powell 

testifies before the United Nations and talks about biological weapons and other things, and they’re not there—that hurts all of us. 

And so, what you’re facing, Secretary, is a great, legitimate sensitivity on these issues. But then you’ve got to get past that and say, 

‘‘So, what do we have?’’ And, number one, you’ve said it again and 

again, did you threaten any analyst because of their views? The answer to that has been ‘‘No.’’ 

Mr. BOLTON. No. 

Senator COLEMAN. Consistently. What you have here is a question of process. You’re concerned about the process being that the 

INR, this analyst sent it out and it had his comments in there, he 

had alternative language in there, he had a number of things in 

there, you didn’t see that, it then went out to the Intelligence Community, came back to you, and you questioned that process. And 

you were angry about that. Is that fair to say? 

Mr. BOLTON. I was concerned about that, that’s exactly right. 

Senator COLEMAN. So, what we have is a, and the other issue is 

the issue of pattern. As a former prosecutor, I know about patterns, 

what you have here is you have two incidences where you were 

upset with analysts, but in each instance you’re saying it was not 

over substance, it was over process. They had different substance 

than you, but your issue was process, is that correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. Precisely. 

Senator COLEMAN. So, in the end, it’s management style. 

Mr. BOLTON. Precisely. 

Senator COLEMAN. And the question that we have to decide in 

casting our vote is management style, it’s going to move us one way 

or the other. 

Let me get to the other issue, because I think it’s important. My 

colleague, Senator Obama, raised an important question, but I 

don’t think it’s the question, at least, that I want, that I think we 

have to answer, the U.S. has to answer. He talked about, in this 

wonderful history of United Nations ambassadors and I believe he 

said something to the effect of, ‘‘We have to convince the world we 

are right,’’ the importance of having the credibility and the stature 

to do that, the integrity to do that. I really think that the question 

is that the U.N. has to convince the American public and the world 

that it’s credible. That’s the issue right now. Credibility of the 

United Nations. And whether it’s Oil-for-Food, and the 56 U.N. audits that talked about the millions, the millions that were ripped 

off from the, the hundreds of millions from the Iraqi people, the billions that Saddam put into his own pocket, whether it’s the sex 

abuse—brutal, horrible sex abuse in the Congo, child rape, prostitution—and whether the U.N. acted quickly enough to deal with 

that. Whether it’s sexual harassment, and the question of whether 

the U.N. acted quickly enough, and in fact, in that instance, originally those allegations, the individual who was eventually removed, 

originally his position was supported by the Secretary General, and 

only after the world press brought it to everyone’s attention, was 

there reversal. And so I would maintain that the question is and 

the challenge that I’m going to ask you is what are you going to 

do and what should we do to help the U.N. continue, if you are in 

a position where its credibility is restored. What I’m looking at, and 

234 

I think something that you have here, is a culture of impunity. If 

we’re not a community for Benon Sevan, white washing of U.N. officials accused of sexual harassment, U.N. peace keepers accused of 

abusing women and girls, can only be held accountable by their 

own government. So, my question for you is, help me understand 

what is it that the U.N. has to do to regain credibility, and then 

what is it that we in Congress, what is our responsibility? What 

is our opportunity to turn this around so that we have a credible 

organization that can be a partner in dealing with international 

crisis and dealing with peacekeeping. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think it’s a very difficult undertaking to try and 

change a organizational bureaucratic culture. It’s probably one of 

the most difficult managerial tasks you can undertake, but I referred earlier today to Dick Thornberg’s report at the end of his 

year as Undersecretary General for management, and one of the 

things that he tried to do with the very strong support of the first 

President Bush, was create in the United Nations system an effective analog to what we call ‘‘Inspectors General’’ in the federal government. It was a concept that was completely foreign to the 

United Nations at the time, although there were outside auditors 

in existence, there was nothing really like the IG system as we 

have it. Now, ultimately in the early 1990’s an office was set up, 

the Internal Oversight Office. It did not have the kind of independence and support that our statutory Inspectors General do in this 

country, and if you read the, I think in both interim reports by the 

Volcker Investigative Commission, you’ll see criticisms by the 

Volcker Commission of the lack of independence, lack of support for 

the internal investigative office, and the general lack of independence of internal audit functions, which is closely related, although 

somewhat more limited, to the broader mandate that IG’s have. I 

really think that this is sort of the tangible, concrete reform that 

we can, that we should be looking at to enhance the sense of responsibility that I think most U.N. employees have. I think that 

most want to do the right thing, if they knew what the right things 

was, but having an effective IG is certainly, I can say as a government official myself, having an IG out there is a very important 

tool, I think it would serve us well in the United Nations, that’s 

the kind of thing we’ve got, that suggestion, as I recall in the late 

1980’s and the early 1990’s came largely from Congress, because of 

Congress’s experience in the years before that of creating a statutory IG system, but I think that’s an example of something both 

the Congress, that’s an idea that came from Congress, and from 

other sources too, but that we were then not as successful as we 

should have been in getting implemented, that’s something to look 

at right now. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I’m sure that Congress is going to be involved in this discussion, we’ve got a big stake in this, I mean, the 

IOS you’re talking about, they don’t have independent budgetary 

authority. They’re dependent on the folks who they investigate to 

get their budget authority. Benon Sevan was able to stop the IOS 

from submitting reports to the Security Council. We don’t have, 

there aren’t ethical guidelines in terms of, in the issue of procurement, either for the procurers or the contractors, there are not a 

series of guidelines, there aren’t a whole range of kind of basic stuff 

that we would insist, that in Congress we would insist that is hapVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00234 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
235 

pening. And I know the Secretary General has raised these issues, 

and I applaud him for that, the question is, how do you get it done? 

And what do we do to keep the pressure on to make sure it gets 

done? 

Mr. BOLTON. I have one other suggestion on that, and I know I’ve 

raised this with a number of you when I’ve met with you in preparation for this hearing, and that is, based on my experiences as Assistant Secretary for International Organizations during the first 

Bush Administration, I really think that there’s an enormous benefit to getting elected officials, American elected officials, up to New 

York, to talk to senior officials in the Secretariat, talk to ambassadors from some of the other countries, you know, we have a tradition, alternating between the House and the Senate that, on a bipartisan basis, two members of Congress are part of the delegation 

to the U.N. every year, and five years ago, Senator Helms took the 

Committee for, what I believe—correct me if I’m wrong—the first 

hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ever outside of 

Washington. So, if I get confirmed here, and I can persuade the 

Chairman, that might be something, and I also think having members go up there—I think it’s important for U.N. Secretariat officials to hear from elected Americans, people like yourselves who 

are responsible to actual voters—I think it’s a very salutary experience, and I think it would be a big help to me in my job if I get 

confirmed, frankly. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that my colleagues would have their staff look at the 56 audit reports that 

were released by the ILC. Management failings extending every 

basic management skill needed to effectively manage a program, 

achieve the program’s results. Failings included budget planning, 

execution, coordination, strategic planning, communication, procurement, inventory, controlled cash management, accounting for 

assets, documents justifying expenditures, information technology, 

human resource management. I think the job is almost overwhelming, it needs to be done, though, and we need a strong voice. 

And we need someone, and I applaud you for this, we need someone who has raised some of these concerns, who has been critical 

of the United Nations in the past, but has a commitment, then, to 

working with this organization so that it is lifted up, and then in 

the end has the kind of transparency and accountability and credibility that is needed if it is to be a partner with us, to work with 

us to deal with some of the challenges in the world today. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that’s the President’s clear intention. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. 

Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Senator Coleman, you’re 

very eloquent, and it would be great to lift up the United Nations, 

it’s tough to do it if you think it doesn’t exist. So, that’s what I’m 

trying to grapple with. You know, Senator Allen, you said that 

we’re taking a detour here as we go into these questions about the 

pressure put on independent intelligence analysts when you don’t 

like the answer you get from them. I think it’s quite central to this 

particular nominee. Mr. Bolton, you seem to be the only person involved, because we have testimony here from several people, who 

is minimizing what you did to Mr. Westermann. Who, as Senator 

236 

Biden has pointed out—and he did it in detail—is a real hero. Serving this country under fire in Iraqi Freedom, 23 years in the Navy, 

etc. Now, maybe you were unaware of his bio when you called him 

a ‘‘mid-level INR munchkin,’’ but maybe you should apologize to 

him at this point. Calling a war hero who served 23 years, who was 

under fire, referring to him in that fashion, I just think that’s outrageous. 

Now, that in itself, it’s unfortunate, but it’s certainly not enough 

to disqualify you. But I think what is enough to disqualify you from 

this position is that, it seems that there is a pattern, when you 

can’t get the answers that you want, because you want to build a 

case, I think of an imminent threat against America by a country 

you think is an imminent threat, but the intelligence officials don’t 

agree with you, then you seek retribution and you get very upset, 

and then when we ask you about it, instead of just coming out with 

it, and saying, ‘‘God, I was frustrated! You know, I thought I had 

the information, I thought it was documented,’’ you tell us, ‘‘No, it 

had nothing to do with that. It was procedural,’’ and the words you 

used, ‘‘he wasn’t,’’ Mr. Westermann ‘‘wasn’t straightforward with 

me.’’ And then we find out, that in fact what Mr. Westermann did, 

was completely appropriate. And that what he’s supposed to do is 

send out your words for comment, and he expedited the process, 

and then when you found out that it was, in essence, a turn-down, 

and whatever Senator Allen says, is a huge difference between 

dual-use and actually giving people help with the program—it’s 

like night and day. I worked on that with, I think, the good Senator, on making sure that, for example, that our computers can still 

be exported, because sometimes they accuse of in the State Department that they’re ‘‘dual-use.’’ But what happened is, you went absolutely wild. This is what Mr. Westermann said, ‘‘He was quite 

upset that I had objected, and he wanted to know what right I had 

trying to change an Undersecretary’s language. And what he would 

say, or not say, or something like that, and I tried to explain to him 

a little bit of the same thing, about the process of how we clear language, and I guess he really wasn’t in the mood to listen, and he 

was quite angry, and basically told me I had no right to do that. 

He got very red in the face and shaking his finger at me, and explained to me that I was acting way beyond my position and for 

someone that worked for him. I told him I didn’t work for him, I 

worked for Mr. Ford,’’ and it goes on and other people come forward and corroborate this story, and then we have the Mr. Smith 

story where you just happened to get in your car and drive out, by 

happenstance, raise the subject when we know Mr. Reich had already spoken for you on Mr. Smith in a previous occasion. So, there 

is a pattern here, which is very disturbing, which is why we’re 

going to try to get some more people here to keep on putting the 

puzzle together. Frankly, if you had just ponged up and said, ‘‘You 

know, I was angry, I was upset, I wanted to make a much stronger 

case against Cuba, and I think they bent over backwards and 

weren’t fair to me,’’ I would have more respect. But trying to say 

it’s some kind of process, it’s upsetting. 

Mr. Chairman, I can’t concentrate. Senator Biden, I’m sorry to 

interrupt you, I can’t make this case. But I want to move on because, again, Secretary Rice, in her strong endorsement of you, 

compared you to Jean Kirkpatrick and compared you to Senator 

237 

Moynihan, and I want to take you through this. Again, I say ‘‘No 

comparison.’’ Jean Kirkpatrick said, ‘‘U.N. votes matter, because 

they effect widely held views about perceptions of power, about effectiveness and about legitimacy.’’ And, here’s your quote in the 

Washington Times. ‘‘Many Republicans in Congress, and perhaps a 

majority, not only do not care about losing the General Assembly 

vote, but actually see it as a ’make my day’ outcome.’’ 

I think there’s a big difference here between Jean Kirkpatrick 

who say that U.N. votes matter, and yours who say, when we lose 

it, it’s a ’make my day’ outcome. It sounds a little bit like ‘‘bring 

it on’’ and we know what happened after that. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think we’re actually talking here, Dr. Kirkpatrick 

is talking about the circumstance that she faced in the early 1980’s 

at the United Nations when following the adoption of ‘‘Zionism is 

Racism’’ resolution in 1975, there were—really throughout the 

70’s—but in the years after that as well, the attitude in, among 

many policy makers in Washington of a sort of, I’ll use the colloquial, ‘‘Boys will be boys,’’ in New York, and that the votes in the 

General Assembly didn’t matter. She, I think, quite correctly, argued—and it was really American policy throughout the Reagan 

and Bush Administrations—to take these votes very seriously. 

The point I was making in the passage you’ve quoted there— 

which we also discussed earlier today—was that there were some 

people in Congress, the argument was we were about to lose our 

vote in the General Assembly, because under the U.N.’s financial 

regulations, we were about to fall two years in arrears. And some 

people were saying we had to pay up the full assessment, even 

though many in Congress were not satisfied, or we’d lose the vote 

in the General Assembly. What I said there was, that’s not very appealing to many people in Congress that I know, that would be a 

situation that would just further affirm their lack of desire to participate in the U.N. and I didn’t want that to happen, and I propose—— 

Senator BOXER. I’m sorry to cut you off, but my time is a-wastin’ 

here. You know, what you’re doing is saying, ‘‘Yeah, I said that, but 

I meant about one specific thing,’’ you know, you don’t say that 

here, and Jean Kirkpatrick doesn’t say that here, so let me move 

on to another quote, because I think this comparison was made by 

Dr. Rice and I don’t think anything could be further than the truth. 

I’ve got a lot of these. This one is, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ‘‘International law can actually enhance the national security of the 

United States.’’ You’ve been compared to him, this is what you say, 

‘‘It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international 

law, even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so, because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything, are those who want to constrict the United States.’’ So, do you see a difference here between 

the two statements: ‘‘International law can actually enhance the 

national security,’’ and yours that international law really constricts the United States. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think there is a difference, I will say that Senator 

Moynihan was somebody with whom I was fortunate to have a 

number of conversations after my confirmation to the IO job, which 

he helped expedite, and we had a number of conversations, really, 

literally, in the months before he died on the international criminal 

238 

court where I think his view and mine were actually the same, but 

on the this subject, I think he had a different view. 

Senator BOXER. Okay, that’s fair, good, because I want to ask you 

about some of these international laws here, since you say, you 

make this sweeping statement that they constrict. Here are some 

examples of international law, and I wonder if you can tell us if 

you feel that they constrict us, or whether they actually are good 

things, and if you don’t know about them, I’ve got some details on 

them. 

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 

Genocide. Do you think that’s a law we should be a party to? An 

international law that we should be a party to? 

Mr. BOLTON. Absolutely, and you know, of course, Senator, we’re 

dualist countries, so the terms of the Convention on Genocide were 

enacted as positive law by Congress. 

Senator BOXER. So, you agree with that and so you do believe in 

this case that international law does not constrict us. 

Mr. BOLTON. In this case, the terms of the Convention on Genocide were enacted by Congress as positive law, since we are a dualist country. 

Senator BOXER. So you believe that this particular law does not 

constrict us. 

Mr. BOLTON. No, I favor this one. 

Senator BOXER. You do not think it constricts us. 

Mr. BOLTON. Right. 

Senator BOXER. So, your broad statement was overly broad. How 

about the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? 

Mr. BOLTON. I support that. 

Senator BOXER. And you don’t think that international law constricts us? 

Mr. BOLTON. You know, if I could just make the philosophical 

statement here, that this issue of what international law amounts 

to is something that legal theorists have talked about, I wrote 

about it in Advaine, in Law Review articles and others, the fact is 

that this is something legal theorists will debate for a long time, 

they’ve been debating it for centuries already. I acknowledge in my 

capacity as an American official that the United States does, and 

should, follow international law. The question of whether international law is law in the same sense as municipal law is a philosophical question I’ve written on, I’ve given my opinion, I think 

you’ve all got the articles, that’s not the same as what we’re talking 

about here, which is concrete. 

Senator BOXER. I don’t know anyone who thinks that it’s the 

same as municipal law, but I think what I think—— 

Mr. BOLTON. ‘‘Municipal law’’ is the term of art used for ‘‘National law.’’ National law versus international law. 

Senator BOXER. Yes, I understand. But, what I wanted to say to 

you is this: You’ve been compared to Ambassador Moynihan, you 

have said different things on international law, and you’ve said you 

disagree with him on international law, so we have a list here, 

we’ll come back to it later, but the first two, you would agree, we 

should be a party to, and it doesn’t constrict us, so your statement 

that you made was overly broad. 

Mr. BOLTON. I never said we shouldn’t agree in bilateral or multilateral treaties that are in America’s interest. And the first, well, 

239 

the sign just got taken down, but the first three or four that I was 

able to read, I support all of them. 

Senator BOXER. Good. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer, you—— 

Senator BOXER. I’ll just end with the quote, ‘‘It’s a big mistake 

for us to grant any validity to international law, even when it may 

seem in our short term interest to do so, because over the long run, 

the goal of those who think that international law really means 

anything, are those who want to constrict the United States.’’ And 

I’m glad to hear that you agree with some of those, at least, that 

I had up on the chart, because I wouldn’t want you to think that 

I, for example, are trying to constrict the United States, America, 

because I support those treaties as well. Thank you. 

Mr. BOLTON. And I have said and written that the United States 

should honor the treaty obligations that it undertakes. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to defer to Senator 

Obama, he’s been sitting here patiently, so if you’d come to me 

after him. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator Obama. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just pick up on a point that was made by my colleague 

from Minnesota, his suggestion that the question is not whether 

the world believers we’re right on these issues. In the first Gulf 

War, we had to convince nation after nation to help the U.S. put 

boots on the ground, Senator Baker and his team were able to convince the world that we were right with respect to repelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, and that capacity to do so made our soldiers safer, reduced the burden on our taxpayers, so I’m just curious as to whether you would endorse the notion that in military 

actions that we take across the world, we don’t need the world’s approval in order to protect our interests, but that putting together 

coalitions, effective coalitions, can be helpful and serve our national 

security interests. 

Mr. BOLTON. Absolutely. 

Senator OBAMA. The second point I guess I want to make, is that 

I am, like Senator Dodd, I think, who mentioned this earlier, am 

actually with you on seeing what we can do to reform the bureaucracy of the U.N., and some of the litany of wrongs that Senator 

Coleman listed have to be addressed. And I look forward to seeing 

how the State Department and the permanent representative to 

the United Nations can do so. But I just want to make clear, you’ve 

made quite a bit of hay about the notion that the United Nations 

is really just a building, and it’s member states that have to be 

held accountable for how we function. That isn’t to say that we 

don’t correct internal bureaucratic bungling on the part of United 

Nations officials, but that there’s a false concreteness when we say, 

‘‘The United Nations is responsible for this,’’ or responsible for that, 

but in fact, it’s whether the member nations are willing to commit 

to certain courses of action that makes the U.N. effective or not effective, is that an accurate assessment? 

Mr. BOLTON. Right, actually it was Senator Clinton who used the 

building metaphor in her speech at Verekunda, I didn’t—— 

240 

Senator OBAMA. Fair enough. But you understand, it’s the same 

point. 

Mr. BOLTON. It’s the same point, yes. 

Senator OBAMA. I just think it’s important that, as we go forward 

in terms of these reforms, I think it would be fair to say that we 

don’t want to apply false concreteness when it comes to the Oil-forFood program, and sort of suggest that somehow it’s the United 

Nations as an institution as opposed to its member states that are 

entirely responsible for the flaws of that, it makes more sense for 

us to examine our relationship with the member nations as well as 

our own actions to figure out how we’re holding the behavior of 

what we call the United Nations responsible for failures in the 

field. Would that be an accurate statement? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yeah, I agree with that entirely, the point I was 

trying to make earlier, perhaps not clearly, is that the original Oilfor-Food program, during the first Bush Administration, was embodied in Resolution 706 and 712, and it kind of played a very intrusive U.N. presence throughout Iraq in terms of the distribution 

of supplies. 

Senator OBAMA. Right. 

Mr. BOLTON. Saddam Hussein rejected that. 

OBAMA. Right. 

Mr. BOLTON. And, in fact, the program went through a number 

of iterations in the Security Council which Saddam repeatedly rejected until he finally found a version that he liked. And I think 

that the fact that he finally found a version he thought he could 

exploit, could only be, the responsibility for that—the responsibility 

for the consequences of that—can only be laid at the doorstep of 

the member governments of the Security Council. 

Senator OBAMA. On the Security Council. Fair enough. We actually agree on that. 

Let me move on. I’m going to read a statement in the newspaper, 

now this is unsubstantiated, I want you to have the opportunity to 

respond to it, this is from July 15, 2003, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, ‘‘In a new dispute over interpreting intelligence data, the 

CIA and other agencies objected vigorously to a Bush Administration assessment of the threat of Syria’s weapons of mass destruction that was to be presented today on Capitol Hill. After the objections, the planned testimony of Undersecretary of State John R. 

Bolton, a leading Administration hawk, was delayed until September. U.S. officials told Knight-Ridder that Bolton was prepared 

to tell members of the House of Representatives International Relations Subcommittee that serious development of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that they 

posed a threat to stability in the region. The CIA and other intelligence agencies said that assessment was exaggerated.’’ And then, 

further down it says, ‘‘Bolton’s planned remarks caused a ’revolt’ 

among intelligence experts, who thought they inflated the progress 

Syria has made in their weapons program, said a U.S. official who 

wasn’t from the CIA, but was involved in the dispute.’’ 

Now, first of all, this is unsubstantiated, so I want to give you 

a brief opportunity to respond, be mindful, though, that I’m sure 

you want to go home, your poor wife, I’m sure, wants to go home 

after all this, so if you can keep responses relatively brief. 

241 

Mr. BOLTON. I was invited to give both classified and unclassified 

testimony to a Subcommittee of the House, drafts were prepared— 

and I should say as is often the case, and was in part in the case 

in other speeches—I hadn’t even seen the draft. I had been traveling, when I came back I found that I had a conflict, I had been 

assigned to go to a Deputy’s Committee meeting at the White 

House, there were a lot of disagreements about the speech, it was 

clear to me that more work needed to be done on it. I called Congresswoman Iliana Rose-Light on and said, ‘‘Look, I’m going to, on 

my own hook, cancel this. We need more time,’’ schedules were 

such that with the August recess, we couldn’t reschedule it until 

September, and that’s what was done. 

Senator OBAMA. Okay. The reason I say this—let me try to put 

in context some of the questioning that at least has been coming 

from this other side of the aisle. My colleague from Minnesota suggested this is a dispute about management style. Let me reiterate, 

I don’t think it’s a dispute about management style. What I think 

is of concern, is that—to the extent that you have a strong set of 

opinions, I’d call it an ideology, but I think that is, you know, sort 

of a loaded term—so let’s say you have a strong set of opinions 

about foeign policy. That you’ve been on the lecture circuit delivering to the International Community as well as to think tanks, 

etc. You’re not seeking a position of power in which every utterance 

you make matters. To the extent that there is a pattern in which 

you are pushing the envelope on your take on the world, and seeking to have intelligence matters conform to your views, then we 

agreed this morning that that is not good for America’s national security. There are two instances that we know of in which, although 

you say that you did not want to have these people fired, it seems 

to me that we’re playing semantics here, because you did suggest 

that they be redeployed. The proverbial ‘‘station them in Antarctica.’’ There are at least two circumstances where there was a dispute, now you say that it was about process, but what it appears 

from the record is that they did not breach any process, they just 

did not do it exactly the way you wanted, partly because—it seems 

as if—there was a substantive disagreement, and you felt that they 

were challenging your substantive assessments. You now have an 

article here, where at least—again, I haven’t interviewed these people personally—but there is substantial evidence indicating that 

perhaps you had a more aggressive view about Syria’s capabilities 

and that the CIA had to reign you in. There are example with respect to Libya in which you make statements saying that the reason that Libya gave up its WMD program was because of the tough 

actions in Iraq, although there were assessments that indicate 

that, in fact, diplomacy served a critical function in that regard. Although you say you don’t do carrots, actually it turns out that there 

were some carrots applied there that made a difference. 

And so the concern, I think, that I have—I’m all for U.N. reform, 

but I’m also making sure that we have sufficient credibility in the 

world that when our troops are deployed around the world that 

they’ve got support and that when we are spending enormous sums 

to bring about some semblance of order in disruptive areas of the 

world, that we’ve got other people also willing to pick up some of 

the tab. And that, it strikes me, would be an important function 

242 

that you would play as this permanent representative to the 

United Nations. 

Now, I know that was a mouthful, and I apologize for that, this 

is one of the problems with, you know, you’re sitting here for three 

hours you think of all kinds of things to say. 

Mr. BOLTON. I’ve thought of a few things myself. 

Senator OBAMA. I’m sure you did. (Laughter.) 

Senator OBAMA. That’s what I figured. And I think you are probably wise enough—out of all the things you were thinking about 

—— Mr. BOLTON. They were much more learned than —— 

Senator OBAMA. So, let me just go to this particular point. Moving forward, with respect to assessments of threats in Syria or 

North Korea, or Iran, we can’t afford to cry wolf. We’ve got to be 

able to—when we say that there’s a threat—people have to believe 

us. Am I wrong to think that this kind of potential overstating 

after what happened in Iraq, after Colin Powell’s presentation before the United Nations, etc., may hamper our ability to protect our 

national security. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think, Senator, the test is what language is 

finally approved. In the case of the Syria speech, it needed a lot 

of work, it wasn’t ready. And the, one of the consequences of the 

clearance process is to take drafts and turn them into an acceptable final product. And as I say, I saw that there was a lot of disagreement both in the classified and the unclassified version, we 

had a small problem, and we were proposing to tell the House 

International Relations Committee intelligence that had not been 

briefed to the House Intelligence Committee and the Senate Committee, that was a problem, but the speech wasn’t ready, and I put 

it off. And I think that was the right thing to do, and I think that 

the final product, the speech, the testimony, the unclassified testimony and the classified testimony that I finally gave, was broadly 

accepted. And that’s part of, that’s inherent in the nature of government. And I think it’s a—it can be frustrating, to say the 

least—but it’s a necessary process, and I have submitted to it 

throughout my tenure in this job, and I think —— 

Senator OBAMA. Although, in at least two circumstances, you 

were unhappy with it to the effect that you might have been taking 

it out on somebody else. 

Mr. BOLTON. No. 

Senator OBAMA. Let me just make this point, and you know, I 

don’t mean to cut you off here, I’m assuming I’m out of time here, 

Mr. Chairman. Poor Mr. Chairman, he’s nodding. But, at minimum 

what happened in these circumstances was that you, a powerful 

person in the Administration expressed sufficient displeasure about 

lower ranking analysts that their superiors felt that you were trying to get rid of them. Now, that may have been unintended on 

your part, it may have been miscommunication on your part, but 

we have testimony indicating that at minimum, you sent a signal 

that was interpreted as, these guys are out of bounds, and I’d like 

to see them removed. That strikes me as contrary to the very statement that you just made which is these clearance processes are 

necessary—frustrating, but necessary—parts of the process. And 

the reason that I think that this side of the aisle is belaboring this 

point is that as we move forward with respect to Iran, North Korea 

243 

and other threats involving weapons of mass destruction and terrorist activity, if we gild the lily and overstate our case, that can— 

over the long term—undermine our effectiveness and actually 

threaten troops overseas as well as the safety of people here at 

home. 

Mr. BOLTON. I absolutely agree that we do not want to overstate 

the case, and I want to say again, as strongly as I know how, that 

the two cases we’ve been talking about were cases of what I considered to be unprofessional behavior. There are, as many on the 

panel would no doubt say, a lot of people in the State Department 

who disagree with me on a lot of issues. That’s never been something that I have found troubling, or been unwilling to discuss. But 

my approach to business and professional matters is, I hope, imperfect, but I hope is open and above-board. And that’s the way I try 

and treat people, and when that behavior is not reciprocated, I’m 

troubled by it. 

Senator OBAMA. Well, I appreciate your appearing before this 

confirmation, I wish I had more time, as I’m sure all of the other 

members do. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama. Let me 

just make note, I’ve informed the distinguished ranking member 

that Mr. Neil Silver will meet with staff the day after the hearing, 

the court reporter, and another individual in question will be available by phone immediately thereafter. I mention that in response 

to requests and we will try to fulfill those today. 

Let me just indicate that, Senator Sarbanes, you have seniority 

at this point, I will recognize you, unless you wish to yield to Senator Nelson, but in any event, the two of you will be recognized to 

complete this round. 

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bolton, a number of people have called for the resignation 

of the Secretary General of the United Nations, including—in 

fact—some members of the Congress. Do you have an opinion on 

that question? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes, that is not the position of the Administration, 

as Secretary Rice and others have said, we have been working with 

the Secretary General, I think in terms of the allegations that have 

been out there on the Oil-for-Food program, that we’ve said that we 

should wait for the final report of the Volcker Commission and the 

outcome of the Congressional investigations. 

Senator SARBANES. And is that your view as well? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes, it is. 

Senator SARBANES. Was it your view before the Administration 

took a position? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes, it was. 

Senator SARBANES. Now, the U.N. was founded 60 years ago this 

spring. What mistakes were made in the founding of the U.N.— 

you’ve been a sharp critic of it—where did those who founded it 60 

years ago go wrong? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I have less to fault with the framers of the 

U.N. charter than with the direction that—in many cases—the Organization has taken since then. The effort, originally understood 

by Roosevelt and Churchill and others, was to recreate in the postWorld War environment, the kind of United Nations decision making that existed during World War II, indeed the very name— 

244 

United Nations—comes from the term applied to the victorious 

powers in World War II. If you want to call it a mistake—and I 

wouldn’t call it a mistake—they wrote the Charter, Chapter 7, in 

particular, the way they thought best, it grid locked, within a matter of years, afterwards, because of the Cold War. That’s why, in 

years since then, much of the Charter has been inoperative. 

The question now, and this was addressed both by the high level 

panel, and by the Secretary General, is whether and to what extent 

as part of U.N. reform, U.N. Charter revision needs to be a part 

of that process, and that is a, it’s obviously required if we’re going 

to change the permanent membership of the Security Council, 

there are other suggestions as well. That’s a pretty weighty undertaking if we decide to go ahead with them. 

Senator SARBANES. Now some have said in response to criticisms 

that have been made about the United Nations, that if we didn’t 

have a United Nations, we would have to invent one. Suggesting 

that the world needs such an institution. What’s your view on that? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that makes a lot of sense. 

Senator SARBANES. Now, in China, over the weekend, it’s reported that they’re having significant demonstrations—in fact, in 

some instances they’ve called them, I think, riots—and one of the 

things they’re demonstrating about, apparently, is the proposal or 

the suggestions that are being made that Japan should play a bigger role in the U.N. It after all is playing quite an enhanced financial role in the U.N. What’s your view on that question? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, the subject of changing the composition of the 

permanent membership has been around in one form or another for 

many years—it’s been the subject of active conversation for at least 

the past fifteen years, since Japan made a very strong move in the 

early 1990’s to get permanent membership—now there are a number of other countries that have sought to get permanent membership as well, and it’s been a politic very actively in New York and 

capitals around the world. It’s going to be politically, very difficult 

to make any change in the composition of the permanent membership, and the things that were going on in China over the weekend 

combine them, I’d say, with some public statements made by senior 

Chinese officials, certainly don’t indicate a very positive attitude towards Japan’s aspirations for a permanent seat, and I’d have to 

say, given our strong support for a Japanese permanent seat that 

this is going to make a very complex situation even more complex. 

Senator SARBANES. But, am I to understand that you have enunciated the view on occasions that the only country that ought to be 

a permanent member given the power realities of the world, is the 

United States? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think what I was trying to say at that point is 

that there are a lot of factors that are suggested for why one country or another should be a permanent member of the Council, and 

if you look at the—what I was saying was—if you look solely at the 

issue of power in the world, in a cliche probably everybody in this 

room has used of the U.S. being the sole remaining super power, 

under that theory, that there would be only one permanent member. Obviously, I understand that there are five permanent members, and the question is, are we going to leave it at those five, or 

are we going to change it? I regard that as a serious question, the 

245 

Administration is taking very responsibly and seriously, I think, 

the obligation of looking at that issue. 

Senator SARBANES. Does changing that encompass changing the 

number downwards as well as upwards? Maybe even downwards to 

one? The United States? 

Mr. BOLTON. No, it does not. 

Senator SARBANES. I’d like to pursue this international law issue, 

and it’s been touched on by others. In an article for the Chicago 

Journal, International Law in 2000, you stated that efforts to create an international system of laws and codes of conduct are ‘‘belittling our popular sovereignty and constitutionalism and restricting 

both our domestic and our international policy flexibility and 

power.’’ 

Am I to read that to mean that you think the body of international law that’s been developed since World War II—take for instance as it relates to human rights—has been a mistake, and that 

moving down this path of making some commitment to international law is the wrong path? Senator Moynihan, I might note, 

was quite committed to the concept of international law, and 

sought to develop it in many ways in both his tenure at the United 

Nations and his service here in the United States Senate. 

Mr. BOLTON. I believe that there’s no question that the United 

States should comply with its international obligations, there is a 

centuries’ old philosophical debate about the meaning of law and 

whether municipal law and international law are really, whether 

they really cover the same ground. The issue—I think—turns principally on the notion of what constitutes binding obligations for a 

country. I think democratic theory and sound constitutional principles from our perspective require that law that bind American 

citizens be decided upon by our constitutional officials—the Congress, and the President. Not derived by abstract discussions in 

academic circles and international bodies. 

Senator SARBANES. But if we approve a treaty, doesn’t that represent a decision by the Congress under our constitutional system? 

Mr. BOLTON. It does, and that is binding on the United States, 

as I’ve written. 

Senator SARBANES. And do you think we should develop such 

systems of treaties? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that when they’re in the national interest 

of the United States that that can be an appropriate way to proceed. 

Senator SARBANES. What constitutes the national interest of the 

United States? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think that’s one of the central issues that 

we can debate. If you look at the ABM Treaty of 1972, for example, 

that was a bilateral treaty, it ha been in force since 1972, many 

people believe that the treaty reflected an outdated strategic relationship with the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation, 

and that it inhibited the ability of the United States to defend 

itself. President Bush campaigned on that as part of his platform 

in 2000, and many on the other hand, opposed withdrawing from 

the ABM Treaty, their argument was that if the United States 

withdrew from the ABM Treaty that the entire fabric of arms control treaties that existed would collapse. The President did not 

agree with that, we were, we tried to work with the Russians so 

246 

that we could mutually move beyond the ABM Treaty, but fundamentally we had concluded that in order to develop a limited national missile defense system, we had to become free of the constraints of the treaty. And although we worked with the Russians 

to try to get them to agree to mutually withdraw—when we were 

unable to do that, the President exercised his authority under the 

ABM Treaty—and gave notice of withdrawal. 

I think the ABM Treaty was a treaty that did not serve the national interests of the United States, and that’s why the President 

withdrew. 

Senator SARBANES. Well, do you generally hold the view that 

since treaties might well constrain our freedom of action, and since 

we’re now clearly the single-most powerful country in the world, 

that as a general proposition we should be very skeptical about entering into treaties, because they circumscribe, or limit, our freedom of action? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think you have to take each treaty on its own 

basis, I don’t have a theological view about it, I think it’s a practical question. 

SARBANES. And is the practical question that you’re answering 

the degree of constraint that it places upon the United States? 

Mr. BOLTON. No, I think there are other factors that come into 

play, for example, the Treat of Moscow, that President Bush and 

President Putin signed in May of 2002 ratified unanimously by the 

Senate provided for the reduction in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by two-thirds over a ten year period. I 

think that was a treaty that was clearly in the interest of the 

United States to sign. 

Senator SARBANES. What about a general view that a system of 

treaties that constrains the ability of others to act would be of benefit to the United States. That, while we might be constrained in 

certain instances by treaty arrangements in terms of having our 

power limited, there’s a benefit that flows to us by constructing 

such an international system because of the constraints and restraints that it places upon others. And it, therefore, contributes to 

making the international environment a more ‘‘rule of law’’ environment. Is that something to be sought after? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that as an abstract proposition that might 

be true, I think you’d have to look at the specifics of the treaty to 

determine the specifics of whatever system or treaty you might be 

talking about to know whether it applies in fact. 

Senator SARBANES. I think one final question, I think you said 

earlier in the testimony that your views and those of Senator Moynihan’s on the international criminal court, or the ICC were similar? 

Mr. BOLTON. I had conversations with him before he died, where 

I don’t want to leave the impression that our views were identical, 

but I know that he had read several articles that I’d written and 

he shared many of the concerns I had written about. He called me 

up to mention that. 

Senator SARBANES. He did send a letter, signed a letter, along 

with a number of members, to President Clinton at the end of 

2000, urging the President to sign the treaty for the International 

Criminal Court, and I think your view was that the happiest day 

of your life was when the U.S. withdrew, is that correct? 

247 

Mr. BOLTON. Right, he called me after signing that letter, it was 

literally, and it was literally within a few weeks before he died. 

Senator SARBANES. Well, I have no way to question that, do I? 

Mr. BOLTON. Sadly. 

Senator SARBANES. I do have his letter which directly contradicts 

that, but you would say that he had a, if not a death bed conversion, a switch of position, is that right? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think what he had, what he had done was look 

at some of the concerns and had, my recollection was that he was 

preparing an article at the time, and had wanted to talk about it, 

and had read one or more of my articles. 

Senator SARBANES. He also said that it was outrageous that we 

hadn’t paid our U.N. dues, calling us one of the world’s biggest 

deadbeats. But you disagreed with that position, I take it. 

Mr. BOLTON. No, I testified earlier today, Senator, that during 

the first Bush Administration, we followed a policy that President 

Reagan had articulated at the end of his Administration to repay 

the arrearage that had built up during the 1980’s, and in the late 

1990’s, I certainly supported the Helms-Biden legislation that was 

intended to find a way through the arrearage question. 

The CHAIRMAN. That will need to all, I think we need to conclude. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bolton, according to a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on page 277, in reference to this big dispute here 

that we’ve been talking about, the process and the analyst and so 

forth, I want to get to the substance of this whole dispute. And in 

that report, they refer to your speech, this is the May ’02 speech, 

the Heritage lectures, the Heritage Foundation. The analyst told 

the Senate Intelligence Committee staff that the text of your 

speech contained a sentence that said, ‘‘The U.S. believes that 

Cuba has a developmental offensive biological warfare program, 

and is providing assistance to other rogue state programs.’’ The 

text also called for international observers of Cuba’s biological facilities. 

Do you believe that Cuba has, or had in 2002, offensive biological 

weapons development program? 

Mr. BOLTON. What we believed at the time was the sentence that 

actually appeared in the text of the Heritage statement, which I 

would be happy to read, and in Assistant Secretary Ford’s testimony, and indeed, Assistant Secretary Ford said later that he believed, in testimony before this Committee, that the evidence for 

that proposition was substantial. 

Senator NELSON. So did you believe that Cuba was providing biological weapons assistance to rogue nations? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think there was intelligence that tended to suggest that, but the point of giving this to the Intelligence Community to clear was to make sure that the statement was accurate. 

Because there was no point, from my perspective, in saying something that was no accurate. So, changes were made, I’m sure this 

drafting process went on for—at the staff level—for a long time, 

and the language that was ultimately cleared was the language 

that was used. 

248 

Senator NELSON. And, of course, that’s the whole dispute here, 

is whether or not there was pressure put on the analysts from your 

initial view. 

Mr. BOLTON. No, it was not. 

Senator NELSON. That was not your initial view. 

Mr. BOLTON. That was not the issue that turned on, that we 

were discussing, which occurred back in February when I thought 

the analyst had not been straightforward with me on a process 

point. 

Senator NELSON. Until the CIA gave their input into the question of offensive biological weapons, did you believe that there was 

an offensive biological weapons developmental program in Cuba? 

Mr. BOLTON. I wasn’t sure from the intelligence I read, where 

different intelligence agencies had different views, what the consensus of the Community would be. And that’s not unusual, and 

not only is it not unusual, I don’t think it’s a bad thing. I think 

the Silberman-Robb Report makes it clear that one of the problems 

we have with intelligence is with the analytical process of intelligence is agencies not being competitive enough in their viewpoints, and it’s not something that policy makers get involved in, 

and I didn’t get involved in this. We kept, we gave, the staff-level 

people were putting language forward, other people were giving alternative formulations, and it was being worked out. It was not me 

staking out a position, it was speech writers trying to write a 

speech. 

Senator NELSON. Well, we’re going to have a chance to cross-examine that fellow tomorrow, and one of the questions that we’re 

going to ask him is, what was the text that was submitted? And, 

according to this Senate Select Committee Intelligence Report, on 

page 277, it was as I just stated. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think there were many drafts of it, Senator, and 

you know, that’s the nature of speech drafting in the government. 

I think what a public official is responsible for, is what he actually 

testifies. 

Senator NELSON. Well, what ultimately came out that was 

scrubbed, was softened. ‘‘The United States believes that Cuba has 

at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort,’’ ‘‘Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other 

rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could support 

BW programs in those states.’’ Is this an issue that we should be 

concerned about, in your opinion? 

Mr. BOLTON. About the Cuban BW effort as described there? Yes, 

I did think it was something that we should be concerned about. 

And that was the best judgment that the Intelligence Community 

had as of that time. 

Senator NELSON. Well, then what is the U.S. government doing 

about it? 

Mr. BOLTON. Part of the problem at that time that the U.S. government was involved in, was it was still dealing with the question 

of what the Cuba spy, Ana Belan Montes, had done to undercut our 

efforts to understand better what the Cubans were up to. And my 

point in raising this was—as I said—in the wake of September the 

11th, I felt that it was responsible to have a discussion about BW/ 

CW and nuclear threats that we faced, because part of what was 

important here was building public understanding, but our efforts, 

249 

what we said was that we called on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states, and to fully comply with all of 

its obligations under the biological weapons convention. 

Senator NELSON. Have we called for international weapons inspectors? 

Mr. BOLTON. We have not, no. Not in Cuba under the, the BWC 

doesn’t provide for that. 

Senator NELSON. Well, have you had consideration of taking the 

issue to the Security Council to seek sanctions? 

Mr. BOLTON. No, that was never discussed. The issue of what 

Cuba was doing here, was not the same as saying that we could 

say with any degree of conclusiveness that Cuba had biological 

weapons, which some press reports said I said, but which I didn’t, 

or anything that would give us a basis to go to the Security Council. 

Senator NELSON. Have we intercepted, or disrupted any transfers 

of the dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states from Cuba? 

Mr. BOLTON. I’m not aware that we have. 

Senator NELSON. Have we, as a policy of the Administration, 

have we urged our allies to use their influence to get Cuba to give 

up this biological weapons capability? 

Mr. BOLTON. I know we have discussed it with them, and it’s a 

subject that when we have consultations on proliferation matters, 

comes up in the conversations, yes. 

Senator NELSON. Well, in what way, since you raised this issue 

nearly three years ago, this very important issue, in what way has 

it become a priority since it was raised by you in this speech to the 

Heritage Foundation. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think we’ve done we felt was within the limits of our ability to do. And there are some things that there are 

a lot of assessments of countries that have clandestine chemical 

and biological weapons programs or efforts underway that there’s 

not a lot we can do about it, because they are, for biological warfare 

in particular, these are all inherently dual-use operations. So that 

operationally, there isn’t much we can do. 

But I think what we have tried to do, and this goes back to the 

point I made earlier about the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in November/December 2001, where one of the 

things we wanted to do is to highlight the problem of noncompliance with the BWC. That there were a number of states that were 

parties to it, that participated in all of the conferences, and that 

we very strongly felt were violating the treaty. So that part of what 

we were trying to do is build international diplomatic pressure on 

those countries to comply with the obligations under the convention 

that they had undertaken. 

Senator NELSON. In the process do you realize you shook up a 

bunch of my constituents? We’re only 90 miles from Cuba. 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes, and I had conversations with Congressman 

Lincoln Biaz Bilart, and Congresswoman Iliana Rose-Light on who 

both thanked me for raising the issue, which was something they 

had been concerned about previously, indeed. 

Senator NELSON. And you say there is very little we can do about 

it, which is what you just said. That’s a scary admission. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think there have also been continuing evaluations of the program and what the evidence is. Part of the conVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00249 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
250 

cern is that Cuba has a very sophisticated biotech and pharmaceutical industry, and given what I said before about the inherently 

dual-use nature of biological warfare, that is a problem that’s endemic in a country that has that kind of capability. 

Senator NELSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by 

saying that when there is the tendency to step over the line with 

an inflammatory statement, it’s troubling to overstate a threat. 

And, in my experience here in the Senate, that’s one of the examples of what got us into trouble in Iraq, by a threat being overstated. Mr. Chairman, I’ll conclude. 

I’m curious, has Secretary Powell and Secretary Armitage, have 

they endorsed you? 

Mr. BOLTON. I haven’t asked them to endorse me. Secretary Powell sent me a congratulatory e-mail, ‘‘On to the Waldorf,’’ it said. 

Senator NELSON. So, that sounds like an endorsement. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I wrote him back and said, ‘‘Thanks very 

much.’’ 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Nelson. 

Let me just indicate that we’ve completed the second round, 

we’re about to commence the third round, but before we do so, I’d 

like to recognize the fact that we’ve been joined by the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, John Warner, 

who will give a brief greeting to our nominee. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It had been my intention to introduce our distinguished nominee 

last week, but of course, the need to reschedule today, and I had 

long-term plans to travel in my state, so I apologize, but the Chairman very thoughtfully put my statement into the record. 

I’ve had a great and long interest in the United Nations. I think 

I’m the only serving member of the Senate now that served in 

Korea under the United Nations flag in the winter of 1951–1952 

in the Marines. And that was my introduction, and I’m very proud 

of my association, although modest it may have been, with the 

U.N. at that time. And in the ensuing years, I’ve had many opportunities to visit, I remember very well, Mr. Chairman, going up 

with Senator Helms. He asked me to accompany him when he went 

up to establish a truce of some sort, and get the dues in order. 

But, anyway, I feel it’s an organization that has played very important roles in the history of our nation with a half century that 

I’ve known it, and that it can become—and I hope will become— 

a much stronger organization, because there are many purposes 

that it, and it alone, can serve, in the cause of human freedom, and 

mankind, and human rights. So, as I said in my statement, I wish 

you the best, and you have my support, strong support, in your 

confirmation process. 

I thank the Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we thank the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, it’s a privilege for Senator Biden and for me to 

work with you and Senator Levin. We have many common interests and important goals to work on together. Thank you for coming. 

Senator WARNER. I might note that in that winter, I think the 

distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, his father was there. We 

often, reminisced many times, he also was in the Marines. 

251 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just suggest that this course of action, 

we’re going to have two roll call votes of the Senate the first commencing at 5:30, as it’s the Chair’s estimate that that is likely to 

take about a half an hour, and that another vote will be occurring 

at about 6:00 p.m. Therefore, I would suggest that we would go 

until 5:30, recommence the round if we have not completed it, at 

6:15. 

Now, in the event that you, Secretary Bolton, would like a short 

recess before then, fair enough. Otherwise we will proceed until 

5:30. And you will know at that point that there is forty-five minutes of surcease. 

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say that in this round I will not ask 

questions and I will yield to my colleague, Senator Chafee for the 

first Republican questions. 

Senator CHAFEE. I’ll pass, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. He passes, I’ll yield then to Senator Biden. 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. 

Again, we’ve been focusing a lot on, and it’s confusing, at least 

I think it’s confusing, I was going to say ‘‘who struck John?’’ but 

that’s a inappropriate phrase, who said what to whom, when and 

how and whether you used undue or inappropriate pressure on people just doing their job, and again, just to re-recap here, what anybody has in their minds, at least speaking for myself, is the debate 

over aluminum tubes, and whether they were for gas centrifuge 

systems, and the assertions by the Vice President that there had 

been a reconstitution of a nuclear program in Iraq, and so on and 

so forth, and it turns out at the end of the day, the Intelligence 

Community was far from unified in any of that. 

And so that’s the context in which there’s a lot of concern here. 

And also that you are a very bright, straight-forward and have very 

clear views about what you think about most of the rest of the 

world, and have never been reluctant to state it, nor should you be. 

For whatever the reasons that you sought the change in assignment, not to penalize, just to get both Mr. Westermann and Mr. 

Smith off your watch, for whatever the reasons, the facts are that 

their superiors, in every case, in the case of Mr. Westermann going 

all the way up to the Secretary of State, said ‘‘No, we think you’re 

doing a find job, we’re keeping him right where he is.’’ Mr. 

Westermann’s immediate boss, Mr. Westermann’s working with the 

man that I’m told is going to testify tomorrow, I’m told he took it 

from there up to the Deputy Secretary of State, that was taken to 

the Secretary of State, they all said, ‘‘Nope, he didn’t do anything 

wrong, he did his job, and he’s doing his job in an excellent manner.’’ And so, for whatever your motive, whether it was loss of 

faith, or whatever, the conclusion of your superiors was, he should 

stay right where he was, is that correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I’m not aware of all of the background, I made 

my point about him, and I didn’t press it. There were a couple of 

conversations, I wrote no memos on the subject—if I had been determined to get something done, I think I probably knew how to 

do it—but I wasn’t, I made my point, I had lost trust and confidence in the fellow, and there it was. 

Senator BIDEN. And you made that known, though, right? You 

made it known to him, did you make it known—you made it known 

252 

to Mr.—the guy testifying tomorrow—Ford, Mr. Ford’s assistant, 

you made it known to them and they concluded, for whatever else 

they wrote to you, he stayed right in place. Right? 

Mr. BOLTON. I felt from what Mr. Fingar had written to me that 

Mr. Westermann’s behavior was entirely inappropriate, that we 

screwed up, that it won’t happen again, I had made my point. 

Senator BIDEN. I got that, but he stayed right where he was, 

right? You made your point, but he didn’t move, right? 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s correct, and that’s fine. 

Senator BIDEN. And, so one of the things that seems, maybe 

I’m—it’s been so long since I’ve done this, but—it seems to me this 

is all about, it comes down to me whether or not your motive was 

that you lost confidence because they went around your back, or 

your motive in wanting them move was because they disagreed 

with you on substance. You say you lost confidence because, paraphrasing, they went behind your back, it had nothing to do with 

the substantive differences that may have existed relating to intelligence analysis in Cuba, and to me, a lot rests in that question. 

So that I make sure I understand this, I’m going to try to recount, 

and you interrupt me if I say anything that you think is inaccurate. 

Mr. BOLTON. I dare not interrupt. 

Senator BIDEN. No, no. For real, because this is getting late in 

the day, and we’re not nearly as tired as you because you’ve had 

to go nonstop, we just go everything thirty minutes or so, but everybody has said that old joke, ‘‘My job is to speak and yours is to 

listen, if you finish your job before I finish mine, raise your hand, 

we all go home.’’ 

Mr. BOLTON. Why don’t you go ahead and give your side of it, 

and I’ll take notes, that’s the easiest thing. 

Senator BIDEN. Let me tell you what I think has happened here, 

factually. For whatever reason, somewhere around February 11th, 

your Chief of Staff contacts the INR guy, who happens to be Mr. 

Westermann, and says, ‘‘Can you clear these several sentences?’’ 

I’m assuming that the reason you wanted them cleared is because 

they were part of, considered to be put in a speech or some public 

statement you were going to make, otherwise, I assume there 

would be no need to have them cleared, if you weren’t going to say 

anything outside the building. 

Then there is this back and forth, whether or not Mr. 

Westermann when he did what is his job, passed those comments 

on to, from INR to the CIA or the Director of Intelligence, and an 

office within that building, that he—instead of waiting to be asked 

for them, what do you think?—he attached his comments, saying 

that he didn’t think the way you were seeking the three sentences 

he got should not be used. As a matter of fact, I’m told that even 

before he did that, he sent approved language to your Chief of 

Staff, even before he sent anything off to the Central Intelligence 

Organization, for those average Americans listening. 

But your Chief of Staff said, ‘‘No, send it on, we need an answer, 

and we need it quickly, as to whether or not we can use it as we 

have characterized, as we, the way we have written this.’’ And 

there’s the back and forth, and the back comes language that is referenced in the Intelligence Committee Report, that’s different than 

the language that you initially wanted to use, but that you subseVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00252 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
253 

quently used. As a matter of fact, Mr. Ford, in March, coming up 

to testify before a committee in this Senate, he used the exact language, even before you did, that had been approved, these three 

sentences. 

Now, then along comes the speech that you make at the Heritage 

Foundation on May the 6th. That speech includes those three sentences, as approved, but a lot more. A lot more about other countries than Cuba, and more about Cuba, including whether or not 

we should be looking at how accurate the intelligence assessments 

were, based on the fact that we found a Cuban spy. You referenced 

this spy, it had been uncovered, in your Heritage Foundation 

speech, among other things relating to Cuba that were not the 

three sentences that had been approved. 

So now, we now find ourselves in the position where, after you 

make that speech, in preparation for testimony, before Senator 

Dodd’s subcommittee, Mr. Smith doesn’t give testimony, but is debriefed in a closed hearing about the Cuba speech. And he says, not 

in a public hearing, but to the staff of Mr. Dodd, or whoever the 

subcommittee chair was that Mr. Helms’ staff. Pardon me? You 

were chair, but Mr. Helms’ staff also was heard, what Mr. Smith 

had to say. What Mr. Smith said was, in addition to the three lines 

that have been, that we’ve discussed so much here, and that the 

Chairman doesn’t want read again, I don’t blame him, there are 

other things in the Bolton Heritage Foundation speech that had 

been given roughly a month later, or earlier, that were not cleared. 

Then, the next day you were going to come and testify, and the 

testimony you were going to give, it is asserted, before the subcommittee of Mr. Dodd, was also not cleared. But you never gave 

it because the Secretary of State said you’re not available to testify. 

In this same time frame, between the time you gave the speech 

on May the 6th at the Heritage Foundation, and the time that Mr. 

Smith talked with Mr. Dodd’s subcommittee, an interesting thing 

happened. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 

CIA, sends out an internal assessment that goes to policy makers 

and other intelligence people, reaffirming their conclusions about 

Cuba’s BWI and chemical weapons efforts. Which is at odds with 

parts of the speech that you made to the Heritage Foundation on 

May 6th. 

I am told that one of Senator Helms’ staff picked up the phone 

after the meeting with Senator Dodd’s subcommittee, and says, 

‘‘Mr. Smith is saying Mr. Bolton’s speech to the Heritage Foundation was never cleared.’’ So two things, maybe related or unrelated, 

happen in the same time frame, that come to your attention. One, 

all of the policy makers related to Cuba and all of the Intelligence 

Agency gets a reaffirmation of the judgments made about Cuba’s 

chemical and biological weapons program, that you are implicitly 

criticizing in your speech on May the 6th, and Mr. Smith says your 

speech on May the 6th never was cleared. 

The next thing we’re aware of that happens, is you make a courtesy call to the CIA, and you speak with Mr. Cohen. And you say 

it was just a courtesy call, and in the process, in the midst of that 

courtesy call, Mr. Cohen says, basically, ‘‘Anything else on your 

mind?’’ And you say, ‘‘Yeah, Reich is right, this guy Smith should 

not be doing this job,’’ or something to that effect. 

254 

And so, it seems to me that you had a substantive motive for 

both dealing with Mr. Westermann and Mr. Smith as you did. Because it was a little embarrassing, wasn’t it? That the CIA after 

your Heritage Foundation speech reasserts to the whole community 

and the policy makers, ‘‘Hey, we stand by what we’ve been saying, 

and this is what we’ve been saying.’’ They never reference your 

speech on May the 6, but it’s sort of the spontaneity of this reaffirmation coming up is—in my thirty-two years here, and being on 

the Intelligence Committee for ten of them, is not something they 

often reaffirm, unless there’s other incidences that occur that put 

in question their assessment. And then you have Mr. Cohen saying 

he had no doubt that one of the reasons you were seeing him was 

to deal with Mr. Smith, and so it seems to me that you had a, I’m 

not suggesting an immoral or illegal, but you had a motive in that 

you had both Mr. Westermann and Mr. Smith taking issue with 

not only the language you had, and you used, but the veracity of 

it, the implication that would be drawn by a reasonable person 

from it. Such as, the Undersecretary’s speech contained a sentence 

which said the U.S. believes Cuba has developmental offensive biological programs, and is providing assistance to rogue state programs. That’s substantively different than, ‘‘we’re concerned that 

such technology, dual technology could support BW programs in 

those states.’’ 

And in addition to that you have, I can understand why you 

might be upset with Mr. Smith, because he says to Mr. Dodd’s committee, ‘‘Hey, Bolton’s speech was never cleared.’’ And your explanation is two-fold. One, it wasn’t about policy, it was about the 

method they used to express their disagreement with me, or the 

language or the speech or what I was intending to say or do; and 

secondly, the part that’s confusing me the most, John, as experienced a bureaucrat, using your own language, you said, ‘‘If you 

wanted to deal with him, you knew had to do it, you never wrote 

a memorandum, but if you wanted to, you would,’’ but you seem 

to be devoid of any knowledge of how these kinds of speeches were 

cleared in the past for your predecessor, for your successor, for 

whoever that will be, for everybody. And you said, ‘‘Well, I just 

didn’t know and I was going out to find out from the new guy on 

the block at the CIA to find out how this process worked.’’ 

To be blunt with you, I find it, it takes a leap of imagination for 

me to believe you didn’t know how it worked, b) that this was 

strictly a procedural disagreement you had with these men, and toward that end, and in the interest of time, if you’d let me, if my 

colleagues would yield me a little bit of time, and their time so we 

won’t take anybody else’s—I don’t understand. I have a few just, 

basic questions, about when in fact, you knew what, and who you 

asked. You know, did you summon the guy heading up INR into 

your office to tell him how dissatisfied you were? Did you tell him 

that he didn’t go through the right channels? Did you ask for him 

to be removed from your portfolio? Did you talk with Otto Reich 

before you went to see Cohen on your drive home for the casual visits. I mean, what are—explain to me why my reading of your motive is not accurate? 

The CHAIRMAN. Please respond, and then we will proceed to Senator Coleman. 

255 

Mr. BOLTON. I think I’ve answered, essentially, all of those questions before, and I don’t have a better way to answer than I answered before so I would, as Cap Weinberger used to say, ‘‘If I said 

any more I’d simply be repeating myself,’’ I’ll just incorporate my 

previous answers into this answer. There is one new question that, 

or two new points I think you’ve raised. First, who cleared the 

speech? And let me say, it’s unequivocal, and you have it in the 

documents that were produced, INR cleared the speech. INR 

cleared the speech, and the CIA cleared the speech. Now, who else 

in the Intelligence Community cleared it, didn’t clear it, should 

have cleared it, I don’t know. That’s why we leave it to the Intelligence Community. You know, much of your commentary has been 

unwarranted or impermissible policy making influence on the Intelligence Community. Okay? 

Senator BIDEN. It sure seems that way. 

Mr. BOLTON. So, what we did was, this speech, other speeches 

that contain intelligence-related information, you give it to them, 

and it’s up to them to decide who to clear. But it came back, and 

it’s not disputed. INR cleared the speech, and CIA cleared the 

speech. 

The other new point that you raised was did I talk to Otto Reich 

before I saw Mr. Cohen, and the answer to that is yes, I did. He— 

I think I mentioned this earlier—but Assistant Secretary Reich was 

responsible for all Western Hemisphere policy matters, and he was 

very concerned about Mr. Smith. And he had heard about this 

question of the speech and came and talked to me about it, and he 

said he was going to go out and speak to the pertinent people out 

in the Intelligence Community, and he was going to let me know 

that, because he had known I had this problem. And I think it’s 

fair to say that he felt pretty strongly about it. 

Senator BIDEN. If you said, ‘‘Leave it up to the Intelligence Community to determine it,’’ why’d you get so mad at Westermann, 

then? Every single person in the Intelligence Community agreed 

with his assessment. 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t actually know whether that’s accurate, or 

not accurate, what I was objecting to was that —— 

Senator BIDEN. Why don’t you know that, John? How could you 

not know that? 

Mr. BOLTON. He went behind my back, he sent out an —— 

Senator BIDEN. How could you not know that? 

Mr. BOLTON. He sent, this was the day it happened, he sent out 

a document that says, ‘‘INR does not concur with the language,’’ 

and I said to myself, ‘‘How does that happen?’’ That’s why I called 

Carl Ford, and with Carl out of the office, and I don’t know why, 

I then asked for the next highest ranking person, who was Mr. 

Fingar, and I said, ‘‘Could you check into this?’’ And he did, and 

he said, ‘‘Westermann’s behavior was entirely inappropriate, we 

screwed up,’’ and he said twice, ‘‘it won’t happen again.’’ 

Senator BIDEN. And that was the end of it for you? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think, the conversation I had with Carl 

Ford, I think he came back into the office from wherever he was, 

and we talked about this, and I repeated, essentially, what I had 

said to Fingar. 

Senator BIDEN. Did you mention it with Carl Ford, or did he 

come to see, to talk to you about it? 

256 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t honestly remember, it may have been on the 

margins of one of the Secretary’s 8:30 staff meetings, he may have 

been in my office after the meeting, I don’t remember. 

Senator BIDEN. Well, just let the record show that every other 

member of the Intelligence Community that reviewed the three 

sentences you want, concurred with INR, to the best of my knowledge, in the assessment that Mr. Westermann gave contemporaneously with sending on those comments. 

Mr. BOLTON. Here’s the bottom line—I gave the language that 

was cleared by the Intelligence Community, I did not give other 

language. 

Senator BIDEN. Bottom line is, did you try to get someone moved, 

that’s the bottom line for me. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me actually 

focus on a conversation responding to some concerns from my colleague from Illinois, and I do want to make it clear that I also believe putting together effective coalitions is in our interest, it absolutely is. My concern is that the ability of the U.N. to do that, the 

ability of the U.N. to do a peacekeeping effort, to do a sanctions effort, has certainly been undermined by some of the circumstances 

and the situations that we’ve seen—be it in the Congo with sexual 

abuse or be it Oil-for-Food—so that clearly, it is in our interest to 

put together coalitions. We must have a United Nations that has 

credibility. But one of the questions that was raised was concerns 

about false concreteness, when we say the U.N. is responsible, that 

in fact the responsibility goes to member states. And clearly, in 

looking at Oil-for-Food, for example, there’s no doubt that member 

states made decisions—both in setting up a program and allowing 

things to happen, in blocking the effort to, at times, to contain the 

Oil-for-Food program as it was expanded, there were concerns that 

the United States and Britain had during that process—but I want 

to, my concern is I have these discussions, often times it seems to 

me the people pointing fingers at these abstract, these ‘‘member 

states,’’ without absolutely there being some real responsibility for 

individuals who are making actions. There is a U.N. bureaucracy, 

there is the Secretariat, they got $1.4 billion of Oil-for-Food money 

to oversee the Oil-for-Food program. And as you’ve noted in the 

past, one of the problems when you have a bureaucracy, they’re not 

beholden to any democratic state, they’re not beholden to any government. Benon Sevan who was overseeing the program, and who, 

in the Volcker Report, it’s clear that he received what I would call 

bribes from Saddam, he lied to the investigators about the source 

of the money that he received—he lied about that, there’s no question about that—you have Saddam’s Chief of Staff who shredded 

documents, you have Louise Frechette who, at one point in time 

when the IOS wanted to submit audits to member states, in fact, 

the IOS was stopped from doing that. So, I would hope it is your 

sense that there is some accountability for individuals in the organization, that it’s not simply a responsibility for member states, 

and we somehow hold blameless those folks who are involved in 

overseeing, failing to manage fraud, abuse and mismanagement, 

who were involved, perhaps, in corruption themselves. When, in 

the instance of the Secretary General in the Volcker report didn’t 

257 

‘‘fully investigate’’ conflicts of interests between the company 

Cotecna, and his son. Could you clarify that a little bit for me? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think there clearly are joint responsibilities here. 

The reason you have a Secretariat is to carry out the programs 

that the member states order. And, in fact, it is the responsibility 

in the first instance—the responsibility of the Security Council to 

set these programs, the Security Council or General Assembly—to 

set these programs up, and the Secretariat, then, to manage them. 

And, I think it’s important when you talk about the Secretary General, Article 97 of the U.N. Charter says, referring to the Secretary 

General, ‘‘He shall be the chief administrative officer of the organization.’’ And I think what that shows is that the Charter intends 

that the Secretary General basically be a manager of programs, in 

this case reporting to the Security Council. So, the member states, 

obviously, can’t be overseeing every single detail. What you need is 

political accountability from the member states, to the extent you 

can get it, and management accountability from the Secretariat, 

and what the Volcker Commission and others’ investigations have 

shown is, I think, that there are some problems here that have 

been uncovered that clearly need to be pursued. 

Senator COLEMAN. And my concern as a former mayor who has 

worked with a bureaucracy and knows how hard it is to make 

change. As I look at the United Nations, and I look at 191 members, and the challenge, the great challenge of reform. Again, at 

both levels that we’ve talked about, one is certainly on the political 

structure, the nature of a Security Council, who serves on it— 

India, Brazil, Japan, do these have roles in the Security Council, 

the Human Rights Commission—but then also the organization 

itself, the bureaucracy, the auditing functions. And, clearly what 

we’ve seen in Oil-for-Food, simply being the one instance—but I 

presume many, many more if you look at the IOS audits—of lack 

of controls, of standards, of evaluations, of a whole range of basic 

management tools, an organization that we’re putting in close to 25 

percent of its operating budget. And I would hope as Ambassador 

that you would be as vigorous in focusing in on that bureaucracy, 

who, I think, deserves to have a system in which there is accountability and responsibility. And my fear was, as we talked about this 

kind of, this concept of false concreteness, and as we say, U.N. is 

responsible, that somehow, we end up holding no one responsible. 

And, in this instance, that’s been my concern with the Secretary 

General. That ultimately the buck has to stop somewhere—and if 

it’s your Chief of Staff who’s shredding documents, if the person 

you appointed to oversee the program is on the take, if you’ve been 

out there advocating expansion of the program when Saddam was 

raking in billions from it for himself—that in the end if there isn’t 

anybody that we hold responsible, then in the end we have this 

great diplomatic discussion and it doesn’t serve the interest of reform, and credibility and accountability. 

Mr. BOLTON. My notion of false concreteness is the notion that 

the U.N. has some political decision making authority, independent 

of member governments, which I think is completely incorrect, but 

there’s no false concreteness in looking at the Secretariat, they’re 

the people who are carrying out the responsibilities; they are the 

people that have to be at the high management standards that I 

think are important to give the U.N. credibility in this country. As 

258 

you say, to justify the appropriations Congress is annually called 

upon to make. 

Senator COLEMAN. Just one last comment—I believe that the 

budget for the IOS is about 24 million, and I’m told that the budget 

for the Communications Office in the U.N. is about 160 million. I 

would hope that you take a look at that and see if we can somehow 

refocus priorities. 

Mr. BOLTON. That’s a good point. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. I thank the Senator also for 

his vigilance in hearings on Oil-for-Food, he has been vigorous in 

pursuing all aspects of that, as is evidenced by his questions. And, 

in the event you are confirmed, Secretary Bolton, hopefully you will 

work closely with the Senator’s subcommittee. 

Mr. BOLTON. I will, indeed. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd? 

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bolton, I appreciate your perseverence here, it’s been a long day, and I’m sorry 

about going so long, but it’s important to try to move this along, 

I appreciate the Chairman sticking with this. 

We’ve been over and over this, let me just tell you my concern 

again with the motive behind all of this. While others maybe think 

this is tangential, this question, I think it is so critically important 

because of my fear and worry that others will see this as an improper message about whether or not you can do this. As I see it— 

and we’re going to hear from, I guess, one of these, maybe more, 

depending upon, Mr. Chairman, our success in getting a couple of 

these people before us —— 

The CHAIRMAN. They’re going to be here at 5:30. 

Senator DODD. I mean other witnesses tomorrow. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have only Carl Ford. 

Senator DODD. His, if you’re looking at this, Mr. Bolton, and 

again—can I see the response to Senator Biden’s question this 

morning?—Senator Biden, at the very outset of this hearing—after 

Senator Lugar asked questions—when asked the question about 

whether or not, your recollection if you had ever sought to remove 

any intelligence analyst as a result of a difference of opinion, 

whether it was over substance or process. At least initially, your 

response was you may have, you couldn’t really remember, but you 

were, as clear as you’ve become during the day long hearing here. 

Here’s what I’m sort of confronted with as I look at this—and 

again, we’re trying to decide—I’ve got Mr. Westermann and Mr. 

Smith. I don’t know what their views are, Mr. Westermann serves 

23 years in the Navy, by every account, highly qualified guy, I can’t 

tell what his politics are or anything else, he’s a defense intelligence analyst. Mr. Smith, I gather again, is a person highly regarded, a specialist on Latin American affairs at the Agency—let 

me just jump back, Mr. Chairman, here’s the point—Senator Biden 

asked the question, and Mr. Bolton’s answer at that time was, ‘‘I 

may have mentioned it to a couple of people, shrugged my shoulders and moved on.’’ I mean, that’s, whether or not you’d asked 

them to be removed from office, from their positions. Your Chief of 

Staff, Mr. Fleitz, Mr. Fingar—who’s presently the head of INR— 

Mr. Cohen, who’s on the National Intelligence Council, Mr. Ford, 

a former head of the INR, Mr. Silver we haven’t heard from yet, 

259 

I’m not sure what he’s going to say—but here are people who agree 

with you, substantively, on issues, to the best of my knowledge, 

don’t embrace any ideological difference of opinion—I’m hardpressed to determine what motivation they would have for stating, 

as they have, that in their view, their impression was, that you 

wanted them removed. This isn’t one person, this is five, six, seven 

people who we’ve talked to in the last several days, who said their 

impressions were that you, and the actions you took, were designed 

to change their portfolio, move them on, get them out of the positions they were in. So, I’m hard-pressed, as some would be, when 

you’re talking and you ask yourself, ‘‘What’s behind this? Why 

would they do this?’’ Who’s this Mr. Westermann, that he would 

have an ax to grind with John Bolton? Who’s this—why would your 

Chief of Staff, as he recounts what occurs here, why would he say 

that? Why would Mr. Ford—years of experience at the Central Intelligence Agency, or Mr. Fingar—why would they say these 

things? Why would Mr. Cohen say that when you come up, you 

have a nice, amicable conversation, you stopped off at the CIA 

when you got there, and when you were there, this was the thing 

you suggested, that you remove this guy, Mr. Smith. I’m just hardpressed to understand what motivations these five, six, seven people would have to draw those conclusions. If it was one of them, 

or two of them, I would say, ‘‘He said/she said,’’ I think we can 

solve that. But, I’ve got on the one hand, five or six or seven people, with credible backgrounds, long experience in this area, professional individuals, who have no ax to grind with John Bolton, 

who—when asked these questions, not even under oath—offer this 

to our joint staff who interviewed them in the last few days. I’m 

sitting here trying to draw a conclusion. What is a person do when 

you’re confronted with that now? If you don’t think this is an important issue, then you don’t care, and whether or not you put 

pressure or you suggest that whether or not you agree with that 

conclusion or not, I want to make that point. I’m not really as concerned about whether or not what they were writing or not writing 

was right or wrong—that is important and I don’t disregard it—but 

the more important question to me is what happens to someone— 

that I think you ought to encourage dissent; I think there are people who disagree with policy centers and I heard you say this, and 

I agree with you—there ought to be that debating side, so you get 

it right. So, no one’s arguing about debate and dissent. The question is, what happens to you if you dissent? And if what happens 

to you when you dissent is that your job is on the line, then we 

need to put a stop to that. And I think you’ll agree with that. And 

the question is, what I have here, what conclusion is one to draw 

when you have five, six, seven people who have no ax to grind, to 

take a view that, in fact you did try to have these people removed, 

and you tell me you didn’t. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think that the—your characterization of Mr. 

Fleitz’s testimony is not accurate—but, let me try again to say 

what I felt. That, in the case of Mr. Westermann—as I believe I 

said to him at the time—I don’t care if you disagree with me, I just 

don’t think you should do it behind my back. And, when there’s a 

loss of trust and confidence in somebody in that kind of position, 

I just think it’s better for everybody to reshuffle the deck. INR’s a 

large bureau, the State Department is a large place, it’s not a quesVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00259 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
260 

tion of putting somebody out on the street, there’s no question of 

that involved here, at all. And, in the case of —— 

Senator DODD. Let me just say on Mr. Fleitz, let me quote him, 

Mr. Fleitz’s interview, page 50, lines ten and thirteen of the interview with Mr. Fleitz, and I’ll just read these to you: ‘‘Mr. Fleitz:’’ 

and I’m quoting, ‘‘All I can remember—and this is from Mr. 

Bolton—is that he spoke to Mr. Fingar to express his concern over 

what had happened, and said that Mr. Westermann had lost his 

confidence, and should be given a new portfolio.’’ Mr. Fleitz goes 

on, ‘‘While Silver was there, Bolton relayed the fact that he had 

lost confidence in Mr. Westermann, and asked that he be given a 

different portfolio.’’ Fleitz interview, page 48, lines 20 to 23. You 

know, get a new portfolio—we’ve all pretty much decided—is a euphemism for moving on, the guy only had one portfolio. So, here’s 

a guy who says something you disagree with—and you’re saying 

it’s process, I understand that—but even if it’s process, say you lost 

some confidence in him, you don’t try to fire a person over that. 

Mr. BOLTON. I didn’t try to fire him. I just felt that if he wasn’t 

being straight in his dealings with me that he ought to have other 

responsibilities, and I’ve said that repeatedly, and I think that’s 

what Mr. Fleitz is saying, don’t you? 

Senator DODD. All right, well, I thank you. Let me just, one or 

two other little questions, and I’ll be done, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just ask you here, and I word this question—I want to 

read the question because I want to make sure I don’t overstep a 

line here—and the question very simply, Mr. Bolton, and I want 

you to listen to the question carefully, you’ll appreciate why I say 

that when I read the question. I want to know whether or not you 

requested to see NSA information about any other American officials. 

Mr. BOLTON. The answer to that is ’yes’, on a number of occasions I can think of. The way—I’m not even sure I should say this 

in open forum, but I’ll try and do it—the Privacy Act precludes 

naming names of Americans, even in the intercepts we get. Now, 

a lot of things that—people use titles and so on—but there are occasions when an intercept comes in on something—it might involve 

a member of another nationality that also gets these intercepts, I 

might say—where it’s important to find out who it is who’s saying 

what to whom. And from time to time—on a couple of occasions 

maybe a few more—I’ve asked to know the name of the person so 

I can better understand the intercept. 

Senator DODD. And that was the only motivation for that? 

Mr. BOLTON. Exactly. 

Senator DODD. I’ll leave that one be. We may want—I don’t know 

if we want to have a private session to maybe delve into that a little bit more, but I’ll leave that, if we ever get to that point. 

And last, Mr. Chairman, I note—and again, I, it’s sort of a 

unique, it’s fairly unique, I’m trying to recall, I was asking staff if 

they could recall other such occasions—when all of us, I think, on 

this Committee received a letter dated March 29th, to each of us 

here, regarding this nomination of Mr. Bolton to the Ambassadorship of the United Nations. It goes on—about a page and a half, 

almost two pages—and it’s signed by 62 former ambassadors, serving in Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Clinton, Reagan, Bush administrations, Eisenhower in some cases, going back—opposed to this nomiVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00260 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
261 

nation. Now, there may be other circumstances that’s occurred, but 

it’s fairly unique, in my regard, to have that many ambassadors, 

in that many different administrations—and I’d ask unanimous 

consent that this letter be included in the record. 

I full well know there were former Secretaries of State who have 

written in supporting this nomination, and if it hasn’t been, I 

would ask unanimous consent that that letter be included. 

The CHAIRMAN. Both letters will be in the record. 

Senator DODD. As I say, my staff can correct this, but I found 

this to be rather significant, that many people who have served as 

an ambassadorial rank would have such reservations about the 

nomination. 

And lastly, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving 

us the opportunity to spend a little time on this thing, and if I’m 

wrong in raising these questions, then I will stand to be corrected, 

but I think, Mr. Bolton said earlier in response to Senator Obama, 

the question about the importance of this question. And while others may not think it is that important, I think you do—even though 

we disagree over what happened here—I was impressed over the 

fact in response to Barack Obama that it would pose a serious 

problem if, in fact—there were a conflict here—and someone’s job 

were put on the line because there was a disagreement over policy. 

Or over intelligence information. And, to that extent, I appreciate 

your willingness to say that, because I think it’s important, too. 

And particularly, we’ve got younger people coming along, people in 

the intelligence analyst community, and it’s important that they 

know that when they disagree, it’s important they speak up. And 

they need to know that when they speak up, under proper circumstances, they should not have to worry about their job being on 

the line. And people who—if they, in fact, do propose threats— 

these people, in my view, should not be rewarded with high positions in office. So, I’ll end on that particular note, Mr. Chairman, 

I thank you. 

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator. 

Let me just comment that we’re coming up to the vote, at 5:30. 

If both Senators can restrict themselves to ten minutes, the Chair 

will extend this before going over to vote, otherwise, we’ll return 

at 6:15. 

Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. I promise that I will. 

Mr. Bolton, we have gone on about this, these two incidents, because we really think they’re very important, given the history of 

what happened in Iraq, the sensitivity of trying to illicit information to prove your thesis—as I think, Senator Obama was eloquent 

about that point—so, let me just wrap up my view on what I know 

today, and then tomorrow we’ll know more, because we’ll have 

some more—we’re going to be interviewing a couple of people tonight, and then Mr. Ford will be there tomorrow, so we’ll know 

more—but, here’s where we are tonight. 

I think Senator Dodd is correct. If this was one person’s word 

against another person’s word it would be one thing. But what you 

have here is seven people disagreeing with you. We have—we 

talked to seven people, our staffs have, about the anger you exhibited toward these two independent intelligence analysts who didn’t 

agree with you. You said you never wished them any professional 

262 

harm and you cite, ‘‘I didn’t write a memo.’’ Well, frankly, people 

wouldn’t write a memo if they were trying to get someone fired, so 

I don’t buy that as an argument, I’ve been around here a long time 

to know that’s the last thing you’re going to do is write a memo 

and have it appear on the front page of the Washington Post, so 

I just think it’s important to go over who disagrees with you. Mr. 

Fleitz who, again, said—and we’ve got the quotes—‘‘Mr. 

Westermann had lost Mr. Bolton’s confidence because of the episode, and he wanted, he asked that,’’ he meaning you, ‘‘asked that 

Mr. Westermann be given a different portfolio.’’ Mr. Fingar, who is 

Mr. Westermann’s boss, ‘‘Bolton said he wanted Westermann taken 

off his accounts.’’ He said, ‘‘I said, ’He’s our CW/BW specialist, 

that’s what he does. He expressed again, as I remember it, that he 

was a Presidential appointee,’’’ meaning you, and you, Mr. Bolton 

could say what you wanted. That’s pretty tough stuff. So, then you 

have Mr. Westermann, himself, on this case, and tomorrow we’ll 

hear from Mr. Ford, who’s Mr. Fingar’s boss, and he’s going to confirm that, as I understand it, and then you have the case of Mr. 

Smith, who says that he was mistreated, Mr. Cohen who confirms 

it, and Mr. Reich who’s visited Mr. Cohen, and said that he spoke 

for you, and wanted this guy out of there. So, we have seven, seven 

to one here. And it’s very, very disturbing, and you know, we’re 

going to pursue it, and if our colleagues think it’s as important as 

we do, we’ll see. We’ll see where everything goes tomorrow. 

I wanted to ask you about a quote that you made in front of this 

Committee, on April 5, 2000 during a hearing on U.N. peacekeeping. You were asked by Senator Brownback how the United 

States would go about helping to create a civil society in some 

areas of Africa that have had difficulty stabilizing for lengthy periods of time. Your response was, and I quote, ‘‘I’m not sure that nation building as a policy is realistic. I would argue, in a very real 

sense, after 224 years we’re still nation building in the United 

States. I think the main thing that the United States can do is not 

perceive from the admittedly idealistic, but fundamentally erroneous, notion that we can do things for societies that they have to 

do for themselves.’’ 

Now, I juxtapose this against a speech that was delivered by the 

President in May ’04 to the Army War College where he says that 

they’re going to continue rebuilding in Iraq. So, I wonder how you 

feel about Iraq, is that an example of nation building, and do you 

make an exception for Iraq? Or do you think we should set a goal 

to get out of there? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think the two statements are consistent, because 

I think the issue is whether it is possible for us to do things other 

than in the case Iraq where we’ve overthrown the existing government, hold a security reign in there for a period of time to give the 

Iraqis themselves, through the institutions that they’ve created, 

the ability to hold their own elections and get their own government. 

I do think that nation building is fundamentally the responsibility of the people who are building the nation, in the case of Iraq, 

the Iraqis, in the case of the United States, the Americans. And I 

think those two statements are consistent, and I think that’s exactly the policy we’ve been trying to pursue, against the argument 

of some people who have said the United States has to remain in 

263 

Iraq for a long, long time, the Iraqis can’t handle themselves— 

we’ve rejected that. We’ve turned sovereignty back over to the 

Iraqis, even though many people said it’s the wrong thing to do, we 

proceeded with the recent elections, even though many people said 

security conditions weren’t right, the Iraqis are now moving towards writing their own constitution, I think all of that is exactly 

the right policy. 

Senator BOXER. Well, as someone who wanted the elections to 

take place, let me just say, the President, when asked when we are 

leaving, says, ‘‘As long as it takes.’’ And I think that—I don’t know, 

have you been to Iraq? Recently? 

Mr. BOLTON. I have not, no. 

Senator BOXER. Have you ever been there, since the war? 

Mr. BOLTON. No. 

Senator BOXER. Okay, well I just came back. We’re doing a lot 

more than holding a security reign. We’re doing a lot more. We’ve 

got a lot of State Department people there, and they’re trying to 

help build that nation—— 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think a lot of the people there—— 

Senator BOXER. They’re in a compound now, they can’t even go 

out into the Green Zone, so to describe what we’re doing is holding 

a security reign, is really just out of the blue different from what’s 

happening on the ground, I can tell you. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think a lot of the people there with the Agency 

for International Development that I served with very proudly for 

two and a half years, very proudly, doing things AID does very 

well, I think that’s all to the good. 

Senator BOXER. Right, well, I’m just saying—what we are doing 

cannot be in the remotest way described as holding the security 

reins. And I would tell you, it’s way deeper than that, and way 

broader than that. And, I would encourage you, when you can, to 

go there, although I would say to you, it is not a very safe place 

to go. It is—seeing it with your own eyes, you could read about it, 

but it’s really quite an experience. Thank you. 

I really don’t have any more questions, aren’t you happy about 

that? 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Obama. 

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. 

Bolton, thanks to your forbearance to your family and your staff, 

I know that this has been a long day. 

I appreciate, I want to make a comment, I appreciate Senator 

Coleman acknowledging my sense that there is a consensus, hopefully, on a bipartisan basis that coalition-building to pursue our national interests is important, and that reforming the United Nations and making that an efficient operation that can effectuate 

policies that have been determined by the Security Council is also 

important. So, it’s not an ‘‘either/or’’ proposition, but it’s a ‘‘both/ 

and’’ proposition. I think my initial response had to do with—what 

I thought was maybe a perception—that somehow one was more 

important than the other. 

The issue that I brought up, I guess, about your statements regarding false concreteness—which I recognize you were making in 

the context of a more academic forum—is simply this: That—I’ll actually agree with you, philosophically—that ultimately the United 

264 

Nations is only as strong as its member nations’ commitment to 

find mechanisms to work together around some common aims. 

That if nobody’s, if none of the member nations are engaged or interested, then United Nations is just an excuse for a bunch of people to hang out in New York. If they are committed to it, than it 

can be a useful forum to accomplish goals that we can more easily 

accomplish collectively than we can individually. My concern, I 

think—and I think perhaps the concern of some of the other panel 

members—is that, that notion has to apply to the United States as 

well. And I think you’d agree with this. That the United Nations, 

that the United States has to be committed to the United Nations, 

and its success. We shouldn’t romanticize what it can accomplish, 

we should never surrender sovereignty, we should preserve—at all 

costs—the notion that we can act unilaterally to pursue our international interests but—having said all of that—if we are dismissive 

or do not believe that the United Nations cannot get something accomplished, then it’s probably not going to happen. I mean, in fact, 

that’s entirely consistent with your previous statements, correct? 

Mr. BOLTON. I absolutely agree. 

Senator OBAMA. Okay, so—and I would take it step further and 

say that—to the extent that we use language with respect to the 

United Nations that is dismissive—to the extent that we put up 

straw men that somehow the United Nations is going to try to take 

away our sovereignty, or that we’re sacrificing our sovereignty to 

the United Nations—I’m not saying these are your statements—I’m 

suggesting that, but I think you’re familiar that, there’s that body 

of literature out there. There are black helicopter notions of the 

United Nations. To the extent that, that is the perception of U.S. 

attitudes towards the United Nations, ironically, I think it actually 

makes it more difficult to reform the United Nations. Because 

countries like a Libya or a Zimbabwe that are sitting on the 

Human Rights Commission can sort of say, ‘‘Well, you don’t have 

to listen to the U.S., because they don’t believe in the United Nations anyway.’’ Would that be a fair assessment in terms of, that 

we need to speak bluntly and tell the truth about the United Nations, and demand accountability and reform, but we do so more 

effectively if the countries, the other countries involved perceive 

that we actually are committed to making the process work? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that’s right, and I think that’s why, in my 

writings, I’ve always tried to stress the importance of American 

leadership. Because I don’t think you get to the larger point without sustained American involvement. 

Senator OBAMA. Fair enough. 

Just one last point to sort of close the loop in this, then. American leadership and commitment to this process is absolutely necessary, would you also agree that part of American leadership has 

to also be to acknowledge and understand that other country’s are 

going to have their own self interests, and that we can’t walk away 

from the United Nations on every occasion where they do not simply tow the line with what we perceive to be, our self interest, i.e., 

that—I’m a little troubled by the language that says, ‘‘We only involve ourselves when it suits us.’’ Presumably leadership encompasses, not only those moments where it suits us to use the United 

Nations, but maybe when it suits others. 

265 

Mr. BOLTON. I think all nations in the United Nations pursue 

their national interests, I think that—— 

Senator OBAMA. Appropriately so. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that’s entirely the right way to look at it. 

And I think our diplomacy in the United Nations should be to try 

and persuade others that our national interests are, more often 

than not, congruent that theirs. When I say ‘‘when it suits us,’’ I 

view the U.N. as one of several potential instruments for carrying 

out American foreign policy, and I was reacting against what I 

thought was the view of some of a reflexive resort to the United 

Nations, as opposed to what I’ve always viewed as a utilitarian calculation, a cost/benefit analysis of what instrument is best suited 

for carrying out the particular task at hand. 

Senator OBAMA. Which makes perfect sense. What I’m concerned 

about is a reflexive attitude of dismissal towards the United Nations. 

Mr. BOLTON. I don’t think you can have either one. 

Senator OBAMA. It’s a mirror image of that. And that’s what I 

think concerns me. 

But let me just shift now, I only have a couple of more questions, 

Mr. Chairman. First, I’m looking forward to North Korea, Syria, 

Iran, countries we anticipate may be giving us problems in the future. I’m just going to read a quote. You delivered a speech in 

South Korea in which you singled out North Korean leader Kim 

Jong Il for ridicule, naming him some three times as ‘‘dictator’’ and 

rejecting what you called his ‘‘extortionist demands.’’ Now, I agree, 

I don’t know that there’s going to be a dispute anywhere in this 

building about characterizing him as a dictator, but I guess what 

I’m wondering is, when you make statements in the context of us 

trying to put together Six Party Talks, I’m just wondering whether 

that’s an example of the sort of tone that makes you a wonderful 

thinker on international affairs, but makes you ill-suited for a particular position. And I’ll preface this by saying this, I would hate 

to have my previous statements over the last 20 years picked apart 

on live TV, my wife does it to me sometimes—it’s awful. But the 

problem is, the position that you’re seeking, words matter. Every 

single utterance you make is speaking on behalf of U.S. interests. 

And so, I’m wondering whether this is, again, an example of a predisposition that may make this not a good fit. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think, to use that case specifically, as I think 

we’ve discussed—— 

Senator OBAMA. I’m just using this as an example. 

Mr. BOLTON. But the clearance of writing and clearance of 

speeches can sometimes be an arduous process, and so the timing 

of the speech had to do with the fact that I was going to be in 

Seoul, the people working on the Six Party Talks knew it was coming, they saw the speech as it evolved, and it went through many 

changes, and in fact, the night before I gave it our ambassador in 

South Korea reviewed it one last time and made a few more 

changes. But the timing was no surprise, everybody knew it was 

coming, and people thought it was a good thing to do to let the 

North Koreans know what our views were and also to communicate 

that in South Korea, and China and Japan. And the day of the 

speech, after it was given, our ambassador in South Korea said to 

me, ‘‘Thanks for that speech, John. It will help us a lot out here.’’ 

266 

Senator OBAMA. Along those lines, though, as we think about 

North Korea and Iran—you’ve been quite critical of the previous 

Administration, prior to George Bush, I mean, you know, when you 

say the nineties, it just so happens that there was a Democrat in 

the White House, but, not to say that your assessment is entirely 

partisan—but it strikes me that things haven’t gotten better with 

respect to North Korea and Iran, you say that this particular 

speech, or approach, was helpful. I’m trying to figure out, in what 

sense was it helpful? I mean, you’ve got a situation right now in 

which North Korea has acknowledged that it’s developing nuclear 

weapons, it appears to have greater capacity now than it did several years ago. Iran appears to be pursuing nuclear weapons, and 

you can give me an assessment of what you think should be optimal policy, but I’m wondering—given the severity of your criticism 

in past Administrations—how is the Administration that you serve 

function better in this regard, and how does the language of the 

sort that I just used, improve the situation? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think in the case of North Korea, what we 

discovered, what we concluded, what the Intelligence Community 

concluded in the summer of 2002, was that the situation in Korea 

had actually gotten much worse years before, because the agreed 

framework had been systematically violated by the North Koreans 

in a way that we didn’t fully understand until the summer of 2002, 

and that the North Koreans had engaged in an extensive procurement program to create a uranium enrichment capability that 

would give them a separate route to nuclear weapons, the uranium 

route as opposed to the plutonium route. That presented us with 

a dramatically different situation than the one that people thought 

we had inherited, and therefore required the unfolding of the diplomatic strategy that has resulted in the Six Party Talks. Those 

talks are now stalled, there’s no doubt about that, we’re waiting for 

North Korea to come back to the table, and it was a major emphasis of Secretary Rice’s recent trip to the region. But I think the advance in our Korea policy is we’ve made it clear to the North Koreans, this is not an issue between North Korea and the United 

States, their nuclear program is an issue between North Korea and 

the world. And the way they’re going to have to deal with the ultimate end to that nuclear program is through the mechanism of the 

Six Party Talks—all of the countries in the region that are affected 

by it. In the case of Iran—I went through this earlier—but I think 

the effort we have to make and we’ve been trying to make, we’ve 

had different levels of success on, is to engage around the world— 

the Europeans, the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese, and others—to continue to apply pressure on Iran to make it clear that 

their nuclear aspirations are never going to be met. 

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator summarize? We’re eleven minutes into the vote. 

Senator OBAMA. I will, and I don’t want anybody to miss a vote. 

I will summarize by saying, again, I appreciate the amount of time 

that you’ve taken. There was one last, very important issue that 

I’ll sort of leave you with, maybe you can respond to it and then 

we can go vote. 

You made a distinction between peace enforcement and peace 

keeping. And I’m wondering how that plays out in a situation like 

Darfur? It strikes me that we have a difficult task in places in the 

267 

world where you’ve got failed states, or you’ve got states that are 

exhibiting gross human rights violations, in the case of the Sudan, 

genocide on groups of people. We have limited resources, we can’t 

do everything. It seems absolutely critical that the United Nations 

is involved in that process, and I’m wondering how your distinction 

between peace keeping and peace enforcement is helpful in helping 

us to discern whether it makes sense for us—either unilaterally or 

multilaterally—to go in, to build coalitions, to prevent these sort of 

gross human rights violations and to create what Senator 

Brownback talked about, which is some functioning structure for 

states that are failing where people that are just being terribly 

treated? 

Mr. BOLTON. The principle difference, and there are several, but 

the principle difference is that peace keeping implies no U.N. use 

of force, other than self-defense; whereas, peace enforcement envisages an active military role against one or more of the factions that 

are involved. I have not said that peace enforcement is illegitimate, 

but it is very different on the balance that you’re weighing of the 

insertion of military force compared to used force, as opposed to 

force inserted for observation or disengagement purposes. And I 

have criticized what I thought was the too facile bridging of the 

very important military differences between the two kinds of operations, and that, in turn, is the kind of analysis you have to go 

through in determining what a U.N. military presence in the region like Darfur might be. 

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman, let me just state for the record— 

I apologize, but I think it’s important to say—my understanding is, 

at least, that the procurement with respect to the uranium program was in 2001 and 2002. So—— 

Mr. BOLTON. The evidence began to show that, that extended 

back into the late 1990’s. We don’t know how far back, but that’s 

pretty clear, I think. 

Senator OBAMA. Right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

your patience. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. I thank the witness for the 

forthcoming, comprehensive responses. The Committee is now adjourned, and this hearing is recessed. 

(Adjourned 5:40 p.m.) 

268 

ANNEX F 

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

COMMITTEE STAFF

Interviewee Position Date of interview 

Frederick Fleitz .... Under Secretary Bolton’s Chief 

of Staff.

April 7 & 

May 5 

Christian 

Westermann.

Analyst in State Department’s 

Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research (INR).

April 7 & 

May 4 

Stuart Cohen ........ CIA—former Acting Head of 

National Intelligence Council.

April 8 & 29 

Thomas Fingar ..... Then INR Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary.

April 8 

‘‘Mr. Smith’’ ........... Former NIO for Latin America April 8 

Neil Silver ............. Director of Strategic, Proliferation and Military Issues for 

INR.

April 11 & 

May 5 

Melody Townsel .... Former USAID contractor in 

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, hired 

by Black, Manafort, et al.

April 26 

Bharat Bharghava IBTCI Employee based in USA April 27 

Charles Black ....... Principal of Black, Manafort ... April 27 

Alan Foley ............. CIA—former Director of CIA’s 

Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC).

April 28 

Thomas Hubbard .. Former U.S. Ambassador to 

South Korea.

April 28 

Kirby Jones ........... Worked for Burson-Marsteller April 28 

John Wolf .............. Former Assistant Secretary for 

Non Proliferation (NP).

April 28 

Ed Hullander ........ Executive Vice President for 

IBTCI.

April 29 

Jayant Kalotra ..... President of International 

Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI), Prime 

Contractor on Bishkek 

project.

April 29 

John McLaughlin CIA—former Deputy Director 

of Central Intelligence.

April 29 

Uno Ramat ............ Townsel co-worker on USAID 

project in Bishkek.

April 29 

State Department 

Attorney.

Handled Sanctions case at 

State Department.

May 3 

269 

Interviewee Position Date of interview 

William Taft, IV ... Former State Department 

Legal Adviser.

May 3 

Matthew Freedman.Townsel’s Supervisor, worked 

for Black, Manafort, et al.

May 4 & 6 

INR Supervisor ..... Mr. Westermann’s Supervisor May 4 

Paula DeSutter ..... Assistant Secretary of State 

for Verification and Compliance (VC).

May 5 

Robert Hutchings CIA—former head of National 

Intelligence Council.

May 5 

Jamie Miscik ........ CIA—former Deputy Director 

for Intelligence.

May 5 

Stephen 

Rademacher.

Assistant Secretary for Arms 

Control (AC).

May 5 

Lawrence 

Wilkerson.

Former Chief of Staff under 

Secretary Powell.

May 6 

Otto Reich ............. Former Assistant Secretary for 

Western Hemisphere Affairs.

May 6 

270 

IV. MINORITY VIEWS

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS BIDEN, SARBANES, DODD, KERRY, FEINGOLD, BOXER, NELSON AND OBAMA ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN

R. BOLTON TO BE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED

NATIONS

On April 19, 2005, the Committee on Foreign Relations met to 

consider the nomination of Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton 

to be United States Representative to the United Nations. At that 

meeting, members of the committee raised concerns about the 

nominee and agreed unanimously to postpone further consideration 

of the nomination until after the Senate’s next recess. The Chairman and Ranking member of the committee subsequently agreed 

that the committee would reconvene on May 12, 2005 to continue 

its consideration of the nomination. 

At the conclusion of the April 19 meeting and in anticipation of 

the next meeting, members instructed the committee staff to further examine the issues of concern regarding the nominee. 

The Republican and Democratic staffs conducted jointly more 

than 30 interviews of individuals with information relevant to the 

nomination. In addition, the minority requested documents from 

the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Central Intelligence Agency. Many but not all of the 

requested documents were produced. The Democratic members also 

submitted written questions for the record to the nominee, who responded in writing. 

Our views on Mr. Bolton’s fitness for service as U.S. Representative to the United Nations were formed on the basis of those interviews, documents and answers; interviews conducted by the committee staff prior to April 19; documents produced to the committee 

by the executive branch prior to April 19; answers to questions in 

writing provided to the committee by the nominee prior to April 19; 

hearing testimony to the committee by the nominee on April 11; 

hearing testimony to the committee by the Honorable Carl Ford on 

April 12; and research of public documents and media reports. 

Based on this record, we recommend that members of the Senate 

vote against John R. Bolton’s nomination to be U.S. Representative 

to the United Nations. This report details why we have reached 

that conclusion. 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. The Failure to Produce Documents 

This report focuses on the fitness of the nominee to be United 

States Representative to the United Nations. But before getting to 

the merits, an important matter of separation of powers requires 

discussion. Despite repeated requests, the executive branch failed 

to produce to the committee documents directly relevant to its inquiry. These documents concern Mr. Bolton’s requests to learn the 

identities of U.S. persons cited in intelligence intercepts and the 

preparation of testimony to Congress on Syria. 

The executive branch provided no compelling reason and cited no 

constitutionally-based rationale for its failure to produce these documents. The committee’s failure to demand their production risks 

271 

undermining Congress’ authority as a co-equal branch of government and shirking the committee’s Constitutional responsibilities. 

B. Disqualifying Patterns of Conduct 

In our judgment, four distinct patterns of conduct disqualify John 

Bolton for the post of U.N. ambassador: (1) Mr. Bolton repeatedly 

sought the removal of intelligence analysts who disagreed with 

him; (2) in preparing speeches and testimony, Mr. Bolton repeatedly tried to stretch intelligence to fit his views; (3) in his relations 

with colleagues and subordinates, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited 

abusive behavior and intolerance for different views; and (4) Mr. 

Bolton repeatedly made misleading, disingenuous or non-responsive 

statements to the committee. 

1. Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of intelligence analysts 

who disagreed with him. 

Mr. Bolton sought to remove Christian Westermann, a State Department analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) 

who disputed language Mr. Bolton tried to use about Cuba and biological weapons (which was Westermann’s proper role as INR’s representative in the inter-agency clearance process). Mr. Bolton 

sought his removal three times over a six-month period. Fortunately, all of Westermann’s superiors rejected Bolton’s efforts. The 

Secretary of State even took the extraordinary step of visiting the 

INR analysts to make clear his support for Mr. Westermann. 

Mr. Bolton sought to have removed from his portfolio the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America, who told this 

committee that some of the views Mr. Bolton expressed about Cuba 

in a speech did not reflect the Intelligence Community assessment. 

Mr. Bolton and his staff discussed the NIO’s removal over several 

months and Mr. Bolton personally traveled to the CIA to seek his 

removal, even though he had never met the officer and does not 

know whether he ever read his work. All of the NIO’s superiors, 

including the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, rejected 

Bolton’s efforts. 

2. In speeches and testimony, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought to 

stretch intelligence to fit his views. 

In the case of Cuba, Mr. Bolton sought repeatedly to exaggerate 

the Intelligence Community’s views about Cuba’s possible biological 

weapons activities and support for terrorism. This caused the CIA 

to take the extraordinary step of republishing the Intelligence Community’s standing views on Cuba and BW in the Senior Executive 

Intelligence Brief, a daily publication for the policy community. 

In the case of Syria, in three instances over the course of a year, 

Mr. Bolton sought to inflate language about Syria’s nuclear activities beyond what intelligence analysts regarded as accurate. The 

Chairman of the National Intelligence Council ordered his staff to 

resist these efforts. Mr. Bolton continued this effort as late as the 

summer of 2003, when it was becoming clear that intelligence 

about Iraq’s WMD programs had been fundamentally wrong. 

Mr. Bolton’s pattern of going beyond his brief on sensitive subjects in speeches that had not been properly cleared caused the 

Deputy Secretary of State to order Mr. Bolton not to give any testimony or speech that was not personally cleared by the Deputy SecVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00271 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
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retary or by the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State. No other 

senior State Department official was subject to this restriction. 

3. In his relations with colleagues and subordinates, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited abusive behavior and intolerance for different views. 

In the case of Rexon Ryu, a highly regarded mid-level State Department officer, Mr. Bolton wrongly accused Ryu of purposefully 

withholding a document and, months later, denied him a significant new assignment. Ryu’s immediate superior secured him an assignment away from Mr. Bolton’s reach, and Ryu ultimately served 

the Deputy Secretary of State with distinction. 

In the cases of two unnamed State Department officers working 

in the Nonproliferation Bureau, Mr. Bolton sought their removal 

over policy differences. Their immediate superior refused to remove 

them. More generally, officers in the Nonproliferation Bureau ‘‘felt 

undue pressure to conform to the views of [Mr. Bolton] versus the 

views they thought they could support,’’ according to the former 

head of that bureau. 

In the case of a State Department lawyer, Mr. Bolton wanted 

him removed from a legal case based on a misunderstanding of a 

position the lawyer had taken. The State Department Legal Adviser and the Deputy Secretary of State insisted that the lawyer remain on the case, and the Deputy Secretary took the extraordinary 

step of sending Bolton a memo reminding him that the rules applied to him. 

4. Mr. Bolton Gave Misleading Testimony to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

In several respects, Mr. Bolton’s testimony has been misleading 

and disingenuous: Q04 

Mr. Bolton told the committee that, after urging Acting Assistant 

Secretary Tom Fingar to change Christian Westermann’s portfolio, 

‘‘I shrugged my shoulders and moved on.’’ In fact, he tried again 

a few days later, and again several months later. Q02 

Mr. Bolton told the committee he pursued the removal of the 

NIO for Latin America only once, stating ‘‘I had one part of one 

conversation with one person one time on Mr. Smith, and that was 

it, I let it go.’’ In fact, getting rid of the NIO was under review by 

Mr. Bolton and his staff for several months and after Mr. Bolton 

traveled to the CIA to seek the NIO’s removal, Mr. Bolton told his 

staff that ‘‘he didn’t want the matter to slip any further.’’ Q02 

Mr. Bolton told the committee that he did not threaten or try to 

have analysts punished because of their policy views. In fact, several witnesses said he did just that. Q02 

Mr. Bolton told the committee that U.S. Ambassador to South 

Korea Thomas Hubbard approved and supported his July 2003 

speech in South Korea. In fact, Ambassador Hubbard himself contacted the committee to correct the record and to make clear that 

he had serious concerns about the speech which he conveyed to Mr. 

Bolton at the time. Q02 

Mr. Bolton told the committee that it was his decision to delay 

testifying on Syria. Larry Wilkerson (Chief of Staff to Secretary 

Powell) told the committee that the Deputy Secretary of State postVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00272 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
273 

poned Mr. Bolton’s testimony because it did not reflect Administration policy on a sensitive issue at a sensitive time. Q02 

Mr. Bolton’s supporters argue that none of this matters because 

no officers lost their jobs and because the speeches and testimony 

that Mr. Bolton actually delivered reflected the views of the Intelligence Community. In fact, at least one highly regarded officer was 

denied a career-enhancing assignment because of Mr. Bolton, and 

Mr. Bolton did make public statements on the most sensitive issues 

that over-stepped Administration policy or were at odds with the 

views of the Intelligence Community. Q04 

But even if no officers had been penalized or unfounded statements made, Mr. Bolton’s repeated efforts to remove intelligence 

analysts and to stretch the intelligence to fit his views had a profoundly negative impact. As Robert Hutchings, the former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, put it: ‘‘[W]hen policy officials come back repeatedly to push the same kinds of judgments, 

and push the Intelligence Community to confirm a particular set 

of judgments, it does have the effect of politicizing intelligence, because the so-called ‘correct answer’ becomes all too clear. . . . I 

think every judgment ought to be challenged and questioned. But 

. . . when it goes beyond that, to a search for a pretty clearly-defined, pre-formed set of judgments, thenit turns into politicization. 

And . . . even when it’s successfully resisted . . . it creates a climate 

of intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging.’’ 

In the wake of our intelligence failures in Iraq—including the 

misuse of intelligence by policy makers—Mr. Bolton’s behavior 

should not be rewarded. With the prospect of intelligence challenges to come—including the need to convince other countries of 

the threat posed by North Korea and Iran—Mr. Bolton’s singular 

lack of credibility risks becoming a detriment to U.S. interests and 

security. 

C. The Wrong Man for the Job 

By itself, Mr. Bolton’s credibility problem on intelligence matters 

makes him the wrong man for the U.N. job at this critical time. His 

approach to problem solving, his disdain for the United Nations 

and international law and his failure to deliver results in the job 

he now holds fatally compound the problem. 

Mr. Bolton’s supporters argue that his ‘‘blunt style’’ is what is 

needed at the United Nations, especially when it comes to the critical issue of U.N. reform. Yet many previous U.S. representatives 

who were well known for being straight talkers—including Ambassadors Holbrooke, Kirkpatrick and Moynihan—nonetheless enjoyed 

broad support and were easily confirmed. The strong opposition to 

or concerns expressed about Mr. Bolton—notably from many former 

officials in this administration—are exceptional. They reflect a 

widespread belief that Mr. Bolton’s apparent contempt for opposing 

views, his unwillingness to listen and his inability to persuade 

make him particularly unsuited for this assignment at this time. 

Mr. Bolton’s many inflammatory statements about the United 

Nations as an institution and the legitimacy of international law 

would also hinder his effectiveness in advancing U.S. interests. The 

United Nations is not a tool to be used ‘‘when it suits our interest 

and when we can get others to go along,’’ as Mr. Bolton has suggested, but rather an essential and ongoing forum for the advanceVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00273 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
274 

1Letter from Sen. Biden to Secretary Rice, Mar. 24, 2005. 

ment of United States foreign policy and national security interests. For better or worse, the U.N. Security Council makes decisions that affect international security and stability. For better or 

worse, it helps to determine whether the United States will have 

international support and allies or will be forced to undertake difficult missions on its own in the face of broad opposition. The 

United Nations offers us an opportunity to make our case to the 

world, to demonstrate international leadership and to share burdens we would otherwise carry alone. It is difficult to elicit support 

from other nations for issues that matter to the United States 

when our representatives show disdain for issues that matter to 

them. 

The job of the U.N. ambassador is occasionally to hold high the 

‘‘United States’’ nameplate at the Security Council and denounce 

lies and hypocrisy. But day in and day out, it is ‘‘to operate in a 

low key, quiet, persuasive and consensus building way’’ to advance 

U.S. interests, in the words of former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. 

Jeane Kirkpatrick. Mr. Bolton has proved himself incapable of operating in this manner. 

Finally, Mr. Bolton’s supporters point to his effectiveness. We are 

told that he gets the job done. Yet even a cursory review of Mr. 

Bolton’s record as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security suggests the opposite. Under Mr. Bolton’s 

watch, North Korea—the most immediate threat to the United 

States in the area of nonproliferation—has become significantly 

more dangerous. The Bush Administration’s most touted success in 

this area—the disarmament of Libya—came about because Mr. 

Bolton was kept off the case, not because he was on it. 

The President of the United States should be accorded deference 

in appointments to executive branch positions. But the advice and 

consent clause of the Constitution is there for a reason: to serve as 

a check against unqualified appointees or when appointments 

would harm the national interest. It is not in the interests of the 

United States to have Mr. Bolton represent our country at the 

United Nations. He should be rejected. 

II. FAILURE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO PRODUCE REQUESTED

DOCUMENTS

During the course of the nomination proceedings, the executive 

branch has failed to provide adequate cooperation with the committee. This failure to cooperate is a serious challenge to the committee, and to the Senate’s constitutional role to advise and consent 

to nominations. The full Senate should not proceed to consider the 

nomination until the requested materials are turned over. 

The Committee’s inquiry—and requests for information 

Within a week after the nomination was submitted to the Senate 

on March 17, the Ranking member, Senator Biden, requested that 

the State Department make available for interview by the committee staff several Department personnel with knowledge of an incident involving Mr. Bolton that occurred in 2002.1 The Department initially refused the request, asserting that the matter had 

been adequately reviewed by the Senate Select Committee on IntelVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00274 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
275 

2Letter from James P. Terry, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Biden, 

Mar. 29, 2005. 3See letters from Sen. Biden to Secretary Rice, Mar. 31, 2005 and Apr. 4, 2005. 

4See two letters from Matthew A. Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to 

Sen. Biden, dated Apr. 5, 2005. 5Letter from Sen. Biden to Secretary Rice, Apr. 29, 2005. 

6Letter from Sen. Lugar to Secretary Rice, May 4, 2005. 

7Letter from Matthew A. Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Lugar, 

May 6, 2005. 

ligence in its review of the intelligence related to the war in Iraq.2

The committee staff then reviewed the Select Committee’s records 

and interviewed the lead staff on that review, and determined that 

the Select Committee had not, in fact, thoroughly reviewed the 

matter.3

So Senator Biden renewed his request. Still, the State Department resisted.4 It was not until April 7, four days before the hearing with the nominee, when the Chairman, Senator Lugar, intervened, that the State Department finally responded to the request 

and provided access to four individuals, and began providing relevant documents. 

At the committee business meeting on April 19, the committee 

agreed to defer a vote on the nomination until after the May recess, 

and instructed the staff to investigate various allegations that had 

been made about the nominee. On April 29, acting on behalf of the 

minority, Senator Biden submitted additional document requests to 

the Department.5 The Chairman intervened to help again a few 

days later, but he also implicitly invited the Department to ignore 

part of the minority request, saying that some of it was ‘‘extremely 

broad and may have marginal relevance to specific allegations.’’ 

The letter then expressed hope that certain specific requests would 

be fulfilled, a list that omitted four parts of the minority request.6

The Department took the hint—and has failed to turn over some 

important materials, all related to preparation of speeches and testimony. 

Even after the request was further narrowed—at the urging of 

the State Department—only a relatively small number of materials 

was provided. In rejecting the minority request, the Department 

proffered an extraordinary rationale: that it ‘‘does not believe the 

requests to be specifically tied to issues being deliberated by the 

committee.’’ 7

Thus, in the course of the committee’s consideration of the nomination, the State Department made two related decisions to reject 

minority requests for information, both astounding in their own 

right. First, the Department responded only to the requests endorsed by the majority. Second, the executive branch decided for 

itself the issues that are relevant to the committee’s review of nomination. 

This disregard for the rights of the minority is a marked departure from past practice, including in this Administration. In 2001, 

in connection with the nomination of John Negroponte for the UN 

post, the Democratic members (in the minority when the nomination was submitted) made substantial document requests, to which 

the Department of State provided full cooperation. 

The decision of the Department to decide for itself which issues 

are relevant is even more troubling, as the same rationale could 

well be applied to requests by the majority. 

276 

8Question for the record by Senator Dodd. 

9Letter to Sens. Roberts and Rockefeller from Sen. Lugar, Apr. 28, 2005. 

10 Ibid. 

What is the Department withholding? 

During the course of the nomination, the committee reviewed the 

question of whether Mr. Bolton sought to stretch the intelligence. 

That is, to say things in public statements that the intelligence 

would not support and to keep going back at the intelligence community again and again to get the answers he wants, not the answers the facts support. 

The material withheld by the Department goes directly to this 

question, as it relates to the preparation of congressional testimony 

on Syria’s weapons of mass destruction program in the summer 

and fall of 2003. The committee has already learned from interviews with intelligence officials that what Mr. Bolton initially 

wanted to say went far beyond what the intelligence would support. 

A related question connected to the Syria testimony is whether 

Mr. Bolton misled the committee when he testified that he hadn’t 

seen the drafts of the testimony. 

Is the Administration hiding something by holding back these 

materials? Could it be that Mr. Bolton was, in fact, involved in the 

drafting of the testimony? 

Also denied—NSA information 

Another government agency, the National Security Agency 

(NSA), has also failed to turn over relevant information. Specifically, the committee has requested information on instances when 

Mr. Bolton requested and received, on ten occasions, the identity 

of U.S. persons on an NSA intercept. On April 13, Senator Dodd 

first made a request for this information.8 By letter dated April 28, 

Senator Lugar also made a request for this information through 

the Intelligence Committee.9

Specifically, the Chairman asked Senators Roberts and Rockefeller to seek ‘‘all information related to Mr. Bolton’s requests and 

the responses thereto, including the unredacted contents of the documents in question . . .’’ And the letter said that the Chairman was 

‘‘prepared to follow the guidance of the Select Committee’’ with respect to the ‘‘access and storage of such material, as well as the 

provisions under which such materials will be shared with members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.’’ 10

In other words, the Chairman made clear his expectation that 

the NSA would provide all the information to the Intelligence Committee, which in turn would share it with this committee. On May 

10, General Hayden, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, 

briefed the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee. This committee was informed that Sens. Roberts and 

Rockefeller were not given the identities of the U.S. persons that 

Mr. Bolton requested and received. And as of the date of the committee’s meeting on May 12, the Select Committee had provided no 

information on when or whether members of the Committee on 

Foreign Relations would be given access even to the information 

given to the Intelligence Committee. 

277 

A challenge to the constitutional process 

The integrity of the nomination process, and the Senate’s constitutional role, are being challenged by the actions of executive 

branch agencies. 

Article II, Section II of the Constitution provides that ‘‘the President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the 

Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the 

United States.’’ 

The failure of the Administration to cooperate with this committee and the rationale offered for this failure—that the ‘‘Department does not believe these requests to be specifically tied to the 

issues being deliberated by the committee’’—has no constitutional 

justification, and does damage to the standing and ability of this 

committee to perform its function of oversight and advice and consent. 

The Administration has asserted neither executive privilege nor 

any other constitutionally-based rationale for not cooperating with 

the committee. It has no right under past practices or under Constitutional theory to offer as a rationale that they do not believe 

the request to be ‘‘specifically tied to the issues being deliberated 

by the committee.’’ 

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, Congress is a coequal branch of government, and it is within the Senate’s power 

alone to decide what it thinks is relevant to its deliberations in the 

exercise of the advice and consent power. 

The Senate does not work for the President. No one is entitled 

to appointment to an office requiring advice and consent—unless 

they have the Senate’s consent. Likewise, no President is entitled 

to approval of a nominee. 

By acquiescing in the executive branch’s position, the committee 

has undermined its authority and shirked its constitutional responsibility. 

III. MR. BOLTON’S EFFORTS TO REMOVE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

A. Christian Westermann 

It is undisputed from the record that Mr. Bolton sought to have 

Christian Westermann, an analyst in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, or INR, removed from his portfolio. Mr. Bolton did so after an incident that occurred in February 

2002 regarding language about Cuba and biological weapons that 

Mr. Bolton’s office sought to clear for use in a speech. 

During the nomination hearing, Mr. Bolton was asked on numerous occasions about the Westermann matter. He frequently avoided 

responding to direct questions, and tried to downplay the significance of what he had done. For example, early in the hearing, Senator Biden asked him whether he had ever asked ‘‘anyone to remove Mr. Westermann from [his] portfolio?’’ Bolton tried to evade 

the question: Q04 

I think, as the interviews that your staff conducted 

show—and that’s one reason why I want to get them all 

out in public—we believe Mr. Westermann had behaved in 

an underhanded fashion. And I think I—as my assistant 

mentioned to your staff, I said to him at the time, ‘‘I don’t 

278 

11 Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Apr. 11, 2005, am session, page 45. 

Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Apr. 11 hearing, am session.’’ Note: this citation and all following citations 

are in reference to the transcripts, e-mails and other documents available to the committee as 

of May 16, 2005. Q04 I21Senator Biden then interrupted him and repeated his question. Mr. 

Bolton responded: ‘‘I mentioned it to Mr. Fingar. I may have mentioned it to one or two other 

people. But then I shrugged my shoulders, and I moved on.’’ 12

12 Ibid., page 46. 13Fleitz is a CIA analyst who has been on detail to Mr. Bolton’s office since August 2001. 14Fleitz memorandum to [name redacted], ‘‘Request to Clear Cuba BW Language for U/S 

Bolton speech,’’ Feb. 8, 2002. 15Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, T3Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 

Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004, page 277. 16Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 11, 2002, 3:11 pm. Westermann’s e-mail opens by saying 

that he would be ‘‘happy to get the Cuba language out to CIA’’ and closes with an invitation 

to Fleitz to come by his office so Westermann could provide the necessary assistance in formatting the request. 17Fleitz to Westermann e-mail, Feb. 11, 2002, 4:18 pm. 18Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 9:00 am. Q04 I23 INR is not happy about the 

Cuba request, but did submit it to CIA for clearance. Christian Westermann told me that the 

IC has already cleared (wimpy) language on Cuba and recently briefed it to the HIRC . . . I explained to Christian that it was a political judgment as to how to interpret this data and the 

care if you disagree with me, just don’t do it behind my 

back.’’ 11

The record indicates that, far from ‘‘shrugging his shoulders’’ and 

moving on, Mr. Bolton asked three different INR supervisors, over 

the course of several months, to remove Mr. Westermann from his 

portfolio. 

Clearing three sentences on Cuba 

The incident began on February 8, 2002, when a senior aide to 

Mr. Bolton, Frederick Fleitz,13 contacted Mr. Westermann’s office 

director, seeking his assistance in transmitting to the Intelligence 

Community for its review three sentences on Cuba and biological 

weapons. INR personnel needed to be involved in transmitting the 

information because they had the proper electronic mail capabilities to handle the highly classified material. 

Mr. Bolton was planning to give a broader speech in the near future; the sentences on Cuba were to be one small part of that 

speech, which would include other language on Cuba and in which 

Cuba would not be the main focus.14 The language sought to be 

cleared included a sentence saying that the United States believed 

that Cuba has a developmental, offensive biological warfare program and is providing assistance to other rogue state programs.15

The following Monday, February 11 (February 8 was a Friday), 

Mr. Westermann informed Mr. Fleitz that his language needed to 

be rewritten to ‘‘reflect CIA-required formatting’’ for circulation to 

the Intelligence Community (IC); Westermann also sought the serial numbers for the intelligence reports that Fleitz had used in 

writing the proposed language, in order to help the intelligence analysts examine the sources of the material.16 Fleitz replied that he 

did not have the serial numbers for the material, and added his 

view about the scope of the IC’s responsibility: ‘‘Mr. Bolton is simply asking that the IC permit him to publicly read the paragraph 

I gave you . . . the IC has to determine if this can be sanitized and 

if there is a sources and methods issue.’’ 17

The next day, Westermann sent to Fleitz talking points on the 

subject that had already been cleared by the IC, and again urged 

Fleitz to provide more specific citations.18 Later that morning, 

Fleitz sent Under Secretary Bolton an update. It indicated some 

possible disagreement with INR’s views on the Cuba issue, reiterVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00278 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
279 

19Fleitz to Bolton e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 9:20 am. Q04 I21Later that day, Westermann transmitted the language to the ‘‘de ́marche coordinator’’ at WINPAC (the DCI’s Weapons Intelligence, 

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center) via classified e-mail. The de ́marche coordinator had 

the task of circulating the language to several people in the IC—including someone in INR— 

for clearance review. Westermann attached the Fleitz memo to his e-mail as a separate document. In the body of his e-mail message, Westermann added his own comment, which included 

a statement that ‘‘INR does NOT concur with the use of the attached language,’’ and proposed 

alternative language. It reads: ‘‘Cuba has demonstrated that it is committed to developing a 

highly advanced biotechnology infrastructure and to arranging foreign collaboration with rogue 

states that could involve proliferation of dual-use technologies to countries assessed to have BW 

programs.’’ 20

20Westermann e-mail to CIA/WINPAC, Feb. 12, 2002 (time unknown). 21 None of the witnesses recalls what occurred, but there is no paper record, so it is presumed 

that the request came by phone. 22 Bolton to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:14 p.m. 23Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:23 pm. 24Fleitz to Westermann e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:25 pm. ‘‘T’’ is the State Department’s letter 

designation for the office of Under Secretary Bolton. 25Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:35 pm. The text of the language sent to the 

Secretary was omitted in the e-mail produced by the Department. 26 Interview of Christian Westermann by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 7, 

2005, page 103. Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005.’’ 27 Ibid., page 103–page 104. 

ated the previously-expressed view that it is for policymakers to interpret Intelligence Community data, and perhaps presaged the 

conflict to come: 

Bolton summons Westermann 

At some point in mid-afternoon of February 12, Fleitz phoned 

Westermann or one of his superiors to inquire about the status of 

the request.21 Around the same time, or perhaps a few minutes 

earlier, Fleitz alerted Under Secretary Bolton of his concern about 

Westermann having sent alternative language to the IC coordinator; in turn, Mr. Bolton asked Fleitz for a copy of the language 

that INR had sent to CIA.22 Westermann replied to Mr. Fleitz by 

e-mail that he had sent the Fleitz memo ‘‘intact to CIA for coordination through the IC for cleared language.’’ 23 Fleitz quickly answered: ‘‘CIA says INR disputed the language Mr. Bolton wants to 

use and offered alternate language. Please bring my memo and this 

memo to T.’’ 24 Westermann responded a few minutes later that the 

language he had suggested was identical to language that INR had 

sent to Secretary Powell the previous October.25

Thus summoned by Fleitz, Mr. Westermann proceeded to Mr. 

Bolton’s office, where he was ushered in to see the Under Secretary. Westermann testified that Bolton was ‘‘quite upset that I 

had objected’’ to his language and that Bolton wanted to know 

‘‘what right I had trying to change an Under Secretary’s language.’’26 Mr. Westermann tried to explain the clearance process to 

Mr. Bolton, who was not, by Westermann’s account, ‘‘in a mood to 

listen.’’ Westermann described Bolton as being ‘‘quite angry and basically told me that I had no right to do that. And he got very red 

in the face and shaking his finger at me and explained to me that 

I was acting way beyond my position.’’ 27 Mr. Fleitz says he witnessed the meeting, and stated that Mr. Bolton said something to 

the effect of ‘‘How can I trust you? I’ve asked you to be neutral in 

a situation like this, and you’re welcome to disagree with me, but 

not behind my back.’’ 28 Mr. Bolton then told Westermann to leave 

his office, and instructed him to send Tom Fingar, Acting Assistant 

Secretary for INR that day, to see him.29

280 

28 Interview of Frederick Fleitz by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 7, 2005, 

page 28. Hereafter cited as ‘‘Fleitz interview, Apr. 7, 2005’’ 29Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 104. 30 Interview of Thomas Fingar by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 8, 2005, 

page 10. Hereafter cited as ‘‘Fingar interview.’’ 31 Ibid. 32Fingar to Bolton e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 8:04 pm. Q04 I21Mr. Fingar testified that the apoloBolton asks Fingar to remove Westermann 

Mr. Fingar testified that his office received a phone call indicating that Mr. Bolton wanted to see him. Fingar went to see Mr. 

Bolton, who was still angry; Bolton complained that ‘‘he was the 

President’s appointee, that he had every right to say what he believed, that he wasn’t going to be told what he could say by a midlevel INR munchkin analyst.’’ 30 Fingar testified that Mr. Bolton 

said he wanted Westermann ‘‘taken off his accounts.’’ Fingar protested that ‘‘He’s our CW/BW specialist, this is what he does,’’ implying that there were no other accounts to which he could readily 

be assigned.31 Mr. Fingar asked Mr. Bolton for a chance to review 

the matter more closely. 

At the end of the day, having reviewed Westermann’s actions, 

Fingar sent an e-mail to Mr. Bolton, as follows: Q04 

Sorry for the delay in responding . . . I looked at what my 

guy sent to the IC and that won’t happen again . . . As I 

said, INR has no position on what you or any principal 

choose to say; our only interests are to ensure that IC 

sources and methods concerns are satisfied and to ensure 

that policymakers know whether we think what they propose to say is clearly supported, unsupported, or pushing 

the evidence as evaluated by IC analysts. My guy tried to 

flag for Fred [Fleitz] where he thought the draft was going 

beyond the IC consensus (as conveyed in a DIA-led briefing on the Hill) and he should have stopped there rather 

than offering alternative language in his e-mail seeking 

clearance from the IC. Choice of the phrase ‘‘does not concur’’ was entirely inappropriate; none of the underlying intelligence comes from INR and we have no role whatsoever 

in determining how you or any policymaker says what you 

want to say beyond suggesting alternatives that we think 

might be cleared more readily than what has been drafted 

if time is of the essence and the drafter asks for such advice. We screwed up, but not for base reasons. It won’t 

happen again.’’ 32

Mr. Bolton testified that, after receiving the Fingar e-mail the 

next day (Bolton replied with a short note of thanks the next morning), he ‘‘basically thought the matter was closed.’’ 34 But the record 

demonstrates that he really didn’t think the matter was closed, for 

he tried two more times to get Mr. Westermann moved off his accounts. 

Bolton asks Carl Ford to remove Westermann 

A few days later, Carl Ford, the Assistant Secretary of State for 

INR, returned to work, where he was briefed on the incident by his 

deputy, Tom Fingar. News of the incident had ‘‘spread like wildfire’’ in INR, and Ford indicated that, having been out of the office, 

281 

35 Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Apr. 12, 2005, page 27. Hereafter cited 

as: ‘‘Apr. 12 hearing.’’ 36 Ibid., page 23–page 24. Q04 I23 I remember going back to my office with the impression 

that I had been asked to fire the analyst. Now, whether the words were ‘‘fire,’’ whether that 

was ‘‘re-assign,’’ ‘‘get him away from me, I don’t want to see him again,’’ I don’t remember, 

frankly, exactly what the words were. I do remember that I came away with the impression 

that I had just been asked to fire somebody in the Intelligence Community for doing, what I 

consider, their job.37

37 Ibid., page 25–page 26. Q04 I21Ford objected not only to the attempt to fire the analyst, 

but to the improper action of screaming at a subordinate so far below him in the Department 

hierarchy: Q04 38 Ibid., page 18–page 19. Q04 I21After the encounter with Mr. Bolton, Ford proceeded to the 

Secretary’s office to inform Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage of the incident. He testified 

that he told the Secretary that there was ‘‘no way’’ he was going to move the analyst simply 

because Bolton was upset. Both Powell and Armitage expressed support for Ford’s position, and 

asked whether they needed to provide any assistance.39 Ford told them he thought he had it 

under control, but that at some point he might want them to speak to the analysts directly to 

buck them up. Some time later, the Secretary did so, making a ‘‘special point’’ of going to INR 

to address a group of INR analysts. In the session, he singled out Westermann by name, and 

said to the other analysts (according to Ford’s account) that he ‘‘wanted them to continue, in 

essence to speak truth to power.’’ 40

he was probably the last to learn about it. 35 That morning, he and 

Mr. Bolton had a heated confrontation about the Westermann matter in a State Department hallway following the Secretary’s morning staff meeting of senior officials. Mr. Ford said that Mr. Bolton 

was ‘‘still fussing about what he could and couldn’t say in the 

speech,’’ 36 and he asked Ford to take punitive action against Mr. 

Westermann: 

Secretary Bolton chose to reach five or six levels below 

him in the bureaucracy, bring an analyst into his office, 

and give him a tongue lashing . . . he was so far over the 

line that [it’s] one of the sort of memorable moments in my 

30 plus-year career . . . There are a lot of screamers that 

work in government, but you don’t pull somebody so low 

down in the bureaucracy that they’re completely defenseless. It’s an 800 pound gorilla devouring a banana.38

Thus supported by the Secretary of State, Mr. Westermann presumably thought he could rest easy about his job security. But such 

thoughts were premature, because Mr. Bolton wasn’t done seeking 

retribution. 

Bolton tries to have Westermann removed a third time 

Later that summer—several months after the Westermann incident—Under Secretary Bolton attempted once again to seek 

Westermann’s removal. A new office director in INR, Neil Silver, 

paid a courtesy call on Bolton, who used the opportunity to ask Silver to remove Westermann from his accounts. The testimony of the 

two men differed as to how the subject arose. Mr. Bolton says he 

raised the matter after Silver asked whether he had ‘‘had any problems’’ with the Bureau.41 Silver believes that Bolton raised it toward the end of the meeting, and that Silver may have asked 

Bolton whether there were ways that the Bureau ‘‘could be more 

helpful.’’ 42 In either event, the record is clear that Mr. Bolton 

urged that Westermann be given a different assignment, as he conceded during the committee hearing: 

Mr. BOLTON. I thought he [Westermann] should be given 

other responsibilities.43

Thus, far from having ‘‘shrugged his shoulders and moved on,’’ 

as he testified to the committee,45 Bolton was still seeking 

Westermann’s removal months after the original incident. 

282 

46 Apr. 12 hearing, page 31–page 32. 47 Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 85. 48Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 98; page 100. 

Was Under Secretary Bolton Complaining About Process or Substance? 

Under Secretary Bolton testified that Mr. Westermann ‘‘went behind my back’’ and as a result he ‘‘lost confidence in him.’’ The assertion is central to Mr. Bolton’s account that his effort to seek 

Westermann’s removal was not an effort to pressure an intelligence 

analyst, but merely a reaction to alleged ‘‘unprofessional’’ behavior. 

Frederick Fleitz, Mr. Bolton’s aide, proffered much the same account, both in contemporaneous e-mails and in later interviews. 

But no other witness did so. Indeed, every witness from INR—from 

Westermann up to and including the Assistant Secretary—stated 

that Westermann did nothing irregular. This aspect of the issue is 

examined below. 

The crux of Bolton’s allegation is that by sending his comments 

to CIA/WINPAC on Bolton’s proposed Cuba language at the same 

time that he transmitted the language for Intelligence Community 

clearance, Mr. Westermann unfairly prejudiced the clearance process within the IC and thereby ‘‘went behind [Bolton’s] back.’’ 

The assertions by Under Secretary Bolton and Fleitz appear to 

be based on a lack of understanding of the clearance process. Carl 

Ford indicated that ‘‘Secretary Bolton . . . wasn’t very familiar with 

the procedures of the Intelligence Community [and] didn’t seem all 

that interested in finding out more about it.’’ 46 Bolton himself admits to a certain degree of ignorance about the process, telling Senator Dodd that he had ‘‘no idea what INR’s policies [regarding 

clearances] are.’’ 47

The clearance process 

As Mr. Fingar indicated in his e-mail to Mr. Bolton, there are 

two purposes to the clearance process: to protect sources and methods; and to ensure that what policymakers say T3on behalf of the 

U.S. government is supported by the available intelligence. Put another way, policymakers need not seek IC clearance if they want 

to state their own personal judgments of intelligence information, 

but if they speak for the government on a matter related to intelligence judgments, or seek to represent what the Intelligence Community believes, the IC must provide clearance. 

Mr. Westermann’s own role in this process was two-fold. First, 

he had a ministerial duty to transmit the Bolton language to the 

IC coordinator at the CIA. As the documentary record produced to 

the committee demonstrates, he did that by transmitting Mr. 

Fleitz’s memo intact. Second, as the analyst in INR for biological 

and chemical weapons, he had a duty to provide INR’s comments 

on the proposed language to the Intelligence Community coordinator. 

The latter process does not involve a debate between intelligence 

analysts (such as INR) and policymakers (such as Mr. Bolton). 

Rather, it is a debate that is conducted within the Intelligence 

Community alone.48 By design, Mr. Bolton’s office was not in the 

loop on the debate. Mr. Westermann was thus under no obligation 

to share the comments on Bolton’s language with Mr. Bolton or his 

283 

49 Apr. 12 hearing, page 30. 50Fingar interview, page 12. 51 Interview of INR supervisor by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, May 4, 2005, 

page 2. Hereafter cited as: ‘‘INR supervisor interview.’’ See also Silver interview, Apr. 11, 2005, 

page 18 (‘‘there are no established procedures’’ on clearance). 52Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 90. 53Fingar interview, page 23. 54 Ibid., page 7–page 9. 55 Apr. 12 hearing, page 23–page 24. 56 Ibid., page 31. 57Fingar interview, page 10. 58Westermann interview, Apr. 7, page 103. 

staff. When he received the proposed language from Bolton’s office, 

Westermann had a choice: to send his comments simultaneous with 

the Bolton language; or to wait until the IC coordinator circulated 

the language throughout the community. He chose the former. 

Doing so was consistent with INR practice, as was attested by 

INR supervisors who appeared before the committee or its staff. 

Former Assistant Secretary Carl Ford testified that ‘‘we all agreed 

that he had been following the routine policies for dealing with 

speeches or questions of what you can and cannot say in an unclassified way from the Intelligence Community.’’ 49 Current Assistant 

Secretary Tom Fingar said that Westermann’s action was not contrary to any policy or procedure. 50 Westermann’s immediate supervisor stated that the manner in which Westermann submitted the 

Bolton request ‘‘did not contravene any guidelines’’ and that there 

are no ‘‘hard-and-fast rules as to when or how INR analysts articulate their view on the language that is being put into play at the 

request of a policy official,’’ 51 a view affirmed by current Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Carol Rodley (who accompanied Mr. 

Westermann to his interview).52 Fingar also testified that 

Westermann was not admonished or disciplined for his actions, and 

that no new procedures were put in place as a result.53 The only 

critical opinion of Mr. Westermann’s actions that came from INR 

management was that he was, at worst, insensitive to how he handled a clearance for such a senior official. 54

It is worth noting, moreover, that three witnesses said that Mr. 

Bolton complained to them about the substance of Mr. 

Westermann’s e-mail. Mr. Ford stated that ‘‘several days after his 

confrontation with my analyst . . . he [Bolton] was still fussing 

about what he could and couldn’t say in the speech.’’ 55 Ford also 

said that ‘‘he was still fussing about not only the way the analyst 

had treated him but that he was not able to say what he wanted 

to say.’’ 56 Mr. Fingar testified that Bolton said, ‘‘That he was the 

President’s appointee, that he had every right to say what he believed, that he wasn’t going to be told what he could say by a midlevel INR munchkin analyst.’’ 57 Mr. Westermann himself testified 

that Mr. Bolton was ‘‘quite upset that I had objected’’ to his language and that Bolton wanted to know ‘‘what right I had trying to 

change an Under Secretary’s language.’’ 58

Mr. Fleitz maintained that Mr. Westermann’s e-mail confused 

the de ́marche coordinator, who was uncertain whether Mr. Bolton 

had backed off his proposed language. If so, a phone call sufficed 

to clear up any misunderstanding. The de ́marche coordinator sent 

Bolton’s text around for comment, with Mr. Fleitz’ arguments in 

favor of the language and without Westermann’s comment. The 

rest of the Intelligence Community also objected to Bolton’s proVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00283 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
284 

59Fleitz interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 38. 60Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 4:23 pm. 61 Apr. 12 hearing, page 40. 

posed language and, by February 21, new language was crafted 

and cleared. 

In sum, even if Mr. Bolton complained about the process used by 

Westermann—as he and Mr. Fleitz testified—there is ample evidence that Bolton was also angry about substance—he was mad 

that a mid-level analyst would dare to propose alternative language 

to his text. 

Did Westermann lie? 

Mr. Fleitz made a serious allegation that Mr. Westermann lied 

to Mr. Fleitz in his e-mail to him stating that he sent his language 

to CIA ‘‘intact.’’ Specifically, Mr. Fleitz stated that ‘‘Mr. 

Westermann lied when he told us that he had sent the language 

that Mr. Bolton wanted declassified to the Agency intact, and only 

with source citations. That was untrue.’’ 59

Fleitz’ description of Westermann’s e-mail is not precisely accurate. The text of Mr. Westermann’s e-mail was as follows: ‘‘I sent 

your memo intact to CIA for coordination through the IC for 

cleared language. I added citations so they could reference the 

intel[ligence].’’ 60 There is nothing false in Westermann’s e-mail to 

Fleitz. He T3had e-mailed the Fleitz memo intact, and he T3had 

included the source citations. If Westermann is guilty of anything, 

it is an act of omission: he did not tell Fleitz that he had also sent 

INR’s comments on the Bolton language. But, as discussed above, 

he was under no obligation to do so, because that comment was 

part of a process that was internal to the Intelligence Community. 

It also bears emphasis that there is no evidence of the precise 

question posed to Westermann by Fleitz that resulted in 

Westermann sending his e-mail. Westermann appears to have been 

responding to a phone call or message from Fleitz, not an e-mail, 

and there is no record as to what Fleitz said in his phone call or 

message. Thus, it is impossible to conclude that Westermann lied 

in his e-mail without knowing the question that prompted it. 

Was there any harm done? 

Mr. Bolton’s efforts to remove Mr. Westermann, a GS–14 analyst, 

proved unsuccessful, because the INR management, as well as the 

top levels of the Department of State, backed Mr. Ford’s refusal to 

do so. Westermann, a 23-year Navy veteran who has worked as a 

government intelligence analyst since retiring from the Navy, today 

retains his position as a chemical and biological weapons expert for 

INR. He testified that he has received numerous awards and continues to receive outstanding performance evaluations. In this respect, therefore, Mr. Westermann’s career suffered no apparent 

damage. 

But Mr. Bolton’s actions did have consequences. As Mr. Ford testified, the Westermann incident caused great concern in his bureau. He testified that analysts in INR ‘‘were very negatively affected by this incident—they were scared.’’ 61 As a result, both he 

and the Secretary of State had to make a special effort to mitigate 

the damage. Ford testified that in the months following the 

Westermann incident, he and other INR managers tried to make 

285 

62 Ibid. 63 Ibid., page 26–page 27. 64 Interview of Christian Westermann by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, May 4, 

2005, page 5. Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Westermann interview, May 4, 2005.’’ 65Westermann to Fingar and Silver e-mail, Sept. 23, 2002, 8:37 am. 66 Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Apr. 11 2005, pm session, page 27– 

page 28. Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Apr. 11, 2005 hearing, pm session.’’ 67 John R. Bolton, ‘‘Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ remarks to the Heritage Foundation, May 5, 2002. Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Bolton speech, 

Continued 

the best of the bad situation by using the incident as a training vehicle—to explain to people how to handle a similar situation. 62 Secretary Powell had to take time out of his schedule to make a special trip to speak to INR analysts and tell them that they should 

continue to ‘‘speak truth to power.’’ 63

The renewed attempt to remove Westermann months after the 

incident also affected Westermann personally. He testified that it 

led him to ‘‘double-think about what I was doing all the time so 

that I wasn’t creating undue problems for me or for other people.’’ 64 And in an e-mail message to his supervisors, he lamented 

the continued ‘‘personal attacks, harassment and impugning of his 

integrity,’’ and indicated that it was affecting ‘‘his work, his health, 

and his dedication to public service.’’ 65

B. Former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America 

It is also undisputed that, in 2002, Mr. Bolton sought to have the 

National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (NIO) removed from 

his position. The NIO is no longer in that position, and is currently 

in a covered position overseas, and thus during the hearing the 

committee and Mr. Bolton took to calling him ‘‘Mr. Smith.’’ 

Mr. Bolton conceded in testimony that he personally traveled to 

CIA headquarters for a meeting with a senior CIA official, during 

which he urged the removal of the NIO from his portfolio. Mr. 

Bolton sought to minimize, however, the intensity with which he 

pursued this goal by stating: ‘‘And that was it, I had one part of 

one conversation with one person, one time on Mr. Smith and that 

was it, I let it go.’’ 66

The record before the committee demonstrates that Mr. Bolton 

sought Mr. Smith’s removal because of disagreements about intelligence, and that Mr. Bolton’s testimony to this committee vastly 

understated the degree of his effort to do so. 

The Heritage Foundation speech 

As described at length in section IV. B. below, on May 6, 2002, 

Under Secretary Bolton gave a speech at the Heritage Foundation 

in Washington, DC. The speech, entitled ‘‘Beyond the Axis of Evil,’’ 

contained several paragraphs about Cuba, including three sentences that had been cleared by the Intelligence Community in 

February 2002: Q04 

The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development 

effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other 

rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could 

support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to 

cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and 

to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.’’ 67

286 

May 6, 2002.’’ Q04 I21The May 6 speech also contained controversial statements on Cuba and 

terrorism, and on the influence of a Cuban spy who had worked as a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, which had not been circulated for clearance by the regional intelligence analysts who 

covered those issues. Press coverage the next day included comments by unnamed officials that 

the intelligence on Cuba and BW was ‘‘broad and deep’’ and that Cuba had experimented with 

anthrax and other dangerous pathogens.68

68Kralev, Nicholas, ‘‘Havana pursues biological warfare; Technology given to rogue states,’’ 

T3The Washington Times, May 7, 2002; Miller, Judith, ‘‘Washington Accuses Cuba Of GermWarfare Research,’’ T3The New York Times, May 7, 2002; Slevin, Peter, ‘‘Cuba Seeks Bioweapons, U.S. Says’’; ‘‘Cuban Spokesman Calls Arms Control Chief’s Allegations a ‘Lie’,’’ T3The 

Washington Post, May 7, 2002. 69 CIA e-mail, 5/13/02, 2:49 pm (‘‘Fleitz reported that Bolton is quite angry at CIA; specifically, 

Bolton perceives our SEIB last week was intended to undercut his speech . . . ’’). 70State Department e-mail, June 7, 2002, 2:45 pm. 71State Department e-mail, June 7, 2002, 3:46 pm. 72 Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 27. Talking points prepared for Mr. Bolton suggest a 

broader agenda for the meeting, and make no mention of the ‘‘courtesy call’’ aspect of the visit. 

They do mention concerns about the NIO. Q04 I23 I also knew that in the weeks and months 

Controversy ensued in public and within government councils 

about the strength of the evidence on Cuba’s BW effort and whether the speech had been properly cleared throughout the Intelligence 

Community. On May 9, the CIA re-published its previous analytic 

conclusions in its daily Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), 

implicitly reminding policy makers that it did not endorse everything that Bolton had said. The SEIB item provoked an angry reaction from Bolton.69 The NIO for Latin America had not reviewed 

the Cuba language in the speech, and said so to the Subcommittee 

on Western Hemisphere Affairs of this committee in a closed briefing on June 4, 2002. Word of the briefing was relayed to Mr. 

Bolton’s office. A rancorous internal debate also occurred in the 

same time period between Bolton’s office and the Intelligence Community over preparation of congressional testimony on Cuba that 

Bolton was scheduled to give (but never did). CIA analysts, including the NIO for Latin America, objected to major points in the draft 

testimony, including parts of the testimony that had been used in 

the Heritage speech. 

By early June, Mr. Bolton and Otto Reich, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, were considering 

an effort to seek the removal of the NIO. On June 7, an aide to 

Mr. Bolton circulated a draft letter from Mr. Bolton and Mr. Reich 

to the Director of Central Intelligence.70 The letter outlined alleged 

unprofessional behavior of the NIO, but also complained about his 

objections to Bolton’s draft testimony. The draft letter to Mr. Tenet 

urged the immediate replacement of the NIO, and indicated that 

Mr. Bolton and Mr. Reich would take several measures on their 

own, including excluding the NIO from official meetings at the 

State Department and from official travel in the Western Hemisphere. A later e-mail from a colleague reports that he has discussed the matter with Mr. Bolton, who, he says, ‘‘would prefer at 

this point to handle this in person with Tenet.’’ 71

In July 2002, Under Secretary Bolton traveled to CIA headquarters to meet with Stuart Cohen, the Acting Chairman of the 

National Intelligence Council (NIC). The appointment was described by Mr. Bolton as a ‘‘courtesy call’’ so he could learn more 

about the function of the National Intelligence Council, and he recalled that the ‘‘bulk of the meeting’’ involved Mr. Cohen explaining 

the functions of the NIC and ‘‘what their publications were and 

how it had been created.’’ 72 Mr. Bolton also stated as follows: 

287 

And that was it, I had one part of one conversation with one person, one time on Mr. Smith, 

and that was it, I let it go.73

73 Ibid. Q04 I20Later in the hearing, Mr. Bolton said that ‘‘in my dealings [with the NIO], 

his behavior was unprofessional,’’ and therefore he had ‘‘lost confidence in him.’’ 74

74 Ibid., page 63. 75Democratic staff memorandum for the record, Apr. 10, 2005, regarding Apr. 8 telephone 

interview with Stuart Cohen. 76 Interview with Stuart Cohen by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 29, 2005, 

page 8–page 9. Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Cohen interview, Apr. 29, 2005.’’ Q04 I23 Stu Cohen came 

to me . . . and said that I might be getting a call from John Bolton or Otto Reich, that they had 

serious disagreements with . . . the NIO’s work, and they might call me and ask to have the 

NIO reassigned or moved. And I said to Stu, ‘‘Well we’re not going to do that, absolutely not. 

No way. End of story . . . I remember having a very strong reaction to it’’ 77

77 Interview with John McLaughlin by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 29, 

2005, page 5–page 6. Hereafter cited as ‘‘McLaughlin interview.’’ Q04 I21The effort to remove 

Cohen did not recall many specifics of the Bolton meeting—including whether Mr. Bolton had asked about the workings of the 

NIC—but believed his intent was clear that he wanted the NIO removed. 75 ‘‘I just don’t recall the details of the meeting,’’ Cohen 

said, ‘‘other than the fact that there was a focus on Mr. Smith.’’ 76

After reviewing the matter, Cohen decided to retain the NIO in his 

position. He told the committee staff that he discussed the issue 

with John McLaughlin, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), who agreed with Mr. Cohen that the NIO should 

not be removed from his position: 

Mr. Frederick Fleitz, a senior aide to Mr. Bolton, also let it be 

known to a senior CIA official that Bolton wanted the NIO removed. In a routine phone call, Fleitz told Alan Foley, then head 

of WINPAC, that Mr. Bolton wanted the NIO fired (or words to 

that effect). Foley recalls being ‘‘jarred’’ by Fleitz’ statement, because he was normally very discreet about Mr. Bolton’s views, and 

that he realized that whatever the nature of the dispute between 

Mr. Bolton and the NIO, it was obviously becoming ‘‘fairly acrimonious.’’ 82

The evidence thus shows that Mr. Bolton didn’t ‘‘let it go’’ after 

his meeting with Mr. Cohen, but rather he and his staff plotted to 

remove the NIO at least until early October. It is not known 

whether a letter was actually sent by Mr. Bolton and/or Mr. Reich, 

or received by Mr. Tenet or Mr. Cohen. 

The significance of Bolton’s actions 

As stated above, the Bolton effort to remove the NIO was 

rebuffed by senior CIA leadership, and the NIO remained in his position until the end of 2004. Mr. McLaughlin stated that no other 

policy maker made such a request during his tenure as DDCI, 83

and explained why he rejected the requests from Bolton and Reich: 

• he had never met or spoken with the NIO; Q02 

• he could not recall whether he had ever read any of the NIO’s 

work product; 85

• the NIO did not work on Bolton’s subject area of arms control 

and nonproliferation. Q04 

This underscores the depth of Mr. Bolton’s feelings regarding 

Cuba and his frustration whenever intelligence analysts sought to 

restrict what he could say on an issue. 

288 

86 April 12 hearing, page 39–page 40. 87 Ibid., page 39. 

IV. STRETCHING INTELLIGENCE

A. The Use and Abuse of Intelligence 

When a policy maker uses intelligence information in public 

statements, he faces certain limitations: he must not endanger sensitive intelligence sources and methods; he must not misstate intelligence information or conclusions; he must not attribute his own 

opinions to intelligence information or analysis, either explicitly or 

implicitly; and he must not defame U.S. intelligence agencies. 

Violating those standards undermines our intelligence agencies 

and harms the policy process. To go beyond these boundaries—to 

‘‘stretch’’ intelligence—can lead to unwise, or even dangerous, policies. Q04 

• If sensitive intelligence sources or methods are disclosed or 

compromised, we may lose them. Those losses can multiply, if 

people around the world come to assume that U.S. intelligence 

cannot keep secrets. Q02 

• If intelligence information or conclusions are misstated, or if 

personal opinions are wrongly attributed to intelligence information or analysis, then the policy process is perverted. In addition, others may disclose sensitive information in their efforts 

to correct the misstatements. Q02 • If U.S. intelligence agencies are defamed, then morale and recruitment—both of employees and of clandestine sources—may 

suffer. Q04 

In the development of government policy, policy makers have 

been known to challenge intelligence analysts and the bases of 

their analytical judgments. Such challenges, in the abstract, are legitimate and, indeed, useful. So, too, do policy makers push the intelligence community to let them say things in public that will 

dramatize or reinforce the policy argument they are trying to 

make. 

But in blatant or repeated cases, the questioning of intelligence 

analysts can lead to politicization of intelligence. Intelligence agencies come to understand what answers the policy makers want. If 

they give in to the pressure to please, then the distortion of policy 

increases. Even if they resist that pressure, their morale and efficiency can be undermined and our country suffers. 

Carl Ford, former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence 

and Research, speaking of Under Secretary Bolton’s attack on an 

INR analyst, told the committee: ‘‘I don’t take a lot of solace in the 

fact that in this particular case, it didn’t turn into politicization. I 

can only give you my impressions, but I clearly believe that the analysts in INR were very negatively affected by this incident—they 

were scared.’’ 86

Former Assistant Secretary Ford called politicization ‘‘a team 

sport. It requires someone to pressure, and what I refer to as a 

‘weasel’ in the Intelligence Community to act inappropriately to 

that pressure.’’ 87

A somewhat different view was expressed by Dr. Robert 

Hutchings, former chief of the National Intelligence Council: Q04 

I23 I think that this all goes to the issue of politicization and— 

289 

88Interview of Robert Hutchings by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, May 6, 2005, 

page 14–page 15. Hereafter cited as ‘‘Hutchings interview.’’ Q04 I21The difference between these 

two views may be due to the fact that Ford was testifying about one attack on an analyst, while 

Hutchings was referring to the repeated efforts of Under Secretary Bolton to get the ‘‘right’’ answer from the Intelligence Community. Ford called Mr. Bolton a ‘‘serial abuser’’ of subordinates. 

Hutchings was warning about the risk of serial abuse of the process, and of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community as a whole. 

you know, there’s different forms of politicization. And I think 

when policy officials—and . . . I’m not singling out Mr. Bolton 

here—but when policy officials come back repeatedly to push the 

same kinds of judgments, and push the intelligence community to 

confirm a particular set of judgments, it does have the effect of politicizing intelligence, because the so-called ‘‘correct answer’’ becomes all too clear. And, you know, even when it’s successfully resisted, it has an effect. Q02 

I think every judgment ought to be challenged and questioned. But . . . when it goes beyond that, to a search for 

a pretty clearly-defined, pre-formed set of judgments, then 

it turns into politicization. And even, as I said, even when 

it’s resisted—and this is where I think the WMD Commission Report didn’t quite get it right—even when it’s successfully resisted, it doesn’t mean that there hasn’t been 

an effect, because it creates a climate of intimidation and 

a culture of conformity that is damaging, . . .88

There are several ways to stretch intelligence. One is ‘‘cherrypicking,’’ in which the policy maker focuses on a few bits of intelligence that support his point of view, while ignoring others that 

contradict it or call it into question. One form of ‘‘cherry-picking’’ 

that was evident in the issue of Cuba and biological weapons is to 

ignore the doubts that intelligence analysts have regarding the reliability of the information that U.S. intelligence has obtained. 

A second way to stretch intelligence is by ‘‘gaming the system.’’ 

In 2002, the clearance of some speeches was managed by the National Intelligence Council, while others went to WINPAC, the 

DCI’s interagency Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and 

Arms Control Center at CIA, which specialized in weapons-related 

issues. By sticking to the WINPAC route, a policy maker can sometimes avoid giving regional intelligence specialists a role in clearing 

language. A policy maker can also try to leave out the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), by sending 

a speech only to policy bureaus for clearance. He can simply persist, through multiple rounds of drafting, sending out successive 

drafts that largely ignore the objections raised to the first one. Or 

he can grind the system down by imposing tight deadlines, or by 

writing his text on the fly and clearing it at the last minute by email, perhaps at odd hours from half-way around the world. 

A third technique is intimidation. A policy maker, or his staff, 

can cite the importance of the person who wants to use the proposed language. He can try to change the rules of the clearance 

process, by repeatedly claiming that intelligence agencies have no 

right to object to language that misstates their conclusions, unless 

it would disclose sensitive sources or methods. Or he can bully analysts, or try to get them fired or reassigned. 

Under Secretary Bolton and his staff used all three of these techniques. They were only occasionally successful, but they kept trying. Both in the State Department and in the Intelligence CommuVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00289 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
290 

89Fleitz memorandum to [name redacted]. ‘‘Request to Clear Cuba BW Language for U/S 

Bolton speech,’’ Feb. 8, 2002. 90 Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 42. 91Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 103. 92Fingar interview, page 10. 93 Apr. 12 hearing. page 22–page 23. 94Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, T3Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 

Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004, page 277. 95WINPAC e-mail, Feb. 12, 2002, 6:33 pm. 

nity, much effort had to be expended keeping Mr. Bolton on the 

strait and narrow, as well as tending to the individual people 

whom he tried to push around. 

B. Cuba and Biological Weapons—Heritage Foundation speech, 

February-May 2002 

On February 8, 2002, Under Secretary Bolton’s office asked an 

INR analyst to send out for Intelligence Community clearance a 

draft paragraph on Cuba and biological weapons. The language 

was part of the process of preparing a speech that Mr. Bolton was 

to give in the near future.89 Mr. Bolton’s personal attack on the 

INR analyst and his repeated requests to have the man reassigned 

are discussed in the section above on attempts to remove analysts. 

What are relevant to this section are, first, Mr. Bolton’s views on 

the clearance process and, second, how he and his office tried to 

game the system. 

Under Secretary Bolton testified to the committee that he told 

the INR analyst, ‘‘I don’t care if you disagree with me, I just think 

you shouldn’t do it behind my back.’’ 90 But others had different 

recollections. The INR analyst told committee staff that Bolton 

‘‘wanted to know what right I had trying to change an Under Secretary’s language.’’ 91 Thomas Fingar, who was Acting Assistant 

Secretary for INR on that day, told committee staff that Bolton 

said, ‘‘[t]hat he was the President’s appointee, that he had every 

right to say what he believed, that he wasn’t going to be told what 

he could say by a mid-level INR munchkin analyst.’’ 92 And former 

Assistant Secretary Ford testified that, ‘‘several days after his confrontation with my analyst, . . . [Bolton] was still fussing about 

what he could and couldn’t say in the speech.’’ 93 Bolton thus contested the idea that the Intelligence Community had any right to 

change his language, except to protect sensitive intelligence sources 

and methods. 

According to the INR analyst, the draft Bolton text ‘‘contained a 

sentence which said the U.S. believes that Cuba has a developmental, offensive biological warfare program and is providing assistance to other rogue state programs. The text also called for 

international observers of Cuba’s biological facilities.’’ 94 The Intelligence Community’s clearance coordinator circulated the proposed 

text and the arguments that Under Secretary Bolton’s office had 

provided in favor of it. The coordinator asked agencies to ‘‘review 

the suggested language . . . for accuracy and completeness, as well 

as for . . . sources and methods concerns.’’ 95

After receiving comments from the Community, a CIA analyst emailed Under Secretary Bolton’s office: ‘‘Our intelligence information cannot support Bolton’s message.’’ The analyst also warned 

that a public speech ‘‘will increase the likelihood that CIA information will come under scrutiny’’ and added that CIA ‘‘could not supVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00290 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
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96WINPAC to Fleitz, attachment to e-mail, Feb. 21, 2002, 6:06 am. 97Fleitz to WINPAC e-mail, Feb. 21, 2002, 6:06 am. 98Westermann to Fleitz e-mail, Feb. 21, 2002, 5:51 pm. 99 Bolton speech, May 6, 2002. 100Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail, Feb. 22, 2002, 6:21 pm. 101Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail, Apr. 26, 2002, 5:51 pm. 102 INR supervisor to Fleitz e-mail, Apr. 30, 2002, 11:20 am; Assistant NIO/S&T to Stuart 

Cohen e-mail, June 3, 2002, 6:37 pm. 103 Bolton speech, May 6, 2002, page 5. 

port a public discussion of our information.’’ 96 The response from 

Bolton’s office made clear that Bolton disagreed with the Intelligence Community’s judgment: ‘‘Bolton believes that State and 

CIA should have been including Cuba’s BW program in reports to 

the Hill and in NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates] over the last 

few years.’’ Bolton’s office added that ‘‘several heavy hitters are involved in this one, and they may choose to push ahead over objections from CIA and INR, . . . UNLESS there is a serious sources 

and methods concern.’’ 97 Thus, Bolton’s office tried to force a 

change in the Intelligence Community judgment and threatened to 

ignore the Community’s views on substantive intelligence issues. 

The Intelligence Community provided a cleared text on Cuba and 

biological weapons on February 21. 98 The cleared text added the 

word ‘‘limited;’’ changed ‘‘developmental program’’ (which would 

have implied a more structured activity) to ‘‘research and development effort;’’ replaced ‘‘provided assistance to other rogue state programs’’ with ‘‘provided dual-use biotechnology. . . . that . . . could 

support BW programs;’’ and deleted any reference to inspections.99

One day later, a senior Bolton staffer wrote, ‘‘John wants his 

speech to include additional tough language about Cuba, but not 

material we will need to clear with CIA. (Cuban sponsorship of terrorism, for example.)’’ 100 It had taken only one experience with the 

clearance process for Bolton’s office to start thinking about circumventing that process. 

On April 26, Under Secretary Bolton’s office circulated for clearance a full text of a proposed May 6 speech to the Heritage Foundation. That text contained the cleared language on Cuba and biological weapons, but also additional language on Cuba. It was sent 

to policy bureaus and to WINPAC, but neither to INR nor to the 

National Intelligence Council. 101 INR only found out about the new 

draft when two policy bureaus asked the weapons specialists in 

INR to comment on portions of the speech. WINPAC consulted the 

National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Science and Technology on 

the text regarding Cuba and biological weapons. But the NIO for 

Latin America and INR’s Latin American specialists never saw the 

additional Cuba language. 102

This might not have mattered, had the additional language on 

Cuba not been controversial; but the Heritage Foundation speech, 

as delivered, was very controversial. It said: ‘‘We know that Cuba 

is collaborating with other state sponsors of terror.’’ It added that 

Fidel Castro ‘‘continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives,’’ and included a quotation that would 

later turn out to be of questionable origins. And it attacked a 1998 

‘‘U.S. government report’’ as ‘‘unbalanced’’ and cited Cuban spy 

Ana Belen Montes (who had been a Defense Intelligence Agency 

analyst at the time) as having ‘‘had a hand in drafting’’ the report.103 The next day, moreover, T3The Washington Times reVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00291 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
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104 ‘‘Havana pursues biological warfare; Technology given to ‘rogue states’,’’ T3The Washington 

Times, May 7, 2002. 105 CIA/DI/APLA analyst e-mail, May 13, 2002, 2:49 pm. 106 CIA/DI/APLA analyst e-mail, May 13, 2002, 2:49 pm. 107WINPAC e-mail, May 30, 2002, 10:12 am; INR to WINPAC e-mail, May 30, 2002. 108 INR to WINPAC e-mail, May 30, 2002. 109 CIA/DI/APLA memorandum, June 5, 2002, p. 1. 

ported: ‘‘In a later interview, a senior administration official said 

Washington has gathered ‘broad and deep’ evidence of Cuba’s pursuit of such weapons but is ‘constrained’ in what it can disclose 

publicly.’’ 104 We do not know who spoke to T3The Washington 

Times, but Mr. Bolton reportedly did hold a question-and-answer 

session after his speech. 

The reaction to Under Secretary Bolton’s May 6 speech was substantial. News media reported that unnamed CIA personnel denied 

that Cuba had biological weapons (a statement that did not actually contradict Bolton’s assertions). And on May 9, the CIA re-published its previous analytic conclusions in its daily Senior Executive 

Intelligence Brief (SEIB), implicitly reminding policy makers that 

it did not endorse everything that Bolton had said. 105

At a meeting with analysts on May 13, Under Secretary Bolton’s 

office reported that he was ‘‘quite angry at CIA,’’ especially over the 

SEIB article and reported media leaks. His staff defended his remarks by citing a WINPAC paper that Bolton had read, but were 

told that the paper had not been coordinated with other intelligence agencies and had not been disseminated to policy makers 

‘‘because of serious reservations about the methodology used.’’ 106

Perhaps inadvertently, Bolton and his staff had ‘‘cherry-picked’’ an 

analysis that many intelligence analysts rejected. 

C. Cuba and Biological Weapons, Again—May-June, 2002 

The smoke had barely cleared from the May 6 speech to the Heritage Foundation when Under Secretary Bolton’s office began to 

seek clearance of draft public testimony that they indicated was to 

be given on June 5, 2002, before the Subcommittee on Western 

Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

(then chaired by Senator Dodd). The draft that Bolton’s office sent 

to WINPAC in late May used nearly all of the Cuba language from 

his May 6 speech and added further information drawn from intelligence reports. INR got the draft on May 30, and a meeting with 

Bolton was scheduled for May 31 to discuss the text.107

In the wake of the Heritage Foundation speech, INR asked that 

regional analysts be involved in the clearance process for the draft 

testimony, along with the weapons specialists.108 The draft was 

shared with the NIO for Latin America, who then participated in 

the clearance process. This time, therefore, nobody was left out. 

Under Secretary Bolton did not attend the May 31 meeting with 

intelligence analysts, but it was by all accounts a contentious affair. A CIA analyst later reported to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that ‘‘Mr. Bolton had left instructions that we confine 

our comments to sources and methods issues or to substantive information that strengthened the Undersecretary’s argumentation 

in the proposed testimony.’’ 109 This contradicted the Intelligence 

Community’s traditional ‘‘accuracy and completeness’’ role in the 

clearance process. The purported Bolton instructions appear to 

293 

110 Ibid. 111 NIO/LA to ANIO/S&T e-mail, June 4, 2002, 3:00 pm. 112 ANIO/S&T to NIO/LA e-mail attachment, June 4, 2002, 3:00 pm. 113 NIO/LA to ANIO/S&T e-mail, June 4, 2002, 3:00 pm. 114 CIA/DI/APLA memorandum, June 5, 2002, p. 1. 115 CIA memorandum for the record, June 4, 2002; CIA/DI/APLA e-mail, June 5, 2002, 8:40 am. 116 NIO/LA e-mail attachment of June 6, 2002, 8:11 am. 

have been disregarded, but they were a clear attempt to change the 

rules. 

At the May 31 meeting, a senior Bolton staffer complained 

(again) about press leaks110 and went on to say that the NIC had 

cleared the Heritage Foundation speech. When analysts explained 

how small a role the NIC had played in clearing that speech, the 

Bolton staffer reportedly said, ‘‘we never clear things with the 

NIC.’’ 111 A few days later, the Bolton staffer called the Assistant 

NIO for S&T and said ‘‘that Bolton is insisting that the NIC 

cleared on the Heritage Foundation speech.’’ 112 The NIO for Latin 

America felt that the Bolton staffer ‘‘seemed confused about the basics of the coordination process,’’ while the NIO for S&T and his 

assistant worried that Bolton was trying ‘‘to deflect criticism that 

Bolton continues to receive from his own management as well as 

DOD and others.’’ The NIO for Latin America felt that perhaps 

Bolton’s staffer ‘‘had led his boss out on a long, weak, and very 

public limb—much to the detriment of his boss, the administration, 

and the policies they support—and was desperate to blame someone else.’’ 113

The CIA analyst warned: ‘‘The controversy on this issue will not 

end soon.’’ CIA had ‘‘a draft Defense Department document that 

seeks (reportedly at Undersecretary Bolton’s request) to add Cuba 

to the State Department’s 2001 nonproliferation report.’’ Thus, 

there was an apparently coordinated effort to change the Intelligence Community’s judgment; the nonproliferation report, by law, 

had to be approved by the DCI. The CIA analyst added that a new 

draft of Bolton’s testimony ‘‘still contains fundamental flaws.’’ 114

Meanwhile, on June 4, an analytic team led by the NIO for Latin 

America gave a closed briefing on Cuba and biological weapons to 

the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The analysts saw the briefing as non-controversial, but their analytic judgments apparently were at odds with 

Under Secretary Bolton’s. 115

Another draft of Under Secretary Bolton’s testimony was provided on June 3 and edited by the Intelligence Community on June 

6. A senior analyst wrote ‘‘that comments will be easy since he did 

not seem to take many of our comments from 5/31.’’ 116 Bolton’s office was thus keeping the pressure on the Intelligence Community 

to clear as much of Bolton’s text as possible. 

CIA, in turn, objected to major points in the draft testimony, including points from the Heritage Foundation speech that regional 

analysts had not been shown before it was cleared. The uncoordinated working paper that Bolton’s office had cited on May 13 was 

now cited in the draft testimony, and CIA/APLA objected to any 

use of it. Regional analysts believed that the text ‘‘misrepresents 

. . . judgments not only on BW but also on terrorism,’’ and that it 

‘‘seems to impugn intelligence community efforts to follow the 

Cuban BW issue’’ and ‘‘implies that the Intelligence Community is 

294 

117 CIA/DI/APLA e-mail, June 6, 2002, 12:30 pm. 118 NIO/LA e-mail and attached edited text, June 6, 2002, 3:31 pm. 119Foley to Fleitz e-mail, June 7, 2002, 10:35 am. 120 INPAC e-mail, June 7, 2002, 1:41 pm. 121 NIO/LA e-mail attachment, June 7, 2002, 5:46 pm. 122 NIO/LA to Stuart Cohen e-mail, June 10, 2002, 3:58 pm. 123Fleitz to INR e-mail, June 12, 2002, 11:09 am. Q04 I21Intelligence analysts had been trying to explain for some time that they did not take views (and therefore could not be asked to 

clear) on policy issues. But they could not agree to cede their role in clearing on substance, especially when intelligence information was invoked or implied, so the proposal from Bolton’s office 

was politely rejected. 124 It stands, however, as an audacious attempt to change the rules. 124 NIO/LA to INR e-mail, June 13, 2002, 3:44 pm. 125 Ibid. 126 Cohen interview, Apr. 29, 2005, page 3. 

trying to hide something from U.S. policymakers and the U.S. public.’’ 117 And analysts argued that references to the Ana Montes 

case could endanger sources and methods 118

Bolton’s office then protested the unwillingness to clear language 

on the Ana Montes case, so the director of WINPAC weighed in by 

telling Bolton’s staff that he supported the Intelligence Community 

view. 119 Another draft text was provided by Bolton’s office and 

edited by the Intelligence Community that day. Aside from the 

Montes issue, there were still concerns over previously unreleased 

information that Mr. Bolton wished to cite, over how to cite a questionable quote of Fidel Castro, and over whether Mr. Bolton could 

say that the Intelligence Community had ‘‘provided’’ any of his 

Heritage Foundation text. Several elements of that speech were no 

longer contained, however, in the draft testimony. 120 Bolton’s office 

responded by scheduling a June 12 meeting between the analysts 

and Bolton. 121 Bolton’s office indicated that the Acting Chairman 

of the NIC should attend. 122

The June 12 meeting was cancelled at the last minute, but 

Under Secretary Bolton’s office sent out a new draft of the testimony. The e-mail from his staff that accompanied the new draft 

said that the statements on Ana Montes to which analysts objected 

were being removed. But it also stated: Q04 

Mr. Bolton would like to take a different strategy on the 

Cuba BW testimony that he hopes will smooth the process 

for future IC [Intelligence Community] clearances of documents like this. He suggests that INR use the following 

boilerplate language in these types of clearance requests: 

‘‘Thank you for the opportunity to review your proposed 

testimony/speech. As you know, the IC does not comment 

on policy or substantive matters, so me [sic: we] express no 

views on those portions of your testimony/speech. As to 

those matters involving intelligence sources and methods 

. . . ’’ 123

The Intelligence Community also proposed a few further edits to 

lessen the implied confidence in the judgment that Cuba was developing biological weapons. 125 Another Bolton draft was promised in 

late June, but it never materialized and the draft testimony was 

never used. The former Acting Chief of the National Intelligence 

Council summed up the affair by saying, ‘‘It just seems to me that 

the clearance of the speech . . . was entirely too rancorous and too 

burdensome.’’ 126 The rancor continued, and this matter was reportedly one reason listed by Mr. Bolton for asking that the NIO for 

Latin America be relieved of his duties. 127

295 

127Democratic staff notes regarding Apr. 8, 2005 telephone interview with Stuart Cohen. 

Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Cohen interview, Apr. 8, 2005.’’ 128Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail. Apr. 19, 2003, 9:03 am. 129 [Redacted name] to Fleitz e-mail, Apr. 26, 2002, 4:22 pm. 130Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail, Apr. 29, 2002, 5:07 pm. 131 [Redacted name] to Fleitz e-mail, Apr. 30, 2002, 11:20 am. 132 [Redacted name] to Fleitz e-mail, Apr. 30, 2002, 8:39 am, forwarded to Fleitz Apr. 30, 2002, 

10:03 am. 133Fleitz to [redacted name] e-mail, Apr. 30, 2002, 11:26 am. 

D. Syria and Nuclear Weapons—Heritage Foundation Speech, 

April-May 2002 

On April 19, 2002, a senior member of Under Secretary Bolton’s 

staff asked the Intelligence Community to prepare unclassified language on Syria, to be included in the Heritage Foundation speech. 

He asked for language on biological weapons, chemical weapons, 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.128 In response, the 

Intelligence Community transmitted unclassified language drawn 

from previously published material.129

On April 29, Under Secretary Bolton’s office circulated a draft of 

the Bolton speech to relevant policy bureaus within the State Department, noting that this draft contained an additional section on 

Syria. 130 The INR bureau, although not asked to clear on any of 

the language in the speech, raised concerns that some ‘‘tweaking’’ 

had been done to the Syria and Libya text originally provided. INR 

also complained that it had been excluded from the speech review 

process, having received the draft from a policy bureau that had 

been asked to clear. 131 An INR analyst raised concerns that the 

new language on Syria’s possible interest in nuclear weapons technology was a ‘‘stretch,’’ implying existence of a Syrian nuclear 

weapons program when such a conclusion had not, in fact, been 

reached by U.S. intelligence. 132 Similar concerns were raised by 

another element of the Intelligence Community. 133 Although INR 

provided revised language that could be used on this topic, Bolton 

did not use it, opting instead to refrain from any discussion of a 

potential Syrian nuclear weapons program in his speech. He did 

not give up on what he wanted to say, however, but rather saved 

it for another day. 

E. Syria and Nuclear Weapons, Again—HIRC testimony, June, 

July, September, 2003 

Under Secretary Bolton testified before the House International 

Relations Committee in June 2003, and again in September, on 

Syrian efforts to develop WMD and ballistic missiles. On June 4, 

Bolton told the committee: ‘‘As we have informed Congress, we are 

looking at Syria’s nuclear program with growing concern and continue to monitor it for any signs of nuclear weapons intent.’’ 134

This statement stand in contrast to a CIA assessment sent to the 

Congress just two months earlier, in April 2003, which was more 

cautious than Mr. Bolton’s testimony. On the question of nuclear 

weapons, the report, noting that Syria and Russia had reached preliminary agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, stated: ‘‘In 

principle, broader access to Russian expertise provides opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide 

to pursue nuclear weapons.’’ (The ‘‘growing concern’’ language used 

in Bolton’s statement was later adopted in the DCI’s report for the 

first half of 2003, which was released in November 2003. By NoVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00295 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
296 

135Director of Central Intelligence, ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 

Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 

January Through 30 June 2002,’’ April 2003, p. 8; ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 

Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003,’’ November 2003, p. 6; ‘‘Unclassified Report to 

Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003,’’ November 2004, p. 6. 136Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, ‘‘CIA: Assessment of Syria’s Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Exaggerated,’’ Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, July 15, 2003. 137 Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, p. 87. 

vember 2004, however, the ‘‘growing concern’’ was reduced to ‘‘concern.’’) 135

On September 16, 2003, the Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee 

held a hearing entitled ‘‘Syria: Implications for U.S. Security and 

Regional Stability.’’ Under Secretary Bolton was the only witness. 

Originally this testimony was to be given in July, but disagreements that emerged between Bolton’s office and the Intelligence 

Community over the interpretation of intelligence data forced 

Bolton to postpone the testimony, according to Bolton’s account. 

After a prolonged clearance process, the testimony that Bolton gave 

ultimately included language on Syria’s WMD programs that was 

cleared by the Intelligence Community. 

According to contemporaneous press accounts about the postponed July testimony, the CIA and other agencies ‘‘objected vigorously’’ to the assessment of the threat of Syria’s weapons of mass 

destruction that Bolton intended to present. U.S. officials told 

Knight Ridder Newspapers that Bolton was prepared to tell the 

subcommittee that Syria’s development of biological, chemical and 

nuclear weapons had progressed to such a point that they posed a 

threat to stability in the region. The article went on to say that the 

CIA and other intelligence agencies ‘‘said that assessment was exaggerated,’’ that the planned testimony had caused a ‘‘revolt’’ within the Intelligence Community, and that the CIA’s ‘‘objections and 

comments alone ran to 35 to 40 pages’’ according to one official. According to the article, an aide to Bolton said the testimony was 

postponed over a scheduling conflict, while others indicated it was 

because the dispute could not be solved immediately. 136

During Bolton’s confirmation hearing last month, Senator Obama 

read excerpts from the above Knight Ridder article and asked 

Under Secretary Bolton to respond. Bolton said that ‘‘drafts were 

prepared—and I should say as is often the case, and was in part 

in the case in other speeches— I hadn’t even seen the draft. I had 

been traveling, when I came back I found that I had a conflict, I 

had been assigned to go to a Deputy’s committee meeting at the 

White House. There were a lot of disagreements about the speech, 

it was clear to me that more work needed to be done on it.’’ He 

stated further that he canceled the testimony, telling Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the subcommittee chair: ‘‘Look, I’m 

going to, on my own hook, cancel this. We need more time.’’ He 

said the hearing could not be rescheduled until September because 

of the August recess. 137

The committee staff interviewed four individuals who confirmed 

that there was a protracted dispute over Bolton’s testimony to the 

Subcommittee. The first is an INR analyst whose name has not 

been made public, but who was involved in the clearance process 

for the Bolton testimony. The analyst stated that one issue, involvVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00296 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
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138 INR supervisor interview, page 12. 139 Ibid., page 14. 140 Interview of Jami Miscik by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, May 5, 2005, page 

5. Hereafter cited as ‘‘Miscik interview.’’ 141 Ibid., page 6. Q04 I21Ms. Miscik further clarified that the memo had been prepared in connection with Bolton’s proposed Syria testimony and that the ‘‘concern and the action on . . . Syria 

came before the [testimony].’’ When asked whether Bolton in the end used the language proposed by the Intelligence Community, Ms. Miscik said: ‘‘I think it had been delayed—I think 

Continued 

ing one of Syria’s WMD-related programs, was a ‘‘big sticking 

point.’’ The question was whether the judgment in Bolton’s draft 

was ‘‘sustainable.’’ This analyst described that judgment as ‘‘an attempt to take a piece of data that was far from definitive and draw 

a conclusion.’’ The analyst went on to say that the Intelligence 

Community had ‘‘reservations’’ about the information and how it 

was obtained, as well as the ‘‘soundness of the science’’ underlying 

it. The analyst indicated that Bolton’s staff was ‘‘not happy’’ about 

the language that came back from the Intelligence Community and 

that ‘‘there was some effort at pushback.’’ 138 The analyst stated 

that ‘‘ultimately’’ the phraseology was removed and that the Intelligence Community was ‘‘comfortable’’ with the final phrasing. 

When asked about this particular clearance process, the analyst 

stated that it was ‘‘fairly rare for this type of dynamic to play 

out.’’ 139 Once again, we see Bolton or his office engaging in the tactic of protracted drafts in an effort to get clearance for text that intelligence professionals felt went beyond the evidence. 

Jami Miscik, who served as CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence from May 2002 to February 2005, also confirmed that there 

were concerns within the Intelligence Community about Mr. 

Bolton’s proposed language. The committee’s staff asked if she had 

followed ‘‘any of the cases that arose regarding clearance of speech 

or testimony for policymakers.’’ She responded that much of the 

process went on at a level that ‘‘usually didn’t involve me,’’ but described the kinds of situations in which she did become involved. 

The first was: ‘‘If it looked like it was going to be a contentious 

issue . . . ’’ She described the second as follows: ‘‘And then sometimes there would be situations where it was really dragging out, 

it was really becoming problematic, and those are the ones that 

usually people would come up and, kind of, tell me about more 

than just a passing FYI kind of phone call.’’ 140

Ms. Miscik was asked if the latter category included cases involving testimony or speeches for Under Secretary Bolton. She replied: 

Q04 

Yeah. One of them, in particular, was the Syria speech 

that he was going to give. And the Cuba speech—I don’t 

remember as much before the speech as after the speech 

was given [on May 6, 2002, to the Heritage Foundation], 

where people were coming up to me, saying, you know, 

‘‘This isn’t what we—this isn’t how we see this information.’’ And so, what that then led—or [was] laid was kind 

of a predicate for when the Syria one came along. People 

were approaching it very cautiously, were concerned that 

there were going to be problems. . . . [T]hey wrote a very 

extensive memo back on the points that they had issues 

with or thought that it went beyond what could be supported by the intelligence.141

298 

this is a—you know, turned into, instead of a couple-of-day process, a couple-of-week process. 

I think what ultimately was used was agreed to by the Intelligence Community.’’ 142

142 Ibid., page 7. 143 Ibid., page 8. 144 Hutchings interview, page 9. Q04 I21Dr. Hutchings did not see every draft of the proposed 

Syria testimony, but was briefed on the continuing clearance process: ‘‘I remember that—either 

seeing or being told that the next draft was pretty much the same as the first one, that there 

were some small changes, but that it was still problematic. That’s the sort of a sense that I 

was getting. And I, again, said that we should not clear anything we’re not—that contains intelligence judgements with which we are not comfortable.’’ He did not recall the reported Syria 

memo, but did state that this case was ‘‘perhaps particularly acute,’’ and he knew of no case 

as protracted as this one. 145

145 Ibid., page 10–page 11. 146 Ibid., p. 13. 

Ms. Miscik testified that she did not ‘‘have to get personally involved,’’ but confirmed that the differences could not be resolved in 

time for the testimony to be given as originally planned: ‘‘my memory could be faulty here, but there had been an original deadline 

that wasn’t going to be met. This was not going to be resolved by 

then. Then there was an extension. I think the speech was postponed.’’ 143

Dr. Robert Hutchings, who served as the Chair of the National 

Intelligence Council from February 2003 through the end of January 2005, also spoke to the process involving Bolton’s Syria testimony. Hutchings recalled: Q04 

The first version I saw struck me as going well beyond 

what—where the evidence would legitimately take us. And 

that was the judgement of the experts on my staff, as well. 

So I said that, under these circumstances, that we should 

not clear this kind of testimony. 144

Dr. Hutchings went on to say that Under Secretary Bolton: ‘‘took 

isolated facts and made much more of them to build a case than 

I thought the intelligence warranted. It was a sort of cherry-picking of little factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to 

present the starkest possible case.’’ 146 (This is, of course, a pattern 

observed on the Cuba biological weapons issue, as well.) Hutchings 

indicated that he had no personal interactions with Bolton. 

Finally, Mr. Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary 

of State Powell, contradicted Mr. Bolton’s testimony regarding the 

reason why the June 2003 hearing was postponed: ‘‘My recollection 

is that the Deputy Secretary of State intervened and would not 

allow the testimony to take place.’’ Mr. Wilkerson cited concerns regarding both the substance of Mr. Bolton’s proposed testimony and 

its timing, while ‘‘[t]here were some delicate negotiations going 

on.’’ 147

F. China WMD/WINPAC and INR 

In August 2002, Mr. Bolton’s office threatened to limit the ability 

of INR to append its own opinions to products produced by other 

parts of the intelligence community, warning that the Under Secretary was considering establishing new arrangements for the dissemination of sensitive compartmented information within the 

State Department that would bypass INR, according to e-mails describing the incident and testimony from Fred Fleitz and Neil Silver. 

On August 29, 2002, INR circulated within the State Department 

a memorandum drafted by CIA’s WINPAC concerning a recentlyannounced Chinese export control list. Bolton’s office considered 

299 

148Fleitz to Fingar e-mail, cc to Bolton and Silver, Aug. 30, 2002, 11:33 am. 149 INR analyst to Silver e-mail, August 30, 2002, 9:54 am. 150Fleitz to Fingar e-mail, cc to Bolton and Silver, Aug. 30, 2002, 11:33 am. 151 Ibid. 152Fleitz to Fingar e-mail, cc to Bolton and Silver, Aug. 30, 2002, 11:33 am. 153 Interview of Frederick Fleitz by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, May 5, 2005, 

page 3. Hereafter cited as ‘‘Fleitz interview, May 5, 2005.’’ 154 Ibid., page 7. 

the memo ‘‘a useful contribution to the debate on this issue,’’ 148

and suggested that Deputy Secretary Armitage’s office request a 

copy of the memo from INR, according to a contemporaneous e-mail 

by a member of Mr. Bolton’s staff. 

INR transmitted the WINPAC memo to Deputy Secretary 

Armitage’s office, as requested, but also attached its own brief 

memo on the subject, taking issue with elements of the WINPAC 

memo. The committee has requested both the original WINPAC 

memo and the INR rebuttal memo, but neither has been provided 

to the committee. 

The INR rebuttal was drafted by an analyst in the Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues (SPM). On the morning of 

August 30, when a senior member of Bolton’s staff learned that 

INR had attached its own memo to the WINPAC analysis, he personally visited the INR drafter and accused him of acting unprofessionally and making the Intelligence Community ‘‘look bad,’’ according to a contemporaneous e-mail account by the INR analyst. 149

The Bolton senior staffer then sent an e-mail to INR Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Tom Fingar and SPM office director 

Neil Silver expressing Bolton’s ‘‘displeasure’’ with INR’s rebuttal 

and accusing INR of failing to follow ‘‘established dissemination 

procedures.’’ 150 The Bolton staffer wrote: ‘‘T [letter designation of 

Bolton’s office in the State Department] considers this a serious 

abuse of INR’s liaison role, particularly since the INR rebuttal was 

not even a finished product, fully coordinated within INR proper.’’ 151

The Bolton senior staffer likened the incident to the March 2002 

dispute over Cuba’s biological weapons program, and warned that 

INR’s actions, ‘‘cannot help but undermine the bond of trust between T and INR.’’ 152

Mr. Bolton was on foreign travel during this incident. Nonetheless, throughout his e-mail communication with INR, the senior 

staff member says that he is speaking ‘‘on behalf of U/S Bolton,’’ 

and repeatedly uses ‘‘we’’ to describe the views of Bolton’s office. 

The committee staff interviewed Mr. Bolton’s staff member, Silver, and another INR supervisor about the incident. The Bolton 

senior staffer said he had no recollection of visiting the INR analyst on the morning of August 30 and described his threatening email as ‘‘a fairly minor matter.’’ 153 His testimony is at odds with 

his use of the phrase, ‘‘serious abuse of INR’s liaison role’’ in his 

contemporaneous e-mail. In his interview, the Bolton staffer said 

that INR should have consulted with CIA before drafting its own 

rebuttal ‘‘as a courtesy, not as a requirement,’’ 154 again at odds 

with his contemporaneous assertion that INR had not followed ‘‘established dissemination procedures.’’ The Bolton staffer said he did 

not pursue establishing a new channel for the dissemination of sensitive intelligence information by the Under Secretary’s office. 

300 

155 Interview of Neil Silver by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, May 5, 2005, page 

9. Hereafter cited as ‘‘Silver interview, May 5, 2005.’’ 156 INR supervisor interview, page 17. 157State 73770, April 21, 2005. Q04 I21Oddly, Secretary of State Rice has sought to downplay 

the significance of management skills in connection with the Bolton nomination. In an interview 

with CNN on April 20, 2005, the Secretary said, ‘‘I think we make a mistake if suddenly comments about management style become part of the confirmation process.’’ 158

Neil Silver recalled that INR attached a brief comment to the 

WINPAC analysis. ‘‘The fact that we had done what we had done 

was absolutely natural and appropriate.’’ 155 Silver described the 

practice as routine, and said that it applies to both finished intelligence (such as the WINPAC memo) and raw intelligence. Silver 

testified that he told Bolton’s staff member that WINPAC had not 

consulted with INR in the drafting of their analysis, and that 

therefore INR did not think it was inappropriate for it to comment 

on the WINPAC memo without first consulting with CIA. The other 

INR supervisor could not recall any incident in 27 years at the 

State Department in which a policy official had expressed concern 

because INR had attached its own view to a product from another 

intelligence agency. 156

V. ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR TOWARD SUBORDINATES

The United States Representative to the United Nations is more 

than the chief American diplomat to the world’s leading international organization; he or she is also the leader of some 150 personnel, both Foreign Service and Civil Service. That person should 

have, among other things, strong leadership skills and the ability 

to manage and motivate people. 

Leadership and management skills at the State Department 

were a high priority during the first four years of the Bush Administration under Secretary of State Powell. Secretary Powell instituted a mandatory leadership and management training course at 

the Foreign Service Institute for senior officials. Secretary Powell 

and Deputy Secretary Armitage were known to instruct ambassadors departing Washington to assume their posts with a simple 

but important dictum: ‘‘take care of our people.’’ 

In a recent cable to all State Department posts, Secretary of 

State Rice noted the importance of leadership skills in the selection 

of career candidates for Chief of Mission positions: Q04 

Special emphasis is placed on ensuring that officers assigned to these senior positions meet the highest standards 

of leadership needed in our Missions overseas and in the 

Department. Those standards apply not only to policy and 

formal management skills, but also to interpersonal skills 

and qualities of personal integrity required of our leaders.’’ 157

The record gathered by the committee is replete with evidence of 

abusive behavior toward subordinates by Secretary Bolton, of retribution against subordinates for minor errors, and even of seeking 

dismissal or removal of personnel over policy views. 

A. Testimony of Larry Wilkerson 

The former Chief of Staff to Secretary Powell, Larry Wilkerson, 

told the committee staff that Mr. Bolton was a ‘‘lousy leader’’ who 

was ill-suited to the post of U.S. Representative to the United Nations because of the need to provide leadership to the roughly 150 

301 

158Televised interview with Jill Dougherty, CNN, April 20, 2005. 159Wilkerson Interview, page 36–page 37. 160 Apr. 12 hearing, page 20. 161 Ibid., p. 18. 162 Ibid., p. 68. 

government employees in the U.S. Mission to the UN. Mr. 

Wilkerson also indicated that Mr. Bolton was a frequent source of 

complaint by Department personnel: that is, that there was a regular stream of visitors to his office complaining about their treatment by Mr. Bolton: Q04 

Mr. WILKERSON. Remember that process I told you about 

whereby [people] came into my office and unburdened 

themselves? Q02 

Ms. O’CONNELL. So, it was often about Article 98s? Q02 

Mr. WILKERSON. On occasion. I won’t say often, but it 

was on occasion. It was more often on personnel matters, 

especially when it came to John Bolton. Q02 

Ms. O’CONNELL. Personnel matters. That—individuals 

coming to complain about—— Q02 

Mr. WILKERSON. Assistant secretaries, PDASs, acting assistant secretaries coming into my office and telling me, 

‘‘Can I sit down?’’ 

‘‘Sure, sit down. What’s the problem?’’ 

‘‘I’ve got to leave here.’’ 

‘‘What’s the problem?’’ 

‘‘Bolton.’’ 159

B. Testimony of Carl Ford 

Former Assistant Secretary Carl Ford described Mr. Bolton as a 

‘‘quintessential kiss-up, kick-down sort of guy . . . But the fact is 

that he stands out, that he’s got a bigger kick and it gets bigger 

and stronger the further down the bureaucracy he’s kicking.’’ 160

‘‘I’ve never seen anybody quite like Secretary Bolton, [it] doesn’t 

even come close. I don’t have a second and third or fourth, in terms 

of the way that he abuses his power and authority with little people.’’ 161 Mr. Ford further stated his view that Mr. Bolton’s action 

in the Westermann matter—in reaching five or six levels down in 

the bureaucracy and ‘‘ream[ing] out somebody’’—was ‘‘professionally unacceptable.’’ 162

After Mr. Bolton and Mr. Ford had heated words about the 

Westermann matter, Mr. Ford says that Mr. Bolton ‘‘chose to shun 

me’’—in other words, refused to speak to him for the next year and 

a half. When Mr. Bolton did speak to Mr. Ford, it was in the final 

weeks of Mr. Ford’s service, and after he had announced he was 

leaving the Department. Mr. Bolton asked Mr. Ford to do something (Mr. Ford could not recall the details of the specific matter). 

Ford said, ‘‘if I could have done it, I would have . . . but for some 

reason I couldn’t. And I told him I couldn’t do it, and I thought the 

phone was just going to explode, and the only thing I remember 

him saying is, ‘I’m glad you’re leaving.’ And he slammed down the 

phone.’’ 163

C. Individual Cases 

The committee has also examined several specific cases of individuals whom Mr. Bolton sought to punish or remove. The 

302 

164 Interview of John Wolf by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 28, 2005, page 

6. Hereafter cited as ‘‘Wolf interview.’’ 165Wilkerson interview, page 16–page 17. 166Wolf interview, pages 4–6. 

Westermann and Smith cases, described above, involve intelligence 

analysts. Cases involving policy officers are described below. 

The Case of Rexon Ryu 

The Rexon Ryu matter came to the attention of the committee 

when it was first reported in T3The Washington Post on April 15, 

2005. The committee staff interviewed Mr. John Wolf, the Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation from 2001 to 2004, who 

supervised Mr. Ryu in 2003, when Mr. Ryu had an encounter with 

Mr. Bolton’s office. The committee staff did not interview Mr. Ryu. 

Mr. Ryu is a Civil Service employee of the Department of State 

currently on detail to the office of Senator Hagel. He was described 

by former Assistant Secretary Wolf as a ‘‘truly outstanding civil 

servant,’’ and part of a ‘‘circle of a handful of the best’’ civil servants that Wolf had ever worked with during his 34-year career in 

the Foreign Service. 164 Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to 

Secretary Powell, said: ‘‘I know Rexon well. . . . Rexon is a brilliant 

young man, and was on my team to prepare the [Powell] presentation at the UN, and I, you know, spent two nights in the Waldorf 

Astoria, awake with him all night, fixing things. So, I know his 

competence.’’ 165

In March 2003, on the eve of the war in Iraq, Frederick Fleitz, 

acting Chief of Staff to Mr. Bolton, asked Mr. Ryu for a copy of a 

draft cable sent to Washington by the U.S. mission to the United 

Nations. (The post was seeking instructions from Washington, and 

had e-mailed to Washington a draft cable; in essence, the post was 

suggesting to headquarters what the instructions should say.) Mr. 

Ryu told Mr. Fleitz he did not have the cable. 

Subsequently, Mr. Ryu circulated fairly widely within the Department a cable (perhaps a draft outgoing cable) that related to 

the UN inspection process in Iraq. Mr. Bolton’s office was not provided a copy of the cable, but at least two bureaus working under 

him—the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of Verification 

and Compliance—were. The Under Secretary’s office, believing it 

was the same cable that Mr. Fleitz had sought from Ryu, then accused Mr. Ryu of duplicity or of having lied to them. 

Mr. Wolf testified that he believes that Mr. Bolton ‘‘actually 

called Rexon Ryu up to his office,’’ but that Ryu never got there because he stopped in Wolf’s office first. Mr. Wolf stated that he reviewed the matter and decided that, because the cable was given 

broad circulation (including to offices under Mr. Bolton), any error 

was inadvertent. 166 Moreover, inasmuch as the Under Secretary’s 

office would have ultimately had to approve the outgoing cable, it 

would have been impossible for Mr. Ryu to keep it from them. 

Mr. Bolton apparently took a different view. Some nine months 

later, in December 2003, Mr. Bolton blocked Mr. Ryu’s assignment 

as the point person in the Nonproliferation Bureau for the preparations for the Group of Eight (G–8) summit to be hosted by the 

United States in June 2004 at Sea Island, Georgia. Mr. Bolton’s office passed word to the Nonproliferation Bureau that Mr. Bolton 

was ‘‘not prepared to have Rexon Ryu as the Nonproliferation BuVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00302 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
303 

167 Ibid. 168 Answer to question for the record by Sen. Biden, April 11, 2005. Q04 I20Mr. Bolton did 

not elaborate on how the T3Washington Post account is inaccurate. 

reau point of contact. It was reported to us that the Under Secretary felt that he had been duplicitous in his dealings with [the 

Under Secretary’s office], and that he simply wouldn’t accept 

him.’’ 167

Concerned that a brilliant young officer would be left manning 

an ‘‘empty desk’’ in the Nonproliferation Bureau because of the attitude of the Under Secretary, Mr. Wolf arranged for Mr. Ryu to 

be assigned to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and then to the 

office of Deputy Secretary Armitage, where he served until Mr. 

Armitage left the Department in February of this year. Mr. Ryu 

was then detailed to the office of Senator Hagel. 

Mr. Bolton, for his part, stated that the account in the Washington Post—relating to the staffing arrangements for U.S. participation in the G-8 Senior Group and Global Partnership was inaccurate: Q04 

After an experienced member of the Nonproliferation 

Bureau staff who had been helping me was detailed without consulting with me to another Bureau by NP and replaced by a less experienced individual, I asked that the 

original NP staffer be returned to NP to continue to assist 

me given the importance of the initiative, my direct role in 

negotiating it, and the active agenda for the year given 

[the] U.S. hosting of the G-8 summit in 2004.’’ 168

To be sure, Mr. Bolton had a right to request that a different officer be assigned to an important matter he was handling directly. 

But it is fair to question why such a significant step would result 

from a seemingly inadvertent error committed nine months earlier 

by an exceptionally talented officer. Had Mr. Ryu’s superiors not 

intervened to give him assignments away from the reach of Mr. 

Bolton, this personnel action could have derailed Mr. Ryu’s career 

progression. The message to other officers is clear: one slip-up with 

Mr. Bolton and he could take punitive action, even long after the 

event. 

The case of an attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the 

State Department 

The committee reviewed a matter that occurred in October 2004 

involving an attorney working in the Office of the Legal Adviser. 

The staff interviewed the attorney as well as the former Legal Adviser, Will Taft. Mr. Bolton was asked a question for the record 

about the matter by Senator Biden. 

In mid-October 2004, Beston Chemical Corporation (‘‘Beston’’), a 

Texas firm, filed a lawsuit in federal district court in Louisiana 

against Secretary Powell. Beston sought an injunction preventing 

the U.S. government from seizing goods that it was importing from 

the People’s Republic of China. The goods were facing seizure as 

a result of an import ban imposed by the State Department on September 20, 2004 on products sold by a Chinese firm, Xinshidai. The 

federal judge handling the case scheduled a status conference for 

October 20, 2004, and told the attorney for the government that 

she wanted a decision-maker available by telephone. 

304 

169 Interview of State Department attorney by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, May 

3, 2005, page 13. Hereafter cited as ‘‘State Department attorney interview.’’ Q04 I21When Mr. 

Bolton stated that he would handle the matter directly with Justice, the State Department attorney understood that Mr. Bolton did not want further assistance from the Office of the Legal 

Adviser. 170 Will Taft verified this impression, stating that the attorney said that Mr. Bolton had 

told Justice Department lawyers ‘‘not to work with my attorney.’’ 171

170 Ibid., page 27. 171 Interview of Will Taft by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, May 3, 2005, page 3. 

Hereafter cited as ‘‘Taft interview.’’ 172State Department attorney interview, page 27. 

The attorney assigned to the case in the State Department 

(whose name has been withheld from the public record at the request of the Department) prepared briefing materials for the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Louisiana handling the matter, and provided similar materials for Mr. Bolton. The briefing materials summarized the status of the case, the legal issues involved, and an 

issue that was still under discussion among the government lawyers and policy offices, namely whether a modification or waiver of 

the sanctions would be needed so as to permit safe handling of the 

goods, which involved explosives. 

Prior to the phone call, the State Department attorney was asked 

to go to Mr. Bolton’s office to orally brief him. The attorney described the account: 

So I went up [to Bolton’s office], pretty much expecting 

to sort of do a pre-brief on the conference call . . . and discuss some of the issues that we were dealing with. When 

I went in, there were—I can’t remember if we all went in 

together or what, but there were four of us in there in addition to Mr. Bolton, the T staffer who had been involved 

plus two NP officials or personnel. Mr. Bolton started off 

basically complaining about my handling of the case, said 

that I was off the case, and I wouldn’t be participating any 

more, that he was going to handle it directly. He said that 

I had told [the] Justice [Department] . . . that we had a 

weak case, and that I had told Justice that we were still 

considering a waiver of the [sanctions] in this case, and 

more generally said that I didn’t like sanctions, had never 

liked sanctions, and sort of accusations of that nature.169

The attorney contends that Mr. Bolton’s accusations were erroneous. He testified that, in fact, his memo stated that the government had a strong case. He also disputed Mr. Bolton’s statement 

that he opposed sanctions. Finally, the attorney told Mr. Bolton 

that the State Department Legal Adviser would want Department 

attorneys to remain involved in the matter, given that the Secretary of State was the defendant. The attorney left the meeting 

at that point, because, he said, ‘‘[t]here didn’t seem to be anything 

more left to say.’’ 172 He then proceeded to the office of Mr. Taft, 

the Legal Adviser, to brief him on the incident. Mr. Taft told the 

attorney to remain on the case and to stay in touch with the Department of Justice on it. 

The following day, Mr. Taft informed Mr. Bolton, both orally and 

by e-mail, that the attorney would continue to handle the case. Mr. 

Taft described his encounter with Mr. Bolton, which occurred in 

the hallway after the Secretary’s morning staff meeting, as ‘‘not 

pleasant’’.173 In an e-mail to the attorney, Mr. Taft described Mr. 

Bolton as ‘‘still very hot’’ and not wanting ‘‘to know what the facts 

are about this incident.’’ 174 Mr. Bolton did not reply to Taft’s eVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00304 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
305 

174Taft to State Department attorney e-mail, October 21, 2004, 9:22 am. 175Taft interview, page 5. 

mail to him, prompting Mr. Taft—apparently concerned that Mr. 

Bolton still had not accepted his view that State Department lawyers would remain on the case—to request the Deputy Secretary to 

reinforce the message. Deputy Secretary Armitage sent Mr. Bolton 

a memo (drafted by Taft) reminding him that the Legal Adviser’s 

Office needed to handle the Department’s litigation and [that Mr. 

Bolton] needed to coordinate with Taft’s office. 175 A copy of that 

memo, which is undated, was provided to the committee, but it has 

not been made available by the State Department for public release. 

Although the attorney did not participate in the October 20 conference call with the federal judge, he did continue to work on the 

case, as well as on other matters related to the Office of Under Secretary Bolton. 

Under Secretary Bolton concedes that he told the lawyer that he 

wanted to communicate ‘‘directly with the DOJ litigators, not 

through him.’’ He asserts that the Department of Justice had received erroneous information from the State Department lawyer, 

and says the he ‘‘expressed my concern [to Mr. Taft] about apparent miscommunications about the status of the waiver’’ of the sanctions. 176

Based on the record the committee has gathered, at worst there 

was a miscommunication between or among Mr. Bolton’s office, the 

Department of Justice, and the Office of the Legal Adviser regarding the status of the legal case. Mr. Bolton’s reaction to this minor 

error can only be described as extreme. He not only sought to remove the individual attorney from the case, he signaled that he did 

not want the Office of the Legal Adviser involved at all. 

As a former General Counsel of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development and a former Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 

Division, Mr. Bolton has significant experience in government litigation. He surely understood the need for the Department’s legal 

office to be involved in any lawsuit related to the Department. If 

he had forgotten this requirement, the State Department’s own internal regulations assigning roles and responsibilities among various offices (known as the Foreign Affairs Manual) would have reminded him: 1 Foreign Affairs Manual 241.1(h) provides that the 

Legal Adviser ‘‘assists the Justice Department in domestic litigation which involves the Department.’’ 

Yet in reaction to a minor error—if, indeed, the error was the 

fault of the lawyer, for the lawyer insists that a waiver was still 

under consideration in Mr. Bolton’s office—Mr. Bolton sought to 

circumvent the established system for handling legal cases by dealing directly with the Justice Department, to the exclusion of State 

Department attorneys. Mr. Bolton’s extraordinary action brought 

an extraordinary response: a memo from the Deputy Secretary of 

State reminding Mr. Bolton—who has over a decade of high-level 

government experience—that the rules applied to him. Mr. Taft 

stated that he reviewed the lawyer’s advice and that ‘‘[i]t seemed 

to me that his advice was sound. It was a little weird that also the 

advice was actually what the client seemed to want. So it was not 

306 

177Taft interview, page 14. 178Wolf interview, page 36. 179 Ibid., page 41 180 Ibid., pages 51–56. 181 Interview of Melody Townsel by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 26, 2005. 

Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Townsel interview.’’ 182Melody Townsel was the ‘‘Chief of Party’’ (Team Leader) from January until October 1994 

of a USAID-funded project to conduct public education on privatization initiatives in 

Kyrgyzstan. With a background in journalism and public relations, she was hired by Black, 

Manafort, Stone and Kelly, which was a subcontractor to International Business and Technical 

Consultants, Inc. (‘‘IBTCI’’). Black Manafort (‘‘BLM’’) and Burson-Marsteller (‘‘BRM’’) were both 

subsidiaries of Young & Rubicam/Sovero (‘‘YRS’’). IBTCI was at the time a minority-owned small 

business, and had been awarded several projects, known as ‘‘task orders,’’ under a broad USAID 

contract known as ‘‘Omnibus I.’’ 

difficult to say, there’s something odd going on here, but let’s just 

leave him on the case.’’ 177

Pressure to conform policy views to Mr. Bolton’s; seeking removal of 

two other officers 

Former Assistant Secretary of State Wolf described the process 

of producing memos for the Secretary, particularly on decisions on 

sanctions under nonproliferation laws, as ‘‘long and arduous.’’ He 

stated that Under Secretary Bolton ‘‘tended to hold on to his own 

views strongly, and . . . tended not to be enthusiastic about alternative views.’’ 178 Mr. Wolf said, moreover, that ‘‘it would be fair to 

say that some of the officers within my bureau complained that 

they felt undue pressure to conform to the views of the Under Secretary versus the views that they thought they could support.’’ 179

Mr. Wolf added that on at least two occasions—in addition to the 

case of Mr. Ryu—Mr. Bolton sought to transfer or remove individuals in the Bureau of Nonproliferation because they were not ‘‘providing diligent service.’’ When asked whether this meant Mr. 

Bolton was complaining about their competence or their viewpoints, Mr. Wolf replied that it was the latter. 180 Mr. Wolf declined 

to identify the officers in question. Their careers did not suffer, because Mr. Wolf resisted the pressure from Mr. Bolton. 

D. Other matters: Melody Townsel 

A few days before the committee’s business meeting on April 19, 

the Democratic staff received an e-mail from Melody Townsel, a 

Dallas resident who alleged that 11 years ago, Mr. Bolton had 

chased her through the halls of a Russian hotel, shoving threatening letters under her door and shouting threats. She also 

charged that Mr. Bolton had attempted to malign her character by 

making false accusations against her to her colleagues, damaging 

her professional reputation. Ms. Townsel styled her e-mail an ‘‘open 

letter’’ to the committee, and it was given wide circulation in the 

press in the days before the April 19 meeting. her subsequent 

interview by the committee staff was consistent with the open letter.181

Townsel said these events occurred in August 1994 when she 

was working as a project director for Black, Manafort, Stone and 

Kelly, which was a subcontractor to International Business and 

Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI) on a USAID contract in 

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. At the time, Mr. Bolton was working as a 

consultant on another project for IBTCI. 182 During a visit to Moscow, Ms. Townsel wrote a memo to USAID complaining about 

IBTCI’s poor performance on the Kyrgyzstan contract. She alleges 

307 

that the harassment and intimidation began as soon as Mr. Bolton, 

who was staying at the same Moscow hotel, became aware of the 

letter. 

The committee staff investigated the allegations by interviewing 

several witnesses on the record and requesting documents from 

USAID, and two private contractors of AID, one of which employed 

Ms. Townsel. Dozens of other persons were contacted to ascertain 

whether they witnessed or recalled the alleged events. 

The investigation was not able to establish conclusively that the 

alleged events occurred. Eleven years have passed. Relevant documents no longer exist. Memories have faded. Some witnesses may 

have a reason not to come forward. What follows is a brief summary of what the committe has learned. What we do know is that 

Townsel and Bolton were in the same Moscow hotel for some period 

of time in August 1994, and they met there. And we do know that 

Bolton traveled to Bishkek in November 1994 (not in August, as 

Townsel recalled) for his client, where he met some of Townsel’s coworkers on the project. 

Charge #1: While Melody Townsel was at the Aerostar Hotel in Moscow in August 1994, John Bolton threw things at her, chased 

her down the hallways, screamed at her, threatened her, and 

banged on her door repeatedly. 

Through the spring and summer of 1994, Townsel complained repeatedly to her superiors at Black, Manafort, including Matthew 

Friedman and Charles Black, as well as to Indira Kalotra and Jay 

Kalotra at IBTCI, about serious cash flow and staffing problems. 

Her complaints are well documented, although there is disagreement over the extent to which IBTCI was to blame for their failure 

to be corrected. 

In July 2004, Townsel was invited by Kirby Jones of BursonMarstellar to participate in a conference in Moscow of all YRS expatriates based in the region. During the conference, Townsel told 

Jones about the problems she was experiencing in Bishkek, and 

Jones recommended that she document them in a memo. She did 

so, and then Jones forwarded the memo to USAID with his own 

cover letter on August 2, 1994. Neither Townsel’s memo nor Jones’ 

cover letter was shared with Townsel’s superiors at Black, 

Manafort or with IBTCI beforehand, although Townsel told her immediate supervisor, Matthew Freedman, that she had delivered the 

letter and all parties were generally aware of the issues raised 

therein. 

After learning of the letter, Black, Manafort asked Townsel to remain in Moscow so that decisions could be made about how to proceed. At this point, Townsel moved to a less expensive hotel, the 

Aerostar, to await further instructions. IBTCI had offices in this 

same hotel, and Mr. Bolton was there working for IBTCI as a consultant on another project, known as ‘‘Healthy Russia 2000.’’ 

It is during this time period—when Townsel and Mr. Bolton were 

both at the Aerostar Hotel and Townsel had already ‘‘blown the 

whistle’’ against Mr. Bolton’s employer—that Townsel alleges the 

harassment took place. 

The record is in conflict about the time period involved. 

Townsel’s original letter to the committee said she was there, and 

the harassment extended for, ‘‘nearly two weeks.’’ In her interview, 

308 

183 Interview of Uno Ramat by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, April 29, page 11. 

Hereafter cited as ‘‘Ramat interview.’’ 184 Answer to a question for the record by Senator Kerry, Apr. 11, 2005. 185Letter to Senator Lugar, Apr. 18, 2005. 186 Interview of Dr. Edwin L. Hullander by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 

29, 2005, page 58. Hereafter cited as: ‘‘Hullander interview.’’ Q04 I21Charlie Black, a lead partner at Townsel’s employer (Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly), also expressed skepticism about 

Townsel’s account: 

she indicated that the harassment went on for at least 10 days. According to records produced by IBTCI, Townsel wrote her memo on 

August 1, and it was forwarded to AID by Kirby Jones on August 

2. Bolton checked out of the Aerostar Hotel on August 6. An internal IBTCI document also suggests that Bolton attended a meeting 

at USAID headquarters on August 8. 

Townsel’s account was cooroborated by Uno Ramat, then IBTCI’s 

Creative Director, based in Bishkek. While Townsel was in Moscow, Ramat was acting director of the project, and thus they had 

daily phone conversations. He testified that she was ‘‘under a lot 

of stress,’’ was calling him every night and sometimes several times 

a night, and was ‘‘distressed about Mr. Bolton’s behavior.’’ Ramat 

said that Bolton was ‘‘applying a lot of pressure to her to get off 

the project or shut up, and Melody was not cooperating, so the guy 

was chasing her around the hotel and beating on her door, throwing things at her, stuff like that.’’ 183

Committee staff were unable to locate any other individuals who 

specifically remembered hearing about a conflict between Bolton 

and Townsel. No one, however contests the fact that Bolton and 

Townsel were in the same hotel in Moscow in early August 1994, 

and Bolton admits he met her there. In response to questions for 

the record, Bolton said ‘‘I recall being introduced to Ms. Townsel 

in the IBTCI Moscow office. I have no other recollection of any 

other interaction with her there or anywhere else.’’ 184

One other person interviewed, Joe Jareb, was not a witness to 

these events, but was told about them by Ms. Townsel a few 

months later. The two of them worked together on a USAID project 

in Kazakhstan, and Ms. Townsel described the incidents in conversation with Jareb. Thus, although not an eyewitness, Jareb provided further contrmporaneous corroboration of Townsel’s account. 

Other witnesses who testified disputed Ms. Townsel’s account. 

Jay Kalotra, President of IBTCI, said that ‘‘Mr. Bolton was not engaged by our firm to have any contact with [Townsel] on any issue 

related to her activities in Kyrgyzstan.’’ 185 Edwin Hullander, thenExecutive Vice President of IBTCI, and now a political appointee 

at USAID, said that ‘‘ . . . if that event had happened, according to 

the report—she said John chased her down the halls and threw 

things at her—if anything like that had happened at the Aerostar, 

the security people would have told my office about it.’’ 186

. . . as often as [Townsel] complained or called things to 

my attention, or to Freedman’s attention—and he was 

pretty loyal about reporting to me—if something—a major 

incident like that had happened, I’m almost certain I 

would have heard about it. . . . And, second, just to add to 

the equation, for your consideration, John Bolton has been 

a fairly good personal friend of mine since the first Ronald 

Reagan campaign, in 1976, and I’m pretty sure that if 

Bolton, in representation of a client, had a problem with 

309 

187 Interview of Charlie Black by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, Apr. 28, 2005, 

page 11–page 12. Hereafter cited as ‘‘Black interview.’’ Q02 188 Ramat interview, page 18. 189 Ibid, page 21–22. Q04 I23 He just, sort of, blew in, and he was very, very aggressive in 

his matter—manner. He was very blunt about his accusations about Melody, and, you know, 

the entire office knew them not to be true. I mean, everyone knew what the actual problem 

was. Melody was well-liked. We all knew that the accusations were false, and it destroyed the 

morale of the office.190

190 Ibid, page 40. Q04 I21USAID’s Acting Inspector General confirms that his office never investigated Melody Townsel, although it conducted numerous investigations of IBTCI in the 

years following Townsel’s departure. There is no evidence that Townsel was ever under any 

other form of criminal investigation for her activities related to this project. 191 Answer to question for the record by Sen. Kerry, Apr. 11, 2005. 

one of my employees, I’m almost certain he would have 

called me. He didn’t. I never heard from him on this.187

Charge #2: While in Bishkek in the fall of 2004, John Bolton told 

IBTCI staff, falsely, that Melody Townsel was under criminal 

investigation for misuse of federal funds. 

After Townsel’s memo was sent to USAID, Bolton was engaged 

as IBTCI’s legal counsel. In November 1994, Bolton traveled to 

Bishkek to meet with IBTCI staff and review operations. There are 

differing recollections as to the dates of Bolton’s trip (Townsel 

thought it occured in August) and who accompanied him, but all 

agree that Townsel was not in the office during Bolton’s visit. 

Mr. Ramat stated that, during his visit to Bishkek, ‘‘[Bolton] told 

me and other expatriate staff that Melody was under investigation 

for misappropriating project funds, for fraud, and for theft of 

money.’’ 188 When Ramat challenged Bolton, he was rebuffed: ‘‘He 

wasn’t—he wasn’t interested in what I had to say . . . he wasn’t 

there to listen. He was there to accuse Melody . . . he basically was 

there to smear her reputation.’’ 189 Ramat described Bolton as 

‘‘very, very aggressive,’’ and said that he ‘‘terrorized the office‘’’ 

Bolton concedes that he traveled to Kyrgyzstan in November 

1994 and met with IBTCI staff ‘‘to ascertain what Ms. Townsel had 

done or not done in Bishkek.’’ 191 He said he ‘‘sought to ascertain 

how much damage Ms. Townsel’s performance had caused to 

IBTCI’s conduct of its project.’’ He says he had other meetings with 

U.S. and Kyrgyz officials, other USAID contractors, and Kyrgyz 

businesses, ‘‘also to repair the damage to IBTCI’s reputation and 

effectiveness.’’ He does not recall making any allegations that Ms. 

Townsel was under investigation for misuse of funds.192

VI. MISLEADING THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

The record before the Committee demonstrates that Under Secretary Bolton did not live up to his reputation as a ‘‘straight-talker’’ 

during his testimony to the Committee. He made several statements to the Committee that were contradicted by others, at odds 

with available evidence, and may be fairly described as misleading, 

disingenuous or non-responsive. 

A. Mr. Bolton says he did not try to have INR analyst Christian 

Westermann disciplined. 

Mr. Bolton insisted, on several occasions, that he did not try to 

have Christian Westermann, an analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), removed from his position or disciplined. This testimony was contradicted by four other witnesses, 

including his Chief of Staff. 

310 

192 Ibid. 193 Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 42. Q02 194 Ibid, page 46. Q02 195 Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 39. Q02 196 Ibid. 197 Apr. 12 hearing, page 26. Q04 I21Senator Obama later asked Mr. Ford whether he was 

‘‘quite certain’’ that ‘‘Mr. Bolton actively sought to have this gentleman removed from his position?’’ Mr. Ford answered in the affirmative.198

198 Ibid., page 58. 199Fingar interview, page 10. 

Mr. Bolton’s essential argument—that seeking to remove an officer from his portfolio does not constitute any effort to discipline or 

punish him—is too clever by half. Mr. Westermann was the State 

Department’s lead analyst on chemical and biological weapons 

issues. Changing his portfolio would result in discarding years of 

experience and training, and force Mr. Westermann to either seek 

employment with another intelligence agency or be retrained for a 

new position in INR. Either way, it would have put Mr. 

Westermann’s career at the State Department off its normal track. 

During the nomination hearing, Mr. Bolton said as follows: Q04 

• ‘‘I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired, at all. 193

• ‘‘I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline imposed on Mr. 

Westermann.’’ 194

• ‘‘I didn’t try to have Mr. Westermann removed—.’’ 195

• ‘‘But I did not, look, I didn’t try to have disciplinary action imposed on Westermann.’’ 196

Testimony contradicting Bolton’s account 

Mr. Bolton’s testimony was contradicted by four witnesses. 

Carl Ford, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence said: Q04 

I remember going back to my office with the impression 

that I had been asked to fire the analyst. Now, whether 

the words were ‘‘fire,’’ whether that was ‘‘reassign,’’ ‘‘get 

him away from me; I don’t want to see him again,’’ I don’t 

remember, frankly, exactly what the words were. I do remember that I came away with the impression that I’d just 

been asked to fire somebody in the intelligence community 

for doing what I considered their job.197

Testimony from other INR managers to whom Bolton spoke 

about Westermann provided similar accounts. Tom Fingar, at the 

time Mr. Ford’s deputy, said that [Bolton] [s]aid that he wanted 

Westermann ‘‘taken off his accounts.’’ 199 Neil Silver, an office director in INR, said that Mr. Bolton ‘‘asked, or indicated, that he 

would like me to consider having [Westermann] move to some 

other portfolio, something of—to that effect.’’ 200

Even Frederick Fleitz, an aide to Mr. Bolton, understood from his 

conversations with Mr. Bolton that he wanted Westermann removed: ‘‘All I can remember, and this is from Mr. Bolton, is that 

he spoke [to Mr. Fingar] to express his concern over what happened, and said that Mr. Westermann had lost his confidence, and 

he should be given a new portfolio.’’ 201

B. Mr. Bolton says he did not try to remove or discipline a CIA employee. 

Mr. Bolton took great pains to leave the Committee with the impression that he made no effort to seek to discipline or to fire the 

311 

202 Apr. 11 hearing, pm session, page 26 203 Ibid., page 27–page 28. 204Fleitz interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 77. 205 Apr. 12 hearing, page 39–page 40. 

National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. In response to Senator Chafee, he said ‘‘I didn’t see[k] to have these people fired, I 

didn’t seek to have discipline imposed on them, I said, ‘I’ve lost 

trust in them,’ and are there other portfolios they could follow, it 

wasn’t anything to me that I followed at his great length, I made 

my point and I moved on.’’ 202 To the extent that he did concede 

speaking to the Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence 

Council about the NIO, Mr. Bolton said that his intervention was 

‘‘one part of one conversation with one person, one time . . . and 

that was it, I let it go.’’ 203

As with the case of Mr. Westermann, Bolton’s effort to minimize 

the significance of his efforts is disingenuous. The NIO was a career officer who had developed expertise on Latin America; he held 

the senior Latin America intelligence analyst position in the U.S. 

government. Removing the NIO from his job, discarding years of 

experience and training, would have been a black mark on the officer’s career; it certainly would not have been career enhancing. 

As discussed at length in Section III. B., above, it is clear that 

senior CIA officials believed that Bolton sought to remove the NIO. 

Likewise, the documentary evidence provided to the Committee 

confirms that Mr. Bolton and his staff actively discussed efforts to 

punish and remove the NIO for several months in the summer and 

fall of 2002. One State Department e-mail states that Mr. Bolton 

planned to talk to Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet 

about the matter. Another indicates that Mr. Bolton had lost patience with the delay in seeking the removal of the NIO and that 

he did not ‘‘want it to slip away further.’’ Mr. Bolton’s office worked 

over a four month period on proposed letters—that would be sent 

from Mr. Bolton and/or Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich— 

to CIA officials to seek removal of the NIO. The letters contemplated blocking the NIO’s access to the State and Defense Departments and his official travel in the Western Hemisphere (by 

blocking country clearance by U.S. embassies). 

Even Mr. Fleitz, the aide to Mr. Bolton, understood that Mr. 

Bolton believed the NIO should be given a different portfolio, and 

had ‘‘at least one meeting with an Agency official where he relayed 

his concerns.’’ 204

C. Bolton says he did not threaten or try to have analysts punished 

because of their views. 

Under Secretary Bolton claimed on several occasions that his disputes with members of the Intelligence Community were procedural in nature. In the cases of his disputes Christian Westermann 

and the NIO for Latin America, however, Mr. Bolton sought to 

have employees disciplined because of their analytic judgments, according to testimony from Ford, Fingar and Westermann as well as 

documentary evidence. Bolton’s attempts to have analysts punished 

had consequences. Carl Ford stated: ‘‘I clearly believe that the analysts in INR were very negatively affected by this incident—they 

were scared. 205

312 

206 Apr. 11, pm session, page 44. 207Westermann interview, Apr. 7, 2005, page 106. Q04 I23 Mr. FINGAR. That he was the 

President’s appointee, that he had every right to say what he believed, that he wasn’t going 

to be told what he could say by a mid-level INR munchkin analyst. 208

208Fingar interview, page 10. Q04 I23 Mr. FORD. And I infer from what I remember of my 

side of the conversation that at that point, which was several days after his confrontation with 

my analyst, that he was still fussing about what he could and couldn’t say in the [Heritage 

Foundation] speech. Q04 209 Apr. 12 hearing, page 23–page 24. 210 Apr. 11 hearing, am session, page 72–73. 211 Hubbard interview, page 14. 212 Ibid., page 15–page 16. 213 ‘‘Testimony of UN Nominee is Disputed.’’ Paul Richter and Sonni Efron, T3Los Angeles 

During the nomination hearing, Mr. Bolton was adamant that 

his concerns about process, not substance: ‘‘If I could just say, I 

have never done anything in connection with any analyst’s views. 

Nothing.’’ 206

Yet other testimony shows that Mr. Bolton did attempt to have 

intelligence analysts and State Department employees disciplined 

because of their views, not merely because of process concerns. Examples of such testimony follows: Q04 

Mr. WESTERMANN. He was quite upset that I had objected and he wanted to know what right I had trying to 

change an Under Secretary’s language.207

Senator BIDEN. About the substance of what he could 

and couldn’t say. Q04 I23 Mr. FORD. That’s correct.209

D. Mr. Bolton led the Committee to believe that the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea approved of his July 31, 2003, speech on 

North Korea. 

In response to a question from Senator Chafee about his July 31, 

2003 speech in Seoul, South Korea on the eve of the Six Party 

Talks, Under Secretary Bolton said ‘‘And I can tell you what our 

Ambassador to South Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after the speech. 

He said, ‘Thanks a lot for that speech, John. It’ll help us a lot out 

here.’ ’’ 210

This assertion was specifically refuted by former Ambassador 

Hubbard, who took the initiative to call the Republican staff of the 

Committee the day after the April 11 hearing to seek to correct the 

record. Hubbard made clear in testimony to the Committee that he 

strongly disagreed with the tone of Mr. Bolton’s speech in Seoul 

and requested changes in the speech that were never made. He expressed concern that invective in the speech aimed at the leadership of North Korea could give them ‘‘another excuse or pretext for 

not coming back to the table.’’ 211 He stated that Bolton had made 

minor changes in the speech that he had requested, and that any 

words of thanks related to those changes, not to the entire speech 

itself. He believed there should have been no doubt that Mr. Bolton 

disapproved of the tone of the speech. 212 Hubbard said ‘‘It’s a gross 

exaggeration to elevate that to praise for the entire speech and approval of it’’ 213

VII. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW

Mr. Bolton has a long history of making inflammatory remarks 

about the United Nations and international law. This record will 

undermine his ability to serve as an effective spokesperson and 

representative of the United States—and to advance the critical 

313 

214Global Structures Convocation, ‘‘Human Rights, Global Governance & Strengthening the 

U.N,’’ February 1994 panel discussion sponsored by the World Federalist Association and the 

Alliance for Our Common Future. Q02 I14 • ‘‘The Secretariat building in New York has 38 

stories. If you lost 10 stories today, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference.’’ 215

215 Ibid. Q02 I14 • ‘‘If I were redoing the Security Council today, I’d have one permanent 

member because that’s the real reflection of the distribution of power in the world: . . . the 

United States.’’216

216 Interview with Juan Williams, National Public Radio, June 6, 2000 Q04 217 ‘‘The Global Prosecutors: Hunting War Criminals in the Name of Utopia,’’ Foreign Affairs, 

Jan./Feb. 1999. 

issue of U.N. reform. Among Mr. Bolton’s more provocative statements are the following: Q04 • ‘‘There is no such thing as the United Nations . . . There is an 

international community, that occasionally can be led by the 

only real power left in the world and that is the United States, 

when it suits our interest and when we can get others to go 

along.’’ 214

Mr. Bolton has not only suggested that the U.S. stop paying its 

dues to the United Nations, but that assessed contributions be terminated as a mechanism of funding for U.N. activities. He has 

taken the radical view that ‘‘while treaties may well be politically 

or even morally binding, they are not legally obligatory.’’ 217 Similarly, Mr. Bolton has written that: ‘‘UN supporters contend that the 

U.S. must [pay its UN dues] in order to meeting its ‘solemn legal 

obligations.’ Failure to pay, they assert, is ‘illegal’ under the ‘treaty 

commitment’ the U.S. entered into by ratifying the UN Charter in 

1945. This line of argument is flatly incorrect.’’ 218

Mr. Bolton’s controversial ideas were developed further in a 

chapter for T3Delusions of Grandeur: The United Nations and 

Global Intervention, where Bolton wrote, ‘‘We should . . . eliminate 

assessments altogether, moving toward a U.N. system that is funded entirely by purely voluntary contributions from the member governments . . . [which would] allow each government to judge for 

itself whether it was getting its money’s worth from the UN and 

each of its component agencies. That would go a long way toward 

making the UN system responsive to the major contributors—especially to the United States, the largest contributor of all . . . And, 

if things were really bad, we should . . . withdraw from one or two 

agencies. That would really get their attention.’’ 

At his hearing, Mr. Bolton expressed no regret for these statements. In response to a question by Senator Boxer, he said that 

‘‘what I was trying to do to that audience of World Federalists was 

get their attention, and that comment about the ten stories was a 

way of saying there’s not a bureaucracy in the world that can’t be 

made leaner and more efficient.’’ 219

Asked by Senator Sarbanes to explain his view that the Security 

Council ought to have only one member, Bolton said, ‘‘what I was 

saying was—if you look solely at the issue of power in the world, 

in a cliche ́ probably everybody in this room has used of the U.S. 

being the sole remaining superpower, under that theory, that there 

would be only one permanent member.’’ 220 Although he agreed 

that ‘‘the United States should comply with its international obligations,’’ he continued to question whether international law constituted a binding obligation in the same way as municipal law. 

These strongly-held views and statements matter because they 

are likely to make Mr. Bolton less, and not more, effective as an 

advocate for U.S. interests at the United Nations—including the 

314 

221State Department press release, March 11, 2005. Q04 I21The press release makes no mention of Mr. Bolton, and, notably, the senior advisor will not report to Mr. Bolton. It is clear, 

then, that this is not about UN reform, it is about whether the appointment of Mr. Bolton is 

in the national interest. 222 ‘‘The Promise and Perils of the Proposed International Criminal Court’’, CATO Institute 

Forum, July 16, 1998. 223 Confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 15, 1981. 224 Christopher Marquis, ‘‘Absent from the Korea Talks: Bush’s Hard Liner’’, T3The New York 

Times, Sept. 2, 2003. 

critical issue of U.N. reform. Whatever one’s views of the United 

Nations and international law, the fact is that many countries 

around the world—including our closest allies—place value in both. 

It is difficult to secure the support of other nations for issues that 

matter to the United States if we show disdain for issues that matter to other nations. Such an approach undermines the national interest. 

The committee is unanimous in the view that the United Nations 

needs reform. There are numerous instances of waste, fraud and 

abuse, and some of its decisions, such as the election of egregious 

human rights violators to the Human Rights Commission, are unacceptable. 

The real work of U.N. reform is not done, however, through 

tough speeches. It is accomplished in the hallways and closed door 

meetings, building alliances and coalitions with governments that 

may disagree with the United States on other issues. It requires 

listening, flexibility, credibility, trust and patience—qualities sorely 

lacking in the nominee. 

Perhaps the best evidence that Mr. Bolton is not the man to advance UN reform is the fact that four days after the Bolton nomination was announced, Secretary Rice appointed someone else to 

handle the issue. On March 11, the Secretary appointed Dr. Shirin 

Tahir-Kheli to—— Q04 

serve as the Secretary’s senior advisor and chief interlocutor on United Nations reform. In collaboration with the 

Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, Dr. 

Tahir-Kheli will report directly to the Secretary of State. 

She will engage the UN Secretary General and Secretariat on UN reform efforts, including the High Level 

Panel Report and the Report of the Secretary General on 

Reform . . . [she] will coordinate within the State Department and interagency community the U.S. government’s 

positions on UN reform.’’ 221

Mr. Bolton has sometimes been compared to former Ambassadors 

Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick. The comparison 

is flawed. Moynihan and Kirkpatrick were staunch defenders of 

U.S. interests and hard-headed advocates of U.S. positions. But 

each also had fundamental respect for the United Nations and understood the imperative for dialogue and diplomacy. Senator Moynihan was a strong advocate of treaties and international law. He 

also supported the International Court of Justice, which Mr. Bolton 

once called a ‘‘travesty’’ and a ‘‘pretend court.’’ 222 Mrs. Kirkpatrick 

spoke eloquently of the need to approach the job of UN ambassador 

in a ‘‘low-key, quiet, persuasive and consensus-building way’’ 223— an approach Mr. Bolton seems incapable of taking. As Ambassador 

Kirkpatrick put it, ‘‘[John Bolton] may do diplomatic jobs for the 

U.S. government, but John is not a diplomat.’’ 224

315 

225Farah Stockman, ‘‘Bolton’s style cited in treaty impasse,’’ T3Boston Globe, May 3, 2005. 226See, e.g., ‘‘The Proliferation Crisis,’’ an editorial in T3The Washington Post, May 4, 2005. 

VIII. A LACK OF RESULTS AS UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS

CONTROL

Under Secretary Bolton’s supporters have noted that many policy 

makers, including United States Senators, have been known to berate their staffs or opponents. Many famous persons have had famous tempers. Mr. Bolton is rightly applauded for having led the 

successful effort in 1991 to undo the UN General Assembly’s 1975 

resolution equating Zionism with racism. Does he have such a 

record of success in his more recent positions as to outweigh his 

demonstrated—and, in our judgment, disqualifying—negative 

qualities? 

We believe that Under Secretary Bolton’s record in his current 

position is, unfortunately, decidedly mixed. On the positive side, he 

has worked to secure international support for President Bush’s 

Proliferation Security Initiative. He has secured legal commitments 

from many countries (known as Article 98 agreements) not to turn 

over American citizens to the International Criminal Court. He has 

also invoked sanctions against entities that engage in the proliferation of WMD technology. 

On the negative side, however, Mr. Bolton was personally responsible for the angry break-up of the conference that was considering how to improve the Biological Weapons Convention. 225 His 

intense focus on securing Article 98 agreements has come at the 

expense of other U.S. interests. The increased number of sanctions 

imposed has arguably had little impact on the extent of WMD proliferation in the world. His reported personal attacks on IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei outstrip U.S. policy (which is 

to oppose a third term for ElBaradei only because of a desire to establish term limits for that position) and threaten to leave the 

United States completely isolated on this issue. Finally, his reported failure to prepare properly for the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) Review Conference now under way in New York may 

be contributing to further isolation of the United States, allowing 

NPT violators to avoid any coordinated international action to force 

compliance with the nonproliferation regime. 226

Perhaps most significantly, Under Secretary Bolton’s approach 

has failed to prevent North Korea from becoming an even greater 

proliferation threat to U.S. security. North Korea is solely to blame 

for its repeated violations of its international obligations, but Mr. 

Bolton’s response to those actions has been singularly ineffective. 

When Mr. Bolton became Under Secretary of State in 2001, North 

Korea was still a member of the NPT, it had 8,000 spent fuel rods 

under international seal, and it was preparing to resume talks with 

the United States; today North Korea has withdrawn from the 

NPT, the fuel rods have been reprocessed, and the Six-Party Talks 

are going nowhere. When Mr. Bolton became Under Secretary, 

North Korea was believed to have enough separated plutonium for 

one or two nuclear weapons; today, North Korea may have enough 

plutonium for 8–10 weapons and is probably downloading more fuel 

rods from its Yongbyon reactor to produce still more separated plutonium. When Mr. Bolton became Under Secretary, North Korea 

was thought to have a small, experimental, covert program to enVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00315 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
316 

227 Hubbard interview, page 14. 228Flynt Leverett, ‘‘Why Libya Gave Up On The Bomb,’’ T3The New York Times, January 23, 

2004. 229 Answer to question for the record by Senator Biden, Apr. 11, 2005. 

rich uranium; today that program is still covert, but is thought to 

be much larger. 

Despite Mr. Bolton’s concern for the enforcement of sanctions, 

North Korea has had to endure little or no punishment for its rejection of the world-wide nonproliferation regime. Despite Mr. 

Bolton’s work to build the Proliferation Security Initiative, there is 

little confidence that the world can keep North Korea from covertly 

exporting fissile material, or even a nuclear device. Mr. Bolton’s vituperation in describing North Korea’s regime and its leader appeared to undermine, moreover, the stated U.S. policy of encouraging a diplomatic agreement that would end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. As noted earlier, U.S. Ambassador Thomas 

Hubbard was of the view that Bolton’s July 31, 2003, speech in 

Seoul, South Korea, only ‘‘gave the North Koreans . . . another excuse or pretext for not coming back to the table.’’ 227

The counter-example that the world hopes North Korea will follow is that of Libya, which agreed in December 2003 to renounce 

its WMD programs; to give up its chemical and nuclear weapons 

materials and equipment, as well as its long-range ballistic missiles; and to end its support for international terrorism. In return, 

the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to gradually 

eliminate sanctions against Libya and to integrate it once again in 

the family of nations. A former National Security Council staff 

member reported, however, that one key to the Libyan success was 

that Under Secretary Bolton was frozen out of the sensitive negotiations relating to the Lockerbie bombing and, later, leading to the 

December 2003 U.S.-U.K.-Libya agreement. 228 Mr. Bolton implicitly confirmed the latter part of that assertion in his answer to a 

question for the record from Senator Biden, when he stated: ‘‘My 

role in the Libya negotiations began in December 2003,’’ i.e., after 

the agreement had been reached. 229

The committee staff’s lengthy inquiry into matters relating to 

Under Secretary Bolton’s nomination was focused largely on his 

interactions with intelligence analysts and subordinates. Even so, 

the committee heard some critical appraisals of Mr. Bolton’s work. 

Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary Powell, was especially forceful. On Article 98 agreements: Q04 

Mr. WILKERSON. I think one of the number-one problems 

facing the country right now—and, you know, I’m here because of my country, not because of anybody else—is North 

Korea. I consider myself an expert on the Koreas; on 

Northeast Asia, in general. I think Kim Jong Il is going to 

test a nuclear weapon in the next year. I think he’s going 

to present it as [a] fait accompli to the world. And I shudder to think what the Japanese are going to do when that 

happens. And I shudder to think what’s going to happen 

to the balance of power in Northeast Asia when that happens. So, when people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at 

dealing with that problem in order to push their pet rocks 

in other areas, it bothers me, as a diplomat, and as a citizen of this country. 

317 

230Wilkerson interview, page 31–page 32. 231 Ibid., page 29–page 30. Q04 I21Mr. Wilkerson’s summary impression of Under Secretary 

Bolton was: 232 Ibid., page 45. Q04 I21Mr. Wilkerson views are, to be sure, just one person’s opinion. But 

he was uniquely situated to observe Under Secretary Bolton in action and to evaluate the effects 

of Bolton’s actions. Sadly, his harsh reflections ring true. 

Ms. O’CONNELL. Do you think that Mr. Bolton did that 

with respect to Article 98? 

Mr. WILKERSON. Absolutely. Let me tell you, 8:30 every 

morning—I rarely missed a meeting—Secretary Powell 

convened the meeting, or Deputy Secretary Armitage convened the meeting . . . and the only thing Mr. Bolton talked 

about, primarily, at those meetings—he rarely said anything, but when he did say something, it was about another Article 98 agreement having been achieved. And, 

frankly, I used to sit there and think to myself . . . —again, 

as a diplomat—‘‘How much damage are we doing to other 

relations as we achieve this sort of baseball score on Article 98 agreements?’’ It was the same thing with nonproliferation.230

On the IAEA Director General: 

In some instances, like, for example, Mohammed 

ElBaradei, I would say, in my professional opinion after 

35-plus years in government, that Mr. Bolton overstepped 

his bounds in his moves and gyrations to try to keep Mohammed ElBaradei from being reappointed as IAEA head. 

How—what do I mean by that? I mean, going out of his 

way to badmouth him, to make sure that everybody knew 

that the maximum power of the United States would be 

brought to bear against them if he were brought back in, 

that we would, you know, refrain from ‘‘no move, no action.’’ 231

I differ from a lot of people in Washington, both friend 

and foe of Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, quote, ‘‘brilliance,’’ unquote. I didn’t see it. I saw a man who counted 

beans, who said, ‘‘98’’ [Article 98 agreements] today, ‘‘99’’ 

tomorrow, ‘‘100’’ the next day, and had no willingness— 

and, in many cases, no capacity—to understand the other 

things that were happening around those beans. And that 

is just a recipe for problems at the United Nations. 232

Today, the NPT Review Conference continues to make little 

progress toward dealing with the crisis of confidence caused by 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and Iran’s probable nuclear weapons program. The United States, in turn, has shown 

much righteous anger, but far too little leadership, in its approach 

to the challenges posed bo those two states. A recent T3New York 

Times editorial spoke of the Administration’s lack of a policy in 

terms that we believe are equally applicable to Under Secretary 

Bolton: Q04 

Step by step North Korea and Iran are advancing their 

capability to build nuclear weapons, and Washington appears to have no clear strategy for stopping them. Given 

how far along both countries already are in their nuclear 

programs, neither can any longer simply be coerced into 

turning back. The only strategy with any real chance of 

318 

233 ‘‘Nukes Happen,’’ editorial in the T3New York Times, May 16, 2005. Q04 I21We believe 

that the same is true regarding this nomination. It’s time to try a different nominee. 

success would offer strong positive inducements for abandoning nuclear weapons development backed up by universally agreed threats of total economic and political isolation if bomb work continued. Perversely, this is the one 

formula that the Bush administration has refused to seriously consider . . . 

Nobody likes rewarding tyrants and nuclear outlaws. 

But refusing to deal with them, or standing aside while 

other countries do all the offering, is not a very serious solution to what is now an alarmingly serious problem. The 

way things are now headed, it is only a matter of time before both North Korea and Iran become full-fledged nuclear weapons states. It’s time to try a different approach. 233

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL IN OPPOSITION TO MR. BOLTON’S

NOMINATION S6602 

May 9, 2005. 

Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. 

Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR AND SENATOR BIDEN: We have noted with 

appreciation the moves of President Bush at the beginning of his 

second term to improve U.S. relations with the countries of the European Union and of the United Nations. Maintaining these ties 

and the willingness of those countries to cooperate with the United 

States is essential to U.S. security. 

It is for this reason that we write you to express our concern over 

the nomination of John R. Bolton to be permanent representative 

of the United States at the United Nations. We urge you to reject 

that nomination. 

By virtue of service in the State Department, USAID and Justice 

Departments, John Bolton has the professional background needed 

for this position. But his past activities and statements dicate conclusively that he is the wrong man for this position at a time when 

the U.N. is entering a critically important phase of modernization, 

seeking to promote economic development and democratic reforms 

and searching for ways to cope better with proliferation crises and 

a spurt of natural disasters and internal conflicts. 

John Bolton has an exceptional record of opposition to efforts to 

enhance U.S. security through arms control. He led a campaign 

against ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 

Today, the administration is pressing for development of new types 

of nuclear weapons. John Bolton blocked more extensive international agreement to limit sales of small arms, the main killer in 

internal wars. He led the fight to continue U.S. refusal to participate in the Ottawa Landmine Treaty. Today, the U.S. has joined 

Russia and China in insisting on the right to continue to deploy 

319 

anti-personnel landmines. John Bolton crafted the U.S. withdrawal 

from the joint efforts of 40 countries to formulate a verification system for the Biological Weapons Convention and blocked continuation of these efforts in a period of increasing concern over potential terrorist use of these weapons and of terrorist access to the 

stocks of countries covertly producing these weapons. John Bolton’s 

unsubstantiated claims that Cuba and Syria are working on biological weapons further discredited the effect of U.S. warnings and 

U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. 

John Bolton led the successful campaign for U.S. withdrawal 

from the treaty limiting missile defenses (ABM Treaty). The effects 

of this action included elimination of the sole treaty barrier to 

weaponization of space. In the face of decades of votes in the U.N. 

General Assembly calling for negotiation of a treaty to block deployment of weapons in space, he has blocked negotiation in the 

Geneva Conference on Disarmament of a treaty on this subject. 

The administration has repeatedly proposed programs calling for 

weapon deployment in space. 

As chief negotiator of the 2002 Moscow Treaty on withdrawing 

U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons from field deployment, John 

Bolton structured a treaty without its own verification regime without required progress reports from both sides, without the requirement to destroy warheads withdrawn from deployment, and without provision for negotiating continued reductions. Under his guidance, the State Department repudiated important consensus agreements reached in the year 2000 Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty and has even blocked the formulation of an 

agenda for the next review conference to be held in May 2005. 

Under John Bolton as Under Secretary for Arms Control and 

International Security, the State Department has continued to fail 

to resolve the impasse with Russia about the legal liability of U.S. 

personnel working with Russia on the security of the huge arsenal 

of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of the former Soviet 

Union and has failed to accelerate measures aimed at the safety 

and security of this huge arsenal from theft, illegal sale and terrorist access. 

John Bolton’s insistence that the U.N. is valuable only when it 

directly serves the United States, and that the most effective Security Council would be one where the U.S. is the only permanent 

member, will not help him to negotiate with representatives of the 

remaining 96% of humanity at a time when the U.N. is actively 

considering enlargement of the Security Council and steps to deal 

more effectively with failed states and to enhance the U.N.’s peacekeeping capability. 

John Bolton’s work as a paid researcher for Taiwan, his idea that 

the U.S. should treat Taiwan as a sovereign state, and that it is 

fantasy to believe that China might respond with armed force to 

the secession of Taiwan do not attest to the balanced judgment of 

a possible U.S. permanent representative on the Security Council. 

China is emerging as a major world power and the Taiwan issue 

is becoming more acute. 

At a time when the U.N. is struggling to get an adequate grip 

on the genocidal killing in Darfur, Sudan, Mr. Bolton’s skepticism 

about U.N. peacekeeping, about paying the U.N. dues that fund 

peacekeeping, and his leadership of the opposition to the InterVerDate Aug 04 2004 11:42 Aug 09, 2005 Jkt 039010 PO 00000 Frm 00319 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\ER001.XXX ER001
320 

national Criminal Court, originally proposed by the U.S. itself in 

order to prosecute human rights offenders, will all make it difficult 

for the U.S. to play an effective leadership role at a time when the 

U.N. itself and many member states are moving to improve U.N. 

capacity to deal with international problems. 

Given these past actions and statements, John R. Bolton cannot 

be an effective promoter of the U.S. national interest at the U.N.. 

We urge you to oppose his nomination. 

Sincerely, Q02 

The Hon. Terrell E. Arnold, Former Deputy Director, Office of 

Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State (Reagan), Former 

U.S. Consul General, San Paulo, Brazil (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Former U.S. ambassador 

to Romania, Chile, and India (Nixon, Ford, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Robert L. Barry, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Bulgaria and Indonesia (Reagan, Clinton), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Carter), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

European Affairs (Carter) 

Ambassador Josiah H. Beeman, Former U.S. ambassador to New 

Zealand and Western Samoa (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Maurice M. Bernbaum, Former U.S. ambassador 

to Ecuador and Venezuela (Eisenhower, Johnson) 

Ambassador (ret.) Jack R. Binns, Former U.S. ambassador to Honduras (Carter, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Richard J. Bloomfield, Former U.S. ambassador 

to Ecuador and Portugal (Ford, Carter, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Peter Bridges, Former U.S. ambassador to Somalia (Reagan) 

Ambassador George Bruno, Former U.S. ambassador to Belize 

(Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Edward Brynn, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Burkina Faso and Ghana (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton), Former 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs (Clinton) 

Ambassador George Bunn, Former member of U.S. delegation to 

the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations (Johnson), 

Former U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference (U.N.) (Johnson) 

Ambassador (ret.) A. Peter Burleigh, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia (Reagan), 

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence 

and Research (G.H.W. Bush), Former Ambassador and Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Department of State (G.H.W. 

Bush), Former Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives 

(Clinton), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Personnel (Clinton), Former U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N. and Acting Permanent Representative to the 

U.N. (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Patricia M. Byrne, Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Security Council (Reagan), 

Former U.S. ambassador to Mali and Burma (Carter, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) James Cheek, Former U.S. ambassador to Sudan 

and Argentina (G.H.W. Bush, Clinton) 

321 

Ambassador (ret.) Paul M. Cleveland, Former U.S. ambassador to 

New Zealand and Western Samoa and Malaysia (Reagan, 

G.H.W. Bush), Former U.S. representative to the Korean Energy Development Organization (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Carleton S. Coon, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Nepal (Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Jane Coon, Former U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh (Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) James F. Creagan, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Honduras (Clinton), Former U.S. Consul General, Sao Paulo, 

Brazil (G.H.W. Bush) 

Ambassador (ret.) T. Frank Crigler, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Rwanda and Somalia (Ford, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) John H. Crimmins, Former U.S. ambassador to 

the Dominican Republic and Brazil (Johnson, Nixon, Ford) 

Ambassador (ret.) Richard T. Davies (signed before he passed away 

on March 30, 2005), Former U.S. ambassador to Poland (Nixon, 

Ford, Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) John Gunther Dean, Former Deputy for CORDS, 

Military Region 1, Vietnam (Nixon), Former U.S. ambassador 

to Cambodia, Denmark, Lebanon, Thailand, India (Nixon, 

Ford, Carter, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean, Former U.S. representative to 

the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna 

(Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Willard A. DePree, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Mozambique and Bangladesh (Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush) 

Ambassador (ret.) Robert S. Dillon, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Lebanon (Reagan), Former Deputy Commissioner General of 

the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 

(UNRWA) (Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Donald B. Easum, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Nigeria and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) (Nixon, Ford, Carter), 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Nixon, 

Ford) 

Ambassador (ret.) William B. Edmondson, Former U.S. ambassador 

to South Africa (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Nancy H. Ely-Raphel, Former U.S. ambassador 

to Slovenia (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) James Bruce Engle, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Dahomey (Nixon, Ford) 

Ambassador (ret.) Richard K. Fox, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Trinidad and Tobago (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Lincoln Gordon, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Brazil (Kennedy, Johnson), Former Assistant Secretary of 

State for Inter-American Affairs (Johnson) 

Ambassador (ret.) Robert Grey, Jr., Former U.S. representative to 

the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Holsey Gates Handyside, Former U.S. ambassador to Mauritania (Ford, Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) William C. Harrop, Former ambassador to 

Israel, Kenya, and Zaire (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton), 

Former Inspector General, U.S. Department of State (Nixon) 

Ambassador (ret.) Samuel F. Hart, Former U.S. ambassador to Ecuador (Reagan) 

322 

Ambassador (ret.) Arthur A. Hartman, Former U.S. ambassador to 

France and the Soviet Union (Carter, Reagan), Former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Nixon) 

Ambassador Ulric Haynes, Jr., Former U.S. ambassador to Algeria 

(Carter) 

Ambassador Gerald B. Helman, Former U.S. ambassador to the 

United Nations, Geneva (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Robert T. Hennemeyer, Former U.S. ambassador 

to Gambia (Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) H. Kenneth Hill, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Bulgaria (G.H,W. Bush) 

Ambassador (ret.) John L. Hirsch, Former U S. ambassador to Sierra Leone (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Lewis Hoffacker, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (Nixon) 

Ambassador (ret.) H. Allen Holmes, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Portugal (Reagan), Former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Reagan), Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (Clinton) 

The Hon. Thomas L. Hughes, Former Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State (Kennedy, 

Johnson) 

Ambassador (ret.) Dennis Jett, Former U.S. ambassador to Mozambique and Peru (Clinton) 

Ambassador James A. Joseph, Former U.S. ambassador to South 

Africa (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Philip M. Kaiser, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Senegal, Mauritania, Hungary, Austria (Kennedy, Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Robert V. Keeley, Former U.S. Ambassador to 

Mauritius, Zimbabwe, and Greece (Ford, Carter, Reagan), 

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 

(Carter) 

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Former Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Andrew I. Killgore, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Qatar (Carter) 

Ambassador Henry L. Kimelman, Former U.S. ambassador to Haiti 

(Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Roger Kirk, Former U.S. ambassador to Somalia 

and Romania (Nixon, Ford, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Dennis H. Kux, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Ivory Coast (Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) James F. Leonard, Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Ford, Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Samuel W. Lewis, Former Assistant Secretary of 

State for International Organization Affairs (Ford), Former Director of Policy Planning, State Department (Clinton), Former 

ambassador to Israel (Carter, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Princeton N. Lyman, Former Assistant Secretary 

of State for International Organization Affairs (Clinton), Director, Bureau of Refugee Programs. U.S. Department of State 

(G.H.W. Bush), Former U.S. ambassador to South Africa and 

Nigeria (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) David L. Mack, Former U.S. ambassador to the 

United Arab Emirates (Reagan, (G.H.W. Bush) 

323 

Ambassador (ret.) Richard Cavins Matheron, Former U.S. ambassador to Swaziland (Carter, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Charles E. Marthinsen, Former U.S. ambassador 

to Qatar (Carter, Reagan) 

Jack Mendelsohn, Deputy Assistant Director of the Strategic Programs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

(ACDA) (Reagan), Senior ACDA representative on U.S. START 

delegation (Reagan) 

Ambassador Carol Moseley-Braun, Former U.S. ambassador to 

New Zealand and Samoa (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Ambler H. Moss Jr., Former U.S. ambassador to 

Panama (Carter, Reagan), Former Member, U.S.-Panama Consultative Committee (Carter, Reagan, Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Leonardo Neher, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Burkina Faso (Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) David D, Newsom, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Libya, Indonesia, the Philippines (Johnson, Nixon, Carter), 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Nixon), 

Former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Donald R. Norland, Former U.S. ambassador to 

the Netherlands, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and Chad 

(Johnson, Ford, Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) David Passage, Former U.S. ambassador to Botswana (G.H.W. Bush) 

Ambassador (ret.) Edward L. Peck, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Iraq and Mauritania (Carter, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Jack R. Perry, Former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Christopher H. Phillips, Former Deputy U.S. 

Permanent Representative to the U.N. (Nixon), Former U.S. 

ambassador to Brunei (G.H.W. Bush) 

Ambassador (ret.) Sol Polanaky, Former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush) 

Ambassador Stanley R. Resor, Former Secretary of the Army 

(Johnson, Nixon), Former U.S. representative to the Mutual 

and Balanced Force Reduction Talks, Vienna (Nixon, Ford, 

Carter) 

Ambassador Nicholas A. Rey, Former U.S. ambassador to Poland 

(Clinton) 

John B. Rhinelander, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 

State (Nixon), Legal Adviser to the U.S. Strategic Arms Limitation Delegation (SALT I) (Nixon) 

Ambassador (ret.) Stuart W, Rockwell, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Morocco (Nixon) 

Ambassador James R. Sasser, Former U.S. ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Cynthia P. Schneider, Former U.S. ambassador 

to The Netherlands (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Talcott W. Seelye, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Tunisia and Syria (Nixon, Ford, Carter) 

The Hon. John Shattuck, Former Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (Clinton), Former Chairman, Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Religious 

Freedom Abroad (Clinton), Former U.S. ambassador to the 

Czech Republic (Clinton) 

324 

Ambassador (ret.) Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs 

(Reagan), Former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and Poland 

(G.H.W. Bush, Clinton) 

Ambassador Richard Sklar, Former U.S. ambassador to the United 

Nations for Management and Reform (Clinton) 

Ambassador Robert Solwin Smith, Former U.S ambassador to Ivory 

Coast (Nixon, Ford), Former Deputy and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (Nixon), Former Deputy Permanent 

Delegate to UNESCO (Truman, Eisenhower) 

Ambassador (ret.) Carl Spielvogel, Former U.S. ambassador to the 

Slovak Republic (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Monteagle Stearns, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Greece and Ivory Coast (Ford, Carter, Reagan), Former Vice 

President, National Defense University (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Andrew L. Steigman, Former Ambassador to 

Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe (Ford), 

Ambassador (ret.) Michael Sterner, Former U.S. ambassador to the 

United Arab Emirates (Nixon, Ford), Former Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 

(Carter) 

Ambassador (ret) John Todd Stewart, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Moldova (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Richard W. Teare, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Harry E.T. Thayer, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Singapore (Carter, Reagan) 

The Hon. Hans N. Tuch, Career Minister, U.S. Foreign Service, 

USIA 

Ambassador (ret.) Theresa A. Tull, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Guyana and Brunei (Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton) 

Ambassador William J. vanden Heuvel, Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Carter), Former 

U.S. representative to the United Nations, Geneva (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Christopher van Hollen, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Nixon), Former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka (Nixon, 

Ford) 

Ambassador (ret.) Richard N. Viets, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Tanzania and Jordan (Carter, Reagan) 

Ambassador (ret.) Frederick Vreeland, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Morocco (G.H.W. Bush), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for the Near East (G.H.W. Bush) 

Ambassador (ret.) Lannon Walker, Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Carter, Reagan), 

Former U.S. ambassador to Senegal, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast 

(Reagan, G.H.W Bush, Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Alexander F. Watson, Former U.S. ambassador 

to Peru (Reagan), Former Deputy Permanent Representative to 

the United Nations (G.H.W. Bush), Former Assistant Secretary 

of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Melissa F. Wells, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, Mozambique, Zaire, Estonia 

(Ford, Reagan, Carter, Clinton), Former U.S. representative to 

325 

the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 

(Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Thomas C. Weston, Former Special Coordinator 

for Cyprus (Clinton, G.W. Bush), Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Clinton) 

Ambassador (ret.) Robert E. White, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Paraguay and El Salvador (Carter), Former Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States 

(Ford) 

Ambassador (ret.) James M. Wilson, Jr., Former Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State, East Asia and Pacific Affairs (Nixon), Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State (Ford) 

Ambassador (ret.) W. Howard Wriggins, Former U.S. ambassador 

to Sri Lanka (Carter) 

Ambassador (ret.) Kenneth S. Yalowitz, Former U.S. ambassador to 

Belarus and Georgia (Clinton) 

April 22, 2005 

The Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., 

U.S. Senate. 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: Knowing your commitment to truth and 

patriotism, I permit myself to write urging that the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee reject the nomination of a person as unworthy 

of your trust, and that of your colleagues, as John Bolton. In 1991, 

I had the honor of being a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs with 

responsibilities that covered, inter alia, U.N. affairs. In this capacity I would meet with John Bolton when my Bureau’s matters had 

to be discussed with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of which he was Assistant Secretary. It was the only unpleasant part of my assignment—and it was very unpleasant. He dealt 

with visitors to his office as if they were servants with whom he 

could be dismissive, curt and negative. He was well known for 

never being good-tempered or even well-mannered. He spoke of the 

U.N. as being the enemy, so that those in the Department who had 

to deal with him wondered why he had precisely that job. My experience bore out his anti-U.N. reputation. It is totally erroneous to 

speak of Bolton as a diplomat. My personal experience with him 

shows that there is no diplomatic bone in his body. Having had 9 

years experience with the U.N. myself, my considered judgement is 

that he would do the U.S. terrible harm in the world body. In the 

U.S. Mission to the U.N., New York, from 1967 to 1971, I served 

under 5 fine U.S. ambassadors to the U.N. both Democrat and Republican. They were of different temperaments and qualities—but 

they all knew how to promote U.S. interests in the U.N. meetings 

and their contacts. For one thing they knew how to listen, something essential for the U.N. job which I found totally lacking in my 

dealings with Bolton. 

Bolton has none of the qualities needed for that job. On the contrary he has all the qualities needed to harm the image and objectives in the U.N. and its affiliated international organizations. 

326 

If it is now U.S. policy not to reform the U.N. but to destroy it, 

Bolton is our man. 

Respectfully, 

FREDERICK VREELAND, 

T3RETIRED FOREIGN SERVICE RESERVE OFFICER & 

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 

Former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco. 

JUDGE STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, Washington, DC, April 7, 2005. 

Hon. JOSEPH BIDEN, 

U.S. Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR BIDEN: Please permit me to set out my view that 

the Senate should decline to approve the nomination of Mr. John 

Bolton as Permanent Representative to the United Nations of the 

United States. That view is informed by my years of service in the 

Department of State as Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations 

Affairs (1961–66), Deputy Legal Adviser (1974–81), and Judge of 

the International Court of Justice (1981–2000), having been President of that Court 1997–2000. 

Mr. Bolton Is on public record (as in an ‘‘op/ed’’ published in The 

Wall Street Journal) in maintaining that there is no legal obligation binding upon the United States to pay the financial assessments upon it as a U.N. Member. His position contravenes the 

U.N. Charter, a treaty binding upon the United States, which 

specifies: ‘‘The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the 

Members as apportioned by the General Assembly’’ (Art. 17(2). In 

1962, the International Court of Justice held—sustaining the argument of the United States, among other Members—that apportionment of expenses by the General Assembly creates the obligation 

of each Member to bear that part of the expenses apportioned to 

it. 

Mr. Botton however claims that, when the U.S. Congress enacts 

legislation determining payment of U.N. assessments by the United 

States, that legislation governs not oniy the United States but its 

international legal obligations. He maintains that that legislation 

frees the United States of any international legal obligation to pay 

its assessments. 

It follows from Mr. Bolton’s position that any State can free itself 

of its international legal obligations by national enactment. That 

position runs counter to elemental principles of international law. 

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that: 

‘‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 

be performed by them in good faith’’ (Art. 26). It specifies that: ‘‘A 

State party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal 

law as justification for its failure to perform the treaty’’ (Art. 27(1). 

In my view, a man who demonstrates such ignorance of, or contempt for, the international legal obligations of the United States, 

notably those under the United Nations Charter, is unsuited for 

service as the Permanent Representative of the United States to 

the United Nations. 

Yours sincerely, 

STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL. 

327