1

Table of Contents

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense

Table of Contents

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense

6 CBRD – A Naval Priority

Captain Michael H. Smith

7 Meeting Today’s CBRD Challenges

Brigadier General Jess A. Scarbrough

8 Supporting the Navy’s CBRD Needs

Michael Purello

Prologue — The Need for Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD)

10 Why Chemical and Biological Defense Is Important

Michael Purello

Fleet, Joint, and Homeland Defense Support —

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) is the lead Systems Command for chemical, biological, and 

radiological defense (CBRD) programs. The CBRD expertise developed under NAVSEA’s leadership is both 

nationally and internationally recognized by the CBRD community. While the primary focus of this expertise is 

in support of the Navy’s CBRD program, this expertise is also leveraged to support the other Department of 

Defense services and agencies, as well as civilian homeland defense organizations. This section discusses the 

Navy’s technical authority hierarchy, the direct support provided to sustain the fleet’s CBRD capabilities, and 

examples of the support provided to support the joint service and homeland defense initiatives.

14 Technical Warrant Holder: Enabling the Navy’s Warfighting 

Capability in a Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) 

Environment

Jon Cofield

18 Engineering Agents for Chemical and Biological Defense 

Information Systems: Getting the Navy’s Information 

Systems to the Field

Santiel Creekmore

22 Sustaining the Navy’s Chemical and Biological Detection Capabilities

Nancy Haymes

26 CBRD Waterfront Team Improves Fleet Readiness

Tara Lalonde and Ronald Roller

32 Chemical and Biological Defense Individual Protection Equipment 

Materiel Readiness Improvement Program

Michael Carl

38 Shipboard Isolation and Quarantine: Protecting Sailors From 

Infectious Diseases

John Garmon

42 Joint Project Manager for Protection Leverages NSWCDD’s 

Systems Engineering and Integration Expertise in New Trail 

Boss Role

Jorge Hernandez

44 Fixed-Facility Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense: 

Protecting Building Occupants From Airborne Threats

Kevin Cogley and Walter Dzula

50 Biological Defense Quality Assurance Sample 

Technical Laboratory

Andrew Sobota

52 Field Activity Support to the Naval Treaty Implementation Program

Matthew J. Hornbaker

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Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense

Fleet, Joint, and Homeland Defense Support (Continued)

56 Is Your Program Arms Control Compliant?

Angela Mersiowsky

60 Homeland Defense Partnership: Major City Fire Departments Reach 

Out to Shipboard Collective Protection Expertise

Richard Warder

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems —

The best defense against chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons is to avoid the CBR contami‐

nation by preventing its release. When prevention is not successful, detection is used to identify what type, 

how much, and where the CBR hazard is present. When a contaminated area cannot be avoided, it is neces‐

sary to protect individuals and equipment from contamination and to decontaminate those individuals and 

equipment that come in contact with the CBR hazard. The Naval Sea Systems Command and its partners in 

the joint CBR community provide the tools and capabilities necessary to detect, protect, and decontaminate 

threats resulting from a CBR attack. This section addresses the specific detection, collective protection, and 

decontamination systems and their integration into fleet and shore assets and facilities.

64 Chemical and Biological Detection for the Fleet

Daniel C. Driscoll

72 M4 Joint Chemical Agent Detection (JCAD)

Harold Bannister

74 The Joint Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agent Water 

Monitor (JCBRAWM)

Brian Patrick

78 Shipboard Installation and Integration of Chemical and Biological

(CB) Detection Equipment

J. Steven Anthony

82 Joint Biological Point Detection System: The Navy’s Program 

for Biological Defense

Mark V. Brown

86 Accelerated Fielding of the Joint Biological Agent Identification 

and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS) to Large Deck Ships

Rose Hayden

90 Improving Reliability of Shipboard Chemical Agent Detection

Christopher Bara and Brian Flaherty

94 U.S. Navy Ships Get Chem-Bio Protection

Robert Snodgrass, Anton Fionov, Jeffrey Donovan, and Eric Arcement

98 The Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS): Not Just 

for Chemical-Biological-Radiological Defense Anymore

Mike Pompeii

104 The Impact of the Environment on Collective Protection Filters 

Carlos Murillo

108 Naval Chemical Decontamination: Effectively Fielding New Skin 

Decontamination Solution

Michelle L. Jackson and Sharon M. Parish

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Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense
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Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense

Modeling and Simulation (M&S) —

M&S provides critical information to decision makers to help them plan and respond to chemical, biological, 

and radiological (CBR) incidents. M&S is used to predict the hazard over time resulting from a CBR incident in 

order to support the ability to avoid the contamination and determine the duration of protection and the extent 

of decontamination that will be required. Some M&S products are intended to be fielded, whereas others are 

used to develop and support other fielded products. M&S is also used in the development of new capabilities 

to evaluate alternative designs and to supplement test data. This section addresses the development and use 

of M&S in providing CBR defense capabilities to the fleet.

112 Validation, Verification, and Accreditation Challenges 

for the Joint Effects Model (JEM)

Russell P. Brown

118 Independent Verification and Validation of MESO for the Threat 

Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept and Countermeasure (TACTIC) 

Program

Gaurang R. Dävé and Cesar Smith

122 What if a Terrorist Attack Releases a Toxic Industrial Chemical?

Timothy J. Bauer

128 Defending Against the Unseen — Chemical and Biological Building 

Protection Challenges

Matthew G. Wolski and Stephen S. Voynar

134 Modeling and Simulation Supports Joint Expeditionary Collective 

Protection (JECP) Program

William G. Szymczak and Harold K. Barnette

140 The Benefits of Metamodels in CBR Defense Modeling and 

Simulation (M&S) Products

Harold K. Barnette

146 Modeling of Personnel Entry Into Collectively Protected 

Shelters

Gaurang R. Dävé

152 The Next-Generation System Performance Model (SPM) 

for CBR Defense

Gaurang R. Dävé and Michael O. Kelly

Research, Applied Science, and Testing Capabilities —

Improvements to existing systems and development of new capabilities to address future threats begin in the 

laboratory with research, applied science, and testing. This section provides an overview of the Naval Sea 

Systems Command’s (NAVSEA’s) state‐of-the-art facilities and discusses several ongoing research, develop‐

ment, test, and evaluation efforts. The steady innovation of NAVSEA’s research facilities advances the Navy’s 

chemical, biological, and radiological defense capabilities to match the evolving threats.

158 Basic and Applied Science at NSWCDD Advances CBRD 

Capabilities

Matthew J. Hornbaker and Richard C. Hodge

164 High-Containment Biological Laboratories

Meredith Bondurant

166 Basic Research in Biology Facilitates the Development 

of Biodefense Products

Tony Buhr and Derrell McPherson

170 Biotoxin Research at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

Division (NSWCDD)

Elaine M. Strauss, Wynn Vo, and Linda C. Beck

(Continued)

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Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense
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Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense

Research, Applied Science, and Testing Capabilities 

(Continued)

174 Development of Novel Solutions for Decontaminating 

Warfare Agents

Claire Wells and Chris Hodge

178 Soft Matter Makes Tough Technologies

James R. Lee

182 Molecular Construction: Novel Multifunctional Adsorbents 

for the Next-Generation CBR Protection Systems

Joseph Hunt

190 Investigating Natural Flavonoid Compounds as Potential 

Radioprotective Agents for the Warfighter

Dena H. Kota and Linda C. Beck

194 Decontaminant Material and Chemical Compatibility Testing

Kathy Crowley

198 Testing is Key to Maintaining an Effective Navy Fighting Capability 

in a Contaminated Environment

Tim Thomasson

Final Thoughts — 

202 NSWCDD’s Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense (CBRD) 

Role — Past, Present, and Future

Michael Purello

The Leading Edge magazine is produced by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. The 

purpose of the publication is to showcase technical excellence across the Warfare Centers and promote a 

broader awareness of the breadth and depth of knowledge and support available to the Navy and DoD.

Address all correspondence to Corporate Communications, C6

Email: dlgr_nswc_c6@navy.mil; or write to

Commander

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division

Corporate Communications, C6

6149 Welsh Road, Suite 239 

Dahlgren, VA 22448-5130

NSWCDD/MP-11/1

Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited; PR Number 3414

4

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense

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Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CPD)

Brigadier General Jess A. Scarbrough, JPEO-CBD

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD)

Captain Michael H. Smith, Commander

Carl R. Siel, Jr., Technical Director

John Lysher, Head, Asymmetric Systems Department

Janice Miller, Corporate Communications Director (Acting)

Margie Stevens, Production Coordinator

Patrice Waits, Editor & Layout

Clement Bryant, Layout Design & Graphic Artist

Kellie Yeatman, Graphic Artist

Trey Hamlet, Graphic Artist/3-D Modeling

CBR Defense Division

Michael Purello, Head, CBR Defense Division

Matthew J. Hornbaker, Division Operations

NSWCDD

J. Steven Anthony Eric Arcement

Harold Bannister Harold K. Barnette

Christopher Bara Timothy J. Bauer

Linda C. Beck Meredith Bondurant

Mark V. Brown Russell P. Brown

Tony Buhr Kevin Cogley

Santiel Creekmore Kathy Crowley

Gaurang Dävé Jeffrey Donovan

Daniel C. Driscoll Walter Dzula

Anton Fionov Brain Flaherty

John Garmon Rose Hayden

Nancy Haymes Jorge Hernandez

Chris Hodge Matthew J. Hornbaker

Joseph Hunt Michelle L. Jackson

Michael O. Kelly Dena H. Kota

Tara Lalonde James R. Lee

Derrell McPherson Angela Mersiowsky

Carlos Murillo Sharon M. Parish

Brian Patrick Mike Pompeii

Michael Purello Ronald Roller

Cesar Smith Robert Snodgrass

Andrew Sobota Elaine M. Strauss

Tim Thomasson Wynn Vo

Stephen S. Voynar Richard Warder

Claire Wells Matthew G. Wolski 

NSWC Panama City Division

Michael Carl

NAVSEA SEA05P14

Jon Cofield

Naval Research Laboratory

William G. Szymczak

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Introductions

CBRD – A Naval Priority

Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons represent what are more commonly known as weapons of mass destruction—extremely deadly weapons that can affect large populations. 

When these weapons don’t kill, they disable. Either way, they can 

affect the Navy’s ability to execute its missions and operations. That 

is why the Navy places a high priority on chemical, biological, and 

radiological defense (CBRD) research, development, testing, and 

evaluation to support the Sailors, whether afloat or ashore, surface 

or undersea. 

The CBR Defense Division at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) spearheads the surface Navy’s 

CBRD capabilities. The Division works in partnership with other 

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Warfare Center activities 

and defense community members to ensure that Navy and joint 

warfighters are safe from the harmful effects of chemical, biological, or radiological contamination. The scope of these efforts ranges from detection and protection, to mitigation and survivability 

in contaminated environments. Moreover, should warfighters become exposed while operating in a contaminated environment, 

the Warfare Centers also arm warfighters with capabilities for decontamination. 

NSWCDD is proud of the CBR Defense Division’s reputation for excellence in developing CBR protection systems. A recent Centers for Disease Control inspection, for example, deemed 

our CBR biosafety program “a model for other organizations.” This 

same excellence is evident in the work described in the articles in 

this issue of the Leading Edge magazine. 

The articles that follow represent a wide range of programs 

and innovative technologies key to CBRD. In these articles, you 

will learn how our Navy civilian engineers and scientists are working diligently on solutions to the CBR threats that face our warfighters, as well as the population worldwide. 

I invite you to explore the CBRD issue of the Leading Edge magazine and learn about the exciting and important work NSWCDD 

and others are doing in support of this most important area of defense. Given the wide array of contributions that our CBRD team 

is making, I am proud to say that our Navy will continue to be protected from CBR attacks, now and in the future.

Captain Michael H. Smith, USN

Commander, NSWCDD

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Introductions

Meeting Today’s CBRD Challenges

Technology and information advances over the past 50 years 

have resulted in a wide range of available chemical and biological 

agents to non-state actors with little scientific skill. Breakthroughs 

in chemical and biological sciences have also led to the emergence 

of new warfare threats. As a result, our world has never been more 

at risk from weapons of mass destruction than it is now. The challenge of the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) is to defend the warfighter and the 

nation against these threats. We are the joint service, single focal 

point for research, development, acquisition, fielding, and lifecycle support of chemical and biological defense equipment and 

medical countermeasures. The JPEO-CBD leads the battle against 

known, unknown, unexpected, and unseen chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

Successful development of CBRN defense capabilities is very 

much a team effort. The resources brought to the table by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) are a 

critical piece of the national strategy to combat weapons of mass 

destruction. I have seen firsthand how the CBR Defense Division 

facilities, both in Dahlgren and Norfolk, support the warfighter 

on land and at sea by providing a full complement of capabilities 

that take products through their full life cycle from development 

to fielding and ultimate disposal. The division’s top-notch laboratories—ranging from the traditional and mechanical to biosafety 

level 2 and 3 laboratories—support the ability of the organization’s scientists and engineers to address emerging chemical and 

biological defense challenges. The skilled professionals within the 

CBR Defense Division demonstrate the Navy core values of honor, courage, and commitment through their expertise, dedication, and adaptability in meeting the ever-changing needs of our 

service members. When I recently toured USS Ashland (LSD 48) 

and USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), I was quite impressed with the 

complexity of design and the seamless integration of CBRN countermeasures for shipboard use. It is clear to see just how NSWCDD 

has earned its stellar reputation throughout the CBRN defense 

community as a leader in systems engineering. 

Brigadier General Jess A. Scarbrough

Joint Program Executive Officer for 

Chemical and Biological Defense

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Supporting the Navy’s CBRD Needs

Welcome to our Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense (CBRD) issue of the Leading Edge magazine. As the CBR 

Defense Division Head at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, I am extremely proud and humbled by both the 

quality and quantity of work that is performed by our outstanding government and contractor team, many of whom have written 

articles contained herein. I hope that as you read through the following pages, you will get a sense of the technical competence and 

patriotic dedication that these employees give every day to our ultimate customer—the warfighter.

Because of our unique CBRD expertise at Dahlgren, our work 

is not limited to ships. In addition to the fleet, we apply our CBRD 

experience to help the Department of Defense, the joint services, 

and other government agencies in support of national needs. Our 

work covers the full range of research and development, science 

and technology, and testing and evaluation. From basic research 

to full operational capability, you will find our scientists in the lab, 

on a ship, and every place in between. Much of this work is showcased in the following articles.

The CBR threat is real. Chemical and biological weapons have 

been used in the past. Accordingly, we must guard against current 

and future use. That’s our mission—to keep our Navy prepared and 

safe and to provide warfighters with the tools, systems, and equipment needed to fight and win in a CBR threatened or contaminated environment. It’s an important mission necessary for keeping 

America’s Navy number one in the world, and for helping to keep 

warfighters safe from the threat of chemical and biological attacks.

Introductions

8

Michael Purello

Head, CBR Defense Division

Acknowledgments

There are many people who worked very hard to make this CBRD issue of the 

Leading Edge magazine a reality. 

I would like to thank the CX7 publishing staff and the NSWCDD Corporate 

Communications team, who worked hard to produce this professional document.

Without articles, we would not have a Leading Edge, so my thanks also go to 

the many authors who provided their expertise and talent, and put pen to paper 

to write these articles. 

I’d like to acknowledge the support of my chain of command—my Department 

Head, Mr. John Lysher, my Commander, Captain Mike Smith, and my Technical Director, Mr. Carl R. Siel, Jr.—who have been very supportive of our work in 

CBRD for the Navy, joint, and national needs areas.

Finally, I would be remiss if I didn’t especially recognize two individuals who 

can share the credit in being largely responsible for this issue of the Leading Edge:

Mr. Matt Hornbaker quarterbacked this effort for the Division and kept things 

moving forward from a Division perspective. He was also our Division liaison to 

Corporate Communications and Command PAO.

Ms. Sandra Wood provided a critical review of all the articles and worked with 

many of the authors to ensure that the articles were current and nonredundant.

With respect and thanks to all,

Mike Purello, P.E. 

Head, CBR Defense Division
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CBRD

Prologue – The Need for Chemical, 

Biological, and Radiological Defense

You can take the most beat-up army in the world, and if they choose to stand and 

fight, you are going to take casualties; if they choose to dump chemicals on you, they 

might even win.—General H. Norman Schwarzkopf 1

The effects of a chemical or biological (CB) attack on a fighting force cannot be overstated. On a Navy ship, every Sailor plays a critical role. In order to fight in a chemically 

or biologically contaminated environment, the shipboard fighting force needs to function at its optimal level. An enemy’s purpose in using CB weapons against a ship is to 

degrade or cease ship operations. Imagine how a ship’s effectiveness might be reduced 

if 50 percent or more of its crew suddenly came down with the flu, food poisoning, or 

other debilitating illnesses. Even the threat of CB weapons can impact ship operations, 

as the crew would need to don individual protective equipment in case an actual attack 

should occur—the threat is real.

The Chemical and Biological Threat

About a dozen countries have offensive biological weapons programs in various 

stages from research and development to weapons stockpiles. Most of these offensive capabilities have been developed covertly, including the following countries: China, Cuba, 

Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Taiwan. Similarly, 12 countries had 

chemical weapons production facilities, but under the Chemical Weapons Convention 

(CWC), pledged to destroy them or convert them to civilian uses.2

The chemical weapon (CW) threat remains despite the decline in the number of countries with active chemical warfare programs and the decrease of CWC-declared stockpiles. 

The number of countries capable of producing chemical agents has grown, and will continue to grow, as the availability of chemical production equipment increases due to the 

globalization of the chemical industry. The increased availability of related technologies, 

coupled with the relative ease of producing some chemical agents, has increased concern 

that their production and employment may become more attractive to states or terrorist 
11

Why Chemical and Biological Defense Is Important

groups. Additionally, both state and non-state actors 

may utilize nonweaponized chemicals—including 

toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and toxic industrial materials (TIMs)—to achieve the same goals. 

TICs/TIMs are usually more readily available and, 

in some cases, can produce the same lethal and incapacitating results as traditional CW agents.3

 Consequently, accidents or intentional attacks involving 

TICs/TIMs must also be considered.

Chemical, Biological, and Toxic 

Industrial Incidents

During the 20th and early 21st centuries, chemical and biological agents were used, and toxic 

chemicals were accidently released. A number of 

examples follow:4, 5

•	 1978—Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian defector 

living in London, was killed with ricin.

•	 1979—The accidental release of 10 kg of anthrax spores over Sverdlovsk, USSR, resulted 

in at least 66 deaths.

•	 1984—The Rajneeshee cult contaminated salad bars in Oregon with Salmonella typhimurium, resulting in 751 people suffering from 

food poisoning, with 45 of them requiring 

hospitalization.

•	 A Union Carbide plant accidently released a 

methylisocynate cloud in Bhopal, India, in 

1984; approximately 3,800 people died, and 

thousands more were injured.

•	 1980–1988—Saddam Hussein used chemical agents (e.g., mustard and tabun) during 

the Iran-Iraq War against the Iranians and 

Iraqi civilians (Kurds), resulting in thousands of casualties.

•	 1994—The Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, released sarin in Matsumoto, Japan, killing 7 

people and injuring at least 500.

•	 1995—Aum Shinrikyo released Sarin gas in 

the Tokyo subway system, resulting in 12 

deaths and 5,000 people requiring treatment. 

Testimony during the Aum Shinrikyo trials 

indicated that they had used VX on individuals, killing at least 10 cult members and one 

individual outside the cult.

•	 1997—Food in Texas was intentionally contaminated with Shigella dysenteriae, resulting in the infection of 45 people.

•	 2001—Mail contaminated with anthrax spores 

were received in Florida; New York City; Washington, DC; and New Jersey. These letters 

scared the country to the point where every 

government mail distribution office or facility issued all its employees masks and gloves 

to be used as they handled, processed, sorted, and distributed mail in the office.

11

Why Chemical and Biological Defense Is Important
12

CBRD

Prologue—The Need for Chemical, 

Biological, and Radiological Defense

•	 2004—This was an accidental chlorine release resulting from a train accident near 

Macdona, Texas. 6

•	 2005—This was an accidental chlorine release resulting from a train accident in Graniteville, South Carolina. 7

•	 2007—Multiple terrorist use of chlorine gas 

was reported in Iraq. 8, 9

•	 2009—There were reported rumors that the 

Sri Lankan military used chemical weapons.10

In addition, 9 people died, 550 people sought 

medical treatment, and 5,400 people had to be 

evacuated from Graniteville, South Carolina, due 

to 54,000 kilograms of chlorine that was released 

by a train wreck in 2005.11

Some people think that the 1972 CWC provides them with protection and peace of mind. 

However, it is both unwise and naïve to believe 

that nation-state terrorists will abide by any agreements. Consequently, the threat remains and, as 

indicated above, is likely to continue. Insofar as no 

country can fight toe-to-toe with the United States 

in a conventional wartime scenario, a number of 

countries or terrorist organizations might consider 

using asymmetric means, such as CB weapons or 

TICs/TIMs to advance their interests.

Effects of Chemical and 

Biological Warfare Agents

The effects of chemical and biological agents 

depend upon the specific agent, the amount of exposure, and the mechanism of exposure, as well 

as the individual. The following summaries reflect generalizations of some of the major types 

of agents:12

•	 Blister agent: The effects of blister agents 

are often not seen for hours. In early stages of contamination, one may experience irritation and inflammation of the eyes, nose, 

throat, trachea, bronchi, and/or lung, as 

well as reddened skin, which is followed by 

blistering and/or ulceration, and if severe 

enough, death.

•	 Nerve Agent: The effects of exposure to vapor agents begin within seconds to a minute, 

while the effects of exposure to a liquid agent 

begin within 30 minutes. The effects can 

range from twitching, sweating, dim/blurred 

vision, pain, nausea, vomiting, runny nose, 

shortness of breath, and coughing to convulsions, loss of consciousness, and death.

•	 Biological Agents: The effects of biological 

agents can include:

◆ Flu-like symptoms—fever, headaches, chills, 

pain, and fatigue

◆ Gastrointestinal disease-type symptoms—

vomiting, diarrhea, muscle cramps, and collapse

◆ Other symptoms—rashes, skin ulcerations, 

respiratory problems, abnormal bleeding, 

and if severe enough, death

Often, the effects of a CB attack do not reveal 

the true impact until weeks or months later. For example, when the Union Carbide plant accidently released a methylisocynate cloud in Bhopal, India, in 

1984, approximately 3,800 people died, and thousands more were injured. Since that time, many 

more people have died in deaths whose causes have 

been attributed to the 1984 accident.13, 14

The Navy Role

A robust and comprehensive Navy CB program is necessary to ensure that the Navy can 

operate unconstrained in a CBR-threatened or 

contaminated environment. This need is attributed to several factors:

•	 The shift of naval operations from the blue water (open ocean) to the littorals and inland waterways has increased both the importance of, 

and need for, Navy CB defense capabilities. Sitting in the middle of an ocean, a ship is primarily concerned with threats from above (planes), 

from below (submarines), and from other 

ships. The likelihood of a CB attack, however, 

increases dramatically as the Navy operates in 

the green- and brown-water environment (littorals and inland waterways). Thus, the Navy 

needs to concern itself more with CB threats 

launched from land or from small craft operating along the coast or near harbors.

•	 Chemical and biological defense (CBD) sensors and systems have to work in concert with 

other complex systems on ships. Navy expertise is required to ensure that these systems 

are properly designed and integrated into the 

ship to ensure that they function properly and 

do not degrade other ship systems. Also, the 

maritime environment is a harsh environment. For example, high humidity, reflectivity 

off the water, sea clutter, etc., can degrade performance of the Navy’s best sensors. Couple 

this with the corrosive effects of salt air, and 

it becomes clear that requirements are different for sensors made to operate on land versus the sea. These maritime environmental 

factors provide unique challenges to the Navy 

and manufacturers of CB equipment.

•	 Ground forces are able to leave a contaminated area after an attack and move to a safer, clean area where they can resume normal 
13

Why Chemical and Biological Defense Is Important

operations. A ship can move to a different 

location, too, but the working environment 

comes with them. Consequently, they must 

continue to operate in the dirty environment 

until the ship has been adequately decontaminated. That is why 24/7 collective protection systems, operational detectors, and 

decontamination stations are critical.

The Way Ahead

The Navy must remain active in the Joint 

Chemical and Biological Defense Program to ensure that the Navy’s maritime environment, operational considerations, and complex system 

interfaces are properly considered. The CB threat 

continues to exist. History provides ample evidence reflecting the employment of CB agents and 

TICs, such as mustard, sarin, tabun, anthrax, ricin, 

and chlorine. The purposeful use or accidental release of CB agents and TICs, therefore, will continue to pose a threat.

The Navy must be protected. The impact of 

an adversary using a CB weapon against the fleet 

could significantly degrade operations and could 

potentially result in the loss of Sailors and Marines. That, ultimately, is why CBD is important. 

Protecting Sailors and Marines from the effects of 

CB weapons requires expert knowledge of the Navy’s environment, operations, and complex system interfaces. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) has the knowledge—along with the CB expertise and experience 

necessary—to protect the Navy and other warfighters from these types of attacks. NSWCDD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Division’s mission is to 

ensure that naval forces are armed with superior 

CB defense capabilities to predict, detect, and stay 

protected whenever the need arises.

References

1. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take A Hero, Random 

House Publishing Group, 1 October 1993.

2. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status 

and Trends, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, 

Updated 20 February 2008.

3. Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program, 

2010 Annual Report to Congress, May 2010.

4. http://cbwinfo.com/Chemical/Nerve/VX.shtml

5. http://arapaho.nsuok.edu/~woodss/BW&CW/ History of Biological 

Warfare and Use of Biological Agents with Terrorism-summary.doc

6. CSB Issues Safety Bulletin on Dangers of a Major Chlorine Release 

During Railcar Unloading; Agency Calls on U.S. Department of 

Transportation to Expand Regulatory Coverage to Require Emergency Shutdown Systems, 2007, http://www.csb.gov/newsroom/

detail.aspx?nid=260

7. Railroad Accident Report, NTSB/RAR-05/04, http://www.ntsb.

gov/Publictn/2005/RAR0504.pdf

8. “Chlorine Tanks Destroyed, Terrorists Killed in Raids,” Multinational Force Iraq, Combined Press Information Center, Press Release A070420a, 20 April 2007, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.

php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11530&Itemid=128

9. “Suicide Vehicle Detonates Outside Police Checkpoint,” Multinational Force Iraq, Combined Press Information Center, Press Release 20070406-34, 6 April 2007, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.

php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11185&Itemid=128 

http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=

11530&Itemid=128

10. “Rumors the Sri Lankan military used chemical weapons,” http://

www.sibernews.com/200904072631.html

11. Railroad Accident Report, NTSB/RAR-05/04, http://www.ntsb.

gov/Publictn/2005/RAR0504.pdf

12. Sidell, F.; Patrick, W. and Dashiell T., Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook, 

Janes Publishing Group, Alexandria, Virginia, 1998.

13. Broughton, Edward, “The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review,” Environmental Health, 10 May 2005, http://www.ncbi.nlm.

nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1142333/

14. “Revisiting the Tragedy: 25 years on, study on Bhopal gas leak effects,” 

http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?F

rom=Search&Source=Find&Key=TOIM/2009/03/07/13/Ar01302.

xml&CollName=TOI_MUMBAI_DAILY_2006&DOCID=746143

&Keyword=(%3Cmany%3E%3Cstem%3Ebhopal)&skin=TOI&Ap

pName=1&PageLabel=13%20&ViewMode=HTML&GZ=T
14

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Technical Warrant Holder: Enabling The Navy’s 

Warfighting Capability in a Chemical, Biological, 

and Radiological (CBR) Environment

By Jon Cofield

The U.S. Navy has tremendous warfighting capabilities. One way the enemy—be it 

a nation state or terrorist—may attempt to degrade these capabilities is through the use 

of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons. A key objective of the chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBRD) community is to provide our warfighters with the means to prevent mission degradation from CBR attacks and eliminate the 

enemy’s incentive to use such weapons.

Department of Defense (DoD) policy requires mission-critical systems to be chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) survivable. It also requires that survivability be accomplished by material measures, or that remediation of vulnerabilities be accomplished through tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) throughout the systems’ life 

cycles. This policy is aimed primarily at the ability of a platform to survive and operate in 

a CBRN environment.1

 A related policy requires program managers (e.g., milestone decision authorities) to address personnel survivability when exposed to residual chemical, biological, and nuclear (i.e., radiation) effects.2

 Inherent in the survivability of personnel and 

platforms is the ability to complete the platform’s mission within a CBRN environment.

The Director, Surface Warfare Division (OPNAV N86) is the Chief of Naval Operations’ (OPNAV’s) Executive Agent for CBRD. This office provides the organizational focus for other military services, joint staff, and DoD agencies, and coordinates with 

warfare sponsors. OPNAV designated the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) as 

the lead systems command (SYSCOM) for CBRD programs.3

Technical Warrant Authority

The Navy also is an integral player in the Joint Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) 

Program, which is responsible for developing CBRD equipment. The NAVSEA Technical 

Warrant Holder (TWH) interfaces with the Joint CBD Program through the Joint Program 

Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD)—as well as its subordinate joint project managers—to ensure that the research, development, acquisition, and 

support of this equipment adequately addresses the Navy’s requirements, as defined by the 

fleet and validated by OPNAV. As the lead SYSCOM for CBRD, NAVSEA has the added 
15

Technical Warrant Holder: Enabling The Navy’s 

Warfighting Capability in a Chemical, Biological, 

and Radiological (CBR) Environment

responsibility for coordinating these efforts not only 

within NAVSEA, but throughout the Navy.

The SYSCOMs defined the role of technical authority “to support program managers and the fleet 

in providing best-value engineering and technical 

products.” 4

 Some key responsibilities include safety and reliability, risk management, technical options for decision makers, and stewardship of the 

technical community. Warrants need to interact 

with each other since products and systems often 

involve multiple technical areas. The TWH is the 

technical voice within the Navy and to the Joint 

CBD Program and the other U.S. military services 

both directly and through designated subject matter experts (SMEs). The CBD TWH supports the 

transition of CBD materiel solutions developed by 

the JPEO-CBD to the fleet. The TWH for CBD’s 

scope of technical authority includes:

•	 Acting as the lead technical advisor to the 

OPNAV executive agent (EA) for CBD

•	 Acting as the lead technical point-of-contact for the CBD areas of:

◆ Individual protection equipment (IPE)

◆ Collective protection

◆ Chemical and biological (CB) detectors

◆ Decontamination systems

◆ Integration of warning and modeling systems

◆ Medical support systems

•	 Providing and advocating for the technical 

details in support of Navy requirements to 

the Joint CBD Program in the development 

of materiel solutions

•	 Leading and providing guidance to the CBD 

SMEs

•	 Providing guidance to ship program offices 

in meeting CBD requirements

•	 Coordinating and collaborating with the 

TWH for medical, climate control, and radiation

•	 Providing CBD execution risk/cost weighting to the program manager

•	 Assessing the health of the engineering 

agents

•	 Maintaining CBD specifications and standards

•	 Providing execution risk guidance for the:

◆ Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)

◆ Naval Special Warfare Command 

(NAVSOC)

◆ Military Sealift Command (MSC)

◆ Naval Facilities Engineering Command 

(NAVFAC)

The CBD TWH’s goal is to partner with the 

Joint CBD Program and the appropriate offices 

within each SYSCOM and program executive office 

(PEO) to provide the best products to the warfighter. NAVSEA SMEs help guide individual programs 

with requirements identification, decomposition, 

and verification.

CBD Engineering and Logistics 

Support Activities

CBD engineering supports Navy missions under chemical or biological threat. It can be thought 

of in terms of avoiding contaminated environments, protecting against contaminants when in 

a contaminated environment, and taking necessary actions when exposed to contaminants in order to ensure survivability. To avoid contaminated 

environments, warfighters need to know, through 

detection, where the contaminants are and where 

the contaminants will likely migrate. The latter is 

achieved through modeling and simulation or information systems (IS). To protect personnel and 

systems against exposure when operating in a contaminated environment, the Navy relies on prophylaxes (e.g., vaccines), IPE, collective protection 

systems (CPS), and protective coatings. To ensure 

survivability when exposed to contaminants, the 

Navy relies on medical countermeasures for individuals, as well as decontamination of individuals 

and equipment. These are also excellent examples 

of cross-warrant interactions as medical, climate 

control, radiological, damage control, and fire protection technical areas are also involved.

To address the entire scope of CBD, the technical warrant authority delegates engineering authority along the following lines:

•	 Detection	 •	 IS

•	 IPE	 •	 CPS

•	 Decontamination	 •	 Medical Support

In addition, the TWH reaches out to the Naval 

Sea Logistics Center to oversee the logistics management across the full spectrum of CB defense. 

Key NAVSEA Warfare Center activities involved 

with engineering support of CB defense equipment 

include:

•	 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD)—located in Dahlgren, Virginia, is the lead for CB detection, CPS, CBRD 

IS, decontamination, and medical support. As 

the lead for these commodities, NSWCDD 

supports joint CBD research development and 

acquisition, fields new equipment, and ensures that Navy needs are properly addressed. 

They also manage the Readiness Assist Visit 

(RAV) efforts, which provide a readiness assessment of all CBR commodities on a ship 

within 90 days prior to deployment.
16

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Figure 1. CBR Team Fits and Measures 

USS Wasp Sailors Prior to Deployment

•	 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (NSWCCD)—located at the Ship Systems 

Engineering Station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the activity assigned responsibility of 

the In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) for 

IPE, CPS, and decontamination. As the ISEA, 

NSWCCD is responsible for the overall engineering, test, maintenance, and logistics requirements of fielded systems and equipment.

•	 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City 

Division (NSWC PCD)—located in Panama 

City, Florida, is designated as the engineering 

agent for CB IPE. As the lead for IPE, NSWC 

PCD supports the joint CBD research, development, testing, and acquisition of IPE; 

fields new equipment; and ensures that Navy 

IPE needs are properly addressed. They also 

oversee the CBD-IPE Readiness Improvement Program (RIP), which ensures that 

every deploying Sailor is outfitted with the 

proper CBD-IPE.

•	 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division 

(NSWC Crane)—located in Crane, Indiana, is 

where detectors containing radioactive material are stored by authority of their Naval Radioactive Material Permit. In addition, NSWC 

Crane serves as the Joint Service Depot for the 

Joint Biological Point Detection System.

Programs to Improve 

Fleet Readiness

The CBD TWH implemented three complementary programs in an agreement with the Type 

Commands that have improved the fleet’s CBRD 

readiness at reduced costs to the Navy. The first two 

programs are the CBD IPE RIP and the RAV Program. Both programs are tied to ship deployments. 

RIP focuses on ensuring that the deploying ships 

are properly outfitted with IPE. RAV addresses all 

CBRD commodity areas to assist the deploying ship 

in improving its CBRD readiness. This provides ship 

commanding officers with full knowledge concerning the ship’s CBRD readiness. As mentioned above, 

NSWC PCD manages the CBD-IPE RIP, which ensures that every deploying Sailor is outfitted with 

the proper CBD-IPE (e.g., gas mask, suits, boots, 

and gloves). Prior to issuance of new equipment, 

each Sailor undergoes sizing of the equipment and 

quantitative fit testing of his or her mask using either a TDA-99M (respirator function tester) or a 

Joint Service Mask Leak Tester. The proper fit and 

sizing of the equipment is essential in order to protect the Sailor in a CB environment. The program 

supports all naval enterprises with fully operational equipment—provided in kit bags—which support 

the Navy’s mission-oriented protective posture and 

continued operations in a CBR threat environment. 

Figure 1 shows a Sailor being fitted for CBR defense 

prior to deployment.

Concerning RAV, a RAV team from NSWCDD 

conducts a readiness assessment of all CBR commodities on a ship within 90 days prior to deployment. 

The team assesses the condition of CBR detectors, 

decontamination consumables, and CPS. The team 

ensures that the ship has been, or is scheduled to be, 

outfitted by RIP. It fields all CB consumables in accordance with the deployment allowance equipment lists, and it provides crew training as necessary 

(see Figure 2). Each ship is provided with completed 

checklists, a readiness review report, recommended 

maintenance requests, and current CBRD literature. 

When each ship returns from deployment, the RAV 

team returns to the ship and collects unexpired consumables for use on another deploying ship.

The implementation of the RIP and RAV efforts 

has reduced the support costs for CBRD equipment 

while ensuring the CBR defense readiness of deploying ships through deployment-focused CBRD 

support. As a result of these programs, the commanding officers of over 130 ships have deployed in 
17

Technical Warrant Holder: Enabling The Navy’s 

Warfighting Capability in a Chemical, Biological, 

and Radiological (CBR) Environment

Figure 2. NSWCDD Engineer Conducts Shipboard CPS Training Aboard USS Tortuga

recent years with the appropriate CBRD equipment 

and full knowledge of their CBR readiness.

The third readiness program is the CPS filter 

change-out program executed by NSWCDD and 

NSWCCD. It replaces CBR filters on a cyclic basis 

and assures proper installation for Sailor protection. 

The team procures multiple filter types for distribution, performs leaks tests to make sure all air passes 

through them, and trains Sailors on the detection of 

problems. Scheduling is particularly important with 

this program, as shipwide cooperation is necessary.

The TWH’s role is to champion Warfare Center ideas for improvements, to increase data surety, and to increase our responsiveness to the Navy 

stakeholders. Increased awareness of Total Ownership Cost provides opportunities to rethink our 

technical options in areas such as IPE, bioconsumables, decontamination, and CPS filters. With the 

addition of risk management practices, the CBD 

team has been able to provide the CBD Program 

Manager with solutions that have already resulted 

in cost avoidance and that will result in millions 

of dollars of cost avoidance across the Future Years 

Defense Program. Many of these actions have been 

executed through the JPEO-CBD and with the other U.S. military services, which means that our collective efforts have DoD-wide benefits.

Future Challenges

As DoD budgets continue to tighten, the expertise and creativity of the CBD engineering and logistics support teams will be needed to maintain and 

improve the fleet’s CBRD readiness. Coordination 

with Navy stakeholders is key to prioritizing Navy 

needs to best focus available resources. Additionally, 

clearly communicating Navy requirements and priorities to the joint community is critical for ensuring that Navy needs are addressed within the Joint 

CBD Enterprise. By leveraging TWHs and their respective authorities, the Navy’s warfighting capabilities are better enabled, even in a CBR environment.

References

1. Department of Defense Instruction, The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability Policy, USD(AT&L), 

Number 3150.09, 17 September 2008, incorporating Change 1, 17 

August 2009.

2. Department of Defense Instruction, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, USD(AT&L), Number 5000.02, 8 December 2008.

3. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological (CBR) Defense Requirements Supporting Operational Fleet Readiness, OPNAVINST 3400.10F, 22 May 1998.

4. Virtual SYSCOM Joint Instruction—VS-JI-22A, Virtual SYSCOM Engineering and Technical Authority Policy, NAVSEAINST 

5400.97C, Ser. TAB/018, 27 November 2006.
18

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Engineering Agents for Chemical and Biological 

Defense Information Systems: Getting the 

Navy’s Information Systems to the Field

By Santiel Creekmore

Recently, when an earthquake and several tsunamis damaged the Fukushima nuclear power plant, it initiated events that would lead to both airborne and waterborne 

releases of radioactive material. Fortunately, the Navy ships operating in the area were 

prepared to handle this threat. This type of event demonstrates the Navy’s need for early warning, reporting, and hazard prediction capabilities. The Navy will use information systems (IS)—such as the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN)a

 and 

the Joint Effects Model (JEM)b

—to provide these capabilities for nuclear (including radiological), biological, and chemical (NBC) hazards. Getting these systems from the 

technology development phase to an operationally proven and fielded Navy capability requires the active involvement of several key players, including the Technical Direction Agent (TDA), the Acquisition Engineering Agent (AEA), and the Logisticians for 

chemical and biological defense (CBD) IS. The TDA, AEA, and Logistician for CBD IS 

provide systems engineering support for the engineering, testing, evaluation, maintenance, and logistics requirements for the development and initial production of the Navy’s CBD IS.

The Naval Sea Systems Command’s (NAVSEA’s) Technical Warrant Holder (TWH) 

for CBD has designated the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Division at 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division as the TDA and AEA for CBD IS. 

The TWH has tasked the TDA, AEA, and Logisticians for CBD IS (collectively referred 

to as engineering agents (EAs) in this article) to ensure that JWARN and JEM are developed, tested, and sustained in accordance with the Navy’s technical policies and standards. The EAs accomplish this by exerting influence on all acquisition activities and 

aspects of an IS. This article focuses on EAs’ activities regarding CBD IS design, architecture, test and evaluation (T&E), and sustainment planning.

EAs and CBD IS Design and Architecture

EAs help ensure that the CBD IS interfaces and information exchanges are compatible 

with the Navy’s command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 

systems and the Navy’s system employment concepts. This compatibility enables the Navy 

to seamlessly exchange NBC information among its components and with joint forces 

(Figure 1) under the various operating conditions. EAs are tasked to find and close gaps 

between CBD IS design, C4I architecture, and the Navy’s system employment concepts. 

They teamed with engineers from the Global Command and Control System–Maritime 
19

Engineering Agents for Chemical and Biological 

Defense Information Systems: Getting the 

Navy’s Information Systems to the Field

Figure 1. JWARN Information Exchanges Occurring Between Navy Components and Joint Forces

(GCCS-M) and the Tactical Messaging program offices to develop architecture for JWARN information exchanges executed under emission control 

(EMCON) conditions. The EAs also teamed with 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) and Knowledge Dominance Action Officers within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to ensure that the architecture was consistent 

with the Navy’s JWARN system employment concept. Once the architecture and details regarding implementation (e.g., communication protocols) were 

validated, they were provided to the JWARN developers to incorporate into the system design. In this 

way, EAs helped ensure that CBD IS interfaces and 

information exchanges support the Navy’s intended 

use under the Navy’s various operating conditions. 

EAs also help mitigate the risks that everchanging information technology (IT) and C4I 

infrastructure pose to CBD IS. These changes include third-party software updates, patches to interfaces, engineering change proposals, waivers, 

and deferrals to IT and C4I infrastructure, as well 

as changes in personnel qualifications/manning. 

The challenges posed by change can be shown by 

the 2009 changes to the Navy’s command and control system, GCCS-M. These changes altered the 

GCCS-M configuration aboard several grouplevel and unit-level ships. The new configuration 

precluded the use of several software applications, 

including JWARN and JEM, thereby reducing the 

number of JWARN-capable ships. This change required the Navy to modify its JWARN system employment concept to ensure that all ships have early 

warning of NBC events.

To support modifications to the system employment concept, the EAs teamed with JWARN 

developers, JEM developers, and GCCS-M engineers to determine what information could be 

exchanged between JWARN-capable and nonJWARN-capable ships. The EAs and engineers 

found that JEM hazard predictions and JWARN’s 

Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-45 plots could 

be exchanged from the JWARN-capable ships to 

the common operational picture (COP) of nonJWARN-capable ships. The JWARN-capable ship 

would create and publish JEM shapefiles and 

JWARN layers in near-real time. These shape files 

and layers would then be published on the nonJWARN-capable ship’s COP via the COP synchronization tools of GCCS-M. This information could 

then be used to plan egress routes and notify landbased units when the area is “clear” (Figure 2). This 

Engineering Agents for Chemical and Biological 

Defense Information Systems: Getting the 

Navy’s Information Systems to the Field
20

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

concept was used to revise the JWARN system employment concept and addressed the gap in early warning created by the decreased number of 

JWARN-capable ships.

EAs and T&E for CBD IS

When in the field, commanding officers and 

emergency responders need to be able to depend upon the CBD IS information products to 

plan operations within NBC environments as they 

make potentially life-and-death decisions. To ensure that decision makers can rely on CBD IS, the 

EAs work closely with IS developers and operational test agencies to ensure that CBD IS systems 

are tested, operationally evaluated, and proven effective and suitable for Navy use prior to fielding. 

EAs are tasked to support all development testing 

and operational testing occurring throughout the 

CBD IS’s life cycle. EAs are members of the T&E 

integrated product team (T&E IPT) that defines 

the test activities, challenges, pass/fail criteria, and 

resources needed to fully test each CBD IS. The 

EA’s role in the T&E IPT is to help testers identify and close gaps between CBD IS test activities 

and the Navy’s system employment concept. For 

example, the Navy’s system employment concept 

and requirements called for JWARN and JEM software to be operated on ships with the versions of 

Common Personal Computer Operating System 

Environment (COMPOSE)c

 that transitioned to 

current Microsoft products (Windows 7, Microsoft Outlook 2008, etc.). JWARN and JEM, however, were developed, integrated, and tested (both 

developmental and operational) within a previous version of COMPOSE that contained earlier versions of the Microsoft products. The EAs 

worked with members of the T&E IPT, GCCS-M 

engineers, and COMPOSE engineers to identify potential issues associated with the change in 

versions (e.g., access to Microsoft exchange server) that would impact JWARN and JEM performance. The EAs also worked with the operational 

test agencies to develop and document a strategy in the T&E master plan (TEMP) to ensure adequate testing for JWARN within all versions of 

COMPOSE. Once documented within the TEMP, 

the T&E IPT was able to identify adequate resources to execute full testing (both developmental and operational) and ensure that JWARN and 

JEM are operationally proven, within all required 

versions of COMPOSE.

EAs monitor the CBD IS performance during 

developmental testing and authenticate test data 

collected during operational testing. By doing so, 

the EAs can inform the Navy’s stakeholder of the 

technical challenges and risks that may prevent 

the CBD IS from meeting the Navy’s needs (e.g., 

loss of interoperability between JWARN fielded to 

Figure 2. COP with JWARN Plot (Yellow) and JEM Hazard Prediction (Blue)—The COP displays 

the areas that need to be contained or avoided with a NATO ATP-45 triangle of the impacted area.
21

Engineering Agents for Chemical and Biological 

Defense Information Systems: Getting the 

Navy’s Information Systems to the Field

Maritime Operation Centers and JWARN developed for ships).

EAs and Sustainment Planning 

for CBD IS

EAs help the Navy plan for sustainment of 

each CBD IS. Prior to fielding a CBD IS, EAs work 

with NAVSEA’s logisticians to maintain and regularly update sustainment plans. Sustainment plans 

for JWARN and JEM specify when the software is 

installed on each ship and who performs the installation, configures the settings, trains the operator (Figure  3), maintains the software/training, 

and maintains a help desk for technical support. 

The EAs update the sustainment plan to address 

IT and C4I infrastructure changes, as well as program schedule and testing deviations. Through 

maintenance of the sustainment plan, EAs enable 

the Navy’s stakeholders to align appropriate levels of sustainment funds for CBD IS capabilities. 

EAs’ sustainment planning activities are critical to 

maintaining the fleet’s readiness for CBD IS.

Engineering Agents (EAs)— 

Value-Added

Warfighters today are faced with a wide variety of NBC threats. Fortunately, the Navy’s EAs 

for CBD IS work hard to see that CBD IS—such as 

JWARN and JEM—are properly designed, are operationally proven, and have adequate sustainment 

plans before they get to the field. If not for the Navy’s 

EAs for CBD IS, Navy and joint warfighters would 

not be equipped with superbly designed and effective CBD IS to defend against NBC threats.

Endnote

a. JWARN is a computer-based application that integrates CBRN data 

and facilitates sensor information into joint and service command 

and control systems for battlespace situational awareness. JWARN 

automates the manual processes of incident reporting and hazard plot generation described in Allied Technical Publication 45. 

JWARN incorporates sensor-alert information and CBRN observation reports from the field, generates a plot of the hazard area, 

displays it on the COP, and generates the warning message. 

b. JEM is a Web-based software application that effectively models and 

simulates the effects of CBRN weapon strikes and incidents. JEM is 

capable of providing warfighters with the ability to accurately model and predict the time-phased impact of CBRN and Toxic Industrial Chemical/Material events and effects. JEM supports planning 

to mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction and provides 

rapid estimates of hazards and effects for integration into the COP.

c. COMPOSE is the underlying infrastructure on which JWARN, 

JEM, and GCCS-M reside. It is a combination of commercial 

off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf products that deliver 

directory services, E-mail, Web acceleration, office automation applications, collaboration tools, and antivirus software.

Figure 3. Operations Specialist 3rd Class David Bevels stands the auto track 

manager and identification operator watch in the Combat Direction Center aboard 

the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan. (Photo Courtesy of U.S. Navy)
22

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Sustaining the Navy’s Chemical and 

Biological Detection Capabilities

By Nancy Haymes

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report related that, “The potential 

spread of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat.” The QDR further related 

that, “As the ability to create and employ weapons of mass destruction spreads globally, so 

must our combined efforts to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons.”1

The 2010 QDR validated the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) instruction entitled 

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Requirements Supporting Operational Fleet Readiness, which included a statement from OPNAVINST 3400.10F, which 

references the 1997 QDR in stating that, “...weapons of mass destruction (WMD) present a grave and urgent challenge to the United States, our allies, and troops abroad.”

The instruction then went on to relate:

“Consistent with national policy and strategy, the Navy shall maintain those 

CBR defense capabilities required to support deterrence and enhance conventional warfighting through defensive means. The goal is to ensure that the use or threat 

of use of chemical or biological weapons or radiological contamination against a 

naval force will be a nondecisive factor in the outcome of any operation.”2

Chemical and biological (CB) detection systems are required for Sailors to take protective actions and initiate treatment, as required, to minimize the impact of CB agents 

that are employed against naval forces. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) performs sustainment in support of CB detection equipment fielded to the Sailor by providing direct fleet technical expertise and assistance. NSWCDD 

supports sustainment by:

•	 Maintaining technical and logistical documentation

•	 Complying with legal and regulatory requirements

•	 Acquiring facilities for staging, storing, and maintaining fielded and radiological 

source detectors

•	 Providing configuration management of the Navy’s CB detectors

•	 Disposing of retired systems

Example CB agent detection systems are shown in Figure 1.
23

Sustaining the Navy’s Chemical and 

Biological Detection Capabilities

Figure 1. Examples of Chemical and Biological Agent Detection Systems

Sustainment of CB agent detection systems enables:

•	 Sailors to operate and maintain CB systems 

and execute the processes that will allow fleet 

forces to avoid CB contamination

•	 The supply system to procure quality spares 

and repair parts to maintain detection systems

•	 Trainers to train the Sailor

•	 The support infrastructure to validate/revise doctrine, develop and execute improved business processes, develop product 

improvements to reduce operational and 

support costs, and to enhance the Sailors’ 

operational capability

Roles and Responsibilities

NSWCDD performs sustainment of CB detectors in support of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Ship Integrity and Performance 

Engineering  Directorate, Damage Control and 

Personnel Protection (SEA 05P14). These functions are performed by the Technical Direction 

Agent (TDA), Acquisition Engineering Agent 

(AEA), In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA), and 

Configuration Manager (CM). The TDA provides 

engineering and technical expertise and leadership for the Navy’s CB detection systems and supports NAVSEA 05P14 in the form of briefings, 

technical reports, policy instructions, and white 

papers to support the readiness and sustainment 

for both shipboard and shore sites. The TDA 

supports all research, development, testing, and 

evaluation programs related to the Navy’s CB detection needs.

The AEA provides budgetary, logistician planning, and sustainment of U.S. Navy CB detectors. 

Responsibilities include asset management, production of reports and trend analyses from performance 

data, improvements to logistics and processes to improve overall fleet readiness—reducing costs when 

and where possible—and developing and executing 

a demilitarization plan for all legacy CB detectors. 

The ISEA provides effective management of 

waterfront team assets to support legacy detectors. This includes interfacing with ship install 

teams; monitoring cost, schedule, and performance 

changes as needed; and responding to routine and 

emergent fleet issues needing resolution. It also includes maintaining knowledgeable training assets 
24

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

and providing training to the Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs) and warfighters. 

The CM provides technical support to the AEA 

and ISEA in the form of database analysis and updates for configuration, alteration, or logistics 

data specific to CB detectors. This is done utilizing the Configuration Data Managers Database–

Open Architecture (CDMD-OA). CDMD-OA has 

been designated by NAVSEA’s Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations (SEA 04) as the 

official repository for all Navy equipment and systems. The CM interfaces with the logisticians, program manager, Alteration Installation Team, AEA, 

ISEA, Waterfront Team, and other technical points 

of contact to obtain the most accurate data in concurrence with the associated life-cycle milestone.

Legal and Regulatory 

Requirements

Many of the CB detectors that the Navy uses 

contain a radiological source, which means that the 

detector must comply with legal and regulatory requirements as dictated by the Radiological Affairs 

Support Office (RASO). RASO is a detachment of 

NAVSEA and is responsible for establishing policy for all radioactive material owned by the Department of Defense. Currently, the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Crane Division (NSWC Crane) 

maintains the Naval Radioactive Material Permit 

(NRMP) for CB detection systems. This permit allows for the handling and distribution of radiation 

source CB detectors. Compliance with the NRMP 

is mandated by RASO. 

The NRMP requires a biyearly physical inventory of all radiation-source CB detectors. The inventory includes tracking the serial number and 

location of each CB detector. For fielded assets, 

NSWC Crane releases a naval message requiring 

each unit to perform this inventory and provide 

information back. Units that are nonresponsive to 

this request are subject to an external audit conducted by NSWC Crane. Possible impacts of noncompliance include fines, negative impact to the 

Commanding Officer’s fitness reports, and the revocation of the NRMP permit, leaving the fleet 

without the necessary CB detection capabilities, as 

required by instruction. For stored assets, NSWC 

Crane performs the physical inspection of all assets 

at their facility. Following the inventory, a formal 

report is sent to RASO, which accounts for all units 

either through serial number inventory verification or through a Judge Advocate General Manual 

investigation of missing units. 

NSWC Crane will continue to maintain the 

NRMP for CB detection systems until NSWCDD 

NRMP’s are approved and assets can be legally 

transferred. NSWCDD is currently building a facility acceptable for staging and maintaining radiation-source CB detectors that comply with 

regulatory requirements.

Touching the Fleet

When a command has an issue or concern with 

their CB detection equipment, the ISEA is notified, and the appropriate activities are contacted. An 

ISEA Waterfront Team from NSWCDD has been 

established on both the East and West coasts to address concerns/repairs quickly and efficiently, resulting in tremendous cost savings to the Navy. This 

team is able to provide direct fleet technical support 

within hours after an issue is raised. Moreover, it can 

perform limited repairs on some CB detectors, such 

as the Improved Point Detection System (IPDS) on 

board ship. This significantly decreases downtime of 

the equipment, as well as cost per repair.

The ISEA Waterfront Team also provides individualized hands-on training and support to Navy 

warfighters, technicians, and support staff to increase operator and corporate knowledge of CB detectors. This includes training for RMC personnel 

who frequently support CB detectors. The training focuses on troubleshooting minor repairs of 

shipboard CB detectors. Waterfront training to the 

warfighter is also provided. Most training is provided by the CB Detector Schoolhouse at the Center 

of Naval Engineering located at the Norfolk Naval 

Base, the Navy’s Fleet Training Centers, and Afloat 

Training Groups. Their support includes ensuring 

that the course curriculum reflects the proper operation and maintenance of fielded CB detectors. 

Training devices are also maintained by the RMCs 

and the CBR Waterfront Team to ensure that they 

are fully operational and represent the current configuration of fielded CB detectors.

Sustainment Supports Readiness

NSWCDD, in partnership with NSWC Crane, 

works to ensure that naval warfighters can continue to rely on their CB detection systems and are 

trained to use those systems in the event of a chemical or biological attack. Accordingly, by sustaining CB detection systems, the divisions are actively 

supporting Navy readiness.

References

1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, February 2010.

2. Chief of Naval Operations, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological 

(CBR) Defense Requirements Supporting Operational Fleet Readiness, OPNAVINST 3400.10F, 22 May 1998.
25

Sustaining the Navy’s Chemical and 

Biological Detection Capabilities

Sustaining the Navy’s Chemical and 

Biological Detection Capabilities

CAM

Chemical Agent Monitor

JBPDS

Joint Biological Point 

Detection System 

JCAD

Joint Chemical 

Agent Detector

JCAD

Joint Chemical 

Agent Detector

DFU/HHA

Dry Filter Unit / 

Hand-Held Assay

CBR

Chemical, Biological, 

and Radiological

Protection
26

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

CBRD Waterfront Team 

Improves Fleet Readiness

By Tara Lalonde and Ronald Roller

On 12 October 2000, terrorists used a small boat laden with explosives to attack 

USS Cole (DDG 67) while it was refueling in Aden Harbor, Yemen, resulting in the loss 

of 17 Sailors.1

 News of the attack devastated Americans. A photograph of the damage 

caused by the terrorist attack on USS Cole is shown in Figure 1.2

In reflecting on the attack, what if the terrorists had used chemical or biological 

weapons? Would the Sailors have been prepared? Would the shipboard systems have 

been operable? Would the Sailors have been trained to use the equipment?

The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)—in response to Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) and Naval Air Enterprise (NAE) concerns of heightened risk of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack—established the Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD) Readiness Support Policy in 2007 to increase afloat fleet 

CBRD readiness. This policy launched the Readiness Assist Visit (RAV) Program that 

provides a comprehensive CBRD assessment to all ships within 90 days of deployment. 

The purpose of the RAV is threefold:

1. Assess all chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) equipment and systems 

2. Train shipboard personnel in operation and maintenance

3. Inventory and issue the chemical and biological warfare agent consumables 

The following equipment and systems are assessed during the course of a visit:

•	 Collective Protection System (CPS)

•	 Improved Point Detection System (IPDS) 

•	 Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) 

•	 Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS)

•	 Dry Filter Unit (DFU) 

•	 Radiological Detectors

•	 Portable Chemical Agent Detectors 

•	 Decontamination

Since its inception, the RAV team has increased CBRD readiness by an average 

of 49 percent on more than 170 ships. A RAV team assessing the JBAIDS on board 

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) is shown in Figure 2.
27

CBRD Waterfront Team 

Improves Fleet Readiness

In February 2009, following the success of the 

RAV Program, NAVSEA chartered a Navy CBRD 

Waterfront Fleet Support Team, which was endorsed by Fleet Forces Command and the Office 

of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Waterfront 

Team, centered at Naval Station Norfolk and Naval 

Base San Diego, boasts over 140 years of combined 

shipboard experience. In addition to the RAV support, the Waterfront Team provides:

•	 Centralized consumables management

•	 Shipboard support to CBR commodity 

owners 

•	 Management of the CBRD website 

•	 New CBRD equipment installation support

•	 Subject matter expert (SME) support for 

CBR training

•	 Publication and documentation SME support

Centralized Consumables 

Management

With warehouse space located on both coasts, 

the CBRD Waterfront Team is responsible for centrally managing all chemical and biological detection consumables. These consumables are very costly 

and have stringent shelf-life criterion, which makes 

it overly burdensome for the ships to individually 

manage. In managing the consumable material on 

Figure 1. Damage Caused by the Terrorist Attack on USS Cole (DDG 67) in October 2000

Figure 2. A RAV Team Assesses the Joint Biological Agent 

Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS) On Board 

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
28

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Figure 3. Approximately 23,000 sq ft of Storage in Norfolk, Virginia, Houses Equipment and Consumables for Various CBR Commodities

behalf of the fleet, the Waterfront Team is able to increase readiness and maximize cost efficiencies by leveraging the RAV program to field the material to 

deploying ships and then return the material to a rotational pool when ships come back from deployment. All material is bar-coded, which provides the 

ability to track expiration dates and maximize shelf 

life. This alleviates the need for each ship to conduct 

an annual inventory, since the bar-coded inventory 

is automatically rolled up to the Annual Report to 

Congress (ARC). A storage facility in Norfolk, Virginia, that houses equipment and consumables for 

various CBR commodities is shown in Figure 3.

Shipboard Support to CBR 

Commodity Owners

Various CBR commodity owners fund the Waterfront Team to provide direct fleet support on their 

behalf. Particularly noteworthy is the support provided to the CPS and Detection Acquisition Engineering Agents (AEAs), and to the program manager 

for the JBPDS. In 2010, the Waterfront Team—in 

conjunction with the Surface Warfare Officer School 

(SWOS) and the Naval Education and the Training 

Program Development Center (NETPDC)—filmed 

a CPS filter change-out on board USS Cole. This video will be used as a training tool to provide increased 

fleet awareness and shipboard support. The warehouses are also utilized to store and stage CPS filters 

for each change-out.

In late 2009, the Radiological Affairs Support 

Office (RASO) authorized a “U” radiation permit, 

which allows repairs of IPDS units to be conducted in the laboratories located at both warehouses. 

By conducting the repairs, the ship is no longer required to requisition a new unit. Consequently, this 

Waterfront Team effort will save the Navy a projected $2 million annually while this system is fielded. 

A photograph of a CBR Waterfront Team member 

conducting IPDS repairs in the Norfolk, Virginia, 

laboratory is shown in Figure 4.

Management of the CBRD Website

The CBRD Waterfront Support Team is also 

responsible for maintaining the CBRD website. 
29

CBRD Waterfront Team 

Improves Fleet Readiness

The website provides valuable information that the 

more than 1800 registered Sailors can access 24/7, 

including the most current CBR guidance and documentation, as well as a plethora of other resources. The “Ask the Expert” function included on the 

website allows questions to be e-mailed to the Waterfront Team; Sailors typically receive appropriate 

direction within 24 hours. The CBRD website allows the Waterfront Support Team to provide distance support for deployed units, including ships 

operating in theater.

New CBRD Equipment 

Installation Support

In addition to CBR sustainment efforts, the Waterfront Team also supports new equipment installations. The Norfolk, Virginia, warehouse serves as 

the site for the acceptance testing and inventorying 

of each JBPDS, JBAIDS, and Joint Chemical Agent 

Detector (JCAD) prior to initial fielding.

SME Support for CBR Training

Given the ever-increasing terrorist threat, 

training for CBR events is improving. The Waterfront Team recently helped to develop shipboard 

drills and scenarios in conjunction with the staff 

at Commander, Third Fleet. The drills help to train 

and assess first responders and support personnel in the collection and processing of simulated 

biological warfare agents—from discovery to final 

analysis confirmation.

Publication and Documentation 

SME Support

Existing doctrine, as promulgated in the Surface Force Training Manual, mandates shipboard 

Figure 4. A CBR Waterfront Team Member Conducts Improved Point Detection System (IPDS) 

Repairs in the Norfolk, Virginia, Laboratory
30

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

training in a CBR environment. For many years, 

the manual was tailored for scenarios that no 

longer reflect the current “real-world threat.” Liaisons with the Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF); the Afloat Training Group (ATG); the 

numbered fleet commanders; and the CBRD Waterfront Support Team have resulted in an updated 

version to be released soon. The revision includes 

mandatory drills for biological warfare and a more 

robust self-assessment to be conducted by ship 

personnel on CBR systems and equipment.

Emergency Life Support System

At the request of the CNSF, the CBRD Waterfront Team recently joined in a teaming effort with 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City to include assessment and training of the Self-Contained 

Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) charging systems during the RAV. This system provides breathing air to 

emergency responders on board ship in the case of 

fires and/or toxic gas emissions. Although SCBA 

systems fall outside of the CBRD scope, cost efficiencies are realized by utilizing RAV, since the team 

is already on board the ship conducting an assessment and training of the CBR equipment.

Conclusion

In today’s world of terrorist threats, ships 

must be capable of operating in a CBR environment. The possibility of a CBR attack on a naval ship is no longer remote. For many years, it 

was the responsibility of the ship’s damage-control organization to equip the ship for all CBR and 

damage-control contingencies. Today, the CBRD 

Waterfront Team outfits each ship with the necessary CBR equipment and supplies prior to deployment, and trains Sailors in the operation and 

maintenance of all CBR systems and equipment. 

Though the CBRD Waterfront Support Team is a 

relatively new initiative, the proven increase in 

readiness and knowledge of Sailors demonstrates 

that the program is paramount in establishing and 

maintaining readiness for the warfighter on the 

front line.

References

1. USS Cole (DDG 67), http://www.cole.navy.mil/site%20pages/history.aspx, accessed 20 July 2010.

2. FBI History, Famous Cases & Criminals, “USS Cole Bombing,” 

http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/cole/cole.htm, accessed 

21 July 2010.

30

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support
31

CBRD Waterfront Team 

Improves Fleet Readiness

CBRD Waterfront Team 

Improves Fleet Readiness
32

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Chemical and Biological Defense Individual 

Protection Equipment Materiel Readiness 

Improvement Program 

By Michael Carl

Introduction

The ever-changing challenges in supporting Overseas Contingency Operations have forced the Navy to make radical changes in the approach for equipping forward-deployed and deploying naval forces. In 

what has become an extremely fast-paced environment, the warfighters were in desperate need of a logistics support solution that ensured 

they were consistently provided with fully serviceable individual protection equipment (IPE)—capable of preventing or reducing individual exposures when faced with chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) threats. To deal with this challenge, a partnership was 

formed between the Navy’s resource, requirements, and materiel development offices. This partnership has been focused on improving the 

materiel readiness and sustainment affordability of this vital equipment. 

Combining principles drawn from the concepts for reduction of Total 

Ownership Cost and LEAN thinking, the Naval Sea Systems Command 

(NAVSEA); the Office for Chemical and Biological Defense; and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division (NSWC PCD), Extreme Environments and Life Support Branch, have implemented an 

extremely successful business transformation for the management of 

the Navy’s IPE assets, known as the IPE Readiness Improvement Program (RIP). The foundation that makes the IPE RIP successful is based 

on three core concepts:

1. IPE kit bags, one per each warfighter

2. Quantitative fit testing and sizing of the individual warfighters 

for proper-fitting chemical protective clothing and masks

3. Centralized management of the Navy-wide IPE assets

Editor’s Note: In August 2010, 

the author, Mike Carl, passed 

away, leaving a legacy of excellence in support of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) defense systems. This 

article is a testament to his skill 

and devotion in providing CBRN 

solutions for our warfighters.
33

Chemical and Biological Defense Individual Protection 

Equipment Materiel Readiness Improvement Program

Figure 1. Individual Protection Equipment (IPE): Protective Gear

Readiness Improvement 

Program (RIP)

The concept of the RIP began in 2002. At that 

time, combatant commanders realized that they 

had an urgent need to:

•	 Promote the capability to have their warfighters have their protective gear close at 

hand (see Figure 1)

•	 Give better care to the equipment

•	 Aid in the accountability of the equipment

In response to warfighter feedback, the NAVSEA 

Office for Chemical and Biological Defense and 

the NSWC PCD, Extreme Environments and 

Life Support Branch analyzed various alternatives 

for meeting the combatant commander needs. 

The most noteworthy alternative identified by this 

working group was the RIP. The most attractive 

feature of the program is the fact that it would 

not only address combatant commander needs, 

but it would also ensure that forward-deployed 

and deploying forces were provided with properly 

sized IPE ready for immediate retrieval in response 

to the dictated mission-oriented protective posture 

(MOPP) condition, which includes a fully serviceable, 

properly fitted chemical protective mask.

In order to meet the combatant commanders’ 

need to have protective gear close at hand, give better care to the equipment, and aid in the accountability of the equipment, it was necessary to provide 

the equipment as a serialized kit that could be issued to each individual warfighter (see Figure 2).

Legacy Process—Prior to RIP

This legacy process, as reflected in Figure  3, 

provided limited accountability, and unsatisfactory materiel and operational readiness, and was a 

burden to the warfighter. This is greatly due to limited oversight and inaccurate inventories of equipment assets.

Current Process

It was clearly evident that the forces deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 

were not at adequate chemical and biological defense (CBD) readiness levels, and that the typical way of doing business would not support the 
34

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

immediate requirements for OIF or future CBD 

operations. The partnership, by implementing policy and doctrinal changes, morphed the operations 

and support (O&S) processes for maintaining the 

Navy’s IPE into the current process reflected in 

Figure 4. The key components of the process are to 

provide centralized asset management and to conduct fit-testing and sizing operations, ensuring that 

forward-deployed and deploying forces are, in fact, 

provided with properly sized IPE ready for immediate retrieval in response to various MOPP conditions, and that this equipment is fully serviceable 

with a properly fitted chemical protective mask.

The IPE Commodity Area is a diverse organization that is strategically positioned to fully meet 

the demands of the Navy Warfare Enterprises. 

The organizational structure selected provides the 

most favorable cost, as compared to the amount 

of resources, facilities, response time, etc., that is 

required and provided. The Navy IPE support organization and locations are depicted in Figure 5.

Centralized Assets Management

The foundation that makes the IPE RIP successful is the centralized management of the Navywide assets, and the cornerstone of the management 

of these assets is the NAVSEA Consolidated Storage Facility (CSF), which is located at Fort Worth, 

Texas. This is a Government Services Administration (GSA)-owned/customer-leased facility that is 

approximately 240-K square feet of completely utilized space.

Figure 3. Legacy Process

Figure 2. Individual Protection Equipment (IPE): Serialized Kit
35

Chemical and Biological Defense Individual Protection 

Equipment Materiel Readiness Improvement Program

Figure 5. Navy IPE Support Structure and Locations

Figure 4. Current Process
36

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Personnel at the warehouse locations provide 

total end-item support, including:

•	 Inspecting for serviceability of chemical protective equipment and mask

•	 Cleaning and sanitizing protective mask

•	 Testing mask utilizing the TDA-99M or 

the new Joint Service Mask Leakage Tester 

(JSMLT)

•	 Laser etching the masks with a bar-code serial number

•	 Assembling and disassembling equipment

•	 Bar-coding other IPE

•	 Packaging for shipment

•	 Assembling generic and individual IPE kits

•	 Managing inventory 

•	 Managing shelf life

•	 Providing asset visibility for the annual reports to Congress

•	 Procuring spare parts and repair parts

•	 Providing maintenance and repair services

The basic workflow process for the management of 

the Navy’s centralized IPE assets is depicted in Figure 6.

Fit Testing and Sizing

During fit testing and sizing (see Figure 7), the 

following activities are performed:

•	 Perform protective mask sizing and quantitative fit testing using JSMLT

•	 Perform IPE sizing and fit verification

•	 Provide a data file populated with mask and 

IPE sizing data

•	 Have the individual sign a page 13 containing fitting, sizing, and personal data

•	 Provide training on the conduct of mask fitting and IPE sizing with designated personnel

•	 Provide training on the operation of the TDA99M or JSMLT with designated personnel

Conclusion

The NAVSEA CBD IPE RIP has been a colossal 

success in maintaining a high level of materiel and 

operational readiness that is affordable, providing 

the Warfare Enterprise with the capability to operate 

effectively and decisively in the face of CBRN threats.

Implementing the RIP—and thereby redirecting the O&S requirements for the inventory, care, 

and maintenance of this vital equipment—has enabled a severely undermanned and overburdened 

warfighting community to focus on the more crucial aspects of their missions: training, logistics support, and execution. Plus, not only is the materiel 

and operational readiness consistently sustained 

at combat-ready levels, but the overall Navy’s Total 

Ownership Cost has been significantly decreased.

Figure 6. Centralized Assets Management Basic Process

IPE is delivered to the CSF

(a)

IPE is sorted

PMS is performed

(b)

IPE is bar-coded

Masks are laser-etched

Information is entered into IMS

(c)

Assessments are performed

(d)

Tests are conducted

(e)

IPE is kitted

Designated kits are returned

Excess gear is returned to stock

Information is entered into the IMS

(f)
37

Chemical and Biological Defense Individual Protection 

Equipment Materiel Readiness Improvement Program

Figure 7. Fit Testing and Sizing

Sailors fit tested with masks

Sailors sized for proper-fitting IPE

Chemical and Biological Defense Individual Protection 

Equipment Materiel Readiness Improvement Program
38

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Shipboard Isolation and Quarantine: 

Protecting Sailors From Infectious Diseases

By John Garmon

Ensign Rodgers was relieved of his duties just after midnight in the signal room due 

to his disruptive coughing. As he made his way down to medical, he collapsed and began coughing up blood. Even to the untrained seaman who helped him to medical, Rodgers’ condition clearly represented something unusual.

Naturally occurring or maliciously spread infectious diseases pose a direct threat to 

warfighters, ships, and the fleet. Doctors and corpsmen are trained to methodically diagnose patients using their knowledge, resources, and contacts to handle infectious diseases, but without proper facilities and protocol, many Sailors remain at risk.

Given the Navy’s global presence, the preceding example of a shipborne infectious 

disease outbreak is a real possibility. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 

epidemic in 2003 represented an actual example that put many Navy personnel in the 

Pacific region at high risk of being exposed to the deadly disease. A subsequent review of 

medical protocol and emergency response plans for infectious disease outbreaks clearly indicated that there was a need for an isolation and quarantine capability aboard U.S. 

Navy ships. Figure 1 shows the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) being 

moved by tugboats to a pier in Busan, Republic of Korea.

In 2005, Commander Third Fleet (C3F) sponsored a limited-scope evaluation of 

a temporary shipboard isolation and quarantine (SIQ) capability. The evaluation assessed the feasibility of using existing damage-control equipment (de-smoking fans, 

smoke curtains, etc.) and commercial high-efficiency particulate air filter and ultraviolet air purification equipment to meet Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC) recommended guidelines for air exchanges, directional airflow, negative pressure, and air-cleaning requirements. Engineering support for this effort was provided by 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), and medical support 

was provided by the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC). The ship’s damage control 

equipment was found capable of meeting the CDC guidelines; however, poor access for 

medical personnel and environmental control of the space were identified as obstacles 

to ensure proper patient care if the capability was required for more than a 24-hour period. A makeshift anteroom aboard CVN 76 for the 2005 experiment is shown in Figure 2.
39

Shipboard Isolation and Quarantine: 

Protecting Sailors From Infectious Diseases

Figure 1. 100721-N-2013O-422 BUSAN, Republic of Korea (21 July 2010) Tugboats move the aircraft 

carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) to a pier in Busan, Republic of Korea. This is the first port 

visit for George Washington during its 2010 summer patrol in the western Pacific Ocean and the 

second visit to Busan by the ship since October 2008. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication 

Specialist 3rd Class Charles Oki/Released)

The evaluation revealed that the commercial 

air-purification equipment performed well, but 

was not suitable for shipboard application due to 

size, weight, and noise factors. In their final report, 

NHRC staff identified elements that were essential for proper patient care. They also identified the 

need to examine doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) elements in relation to the 

potential SIQ capability. Some of the recommendations made by NHRC included:

•	 A vestibule for controlled entry and exit

•	 Sufficient storage for personal protective 

equipment

•	 Personal hygiene supplies

•	 Proper food and laundry delivery/removal 

processes

•	 Access to toilet and shower facilities

These capability gaps were confirmed by C3F as the 

“next steps” in developing the SIQ capability.

Developing this capability for the fleet was given a higher priority in 2009, as influenza virus H1N1 

spread around the world and became a potential 

threat to fleet readiness. In response, a SIQ Limited Objective Experiment (LOE) was approved by 

Shipboard Isolation and Quarantine: 

Protecting Sailors From Infectious Diseases

Figure 2. Makeshift Anteroom for the 

2005 Limited-Scope Evaluation
40

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and was 

subsequently funded by the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense 

(JPEO-CBD). Objectives of the current LOE are to:

•	 Identify materiel and nonmateriel solutions 

for establishing SIQ capability on the Navy’s 

large-deck amphibious ships

•	 Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTPs) and medical protocol that can be 

used in conjunction with SIQ space

•	 Analyze DOTMLPF impacts of providing 

SIQ capabilities to the fleet

The SIQ LOE Team completed a 3-day tabletop 

exercise in May 2010 to evaluate the preliminary 

TTPs, identify potential materiel requirements, and 

begin to list DOTMLPF impacts. The final phase of 

the LOE was a live experiment on board a Navy 

ship to test the revised TTPs using a SIQ area 

mock-up provided by JPEO-CBD and NSWCDD. 

A photograph of the SIQ LOE live experiment is 

shown in Figure 3.

In line with the original objectives, the LOE 

should result in a more mature understanding of 

the DOTMLPF impacts, TTPs, and materiel requirements. The goal is to protect warfighters from 

the spread of infectious disease and maximize fleet 

readiness by providing the foundation for this isolation and quarantine capability. Once achieved, 

warfighters will benefit from safe and effective SIQ 

capabilities that protect them from exposure to infectious diseases. 

Figure 3. 100819-N-7282P-001 SAN DIEGO (19 August 2010) Sailors aboard the amphibious assault 

ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8) transport a simulated patient infected with a contagious disease from 

an experimental isolation unit during a Limited Objective Experiment. The 3rd Fleet sponsored evolution 

focused on developing new ways to isolate and quarantine Sailors suspected of contracting a contagious 

disease. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Phillip Pavlovich/Released)
41

Shipboard Isolation and Quarantine: 

Protecting Sailors From Infectious Diseases

Shipboard Isolation and Quarantine: 

Protecting Sailors From Infectious Diseases
42

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Joint Project Manager for Protection 

Leverages NSWCDD’s Systems Engineering and 

Integration Expertise in New Trail Boss Role

By Jorge Hernandez

When the Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense 

(JPEO-CBD) identified the need for a single point of contact resident within his office to integrate chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND) capabilities into major defense acquisition programs (MDAP), the Joint Project Manager 

(JPM) for Collective Protection and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) were the first choice. 

The JPEO-CBD established the MDAP Trail Boss in response to a 2006 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report. The GAO report found that the integration of CBRND 

capabilities was not consistent across the nine major weapons systems and platforms reviewed. This inconsistency resulted in duplication of effort and an increased risk to the 

warfighter due to interoperability issues.1 The Trail Boss concept ensures consistent integration of CBRND capabilities across the military services by:

•	 Building partnerships for the integration of technology

•	 Building consensus for major governance and acquisition decisions

•	 Being responsible for horizontal integration across the enterprise

In January 2011, the JPM offices for Collective Protection, Individual Protection, 

and Decontamination converged into a single organization, the JPM Office for Protection. At the same time, the JPM Office for Protection became the MDAP Trail Boss. The 

MDAP Trail Boss is responsible for facilitating research, development, testing, procurement, operations and sustainment, and delivery of CBRND systems in support of platforms designated CBR mission critical, as well as those requiring CBRND capabilities.

The MDAP Trail Boss focuses on coordinating with the supported program manager early in the acquisition process to ensure that their CBRND capability requirements are adequately addressed in a way that minimizes redundancy of effort across the 

Department of Defense (DoD) throughout the life cycle of the platform. MDAP supports the development of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) concept of operations (CONOPS) for the host platform, which can then be used, along with 
43

Joint Project Manager for Protection Leverages 

NSWCDD’s Systems Engineering and Integration 

Expertise in New Trail Boss Role

capability documents and the projected threat, to 

derive the platform’s CBRND requirements. The 

MDAP Trail Boss is divided into five product areas:

1. Ground Mobile (i.e., ground vehicles)

2. Ships

3. Aircraft (e.g., rotary and fixed-wing)

4. Fixed Site (i.e., buildings)

5. Transportable (i.e., portable shelters and 

gear worn by the warfighter)

To assist in executing the MDAP Trail Boss 

responsibilities, the JPM for Protection assigned 

NSWCDD the role of Director for CBRN Survivability and MDAP Support (currently held by the 

author). This position is supported by a team of 

NSWCDD system engineers. This Systems Engineering Team documents the requirements derived 

from the CONOPS and the program’s capability documents, along with the methods to be used 

to validate these requirements in a Requirements 

Traceability Matrix. By leveraging the expertise 

across the JPEO enterprise, the CBRND requirements are then used to identify the total family of 

subsystems and components from the JPEO-CBD 

portfolio, which satisfy platform CBRND capability requirements within the platform’s cost, schedule, and performance parameters. This family is 

known as the CBRND capability set (CapSet). For 

example, the MDAP Trail Boss is working closely 

with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program to develop a chemical and biological (CB) defense CapSet 

to meet the program’s survivability and force protection requirements (see Figure 1). The JSF Operational Requirements Document (ORD) requires 

that the aircraft must be designed to facilitate pilot 

survivability and facilitate decontamination when 

exposed to CB agents. To address these critical requirements, the MDAP Trail Boss and his partners 

are developing a CB defense CapSet consisting of 

a flight mask and an aircraft decontamination system for use in the JSF live fire testing.

The MDAP Trail Boss’s use of the systems engineering process ensures consistent application 

and integration of CBRND capabilities throughout the DoD. This process prevents duplication of 

effort, assists programs in achieving their CBRN 

survivability requirements, increases interoperability amongst the various platforms, and affirms 

that CBRND systems are sustainable throughout the life of the platform. As more platforms 

integrate CBRND capabilities, the joint force commanders will see a significant increase in CBRND 

situational awareness, enhancing the Soldier, Sailor, Airmen, and Marines’ ability to continue effective operations in the presence of a CBRND threat.

Reference

1. Chemical and Biological Defense: DoD Needs Consistent Policies 

and Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of Weapon Systems 

Against Chemical and Biological Threats, Report to Congressional 

Committees, GAO report GAO-06-592, April 2006.

Figure 1. The Joint Strike Fighter Chemical and Biological Defense CapSet

JSF Decontamination System Joint Service Aircrew Mask - JSF
44

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Fixed-Facility Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD): Protecting 

Building Occupants From Airborne Threats

By Kevin Cogley and Walter Dzula

Chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBRD) systems are utilized in many 

government and Department of Defense (DoD) buildings to protect occupants and 

equipment from airborne chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) threats without 

requiring evacuation or the donning of personal protective equipment (see Figure 1). 

These systems utilize specialized filtration, detection, notification, and decontamination 

equipment to provide safe working environments for facilities such as command and 

control centers, communication nodes, and medical facilities.

Personnel from the CBR Protection and Integration Branch of the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) lead multiple CBRD integration projects 

at DoD and government facilities. These projects have varied from small-scale retrofit efforts to multimillion-dollar construction programs in locations ranging from the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area to facilities overseas in multiple areas of responsibility. 

Working under the umbrella of the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD), NSWCDD partners with other organizations—including Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and other 

sponsors and programs—to develop and field facility CBRD systems. Working with these 

partners, NSWCDD personnel develop and field optimal solutions and systems that support critical missions, reduce life-cycle costs, and shape the future of fixed-facility CBRD.

Facility CBRD System Design

Effective CBRD systems in facilities provide a significant level of protection for 

building occupants against internal and external threats. These systems range from robust architectures that ensure mission continuity to low-impact design changes that 

increase protection and support evacuation. They also affect the long-term impact of 

restoration after an attack, as CBRD systems can reduce the spread of contaminants in a 

facility, reducing the time and cost of remediation.

In 2008, the DoD published Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-024-01, Security Engineering: Procedures for Designing Airborne Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Protection for Buildings.

1

 This document, developed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
45

Fixed-Facility Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD): Protecting 

Building Occupants From Airborne Threats

with the support of other DoD activities including 

NSWCDD, provides minimum criteria and design 

guidance for facility CBRD systems. UFC 4-024-01 

is intended for building owners, antiterrorism/

force protection (AT/FP) specialists, and architects and engineers to ensure that facilities include 

equipment and design elements to protect against 

CBR threats. The document focuses on systems 

that provide occupants with protection for mission durations of days to weeks, as well as low-cost 

measures that can be implemented at any facility 

to provide some level of protection for occupants. 

The measures described in UFC 4-024-01 include 

enhanced measures beyond those described in another DoD document, UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings.

The CBRD systems implemented at most mission-critical facilities include: 

•	 Equipment to provide for the collective protection of occupants

•	 Detection of threats inside and outside the 

facility

•	 Means to decontaminate personnel

Facility collective protection systems provide 

contaminant-free areas within a facility, enabling 

personnel to move about freely without individual protective equipment. These systems include 

air filtration using military-grade carbon and highefficiency particulate arresting (HEPA) filters, which 

remove chemical and biological agents, radiological 

particles, and many toxic industrial chemicals (see 

Figure 2). Collectively protected spaces are maintained at an overpressure (generally less than 0.5 

inches water gauge (inwg)) with respect to surrounding areas; such low overpressures reduce the 

fan and filtration equipment costs and are generally unnoticeable to the general public. Detection 

systems must be capable of detecting threats in low 

quantities in the air. These detectors are often located at intakes and interior areas such as corridors 

and lobbies. Additionally, detectors may be located in fixed positions around the facility perimeter, providing an early-warning standoff detection 

capability. Facility missions with a requirement to 

in-process personnel during a CBR event also incorporate entry decontamination. These solutions 

range from stand-alone systems that can be expediently set up to fully integrated decontamination 

stations permanently installed in a building.

Although the measures discussed can present 

a significant capital and sustainment cost, relatively simple modifications, such as those listed in 

UFC 4-010-01, can greatly increase its protective 

posture. One such modification is the location of 

Figure 1. Artist’s Rendering of a Notional Government Facility With Integrated CBRD Systems
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CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

a building’s outside air intake. Consider that many 

airborne threats are heavier than air and collect 

in low-lying areas. Shifting facility air intakes to 

the highest possible point will greatly reduce the 

potential for contaminants to enter the building’s airstream. Second, many facilities utilize air 

shutoff switches located in lobbies and public areas. When an airborne threat is identified, activation of these switches can rapidly shut down the 

building’s outside air supply, thus allowing facility occupants to shelter in place until the threat 

has passed. Finally, extensive sealing of a building’s envelope is being widely adopted in both the 

government and commercial sectors. By reducing air leakage through walls, windows, and roofs, 

two benefits are realized:

1. The building is better suited to block the infiltration of airborne threats.

2. Energy efficiency is increased by limiting 

the loss of conditioned air.

A widely used target for envelope leakage is 

0.25 cubic feet per minute of air per square foot 

of envelope area (CFM/ft2

) at 0.30 inwg of overpressure—a significant improvement when considering that many buildings today have envelope 

leakage rates of 1.0 CFM/ft2

 and greater.

Challenges and Opportunities

Facilities present a significantly different operating environment from traditional military CBRD 

platforms such as ships, shelters, and vehicles. Facilities also pose unique challenges to system designers, as well as opportunities not available in 

other systems.

First, consider the challenge of protecting the 

wide array of personnel that occupy a given protected facility. In most government or DoD buildings, occupants range from military personnel with 

extensive experience and training in crisis management and operation in CBR environments, to civilian and contractor personnel who may not have 

similar education or background, to visitors and 

guests who may not have any familiarity at all. 

Moreover, facility populations will vary throughout the day.

Second, consider the tenant-landlord arrangements being implemented today as part of 

a service-based approach at many installations, 

which can present conflicts between building operators and tenant missions regarding CBRD requirements. System designers and operators must 

take into account the static nature of facilities. 

Unlike other platforms, such as ships and vehicles 

Figure 2. CBR Collective Protection Filter Housings Installed in a Facility
47

Fixed-Facility Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD): Protecting 

Building Occupants From Airborne Threats

that can move to avoid a threat, buildings are fixed 

in location.

Finally, consider that many facilities that house 

critical missions are high-profile and are often in 

the public eye. This high-profile visibility increases 

the probability of an attack and necessitates taking 

measures to ensure that protection systems remain 

invisible and seamless within the facility.

The unique nature of fixed facilities also can 

present opportunities for CBRD systems. CBRD 

systems can benefit greatly from the mature building construction industry, as products and methods are often developed in industry that can be 

applied to building CBRD systems. Additionally, the pharmaceutical, clean room, manufacturing, and nuclear markets significantly overlap with 

CBRD and frequently develop dual-use products 

that can be used in building protection systems.

Need for System Integration

Traditionally, fixed-facility CBRD efforts have 

been highly compartmentalized, with each function (such as collective protection, detection, or 

decontamination) focusing only on its respective 

area (see Figure 3). In these cases, the equipment 

and systems did not communicate, interact with, or 

utilize the functions of other areas. This stove-piped 

approach often resulted in increased costs due to 

redundant functions or gaps in protective posture. 

Building managers were also frustrated by this approach because they had to serve as the general contractors, as well as integrated CBRD subject 

matter experts for their facilities.

With these issues in mind, the integration of 

subsystems into the overall protective strategy for 

the building is critical. Thus, a systems engineering approach ensures that the protection system 

meets the mission needs and that the integrated solution is greater than the sum of its parts. Integration teams must consider materiel solutions, as well 

as the development of concept of operations, sustainment, and training. This systems engineering 

effort must focus on developing an integrated architecture that utilizes components or subsystems 

to provide CBRD. Integration is complex and requires expertise in engineering design, systems engineering, and operational planning.

The need for integration of CBRD in fixed facilities becomes critical as major programs address 

CBR survivability requirements for fully integrated 

weapons systems. NSWCDD is home to the office 

of the Product Director, Fixed CBR Survivability (PD-FCS) within the Joint Project Manager for 

Collective Protection (JPM-ColPro), one of nine 

Figure 3. Typical Fixed-Facility Command and Control Center
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Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

JPMs reporting to the JPEO-CBD. The PD-FCS 

serves as the lead for fixed-facility CBRD efforts 

throughout the DoD, including coordination between partner agencies, development of design 

guidance and practices, and oversight of development and integration efforts.

Path Forward for 

Fixed-Facility CBRD

Solutions for future fixed CBRD systems must 

balance the need for increased protection for building occupants, while considering the long-term 

cost and impact of these systems. Key areas of interest to the user community include:

•	 Increasing the capabilities of currently fielded equipment and methods

•	 Developing lower-burden systems that can 

effectively and affordably protect a wider 

building population

•	 Providing opportunities for reduced operations and maintenance cost

These key areas, when implemented in new 

and existing facilities, offer the potential to significantly impact the future of fixed CBRD. Additionally, efforts are underway to investigate the use of 

protective architectures and facility heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems to 

mitigate the effect of releases in buildings. These efforts increase building CBRD through the use of 

detection-based airflow modifications using fans, 

dampers, and exhaust systems. In these cases, a 

detector alarm can trigger changes within a facility, such as shutting down air-handling units, activating standby filtration units or exhaust systems, 

or generating tenant alarms. By automatically implementing measures based on detection triggers, 

the spread of contaminants inside the building can 

be minimized. Ongoing efforts by NSWCDD engineers seek to optimize these integrated architectures and field systems in test locations.

Recently, PD-FCS—with Joint Project Manager Guardian (JPM-Guardian)—fielded a lowimpact protection system at an installation in the 

Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. This system 

operates with outside air systems in low speed (approximately 15 to 30 percent) in normal operations using a variable-frequency drive system, and 

ramps to full speed in a threat environment. This 

mode reduces the energy consumption of the fan 

system during normal operations and is intended 

to extend the operational life of the CBR filters for 

several additional years. This system remains under study to determine long-term benefits.

As part of another effort, PD-FCS, with JPMGuardian, constructed and tested a fixed collective 

protection test bed intended to evaluate facility design and operation parameters (see Figure 4). As 

part of this effort, the project team constructed a filtration and air-movement system, and a 1,300-ft2

test structure with airflow, differential pressure, and 

Figure 4. Fixed-Facility Test-Bed Structure in the Test Chamber
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Fixed-Facility Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD): Protecting 

Building Occupants From Airborne Threats

chemical sensors. This package was placed inside 

a test facility and exposed to an external chemical 

simulant challenge. During this testing, the overpressure, leakage, and wind speed were varied to determine the impact on building protection. Testing 

and analyses are ongoing, but results at this point 

are already proving valuable to system designers. 

Future testing plans include biological agent testing, 

additional chemical simulant testing, and experimentation with new architectures and technologies.

Conclusion

CBR and nuclear attacks remain a threat to 

DoD and government assets, including fixed facilities. Implementation of CBRD systems at 

these sites can result in sustainment of mission, 

personnel protection, and reduction of scope and 

time for postattack remediation. When considered 

carefully during building design, construction, 

and renovation, these systems can be implemented 

with significant effectiveness and relatively minimal impact to tenant operations and life-cycle cost. 

NSWCDD engineers continue to lead the development, design, and fielding of these critical lifesafety systems, and will continue to partner with 

industry, DoD, and other government agencies to 

further fixed-facility CBRD.

Reference

1. Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), Security Engineering: Procedures 

for Designing Airborne Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Protection For Buildings, UFC 4-024-01, 10 June 2008.

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Fixed-Facility Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD): Protecting 

Building Occupants From Airborne Threats
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CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Biological Defense Quality Assurance 

Sample Technical Laboratory

By Andrew Sobota

Following the anthrax letter attacks against Americans in October 2001, a sustained 

monitoring capability was emplaced for important potential targets of bioterrorism in 

the National Capital Region (NCR). It also became necessary at that time to establish 

a capability to rapidly analyze quality assurance (QA) samples for biological defense, 

as environmental sampling capabilities throughout the NCR highlighted several operational challenges for the Department of Defense (DoD). Screening associated with 

the anthrax letters of 2001 and other perceived threats quickly forced the DoD goldstandard laboratories—such as the United States Army Medical Research Institute of 

Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) and the Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC)—

away from their mission of routine research and development, and occasional sample 

analysis, to analytical production facilities. Although available laboratories successfully accommodated the nation’s needs, their staffs were inundated as the high volume of 

samples produced by the NCR sampling effort easily overloaded the laboratories beyond 

the sampling capacity that these organizations were designed to perform. Moreover, 

timely analysis within these laboratories was constrained by limited available laboratory 

space, personnel, and analytical instruments.

In response to these challenges, the Joint Program Office (JPO)—now the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD)—deployed 

the Dry Filter Unit (DFU) as a sample collection system. The DFU is used to collect 

aerosolized particles on filters. While some filters can be screened using a hand-held assay (HHA), similar to a pregnancy test, analysis of such a large number of filter samples 

requires production-level laboratories dedicated solely to the analysis of the filters. The 

JPO worked with the Pentagon and other government agencies to create a contractorowned and -operated facility. Midwest Research Institute (MRI) was awarded the contract to operate the NCR laboratory.
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Biological Defense Quality Assurance 

Sample Technical Laboratory

NCR Laboratory

The NCR laboratory is one of many laboratories 

that constantly analyze environmental samples for 

the JPEO-CBD Lab-QA Program. The NCR Laboratory actively employs a proven and optimized 

set of standard operating procedures and detection assays transitioned mostly from USAMRIID, 

a gold-standard laboratory. To provide additional confidence about the quality of the analysis performed within the NCR laboratory, the JPEO-CBD 

established a QA, testing, verification, and validation program (Lab-QA Program) in 2002 to monitor the performance of the laboratory. Since that 

time, environmental monitoring expanded to a regional laboratory that supports samples collected 

for:

•	 The Installation Protection Program (JPMGuardian)

•	 Operations at the Edgewood Chemical and 

Biological Command (ECBC), Edgewood, 

Maryland

•	 Operations undertaken by the National 

Guard Bureau’s Civil Support Teams (CSTs)

The Lab-QA Program is oriented for laboratories utilizing government reagents for routine environmental biological hazard testing but also can 

provide rapid testing when required. The Lab-QA 

Program currently exists in two parts:

1. Development and management of the strategy for QA and proficiency test (PT) samples 

using a Lab-QA Program contractor under 

the discretionary guidance of the JPEO-CBD.

2. Production and distribution of the QA and 

PT samples using a quality assurance sample 

technical laboratory (QA lab). The Lab-QA 

Program allows the results of the laboratory to be presented with increased confidence 

that the results are accurate and that standard 

operating procedures are being followed.

Analytical testing of samples ranges from initial 

screening using the HHA to more comprehensive 

laboratory analysis utilizing real-time polymerase 

chain reaction (PCR) and/or electrochemiluminescence (ECL) immunoassay techniques. These 

techniques assist in determining the presence or absence of a particular threat. Figure 1 shows a scientist operating the BioVeris M1M, which is used for 

ECL to detect bacteria, viruses, and toxins/proteins.

A major facet of establishing and maintaining 

the credibility of an analytical laboratory is the ability of the laboratory to detect samples spiked with 

known inactivated targets at a known concentration. QA samples serve as the positive and negative 

controls that are required for the validation of any 

laboratory experiment. The Naval Surface Warfare 

Figure 1. Scientist Operating the BioVeris M1M Used 

for Electrochemiluminescence (ECL) to Detect Bacteria, 

Viruses, and Toxins/Proteins

Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) serves as 

the QA lab for the Lab-QA Program. The QA lab 

prepares the sample blanks and spikes used by the 

analytical laboratories for routine analysis, PT, and 

special studies, as determined by the JPEO-CBD. 

The sample spikes contain inactivated biowarfare 

threat agents supplied by the Critical Reagents Program (CRP). The QA samples are designed to evaluate whether or not the analytical laboratory meets 

the JPEO-CBD’s expectations for long-term falsenegative and false-positive rates. The QA sample 

results generated must meet minimum statistically 

relevant acceptability standards, and the analytical 

laboratory’s performance must be consistent with 

other peer laboratories.

Beyond supporting the Navy, the DoD and the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently entered into an interagency agreement specifying that the QA lab will provide QA samples to 

both agencies on a weekly basis. There are 29 Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratories that 

support the DHS BioWatch Program. During any 

given week, the QA lab could ship anywhere from 

33 to 90 small boxes containing QA or PT samples. 

The NSWCDD QA lab, therefore, represents an 

important and integral part of an overall process to 

help ensure that the American people are protected 

from the threat of biological warfare attacks.
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CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Field Activity Support to the Naval 

Treaty Implementation Program

By Matthew J. Hornbaker

The United States is signatory to over 60 treaties and agreements pertaining to arms 

control, many of which have the potential to impact U.S. Navy and Marine Corps programs. These treaties are important international confidence-building measures that 

enhance global and regional stability. All U.S. Navy and Marine Corps programs are required to adhere to arms control compliance requirements, obligations, and constraints 

as an integral part of their planning, acquisition, and operational processes.

The Naval Treaty Implementation Program (NTIP) provides the Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN (RDA)) comprehensive 

support for the oversight of arms control implementation, compliance, and verification. 

Under the NTIP Compliance Assessment Program (CAP), senior military and civilian 

personnel assess U.S. Navy and Marine Corps programs to identify and resolve potential arms control compliance concerns. If necessary, NTIP provides inspection planning, 

preparation, and on-site support.

Chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBRD) program managers need to 

maintain heightened awareness of treaties and agreements that pertain to CBRD. The 

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), for example, prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, 

stockpiling, acquiring, or retaining biological agents, toxins, or weapons. The Open 

Skies Treaty obligates States Parties to accept unarmed aerial observation flights of their 

national territory using aircraft equipped with sensors and recording devices.

Under the terms of the arms control agreements ratified by the United States, Navy 

and Marine Corps activities and facilities are candidates for comprehensive, intrusive, international verification inspections. For example, the CWC contains a provision whereby 
53

Field Activity Support to the Naval 

Treaty Implementation Program

a State Party can question another State Party’s compliance and request a short-notice, on-site inspection, referred to as a CWC Challenge Inspection. 

In the event of a treaty-related activity—such as a 

CWC Challenge Inspection or an Open Skies observation flight—NTIP provides assistance to a command, installation, or program. A command is not 

allowed to deny or delay one of these events. Consequently, scheduled exercises, operations, and tests 

may be interrupted, delayed, or canceled in order to 

support the affected activity’s compliance requirements. NTIP steps in to help ensure that treaty obligations are met while simultaneously safeguarding 

national security.

In the event of a CWC Challenge Inspection, 

NTIP deploys an Assistance Team comprising three 

integrated teams: 

1. Treaty Management Center (TMC) Team

2. Point of Entry (POE) Team

3. Tiger Team

Each of these teams works closely with the facility commander’s inspection planning staff for 

the duration of the event. The TMC functions as 

the central source of authority and information; it 

deploys Assistance Team personnel to the affected facility to collect, record, and compile inspection-related information. The POE Team serves 

as liaison between NTIP and the host command’s 

security office. The Tiger Team facilitates communication, supports preparation activities, and 

performs analysis of the compliance concern. Figure 1 shows an inspection team preparing to enter an ammunition storage bunker during a CWC 

Challenge Inspection exercise.

To execute its mission, NTIP utilizes several field activity support offices staffed by personnel from the:

•	 Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS), China 

Lake, California

•	 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren

Division (NSWCDD), Dahlgren, Virginia

•	 Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head 

Division (NSWCIHD), Indian Head, Maryland

Field Activity personnel assist NTIP by providing equipment and subject matter expertise to support NTIP Tiger Team training exercises and stand 

by to support in the event of a Challenge Inspection.

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Field Activity Support to the Naval 

Treaty Implementation Program
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CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

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NAWS China Lake is a Navy-operated, airborne weapons testing and training range located 

in California at the southeastern base of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. NTIP support personnel in 

China Lake comprise the Non-Strategic Treaty Coordination Office. They are organizationally aligned 

with the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWCWD), a NAWS China Lake tenant 

command. The Non-Strategic Treaty Coordination 

Office is positioned to serve as an “Advance Team” 

to support NTIP activities on the West Coast by arriving prior to the main NTIP Assist Team to initiate coordination efforts. The Non-Strategic Treaty 

Coordination Office maintains a backup of NTIP’s 

two critical treaty support systems: Treaty Information Management System (TIMS) and the Treaty Library System (TLS). The team also conducts 

regular Open Skies, CWC, and CAP training and 

outreach efforts to ensure that research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) personnel and 

acquisition program managers understand their 

arms control responsibilities.

NSWCDD is a premier RDT&E center, specializing in integrated warfare systems, weapons and 

ammunition, sensor systems, directed energy, and 

asymmetric defense systems.

The NTIP support team at NSWCDD is attached to the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Division within the 

Asymmetric Systems Department. The CBR Defense Division is the U.S. Navy’s lead laboratory for nonmedical CBRD activities. NSWCDD’s 

NTIP personnel primarily support the Tiger 

Team in the area of sampling and analysis of materials found at an installation. They assist the 

self-monitoring, base escort, and base preparation teams as needed. NSWCDD supports NTIP 

annual data calls by capturing program details for 

all NSWCDD programs involving chemical, biological, riot control, or nonlethal defense capabilities. The team also conducts arms control training 

efforts to educate management and the workforce 

about treaty considerations and obligations affecting their programs.

Figure 1. An Inspection Team Prepares to Enter an Ammunition Storage Bunker During a CWC 

Challenge Inspection Exercise
55

Field Activity Support to the Naval 

Treaty Implementation Program

NSWCIHD provides RDT&E and in-service 

support of energetic materials for warheads, 

propulsion systems, ordnance, pyrotechnic devices, 

and fuzing for Navy, joint forces, and national sponsors. The Treaty Support Branch of NSWCIHD 

provides technical, administrative, and logistical 

support to NTIP. The TIMS (see Figure 2) used by the 

NTIP Assistance Team to help to plan inspections 

and monitor perimeters, sites, buildings, and inspection progress, was developed by the Treaty 

Support Branch. NSWCIHD maintains facilities 

and equipment to serve as a backup TMC should 

NTIP offices be unavailable. Much of the work at 

NSWCIHD is focused on chemicals, propellants, 

explosives, and special weapons support. This 

makes the site uniquely positioned to provide comprehensive training opportunities.

Effective international arms control measures 

enhance national security in a number of ways. 

Increased transparency among nations about the 

size, composition, and operations of their military 

forces can reduce incentives and opportunities to 

attack; these agreements can also be used to build 

confidence and trust among historic adversaries. 

The direct result is fewer regional conflicts that can 

escalate to involve U.S. forces. In an era of declining 

defense budgets, arms control agreements stretch 

Pentagon dollars and complement U.S. force structure objectives by placing limits or restraints on 

U.S. and other nations’ activities. Finally, slowing 

or preventing the spread of CBR weapons and delivery systems reduces the likelihood that they will 

be acquired by terrorist organizations, thus reducing the threat to the U.S. homeland.

The comprehensive oversight of arms control 

implementation, compliance, and verification that 

NTIP provides is an invaluable component of our 

nation’s defense. NTIP team members within the 

field activities provide technical expertise, as well 

as guidance and clarification on efforts involving 

the use of chemical, biological, nonlethal, and riot 

control materials. Field activity support teams routinely participate in NTIP training exercises to ensure the NTIP Assistance Team maintains a high 

level of readiness and proficiency to assist Navy and 

Marine Corps installations. NTIP support personnel at the field activities are committed to ensuring 

the U.S. remains in compliance with all treaties and 

agreements while simultaneously safeguarding our 

nation’s fielded and emerging technologies.

Figure 2. Inspection Tracking Using the Treaty Information Management System (TIMS)
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Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Is Your Program Arms Control Compliant?

By Angela Mersiowsky

All Department of the Navy (DON) activities and programs are required to be compliant with international arms control treaties and agreements.1

 These programs, projects, and/or activities run the gamut from basic bench-top research—such as chemical 

and biological decontamination and detection technology—to weapon systems, delivery platforms, and dual-use technologies. The program, project, activity manager, or 

principal investigator is responsible for ensuring that his or her program, project, and/

or activity has been reviewed for arms control compliance. Program information is reviewed by arms control treaty experts at the Naval Treaty Implementation Program 

(NTIP) office. To determine arms control compliance, program information is compared and assessed against all applicable treaties in which the United States is a signatory, as well as U.S. policies. Anytime a Navy or Marine Corps equity is involved, no 

matter which branch of service or government agency has the lead on the program/

project, the DON has an arms control compliance obligation to ensure its participation 

is arms control compliant. Acquisition practitioners, requirements officers, and operational planners should apply proven acquisition and operational business practices by 

integrating the NTIP into the risk management process and mitigation plans. Issues of 

a potential compliance concern, if not addressed and resolved early, can have serious, 

programmatic cost ramifications, program cancellation, or allegations of violating binding international agreements. All DON stakeholders are responsible to ensure that work 

performed, regardless of the program sponsor, has been reviewed for arms control compliance and received an arms control compliance certification by NTIP. Program, project, activity managers, or principal investigators cannot self-certify.

Who Reviews the Programs?

All systems developed or acquired by DON shall be reviewed by the Director, Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) via the NTIP Office, with the advice of the SSP Office of 

General Counsel (OGC), to certify compliance with arms control agreements.2

 NTIP is 

assigned the responsibility for coordinating DON (U.S. Navy (USN)) and U.S. Marine 
57

Is Your Program Arms Control Compliant?

Corps (USMC)) implementation and compliance 

for designated treaties worldwide. NTIP supports 

all DON organizations with expert arms control 

implementation and compliance assistance. The 

Compliance Assessment Program staff conducts 

comprehensive compliance assessments of USN 

and USMC programs, which consider over 40 treaties and agreements, as well as U.S. policy, statutory, and regulatory obligations at no cost.

How Does a Program Obtain an 

Arms Control Certification?

The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

Division (NSWCDD); the Naval Surface Warfare 

Center, Indian Head (NSWCIH); and the Naval 

Air Weapons Directorate, China Lake (NAWDCL) 

are NTIP Field Activities. A program, project, activity manager, or project lead can submit acquisition programs, research and development projects, 

concepts of operation, and exercises in need of 

certification to the on-site treaty point of contact 

(POC) located at one of the designated field activities or directly to NTIP. NTIP field activity POCs 

help to ensure that all appropriate program documentation is current and technically descriptive. Program documentation can be in the form 

of statements of work, white papers, articles, and 

even scientific abstracts, etc. NTIP conducts arms 

control compliance assessments (ACCAs) at every 

stage of the acquisition life cycle (see Figure 1), as it 

is a requirement for each milestone review.

What Is the Compliance 

Assessment Process?

The compliance assessment process consists 

of a thorough review of current technical/descriptive program documentation from NTIP and SSP 

OGC against arms control treaties, agreements, 

U.S. statutory regulations, and policy documents 

to determine arms control compliance. If causes 

for concern are identified, the program manager 

is consulted, and the program, project, or activity 

may be presented to the Naval Arms Control Review Board (NACRB). Members of the NACRB include representatives from Headquarters Marine 

Corps, Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Judicial Advocate General, and Naval Criminal Investigative Services. If the NACRB endorses 

the NTIP assessment conclusion, they may recommend that the program be presented to the appropriate Treaty Manager at the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(OSD (AT&L)), who will convene the Compliance 

Review Group (CRG). The CRG makes the final 

compliance decision on programs that raise a reasonable compliance concern. If there are no causes 

for concern, the program is certified compliant by 

NTIP. A depiction of the compliance assessment 

process is shown in Figure 2.

The treaty field activity POC or NTIP tracks the 

progress of the compliance assessment review and 

coordinates with the program, project, or activity. 

In the case of classified programs, NTIP personnel 

are appropriately cleared and have access to Secret 

Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) accounts and other classified electronic means in order to accommodate receiving documentation.

For more information about the Compliance 

Assessment Program, visit NTIP online at www.

ntip.navy.mil. You can also reach NTIP by telephone at 888-867-5880.

References

1. Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements, USD(AT&L), Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 

2060.1, 9 January 2001.

2. Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 

and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, Secretary of the Navy Instruction, SECNAVINST 5000.2D, 16 October 2008.

Figure 1. Arms Control Compliance Assessments (ACCAs) and certification are conducted 

throughout the entire acquisition life cycle; certification is required at each milestone.
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CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Figure 2. Depiction of the Compliance Assessment Process

Program 

Documentation

Tripwire /

Red Flags

Compliance Assessment Process Legal Review

Arms Control Treaty

Compliance Analysis

Program Manager 

Compliance Consultation

Certification

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics (AT&L) 

Compliance Review Group

Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

for Research, Development, and 

Acquisition (ASN-RD&A)

Concerns

Naval Arms Control 

Review Board (NACRB)

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CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support
59

Is Your Program Arms Control Compliant? Is Your Program Arms Control Compliant?
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CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Homeland Defense Partnerships: Major City 

Fire Departments Reach Out to Shipboard 

Collective Protection Expertise

By Richard Warder

The magnitude of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon opened the nation’s eyes to homeland defense challenges never before encountered. In the aftermath of the attacks, the difficulties experienced by 

first responders exposed numerous capability gaps and vulnerabilities, especially for 

city fire departments.

The attacks also intensified the concern over the possible terrorist use of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) in U.S. cities. Some major city governments—given fire department readiness levels—identified emergency services capability shortfalls that likely would be encountered before, during, and after a chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear (CBRN) event. The Seattle Fire Department (SFD) and the Fire Department of 

New York City (FDNY) were the first to field capabilities upgrading their CBRN readiness posture by the acquisition of new fireboats with a collective protection system (CPS).

Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS)

A shipboard CPS generally operates full time and is seamlessly integrated with a 

ship’s heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system. The CPS provides protected areas within airtight, controlled boundaries, referred to as a citadel. High-pressure fans, 

coupled with special CBRN filters, provide a continuous, contaminant-free environment within the citadel. The CBRN filters capture or neutralize harmful CBRN particulates, liquids, and vapors prior to the air’s entry into the citadel. Additionally, the 

high-pressure fans keep the citadel at an increased pressure over that of the exterior 

ambient conditions, which prevents contamination from entering the protected areas. 

An overview of a CPS is shown in Figure 1.
61

Homeland Defense Partnerships: Major City 

Fire Departments Reach Out to Shipboard 

Collective Protection Expertise

Controlled access to the citadel via air locks 

and decontamination stations prevents the ingress of contamination and allows personnel to 

move in and out of the protective areas. Thus, CPS 

allows firefighters to perform their duties more 

effectively and efficiently while not hindered by 

cumbersome personal protective equipment (e.g., 

masks, suits, gloves, and boots). A decontamination station is included in case firemen have been 

exposed to contaminants outside of the protected areas. A decontamination station and shower 

is shown in Figure 2.

In 2007, the SFD received two new fireboats 

to upgrade their maritime firefighting capability. The new fireboats were outfitted with a CPS 

capability, the first such system fielded to a local 

government’s fire department. The SFD contacted the Joint Project Management Office for Collective Protection (JPMO-ColPro) and requested 

technical assistance for this new capability. SFD 

leadership realized that specialized assistance was 

needed to ensure that firefighters understood the 

proper operational and maintenance requirements 

for the new system.

The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

Division (NSWCDD) Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Protection and Integration Branch engineers and other Navy shipboard CPS experts met 

with SFD’s Captain Chris Dahline and Chief Engineer Dick Chester to address the fireboat’s CBRN 

system. NSWCDD engineers assessed the fireboat’s 

systems and provided operational, maintenance, 

and performance feedback to fire department personnel. The Fireboat Leschi is shown in Figure 3.

Concurrently in 2007, the FDNY was in the 

planning stages to acquire two new fireboats with 

the same CBR capability as the SFD. Since the 

FDNY had no prior experience fielding these specialized systems, the FDNY requested the advisement of NSWCDD CPS subject matter experts 

and contracted NSWCDD as the technical advisor for the CBRN system acquisition for their new 

Figure 1. Overview of a Collective Protection System
62

CBRD

Fleet, Joint, and 

Homeland Defense Support

Figure 2. Decontamination Station and Shower Aboard the SFD’s Fireboat Leschi

Figure 3. The Leschi, built in 2007, is a 108-foot fireboat that can 

shoot 22,000 gallons of water per minute and travel at 14 knots.
63

Homeland Defense Partnerships: Major City 

Fire Departments Reach Out to Shipboard 

Collective Protection Expertise

fireboats. In discussions about shipboard CPS, 

Battalion Chief Jim Dalton remarked,

“In the future, the FDNY fireboats 

may encounter the same threats as the U.S. 

Navy...I want on my boats the same CBRN 

system design as the U.S. Navy.” 

During 2007, at the Joint Chemical-Biological 

Decontamination and Protection Conference and 

Exhibition, FDNY Battalion Chief Ed Bergamini 

remarked in his address to conference attendees,

“I am a fireman but I know where we are 

lacking. I needed engineering and technical 

support to help solve my problems, and for 

that I went to the experts at JPMO-ColPro and 

NSWCDD for their expertise and knowledge.” 

Subsequently, FDNY’s first fireboat, Three Forty 

Three, was commissioned in May 2010, and the second fireboat, Fire Fighter II, was commissioned in 

December 2010. The partnership fostered between 

the FDNY and NSWCDD serves as a model for how 

the Department of Defense’s expertise can transition 

to meet the needs of homeland defenders and first 

responders. Fireboat Three Forty Three—named in 

honor of the 343 firefighters who perished on September 11, 2001, in the terrorist attack on the World 

Trade Center—is shown in Figure 4.

New threats to homeland security require special equipment and procedures to ensure that the 

nation’s first responders are well-equipped to handle any emergency. As was learned from capability 

gaps identified following the September 11, 2001, 

attacks, civilian first responders must be prepared 

to operate in dangerous CBRN environments. In 

working to close these gaps, collaborative relationships between the Department of Defense and civil support agencies facilitated the development 

and fielding of unique protection systems and the 

training of first responders necessary to protect citizenry in the event of a CBRN event. As a result, 

the SFD and FDNY are now equipped with the best 

CBRN protection systems available and are well 

prepared to meet CBRN challenges.

Figure 4. FDNY Fireboat Three Forty Three
64

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

Chemical and Biological 

Detection for the Fleet

By Daniel C. Driscoll

Today’s warfighter is faced with a broad spectrum of threats ranging from conventional battlefield weapons commonly associated with armies or fleets fighting “force on 

force” battles, to asymmetric threats more likely to be employed in terrorism or guerilla warfare. Of these latter threats, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have captured 

the attention of the public and the news media in recent years. Ironically, neither of 

these threats represents anything new from the standpoint of technology; the Department of Defense has been concerned with countering these kinds of threats for decades. 

The question of how to detect and counter chemical and biological warfare agents goes 

back to the days of the Cold War. The Soviet warfighting doctrine of that era included 

plans to make heavy use of both chemical and biological weapons. In response, the U.S. 

military developed tools, techniques, and procedures to fight in a chemical, biological, 

or radiological (CBR)-contaminated environment. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 

1991, the nature of the threat changed in the sense that massive use of WMDs on the 

battlefield became much less likely, but the experience of the Gulf War that same year, 

and the growth of the global terrorist threat in the years since, have demonstrated that 

the threat remains.

The Historical Chemical Threat: Chemical Warfare 

Agents (CWAs) and Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs)

Chemical warfare can trace its origins to ancient times when toxic fumes from 

burning vegetation or sulfur were used in siege warfare.1, 2

 However, it wasn’t until World 

War  I (WWI) that toxic chemicals were deliberately used on a massive scale to at least 

attempt to affect the outcome on the battlefield. By the end of the fighting in 1918, thousands of deaths and many thousands more injuries—many of which caused permanent 

disabilities—resulted from the use of mustard gas (H). Many countries, including the 

United States, continued to manufacture and stockpile mustard agents for decades afterward.3

 Figure 1 shows a battery of dug-in Livens projectors, with one gas shell and its 

propellant charge shown in the foreground, followed by Table 1, which reflects casualties from gas during WWI.
65

Chemical and Biological 

Detection for the Fleet

Figure 1. A Battery of Dug-In Livens Projectors with One Gas Shell and Its Propellant Charge Shown in the Foreground4

Table 1. Casualties from Gas During WWI3

65

Chemical and Biological 

Detection for the Fleet
66

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

During World War II (WWII), German scientists—who began their work in the 1930s looking at 

organophosphorous compounds for better insecticides—formulated the G-series nerve agents more 

commonly referred to as “nerve gas.” While these 

were never used, and chemical weapons in general were not employed to any great extent during 

WWII, nerve agents were recognized to be a potentially very effective weapon. With the onset of 

the Cold War, nerve agents, together with mustard 

and later VX (a more lethal form of nerve agent), 

were stockpiled as the standard chemical weapons 

arsenal by the United States, the USSR, and their 

respective allies.

Another class of chemical threats is TICs. 

While the G and V series nerve agents and mustard are dedicated weapons requiring the resources 

of a state actor to produce and maintain, TICs, as 

their name indicates, are industrial products that 

can be found anywhere in the world where significant industrial activity is conducted. Traditional 

CWAs are much more toxic than most TICs, but 

the large quantities of TICS that may be present at 

an industrial site can still pose a significant threat 

as tragically demonstrated in the Bhopal, India, disaster in 1984.5

 The Bhopal disaster was an industrial catastrophe that took place at a pesticide plant 

owned and operated by Union Carbide in Bhopal, 

Madhya Pradesh, India. Around midnight on 2–3 

December 1984, the plant released methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and other toxins. The official immediate death toll was 2,259; the government of 

Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths 

related to the gas release. Others estimated that 

8,000 died within the first weeks, and that another 8,000 have since died from gas-related diseases.5

Whether through accidental release, as in the case 

of Bhopal, or by deliberate release due to terrorism, 

sabotage, or collateral damage due to military operations, TICs have the potential to cause significant casualties.

The Historical Biological and 

Disease Threat

As with the chemical threat, the threat posed 

by biological agents has its roots in ancient times 

in siege warfare. Throughout history, attempts have 

been made to employ disease as an ally on the battlefield, though usually with limited success. Like 

the chemical threat, the evolution of a significant 

credible biological threat came in the 20th century 

and reached a peak during the Cold War. Biological 

weapons were not used in combat either in WWI 

or WWII, but during the Cold War, a variety of 

threat agents were developed and stockpiled. Since 

the end of the Cold War, with the rise of asymmetric warfare, the biological threat has evolved and remains a threat today.

A compelling measure of the threat posed by 

biological weapons is reflected in the effects of disease throughout history, which can be traced from 

the plague of medieval times through the nearly 225,000 deaths by disease among Civil War soldiers6

 and, later, victims of the Spanish influenza 

outbreak in 1918 that killed more people than were 

killed during WWI.7

 While weapons were developed and deployed throughout the 20th century, 

detection technology lagged behind the development of the CWAs, with no significant ability to 

sense the presence of agents until the 1970s, other than by the smell and the sound the ordnance 

made when delivered. Not until the arrival of the 

M8A1 detector and M8 paper (circa 1978), followed by chemical reaction-based detection in the 

M256 kit,8

 did the warfighter have something more 

effective than his nose. Just as with the threat posed 

by CWAs, the fleet must be prepared to protect Sailors from the threat of biological warfare agents, as 

well as naturally occurring diseases, such as H1N1.

Detection of the Contemporary 

Chemical Warfare Threat

Chemical weapons today can be disseminated 

by means of explosive ordnance—such as artillery 

rounds, missiles, and bombs—or through improvised explosive devices. Aerial sprayers or clandestine spray release are possible as well, though 

perhaps less likely due to the possible presence of 

counterfire. Chemical dissemination is also possible through vapor, airborne respirable aerosols, liquid on surfaces, or as contamination absorbed into 

soil or water. In response, detectors have been developed to detect the presence of chemical agents—

whether in the immediate vicinity of the users 

(point detection), remotely, or as standoff detection.

M256 Kit and M8/9 Paper

M8 (or M9) paper is used to detect the presence of liquid chemical agent on surfaces, or the 

paper can be secured on surfaces to detect the 

impact of agent droplets. The paper is embedded with chemically reactive dyes, which produce 

a characteristic color change unique to the kind 

of agent present when exposed. So, for example, 

if the M8 paper turns red, that indicates the presence of a blister agent (mustard). If it turns orange 

to light yellow, that indicates the presence of the G 

nerve agent (the VX nerve agent will turn it dark 

green). The M256 kit, shown in Figure 2, is a twocomponent detector kit: M8 paper and a chemical 
67

Chemical and Biological 

Detection for the Fleet

reagent-based detection sampler that reacts to the 

presence of chemical agent vapors by producing 

color changes when the reagent ampoules are broken open and exposed on the sampler card.

The combination of M8 paper and the M256 

kit are used on board ships for postattack monitoring and for surveys conducted by damage control teams walking predetermined routes through 

the ship after an attack. M8 paper can be affixed to 

surfaces on the exterior of the ship and monitored 

for color changes to indicate the arrival of aerosols. 

For vapor exposures, if the M256 sample turns blue 

for example, that indicates a nerve agent. An intense blue-purple color indicates mustard gas. An 

olive-drab color indicates lewisite.

Ion Mobility Spectroscopy (IMS)

IMS is a technology used to detect the presence of chemical vapors in air. This is accomplished 

by ionizing a sample of air drawn into the detector 

and then analyzing the sample by first ionizing the 

constituents of air and then measuring the transit 

time of cluster ions formed in the ionization region 

across a constant electric field inside the detector 

in order to determine the mobility of the sample 

species. Molecules of differing sizes, polarizabilities, and electron affinities will have distinct times 

to cross the field region, so they produce a characteristic IMS signature. Compared to other analytic techniques, such as mass spectroscopy, IMS is 

simple, relatively cheap, and can be packaged in a 

lightweight sensor. For this reason, IMS detectors 

have been employed for a number of missions, including limited shipboard use. An example of an 

IMS cell is shown in Figure 3.

The Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), the Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM), and 

the Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm 

(ACADA) were among the first IMS detectors developed for use by the military. Designed for use 

by the Army in land-based missions, they have 

seen Navy use by expeditionary and other ashore 

activities. The Joint Chemical Agent Detector 

(JCAD) is in use with deployed Navy units in expeditionary, explosive ordnance disposal, and 

medical missions. It is employed to survey interior and exterior spaces, surfaces, equipment, and 

personnel, and provides users with the capability to automatically detect, identify, localize, and 

alarm to the presence of acute levels of CWA vapors by agent class. In each of these examples, a set 

of performance requirements must be met while 

also meeting survivability, reliability, and cost demands within a harsh operating environment. The 

JCAD is shown in Figure 4.

The Mk 26 Mod 0 Improved Point Detection 

System (IPDS) is an IMS detector that was developed to monitor the ship’s exterior and has been 

in service with the fleet for over 10 years. As the 

Mk 26 Mod 0 reached the end of its service life, 

an Improved Point Detection System – Life-Cycle 

Replacement (IPDS-LR) was selected. Testing was 

completed as planned in 2010, and installation of 

IPDS-LR on Navy ships commenced in late 2011. 

IPDS is designed to detect the presence of CWAs at 

the immediate exterior of a ship; IPDS-LR will fill 

this same mission without loss of performance and 

with superior reliability and maintainability. A depiction and functional description of the IPDS-LR 

System is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 2. The M256 Kit shown being used by Soldiers in mission-oriented 

protective posture gear. The kit, as issued, is shown on the right.
68

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

Detection of the Contemporary 

Biological Warfare Threat

Biological threats can be present as either respirable aerosols or in other forms, such as drinking water, or they can be spread by human contact 

(communicable diseases). Responding to this 

spectrum of biological threats requires diverse 

technologies, each tailored to the type of sample to 

be interrogated and the environment in which it 

will be used. Three systems that are currently being procured and fielded to the fleet are the Joint 

Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS), the 

Joint Biological Agent Identification and Detection System (JBAIDS), and the Joint Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agent Water Monitor 

(JCBRAWM), which address the areas of airborne 

threats, medical/confirmatory, and waterborne 

threats, respectively. The JCBRAWM and handheld assay ticket are shown in Figure 6.

In addition to the JBPDS, detection of bioaerosols in air is also addressed by the Joint Biological Tactical Detection System (JBTDS) being 

developed to fill a flexible deployment, surveillance, 

and monitoring mission currently being covered by Figure 4. Joint Chemical Agent Detector (M4) (JCAD)

Figure 3. Example of an IMS Cell
69

Chemical and Biological 

Detection for the Fleet

dry filter units and deployed in the fleet, as well as a 

number of continental U.S. facilities.

While chemical detection allows for direct interrogation of the target species by a chemical or 

physical interaction, the more complex nature and 

larger size of biological species introduces an added level of complexity to biological detection. Each 

system named above requires that a sample first be 

collected, and then a separate detection and identification (ID) step—relying on either antibody 

capture of the agent antigen or genetic amplification (recombinant DNA)—is necessary to make a 

presumptive or confirmatory detection of the target agent. The JBAIDS and JCBRAWM detectors 

do not specifically target detection of agents in 

air. The JBAIDS is a confirmatory detection and 

ID system that primarily targets medical samples. 

JBAIDS employs polymerase chain reaction to amplify and identify the genetic material of the target 

agent. The JCBRAWM interrogates water samples 

for two biological agents (ricin and staphylococcal 

enterotoxin B (SEB)) via a hand-held assay antibody ticket and, for gross alpha and beta radiological contamination, by distilling the water sample 

on a heated planchet, followed by reading with a 

radiation detection, indication, and computation 

(RADIAC) device.

Just as with chemical detection, it is desired that 

remote or standoff detection of biological species 

in air be available. Additionally, as in the chemical 

case, the preferred approaches to this problem have 

been to use optical techniques, such as Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), to interrogate suspect aerosol clouds. The Joint Biological Standoff 

Detection System is in a second increment of development. Unlike the chemical case, direct interrogation of the target by electromagnetic radiation 

does not permit a species ID. The best that can be 

done with the current state of the art is a determination of whether the target is of biological origin.

Figure 5. IPDS-LR external air sampling units sample exterior air and transfer it to the detector units (DUs) 

for analysis. Two exterior points are sampled and alarm/status is communicated to two points in the ship: 

Damage Control Central and the Bridge.
70

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

The Way Ahead

The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

Division (NSWCDD), working through the Joint 

Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, is developing and fielding a range 

of systems to address the full spectrum of chemical and biological threats. Beginning with intelligence of an adversary’s intentions, and continuing 

through multiple layers of detection from remote 

or standoff detection to point detection for both 

inside and outside the ship, Sailors need to be protected by a robust set of detection technologies addressing a spectrum of chemical and biological 

threats. Through NSWCDD’s participation in the 

joint program, the Navy is able to leverage other 

services’ development efforts which, together with 

research, development, and systems engineering, 

are providing the fleet with a suite of detectors addressing these requirements. Future efforts will enhance this suite of detection capabilities.

References

1. Tharoor, Ishaan, “Why Chemical Warfare is Ancient History,” Time 

Magazine, 13 February 2009.

2. Markoulakis, Nikolous, “The Greek Fire and Ancient Chemical 

Warfare,” Sparta/Journal of Ancient Spartan and Greek History, 

25 June 2007.

3. Weapons of War/Poison Gas (Casualties), www.First World War.

com

4. Figure 1 photograph: History of the Chemical Threat, Chemical 

Terrorism, and its Implications for Military Medicine, Chapter 4, 

Jeffery K. Smart, MA*; Al Mauroni, MS†; Benjamin A. Hill Jr., 

DO, MS, MEd‡; and Allart B. Kok, MS§, Photograph: Courtesy of Research, Development, and Engineering Command Historical Research and Response Team, Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland, http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/published_volumes/chemwarfare/CHAP4_Pg_115-154.pdf, accessed 16 August 2010.

5. Bhopal Disaster—Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhopal_disaster

6. www.phil.muni.cz/~vndrz1/amstudies/civilwar_stats.htm and Time 

Life Books.

7. Taubenleger, Jeffery K. and Morens, David M., “1918 Influenza: 

The Mother of All Pandemics,” CDC Emerging Infectious Diseases, 

Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006.

8. Ramachandran, C.K., Reliability of M256 Chemical Agent Detector Kit at Extreme Environmental Temperatures, DPG/TA-88/07, 

February 1988.

Figure 6. The Joint Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM) and Hand-Held Assay Ticket
71

Chemical and Biological 

Detection for the Fleet

Chemical and Biological 

Detection for the Fleet
72

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

M4 Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)

By Harold Bannister

U.S. military forces have not experienced direct exposure to chemical warfare agents 

(CWAs) or toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) in decades despite the fact that a number 

of nation states possess capabilities for producing and deploying CWAs. Still, adversary 

countries, non-nation states, warlords, or terrorist organizations may one day deploy 

CWAs or TICs against U.S. warfighters in the form of a poor man’s nuclear weapon. If 

such a hazardous or contaminated environment were to occur, Navy and joint warfighters will be prepared because of a suite of detectors, including the improved hand-held 

CWA and TIC vapor detection capability.

Current Detection Capabilities

Current lightweight detectors within the Navy warfighter inventory are the M256 

Chemical Paper Kits, the Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM), and the Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA), shown in Figures 1 through 3, respectively.

The M256 kit provides confirmation of the presence of chemical agents. Although 

the M256 kits are very reliable, they require 30 minutes or more to process a sample. 

When the warfighter is in need of quick and accurate detection, the alternative is to use 

the electronic detectors (ICAM and ACADA). Both electronic detectors are currently in 

use by all U.S. military forces. The ICAM and the ACADA utilize radiological sources 

and ion mobility spectrometry (IMS), an analytical technique used to separate and identify ionized molecules.

Navy regulations require the tracking of radiological sources, such as the minute 

quantities found in the ICAM and the ACADA. The radiological tracking process includes an annual inspection, which adds additional overhead cost to the Navy’s sustainment. Both the ICAM and the ACADA can detect CWAs and TICs within several 

minutes, which illustrates the advantage over the M256 kits. The warfighters, however, 

need faster CWA and TIC detection capabilities. Moreover, they require a chemical detector that is lightweight; accurate; has no radiological source; is able to detect nerve, 

blood, and blister agents; and produces fewer false alarms.

Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)

The M4 JCAD is a commercial solution in response to the CWA and TIC agent 

detection requirements of the Joint Program Executive Office. Weighing in at a little 

more than 3 pounds, the M4 JCAD is a hand-held, portable, nonradiological source 
73

M4 Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)

Figure 1. M256 Chemical Paper Kits

Figure 2. Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) 

Figure 3. Automatic Chemical Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA) 

chemical detector. It uses IMS technology to alert 

the warfighter of CWA and TIC vapors by drawing air from the surrounding area into an internal 

chamber where positive and negative charged ions 

are separated to identify the presence of nerve, 

blood, and blister agents. Commercial AA batteries power the M4 JCAD, which supports reducing 

sustainment cost to the warfighter. The M4 JCAD 

contains no radiological sources like its predecessors, ICAM and ACADA. With no radiological sources, an annual radiological inspection of 

the M4 JCAD is not required, further reducing the 

Navy’s sustainment cost.

The M4 JCAD provides the warfighter with 

a detection alarm within seconds vice the ICAM 

and ACADA response time of several minutes. The 

JCAD is shown in Figure 4.

The Navy’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Bureau of Medicine, and Construction Battalions 

(Seabees) received the first increment of M4 JCADs 

in March of 2009. By September of the same year, 

the Navy reached initial operational capability. In 

the near-term, the Navy will retire the ICAMs and 

ACADAs and replace them with JCADs as soon 

as full operational capability is achieved in fiscal 

year 2011. Equipped with JCAD’s capabilities, the 

warfighter will be better protected, given the more 

rapid detection times and increased capabilities 

that JCAD provides in the face of serious chemical agent threats.

Figure 4. Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)

73

M4 Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)
74

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

The Joint Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM)

By Brian Patrick

U.S. joint forces (JF) need to be able to detect the presence of chemical, biological, 

and radiological (CBR) contamination under a variety of conditions and circumstances. The Joint Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM) 

Program was initiated to enhance the current capabilities by providing an additional 

portable detection capability for individuals to test water sources. When fully developed 

and fielded, the JCBRAWM will be used for water treatment monitoring, water distribution monitoring, and water preconsumption situations. It also will be used to determine 

the presence, quantity, and identification of agents in local water sources (lakes, rivers, 

creeks, wells, and water purification and distribution points) that JF might encounter. 

Water treatment monitoring facilities will use the JCBRAWM to verify that the water, 

before and after processing, does not contain CBR agents at established detection levels. Water distribution monitoring also will use the JCBRAWM to determine if stored 

or distributed water is contaminated. Detection and identification of biological agents 

and radiological contamination in water are required to protect forces across the range 

of military operations (e.g., conventional war, combating terrorism, peace enforcement, 

and peacekeeping). A soldier on patrol in Afghanistan is shown taking a drink of water 

in Figure 1. JCBRAWM Increment I provides this capability by augmenting the currently fielded M272 Water Testing Kit. The JCBRAWM Program covers the interval from 

now through the near future, with future growth possible in later time frames.

The currently fielded U.S. Navy (USN) M272 Water Testing Kit was designed to detect chemical warfare agents (CWAs). It cannot be modified to detect biological agents 

or radiological contamination. As a result, chemical reconnaissance units; most medical units; or units with a water purification, transportation, and distribution mission can 

currently detect and identify CWA contamination in water. The detection of biological 

agents and radiological contamination in potable water historically has been difficult to 

employ. The JCBRAWM, however, is contributing to the overall biological and radiological defense concept by providing crucial detection, identification, quantification, and 

warning information about biological and radiological hazards in water prior to distribution to JF for consumption or use. The M272 Water Testing Kit is shown in Figure 2.

The JCBRAWM will be fielded in four increments. Increment 1 will provide for the 

detection and identification of two biological agents using immunoassays and the detection of gross alpha and beta radiation using components of fielded Radiation Detection, 
75

The Joint Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM)

Indication, and Computation (RADIAC) meters 

and probes. Follow-on JCBRAWM increments are 

planned to enhance detection of additional biological, chemical, and radiological agents, to include 

replacement of the M272 Water Testing Kit and 

provided inline monitoring capability. 

The JCBRAWM Increment 1 kit provides detection capability for two biological agents and 

gross alpha and beta radiological contaminants in 

water. The system is provided to the JF in two configurations:

1. M329: Used by the U.S. Army (USA), this 

all-inclusive kit contains components to 

sample and monitor water supplies for biological agents and alpha/beta radiation. The 

M329 kit (NSN 6665-01-560-2158) is intended for personnel with no IM-263 RADIAC meter or the DT-695/PDR-77 beta 

probe. The M329 JCBRAWM is shown in 

Figure 3.

2. M330: This is the same kit as the M329 kit, 

but without the RADIAC meter and probe. 

This kit, the M330 is designed for use by 

USN personnel who are already equipped 

with an IM265/PDQ RADIAC meter and a 

DT-304/PDR Beta Probe. M330’s hand-held 

assays (HHA), sample collection, and testing 

components are identical to the M329. The 

USN also currently utilizes M8/M9 chemical contamination detector paper (not part 

of the JCBRAWM) to monitor for CWAs on 

board USN ships; the M272 water monitor 

is utilized for shore-based activities.

In keeping with USN and JF initiatives to improve overall safety for sea- and shore-based 

personnel, and to protect the warfighter from 

contamination after a CBR attack or an inadvertent release of CBR contamination in close proximity to USN and JF commands, the JCBRAWM 

Figure 1. U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Ricardo Saldana, from Blue Tank, 1st Platoon, Delta Company, 

1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, drinks some water during a patrol in Lamal, Afghanistan, 

22 June 2010. 100622-A-8335T-080 (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. William Tremblay/Released)

Figure 2. M272 Water Testing Kit
76

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

will be operationally deployed to detect biological 

and radiological water contamination. The M330 

JCBRAWM Water Monitor is shown in Figure 4.

Radiological Detection

The radiological detection component of the 

JCBRAWM Kit consists of a separate RADIAC 

meter and probe, and is used to detect and identify gross alpha and beta radiation contamination 

in water. A sample is prepared by placing a known 

volume of water in a planchet (a small shallow metal container in which a suspected radioactive substance is deposited for measurement of its activity), 

which is then evaporated (by a heater) to eliminate 

the masking capability of the water. The planchet 

containing the evaporated sample is cooled and 

then tested. The probe is placed directly over the 

planchet, and a sample count is taken for 1 minute. 

Prior to testing, the RADIAC meter must be prepared by performing preoperational procedures, 

a meter response test, and a background count. If 

the sample count is at least 600 counts per minute greater than the background count, appropriate personnel must be notified so that mitigation 

procedures can be implemented. The beta probe is 

sensitive to beta and gamma radiations, so gamma 

needs to be subtracted. The type of contamination 

is determined by shielding the sample (using an attenuator) and taking another count. The difference 

between the unshielded count and the shielded 

count is the gross amount of alpha/beta radiation 

contamination.

Biological Detection

The biological detection component of the 

JCBRAWM is the HHA. Each immunoassay ticket 

consists of three important functional areas:

1. The Control Area

2. The Detection Area

3. The Sample Well

Each provides the field capability to test two biological agents in water. A water specimen is collected, and several drops of the sample are dispensed 

into the oval-shaped sample well on the ticket. The 

water then flows across the paper strip inside the 

assay assembly. A line should form at the control 

area indicating that the ticket functioned correctly, and lines may or may not form in the detection 

area, depending on whether an agent has been detected or not. After 15 minutes, but no longer than 

20 minutes, the results are interpreted by observing 

Figure 3. The M329 Joint Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM)

Figure 4. The M330 JCBRAWM Water Monitor
77

The Joint Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Agent Water Monitor (JCBRAWM)

and comparing both the control and the detection 

areas. HHA tickets are shown in Figure 5.

Conclusion

The JCBRAWM is an important joint asset. It 

allows a ship or shore installation to take on water in an emergency, even if on foreign soil where 

a terrorist attack may occur. The JCBRAWM will 

give USN commanders confidence that their Sailors 

will not fall victim to incapacitating or lethal doses 

of CBR agents in potable water. The current water 

testing kit used by the USN was designed to detect 

CWAs and cannot be modified to detect biological 

or radiological contamination. The JCBRAWM will 

provide the USN with the capability to not only detect CWAs, but to also detect two biological agents 

and gross alpha and beta radiological contamination in a rapid time frame, thus giving commanders better situational awareness. Future variants of 

JCBRAWM will add more chemical detection capabilities and ultimately replace the existing fielded 

M272 Water Testing Kit. The JCBRAWM is intended for use by USN and JF during wartime and 

emergency operations. The JCBRAWM will eventually be fielded to every USN ship, as well as to select shore installations.

Figure 5. HHA Tickets
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CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems
79

Shipboard Installation and Integration of 

Chemical and Biological (CB) Detection Equipment

Joint Biological Agent 

Identification and Diagnostic 

System (JBAIDS)

JBAIDS provides positive identification and 

diagnostic confirmation of BWAs. Essentially, the 

sample from JBPDS can be analyzed by JBAIDS for 

confirmatory purposes. Additionally, JBAIDS provides H1N1 virus diagnostic capabilities, which 

was the principal reason for executing an accelerated fielding schedule. A 3-year fielding schedule 

for JBAIDS was accelerated to fielding all of the 

systems to the LHA, LHD, and CVN hulls within 

1 year. Systems were to be fielded prior to the ships 

leaving for deployment. Nearly 95 percent of the 

systems (19 total) will have been installed by the 

conclusion of FY10. JBAIDS is shown in Figure 2.

Improved Point Detection 

System–Life-Cycle Replacement 

(IPDS-LR)

IPDS-LR is a fixed-site chemical warfare agent 

(CWA) point detector used to detect the presence of chemical nerve and blister agents external 

to the ship. The system was designed to increase 

maintainability and reliability while reducing false 

alarms caused by common shipboard interferents. 

IPDS-LR will be fielded to CVN, MCM, DDG, 

LHA, LHD, LPD, and LSD classes through FY16. 

Consequently, installation and integration costs 

will be reduced, as IPDS-LR is a form/fit/function 

replacement for the currently fielded IPDS system. 

IPDS-LR is shown in Figure 3.

Acquisition, Fielding, Maintenance, 

Sustainment, and Training

All three of these systems are in various stages 

of their acquisition life cycle, which encompasses 

all aspects of research and development, production, fielding, and eventual sustainment or disposal. NSWC Dahlgren is responsible for these systems 

The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

Division’s (NSWCDD’s) Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological (CBR) Defense Division is responsible for protecting the fleet from chemical and biological (CB) threats. One of its responsibilities is 

to perform shipboard installation and integration 

of CB detection equipment in support of requirements to integrate CB detectors. Currently, the 

CBR Defense Division is fielding three systems to 

the fleet. These are the Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS), the Joint Biological Agent 

Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS), 

and the Improved Point Detection System – LifeCycle Replacement (IPDS-LR).

Joint Biological Point Detection 

System (JBPDS)

JBPDS provides a 24-hour biological agent detection capability that detects, identifies, and warns 

of biological warfare agents (BWAs), allowing time 

for warfighters to take preventative measures or 

apply prophylactic measures. The system has the 

ability to connect to navigational and meteorological equipment, detect up to 10 BWAs during a mission and, most importantly, can save the sample 

for further confirmation analysis. Through FY11, 

51 of the systems have been successfully installed 

on a variety of ship platforms (i.e., DDG, LPD, 

LSD, LHA, and LHD). Installations are scheduled 

to continue through FY15, with a total of 88 installations scheduled. The JBPDS is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. JBPDS Shipboard Installation

Figure 2. JBAIDS System
80

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Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

from “cradle to grave.” IPDS-LR has passed all of 

the testing requirements (i.e. shock, vibration and 

electromagnetic interference) and has shown that 

it will survive and operate in a combat environment. The first system was installed in the fourth 

quarter of FY11 with 25 installations currently 

planned for FY12. JBAIDS is nearing the end of its 

fielding schedule, where the system is moving into 

the operational sustainment portion of its life cycle. Proper installation of the systems, in addition 

to training, underlies the success of these systems. 

The ability to maintain, sustain, and support the 

systems throughout their life cycle is equally important. These responsibilities are also performed 

by the CBR Defense Division throughout the life of 

the equipment. JBPDS is currently halfway through 

its fielding schedule. Initial training is provided at 

the conclusion of each installation. Fielded systems 

will be maintained only to the extent that the users 

have been trained to perform necessary preventive 

maintenance. This is extremely important as lifecycle costs are reduced, and operational readiness 

is increased.

Shipboard Installation and 

Integration Planning

Shipboard installation and integration of CB 

defense systems must closely follow the processes 

and procedures as delineated by Technical Specification (TS) 9090-310F, Alterations to Ships Accomplished by Alteration Installation Teams. Any 

change that is performed to a ship is referred to 

as an alteration and is subjected to the preplanning milestones and requirements as directed 

by the Navy Modernization Plan. These requirements are not optional and must be strictly followed. Ship Change Documents (SCDs) must be 

generated within the Navy data environment, explicitly describing the alteration that will be performed. Technical assessment teams, integrated 

logistical officers, and budgetary personnel all review the SCDs for technical merit, schedule execution, costs, and maintainability. Approval is not 

granted until logistical documentation, testing, 

and ship installation drawings (SIDs) have been 

generated and approved. Development of these 

SIDs is performed by the planning yards for integration of the system on a particular hull. Close 

Figure 3. IPDS-LR System
81

Shipboard Installation and Integration of 

Chemical and Biological (CB) Detection Equipment

interactions are made with the planning yards to 

answer technical questions that arise. These SIDs 

detail how the systems integrate with the ship and 

show how potential problems must be handled in 

order to integrate the systems properly. Interactions are conducted between the planning yards 

and the Ship’s Force to affirm that there will be 

minimal impact to the ship. The preplanning activities are not trivial and require approximately a 

year of effort.

Shipboard Installation and 

Integration Execution

Initially, coordination is made with the Ship’s 

Force to ensure that the ship is aware of the system 

that they will be receiving. The installation team is 

responsible for answering any questions or concerns 

that the ship may have about the system. Prior to arrival, a walk-through and ship check is conducted 

to make sure that the system will be installed as described by the SIDs.

Many times, difficulties exist where slight deviations must be made from the drawings and accurately reflected in the as-built configuration. The 

difficulty is that space on ships is very limited and 

some of the systems—JBPDS, for example—occupy a significant amount of space in one of the ship’s 

compartments.

The Alteration Installation Team (AIT) must 

provide the ship a plan of actions and milestones 

for execution of the installation. This is provided for 

accountability to the planning coordinators to affirm that the installation is progressing according to 

schedule. For JBPDS, each installation requires approximately 3 weeks to execute. This represents the 

time from arrival on ship until the time when checkout is complete.

Arrangements are made with the shipyard to 

make sure that all necessary industrial services are 

available. Welding and grinding are some of the 

principal services needed for the installations. Final items needed prior to installation initiation are 

the generation of a Readiness to Start (RTS) message 

and check-in with the designated Regional Maintenance Center (RMC). The RTS notifies all concerned 

of the arrival of the AIT and the system they will be 

installing. The RMCs are responsible for being aware 

of alterations that are occurring on a particular ship. 

They will not allow the installation to proceed unless 

all logistical documentation, drawings, and other required items are complete.

During installation, it is the responsibility of the 

AIT On-Site Installation Coordinator (OSIC) to ensure that the system is installed according to plan 

and on schedule. To accomplish that, an in-brief is 

initially scheduled with the ship to define the scope 

of work and level of effort. The OSIC is responsible 

for performing “go/no go” inspections of work performed to make sure that the system is installed professionally and properly. Additionally, situational 

reports and photos are used to document the daily 

production.

At the conclusion of the installation, there are 

items that must be performed prior to officially turning over the system to the ship. Occasionally, small 

changes are made to the SIDs, which must be accurately reflected. These “redlines” are then submitted 

to the responsible Planning Yard to reflect that the 

accurate “as-built” configuration is captured. This is 

imperative in order to make certain that the Acquisition Engineering Agent responsible for sustainment 

possesses the most accurate data—primarily for instances where troubleshooting might be necessary. 

A completion report is generated, per NAVSEA TS, 

to confirm that:

•	 An out brief has been scheduled

•	 Training dates are set

•	 Cable pathways have been properly performed

•	 System operational and verification testing 

have been performed

•	 Spares associated with the equipment have 

been properly turned over to the ship1

The goal is to certify that the ship is left in the same 

condition as before the installation.

Shipboard installation and integration of CB detection equipment on ships is necessary to protect 

ship crews from CB threats so they can perform their 

respective warfighting missions. By properly installing, integrating, and maintaining these systems—in 

addition to training crews on the proper maintenance of the systems—warfighters are not only safer, but naval readiness is enhanced.

Reference

1. Alterations to Ships Accomplished by Alteration Installation Teams, 

NAVSEA Technical Specification TS9090-310E, April 2009.
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and Decontamination Systems

Joint Biological Point Detection System: 

The Navy’s Program for Biological Defense

By Mark V. Brown

Biological weapons are armed with some of the most dangerous diseases known to 

man. These weapons are at the forefront of terrorist threats to world safety and peace. 

The Navy has chosen the Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) to protect its 

fleet and personnel from biological threats. JBPDS is a modular suite of equipment that 

provides commanders with the ability to detect and presumptively identify biological 

warfare (BW) agents in near real time. The suite fully automates the biological detection, 

sample collection, and identification functions, which enables Sailors to perform other critical duties. When complete, JBPDS will be installed on approximately 119 surface 

ships, providing commanders with the frontline knowledge necessary to effectively mitigate the aftereffects of BW agents. The JBPDS is shown on USS The Sullivans in Figure 1.

The Threat

Many nations that are considered unfriendly toward the United States have the capability to deliver biological weapons. In a traditional declared war, we can expect to 

encounter a biological threat from several potential enemies. Unfortunately, biological 

weapons offer a relatively cheap and effective means of offsetting U.S. military and economic power, and are thus attractive to anti-American terrorist groups. Such groups 

may not have the capability to deliver biological weapons on a military scale but could 

attempt to infect a ship, a port, a military base, or a symbolic or valuable civilian target 

if their desire for revenge or glory were sufficiently strong. Whether the delivery of biological agents is caused by a state or a terrorist group, the need for preparedness is acute, 

and rapid identification is the key.

Program History

In 1997, the Department of Defense launched a joint program to develop and field 

a biological detection system, which had two primary characteristics: speed of identification and automation. In order to proceed in an orderly and manageable fashion, the 

program’s oversight process was divided into four functional areas, each led by a uniformed service. During the early development period, the design effort was led by the 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) as the designated Navy 

agent for this function. Test planning and oversight was an Air Force responsibility. 

Requirements development fell to the Army, and logistics was assigned to the Marine 
83

Joint Biological Point Detection System: 

The Navy’s Program for Biological Defense

Figure 1. JBPDS on USS The Sullivans

Corps. While project management was undertaken by an Army officer assigned to the Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, the chain of command was truly 

joint in nature since the responsible acquisition official was, and is, the Joint Program Executive Officer for Biological Detection, currently an Army 

general officer.

The first Navy JBPDS was installed on USS Comstock in the summer of 2000. Many design flaws and 

performance deficiencies were found in this first 

variation. Consequently, the JBPDS team went back 

to the drawing board to engineer a more successful 

system. The next Navy installation occurred in the 

fall of 2001 with a better system but not quite ready 

to support a ship’s mission.

Over the next 3 years, from 2001 to 2004, the 

JBPDS went through extensive design changes to increase both performance and robustness. 

NSWCDD played a major role in this design to ensure that unique Navy needs were addressed. As a 

result, the current Navy shipboard JBPDS incorporates hardware responsive to the maritime environment.

Finally, Operational Evaluation was undertaken by Operational Test and Evaluation Force 

on board USS The Sullivans in September 2004. 

Following a positive evaluation, the detection 

system was approved for shipboard use. Installations subsequently began on DDG and amphibious ship classes, and today there are 38 shipboard 

units installed, with a total of 119 planned installations. JBPDS is the first and only joint chemical or biological detection system to be fielded 

by the Navy.

Installation and Local 

Hardware Support

Installation and integration of JBPDS into 

the shipboard environment requires about 7 

man-weeks. A supporting stand is built off-site 

and installed where the ship structure is sufficiently robust to support the total operating 

weight of 295 pounds (plus stand). Occasionally, modifications to the existing structure must be 

performed to ensure this robustness. Fiber optic 

cable is run to the two remote controllers (one 

in Damage Control Central and one in the Combat Information Center) and to the navigation 

system. The superstructure is pierced to accommodate two inlet stacks and two exhaust ports, 

with welded brackets provided to affix the supporting structure for the ports. A small refrigerator is installed to store operating consumables, 

inlet ducting is lagged to minimize condensation 

within the duct, the internal bulkheads are relagged, and the space is painted where necessary. 

Finally, the unit is connected with shipboard power (120 volt) using an essential power circuit.

Training and Support

The Navy Program Manager for biological detection had the foresight to set up a team to completely support such a unique system. JBPDS Team 

Navy provides the ship and Sailor with complete 

system support anywhere in the world. This support includes new equipment training, predeployment training, reach-back troubleshooting, repairs, 

and logistics.

After an installation, JBPDS Team Navy provides ship personnel with the required training 

to operate and maintain the JBPDS. This training consists of 40 hours of classroom and handson training to include troubleshooting, operations, 

and preventive maintenance services. Corrective 

maintenance consists primarily of removing and 
84

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Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

replacing any of six repairable components identified by operating software fault indications. Preventive maintenance involves cleaning intakes and 

operating the system to verify full functionality. 

This requires 2 hours bimonthly. A JBPDS Team 

Navy training session is shown in Figure 2.

Both of these efforts were undertaken by the 

Navy JBPDS Program Manager in response to the 

need to augment the chemical/biological course 

taught at the Navy school in Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri.

Accordingly, specialized Navy repair activities (equipment and labor) were established in fleet 

concentration areas in Norfolk and San Diego. The 

establishment of these repair activities is designed 

to provide real-time support to JBPDS-equipped 

platforms to increase equipment availability and 

decrease downtime. JBPDS Team Navy operates 

these activities and has personnel with specialized 

technical expertise. Performing system repairs at 

the subcomponent level saves the Navy thousands 

of dollars each year.

Biological agents are insidious because the human body does not recognize their presence until well after exposure. In most cases, the onset 

of physical symptoms will occur several days or 

weeks after initial contact, and by the time the disease is recognized, it is well established and considerably past the time when medical attention is 

most effective. For the shipboard warfighter, the 

message is clear—prompt identification of biological agents and associated treatment will prevent 

the loss of personnel and help maintain mission 

readiness. JBPDS is the Navy’s system of choice to 

combat the devastation that may be caused by a biological attack.

Figure 2. JBPDS Team Navy accomplishes follow-on or predeployment training via tailored operator and maintainer 

courses using JBPDS systems installed at Naval Stations Norfolk, San Diego, and Mayport. This training is conducted 

when requested. Refresher training is available using course material located on the Navy Knowledge Online system.
85

Joint Biological Point Detection System: 

The Navy’s Program for Biological Defense

Joint Biological Point Detection System: 

The Navy’s Program for Biological Defense

Local Control 

Substation

Collector Identifier JBPDS Controller 

Assembly (JCA)

Fluid Transfer 

System

BAWS 

Compressor

Biological Agent BAWS

Warning Sensor

(BAWS) Dryer
86

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems
87

Accelerated Fielding of the Joint Biological 

Agent Identification and Diagnostic System 

(JBAIDS) to Large Deck Ships

The H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009 directly impacted the missions of USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) in late spring 2009 and USS Bataan

(LHD 5) and other Navy ships by summer 2009. 

Because of the close quarters of a shipboard environment, a respiratory illness such as influenza 

spreads rapidly and renders personnel unable to 

perform their normal duties. As a result, scheduled 

exercises may be canceled, or deployments may be 

postponed until the situation is mitigated.

The 2009 pandemic of H1N1 influenza began 

in March 2009 with an “influenza-like illness” that 

spread rapidly within Mexico, and a nationwide 

alert for Mexico was issued in April. As the illness 

in Mexico was confirmed to be H1N1, the first reported cases in the United States were announced. 

The H1N1 strain was anticipated to become pandemic in a short period of time due to its infectiousness and its exposure to a population that traveled 

freely to other areas of the world. As new outbreaks 

were anticipated, and no vaccine was available, by 

August 2009, Vice Admiral Gortney stated “an urgent need to expedite” and requested the accelerated 

fielding of the Joint Biological Agent Identification 

and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS) to provide ship 

medical personnel the H1N1 diagnostic capability 

on forward-deployed ships. The Office of the Joint 

Project Manager for Chem/Bio Medical Systems 

provided H1N1 support equipment to supplement 

the JBAIDS package and assisted in the acceleration 

process to field JBAIDS to the ships.

Flu is a serious illness, as each year a number 

of people—usually the older population or persons 

with pre-existing conditions—die after contracting 

a flu virus. For seasonal influenza, 90 percent of the 

deaths are of persons 65 years or older. Nonetheless, previously healthy individuals also die each 

year from flu and its complications. Unlike the 

other influenza strains, H1N1 primarily impacted children and younger adults. Data taken from 

April to July of 2009 shows the infection rate of 

H1N1 to be 20 times higher for the age group of 4 

to 25 years compared to the age group of 65 years 

or older. Of patients hospitalized with H1N1 influenza, 41 percent of the deaths were of patients 25 

to 49 years old, compared to 9 percent of patients 

65 years and older.

Each year, projections are made of which 

strains of flu are most likely to impact the population based on observations of emerging and existing illnesses. Once strains are identified, a vaccine 

is prepared to incorporate elements of the combination of strains in the annual flu shot. Over a relatively short period of time, however, flu strains can 

change and combine. Genetic material of a virus can 

change, or parts of different flu viruses can combine 

during infection in a host, and a new strain (with 

changed or combined genetic material) can emerge

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Accelerated Fielding of the Joint Biological 

Agent Identification and Diagnostic System 

(JBAIDS) to Large Deck Ships
88

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

to be transferred to the next host. That is why the flu 

shot is updated annually, and why a person may retain some immunity to a current flu from previous 

flu shots. The 2009 H1N1 strain contained components of human, swine, and avian flu viruses.

Following the initial confirmations in Mexico and the United States, the Centers for Disease 

Control (CDC) mapped the areas of H1N1 influenza cases with frequent updates over the months 

as H1N1 rapidly spread throughout the world. The 

H1N1 diagnostic assay, provided by the CDC, was 

adapted and tested for use on JBAIDS and received 

Food and Drug Administration authorization for 

emergency use in August 2009. Concurrently, a 

new vaccine for H1N1 was prepared to be administered in addition to the annual flu shot. Although 

the Navy JBAIDS fielding plan prior to 2009 did 

not include the delivery of medical diagnostic assays for clinical specimens, JBAIDS does have the 

capability to perform a diagnostic identification of 

H1N1 in a clinical specimen aboard ship.

JBAIDS is the program of record to meet the 

need for confirmatory testing of possible contamination by biological warfare agents aboard ship. 

Hand-held assays for presumptive testing of biological warfare agents from environmental samples are utilized to provide a quick-look result in 

minutes. However, these assays do not have the accuracy needed to justify the medical treatment of 

the crew. JBAIDS utilizes polymerase chain reaction technology, which is more accurate than the 

antigen-antibody-based technology utilized in the 

hand-held assays. JBAIDS provides confirmatory 

identification in a matter of a few hours. For legal 

and forensic purposes, a sample can also be sent 

away to a definitive laboratory, but this more thorough identification can take weeks, which is too 

long in order to begin implementation of protective measures for the warfighter aboard ship. With 

contamination or infection by known biological 

agents, specific symptoms can be anticipated, appropriate medication for prophylaxis or treatment 

can be identified, likely course of illness or contamination can be anticipated, and the appropriate 

protective posture can be implemented. JBAIDS is 

shown in Figure 1.

The acceleration of JBAIDS fielding required 

attention to several items, as the logistical, training, personnel, and financial plans assumed a 

3-year time frame. While the modification and 

testing of the H1N1 assay for use on the JBAIDS 

platform was underway during spring 2009, personnel at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) responded to the 

possibility of accelerating the fielding by addressing the shortest time possible to get the H1N1 diagnostic capability with JBAIDS to the ships. This 

included the renegotiation of contracts to acquire 

Figure 1. Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System (JBAIDS)
89

Accelerated Fielding of the Joint Biological 

Agent Identification and Diagnostic System 

(JBAIDS) to Large Deck Ships

the hardware and perishable consumables in a 

shorter time frame, the surge in training by the 

JBAIDS schoolhouse to accommodate additional 

Navy JBAIDS operators, the surge in provision of 

operator support, and the accelerated install process (with all the coordination and work needed 

to formally install a system aboard ship). After all 

time requirements for the different aspects of fielding were identified, the JBAIDS fielding schedule 

was compressed from 3 years to 9 months. With 

receipt of the Vice Admiral’s request to accelerate fielding in August 2009, NSWCDD was poised 

to respond immediately with the 9-month fielding schedule.

Since the initiation of the accelerated fielding 

of JBAIDS, an effective vaccine for H1N1 has been 

produced and administered. In Figure 2, a hospital corpsman is shown preparing to administer an 

H1N1 flu vaccine aboard the amphibious assault 

ship USS Bataan (LHD 5).

The availability and administration of the 

H1N1 vaccine allayed many of the fears of the effects of H1N1 globally; however, NSWCDD’s ability 

to rapidly mobilize the H1N1 diagnostic capability 

to the ships emplaced an infrastructure for the next 

pandemic should another strain mutate or should a 

new biological threat present itself. Consequently, 

naval warfighters will be better protected from future biological threats.

Figure 2. ATLANTIC OCEAN (5 December 2009) Hospital Corpsman 2nd 

Class Eric M. Garneau prepares to administer an H1N1 flu vaccine aboard the 

amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5). (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass 

Communication Specialist Anthony Sisti/Released)
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Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

Improving Reliability of Shipboard

Chemical Agent Detection

By Christopher Bara and Brian Flaherty

Chemical warfare agent (CWA) detection is a priority for U.S. Navy warfighters. 

Detecting an attack and having the capability to alert the crew to the presence of CWAs 

is critical in saving lives and minimizing harmful exposure. Currently, the U.S. Navy 

uses the Improved Point Detection System (IPDS) to provide its ships with automated CWA detection.

IPDS uses ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) as its chemical detection technology. 

This technology ionizes the chemical agent and then sorts the ions based on molecular size and shape in an electric field in order to produce a spectrum. The algorithm 

compares this spectrum to reference spectra and identifies the chemical. The IPDS has 

components located on both port and starboard, and samples through external air intakes in the ship’s hull. The system analyzes the external air for a chemical agent. If the 

detector identifies a chemical agent, it sends a signal that displays an alert at both the 

ship’s Damage Control Central (DCC) and the bridge. The system also interfaces directly to the ship’s chemical alarm, which broadcasts an audible shipwide alarm to alert 

the crew of a CWA.

The current IPDS, fielded in 1999, provides automated shipboard chemical detection; however, issues of obsolescence, maintainability, and the resulting increase in repair time drove the requirement for a replacement system. A review of the current IPDS 

established that it was neither technically feasible nor cost-effective to refurbish the existing system. The original equipment manufacturer no longer supports the IPDS, and 

the current system is susceptible to false identification to many normal chemicals in the 

shipboard environment. Moreover, Navy analysis indicates that the current IPDS will be 

unsupportable by 2014, thus requiring fielding of a replacement to begin in 2011, well 

in advance of the Next-Generation Chemical Agent Point Detector system’s initial fielding in 2020. Consequently, the Navy’s senior chemical biological defense (CBD) leadership requested the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense 

(JPEO-CBD) to develop and field a life-cycle replacement to provide protection for this 

interim period.

The Joint Project Manager for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Avoidance—working with the Navy’s chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) Action Officer and Naval Sea Systems Command 
91

Improving Reliability of Shipboard

Chemical Agent Detection

(NAVSEA) CBD Technical Warrant Holder—have 

worked to select and evaluate a potential commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution to this fleet request. Titled the Improved Point (Chemical Vapor) 

Detection – Life-Cycle Replacement (IPDS-LR) effort, the joint team evaluated multiple candidates 

in an open competition. The joint team evaluated 

the candidate systems based on each system’s ability to meet the requirements set forth in the original IPDS Operational Requirements Document 

(ORD). This was supplemented with a robust performance specification and CWA surety detection 

capability using the more recent U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine 

(USACHPPM) information. The IPDS-LR system also needed to be able to be packaged to meet 

form/fit/function requirements to allow reuse of 

current shipboard IPDS installation foundations. 

Despite utilizing the same basic IMS technology, 

the IPDS-LR demonstrated the ability to meet the 

requirement for mean time between false alarms. 

Figure 1 shows the IPDS-LR component image 

compared to IPDS.

IPDS-LR system testing consisted of extensive 

production verification testing (PVT). The PVT 

emphasized Navy shipboard maritime environment and reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) events, since it was the prime program 

initiator. The team collected over 14,000 hours of 

underway and in-port test time to support the RAM 

analysis utilizing multiple ships (and ship classes) 

stationed from both Norfolk, Virginia, and San Diego, California, areas. Additional data collection 

continued aboard ships in forward-deployed locations. The shipboard test data verified that the 

IPDS-LR had improved on the deficiency of IPDS in 

both RAM and shipboard mean time between false 

alarms. In conjunction with shipboard testing, the 

team conducted laboratory testing against known 

interferents to determine the shipboard chemical to false identification relationship. To date, 

IPDS-LR has demonstrated the ability to meet the 

Navy’s false-alarm frequency, as well as its RAM 

criteria. While the current concept of operations 

(CONOPS) is based on short-term continuous operation, IPDS-LR PVT testing systems operated 

continually when aboard ship, as well as during operational service-life testing. Additionally, the current IPDS CONOPS states that IPDS should not be 

operated in the rain. However, to fully characterize 

the IPDS-LR performance and to reduce the workload on the Sailor, the test plan dictated continuous system operation—even during rainy weather.

In the course of this test, one significant RAM 

issue surfaced. During rainy weather, the air sampling system often pulled water through the inlet 

nozzle (i.e., system air-sampling inlet and exhaust 

nozzle are part of the External Air Sampling Unit 

(EASU) component). The EASU is the only part 

of the system on the outside of the ship. All other 

Figure 1. IPDS/IPDS-LR Components
92

CBRD

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

components, including the detection units, are internally located. In several cases, rainwater saturated the sampling-line membrane filter. The resulting 

blockage of airflow would then cause the sampling 

pump to shut down (system self-protection mode) 

and require the detection unit to be offline until the 

water blockage was cleared (via system backflush 

or manual membrane drying). The self-protection 

mode prevented water from penetrating this membrane filter and damaging the pump.

Nevertheless, as this issue occurred repeatedly 

in wet situations, the IPDS-LR team and the IPDSLR manufacturer developed and implemented a design change on the inlet nozzle. The original design 

consisted of four small holes, in close proximity, allowing blockage by water droplets running down 

the ship’s bulkhead onto the inlet assembly. The new 

inlet nozzle has a large, flared opening designed to 

separate the water droplets, while still allowing access to collect air. Figure 2 shows a side-by-side 

comparison of the old and new nozzle designs. Follow-on shipboard testing with the new inlet nozzle resulted in no further water ingestion problems. 

Additionally, airflow “smoke” testing validated that 

the new nozzle design would not negatively impact 

the sampling airflow getting to the detector.

The team analyzed IPDS-LR shipboard PVT 

data to determine system performance with respect to false identification alarms. The IPDS ORD 

states that the system shall operate with an average 

not to exceed one false alarm per mission, where a 

mission is a period of continual operation lasting 

between 24 and 144 hours. As mission length can 

be variable, this analysis considered the maximum 

and minimum number of missions during the test 

periods (dividing 24 and 144 hours, respectively, 

into the test duration for maximum and minimum 

number of missions). The IPDS-LR met this specification.

PVT evaluations also included CWA surety performance, environmental survivability, and 

operational service life (maritime/salt air environment), as well as shipboard shock, vibration, and 

electromagnetic interference (EMI) qualification.1

As the IPDS-LR is considered an essential shipboard system, the shipboard mounting must allow it to survive and continue to operate after a 

dynamic impact simulating attack by large munitions. This dynamic impact must not cause the 

mounted system to break free and become a projectile hazard. Follow-on operational test and evaluation (FOT&E) included challenging the IPDS-LR 

system with a CWA simulant (methyl salicylate) 

in an operationally relevant environment, with the 

ship both in port and underway. These trials occurred during August 2010. All PVT and FOT&E 

results are being reviewed, and a decision will be 

made regarding the procurement of additional

IPDS-LR systems. Assuming IPDS-LR is deemed 

acceptable for fielding to the U.S. Navy, production 

system deliveries will occur from 2011 to 2015.

Reference

1. Department of Defense Test Method Standard for Environmental 

Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests, MIL-STD-810F, 

January 2000.

Figure 2. IPDS-LR Inlet Design Change

Original Inlet Redesigned Inlet
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Chemical Agent Detection

Improving Reliability of Shipboard

Chemical Agent Detection
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U.S. Navy Ships Get Chem-Bio Protection

By Robert Snodgrass, Anton Fionov, Jeffrey Donovan, and Eric Arcement
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U.S. Navy Ships Get Chem-Bio Protection

Mission accomplished...the Marine Battalion Landing Team successfully secured the beachhead. It was a difficult task, but the Marines were 

up to the challenge. The mission was complicated by the enemy’s use of chemical munitions in 

their artillery attacks. Initial indications suggested it was the nerve agent VX. There were casualties, but the Marines were ready, trained, and 

equipped to fight in a chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) environment. Triage and casualty decontamination operations were conducted 

on shore, and the casualties were evacuated back 

to the amphibious ready group for more definitive treatment. Once aboard the amphibious assault ship, the patients were processed through 

the ship’s collective protection system (CPS) casualty decontamination station and into the medical collective protection zone for further medical 

evaluation and treatment. Treatment of all Marine 

casualties was successful. Notwithstanding, without the extended CPS installed on the amphibious 

assault ship, the Marines in this hypothetical scenario might not have been so fortunate.

The Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) 

funded the installation of additional CPS capability on 15 amphibious ships as part of the CPS 

Backfit Program. This program retrofits U.S. 

Navy ships with reliable CPS to protect the warfighter and ensure mission success despite the 

CBR threat from adversary nation states and terrorist organizations.

The CPS provides areas protected from CBR 

contamination, called CPS zones, where the 

crew can continue operations unencumbered 

by individual protective equipment. CPS consists of three main components: filtration, overpressurization, and controlled access. Filtration 

provides clean air—free from CBR agents—

to the zone. Overpressurization of the zone assures that the clean air leaks out of the zone, 

preventing contaminated air from leaking in. 

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Controlled access is provided through decontamination stations and air locks, which allows 

decontaminated personnel to enter and exit the 

zone while maintaining the overpressure.

Many ship classes are built with CPS already 

installed; however, some classes were built with 

limited coverage or no CPS at all. The crews of amphibious ships, operating close to shore while receiving potentially contaminated Marines, have 

increased risk of exposure to CBR threats. The CPS 

Backfit Program retrofits CPS zones onto these 

amphibious warfare ships in order to reduce the 

impact of exposure to CBR threats.

The CPS Backfit Acquisition Program Manager 

(APM), based at the Naval Surface Warfare 

Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), manages 

the CPS Backfit Program for the Joint Project 

Manager for Protection, who reports directly to 

the JPEO-CBD. The CPS Backfit Program has 

developed CPS zone designs for each ship class, 

which protect key mission functions. The designs 

have been optimized to balance the amount of area 

protected with the intrusiveness and complexity 

of the system installation. The CPS Backfit APM 

works with the Program Executive Office (PEO) 

Ships, Naval Sea Systems Command and the ships’ 

planning yards to adapt the class designs to each 

ship. In addition to improving performance, the 

APM works to reduce installation and life-cycle 

costs at every opportunity to ensure that the 

government is receiving the maximum value for 

its investment.

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Figure 1. CPS Backfit and Planning Yard Representatives collaborate to develop the quickest 

and most cost-effective solutions to installation challenges.

Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems
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U.S. Navy Ships Get Chem-Bio Protection

Figure 2. CPS Backfit Representative Performing CPS Quality Assurance

The CPS Backfit APM assigns on-site representatives (see Figures 1 and 2) to serve as the face of 

the program throughout the installation. The onsite representatives resolve all technical issues and 

questions that arise. These on-site representatives 

manage the costs associated with installation problems and design changes to ensure that costs are 

contained. Also, the on-site representatives facilitate communication among the disparate organizations involved in the ship’s availability, including:

•	 PEO Ships

•	 Ship’s Force

•	 Naval Sea Systems Command

•	 Planning Yards

•	 Regional Maintenance Centers

•	 Shipyard Contractors and Subcontractors

The on-site representatives address any concerns 

Ship’s Force may have with the system or its installation and ensure that the ship understands the 

new capability, and that the crew is fully trained to 

use and maintain the system.

The CPS Backfit alteration (Navy-speak for 

modifications and upgrades to existing ships) is 

complex and intrusive. The installation significantly impacts the ship’s structural design; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems; and 

electrical systems. A typical CPS Backfit alters numerous spaces to create the new CPS zone, which 

requires significant structural modifications. Leaky 

sheet-metal bulkheads are removed and replaced 

with 42,000 lb of airtight steel bulkheads to form 

the new CPS decontamination station and up to 

13 new air locks. Additionally, sheet-metal doors 

are replaced with watertight steel doors along the 

boundary of the zone. Multiple existing fresh-air 

supply systems are removed and replaced with CPS 

filtered-air supply systems in completely new fan 

rooms that house the filters, fans, heaters, cooling coils, and other equipment needed to bring the 

CPS filtered air into the zone. The other ventilation 

systems in the zone are completely reconfigured 

to tie into the new fresh-air supplies. In total, over 

half a mile of ventilation ducting is rerouted, up to 

21 fans are replaced with new fans, and numerous 

HVAC components are upgraded. Furthermore, 

25,000 ft of electrical cable are installed to provide 

power to the new ventilation equipment and other electrical equipment relocated in support of the 

new bulkheads and ventilation.

The 15th and final programmed installation 

for the CPS Backfit Program is scheduled for completion in 2015. The JPEO-CBD has invested more 

than $141M to provide the Navy amphibious fleet 

the required capabilities to continue critical operations in a CBR environment. Accordingly, Marines 

and Navy warfighters will have the best shipborne 

CBR defenses available to protect them from the 

threat of CBR contaminants.
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The Navy Shipboard Collective Protection 

System (CPS): Not Just for ChemicalBiological-Radiological Defense Anymore

By Mike Pompeii

What Is a Collective Protection System (CPS)?

Most U.S. Navy ships are equipped with a special ventilation system called the Collective Protection System (CPS). CPSs were originally designed to protect personnel and 

equipment inside ships from chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) attacks. Collective protection works by using special filters to remove any contaminants from intake 

ventilation air and then providing a slight overpressure inside the CPS zone to prevent 

entry of contaminants through any leak paths. In a typical CPS zone on a ship, contaminated outside air is drawn in, cleaned by special filters, and distributed throughout the 

zone. Air locks and special decontamination stations are used by personnel for exiting 

and entering the CPS zone, respectively. Figure 1 shows the layout of a typical CPS zone.

The Known Roles of CPSs

Without CPS, many missions would be extremely difficult or impossible to accomplish in a CBR-contaminated environment. Imagine a crew trying to perform work 

while wearing cumbersome protective clothing, especially in command and control or 

medical areas. Moreover, collective protection is essential for missions in warm or hot 

weather because protective clothing can be worn only for very short periods of time. 

Personnel in CPS zones do not need to wear cumbersome gas masks or protective clothing, which can degrade mission accomplishment.

Testing has shown shipboard CPS to be very effective at protecting a ship and its 

crew from CBR warfare agents.1, 2

 Deadly chemical nerve agents such as sarin, soman, 

tabun, and VX, along with blister agents such as sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and 

lewisite are completely filtered and removed by CPS. Biological warfare agents such as 

anthrax, tularemia, and botulinum toxin are completely removed as well. Collective protection is also very effective at removing all radioactive dirt, dust, and particles that result from a nuclear blast.
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The Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS): Not Just 

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The Top Ten Generally 

Unrecognized Roles of CPS

The roles, benefits, and costs of CPSs historically have been misunderstood. In addition to 

its original CBR defense role, CPS has taken on 

many new roles over the last 15 years, as increasingly more ships have been outfitted with CPS and 

have become dependent on CPS in areas other 

than CBR defense. Shipboard systems and procedures have become dependent on CPS in different 

ways and for different purposes. These unforeseen 

and unrecognized benefits of CPS have been both 

direct and indirect, while providing valuable protection, battle damage, and cost- and labor-saving 

advantages to our ships.

Ship program managers need to carefully consider all aspects of shipboard CPS from a total ship 

systems-engineering viewpoint. This includes the 

primary and secondary benefits, other shipboard 

system dependencies, and the significant amount 

of unrealized life-cycle cost and manpower savings 

for U.S. Navy ships provided by CPS.

The top ten generally unrecognized roles of 

shipboard CPS are discussed in the following paragraphs.

1. Protection from toxic industrial chemicals 

(TICs)—Toxic chemicals used by industry 

are abundant and are shipped daily in large 

quantities over highways, rail lines, and waterways. Use of these TICs by terrorists or 

Figure 1. Layout of a Typical Collective Protection System Zone
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accidents is very feasible, and CPS provides 

the ships with this needed protection.

2. Protection from petroleum fumes—Crews 

must also be protected from noxious petroleum fumes while operating in areas of 

major oil leaks (for example, the Gulf of 

Mexico spill in 2010) or sabotaged oil wells 

(for example, in Operation Desert Storm 

in 1991). CPS effectively provides this protection to the ship.

3. Protection from terrorist use of radiological 

dispersion devices (dirty bombs)—Radioactive particles from dirty bombs can travel 

significant distances and render large areas 

uninhabitable for many years. Again, CPS 

is very effective at protecting the interior 

ship spaces from these types of weapons or 

releases.

4. Protection from battle and smoke damage—

Immediately after the terrorist attack on 

USS Cole (see Figure 2), the ship’s CPS was 

responsible for limiting smoke and soot 

damage to just one of the ship’s four CPS 

zones. This greatly enabled rescue and repair efforts and saved an estimated millions of dollars in equipment, cleanup, 

and repair costs. Quoting from USS Cole’s 

Damage Control Report, 

“In the blast area mostly between frame 220 

and 174 damage was everywhere. Debris, 

trash, the smell, soot-covered bulkheads, 

etc. It was simply throughout. But outside the area, if you had not known better, 

it looked as if it was a different ship. Bulkheads were clean, along with just about everything.”

The report went on to say:

“All the debris that covered the outside of 

the ship had been filtered out, and the over 

pressurization inside had either minimized 

or completely protected the unaffected areas of the ship. Collective protection had 

worked and protected this crew in maybe a completely different faction then (sic) 

thought of in the beginning.”

The report also included details on how 

the CPS enhanced the recovery efforts that 

took place both immediately after the attack and during near- and mid-term repair 

and recovery efforts.3

5. Rapid de-smoking and smoke control during 

and after fires—CPS zones can be quickly 

configured to use its overpressure to rapidly purge (in seconds) any smoke from any 

area within a CPS zone. For example, on 

a DDG-class ship, the damage control and 

firefighting team can simply open all interconnecting doors for each of the three 

Figure 2. Damage to USS Cole From a Terrorist Attack: The CPS greatly enhanced 

rescue and recovery efforts and also limited the extent of damage on the ship.
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The Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS): Not Just 

for Chemical-Biological-Radiological Defense Anymore

or four CPS zones to form one large zone 

and then open the door or hatch closest 

to the source of the smoke. All smoke will 

be purged through that door or hatch in a 

matter of seconds. 

6. Protection from dust storms—CPS routinely provides protection of interior spaces from dust and sand storms commonly 

encountered in the Southwest Asia area. 

Without CPS, the ship’s crew must perform 

extensive clean up of interior spaces after 

such storms. The Damage Control Assistant (DCA) aboard USS Barry (DDG 52), 

an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, when referring to a recent deployment, said:

“CPS helped keep the ship clean, even in 

some of the worst environmental conditions. We shook out the prefilters after a 

dust storm, and continued to check them 

on a regular basis. I couldn’t imagine going 

through that deployment without CPS; it 

would have been a nightmare to clean the 

ship.”4

Figure 3 shows a dust storm over the Persian Gulf.

7. Increased crew health, habitability, and 

comfort—Since the crew is basically living 

and working full-time in a clean-room environment, they are always breathing purified air and are exposed to virtually no 

environmental pollutants, pollens, or dust. 

8. Higher electronics reliability due to a dustfree environment—It is a well-known fact 

that most electronics failures are caused 

by a dust buildup from electrostatic forces, causing excessive heating, short-circuiting, and subsequent early failure of 

electronic components.5

 A ship is full 

of sophisticated electronics and is highly susceptible to dust buildup and electronics failures. The CPS system provides 

Figure 3. Satellite View of a Typical Dust Storm Often Encountered by Navy Ships
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an almost completely dust-free environment inside the ship. So without CPS, 

one must include a significant life-cycle 

cost increase to account for these higher 

electronics failure rates. This cost savings 

is complex and very difficult to quantify, however, due to the number of uncontrolled variables involved in any type of 

CPS/non-CPS comparison test. Figures 4 

and 5 show the effects of dust buildup on 

electronics.

9. Less maintenance for combat systems and 

electronics—Excessive dust loading not 

only reduces the reliability of electronics, 

but also increases the maintenance hours 

required for those exposed electronics. 

Without CPS, one must include significant life-cycle cost and maintenance hour 

increases to account for the increased dust 

load present on any air-cooled electronics 

in non-CPS zones.

10. Less general cleaning hours by the crew—

Have you ever been on board a ship with 

CPS? If you have, it is very obvious how 

clean it is compared to a ship without CPS. 

That’s because most of the dirt and dust inside a ship comes in through the ventilation 

system, and the CPS filters it all. Without CPS, one must significantly increase 

the crew maintenance hours required for 

cleaning due to the significantly increased 

dust load. This is especially critical for new 

and mandated reduced-shipboard manning initiatives. In addition, CPS zones 

require no ductwork cleaning, while nonCPS zones require extensive and timeconsuming duct cleaning approximately 

every 2 years. Cost is significant and varies by ship type. 

How Much Does CPS Actually 

Cost to Install and Operate?

The initial installation cost and the life-cycle 

cost of CPS historically has been misunderstood. 

A common misconception is that “CPS is too expensive” to install on a ship when, in fact, it really 

is not. CPS uses much of the same ductwork, recirculation systems, and exhaust fans that are used in 

non-CPS shipboard ventilation systems. The only 

significant difference between CPS and non-CPS 

ventilation systems are the filters, the filter housings, high-pressure fans (versus low-pressure fans 

in non-CPS systems), and air locks used in CPS. 

Therefore, when calculating the cost of CPS, the 

cost estimator must subtract the cost of a complete 

conventional shipboard ventilation system.

The true extra cost of CPS was analyzed in a 

2002 report and found to be approximately $168 

per cubic feet per minute (CFM) more when 

compared to a conventional shipboard ventilation 

Figure 4. Typical Dust Buildup in an Electronic System
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The Navy Shipboard Collective Protection System (CPS): Not Just 

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system.6 For a destroyer-sized ship with two large 

CPS zones and two medium-sized CPS zones, this 

equals about $3 million in extra costs. Smaller 

sized ships and/or ships with fewer than four CPS 

zones would, of course, cost significantly less.

The support and logistics cost of CPS also has 

been historically misunderstood. For logistics, the 

only consumable items that the ship needs to purchase are disposable prefilters. These prefilters last 

from 3 to 6 months, are easy to replace, and cost 

about $25 each ($2 thousand to $4 thousand per 

year for a DDG 51). The main CBR filters last 3 to 5 

years, are paid for by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), and are installed and tested by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). 

Ships, therefore, do not pay for these more expensive filters. Other maintenance actions required for 

CPS are very similar in type and numbers as compared to maintenance for a conventional shipboard 

ventilation system. The total life-cycle cost of CPS 

for each ship, therefore, is relatively low. Notwithstanding, these correct cost factors must be used by 

ship program offices to determine the true cost of 

installing CPS on their ships.

Summary

A CPS has many valuable and important shipboard benefits besides CBR protection. Accordingly, 

CPS provides a significant amount of unrecognized 

life-cycle cost and manpower savings for U.S. Navy 

ships. That said, a total ship systems engineering approach must be used when considering CPS installation and coverage on new or existing ship classes. 

The primary benefits, the secondary benefits, other shipboard-system dependencies, and the overall 

reduction in life-cycle cost provided by shipboard 

CPS—all must be considered when designing, 

building, and backfitting our ships. The lives of our 

Sailors depend on it.

References

1. Pompeii, Michael A., et al., Developmental Testing (DT-IIIA) of 

the Collective Protection System (CPS) Aboard USS Curtis Wilbur, 

DDG  54, NSWCDD/TR-94/243, Naval Surface Warfare Center 

(NSWC), Dahlgren, Virginia, December 1994.

2. Pompeii, Michael A., et al., Developmental Testing (DT-IIF) of the Collective Protection System (CPS) Aboard USS Gunston Hall, LSD 44, 

NSWCDD/TR-93/89, NSWC, Dahlgren, Virginia, April 1993.

3. U.S. Navy Report, Damage Control Information, USS Cole, date 

unknown.

4. E-mail correspondence from Lieutenant Karen Wingeart, “The 

Damage Control Assistant (DCA),” USS Barry, DDG 52, from deployment circa 1999. 

5. Special Report: Effects of Dust on Computer Electronics and Mitigating Approaches, Computer Dust Solutions LLC, Hancock, Michigan, 2009.

6. Arcement, Eric R., Cost Estimate of Increased Funding Required to 

Install CPS During New Construction Versus Installing A Conventional Ventilation System, NSWCDD B53 Technical Report, Dahlgren, Virginia, 22 October 2002.

Figure 5. Dust Buildup on a Typical Electronics Board
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The Impact of the Environment on 

Collective Protection Filters

By Carlos Murillo

Collective protection filters are utilized throughout the military for various applications from naval vessels, military installations, and mobile platforms such as tanks to 

portable shelters like field hospitals. These filters are installed in ventilation systems to 

protect warfighters and civilians from chemical, biological, and radiological attacks. An 

area of great concern is a filtration system’s ability to remove chemicals from the airstream as the filter ages over time. Understanding environmental effects, therefore, is 

critical to the success of military technologies, especially in the area of filtration.

The impact of pollution has become an important variable that needs to be considered in the life cycle of military-relevant filtration systems. Filters don’t just absorb 

chemical and biological warfare agents; they also filter out chemicals normally found in 

the atmosphere: sulfur dioxide, ammonia, paint remover, industrial solvents, partially combusted diesel fuel, and more. For this reason, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) scientists analyzed filters from Navy vessels and landbased facilities that were exposed to heavy construction and pollution to identify contaminants. Filter samples not only were evaluated for their remaining filtration capacity, 

but they were also analyzed to identify chemicals that had been absorbed by the carbon 

media over time. This analysis required an understanding of how filters function.

A collective protection filter is a set comprising a High Efficiency Particle Arresting 

or High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter and a carbon filter collectively known 

as the M98 filter set. HEPA filters provide an excellent means of removing an extremely high percentage of biological and particulate material (both solid and liquid) from 

the air. HEPA media consists of a nonwoven sheet fabricated from glass and polymeric fibers. The sheet is pleated to allow more filter material in a smaller space. The fibers 

remove particles from the air by mechanical trapping that includes sieve effects, impaction, interception, and diffusion processes, in addition to static charge effects.1

 The M98 

filter set is shown in Figure 1.

The carbon portion of the collective protection filter is made of activated coal-based 

carbon that has been impregnated with metallic salts. The carbon media filters the air 

stream by removing harmful vapors, chemical contaminants, and normal atmospheric pollution (e.g., sulfur dioxide). These harmful chemicals are removed by physical adsorption into the micropores of the carbon granules,2

 as well as by chemical reaction 

with impregnants deposited on the carbon media. As a guideline, chemicals that have 
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The Impact of the Environment on 

Collective Protection Filters

Figure 1. M98 Filters Installed in Series

low vapor pressures (approximately 10 mm Hg or 

less) are removed by physical absorption onto the 

pores of the carbon media. For chemicals with high 

vapor pressures (greater than 10 mm Hg), purification of the airstream is accomplished by chemical 

reaction of the gases with the metallic salts on the 

carbon media.

As previously mentioned, military installations 

and naval vessels employ carbon filters installed in 

their ventilation systems as a form of protection 

against chemical, biological, and, radiological attacks. However, as time progresses, the protection 

levels of these filters begin to degrade.3

 The main 

causes for diminished levels of protection include:

•	 Access to reactive sites has been blocked by 

adsorbed contaminants

•	 Metallic salts have reacted with acidic type 

pollutants

•	 Reactive salts have migrated due to moisture 

adsorption

These causes are of great concern since naval ships are continuously exposed to humid air 

and high pollution levels in ports. Consequently, vessels periodically need to have their filters replaced. Land-based facilities, too, can be exposed to 

high levels of humidity and pollution from various 

sources such as automobiles, cleaners, smokers, and 

construction, or when remodeling occurs.

As an example, NSWCDD scientists and engineers removed a filter from a military installation 

that had been exposed to construction and pollution. The carbon media was removed and analyzed. 

The analysis was performed using gas chromatography–mass spectroscopy (GC-MS). GC-MS is a 

combination of two techniques that are combined 

to form a single method for analyzing mixtures of 

chemicals. GC separates the different compounds 

within a sample, and then MS is utilized to characterize each of the individual compounds. By using 

this technique, scientists can identify and characterize the chemicals that desorb off of the carbon 

media when it is heated to high temperatures. The 

chromatogram of a sample is shown in Figure 2. 

The x-axis is the retention time, and the y-axis is 

the signal intensity, which is directly related to the 

concentration of that compound in the sample. The 

values shown by the peaks are elution times—the 

time required for the compound to exit the chromatography column. Every chemical has a unique 

retention time.

MS characterizes individual compounds by the 

mass-to-charge ratio of the individual fragments 
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that compose the molecule. As the individual compounds exit the GC column, they enter a mass spectrum detector. In this detector, the chemical collides 

with a stream of electrons that break the molecule 

into fragments. The mass spectrum produced by a 

given chemical compound is essentially the same 

every time; it is a fingerprint for a molecule. Figure 3 

shows a mass spectrum along with a match from the 

chemical library.

Analysis results of the filters exposed to combustion and pollution showed that a significant 

amount of chemical was adsorbed onto the media. Knowing that the filter tested was exposed 

directly to construction, the obvious conclusion 

was that these compounds represented a mixture 

of pollution and chemicals found in a construction area, perhaps combined with some naturally 

occurring environmental compounds. Scientists 

focused on products used in construction and 

found in pollution, such as paint thinners, caulking, and fuel byproducts. They found that the 

primary components of a typical brand of paint 

thinner include:

•	 Either naphtha or Stoddard solvent

•	 A benzene derivative, such as 1,2,4-trimethylbenzene or xylenes (dimethyl-substituted benzene)

Secondary components—such as alcohols, esters, and ketones—are found in some paint thinners. Fuel byproducts can be classified in two 

categories: tailpipe emissions and evaporative 

emissions.4

 Tailpipe emissions are the byproducts 

created in the normal operation of machines. The 

makeup of the emissions is dependent on the initial composition of the fuel used. Byproducts of incomplete combustion must also be considered in 

tailpipe emissions. Evaporative emissions represent 

all other emissions aside from tailpipe emissions, 

Figure 2. A Chromatogram of a Carbon Sample From a Filter

Figure 3. A mass spectrum of ethylbenzene along with the standard spectrum from a chemical library—

ethylbenzene is a compound that can be found in fuel, paints, and tar.
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The Impact of the Environment on 

Collective Protection Filters

such as resting emissions and leaks. These emissions usually are characterized by high content of 

smaller hydrocarbons.4

 The chemical composition 

of vehicle-related volatile organic compound emissions includes a large variety of compounds that 

were analyzed and that fit into eight basic groups:

•	 N-Alkanes	 •	 Isoalkanes

•	 Cycloalkanes	 •	 Alkenes

•	 Aromatics	 •	 Acetylene

•	 Oxygenates	 •	 Carbonyls

Almost all of the chemicals found on the filter fit 

into one of these eight categories.

Conclusions

Since the capacity of the filter is based on absorption volume, it can be hypothesized that pollution due to construction and vehicle exhaust can 

have a direct impact on the capacity and lifetime 

of a filter. This is also critical for navy vessels, as 

they make port calls to various locations throughout the globe. Some nations have fewer environmental regulations than the United States, which 

corresponds to an increase in exposure to toxic air 

pollution. Consequently, the results of this analysis are of significant value to the armed services because these conclusions enable scientists to design 

solutions for longer filter life or help shape filter 

change-out timelines. That has the potential to save 

the Navy millions of dollars in material and maintenance costs while providing warfighters with the 

protection they need.

References

1. Larzelere, J.C., New and Novel Technologies in Particulate Filtration, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division.

2. Martin, C., “Dynamic adsorption on activated carbons of SO2 

traces in air: I. Adsorption capacities,” Carbon, Vol. 40, Issue 12, 

2002, pp. 2235–2246.

3. Peterson, G.W., Containment-Induced Degradation of ASZM-TEDA 

Reactivity, Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Research 

and Technology Directorate, 2006.

4. Harley, R.A., Chemical Composition of Vehicle-Related Volatile Organic Compound Emissions in Central California, California Air Resource Board–Contract Number 00-14CCOS, August 2004. 

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Navy Chemical Decontamination: Effectively 

Fielding New Skin Decontamination Solution

By Michelle L. Jackson and Sharon M. Parish
109

Navy Chemical Decontamination: Effectively 

Fielding New Skin Decontamination Solution

The Navy has used the M291 Skin Decontamination Kit since the early 1990s. An absorbent of 

chemical agents, an M291 kit contains six individual pads impregnated with a charcoal-like, resinbased power. The M291 Decontamination Kit is 

shown in Figure 1.

The Joint Service Personnel Decontamination 

System (JSPDS) Program launched a search for 

an upgraded skin decontamination system, ultimately selecting a commercial product—Reactive 

Skin Decontamination Lotion (RSDL). The Federal Drug Administration approved RSDL as a skin 

decontaminant, as it provides warfighters with a 

greater decontaminating capability than M291 for 

the nerve agents VX and soman (GD), and for the 

mustard blister agent (HD). Moreover, one application of RSDL is contained in one packet instead 

of two, as with M291, thus simplifying the process required for applying skin decontaminant. An 

opened packet of RSDL is shown in Figure 2.

While RSDL provides increased capabilities, it 

poses sustainment challenges for the Navy. Specifically, RSDL exposed to a static temperature 

of 120°F or greater has an operational life of 24 

weeks. However, if the static operational temperature is less than 120°F, the operational life of RSDL 

Figure 2. An opened packet of Reactive Skin Decontamination Lotion 

(RSDL) is shown with the applicator. The applicator is used to apply the 

RSDL onto equipment or personnel to decontaminate chemical agents. 

Figure 1. M291 Decontamination Kit
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Detection, Collective Protection, 

and Decontamination Systems

is 24 months. Given that typical Navy deployments last longer than 24 weeks, the Naval Sea 

Systems Command’s (NAVSEA’s) Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) 

was tasked to assess operational temperatures that 

RSDL would likely be exposed to during operational deployments. The intent of this effort was 

to see if actual temperatures stay below 120°F and 

to estimate the useful operational life under actual fielding conditions.

NSWCDD championed this effort, which employed Universal Serial Bus (USB) Temperature 

Dataloggers from Extech Instruments Corporation 

to monitor operational temperatures. The temperature dataloggers are placed on board ships in decontamination station areas and inside individual 

protective equipment kit bags for ground forces. Issued through the Readiness Assist Visit team and 

the Readiness Improvement Program, the dataloggers provide the ability to estimate operational temperature exposure to RSDL if placed in these areas. 

Placement of dataloggers in these areas is significant 

because operational temperatures can vary within 

the course of a day for both ashore and afloat operational environments. Notwithstanding, the JSPDS 

program used mean kinetic temperature (MKT) as 

a simplified way of expressing the overall effect of 

temperature variation once RSDL is removed from 

controlled temperature storage. The advantage of 

using the MKT is that it takes into account short 

temperature excursions above 120°F that may not 

reduce the operational life to 24 weeks. The benefit of a 24-month operational life for unused RSDL 

is that it can be reissued within the span of the 

24 months, which results in a cost savings to the 

NAVSEA Decontamination Program.

Additionally, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense has developed a time temperature indicator (TTI) to include 

on RSDL packets when manufactured. TTIs incorporate MKT to accurately determine the service life 

limits of RSDL exposed to various temperatures. 

TTIs, therefore, assist with RSDL management by 

providing visible information reflecting product 

quality. An example TTI is shown in Figure 3.

The temperature analysis provided by NAVSEA’s 

Dahlgren and Carderock warfare centers will aid decontamination support decision makers in determining how much RSDL the Navy needs to procure 

each fiscal year, which will further aid in developing a more accurate RSDL sustainment budget. 

More importantly, this analysis will help to ensure 

that warfighters afloat and ashore continue to be 

equipped with the most effective skin decontamination solution despite fluctuations in operational 

temperatures over time.

Figure 3. Time Temperature Indicator
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Navy Chemical Decontamination: Effectively 

Fielding New Skin Decontamination Solution

Navy Chemical Decontamination: Effectively 

Fielding New Skin Decontamination Solution
112

CBRD

Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

Validation, Verification, and Accreditation 

Challenges for the Joint Effects Model (JEM)

By Russell P. Brown

Scientists and engineers routinely use modeling and simulation (M&S) in the course 

of their work. M&S provides decision makers with information in the context of military operations, and its use is becoming more frequent. Department of Defense (DoD) 

regulations require M&S to be verified (did we build it right?), validated (did we build 

the right thing?), and accredited for each intended use and environment (can we use 

what we built to do what we want, where we want, and by the people we want to use it?).1

This article will describe the Joint Effects Model (JEM) and its verification, validation, 

and accreditation (VV&A).

What Is the Joint Effects Model (JEM)?

The JEM is a computer model that predicts the hazards and toxic effects that can result from enemy use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, 

as well as from releases involving toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) or toxic industrial 

materials (TIMs). JEM is the first model of its kind to be verified, validated, and accredited for use by DoD. Users of the JEM define or select a specific release from one of the 

incident source models (ISMs), and the JEM then transports the material downwind 

while calculating natural dispersive behavior. Once the location and amounts of hazardous material have been computed and stored, JEM then computes the severity of the 

hazard and displays it to the user.

What Can JEM Be Used for?

The JEM has a large number of intended uses as shown in Figure 1. Warfighters 

can use the JEM for operational uses—defensive planning, reacting, and being aware 

of CBRN incidents. Warfighters can train with the JEM, too. Analytical users, who are 

typically DoD analysts, can use the JEM to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures 

while including any effects CBRN weapons might have on the numbers and kinds of 

military units, weapons, and/or defensive equipment needed in the future.
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Challenges for the Joint Effects Model (JEM)

Incident Source Models (ISMs)

JEM capabilities are defined by the incident 

types (ISMs) that can be modeled. The ISMs in 

JEM are:

•	 Chemical/Biological Weapon Strike (CBWS)— 

models the results of chemical or biological 

bomb, missile submunition, rocket, and artillery attacks (see Figure 2). Aerosol sprayer attacks are also included. Outputs include:

◆ Surface Dosage

◆ Surface Deposition

◆ Concentration

◆ Integrated Concentration

◆ Probability of Casualties

◆ Probability of Mortality

◆ Probability of Infection (biological 

agents only)

•	 Chemical Stored Weapon Incident (CSWI)—

models accidental releases at facilities where 

U.S. chemical weapons are stored pending 

disposal. Outputs are the same as for CBWS 

except for surface deposition. 

•	 Chemical or Biological Facilities Strike (CBFS)—

models standard, conventional munition attacks on chemical or biological production 

or storage facilities, with three levels of fidelity (Quick Calculation, Damage Category, 

and Detailed Model). TIMs are included as 

“agents” in the damage category option. Outputs are the same as for CBWS.

•	 Chemical-Biological High-Altitude Release 

(CBHAR)—models bulk chemical and submunition theater ballistic missile payloads 

released at altitudes over 20.5 km. Outputs 

are the same as for CBWS.

•	 Radiological Dispersion Weapon Detonation (RDWD)—models “dirty bombs” where 

radiological materials are dispersed by conventional explosives. Outputs include radiation dose, radiation concentration, radiation 

deposition, and surface deposition. 

•	 Nuclear Weapon Detonation (NWD)— models selected NWDs. Outputs include radiation 

dose; probability of casualties; and the effects 

of blast, heat, and prompt radiation (which 

excludes radioactive fallout). 

•	 Nuclear Reactor Facility Release (NRFR)—

models releases by, and selected accidents 

in, nuclear reactors. Outputs are the same as 

for RDWD. 

•	 Nuclear Weapon Incident (NWI)—models 

the release of special nuclear material from 

a weapon that has not produced a nuclear 

yield. Outputs are the same as for RDWD. 

•	 Analytical Release Incident (ARI)—models 

any release, provided the necessary parameters are known or postulated. This ISM represents JEM’s ability to model nonstandard 

incidents. Outputs include surface dose, surface deposition (liquids), concentration, and 

integrated concentration.

The JEM is to be used operationally by all 

U.S. military services, individually and as part of 

joint operational task forces, as well as by analysts 

working in or for the DoD. The program can reside within an organization’s unique command and 

Figure 1. Joint Effects Model (JEM) Intended Uses
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control system, and it can also be installed on a laptop or desktop computer with a Windows operating system.

VV&A in General

The goal of VV&A is accreditation, which is 

simply a statement saying whether or not a model 

meets all of the acceptability criteria for the model’s intended uses and can be used with or without 

limitations. 

Accreditation limitations are usually the uses 

that could be attempted by users but should also 

include uses for which the model is not suitable, 

should only be used with caution, or should be used 

only by subject matter experts. The intended uses 

are necessary in order to develop acceptability criteria (defining “good enough”); these, in turn, are 

used to identify verification and validation (V&V) 

tasks. Validation can be broken down into data validation, method validation, and output validation. 

Figure 3 depicts a generalized VV&A process.

Intended Use(s)

The intended uses of any particular M&S drive 

the type and kind of V&V that is done; otherwise, 

V&V—not to mention development—would never 

end. Thus, the intended uses of a model or simulation are critical. The intended uses must be specific, and there must be things associated with the 

intended uses that can be measured or counted. 

Figure 2. Sample JEM hazard prediction from 32 bombs each filled with 500 kg of the nerve agent Sarin. The yellow triangles 

show the “old” method of estimating the hazard. The dotted black lines show the possible uncertainty in wind direction. The colored 

contour plots show three different levels of Sarin toxicity predicted by JEM.
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Challenges for the Joint Effects Model (JEM)

At first glance, it is not obvious that the JEM’s intended uses can be measured or counted. However, 

what permits each of the intended uses are predictions of the location and severity of some kind of 

physical process (a dosage, concentration, or deposition) leading to some toxic effect. 

Verification

For any model, verification is the process by 

which bits of computer code are checked to make 

sure that the code is doing what the programmer 

intended it to do. For example, are the correct constants and variables being used in an equation? Is 

the correct equation being used to compute a particular quantity? Are the correct units being used? 

Are unit conversions being done correctly? These 

are the types of questions that are asked in verification. Since JEM is also a DoD acquisition program, 

as well as a computer model, verification also asks 

if JEM meets its requirements. In response to this 

question, the JEM Test and Evaluation team performed development testing on the program to ensure that the stated requirements were met. This 

served as a system-level verification of the model.

Data Certification

All models have input data; most models have 

embedded data. JEM input data falls into two categories: incident specific and material specific. Incident-specific data describes the what, where, and 

when of an incident. This data does not have to be 

certified. The material-specific data, however, does 

have to be certified. The material-specific data in 

JEM refers to the physical properties of the hazardous materials JEM can model. Examples of these 

properties include vapor pressure, density, molar 

Figure 3. General VV&A Process
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mass, boiling point, etc. Material toxicity and how 

it varies with concentration and exposure time are 

also examples of material-specific properties that 

must be certified. The certification process usually 

involves identifying an authoritative source (e.g., a 

textbook or technical report) for a particular property to see if the correct value is being used. Examples of embedded data include the gravitational 

constant (G) or the ratio of a circle’s circumference 

to its diameter (π). Any and all uses of constants 

like these must be checked to determine if they are 

correct and consistent.

Output and Method Validation

Ideally, output validation—where model predictions and real-world data can be directly compared to each other—is the preferred method of 

validation. However, when real-world data does 

not exist, method validation is used. This approach 

requires that subject matter experts go through 

the code to make sure that the correct equations 

and methods are being used. If possible, intermediate quantities calculated by the program before 

displaying the final results are compared to existing data. This is known as method validation. For 

example, one JEM output is the probability of casualties from a bomb filled with nerve gas. Obviously, field experiments designed to capture this 

kind of data are unthinkable; therefore, intermediate data (like the amount of nerve agent deposited on the ground per square meter or a 10-min 

dosage measurement) is compared to the predicted values.

JEM VV&A Challenges

The VV&A effort for JEM was quite challenging for a number of reasons and revolved around 

the validation. Not only does JEM predict very 

complicated real-world behavior (the transport 

and dispersion of hazardous materials), it must do 

so in a complex operational environment when 

used by nonscientists in time to provide useful information to decision makers. JEM is a large program (over 1 million lines of code, including 

comments), with a great deal of both input and 

embedded data. Probably the most difficult challenge faced during VV&A for JEM was the fact that 

for some outputs, like the probability of casualties 

following an attack, there was no data that can be 

used for output validation.

Validation “by Parts”

The nature, complexity, and validation challenges of JEM led the JEM Program Office to develop a VV&A strategy called validation “by parts.” 

Figure 4 shows the natural “parts” of JEM. 

Figure 4. JEM Parts
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Challenges for the Joint Effects Model (JEM)

Atmospheric transport and dispersion is the 

key process that enables everything else and the 

process (in terms of what is modeled) that will have 

the most influence on the outputs. Thus, a separate output validation effort was conducted on the 

JEM atmospheric transport and dispersion engine 

using high-quality field trials specifically designed 

to test these kinds of models. The separate validation of the atmospheric transport and dispersion 

engine allowed the examination of each ISM. Since 

data for all of the available outputs for the ISMs was 

not available, the method validation approach was 

used. This method compared available data to intermediate outputs (like dosage or deposition) and 

relied on independent subject matter experts to ensure that the correct science was used and to capture any limitations present. Dosage and deposition 

data for some chemical weapons—dating from the 

1950s and 1960s—was available, likewise for historical nuclear weapon tests. However, this data 

was not intended to be used for model validation 

and reiterated the need for subject matter experts. 

This approach was also used to validate the science 

behind the calculation of toxic effects. Most existing 

data is based on historical animal testing, which also 

required review by subject matter experts.

Conclusion

While the VV&A of JEM was extremely challenging, the model was successfully accredited, with limitations, for use by all of the DoD by 

the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical 

and Biological Defense (JPEO CBD) on 15 August 2007. Since then, the JEM Program Office has 

been providing U.S. warfighters with the JEM that 

they can use with confidence to predict the hazards 

and toxic effects that can result from enemy use of 

CBRN weapons, as well as from releases involving 

TICs or TIMs.

Reference

1. DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation, and 

Accreditation (VV&A), DoD Instruction Number 5000.61, 9 December 2009.

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Challenges for the Joint Effects Model (JEM)
118

CBRD

Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

Independent Verification and Validation of MESO 

for the Threat Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept 

and Countermeasure (TACTIC) Program

By Gaurang R. Dävé and Cesar Smith

A 155mm artillery shell containing mustard gas explodes in the suburbs of 

Washington, DC. A thick, yellow-brown cloud forms and slowly moves downwind. 

Thousands of people are in its path.

Fortunately, this scenario did not take place near a metropolitan area or military base. 

It occurred within the confines of a Navy computer laboratory at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), located in Dahlgren, Virginia. NSWCDD’s 

Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Division employs state-of-theart computer modeling and simulation (M&S) to perform hypothetical scenarios using 

mathematical and scientific principles to predict what would happen in the real world. 

In addition to providing added safety to the warfighter and the general population, M&S 

saves time and money. NSWCDD scientists and engineers perform M&S in support of 

the Threat Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept and Countermeasure (TACTIC) Program.
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Independent Verification and Validation of MESO 

for the Threat Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept 

and Countermeasure (TACTIC) Program

The Threat Agent Cloud Tactical 

Intercept and Countermeasure 

(TACTIC) Program

The purpose of the TACTIC Program, managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA),a

 is to provide the U.S. military 

with the capability to protect the warfighter from 

chemical and biological warfare agent threat clouds 

on the battlefield. The goal of the program is to 

provide a system that can rapidly detect and identify the presence of a typical threat cloud and provide a countermeasure to that cloud that will kill it 

before it reaches the intended target.1

 Accordingly, TACTIC aims to develop models that accurately 

simulate the transport, dispersion, and interaction 

of threat agents and counteragent aerosols or vapor clouds on the battlefield and in urban areas. 

CBR Defense Division researchers, in support of 

the TACTIC Program, use models to predict the 

effectiveness of such countermeasures. They currently are working to determine whether or not the 

Mesoscale Model (MESO) is better than traditional hazard prediction models. 

The MESO 

The MESO—developed by ITT Industries located in Colorado Springs, Colorado—is currently being validated by the CBR Defense Division. 

MESO can theoretically produce results that model behavior that is closer to the real world since 

it takes into account the “randomness” of plume 

movement through an environment. It also has the 

potential to provide higher fidelity results without 

the need for intense resources, such as computational fluid dynamics, required by other models. 

Other models, such as the Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK) Computer Model, employ a Gaussian-based calculation, whereas MESO 

employs random walk tracer particles.b

 In Gaussian-based code, the main vehicle for calculations is 

the center point for concentrations and its distribution. With random-walk tracer-particle code, the 

concentration is represented more discretely with 

the use of individual particles.

To further illustrate this difference, assume, 

for instance, a group of people watching a football game. We can take one person’s observations 

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Independent Verification and Validation of MESO 

for the Threat Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept 

and Countermeasure (TACTIC) Program
120

CBRD

Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

into consideration and assume that they represent 

the observations of the group. On the other hand, 

we can take into consideration each individual’s 

observations. Obviously, the more people we take 

into account, the higher the details of the football 

game observations.

Going back to the models, VLSTRACK will 

produce a result that best describes the plume and 

is probably good enough for most cases. However, MESO will theoretically produce higher fidelity results and can take into account more factors, 

such as differences in terrain (hilly versus flat), 

3-D wind fields, and variations in ground cover 

(i.e., vegetation). 

Figure 1 shows example output from a Gaussian-based puff, as produced by the VLSTRACK 

Computer Model. The color inside the cloud represents higher concentration. The smaller cloud represents the plume after 30 seconds, and the cloud 

on the right shows how the plume has grown in 

size after 5 minutes.

Figure 2 is an example of MESO output showing how it interacts with terrain. Also, notice how 

each red dot represents the particle tracers and 

their location within a three-dimensional domain.

In determining whether the MESO is better 

than traditional hazard prediction models, the first 

step is to study the procedure used to validate previous models, such as VLSTRACK. Studying this 

procedure provides the ability to look at lessons 

learned and leverage existing methodologies, as 

well as looking back at the benchmark to see how 

well the new model must perform. Field trial data is 

then gathered and analyzed, followed by a translation of this data into the model’s inputs. After the inputs are generated, the model is run, and the output 

is compared to the field trial reports. The last step is 

to take these comparisons and calculate a series of 

statistics, which will determine how well the model 

predicted a simulated incident. Subsequently, if researchers determine that MESO provides better prediction technology than existing models, then that 

determination serves as the basis for implementing 

MESO into programs such as TACTIC. The goal for 

TACTIC is to be able to accurately model the movement and interaction of clouds; the validation effort 

determines if MESO is the right tool for that job.

Verification and Validation

There are risks associated with using M&S 

to simulate events such as the opening scenario 

above. How do we know that the model will accurately predict the size, shape, and orientation of 

the mustard cloud? Does the model take into account real-world factors such as weather, terrain, 

vegetation, etc.? To ensure that the model is behaving appropriately and is accurate, therefore, it has 

to be verified and validated using field trial data. 

In general, field trial data is obtained by releasing 

an agent or simulant in an open, unpopulated test 

range. Sensors are placed throughout the range and 

data, such as concentration amounts, are collected. 

This collected data indicates locations where the 

agent was found and in what quantities. This effort 

Figure 1. Gaussian Puff Example
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Independent Verification and Validation of MESO 

for the Threat Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept 

and Countermeasure (TACTIC) Program

requires analyzing the trial data, creating and running scenarios within the software that emulate the 

parameters in the trial, and performing a statistical 

analysis of the results.

Using the parameters collected at the test site 

(e.g., wind speed and direction, temperature, time 

of day, agent quantities, relative humidity), a run 

can be performed using a mathematical computer model. The output from this model is compared 

to the data collected from the field trial. After obtaining a series of statistics from this comparison, 

engineers can decide how accurate the model is in 

predicting the hazard.

Notwithstanding, there are concerns in using this method of validation. Probably the biggest 

concern is comparing model outputs with data that 

is over 50 years old. The reason data is so old is because testing using live agents is prohibited. Moreover, the means for collecting and processing the 

data were limited and crude by today’s standards. 

One way of addressing these concerns is to use a 

variety of test data, including more recent field trials. Additionally, the statistics derived from analyses are averaged over the entire field trial set, which 

diminishes the effect of “bad data.”

Conclusion

In the future, TACTIC will be able to provide 

the warfighter with the capability to evaluate the effectiveness of various chemical and biological “defeat” mechanisms—countermeasures intended to 

neutralize, kill, or decontaminate a chemical or 

biological threat. The use of M&S within the confines of a computer laboratory saves time and money, and potentially can save lives. State-of-the-art 

models, such as MESO, are being studied by the 

CBR Division to determine model effectiveness 

when predicting chemical or biological attacks. As 

a result, answering the question of what would happen if a 155mm shell containing mustard gas actually went off near populated areas may just be 

a matter of a few clicks of the mouse. Ultimately, 

warfighters will benefit by being better prepared in 

the face of chemical and biological threats.

Endnotes

a. The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this article are 

those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing 

the official views or policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the Department of 

Defense.

b. The VLSTRACK Computer Model provides approximate downwind hazard predictions for a wide range of chemical and biological agents, and munitions of military interest. VLSTRACK features 

smart input windows, which check input parameter combinations 

to ensure that a reasonable attack is being defined, and simple and 

informative output graphics, which display the hazard footprint for 

agent deposition, dosage, or concentration. Source: http://www.

ofcm.gov/atd_dir/pdf/vlstrack.pdf

Reference

1. Threat Agent Cloud Tactical Intercept and Countermeasure 

(TACTIC) Program, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA), http://www.darpa.mil/sto/chembio/tactic.html

Figure 2. The MESO: Random-Walk Tracer Particles
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Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

What if a Terrorist Attack Releases 

a Toxic Industrial Chemical?

By Timothy J. Bauer

On 6 January 2005, a train wreck in Graniteville, South Carolina, led to the rupture of a 90-ton chlorine railcar, resulting in the release of 54 tons of chlorine.1

 Over 

5,000 people in the lightly populated area were evacuated, over 500 people sought 

medical treatment, and 9 people died. This accident led to concern among city planners, emergency responders, the transportation industry, the chemical industry, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense (DoD) 

about potential terrorist attacks on chemical railcars and tanker trucks transiting an 

urban area, or chemical storage tanks near an urban area. A comparison of modern 

hazard-assessment model predictions at the time consistently suggested that lethal 

concentrations from large releases of chlorine would persist within the plume of toxic vapor beyond 6 miles downwind.2

 As the spread of the expected plume moved rapidly through an urban area, results indicated that hundreds of thousands of persons 

would need to be evacuated.

Such a large evacuation effort would be impractical for emergency responders. 

Further, records of toxic effects from accidents like that in Graniteville suggest that the 

downwind hazard area is much shorter than the hazard assessment models predict. 

The nine deaths in Graniteville all occurred within half a mile of the accident. Likewise, deaths during the World War I Battle of Ypres, France, on 22 April 1915 resulted 

from several thousand chlorine cylinders along a 4-mile-long trench and were limited to within less than a half mile of the release trench.3

 Even the over 2,000 deaths in 

Bhopal, India, that resulted from the 3 December 1984 release of 40 tons of methyl isocyanate occurred within less than 2 miles; the large number of deaths were associated with the high population density rather than the downwind distance of that highly 

toxic chemical.4

To address the large discrepancy between recorded toxic effects and model predictions, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assembled a group of subject 

matter experts from the chemical industry, transportation industry, national laboratories, academia, emergency response organizations, DHS, DoD, and the intelligence 

community. A meeting was held on 8–9 November 2006 in McLean, Virginia, and was 

co-chaired by a representative from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD).5

 Discussion focused on the release of chlorine from a 90-ton railcar 
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What if a Terrorist Attack Releases 

a Toxic Industrial Chemical?

and the identification of knowledge gaps associated with such a release. The most important knowledge gaps fell into three categories:

1. Characterization of the vapor source resulting from the liquid jet

2. Human toxic effects

3. Reaction and removal of the chlorine vapor 

with surfaces and air as it travels downwind

Each is discussed below.

Vapor Source Characterization

Survivors of the Graniteville accident reported that chlorine vapor remained in the release 

area for at least 2 hours. The chlorine vapor plume 

also followed the path of the valley within which 

Graniteville is located, which was somewhat different from the wind direction at the time of the 

accident. The chlorine was thus heavily influenced 

by the terrain features, along with the buildings 

and vegetation in the release area. Conversely, 

hazard prediction models all assumed that the liquid jet would mix with passing air and be carried 

downwind as a long vapor plume. These modeling 

approaches agreed with data from field trials involving large releases of toxic industrial chemicals 

(TICs), such as ammonia; but those releases occurred over flat desert terrain under a fairly high 

wind speed. Field trials also were limited by available test sites and the requirement that the wind 

direction remain steady and predictable for safety reasons.6

One theory addressing these additional features, developed by NSWCDD in 2008, was that 

large TIC masses of vapor and aerosol released over 

a short time period would pool into a large cloud at 

the release site and give off vapor into the passing 

air over an extended time period.7

 This pooling was 

likely enhanced by the presence of buildings, vegetation, and terrain depressions in the release area. 

The significance of having a long-duration source 

of vapor instead of a short-duration plume was that 

the concentration of the chemical was lower and 

less toxic, especially when coupled with the human 

toxic effects described in the next section. TIC vapor plume formation versus pooling at the release 

site is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. TIC Vapor Plume Formation Versus Pooling at the Release Site
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Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

Human Toxic Effects

The model predictions used to estimate the 

downwind hazard areas were based on chemical 

concentrations. The concentrations of interest were 

the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) developed for the Environmental Protection Agency.8

For a given chemical, there are AEGLs for lifethreatening, serious, and irritating effects. Human 

toxic responses are a function of exposure (which 

combines concentration and duration) rather than 

just concentration, so there are AEGLs for a range 

of exposure durations ranging from 10 minutes to 

8 hours. The problem with the AEGLs identified by 

the subject matter experts was that they are set for 

the most sensitive subpopulation rather than the 

average person. Thus, the AEGLs cannot be used 

to estimate expected casualties from a TIC attack 

or accident.

An important aspect of human toxic responses is that, for one-time acute exposures, the human 

body can slowly expel or otherwise counter a toxic chemical. A high concentration received over 

a short duration, therefore, is more toxic than an 

equivalent exposure involving a low concentration over a longer time period. This “toxic load” 

approach reveals why lowering the vapor concentration at the release location, as discussed above, 

can dramatically reduce the size and length of the 

downwind hazard area. Even if the TIC does travel downwind as a high-concentration plume, use 

of higher toxicity values appropriate for the average person and the toxic load approach with existing hazard prediction models will greatly improve 

model output.

The importance of proper source characterization and toxicity estimation can be demonstrated using a scenario involving the release of 

2,500 pounds of hydrogen cyanide in downtown 

Baltimore, Maryland.9

 In this scenario, the number of persons requiring medical attention ranged 

from 1,288 within the model contour to 22,182 if a 

simple circle is drawn. The length of the contour is 

approximately 1 mile. If the toxic load approach is 

then used with toxicity values for the total population distribution (as opposed to the most sensitive 

subpopulation), the length of the contour decreases to less than a quarter mile, decreasing the number of persons requiring medical treatment to 32. 

Figure 2 shows the hazard area with an appropriate source characterization but using the current 

Figure 2. Baltimore Incident Concentration Hazard Area Estimates 
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What if a Terrorist Attack Releases 

a Toxic Industrial Chemical?

AEGL approach. Figure 3 shows a contour with 

the toxic load approach with toxicity values for the 

total population distribution.

Reaction and Removal Mechanisms

The chlorine vapor at Graniteville penetrated 

the ground at the release site and had to be neutralized with large amounts of lime. As the chlorine vapor traveled downwind, it corroded exposed metal 

surfaces, such as doorknobs and electrical transformers. The vapor reaction with surface materials formed a different compound, pulling mass out 

of the vapor plume and lowering its concentration. 

TICs can also potentially react with water vapor or 

air pollutants to form less toxic compounds. Some 

vapor absorbed into porous materials. One issue 

with absorption is that once the plume has moved 

on, the TIC may then desorb from within the surface. This would result in a lower concentration 

but not a lower total vapor mass. Although some 

TIC reaction data exists, the data were generated 

for pollution monitoring purposes using very low 

TIC concentrations rather than the high concentrations relevant to attacks and accidents. Data are 

still needed on how far and how fast the relevant 

reactions will occur to estimate how much mass is 

removed from the plume as it travels downwind.

Current Research Efforts

There are now quite a few groups that have become interested in TIC incidents, and NSWCDD 

provides subject matter expertise, as well as modeling and analysis support to almost all of them. The 

TSA group of experts assembled for the November 

2006 meeting mentioned earlier has held together 

and expanded, and holds regular teleconferences. 

Helping to plan chlorine and ammonia field trials 

has been key to maintaining the group. The following agencies and task forces are among the groups 

NSWCDD supports:

United States

•	 The Toxic Industrial Chemical/Toxic Industrial Material (TIC/TIM) Task Force was established by the Joint Program Executive 

Office for Chemical and Biological Defense 

in 2007 to develop a prioritized list of TICs 

and then to determine the potential hazard 

of TICs if used in a terrorist attack against 

forward-deployed troops.10

Figure 3. Baltimore Incident Final Casualty Estimate
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•	 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) assembled a group of subject matter 

experts in 2007 to determine the shortcomings of the TIC source module in their Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability 

Model, and to recommend improvements.11

•	 The U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence 

Center conducted the Wild Stallion field trials at Dugway Proving Ground (DPG) releasing chlorine from 1-ton tanks in October 

2007; these tests were conducted in response 

to the terrorist attacks in Iraq employing 

similar 1-ton chlorine tanks.12

•	 Like the DoD TIC/TIM Task Force, the DHS 

Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) 

developed a prioritized list of TICs of concern 

for terrorist use against homeland security.

•	 The Advanced Tank Car Collaborative Research Program involves government and 

industry working together to design rail tank 

cars that either resist puncturing or result in 

a greatly reduced hazard area if the TIC contents are released.

•	 The U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC) evaluated toxicity 

data for both the TIC/TIM Task Force priority TIC list and the CSAC priority TIC list to 

provide toxicity values to use with the toxic 

load approach for both DoD and DHS hazard area analyses.

International

•	 The Joint Industry Project is a European collaborative effort, which began in 2001 to 

measure the characteristics of jets of chemicals stored as pressurized liquid, such as 

chlorine.13

•	 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) System Analysis and Studies 061 

Panel (SAS-061) was assembled in 2006 to 

analyze the hazards of potential terrorist actions against allied troops. The scenarios evaluated included a terrorist attack on a chlorine 

tanker truck outside of a NATO camp.14

•	 The NATO Challenge Sub-Group is now evaluating the concentration challenge to NATO 

protective equipment resulting from the terrorist attacks defined for the TIC/TIM Task 

Force scenarios.

•	 The European Defense Agency is setting up 

a testing and model development program 

to address release of TICs in an urban environment.

Considerable coordination and collaboration 

across all domestic and international groups has 

been established. NSWCDD is a member of most 

groups.

Jack Rabbit Test Program

The most significant effort to date to generate 

data necessary to improve downwind hazard area 

estimation was the set of field trials conducted at 

DPG during the period 27 April through 21 May 

2010. Funding was provided by TSA and managed 

by ECBC; the project was operated by CSAC, and 

the trials were conducted by DPG.15 The test design 

(Figure 4) was created by NSWCDD and the Norwegian Defense Research Institute (FFI).

NSWCDD and FFI took advantage of an existing collaborative effort to work on Project Jack 

Rabbit. The field trials were intended to prove or 

disprove the NSWCDD theory regarding pooling 

of chlorine (or other TICs transported as pressurized liquids) vapor and aerosol at the release 

location, so the design included a circular pit designed to shelter chlorine and ammonia against 

the wind flowing over it. The test geometry was 

refined by FFI using computational fluid dynamics modeling.16 The instrumentation was specified and positioned by the TSA group of subject 

Figure 4. Jack Rabbit Test Design
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What if a Terrorist Attack Releases 

a Toxic Industrial Chemical?

matter experts. Four trials each were conducted 

with chlorine and ammonia involving the rapid 

release of 2 tons of liquid directed downward into 

the pit. NSWCDD and FFI provided on-site modeling and analysis support during the trials. The 

trials did result in chlorine and ammonia pooling in the pit and releasing vapor into the passing air, supporting NSWCDD’s theory that large 

TIC masses of vapor and aerosol released over a 

short time period would pool into a large cloud at 

the release site and give off vapor into the passing 

air over an extended time period, suggesting that 

the chemical concentration would likely be lower 

and less toxic.

As a result of this important finding, in conjunction with the extensive measurements taken 

during the Jack Rabbit field trials, hazard assessment models will be better equipped to predict 

or respond if a terrorist attack releases TICs, and 

warfighters will be much better protected from 

these types of attacks.

References

1. “Collision of Norfolk Southern Freight Train 192 with Standing 

Norfolk Southern Local Train P22 with Subsequent Hazardous 

Materials Release at Graniteville, South Carolina,” Railroad Accident Report, National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB/RAR05/04, 29 November 2005.

2. Hanna, S.R., Comparisons of Six Models Using Three Chlorine Release Scenarios (Festus, Macdona, Graniteville), Hanna Consultants, Report Number P082, 24 February 2007.

3. Marshall, V.C., “The Predictions of Human Mortality from 

Chemical Accidents with Especial Reference to the Lethal Toxicity of Chlorine,” Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 22 (1), 

1989, pp. 13–56.

4. Sharan, M., et al., “Bhopal Gas Leak: A Numerical Simulation of 

Episodic Dispersion,” Atmospheric Environment, Vol. 29, No. 16, 

1995, pp. 2061–2074.

5. Toxic Industrial Hazard Source Term Characterization Technical Interchange Meeting, Northrop Grumman, McLean, Virginia, 

8–9 November 2006.

6. Goldwire, H.C., et al., Desert Tortoise Series Data Report, 1983 

Pressurized Ammonia Spills, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCID-20562, December 1985.

7. Bauer, T.,J. and Fox, S.B., Characterization of the Initial Cloud of 

Chlorine Resulting from a 90-Ton Railcar Incident, Department of 

Homeland Security, Chemical Security Analysis Center, September 2008.

8. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Selected Airborne Chemicals, 

Volume 2, The National Academies Press, 2002.

9. Bauer, T.J., “Chemical Toxicity Approach for Emergency Response,” 

presented at the Chemical Biological Medical Treatment Symposium (CBMTS), Industry VI, Cavtat, Croatia, 5–10 April 2009.

10. Memorandum for Record #1, “TIC/TIM Task Force Prioritization & Application Recommendations,” Errata 1, 31 August 2009, 

which adopts Sutton, T.E., Toxic Industrial Chemicals: Global Assessment and Scientific Analysis, Naval Research Laboratory, District of Columbia, NRL\FR\6364—09-10, 182, 2009.

11. Hanna, S.R., et al., Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIC) Source Emissions Improvements, Hanna Consultants, Report Number P098, 

29 August 2007.

12. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=46311

13. Witlox, H.W.M., Flashing Liquid Jets and Two-Phase Droplet Dispersion, Phase 3: Scaled and Large-Scale Experiments (Materials 

Other Than Water) and Model Improvements (Droplet/Rainout/Pool 

Modelling), DNV Risk Management Solutions, 6 September 2006.

14. Defence Against CBRN Attacks in the Changing NATO Strategic 

Environment, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, RTO Technical 

Report, RTO-SAS-061, October 2007.

15. Storwald, D.P., Detailed Test Plan for the Jack Rabbit Test Program, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, WDTC-TP-10-011, 

March 2010.

16. Vik, T. and Reif, B.A.P., Preliminary Assessment of the Vertical Release of Liquefied Chlorine Inside a Depression, FFI-rapport 

2009/01251, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), 

1 August 2009.
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Defending Against the Unseen — Chemical and 

Biological Building Protection Challenges

By Matthew G. Wolski and Stephen S. Voynar

Imagine if a building could defend its occupants from chemical and biological (CB) 

threats, using a very limited number of sensors, while not triggering false alarms every 

time someone arrives on the premises with an aromatic lunch or a new perfume. Given the wide array of CB threats to American facilities throughout the world, sensitivity 

settings aside, key protection questions remain. How can military commanders plan to 

protect facilities from CB threats? And, how can teams of first responders respond safely should an incident occur?

As a hypothetical example, consider a military barracks located on a base 5 km from 

a nearby chemical plant processing methyl isocyanate (MIC). The proximity of this type 

of plant to a military installation is of great concern—especially since MIC is the same 

chemical released from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984 that killed thousands of people. Figure 1 shows a chemical plant (located in West Virginia) similar to 

the plant in Bhopal, India.1

Building Protection Challenges

In addressing these key building protection challenges, a single, hypothetical building scenario will be used in this article and presented from the perspective of the military commander. Knowing the dangers posed by MIC, the commander of the facility 

needs to ensure that his people are well protected.

Many challenges confront the commander and other warfighters when trying to 

protect personnel from the unseen threats posed by CB agents. The first challenge is 

discovering that a chemical or biological event occurred and determining where it occurred. Most important is to ensure survival of the building’s inhabitants. Another key 

challenge is having confidence in the organization’s ability to perform its mission. In addressing these challenges, fortunately, commanders have several powerful, effective toolkits and modeling programs at their disposal to assess threats and courses of action to 

protect against or minimize the effects of a chemical or biological event.

Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Tools

Over the years, M&S tools have been used to assess the indoor air quality (IAQ) of 

buildings. IAQ includes the amount of contaminant entering and leaving a building over 

time. To assess IAQ, single-zone models (also known as box models) have been used, as 
129

Defending Against the Unseen — Chemical and 

Biological Building Protection Challenges

well as multizone and full computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes. Each of these capabilities has 

benefits and drawbacks.

An example of an IAQ tool is the CONTAM 

model developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). CONTAM is a 

multizone model that can be described as a simplified macro model of a building. CONTAM determines airflow and contaminant movement within 

a building. A building can be modeled as one or 

more zones (boxes) of uniform temperature, pressure, and concentration. Each zone can represent a 

single room, hallway, or portion of a larger room. 

CONTAM calculates air pressure and airflows 

within each zone of a building, and then it calculates the movement of contaminants between each 

zone. After a user configures a moderately complex 

building, a CONTAM simulation can be executed 

within a matter of minutes.

When performing an analysis of a building, 

there are five main steps:

1. View the building as a system of multiple 

unique zones

2. Create a “model” representation of the 

building

3. Determine the important building components and create data for each component

4. Execute one or more simulations

5. Analyze the results

This analysis process seems simple and straightforward, but each step can contain numerous challenges that need to be addressed and solved. In an 

attempt to simplify this process, the Immune Building Toolkit (IBTK) was created. IBTK is a component of the Immune Building Program, which was 

sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). IBTK was integrated with 

CONTAM to leverage its ability to calculate movement of CB agents within a building. Contamination from outside of the building and weather data 

can be supplied from other models, such as the:

•	 Advection and Dispersion of Vapor, Evaporating Droplets, and Solids model (ADVEDS) 

(a government-owned CFD model)

•	 Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking 

(VLSTRACK) model (a government-owned 

Gaussian puff model)

•	 MESO-RUSTIC model (a governmentsponsored building-aware Lagrangian particle model)

These models calculate outside contamination 

entering a building through leakage paths. Analysis tools included in the models provide detailed 

reports about the level of building exposure, costs 

Figure 1. Two workers were fatally injured when a waste tank containing the pesticide methomyl violently exploded, 

damaging a process unit at the Bayer CropScience Chemical Plant in Institute, West Virginia.1
130

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of designed protective solutions, and protective device performance during simulations. Output can 

be displayed in tabular format, in graphical charts, 

or 3-D displays.

Challenges: Data-Driven Analysis

Users might have several purposes in mind for 

modeling the interior of a building. They might 

want to assess the effectiveness of various building protection strategies. They might want to estimate the overall building protection level and cost 

associated with protection strategies, or they might 

want to search for an optimal protective solution. 

Regardless of the purpose, before users can perform any kind of analysis, data is required.

Developing an internal model of any structure 

can be challenging, as much needed information 

might not be available or complete. In most cases, 

a building’s layout is available only in two-dimensional computer-aided design (CAD) files or on paper. Consequently, without visiting the structure, 

analysts might not know if the building was built as 

originally designed, if the doors and windows leak, 

if air is really being supplied to each room, or if any 

modifications to the building have been done. IBTK 

attempts to address the two-dimensional challenge 

by implementing a capability to read the Industry Foundation Classes (IFC) format, which is becoming an international standard. IFC is a standard 

for representing 3-D, real-world objects—such as 

buildings—and sharing that information among 

different software tools. Unfortunately, this standard is still evolving, and not everyone in the United States is using this file format yet. This challenge 

is more significant in multizone and CFD models 

than it is to the much simpler single-zone box model. Thus, sometimes the box model is much more 

attractive, since all that is necessary is the bulk air 

exchange rate (how fast the building changes its 

air). Data for the hypothetical example in this article is shown in Table 1 and is annotated on Figure 2. It suggests that 10,000+ gallons of MIC from 

a chemical plant could pose a significant threat 

from a distance of 1–10 km. For comparison, data 

is also provided for the agents phosgene, ricin, sarin, and anthrax.

Additional challenges are introduced with creation of a “smart building” capable of defending 

itself against detected threats without assistance 

from humans. To protect occupants, sensors and 

alarms need to be smart enough to use active and 

passive protection systems capable of adapting to a 

variety of situations and threats. They also need to 

alert security and safety teams in a timely manner. 

Many of the available sensors are not able to be networked and used in a smart-building setup. Those 

that are capable would need to identify threat contaminants efficiently and quickly without triggering false alarms. Most smart-building sensors 

are too expensive to place within every room of a 

building. IBTK and other tools, such as the Probabilistic Algorithm for Sampler Siting (PASS), offer 

realistic, cost-effective methods for placing sensors. Capabilities such as these are designed to define the optimum sensor locations with a limited 

number of sensors to defend against a defined set 

of threats. In turn, this decreases response time.

Another challenge involves filtering the air that 

feeds the building, a form of passive protection. 

Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) can be damaging to chemical filtration. The challenge here is the 

amount of data available on the efficiency of material removal from the air and what happens to the 

material over time. IBTK developers incorporated 

a useful library for typical types of doors, windows, 

and leakage paths along openings and through wall 

Table 1. Example Threat Scenario Data
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Defending Against the Unseen — Chemical and 

Biological Building Protection Challenges

materials; heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) ducts; filtration devices; and sensors 

to help minimize the data challenges. Of course, 

when making an analysis, there are always new 

variables to consider.

Challenges: Threat Analysis

In our hypothetical building example, we 

know what the threat material is (MIC), approximately how far away it could be, and approximately how much material might be released during an 

event. It is actually rare for that much information 

to be known in advance. The remaining challenge 

for the analyst supporting the commander in other scenarios is to determine the most likely threats 

to the building. This could be gleaned from intelligence sources or from other threat assessments. 

Probably the biggest challenge in understanding 

and conveying the threat is that—unlike what we 

might see in a Hollywood blockbuster or an incident like Bhopal—material likely will be released 

in an unseen, unspectacular way.

Analyzing model results can be somewhat 

complicated. One metric used by the Immune 

Building Program is the fraction of building exposed (FBE). This metric is an estimate of the 

amount of the building exposed beyond a specified level; unfortunately, this metric can skew the 

perception of the severity of the situation. Another 

metric is the fraction of occupants exposed (FOE). 

This allows for a more targeted look at the building, where only inhabitants are counted and not 

the entire building; this, too, can be misleading, as 

the analyst can miss areas that may need decontamination or may cut off a route of evacuation. 

Another view is to examine zone by zone, looking 

at the movement of material through the building. 

This can be done using a number of tools: NIST 

developed the CONTAM Results Viewer, and the 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

(NSWCDD) developed the ContamViewer, which 

IBTK integrated into its 3-D view (only one level at a time). There are many other ways to analyze 

the data beyond contamination movement. These 

Figure 2. Threat Scenario Locations for Hypothetical Facility 2
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may include, but are not limited to, air flow, pressure differences, and temperature. Computer tool 

screen captures depicting the analysis process are 

shown in Figure 3.

Protecting Personnel: 

The Ultimate Benefit

As noted earlier, the hypothetical building 

in this example is located 5 km from a chemical 

plant processing MIC. An IFC file is available of 

the building, and basic building information has 

been entered into the CONTAM model. After verifying the validity of the model, a baseline analysis 

is performed, and it is determined that over 75 percent of the inhabitants of the building are at risk if 

a release occurs. Filters are then added to the main 

HVAC supply system. Active sensors (that can detect MIC) are also added into both the exterior and 

interior of the building. These sensors can trigger 

automatic shutdown of the HVAC supply and exhaust systems. Following the baseline, a follow-on 

analysis is performed, and it is determined that less 

than 5 percent of the inhabitants are now at risk. 

This analysis is presented to the base commander to determine if he or she is willing to accept 

that level of risk. Changes to the building are then 

made. Subsequently, at some time in the future, if 

an accidental release of MIC occurs at the chemical 

plant, model results can determine if the resulting 

cloud is sufficiently toxic to cause injury or death to 

individuals outside. With protections in place, all 

inhabitants of the protected building would be safe.

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Figure 3. Computer Screen Captures Depicting an Example Analysis Process

IBTK

IFC

FBE

Contamination 

by Zone

(ContamViewer)

CAD
133

Defending Against the Unseen — Chemical and 

Biological Building Protection Challenges

This hypothetical situation demonstrates 

that tools like CONTAM and IBTK provide warfighters with a level of confidence that personnel in their facilities will be reasonably safe from 

a chemical or biological incident. Extending this 

capability to Navy ships is the next step. It can be 

(and has been) done. These tools enable analysts 

to examine threat scenarios from many points of 

view. Modeling analysis costs much less than fullscale testing and poses no health risks to anyone. 

Additionally, new kinds of metrics are being used 

to measure the effectiveness of a building’s protection architecture in relation to its costs and maintenance. As a result, people within buildings will 

be safer against a variety of threats. First responders, too, will have access to improved training 

tools, enabling them to develop improved procedures for safely handling threats.

Interior modeling for CB defense continues 

today through efforts with the Joint Science and 

Technology Office at the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency and the Department of Homeland Security. As a result of these efforts, warfighters and first 

responders will be much safer from CB threats.

References

1. U.S. Chemical Safety Board, Bayer CropScience Pesticide Waste Tank 

Explosion, http://www.csb.gov/investigations/detail.aspx?SID=3&

Type=1&pg=3%2f%2f%2f ’%2c%2f%2f ’%2c%2f ’%2c’%2c&print

=y, accessed 10 June 2010.

2. Building Protection Toolkit Analyst’s Manual, Toyon Research Corporation, Distributed with IBTK Product III, 13 October 2005.

133

Defending Against the Unseen — Chemical and 

Biological Building Protection Challenges
134

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Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

Modeling and Simulation Supports 

Joint Expeditionary Collective 

Protection (JECP) Program

By William G. Szymczak and Harold K. Barnette

Joint expeditionary forces employ two-man tents for a number of missions in areas 

where the adversary’s use of chemical and biological agents is possible. Two-man tents 

for expeditionary-type missions—unlike some larger, more stationary structures—cannot make use of forced-air filtration systems. Consequently, to protect these forces, scientists and engineers from the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), in partnership with 

the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) in Dahlgren, Virginia, explored 

the question: Can a small tent structure be designed to provide protection against biological or chemical vapor agent attacks?

The Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection (JECP) System Performance Model 

(SPM) is being developed in parallel with the JECP collection-of-shelters effort. SPM 

supports testing and evaluation through the use of computer modeling and simulation. 

The SPM brings together various computer models to simulate the threat, dispersion, 

airflow, filters, and components of the system. It supports modeling in a wide variety 

of environments and terrain, far beyond what is possible with live testing. Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations are used to provide solutions to various SPM 

technical challenges.

This article describes a methodology for treating fully coupled internal/external flow 

through a passively filtered structure (two-man tent). Most state-of-the-art approaches 

to internal/external flows involve the use of separate codes for each domain, which are 

weakly coupled through boundary conditions. However, these approaches cannot be 

used directly for passive filtration, as the internal pressure is not known, and the pressure drop across the filters is required to determine the internal flow. A fully coupled solution directly resolves these issues and provides for a more accurate model for assessing 

the performance of passive filter systems.

System Performance Model (SPM) Approach

Filtration on a tent would have to allow for a sufficient exchange of uncontaminated air for respired carbon dioxide. For this effort, an analysis of a passive filter structure 
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Modeling and Simulation Supports 

Joint Expeditionary Collective 

Protection (JECP) Program

was performed. The unique aspect of this analysis 

was that the flow surrounding, through, and inside 

the tent was determined simultaneously in a fully 

coupled computation. The methodology and analysis presented here could be applied to a wide variety of relevant design structures.

In general, the motion of fluids is described 

by the Navier-Stokes equations derived in the 19th 

century. These equations are classified as nonlinear partial differential equations and are used for a 

wide range of flow applications, including weather prediction, ocean currents, the motion of stars 

in a galaxy, and the turbulent flow of air surrounding shelters. However, their full analysis is very difficult. The proof of the existence of solutions in 

three dimensions (3-D) has not been mathematically determined to this day. Thus, because of the 

difficult nature of the equations and the complexity of turbulent flows, solutions to the Navier-Stokes 

equations are approximated using computational 

algorithms within CFD codes.

One example of a CFD code is the Atmospheric Dispersion of Vapor and Evaporating Drops and 

Solids (ADVEDS) code developed at NRL and 

NSWCDD over the past 20 years. Although this 

code was originally used for external flows for ship 

defense from CBR attacks, it has been generalized 

for internal and fully coupled internal-external flow 

simulations through JECP structures. This code is actually a pair of codes, namely ADVED_NS for determining the Navier Stokes flow field and ADVED_T 

to transport particles, evaporating drops, and vapor 

using the predetermined flow field. A photograph 

of a tent and a depiction of the ADVEDS CFD grid 

model for the two-man tent structure is shown in 

Figure 1. Three Triosyn filter panels (shown in magenta) are embedded in the tent walls. The Triosyn 

panels are permeable, allowing fresh air to enter the 

structure and carbon dioxide to be purged, while filtering out contaminating agents. By determining 

the flow features (pressure and velocity) surrounding and through these filters, the performance of this 

passively filtered system can be assessed with respect 

to how long a soldier could survive a biological or 

chemical attack if protected by such a structure.

The primary technical challenges arising from 

flow simulations of shelters with passive filters include the resolution of thin walls and filter membranes, and the relatively low permeability of the 

filter components. The walls of the material fabric are approximately 3 mm, while the filters are 

slightly thicker (5 mm). The ADVEDS code employs a structured grid that must be fitted to the 

structure boundaries. This is done by mapping regions of an initially uniform grid onto the surface 

of the structure identified as a collection of triangles in a stereolithography file (STL) format. For 

internal/external flow, both the inside and outside 

of a thin structure must be described and mapped 

using different grid surfaces. By expressing the 

tent structure using separate STL files for its interior, exterior, and each side of the fly, a grid fitted to each surface of the shelter is constructed and 

smoothed with a structured grid generation code.

Permeability is measured by maintaining a 

constant pressure drop across the filter membrane 

and measuring the resulting flow velocity. The relationship between a constant pressure drop and 

flow velocity measured in one-dimensional experiments on a Triosyn swath is shown in Figure  2. 

The lines through the data points represent least 

squares fitsa

 using linear (Darcy) and quadratic 

(Darcy-Forchheimer) approximations. Both models were implemented as drag force terms added to 

Figure 1. Photograph and ADVEDS Model of the Two-Man Tent Structure
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the Navier Stokes equations and discretized within 

the ADVED_NS code. For this study, only the simpler Darcy model was used.

Three distinct technical challenges needed to 

be addressed before obtaining a CFD solution to 

this model:

1. In order to resolve the thin-layer material 

of the structure, either a very large number 

of small grid cells or cells with high aspect 

ratios with one dimension representing the 

thickness of the fabric is required.

2. An abrupt change in flow velocity can be expected for the flow through the filter material. For this example, the flow speed through 

the filter was over 300 times 

smaller than the external flow 

upstream. This large flow reduction needed to be accurately modeled to obtain the 

correct internal pressures and 

purge rate for the system.

3. The model of the filter drag 

represented by the data shown 

in Figure 2 represented a very 

high drag coefficient, resulting 

in a classical numerical analysis difficulty, known as a “stiff” 

system of equations. With such 

a system, although the variable 

(in our case velocity) decreased 

to zero very quickly, the time 

steps required to maintain stability for an explicit scheme 

were exceedingly small. 

For the first challenge, 

researchers simply allowed 

the use of distorted cells so 

that the tent structure could 

be adequately described using a moderate number of 

grid cells. The ADVED_NS 

code uses algorithms that remain stable under minimal 

grid restrictions. The second 

two challenges were each 

related to the filter model. 

These challenging problems 

were alleviated through the 

use of a carefully designed 

implicit method, which provided stable and accurate results. Flow simulations were 

conducted in a domain approximating a wind-tunnel 

configuration, as displayed 

in Figure 3. The computations were performed 

with an inflow velocity of approximately 11.2 m/s 

(25 mph) representing a “high” wind-speed case.

Figure 4 shows particle paths for the computed velocity field. These velocities were determined from fluctuating velocities, which were 

time-averaged over a 6-s interval. In this figure, 

the speeds are indicated by the color palette on 

the right, with red being fastest (12 m/s) down to 

the slowest speeds in magenta and black. As can 

be seen in Figure 4, the wind is fastest upstream, 

over the top, and around the sides of the tent fly. 

The nearly black vortices (swirling or recirculating flows) inside the tent indicate much slower 

Figure 2. Measured Velocity as a Function of Pressure Drop Across a Triosyn Filter

Figure 3. Grid and Domain for the Two-Man Tent in a Wind Tunnel
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Joint Expeditionary Collective 

Protection (JECP) Program

speeds induced by flow through the filters. Path 

lines traveling near the ground of the inflow side 

can be traced under the fly and through the top 

of the upstream filter. A pair of large vortices are 

seen in the region immediately behind the tent.

The effects of these flow patterns on the internal/external coupling is seen in Figure 5, which 

shows the pressures on the filter surfaces, as well 

as the velocities through the filters. On the side 

crosswind filter (5a), a very low-pressure region is 

formed on the lower upwind corner due to a small 

recirculation region. This low pressure induces the largest flow rates leaving the tent. On the 

downwind side (5a), flow exits the filter along the 

top and sides where the pressures are low but enters the filter at the center and bottom where the 

pressures are slightly above the internal pressure 

(shown as a small green patch in the top portion 

of Figure 5). That is due to backflow from the recirculation region. On the upwind panel (5b), the 

high pressures on the bottom of the filter are due 

to flow striking the face just under the fly. These 

pressures are roughly 80 pascal (pa) above ambient, corresponding to the stagnation pressure of 

the inflow velocity.

The velocities shown in Figure 5 can be used 

to determine the flow rates entering, Qin, and exiting, Qout, each filter region of the shelter. It is 

expected that these two values should be nearly 

equal; otherwise, the tent would tend to “blow up” 

if more air enters the tent than exits, or “deflate” if 

more air exits the tent than enters. This simple observation can be used as a verification check for 

the computations. Table  1 lists these flow rates 

and the totals for the entire structure for both the 

high wind speed (11.2 m/s) described previously, 

as well as for computations with a more moderate 

wind speed (5.6 m/s). In each case, the differences between Qin and Qout were less than 1.3 percent. 

The four-factor reduction in flow rates from the 

high to the moderate case is consistent with the 

expected stagnation flow pressures, which depend 

on the square of the inflow velocity.

If a vapor (e.g., CO2

) inside the shelter remains 

well-mixed, (that is, maintains a nearly uniform 

concentration) then its mass will be purged with a 

fixed exponential decay rate depending on the ratio of the flow rate, Qin, to the volume of the tent 

interior. A more accurate determination of purge 

rates can be obtained using a transport code, which 

moves the vapor with the flow according to the 

laws of mass conservation. Figure 6 compares the 

remaining mass fractions of CO2

 in the high wind 

case using the well-mixed assumption to results 

computed using the transport code, ADVED_T. 

While the ADVED_T code was initialized with 

Figure 4. Top- and Side-View Particle Paths Around and Inside Tent
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Figure 5. Computed Pressures and Velocity Vectors on Filter Panels

(a) Downwind and Crosswind Filter Panels

(b) Upwind and Crosswind Filter Panels

Table 1. Values of Flow Rates (m3/s) Through the Triosyn Filters
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Protection (JECP) Program

a uniform density of CO2 in the interior, changes 

in density were allowed to evolve according to the 

transport equations. The ADVED_T purge rate is 

slightly higher than that using the well-mixed assumption because it predicted lower CO2

 densities 

near the regions where fresh air enters, (Qin > Qout), 

and consequently, higher CO2

 densities near regions where flow is exiting the tent.

With a known purge rate, the accumulation 

of CO2

 from internal sources (i.e., two people 

breathing) can be approximated directly using the 

well-mixed assumption. In this case, the steadystate volume of CO2

 within the tent is simply the 

ratio of the respiration rate to the purge rate. The 

steady-state value is simply the theoretical level 

value that will be attained after a sufficiently long 

time. For example, assuming a respiration rate for 

two average people, the steady-state concentrations of CO2

 are 934 parts per million (ppm) for 

the high wind case and 3472 ppm for the moderate wind case. Each of these cases fall below the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) limit of 5000 ppm for CO2. During a biological or chemical vapor attack, the tent will be 

closed, and the only fresh air entering the structure will flow through the filter areas (assuming 

no other leakage). This analysis shows that, at 

least in the moderate and high wind cases, there 

will be a sufficient supply of filtered fresh air entering the tent to maintain safe CO2

 levels inside 

the shelter.

Conclusion

As mentioned earlier, most state-of-the-art approaches to internal/external flows involve the use 

of separate codes for each domain, which are weakly coupled through boundary conditions. A fully coupled solution directly resolves this issue and 

provides for a more accurate model for assessing 

the performance of passive filter systems. In providing this SPM solution, joint expeditionary forces in the future will likely be better protected while 

employing two-man tents in the event of chemical 

or biological attacks.

Acknowledgment

Roger Gibbs (BSM-Inc.) contributed to this article.

Endnote

a. “Least squares fits” computes a set of coefficients to the specified 

function that minimize the square of the difference between the 

original data and the predicting function. In other words, it minimizes the square of the error between the original data and the values predicted by the equation (http://www.synergy.com/Webhelp/

Least_Squares.htm).

Figure 6. Mass Fraction Computed Using Both a Well-Mixed 

Assumption and the Transport Code ADVED_T
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The Benefits of Metamodels in CBR Defense 

Modeling and Simulation (M&S )Products

By Harold K. Barnette

Scenario (Fictitious)

Pentagon planners quickly gathered in the war room to discuss the operational plan 

about to be executed in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. U.S. Army and 

Marine Corps forces and their associated equipment had been staged and readied for a 

planned attack slated to begin in just 12 hours. Key to the operation was the joint forces 

positioned on the left flank. If those forces were unable to execute, for whatever reason, 

the entire operation could fail.

Given the importance of the left flank forces to the overall operation, one contingency that war planners discussed was the possibility that the enemy could employ chemical, biological, or radiological weapons in an attempt to thwart the advance by U.S. 

forces. What they needed to know, quickly, was whether U.S. forces could survive the effects of a chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) attack.

Consequently, Pentagon planners urgently tasked CBR defense (CBRD) experts located at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) in Dahlgren, 

Virginia, to see if they could rapidly model and simulate the situation to answer the 

planners’ critical question. Fortunately, because scientists and engineers at NSWCDD 

employed metamodels in their CBRD modeling and simulation (M&S) products, they 

could comply with the Pentagon’s urgent need.

Metamodel Overview

The use of M&S products in CBRD applications harnesses the power of the computing age to provide warfighters with the best possible resources. The benefit of any M&S 

product, however, is proportional to the quality of the answers it provides (fidelity) and 

the speed at which it provides those answers. Unfortunately, these two desired M&S 

traits of speed and fidelity are often diametrically opposed. Typically, an increase in fidelity requires an increase in the amount and complexity of computations that a model 

performs, which, in turn, results in a slower simulation. It is this dilemma between M&S 

fidelity and speed that presents an opportunity for the use of metamodels. The relationship between fidelity and speed is shown in Figure 1.
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The Benefits of Metamodels in CBR Defense 

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The prefix “meta” is used to indicate a concept 

that is an abstraction of another concept. In light 

of this, the term “metamodel” can be thought of as 

“a model of a model” since it provides a model of a 

data set derived through some systematic process. 

Metamodels characterize data sets by reducing 

them into mathematical expressions. The data sets 

themselves can come from different sources, such 

as laboratory experiments, live testing, or computer simulations.

The primary benefit of metamodeling is in its 

ability to closely approximate all possible outcomes 

based on a limited data set of known outcomes. That 

is why Pentagon planners, in the fictitious opening 

scenario, turned to NSWCDD for quick answers 

concerning a set of unknowns. This benefit provides a time and cost savings to the systematic process by which data is collected. Once a metamodel 

has been developed, it allows the user to almost instantaneously obtain an answer on the performance 

of the systematic process it represents.

With respect to CBRD M&S products, metamodels have the potential to characterize the results 

of long-running simulations—such as those that occur with computational fluid dynamics (CFD)—by 

using the data set that results from a planned, strategic set of runs. The end result of this is a metamodel 

that provides good approximations to CFD simulations that have not yet been run. Incorporation of 

the metamodel into a CBRD M&S product allows 

the product to provide CFD fidelity without the long 

run times.

To help illustrate the benefits of metamodeling, consider a scenario where it is desirable to 

predict the time at which a peak concentration occurs for a relative location from a specific threat 

in a specific environment. Peak time predictions 

can be accomplished via a metamodel developed 

from a limited set of simulation data. An example of results for a simple metamodel that predicts 

peak concentration time is shown in Figure 2. In 

this figure, peak concentration time values, predicted by the metamodel, are represented on the 

vertical axis and are correlated with the simulated data set represented on the horizontal axis. An 

ideal metamodel would share a one-to-one correlation with the simulated data set because there 

would be no difference between predicted values 

and the data. The correlation shown in Figure 2 

shows something close to a one-to-one correlation 

and indicates a good metamodel.

The simulated data set in Figure 2 was derived from 19 runs that required over 300 hours 

of simulation time using Atmospheric Dispersion of Vapor and Evaporating Droplets and Solids (ADVEDS).a The metamodel was derived from 

the simulated data set and is a polynomial consisting of 75 terms. In this example, 99.5 percent of 

the peak time metamodel predictions are within 

0.8 s or less of the simulated data set. Thus, additional peak-time concentrations for this particular 

instance can now be predicted by the metamodel almost instantaneously and reliably without the 

additional hours of simulation time.

Metamodel Development Process

The process of developing a metamodel consists of three primary phases:

1. Design of Experiments (DOE)

2. Data Collection

3. Data Fitting

Design of Experiments (DOE)

Conducting a DOE essentially establishes a 

strategic plan for data collection that identifies factor space and minimizes the number of runs. The 

first step in developing this strategic plan is to identify factors (i.e., wind speed, temperature, etc.) that 

are believed to have influence on the response of 

the systematic process that is being modeled. The 

expected range limitations associated with each 

factor (e.g., temperature = 5°–32°C) establish the 

factor space boundaries. Once a factor space has 

been defined, the next step is to maximize coverage throughout the factor space using a fixed number of sample points. Different techniques exist for 

optimizing factor space coverage for a given number of sample points. One technique that is often 

used is referred to as a “Latin Hypercube”—a statistical method developed to generate a distribution of plausible collections of parameter values 

from a multidimensional distribution. Statistical 

software products, such as JMP, facilitate the use of 

Figure 1. Relationship Between Fidelity and Speed
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these space-filling techniques. The DOE process is 

shown in Figure 3.

In addition to identifying a set of sample points 

(from which the metamodel will be developed), a 

set of checkpoints should also be generated for the 

purpose of providing an independent assessment 

of metamodel error.

One question that commonly arises when conducting a DOE is, “How many sample points are 

enough?” This is an important question since identifying too few sample points could adversely affect 

metamodel error and identifying too many sample 

points might be too time-consuming and costly. 

Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to this. One 

rule of thumb states 10 samples per factor. A more 

practical approach is to answer the question, “How 

many sample points can be taken given a specified 

time and budget?”

Data Collection

This phase consists of collecting data from the 

systematic process that will be represented by a 

metamodel. The DOE provides the road map for 

collecting data during this phase.

Data Fitting

This is the process of fitting collected sample 

point data to an equation where terms comprise 

the factors contained within the DOE. This process should begin as soon as data becomes available to begin exploring ideas on how to fit the data. 

Some of these ideas may consist of data transformations that reduce metamodel error by reshaping the data to a form that is easier to work with. 

With each metamodel iteration, error is first assessed by comparing the metamodel prediction to 

the sample point results. Upon achieving an acceptable error level with respect to the sample points, 

the metamodel results are compared to the checkpoints. Checkpoints provide an independent assessment of metamodel error since they were not 

used to develop the metamodel equation. If the error level of the metamodel is acceptable with respect to the checkpoints, then the checkpoints may 

Figure 2. Peak Concentration Time Metamodel Correlation to Original Data Set
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then be utilized, along with the sample points to 

develop a metamodel with even less error. Figure 4 

shows aspects of the data-fitting process.

Potential Metamodel Applications 

to the Joint Expeditionary 

Collective Protection System 

Performance Model (JECP SPM)

Metamodels are being explored for use within 

the JECP SPM (see Figure 5). JECP refers to a family of shelter systems that are intended to protect 

Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF) and their assets 

by means of a versatile and transportable collective 

protection capability. The JECP SPM is a software 

tool sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) Joint Science and Technology Office (JSTO), and its development is 

currently being led by NSWCDD’s Chemical, 

Biological, and Chemical (CBR) Defense Division 

in cooperation with other partners:

•	 United States Naval Research Laboratory

•	 University of North Carolina

•	 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

•	 ITT Industries

The JECP SPM models the collective protection 

performance of each member in the family of JECP 

shelters and will be used to supplement live testing. 

It is important that the JECP SPM provide reliable 

results in a timely manner, and metamodels provide a possible means of achieving this goal.

Some areas within the JECP SPM—where 

metamodels are being investigated—are listed below, followed by a depiction of a contaminant passing over a JECP shelter.

•	 Propagation of contaminants via wake effects caused by walking

Figure 4. Aspects of the Data-Fitting Process

Figure 3. The DOE Process

Factor
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•	 Characterization of airflows and agent concentrations on the interior and exterior of a 

shelter

•	 Performance of shelter components using 

component test data

Conclusion

The incorporation of metamodels into the JECP 

SPM and other CBR M&S products could help to 

provide extremely fast-running simulations that 

yield high-fidelity results. An increase in simulation 

speed and fidelity would result in fewer man-hours, 

lower costs, and an increase in analysis quantity and 

quality. These benefits would arm warfighters with 

more reliable CBRD products.

Endnote

a. ADVEDS is a Chemical and Biological Defense CFD product developed and maintained by Dr. William Szymczak from the Naval 

Research Laboratory.

Figure 5. Exterior Concentrations Passing Over a JECP Shelter
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The Benefits of Metamodels in CBR Defense 

Modeling and Simulation (M&S )Products
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Modeling of Personnel Entry Into 

Collectively Protected Shelters

By Gaurang R. Dävé

The Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection (JECP) Program is developing a family of transportable shelter systems that will provide collective protection to joint expeditionary forces and their assets. These shelter systems range from two-person, passive 

filtration tents to large multiperson shelter complexes that provide active filtration and 

internal environmental conditioning. North Carolina State University’s Department of 

Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering personnel are collaborating with the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense System Performance Model (SPM) team to research personnel 

entry into collectively protected shelters.

Entry of personnel into collectively protected shelters constitutes a critical point in 

which system protections are necessarily breached. A typical entry event starts with the 

removal of possibly contaminated clothing, followed by entry into an air lock that separates the area external to the shelter from the toxic-free area (TFA) inside the shelter. 

The air lock operates using principles of overpressure: air from the TFA or from a separate heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) unit flows into the air lock, increasing the inside pressure to levels higher than the external air pressure. The air flow 

is vented out of the air lock, moving either outside or back into the HVAC unit, where it 

is filtered. The overpressure helps keep contaminated air from flowing into the air lock, 

while the vented flow drives contaminated air out of the air lock. As a person enters the 

air lock, two things happen. First, the overpressure is relieved as the doors are opened, 

causing a strong gas jet to flow outward. Second, wakes generated by the motion of the 

doors and the person cause a net flow of contaminated gas into the air lock. Once the 

doors close, the overpressure begins to build up, and the contaminated gas is purged 

from the air lock.

The time required for a person to remain within the air lock depends on the size of 

the air lock, the volume flow rate of clean air into the air lock, and the desired amount 

of concentration reduction required. Typically, an air lock will be required to reduce 

the initial vapor concentration by a factor of 1000 or more, but the precise amount of 

reduction needed depends also upon the agent under consideration and on the allowable dosage limit—as described in the Military Exposure Guidelines (MEG)—that personnel can withstand. For example, 8 hours of exposure to concentration levels above 

0.0038 mg/m3

 for the nerve agent VX is considered life-threatening. Air locks may be 
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Modeling of Personnel Entry Into 

Collectively Protected Shelters

designed for single-person entry (SPE) or for multiple-person entry (MPE). MPE air locks are larger in volume and require a longer purge time for 

a specified level of concentration reduction. Typically, a group of people enter the MPE simultaneously, while only one person at a time enters an 

SPE. The design of an air lock is driven by the requirement to handle a specified number of personnel entries per hour. This, along with the air-lock 

volume and target concentration reduction, determines the required volume flow rate of clean air 

into the air lock.

The initial agent concentration within the air 

lock is a function of the external agent concentration: a time-dependent quantity that depends on 

the agent release point and on meteorological conditions. The transport of the agent into the air lock 

during entry depends on the wind speed and direction in the vicinity of the unit, as well as on specific 

details of the entry event, such as the:

•	 Walking speed of the person(s) entering

•	 Door-opening mechanism

•	 Level of air-lock overpressure

Other factors—such as whether personnel remove protective clothing and how such clothing is 

handled—can also affect agent transport by influencing the amount of time that the air-lock door 

remains open. Other mechanisms of infiltration 

include surface deposition or adsorption of agent 

material onto clothing and its eventual resuspension or desorption into the TFA over periods of 

time longer than the air-lock purge time. The air 

lock is not designed to be effective in this situation; 

therefore, the modeling activity described next 

does not yet handle this mode of infiltration.

To arrive at an estimation of potential hazards 

for shelter occupants for a given release scenario, it is necessary to predict the amount of agent 

mass transported into the air lock and into the TFA 

during the course of a personnel entry event. As 

the entirety of such an event may last tens of minutes, and as each stage is separated by an air-lock 

purge of 3 to 5 minutes, it suffices to analyze the 

response of a single-entry event as a function of 

the parameters mentioned above. The key parameter is the volume of air transferred per unit time (a 

volume flow rate, usually expressed as cubic feet/

second). The product of this quantity with the external agent concentration (mass of agent per volume of air), integrated over the duration of the 

entry event, provides the total mass of agent transported into the air lock. The external agent concentration may be predicted by the Vapor, Liquid, 

and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK), the Joint Effects 

Model (JEM), or similar strategies. Figure 1 shows 

a plot of external agent concentration versus time 

Figure 1. External Agent Concentration and Entry Volume Flow Rate Versus Time
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intersecting with a curve representing the volume 

flow rate during entry. Agent mass can be transported into the air lock over the period of time indicated within the blue square.

A prediction of the amount of an agent transported into an air lock and the TFA during entry 

is a required feature of the JECP SPM being developed by NSWCDD’s CBR Defense Division. As 

experimental data for personnel entry is generally unavailable, researchers at North Carolina State 

University are conducting detailed computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of air-lock 

entry to support the development of an air-lockspecific SPM to be integrated into the overall SPM. 

An outcome of the air-lock SPM is a model for 

computational fluid (CF) transported versus time, 

which can be used as described above to predict 

the amount of agent transported into the air lock. 

The computational strategy is a large-eddy simulation, which attempts to capture the larger turbulent eddies generated by the external wind field and 

by personnel motion. The movement of people and 

doors is modeled using 3ds Max rendering software, which enables the construction of sequences 

of computer-aided design (CAD) objects representing different stages in a person’s motion. These 

sequences are embedded into the computational 

domain using an immersed-boundary technique. 

This technique transfers the motion of the objects 

to the surrounding velocity field, which then drives 

transport of the agent material. Figure  2 shows a 

set of snapshots of an entry into an MPE equipped 

with a bump-through door. In all figures, surfaces representing vortex cores are colored by agent 

Figure 2. Snapshots of Vortex Cores (Colored by Agent Concentration) During a Simulated Entry Into an Air Lock
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Modeling of Personnel Entry Into 

Collectively Protected Shelters

concentration, with red being high and blue being 

low. The top-right figure shows conditions just as 

the person enters. The release of overpressure forces a jet of air-lock gas outward and over the person. 

This response would naturally inhibit agent transport into the air lock, but the subsequent vacuum 

condition formed as the jet is released and the door 

closes counteracts this effect. The bottom snapshots show the decay of the initial jet and the reestablishment of the prevailing wind effect.

Simulations of this type have been performed 

for a sequence of trials generated by a Latin hypercube design-of-experiments (DOE) procedure developed at NSWCDD.a

 The trials vary the:

•	 Prevailing wind speed (0 to 5 m/s)

•	 Wind direction (0 to 180 degrees)

•	 Proximity of a person from the air lock (0 

to 3 m)

•	 Walking speed (1 to 1.5 m/s)

The overpressure of the air lock is held fixed at 

0.3 inches of water. Twenty-six individual simulations have been performed, with the initial stages of each simulation devoted to computing the air 

flow over the shelter (~45–60 s), and the last stages 

devoted to the entry event itself (~10 s). Figure 3a 

shows a plot of CF transported into the air lock versus time for the first 16 of these simulations. The 

general trend is toward an increase in CF transported for high wind speeds moving into the air-lock 

door. The fall in CF after its peak value is due to 

the closing of the air-lock door. A meta-modeling 

approach is employed to reduce the distributions 

shown in Figure 3a into a simpler form that correlates the response with the driving parameters of 

wind speed, wind direction, proximity, and walking speed. Figure 3b presents the data normalized 

by the maximum CF and by a time scale associated 

with the duration of the entry event. Also shown is 

a modified Gaussian fit to the normalized data. The 

modeling challenge is the regression of the parameters of the Gaussian fit (maximum CF, standard deviation) as functions of the driving parameters. A 

nonlinear regression analysis using SAS’s JMP software has been used to determine the final form for 

the entry model.

Figure 4 shows model predictions (solid lines) 

versus computational data (symbols) for several 

trials not included in the initial set. These provide 

checkpoints for assessing the quality of the metamodel.

Figure 3. CF Transported Into Air Lock Versus Time
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This proof-of-concept exercise illustrates the 

potential of high-resolution CFD combined with 

metamodeling in developing a contaminant-transport model for air-lock personnel entry. The CF 

versus time distributions outputted are suitable for 

incorporation into zonal models such as CONTAM 

(multizone airflow and contaminant transport analysis software) from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and, with refinement, 

may also be used to provide boundary conditions 

for coarse-grained CFD calculations of the flow 

within the air lock and TFA.1

 The techniques used 

in this exercise are now being applied to the actual JECP SPE and MPE air-lock configurations. The 

end product will ultimately help protect the warfighter from chemical and biological (CB) agents by 

improving the testing and evaluation process that is 

in place to help ensure that the best possible shelters 

are being produced. 

Acknowledgments

Jack Edwards, Jung-Il Choi, Jeffrey Eischen, 

and Nathan Obringer from North Carolina State 

University contributed to this article.

Endnote

a. Latin hypercube—a statistical method developed to generate a distribution of plausible collections of parameter values from a multidimensional distribution.

Reference

1. http://www.bfrl.nist.gov/IAQanalysis/CONTAM/overview/1.htm

Figure 4. Meta-Model Predictions Versus Computational Data for CF Transported Into an Air Lock
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Modeling of Personnel Entry Into 

Collectively Protected Shelters
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The Next Generation of System Performance 

Model (SPM) for CBR Defense

By Gaurang R. Dävé and Michael O. Kelly

Overview

In developing a family of transportable shelter systems, the Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection (JECP) Program will provide collective protection to joint expeditionary forces and their assets. These shelter systems range from two-person passive 

filtration tents to large multiperson shelters that can be complexed together to provide 

active filtration and internal environmental conditioning. The objective of the JECP System Performance Model (SPM) is to model the collective protection performance of 

each JECP shelter and predict the level of exposure to chemical and biological (CB) 

agents experienced by personnel inside the toxic-free area (TFA). Exposure within the 

TFA can occur as a result of agent infiltration through barrier materials, air locks, closures, seams, filters, and from personnel entering or exiting the TFA. The SPM will provide a cost-effective method for predicting system collective protection performance 

while interacting within a complex environment, allowing users to create realistic operational scenarios. Also, the SPM will improve the test and evaluation (T&E) planning 

process by simulating results for testing environments that are otherwise too dangerous, 

complex, or expensive to physically test.

This article presents an overview of the challenges being addressed in JECP SPM 

software development, along with the technical solutions being applied to meet SPM 

requirements. The approach involves rigorous physics-based representations of most 

components or building blocks within the JECP system, along with empirical or semiempirical representations for others. The fidelity of the representations will be commensurate with the level of detail that needs to be modeled for purposes of augmenting 

selected portions of the normal operational T&E (OT&E) process. The results of component and system analyses using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models, along 

with the component and system testing conducted by the JECP program, will allow for 

the development of:

•	 Transfer functions for use in faster-running models

•	 Metadata models (empirical and/or physical) to allow more rapid system analysis 

during the JECP OT&E effort
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Problem Statement 

Given recent historic events and trends, the 

probability of a CB attack seems likely to increase. 

Consequently, protective measures must be taken 

to preserve the lives of warfighters in the field. In 

response to this threat, the JECP family of transportable shelter systems is being developed to provide protection against various types of CB attacks. 

However, it is critical to accurately assess the effectiveness of the protection provided in order to ensure that warfighters are safe from CB attacks.

The cost of physically testing the CB protection 

of the proposed shelters is very high. Thus, there 

is a strong desire to perform as much testing and 

evaluation as possible using modeling and simulation. This desire is in line with current acquisition 

strategies that specify modeling and simulation as 

a significant cost-saving tool.

The JECP SPM supplements the T&E strategy by providing a software construct (model test 

bed) that will enable testers to simulate operational environments for JECP applications across a 

range of battlefield conditions. The SPM will integrate several different data, component, and system modules (e.g., airflow mapping, breakthrough 

rate, and air filtration performance) with tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and simulated threats. Simulant data generated during T&E 

will provide a critical link between chamber performance data and field performance. The JECP 

SPM will relate test data to CB toxicological endpoints and provide output data to support operational system assessments.

The goal of the SPM effort is to design and implement a collection of modeling and simulation 

tools that can be used to accurately test and evaluate the various JECP shelters under a large number of conditions. The SPM software will allow one 

or more analysts to rapidly create and execute scenarios while specifying the conditions of a CB attack. Once a scenario has been executed, the SPM 

software will allow the user to view and analyze the 

resulting data in order to assess the level of performance for each shelter.

Challenges

The primary challenge facing SPM software 

development is ensuring the accuracy of the fluid flow and dispersion models. The chemical and 

physical properties required to accurately model 

the effects of a CB attack are far from trivial. Everything from weather conditions to the presence of 

trees and rough terrain must be considered to accurately predict the pressures and concentrations 

of harmful agents in and around the JECP shelters.

To meet the challenge of designing accurate 

models, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) enlisted the help of several experts in the field of CFD and dispersion. 

These scientists and engineers have the difficult 

task of researching and developing models that 

can accurately simulate the flow and dispersion of 

harmful agents from an external source into the 

JECP shelters. A depiction of modeled airflow over 

a shelter is shown in Figure 1.

To gain an appreciation for the complexity 

of this task, consider the number of instances for 

which various models must be developed:

•	 Modeling the initial release from a missile, 

rocket, sprayer, or other munition

•	 Modeling the flow, evaporation, and dispersion of contaminants over a variable terrain 

(This includes accounting for trees, buildings, rocks, and the deposition that may occur onto these surfaces.)

•	 Modeling the concentrations, pressures, temperatures, and accumulation of contaminants 

at the JECP shelter of interest

•	 Modeling the flow of contaminants through 

airlock doors and through airlock barrier 

materials

•	 Modeling the flow of contaminants through 

shelter doors and through shelter barrier materials

•	 Modeling the concentrations and flow profiles that result from personnel entering/exiting a shelter

•	 Modeling the flow and concentrations of 

contaminants within a shelter

As can be seen from the list above, there are 

several places in which physical and chemical 

models of varying types and complexities must be 

employed. Each model must provide a similar degree of accuracy to avoid passing high-precision, 

but low-accuracy results to downstream models. 

The SPM software provides the logic for connecting disparate models together and ensuring that 

they are invoked at the correct time with the appropriate set of inputs. This is no small task, since 

much of the modeling will likely require coordination of model inputs and outputs at every step. 

Factor in the need to model the effects of personnel entering and exiting a particular shelter, and 

the problem’s complexity increases. The SPM must 

be capable of describing scenarios that have timedependent properties. For example, a person’s position changes during the scenario as a person moves 

toward and eventually into a particular shelter. Scenario dependencies may also affect the ingress of 

personnel into a shelter. For instance, if entrance 
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into the TFA is allowed only if airlock concentrations are below some threshold value, this may reduce the expected ingress rate of personnel (due to 

having to wait for concentrations to drop).

Another major challenge facing the development of SPM is the need for speedy performance. 

When it comes to CFD, the simulation run times 

are often on the order of hours, days, and sometimes even weeks. The lengthy run times typically 

associated with fluid flow modeling are not acceptable for the purposes of SPM; thus, performanceenhancing measures must be taken. Because of the 

large number of models (internal and external) that 

must be executed, and the required level of accuracy, the challenge of improving run times is very 

significant. There are algorithmic improvements 

that can be made, but the complexity of solving 

multiple, partial differential equations in three dimensions is difficult to reduce without sacrificing 

accuracy. Thus, the developers and engineers must 

try to find solutions that provide an acceptable degree of accuracy while drastically reducing computational run times.

Proposed Solution

As mentioned above, a major challenge facing the development of SPM is the lengthy run 

times typically associated with computation fluid dynamics (CFD) scenarios. Scenario execution 

times need to be on the order of a few minutes versus a few days in order to meet SPM usage requirements. To satisfy this requirement, the SPM team 

is exploring the use of “metamodels” as a means of 

maximizing performance without sacrificing accuracy. The term metamodel refers to a simple model that can be used to approximate a more complex 

model over a specific set of conditions. This approach is analogous to approximating a small 

section of a nonlinear function with a linear function. The objective is to design metamodels that 

Figure 1. Airflow Over a Shelter
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Model (SPM) for CBR Defense

closely match high-fidelity CFD results over the 

conditions required for SPM simulations. Once 

developed, these metamodels can be intelligently 

applied during SPM-scenario execution, such that 

execution time is minimized without losing a significant degree of accuracy.

From a software perspective, there are several “best practices” that can improve usability, maintainability, and flexibility. On the other 

hand, there are common mistakes that can all but 

ensure project failure despite the complexity of 

the problem domain. For the SPM development 

effort, the need to integrate several models that 

have evolving inputs, outputs, and requirements, 

and the desire for a flexible software approach is 

high. The SPM must be flexible enough to accommodate changing models and components as the 

details for each computational approach become 

known. There are several ways for achieving “flexibility” in software, but at an architectural level, 

the most common approach is to employ a “modular” approach. This modular approach refers to 

constructing several disjointed software components that, when loosely coupled, make up a useful application. The modular approach is not new 

and is commonly referred to in most programming languages. 

The approach taken for SPM development leverages the open source NetBeans application platform. This approach allows for highly modular 

application development while making extensive 

reuse of mature software components. In developing any application that has a significant number 

of capabilities, there are typically a large number 

of “boilerplate” features that must be implemented 

in order to make the domain-specific capabilities 

accessible by the user. Many of these application 

components are taken for granted by most users 

(i.e., menus, drag and drop, cut/paste, undo/redo, 

open/save) but are very time-consuming to develop. The NetBeans platform provides a large portion of these common application capabilities as 

reusable components. This drastically reduces the 

development time required to implement a new 

application by allowing developers to focus primarily on the domain specific capabilities instead 

of the “boilerplate” code.

The NetBeans platform is an open-source 

framework that has been steadily maturing over 

the course of almost a decade. NetBeans is most 

commonly known as the host environment for the 

highly popular NetBeans integrated development 

environment (IDE) which, in many ways, outperforms commercial IDEs, such as Microsoft’s Visual Studio. The platform provides a large set of 

reusable software components that allow for rapid 

development of highly modular applications. The 

workflow for developing applications that leverage 

the NetBeans platform is built into its IDE, which 

makes constructing new applications and modules very straightforward. Because of its flexibility 

and maturity, SPM developers chose to implement 

SPM capabilities on top of the NetBeans platform, 

which affords a great deal of flexibility that can 

easily accommodate changing requirements and 

data structures.

The various models and capabilities that need 

to be managed by SPM can be nicely encapsulated 

inside NetBeans modules. Each module has welldefined interfaces that govern which portions of 

the module’s code are exposed to other modules. 

In addition, modules must specifically state dependencies on other application modules in order to 

access exposed classes. This ensures that all application dependencies can be quickly determined, 

thus providing better software maintainability.

General Interface

The user interface for SPM allows the user to 

arrange views in several different ways. There is a 

project view that resembles a “file explorer”-type 

widget. Users can navigate this project view to 

open files related to a project. Once located, files 

can be opened for viewing and editing. Encapsulating project components into individual “files” 

allows for greater scalability since only the portions of a project that are being viewed are loaded into memory. The JECP SPM Interface is shown 

in Figure 2.

Scenario Builder

SPM must be capable of modeling CB release 

scenarios under various conditions. The scenario builder allows users to drag and drop scenario 

components (e.g., shelters, air locks and personnel) onto a scenario canvas. Once added to the 

canvas, the user can set specific properties related 

to a particular object. In addition, time-dependent 

behavior can be described using a timeline. Once 

scenario properties have been specified, the scenario can be executed using the appropriate scenario executor.

Model Integration

Each model utilized by SPM is encapsulated 

in a module that can easily be added or removed 

from the application. Abstract services are defined to represent the models, which can then be 

implemented inside a module. The advantage is 

that the SPM execution logic does not need to be 
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aware of the details of a particular module, except 

that it implements a particular interface. This allows models to be easily switched out as requirements evolve. It also allows capabilities to be added 

or removed without inadvertently affecting other 

portions of the application. The ability to add and 

remove capabilities without unwanted side effects 

is a huge plus when developing complex applications. In most circumstances, a full regression test 

is necessary to ensure that seemingly minor changes do not “break” the application. With the modular approach utilized by the NetBeans platform, 

dependencies can be traced easily, thus drastically reducing the time required for regression testing.

Results Visualization

During scenario execution, the models generate a large amount of result data. This data takes the 

form of flow fields, pressure profiles, and concentrations. Depending on the complexity and length 

of a scenario, the amount of result data can be several gigabytes. With such a large amount of data, 

sophisticated visualization tools are necessary to 

help analysts review and comprehend the results of 

a scenario. For this purpose, SPM utilizes the JECP 

SPM 3-D graphics package. This government offthe-shelf (GOTS) tool was developed by Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and is capable of providing highly detailed visualizations of 

fluid flows and concentration profiles. In addition, 

the JMAT Visualization Package software allows 

analysts to “playback” a scenario in order to view 

how contaminants move externally and internally. This visualization, coupled with various reports 

and plots, allows the user to determine the overall 

performance of JECP shelters, air locks, and other 

components when faced with a variety of attacks, 

configurations, and environmental conditions. A 

depiction from the JMAT Visualization Package is 

shown in Figure 3.

Conclusion

The development of the JECP SPM is on course 

to meet the challenges of complexity, speed, and fidelity. The end product will ultimately help protect 

warfighters from CB agents by improving the T&E 

process currently in place to help ensure that the 

best possible shelters are produced.

Figure 2. JECP SPM Interface
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Figure 3. JMAT Visualization Package

The Next Generation of System Performance 

Model (SPM) for CBR Defense
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Basic and Applied Science at NSWCDD 

Advances CBRD Capabilities

By Matthew J. Hornbaker and Richard C. Hodge

As a warfare center within the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Enterprise, 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) works with other 

Navy laboratories to ensure that the technical challenges facing our warfighters are met 

with effective and affordable solutions. Scientists and engineers (S&Es) from NSWCDD 

design, develop, integrate, acquire, and test technologies and systems that our nation’s 

warfighters rely on to meet current and future combat threats. NSWCDD’s Chemical, 

Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Division is responsible for providing disciplined systems engineering expertise for CBR research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) modeling, integration, acquisition, and sustainment efforts to protect 

naval and joint forces afloat and ashore.

NSWCDD has a long history of leadership in chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBRD) projects. During the Vietnam War, NSWCDD was named the lead 

Navy laboratory for chemical and biological warfare (confined to defensive countermeasures by Presidential directive). After the Vietnam War, the number of active CBRD 

projects waned until the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein against Iraqi 

Kurds in the early 1980s brought renewed Navy interest.1

 Today, U.S. adversaries are 

constantly evolving their CBR methodologies and capabilities, necessitating continuous 

Navy research fundamental to the development of technologies and systems to counter 

or mitigate current and future CBR threats.

Although the structure of the CBR Defense Division at NSWCDD has changed several times throughout the years, maintaining a research component has always been a 

top priority for the organization’s leadership. This commitment to basic and applied research programs is made with the understanding that the research ultimately enhances 

warfighter, fleet, and homeland defense CBRD capabilities. Today, NSWCDD has a robust CBRD research program providing a broad spectrum of support and technical solutions to many sponsors.

Laboratory Capabilities

In order to perform basic and applied scientific CBRD research, an organization 

must have personnel who have expertise in a variety of scientific and engineering disciplines. They need experience in CBR detection, decontamination, protection, or 
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Figure 1. An engineer inside the CBR Filtration Evaluation and 

Support Facility demonstrates a filter change-out procedure.

other specialty areas, as well as access to specialized 

laboratories and equipment. NSWCDD employs a 

diverse technical workforce, many with advanced 

academic credentials and security clearances, 

which enable them to perform CBRD research for 

the Navy. Research in the division is performed using in-house chemical, biological, and materials 

testing laboratories and equipment.

The CBR Defense Division’s chemistry laboratories support RDT&E for characterization of new 

chemistries and materials for all product areas of 

CBRD. These laboratories are outfitted with a full 

suite of state-of-the-art analytical equipment commonly found in modern research institutions. Major focus areas for the chemistry laboratories include 

development of novel materials and formulations 

for hazard mitigation, spill cleanup, and advancement of detection technologies. A toxic chemistry 

laboratory provides hazard assessment and testing 

for high-hazard toxins, toxic industrial chemicals 

(TICS), and toxic industrial materials (TIMS). 

The Electrochemical Laboratory is set up to provide a test and evaluation (T&E) capability to 

determine accurate corrosion rates for multiple 

types of alloys, composites, and coatings. This 

technical capability provides input into paths 

forward in terms of fielding new CBRD products or in ship/vehicle design. The Materials 

Science Laboratory provides an additional capability used to judge the effects of the environment or CBRD products on military materials 

by mimicking the operational environment.

The Collective Protection System Laboratory, the Filtration Laboratory, and the CBR Filtration Evaluation and Support Facility are being 

used to evaluate components of the Collective 

Protection System (CPS), including filters, materials, and closures to identify limitations of currently fielded systems. Efforts are underway to 

develop advanced filters using engineered multicomponent systems that will improve TIC protection. Work in the Filtration Laboratory helps 

transition and field filtration systems to the warfighter that have been thoroughly and consistently evaluated against a full range of CBR 

threats. An engineer inside the CBR Filtration 

Evaluation and Support Facility demonstrating a 

filter change-out procedure is shown in Figure 1.

The CBR Defense Division hosts a number 

of biology laboratories operating at various 

biosafety levels. Biosafety level refers to the 

level of the biocontainment precautions, specified by the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), required to isolate dangerous biological agents in a facility. Levels of 

containment range from the lowest biosafety level 1 to the highest at biosafety level 4. NSWCDD 

operates laboratories ranging from biosafety level 1 through biosafety level 3. These laboratories host programs that identify and develop new 

strategies for biological agent defense and validate 

the claims of commercial products for utility in 

neutralizing biological agents. The biology laboratories also support work that contributes directly to the understanding of low-dose exposures of 

various populations to biological agents.

The CBR Defense Division is responsible for 

various shipboard equipment and systems used for 

Navy radiological defense. The CPS, Countermeasure Washdown (CMWD) System, and Shipboard 

Personnel Decon Stations are three examples of 

shipboard systems that rely on the expertise of the 

CBR Defense Division researchers to ensure that 

radiation does not contaminate the inside of a ship. 

The Division has the appropriate permits in place 
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for working with select radiological material associated with these and other systems. The Radiological Laboratory is used to conduct testing and 

repairs on fielded systems, which contain radiological sources as part of the detection system. The 

Aerosol Laboratory provides S&Es with the capability to sample and fully characterize fine solid particles or liquid droplets suspended in gases. 

Chemical or biological warfare agents can be deliberately or naturally masked by smoke, haze, or 

other means, making them more difficult to detect. 

S&Es working in the Aerosol Laboratory perform 

essential testing of detectors to ensure that chemical and biological threats are detected and that 

false alarms are minimized.

The CBR Defense Division also maintains an 

Imaging and Electron Microscopy Laboratory, 

where state-of-the-art optical and binocular microscopes equipped with both digital image and video 

capture systems are maintained. This laboratory also 

houses one of the world’s most powerful scanning 

electron microscopes, providing researchers with 

the capability to evaluate material and generate images at the nanoscale. All of these systems are shared 

assets available for use by S&Es across the Division.

Potomac River Test Range (PRTR)

NSWCDD operates the PRTR, which is the 

Navy’s only fully instrumented over-the-water littoral test range. The maritime environment provides unique challenges to CBRD due to factors 

such as corrosive effects of sea air, reflectivity of 

water, and temperature extremes impacting deployed equipment. To characterize and overcome 

these challenges, the CBR Defense Division utilizes the PRTR to test programs designed to rapidly 

and accurately detect and defend against chemical 

or biological agents. By testing equipment and systems under similar conditions those systems will 

see in the field, researchers are helping to ensure 

that deployed equipment will function as intended. 

An infrared (IR) sensor at the CBRD Facility overlooking the PRTR is shown in Figure 2. It is followed by a photograph of a meteorologist releasing 

a weather balloon prior to a test event in Figure 3.

Basic Research

Basic or fundamental research refers to research 

conducted to increase understanding of fundamental principles. Carried out at the bench level, this research consistently advances many areas of interest 

Figure 2. View from the CBRD Facility overlooking the Potomac River Test Range (PRTR)—This IR sensor 

focuses on a very narrow frequency band to detect agents and simulants by their absorption of IR energy at 

“fingerprint” wavelengths.
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to the CBRD community. For example, through a 

unique collaboration between the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), traditional experimental techniques are being coupled with novel modeling techniques to gain a new understanding of the 

effects of low-dose exposure to biowarfare agents. 

Results are provided to warfighters, to the scientific 

community, and to Department of Defense (DoD) 

policy and decision makers to help them formulate 

strategies for risk assessment and for the mitigation 

of microbial pathogens. Spore characterization research is clarifying the extent to which environmental factors influence spore yield and viability. This 

research is being used to highlight the importance 

of spore preparation methods on efficacy testing. 

Standardization of spore preparation methods impacts the quality of data generated at laboratories 

across the DoD and allows for more direct comparison of results from different research groups. 

Surface chemistry research activities are leading 

to the development of advanced supergelators and 

superabsorbants, which enable small quantities of 

material to gel or capture large amounts of spilled 

chemicals for cleanup. Novel compounds prepared 

in NSWCDD’s laboratories have achieved gelation 

or absorption of common chemicals at very lowweight ratios, in the range of one pound per one 

hundred pounds (or 1 percent by weight), which 

is like capturing 1 gallon of milk with 1 ounce of 

gellant. A researcher in the CBR Defense Division’s 

Toxic Chemistry Laboratory is shown in Figure 4.

Applied Science

Applied science refers to research accessing, 

using, or leveraging the scientific communities’ 

accumulated theories, knowledge, methods, and 

techniques for a specific purpose. NSWCDD’s applied technology efforts are helping to safely and 

effectively remove and neutralize contaminants 

from personnel, equipment, vehicles, and the environment. NSWCDD’s efforts also provide critical 

standards and methods to the testing community.

Applied research at NSWCDD led to the development of a fieldable decontamination formulation 

product and a number of patents and publications. 

Figure 3. A meteorologist releases a weather balloon prior to a test event—Weather data 

fed into high-resolution models is used for event prediction and for postevent analysis.
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Using a Navy-centric approach focused on fielding a solid or concentrated formulation, a decontamination formulation was developed that is both 

environmentally and logistically friendly. Material and chemical compatibility tests were performed 

on these formulations prior to procurement to ensure that they did not degrade the capability of the 

protective suits or equipment they were designed to 

decontaminate. Testing and the evaluation of hazards associated with decontamination formulations 

sometimes reveal incompatibilities between fielded 

materials and products being considered for fielding. NSWCDD scientists routinely perform this 

type of testing and provide data to program managers in support of milestone decisions in the acquisition process. Further characterization of identified 

incompatibilities allows the development of guidelines for proper storage, handling, and training in 

order to better ensure the safety of our warfighters.

Basic and Applied Science 

Value-Added

New threats and changing technology often 

create situations where new methods are needed or old methods become obsolete. Recently, 

standard methods for both biological and biotoxin decontamination testing and analysis methods 

were developed to ensure that the best available 

technology is used. These methods now represent the standard for conducting efficacy testing 

for all DoD laboratories. Quality-control samples 

produced by NSWCDD are utilized by customer 

laboratories for proficiency tests and validation 

of biological detection equipment. These samples 

are critical to biological defense analysis efforts 

and ensure that both military and civilian organizations monitoring the environment for release 

of biowarfare agents near population centers and 

key assets can do so with confidence.

The CBR Defense Division’s multidisciplinary 

CBR experts perform work for a broad range of 

projects and provide critical subject matter expertise in support of multiple sponsors, including policy makers, program managers, partner Navy and 

DoD laboratories, and other government agencies. Subject matter expertise is critical for ensuring that effective CBRD systems are developed and 

that those systems are compatible with currently 

fielded technologies. Major sponsors for the organization include the DTRA, the EPA, the Defense 

Figure 4. A Researcher Conducting Experiments in the CBR Defense Division's Toxic Chemistry Laboratory
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Advances CBRD Capabilities

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the 

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and 

Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) and supporting 

Joint Program Managers (JPMs), the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), the Navy Treaty Implementation Office, and the Office of Naval Research.

The pursuit of basic and applied science enables researchers to discover and apply solutions 

important for all CBR Defense Division sponsors. 

Basic and applied science ultimately arms warfighters with technological advances that give U.S. 

forces the advantage where it matters most—on the 

battlefield.

Reference

1. Rife, James P. and Carlisle, Rodney P., The Sound of Freedom: Naval Weapons Technology at Dahlgren, Virginia, 1918–2006. Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 2006.

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High-Containment Biological Laboratories

By Meredith Bondurant

In the field of biosafety, the primary objective is containment of potentially harmful 

biological agents. These agents may be pathogenic to humans, animals, or plants. Containment is accomplished with a combination of safe methods, facilities, and equipment 

that reduce the possibility of exposure of laboratory workers, other people, and the environment to potential biological hazards. Containment laboratories are described using four biosafety levels (BSLs).

BSLs range from BSL-1 laboratories, which have the most basic level of containment, 

to BSL-4 laboratories, which have the most robust containment. BSL-1 laboratories are 

acceptable for agents that are not usually associated with disease in healthy adults. BSL-1 

laboratories rely primarily on standard microbial practices for containment. BSL-4 

laboratories are equipped to contain the world’s most dangerous biological agents. Agents 

handled in a BSL-4 are exotic agents that pose a high risk of life-threatening disease for 

which no vaccine or therapy is available. Containment is accomplished with a complex 

system that provides complete isolation of the agents through facility design; glove boxes; full-body, positive-pressure personnel suits; specialized ventilation; and waste management. BSL-2 and BSL-3 laboratories fall in between. BSL-2 laboratories are able to 

contain moderate-risk indigenous agents, while the BSL-3 is designed for work with indigenous or exotic agents with the potential for serious or potentially lethal infection.

Specific agents of concern are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). The agents 

regulated by these organizations are referred to as “select agents.” Select agents include 

Bacillus anthracis (causative agent of Anthrax), Yersinia pestis (causative agent of Plague), 

Ricin, and Ebola virus, to name a few. Laboratories that work with select agents may be 

BSL-2, -3, or -4 laboratories and must be registered with either the CDC or APHIS.

Laboratories that meet the criteria to operate as BSL–3 or BSL-4 are commonly referred to as high-containment laboratories. According to a 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on high-containment laboratories, in 2008 there were 279 

entities registered with the CDC and APHIS to handle select agent(s) in 1,643 BSL-3 

laboratories, and 5 entities registered to operate BSL-4 laboratories.1

 Of the 279 entities 

with registered BSL-3 laboratories, one of those entities resides within the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) in Dahlgren, Virginia, which has 

met the regulatory requirements to manipulate select agents within its BSL-3 laboratory. NSWCDD conducts basic and applied research focusing on Navy-specific concerns 
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High-Containment Biological Laboratories

of detection and decontamination of biological 

agents. A researcher is shown in a BSL-3 laboratory in Figure 1. 

Operating a BSL-3 with a select agent requires 

an immense commitment of time, expertise, and 

resources. The U.S. Navy imposes physical and personnel security requirements above and beyond 

the CDC/APHIS regulations. Why does the Navy 

invest substantial resources in high-containment 

laboratories? The U.S. Navy’s commitment to maintaining BSL-3 capability is a testament to the importance of these facilities and personnel necessary 

to keep warfighters safe. Maintaining BSL-3 capability is central to meeting operational needs in a 

biologically threatened environment and being prepared for the unknown. Simulant organisms have 

been identified that closely mimic virulent organisms and are much less hazardous. However, these 

organisms are not identical to virulent agents. In order to detect biological agents and destroy them, we 

must understand them and challenge them to various novel decontamination conditions. This can 

be accomplished only by working with virulent 

agent(s) in a secure, safe environment.

NSWCDD utilizes its BSL-3 for basic research in 

spore characterization, decontamination challenges, and modeling disease progression. For example, 

the bacterium, Bacillus anthracis, forms a spore that 

can remain dormant for many years. If that spore 

is better understood (i.e., characterized), vulnerabilities can be detected that could be exploited for 

more effective decontamination methods, and detection capabilities could be developed for specific 

spore qualities. Development of a decontamination 

method that is effective with a high degree of material compatibility is ideal. NSWCDD is able to test 

novel decontaminate methodologies on virulent 

agent(s) in its BSL-3. This is critical to fielding reliable decontamination solutions.

The value of maintaining BSL-3 capabilities 

cannot be understated. Responsible research is necessary to protect warfighters and the nation from 

biological attack. As such, the Navy recognizes the 

importance of understanding select agents and the 

value of BSL capabilities in the quest to discover 

detection and decontamination solutions. By following strict biosafety and security regulations, 

NSWCDD’s basic and applied research is advancing the Navy’s understanding of biological threats 

and its ability to counter them.

Reference

1. High Containment Laboratories, National Strategy for Oversight is 

Needed, GAO-09-574, September 2009.

Figure 1. BSL-3 Researcher at NSWCDD
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Anthrax is a common name for one of the primary threats in biological warfare 

(BW). The disease has an important and well-known history compared to emerging diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS). Anthrax is a natural disease of livestock, but it also affects humans. The 

historic knowledge of anthrax and its stability in the environment contributed to its development as a biological weapon. The aims of this article are to briefly describe the history of anthrax, Bacillus anthracis (the bacterium that causes anthrax), microbial relatives 

of B. anthracis that are critical for testing, and biodefense product development.

The Roman poet Virgil (70–19 BCE) wrote four works on agriculture, the third 

covering the topic of animal husbandry. In this volume, he gave a detailed account of a 

plague in the eastern Alps and described early attempts at decontamination:

A terrible plague once sprang up there and raged on through the warmer part 

of autumn, not only destroying one flock of sheep after another, but killing animals of all kinds. Nor did the victims die an easy and uncomplicated death. After a 

burning fever had raged through an animal’s veins and shriveled its flesh, the fluids 

again became abundant and virtually dissolved the bones... . The steaming ox falls 

before the heavy plow. Blood mixed with froth issues from his mouth as he groans 

his last... . His sturdy flanks waste away, a heavy stupor dulls his eyes, and his head 

sags near the earth. Of what use to him now is all his toil in the service to mankind? What profit has he gained by turning up the heavy soil with the plow?... .The 

pelts of diseased animals were useless, and neither water or fire could cleanse the 

taint from their flesh. The sheepmen could not shear the fleece, which was riddled 

with disease and corruption, nor did they dare even touch the rotting strands. If 

anyone wore garments made from tainted wool, his limbs were soon attacked by 

inflamed papules and foul exudates.1

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Basic Research in Biology Facilitates the 

Development of Biodefense Products

In the 19th century, an anthrax epidemic destroyed approximately half of the sheep in Europe. 

From 1867 to 1870, more than 56,000 horses, cattle, and sheep, and 528 men perished in Russia. 

Inhalation anthrax became known in Victorian 

England as woolsorters’ disease because of the frequency of infection in millworkers exposed to animal fibers contaminated with B. anthracis spores. 

Twenty-three cases of anthrax were recorded in 

the Bradford district of England, where the animal 

hair industry was concentrated, between November 1879 and September 1880.2–4

Historically, it was very difficult to deal with a 

disease such as anthrax because there was no rational understanding of the cause of the disease. 

For example, a primary treatment for anthrax was 

to simply avoid areas where the disease occurred. 

This was problematic since anthrax was a worldwide disease, and it was very persistent in the 

environment; some areas were known to be heavily infected for centuries. Treatment of anthrax 

changed during the 1800s with the advancement 

of scientific knowledge. Studies by Eloy Barthelemy, Aloys Pollender, Casimir Davaine, Robert 

Koch, John H. Bell, and Louis Pasteur in France, 

Germany, and England between 1823 and 1881, 

culminated in the demonstration that B. anthracis was the causal agent of anthrax disease. This 

knowledge was critical because the focus shifted 

to treatments and decontamination of B. anthracis rather than treatment of disease symptoms or 

avoiding regions known to have problems with anthrax. This knowledge also contributed to the development of anthrax vaccines and early industrial 

hygiene practices.2–4

During the 20th century, incidence of anthrax 

decreased significantly due to vaccination and improved animal husbandry, as well as the processing of animal products. Anthrax continued to 

represent a worldwide presence outside the United States, with an annual occurrence of 20,000–

100,000 in the first half of the 20th century, and 

approximately 2,000 cases yearly during the second half.2–4 Thus, knowledge of B. anthracis led to 

control of anthrax disease in developed countries. 

However, the stability of B. anthracis spores (spores 

are the dormant state of the bacterium, analogous 

to a plant seed) also made it a top candidate as a 

biological weapon for both state-sponsored programs and terrorists.

Today, safety, security, and costs constrain our 

ability to test virulent, disease-causing strains of 

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B. anthracis under many test conditions. Instead, 

biodefense testing frequently relies on relatives of 

B. anthracis. These relatives are often called simulants or surrogates. One traditional simulant has 

been Bacillus atrophaeus because it has not been 

confirmed to cause disease in livestock or humans.

One important role of biodefense testing is 

to accumulate and compare data about different 

strains and species in order to develop tests that 

accurately and safely represent the threat from a 

B. anthracis (anthrax) spore attack. Collections 

of different Bacillus strains have greatly increased 

over recent decades at a number of different laboratories. Data comparisons, particularly genetic 

information, also greatly increased in the past decade. One goal of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) is to study and 

characterize spore preparation methods and physical characteristics of select strains of Bacillus species.5

 These data help design experiments that will 

best reflect different scenarios for anthrax attacks. 

They also help prepare for postattack management.

Figure 1 shows electron microscope pictures 

of spores from four different species. The outside 

structure of the spore is called an exosporium. 

This structure exists on B. anthracis, Bacillus cereus, and Bacillus thuringiensis spores, but not on 

B. atrophaeus spores. The exosporium is a critical 

feature because it impacts spore hydrophobicity. 

The degree of hydrophobicity is related to spore 

stickiness, spore clumping, and spore suspension 

in different solutions. The traditional simulant has 

been B. atrophaeus spores, which do not contain 

the exosporium, do not clump, and are easy to suspend in water. B. atrophaeus spores are also prepared differently than B. anthracis. This suggests 

that B. atrophaeus may not be the best simulant 

for B. anthracis.

Selection of simulants and spore preparation 

methods can impact test results. For example, 

there are thousands of known strains of Bacillus scattered throughout the world, and there are 

thousands of differences among strains. There are 

also many similarities among different strains. 

Detection methods must be developed based on 

similarities and differences in order to distinguish 

B. anthracis from other species. Otherwise, detectors may send out false alarms, i.e., false information. This impacts resources in terms of 

responding to false alarms and the costs associated with such responses.

During the basic research process, multiple objectives are addressed in order to develop improved 

biodefense test methods, improve test reproducibility, decrease test time, and increase confidence in 

data and data analyses. Programmatic goals that are 

Figure 1. Transmission Electron Microscope Spores of Four Different Species—Size bars are 0.5 μm in size.
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Development of Biodefense Products

addressed include costs, performance, and schedule. 

Moreover, increased confidence in BW research data 

related to spore decontamination testing increases 

over time. Recent sporicidal (decontamination) testing at NSWCDD led to two decontamination technology transitions from Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) Science and Technology (S&T) 

to Joint Project Manager Decontamination (JPMDecon): the transition of hot humid air for whole 

aircraft decontamination and electronically generated chlorine dioxide for general decontamination 

of rugged materials. NSWCDD’s basic research, 

therefore, ultimately leads to improved protection 

for warfighters.

References

1. Dirck, J.H., “Virgil on Anthrax,” Am. J. Dermatopathol., 3, 1981, 

pp. 191–195.

2. Sternabach, G., “The History of Anthrax,” J. Emerg. Med., 254, 

2002, pp. 463–467.

3. Witkoswki, J.A. and Parish, L.C., “The Story of Anthrax from Antiquity to the Present: A Biological Weapon of Nature and Humans,” Clin. Dermatol., 20, 2002, pp. 336–342.

4. Carter, T., “The Dissemination of Anthrax From Imported Wool: 

Kidderminster 1900–1914,” Occup. Environ. Med., 61, 2004, 

pp. 103–107.

5. Buhr, T.L.; McPherson, D.C. and Gutting, B.W., “Analysis of 

Broth-Cultured Bacillus atrophaeus and Bacillus cereus Spores,” 

Appl. and Environ. Microbio., 105, 2008, pp. 1604–1613.

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Basic Research in Biology Facilitates the 

Development of Biodefense Products
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Biotoxin Research at the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD)

By Elaine M. Strauss, Wynn Vo, and Linda C. Beck

The potential use of biotoxins as weapons against military and civilian targets constitutes an emerging threat to national security. Following the tragic terrorist attacks of 

September 2001 and the anthrax mailing attacks the following month, there has been 

heightened interest concerning the deliberate use of chemical and biological agents by 

terrorists. A recent report, World at Risk—The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, submitted by Senators Bob Graham and Jim 

Talent in December, 2008 to then-President, George W. Bush, indicated that nuclear and 

biological weapons “...pose the greatest peril.”1

 The severity of this threat was reiterated 

recently by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, who said, “The risk 

of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists is the gravest threat 

facing the United States.”2

 The extent of the concern about bioterror activity is highlighted in numerous papers, reports, and books published over the past decade. Examples are 

listed under the References subheading at the end of the article.1–11

Background on Biotoxins and Their Potential Threat

Biotoxins can be defined as biologically active compounds that are produced by living organisms. They can be grouped according to the organisms that produce them, including bacteria, fungi, plants, and dinoflagellates. Based on their chemical structure, it 

is also possible to divide biotoxins into protein and nonprotein categories. Toxins of biological origin generally reflect the following attributes:

•	 Are natural, although some biotoxins can be synthesized

•	 Can be produced in large-scale or small quantities

•	 Are nonvolatile

•	 Are more toxic than chemical agents, such as sarin, soman, and VX

•	 Have legitimate medical uses

•	 Are odorless and tasteless

•	 Are capable of producing diverse toxic effects

•	 Are highly dependent on the route of exposure

•	 Are effective immunogens 
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For state or non-state terrorists who lack the 

funding to acquire nuclear weapons, biotoxins, 

offer significant appeal for several reasons. First, 

biotoxins already have been produced for use as 

strategic and tactical weapons. Second, in general, the source organisms for many biotoxins are 

readily available worldwide. Third, the extraction 

and purification process for many biotoxins poses relatively few technical challenges, especially as 

compared to constructing a nuclear device. Lastly, biotoxins are endemic to much of the world and 

cause natural contaminations in food and water. 

Moreover, they may be easy to conceal. 

Ricin and botulinum toxin represent two protein biotoxins that are of great interest as potential 

weapons of warfare and terrorism. Ricin is a protein 

produced by the castor oil plant, Ricinus communis. The seeds of the plant contain the highest concentration of the biotoxin and are used for castor 

oil production. As a result, ricin is one of the toxins that can be obtained very easily in large quantities. Each year, more than one million tons of castor 

beans are processed to produce castor oil, and ricin 

can easily be separated from the castor bean waste 

mash, which contains 5–10 percent of the toxin by 

weight. Toxicity results from ricin’s ability to shut 

down protein synthesis, which leads to cell death. 

Further, ricin is stable and is toxic by ingestion, 

injection, or by inhalation. When considering its 

use as a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), the 

quantity of ricin required for 50 percent lethality 

over a 100-km2

 area is estimated to be much greater 

than Bacillus anthracis. However, it could be used 

to contaminate food or water supplies, which could 

incapacitate many and overwhelm healthcare facilities. Seeds from Ricinus communis are shown in 

Figure 1.

Also of grave concern is botulinum toxin, produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum, 

which has the distinction of being known as the 

most potent toxin. In contrast to ricin, which acts 

by inhibiting protein synthesis, botulinum toxin 

is a neurotoxin and acts by inhibiting the release 

of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine from the 

nerves, resulting in paralysis. There are seven antigenic types of botulinum toxin designated A to G, 

with types A, B, E, and F causing most human poisoning. Botulinum toxin could be delivered by contaminated food or water, but it is extremely toxic by 

inhalation, with estimates of 1–10  ng/kg of body 

mass as all that would be required for 50 percent lethality in humans. Recently, terrorism experts have 

raised the possibility that terrorist organizations 

could obtain significant quantities of botulinum 

toxin from the emerging black market for counterfeit “Botox” from counterfeit laboratories and networks in Russia, Eastern Europe, or China. “Botox” 

is the commercial name for botulinum toxin used 

in tiny amounts for legitimate medical purposes, 

including treating migraine headaches, facial tics 

and facial wrinkles.11 The bacterium Clostridium 

botulinum is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 1. Seeds From Ricinus communis
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Biotoxin Research and 

Experimentation 

Since the Herbert H. Bateman Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Center at 

the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) in Dahlgren, Virginia, was dedicated on 22 August 2002, one focus has been the 

analysis, detection, and decontamination of biotoxins. This CBR Defense Center houses chemical and 

biological laboratories, with Biosafety Levels 2 and 

3 (BSL-2 and BSL-3) containment facilities, quality assurance and materials laboratories, collective 

protection and standoff detection laboratories, and 

high-performance computing capabilities.a Within 

this facility, the CBR Concepts and Experimentation 

Branch plans and executes research, development, 

test, and evaluation (RDT&E) projects directed toward an improved understanding of the nature of 

biotoxins and how to better detect and neutralize them. To facilitate these studies, the Toxin Testing Laboratory is outfitted with dual chemical fume 

hoods equipped with charcoal and high-efficiency 

particulate air (HEPA) filters, and equipment for 

high-pressure liquid chromatography (HPLC), gas 

chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS), and 

electrochemiluminescence (ECL) analyzers. Prior 

to initiating projects with active biotoxins, all scientists and engineers undergo extensive safety and 

security training, and each project is rigorously reviewed for safety and treaty compliance. A scientist 

working in a toxin laboratory with a powered, airpurifying respirator is shown in Figure 3.

Utilizing this Navy CBR defense facility and 

specialized equipment, highly qualified scientists 

and engineers investigate biotoxin detection, decontamination, remediation, and consequence 

management. To illustrate the scope of the their efforts, projects have included:

•	 Developing methods for determining decontamination efficacy against biotoxins on 

military-relevant surfaces

•	 Investigating the effects of standard water 

treatments, including chemical oxidants, coagulants, heating, and boiling on biotoxins 

in water samples

•	 Analyzing recovery of bioagents, including 

biotoxins, from dry filter units (DFUs)

As part of the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Concept, 

these biotoxin projects enabled collaborations with 

several military (Edgewood Chemical Biological 

Center, Naval Medical Research Center, Naval Research Laboratory, and U.S. Army Dugway Proving 

Ground) and nonmilitary agencies (Environmental Protection Agency and the Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)).

Protecting the Navy and Our Nation

John Michael McConnell, former Director of 

National Intelligence, stated in a speech in 2008 that, 

“One of our greatest concerns continues to be that 

a terrorist group or some other dangerous group 

might acquire and employ biological agents...to 

create casualties greater than September 11.”1

 This 

Figure 2. Clostridium botulinum
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concern was again confirmed by Michele Flournoy’s more recent statement, “...The thing that keeps 

me awake at night is a nexus between terrorism and 

massive destruction.” 

The Navy and our nation must be prepared for 

these potential threats. Accordingly, scientists from 

NSWCDD are not only committed to biotoxin research, they are contributing significantly to the 

Navy’s and our nation’s ability to detect, protect, 

and decontaminate hazards from a biotoxin attack.

Endnote

a. Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) is appropriate for handling moderate-risk 

agents that cause human disease of varying severity by ingestion or 

through percutaneous or mucous membrane exposure. Biosafety 

Level 3 (BSL-3) is appropriate for agents with a known potential for 

aerosol transmission, for agents that may cause serious and potentially lethal infections, and for those that are indigenous or exotic 

in origin. Source: Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of 

Health, Fifth Edition, 2007.

References

1. Graham, R. and Talent, J. (2008) World at Risk—The Report of the 

Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, Random House, New York.

2. Rogue WMDs Major Threat to U.S.: Pentagon Official, Yahoo article in the Early Bird, 10 June 2010, http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/

e20100611757374.html

3. Aas, P., “The Threat of Mid-Spectrum Chemical Warfare Agents,”

Prehospital and Disaster Medicine., 18 (4), 2003, pp. 306–312.

4. Franz, D.R., “Defense Against Toxin Weapons,” in Medical Aspects 

of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Sidell, F.R.; Takafugi, E.T.; 

Franz, D.R., specialty eds.), Washington, DC: TMM Publications, 

1997, pp. 603–619.

5. Howard, R.D. and Forest, J.J.F., Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

Terrorism, McGraw Hill, New York, 2008.

6. Josko, D., “Botulinum Toxin: A Weapon in Terrorism,” Clin. Lab. 

Sci., Vol. 17, 2004, pp. 30–34.

7. Meinhardt, P.L., “Water and Bioterrorism: Preparing for the Potential Threat to U.S. Water Supplies and Public Health,” Annu Rev 

Public Health, Vol. 26, 2005, pp. 213–37.

8. Salem, H., “Issues in Chemical and Biological Terrorism,” International Journal of Toxicology, Vol. 22, No. 6, November 2003, 

pp. 465–471.

9. Slater, L.N. and Greenfield, R.A., “Biological Toxins as Potential 

Agents of Bioterrorism,” J Okla State Med Assoc, Vol. 96, Issue 2, 

2003, pp. 73–76.

10. Stewart, C.E., Weapons of Mass Casualties and Terrorism Response 

Handbook, in “Chapter 13: Possible Biotoxins,” Jones and Bartlett 

Publishers, Sudbury, Massachusetts, 2006.

11. Warrick, J., “Officials Fear Toxic Ingredients in Botox Could Become Terrorist Tool,” Washington Post, 25 January 2010.

Figure 3. Scientist Working in a Toxin Laboratory With a Powered, Air-Purifying Respirator
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Development of Novel Solutions for 

Decontaminating Warfare Agents

By Claire Wells and Chris Hodge

In the aftermath of a chemical or biological warfare agent attack, the inevitable question asked is, “How do we clean this up?” For chemical and biological experts 

and experienced naval personnel, the obvious answer is to use a decontamination solution, commonly called a decon. Decons currently in the field are based on oxidative 

chemistry employed in water-based systems. One example is the high-test hypochlorite (HTH) presently used by the Navy as its standard shipboard oxidizer for decontamination. HTH is more commonly known as a common active ingredient in swimming 

pool shock products. It is a reactive, corrosive, chlorinated chemical that severely corrodes metals and can cause serious damage to the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract. Because of its reactivity, oxidants like HTH are effective in neutralizing the threat from the 

warfare agents. However, for the same reason, they can also be harsh on materials, users, and the environment.

Decontamination Challenges

It is challenging to formulate a decon that is powerful enough to neutralize the agents 

but gentle enough to be compatible with common military materials. How do scientists 

and engineers balance the reactivity required for quick agent neutralization with the stability required to avoid destruction of the surface they are trying to clean? How can a decon meant to chemically react be stable enough to have a useful shelf and pot life? The 

challenges don’t stop there. Scientists and engineers must also solvate hydrophobic (i.e., 

water-hating) chemical warfare agents and hydrophilic (i.e., water-loving) oxidizers into 

the decon solution at the same time, under the same conditions, so the neutralization reaction has a chance to occur in the first place. Anyone who has mixed olive oil and vinegar for their salad and wanted it to stay mixed understands the challenge. Even though 

solvents can help solvate the agents, their use would create additional environmental concerns and safety issues. To be most useful for the warfighter, a decon needs to be:

•	 Effective

•	 Compatible with common military materials

•	 Easy to use by a warfighter in protective gear

•	 A low logistical burden

•	 Nonhazardous to the user and the environment
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Development of Novel Solutions for 

Decontaminating Warfare Agents

To address these challenges, a diverse team of 

scientists and engineers from the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Division 

of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), in Dahlgren, Virginia, conducts research and development efforts to design 

and test new decon formulations. In one such effort, scientists and engineers utilized microemulsions formulated from biodegradable surfactants 

in place of solvents to solvate the warfare agents. 

Microemulsions are typically mixtures of water, 

one or more surfactants, and an oil. In this case, the 

warfare agent serves as the oil.1

 A 2-D depiction of 

a microemulsion is shown in Figure 1.

Using a particular ratio of one surfactant slightly soluble in the oil phase and one surfactant slightly soluble in the aqueous phase, the researchers 

Particularly effective was peracetic acid, which has 

been shown to achieve 100 percent neutralization 

of all major chemical and biological agents, while 

avoiding production of toxic by-products.1

Discovering Decontamination 

Solutions

While improved safety and compatibility were 

important achievements of these efforts, seeking 

options to reduce the logistical footprint of the 

developing decon was also required. This was especially important for the Navy since shipboard 

storage space is limited. One way to achieve this 

is by identifying solid counterparts for the decon 

ingredients. The use of solid ingredients avoids 

the unnecessary storage and transportation of extra water and allows the decon to be mixed on 

designed a microemulsion with high solubilization 

characteristics. The resulting water-based solution 

of surfactants formed a stable, single-phase solution without the use of harmful solvents.1

In addition to using microemulsions rather than 

organic solvents to solvate the chemical agents, the 

researchers utilized peroxygen compounds instead 

of harsh chlorinated oxidizers (e.g., HTH) to neutralize them. A wide range of peroxygen compounds 

was evaluated, from simple hydrogen peroxide to 

complex peracids. These nonchlorine-based peroxygen compounds were of interest because of their 

low environmental impact, their improved materials compatibility, and their relatively low toxicity. 

demand. However, locating a solid source of peracetic acid proved particularly challenging. Typical systems generated the peracid in situ upon 

mixing in water. For example, peracetic acid can 

be generated from the reaction of hydrogen peroxide and tetraacetylethylenediamine (TAED).1

 This 

approach is feasible but offers limited success partially because of poor solubility and a slowed reaction rate. A milestone was reached when the 

Dahlgren research team identified and successfully 

tested a novel, solid source of peracetic acid developed for the commercial detergent industry. This 

compound—with the trade name PES-Solid—does 

not depend on in situ generation peracetic acid, 

Figure 1. 2-D Depiction of a Microemulsion
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but releases it immediately upon dissolution in water. This makes it available for agent neutralization 

much more rapidly than in situ methods.1

 In numerous testing efforts at NSWCDD, PES-Solid has 

shown promise against chemical and biological 

agents, as well as improved materials compatibility 

with military materials.1–3 A representative structure of PES-Solid is shown in Figure 2. The exact 

structure remains unknown.

Current NSWCDD decontamination development efforts utilizing PES-Solid are focused on creating a product for the warfighter that is safe and 

user-friendly. In the course of efforts to mature 

the developed technology, formal collaboration 

with the solid oxidizer manufacturer will allow researchers to explore the optimization of the product for safe storage and transportation, as well as 

for ease of mixing. This will help to reduce the risk 

and workload of the operators in the field.

The journey to creating a safe and effective 

decon that meets the needs of the warfighter is 

challenging because many of the desirable attributes of a decon formulation conflict with one 

another. NSWCDD scientists and engineers continue to work with our Navy and joint partners to 

develop technologies that lead to more effective 

and safer decontamination methods.

References

1. Hodge, R.C.; Lawson, G.E. and Brown, J.S., Research and Development of the Surfactant-Based Chemical and Biological Decontaminating Solution, (Dahlgren Decon), NSWCDD/TR-06/32, 

Dahlgren, Virginia, May 2006.

2. Wagner, G.W.; Lawson, G.E. and Wells, C. Formulation of a BroadSpectrum, All-Weather, Solid-Based, Peracetate-“Solvent” Dry Decontaminant Concentrate, ECBCTR-743, Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland, April 2010.

3. Wagner, G.W.; Procell, L.R.; Sorrick, D.C.; Lawson, G.E.; Wells, 

C.M.; Reynolds, C.M.; Ringelberg, D.B.; Foley, K.L.; Lumetta, G.J. 

and Blanchard, D.L., “All-Weather Hydrogen Peroxide-Based Decontamination of CBRN Contaminants,” Ind. Eng. Chem. Res., 49 

(7), doi: 10.1021/ie9019177, 2010, pp. 3099–3105.

Figure 2. Representative Structure of PES-Solid
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Decontaminating Warfare Agents

Development of Novel Solutions for 

Decontaminating Warfare Agents
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The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) in Dahlgren, 

Virginia, is home to the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Defense Division, 

where one of its primary goals is to develop technologies that will neutralize or contain 

chemical warfare agents (CWAs). This article communicates how soft-matter technologies are used to accomplish this goal.

What is soft matter? Soft matter refers to materials that are in-between crystalline 

solids and simple liquids. Examples include liquid crystals, gels, foams, and microemulsions. These materials are found in many common commercial products. Liquid crystals, 

for example, are found in liquid crystal displays (LCDs) in flat-screen televisions. Jello 

and shaving cream are examples of gels and foams. So how do 

soft-matter technologies like these help to neutralize and contain CWAs? This is where the last example, microemulsions, is 

really important. This article explains how microemulsions are 

the solution to one of the toughest problems in CWA cleanup 

and decontamination.

To begin, consider a problem that is specific to the decontamination of CWAs. Some CWAs—like the blistering agent 

distilled mustard—are soluble in oil; other CWAs—like the 

nerve agent sarin—are soluble in water. Most chemical compounds that neutralize CWAs are soluble only in water. It is 

common knowledge that water and oil don’t mix, as illustrated in Figure 1, which shows motor oil and water in a glass. 

Even if shaken, the two liquids will separate. The oil remains 

on top since it has a lower density than water. This creates two 

problems: 

1. How to get neutralizing agents, soluble in water, to react with oil-soluble CWAs

2. How to make a cleaning solution that will dissolve both 

oil- and water-soluble CWAs

There is a way to make oil and water mix and solve both of 

the decontamination problems. Chemicals called surface active agents, commonly known as surfactants, are the key to 

the solution. A surfactant is a molecule that contains both 

Figure 1. Motor Oil and 

Water in a Glass
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Soft Matter Makes Tough Technologies

particular case shown in Figure 4, the spherical micelles have the hydrophilic part of the surfactant on 

the surface of the sphere, and the hydrophobic part 

Figure 2. Simple Model of a Surfactant

hydrophilic (water-loving) and lipophilic (oil-loving) groups. Figure 2 shows a simple model of the 

surfactant octane-1-oxydiethylene glycol.

Octane-1-oxydiethylene glycol is only one example of a surfactant; there are thousands of surfactants, if not more. They are actually very common. 

The phospholipids that make up the cell membranes in the human body are surfactants. Surfactants can also be found in all sorts of commercial 

products, including paints, detergents, shampoos, 

conditioners, cosmetics, inks, and insecticides, to 

name a few.

How do surfactants cause oil and water to mix? 

The dual nature of surfactant molecular structure 

causes these molecules to reside at the interface between a nonpolar solvent (like oil) and a polar solvent (like water). The hydrophilic group prefers to 

bond with water, and the lipophilic group prefers 

to bond with oil. A depiction of this interface is 

shown in Figure 3.

Surfactants don’t just sit at the interface. They 

actually self-assemble into different micro- and 

nano-structures depending on their specific physical properties. One specific example, shown in Figure  4A, are small spheres called micelles. In the 

Figure 3. Surfactants reside at the oil 

and water interface. The hydrophilic 

group prefers to bond with water, and the 

lipophilic group prefers to bond with oil.
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of the micelle on the interior of the sphere, depicted in Figure 4B. Therefore, the water is on the outside, and the oil is on the inside. This means that 

the spherical micelle encapsulates oil droplets and 

carries them into the water. This is how surfactants 

cause oil and water to mix.

It is important to note that when surfactants 

form structures where the domains are from 10 to 

100 nanometers (the diameter of a micelle sphere), 

the solutions are referred to as a microemulsion. 

These nanostructures cannot be seen with the naked eye and do not scatter light, making microemulsions transparent. The really important fact 

about surfactant structures that are smaller than 

100 nanometers is that they are stable. In other words, the oil, water, and surfactants in a microemulsion do not separate over time. Figure 5 

shows how microemulsions are stable, transparent oil and water solutions where surfactants have 

formed nanostructures with 10–100 nanometer 

domains.

Microemulsions dissolve CWAs that are soluble in oil or in water because surfactants cause oil 

and water to mix. However, it is not clear how microemulsions allow neutralizing agents dissolved 

in water to interact with CWAs that are soluble 

only in oils. From the information presented, it 

would seem that a layer of surfactants would prevent these chemicals from coming into contact.

How do neutralizing agents interact with oilsoluble CWAs? Surfactant structures are not permanent structures floating in water or oil. They 

are highly dynamic, falling apart and reforming 

many times each second. This can be compared 

Figure 4. (A) Spherical Micelles in Water (B) Cross-Section of a Micelle—Micelles cause 

oil and water to mix by encapsulating oil droplets and carrying them into the water.
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Soft Matter Makes Tough Technologies

to ballroom dancing, where each dancer changes partners as the dance moves along. The dance 

has structure but is always changing. This type of 

dynamics in microemulsions allows neutralizing 

agents to bump into CWAs in the oil phase, causing a reaction that neutralizes the agent.

Microemulsions provide an amazing capability, as they allow for the creation of a decontamination solution that soaks up and neutralizes a broad 

spectrum of CWAs. This one-size-fits-all approach 

saves storage capacity and money. Microemulsionbased decontamination solutions also have other 

advantageous properties. For example, these solutions are not considered to be corrosive and can 

be used at low temperatures; microemulsions can 

be designed to function below the freezing point of 

water. Furthermore, many of the components are 

already commercially available, making this approach very attractive. Microemulsion decontamination solutions have been developed at NSWCDD 

and are currently being evaluated for approval for 

use by the military. They are also in consideration 

for use by nonmilitary emergency personnel, such 

as first responders.

Figure 5. Illustration of a Microemulsion
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Molecular Construction: Novel Multifunctional 

Adsorbents for the Next-Generation 

CBR Protection Systems

By Joseph Hunt
183

Molecular Construction: Novel Multifunctional 

Adsorbents for the Next-Generation 

CBR Protection Systems

carbon materials because materials with the same 

or improved adsorptive properties could be produced. Reticular chemistry produces materials like 

metal organic frameworks (MOFs) in which organic 

building blocks are combined with metal salts to produce extended structures connected through robust 

bonds 1a–f (Figure 1A) and covalent organic frameworks (COFs) in which the structures are formed 

by connecting the organic building blocks together 

without the metal ions 2a–g (Figure 1B). These figures 

show how the simple organic building blocks on the 

left are connected together to make the extended interconnected structures on the right through chemical bonds. The advantages and benefits of using 

reticular materials to produce new CBR protection 

systems will be laid out in the rest of the article.

Nanoscale Design

One of the many advantages of MOF and COF 

systems is that the design of specific structures is 

possible. The principles of reticular chemistry involve simplifying organic molecules or metal complexes as simple geometric shapes with points of 

connectivity at the corners like those shown in Figure 2.1a The organic linker, shown as a simple line, 

is analogous to an I-beam or girder (Figure 2A, B, 

and D). The metal coordinates with linkers, forming the secondary building unit (SBU) with a 

specific shape similar to the joints found in construction (Figure 2C, E, and F). These struts and 

joints form an extended structure similar to the 

structural skeleton of a building (Figure 2G and 

H3

). In past publications—such as the Taxonomy of 

periodic nets and the design of materials by Michael 

O’Keeffe—crystal structures of many different materials were analyzed, simplifying the molecules 

into simple geometric shapes. It was found that despite the wide range of materials in nature, only a 

small number of basic structures were present, and 

the structure of materials in nature could be predicted if the molecules were simplified into rigid 

shapes.4

 These principles have been further tested 

and proven in many MOF and COF publications 

that demonstrate the ability to predict the structures of materials before making them. Thus it is 

possible to truly design a material with a specific 

desirable structure through careful selection of the 

building blocks used. This is similar to the blueprints used in the fabrication of buildings, where 

the structure is planned out with specific joints and 

beams. This design is important for certain CBR 

applications where specific pore sizes or shapes 

may be needed to obtain maximum protection. Using reticular chemistry, the sizes and shapes of the 

pores in the material can be designed by changing 

Introduction

Construction involves the combination of artificial or natural components into a larger whole. 

There have been many advancements in the development of construction methods and building 

blocks used throughout history—from wooden log cabins to steel skyscrapers. This ability to 

manipulate and produce complex structures with 

specific designs, while common in the macroscale 

world of rivets and girders, has been, for the most 

part, unrealized in the microscale and nanoscale 

regimes of our world. Consequently, the ability to 

produce advanced functional materials displaying 

many different properties like conductivity and 

reactivity has been hindered by limitations in our 

materials science and engineering capabilities. Reticular chemistry is concerned with the design and 

controlled construction of nanoscale structures 

through the linking of molecular building blocks 

with strong bonds. More simply, this chemistry allows one to design and construct nanoscale materials with specific properties and structures with 

a great deal of control. The image on the previous 

page represents the idea of molecular construction 

by illustrating a city with buildings and roads constructed from various extended reticular materials using actual crystal structures. This powerful 

form of molecular construction could be used to 

build materials for any number of relevant technologies including organo-electronics, catalysts, 

or building materials, but this article will focus on 

the design and synthesis of advanced, functional 

materials for chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) defense applications.

Fielded CBR Adsorbents

Current CBR technologies utilize porous materials that adsorb or trap a chemical weapon agent 

(CWA) and other toxic industrial chemical (TIC) 

threat molecules. Some of these adsorbents also contain reactive species that break down the threats after adsorption. Currently, activated carbon materials 

are used in filters to adsorb the CWA/TIC threats 

while metal salts impregnated into the pores chemically break down those threats. These carbon materials have random, disordered structures and allow 

very little control over the sizes and shapes of the 

pores or spaces in the materials. While these carbon 

materials adsorb some threat molecules very well, 

some TIC threats are not as strongly adsorbed and 

can pose protective challenges. Reticular chemistry 

is concerned with the connection of simple chemical building blocks into predictable structures using 

strong bonds to connect the building blocks. Reticular chemistry is well suited to improve on porous 
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the shapes and lengths of the building blocks used. 

This capability is not possible with current porous 

carbon materials, where there is very little control 

over the structures.

Functionalization Methods

Functionalization refers to the ability to 

change or add chemical groups to a molecule or 

polymer. The functionalization and variability of 

potential building blocks is another advantage for 

reticular materials. This is important because certain functional groups may bind or react with a 

desired CWA or TIC threat to give better protection. Using well-known chemical reactions (Figure 3a), virtually any organic molecule or metal 

could be incorporated into a MOF or COF material simply by producing a building block with 

desired functionality. These functional groups 

may improve adsorption, add reactive capabilities, 

or enhance the detection of specific CBR threats. 

The amazing thing about MOFs and COFs is that 

building blocks with these functionalities can be 

used to make the material without changing the 

overall structure.5

 This is similar to using girders 

made from different metals or changing the decorations in a building without changing the skeleton structure. This variability makes it possible 

to make materials with any functional group or 

structure desired. This is important to CBR applications because materials can be designed for 

specific threats where reactivity or increased sensitivity requires special materials. Using reticular chemistry, these threat-specific materials 

could be made without altering the basic adsorbent material structure and properties. This functionalization, however, does not always need to 

Figure 1. Synthesis of MOFs (A) and COFs (B) showing the formation of building units from 

organic linkers and metal ions and the extended structures formed from these building units.
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be carried out on the building blocks before production of the adsorbent. Reticular chemistry has 

also demonstrated the ability to modify the structure after synthesis of the MOF or COF. This procedure, called postfunctionalization,6a–e utilizes 

known organic reactions to chemically change 

the side groups of the building blocks without destroying the extended structure (Figure 3B). Recent discoveries have added even more options 

to the modification of MOF and COF materials. 

Researchers have shown that the linkers in MOF 

materials can even be exchanged without losing 

the original extended structure.7

 This was demonstrated by starting with the MOF shown in Figure 

3C and sequentially exchanging different functionalized building blocks in the structure, producing a material with many different side chains 

present.

Importance of Order

The fact that MOFs and COFs are produced as 

crystalline materials is another advantage for these 

materials. A crystalline material has an ordered 

structure where the arrangement and position of 

atoms repeats itself throughout the structure. Although crystalline structures are not necessary 

for adsorption and other applications, the ability to produce well-defined, ordered materials can 

be very useful. Crystalline MOFs and COFs have 

well-ordered pore structures that can be thoroughly 

characterized. This characterization can tell you 

where every atom in the structure is and reveal important information about reaction, adsorption 

properties, or sensing mechanisms in the material. 

This information could then be used to design better materials and predict their behavior and performance. Even though materials like porous carbons 

Figure 2. Organic linker (A), which is represented as a black line (B), is analogous to an I-beam or girder (D). When 

this linker is reacted with a metal ion (C), the octahedral building unit (E) is formed, which is similar to the joints (F) 

found in modern construction. The extended structure formed by the connection of linkers and metal ions (G) is 

analogous to the skeletal structure of a modern building (H).
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Figure 3. Various methods of MOF, COF functionalization: (A) Represents direct transformation 

of the building block followed by synthesis of the MOF or COF, (B) Postfunctionalization involves 

modification of the building blocks after synthesis of the extended structure, and (C) Ligand 

exchange involves sequential exchange of some of the building blocks in the structure after the 

MOF is synthesized.
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have been used for the last 50–100 years, we still 

lack complete fundamental knowledge in terms of 

reaction mechanisms with CWA and TIC threats. 

This lack of fundamental knowledge hinders our 

understanding of many mechanisms important to 

CBR applications—including loss of reactivity in 

aged or fielded filters for collective protection systems (CPSs)—limiting our ability to effectively address shelf life and residual life issues.

Properties of MOFs and COFs

The advantages described above give MOF and 

COF materials certain properties that are superior 

to the currently fielded porous carbons. Most MOF 

and COF materials are extremely porous and, unlike porous carbons where the adsorption occurs in 

microporous branched channels, MOFs and COFs 

are completely open structures, allowing access to 

the pore structure from any direction. This is similar to a building with six entrances versus a building with only one entrance, allowing much more 

efficient access. Consequently, MOFs and COFs 

exhibit much higher surface areas than porous carbons because the open structure allows access to all 

the adsorption sites. This means that there is more 

area inside these MOF and COF materials for reacting with or adsorbing gas molecules. Due to the 

strong bonding in MOFs and COFs, these materials exhibit high thermal stabilities. Many MOFs 

and COFs have demonstrated very good chemical 

stability to water and even acids and bases. Most 

MOFs and COFs also have very low densities due 

to the large amounts of open space in the structures 

versus the volume of the structures. The author discovered COF-108—which has the lowest density known for a crystalline material (0.17 g cm-1)2c 

(Figure 4)—in 2007 during his doctoral work. The 

properties described above are common for most 

MOF and COF materials, but there are also material-dependent properties that are very important to 

consider when designing MOF and COF materials 

for CBR and other applications.

Future Applications of 

MOF and COF Materials

As mentioned before, any organic molecule 

or metal could potentially be incorporated into 

a MOF or COF. This includes molecules that are 

currently used in other applications like catalysis, 

electronics, detection, and others. The versatile nature of reticular chemistry or molecular construction towards enhancing warfighter capabilities is 

detailed in the following examples. Many organic molecules are used in electronic applications to 

conduct electricity or signals. A newly discovered 

2-D COF was tested and found to conduct electricity and produce electricity from light.8

 These molecules could be used to construct MOFs or COFs 

that would be able to adsorb CBR threats and then 

signal through the conductivity that an attack is 

underway. The COF or MOF materials could even 

bind reactive species or incorporate reactive linkers in the synthesis so that a multifunctional material could be produced that would capture, detect, 

and destroy CWA and TIC threats. This technology would be useful for collective and individual protection equipment applications such as CP 

filters and masks. The materials could also be developed for protective clothing that would protect the warfighter, as well as signal him, his unit, 

and headquarters that the area is dangerous. Conducting MOFs or COFs could also be used to produce standoff/remote point detection technologies 

by supplying new detection materials with better 

sensitivity and selectivity. These sensing materials 

could be incorporated into remote CBR sensors 

that could be left around the perimeter of a ship or 

encampment to warn against attacks. Other MOF 

and COF materials could also be developed to capture solar energy or make more efficient batteries 

so that detection devices could be fielded longer 

with less necessary maintenance. These examples 

should demonstrate how new MOF and COF materials could be utilized in protecting warfighters 

on the ship, in battle, or in the field. There are additional areas of military interest in which MOFs 

and COFs could be applied—including armor, water filtration, gas storage, or organo-electronics—

that are not discussed.

Current Research

Many of the concepts and applications discussed in this article are theoretical; however, there 

is research showing the effectiveness of MOF and 

COF materials towards CBR applications. One 

study tested a group of well-known MOFs against 

common TIC threats like ammonia and chlorine, 

and compared their performance to an activated carbon (BPL carbon).9

 The results showed that 

some of the MOFs were more effective than carbon 

materials towards some TIC threats. Some COF and 

MOF materials have been synthesized and characterized at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) in Dahlgren, Virginia, 

and tested against TIC threats like ammonia and 

sulfur dioxide at the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC) to probe the structural features and characteristics most effective against TIC 

and CWA protection. The MOFs and COFs tested showed good potential to improve TIC threat 
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Figure 4. COF-108 shown above exhibits the lowest density (0.17 g cm-1) of any known crystalline material.
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protection. NSWCDD scientists are also designing and researching new multifunctional MOF 

and COF materials with potential improvements in 

CBR protection capabilities against TIC threats. 

Conclusion

Since the discovery of MOF materials in 1999, 

research has grown quickly, with thousands of new 

MOFs being reported every year. Research into 

COF materials has not been as extensive; however, 

COFs were discovered only in 2005. It is only in the 

last couple of years that concerted efforts were made 

to apply MOF and COF materials towards air purification and CBR applications. Despite the infancy of this field of chemistry, the potential for these 

materials is vast. Reticular chemistry truly represents molecular construction in the sense of synthesizing nanostructured materials in a controllable 

and reproducible manner. This article highlights 

the power of reticular chemistry to design and tailor adsorbents towards specific threats and applications. Given the amazing potential for MOF and 

COF materials, the molecular construction used to 

construct a city like the one shown on the first page 

of this article may not be so unrealistic after all.

References

1. (a) Li, H.; Eddaoudi, M.; O’Keeffe, M. and Yaghi, O.M.; Nature,

Vol. 402, 1999, p. 276; (b) Chu, S.S.Y.; Lo, S.M.F.; Charmant, 

J.P.H.; Orpen, A.G. and Williams, I.D.A., Science, Vol. 283, 1999, 

pp. 1148–1150; (c) Soo Seo, J.; Whang, D.; Lee, H.; Jun S.I.; Oh, J.; 

Jeon, Y.J. and Kim, K., Nature, Vol. 404, 2000, p. 982; (d) Rowsell, 

J.L.C. and Yaghi, O.M., Microporous Mesoporous Mater, Vol.  73, 

2004, pp. 3–14; (e) Chae, H.; Siberio-Perez, D.Y.; Kim, J.; Go, Y.; 

Eddaoudi, M.; Matzger, A.; O’Keeffe, M. and Yaghi, O.M., Nature, 

Vol. 427, 2004, p. 523; (f) Kitagawa, S.; Kitaura, R. and Noro, S., 

Angew. Chem. Int. Ed., Vol. 43, 2004, p. 2334.

2. (a) Uribe-Romo, F.J.; Hunt, J.R.; Furukawa, H.; Klock, C.; O’Keeffe, 

M. and Yaghi, O.M., J. Am. Chem. Soc., Vol. 131 (13), 2009, 

pp. 4570–4571; (b) Hunt, J.R.; Doonan, C.J.; LeVangie, J.D.; Côté, 

A.P. and Yaghi, O.M., J. Am. Chem. Soc., Vol. 130, 2008, p. 11872; 

(c) El-Kaderi, H.M; Hunt, J.R.; Mendoza-Cortés, J.L; Côté, A.P.; 

Taylor, R.E.; O’Keeffe, M. and Yaghi, O.M., Science, Vol. 316, 2007, 

p. 268; (d) Côté, A.P.; El-Kaderi, H.M.; Furukawa, H.; Hunt, J.R. 

and Yaghi, O.M., J. Am. Chem. Soc., Vol. 129, 2007, p. 12914; (e) 

Côté, A.P.; Benin, A.L.; Ockwig, N.W.; O’Keeffe, M.; Matzger, A.J. 

and Yaghi, O.M., Science, Vol. 310, 2005, p. 1166; (f) Tilford, R.W.; 

Gemmill, W.R.; zur Loye, H.C. and Lavigne, J.J., Chem. Mater., 

Vol. 18, 2006, p. 5296; (g) Tilford, R.W.; Mugavero, S.J.; Pellechia, 

P.J. and Lavigne, J. J., Adv. Mater., Vol. 20, 2008, p. 2741.

3. Photo courtesy of Wikimedi Commons, Samuel Boisvert, 2009.

4. Delgado-Friedrichs, O.; O’Keeffe, M. and Yaghi, O.M., “Taxonomy 

of periodic nets and the design of materials,” Phys. Chem. Chem. 

Phys., Vol. 9, 2007, pp. 1035–1043.

5. Eddaoudi, M.; Kim, J.; Rosi, N.L.; Vodak, D.T.; Wachter, J.; 

O’Keeffe, M. and Yaghi, O.M., Science, Vol. 295, 2002, pp. 469–472.

6. (a) Wang, Z. and Cohen, S.M., J. Am. Chem. Soc., Vol. 129, 2007, 

p.  12368; (b) Tanabe, K.K.; Wang, Z. and Cohen, S.M., J. Am. 

Chem. Soc., Vol. 130, 2008, p. 8508; (c) Costa, J.S.; Gamez, P.; 

Black, C.A.; Roubeau, O.; Teat, S.J. and Reedijk, J., Eur. J. Inorg. 

Chem., 2008, p. 1551; (d) Morris, W.; Doonan, C.J.; Furukawa, H.; 

Banerjee, R. and Yaghi, O.M., J. Am. Chem. Soc., Vol. 130, 2008, 

p. 12626; (e) Gadzikwa, T.; Lu, G.; Stern, C.L.; Wilson, S.R.; Hupp, 

J.T. and Nguyen, S.T., Chem. Commun., 2008, p. 5493.

7. Deng, H.; Doonan, C.J.; Furukawa, H.; Ferreira, R.B.; Towne, J.; 

Knobler, C.B.; Wang, B. and Yaghi, O.M., Science, Vol. 327, 2010, 

pp. 846–850.

8. Wan, S.; Guo, J.; Kim, J.; Ihee, H.; Jiang, D., Angew. Chem. Int. Ed., 

Vol. 47, 2008, pp. 8826–8830.

9. Britt, D.; Tranchemontagne, D.J. and Yaghi, O.M., Proc. Natl. Acad. 

Sci. USA, Vol. 105, 2008, pp. 11623–11627.
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Investigating Natural Flavonoid Compounds 

as Potential Radioprotective Agents 

for the Warfighter

By Dena H. Kota and Linda C. Beck
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Investigating Natural Flavonoid Compounds 

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for the Warfighter

Figure 1. Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) Concept

Radiological threats are a potential area of terrorism that has not received much attention until 

recently. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

estimated that approximately one licensed source 

of radiation is lost every day of the year in the United States alone.1 Moreover, there have been 700 incidents of illegal trafficking of radioactive materials 

worldwide, including 440 incidents in the United 

States, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).2

Radiological threats are usually found in the 

format of a dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersion device (RDD). RDDs are a combination of conventional explosives and radioactive 

material designed to scatter dangerous amounts of 

radioactive material, as well as shrapnel over a general area. Terrorist use of RDDs is considered far 

more likely than use of a nuclear device because 

they require very little technical knowledge to 

build and deploy compared to that of a nuclear device. RDDs also appeal to terrorists because certain 

radiological materials are used widely in medicine, 

agriculture, industry, and research, and are much 

more readily available compared to weapons-grade 

uranium or plutonium. Unlike a conventional terrorist bomb, the primary objective of an RDD is 

not to target warfighters or civilians directly with 

the explosion; rather, the explosion disperses radioactive material over a wide area in an attempt 

to create fear and disruption. The levels of radioactive material are usually sublethal; however, they 

can still result in long-term, harmful effects. The 

concept of an RDD is shown in Figure 1.

In 2005, the Radiological and Nuclear Threat 

Countermeasure Working Group established a priority list of research goals relevant to this rising 

area of concern. Their top two goals were:

1. To understand the mechanisms of radiation 

injury at the molecular, cellular, tissue, and 

organism levels as a basis for development 

of preventative, therapeutic, and diagnostic 

approaches

2. To develop new therapeutic agents that can 

be used to treat people who have been exposed to ionizing radiation (IR)

Just recently, the Department of Health and 

Human Services reiterated the importance of this 

effort in a report stating that:

“...the understanding of the mechanisms 

of radiation damage, as well as organ system 

injury, damage repair, and inflammation, is 

necessary to develop optimal medical management and medical countermeasures.”3

Scientists from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), Dahlgren, Virginia, recently teamed with scientists from Virginia 

Commonwealth University in Richmond, Virginia, 

to examine the basic scientific principles behind the 

damage caused by IR, as well as novel solutions to 

mitigate these risks.

It is known that exposure to IR leads to the 

production of toxic free radicals and DNA damage 

in living cells. However, understanding the mechanisms behind this damage will allow researchers to 
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develop more efficient methods of protection and 

treatment against radiological attacks. Figure 2 depicts a strand of DNA being damaged by an outside 

source of radiation. When this occurs, it begins a 

cascade of signaling molecules that reaches various 

effectors in the cells of our bodies and results in 

certain responses. In some cases, the DNA is able 

to repair itself and continue with its normal function. At other times, this type of damage will lead 

to the arrest or inhibition of various cell cycle transitions, which ultimately results in the demise of 

the cell. It is also possible for this exposure to result 

in the generation of new genes and proteins, a process known as transcription, which can initiate a 

variety of cellular processes. Lastly, the cell can undergo a protective process of cell death, referred to 

as apoptosis, which prevents the damage from being passed on to future generations of cells.

One possible mitigation method under examination is the use of naturally occurring compounds 

known as flavonoids. Flavonoid compounds show 

promise as protective agents against IR-induced 

damage. One of the main functions of flavonoids is 

to act as an antioxidant to slow or prevent formation 

of free radicals and DNA damage following exposure to IR. These compounds are found ubiquitously 

throughout common foods in the human diet such 

as citrus fruit, red wine, dark chocolate, and tea. Due 

to their high availability, flavonoids represent an extremely cost-efficient method of protection.

While preliminary work with flavonoids has 

shown the potential to mitigate the harmful effects 

of radiation, specific information on effective doses 

and therapeutic mechanisms is still lacking. Dahlgren scientists have begun to explore these gaps 

in hopes of answering the types of basic research 

questions that will enable development of successful preventative and treatment options.

In initial studies, Dahlgren researchers examined the effect of quercetin (QN)—a flavonoid 

with strong antioxidant and anti-inflammatory effects—on cell survival following exposure to radiation. In primary human skin cells, quercetin dose 

dependently a

 increases the percentage of cell survival following exposure to radiation, suggesting a 

protective effect. Figure 3 shows skin cell survival 

Figure 2. Possible Effects of DNA Damage Due to Ionizing Radiation (IR)
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Investigating Natural Flavonoid Compounds 

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resulting from pretreatment with various concentrations of the flavonoid compound quercetin.

Scientists plan to complete studies testing a full 

range of IR doses and quercetin concentrations to 

fully understand the most effective way to counter radiological threats using natural sources. In 

addition, studies will be conducted to examine responses that are occurring at the cellular level so 

that these mechanisms can be targeted for therapeutic measures. Ultimately, it is hoped that this 

research will lead to the development of effective 

radioprotective agents that will keep warfighters 

safe from the effects of RDDs and other radiological threats.

Endnote

a. Dose-dependent refers to the effects of treatment with a drug or 

compound. If the effects change when the dose is changed, the effects are said to be dose-dependent, Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention (CDC) Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Glossary, http://

www.cdc.gov/des/consumers/resources/glossary.html#D

b. A clonogenic assay is a microbiology technique for studying the effectiveness of specific agents on the survival and proliferation of 

cells. It is frequently used in cancer research laboratories to determine the effect of drugs or radiation on proliferating tumor cells, 

as well as for titration of cell-killing particles (CKP) in virus stocks, 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clonogenic_assay

References

1. Zimmerman, P.D. and Loeb, C., “Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited,” Defense Horizons, Issue No. 38, 2004, pp. 1–11.

2. International Atomic Energy Agency website, copyright 2003–2009, 

retrieved from http://www.iaea.org/

3. Coleman, C.N., et al., “Medical Response to a Radiologic/Nuclear Event: Integrated Plan from the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

for Preparedness and Response, Department of Health and Human Services,” Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 53 (2), February 2009, pp. 213–222.

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as Potential Radioprotective Agents 

for the Warfighter

Figure 3. After exposure to 8 gray (Gy) of radiation, approximately 35 percent of human skin 

cells survived. Pretreating these cells with various concentrations of quercetin (QN) dose-dependently increased the amount of cell survival, suggesting that this flavonoid compound may 

have potential as a protective agent for both the warfighter and civilians.b
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195

Decontaminant Material and 

Chemical Compatibility Testing

Figure 1. A respirator with a lens that impairs vision would hinder a warfighter’s ability to complete mission operations.

Branch conducts testing to determine the compatibility of decontaminants selected by these 

programs with representative military materials; 

selected petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); 

and, where applicable, other currently fielded decontaminants. Testing by branch personnel provides a thorough assessment of the compatibility 

of the selected decontaminants. The testing also 

is designed to identify any destructive effects on 

materials, as well as potentially hazardous interactions with compounds commonly found in the 

operational environment.

The following hypothetical field scenarios demonstrate the need for decontaminant testing. 

Hypothetical Field Scenario: 

Incompatible Decontaminant 

Solution

After possible exposure to a chemical warfare 

agent during mission operations, soldiers perform 

decontamination procedures before returning to 

base. After doing so, they stow their respirators in 

their mask storage containers until the next time 

they need them. Unfortunately, when the respirators are needed again, they cannot be used because 

the decontaminant destroyed the masks’ lenses, 

hindering a warfighter’s ability to complete mission 

operations. A personnel decontamination exercise 

is shown in Figure 1.

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Imagine fighting terrorists in Afghanistan, or 

any other strange land for that matter, and being attacked with a chemical warfare agent...pretty scary. 

While many nations have agreed through treaties to 

eradicate the use of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) weapons, terrorists follow no such 

agreements. Fortunately, warfighters are equipped 

and trained to protect themselves if this happens.

The research arm of the Chemical, Biological, 

and Radiological (CBR) Defense Division at the 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

(NSWCDD) in Dahlgren, Virginia, is the Concepts 

and Experimentation Branch. Scientists and engineers in this branch actively seek CBR defense solutions for the technical challenges and threats facing 

the Navy and the U.S. homeland. These skilled professionals are responsible for performing the basic 

and applied science supporting the research, development, testing, and evaluation of technologies 

necessary to defend against chemical, biological, 

and radiological weapons. This research enhances 

warfighter, fleet, and homeland CBR defensive capabilities and increases fleet readiness.

The Joint Program Manager for Decontamination (JPM-Decon), located in Stafford, Virginia, 

conducts testing and evaluation of decontaminants 

selected for acquisition programs to support subsequent fielding decisions. As part of these efforts, 

the NSWCDD Concepts and Experimentation 
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For materials compatibility, the primary objective is to determine the extent of degradation of a 

material after decontamination procedures. Representative military materials include individual protection equipment (IPE) such as protective 

outer garments, respirators, gloves, and overboots. 

Military materials also include equipment such 

as weapons, tactical vehicles, etc., and the paints, 

metals, fabrics, and plastics that are used to make 

them. Prospective decontaminants need to be tested against these articles to ensure that the decontaminating process does not destroy the materials 

and that the equipment will perform as expected. 

Accordingly, following the decontamination process, IPE must still be able to protect against CBR 

events, weapons must still fire safely, and vehicles 

must still start and run as expected.

Hypothetical Field Scenario: 

Decontaminant Deadly— 

Gas Hazard

A vehicle had a small, undetected fuel leak during decontamination, and the fuel reacted with the 

decontaminant. When the two mixed, a toxic and 

potentially deadly gas formed, endangering personnel. Vehicle decontamination procedures are shown 

in Figure 2.

Selected POL are tested for incompatibility, 

with prospective decontaminants based on prescribed decontamination procedures developed to 

prevent accident or injury due to chemical reactivity. POL testing focuses on two primary issues:

1. Chemical incompatibility, resulting in hazardous increases in temperature or offgassing when the decontaminant comes 

into contact with a POL

2. The potential interaction of the decontaminant with external or topical POL that could 

result in a loss of lubricating properties and 

increased maintenance requirements

Hypothetical Field Scenario: 

Decontaminant Fire Hazard

During decontamination operations, a quantity of personnel decontaminant reacts violently with 

a vehicle decontaminating solution when mixed in 

Figure 2. An odorless, colorless, toxic gas created by decontaminant/fuel incompatibility could quickly overcome this soldier.
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Decontaminant Material and 

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Figure 3. A potential personnel decontaminant reacts violently with a fielded decontaminant when mixed in certain ratios.

certain ratios. The two are incompatible, and the 

reaction starts a fire. A depiction of the reaction is 

shown in Figure 3.

Selected decontaminants are also tested 

against currently fielded decontaminants. For 

compatibility of any potential decontaminant 

with currently fielded decontaminants, the primary objective is to identify any hazards resulting 

from accidental or intentional mixing. Fire, large 

and rapid temperature increases, hazardous offgassing, or profound physical changes help determine whether the risks of potentially hazardous 

consequences are worth the decontaminating potential of a newly deployed solution.

As these realistic field scenarios demonstrate, introducing new decontaminants without understanding the potential hazards involved can be dangerous. 

The efforts of JPM-Decon and NSWCDD’s Concepts 

and Experimentation Branch ensure that warfighters 

are protected by the latest and most effective decontaminants and are made aware of potential hazards 

that can undermine their safety further ensuring that 

they can fight, win, and come home safely.
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Testing is Key to Maintaining an 

Effective Navy Fighting Capability

in a Contaminated Environment

By Tim Thomasson

Nowhere else on earth can you find such an assemblage of deadly firepower, intricate electronics, powerful propulsion systems, and numbers of highly trained personnel than on a U.S. Navy warship. Nor can you find a more challenging environment for 

testing the protective equipment designed to prevent chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) threats or other toxic compounds from doing harm to these amazingly 

powerful vessels and their crews. The lives of the crew and the missions assigned to the 

Navy are too important to base the measures of effectiveness of the protective technologies on laboratory testing or engineering assessments. The equipment must be placed on 

ships and must be tested in realistic, measurable ways. Testing on ships, however, is both 

challenging and complex, and requires specialized expertise—expertise available thanks 

to scientists and engineers from the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

(NSWCDD), who have earned the title, Shipboard Testing Subject Matter Experts. The 

amphibious dock landing ship USS Oak Hill (LSD 51), which was recently used for shipboard testing, is shown at sea in Figure 1 and is followed by a photograph of U.S. Navy 

test personnel aboard USS Oak Hill in Figure 2.

Shipboard Testing

The Defense Acquisition Process employs a number of paths for equipment to follow during development, but for shipboard equipment, all end up needing some final 

test phase that places it on an appropriate vessel for testing and evaluation. Central to 

this evaluation process is subjecting the equipment to a realistic threat environment and 

measuring its performance. This is where the challenges of testing can actually exceed 

those of developing the new hardware.

What is so hard about CBR shipboard testing? For one thing, the testing often needs 

to be done at sea underway with all the other ship systems operating. Another challenge 

is the need for a realistic threat in order to evaluate the performance of the protective 

equipment. A ship cannot be attacked with an actual chemical or biological agent, or 

anything that would harm the ship, the crew, or the environment. Consequently, a safe 
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in a Contaminated Environment

Figure 2. U.S. Navy Test Personnel Aboard USS Oak Hill (U.S. Navy photo released)

Figure 1. USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) (Official U.S Navy Photo Released)
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Figure 3. Helicopter Spraying Simulated Agent

way to simulate the hazardous CBR threat must be 

found (a safe substitute), and a means of delivering 

it must be developed.

Along with the challenges of simulating the attack, there is the requirement for instrumentation to 

measure how effective the attack was on the ship. It 

answers the question “How much hit the ship?” This 

measurement becomes the reference point for evaluating the performance of the protective technology 

with respect to whether the equipment will protect 

the ship and crew, enabling them to safely perform 

the mission. In Figure 3, a helicopter spraying a simulated agent is shown performing an area attack to 

determine if the shipboard detectors adequately detect the attack in time to protect the ship and crew.

NSWCDD has been conducting CBR shipboard testing for over 25 years and has assembled 

the world’s best expertise in taking on these challenging tests. Their team includes in-house personnel, contractors, and joint participation from other 

service laboratories.

Testing is key to maintaining an effective Navy 

fighting capability in a contaminated environment. 

Testing ensures that our CBR systems work, that our 

Sailors are protected, and that our ships can continue to conduct their missions in spite of CBR attacks.

Spray Nozzle
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in a Contaminated Environment

Testing is Key to Maintaining an 

Effective Navy Fighting Capability

in a Contaminated Environment
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Final Thoughts

NSWCDD’s Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD) Role – 

Past, Present, and Future

By Michael Purello, P.E.

In approximately 190 B.C., Hannibal of Carthage made history when, while helping 

the king of Bithynia, he had some earthen vessels filled with poisonous snakes, covered 

the pots, and set sail. As the Bithynians prepared for battle, they hurled the pots full of 

the poisonous snakes onto the decks of the enemy ships. The resulting confusion, fear, 

and chaos demonstrated the effects of a chemical or biological (CB) attack. This is perhaps the first recorded instance of a CB attack on a naval ship. Over 2,000 years later, the 

threat is still just as real—only much more sophisticated—and generates the need for a 

comprehensive Navy Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) defense program.

Introduction

A leader in the Navy CBR defense program, the CBR Defense Division of the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) provides our warfighters with 

the tools and capabilities necessary to detect, protect, and if necessary, decontaminate 

the toxic residue resulting from a CBR attack. The CBR Defense Division has a full complement of capabilities to support the naval warfighter both on land and at sea, as well 

as throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Defense communities.

NSWCDD has a long history of supporting CBR defense initiatives. Tracing back 

to the earliest ordnance-based programs and moving ahead to today’s full-spectrum 

CBR defense support, this article provides a broad-brush historical perspective of the 
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NSWCDD’s Chemical, Biological, and 

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CBR work performed at NSWCDD in Dahlgren, 

Virginia, since the mid-1950s. It examines present 

products, capabilities, and fleet support services, 

and concludes with an exploration of the future on 

Navy CBR defense.

Historical Perspective

Beginning in August 1954, NSWCDD—then 

the Naval Proving Ground at Dahlgren, Virginia—

conducted a variety of work in chemical warfare 

(CW) research and development programs. This 

initial work, which was performed for the Bureau 

of Ordnance, focused on the simulant-filled EX 23 

(Mk  94) bombs and involved fit checks, assembly tests, environmental testing, and ballistic characterization. Having its roots as a naval gunnery 

range, it is not surprising that NSWCDD would be 

the recipient of this kind of work.

1960s–1980s

In the early 1960s, the CBR work performed at 

NSWCDD expanded from a solely chemical weapon focus to include CW defense. At this time, the 

Cold War was in full throttle, and there was a real 

and increasing concern of CW being used against 

the U.S. Navy. Once again, the Navy turned to 

NSWCDD to meet their needs for:

•	 Information to support commanding officer’s decision-making capability in the event 

of a CW attack

•	 A centralization of the resources that were 

becoming available to help deal with a possible attack

•	 An understanding of the complexity of CW 

situations

As the Vietnam War progressed, the use of biological and chemical warfare (BW/CW) agents 

against U.S. forces emerged as a significant threat. 

To help address this threat, NSWCDD (known 

then as the Naval Weapons Laboratory) constructed a CB devices test chamber, which consisted of 

a full-scale mock-up of a shipboard magazine. In 

this chamber, personnel safely performed experiments and tests using toxic materials. Tests with 

CW agents, if required, were performed at the 

Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. Throughout the 

1960s, the work performed at NSWCDD expanded to include:

•	 Toxicology research

•	 CB research, development, test, and evaluation

•	 CB detection

•	 CB decontamination

In 1969, National Security Decision Memorandum 35 ended offensive BW programs; however, 

defensive programs for both BW/CW threats were 

still very much needed. Because the Navy deemed 

the work that NSWCDD performed in this area so 

critical, it designated NSWCDD as the lead laboratory for BW/CW work in early 1970 and, when the 

Navy’s Biological Laboratory facility in Oakland, 

California, was closed, some of its personnel were 

reassigned to NSWCDD.

While the U.S. production of CB weapons 

stopped in 1969, the CBR defense work continued 

to grow. In the 1970s and 1980s, NSWCDD continued working in CB safety, logistics, and operations planning, which included the logistics and 

safety of binary chemical weapons and increased 

research and development work in the area of 

chemical agent detection and decontamination. 

NSWCDD also received new work in the area of 

personal and collective protection, as Dahlgren 

engineers provided technical support in the development of the M98 Collective Protection System 

(CPS) filter for shipboard applications. The collective protection efforts led to the first CPS installation on a U.S. Navy ship with the backfit of CPS 

into USS Belleau Wood (LHA 3) in 1983 (shown 

in Figure 1).

International events would shape the future CBR efforts at NSWCDD. In the 1980s IranIraq War, Iraq used chemical weapons against the 

Iranian army. Iraq began with the use of riot control agents and progressed to the use of blister and 

nerve agents. As the war was coming to a close, the 

Iraqi government used chemical weapons against 

their own people, killing thousands of Kurd civilians (see Figure 2).

During this time, it is believed that Iraqi scientists were also researching biological agents and 

nuclear weapons to add to their arsenal of mass destruction. As these events unfolded, the emphasis on 

chemical and biological defense (CBD) increased.

While the Iraqi government was intentionally using chemical weapons, in 1984, a tragic incident occurred that reminded us that not all CB 

threats are war- or terrorist-related. A Union Carbide industrial plant in Bhopal, India, released a 

toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate, which killed over 

3,000 people and injured tens of thousands more. 

This incident demonstrated the need for our nation to be prepared for a chemical, biological, or 

radiological event whether it is the result of a terrorist activity, war, or an accident. Having the capability to protect the fleet from these kinds of 

scenarios was imperative.

Back home, an event was taking shape that 

would impact the CBR defense work being performed at NSWCDD. In March 1986, Rear Admiral J.B. Mooney, Jr., Chief of Naval Research (CNR), 
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Final Thoughts

formalized in a letter to the Naval Surface Warfare 

Center (NSWC) what would quickly become what 

some called the “Panic of ‘86”.1

 That short letter said:

“Budget constraints have required that 

the Office of Naval Technology (ONT) reduce 

the scope of several of its programs beginning in FY86 and into the out years ... . The 

Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

has not been identified in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 88 process as 

a high priority technology area by the Chief 

of Naval Operations (CNO) ... . Hence, ONT 

intends to reduce the CBR effort starting in 

FY86, followed by 50 percent in FY87, with 

total phase-out by FY91.”

Almost immediately, the CBR defense leadership sought new positions for the branch personnel 

that would be immediately affected and by July had 

identified placement for some of the individuals. 

In August, the Commander of NSWCDD advised 

the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 

(COMNAVSEASYSCOM) of his intent to eliminate 

the Center’s involvement in CBR defense matters 

over the next several years.2

 Other Division personnel continued to look for and find positions across 

NSWCDD.

In August, the Undersecretary for Defense, Research, and Engineering—who had previously concurred with the Navy decision to reduce the ONT 

CBR defense budget—expressed his concerns to 

the Navy at the Department of the Navy (DON) 

Science and Technology (S&T) Investment Strategy Review. By September, the CNO had officially 

expressed his concern to the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)

... about the potential loss of the Navy’s 

capabilities in this area, especially at a time 

when upgraded individual and collective 

protection measures are being developed and 

purchased for the fleet.

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) 

for Surface Warfare went on to say, “I strongly 

Figure 1. USS Belleau Wood (LHA 3)
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NSWCDD’s Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD) Role – 

Past, Present, and Future

support the continuance of NAVSURFWPNCEN’s 

role in CBR defense and request that you act 

expeditiously to prevent loss of core expertise.”3

By December, CNR was having second thoughts 

and recommended that CNO (OP 098) consider additional coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).4

 In February 1987, the CNO 

made it clear that the Navy needed to maintain a capability to support fleet needs, and SPAWAR was directed to develop a plan for a continuing program at 

NSWCDD.5

 The Division began hiring new personnel to replace the many valuable people who had left 

and reorganized to fulfill the earlier CNO mandate.

1990s

During Operation Desert Shield, it was feared 

that Iraq would once again use CB weapons, this 

time against U.S. and coalition forces. The use of CB 

weapons against ships was of particular concern to 

the Navy given the unique challenges associated with 

the sea environment. The Navy turned to NSWCDD 

as the Navy’s leader in CBD to help prepare the Navy 

to operate in a maritime CB environment. 

To determine how effectively the Iraqi army 

could contaminate our ships with attacks from their 

shore batteries, NSWCDD developed a computerized CW naval simulation model. This model—first 

called PLUME and later Vapor, Liquid, and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK)—simulated the attacks 

and tracked the vapor, liquids, and solids from the 

munitions based on agent type and meteorological 

(e.g., temperature, humidity, wind direction, and 

speed) conditions. The ship’s commanding officer 

could then use the output to determine where there 

would be a threat of contamination.

To address the threat of ships being contaminated by CW agents, NSWCDD aggressively fielded 

CBD equipment and trained deploying personnel. 

CPS was installed on ships heading to the Persian 

Gulf to allow Sailors in the protected areas to operate without wearing cumbersome protective clothing and masks. These areas also allowed a place for 

Sailors to remove their protective clothing to prevent excessive heat stress. NSWCDD provided special protective clothing, detection and monitoring 

equipment, and CB warfare training to deploying 

Figure 2. Chemical Weapons Killed Thousands of Kerds—Halabja, Iraq, March 1988
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CBRD

Final Thoughts

units. In addition, they provided decontamination 

and casualty-handling training to fleet physicians 

and corpsmen. 

To determine the threat to personnel once a 

ship was exposed to CW agents, NSWCDD conducted extensive research and testing to determine 

how long agents would remain on shipboard deck 

surfaces and how effectively the wash-down countermeasure system would remove the agents. The 

compilation of all this information under various 

environmental conditions led to the publication of 

the Chemical Hazard Assessment Guide, which was 

disseminated to the fleet to aid them in conducting 

risk assessments.

Fortunately, the Iraqis did not use any CB 

weapons against coalition forces; however, the lessons learned during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm would impact the management of CBD 

research, development, and acquisition. Based on 

some of the lessons learned, Congress passed Public Law 103-160 in 1994. This law mandated that 

the CBD efforts of all the Services be consolidated 

in a single program managed under OSD. While 

NSWCDD had collaborated across the Services 

prior to this, the implementation of the law formalized the means of collaboration. The Joint Service Materiel Development Group (JSMG) was 

established as the organization responsible for developing and acquiring CBD equipment for all the 

Services. Each Service had representatives in the 

JSMG. NSWCDD was selected to hold two of the 

key positions:

1. The Commodity Area Manager (CAM) for 

Collective Protection

2. The CAM for Battle Management, and Modeling and Simulation (M&S)

In addition to holding the CAM positions, 

NSWCDD represented the Navy on the joint Service acquisition programs and was selected to lead 

the ARTEMIS active standoff detection system program. The organization expanded to address the 

increase in workload, including new work in modeling, threat analysis, and decision aid development.

2000–2004

The collateral benefits of the collective protection were seen in the October 2000 terrorist attack 

on USS Cole (DDG 67) in the Port of Aden, Yemen. Seventeen of our Sailors were killed in this 

attack, and had it not been for the bravery and heroic deeds of the crew, the ship would most likely have sunk. Although not a CB attack, the CPS 

nevertheless performed as designed and continued 

to provide clean filtered air to the interior of the 

ship where the Sailors, who were fighting for their 

ship’s survival, could receive respite from the noxious fumes and resultant hazardous contaminants.

The terrorist attacks in 2001 on the World 

Trade Center and the Pentagon, as well as the anthrax attacks, brought renewed focus on CBR 

defense. NSWCDD was once again called on to expeditiously address CBR defense shortfalls in the 

fleet. NSWCDD managed the procurement of CBR 

defense items across all commodities, including 

both medical and nonmedical items to ensure that 

our Sailors deploying to the Gulf were adequately prepared to defend themselves against a CBR attack. Dahlgren engineers were also called upon to 

support the newly formed Pentagon Force Protection Agency and helped design and install CBD 

systems throughout the Pentagon to ensure continuity of operations in the event of another attack. 

As part of this work, Dahlgren engineers and scientists were involved in a project that completely 

upgraded the Pentagon mailroom.

During the same time period, NSWCDD was 

also erecting a new facility to house the Center’s 

CBR defense workforce. The Herbert H. Bateman 

Chemical Biological Defense Center was dedicated by Navy officials on 22 August 2002. This 

facility provided the organization with a state-ofthe-art research and development facility to continue the research and development of new and 

novel technologies, methods, and equipment to 

protect our Sailors.

In 2003, the Joint Program Executive Office 

for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) 

was established, replacing the JSMG organization. 

The Navy filled two of the original seven chartered 

Joint Program Manager (JPM) positions:

1. JPM for Collective Protection (JPM-ColPro) 

2. JPM for Information Systems (JPM-IS)

NSWCDD was established as the office for the 

JPM-ColPro, while JPM-IS established its office at 

SPAWAR in San Diego, California. Because of the 

uniqueness of the naval and maritime environment, NSWCDD provides support to all the JPMs, 

as well as to JPEO-CBD headquarters.

2004–Present

In 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commission recommended moving NSWCDD’s CB research and development 

work to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center in 

Edgewood, Maryland (near the Aberdeen Proving Ground). This was a challenging time for the 

CBR Defense Division. Because most of the Division’s employees were longtime Dahlgren area residents, with children in schools and involvement 

in the local communities, many of the employees 
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Past, Present, and Future

looked for and got opportunities in other areas at 

Dahlgren (as many had done almost 20 years earlier with the “Panic of 86”). Before long, the Division had lost about 30 percent of its employees. 

The good news is that the BRAC decision was 

overturned, and the DoD decided to keep the capability at Dahlgren. This decision was primarily based on two factors. First, it was decided that 

the Navy was indeed unique, and due to the high 

quality and quantity of support that NSWCDD provides 

to the fleet, it was the right 

place to perform this work in 

support to the warfighter. Secondly, JPEO-CBD was intent 

on having an organization that 

was truly joint with representation from all Services, and 

NSWCDD was the recognized 

lead for Navy CBR defense.

The period of 2006 to the 

present has been a period of rebuilding and growth: 

rebuilding to replace the many high-quality individuals who left after the initial BRAC decision 

was made and growth to handle the new work that 

came from a variety of areas, as potential sponsors 

saw the value of not only the qualified people in the 

CBR Defense Division, but the technical strength of 

NSWCDD as well.

It was also during this time frame that NSWC, 

Crane, as part of its sunset strategy, decided to focus on only a few major areas and divest itself of 

other work. One of these divestitures was the InService Engineering Agent (ISEA) CB Detection 

work. NSWCDD is a research, development, test, 

and evaluation institution, and as such, the focus 

is not usually on the ISEA component. However, 

there were three reasons why this work eventually 

came to NSWCDD:

•	 First and foremost, the warfighter needed to 

have the work done.

•	 Second, the sponsor—the Naval Sea Systems 

Command’s (NAVSEA’s) SEA 05P14—saw 

NSWCDD as the place to send this work. This 

decision came after conducting a LEAN value stream analysis, several resultant rapid improvement events, and several “Just Do Its.”

•	 Third, the decision was in sync with the 

Asymmetric Defense Systems Department 

and the CBR Defense Division’s vision of 

making NSWCDD a Navy Center of Excellence for CBR defense.

The transition was not without its challenges, but with a supporting command, dedicated 

personnel, and the outstanding leadership at the 

branch and programmatic levels, the work for the 

fleet continued and thrived.

One of the main impacts to the Division is the 

increased focus on providing relevant and timely 

support to the Sailor at the waterfront. To improve 

support to the fleet, the CBR Defense Division established locations on the waterfront: first in Norfolk, Virginia, and then in San Diego, California. 

(More comprehensive coverage of NSWCDD’s waterfront support can be found 

in this issue’s Haymes article, 

“Sustaining the Navy’s Chemical and Biological Detection 

Capability,” and in the Lalonde 

and Roller article, “CBRD Waterfront Team Improves Fleet 

Readiness.”) Suffice it to say 

that this focus on the fleet 

has been a huge success for 

the warfighter, as every Commanding Officer deploys with 

a complete knowledge of their CBR state of readiness, and fleet issues and concerns are fed back into 

research and development areas that can find fixes 

and improvements.

Present Products, Capabilities, 

and Fleet Support Services

The CBR Defense Division is a Navy organization supporting the NAVSEA technical warrant 

holder in SEA 05P14 and providing CBR defense 

products, services, and expertise to the Navy, the 

DoD, and the nation in the areas of collective protection, detection, decontamination, M&S, systems 

engineering, and S&T. The CBR Defense Division 

consists of over 175 talented government and contractor professionals with various education and 

experiential backgrounds, outstanding reputations 

at the national and international level, and a sense 

Mission

Serve DoD and the nation as 

the Navy organization providing 

innovative, timely, and effective 

products, technical solutions, and 

expertise in chemical, biological, 

and radiological defense (CBRD)

Facilities

State-of-the-art laboratory and equipment 

housed in a new 54,000-ft2 building.

Laboratories include:

• Biological Safety Level 1, 2, & 3,

• Quality Assurance

• Stand-Off Detection 

• Collective Protection

• Modeling and Simulation

• Systems Engineering

Equipment includes:

• Optical Microscopes

• Scanning Electron Microscopes
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CBRD

Final Thoughts

of service and dedication. The Division collaborates 

with the other warfare centers performing CBR 

work as part of the seamless warfare enterprise.

Occupying a state-of-the-art research and development facility, the Division combines a strong 

systems engineering approach, technical competence, extensive experience, modern laboratories, 

and a continuous-improvement attitude, with extensive collaborative relationships with other Services, government, industry, and academia in 

order to deliver world-class, full-spectrum CBR 

defense solutions for the fleet, warfighters, key 

national assets, operational facilities, and military 

installations.

The Division’s strong S&T base ensures that 

new ideas are continuously being created, and that 

the most promising ideas are being matured into 

affordable technologies that can be integrated into 

CBR defense solutions of the future. Division personnel brief their work at symposiums, conferences, and seminars, and learn about work being 

performed by other organizations. By staying on 

the leading edge of S&T, they can leverage the latest 

technologies to enhance the effectiveness and affordability of CBR defense solutions. See this issue’s 

Research, Applied Science, and Testing Capabilities section for examples of the Division’s ongoing 

S&T efforts. 

With a presence in Norfolk and San Diego, the 

NSWCDD CBR defense waterfront support team 

maintains daily, direct contact with the fleet on 

both the East and West coasts. This direct and active connection with the fleet helps the warfighter and provides a wealth of valuable information 

for our scientists and engineers in the laboratory. 

This knowledge is immediately put to use as they 

work to create, develop, and provide updates and 

future solutions for our men and women in uniform. The Readiness Assist Visit (RAV) component of the waterfront support team—again, read 

details in Lalonde and Roller’s “CBRD Waterfront 

Team Improves Fleet Readiness” article in this issue—ensures that our ships deploy at the highest 

state of CBRD readiness (see RAV Feedback Report summary slide in Figure 3).

The CBR Defense Division continues to be an 

integral member of the joint Service CBD community and supports key CBR defense initiatives. The 

Division’s inherent understanding of what it takes 

to design and field CBR defense systems that will 

reliably operate in a maritime environment has 

helped ensure that the Navy gets the right products 

and services at the right time and at the right cost. 

The Division also uses this understanding to ensure that the joint Service programs adequately address Navy requirements in the design of new CBR 

defense equipment. 

NSWCDD’s CBR Defense Division collaborates 

with and supports other DoD agencies, such as the:

•	 Missile Defense Agency

•	 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

•	 Defense Threat Reduction Agency

NSWCDD’s increasing national reputation in 

several areas of CBR defense has expanded the Division’s support in the national needs areas through 

support of other federal government agencies, such 

as the Coast Guard and the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention. In addition, subject matter expertise is provided to local governments in support 

of Homeland Defense initiatives. For example, when the New York City Fire Department (NYFD) wanted to build a new 

fireboat that was prepared to deal with a 

CB threatened or contaminated environment, they came to NSWCDD for the 

CBR defense expertise. NYFD Fireboat 

Three Forty Three was recently commissioned and is fully prepared to deal with 

the CB threat.

Future of NSWCDD’s Role 

in Naval CBR Defense

There will be many challenges and 

opportunities for the Division as the CBR 

defense threat continues to evolve. As 

such, NSWCDD will be required to address these evolving threats and ensure 
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NSWCDD’s Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Defense (CBRD) Role – 

Past, Present, and Future

that the Navy’s unique considerations and needs 

are addressed and continuously met through demonstrating adaptability to change and responsiveness to the fleet, as well as by applying creativity 

and technical expertise. The CBR Defense Division 

is adapting to the changes that are ongoing with 

the JPEO-CBD reorganization in response to new 

direction coming from the White House. There is 

more focus on medical initiatives as evidenced by 

the new JPM Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative and the start of the Medical Countermeasures Initiative. The CBR Defense Division 

is aligning itself to support these efforts while remaining responsive to the fleet’s current needs. For 

example, in March 2011, NSWCDD responded to 

fleet requests for support as Japanese nuclear power plants that were hit by a powerful tsunami were 

leaking radiation. The adaptability, responsiveness, 

creativity, and technical expertise of the naval CBR 

defense community will ensure that the Navy can 

be involved in cutting-edge products to support the 

fleet. Examples of these kinds of projects include:

•	 Integrated prediction models and warning 

systems to provide real-time warfighter decision support, prediction and tracking tools 

for CBR events, and a common operational 

picture for the warfighter that is integrated 

and seamless with other systems

•	 Improved decontamination with the creation 

of all-in-one decontamination products, decontamination of threat clouds, verification 

that decontamination has occurred, and selection of the right decontaminant for the 

agent or toxin used

•	 Better biological and chemical standoff detection capability that can operate effectively 

in the harsh maritime environment

•	 More capable filtration systems that are 

lighter and smaller, last longer, and are more 

effective than current filters

•	 Increased use of systems engineering principles and practices to ensure that CBR defense is properly integrated into complex 

naval systems

•	 Expanded roles and responsibilities for our 

waterfront support team

•	 Increased collaborative relationships with 

government, industry, and academia

•	 Pioneering S&T efforts geared towards providing highly adaptive solutions that are not 

only evolutionary, but revolutionary

Defense funding levels and expenditures have 

come under intense scrutiny. All Defense organizations are looking for ways to increase efficiencies. Fewer dollars for invention purposes 

demands more focus on innovation. The ability to 

look at how existing technologies can be used in a 

different way to solve a complex problem is how 

successful organizations will thrive in the next decade. This holds especially true in the area of CBR 

defense. Perhaps the next great “all-in-one” decontaminant already exists and needs only slight 

modification to be used on the battlefield or on 

board ship. Innovation, not invention, may supply the answers to some of our most vexing problems and challenges. As new technologies are 

introduced, NSWCDD will be expected to play an 

integral role in assuring that the technologies perform as promised and are integrated across multiple systems and platforms. 

NSWCDD’s CBR Defense Division is poised 

to address the future’s challenges and ensure that 

our Sailors can fight, win, and survive in a CBRthreatened or -contaminated environment. Success will be measured by the state of the Navy’s 

CBR defense readiness, the confidence that the 

Sailors have in our detection, M&S, protection 

and decontamination systems, and the ability to 

treat any CBR attack or accident as a nuisance 

rather than as an ordeal. The Division’s expertise, 

facilities, and strong fleet interaction will ensure 

this success.

Bibliography

Rife, James P. and Carlisle, Rodney P., The Sound of Freedom: Naval Weapons Technology at Dahlgren, Virginia, 1918–2006, Department of the Navy, April 2007.

References

1. CNR ONT Letter 3900 Ser 223/157/604317 dated 3 March 1986.

2. NAVSURFWPNCEN Letter 3400 H301-DWC of 11 August 1986.

3. CNO Letter 3430 Ser 03/6U391055 dated 12 September 1986.

4. CNR Letter 3900 Ser 20/31/633506 dated 1 December 1986.

5. CNO Letter 3430 Ser 03/7U390406 dated 2 February 1987.

Vision

Be the recognized leader in providing 

revolutionary concepts through fully 

integrated family of systems/system of 

systems solutions for chemical, biological, 

and radiological defense (CBRD)—in 

short, be the “voice” of the Navy for all 

matters pertaining to naval CBRD
World War I World War II Korea

April 2012

Persian Gulf (May 28, 2005) – Sailors assigned to USS Ashland (LSD 48) inspect 

the sprinklers and valves of the chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) 

wash down system on the ship’s flight deck. USS Ashland is currently conducting 

Maritime Security Operations in the Northern Persian Gulf.

210 U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Aaron Ansarov (Released)