57352 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 185 / Friday, September 24, 2004 / Notices 

exercises jurisdiction or when 

conducting litigation or in proceedings 

before any court, adjudicative or 

administrative body, when: (a) TSA, or 

(b) any employee of TSA in his/her 

official capacity, or (c) any employee of 

TSA in his/her individual capacity 

where DOJ or TSA has agreed to 

represent the employee, or (d) the 

United States or any agency thereof, is 

a party to the litigation or has an interest 

in such litigation, and TSA determines 

that the records are both relevant and 

necessary to the litigation and the use of 

such records is compatible with the 

purpose for which TSA collected the 

records. 

(7) To the National Archives and 

Records Administration or other 

appropriate Federal agency pursuant to 

records management inspections being 

conducted under the authority of 44 

U.S.C. 2904 and 2906. 

(8) To the United States Department 

of Transportation, its operating 

administrations, or the appropriate state 

or local agency when relevant or 

necessary to: (a) Ensure safety and 

security in any mode of transportation; 

(b) enforce safety- and security-related 

regulations and requirements; (c) assess 

and distribute intelligence or law 

enforcement information related to 

transportation security; (d) assess and 

respond to threats to transportation; (e) 

oversee the implementation and ensure 

the adequacy of security measures at 

airports and other transportation 

facilities; (f) plan and coordinate any 

actions or activities that may affect 

transportation safety and security or the 

operations of transportation operators; 

or (g) the issuance, maintenance, or 

renewal of a license, certificate, 

contract, grant, or other benefit. 

(9) To TSA contractors, agents, 

grantees, experts, consultants, or other 

like persons when necessary to perform 

a function or service related to this 

system of records for which they have 

been engaged. Such recipients are 

required to comply with the Privacy 

Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, as amended. 

(10) To third parties during the course 

of an investigation into violations or 

potential violations of transportation 

security laws to the extent necessary to 

obtain information pertinent to the 

investigation. 

(11) To airport operators, aircraft 

operators, and maritime and land 

transportation operators and contractors 

about individuals who are their 

employees, job applicants, or 

contractors, or persons to whom they 

issue identification credentials or grant 

clearances or access to secured areas in 

transportation facilities when relevant 

to such employment, application, 

contract, the issuance of such 

credentials or clearances, or access to 

such secure areas.

(12) To the appropriate Federal, State, 

local, tribal, territorial, foreign, or 

international agency regarding 

individuals who pose or are suspected 

of posing a risk to transportation or 

national security. 

POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING, 

RETRIEVING, ACCESSING, RETAINING, AND

DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM: 

STORAGE: 

Paper, bar code, magnetic stripe, 

optical memory, disk, integrated circuit 

chip (ICC), and electronic media. 

RETRIEVABILITY: 

Data records contained within bar 

codes, magnetic stripe, optical memory 

stripe, disk, ICC, and/or electronic 

media may be retrieved by the 

individuals’ name, unique card number, 

or organization; paper records, where 

applicable, are retrieved alphabetically 

by name. 

SAFEGUARDS: 

Unauthorized personnel are denied 

physical access to the location where 

records are stored. For computerized 

records, safeguards established in 

accordance with generally acceptable 

information security guidelines via use 

of security codes, passwords, Personal 

Identification Numbers (PINs), etc. Data 

security and integrity safeguards will be 

observed during data transmission to 

the database using strong encryption 

and digital signing methodologies. 

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL: 

Record disposition authority for these 

records is pending at the National 

Archives and Records Administration. 

SYSTEM MANAGER(S) AND ADDRESS: 

Assistant Director for Compliance, 

Credentialing Program Office, TSA 

Headquarters, TSA–19, 601 S. 12th 

Street, Arlington, VA 22202–4220. 

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE: 

To determine if this system contains 

a record relating to you, write to the 

system manager at the address indicated 

above and provide your full name, 

current address, date of birth, place of 

birth, and a description of information 

that you seek, including the time frame 

during which the record(s) may have 

been generated. You may also provide 

your Social Security Number or other 

unique identifier(s) but you are not 

required to do so. Individuals requesting 

access must comply with the 

Department of Homeland Security’s 

Privacy Act regulations on verification 

of identity (6 CFR 5.21(d)). 

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURE: 

Same as ‘‘notification procedure,’’

above. 

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURE: 

Same as ‘‘notification procedure,’’

above. 

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES: 

TSA obtains information in this 

system from the individuals who are 

covered by the system, their employers, 

or their transportation facility. 

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM: 

None.

Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on 

September 20, 2004. 

Susan T. Tracey, 

Chief Administrative Officer.

[FR Doc. 04–21481 Filed 9–23–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Transportation Security Administration 

[Docket No. TSA–2004–19160] 

Privacy Impact Assessment; Secure 

Flight Test Phase

AGENCY: Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS).

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the 

Transportation Security 

Administration’s (TSA) Privacy Impact 

Assessment (PIA) prepared for the 

testing phase of the Secure Flight 

program. After a lengthy review of the 

initial plans for a successor system to 

Computer Assisted Passenger 

Prescreening System (CAPPS), and 

consistent with a recommendation of 

the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks upon the United States (9/11 

Commission), the Department of 

Homeland Security is moving forward 

with a next generation system of 

domestic passenger prescreening, called 

‘‘Secure Flight’’, which will prescreen 

airline passengers using information 

maintained by the Federal Government 

about individuals known or suspected 

to be engaged in terrorist activity and 

certain other information related to 

passengers’ itineraries-specifically, 

passenger name record (PNR) data. On 

a limited basis, TSA will also test the 

use of commercial data to identify 

instances in which passengers’

identifying passenger information is 

inaccurate or incorrect. 

Elsewhere in this edition of the 

Federal Register, TSA is publishing 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 185 / Friday, September 24, 2004 / Notices 57353

1The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), 

established in December 2003, maintains a 

consolidated, comprehensive watch list of known 

or suspected terrorists. This database can be used 

by government agencies in screening processes to 

identify individuals known to pose or are suspected 

of posing a risk to the security of the United States.

notice of a new system of records under 

the Privacy Act, known as ‘‘Secure 

Flight Test Records,’’ which TSA will 

use for records related to the testing of 

the program. Also in this edition of the 

Federal Register, TSA is publishing a 

notice announcing its request for 

approval by the Office of Management 

and Budget of TSA’s collection of a 

limited set of historical PNR from 

domestic airlines for purposes of testing 

the Secure Flight program.

DATES: This notice is effective 

September 24, 2004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa 

S. Dean, Privacy Officer, (TSA–9) 

Transportation Security Administration, 

Arlington, VA 22202; Nuala O’Connor 

Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, 

Washington, DC 20528.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Availability of Notice 

You can get an electronic copy using 

the Internet by—

(1) Searching the Department of 

Transportation’s electronic Docket 

Management System (DMS) Web page 

(http://dms.dot.gov/search); 

(2) Accessing the Government 

Printing Office’s Web page at http://

www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/

aces140.html; or 

(3) Visiting TSA’s Law and Policy 

Web page at http://www.tsa.dot.gov/

public/index.jsp.

In addition, copies are available by 

writing or calling the individual in the 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section. Make sure to identify the docket 

number of this notice.

Secure Flight—Test Phase Privacy 

Impact Assessment 

I. Introduction 

Pursuant to the authority granted it by 

the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), TSA has 

developed a new program for screening 

domestic airline passengers in order to 

enhance the security and safety of 

domestic airline travel. Under this new 

program, Secure Flight, TSA will 

compare PNR information against 

expanded and consolidated watch lists 

held in the Terrorist Screening Database 

(TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC) 1 to identify 

known or suspected terrorists who 

would use the airways to inflict 

catastrophic damage on the United 

States. TSA plans to test the efficacy of 

the Secure Flight program after issuing 

an order to domestic air carriers to 

compel the collection of historic 

passenger name record (PNR) 

information for testing purposes. TSA 

will also conduct a separate test to 

determine if commercial data is 

effective in identifying passenger 

information that is incorrect or 

inaccurate. TSA does not assume that 

the result of comparison of passenger 

information to commercial data is 

determinative of information accuracy 

or the intent of the person who provided 

the passenger information.

Earlier this year, the Department of 

Homeland Security ordered a thorough 

review of the next generation passenger 

prescreening program under 

development by TSA. That review, 

which reflected helpful input to DHS 

from Congress, the public, privacy and 

civil liberties groups, airline passengers 

and the airline industry, and our 

international partners, has now been 

completed. Based on the results, TSA 

has developed a new program, Secure 

Flight, described above, which it 

intends to test prior to actual 

implementation. The new program will 

allow DHS to add a critical piece to its 

layered strategy for securing the nation’s 

commercial air transportation system 

and is consistent with the 9/11 

Commission recommendation: (1) That 

the Federal Government take over the 

responsibility for checking airline 

passengers’ names against expanded 

‘‘no-fly’’ and ‘‘automatic selectee’’ lists 

(this function is currently performed by 

individual airlines); and (2) that air 

carriers be required to supply data to 

test and implement this new system. 

Because existing watch lists that are 

being consolidated and expanded in the 

TSC will be used to test the 

prescreening of airline passengers by 

TSA using the TSDB, the E-Government 

Act of 2002 requires that a Privacy 

Impact Assessment (PIA) be conducted. 

That assessment follows. After the test 

has been concluded and the results 

analyzed, TSA will update the PIA as 

necessary prior to actual 

implementation of the Secure Flight 

program. 

System Overview 

• What information is to be collected 

and used for this passenger prescreening system? 

The information to be collected will 

be used for a test of the Secure Flight 

program to ensure its accuracy, efficacy 

and reliability. In order to conduct the 

test, TSA will require domestic air 

carriers to submit historic PNR about 

individuals who have completed 

domestic flight segments during the 

month of June, 2004. PNR varies 

according to airline, but includes the 

following information fields which TSA 

will need for testing purposes: full 

name, contact phone number, mailing 

address and travel itinerary limited to 

domestic flight segments that were 

completed prior to June 30, 2004. Upon 

completion of testing and before 

implementation of the Secure Flight 

program, TSA will publish an amended 

Privacy Impact Assessment and Privacy 

Act Notice reflecting changes to the 

program based on knowledge gained 

from testing as well as constructive 

feedback from the public. 

• Why is the information being 

collected and who will be affected by 

the collection of the data? 

TSA is collecting information to test 

the Secure Flight program, the purpose 

of which is to enhance the security of 

domestic air travel by identifying only 

those passengers who warrant further 

scrutiny. The PNR to be collected will 

be compared with data maintained in 

the TSDB regarding individuals known 

or reasonably suspected to be or have 

been engaged in conduct constituting, in 

preparation for, in aid of, or related to 

terrorism. Individuals subject to the data 

collection requirements and processes 

of Secure Flight are persons who 

traveled within the United States during 

June 2004, the pre-selected 30-day 

period. 

This same historic PNR data also will 

be used to conduct a limited test to 

determine if the use of commercial data 

is effective in identifying passengers’

information that is incorrect or 

inaccurate. This test will involve 

commercial data aggregators who 

currently provide services to the 

banking, home mortgage and credit 

industries. Testing will be governed by 

strict privacy and data security 

protections. TSA will not store the 

commercially available data that would 

be accessed by commercial data 

aggregators. TSA will use this test of 

commercial data to determine whether 

such use: (1) Could accurately identify 

passenger information that is incorrect 

or inaccurate; (2) would not result in 

inappropriate differences in treatment of 

any protected category of persons; (3) 

could be governed by data security 

safeguards and privacy protections that 

are sufficiently robust to ensure that 

commercial entities or other 

unauthorized entities do not gain access 

to passenger personal information, or to 

ensure that the federal government does 

not gain access inappropriately to 

certain types of personally sensitive 

data held by commercial entities. 

57354 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 185 / Friday, September 24, 2004 / Notices 

TSA will defer any decision on how 

commercial data might be used in its 

prescreening programs, as Secure Flight, 

until the completion of the test period, 

assessment of the test results and 

publication of a subsequent System of 

Records Notice under the Privacy Act 

announcing the intended use of such 

commercial data. 

• What notice or opportunities for 

consent are provided to individuals 

regarding the information that is 

collected and shared? 

The Privacy Act System of Records 

Notice being published at this time—as 

well as this Privacy Impact 

Assessment—provide notice that TSA 

intends to collect historic PNR to test 

the Secure Flight program. Because the 

test phase will rely on historical PNR 

from the month of June 2004 for flights 

that were completed by the end of that 

month, the notice given by this Privacy 

Impact Assessment and the publication 

of a Privacy Act System of Records 

Notice for these records does not afford 

the opportunity for a passenger to 

provide consent in advance of this 

collection. Nevertheless, airline 

passengers are aware that by engaging in 

air travel they have consented to certain 

screening protocols since passenger 

prescreening is already in place. 

Additionally, Secure Flight has now 

been the subject of numerous media 

reports that convey additional notice, 

including information that appears on 

the TSA Web site at http://www.tsa.gov/

public/.

The information to be collected will 

be shared with TSA employees and 

contractors who have a ‘‘need to know’’

in order to conduct the required test 

comparisons. All TSA contractors 

involved in the testing of Secure Flight 

are contractually and legally obligated 

to comply with the Privacy Act in their 

handling, use and dissemination of 

personal information in the same 

manner as TSA employees. 

If a comparison using the test data 

indicates that an individual is suspected 

of terrorism, TSA will refer the 

information to appropriate law 

enforcement personnel for further 

action. Referrals will only occur, 

however, in this limited circumstance 

because the basic purpose of this 

information collection is to test the 

Secure Flight program. 

• What security protocols are in place 

to protect the information? 

Information in TSA’s record systems 

is safeguarded in accordance with the 

Federal Information Security 

Management Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107–

347), which established governmentwide computer security and training 

standards for all persons associated with 

the management and operation of 

Federal computer systems. The systems 

on which the tests will be conducted 

have been assessed for security risks, 

have implemented security policies and 

plans consistent with statutory, 

regulatory and internal DHS guidance, 

and are certified and accredited. 

TSA will maintain the data to be 

collected for this test in a secure facility 

on electronic media and in hard copy 

format. The information will be 

protected in accordance with rules and 

policies established by both TSA and 

DHS for automated systems and for hard 

copy storage, including password 

protection and secure file cabinets. 

Moreover, access will be strictly 

controlled; only TSA employees and 

contractors with proper security 

credentials and passwords will have 

permission to use this information to 

conduct the required tests. Additionally, 

a real time audit function will be part 

of this record system to track who 

accesses the information, and any 

infractions of information security rules 

will be dealt with severely. All TSA and 

assigned contractor staff receive DHSmandated privacy training on the use 

and disclosure of personal data. The 

procedures and policies that are in place 

are intended to ensure that no 

unauthorized access to records occurs 

and that operational safeguards are 

firmly in place to prevent system 

abuses. 

• Does this program create a new 

system of records under the Privacy Act. 

Yes. The Secure Flight Test Records 

system of records, DHS/TSA 017, is 

being published concurrently in today’s 

Federal Register. 

• What is the intended use of the 

information? 

The information collected by TSA 

will be used solely for the purpose of 

testing the Secure Flight program and 

will be maintained in a Privacy Act 

system of records in accordance with 

the published system of records notice 

for DHS/TSA 017. 

• Will the information be retained 

and, if so, for what period of time? 

TSA will retain these records for a 

sufficient period of time to conduct and 

review the Secure Flight test and in the 

event where a request for redress must 

be resolved. TSA does not yet have a 

record retention schedule approved by 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA) for records 

pertaining to this program and must 

retain these records until such schedule 

is approved. TSA is in the process of 

developing a records retention schedule 

that will dictate the retention period for 

these records and allow TSA to dispose 

of them within an appropriate 

timeframe. 

• How will the passenger be able to 

seek redress? 

During the test phase individuals may 

request access to information about 

themselves contained in the PNR 

subject to Secure Flight test phase by 

sending a written request to TSA. To the 

greatest extent possible and consistent 

with national security and homeland 

security requirements, access will be 

granted. If an individual wishes to 

contest or amend the records received in 

this manner, he or she may do so by 

sending that request to TSA. The 

request should conform to DHS 

requirements for contesting or amending 

Privacy Act records, and should be sent 

TSA Privacy Officer, Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA–9), 601 

South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202. 

Before implementing a final program, 

however, TSA will create a robust 

redress mechanism to resolve disputes 

concerning the Secure Flight program. 

• What databases will the names be 

run against? 

TSA will run the names against the 

TSDB, which is a consolidated, 

comprehensive watch list of known or 

suspected terrorists. This database can 

be used by government agencies in 

screening processes to identify 

individuals known to pose or are 

suspected of posing a risk to the security 

of the United States. This consolidated 

database contains information 

contributed by the Departments of 

Homeland Security, Justice, and State 

and by the intelligence community. 

Because information related to terrorists 

is consolidated in the TSDB, TSA 

believes that the TSDB provides the 

most effective and secure system against 

which to run airline passenger names 

for purposes of identifying whether or 

not they are known or reasonably 

suspected to be engaged in terrorism or 

terrorist activity.

• Privacy Effects and Mitigation 

Measures. 

The decision to initiate Secure Flight 

follows completion of a thorough review 

of the TSA’s next generation passenger 

prescreening program, and is consistent 

with recommendations of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 

the United States (9/11 Commission) 

that ‘‘improved use of ‘no-fly’ and 

‘automatic selectee’ lists should not be 

delayed while the argument about a 

successor to CAPPS continues.’’

Moreover, by focusing solely on 

potential terrorism and not other law 

enforcement purposes, Secure Flight 

addresses concerns raised by privacy 

groups and others about the potential 

for ‘‘mission creep’’ by TSA. 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 185 / Friday, September 24, 2004 / Notices 57355

TSA appreciates the privacy risk 

inherent in any airline prescreening 

program in which passenger name 

record information is provided to the 

Federal Government for use in 

conducting the prescreening. However, 

TSA also recognizes that the risk is 

necessary for ensuring the security of 

our air transportation system. TSA 

believes it has taken action to mitigate 

any privacy risk by designing its next 

generation passenger prescreening 

program to accommodate concerns 

expressed by privacy advocates, foreign 

counterparts and others. 

First, under the Secure Flight testing 

phase, TSA will not require air carriers 

to collect any additional information 

from their passengers than is already 

collected by such carriers and 

maintained in passenger name records. 

Testing of the Secure Flight program 

will compare only existing PNR record 

information against names in the TSDB 

in order to determine how effectively 

existing PNR information can be 

compared against such names, how 

many instances of false positive matches 

occur, and what, if any additional 

limited data, would be most effective in 

reducing the number of such false 

positive hits. TSA envisions that 

carriers may be required to collect full 

passenger name and possibly one other 

element of information under a fully 

implemented operational Secure Flight 

program. However, TSA will not make 

such determination until the initial test 

phase results can be assessed and an 

additional Privacy Impact Assessment is 

published. 

Second, the Secure Flight program 

will permit TSA to take on sole 

responsibility for conducting passenger 

name comparisons against a 

consolidated TSDB watch list, rather 

than continuing to require multiple 

individual air carriers to conduct such 

comparisons. TSA will be able to apply 

improved prescreening procedures, 

including more consistent analytical 

procedures, for identifying actual name 

matches and for resolving false positive 

name matches prior to a passengers’

arrival at an airport, than can currently 

be applied by the individual air carriers 

that currently administer the watch list 

comparisons. TSA expects that the 

number of individuals currently 

subjected to automatic secondary 

screening will be reduced under an 

implemented Secure Flight program. 

Third, Secure Flight will mitigate 

impact on personal privacy because of 

its limited purpose and anticipated 

limited retention period. Secure Flight 

will focus screening efforts only on 

identifying individuals known or 

reasonably suspected to be terrorists or 

engaged in terrorist activity, rather than 

on other law enforcement purposes. In 

addition, Secure Flight will only be 

applied to passengers on U.S. domestic 

flights. Passengers on international 

flights will continue to be prescreened 

using APIS (Advanced Passenger 

Information System data—information 

from the machine readable portion of an 

individual’s passport) provided to U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection for this 

purpose. Passengers on international 

flights will not be subject to duplicative 

information provision requirements or 

overlapping screening procedures. TSA 

also anticipates that passenger 

information will be held for a relatively 

limited amount of time after completion 

of a passenger’s itinerary. TSA’s 

prescreening efforts will be as narrow as 

reasonable to accommodate privacy 

concerns, including access to redress 

mechanisms, but as robust as necessary 

to accomplish its security mission. 

TSA believes that the Secure Flight 

program will represent a vast 

improvement in security by permitting 

TSA to identify individuals known or 

reasonably suspected to be engaged in 

terrorism or terrorism related activity. 

However, because Secure Flight may be 

rendered less effective if passengerprovided information is not accurate or 

correct, TSA does seek to identify the 

most appropriate means to identify 

when passenger information is incorrect 

or inaccurate. For this reason, TSA will 

use PNR information obtained for 

testing of the Secure Flight program to 

conduct a separate test of the use of 

commercial data to identify such 

inaccurate or incorrect passenger 

information. TSA recognizes that this 

may raise privacy and civil liberties 

concerns. TSA’s testing of commercial 

data use will therefore involve the 

following: 

(a) TSA will only test the use of 

commercial data 

(b) TSA does not assume that the 

result of comparison of passenger 

information to commercial data is 

determinative of information accuracy 

or the intent of the person who provided 

the passenger information.

(c) Such testing of commercial data 

will be governed by stringent data 

security and privacy protections, 

including contractual prohibitions on 

commercial entities’ maintenance or use 

of airline-provided PNR information for 

any purposes other than testing under 

TSA parameters; strict firewalls between 

the government and commercial data 

providers; real-time auditing procedures 

to determine when data within the 

Secure Flights system has been accessed 

and by whom; strict rules prohibiting 

the accessing or use of commercially 

held personal data by TSA; 

(d) Assessment of test results prior to 

any operational use of commercial data 

in TSA programs and determination that 

its use is effective in identifying 

incorrect or inaccurate information does 

not result in disparate treatment of any 

class of individuals, and that data 

security protections and privacy 

protections are robust and effective. 

TSA also recognizes that there is a 

privacy risk inherent in the design of 

any new system which could result 

from design mistakes. By testing the 

proposed Secure Flight program, TSA 

will have the opportunity to correct any 

privacy-related design mistakes before 

the program becomes fully operational, 

ensuring a better program. TSA is 

purposely testing the Secure Flight 

system, in fact, and will be carefully 

scrutinizing the performance of the 

system during the test phase—and 

conducting further analysis upon 

completion—to determine the 

effectiveness of Secure Flight both for 

passenger prescreening as well as for 

protecting the privacy of the data on 

which the program is based. By layering 

on top of the program design strict rules 

for oversight and training of personnel 

handling the data as well as strong 

system auditing to detect potential 

abuse and a carefully planned and 

executed redress process, TSA intends 

to make sure that privacy is an integral 

part of this overall effort. TSA’s efforts 

will not only be thoroughly examined 

internally, including review by the TSA 

Privacy Officer, but also will be 

reviewed by the DHS Chief Privacy 

Officer before a final program is 

designed. In this process, TSA will 

carefully review constructive feedback it 

receives from the public on this 

important program.

Issued in Arlington, VA, on September 21, 

2004. 

Lisa S. Dean, 

Privacy Officer.

[FR Doc. 04–21477 Filed 9–21–04; 12:58 pm] 

BILLING CODE 4910–62–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Office of the Secretary 

Notice of Establishment

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of Establishment of Great 

Sand Dunes National Park. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to Public Law 106–

530 (114 Stat. 2529, 16 U.S.C. 410hhh–

2), the Great Sand Dunes National Park 

and Preserve Act of 2000, on September