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AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY FORWARD

IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (PART III)

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 10, 2014

Serial No. 113–233

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Jarret Blanc, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State ........................................................... 8

The Honorable Donald L. Sampler, Assistant to the Administrator, Office 

of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................................................................................... 19

Mr. James Soiles, Deputy Chief of Operations, Office of Global Enforcement, 

Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice ..................... 33

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Jarret Blanc: Prepared statement ................................................ 11

The Honorable Donald L. Sampler: Prepared statement ..................................... 21

Mr. James Soiles: Prepared statement .................................................................. 35

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 68

(1)

AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY 

FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

(PART III) 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. This joint subcommittee hearing will come to 

order. 

After recognizing myself, Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member 

Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then 

recognize any other member seeking recognition for 1 minute. I 

know that we will have votes, but we hope to get through some of 

this. 

We will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you, gentleman, 

and without objection the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record and members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

I see Mr. Delaney has joined us, and I ask unanimous consent 

to allow Congressman Delaney to question the witnesses and participate in the hearing after all the members of the committee have 

had the chance to ask their questions. Welcome. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

This is the third and final hearing this session in a series of 

hearings these two subcommittees have had aimed at examining 

the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the U.S. withdrawal. 

In addition, the Middle East and North Africa subcommittee has 

held hearings on how our counternarcotics efforts will be impacted 

by the withdrawal and our relief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and what needs to be done to address the waste, the 

fraud, the abuse that the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR, and the U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO, have found over the years. 

2

As of Monday, the U.S. and NATO coalition have officially closed 

their Afghanistan combat command, and we now have transition 

from military to a civilian-led presence. A maximum 10,800 U.S. 

troops will remain in Afghanistan for the first 3 months of 2015, 

and with that number dropping to 5,500 by the end of next year, 

and down to just a few hundred by the end of 2016. 

But we must ask, has the administration made the decision to 

withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2016 based on a political 

decision or a strategic decision, and are we leaving the security of 

Afghanistan and our own national interests in the hands of a capable, trustworthy government and security forces? As we take a back 

seat to the Afghan National Security Forces and leave in its hands 

the fate of Afghanistan’s security, we have many reasons for concerns. 

This past year the security forces taking the lead and conducting 

many of its own operations, we witnessed the bloodiest year in Afghanistan since 2011 as the security forces suffered over 5,000 casualties. U.S. military leaders in Afghanistan, including the outgoing top international commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, have called this casualty rate and the rate of desertion in 

the security forces unsustainable. And as the U.S. began its transition out of the lead last year, the Taliban and an abundance of 

other terrorist groups and factions across the country have stepped 

up their attacks, and the rate of attacks are only likely to increase 

now that they know that the U.S. and our allies have ended our 

combat operations. 

But terrorists inside Afghanistan’s borders are not its only challenge. Pakistan continues to harbor and host insurgents and other 

extremists in the Afghan border regions. Making matters worse, 

Pakistan’s intelligence service is known to cooperate with the 

Taliban as it works to undermine Afghanistan’s stability. 

Even more concerning, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stockpile is 

reportedly growing faster than any other in the world and is notoriously insecure. 

Security concerns with Pakistan are not only helped—are also 

not helped when the Afghan Government cannot form a cabinet, including key positions like Defense Minister. 

A weak and corrupt government combined with incapable security forces does not indicate a positive path forward. 

Another threat that gets constantly ignored is counternarcotics. 

Opium cultivation and production again increased sharply this 

year. Afghanistan is responsible for over 90 percent of the world’s 

opium supply. This is an estimated $3 billion industry that generates immense profits, finances terrorism in and outside of Afghanistan, and feeds the rampant corruption that continues to 

plague its government. 

As we approach this new phase in Afghanistan, we must be honest with ourselves and the American people. Even though the U.S. 

has closed its combat command, President Obama has reportedly 

changed the rules of engagement so that all remaining U.S. troops 

will be allowed to carry out combat missions instead of just training and advising. 

Combat aircraft drones will now be allowed to provide air support. President Ghani is pleading with the administration for addiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Jan 14, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\121014\91845 SHIRL
3

tional support, for additional troops, for additional funds, desperate 

to ensure that his country does not become another Iraq. 

The administration likes to pretend that Iraq and Afghanistan 

are different, or at least as Secretary Hagel claimed yesterday, that 

the differences outweigh the similarities. But Secretary Hagel and 

the administration cannot hide from the facts. Since the withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Iraq in 2011, we have seen the brutal 

terrorist group ISIL take over large portions of both Iraq and 

Syria, displace millions of people, leave thousands dead, and 

threaten the interests of both the U.S. and every ally in the region. 

The fact is that U.S. troops have returned to Iraq, and although 

we continue to lack a comprehensive or coherent strategy there, the 

stakes are even higher in Afghanistan. If we do not leave behind 

a stable strong Afghan Government with capable security forces, 

the Taliban will not hesitate to reclaim its lost territory and quickly establish another safe haven for terrorists to thrive. 

The United States has paid too much in blood and treasure to 

allow this to happen. We owe it to our brave men and women who 

have sacrificed everything to protect our values and way of life, and 

to whom we are forever indebted, we owe it to heroes like Christian 

Guzman Torres, a Marine Corporal from my Congressional district 

who gave his life in the name of freedom and democracy and whose 

memory and legacy will live on forever at a post office that the 

Congressional delegation named in his honor in South Dade in 

Princeton, Florida. 

We owe it to all of those who made the ultimate sacrifice to ensure that we do not let the gains we have made slip away, and that 

we do not allow the Taliban to re-establish itself and further destabilize the region. 

I now turn to my ranking member, my good friend, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Chair Ros-Lehtinen and Chairman 

Chabot for calling today’s hearing. 

I would like to take a moment to recognize the outstanding work 

of one of our colleagues, a ranking member and former chairman 

of the Asia and Pacific subcommittee, Eni Faleomavaega. We are 

thankful for his years of service to this country and his leadership 

in this critical area of foreign policy. 

This is our third hearing examining the future of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. The hearing comes on the heels 

of the administration’s announcement that it will leave an additional—it will leave 1,000 troops in Afghanistan to conduct operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda linked targets. 

As we look forward to the beginning of Operation Resolute Support, focused on training and advising and assisting, we are reminded that for a decade we have been focused on destroying alQaeda, building a secured and civil society capacity of the Afghan 

Government with the goal of turning over responsibility for their 

Nation to the Afghans. 

The questions is have we achieved these goals? We have effectively dismantled al-Qaeda’s stronghold in Afghanistan, but will 

the surge in extremism in the neighboring Middle East impact Afghanistan. 

We have turned security control of the country over to the Afghan security forces, yet there continue to be high rates of deserVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Jan 14, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\121014\91845 SHIRL
4

tion. Can the Afghan national security force pick up where international coalition forces have left off and ensure that al-Qaeda cannot regroup and again use Afghanistan as a safe haven? 

At our hearings in March and October of last year, we focused 

on Presidential elections as an indicator of progress. Would we see 

free and fair elections lead to a peaceful transition of power? I am 

pleased that President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah 

were able to come to a power-sharing arrangement, but I would 

also hope that the State Department will comment on the recount 

results so that we might be able to look toward assisting Afghanistan in making sure the process for future elections is both credible 

and transparent. Electoral reform should be a high priority for Afghanistan going forward. 

This past year has been one of transition, and we now look to 

President Ghani’s government to articulate its agenda, including 

much needed reforms for both the security and civilian sectors in 

a timeline in which he would like these reforms to move. Such a 

timeline would send a strong signal to Afghanistan’s international 

partners that the President means business and is willing to hold 

himself accountable. 

New leadership brings renewed hope of addressing longstanding 

issues of corruption and patronage. I am encouraged by some of the 

positive steps President Ghani has taken in the 10 weeks he has 

been in office, including the signing of the bilateral security agreement, but at the same time, we have challenges remain. One looming is how this new government can engage with the Taliban. 

U.S. support and assistance will continue to be a key component 

of our engagement with Afghanistan, but as our presence decreases, we have got to focus greater attention on how we will continue to monitor this assistance. How can we ensure that years of 

training Afghan security forces and civil society will result in stability and productive governing? 

As Secretary Kerry noted last week, the U.S. will have provided $8 billion of economic assistance to Afghanistan between 2012 and 

2015, but what happens when the assistance from the outside 

slows? How will the new government create an economy that can 

sustain itself without such levels of international assistance? What 

will be the drivers of Afghan economic growth going forward? 

And I would like to take a moment to commend the State Department, including the Special Representatives Office and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs for its work on that 

CASA–1000 project, a joint energy initiative that connects energy 

resources from the Kyrgyz Republic in Tajikistan with Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. 

And the reason that we do these hearings jointly is because it is 

near impossible to address the challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in many instances, in isolation from the rest of South Asia. 

It might be time for the State Department to follow this cue and 

realign its Bureau of South and Central Asian affairs to better reflect this reality. 

Many of us continue to have longstanding concerns over the ability of insurgents to operate in Pakistan and cross the border into 

Afghanistan. I have been encouraged by Pakistan’s military operations in North Waziristan. Even the most skeptical among us 

5

have to acknowledge that it has disrupted operations emanating 

from the North Waziristan agency, especially for the Pakistani 

Taliban. 

At the same time, while progress has been made in disrupting 

the Haqqani networks’s operations in the tribal areas. Both of 

these designated—both the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba 

are responsible for the deaths of Americans. The question is can 

Pakistan rid its country of terrorism without going after terrorists 

wholesale? And despite the mistrust and tensions, we need cooperation from Pakistani security services as well as strong communication with Pakistan’s civilian leadership. 

The Congress authorized $7.5 billion via the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill to assist in strengthening Pakistan’s civilian institutions, 

so I am concerned about the message sent to the people of Pakistan 

and Pakistan’s civilian leadership when Secretary Kerry meets 

with Pakistan’s chief of staff, Mr. Blanc, and I hope that you today 

will be able to shed some light as to who really is in charge of Pakistan’s foreign policy, and particularly its policy toward Afghanistan. 

Finally, I would just say that, as I said previously, there is too 

much at stake for us to just simply turn our backs on these critical 

relationships. Continuing engagement in a supporting role in Afghanistan is critical to ensuring terror networks can’t re-establish 

roots, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today as 

to how our policy in both places will address the challenges of these 

relationships. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And if you will excuse us, our subcommittees will suspend while 

we vote, and then when we come back, we will have Mr. Chabot 

chair, and he will give his opening statements. 

We will recognize our members for their opening statements and 

then introduce our witnesses, and with that, subcommittee——

[Recess.] 

Mr. CHABOT [presiding]. The subcommittees will come back to 

order. 

I want to again thank our witnesses for being here, and who that 

are in attendance this afternoon. I want to thank the chair for calling this important joint hearing between the subcommittee on the 

Middle East and North Africa and the subcommittee on Asia and 

the Pacific. 

I am please to join her efforts to discuss the current situation in 

the Afghanistan/Pakistan region and the United States’ critically 

important role in securing Afghanistan’s future stability during the 

next few months. 

Afghanistan has seen many changes this year both promising 

and, unfortunately, worrying in many instances as well. 

On the positive end of things, the bilateral security agreement 

was finally signed in September, which I am hopeful will both lay 

out and secure the U.S. role in the post-2014 Afghanistan. 

Also somewhat encouraging is the relative clarity we have of the 

U.S. presence in Afghanistan, as least for the next couple of years. 

The last time we examined the situation in Afghanistan back in 

October of last year, that picture was not so clear. 

6

Today, we know that Afghan security forces hold primary security responsibility in the country, while the U.S. maintains a force 

of 20,000 for the time being. That number will decrease to 9,800 

next year, then further decrease to 4,900 in 2016. At least that is 

what we think. 

But even with clarity on the numbers, I am concerned about future stability there because Afghan forces will undoubtedly need 

continued support. The plan for an eventual U.S. Military exit from 

Afghanistan after 2016 is troubling because I don’t believe that Afghan security forces will be able to secure Afghanistan if left on 

their own, at least not in that time frame. 

Events in Iraq this year depicted one such scenario. ISIL captured Mosul and Iraqi security forces collapsed. We can’t afford to 

let this happen in Afghanistan after so many years of investment 

and sacrifice. In fact, I believe General Campbell’s statement where 

he expressed his confidence that ‘‘Afghan forces have the capability 

to withstand the fight internally’’ is premature. 

With the ISIL threat in the region spreading its talons east, we 

have no way of knowing what the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan will look like in 2 years time. With this in mind, it is prudent 

for us to keep the option of a bigger post-2016 U.S. And NATO 

force presence on the table. 

It is widely acknowledged that stability in Afghanistan necessitates close engagement and cooperation with Pakistan. However, 

Pakistan’s sustained tolerance and support of Afghan Taliban 

forces in Qatar and the federally-administered tribal areas means 

a peaceful, stable, independent, and united Afghanistan is in the 

distant future. 

Despite some advances in the U.S./Pakistan relationship and the 

Pakistani military’s launch of a major offensive against Islamist 

terrorist groups in the federally-administered tribal areas, the end 

results of these efforts are not certain. 

Limited capacity, rampant corruption, distrust, disorganization, 

and divergent security interests between various sectors, both civilian and military, make promises from Islamabad unreliable, if history tells us anything. In fact, the political protests in August aptly 

illustrate the case in point. Prime Minister Sharif’s control over the 

military is not strong. But the military’s influence over Pakistan’s 

foreign and national security policies is rather solid. I urge the administration to exhibit caution. 

Pakistan’s ongoing support for sectarian extremist groups to expurgate Indian influence in Afghanistan will not end well if the 

current trend continues. This path will only be to the detriment of 

the region and U.S. security and foreign policy interests. 

I also continue to be concerned about Pakistan’s ongoing persecution of religious minorities. Pakistan is ranked among the most religiously intolerant countries in the world, and Prime Minister’s 

Sharif’s Government continues to tolerate the oppression of Christians, Hindus, Shiites and Hamotzis, among many others. However, the State Department has yet to designate Pakistan a country 

of particular concern for its violations of religious freedom. 

Between 2012 and 2013 there were over 200 attacks among religious groups, and 1,800 casualties resulting from religion-related 

violence. The highest rates in the world. And just over a month ago 

7

on November 4th, two young Christians were murdered—burned 

alive—accused of blasphemy by a Muslim mob of 4,000 people. One 

of them was a pregnant mother of four. We cannot continue to ignore this horrific behavior and the plight of these groups due to 

discriminatory laws, forced conversions, terror attacks and blasphemy arrests. Ongoing religious persecution in Pakistan and its 

government’s paltry efforts to recant its support of Islamist extremist groups makes it increasingly difficult, I believe, to justify the 

administration’s billions of dollars worth of aid to Pakistan. 

I hope our witnesses will discuss what the administration is 

doing to support religious minorities in Pakistan and demand that 

the Sharif Government ensure the human rights of minorities in 

that country. 

I want to again thank Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for calling this 

hearing. I look forward to hearing testimony from our distinguished witnesses today. 

And I would also like to associate myself with the remarks made 

by the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutch, relative to Eni 

Faleomavaega who I have had the honor to lead the subcommittee 

with for the past 2 years. Eni is just a tremendous individual. He 

served our country in Vietnam, and we are really going to miss seeing him. So we wish him only the best in the future. 

And if there are any other members whowould like to make open 

statements, I believe Mr. Bera would like to make an opening 

statement. So the gentleman is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Chairman Chabot. 

About 11⁄2 years ago I had a chance to visit Afghanistan with 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and at that juncture there was uncertainty. You know, we were in the midst of negotiating a bilateral 

security agreement. Afghanistan was going to undergo their elections and so forth, and while everything wasn’t smooth from that 

point to where we are today, at least there is a little bit more certainty at this juncture. 

And at that time too, real questions came up and concerns from 

my perspective as we start to draw down the economic impact on 

Afghanistan. There is no way to replace the presence of our troops 

there in terms of what it means to the Afghan economy, and in conversations with the—and in government, they have obviously made 

some significant investments there. 

You know, when I think about Afghanistan and South Asia in 

general, it is this intricate web between Afghanistan, Pakistan and 

India, and I do look forward to hearing the comments of the witnesses on how we continue some of that economic investment that 

Afghanistan will need and how we move forward from here. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And believing that no other members would like to make an 

opening statement, I would like to at this point introduce our panel 

for this afternoon. 

First, I am very pleased to welcome the honorable Jarrett Blanc 

who serves as Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan at the Department of State. Prior to joining the State Department, he was the senior policy analyst for multi-lateral affairs 

at the Open Society Institute. He has worked for the United NaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Jan 14, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\121014\91845 SHIRL
8

tions and has managed governance operations in conflict and postconflict areas such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Lebanon and Nepal. 

We welcome you here this afternoon. 

Our next witness, we would like to welcome back the honorable 

Donald L. Sampler who is Assistant to the Administrator in the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs at USAID. Mr. Sampler 

previously served as senior deputy assistant to the administrator 

in the OAPA. He has lived in Kabul for several years and has traveled to Afghanistan, Pakistan over 60 times since 2001. 

And we welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Sampler. 

And our last but certainly not least witness this afternoon, we 

are pleased to welcome Mr. James Soiles. Mr. Soiles has served 

with the DEA since 1983, rising through the ranks until reaching 

the current duties as Deputy Chief of Operations in the Office of 

Global Enforcement for the Drug Enforcement Administration. In 

the past, he has served as the DEA section chief of Europe, Asia, 

Africa, Middle East, and Canada section overseeing operations in 

125 countries. 

And we, again, want to welcome all three of you here this afternoon. You are probably familiar with the committee rules. You will 

each have 5 minutes to give your testimony. We have a lighting 

system. The yellow light will let you know that you have 1 minute 

to wrap up, the red light will come on, and we would ask that you 

cease your testimony as close to that point as possible. Give you 

a little bit of leeway, but not a whole lot, so we would ask you to 

try to stay within that if at all possible, and then we will follow 

up with questions. 

So we will begin with you, Mr. Blanc. You are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JARRET BLANC, DEPUTY 

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BLANC. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Afghanistan and Pakistan. With your permission, I will briefly summarize my remarks 

for the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, the full report will be included 

in the record. 

You might want to pull the mike, if you can, a little closer there, 

just so everybody in the room can hear you. 

Mr. BLANC. I will pull myself closer. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. BLANC. Please allow me to begin by thanking the members 

of the subcommittee for your continued support for our mission in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also to thank the thousands of 

Americans, military personnel, diplomats and assistants, professionals who have and continue to serve in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The American people have been generous, steadfast and brave in 

their support for this region. I would like to particularly note the 

service of Ambassador Jim Cunningham who has finished his term 

as Ambassador of the United States to Afghanistan and to welcome 

9

the confirmation by the Senate last night of Ambassador Michael 

McKinley. 

Starting with Afghanistan, it is important to remember why we 

are so deeply involved in that country today. It was in Afghanistan 

that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were planned, and we remain there because we understand the importance of ensuring that 

Afghan soil not again be used to launch attacks against us. 

As part of a military coalition of more than 50 Nations, we have 

helped make the world, Afghanistan, and the region more secure. 

We should also be proud that we have helped the Government of 

Afghanistan build the capacity and start to build the capacity to 

provide security, education, and jobs for its own people moving forward. 

Today’s hearing is timely. Having long talked about 2014 as the 

critical year of transition, it is appropriate now to talk about the 

way ahead as the year draws to a close. Politically, Dr. Ashraf 

Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah have forged a political compromise amid an electoral process that, while imperfect, honored 

the participation of millions of Afghans and led to the first peaceful 

and democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan’s history. 

All eyes are now on them to deliver on the promises of security, 

better governance, accountability, women’s rights and realizable 

sustainable development goals. 

The media have focused on the challenge of the government naming its new ministers. We should not allow this important issue to 

distract us from the impressive start that the government has already made in actually governing on issues ranging from corruption to security. And I would also note that we hope that Dr. Ghani 

and Dr. Abdullah will soon have an opportunity to speak to you directly about their priorities and vision of the way forward. 

On security, the United States combat mission with come to a 

close this year, and the International Security Assistance Force will 

be replaced with a more limited international mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Security Forces. 

To a large extent, though, Afghanistan’s security transition has 

already taken place. In June 2013, the ANSF took responsibility for 

security throughout the country, and its performance, while despite 

the violent attacks of the Taliban and other insurgents, has been 

impressive so far. 

I would also note as you did in your opening that the BSA has 

been signed and ratified and just today we have been informed that 

the final formality is the Afghan legal system has been completed 

so that it can come into force on January 1st. 

Afghanistan, of course, faces continued economic challenges, but 

at the London Conference on Afghanistan last week, the international community and the Afghan Government renewed our set 

of mutual commitments to continuing support that country as it 

charts its own path to greater sustainability. 

I would also note that Afghanistan’s economy and security are 

inexorably tied to the broader region which remains one of the 

world’s least integrated, and as the ranking member noted, it is a 

welcome sign of progress that earlier this month the region finalized negotiations on key agreements for the CASA–1000 electricity 

transmission line project. 

10

Perhaps most importantly in this context, there is real potential 

for improving Afghan/Pakistan relations. 

Turning to Pakistan, we have a bilateral relationship that is full 

of both opportunity and challenge. The bottom line is that our relationship is vital to the national security of the United States. We 

have many shared long-term interests in both economic and security cooperation, and our policy of sustained engagement to date 

has yielded tangible, if incremental, results. 

Due to the importance of our relationship, we have invested in 

a substantial civilian assistance program in Pakistan which complements our robust security assistance program. 

It is easy to criticize imperfect progress in Pakistan. However, it 

is also easy to overlook its successes. In May of last year, Pakistan 

made its first ever democratic transition from one civilian government to another. It has made progress in stabilizing economy and 

in implementing reforms, but obviously it has further go to realize 

its economic potential. 

Pakistan’s military operations in North Waziristan have disrupted militant activities in the tribal areas and resulted in important seizures of weapons and IED materials. This operation is the 

latest and most extensive phase of Pakistan’s effort to extend 

greater government control throughout its territory. 

We recognize that Pakistan has suffered greatly at the hands of 

terrorists and its sacrifices are laudable. 

It is also clear that their job is not done. Militant groups such 

as the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, including the Haqqani network, continue to pose a threat to Pakistan, its neighbors, and to 

the United States. It is vital that these groups not be allowed to 

find their footing, and we will hold Pakistani leaders to their commitments in this regard. 

Our constructive engagement with Pakistan has garnered results, and it will be continued to be an important component of our 

national security strategy going forward. 

And with that, I thank you and look forward to your questions. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blanc follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Sampler, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD L. SAMPLER, ASSISTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. SAMPLER. Mr. Chairman, members, thank you very much for 

the opportunity to testify today about USAID’s civilian assistance 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

I am proud to represent USAID at this pivotal time in the history of our engagement with these two countries. 

Today, as a matter of fact, in Oslo, Norway, Malala Yousafzai 

was awarded a Nobel Prize for her remarkable courage and advocacy on behalf of education for girls in Pakistan and around the 

world. Her recognition is made even more notable because she 

shares the Prize with an Indian advocate for the rights of children, 

Mr. Kailash Satyarthi. As she herself said as she accepted the 

award, ‘‘I am glad that we can stand together and show the world 

that an Indian and a Pakistani can stand united in Peace and 

stand together to work for children’s rights.’’

In Afghanistan, as the international military forces transition 

away from direct combat, and as their numbers and their political 

and economic impact diminishes, the roles of civilian agencies become increasingly more important, and rightly so. 

I am clearly aware of our commitment in and to Afghanistan. A 

week from today marks the 13th anniversary of the reopening of 

the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. At that ceremony in 2001, Jim Dobbins, an outstanding diplomat and a personal role model for me, 

noted that with the reopening of the United States mission in 

Kabul today, America has resumed its diplomatic, economic, and 

political engagement with Afghanistan. He continued and finished 

by saying, ‘‘We are here and we are here to stay.’’

I first worked in Afghanistan in 2002 and played a role in the 

emergency and constitutional Loya Jirgas that constituted the 

founding of the new Government of Afghanistan. I have been more 

or less engaged in supporting U.S. efforts there ever since. I have 

worked with and for USAID, the Departments of State and Defense, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, a think tank, an 

NGO, and for-profit, all in support of U.S. national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

But as we enter the holiday period here at home, I am reminded 

that there are over 2,300 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines 

who were killed in Afghanistan, and whose families will miss them 

this holiday season. There have also been over 400 USAID contractors killed, and over 1,000 of our colleagues wounded during this 

same period of time. 

I have participated in Fallen Hero ceremonies for USAID and 

State Department colleagues who were killed in Afghanistan in the 

line of duty, and just last week met with the family of Mike 

Dempsey, one of my employees killed last year, and I last saw his 

family when I visited Detroit, Michigan for his visitation and funeral. So I have firsthand experience in pain—I have firsthand experience with the painful consequences and costs for the progress 

we have made in Afghanistan. 

20

I am also cognizant of the fiscal costs, the treasure that we invest in Afghanistan and Pakistan each year. I and my staff take 

very seriously our stewardship of taxpayer resources, and we work 

tirelessly to ensure that these dollars are spent appropriately and 

effectively, and that they support the national interest and development goals we have set for ourselves. 

In support of our national interests abroad, USAID partners to 

end extreme poverty and support resilient democratic societies 

while advancing U.S. security and prosperity. 

Afghanistan and Pakistan represent a range of development 

challenges, but in both countries, USAID works to implement programs that are sensible, sustainable, and developmentally sound. 

In Pakistan, we work in five sectors. They are energy, economic 

growth and agriculture, health, education, and stabilization. In Afghanistan, our programs range from humanitarian assistance to infrastructure, which includes energy, health, education, and governance capacity building. 

In both countries, assuring and advancing the gains made by 

women and girls are essential cross-cutting themes of our work, as 

is building the capacity of local partners to ensure sustainability. 

As USAID navigates to the 2014 transition and looks to 2015 and 

beyond, the agency is committed to making every effort to safeguard taxpayer funds and ensure that the remarkable development 

progress made in Afghanistan and in Pakistan is maintained and 

made durable in order to secure our national interests in that part 

of the world. 

It is an honor to share with you today a small glimpse of what 

USAID is doing in that regard, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampler follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. And, Mr. Soiles, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES SOILES, DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. SOILES. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Chabot, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, on behalf of Administrator 

Leonhart and the Drug Enforcement Administration, I appreciate 

your invitation to testify today regarding DEA’s counternarcotic 

strategy and the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

DEA’s core principle is to secure our Nation and protect our citizens by relentlessly pursuing our mission of disrupting and dismantling major drug trafficking organizations, their networks and 

financial infrastructures, preventing the diversion of pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed chemicals from legitimate 

channels, leading the collection and dissemination of drug-related 

information and strengthening the strategic partnerships with our 

domestic and foreign law enforcement counterparts and extending 

the rule of law globally. 

A recent report by the Special Inspector General of Afghanistan 

Reconstruction indicated that the United States and our allies have 

all but abandoned our focus on combating Afghanistan’s drug 

trade. I can say unequivocally that DEA and our partners have not 

and will not abandon our focus on addressing the drugs threats in 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, or anywhere else. In fact, in some ways we 

have sharpened our focus on the threats. 

The United Nations has estimated that the international drug trade generates $400 billion per year in illegal revenue, making 

drug trafficking the most lucrative illicit activity by far. 

Because drug trafficking is so profitable, terrorist organizations 

are increasingly tapping into the revenue stream. The DEA has 

conservatively linked 22 of the 59 foreign—designated foreign terrorist organizations to drug trafficking. Approximately one quarter 

of these are based or operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Many of these organizations and other insurgent groups operate 

in or receive drugs or drug-related funding from drugs that are produced in or transited through Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Over 80 percent of the world’s illicit opiates are produced in Afghanistan, and approximately 160 tons of heroin and 80 tons of 

opium are smuggled across the Afghan/Pak border every year. 

Afghan-produced heroin is primarily destined for world markets. 

Only a small percentage reaches the United States. 

In order to address these challenges, DEA leverages existing programs such as our specialized vetted units, our Foreign-Deployed 

Advisory and Support Teams and the Special Operations Division 

to support, mentor, and advise foreign counterparts and coordinate, 

de-conflict, and synchronize ongoing investigations. 

Based in large part on DEA training, mentoring and assistance, 

the capacities and capabilities of our counterparts in Afghanistan 

have increased. They can now independently conduct drug investigations. In Fiscal Year 2014, they initiated and led over 2,600 operations resulting in the arrest of over 2,700 individuals, and the 

seizure of over 109 metric tons of drugs. 

34

Since January 2014, our counterparts in Pakistan seized over 

960 kilograms of heroin, 25,000 kilograms of opium, and 52,000 

kilograms of hashish. 

DEA’s Special Operations Division directly supports ongoing investigations throughout the world, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Bilateral Investigations Unit of the Special Operation Division work closely with our office to leverage U.S. Extraterritorial 

authority against the world’s most significant drug trafficking and 

narcoterrorist organizations. 

We have successfully used these laws to indict and incarcerate 

several Afghan-based international drug trafficers, including Haji 

Juma Khan, allegedly Afghanistan’s largest heroin trafficker with 

ties to the Taliban; Haji Bagcho, one of the first defendants ever 

extradited from Afghanistan to the U.S.; and Khan Mohammed, 

who intended to ship heroin to the United States and use his profits to assist the Taliban. 

Thanks to our efforts and those of our partners at the U.S. Attorney’s Offices in New York and Virginia, all of these significant drug 

traffickers, many with ties to the Taliban, faced justice in the 

United States. 

The reality of being held to account for crimes in the U.S. courtroom is a powerful and complimentary tool that must be used to 

the fullest extent possible. 

Due to the immediate and dire consequences of international 

narcoterrorism crimes, DEA does not have the luxury of adopting 

a reactive response to this existing criminal threat. Only a 

proactive investigative response with the prospect of incarceration 

in the U.S. can address the threat posed to U.S. national security. 

Unfortunately, prior to leaving office, President Karzai suspended 

extraditions of indicted individuals from Afghanistan to the U.S., 

therefore foreclosing U.S. prosecution. 

President Ghani could send a clear message to the international 

drug traffickers and narcoterrorists that operate in Afghanistan by 

appropriately allowing them to face justice in the United States 

and thereby complying with international agreements, enhancing 

Afghanistan’s security and strengthening the U.S. national security. Quite simply, a safe Afghanistan means a safer U.S. 

Administrator Leonhart and the men and women of the DEA are 

committed to standing with our interagency colleagues and domestic and foreign counterparts to build and sustain effective counternarcotics programs to protect U.S. national security interests 

around the world. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Soiles follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. And members will now have 5 minutes to ask questions, and I will begin with myself. 

Mr. Blanc, I will begin with you. The Inter-Services Intelligence 

Directory, ISI, has come under intense scrutiny for its alleged ongoing links with and even material support for Islamic militant/terrorist groups operating in Pakistan, perhaps including the Haqqani 

network of Afghan insurgents. 

What is your assessment of the security, intelligence and political 

roles played by the ISI? Does that organization play a double game 

with the United States as many assume is the case? 

Mr. BLANC. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that what we have seen most recently in Pakistan with 

the North Waziristan operation is a real disruption of all insurgent 

and militant activity in Pakistan, including the Haqqani network. 

Now, that is not to say and it remains the case that Afghan-focused militants continue to operate from Pakistani territory, and 

that is to the detriment of Afghan security. It is to the detriment 

of our security. It is to the detriment of Pakistan’s security. 

The Pakistani authorities, all Pakistani authorities, including intelligence authorities, military authorities, civilian authorities, 

have repeatedly said to us that they will prevent the reconstitution 

of these disrupted groups as their operations continue and conclude, and it is part of our continuing dialogue with Pakistan to 

make sure that that is the case. 

So we are very focused on making sure that the disruption that 

we have seen over the last few months becomes a more permanent 

fact. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. That is a nice answer, but I am not 

sure if you answered my question, but I won’t press you on that. 

Let me turn to you on this, Mr. Soiles. I really believe that if the 

international community does not continue to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the economic 

development, stability, and rule of law assistance we have provided 

there all these years will become null and void. 

You mentioned in your testimony that you will continue to pursue a collaborative and productive relationship with the Pakistani 

Government to support DEA efforts. 

Can you discuss the state of your agency’s relationship with the 

Pakistani Government and the extent of cooperation you receive 

from local law enforcement? Rampant corruption is known to be a 

huge problem in virtually every sector in Pakistan. So how does 

that affect your ability to interdict and shut down drug trafficking 

networks? 

Mr. SOILES. Well, our relationship with Pakistan, as you all 

know, has been prickly, but——

Mr. CHABOT. Has been what? 

Mr. SOILES. Prickly. Difficult. 

Mr. CHABOT. Tricky. Okay. 

Mr. SOILES. Yeah. But the DEA has always had a relationship 

with the anti-narcotics force of Pakistan. We have a vetted team 

that we use that we work with. 

Recently we got authorization to open our office in Karachi. Of 

course, as you probably know 45 or 50 percent of the heroin proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Jan 14, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\121014\91845 SHIRL
42

duced in Afghanistan comes through Pakistan down to Karachi and 

then out the Makran Coast. 

We are—that is part of our containment program. We have—we 

have worked really hard, not only with the Pakistanis, but with all 

Afghanistan’s partners to build the capabilities to contain the flows 

going across the Afghan borders. 

The Pakistanis are working hard with us to look at those organizations. We are working not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but 

in Central Asia, and also in East Africa where a lot of this stuff 

ends up on—on the Makran Coast and go down to East Africa and 

get off, flow into Tanzania and Kenya. 

So we have a presence in these areas. We have vetted teams. We 

have established vetted teams, and we will continue to do that. The 

vetted teams give us an immediate capability to deal with the investigations that we need and deal with the problem, but it also 

has a long-term institution-building, capacity-building capability. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

I have only got about a minute to ask my question and get a response. Let me come back to you, if I can, Mr. Blanc, on a different 

question. 

GAO recommended in 2012 that the State Department direct the 

U.S. mission in Pakistan to enhance its counter-IED performance 

measures to cover the full range of U.S.-assisted efforts. I understand that this recommendation remains open. 

Can you explain why there has been so little action on this and 

share with us what steps, if any, the State Department plans to 

take to address these recommendations that would serve to benefit 

U.S. soldiers and our allies in Afghanistan and development efforts 

in Pakistan as well? 

I think we all know that that is one of the most dangerous things 

that we face in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is IEDs. 

Mr. BLANC. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, actually, there is a report out today from JIEDDO because 

this is the—the counter-IED effort goes across both of our missions 

and a number of military organizations. 

And, if I may, I am just going to refer to some of the specifics 

in the report——

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. 

Mr. BLANC [continuing]. Because, actually, there is some good 

news here. 

So it is assessed that the actions of the Government of Pakistan 

and the Pakistan industry are steadily decreasing the amount of 

HME material necessary for IEDs available to the insurgency, increasing the cost of IED components, and forcing the insurgency to 

extend its supply line deeper in Pakistan, making it more vulnerable to, essentially, Pakistani efforts. 

Information has become available that insurgent forces are having difficulty obtaining the IED precursors that used to be more 

easily available on the market, and the lack of availability is a likely link to the voluntary ban on the sales of some these materials 

in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by Pakistan’s sole producer of one of the key precursors, Pakarab. 

We will—we can submit the rest of this report to you for the 

record. Your staff probably already have it. But where this broadly 

43

points is that the whole-of-government effort that we have undertaken with both Embassies with the Department of Defense I think 

is actually showing results on thecounter-IED effort. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

My time is expired. But if you could make the report available 

to the committee, we would appreciate that, and then all members 

would have access to it. And, as I say, my time is expired. 

The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

holding this important hearing. 

And thank you to the witnesses for being here. 

I would like to begin, Mr. Blanc or Mr. Sampler, when you consider the level of funding in foreign assistance that has been provided to Afghanistan and the expectation that they will continue to 

rely on foreign assistance for at least the next decade, what are the 

plans that the new Government—this new coalition Government 

has developed, if any, to really begin to build an economy in Afghanistan that might ultimately be able to actually provide goods 

and services that the Afghan people require? And what is the likely 

timeline for this—the country to wean itself from almost total subsistence from foreign aid? 

Mr. SAMPLER. I will begin, Congressman. Thank you for the 

question. 

The new Government is still establishing itself. I came just this 

past week from London, where President Ghani and CEO Abdullah 

presented their aspirations. We have the benefit in Afghanistan 

now of having a President who is himself a well-known international economist of developmental countries. 

Dr. Ghani wrote the book, ‘‘Fixing Failed States,’’ which literally 

addresses how to do these things in a very measured and predictable and deliberate way. Now, taking his academic aspirations and 

translating them into operational reality is the challenge that he 

faces. 

I will give you a very small example, though, that gives me reason for optimism. In Afghanistan, they realized back in 2006 that 

they needed to have an electric power utility, not unlike Duke 

Power or Georgia Power, and they created DABS, which is the Afghan power utility. At the time, it received subsidies from the government of around $50 million a year to become functional. 

I am pleased to say that, with USAID support and other donor 

support, DABS is now actually turning a profit. It is actually regarded in the region as one of the more well-managed power utilities. 

So if Dr. Ghani can identify the kind of talent that he has found 

in DABS and if he can replicate that kind of competence in the 

ministries of Afghanistan, I think there is reason for optimism. 

Mr. CICILLINE. But do we have—have we developed specific 

measurements and timelines so that we can be certain that these 

kinds of improvements in governance and anti-corruption efforts 

actually happen? 

I mean, is that a condition of our assistance or at least an implicit expectation that we are measuring that we have some delineated outcomes that we expect over a certain period of time? 

44

Mr. SAMPLER. At the tactical level, it is. And what I mean by 

that is, in each of the ministries in which we work, we have very 

specific metrics for what we expect that ministry to develop. 

You have to remember that 10 years ago they were not a literate 

society; so, it literally began with teaching some of these staff to 

read and to operate computers. 

But in each of the ministries, we make sure that they have the 

prerequisite requirements to manage funds before they do, and 

that is, in effect, building this government and building the institutions from the ground up. 

In terms of timelines, that would be irresponsible of me to suggest. I think you are right to say it will be measured in 5-year increments or decades. It will not be quick. 

But President Ghani has said publicly one of his primary goals 

is to build an economy that will allow government revenues to grow 

and allow him to wean his government off of international subsidies as quick as——

Mr. CICILLINE. I think what would facilitate that progress is for 

us to be setting those expectations as a condition of our support 

and assistance. 

I think what is irresponsible is for us to continue to spend unlimited amounts of money on an effort without some clear expectation 

of what we expect the Afghan people to do. 

And I have been very critical of our failure to really demand that 

the Afghan people take responsibility for their governance and 

their security and really begin to take on those responsibilities. 

But I just have a minute left. So I want to turn to you, Mr. 

Soiles, for a moment on the question of the illicit drug trade. 

As you said in your testimony, Afghanistan is responsible for 90 

percent of the world’s opium, and despite the fact that we have 

spent $7.8 billion in counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 

2002, Afghanistan has, in fact, produced an all-time high—recordhigh amount of opium. 

And it really calls into question—if they are going to build an 

economy, it is going to require that there be—it be replacing this 

opium economy, and it doesn’t seem like we are having great success with record-high production and a huge expenditure of American taxpayer dollars. 

What can you recommend that we do differently or better to 

produce better results? 

Mr. SOILES. We are—the Drug Enforcement Administration is an 

investigative agency. We are not eradicators, but eradication would 

be an important issue. But that causes other issues that our 

USAID and our State Department people could—are more adept at 

explaining. 

The reality is you got to have—we have to have a counternarcotics capability in that country. The reality is, when we first 

went in in 2002—and DEA did go in there in 2002—there was no 

one. There was no institution at all. 

And, as a result, we have had to build the institutions from 

ground up, everything, the buildings and—along with our interagency partners, because it was—it was State and DOD and 

USAID. It was a real U.S. interagency effort to try to build those 

45

institutions so they can actually perform the duties that they were 

given. 

We had to establish their legal systems. We had to establish the 

judicial process in Afghanistan. We have done that. And it is working. It is working. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Except it is not working. I mean, this is one of 

the challenges I think we face when we try to build countries and 

those kinds of institutions. They are producing opium at the highest rate that they have ever, and we have expended, you know, billions—$7.8 billion since 2002. 

And it just strikes me that it is—I am not assigning blame to 

this, but it strikes me that it demonstrates the futility or the almost near impossibility of taking on the responsibility of building 

another country from the ground up, that that responsibility ultimately has to rest with the Afghan people. 

And we have now been at it for 13 years, and it calls into question how much more lives and Treasury should invest in this effort. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Cicilline. 

And now Mr. DeSantis from Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

The President exchanged five very high-ranking Taliban detainees, very lethal terrorists, in exchange for the Bowe Bergdahl 

trade. The assurances were that they would be in Qatar and be 

monitored. 

So what have those detainees been doing in Qatar since they 

have been transferred there? 

Mr. BLANC. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

There are limits, of course, to precisely what I can say in this 

forum. You are exactly right to——

Mr. DESANTIS. Can you say, though, that—without going into detail, that you—we are in a situation where we can monitor them 

so that they are not reengaging in terrorist activity? 

Mr. BLANC. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. 

Mr. BLANC. And I would actually like to further add to that that 

the Qataris have been scrupulous in their adherence to the terms 

and conditions of their agreement with us. 

Mr. DESANTIS. President Obama has reportedly changed the 

rules of engagement for the remaining U.S. troops in Afghanistan 

so that now troops will be allowed to carry out combat missions instead of the initially reported train-and-advise role. 

What are the rules of engagement for U.S. Troops and personnel 

in Afghanistan. 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I would defer to the Department of Defense to 

describe the rules of engagement in particular. 

The announcement that you are referring to regards the missions 

of the troops. While it is true that we have—we have moved from—

or are moving from a combat mission to a train, advise, and assist 

mission, there, of course, have always been things the troops are 

going to be able to do, including continued counterterrorism missions in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan, our own 

force protection requirements, and a new thing that the President 

46

has announced, which is that, in certain extreme situations, we 

will be able to provide support to the Afghan National Security 

Forces as they are conducting their own operations. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So if we want to get the actual rules of engagement, are those—I understand the DOD is the one that promulgates them. 

Are those classified? Do you know? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I am sorry. I actually don’t know the answer to 

that question. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. What is the impact of the 24 elections in—

2014 elections—excuse me—in India have had on India and Pakistan relations, specifically with regard to the conflict in Kashmir? 

And do you think that the 2014 elections has had a noticeable effect on India-Pakistan relations? 

Mr. BLANC. Well, sir, I will be careful in what I say about India 

because my colleagues from the Bureau of South and Central Asia, 

which is responsible, are not here with me today. 

What I will say is that the elections in both Pakistan a year ago 

and then in India this year do create a window of opportunity with 

new Governments, both with strong mandates. 

And to some extent, we have seen some hopeful signs from both 

sides, including Prime Minister Modi’s invitation for Prime Minister Sharif to attend his inauguration, an invitation which Prime 

Minister Sharif took up. 

We would like to see more focused improvement along the line 

of control in other areas of the conflict. We would like to see more 

focus on building some of the trade links which we think are essential for both countries and essential for the region. But there have 

been at least some positive indications since those two elections. 

Mr. DESANTIS. My constituents will say, ‘‘Man, India’’—or ‘‘Pakistan and Afghanistan, what is going on over there? Why do we 

even need to be worried about it?’’

And one thing I will always say is, ‘‘Well, Pakistan has nuclear 

weapons and, in a very dangerous part of the world, those in the 

wrong hands could be catastrophic.’’

So what efforts is the administration pursuing to influence Pakistan to cooperate on nuclear nonproliferation and security in the 

region? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I think you have put your finger exactly on it, 

that it is a complicated relationship with Pakistan, but one that for 

a number of reasons is vital for our national security interests. 

And those interests, including nuclear weapons and assets, including the safe haven that some militants have found, those are 

the center of our dialogue with Pakistan. 

And so it is what drives every conversation that we have. It is 

what drives the strategic dialogue that the Secretary of State has 

with his counterparts in Pakistan. And that will continue to be 

structuring our engagement with Pakistan moving forward. 

Mr. DESANTIS. My final question is—I think we have learned 

some lessons in Iraq, well, from the beginning, but particularly 

over the last several years. 

Is the administration looking at Iraq and saying, ‘‘Okay. In Afghanistan, if we withdraw too soon, that could create a situation 

in which jihadists will be able to gain more territory’’? 

47

You know, we are having to now put more troops back into Iraq 

and we are much more engaged there than we were 2 years ago. 

Is there a similar danger in Afghanistan? 

I know the mission end date has changed a little bit, but I still 

think the President’s goal is to really radically withdraw. If that 

happens, are we going to just leave behind another Jihadistan? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, you know, as far as withdrawing lessons from 

different operations, I can only tell you my perspective as part of 

this discussion. And I served in both Afghanistan and Iraq for a 

number of years and have always believed that the comparisons 

drawn between the two countries are misleading guides to policymaking, that there are tremendous differences between the two 

countries. 

There differences between the way the politicians in the two 

countries have come together or not come together. There are differences in the way that the Afghan——

Mr. DESANTIS. And I agree with that. My time is almost up. 

So I agree with that 100 percent. But what would you say in 

terms of—Is there a danger that, as the U.S. presence wanes, that 

terrorism and jihadist groups are able capitalize on that? 

Mr. BLANC. I think that we need to be very focused on filling in 

the gaps that the Afghan National Security Forces still has so that 

they are able to take responsibility—fuller responsibility for security across their country and make sure that Afghanistan does not 

again become an international threat. 

And I believe that we are on track doing exactly that, that the 

Afghan Security Forces, since taking lead responsibility across the 

country in June 2013, have done a good job despite very forceful 

efforts on the Taliban to disrupt them. 

And, actually, I would just like to underline this. I think it is 

often missed. The Afghan National Security Forces took lead responsibility across the whole country in June 2013. That was really 

the transition point. 

And the fact that there hasn’t been the sort of catastrophic effect 

that some people might have feared I think is an indication that 

the strategy of standing the Afghan forces up and helping them 

fight their own fight is working. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. 

Dr. Bera is recognized, even though I have the esteemed and 

much revered colleague Mr. Connolly breathing down my neck next 

to me——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Who once worked in the Senate. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Who once worked in the Senate 

as a staffer. 

Dr. Bera, you are recognized 

Mr. BERA. Well, I appreciate my esteemed colleague from Virginia deferring to me. 

The political complexity of South Asia, the political complexity of 

the interrelations between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, you 

know, are not easy. You know, when we were there 11⁄2 years ago, 

you know, my impression when we met with President Karzai was, 

in many ways, he did not make it any easier, playing one country 

out against the other. 

48

Perhaps, Mr. Sampler, with the new administration in Afghanistan, have you seen a shift in how Afghanistan is interacting both 

with India and Pakistan and how that administration is engaging? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes. Certainly. I will begin and then yield to 

Jarrett from the State Department for the diplomatic level. 

But, you know, India is the fifth largest donor in Afghanistan. 

And in that regard, they have done remarkable things for the Afghans, and particularly for Afghan women in some cases. 

Allowing Afghan women, for example, to travel out of the country 

is a challenge. But if they are going to a place like India, where 

many of their family and relatives have been before, they are allowed to go. 

And so India has taken it upon themselves to train Afghan 

women in some basic life skills and confidence-building skills and 

then in some vocational training skills that allow them to work 

from their homes. 

Similarly, at a more—at a higher level, they have—USAID has 

worked with the Government of India to host a number of bilateral 

business development conferences where Afghan businessmen have 

gone to India. 

Specific to your question, President Ghani has thus far—and it 

is very early days—been very adept at talking about the importance of a regional approach to solving the problems and not two 

separate bilateral approaches, and I think the steps we have seen 

on the development front have been very sensitive to that. 

But I will yield on the diplomatic front to Mr. Blanc. 

Mr. BLANC. I think, you know, Larry has done a terrific job of 

laying out the need for economic integration and the critical role 

that India, in particular, can play in Afghanistan in that respect. 

Looking more to the political and the diplomatic issues, it is clear 

that regional diplomacy is one of the President of Afghanistan’s 

most important and hardest jobs, and President Ghani has really 

grabbed hold of it in his first 65 or 70 days in office. 

He has visited Saudi Arabia. He has visited China. He has visited Pakistan. He has welcomed key Pakistani leaders to Afghanistan. And I think he has struck a new tone in terms of trying to 

find ways to cooperate bilaterally with these key countries, but also 

as a regional grouping. 

And it is early days yet, obviously. There is a lot of work for him 

to do. There is a lot of reciprocation from these partners to do. But 

I think he has approached it in a very open and intelligent way. 

Mr. BERA. I would imagine, as we go into this transition phase 

in 2015, you know, in conversations with Indian multi-national 

companies and others that have made significant investments in 

Afghanistan, one of their major concerns obviously is the security 

climate there. 

And, you know, as the ANSF, you know, gains further capabilities, I think one thing we can certainly do to continue to encourage 

investment in Afghanistan infrastructure and a favorable investment environment is to continue to offer some of that—at least security training and security confidence. 

You know, shifting gears to Mr. Soiles, it does—it appears to me 

that the narcotics trade and narcotics trafficking go hand in hand 

49

with counterterrorism. That would be an accurate assessment 

and——

Mr. SOILES. Absolutely. The UNODC’s recent study suggests that 

50 percent of the Taliban revenues come from the trafficking of 

narcotics. 

Mr. BERA. So if we are looking at other situations where we can 

kind of—you know, let’s take Colombia, for instance, where I would 

imagine we encountered a very similar situation. 

Are there lessons to be learned from how we approached Colombia and our engagement there that we can apply to Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOILES. Absolutely. But Colombia was a lot more progressed 

as a nation than Afghanistan was. They didn’t have decades of internal strife. I mean, the whole country was devastated because of 

the internal stuff that was going on in Afghanistan. But yes. 

In fact, we used the model of Colombia in a lot of ways to see 

what was needed in order to build the kind of narcotics forces of 

Afghanistan, and we—not only Afghanistan, but in some of the 

neighboring countries, for instance, some of the central Asian countries that we are dealing with to try again to stem the flow of the 

narcotics that are going out. 

Mr. BERA. Right. And one last question. 

One of the big successes in Afghanistan, perhaps for you, Mr. 

Sampler, is that we have educated a decade of girls, and those are 

real gains. Yet, one of my concerns is, as we start to transition out, 

how do we hold on to those gains and, you know, empower this 

generation of girls that are now becoming women in leadership? 

And I would be curious about your perspective. 

Mr. SAMPLER. And that is one of the core interests of USAID, is 

making stable and advancing the gains for women and girls thus 

far. 

One of the best metrics for the success we have had in educating 

women and girls over the preceding 12 years is that there are now 

roughly 40,000 girls who have enrolled in universities in Afghanistan and others who have enrolled in the regions. We have various 

scholarship programs and various incentive programs to keep them 

engaged. 

There is a tension in Afghanistan, though. Families choose to 

marry their daughters and—not even prematurely, but choose to 

see young women married as opposed to entering professional circles. So we are working to create opportunities and set-asides for 

women in some of these circles. 

We have, as you may be aware, a $400-million program which we 

are funding to the level of $200 million over 5 years called ‘‘Promote,’’ and it is specifically focused on women from the age of 18 

to 30 who have taken advantage of at least their primary education. We can assist them with secondary education, vocational 

training, and then placement in either the private sector, in government, or in civil society. 

So we are looking to seize and make permanent those gains to 

achieve sort of a tipping point that women can’t be set back from. 

Mr. BERA. Right. Thank you. 

And I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Dr. Bera. 

50

The chair recognizes herself. And I apologize to the witnesses if 

the questions that I am going to be asking have been already 

asked. I was in another—some other few meetings. So I thank you. 

I read your testimony. 

So I’ll start with Mr. Blanc. 

In testimony before our Middle East and North Africa subcommittee last month, former CIA Director Michael Hayden posed 

a scenario of what he said, ‘‘A Pakistani nuclear guarantee for the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons 

programs.’’

Do you think that Pakistan would sell Saudi Arabia a nuclear 

weapon? What can you tell us about their nuclear cooperation? 

Where would other players in the region acquire the technology for 

it? We know that—we have heard reports that other countries in 

the region as well might be interested. 

And, Mr. Sampler, during a previous hearing with SIGAR and 

GAO, we discussed the fact that State and USAID were moving to 

give Afghanistan more and more in direct assistance, and this was 

despite warnings from these agencies that the Afghans were not remotely capable of handling the massive amounts of assistance and 

that the Afghan leaders lacked a system to manage the endemic 

corruption. 

Now, you testified that USAID has, with regard to direct assistance, ‘‘put in place stringent measures to safeguard taxpayer 

funds.’’

And so I will ask you: Are these stringent measures the same 

recommendations that SIGAR recommended before USAID started 

providing direct assistance? And how much money are we providing in direct assistance in dollar amounts? And what is that in 

terms of percentages of what we are providing in total? 

Also, what steps have State Department and USAID taken to 

mitigate the risks of providing direct assistance that GAO and 

SIGAR highlighted? 

And, lastly, have State and USAID addressed all of the recommendations of these agencies? And which ones have yet to be 

recommended and why? Because I know it is a long list that they 

had. 

And, lastly, sir, Mr. Soiles, in your testimony, you describe the 

connection between drug trafficking and terrorist financing in and 

outside the country. 

Can you elaborate on the fact that 24 Afghan and 15 Pakistani 

individuals have been designated by OFAC under the Kingpin Act. 

Will we see more of that? Less of that? Is that about average? 

And what does this tell us about the scope of drug trafficking in 

the region and the threat posed by the nexus between terror and 

drug trafficking? 

So, Mr. Blanc, we will begin with you. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BLANC. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

It is, of course, true that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have important and deep ties. I have seen no indication of the scenario that 

you have described. And we would——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You have seen what, now? 

Mr. BLANC. I have seen no indication of the——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No indication. 

51

Mr. BLANC. And we would look very negatively on any indication 

of proliferation of any kind, including that. Certainly a large part 

of our national security dialogue with Pakistan is focused on nonproliferation issues. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Did I select the wrong country? Would there 

be such collaboration between Pakistan and some other country or 

Saudi Arabia and some other country? 

Mr. BLANC. Ma’am, Saudi Arabia I couldn’t speak to. But, no, we 

are not—we are not seeing ongoing proliferation concerns of that 

nature. And within the limits of what we can discuss here, I would 

just say that we are—nonproliferation is an important part of our 

dialogue with Pakistan. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So you feel fairly confident that, were these 

other countries to acquire the technology, the material, et cetera, 

it would not be provided by Pakistan? 

Mr. BLANC. We—I haven’t seen indications of that scenario. And 

we are very focused in our dialogue with Pakistan on keeping them 

away from any kind of proliferation of that or any other nature. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And would you—was our intelligence good 

enough during the A.Q. Khan era that you would have also had indications that something was happening? 

Mr. BLANC. Ma’am, that was before my time in this office and, 

I imagine, probably something that we couldn’t discuss in this 

forum in any case. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sampler. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes, ma’am. I will try to address your questions 

in the order I remember them and, if I miss some, please—I will 

go back. 

With respect to on-budget support, we have about——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Sampler, could I just ask you to bring this 

closer to you. I am sorry. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Certainly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The acoustics are not good here. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Certainly. Is this better? With respect to on-budget support, $2.4 billion of the $21 billion 

that we have been appropriated has been shared with the Afghans 

to what we call on-budget support. 

I don’t use the phrase ‘‘direct support’’ because, in development 

circles, that typically means money given carte blanche to a government, and we don’t do that. 

On-budget support is a very specific mechanism that we use with 

a particular office or ministry, and it is very tightly controlled. 

So to answer your question, about 11 percent of the money that 

we have spent in Afghanistan has been spent in this on-budget 

mechanism. It is a mechanism that, from a development perspective, we quite like because it builds government capacity. 

But it is one from a fiduciary accountability perspective that we 

don’t trust because it means that we are putting more of our faith 

in the local government. 

So to the second point, then, of SIGAR’s recommendations for 

how we account for and how we control this on-budget support, 

they made 18 recommendations, and I am—17 of the 18 we either 

already were or are now implementing. 

52

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So out of the 18, 17 have already been put 

in place or will be put in place? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Have already been put in place. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Have already been put in place. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes, ma’am. 

And then with respect to the discussion about the——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What is that last one? 

Mr. SAMPLER. I don’t know. I was afraid you would ask that, but 

I am happy to find out. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No. Don’t worry about it. 

Mr. SAMPLER. With respect to the broader question of safeguards 

in these ministries, we don’t give money to the Government of Afghanistan. We give money to particular ministries or offices. And 

we only do that after they meet a very exhaustive list of preconditions. 

And, in fact, we embed in that ministry what is typically called 

a grants and contract management unit, and these are people who 

work for us on our payroll, but are embedded in the ministry to 

oversee this ministry as they build their capacity. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Are they American citizens? 

Mr. SAMPLER. No, ma’am. Typically not. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Typically not. 

But they work——

Mr. SAMPLER. They work for us and under our supervision. 

And they are qualified to international standards. If they are an 

accountant, they are an internationally certified accountant. If they 

are a bookkeeper, they meet international standards for bookkeeping. And they don’t work for the ministry, but they work in the 

ministry alongside the ministerial team. 

Their roles are twofold. Primarily, they are there for our accountability. But, secondarily, they are there for mentoring and to help 

this Government as they build these institutions’ capacity. 

I will stop there. And if there is something I missed, I am happy 

to go back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Soiles. 

Mr. SOILES. The OFAC Kingpin Designation Act, which was 

passed in 1999—since that time, we have had about 3,500 designations on kingpins. And it is a drug—it is a Treasury action against 

drug traffickers—international drug traffickers. 

And, basically, what it does——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. How many total did you say, sir? 

Mr. SOILES. Since 1999, 3,500. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But that is throughout the world? 

Mr. SOILES. Yes. Throughout the world. Throughout the world. 

And it is an interagency process that you—you appoint someone 

and it has to go through a review process in order to become OFAC 

or Kingpin. 

Obviously, when we first started the process in 1999, our threat 

was Colombia, Mexico, Western Hemisphere, and it is geared toward looking at—initially, it was geared at looking at traffickers 

out of that region, out of this—the Western Hemisphere. And a lot 

of their assets were in the United States. So, the process actually 

freezes their assets. 

53

As it went global because of the—how drugs became global, we 

have used it around the world. But, more importantly, by designating the Afghan-Pak, what we do is we use it with our foreign 

counterparts, our partners, to say, ‘‘These people are drug traffickers. If they have assets in your country, you should be looking 

at it,’’ and we can provide the assistance in order for them to freeze 

those assets. Okay. So that is the first part of your question. 

The second part of your question is the drug terror nexus and 

how does it work. As I stated earlier, 50 percent—according to 

UNODC, 50 percent of the Taliban funding comes from drug trafficking. 

We have seen not only in Afghanistan, but in other areas of the 

world—the FARC down in Colombia and other places of the world, 

where the terrorist organization starts off basically taxing the 

farmers. That is what happened in Afghanistan. They taxed the 

farmers. 

But they have progressed beyond taxing the farmers. They provide security to the labs. They do transportation. They are involved 

in actual moving roles just like the FARC did, the FARC being one 

of the largest drug-trafficking organizations in the world. That is 

what has happened—what happened in Afghanistan. 

The real problem with all that, of course, you know, the terrorists have funding to do their operations. But in addition to that, 

a collateral bene—or problem comes where they use the money to 

corrupt various governments along the routes. And that we have 

seen, too. Forget the corruption in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but 

even in Central Asia. We have seen it in the Balkans. We have 

seen it in Africa. 

And all—a lot of these countries that are—experience the threat 

as the drugs move out of Afghanistan and through these territories 

are developing democracies. So they don’t need another problem. 

So—and, ultimately, what happens is, if they corrupt the governments, then they have a weak—weak institutions and it gives the 

terrorist organization safe havens. And that is the real threat. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is a real threat. 

Now, of these 24 and 15—24 Afghans, 15 Pakistani, is that the 

largest number that we have ever had? When were—when were 

those designated as kingpins? And how has the level of cooperation 

changed with the new Government in place in Afghanistan? 

Mr. SOILES. They are designated over time. As investigations are 

developed and we can identify our organization and a network, we 

designate them along the way. Of course, it is an interagency process and it takes time to do. So those are over time. 

Now, also, part of the process is, at some point, if they are not 

a threat, they get removed from the list. So—but the 24 and 15 

have been there for awhile. We are working with the Afghans on 

the targets. The Afghans have initiated a financial investigative 

team that we are mentoring, that we are working closely with together. 

The new President has—has stated openly and publicly that 

counternarcotics is a priority for his administration. He has taken 

steps. We have seen significant steps for him—showing that it is 

a priority for him, and we will continue working with the new—

with the new administration. 

54

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let’s hope so. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Yes, Mr. Blanc. 

Mr. BLANC. Ma’am, if I could just add one thing to that, which 

is that, again, it is very early in President Ghani’s administration. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Blanc, you have got to pull that closer to you, 

too, please. 

Mr. BLANC. Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. BLANC. It is very early in President Ghani’s administration. 

But one of the things that he did in literally his first weeks of office 

was to remedy some failings in their anti-money laundering law in 

order to address concerns raised by the Financial Action Task 

Force, or FATF. 

And that, of course, relates to the counternarcotics issue. It relates to the counterterrorism issue. And I think it is—again, it is 

an indication that this Government is taking very seriously some 

of our shared concerns. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

And now my good friend, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, if I may, I would like to give 

my colleague from Maryland the opportunity to ask his questions 

if he—he is on a tight schedule. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And then I would reclaim my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Delaney is recognized. 

Mr. DELANEY. I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia for 

giving me the opportunity. 

And I want to thank the chair and the ranking member for allowing me to sit in and participate in this important hearing about 

two countries that will obviously be very important for our national 

security for a long time. 

The reason I was particularly focused on sitting in on this hearing is because one of my constituents is a gentleman named Warren Weinstein, who was captured in Pakistan over 31⁄2 years ago. 

And, as Mr. Sampler probably knows, he was a contractor for 

USAID at the time and has had a long career—he is 72 years old 

at this point. He has had a long career working for the Peace Corps 

and for USAID and for helping people around the world on behalf 

of our Government. And he has been over there for 31⁄2 years now, 

and we know he is being held by al-Qaeda. 

And so my question for you, Mr. Blanc, is: In your opinion, is the 

Government of Pakistan, its civilian and military leadership, cooperating with us to the full extent possible in our efforts to try to 

secure Warren Weinstein’s release back to the United States? 

Mr. BLANC. Thank you very much for that question, Congressman. 

Our hearts go out to Dr. Weinstein and to his family. I think it 

is a measure of the nihilism of his captors that they would hold 

somebody who is so dedicated to the welfare of the people of Pakistan. 

55

We are cooperating with the Government of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan is cooperating with us in this investigation. As 

you know, there is a terrible kidnapping problem in Pakistan——

Mr. DELANEY. Yes. 

Mr. BLANC [continuing]. That affects Pakistanis as well. 

There is always more that we can do. There is always more that 

they can do. But, yes, we are cooperating. 

Mr. DELANEY. But, in your opinion, are they—for example, if we 

want to interview individuals that they have detained as part of 

their police processes that are familiar with Mr. Weinstein’s kidnapping, are we provided unfettered access, in your opinion, to 

these kind of resources? 

Mr. BLANC. We have been getting access in those cases. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DELANEY. Are we conditioning various assistants we provide 

to the Government, whether it be civilian and defense assistants, 

on full and complete cooperation as it relates to not only Mr. 

Weinstein’s situation, but, obviously, other hostages that may, unfortunately, be held in the region? 

Mr. BLANC. I think that we look at our assistance, both civilian 

and military, in Pakistan as, really, an investment that we are 

making in our own national security. 

So while we wouldn’t—we don’t and wouldn’t want to specifically 

condition pockets for specific actions, we want to be able to look at 

that leverage and use it to best improve our relationship with Pakistan and the assistance they provide us. 

I think again, in this case, we really are getting cooperation out 

of them and—within the confines of their abilities because, again, 

they face a very serious problem of their own. 

Mr. DELANEY. Right. 

And I understand how we can condition our aid on the release 

of hostages like Warren because they may—you know, at least 

their representations to us is they don’t know where he is. 

And, as you have said, many—there is many even high-ranking—children of high-ranking Government officials in the country 

who have been kidnapped. 

But it seems to me information that is completely under their 

Government’s or military’s or police control, there should be no hesitancy about providing us with complete and, as I said, unfettered 

access to that information. 

And I guess my question is: Why is it not a condition to the cooperation that we provide? Again, I understand why certain things 

can’t be a condition because it is out of their control. 

But access to information, intelligence they may have about a 

specific American who is captured and left behind over there, it 

would seem to me that is the low-hanging fruit of things we can 

use our significant leverage to obtain. 

Mr. BLANC. And, again, I guess the most important answer I 

would give to this question is that we are cooperating with the 

Government of Pakistan and they are cooperating with us, including on access to detainees and other issues. 

Mr. DELANEY. Just a separate question: Do you believe—you 

know, because we have a broader issue with respect to Americans 

that have been kidnapped in the region and, quite frankly, other 

parts of world. 

56

Do you believe the coordination—because the United States Government in a whole variety of ways provides assistance to countries 

all over the world and, in my opinion, why we have—while we obviously have a policy against negotiating with terrorists for the release of Americans, which is a policy I obviously support, we have 

many partners around the world who can help us in finding and 

identifying and locating and securing the release of Americans. 

Do you think that we are coordinated enough as a Government 

and have made this a big enough priority? For example, should we 

have a hostage czar who is looking at every touchpoint that the 

United States has with partner nations around the world who 

might have information that are useful to us to get these people 

home? In your experience, what is your answer to that question? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I would be reluctant to comment on that particular proposal partially just because I haven’t thought it through. 

I have been very involved in the hostage cases that we have addressed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and what I would say is that 

they certainly—again, going back to the premise that we can always do more, these cases have received a tremendous amount of 

attention at the highest levels and I think have been the focus of 

creative diplomacy and thoughtful efforts to find the leverage that 

we can and use it to—to secure the freedom of these individuals. 

Mr. DELANEY. With the chair’s permission, one more question. 

Is there anything that this Congress can do to put in place a system so that the resources and leverage the United States Government has is used more fully to help identify—we will stay with 

Warren Weinstein, for example—to help find where he is and bring 

him home? 

Mr. BLANC. I am grateful for that question. 

I don’t—it is not something I can pull off the top of my head. 

But, with your permission, I would like to take that back to our 

counterterrorism teams and come back to you with a considered 

answer. 

Mr. DELANEY. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for making such a valuable contribution to this debate. Thank you. 

Mr. DELANEY. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is a terrible situation. 

Mr. Perry is recognized. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your time today. 

Mr. Blanc, the question will be related to you. 

But, first, you know, although December 8, 2014, marked the official end to the U.S. and NATO combat mission in Afghanistan, 

the violence and threats to U.S. interests in the region are certainly far from over. 

As a matter of fact, as I understand it, 2014 is the bloodiest year 

in Afghanistan since 2001 and, to date, the administration reportedly has not altered its post-2016 troop planning for Afghanistan, 

asserting that only successful Afghan governance can keep Afghanistan stable over the long term. 

Now, I am concerned that, similar to the power backing that allowed ISIL’s rise in Iraq, the Taliban is waiting to reclaim lost terVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Jan 14, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\121014\91845 SHIRL
57

ritory and establish another safe haven for terrorists to thrive in 

Afghanistan. 

So, with that, is this administration willing to be flexible? And 

can you give any assertions in that regard with planned American 

troop levels in Afghanistan after 2016? 

Mr. BLANC. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

We are operating along the plan the President announced, which 

is precisely as you have outlined it, and our view is that that plan 

is working, that the Afghan National Security Forces, which hardly 

existed 6 years ago, have been in lead responsibility for the security of their country since June 2013, and despite the extremely 

violent efforts of the Taliban insurgent groups against those forces, 

despite the need to protect two rounds of Presidential elections, despite the need to protect the loya jirga to confirm the BSA last 

year, the Afghan National Security Forces have held. 

And so what we think is necessary for our national security is 

to continue to fill in some of the gaps and needs that the Afghan 

National Security Forces have—that is the train, advise, assist 

mission—so that they can—they can continue to take the last bits 

of responsibility that we have essentially already given them over 

the course——

Mr. PERRY. But if there are setbacks in the successes that you 

have enumerated that requires a more robust effort, a little bit of 

a longer stay as opposed to a date-based withdrawal, is this administration—are you able to say now, without equivocation, that the 

administration is flexible enough to change its policy based on 

troop and basing levels? 

Mr. BLANC. You know, I think I can point to some flexibility that 

the administration is showing, for example, in moving from a 

9,800-troop level for the end of this year to a 10,800-troop level in 

response to specific requirements. And I think it is clear the President stays in very close touch with his commanders and will continue to do so. 

That said, I think everything that we see confirms our confidence 

in the plan that we are on to have a more normalized security relationship with Afghanistan with them leading the fight in their own 

country in 2017. 

Mr. PERRY. With all due respect—and I hope you are right—but 

from many Americans’ views and certainly partially mine, that—

the flexibility that we have seen recently in the administration is 

more borne out of events in Iraq than events and facts on the 

ground in Afghanistan. 

Be that as it may, the flexibility is there. But I would like to get 

some kind of confidence and an answer that says that that flexibility will remain regarding Afghanistan, specifically notwithstanding other events in the world that might politically make it 

more plausible, more agreeable, to do what needs to be done based 

on the facts. 

Let me ask you this: Post-2016, can you give us any indication 

of what metrics will be used to determine the size of a residual 

force? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I would have to defer that to the Department of 

Defense that has been working on plans for a security assistance 

office in Afghanistan. 

58

Mr. PERRY. So does that mean that there will be no political component to assessing troop strength size in Afghanistan? 

Mr. BLANC. I think that, of course, there is a political component. 

The conflict is political. And so we will have a discussion about 

what the requirements are, which is essentially a political discussion. 

But in terms of planning for what the numbers would be and 

what that more normalized security relationship requires in terms 

of people to oversee assistance and other factors, I think there 

are—we have—we have planning experts, and DOD will be much 

better suited to answer those questions. 

Mr. PERRY. I would agree with you. 

And I would just urge the State Department and the administration to take the advice of the military planners in this regard based 

on the facts as opposed to the political considerations, not the ones 

in Afghanistan as—or the ones in Afghanistan more than the ones 

in this country that—that might call for a hasty withdrawal based 

on the considerations of what somebody’s campaign speeches might 

have been or political narrative might have been to secure the 

gains that many American lives and Treasury have spent to retain. 

Appreciate your time. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent point. Thank you, Mr. Perry. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome to 

our panel. 

Before I begin, Mr. Soiles, what part of New England are you 

from? 

Mr. SOILES. From Massachusetts. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Where? 

Mr. SOILES. Lowell, Mass. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Lowell. Oh, my God. All right. I had a primary 

opponent from Lowell. 

Mr. SOILES. I thought I lost the accent. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh. You lost the accent. He said ‘‘Colombier,’’ he 

says ‘‘oughta,’’ and he thinks he lost the accent. But thank God you 

probably still root for the Red Sox. 

Mr. SOILES. Oh, absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. God bless you. All right. 

Put my time back to 5, please. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. Move it back. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I want to ask about efficacy because I think, really, that is what 

all of us ought to be concerned about in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

holding in abeyance Pakistan. 

Mr. Blanc, for example, we spent apparently something like 

$61.5 billion in equipping, training, recruiting personnel for the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Would you say that investment has been a successful investment? 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I think that the investment——

Mr. CONNOLLY. You need to speak directly into the mic. The 

acoustics in this room are really among the worst. I am sorry. 

Mr. BLANC. I am very sorry, sir. 

59

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is all right. That is great. 

Mr. BLANC. I would say that our investment in the Afghan National Security Force is paying off and that, in particular, the investment that we have made really since 2008, 2009 is paying off, 

that, from a point, you know, at the beginning of this administration, where there hardly was an Afghan National Security Force, 

we are now at a point where, since June 2013, they have been in 

the lead in providing security across the country through some very 

difficult months and through some very challenging periods, including two rounds of Presidential elections. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would you say they are equipping themselves 

well against, for example, the Taliban? 

Mr. BLANC. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And maybe we could agree, maybe not, in sharp 

contradistinction with the Iraqi Armed Forces that melted away in 

the face of ISIS. 

Mr. BLANC. Sir, I haven’t been to Iraq since 2005. And so I want 

to stay away from comparisons in which I am not an expert. But 

I will say——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I am not an expert either, but I can read 

a newspaper. I can see the television. 

I do understand that ISIS is now one of the best-equipped, bestfinanced terrorist groups on the planet because precisely of the 

comprehensive collapse of the Iraqi Armed Forces in the face of a 

military threat. And we paid for it. 

We—remember history. We rebuilt the Iraqi military after Paul 

Bremmer took it apart. God knoweth why, but he did. So we rebuilt it to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. 

Surely you could agree, based on what you know, not being an 

expert, and what I know, not being an expert, that that is hardly 

a success model. 

Mr. BLANC. My colleagues in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

would probably be unhappy with me if I wade deeply into this. 

What I will say is—as I said in response to Mr. DeSantis earlier, 

is that, from my experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq and having spent a couple of years in both, I think that the comparisons 

between the two are overdrawn and—and I think that the nature 

of the security forces is one place where the comparisons are overdrawn. 

I certainly believe that the Afghan National Security Forces, having taken lead responsibility for security in their country in June 

2013, have weathered a predictable, but very violent, storm and deserve a tremendous amount of praise and credit for that. 

There are still areas where they need our support, and that is 

what the train, advise, assist mission is about. I think that, if we 

can finish that mission, we will redeem the investment that you 

have described and leave behind a security force that is able to secure its country and, therefore, provide critical security for the region in the world without our combat mission. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I hope you are right. 

But, again, I began by saying my questions of all three of you 

are going to be about efficacy. And they are not—they are hard 

questions and they are not easy answers and, you know—but I 

think we, as a country, have to ask ourselves this. Was the investVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:06 Jan 14, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\121014\91845 SHIRL
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ment—did it pay off? And when it doesn’t, we have to be honest 

with each other that it didn’t—it didn’t work. 

And maybe you are right that, with the military in Afghanistan, 

in contradistinction to a nearby place that you are not an expert 

on and I am not either, it is working. I hope you are right. I sure 

hope that $61 billion—it is working. 

Mr. BLANC. And I want to let Larry make a very compelling case 

he is going to make about the tremendous gains that we have seen 

in Afghanistan from the civilian assistance. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The what? 

Mr. BLANC. Tremendous gains we have seen in Afghanistan as 

a result of our civilian assistance. 

But before—before he does, I just want to underscore that one of 

the things that is unique about our engagement in Afghanistan is 

that the planning for 9/11 took place in Afghanistan. We are engaged there because there was a threat from there, and our continued engagement there is inexorably linked with our national security. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am well aware of that. But we, of course, took 

our eye off the ball to invade Iraq that had nothing to do with 9/11. 

I am very well—very aware of the history. 

Mr. BLANC. But on Afghanistan and the focus that I believe we 

have brought to Afghanistan since 2009, I think that standing up 

their security forces so that they can take over from us and be a 

provider rather than a consumer of international security—I think 

it is—we are on the right track and we are seeing signs of success. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Well, we will hold you to it. 

Before you answer a question you haven’t been asked, let me ask 

you a question and then you can answer, including Mr. Blanc’s lead 

in. 

We had a hearing in June, this subcommittee, and we heard 

from Mr. Sopko, the SIGAR, and we heard from Mr. Johnson from 

GAO. And they actually testified they could not provide metrics for 

the percentage of funds that were well spent or wasted because—

in Afghanistan because the raw numbers did not exist. 

Is it your testimony that they are wrong, that, as a matter of 

fact, you have got metrics and you have got numbers that would 

demonstrate the efficacy of the domestic investments we have 

made in reconstruction and relief and civil engagement in Afghanistan? 

Mr. Sampler. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Congressman, it absolutely is. As the question is 

asked, it is a very simple answer. 

We do have metrics for success. And I can start with a very concrete and appreciable on the ground kind of metrics all the way up 

to more strategic what we call developmental objectives that we are 

pursuing. 

So I will answer that question first and then, with your permission, I will address Jarrett’s question as well. 

In Afghanistan, for example, with respect to health care——

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I may just for a second, Mr. Sampler. 

If the chair will indulge us, this is, I think, the last hearing of 

the——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Sure. 

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Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. Of this Congress. At least I hope it 

is my last hearing of this Congress. And so if she will indulge us 

to allow Mr. Sampler to——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Please go right ahead. Thank you. Thank 

you, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. SAMPLER. I will be brief and I will let you ask followups, if 

you wish. 

But with respect to health care, for example, an area in Afghanistan that is often raised and criticized because of the amounts of 

money invested, our efforts have helped raise the average life expectancy by 22 years in Afghanistan. So Afghans who would have 

died as they had children in elementary school can now live to see 

grandchildren. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good metric. 

But, Mr. Sampler, do you directly take issue with the testimony 

of the SIGAR that says, ‘‘I can’t tell you how much money was 

wasted and I can’t tell you how much money was well spent because we don’t have the raw numbers in Afghanistan’’? That was 

his testimony. And remember what his charge is. So be careful 

here. 

Are you taking direct issue with the SIGAR? 

Mr. SAMPLER. I have in the past. And I will. We certainly have 

the numbers, and we share all our data with SIGAR. If there are 

particular issues that he would like to explore, we are happy to 

share the information that we have. 

There are times when the special Inspector General takes a different view of success than we do or he takes a different view of 

the risk of particular programs we are pursuing than we do. But 

we don’t do programs that don’t have metrics. 

That is not something that I would come before Congress and defend or go before my boss, Dr. Shah, and defend. We do have 

metrics on all of our programs. And if—if we have been remiss in 

not sharing our numbers broadly enough, I am happy to address 

that. 

If you would allow me to address——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I would just say—and I know you want to 

go on, and I welcome it. 

I would just say to you there is a profound difference between 

your testimony right here and now and what we heard in June—

profound—and one is true or the other is true. They can’t both be 

true. 

I take your point that we have metrics, but some metrics are 

meaningless and some metrics are meaningful and—but he 

claims—and so did GAO, by the way; he backed it up—that, ‘‘Sorry. 

We don’t have those. We can’t have metrics. We can’t even establish metrics. That is how bad it is. We can’t account for billions of 

dollars in economic assistance to Afghanistan.’’

And you are here testifying that is not true, and you are wearing 

your AID hat asserting that. Is that correct? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Congressman, I don’t know the context under 

which they said that, but I will stand behind my assertion that we 

have metrics for the programs we perform in Afghanistan. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. You wanted to——

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Mr. SAMPLER. Very briefly. 

Several of the members raised the issue that 2014 has been the 

most violent year in Afghanistan of the last 5, and that is actually 

certainly true. Our numbers show attacks up 83 percent over the 

average of the previous 5 years. But I wanted to give you a customer’s perspective of security in Afghanistan. 

In the last 15 days, there were about 10 or 12 attacks just in the 

greater Kabul area alone. And I called some of my partners working on the ground in Afghanistan to make sure that they were—

that they had what they needed to assure their own safety, and the 

partners made the following observation. 

They said that the Government of Afghanistan doesn’t control 

the number of incidents of violence that occur. The Taliban has a 

vote in that regard. And so they recognize that the number of incidents may not be immediately something the government can manage. 

But two different partners spoke very highly of the professionalism of the police who had responded to attacks on their compounds and who had dealt with their Afghan staff and their international staff in what they described as a very competent and a 

very professional way. 

So I would just propose for your consideration that, as we evaluate the Government of Afghanistan’s ability to secure its population, we focus on their response to violent incidents more right 

now than on their ability to prevent them. 

Preventing violence is maybe a graduate-level task that we expect them to eventually achieve, but right now I am thrilled to see, 

given my 12 years in Afghanistan, that the police in Afghanistan 

are someone someone—that they are partners welcome into their 

compounds as opposed to refuse to deal with. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Sampler. We will explore this in 

more depth. Thank you. 

My final question, with the indulgence of the chair, has to do 

with the DEA and drugs. 

Mr. Soiles, in the time we have been in Afghanistan, given our 

commitment to fighting poppy production and narcotics trafficking 

and cross-border transshipment of illicit drugs to Iran, what has 

happened in that time period is, I believe, Afghanistan is now the 

world’s number 1 heroin-producing country and Iran is now the 

number 1 heroin addict-consuming country, despite us spending 

$7.8 billion in counternarcotics funding. 

How—again, the efficacy question. So we feel pretty good about 

our investment and the payoff? 

Mr. SOILES. The DEA part of that—the DEA part of that is a 

very small budget. I mean, our vetted teams there that we have 

that we have trained—we have 77 vetted members. 

We have what we call the National Interdiction Unit, which is 

our kind of SWAT team types that go out and project out with our 

FAST teams into—outside of Kabul that—that is only about 530 

members. 

And then we have what we call the Technical Investigative Unit, 

which is our intercept program that we have there in order to go 

after the command-and-control structures of organizations. 

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You have to be able to intercept their communications. To intercept their communications, you need a—we have a judicial process 

in Afghanistan that we helped build and, as a result, we use that 

as evidence. 

Those units have been very effective. We—we stood up this—the 

counternarcotics police of Afghanistan from scratch along with our 

partners from State and our partners from DOD. We have trainer 

training programs, and now they are training——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Soiles. Mr. Soiles. You are representing the 

United States Government here, too. I mean, yes, you are DEA and 

Mr. Blanc is State Department, where we have a narcotics matters 

bureau. Presumably, you are coordinating with all of the U.S. entities in a coordinated anti—you know, counternarcotic strategy for 

Afghanistan. 

When I was in Afghanistan, I remember getting briefed by DEA 

and State Department and the Embassy and so forth in Kabul 

about what we were planning and what we were doing and the 

interdiction and all that good stuff. 

But the fact of the matter is, I think, the narcotics trade—well, 

poppy production has grown, not decreased, and the narcotics trade 

has grown, not decreased, both in volume and in value. 

So don’t we have to ask ourselves that—you know, what—do we 

need to do something different. Because it doesn’t seem to have 

worked. 

And it is hardly like the United States didn’t have a footprint in 

Afghanistan. I mean, the longest war in our history was in Afghanistan. 

Mr. SOILES. True. Bottom line is we do. We ask that question 

every day. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And are we satisfied with the answer? 

Mr. SOILES. We don’t see an alternative other than to continue 

building the capabilities of the Afghans for them to have a sustainable ability to solve their own problem, and that is what we do. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you believe the current Afghan Government 

is committed to ‘‘solving their own problem’’ with respect to narcotics? 

Mr. SOILES. I think the former government had a big issue of—

not the guys—not the people that we work with, quite honestly, the 

rank and file counternarcotics police officers that we deal with, but 

I think there was some significant lack of political will from the 

former administration. With Ashraf Ghani in, the new President, 

when are hopeful. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am not sure I am satisfied with 

the answers about efficacy, but I am glad we had the hearing to 

explore it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is a good theme. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I am glad that we had the hearing as 

well. I am glad that we had all of the hearings this session. 

We thank you gentlemen for your service to our country. We 

know that this is a very troubling situation, the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We could be at this all day and all night 

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and not come up with the answers, but we thank you for what you 

are doing for our country. 

Thank you. And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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