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*********************************************** 
MARTIN J. PRAISNER, JR. v. STATE

OF CONNECTICUT

(AC 40784)

DiPentima, C. J., and Prescott and Elgo, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, a former member of a special police force maintained by

the defendant state of Connecticut for one of its universities, sought,

pursuant to statute ([Rev. to 2013] § 53-39a), indemnification from the

state for economic losses that he allegedly incurred as a result of a

federal criminal action filed against him in his official capacity. The

state filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the action was barred by

sovereign immunity and, therefore, that the trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the action was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity

because members of the university’s special police force fell within a

class of individuals, namely, members of a local police department, who

are expressly authorized to bring an action against the state under § 53-

39a. Thereafter, the state filed a motion for summary judgment, renewing

its claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity, and the plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment as to liability only. The trial court, relying on the law of the case

doctrine, denied the state’s motion and granted the plaintiff’s motion.

Following a hearing in damages, the court rendered judgment in favor

of the plaintiff and awarded him certain damages. Subsequently, the

trial court rendered a supplemental judgment in which it awarded the

plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs. On the state’s amended appeal to this

court, held that the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiff’s

action was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as that

court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff, as a member of the

university’s special police force, was authorized to bring the action

pursuant to § 53-39a: this court, after reviewing the unambiguous text

of § 53-39a and its relationship to other statutes, concluded that the

plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable basis on which to conclude that

his claim for indemnification fell within the waiver of sovereign immunity

contained in § 53-39a, as that statute, which identifies certain officers

and other classes of persons with exacting precision, contains no reference to members of the university’s special police force, which strongly

suggested that they do not fall within the narrow scope of the statute,

and, unlike § 53-39a, the statute ([Rev. to 2013] § 10a-142, as amended

by No. 13-195, § 1, of the 2013 Public Acts), that provides for the establishment of special police forces for public universities of the state, by its

plain language specifies particular duties, responsibilities and authority

that members of those special police forces share with members of

local police departments, thereby recognizing that those entities are

distinct, which distinction is underscored by a number of other statutes

in which the legislature has differentiated between them; moreover,

because our Supreme Court has construed the term ‘‘local police department’’ as used in § 53-39a as implicating governmental, rather than sovereign, immunity, it was difficult to reconcile the plaintiff’s undisputed

status as a state employee with his contention that he qualified under

§ 53-39a as a member of a local police department, and common sense

persuaded this court that the legislature did not intend state employees

like the plaintiff to qualify as members of a local police department;

furthermore, given that § 10a-142 (b) expressly identifies certain sections

of the General Statutes as ones either applicable or inapplicable to

members of such special police forces, but § 53-39a is not mentioned

in any manner, if the legislature had intended § 53-39a to apply to members of the university’s special police force, it easily could have included

that statute among those specifically identified in § 10a-142 (b), but it

did not do so, and § 10a-142 (e) contains an indemnification provision

that applies specifically to members of the university’s special police

force without reference to § 53-39a, which suggested that the legislature

intended § 10a-142 (e) to govern the indemnification of such members.
Argued December 6, 2018—officially released April 30, 2019

Procedural History

Action for indemnification for economic losses allegedly incurred by the plaintiff as a result of a federal

criminal action filed against him in his capacity as a

police officer, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the

court, Hon. Richard M. Rittenband, judge trial referee,

denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss; thereafter,

the court, Scholl, J., denied the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment and granted the plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment as to liability; subsequently, after

a hearing in damages, the court, Pittman, J., rendered

judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant

appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Pittman,

J., rendered a supplemental judgment awarding the

plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs, and the defendant

filed an amended appeal. Reversed; judgment directed.

Emily V. Melendez, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, former attorney

general, for the appellant (defendant).

Elliot B. Spector, with whom was David C. Yale, for

the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The defendant, the state of Connecticut,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its

motion for summary judgment in this indemnification

action brought by the plaintiff, Martin J. Praisner, Jr.,

pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53-39a.1

On appeal, the state contends that the court improperly

concluded that the action was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The facts are not in dispute. At all relevant times,

the state maintained a special police force for Eastern

Connecticut State University (university). The plaintiff

was a member of that special police force and an

employee of the state. While on duty on September 1,

2008, the plaintiff was involved in an incident in which

he allegedly ‘‘deployed pepper spray against an intoxicated and violent prisoner in a converted Sheetrock

coat closet, which was used as a holding cell, and failed

to promptly decontaminate the prisoner.’’ Weeks later,

the plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave by

the university. He thereafter applied for a position with

the state’s Department of Correction (department) and

was hired as a correction officer on August 15, 2009.

On December 1, 2009, the plaintiff was indicted by

the federal government and charged with the crimes

of conspiracy to violate an individual’s civil rights in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 and deprivation of an individual’s civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. Following

his arrest, the plaintiff’s employment with the department was terminated. After two federal trials that both

resulted in hung juries, the United States District Court

for the District of Connecticut on August 10, 2011,

granted the government’s motion to dismiss the indictment against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff subsequently demanded reimbursement

from the state for economic losses that he allegedly

incurred as a result of his federal prosecution. When

the state declined to do so, the plaintiff commenced

the present action. His one count complaint sought

indemnification pursuant to § 53-39a ‘‘for economic

losses sustained . . . as a result of the aforesaid arrest

and prosecution, including the payment of any legal

fees incurred in pursuing these damages.’’3

In response, the state moved to dismiss the action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the memorandum of law that accompanied that motion, the state

acknowledged that § 53-39a ‘‘waives the [s]tate’s immunity to liability and suit,’’ but only with respect to ‘‘those

individuals who fall within the designated classifications’’ set forth in that statute. The state then argued

that (1) members of the university’s special police force

do not fall within the class of individuals who expressly

are authorized to bring an action against the state pursu-
ant to § 53-39a and (2) the complaint contained no allegation that the plaintiff had obtained permission from

the Claims Commissioner to institute the action for

monetary relief. See General Statutes § 4-160.4 The

plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss, to

which the state filed a reply brief.

The court, Hon. Richard M. Rittenband, judge trial

referee, heard argument from the parties on March 17,

2014. In an order issued later that day, the court concluded that a member of the university’s special police

force ‘‘falls under the category of a member of a local

police department’’ as that term is used in § 53-39a. The

court therefore denied the motion to dismiss. The state

filed a motion to reargue that ruling, which the court

denied.

The state then answered the complaint, and the plaintiff filed a certificate of closed pleadings, in which he

requested a court trial. On January 13, 2017, the state

filed a motion for summary judgment, renewing its

claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

due to sovereign immunity. Relying on the law of the

case doctrine,5

the court, Scholl, J., denied that motion.

The court at that time also granted the plaintiff’s cross

motion for summary judgment as to liability only. A

hearing in damages followed, at the conclusion of which

the court, Pittman, J., rendered judgment in favor of

the plaintiff ‘‘in the amount of $658,849 in lost earnings

and benefits . . . .’’ Approximately one month later,

the court rendered a supplemental judgment, in which

it awarded the plaintiff $118,196.04 in attorney’s fees

and costs. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the state claims that the court improperly

determined that the plaintiff, as a member of the university’s special police force, was authorized to bring the

present action in the Superior Court pursuant to § 53-

39a. The state argues that because the plaintiff has

not established that he falls clearly within any of the

classifications of individuals specified therein, sovereign immunity bars his action for monetary relief. We

agree.

At the outset, we note that ‘‘[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction

and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.

. . . A determination regarding a trial court’s subject

matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When . . . the

trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are

legally and logically correct and find support in the

facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Machado v. Taylor, 326 Conn. 396, 403,

163 A.3d 558 (2017).

Our courts ‘‘have long recognized the validity of the

common-law principle that the state cannot be sued

without its consent . . . . A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete

theory, but on the logical and practical ground that

there can be no legal right as against the authority that

makes the law on which the right depends.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Horton v.

Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). Rooted

in the recognition that subjecting ‘‘state and federal

governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective

instrumentalities, funds and property,’’ the doctrine of

sovereign immunity shields the state ‘‘from unconsented to litigation, as well as unconsented to liability.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocky Hill v.

SecureCare Realty, LLC, 315 Conn. 265, 282, 105 A.3d

857 (2015).

In the present case, the plaintiff’s action is one for

monetary damages stemming from his criminal prosecution in federal court. To avoid dismissal, the allegations of his complaint, construed in their most favorable

light, must establish either that his indemnification

action falls clearly within a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity or that the Claims Commissioner had

authorized the action. See Nelson v. Dettmer, 305 Conn.

654, 661, 46 A.3d 916 (2012); Babes v. Bennett, 247 Conn.

256, 262, 721 A.2d 511 (1998). Fairly construed, the

plaintiff’s complaint alleges that, as a member of the

university’s special police force, he qualifies under the

statutory waiver embodied in § 53-39a as a member

of a local police department.6 For its part, the state

concedes that § 53-39a is an indemnification statute that

constitutes an express legislative waiver of sovereign

immunity.7 The state nonetheless contends that members of the university’s special police force do not fall

within the narrow class of individuals specified therein.

The issue before us, then, is whether the legislature

intended to include such members within the waiver

of statutory immunity contained in § 53-39a. That issue

presents a question of statutory interpretation, over

which our review is plenary. See Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400, 416, 195 A.3d

664 (2018). The principles that govern such review are

well established. ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the

apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words,

we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts

of [the] case, including the question of whether the

language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us

first to consider the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such

text and considering such relationship, the meaning of

such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . .
When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also

look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history

and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the

legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to

its relationship to existing legislation and common law

principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We begin with the relevant statutory language. General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53-39a provides: ‘‘Whenever, in any prosecution of an officer of the Division

of State Police within the Department of Emergency

Services and Public Protection, or a member of the

Office of State Capitol Police or any person appointed

under section 29-18 as a special policeman for the State

Capitol building and grounds, the Legislative Office

Building and parking garage and related structures and

facilities, and other areas under the supervision and

control of the Joint Committee on Legislative Management, or a local police department for a crime allegedly

committed by such officer in the course of his duty as

such, the charge is dismissed or the officer found not

guilty, such officer shall be indemnified by his

employing governmental unit for economic loss sustained by him as a result of such prosecution, including

the payment of attorney’s fees and costs incurred during

the prosecution and the enforcement of this section.

Such officer may bring an action in the Superior Court

against such employing governmental unit to enforce

the provisions of this section.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Section 53-39a delineates four classifications of individuals that expressly are authorized to bring an action

against the state: (1) officers of the Division of State

Police within the Department of Emergency Services

and Public Protection; (2) members of the Office of

State Capitol Police; (3) any person appointed under

§ 29-18 as a special policeman for the State Capitol

building and grounds, the Legislative Office Building

and parking garage and related structures and facilities,

and other areas under the supervision and control of

the Joint Committee on Legislative Management; and

(4) members of a local police department. Only the

fourth class of individuals is at issue in this case.8

The term ‘‘local police department’’ is not defined in

§ 53-39a or elsewhere in the General Statutes. On

appeal, the plaintiff notes that the commonly understood meaning of the term ‘‘local,’’ as gleaned from

dictionaries, is ‘‘relating to place’’ and ‘‘confined to a

particular place.’’ See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) p. 1327. The plaintiff thus

argues that the term ‘‘local police department’’ encompasses the university’s special police force, particularly

because the General Statutes demarcate the jurisdiction

of a special police force as confined to ‘‘the geographical

limits of the property owned or under the control of’’

the educational institution. See General Statutes (Rev.
2013) § 10a-142 (a), as amended by No. 13-195, §1, of

the 2013 Public Acts.9

If that construction is correct, it

necessarily would encompass persons appointed under

§ 29-18 as a special policeman for the State Capitol

building and grounds, the Legislative Office Building

and parking garage and related structures and facilities.

The fact that the legislature deemed it necessary to

specifically and expressly provide indemnification to

that class of persons undermines the plaintiff’s broad

reading of the term ‘‘local police department’’ in § 53-

39a. Although § 53-39a identifies certain officers with

exacting precision, it contains no reference whatsoever

to members of the university’s special police force,

which strongly suggests that members of the university’s special police force do not fall within the narrow

confines of § 53-39a. See DeNunzio v. DeNunzio, 320

Conn. 178, 194, 128 A.3d 901 (2016).

The plaintiff also asserts that members of the university’s special police force and members of a municipal

police department ‘‘are for all intents and purposes

identical’’ and ‘‘provide the same full range of services

. . . .’’10 We disagree. Unlike § 53-39a, § 10a-142

expressly applies to members of the university’s special

police force. Titled ‘‘Special police forces,’’ § 10a-142

provides for the establishment of special police forces

for the public universities of this state, including the

university. By its plain language, that statute specifies

particular ‘‘duties, responsibilities and authority’’ that

members of those special police forces share with members of a ‘‘local police department.’’ General Statutes

(Rev. to 2013) § 10a-142, as amended by No. 13-195,

§1, of the 2013 Public Acts. In so doing, the statute

recognizes that those special police forces and local

police departments are distinct entities. That distinction

also is underscored by other statutes in which the legislature has differentiated ‘‘special police forces’’ from

‘‘local police departments.’’ See, e.g., General Statutes

(Rev. to 2013) § 10a-55a (a) (mandating that ‘‘[t]he state

police, local police departments and special police

forces established pursuant to section 10a-142 shall

cooperate with institutions of higher education in preparing [campus crime] reports’’). Section 10a-142 further reflects the limited scope of the duties,

responsibilities, and authority shared with members of

a local police department. See General Statutes (Rev.

to 2013) § 10a-142 (a), as amended by No. 13-195, §1,

of the 2013 Public Acts (‘‘[t]he members of each special

police force shall have the same duties, responsibilities

and authority under sections 7-281, 14-8, 54-1f and

54-33a and title 53a as members of a duly organized

local police department’’ [emphasis added]). Had the

legislature intended all of chapter 104 of the General

Statutes,11 for example, to apply to members of the

university’s special police force, it would not have so

circumscribed the duties, responsibilities and authority

specified in § 10a-142 (a).
In addition, § 10a-142 (b) provides in relevant part

that members of the university’s special police forces

‘‘shall . . . be state employees . . . .’’ See also General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 4-141 (in context of claims

against state, defining ‘‘state officers and employees’’

to include ‘‘every person elected or appointed to or

employed in any office, position or post in the state

government, whatever such person’s title, classification

or function’’) For that reason, the plaintiff understandably alleged in his complaint that he was ‘‘a state

employee’’ as a result of his employment with the university’s special police force. As a state employee, the

plaintiff does not fall within the protections of ‘‘the

governmental immunity applicable to municipalities’’;

Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn. 1, 26, 664 A.2d 719 (1995); see also

Murphy v. Ives, 151 Conn. 259, 264, 196 A.2d 596 (1963);

nor has the plaintiff so argued. Because our Supreme

Court has construed the term ‘‘local police department’’

as used in § 53-39a as one implicating governmental,

rather than sovereign, immunity; see Martinez v. Dept.

of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 87–88, 818 A.2d 758

(2003); it is difficult to reconcile the plaintiff’s undisputed status as a state employee with his contention

that he qualifies under § 53-39a as a member of a local

police department.12 Common sense further persuades

us that the legislature did not intend state employees

like the plaintiff to qualify as members of a local police

department. See Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 284 Conn. 149, 171, 931 A.2d 890

(2007) (‘‘[i]t is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that courts must interpret statutes using common sense’’); Trumbull v. State, 206 Conn. 65, 80, 537

A.2d 431 (1988) (‘‘[c]ommon sense . . . is a highly significant guide to statutory interpretation’’).

It also is significant that § 10a-142 (b) expressly identifies certain sections of the General Statutes as ones

either applicable or inapplicable to members of such

special police forces, but § 53-39a is not mentioned in

any manner.13 Had the legislature intended § 53-39a to

apply to members of the university’s special police

force, it easily could have included that statute among

those specifically identified in § 10a-142 (b), but it did

not. The precedent of our Supreme Court instructs that

‘‘[u]nless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory

itemization indicates that the legislature intended the

list to be exclusive.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Republican Party of Connecticut v. Merrill, 307 Conn.

470, 492–93, 55 A.3d 251 (2012); see also Feehan v.

Marcone, 331 Conn. 436, 472, A.3d (2019)

(‘‘[b]ecause [General Statutes] § 9-328 is contained in

chapter 149 of the General Statutes, and therefore not

in the chapters or sections listed in [General Statutes]

§ 9-372, the definition . . . contained in § 9-372 (7), by

its own unambiguous terms, does not apply to § 9-328’’).

The legislature’s failure to include § 53-39a among the
statutes specified in § 10a-142 (b) is further evidence

that it did not intend members of the university’s special

police force to fall within the narrow statutory waiver

of sovereign immunity contained in § 53-39a. See C. R.

Klewin Northeast, LLC v. State, 299 Conn. 167, 177, 9

A.3d 326 (2010).

Section 10a-142 also contains an indemnification provision that applies specifically to members of the university’s special police force. It provides in relevant part:

‘‘The state shall protect and save harmless any member

of the special police forces from financial loss and

expense, including reasonable legal fees and costs, if

any, arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment

by reason of the alleged deprivation by such member

of any person’s civil rights, which deprivation was not

wanton, reckless or malicious, provided such member,

at the time of such acts resulting in such alleged deprivation, was acting in the discharge of such member’s

duties or within the scope of such member’s employment or under the direction of a superior officer.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 10a-142 (e), as amended

by No. 13-195, § 1, of the 2013 Public Acts.

The existence of a statute that specifically provides

indemnification to members of special police forces

without reference to § 53-39a suggests that the legislature intended § 10a-142 (e) to govern the indemnification of such members. As our Supreme Court has

explained: ‘‘[W]e repeatedly have stated in seeking to

ascertain legislative intent from more than one statutory

pronouncement on a particular subject [that] specific

terms in a statute covering a given subject matter will

prevail over the more general language of the same or

another statute that otherwise might be controlling.

. . . This oft-stated principle reflects the fact that specific statutory language constitutes a more accurate

representation of the legislature’s purpose or intent

than more general pronouncements concerning the

same subject matter.’’ (Citations omitted.) Thibodeau

v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691,

713–14, 802 A.2d 731 (2002). The presence of an indemnification provision that specifically pertains to the

indemnification of members of the university’s special

police force counsels against an expansive reading of

the term ‘‘local police department’’ in § 53-39a to encompass the plaintiff’s claim for indemnification in the present case. See LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828,

837–38, 144 A.3d 373 (2016) (court must read statutes

together when they relate to same subject matter

because legislature presumed to create harmonious and

consistent body of law).

Lastly, we are mindful of the particular context in

which this issue arises. The plaintiff is a litigant seeking

to secure monetary damages from the state. To do so,

he must overcome the ‘‘strong presumption in favor of

the state’s immunity from liability or suit’’; Envirotest
Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 293

Conn. 382, 387–88, 978 A.2d 49 (2009); by demonstrating

that his claim clearly falls within the narrow scope of

a statutory waiver. See, e.g., State v. Lombardo Bros.

Mason Contractors, Inc., 307 Conn. 412, 452, 54 A.3d

1005 (2012) (‘‘[t]he scope of [an] exception [to sovereign

immunity] is not to be extended, modified, repealed or

enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of [statutory]

construction’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]);

Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue

Services, 301 Conn. 268, 289, 21 A.3d 759 (2011) (statutory waiver of immunity must be narrowly construed

and its scope must be confined strictly); Dept. of Public

Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558,

737 A.2d 398 (1999) (party attempting to bring action

under statutory waiver must come clearly within its

provisions). On our review of the text of § 53-39a and

its relationship to other statutes, we conclude that the

plaintiff has not established a reasonable basis on which

to conclude that his claim for indemnification falls

within the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 53-39a. As applied to the facts of this case,

the statute is unambiguous, and we, therefore, do not

consider extratextual evidence of its meaning. See State

v. Josephs, 328 Conn. 21, 26, 176 A.3d 542 (2018).

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to render judgment dismissing the action

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 53-39a in this

opinion are to the 2013 revision of the statute.

2 The state alternatively claims that ‘‘[e]ven if sovereign immunity did not

bar the plaintiff’s suit . . . the award of damages [ultimately] determined

by the trial court would still be erroneous . . . .’’ In light of our conclusion

that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s action,

we do not consider the merits of that claim.

3 The plaintiff’s claimed damages included ‘‘lost overtime’’ with the university’s special police force; ‘‘lost employment’’ and ‘‘lost overtime’’ with the

department; ‘‘lost pension benefits and contributions’’; ‘‘lost insurance, sick

time and vacation time’’; and ‘‘future lost earnings.’’

4

‘‘When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state

and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim.’’ (Emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301,

317, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).

5

‘‘The law of the case doctrine expresses the practice of judges generally

to refuse to reopen what [already] has been decided . . . . New pleadings

intended to raise again a question of law which has been already presented

on the record and determined adversely to the pleader are not to be favored.

. . . [When] a matter has previously been ruled [on] interlocutorily, the

court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may treat that decision as the

law of the case, if it is of the opinion that the issue was correctly decided,

in the absence of some new or overriding circumstance.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut

Oil Recycling Services, LLC, 308 Conn. 312, 322, 63 A.3d 896 (2013).

6 The plaintiff has never alleged that he obtained the authorization of

the Claims Commissioner to pursue this action for monetary damages. In

addition, we emphasize that the plaintiff brought this indemnification action

pursuant to § 53-39a, and not General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 10a-142 (a).

As the plaintiff’s counsel confirmed at oral argument on the motion to

dismiss, ‘‘[h]is indemnification is solely under § 53-39a.’’

7

In its principal appellate brief, the state acknowledges that ‘‘the statute
at issue in this case—[§] 53-39a—is a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity’’ and that ‘‘§ 53-39a contains an express waiver of sovereign immunity

. . . .’’ That position is consistent with the state’s assertion in its memorandum of law on its motion to dismiss that § 53-39a ‘‘waives the [s]tate’s

immunity to liability and suit . . . .’’

8

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that his employment as a member

of the university’s special police force constituted membership in a local

police department, thus bringing his action within the fourth class of individuals specified in § 53-39a. In denying the state’s motion to dismiss, the court

agreed with that contention.

9 General Statutes § 10a-142 has been amended on multiple occasions,

and now is codified as General Statutes § 10a-156b. Because the plaintiff

commenced this action by service of process on July 19, 2013, the operative

statute is General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 10a-142, as amended by No. 13-

195, §1, of the 2013 Public Acts. Unless otherwise indicated, all references

to § 10a-142 in this opinion are to that revision.

10 In its appellate brief, the plaintiff cites a litany of statutes generally

pertaining to local police officers. As the plaintiff’s counsel conceded at

oral argument before this court, none of those statutes provides a definition

of ‘‘local police’’ that includes members of a special police force, nor do

those statutes expressly indicate their applicability thereto. Furthermore,

none of those statutes pertains to indemnification, the subject of § 53-39a.

In addition, we note that several of the statutes relied on by the plaintiff

pertain to training programs administered by the Police Officer Standards

and Training Council. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 7-294a et seq.

Significantly, General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 7-294a (9) defines ‘‘[p]olice

officer’’ as ‘‘a sworn member of an organized local police department, an

appointed constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, 29-18a or 29-19 or any member

of a law enforcement unit who performs police duties . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) That definition appears to encompass members of the university’s

special police force, as they are members of a law enforcement unit who

perform police duties.

11 Titled ‘‘Municipal Police and Fire Protection,’’ chapter 104 contains

numerous sections that pertain to the duties, responsibilities and authority

of local police.

12 In this regard, we note that the legislature in other statutes has utilized

the term ‘‘local police’’ as a synonym for municipal law enforcement. See,

e.g., General Statutes § 8-265mm (c) (1) (to be eligible for assistance under

home purchasing assistance program ‘‘an applicant shall . . . [b]e a local

police officer employed by a municipal police department on a full-time or

part-time basis or a state police officer’’); General Statutes § 29-1l (a) (‘‘in

the event of any incident involving numerous victims or casualties, the chief

or superintendent of the local police department having jurisdiction over

the municipality where such incident occurred or, where there is no organized local police department, the commanding officer of the state police

troop having jurisdiction over such municipality may notify the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection of such incident’’).

13 General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 10a-142 (b), as amended by No. 13-

195, § 1, of the 2013 Public Acts, provides: ‘‘Members of said special police

forces shall continue to be state employees and shall be subject to the

provisions of chapter 67, and parts III and IV of this chapter. The provisions

of part V of chapter 104 and section 7-433c shall not apply to such members.’’