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Joint Special Operations University

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Ph.D., Education

The Apollinaire Group and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

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JSOU Senior Fellow

Gilbert E. Doan

Major, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Institutional 

Integration Division Chief

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution Stanford 

Univ. and JSOU Senior Fellow

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director of the Jebsen Center for 

Counter-Terrorism Studies, The 

Fletcher School, Tufts University 

and JSOU Senior Fellow

George Emile Irani

Ph.D., International Relations

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Studies and JSOU Associate Fellow

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Lt Colonel, U.S. Air Force

JSOU Strategic Studies 

Department Director

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Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow 

Kenneth H. Poole

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

James F. Powers, Jr.

Director of Homeland Security, 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Stephen Sloan

Ph.D., Comparative Politics

University of Central Florida

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Joseph S. Stringham

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Alutiiq, LLC and JSOU

Associate Fellow

Joseph A. Stuart

Ph.D., Educational Leadership

JSOU Dean of Academics

J. Paul de B. Taillon

Ph.D., International Affairs

Royal Military College of Canada 

and JSOU Associate Fellow

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Ph.D., History

Courage Services, Inc. and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

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and JSOU Senior Fellow

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JSOU Senior Fellow
JSOU Report 07-10

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2007

Intelligence 

in Denied Areas

New Concepts for a 

Changing Security Environment

Russell D. Howard
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

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JSOU Press publications can be found at https://jsou.socom.mil/gateway/highlights.aspx. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written 

works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more 

information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, 

at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-21-0
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint 

Special Operations University.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, 

Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and 

Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise,

December 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community,

January 2007, Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, 

Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 


Contents

Foreword ...............................................................................vii

About the Author ....................................................................ix

Introduction............................................................................ 1

1. The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend................................. 7

2. Leveraging Diasporas........................................................ 15

3. Marriage of Convenience: NGOs and 

 U.S. Intelligence Agency Cooperation............................... 25

4. SOF for Life: A Potential Intelligence Force Multiplier ....... 33

Concluding Remarks ............................................................ 37

Endnotes............................................................................... 39

vii

Foreword

Russell Howard’s paper focuses on intelligence operations 

within denied areas and how these operations today differ 

from those of the Cold War period. Today, the preeminent 

threat is transnational, violent terrorist groups that operate under 

the cover of failed or weak states, as well as under the civil protections afforded in western liberal democracies. Howard focuses on the 

operational environments in failed or weak states as he discusses 

ways to improve intelligence targeting and collection in these challenging areas.

The congressionally mandated 9/11 Commission highlighted 

shortcomings in United States intelligence capabilities. In particular, 

the commission emphasized the need to refocus the intelligence community to overcome institutional biases toward technical intelligence 

collection. Howard’s paper agrees with this assessment and provides 

four areas for consideration to improve our ability to operate against 

transnational terror networks. 

One area of consideration is using criminal networks to target 

terrorist networks. Howard makes a cogent argument that there is 

significant overlap between criminal and terrorist organizations. Targeting and manipulating criminals may significantly improve intelligence collection on terrorist activities. Traditionally, lawmakers have 

resisted using “tainted” intelligence sources, as evidenced by Congress’ 

restrictions imposed in the 1990s on using sources with human rights 

violations. The reality is there is a nexus between criminal and terrorist networks and “wishing away” this linkage is not an appropriate 

policy—managing and taking advantage of the linkage is the right 

course of action.

Another theme that flows through this work is the importance of

leveraging networks to target and collect on other networks. In the 

current conflict, the battle of the narrative is critical to winning and

maintaining public support, and it is a pivotal element in the irregular 

warfare paradigm. Ethnic diasporas and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) are two powerful factors within the narrative battle and 

Howard is quite persuasive in his arguments for the need to better 

leverage these communities. 
Intelligence targeting and operations may well be the decisive 

factor in winning the long war against radical terrorist networks. 

Most observers will readily agree that the United States intelligence 

community is not optimized for this fight and, although improvements

have been made since 9/11, more needs to be done. Howard’s treatise 

helps point the way, not only for the intelligence community, but for 

the SOF community in particular. 

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
ix

About the Author

Brigadier General (Ret.) Howard is 

the founding director of the Jebsen 

Center for Counter Terrorism Studies at the Fletcher School and a JSOU senior 

fellow. Prior to assuming his current responsibilities, he was the Social Sciences Department chair and the founding director of the 

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 

His previous Army positions include chief 

of staff fellow at the Center for International 

Affairs, Harvard University and commander of the 1st Special Forces 

Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. Other recent assignments 

include assistant to the Special Representative to the Secretary General during United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II, deputy 

chief of staff for I Corps, and chief of staff and deputy commander for 

the Combined Joint Task Force, Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group. Previously, he was commander of 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training 

Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He also served as the 

administrative assistant to Admiral Stansfield Turner and as a special

assistant to the commander of SOUTHCOM. 

As a newly commissioned officer, he served as an “A” team commander in the 7th Special Forces Group from 1970 to 1972. From 

1972 to 1980, he served in the U.S. Army Reserve and was an overseas 

manager, American International Underwriters, Melbourne, Australia 

and China tour manager for Canadian Pacific Airlines. In 1980 he was

recalled to active duty and served in Korea as an infantry company 

commander. Subsequent assignments included classified project officer, U.S. Army 1st Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, and 

operations officer and company commander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special

Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. 

General Howard holds a B.S. in Industrial Management from San 

Jose State University and B.A. in Asian Studies from the University 

of Maryland. He also has two master’s degrees: M.A. in International 

Management from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and 

MPA from Harvard University. He was an assistant professor of Social 

Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy and a senior service college fellow 

at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

 Introduction

The September 11, 2001 attacks and the ensuing Americanled campaign against Al Qaeda and its affiliated movements

marked the initial phase of what will no doubt be a long-term 

struggle against terrorism. The tasks facing the United States and other 

nations battling terrorism are extraordinarily difficult: future terrorist

attacks must be prevented, terrorists must be denied the means to 

carry out attacks, and any plans to attack the U.S. and its allies must 

be preempted. None of these tasks can be achieved without accurate 

and timely intelligence—particularly human intelligence (HUMINT).

Unfortunately, and as outlined in a host of studies, panels, and 

committees, intelligence—and HUMINT in particular—was inadequate in predicting, preventing, or preempting the events of 9/11. 

This fact was clearly documented in the 9/11 Commission Report, 

which determined the U.S. intelligence community tried to solve the 

Al Qaeda problem with the capabilities it had used in the last stages 

of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath.1 These capabilities, 

according to the Commission, were insufficient, yet little was done to

expand or reform them. Finally, the 9/11 Commission concluded that 

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence organizations needed to wean themselves from an over-reliance on technical 

means of intelligence gathering and to markedly improve the quality 

of intelligence obtained from human agents.2

This paper agrees that technical intelligence methods that worked 

well in a Cold War environment, such as imagery intelligence (IMINT) 

or signal intelligence (SIGINT), have not proven effective against

terrorists, and it posits that increased HUMINT capabilities will be 

crucial in waging an effective 

campaign against Al Qaeda and 

like-minded terrorist groups. 

More specifically, this paper

addresses the difficulty in 

gleaning HUMINT from denied 

areas and offers unconventional alternatives that may better fit the

post-Cold War security environment. 

...increased HUMINT capabilities 

will be crucial in waging an effective 

campaign against al Qaeda and 

like-minded terrorist groups.
JSOU Report 07-10

Background

Many in addition to those who prepared the 9/11 Commission Report 

have been critical of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence organizations 

for adhering to Cold War methodologies in the face of post-Cold War 

threats. Thorough examination of these intelligence shortcomings has 

been the topic of numerous reports, panels, and articles. However, 

missing from these critiques is much in the way of out-of-the-box 

thinking on ways to gather HUMINT in difficult-to-access or denied 

areas.

To “Cold Warrior” intelligence professionals, denied areas referred 

to the vast territories behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. In today’s 

parlance, denied areas describe regions whose nations are characterized 

by weak state structures, including sub-Saharan and Eastern Africa, 

the former Soviet bloc (particularly the newly independent states in 

Central Asia), and several quasi-states such as Nagorno-Karabakh in 

Azerbaijan and Abkhazia and Ossetia in Georgia.3

During the Cold War, access to areas behind the “curtains” was 

difficult, particularly for HUMINT gatherers—known as spies in

common language. To overcome these difficulties, U.S. intelligence

organizations developed technical means that allowed collectors to 

look behind and inside denied areas. For 

example, more than forty-six years ago, a 

top-secret U.S. spy satellite code-named 

CORONA captured a series of grainy, blackand-white photographs of selected missile 

sites in the Soviet Union and became the 

first reliable technical intelligence system 

to penetrate the Iron Curtain. This “difficult, high-risk mission...brought back

the world’s first pictures from space and,

according to the men who worked on it, 

helped preserve the peace between two Cold 

War superpowers.” 4 In one day, “CORONA 

yielded more images of the Soviet Union 

than did the entire U-2 spy plane program,” 

proving that the USSR’s missile stockpile 

was much more meager than had been 

anticipated—somewhere between 25 and 

First imagery taken by 

CORONA: Mys Shmidta 

Air Field, USSR (on the 

north coast of Siberia) 18 

Aug 1960. Photo National 

Reconnaissance Office. 
Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

50 units, rather than hundreds.5 The early CORONA systems ejected 

film canisters that parachuted to earth and were “snatched” by aircraft

before the canisters landed. Later systems with intriguing names such 

as Argon, Lanyard, Gambit, Big Bird, Dorian, and Crystal had digital 

imaging systems and downloaded and forwarded images to operators 

and analysts via radio links giving both near real-time data. 

Unfortunately, the intelligence community still relies mostly on 

the same collection paradigm created for denied areas during the Cold 

War. Clearly, remote technical collection was an appropriate means of 

obtaining critical intelligence from the Soviet Union, a bureaucratized, 

centralized, and rigid superpower adversary that exhibited strongly 

patterned behavior. However, the problem presented by many of the 

new threats—particularly transnational terrorist groups, which operate 

in the shadows of failed and failing states—is much more ambiguous 

and difficult to detect. Technical assets do little to overcome the difficulty of monitoring the activities of a dispersed network of multiple,

secretive Al Qaeda-like terrorist organizations and operational cells 

that operate around the globe.6 As one scholar states, terrorist cells 

“come and go, moving and morphing so rapidly as to render detection 

of their activities by hierarchically bound Western intelligence organizations highly problematic.” 7 The diffuse, networked structure of 

Al Qaeda, unlike the hierarchical state structure of the Soviet Union, 

does not operate from large, easily identifiable bases and does not

depend on extensive traditional communications techniques. Furthermore, unlike the Soviet and other conventional armies, Al Qaeda does 

not conduct large-scale repetitive exercises that are easily monitored 

with technical-intelligence assets. The visible signature of terrorists 

is much smaller than that of the former Soviet Union or any nationstate. Finally, technical collection assets do little to penetrate denied 

minds—not just those of a few recognized leaders, but of terrorist 

groups, social networks, and entire cultures for which there is little 

understanding in the West.8

Complicating the technical collection problem is the fact that 

Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are transnational, non-state actors

that often operate in ungoverned areas in failed and failing states. The 

CIA estimates that there are fifty ungoverned zones where terrorist

groups take advantage of states that cannot control their “borders and 

boundaries.” 9 Indeed, weakened central authority and state structure 

are common in many parts of the world, even in remote regions of 


JSOU Report 07-10

countries that are U.S. allies, such as Pakistan. As Daniel Byman 

notes, “Afghanistan, Mauritania, Pakistan, Somalia, Tajikistan, and 

Yemen are only a few of the countries where the government’s writ is 

limited to the capital and other major cities.” 10

Clearly, technical intelligence is still an important capability in 

the campaign against terrorism and in confronting more traditional 

threats. For example, the worldwide network to intercept messages 

and to carry out other forms of signals intelligence (SIGINT) operated by the National Security Administration (NSA) is important, 

even though Al Qaeda operatives have become more sophisticated in 

avoiding listening and tracking capabilities. Also, unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs) such as the Predator have been successful in identifying and attacking terrorist targets. Furthermore, despite being less 

successful in tracking non-state actors and terrorist groups, technical 

intelligence assets can be vitally important in monitoring rogue states 

such as North Korea and Iran. However, the technical assets used in 

tracking the activities of these two “axis of evil” countries, which still 

retain traditional state structures, are much less useful in monitoring 

the activities, capabilities and intentions of transnational non-state 

actors such as Al Qaeda. These terrorist organizations represent a new 

challenge to intelligence agencies: a small, well-trained, networked 

enemy that calculates, plans, and operates unchallenged from the 

ungoverned areas of failed and failing states. 

Ungoverned Areas: Failed and Failing States

Prior to 9/11, U. S. security analysts viewed failed and failing states 

as humanitarian problems; they “piqued the moral conscience but 

possessed little strategic significance.” 11 Al Qaeda’s ability to act with 

impunity from Afghanistan changed this calculus, convincing the Bush 

administration that “America is now threatened less by conquering 

states than we are by failing ones.” 12

Failed states are characterized by a failed economic infrastructure, 

nonexistent or declining health and education systems, declining 

per capita GDP, soaring inflation, rampant corruption, and food and

transportation shortages—the perfect breeding ground for Al Qaeda 

organizers and recruiters.13 These so-called weak states appeal to 

Al Qaeda and other transnational, non-state terrorist groups for the 

many benefits they offer: safe havens, conflict (combat) experience,
Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

settings for training and indoctrination, access to weapons and equipment, financial resources, staging grounds and transit zones, targets

for operations, pools of recruits, and—perhaps most appealing to 

Al Qaeda—limited opportunities for the collection of technical intelligence and HUMINT by U.S. forces.14 Failing states’ problems mirror 

those of failed states, but at lesser levels of decline. 

The threats posed by the ungoverned areas in failed and failing states have been exacerbated by the empowerment of non-state 

actors such as Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups who have access 

to modern technologies, including both highly destructive weapons 

and sophisticated communications and information systems.15 This 

empowerment of individuals and small groups has combined with the 

inability of failed states to control such groups operating and recruiting 

disaffected elements to terrorist causes within their borders. “The ease 

of travel and communication in the closely integrated world enables 

terrorist groups to increasingly act globally.” 16 The U.S. and other 

major powers are now vulnerable to attacks planned and executed 

from areas that are not only thousands of miles away from the target, 

but also from the terrorists’ native countries, as was the case with 

Al Qaeda’s 9/11 planning operations in Afghanistan.

This paper explores four different—and arguably controversial—

means of gaining intelligence in ungoverned areas of failed and failing 

states—the post Cold-War denied areas. Presented in four sections, 

this paper elaborates on different groups that have the ability to gather 

intelligence on terrorists—particularly Al Qaeda—in areas where traditional intelligence collectors have difficulty operating.

1.	 The first section describes how criminals and criminal cartels

could be used as intelligence gatherers—a controversial but 

historically not-unheard-of source. 

2. The second section explains how ethnic diasporas could be 

leveraged to gain intelligence. 

3. The third section evaluates the possibility of non-governmental 

organizations cooperating with intelligence services for mutually beneficial reasons.

4. Finally, the fourth section reexamines the SOF for Life program, 

a discarded concept that has unique intelligence collection 

possibilities. 

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

1. The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Friend

This section advances the notion that criminals—particularly 

drug, arms, and human traffickers—could be a useful source

of information and possibly actionable intelligence in the campaign against terrorism. This notion is timely because of a decision 

lifting restrictions imposed in 1995, which limited the opportunity for 

intelligence services to recruit informants who may have run afoul 

of human rights laws.17 In theory, these guidelines were designed to 

protect U.S. intelligence services. However, in practice the guidelines 

discouraged the recruiting of potentially useful informants, thus hindering collection efforts. 

It is unfortunate but necessary that intelligence operators must 

seek information from former terrorists and other criminals—people 

who most probably possess questionable human rights records. Such 

collaboration is all but inevitable in the process of obtaining specialized information, because these sources often operate in areas where 

U.S. intelligence professionals cannot easily establish a presence. As 

Cilluffo et al. state:

The intelligence community must deal with individuals who 

are unsavory and dangerous. Interaction with them does not 

imply approbation of their previous actions, but recognizes 

that the potential knowledge—information that can save the 

lives of U.S. citizens—outweighs the disagreeable background 

of these sources.18

Seeking the cooperation of unsavory 

elements in time of war is nothing new. 

Many credit Lucky Luciano, a Mafia kingpin, for aiding Naval Intelligence during 

World War II. In return for reduction in his 

prison sentence in 1942, it is often speculated that Luciano made a 

deal with the U.S. government to secure New York’s docks from Nazi 

or Fascist sabotage and to provide human intelligence (HUMINT) that 

would be used during the invasion of Sicily. Interestingly, in July 1943, 

possibly because of Luciano’s connections and influence, Italian troops

did not fire a single shot at the invading Americans in Sicily.19

Just as the Mafia was used as an intelligence source because of

its specialized knowledge and familiarity with the enemy, I argue that 

Seeking the cooperation of 

unsavory elements in time 

of war is nothing new.
JSOU Report 07-10

criminals should be leveraged today for intelligence purposes in the 

fight against terrorism. Increasingly, and most certainly since the

end of the Cold War, transnational terrorist and criminal organizations activities are linked through symbiotic activities and mutually 

beneficial arrangements. These linkages mean that it is possible for

criminal syndicates and other illegal operators to provide valuable and 

actionable information about terrorist networks and operatives.

The Connection

International organized crime groups and terrorist networks such 

as Al Qaeda have much in common. They are both engaged in illicit 

activity and use many of the same methods and tactics in the pursuit 

of their goals: violence, fear, and corruption, are but a few. Also, the 

geographic scope of both transnational organized criminal syndicates 

and terrorist networks are global—a phenomenon resulting in the 

post-1990s security environment.20

There are also significant differences between organized criminals

and terrorists. A terrorist is fundamentally an altruist: he believes 

he is serving a good cause designed to achieve a greater benefit for

a wider constituency, whereas the criminal, by and large, serves no 

cause other than his own personal aggrandizement and wealth.21

Also, the groups’ main targets of violence are different. Criminals use 

violence against other organs of force, such as the police and competing criminal elements, while terrorists predominantly direct their 

violence against unarmed civilians.22 Further, while the crimes committed by these two groups—drugs, human trafficking, arms sales,

counterfeiting, corruption, and more—do not differ in substance, they 

differ in motive. For terrorists, revenue-generating criminal activity 

is a means to support larger political and ideological objectives. For 

criminals, criminal activity in itself is their business. Bruce Hoffman 

explains it best:

Perhaps most fundamentally, the criminal is not concerned 

with influencing or affecting public opinion: he simply wants

to abscond with his money or accomplish his mercenary task 

in the quickest and easiest way possible so that he may reap 

his reward and enjoy the fruits of his labors. By contrast, 

the fundamental aim of the terrorist’s violence is ultimately 
Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

to change “the system”—about which the ordinary criminal, 

of course, couldn’t care less.23

Terrorist groups and organized criminal elements maintain various 

relationships for a number of mostly self-serving reasons. Drug trafficking, the smuggling of consumer goods, and extortion are important

sources of income for both types of groups.24 Also, organized crime 

plays a central role in terrorists’ arms supply—from traditional small 

arms to weapons of mass destruction. For example, the Al Qaeda 

network has sought fissile materials through criminal elements and

has explored the possibility of buying an intact nuclear weapon.25

In order to gain access to “strategic nuclear goods,” terrorists must 

link up with a subset of people who are willing to commit illegal or 

disloyal acts. The obvious candidates are members of criminal organizations—specifically those which have connections inside nuclear

enterprises and cross-border smuggling experience.26 In several known 

cases, “Al Qaeda reportedly negotiated with the Chechen ‘mafiya’ [sic]

to buy tactical nukes and with Russian crime figures in Europe to

obtain the makings of a radiological (dirty) bomb.” 27

The relationships between terrorists and criminal cartels vary, 

but they are most often marriages of convenience, used to gain expert 

knowledge (such as tactics or networks for activities such as moneylaundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making) or operational support 

(access to smuggling and transit routes, for example). Such a mutually 

beneficial arrangement is embodied in the relationships between criminal groups specializing in drug trafficking and terrorist groups. Since

drug traffickers and terrorists operate in a clandestine environment,

both groups utilize similar methodologies to function, says a 2005 

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) report. Interestingly, drug trafficking is now the major source of profits for both international organized

crime groups and terrorist networks.28 Furthermore, both groups, says 

the DEA report, “...lend themselves to facilitation and are among the

essential elements that may contribute to the successful conclusion 

of a catastrophic event by terrorists.” 29 Drug traffickers and terrorists also use the same transit routes in pursuit of their activities. For 

example, the 2005 DEA report outlines an ongoing operation in which 

multiple Middle Eastern drug-trafficking and terrorist cells operating in

the U.S. fund terror networks overseas, aided by established Mexican 

cartels with highly sophisticated trafficking routes.30
10

JSOU Report 07-10

Human traffickers also serve terrorist interests. Trafficking in

persons can mask the movement of members of terrorist groups. For 

example, the movement of Afghans and Pakistanis has been used 

as a cover for the transit of at least one Al Qaeda operative.31 Also, 

profits from the trade in human beings are used to fund terrorist

activities.32 Terrorists and human and drug traffickers often use the

same document forgers, particularly in Qatar and Bangkok.33 Fake 

travel documents are easily obtained—albeit often for a steep price—at 

several shops in Bangkok’s gritty Lard Prao district, which according to trafficking experts is a regional hub for forging passports and

visas.34 In fact, while doing research in Bangkok for a project linking 

human traffickers with terrorists, this author was told that for $4,000

he could change his identity in the Nara District of Bangkok—an offer 

that is surely also extended to terrorist groups and other nefarious 

individuals who use this busy city as a transit hub.35

The connections between terrorist networks and organized criminal 

syndicates are many and varied. Their operations are similar even if 

their motives differ. Hard-core terrorists who are ideologically driven 

are difficult to “break,” as reports from Guantanamo and other detention centers indicate. By contrast, criminals with special knowledge of 

terrorist activity may not be as hard to break. Their interests are not 

ideological or focused on a higher calling; rather, they are personal, 

self-serving, based on survival, and should be exploited for the benefit

of intelligence and counterterrorism operations. 

Supporting Factors

The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security runs a 

Rewards for Justice Program for the Department of Justice. The program, which offers rewards for tips leading to the capture of terrorists, 

was originally promulgated in 1986 and enhanced after 9/11.36 For 

their efforts, informants, whose identities are kept secret, can receive 

up to $5 million for tips that lead to the capture—or death—of mostwanted terrorists. Indeed, the State Department has paid out nearly 

$48 million to nineteen different people since September 11, 2001,

with payments between $300,000 and $1 million being the norm.37

Although its success with Al Qaeda targets has been limited, the 

reward program has helped to net some key fugitives, particularly in 

Iraq. According to U.S. officials, five of Saddam Hussein’s henchmen
11

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

were nabbed with the help of informants motivated by the promise 

of cash.38 In fact, Hussein’s sons, Uday and Qusay, were found and 

killed nineteen days after rewards of $15 million were offered for their

capture. Rumored to be a cousin of the slain brothers, the informant 

was paid $30 million and has left Iraq, his identity never revealed.39

In recent months, three terrorist plots in the U.S. have been foiled 

by informants. In June 2006, an informant posing as an Al Qaeda 

operative helped bring down a plot to blow up 

the Sears Tower in Chicago, and in May 2007 

an informant infiltrated a group of Muslim

extremists plotting to attack soldiers at Fort Dix, 

New Jersey. And, most recently, an informant 

helped stop a plot by Muslim extremists to bomb 

the jet fuel pipeline that supplies the JFK Airport. The informant, a 

twice-convicted drug dealer who found himself in the midst of what 

investigators called a terrorist plot “conceived as more devastating 

than the Sept. 11 attacks” was so convincing that the suspects gave 

him unfettered access to their operation.40

Despite their often selfish and perhaps insidious reasons for

cooperating, it seems that a policy of using informants—even criminals—works and should be exploited to its fullest extent. Criminals 

who have worked either with or in close proximity to terrorists should 

be priority informant candidates. 

Case Study

International arms dealer Monzer Kassar of Marbella, Spain was 

arrested on June 9, 2007 in Madrid for conspiring to sell millions of 

dollars worth of weapons to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia (FARC)—a designated foreign terrorist organization—to be 

used to kill Americans in Colombia.41 Between February 2006 and May 

2007, Kassar and two associates agreed to sell to the FARC millions 

of dollars worth of weapons, including thousands of machine guns, 

millions of rounds of ammunition, rocket-propelled grenade launchers 

(RPGs), and surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs). During a series of 

recorded telephone calls, emails, and in-person meetings, Kassar and 

his associates (who were also charged) agreed to sell the weapons to 

two men who claimed they were acquiring these weapons for the FARC 

with the specific purpose of using them to attack U.S. helicopters in

In recent months, 

three terrorist plots in 

the U.S. have been 

foiled by informants.
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Colombia.42 The buyers were actually confidential sources working

with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

Also known as Abu Munawar and El Taous, Kassar has been 

accused of a variety of crimes, including drug trafficking, illegal arms

deals, and terrorism.43 Recently, he was named by the Iraqi government as one of its most wanted men.44 A United Nations report called 

him an “international embargo buster.” John Kerry, the Democratic 

presidential candidate in 2004, has called him a “vile terrorist.” 45

Since the early 1970s, Kassar has been a ready source of weapons 

and military equipment for armed factions engaged in violent conflicts

around the world. He has provided weapons and military equipment to 

factions in Nicaragua, Brazil, Cyprus, Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, Iran, 

and Iraq, among other hot spots. Some of these factions have included 

known terrorist organizations, such as the Palestinian Liberation Front 

(PLF), the goals of which included attacking United States interests 

and U.S. nationals. In 1992, Kassar 

was arrested in Spain on charges of 

piracy and providing the arms to the 

Abu Abbas-led PLF terrorists who 

hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise ship 

and murdered American Leon Klinghoffer. Western intelligence agencies 

determined that Kassar flew Abbas

to safety aboard one of his private 

planes after the hijackers surrendered.46 Kassar was acquitted of all 

charges related to the Achille Lauro 

ordeal when tried in a Spanish court 

because most of those who agreed to 

testify against him either died mysteriously or failed to show up in court.47

In addition to Abu Abbas, Kasser has 

been connected to known terrorists 

Abu Nidal, Georges Habbash, and 

Farah and Hassan Aideed.48

To carry out his weapons trafficking and other illegal businesses,

Kassar developed an international 

network of criminal associates as 

Syrian-born arms dealer Monzer 

Al Kassar (L) escorted by Spanish 

police at his house in Marbella, 

southern Spain, June 8, 2007. 

REUTERS/Jon Nazca, used by 

permission from Newscom.
13

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

well as front companies and bank accounts in various countries, 

including the United Kingdom, Spain, Syria, Iraq, Poland, Bulgaria, 

and Romania. Additionally, Kassar has engaged in money-laundering 

transactions in bank accounts throughout the world to disguise the 

illicit nature of his criminal proceeds.49

The indictment against Kassar and two accomplices, Tareq Mousa 

Ghazi and Luis Felipe Moreno Gody, charges them with four separate 

terrorism offenses: “... conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, conspiracy to

kill U.S. officers or employees, conspiracy to provide material support

or resources to designated foreign terrorist organization, and conspiracy 

to acquired and use an antiaircraft missile.” 50 Additionally, Kassar 

and Moreno were charged with money-laundering. If convicted of all 

counts, the men face a sentence of life in prison without parole.51

Given Kassar’s history and lavish lifestyle (a fifteen-suite residence

designed like a Renaissance palazzo, where there is a swimming pool 

built in the shape of a four-leaf clover), one might surmise that Kassar 

would be good informant material. If half of the allegations about his 

associations are true, one can imagine the intelligence “treasure trove” 

that might develop from information given by Kassar in exchange for a 

reduced sentence. For his help during World War II, Luciano’s thirtyto-fifty year sentence (for which he served ten years) was commuted,

and he was deported to Italy. At the age of sixty-one, Kassar still has 

some time left to live a normal life; my guess is that he would prefer 

to live it somewhere other than prison. 

Recommendation

My recommendation is that Kassar and those criminals like him who 

have special knowledge because of the nexus between transnational 

terrorist and criminal organizations, be leveraged for intelligence 

information in the global war on terror. Kassar’s case is at least the 

fifth time in two years in which the U.S. government has relied on

paid informants to bring terrorism related charges against U.S.-based 

Muslims.52 These charges have resulted in four convictions and I believe 

more terrorist plots could be uncovered and convictions rendered 

by increasing efforts to co-opt criminal elements knowledgeable of 

terrorist activities.53 Despite the various issues that might be raised 

by collaborating with established criminals, the potential to obtain 

actionable intelligence from them is an opportunity too great to pass 
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JSOU Report 07-10

up. The developing nexus between criminal and terrorist activity—and 

the subsequent increased access to terrorist networks by criminal 

groups—make members of organized criminal syndicates ideal targets 

for intelligence-gathering operations. 
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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

2. Leveraging Diasporas

According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a diaspora refers 

to “the movement, migration, or scattering of a people away 

from an established or ancestral homeland.” 54 Originally, 

the term was exclusively applied to the Jewish Diaspora,55 but it is 

now used to describe the global distribution of various ethnic and 

cultural groups, including the African, Chinese, and Irish expatriate 

communities. 

For the purpose of this study, I define diaspora as a people dispersed from their original homeland who possess a collective memory 

and myth about a sentimental and/or material link to that homeland, 

and who also have a sense of sympathy and solidarity with those in 

their ancestral homeland. My definition implies that a member of a

diaspora who has never lived in the ancestral homeland can have as 

great a sense of obligation to support the homeland as someone who 

was born there. 

Ethnic diasporas are not a new phenomenon. According to Robin 

Cohen, “Diasporas as a social form have pre-dated the nation state, 

lived uneasily within it, and now, in specific respects, transcend and

exceed it.” 56 While diasporas have likely existed before the Westphalian state system was established in the mid-seventeenth century, 

in recent decades, advances in transportation and communications 

have increased the size, visibility, and impact of diasporas. As one 

scholar notes, “Diaspora networks have become important facilitators 

of internal, inter-state, and worldwide political, cultural and economic 

connections and may be the precursors of post-modern, trans-state 

social and political systems.” 57

Leveraging Diasporas: The Traditional View

Since the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, scholars 

and policy makers have increasingly observed the ability of terrorist 

groups to leverage diasporas. Indeed, there has been a “veritable explosion” in the number of public, media, and policy statements about the 

potential links between expatriate ethnic groups and national security 

challenges—with good reason.58

Terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda use diasporas to provide a cover for their operations. Sometimes members of 
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these diasporas overtly sympathize with the terrorists or are economic 

beneficiaries of their illicit activities. Other times, the diaspora community is not complicit in terrorist operations; its members merely 

provide shelter or support, perhaps unwittingly, to members of a terrorist network.59 Although most of the September 11 terrorists were 

Saudi citizens who entered the U.S. legally and were recruited and 

trained in Afghanistan, they were supported by Arab expatriate communities in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and elsewhere. 

Other failed Al Qaeda operations took advantage of locally-recruited 

sympathizers and were supported by expatriate cells in such places 

as Canada and the Philippines.60

Certainly many diasporas in the U.S. and Europe “require watching”—particularly those that might fall victim to Al Qaeda’s theoretical 

indoctrination and ideology.61 Says John Sullivan of the Los Angeles 

Sheriff’s Department, “...diaspora communities can provide extremists

with a permissive environment that can favor conditions that enable 

the emergence of extremist cells.” 62 Radical enclaves can emerge within 

diasporas and serve as catalysts for further radicalization. When 

communities are linked through social networks and online media to 

lawless zones in failed states, radical enclaves, and denied areas, a 

powerful networked diaspora can result.63

An example of this type of networked diaspora can be observed in 

the United Kingdom. According to Sullivan, the UK is currently the 

vanguard of violent jihadism in Western Europe. Extreme Islamist 

sects are active in British cities, and their members—separate and in 

concert—concoct viable rationales that legitimize extremist narratives 

and threatening actions.64 Sullivan believes the threat is certain to 

continue beyond the attempted and successful bombings of central 

London cars and public transportation in recent years. As reflected in

the statements of British Islamist extremist Anjem Choudary, “There 

is no doubt whatsoever that there will continue to be attacks against 

the British government...there are many in Britain who take their

ideology from Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and are ready to carry 

out many more attacks.” 65 Ultimately, says Sullivan, this threat, if 

unchecked, will mature in the United States and elsewhere.66

The notion that a diaspora might be used for intelligence gathering 

purposes is not new or novel. However, most of the existing research 

has been focused on diasporas working for terrorists—not counterterrorists. For example, terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah 
17

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) understand how to 

leverage diasporas. 

Hezbollah has used the Lebanese Shi’a diaspora to gather intelligence abroad, including information that has helped the terrorist 

organization launch attacks on overseas Israeli targets.67 Hezbollah 

has expanded its operations from Lebanon to the wider Middle East 

and other regions. According to James Phillips, Hezhollah “...now is

truly a global terrorist threat that draws financial and logistical support from the Lebanese Shiite Diaspora in the Middle East, Europe, 

Africa, Southeast Asia, North America, and South America.” 68

Another case study is the Tamil diaspora, which has played an 

important role in supporting the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka in 

its struggle to carve out an independent Tamil homeland. The Tamil 

diaspora numbers between 700,000 and 800,000, and its members 

are settled across North America and Europe.69 This community has 

provided crucial support to the LTTE, the most active Tamil terrorist 

organization—in particular, by providing its primary financial backing. LTTE funds come from countries hosting large Tamil diaspora 

communities, including Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the UK, the 

U.S., and Scandinavian countries.70 Additionally, apart from the utility 

of the Tamil diaspora in raising funds and producing intelligence, its 

members also generate political and diplomatic support and help in 

weapons procurement.71

Leveraging Diasporas: A Proactive View

Sullivan’s findings about the danger of diasporas supporting Al Qaeda

and other terrorists in the UK and U.S. are most certainly true, and 

the Hezbollah and LTTE case studies are only two of many examples 

describing how terrorists are supported by diasporas. However, this 

paper advocates that diasporas can be positively leveraged in the fight

against terrorism. I argue that diasporas, both in the United States 

and abroad, can be sources of intelligence in the campaign against terrorism. The growing use of the Internet and modern communications, 

the ease of international travel, and other globalization functionalities 

increase opportunities for globally distributed ethnic diasporas to play 

key intelligence roles in counterterrorism campaigns involving their 

home state or adopted territory.72
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To clarify my arguments, diasporas will be viewed in two different contexts (locations). First, diasporas originating from failed 

states and denied areas—primarily Muslim diasporas (for example, 

Somalia)—will be viewed as sources of intelligence about activity both 

within the diaspora’s ancestral land and within the expatriate diaspora 

community within resettlement countries such as the U.S. Second, 

diasporas composed primarily of economic immigrants, such as the 

varied Chinese communities, will be discussed as a possible domestic source of intelligence for U.S. agencies. Diasporas are commonly 

used as sources of information by the governments of their adopted 

or native countries. However, it is rarer and therefore more innovative 

for a third-party government to leverage global diasporas.

Leveraging Diasporas Resident in the United States

According to migration scholar Rex Brynen, “Many of the chief tools 

of effective counterterrorism and counterintelligence are remarkably 

similar to those of good community policing.” 73 Diaspora networks in 

the U.S. are particularly well equipped to detect within their neighborhoods potential terrorist activities that are detrimental to their 

adopted country. However, this information is useless if it remains 

locked inside a close-knit community.74 Therefore, it is imperative that 

security and intelligence agencies work to develop relations of trust 

and transparency with diaspora communities.

Recruitment from all diasporas—but particularly from various 

ethnic Muslim diasporas—into U.S. military, intelligence, and law 

enforcement agencies should be a major policy goal for two important 

reasons. First, those with diaspora ties who are recruited into domestic law enforcement agencies are well equipped to identify Islamist 

jihadi infiltrators within diaspora communities. Second, recruitment

of Americans with various ethnic backgrounds into the military—particularly the Army, Marines, and Special Operations Forces—could 

be great value-added in the campaign against terrorism, particularly 

when these recruits are deployed. Organizations charged with domestic 

and external security need to take advantage of the ethnic diversity 

in diaspora populations and leverage diasporas for the linguistic and 

cultural skills they make readily available.

In addition to the contributions previously mentioned, diaspora 

recruitment has the potential to be particularly useful to intelligence 
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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

services trying to glean information from denied areas. For example, 

one important benefit of diaspora recruitment is member knowledge

of and contacts in the country of ethnic origin. If recruits hail from 

failed states and denied areas where normal sources of intelligence 

are not readily available, this information can be invaluable.75 Many 

individuals residing outside of their country of origin, regardless if they 

left voluntarily or involuntarily, are able to answer questions about the 

geography, culture, and social infrastructure of their former homeland. 

According to Brian Auten, “They can interpret the nuances, infighting

and splintering of their home country’s political landscape.” 76

Furthermore, it is unusual for communications to completely 

sever even for those from so-called denied areas such as Somalia. For 

example, even though Somalia has no formal banking system, Somali 

diasporas in the U.S. and United Kingdom repatriate more than $700

million a year to their homeland through the hawala banking system.77

In fact, it is estimated that nearly twenty-three percent of Somalia’s 

total income is sent there by Somalis living abroad.78

In addition to financial information, when communication is possible, personal ties can be used as a conduit for continued information 

gathering among diaspora networks. It is a communication medium, 

says Auten, “...that can double as a conduit for receiving information on current (and possibly future) happenings within the home 

country.” 79 Important for intelligence organizations, this conduit can 

also be used for recruiting and running agent networks back in the 

home country, particularly where the diaspora’s country of origin is 

so ethnically or culturally dissimilar to preclude the use of the U.S. 

government’s normal intelligence assets.80

Again, the United Kingdom serves as an interesting case study of 

diaspora activity, this time in the recruitment of Muslims from various 

ethnic diasporas into law enforcement and military service. After the 

July 2005 London subway bombings, recruitment of police officers

from within the Muslim diaspora increased dramatically. Presently, 

there are 300 Muslims in the London Metropolitan Police Constabulary and 3,000 nationally, with another 6,000 community officers to

be added.81 Interestingly, this recruitment of the Muslim community 

does not extend to the UK military services, where, according to one 

member of Parliament, “there is a particular problem relating to the 

Muslim community, because the levels of recruitment of members of 
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that community to the three services are almost statistically insignificant.” 82

In the U.S., several security and military service organizations are 

recruiting aggressively in diaspora communities (particularly those 

with predominantly Muslim backgrounds), also with mixed results. 

Faced with a shortage of “personnel who speak Arabic and understand 

Islam, the U.S. military is quietly courting American Muslims.” 83 The 

Marines are perhaps the most proactive and far-sighted. Recognizing 

that deployed forces often serve as the main face of the U.S. abroad, 

the Marines have established an outreach and recruiting program 

for Muslim communities within the United States. The program is a 

mechanism for increasing the diversity of the force in order to better 

represent the backgrounds and skills of the U.S. population to foreign 

audiences.84 However, members of most Muslim diasporas show little 

enthusiasm for joining these organizations that many say are prejudiced against them.85 Says Ibrahim Hooper of the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), “The military have the same problem 

as civilian government agencies, such as the FBI. There is a general 

reluctance to join because Muslims think there is bias against them 

and career prospects are limited.” 86

This perception is unfortunate, because many benefits could accrue

from diaspora recruiting within the U.S. military, intelligence, and 

law enforcement communities. The superior cultural and contextual 

knowledge possessed by diasporas is an untapped resource that the 

U.S. and other countries have not yet fully leveraged.

Leveraging Third-Party Diasporas

To my knowledge, leveraging the diasporas living in countries not of 

their native homeland for U.S. intelligence purposes is a relatively 

new and perhaps novel concept. For my example, I use the Chinese 

diaspora (though the Indian diaspora would also be a good example to 

study). Notionally, one could expect that Chinese living overseas would 

pass intelligence on to their home country, and as we have learned 

from bad experiences in the U.S., they sometimes do. However, one 

might not expect that the Chinese diaspora might be useful for U.S. 

intelligence collection.

I have chosen to highlight the Chinese diaspora for four reasons. 

First, Chinese diasporas are located worldwide, and resident in virtu-
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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

ally every country. Second, Chinese have lived outside their homeland 

for generations. Third, I speak Chinese and have experience with 

intelligence operations in the region. Fourth, and most important, 

members of the overseas Chinese community are entrepreneurs. They 

make their living through business and commerce. The notion of a 

Caliphate—a Muslim state governed by Sharia Law, which is the goal 

of Al Qaeda and unfriendly to business—goes against everything most 

Chinese diasporas live for. Therefore, there is no interest in Al Qaeda 

or its ideology within the Chinese diaspora community which could 

be a beneficial circumstance for the U.S. intelligence community.

Generally referred to as overseas Chinese, the Chinese diaspora is 

an instructive case study in capitalism and entrepreneurship. Overseas 

Chinese number between thirty five and fifty million people and are

resident in 150 countries worldwide.87 As an economic bloc, overseas 

Chinese constitute the third largest economy in the world— thought 

to possess $1.5 to $2 trillion in liquid assets—and has been the main

investment engine in China’s massive and continuous growth for the 

past three decades.88

The Chinese people have a long history of migrating overseas. The 

earliest migration dates from the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), when 

Chinese were sent to the South China Sea and Indian Ocean to develop 

commerce. Several waves of migration have occurred since, most 

notably in the nineteenth century, when surplus Chinese laborers 

filled the labor shortage gap in colonial empires and the industrializing

West. A third major migration wave was the result of twentieth century 

political turmoil and later the competition between the mainland (Communist China) and Taiwan (Nationalist China).89 A fourth and much 

smaller wave began after the so-called Cultural Revolution in China 

at the end of the 1970s and continues today. In the late 1970s, when 

Deng Xiaoping (“to get rich is glorious”) ruled the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC), political and military intelligence services received special 

funding to start hundreds of so-called “private” firms and companies

in Third World countries. By a special decree of the Politburo, the 

Chinese intelligence services organized trading companies, manufacturing industries, banks, and other enterprises designed to look like 

very attractive business partners without any real connections to the 

Communist regime. In the mid-1980s, hundreds of these companies 

were created, usually headed by persons with strong family connections with the Communist Party and the PRC government.90
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American intelligence organizations should not bother to look for 

assistance among first-generation immigrants who were sent by the

PRC to engage in mercantile and espionage activities. Even if they might 

cooperate, they generally have fewer connections, and less access to 

information. Rather, U.S. intelligence services should try to develop 

contacts among second-, third-, and fourth-generation immigrants 

who have largely become part of the local and historical fabric of the 

area in which they and their families have settled. They have had a 

chance to do business, to take part in political and social life, and to 

work inside the system, and they possibly have access to valuable 

domestic information. Importantly, the vast majority of these Overseas 

Chinese descendants of immigrants are not susceptible to working with 

the Chinese intelligence services. More than likely, these long-term 

residents would be more responsive to monetary compensation.91

Conclusion

American diplomatic, intelligence, and defense policy makers will to 

have to consider the potential impact ethnic diasporas can have on 

regional conflict in the next ten to twenty years as they become more

involved in supporting the security postures and campaigns of their 

home territories and adopted states.92

This paper has presented two of ways of leveraging diasporas in 

the campaign against terrorism. The first example was a traditional

approach of leveraging diasporas in the U.S. who have special knowledge of the language, culture, religion, and personalities of foreign 

lands which may be harboring those who might want to harm us. 

Domestically, they know the “street” and can sense when homegrown 

terrorists might be in their midst, in ways that most law enforcement 

and intelligence officials will not. The challenge with these diasporas

is gaining their confidence to the degree that they will report untoward

behavior. Getting them to join the ranks of law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and the military is another challenge worth pursuing. 

Their special knowledge would be useful to these organizations in the 

U.S. and in far-off places such as the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, 

Somalia, Iraq, and other deployment spots where the U.S engages 

the forces of terror.

The second, not-so-traditional example focused on leveraging thirdcountry diasporas living abroad, the hypothesis being that they would 
23

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

rather help the U.S. intelligence apparatus than watch an Al Qaedainspired Caliphate undermine their entrepreneurial endeavors. The 

Chinese diaspora was case study used for the second example, but 

it could have just as easily been the Indian, Korean, or Philippine 

diasporas, which are also entrepreneurial and live and work in failed 

states and denied areas at risk. Early knowledge of Al Qaeda and other 

terrorist activities in these areas could enable the U.S. to prevent a 

future Afghanistan or, worse yet, an Al Qaeda-led state. 

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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

3. A Marriage of Convenience

 NGOs and U.S. Intelligence Agency Cooperation

Special Forces Field Manual (FM) 3-05.102 (formerly FM 34-36, 

Army Special Operations Forces and Intelligence) stipulates in 

Annex A that there may be situations where intelligence should 

be shared with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) “outside usual 

political military channels,” but does not clarify or elaborate on the 

statement.93 This lack of further detail is regrettable, because NGOs 

could be an important partner in securing vital intelligence information, particularly in denied areas. These organizations and their staff 

would be especially useful as information sources in areas where 

technical intelligence gathering is not effective and it is difficult for

traditional intelligence organizations responsible for human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.

Interestingly, since 9/11 the potential for positive informationsharing dynamics between intelligence operatives and NGOs has 

expanded dramatically for four reasons: 

a. The availability and diffusion of information technology

b. The increasingly visible role of NGOs as important players in 

international affairs

c. The demand for international engagement in failed or failing 

states, many vulnerable to penetration by terrorists

d. The recognition of NGOs as important international economic 

players that account for over five percent of the gross domestic

product and over four percent of the employment in thirty-six 

of the most impoverished countries in the world.94

In denied areas where U. S. military operations are not being 

conducted, no U.S. diplomatic presence exists, and intelligence 

assets are scarce or non-existent, it is my view that non-traditional 

HUMINT sources—including NGOs—should be developed. In many 

cases, NGOs will have been in the area long before any intelligence 

or military deployment. As such, NGO staff—particularly those of 

development, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief organizations—will have a grasp of the overall situation “on the ground” in 

their particular area of expertise and operational area, making them 

excellent intelligence sources.95
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Cumulatively, hundreds of international NGOs comprise a “global 

network of information” and capacity for information gathering, “even 

if the information flow is unpredictable and action is rarely coordinated.” 96 Concurrently, the U.S. intelligence community and the 

national security apparatus in which it is embedded comprise another 

global information gathering network. In a perfect world, the information gathering capabilities of both networks should create opportunities to pool information and coordinate information requirements. 

However, several structural, cultural, and operational factors inhibit 

closer coordination and more positive working relationships.97

NGO and U.S. intelligence networks retain significant differences

of mission and structure that militate against collaboration. The missions and motivations of NGOs and intelligence organizations stand 

almost in direct opposition. NGOs respond to the needs of their clients 

and the desires of their primary financial donors—the lifeblood of their

existence. Intelligence organizations, on the other hand, respond to 

the desires of the current administration and to departments and 

agencies responsible for U.S. security. 

In structure and organization, too, NGOs and intelligence agencies 

dramatically differ. As William E. DeMars notes, “The U.S. security 

apparatus is organized in a hierarchical structure under the President 

and the executive branch. Intelligence organizations are bureaucratic 

and respond to a definite chain of command. Conversely, international

NGOs interact as a fluid and decentralized mix of thousands of independent organizations.” 98 In stark contrast to U.S. military and security 

operations, NGOs operate independently, with no central control and 

no centralized chain of command. They rely on decentralized authority (especially in field operations) and value independence.99 In recent 

years the NGO sector has seen a movement toward setting operating 

standards and best practices, but they are still often criticized for 

lacking standard procedures and adequate training.100 Conversely, 

intelligence agencies—particularly military intelligence organizations—rely on established doctrine, regulations, and set procedures, 

expect discipline and conformity and are well trained.

Different cultural approaches to information requirements also 

affect the priority given to information-sharing relationships. NGO 

professionals are action-oriented and develop highly pragmatic information strategies intended to support immediate requirements. They 

don’t do deep analysis. In contrast, U.S. intelligence analysts are 
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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

information specialists and place value on deep expertise: “For them, 

trading information is an end in itself, not a means to an end.” 101

Operationally, U.S. military and intelligence organizations differ 

greatly from their NGO counterparts. Access to operational funding 

is a good example. U.S. intelligence assets have what many argue are 

unlimited (and poorly regulated) funds. Comparatively, while they strive 

to remain neutral, few NGOs are able to fund their activities entirely 

out of private donations. For example, World Vision—now the largest 

U.S.-based NGO—secures 70 percent of its $869 million annual budget

from private donors (individuals, corporations, and foundations), with 

the difference funded by government grants.102 According to one specialist, the sheer magnitude of resources of the military and security 

agencies dwarf the programs of humanitarian NGOs, not only in Iraq 

and Afghanistan but in other low-income countries as well.103

Working with NGOs is complicated. Many are suspicious of the 

military and intelligence types and of Special Forces in particular. 

To me this is somewhat surprising, given the common contexts in 

which NGO staff and military or intelligence operatives often work. 

Years ago I articulated (albeit in a bit of tongue-in-cheek analysis) why 

Special Forces operators and NGO workers—particularly those who 

work for development, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance 

NGOs—actually have much in common:

a. We tend to want to serve in interesting, far-off, and usually 

dangerous places

b.	 Most of us have foreign language qualifications

c. We work for low pay

d. We actually like mystery meat or can get by with no meat at 

all

e. We can get along without hot water for long periods of time. 

And, often—more often than not—smell peculiarly the same

f. We wear the same kinds of clothes

g. We hang out in the same bars

h.	 We don’t like to be over-supervised...or supervised at all

i. We enjoy taking risks

j. And, in our own ways, both train hard to help mankind.104

Fundamentally, mutual mistrust mars the relationship between 

NGOs and most government agencies: NGOs “see any collaboration 
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as compromising their reputation for independence and impartiality,” 

while government agencies “tend to view NGO workers as unpredictable and overly idealistic.” 105 Most humanitarian, development, 

and disaster relief NGOs base their operations on three principles: 

impartiality (“that assistance is distributed solely on the basis of need 

regardless of race, religion, or political affiliation”), neutrality (“that

organizations do not take sides in a conflict”), and independence (“that

their actions are free of any political or military interests”).106 NGOs 

with a long history of independence tend to be more sensitive about 

following these principles, and often conclude that associating with 

any military or intelligence organization reduces their “neutral” status 

and increases their security vulnerability. 

Some NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC), pride themselves on serving a completely apolitical set of objectives and feel no need to share information with government-associated 

groups operating in the same area. The ICRC in particular “has maintained the clearest position of classic neutrality—that humanitarian 

action can and should be completely insulated from politics.” 107 In 

fact, “Not only does the ICRC base its actions on its interpretation of 

established humanitarian law but in order to maintain neutrality has 

often adopted a position of silence in order to avoid being perceived 

as partisan.” 108 Not all NGOs agree. Rather, some seek an association with the U.S. military in crisis zones, believing that a cooperative 

relationship will serve to protect their workers.109

In my view, complex counterterrorism challenges pose major problems for NGOs to remain truthful to the three principles of neutrality, 

impartiality, and independence, even when their contact with the 

military or intelligence services is limited. One important question in 

the context of any conflict is, “Who determines and defines neutrality

and impartiality?” 110 Certainly, most terrorist groups—particularly 

Al Qaeda and its surrogates—do not recognize these three principles, 

as the ICRC found out in Baghdad in October 2003 when a car bomb 

aimed at Red Cross headquarters killed ten people.111 It is primarily 

for this reason—the refusal of Al Qaeda to recognize the neutrality 

and impartiality of NGOs—that I believe NGOs should be willing collectors of information for intelligence purposes where Al Qaeda is 

presently recruiting, training, and operating or will be likely to do so 

in the future. 
29

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

Advantages and Disadvantages of 

NGOs as Information Collectors

NGOs have several comparative advantages over traditional intelligence collectors engaged in early warning activities. As mentioned 

previously—and most importantly—NGOs often operate in locations 

where there is no military and/or intelligence presence.112 Disaster 

relief, development assistance, and human rights NGO personnel 

are normally involved in on-the-ground operations and are therefore 

attuned to the local real-time security situation. Also, because NGOs 

are often present in an area over many years, they understand the 

sensitivities of the local culture and the immediate needs and vulnerabilities of the populace.113 Finally, NGOs often have access to individuals who for any number of reasons would not speak with military 

or intelligence personnel.114

NGOs have several disadvantages too. The capabilities that most 

NGOs lack include ways to disseminate the information they may 

be able to gather. There are no protocols or systems for information 

sharing or analysis among the myriad of disparate NGOs. There is 

also a general lack of cooperation among NGOs. Differing agendas 

and mandates often divide groups. In addition, the competition for 

donor dollars often makes NGOs reluctant to share information with 

potential competitors in the battle to attract donors’ largesse. Due 

to these factors, “...an NGO, in fulfilling its normal humanitarian

functions, may collect important data for effective early warning, but 

this information rarely finds its way to governmental policy-making

bodies.” 115 Finally, one persistent obstacle to institutionalizing the 

collaboration between the intelligence community and NGOs is the 

unspoken norm of reciprocity that pervades the decentralized networks 

of NGOs. In other words, the “intelligence community is hard pressed 

to offer anything to NGOs in return for the information they provide 

to the U.S. government.” 116

Cooperation Does Work

There have been positive cases of successful information-sharing 

between intelligence collectors and NGOs. The “Great Lakes Crisis” in 

Central Africa in the mid-1990s is one example; the 2004-2005 tsunami relief effort is another. During the Great Lakes Crisis, which was 

prompted by the genocide in Rwanda, Washington wanted to act but 
30

JSOU Report 07-10

had few assets on the ground. Several NGOs were also eager to help, 

but had trouble identifying the most acute areas of crisis in Rwanda, 

Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Because U.S. 

national security sensitivity around the issues was low, “the government was willing to share satellite imagery (although it was of dubious 

value in heavily forested areas) and other intelligence derived information.” 117 For their part, NGOs on the ground using modern means of 

communication were able to send back ground truth to U.S. agencies 

that had an interest in the operational area.118 Southeast Asian tsunami relief operations in 2004-2005 were also a largely positive story. 

The U.S. government and its forces responded to NGO requests for 

transportation, while NGOs shared information.119

Much of the ability for NGOs and military or intelligence agencies 

to cooperate is based on personal contacts and relationships honed 

during times of crises. From personal experience—mine in Somalia 

and others from a number of hot spots—NGO workers and U.S. military and intelligence personnel deployed to crisis areas have often 

developed ad hoc collaborative arrangements for information-sharing 

based on mutual respect and, at least at a personal level, a capacity 

and commitment to work together.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Entities, like people, most generally cooperate when it is in their 

common interests to do so. In regions with the weakest state structures, 

Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations often respond to citizens’ 

basic requirements when state institutions cannot. For these regions, 

understanding Al Qaeda’s presence, strategies, tactics, and operational 

procedures advances both counterterrorist operations and the 

ability of many NGOs—particularly development, disaster relief, 

and humanitarian assistance 

NGOs—to fulfill their charters.

For such environments, NGOs 

and U.S. intelligence operators can hardly avoid dealing with each 

other, and at a minimum should value the information the other has 

to offer.120 U.S. operatives must recognize that “NGOs, individually 

...NGOs and U.S. intelligence 

operators can hardly avoid dealing 

with each other, and at a minimum 

should value the information the 

other has to offer.
31

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

and cumulatively, know some things that the intelligence community 

does not know from other sources.” 121

Typically, a variety of NGOs are on the ground in failed states and 

regions at risk, their staffs working in remote areas and interacting 

with diverse populations where traditional HUMINT operatives have 

difficulty maneuvering. In counterterrorism terms, the value-added

in NGO-provided information lies in the opportunity to analyze the 

likelihood of terrorist activity resulting from the political, economic, 

and humanitarian consequences on the ground. The value-added by 

intelligence agencies is their ability to analyze a large volume of complex data, which NGOs cannot accomplish on their own.122

So what to do? Five observations and recommendations come to 

mind. First, the potential for compromise on the “three principles” outlined previously in this chapter should be addressed within the NGO 

community. Retaining neutrality and impartiality when an enemy such 

as Al Qaeda does not respect those principles is impossible for NGOs 

to achieve and counterproductive to their interests and mandate. 

Second, complex terrorist security challenges require both NGOs 

and intelligence organizations (particularly those of Special Operations) to acknowledge, understand, and respect each others’ mandates, capacities, and contributions.123 Intelligence and NGO players 

should be involved in consultation at the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels, and appropriate ways of communication need to be 

established.

Third, education is an important mechanism for creating understanding and long-term relationships. Increased knowledge about 

each other’s need for information, coupled with increased knowledge 

about which information can be exchanged between different functions 

and players would contribute greatly to more effective information 

sharing and operations among the NGO and intelligence sectors. A 

specialized course—perhaps taught at the Joint Special Operations 

University or the National Defense University—could be the venue for 

increasing knowledge. The goals of such a course would be to develop 

and improve cooperation and sharing of information and intelligence 

in denied areas by giving operators, analysts, and NGO professionals 

who are involved in, or designated to work in areas at risk the ability 

to build—at least notionally—functioning networks and systems for 

collection, analysis, and dissemination of information.124
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Fourth, consider using intermediaries to facilitate collaboration 

between NGOs and the intelligence community. A successful example 

of intermediary use occurred during the African “Great Lakes Crisis” 

in 1994. During that crisis, the National Security Council’s Africa 

Director acted as the intermediary between Washington-based NGO 

Refugees International and the intelligence community. Due to his 

involvement, “The compatibility between the terms of the humanitarian 

issue as framed by the NGO and the terms of U.S. interests as framed 

by the NSC allowed the exchange to proceed with reciprocity and semitransparency.” 125 In contrast to traditional exchanges between U.S. 

intelligence agencies and NGOs, this reciprocity was based on trading 

information for information, rather than NGOs providing information 

for the possibility of influence.126

Finally, reciprocity is important. When dealing with intelligence 

agencies, a common complaint among NGOs is that the information 

flow is one-way: NGOs give, but do not receive. Also, there is little or

no feedback on the reliability or effectiveness of the information NGOs 

feed. To alleviate this problem, my suggestion is for both sides to deal 

primarily in the exchange of non-classified, open-source information.

Interestingly, intelligence analysts are finding it more important to keep

up with this non-classified material published in full public view—like

newspapers, jihadist blogs, and discussion boards in foreign countries—than some of the more secretive sources of intelligence.127

In my view, the major obstacle to good intelligence is the obsession 

with secrecy. According to some observers, 75 to 90 percent of classification is used to protect “turf” and reputations, not sources. Only

a small minority of the information actually needs to be classified to

protect sources, agents, or to prevent potential damage to the interest 

of the state.128 According to a source with which I agree, the products 

produced by classified agencies are also frequently beaten out by

non-classified sources when they compete head-to-head. Various past

examples have embarrassed the classified intelligence communities

badly. Colin Powell probably said it best when he commented on his 

information opportunities while Secretary of State: “I preferred the 

Early Bird with its compendium of newspaper stories to the President’s 

Daily Brief, the CIA’s capstone daily product.” 129
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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

4. SOF For Life 

 A Potential Intelligence Force Multiplier

Special Operations Forces (SOF) For Life was a concept that 

had some traction at USSOCOM from 2001 through 2003. 

It was a program to “produce and sustain force of SOF Warriors capable of meeting the national security demands of today and 

tomorrow.” 130 It was to be a “highly specialized and focused personnel 

program” that was intended to produce a SOF Warrior with a level 

of proficiency that would guarantee SOF relevance in the future. As

envisioned, the concept would have placed emphasis and had impact 

on all the personnel phases of a SOF Warrior: recruitment, accession, 

development, and retention.131

Post-retirement utilization (or Continuous Reserve) was a main 

feature of the program. Despite the implications of the name, this 

feature applied to personnel separating from active duty, not formally 

retiring. Conceptually, the Continuous Reserve program would have 

selected “voluntary separating personnel” with eight to fourteen years 

of SOF experience to belong to a Joint SOF Reserve Organization 

(JSOF-R). Those who became members of JSOF-R would have been 

available for call-up as individual augmentees for periods of ninety 

days, or longer in special cases.132

The SOF For Life program was a novel, eclectic, all-encompassing 

concept that died in 2004 for unknown reasons. It is probable that 

the program was too difficult to comprehend in its entirety and too

expensive to implement. Still, the Post-Retirement Utilization (Continuous Reserve) idea, perhaps in a modified format, could have great

utility for intelligence gathering. 

My suggestion is this: recruit retired Special Forces personnel 

who live or work overseas in at-risk areas as a force multiplier. While 

no statistics exist categorizing where retired Special Forces work or 

live, anecdotal evidence exists that suggests that the numbers are 

substantial for those who work, and frequently reside, in areas where 

current or potential terrorist, criminal cartel, and other securitythreatening activities are taking place. One such anecdotal case was 

the September 2007 reunion and fifty-year anniversary of the First

Special Forces Group. Among the attendees, six presently work in 

Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Two others work in Sudan. I know 
34

JSOU Report 07-10

of another who just sold a bar in Southern Thailand—an area rife with 

extremist Islamic terrorist activity. My guess is that there are many 

more, perhaps in the hundreds, who are working overseas in areas at 

risk and whose previous training makes them excellent information 

and intelligence assets. I recommend retaining their capabilities and 

skills in some organized form. 

How This Might Work

You are a retired Special Forces NCO or officer and are working

for an oil company or NGO in an at-risk area. With your employer’s 

concurrence, you belong to a retired reserve pool whose members are 

on a small retainer for basically keeping their eyes and ears open 

and reporting once a month to a central facility. These reports might 

contain observations, thoughts, impressions, and gut instincts about 

the area you are in. To help you do this, you are “re-blued” in a short 

course before you deploy and given a standard template for reporting 

purposes—nothing fancy, but easy to use and to consolidate electronically. What you report is all open source.

If the area you are in heats up, you can (and this is tricky) be 

directed to get specific information. This is still all open source, but

you are being asked to provide more detailed information that increases 

your exposure and the understanding of your employer. For this, your 

retainer is increased.

Then, if the area you are in really heats up, you might be in a 

position to do a lot of advanced party preliminary work: intelligence, 

logistics, LZ and DZ surveys, and similar tasks. For this level of work 

and exposure, you are brought back on active duty in your retirement 

grade, which does a number of things: protects you legally, compensates you for the increased risks, and provides for your family if things 

don’t work out so well. All retirees can be recalled to active duty in an 

emergency until age sixty (in certain cases age seventy), so this is—or 

could be—a fairly pro forma procedure if all the advanced paperwork 

was front-loaded and held in your file.

Interested? My guess is that most Special Forces retirees would 

be. Expensive? Not really; the financial retainers for the first levels of

exposure would be fairly minimal, and for the last level of exposure 

the government would be saving a lot of money in deployment and 

training costs. 
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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

How This Could Be Realized

First, a database needs to be developed to catalogue and categorize all 

of those Special Forces retirees who would like to voluntarily participate and are in a position and location to do so. Regardless of whether 

the plan is eventually adopted, this database should be developed as 

a minimum measure. 

Second, a small control center would have to be established to 

run the program. This does not need to be (nor should it be) a large 

organization and it should not be in some headquarters intelligence 

shop. It needs to be at the War College or in the basement in the 

Department of Social Sciences at West Point and titled a “Research 

Officer” or “Research Directorate” or some such term. Retirees in the

program would be listed as researchers until or unless they were 

activated, and then they would be handled, controlled, directed, and 

protected by normal military command and control or “country team” 

channels and procedures. 

Far-fetched? I think not. Doable? Most certainly. This program 

could be the most substantive force multiplier for intelligence collection to exist in several decades. 

37

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

Concluding Remarks

The main premise of this research paper is that the present 

international security environment requires new and perhaps 

controversial intelligence collection alternatives. The technical remedies that satisfied Cold War intelligence requirements are

not adequate for the collection challenges faced by the U.S. and its 

Western allies. Our common enemy today—Islamist extremists, the 

most dangerous being Al Qaeda—are not vulnerable to the same intelligence-gathering mechanisms that helped to bring down our past 

common enemy, the Soviet Union. 

Unlike the Soviet Union, Al Qaeda is not a centralized, hierarchical 

state that exercises its military arm in full view of satellite technology 

and or communicates in ways that make eaves dropping relatively 

simple. Al Qaeda and its extremist compatriots are networks of relatively 

autonomous cells, held together by a perverse ideology and inspired 

and directed—though not controlled—by charismatic leaders.133 Also, 

unlike the Soviet Union, Al Qaeda holds no territory and possesses 

no capital. Al Qaeda operates in the shadows and seeks sanctuary 

in failed and failing states, where the organization can plan terrorist 

attacks and recruit and train operators undetected by sophisticated 

technical intelligence assets. 

Offered in this paper were four ideas for leveraging diverse groups—

criminals, diasporas, NGOs, and SOF retirees—to help intelligence 

organizations collect intelligence-producing information from denied 

areas where technical assets have limited success and regular HUMINT 

assets have difficulty operating. None of these ideas are entirely new. All

have been used in the past, and are used now in some fashion—albeit 

not very often and, in the case of diasporas, are used mostly by our 

adversaries. Individually or collectively—at least in my view—these 

four intelligence force multipliers could help win the global war on 

terrorism.

The benefit to SOF in leveraging criminals, diasporas, NGOs, and

retirees for intelligence purposes is mixed. National-level agencies 

would most likely take the lead and benefit most from leveraging criminals and diasporas. However, disseminated intelligence information 

from these sources would eventually find its way to SOF consumers.

Information from NGOs could have immediate benefit for national
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JSOU Report 07-10

intelligence organizations and SOF, depending on the type and location of the NGO and at what level in the organization the information 

is processed. One could assume connectivity between Washington and 

the headquarters of major NGO organizations. One would hope that 

forward deployed NGO and SOF teams would share information and 

develop symbiotic partnerships in denied areas. Finally, retirees in the 

proposed SOF for Life concept would be the easiest and my guess the 

most beneficial intelligence force multiplier for SOF to leverage. Many

SOF retirees—particularly Special Forces retirees—have the requisite 

knowledge base, could be easily re-trained and are out there now. All 

they need is a bit of direction and support to become important intelligence force multipliers in denied areas. 
39

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

Endnotes

1. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 

The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive Summary (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 2004). Available at <www.9-11commission.

gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf>. Accessed September 11, 2007.

2. Ibid.

3. Lawrence E. Cline, “Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement and 

Stability Operations,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 2002): 179-194; William E. DeMars, 

“Hazardous Partnership: NGOs and United States Intelligence in Small 

Wars,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, Vol. 

14, No. 2 (Summer 2001): 193-222, 200.

4. Paul Hoversten, “Forty Years Ago a Top Secret Satellite (CORONA) 

Snapped Photographs of Selected Missile Sites in the USSR,” Space.

com, September 26, 2000. Available at <www.space.com/news/spacehistory/nro_at_forty_00926.html>. Accessed September 11, 2007.

5. Ibid.

6. See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New 

York: Random House, 2002).

7. Dennis M. Gormley, “The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq’s Lessons,” Survival, 

Vol.46, No.3 (Autumn 2004), 8. 

	 8.	 Found at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/curing-analyticpathologies-pathways-to-improved-intelligence-analysis-1/summary.

htm>.

9. Gormley, 8.

10. Daniel Byman, “U.S. Counter-Terrorism Operations: A Taxonomy,” 

Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Autumn 2007), 127.

11. Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction,” The 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring 2006): 27-53; 27.

12. Ibid, 27.

13. John Robb, Brave New War (New York: Wiley, 2007), ii.

14. Ibid.

15. Banning N. Garrett and Dennis M. Sherman, “Why Non-Globalized States 

Pose a Threat: Increasing Interdependence is Key Concern,” Update: For 

Alumni and Friends of the UW-Madison School of Business (Fall/Winter 

2003). Available at <www.bus.wisc.edu/update/winter03/globalization.

asp>. Accessed September 11, 2007. Accessed September 11, 2007.

16. Ibid.

17. Frank J. Cilluffo, Ronald A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi, “The 

Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence,” Strategic Intelligence: Windows 

Into a Secret World, (Roxbury Publishing: Los Angeles, 2004), 36. See 

also Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 
40

JSOU Report 07-10

9/11, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, July 2002, 

available at <www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html>;

and William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, “Targeted Killing and 

Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework,” University of Richmond Law 

Review (March 2003), available at <http://insct.syr.edu/Research/

Publications/ProfessorsPublications/Banks/Targeted%20Killing%20

and%20Assassination.pdf>.

18. Cilluffo et. al., 37.

19. Tim Newark, “Pact With the Devil,” Britannica Online, April 2001. Avail.

able at <www.britannica.com/magazine/article?query=Mafia&id=2>.

20. Stefan Mair, “The New World of Privatized Violence,” International Politics 

and Society, Vol. 2 (2003), 12.

21. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia Press, 1998), 43. 

See also Svante E. Cornell, “The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict,”

The Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2005), 753.

22. Mair, 12.

23. Hoffman, 42.

24. Mair, 19.

25. Rensselaer Lee, “Nuclear Smuggling, Rogue States and Terrorists,” 

China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2006), 26.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli, “Methods Not Motives: Implications of the Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Police Practice and Research, Vol. 3, No. 4 (January 2002), 312. 

29. Sara A. Carter, “Terrorists Teaming with Drug Cartels,” Washington 

Times, August 8, 2007, 1.

30. Ibid.

31. Shelly and Picarelli, 312.

32. Ibid.

33. “Crackdown on Thai Visa Train to Canada,” The Southern Post, August 

8, 2002. Available at <www.southasianpost.com/portal2/ff8080810eb

fa5d9010ebfcfaea200b0.do.html>.

34. Ibid.

35. Interestingly, the Grace Hotel is located in the Nana District. During 

the Vietnam era, the Grace was a popular spot for U.S. Special Forces 

soldiers. Today it caters to Arabs and others of the Muslim faith. See 

also, Bertil Lentnir, “A How-To-Guide for Fleeing China,” Asia Times 

Online, April 19, 2007, available at <www.atimes.com/atimes/China/

ID19Ad01.html>.

	 36.	 Douglas A. Kash, “Hunting Terrorists Using Confidential Informant

Reward Programs,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April, 2002, 26.

37. Kevin Whitelaw, “Just a Phone Call Away,” U.S. News and World Report, 

January 23, 2005.
41

Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

38. Ibid.

39. Gethin Chamberlin, “Uday and Qusay Die in Gun Battle,” The Scotsman, 

July 23, 2003, 1. Available at <http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:_

DElNHehDnYJ:www.mercurynews.com/ci_6055622+former+drug+dea

ler+turned+informant+helps+stop+jfk+airport+plot&hl=en&ct=clnk&c

d=1&gl=us>.

40. JFK Terror Plot Informant Crucial to Case,” CBS News, June 4, 

2007. Available at <www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/04/terror/

main2880870.shtml>.

41. Josh Meyer, “Three Arrested on U.S. Arms, Terrorism Charges,” Los 

Angeles Times, June 9, 2007, A7.

42. “International Arms Dealer Charged with Trying to Kill Americans,” P. 

R. Newswire, June 8, 2007. Available at <http://news.findlaw.com/

prnewswire/20070608/08jun20071233.html>.

43. Meyer, A7.

44. Aram Rosten, “Meet the Prince of Marbella,” The Observer, October 1, 

2006, 1.

45. Ibid.

46. Matthew Brunwasser, “The Prince of Marbella: Arms to All Sides,” PBS 

Frontline, May 2002.Available at <www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/

sierraleone/alkassar.html>.

47. Ibid.

48. Chris Thompson, “Busting the Merchant War,” The Village Voice, July 24, 

2007. Available at <www.villagevoice.com/news/0730,thompson,77325,6.

html>.

49. “International Arms Dealer Charged with Trying to Kill Americans.”

50. Meyer, A7.

51. Rosten.

52. Richard Willing, “Papers: Con Was Key in Foiling JFK Plot,” USA Today, 

June 4, 2007, 3A. 

53. Ibid.

	 54.	 “Diaspora,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Available at <www.

m-w.com/dictionary/diaspora>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

55. “Diaspora,” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Available at <http://

dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50063322?single=1&query_type=word

&queryword=diaspora&first=1&max_to_show=10>. Accessed October

1, 2007.

56. Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas, an Introduction (London: University 

College London Press, 1997), 520.

57. Gregory Kent, “Diaspora Power: Network Contributions to Peacebuilding and the Transformation of War Economies,” paper presented at the 

“Transforming War Economies” Seminar, Plymouth, UK, June 16-18, 

2005. Page 7. See also Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics at Home and 

Abroad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 245
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JSOU Report 07-10

58. Rex Brynen, “Diaspora Populations and Security Issues in Host Countries,” paper presented at the Metropolis Interconference Seminar, 

“Immigrants and Homeland,” Dubrovnik, Croatia, May 11, 2002, 4. 

Full text of paper available at <http://international.metropolis.net/

events/croatia/brynen.pdf>. Accessed October 1, 2007. 

59. Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli, “Methods not Motives: Implications 

of the convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 

Police Practice and Research, Vol. 3, No. 4 (September 2006), 308.

60. Brynen, 4.

61. John P. Sullivan, “Policing Networked Diasporas,” Small Wars JournalBlog, July 9, 2007. Available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/

blog/2007/07/print/policing-networked-diasporas>. Accessed October 

1, 2007.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, and Bruce Hoffman, “The New Face of 

Insurgency,” Rand Research Brief, RB-7049-OTI, 2001. Available 

at <http://rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7409/index1.html>.

Accessed October 1, 2007.

68. James Phillips, “Hezbollah’s Terrorist Threat to the European Union,” 

Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, European 

Sub-Committee, June 20, 2007. Available at <www.heritage.org/

Research/MiddleEast/tst062007a.cfm>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

69. C. Christine Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from 

the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic 

Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2005), 139.

70. Ibid, 140. 

71. Dominic Whitman, “LTTE Tamil Tigers and its UK-Wide Network,” Global 

Politician, October 18, 2006. Available at <www.globalpolitician.com/

articledes.asp?ID=2235&cid=3&sid=74>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

72. Brian Nichiporuk, “The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors,” 

Rand Monograph Report, 2000. Available at <www.rand.org/pubs/

monograph_reports/MR1088>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

73. Brynen, 14.

74. Ibid.

75. Brian J. Auten, “Political Diasporas and Exiles as Instruments of 

Statecraft,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Otober-November 

2006):329-341; 329.

76. Ibid, 332.
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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

77. Joseph Winter, Somalia’s Diaspora offers Financial Lifeline,” BBC 

News, November 24, 2004. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

africa/4038799.stm>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

78. Ibid.

79. Auten, 332.

80. Ibid.

81. Jytte Klausen, “British Counter-Terrorism After the July 2005 Attacks, 

Adapting Community Policing to Fight Against Domestic Terrorism,” 

USIPeace Briefing, U.S. Institute for Peace, February 2007. Available at 

<www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0205_terrorism.html>.

Accessed October 1, 2007.

82. House of Commons Hansard Debates, March 20, 2007. Available 

at <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/

cm070320/halltext/70320h0002.htm>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

83. “U.S. Military Courting American Muslims,” NewsMax.com, February 7, 2007. Available at <http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/

ic/2007/2/7/154749.shtml>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

84. Tim Kilbride, “Shared Understanding Provides Key to Defeating Extremism,” American Forces Press Service, April 26, 2007. Available at <www.

defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32955>. Accessed October

1, 2007.

85. There is no such thing as a “Muslim Diaspora” in the United States. 

There are many predominantly Muslim diasporas that are mostly structured along ethnic rather than religious lines. Underscoring the lack 

of information about Muslim diasporas is the fact that no one knows 

how many Muslims there are in the United States. Estimates vary from 

three to eleven million people. 

86. “U.S. Military Courting American Muslims.”

87. The World Bank Group, Entering the 21st Century: World Development 

Report 1999/2000 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2000), 40. See also Min Zhou, “The Chinese 

Diaspora and International Migration,” forthcoming in Social Transformations in Chinese Societies. Paper available at <www.sscnet.ucla.

edu/soc/faculty/zhou/pubs/Zhou_Chinese_Diaspora.pdf>. Accessed 

October 1, 2007.

	 88.	 Kent, 1. Professor Kent’s article specifies the last two decades, but this

author was in China in 1979 and maintains that the growth really 

started when Deng Xiaoping assumed power.

89. I taught Chinese Politics and Government at the U.S. Military Academy, 

West Point for a number of years, went to graduate school in Taiwan, 

and have made more than thirty trips to China. This is my best recollection of Chinese migration periods as I have studied and taught them. 

90. Stanislav Lunev, “Chinese Intelligence Activities,” Insight on the News, 

November 17, 1997, 1.

91. Ibid. 
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92. Nichiporuk, 23.

93. FM 3-05.102, Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence, July 2001, 

Appendix 1.

94. For an in-depth discussion of the potential for information sharing 

between intelligence agencies and NGOs, see Ellen B. Laipson, “Can 

the USG and NGOs Do More? Information Sharing in Conflict Zones,”

Studies in Intelligence: Journal of the American Intelligence Professional, 

Vol. 49, No. 4 (2005). Available at <www.cia.gov/library/center-for-thestudy-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/

USG_NGOs_5.htm>. Accessed October 1, 2007. 

95. Lawrence E. Cline, “Operational Intelligence in Peace Enforcement and 

Stability Operations,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 2002): 179-194; 184.

96. William E. DeMars, “Hazardous Partnership: NGOs and United States 

Intelligence in Small Wars,” International Journal of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2001): 193-222; 196.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Laipson, 2.

100. See, for example, “The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response,” available at <www.sphereproject.

org >, accessed October 1, 2007; and “The HAP Principles of Accountability,” The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership-International, available at <www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=3&IDcat=10>,

accessed October 1, 2007.

101. Laipson, 4.

102. “Frequently Asked Questions: World Vision at a Glance,” World Vision 

website. Available at <www.worldvision.org/worldvision/pr.nsf/stable/

press_FAQs?Open&lid=press_FAQs&lpos=main>. Accessed October 1,

2007.

103. Barbara Brubacher, “Moral and Practical Challenges to NGO Neutrality,” 

Global Policy Forum, September 28, 2004. Available at <http://globalpolicy.org/ngos/aid/2004/0928neutrality.htm>. Accessed October 1, 

2007.

104. First articulated by the author of this piece at a “Ground Operations 

Workshop” in Washington, DC sponsored by the Carr Center for Human 

Rights at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 17-18, 2002. Sara Sewell, the director of the Carr Center, 

often comments on the “reliability” of the list: “General Howard captures 

a central truth that many would prefer to deny: the Special Forces 

and humanitarian assistance communities have much in common. 

Their values-driven professions appear at odds, but they have striking 

similarities from which mutual respect can grow. Understanding and 

respecting both the differences and the similarities is critical for planning and executing field missions that affect foreign civilians.” For more
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Howard: Intelligence in Denied Areas

information about the “Ground Operations Workshop,” see <www.ksg.

harvard.edu/cchrp/programareas/conferences/october2002.php>, 

accessed October 1, 2007.

105. “Does Early Warning Work?” Forced Migration Monitor, May 1997. 

Monthly newsletter of the Forced Migration Projects (1994-1999), a 

past initiative of the Open Society Institute. Available at <www.osi.

hu/fmp/html/fmm_may_97.1.html>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

106. Djenana Jalovcic, “Who Leads, Who Follows and Who is Able? The 

Operational and Strategic Relations between International Organizations, the Military and NGOs,” unpublished paper presented at the 

Weak States and Sudden Disasters and Conflicts: The Challenge for

Military-NGO Relations Conference, Ottawa, Canada, June 7, 2005, 3. 

Available at <www.irpp.org/events/archive/jun05NGO/jalovcic.pdf>.

Accessed October 1, 2007.

107. Brubacher.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

110. Jalovicic, 3.

111. Charles Hanley, “Baghdad Bomb Kills 34,” The Age (Australia), October 

28, 2003, 1.

112. Daniel Byman, “Uncertain Parners: NGOs and the Military,” Survival, 

Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 2001), 100.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. “Does Early Warning Work?”

116. DeMars, 199.

117. Laipson, 2.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. DeMars, 200.

121. Ibid, 201.

122. Ibid, 204.

123. Adapted from Jalovicic’s “Who Leads, Who Follows and Who is Able?,” 

7.

124. A possible model for such a course might be the “Information and Intelligence Cooperation in Multifunctional Operations” Course, taught at 

the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden. Course description available 

at <www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/060531/f340b4a8c09b9b8

25a1969f07cb4b812/Swedish%20PKI%20Course%20description.doc>. 

Accessed October 1, 2007.

125. DeMars, 208.

126. Ibid.
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127. Clive Thompson, “Open Source Spying,” New York Times Magazine, 

December 3, 2006. Available at <www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/

magazine/03intelligence.html>. Accessed October 1, 2007.

128. Tom Quiggen,” “Open Source Intelligence for National Security,” 

International Relations and Security Network website, September 28, 

2006. Available at <www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16727>.

Accessed October 1, 2007.

129. Ibid.

130. USSOCOM Concept: Special Operations Forces (SOF) For Life, concept 

paper prepared by the Future Concepts Development Branch (SORRSTC), U.S. Special Operations Command, April 18, 2003 (Version I), 

12.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid, 27-28.

133. Mair, 17.