### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Marc h 29 , 200 6 S es sio n JOHN WE SLEY CA MP BELL v. SH EILA DA RLE NE CA MP BELL

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Coff ee C ounty No. 03-158 John Wiley Rollin s, Chancellor

No. M2005- 00288-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on Au gust 8, 2006

Th is i s a n a

pp e a l f ro m a div orce act io n in w hic h th e Ap pe lle e , Sh e ila Da rl e ne Ca mpb e ll ( Ms. C a m p b e l l ) , w a s a w ar d e d 7 3

. 6 p e r c e n to f t h e p ar t i e s m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y t o g e t h e r w i t h a l i m o n y in solido in the amount of $500.00 per month for a pe riod of five y ear s. The Appe llant, J ohn Wesley Campbell (Mr. Campbell) ha s appea led both the division of the marital asse t s an d awa rding of alimony

. Ms. Ca mpbell a ppeals the ref

usal of the trial court to r equire that Mr. Campbell pay her at to r n e y s ' f

e e s a n d a ll e g e s th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in e q u a ll y d iv id in g th e c o u r t c o s ts

. We mo d if ythe j u d g m e n to f

t h e tr i a l c o u r tt o d e l e t e t h e r e q u i r e m e n tt h atM r
. C a m p b e l l p a y a l i m o n y in solido and a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt

in a ll o the r r e sp e c ts.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affir m e d, a s M odi fie d
D ONAL D P. H A R R IS , S R
. J ., delivere d the op i n i o n o f the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J J , joined.
Eric J. B ur c h, Ma nc he ste r, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, John Wes le y Ca mpb e ll
Jef fr e y D. Rid ne r, Tu llaho ma , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , Sh e ila

Da rl e ne Ca mpb e ll
OP IN ION
I . FACTUA L

BA CKGROUND
Th is i s a div or c e a c tio n b e tw e en J oh n W esl e y Ca mpb e ll, bo rnJune 7, 19 57 , a ndShe ila Dar lene Campbe ll, born Marc h 26, 1961. The pa rties wer e mar

ried on May 19, 1979, and have two children, Jonathan Dre w Campbell, born Aug ust 23, 1985, and Amanda L ei gh Campbell, born Au g us t 28 , 1 98 3. Dr e w i s n ow a t th e Un ive rs ity of Te nn e sse e a nd Am a nd a is at D a vidL ips c omb University . The pa

rties sepa rate d on Marc h 7, 2003. Mr. Campbell is employ ed at Arnold Eng ineering D evelopment Cente r (AE DC) wher e he is C hie f o f Inte lli g e nc e wi th a ba se inc ome of $8 6, 00 0. 00 pe r y e ar. Th e re is n o h ig he r p os iti on to-2-

which M r. C am p bell can be promoted at AED C but he periodica lly rec eives step r aises of approximately

$1,500.00 per y ear , the next to occur in 2006. He a lso participates in a n employ ee saving s plan wher e AEDC will matc h up to f ive perc ent of his inc ome that he save s. Previously , he ha d e nli ste d inthe Un ite d St a te s A ir F or c e on Au g us t 1, 19 75 a ndre tir e d a s a Captain in 19 97 wi th tw e nty -t wo y e ars se rv ic e
. Mr . Campb e ll re c e ive s $26 ,0 00 .0 0 an nu a lly in re tir e me nt be ne fi ts f or his Air Fo rc e s er v i ce and $2460 annua lly in disabilit y

benef its. Ms. C ampbell is a re altor in the Tu llaho ma , T e nn e sse e , a

re a
. She be c a me a

re a l e state a g e nt i n 2 00 0 a nd , inthe thr e e y e ars prior to 20 04 , e arn e d a n a ve ra g e of $5 1, 00 0 a nn ua lly . In 2 00 4, a t th e tim e of the tr ia l, s he wa s o n tr a c k to earn approximately

$75,000.00 during that y ear . She works lar g ely on a commission basis and rec eives no be nefits such a s paid vacations, sick lea ve or r etireme nt benef its. S he will be re quired to purcha se her

own medica l insurance as a r esult of the divorc e. When the parties we re f

irst married, Ms. Campbell had just g raduated from hig h school. She moved to Blytheville, Arka nsas, wher e Mr . Campbell was stationed in the Air F orce . She beg an wo rking a s a de nta l ass ist a nt ea rn ing lit tle mor e than the min imu m wa g e
. I n 1 98 0, Mr . Campb e ll was tra nsfer

red to Ke esler A ir For ce B ase in Mississippi. Ms. Ca mpbell move d there with him and c on tin ue d w or

kin g un til sh ortly

be fo re the ir

fi rs t c hil d w a s b orn. Th e pa rt ie s a g re e d th a t sh e sh ou ld stay a t ho me a nd fo c us on raisi ng the c hil dr e n. Whil e statio ne d a t Ke e sle r, Mr . Campb e ll w a s a ble to e arn an associate ’s deg ree from J eff erson Davis Communi ty College

. He was then selec ted for the Airman’ s Education and Commission P rog ram whic h allowed Air Force pe rsonnel to attend colleg e on a f

ull-time basis while rec eiving their re g ular pay . T h e parties moved to Starkville, Mississ ippi, where Mr. C ampbell enrolled in Missi ssippi S tate Univer sityand re ceive d a bac helor’s deg ree in aer ospace eng ineering. D uring that time, the parties se cond child, Dr ew, wa s born.
I n 1987, the family moved to Wrig ht-Patterson Air For ce Ba se in O hio. Ms. Ca mpbell beg an attending nigh t classes at Sinclair Communi ty College in Dayton, Ohio, where she obtained a n associate ’s deg ree . There afte r, she at t en ded Wrig ht State to obtain her bac helor’s de g ree but w i t h d r e w w h e n M r
. C a m p b e l l w a s tr a n s f e rr e d t o A E D C a n d t h e p ar t i e s m o v e d t o C o f f e e C o u n t y, Tenne ssee. Ms. Campbell attempted to tra nsfer to M iddle Tenne ssee State Unive rsity but was confr onted with losing seve ral c redited c lassroom hours and ha s not pursued her education further. Mr. Campbell rec eived a master’ s deg ree i n aviation sy stems eng ineering f rom the Univer sityof Tenne ssee Spac e Institut e in 1994.
I n 1 99 8, Mr . Campb e ll de ve lop e d a re la tio ns hip wi th a

y ou ng fe ma le e mpl oy e e of AE DC

. When Ms. Campbell discovered the relationship, he discontinued i t for a time but resumed the re la tio ns hip in la te 20 01

. Th e pa rt ie s se pa rate d inMa

rc h 2 00 3. On Ma

rc h 2 8, 20 03 , M r. Ca mpb e ll filed a c omplaint for divorce. Ms. Campbell filed an answ er and counter -complaint on May 5, 2003. Th e c a s e w a s tr i e d o n A u g u s t 3 1 , S e p t e m b e r 1 , a n d O c t o b e r 8 , 2 0 0 4

. T h e tr i a l c o u r t r e n d e r e d its decision on De cembe r 7, 2004, and a Final Or der of

Divorce was e ntere d J anuary 10, 2005.
I n the Fina l Order

of Divorc e, Ms. Campbell was g ran t ed the divorc e on the g round of ina pp ro pria te mari ta l c on du c t. She wa s a wa rd e d p ro pe rty

wi th a va lue of $3 73 ,3 49 .7 2 a c c or din g to ou r c a lc ulatio ns . M r. Ca mpb e ll w a s a wa rd e d p ro pe rty

wi th a va lue of $1 33 ,9 22 .2 8. Mr s. Ca mpb e ll-3-

was a lso awar ded 40.9 % of Mr. Campbell’s Air F orce retire ment benef its which will result in her rec eiving $886.17 per month. I n addition, Mr. Campbell was orde red to pay alimony in the amount of $500.00 per

month for a total of five y ear s. Eac h of the pa rties was or dere d to pay

their individual a tto rn e y s’ fe e s a ndthe c ou rt c os ts w e re div ide d e qu a lly be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s. Both pa rties have appea led. Mr. Campbell alleg es the property division was inequitable and that the trial court err ed in awa rding Ms. Campbell alimony

. Ms. Campbell alleg es t he trial c ourt e rr e d b y faili ng to r e qu ir e Mr . Campb e ll t o p a y he r atto rn e y s’ fe e s a nd re qu ir ing he r to p a y on e -h a lf of the c ou rt c os ts.
I I . STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our standa

rd of r eview of

a trial court sitti ng without a jury is de novo upon the re cord. Te nn. R. A pp . P. 13 (d ) ( 20 04 ); W rig ht v . City of K

nox v ill e , 898 S.W .2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995) . A presumption of corre ct n es s att ache s to the trial court' s findings of fac t, unless the evidenc e in the re co rd preponde rate s ag ainst them. Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13( d). Howeve r, we revie w the trial co u rt 's conclusions of law un d er a pure de novo standa rd without any

presumption of cor

rec tness. Id .; Bo wde n v . W

ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000)

. Be cause the trial judg e is in a better po s i t i o n t o we i g h and eva luate the c redibility of the witnesses who testify

orally , the weig ht, faith, and cre dit to be g iven to any witness' s testimonylies in the first instance w ith the trier of fac t, and the credibility acc orded w ill be give n g reat weig ht by the appe llate court. In re Con se rv ato rsh ip o f M oo re , 2005 Tenn. App. LEXI S 188, at *5, No. W2004-01828-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 729185, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (no perm. app. filed) (c i t i n g I n r e E s ta te o f W a lto n v . Y oung , 9 5 0 S.W .2d 956, 959 (Tenn.1997) ) . Thus, we will not re- evaluate the trial c ourt' s assessment of a witness' s cre dibilit y

absent c lear

and c o n v inc ing e vidence to the contra

ry . See W

e lls v . Te nn e sse e Bd

. o f R e ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)

. III

. A N A LY S IS
I n the ca se bef

ore us, the t ri al j u d ge d i d not make finding s with reg ard to the va lue of the pa rt ie s’ ma ri ta l pro pe rty
. B a se d upo n our vie w o f the be st e vid e nc e wi th r e g ardto v a lue , th e ite ms of pr op e rty , th e ir

va lue a ndthe sp ou se to w ho m the y we re a wa rd e d ma y be su mma

ri zeda s f oll ow s: Property Value Awar ded husband Awar ded wife
Marital re sidence $200,000.00 $200,000.00 Husband' s residenc e $15,000.00 $15,000.00 Husband' s saving s acc t. $14,689.28 $14,689.28 Wife' s chec king a cct. $3,153.70 $3,153.70 Wife' s saving s acc t. $47,678.02 $47,678.02 Thrift saving s plan $66,890.00 $66,890.00 Roth Acct.-Wife $15,361.00 $15,361.00 Roth Acct.-Husband $12,498.00 $12,498.00-4-

Safec o Acc t.-Wife $1,693.00 $1,693.00 Safec o Acc t.-Husband $1,671.00 $1,671.00 Wife’s I RA Acc t. $23,464.00 $23,464.00 2001 Mazda Miata $12,674.00 $12,674.00 2002 For d Rang er $5,500.00 $5,500.00 2002 Nissan Altima $15,000.00 $15,000.00 Personal Property $35,000.00 $5,000.00 $30,000.00 Transf er to Children $37,000.00 $37,000.00
Total $507,272.00 $133,922.28 $373,349.72
Th is l ist inc lud e s $ 37 ,0 00 .0 0 th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d M s. Ca mp bel l ha d c on ve y e d to a c c ou nts he ld jointlywith her c hildren during the pendenc y of t he divorce i n violation of the temporary injunction issued pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 36-4-106(d). T his sum was awa rded to he r in the Final Or der of

Divorce . Ba sed u p o n o u r v i ew o f the prope rty division, 26.4 percent of the pa rt ie s ma ri ta l pr op e rty

wa s a wa rd e d Mr. Ca mpb e ll an d 73. 6 pe rc e nt w a s a wa rd e d M s. Ca mpb e ll.
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 3 6 -4 -1 2 1 authorizes courts with divorce jurisdiction, u p o n r e q u e s to f

e i t h e r p ar t y i n a d i v o r c e a c t i o n , t o e q u i t ab l y d i v i d e o r d i s tr i b u t e t h e m ar i t a l p r o p e r t y. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( a )( 1) (2 00 4) . In ma kin g a n e qu ita

ble div isi on , th e tr ia l c ou rt sh a ll consider a ll releva nt fac tors , including any of those listed in section 36-4-121( c) . Flannary v. Flan na ry , 121 S.W .3d 647, 650-51 (Te nn. 2003) . Section 36-4- 121(c) sets forth the f ollowing fa c tor s: (1) The duration of the ma rriag e; ( 2 ) T h e a g e , p h ys i c a l a n d m e n t a l h e a l t h , v o c a t i o n a l s k i l l s , e m p l o yab i l i t y, e ar n i n g c ap a c i t y, e state , f inanc ia l li abil iti e s a ndfi na nc ia l ne e ds of the pa rt ie s; (3) The tang ible or intang ible contrib u t i o n b yone (1) party to the education, training or i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y; (4) The relative ability

of ea ch party

for f uture a cquisitions of capital asse ts and income; (5) The contribution of each pa rty to the acquisition, prese rvation, appr eciation, deprec iation or di ssipation of t he marital or separate property , including the contribution of a pa rty to the marria g e as h omemaker , wag e ea rner or par ent, with the contribution of a pa rty as homemaker

or wa g e ea

rner to be g iven the same weig ht if eac h party has fulfilled its role; ( 6 ) T h e v a l u e o f

t h e s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y o f

e a c h p ar t y; (7) The estate of

eac h party

at the time of the ma

rriag e;-5-

(8 ) T he e c on omi c c ir c ums ta nc e s o f e a c h p arty a t th e tim e the div isi on of pr opert y is t o become eff

ective; (9 ) T he ta x co ns e qu e nc e s to e a c h p arty , c os ts as so c ia te d with the re a so na bly fo re se e able sa le of the a sse t, andoth e r f

or e se e able e xpe ns e s a sso c ia te d w iththe a sse t; (10) The amount of social se curity benef its available to ea ch spouse; and (1 1) Suc h o the r f

a c tor s a s a

re ne c e ssa

ry to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( c ) ( 20 04 ). " A d ivi sio n is no t r e nd e re d in e qu ita ble simply

be c aus e it i s not prec isely

equal, or beca use ea ch party

did not r ece ive a share of ever y piece of marital pr operty ." Ma nis v . M

an is , 49 S.W.3 d 295 , 306 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 1) ; Kin ar d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d 220, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

. Trial courts are g rante d broad discr etion when dividing the marital e state, and su ch deci si on s ar e "ent it led to great w eight on app eal ." W atte rs v . W

atte rs , 959 S.W .2d 585, 590 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) . A pp e llate court s w ill g e ne ra lly de fe r t o a

tr ia l c ou rt ' s d ivi sio n o f p ro pe rt y unless it is inconsistent with the fac tors enumer ated in se ction 36-4-121( c) or is ag ainst the weig ht of the e vidence

. Id

. Whil e the tria l court did not articulate which of the fac tors set forth in Tenne ssee Code Annotate d , s ection 36-4- 121(c) wer e important to its divis ion of marital prope rty , we a re of the op ini on tw o of the m su pp ort the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n. F ir st is the ta ng ibl e or in tan g ibl e contribution of Ms. C am p b el l to the education, training and incre ased e arning power of Mr. Campb el l

. As s t ated in the brief filed by the Appellee , she sac rifice d her ow n educational opportunities in order to ac company Mr. Campbell on his various assig nments with the Air For ce, raise the parties’ children and be a home maker for the family

. During sever al of his assig nments he wa s ab l e t o ad v an ce h i s ed u ca t i o n an d n o w h as a m as t er ’s d egr ee i n av i at i o n s y s t em s en gi n ee ri n g. Vi rtua lly a ll o f h is col leg e e du c a tio n a pp e ars to h a ve be e n o btaine d d uring the marria g e of the se parties.
The sec ond fac tor we de em to support the division of property made by the trial court is the economic c ircumstance s of the pa rties. As ar g ued by

counsel for

Ms. Campbell, Mr. Campbell has a sta ble a nd rela tiv e ly

se c ur e inc ome fr om h is e mpl oyme nt w ithAE DC . H e ha s a mpl e be ne fi ts, pe ri od ic ste p r a ise s a nda n e mpl oy e r- ma tc hin g sa vin g s p la n. Ms. Ca mpb e ll’ s in c ome is s ub je c t to e c on omi c c on dit ion s a nd the va g ari e s of the loc a l re a l e state mark e t. Whil e sh e ha s the po te nti a l to earn the gre at er i n co me of the two, historica lly she has not and that potential may not only be interrupted by

economic c onditions but also by illness or disability . She has no medica l insurance , retire ment or disabil i t y b enef its provided by

her e mploy ment and, ac cording ly , needs a g reater economic safety net than Mr. Campbe ll. Bec ause, in our vie w, the division of property is consistent with the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 36-4-121( c), w e af firm the division ma de by the tr ia l c ou rt

.-6-

Ap pe lla nt n e xt ch a lle ng e s th e a wa rdof a lim on y ma de by the tr ia l cou rt

. Th e tr ia l ju dg e , in a wa rd ing a lim on y , s ta te d a s f oll ow s: The m o s t c o n te n ti o u s is s u e inth is li ti g a ti o n is th e n e e d f o r a li mo n y
. T he testimony ref

lects t hat after Mrs. Campbell raised her children t o a certain a g e that she st ar ted working for L ewis Orr Realty then Fir st Choice and now Joe Orr. The rec ords ref

le c ts ( s ic ) th a t i n 2 0 0 3 , w h ic h s h e te s ti f ie d , w a s a

v e r y b le ak y e ar , s he made ove r fifty

thousand dollars ($50,000.00) and appea rs to be on a trac k this y ear to make some where in the rang e of seventy five thousand to eighty thousand dollars ($75,000.00). Mrs. Campbe ll testified ext ensively that while her

husbands pre sent annual income i s ap p roxi mately one hundre d fourtee n thousand dollars ($114,000.00), that he r income w as s u b j ec t t o the whims of the re al estate marke t wi th a ll i ts u nc e rt a int ie s a nd th a t he ha d a g ua rante e d in c ome no ma tte r the wh ims of the bu sin e ss w or ld. I f o ne loo ks a t the lon g vie w it app e ars the re a lit y is that w hil e Mr. Campbell’s income is fixed with t h e ex ce p t ion of raise s and cost-of -living inc re a se s. I n f

a c t it is Mr s. Ca mpb e ll wh o ha s the po te nti a l to e arnthe g re a te r i nc ome of the two.
The unde rsig ned notes that unde r cr oss-examination Mrs. Campbell stated “I don’t nee d the money , I

just want it. ” The court is mindful of the conduc t of Mr. Ca mpb e ll a ndre a dil y

se e s w he re it wou ld d e e ply hu rt a nde mbi tte r M rs . Campb e ll. L e g a ll y , th a t i s n o t a

ju s ti f ic a ti o n u n d e r

th e la w s o f

th e s tate o f

T e n n e s s e e f

or awa rding alimony . Take n as a whole the court views Mrs. Campbell’s statement a s an intemper ate r emar

k.

. . . Mrs. Campbell testified that she wa s ext reme ly satisfied with her c urre nt income and unlikely to seek further education or other opportunities as long as her

business continued t o prosper
. Fr om all of which the court finds that neither transitional alimonyor re habilitative alimony is a ppropriate in this case
. Out of a n a bu nd a nc e of

c auti on a ndto i ns ur e Mr s. Ca mpb e ll’ s imme diate e c on omi c future the undersig ned aw ards he r the sum of fivehundred dollars ($500.00) per month for a pe riod of five (5) y ear s and af ter the e ntry

of the fina l decr ee.
I n order to consider the a

ppropriate ness of the a limonyawa rd , we first must consider the nature of the a limonyawa rded. The types of alimony a court with divorce jurisdiction may awa rd ar e r e h ab i l i t a t i v e a l i m o n y, a l i m o n y i n f u t u r o , a l s o k n o w n a s p e r i o d i c a l i m o n y, tr a n s i t i o n a l a l i m o n y, a n d a l i m o n y in solido . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36 -5 -1 0 1 (d )(1) (Supp. 2005). Rehabilitative alimony pr ov ide s th e e c on omi c a lly dis a dv a nta g e d s po us e su pp ort f or a pe ri odof tim e to e na

ble that sp ou se to become and rema in self-suff icient. Rehabilitative al i m o n y i s appropriate whe re the trial court fi nd s th a t th e e c on omi c a lly dis a dv a nta g e d s po us e c a n b e re ha bil itate d fr om a n e c on omi c stand po int

. Crabtree v. Crabtree , 16 S.W .3d 356, 360 (Tenn. 2000) . Transitional alimony is awar ded whe n the court finds that re habilitation is not nece ssary , but the economica lly disadv an t aged spouse needs assistance to adjust to the economic conseque nces of a divorc e. Te nn. Code Ann. §36-5- 121(d)( 4). Where such r ehabilitation is not feasible a nd transitional alimony is insufficient bec ause long -term s u p p o r t i s n e c e s s ary, a n d t h e c o u r tm a y a w ar d a l i m o n y in f utu ro . Id

. " A l i m o n y in f

utu ro should be-7-

awa rded only when the trial court finds that ' economic reha bilitation is not feasible a nd long- term su pp ort is neces sar y .' " Id . at 359.
In c o n tr a s tt o t h e o t h e r

t yp e s o f a l i m o n y, t h i s c o u r th a s n o tc o n s i d e r e d a l i m o n y in solido as support and maintena nce f or an e conomically

disadvantag ed spouse but, rather, a form of division of marital pr operty . See, Schmidt v. Sc hmidt , 2005 Tenn App L E XIS 5 8 6 , No. M2 00 4- 01 35 0- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 5 W L 22 4096 0, a t *3 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Se pt. 15 , 2 00 5) ; Knowles v. Knowles , 2002 Tenn. Ap p
. LEXI S 272, No. M2001-01282-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 598551, at * 4 , * 6 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. A p r
. 1 9 , 2 0 0 2 )

. A l i m o n y in solido ma y be a wa rd e d ina lump s um at th e tim e of the fina l decr ee, or

it may be aw arde d in the form of pe riodic pay ments for a g iven period of time. I n either f

orm, the aw ard is of a

definite a mount. W

addey v. W

addey , 6 S.W .3d 230, 232 (Tenn. 1 9 9 9 )

. S i n c e a l i m o n y in solido is a form of p ro p er t y division, i t is non-modifiable and the tria l court' s jurisdiction ove r the awa rd ends once the awa

rd bec omes final. Bryan v. Leac h , 85 S.W .3d 136, 145-46 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2001).
I n the ca se bef

ore us, the trial court spec ifically found re habilitative and tra nsitional alimony to be ina pp ro pria te . Wh e the r a lim on y is in f utu ro or in solido is d e te r mi n e d b y e ith e r the defi niteness or indef

initeness of the sum of a limonyorder ed to be pa id at the time of the a war d. McKee v. Mc Kee, 6 5 5 S

. W

. 2 d 1 6 4 , 1 6 5 ( T e n n
. A p p
. 1 9 8 3 )

. A l i m o n y in solido is an awa rd of a definite sum of a limony

. Spalding v. Spalding, 597 S.W .2d 739, 741 (Tenn. A pp. 1980). Alimony in solido may

be paid in installments provided the pay ments are ord ere d over a definite pe riod of time and the sum of the a limonyto be paid is asce rtainable when a war ded. Id. A l i m o n y in futuro, howeve r, lac ks sum-certainty due to conting encie s aff

ecting the total amount of alimony to be paid. M c Ke e, 65 5 S. W.2 d at 16 5- 66 (h old ing a lim on y wa s in f utu ro wher e husband w as orde red to pa y the mortg a g e no te un til e ith e r the so n tu rn e d tw e nty -t wo or the ho us e wa s so ld)

. Vi e we d b y the se s t a n d ar d s , t h e a l i m o n y a w ar d e d b y t h e tr i a l c o u r tw a s c l e ar l y a l i m o n y in solido , being for a n amount that may be re a dil y a sc e rt a ine d a ndwi th no co nti ng e nc ie s tha t wou ld te rm inate or a lte r the pay me nts

. B e c au s e t h i s c o u r tc o n s i d e r s a l i m o n y in solido in the natur e of a pr op e rty di vi si on , in e va luatin g the pr op ri e ty

of su c h a n a wa

rd the a mou nt o f s uc h a lim on y ha s b e e n a dd e d to the pr op e rt y awa rded the rec ipient and deduc ted from the prope rty awa rded to the pay er. Knowles v. Knowl es , 20 02 Te nn . A pp . L

EX I S 27 2, No . M 20 01 -0 12 82 -C OA -R 3- CV , 2 00 2 WL 59 85 51 , at *6 (Te nn . Ct

. A p p
. A p r
. 1 9 , 2 0 0 2 )

. T h e a m o u n to f a l i m o n y in solido a wa

rd e d in thi s c a se is $ 50 0. 00 pe r m on th for five y e ars (s ixty

mon ths ) o r $ 30 ,0 00 .0 0. Ad din g $3 0, 00 0. 00 to the pr op e rty a wa rd e d M s. Campbell would result in he r rec eiving $403,349.72 or approximately 79.5 perc ent o f t h e m ar i t al e state . D e du c tin g a

sim ila r amou nt f

ro m th e pr op e rty

a wa rd e d M r. Ca mpb e ll w ou ld r e su lt i n h is rec eiving $103, 922.28 or appr ox imately 20.5 perc ent of the m arital estate. Considering the re cord as a w hole, we f

ind this t o be an ine quitable division of martial property , and, ac cording ly , the final o r d e r s h o u l d b e m o d i f

i e d b y d e l e t i n g t h e a w ar d o f a l i m o n y in solido of $500.00 per month for five y e ars
. Th e Ap pe lle e , Ms. Ca mpb e ll a ssi g ns a s e rr or the tr ia l c ou rt ’s re fu sa l to or de r M r. Ca mpb e ll to pay her a ttorney s’ fe es incurr ed in prosec uting he r divorce action. The rec ord indicate s the-8-

attorney s’ fe es of Ms. Campbell we re $20,860.33. In denying he r re quest for attorney s’ fees, the trial court stated: Finally , Mrs. Campbell seeks attorney s fee s. For the better part of two day s of a thre e day trial there was testimony

from Mrs. Campbell and he r witnesses a bout Mr. Campbell’s misconduct for which the rec ord ref lects he admitted inappropriate marital conduc t from the fi lin g of the c omp la int . E a c h p arty sh a ll b e re sp on sib le fo r the ir ow n atto rn e y

fe e s. The award of attorney fee s by the t rial court is considere d an aw ard of alimony

. W

allace v. W allace , 733 S.W. 2d10 2, 11 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 7) . D e c isi on s in vo lvi ng a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a re wi thi n the sound discre tion of the trial court and, on appe al, this c ourt will not int erf ere with that decision except wher e ther e is a c lear showing that the trial court rea ched the wrong c onclusion such that manifest injustice would be done if the aw ard or failure to make an a war d is al l o wed to st and. Hanove r v. Hanov er , 7 75 S.W. 2d61 2, 61 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 9) . T he tr ia l c ou rt wa s a pp are ntl y of the opinion that Ms. Campbell had consider ably leng thened the trial and attorne y ’s fe es incurr ed in order to pr ove the inappr opriate r elationship that Mr. Campbell had admitted. We note that afte r paying he r attorne y s’ fe es, Ms. Campbell will r etain approximately 69.6 perc ent of the total marital estate of the parties. Acc ording ly , we cannot say that the trial court abused its discr etion in ordering the pa rt ie s to be ar the ir

ow n le g a l e xpe ns e s o r that de nia l of a n aw ard to Ms. Ca mpb e ll w ou ld r e su lt in a m an i fe s t injust ice to her . Ms. Campbell's r equest for her attorney s’ fe es incurr ed in the trial court is re spectfully

denied. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court on this issue. Finally , Ms. Campbell alleg es the trial c ourt err ed b y e q ually dividing the c ourt costs incurr ed in the trial court. The trial court is af forde d discretion in taxi ng and asse ssing c osts. Long v. Long , 95 7 S .W .2 d 8 25 , 8 33 -3 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) ; Ray v . Ray , 2 0 0 4 T e n n A p p LE X I S 3 2 4 , N o. M2 00 3- 01 15 8- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 4 WL 11 14 57 8, a t *17 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. Ma y 18 , 2 00 4) . Wh ile court c osts are or dinarily

allowed to the pr evailing party , Rule 54.04, Tenn. R. Civ. P., the Appellee has fa iled to cite anything in the record, other than s he was awa rded the divorce , that would lead us to the conclusion that the trial c ourt abused its discretion in equally dividing the c ourt costs betwe en the parties. As a re sult, we must affirm the tria l court on this issue.
I V. CONCLUSI ON
Th e ru lin g of

the tr ia l c ou rt

is a ff ir me d a s mo dif

ie d to de le te the ob lig a tio n o f M r. Ca mpb e ll t o p a y a l i m o n y in solido . We no te that a mot ionby

Mr . Campb e ll t o su sp e ndthe a lim on y pay me nts pending appea l was denie d. This matter is rema nded to the trial c ourt for a determination of how payments of alimony

heretofore made by

Mr. Campbell shall be re couped and for e nforc ement of the judg ment of the c ourt. The c ourt costs on this appea l s h al l b e divi ded equa lly betwee n the parties.

___________________________________ DONALD P. HARRI S, SENI OR J UDGE-9-