14-2430 

Singh v. Lynch 

BIA 

Christensen, IJ 

A200 943 204

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

23rd 4 day of December, two thousand fifteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 RALPH K. WINTER,

8 DENNIS JACOBS, 

9 GERARD E. LYNCH,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 GURPREET SINGH, AKA SINGH 

14 GURPREET, 

15 Petitioner, 

16 

17 v. 14-2430 

18 NAC 

19 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

21 Respondent. 

22 _____________________________________ 

23 

24 FOR PETITIONER: Amy Nussbaum Gell, New York, New 

25 York. 

26 

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

28 Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. 

29 Wernery, Assistant Director; 

30 Gregory M. Kelch, Trial Attorney, 
2

1 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

2 United States Department of Justice, 

3 Washington, D.C. 

4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

7 DENIED. 

8 Petitioner Gurpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, 

9 seeks review of a June 20, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming 

10 a May 17, 2013 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying 

11 Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

12 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re 

13 Gurpreet Singh, No. A200 943 204 (B.I.A. June 20, 2014), aff’g

14 No. A200 943 204 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 17, 2013). We assume 

15 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

16 procedural history in this case. 

17 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

18 the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” 

19 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 

20 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

21 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. 

22 Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 
3

1 For asylum applications, like Singh’s, governed by the REAL 

2 ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

3 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an asylum 

4 applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the 

5 plausibility of his or her account, and inconsistencies in his 

6 or her statements, “without regard to whether” they go “to the 

7 heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. 

8 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 

9 (2d Cir. 2008). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility 

10 determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, 

11 it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an 

12 adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. 

13 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse 

14 credibility determination, which was based mainly on Singh’s 

15 implausible testimony. The agency reasonably found it 

16 implausible that Singh could be a party activist with a pro-Sikh 

17 political party, without knowing the party’s chief goal, or that 

18 elections occurred shortly after he began his alleged activism. 

19 We uphold an IJ’s implausibility findings unless we have a 

20 “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

21 committed,” Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 
4

1 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), as long as the finding 

2 is “tethered to record evidence,” Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 

3 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2007). 

4 The agency’s implausibility finding is supported by 

5 Singh’s inconsistent testimony about alleged persecution 

6 related to his activism. His application stated that he was 

7 beaten by Congress Party “hooligans.” However, he initially 

8 testified that he was at a rally when unknown assailants beat 

9 him for undisclosed reasons, and then immediately testified 

10 that his assailants told him to join the Congress Party. His 

11 claim of political activism is undermined by his changing 

12 accounts of the incident and the motivation for it, and by his 

13 ignorance of the goals of his party and the fact that elections 

14 had occurred. 

15 Singh was given opportunities to explain the implausible 

16 features of his testimony. Although he had never heard of 

17 Khalistan (the independent state whose formation is the central 

18 goal of his political party), he said that people in India do 

19 not talk about Khalistan for fear that they will be persecuted. 

20 As to not knowing about the 2009 elections, he stated that he 

21 was a simple party worker who provided free food service for 
5

1 the impoverished. Neither explanation is so compelling that 

2 a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to accept it, 

3 particularly as it contradicts his assertions in his 

4 application that he was one of a small group of activists who 

5 promoted the party. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 

6 (2d Cir. 2005). 

7 Further, the IJ reasonably found that Singh’s 

8 corroborating evidence was insufficient to rehabilitate his 

9 testimony. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 

10 2007). While Singh stated that he had learned of Khalistan by 

11 attending a Sikh temple in the United States, he produced no 

12 evidence from his fellow congregants. Further, he submitted 

13 no evidence from his family describing the 2004, 2009, and 2010 

14 incidents. And, the IJ permissibly afforded scant evidentiary 

15 weight to the documentary evidence that he did submit because 

16 the authors of letters from his village leader and the political 

17 party were unavailable for cross-examination, and his doctor’s 

18 letter was not contemporaneous with the treatment it described. 

19 Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d 

20 Cir. 2006). 
6

1 Considering the foregoing, the IJ’s adverse credibility 

2 determination is supported by substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C. 

3 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. This finding 

4 was sufficient to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 

5 relief, as all three claims were based upon the same factual 

6 predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 

7 2006). 

8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

9 DENIED. 

10 FOR THE COURT: 

11 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk