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FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN THE OSCE REGION 

(PART I) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

AUGUST 2, 2007 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 110–1–5] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida, 

Chairman 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

VACANT, Department of State 

VACANT, Department of Defense 

VACANT, Department of Commerce 

(II) 

FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN THE OSCE REGION 

(PART I) 

AUGUST 2, 2007 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 1 

Hon. Hilda L. Solis, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Fatima Tlisova, Russian Independent Journalist .................... 4 

Nina Ognianova, Europe and Central Asia Program 

Coordinator, Committee to Protect Journalists .................... 6 

Paula Schriefer, Director of Advocacy, Freedom House, 

Washington, DC ....................................................................... 11 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, 

Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe .................................................................................. 25 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Ranking 

Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe ...................................................................................... 27 

Prepared statement of Fatima Tlisova ...................................... 29 

Prepared statement of Nina Ognianova .................................... 32 

Prepared statement of Paula Schriefer ..................................... 42 

Response of Nina Ognianova to written questions submitted 

by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ........................................................................................... 49 

(III) 

(1) 

FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA IN THE OSCE 

REGION (PART I) 

August 2, 2007 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 2:05 p.m. in room 340 Cannon House 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Mike McIntyre, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe; Hon. Hilda L. Solis, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Fatima Tlisova, Russian Independent Journalist; Nina Ognianova, Europe and Central Asia Program Coordinator, Committee to Protect Journalists; and Paula Schriefer, Director of Advocacy, Freedom House, Washington, DC. 

HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, COMMISSIONER, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HASTINGS. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Our hearing will come to order. 

I apologize, Ms. Solis and I, for having to vote. 

I welcome you here to this Helsinki Commission hearing on 

‘‘Freedom of the Media in the OSCE Region.’’ 

Freedom of the media is freedom of expression at work. When 

the OSCE Permanent Council created the position of Representative on Freedom of the Media in 1997, it declared that—and I 

quote—‘‘Freedom of expression is a fundamental and internationally recognized human right and a basic component of a democratic 

society,’’ and that ‘‘free, independent and pluralistic media are essential to a free and open society and accountable systems of government.’’ 

In practical terms, a free media in a democratic society keeps 

citizens abreast of the decisions of their government and gives the 

citizenry the opportunity to make informed choices about the men 

and women who seek their permission to govern them. 

It provides a forum for both experts and average citizens to express their opinions and exchange alternative visions of the future. 

By exposing malfeasance and corruption in the corridors of government or in corporate boardrooms, newspapers and the electronic 

2 

media help remove the cancer of corruption from honest and productive enterprise. 

In June 2007, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the 

Media, Miklos Haraszti, presents a mixed picture: progress in some 

countries, regression in others. It is clear that, although the window dressing of democratic elections may be preserved in certain 

OSCE participating States, free media constitute a threat to leaders who would rule their nations for their own benefit or hold on 

to power long after their political shelf life has passed. 

Particularly disturbing is the ongoing media crackdown in many 

of the countries that will be addressed here today. 

Electronic media are increasingly under tightened control and we 

find journalists in jail, and in many of these places there are journalists who have openly sought political asylum abroad to protest 

the worsening conditions in their country. 

In some countries, journalism is not only a difficult profession, 

but sometimes a life-threatening one. 

It may be, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn said recently, ‘‘all too easy 

to take Russia to task with a long list of omissions, violations and 

mistakes.’’ But the unfortunate fact is, according to the Committee 

to Protect Journalists, the Russian Federation has become the 

third most dangerous country in the world for journalists—after 

Iraq and Algeria. 

CPJ reports that since the year 2000, 14 journalists have been 

murdered in the Russian Federation in retaliation for their professional activities. 

Only last month, both the board of the World Association of 

Newspapers and the U.S. House of Representatives passed resolutions calling on Russian authorities to investigate these unsolved 

murders more vigorously. 

I would note that, in a few cases investigated, progress has been 

claimed by law enforcement officials. And I look forward, as do my 

colleagues, to any additional information our witnesses may provide. 

Today’s subject is a complex and voluminous one—and I won’t 

claim that we’ll do it justice in just this limited hearing, nor would 

I assert that the media always acts responsibly or that journalists 

should be above the law when the law is properly formulated. But 

I can’t help but recall that Thomas Jefferson, whose relationship 

with the press was, shall we say, uneven, wrote in 1787 that, if 

given a choice between having a government without newspapers 

or newspapers without a government, he would not hesitate a moment to take the latter. 

I have asked two of our witnesses today to present a survey of 

developments related to freedom of the media in the OSCE participating States, with a view toward negative trends or especially 

egregious cases or situations—although we are always happy to 

hear good news, too. 

We’ll also be pleased to hear the testimony of a journalist from 

Russia, whom I’ve had the pleasure of meeting before, whose 

harrowing personal experiences demonstrate the extremes to which 

certain forces will go in order to suppress the distribution of information. 

3 

Finally, I’d like to note that we invited the OSCE Representative 

on Freedom of the Media to share his perspective with us today. 

But unfortunately, his schedule did not permit his attendance. 

He has, however, indicated his willingness to participate in a future Commission hearing, so I’m hopeful that we will be able to 

have him join us on another occasion. 

If time permits, I’ll entertain written questions from the audience that are submitted to staff during the course of the hearing. 

Ms. Solis? 

HON. HILDA L. SOLIS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a real pleasure to be 

here. I want to thank the witnesses for coming here today. 

This is the second time or opportunity I’ve had to attend one of 

the CSCE hearings here in the House, and it’s a real pleasure to 

be able to welcome individuals who, like yourself, are so courageous 

here. 

Freedom of the press, as you know, is a basic value in America, 

and it’s outlined in our Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Media freedom 

is the foundation of any successful, responsive democracy and 

keeps governments accountable in challenging times, especially 

now. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the challenges to media freedom in the OSCE region. And particularly, I’m 

interested in developments in Russia, where threats to journalists 

are real and dangerous. 

The high murder rate of journalists in Russia is simply unacceptable. We must continue to strongly urge Russia to respect basic 

freedoms, such as freedom of the press, and end any intimidation 

of journalists, especially threats of violence. 

Freedom of the press is especially important in countries such as 

Uzbekistan, as Uzbekistan faces upcoming elections. The press 

plays in integral role in educating voters about the positions candidates and parties take on various issues. 

Without media freedom during the campaigns and elections of 

public officials in these countries, the United States and the Helsinki Commission are left to question the outcome of these elections, because voters are at best uninformed or, worse, misled. 

We must also encourage states in the OSCE region to repeal any 

laws that make criticism of a country’s government a crime. Azerbaijan has charged at least 60 journalists for speech-related offenses for simply doing their job. And as we work with countries 

to establish or improve freedom of the press in countries where it 

is very limited, we must also foster progress with states that have 

made some improvements, but need to maintain and expand upon 

freedom of the press. 

With the U.S. Department of State’s recent Country Report on 

Turkey, I am also concerned that that country could be regressing 

to limit media freedom. 

Again, I want to thank our witnesses and am looking forward to 

hearing your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Ms. Solis. 

4 

I’d like to begin and urge the audience to realize that we have 

circulated the curriculum vitae or biographies of our witnesses already. And if they won’t take it as an offense, then I would appreciate very much that we not go into great detail with reference to 

their biographies. 

Our first witness will be Ms. Fatima Tlisova. She is an independent Russian journalist and has worked with the Associated 

Press, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and the London-based Institute for War and Peace. And I won’t go further. She tells her 

story much better than her biography does. 

Ms. Tlisova, you have the floor. 

FATIMA TLISOVA, RUSSIAN INDEPENDENT JOURNALIST 

Ms. TLISOVA. Chairman Hastings and members of the Commission, thank you for this opportunity to talk to you about the working conditions for journalists in Russia’s North Caucasus. 

For more than 10 years I worked as a correspondent for different 

newspapers and agencies in the North Caucasus—the land between 

the Black and Caspian Seas in southern Russia. This region was 

the arena of war a hundred years ago. It still remains an area of 

war. 

Russia’s statements about the fight against global terrorism in 

the North Caucasus have nothing to do with the truth. It is a war 

against nations that tried to become independent. Russia has been 

using in this region military policies that are very close to genocide. 

I can describe those policies as massive and regular violations of 

human rights, even the basic right to life. 

This is the truth that the Russian Government tries to hide. And 

the best way to hide information is by destroying the freedom of 

speech and the independent press. Most famous Russian journalist, 

Anna Politkovskaya, was murdered only for one reason—for her job 

in the North Caucasus, for telling the truth. 

I don’t need to tell you the statistics of freedom of speech in Russia. These numbers are very familiar to all who are interested in 

the situation. My personal story is also well known. 

But there are dozens of stories beyond the statistics—stories that 

remain unknown. I want to tell you only one of these stories, about 

a friend of mine who still lives and works in Russia. For this reason, I can’t call him by name. 

When he started to work as a correspondent for one of Russia’s 

central newspapers, he never used his legal name; he used only 

pseudonyms. He started to write articles that were very different 

from the others appearing in the official press. His stories were full 

of details. They were mirrors of what was really happening in his 

region. He wrote about kidnapped young people, about murdered or 

tortured civilians, who were called terrorists after their deaths. 

Then, only after a few weeks, he suddenly disappeared. I tried 

to call him. His cell phone was switched off. No one in his family 

had any idea where he could be. 

On the second day, the news of his abduction came. Someone saw 

the man being kidnapped near an Internet cafe by masked militants. For Caucasians, it means only one thing—his relatives 

should start to collect cash to pay for the return of the dead body. 

5 

I was on my way to his town when he called me. His voice was 

changed. At first I couldn’t understand who was calling from his 

cell phone. He said, ‘‘Do not come, please. I will be soon in your 

city.’’ 

A few hours later, in the evening, we met in a cafe in Nalchik. 

He was very angry and sad. He used the paper napkins on the 

table to write down for me what had happened. He could not speak 

about it, because he was very afraid. 

Five or six masked men kidnapped him. He had with him a cell 

phone, flash card and tape recorder when they took him. They took 

all this stuff from him and then pushed him inside a car. 

He was brought to a neighboring town. After arriving, they left 

him in a small room, and all his guards disappeared. The door was 

locked. There was only one table and two chairs in this room. 

He heard men’s voices screaming like wild animals. He realized 

they were being tortured. 

Then, two men came in wearing civilian clothes. They did not 

hide their faces, and they showed him IDs. Both of them were FSB 

officers. They asked him how he became a journalist. Their tone 

was smug and superior. 

‘‘There are dozens of journalists in your region, but only a few 

of them were here like you.’’ We understand why they asked him. 

They put all his articles, signed by different pseudonyms, in front 

of him on the table. Then the questions changed. 

They asked him, is he a spy? What Western secret services was 

he connected to? ‘‘You can’t write articles like you wrote if you are 

only a journalist. You must have someone strong behind you,’’ they 

told him. 

He tried to explain, he wrote only the truth. They were laughing. 

‘‘Who needs your truth? You must write what you must, nothing 

more.’’ 

These questions lasted until midnight. Then they left him alone 

for the night. The next morning, he received instructions. Every 

time he wrote something for the central newspaper, he must first 

send it to them for checking. Once a week he must come to meet 

with the officer who will work with him. 

‘‘We know where are you all the time. We are watching you. We 

are hearing you,’’ they told him when they gave him back his cell 

phone. 

They made him sign an agreement to keep silent. 

And last they told him, ‘‘If you break our agreement, you will be 

disappeared forever.’’ 

Two weeks after our meeting, he received access to a closed security zone on the border of Russia and Azerbaijan. He started writing articles about the very good relationship between the Russian 

security services and local civilians. 

I’m not afraid to make things worse for this journalist because 

of this testimony, because I know dozens of stories like his. They 

will not realize which one of dozens is my hero. 

These official methods I described are not unusual, but the most 

useful methods are much more simple. A year ago, I had an interview with an officer from this FSB. He spoke incognito. I asked 

him about methods they used to keep under control the local press. 

I was interested, have they really met with every journalist? 

6 

‘‘We are not interested in every journalist,’’ he told me. ‘‘We have 

our people in everyplace they are. We know what they write about 

before it becomes public. If something is wrong, we need to just call 

the editor. That’s all. You must truly believe. If you disagree with 

us, you must change your profession, or we are strong enough to 

make you much more flexible.’’ 

I can name those methods used against the journalists to make 

them flexible. In my own opinion, you can do it: beatings, kidnapping, torture, arrests. Things can be done not only to you, but to 

your family, too. Even your 70-year-old father can be beaten so terribly that he will lose an eye. This is what happened to the father 

of one journalist who freelances for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 

Or your 16-year-old innocent son can be arrested. Your house 

and your parents’ house can be searched any time they want to. 

Your name can appear on the pages of very flexible newspapers 

with unseemingly commentaries. 

You can be arrested from the list of journalists who have access 

to official information, or who are allowed to attend official press 

conferences. You can be barred from working for foreign news 

agencies, because the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will 

never give you the accreditation. And without accreditation, your 

work is illegal. 

If you didn’t become flexible after all, you can suddenly die or be 

publicly executed, as happened to Anna Politkovskaya. 

These are my observations after 10 years’ work as a journalist 

in the North Caucasus region of Russia. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much. 

I would now like for our next witness from the Committee to Protect Journalists, Ms. Nina Ognianova, to take the floor. And thank 

you so much for being here. 

NINA OGNIANOVA, EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA PROGRAM 

COORDINATOR, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Chairman Hastings and members of the Commission, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and 

participate in this hearing. 

My name is Nina Ognianova. I coordinate the Europe and Central Asia program at the Committee to Protect Journalists, an 

international, independently funded organization that defends 

press freedom worldwide. It is an honor to be here. 

In my testimony, I will first address the issue of impunity in 

journalist murders—the gravest danger to press freedom in the 

countries of the former Soviet Union. I will then focus on the press 

freedom records of Russia and Azerbaijan, where media conditions 

have severely deteriorated, according to CPJ research. 

Governments in several former Soviet states have strengthened 

their grip on power by restricting independent activities—from 

journalism and human rights defense, to religious activity and political dissent. In particular, the central administrations in Russia 

and Azerbaijan have stepped up their efforts to silence critical 

voices in the run-up to national votes, which are scheduled in these 

countries over the next 14 months. 

7 

Politicians, state officials, government regulators, security agencies and pro-government businesses have relied on a variety of 

methods to consolidate control of influential broadcasters to sideline critical journalists and to intimidate them into self-censorship. 

Such methods include the selective use of bureaucratic regulations to inhibit media outlets; the passage of vaguely worded laws 

to silence independent voices; the use of politically motivated criminal investigations against critics; the imprisonment of independent 

journalists on trumped-up charges (oftentimes accompanied by the 

closure of their media outlets); the purchase of controlling interest 

in independent news outlets; the aggressive harassment of journalists by security services; and the failure to bring justice in the murders of journalists and in other physical attacks against the press. 

Impunity in journalist murders remains the gravest danger to 

press freedom and threatens democracy in the transitional countries of the former Soviet Bloc. Critical, investigative reporters, 

who work to uncover social ailments such as corruption, corporate 

crime, human rights violations and abuse of power, are the usual 

targets of this lethal censorship. 

As violence against these messengers goes unpunished, fewer 

journalists are willing to risk their lives in pursuit of difficult stories, the press is forced to compromise its role as the watchdog of 

power, and the public is kept in the dark about important issues. 

When it comes to impunity, Russia sets a sad regional standard. 

As Chairman Hastings mentioned in his introduction, it is the 

third deadliest country in the world for journalists over the past 15 

years, behind only conflict-ridden Iraq, and Algeria—when it was 

in civil war. 

A total of 47 jounralists have been killed in Russia since 1992. 

The vast majority of the killings remain unsolved. Since the year 

2000, 17 journalists have been killed in Russia in the line of duty. 

And out of these 17, 14 were murdered in direct response for their 

professional work. None of the murders have been solved. 

Five suspects are currently on trial in the 2000 murder of 

Novaya Gazeta journalist Igor Domnikov, but the masterminds of 

this crimeare still at large. 

The trial of two suspects in the 2004 murder of Forbes Russia 

editor, Paul Klebnikov, is now in limbo, because one suspect in the 

killing went missing in March. 

Progress is being made in last year’s high-profile assassination of 

Anna Politkovskaya, Moscow prosecutors say. But after 10 months, 

they have yet to report any results. 

On February 1, as a response to an international outcry over the 

murder of Politkovskaya, President Vladimir Putin publicly 

pledged to protect the press corps during his annual news conference at the Kremlin. But only a month later, another death 

shook the Russian press corps, that of Kommersant military correspondent, Ivan Safronov. The circumstances surrounding his 

death, coupled with the sensitivity of Safronov’s beat, prompted 

many to suspect that he had been murdered. 

Moscow prosecutors initially said that the death was a suicide. 

Later, they opened a criminal investigation into what they called 

‘‘incitement to suicide’’—an article in the Russian penal code that’s 

8 

defined as provoking a suicide through threats or abusive treatment. 

Most recently, in late June, authorities ruled out foul play in the 

case, and said they had not found any link between Safronov’s reporting on alleged Russian arms sales to Syria and Iran and his 

death, the news agency Interfax reported. 

The investigators’ behavior in this case is not unusual for Russia. 

Local authorities regularly reject the professional motive in journalists’ killings, and instead classify them as street crimes, domestic disputes or robberies. 

Russia remains the political and moral force in much of the region, so its behavior in journalist murder investigations—is widely 

emulated in the region. 

In Azerbaijan, for example, President Ilham Aliyev called the 

March 2005 assassination of a prominent editor, Elmar Huseynov, 

a provocation against the state and an act of terrorism. But despite 

these strong words, authorities have shown little resolve to identify 

and prosecute the killers. 

In Belarus, 2 years after the 2004 murder of Veronika 

Cherkasova, a reporter with the opposition newspaper Solidarnost, 

who was stabbed to death in her Minsk apartment, prosecutors 

have suspended the investigation for what they have called ‘‘lack 

of suspects.’’ 

Authorities ignored Cherkasova’s articles on surveillance by the 

Belarusian state security service and her reporting on alleged arms 

sales by Belarus to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. They 

said that the killing was the result of a domestic dispute and, effectively shelved the case. 

In Turkmenistan, even after a journalist died in official custody, 

authorities refused to investigate the case. Ogulsapar Muradova, a 

correspondent for RFE/RL, was arrested last June [2006] and held 

incommunicado for more than two months in an Ashgabat jail. 

A day after her arrest, then-President Saparmurat Niyazov 

called her a traitor to the motherland on national television. Last 

August, she was convicted on a bogus charge of possessing ammunition and sentenced to six years in prison after a closed-door blitz 

trial without defense counsel. 

Three weeks later, in mid-September, authorities released 

Muradova’s body to her family, refused to tell them the time and 

cause of her death, and denied requests for autopsy. Muradova’s 

relatives said that the body bore a large head wound and multiple 

neck bruises. But to this day Turkmenistan has ignored international calls for an independent inquiry into the journalist’s 

death. 

According to CPJ research, out of the countries in Europe and 

Central Asia, Russia and Azerbaijan have backtracked the most on 

press freedom in recent years. On World Press Freedom Day this 

year, they each earned a spot on CPJ’s list of the world’s worst 

press freedom backsliders in the past five years. 

As Russia nears parliamentary and presidential elections, the 

Kremlin has pushed critical journalism out of the public space. 

Independent reporting is now limited to a small number of print 

publications and news Web sites, which, compared to the Kremlincontrolled national television, have only marginal influence on pubVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:00 Dec 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\080207 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
9 

lic opinion. Authorities have recently shifted attention to buying 

controlling interest in print publications. 

Most recently, on July 26, President Putin signed into law a 

package of amendments that expand the definition of extremism to 

include public discussion of such activity and give law enforcement 

officials broad authority to suspend media outlets which do not 

comply with these new regulations. 

The bill’s vague language turns ‘‘extremism’’ into an umbrella 

catch-all term that could be used to silence critics. 

Russia’s NGOs have also experienced legal pressure. In January 

2006, President Putin signed into law a restrictive bill regulating 

the work of NGOs, including those dedicated to promoting press 

freedom and supporting independent media. 

The measure gives the Justice Ministry broad authority to shutter NGOs for engaging in activities that are counter to the political 

independence of the Russian Federation, or which are prohibited. 

But the law does not define those ‘‘prohibited’’ activities. Under 

this new law, at least one NGO has already been shut down—the 

Nizhny Novgorod-based Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, 

which published one of the very few sources of independent news 

on the conflict in Chechnya. 

In April, Moscow law enforcement also closed down the successor 

of Internews Russia, the Educated Media Foundation, allegedly in 

order to check the organization for financial improprieties. The director of the foundation, Manana Aslamazian, was forced to flee 

abroad, because she feared possible jailing. 

Aslamazian is right to fear. This year alone, Russia has jailed 

two journalists because of their work. 

One of them is Vladimir Chugunov—founder and editor of the 

independent weekly Chugunka in the small town of Solnechnogorsk. He was arrested in January on a charge of threatening to 

murder or cause serious damage. Authorities did not disclose any 

details of this charge. After spending more than four months in 

state custody, during which he was shuttled between prison cell, 

hospital wards and psychiatric wards, authorities conditionally released Chugunov in May from the Butyrskaya prison in Moscow. 

The journalist had been held at Butyrskaya prison on an undisclosed diagnosis prior to his release. 

Chugunov said that he was given medications that were not disclosed to him, and that he had become infected with lice and scabies during his hospital stay. He went on a 10-day hunger strike 

to protest the treatment. To this day authorities have not even 

given any explanation for the release. 

My colleague Fatima Tlisova has already given you an account 

of the brutality of the methods used by Russian authorities in suppressing news from or about Chechnya and other parts of the 

North Caucasus. So, I’ll go on to say a few words about Azerbaijan. 

Azerbaijan’s press freedom record in recent years also causes serious concern. With seven behind bars, the country now sets the 

Europe and Central Asia regional record for jailing journalists for 

their work. 

Despite CPJ’s and other organizations’ calls to release the journalists on National Press Day, July 22, authorities continue to hold 

them. Most disturbingly, in these cases journalists are held on 

10 

criminal charges filed by public officials. Defamation remains a 

criminal offense in Azerbaijan, so removing it from the country’s 

penal code will be an important first step in reversing this record. 

And while journalists are punished as criminals, crimes against 

journalists remain unpunished. Apart from the unsolved 2005 murder of Elmar Huseynov, the brutal 2006 attacks against two opposition journalists, Fikret Huseinli and Bakhaddin Khaziyev also remain unpunished. 

Huseinli was kidnapped in March in a Baku suburb by unidentified assailants who slashed his throat; he survived the attack. The 

journalist had received several prior death threats by phone, warning him to discontinue his reporting. 

Khaziyev was abducted in May on the outskirts of Baku. His 

attackers beat him for several hours and drove over his legs with 

a car. Khaziyev survived, but suffered serious leg injuries. Shortly 

before the attack, he had written articles critical of officials in the 

security services. 

The international community, including the United States, cannot afford to be indifferent to the deteriorating press freedom 

records of Russia and Azerbaijan. Journalists increasingly resort to 

self-censorship to avoid dangerous, even deadly repercussions. As a 

result, the Russian and Azerbaijani public suffers—uninformed 

about sensitive issues such as human rights abuses, corruption, 

high-level crimes and, in the case of Chechnya, an ongoing conflict. 

CPJ urges the Helsinki Commission to take the lead in making 

press freedom a priority of U.S. foreign policy. Eclipsed by strategic 

defense and energy concerns, human rights and press freedom have 

suffered in recent years. 

This sends a dangerous message to the world—that the United 

States is willing to tolerate impunity in journalist murders, the imprisonment of critical reporters and the closures of independent 

news outlets in Russia and Azerbaijan. Now more than ever, the 

United States should take a firm stand against therepressive actions in these nations. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much. 

Our next witness—and as I indicated to the audience, time permitting, if you have questions that you would write and pass to our 

staff, we’ll try to entertain some of those, as well. 

But before we get to any questions, I’d like to hear from Freedom 

House’s Director of Advocacy, Paula Schriefer, who has a considerable amount of experience in democracy and human rights promotion and currently oversees Freedom House’s advocacy outreach 

and communications activities, including foreign policy advocacy, 

press relations and coordination with international organizations. 

I don’t know how you keep all those balls in the air, but Paula, 

you have the floor. 

PAULA SCHRIEFER, DIRECTOR OF ADVOCACY, FREEDOM 

HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. Thank you, Chairman Hastings, as well as the 

members and staff of the Helsinki Commission. I really appreciate 

you offering Freedom House the opportunity to participate in this 

important hearing. 

11 

I’m honored to be here with my colleagues, Nina Ognianova from 

CPJ, which does important work for the protection of journalists, 

and particularly to be here with Fatima Tlisova, who is really an 

inspirational and courageous journalist and human being. 

Fatima, I think, is here to remind those of us who, from the comfort of our Washington office, throw out statistics about human 

rights and freedom. But what we’re really talking about, of course, 

is human beings. 

It’s a terrible tragedy for the Russian people that Fatima is no 

longer able to do her work from within the borders of her own 

country. 

Freedom House has been monitoring press freedom around the 

world for more than two decades now. Our annual press freedom 

survey evaluates press freedom by looking at a series of questions 

under three different categories that have historically been used to 

limit press freedom. So we look at the legal environment, the political environment and the economic environment. 

We’re talking today about the state of media freedom in the 

OSCE countries, and I have been asked to specifically focus on four 

countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkey. I’ll focus a 

little bit less on Russia and Azerbaijan, since we’ve heard a great 

deal about them already. 

I will start out, however, by pointing out that, among the 56 

countries that now comprise the OSCE, there is a very stark and 

troubling dividing line in the state of press freedom between those 

countries of the former Soviet Union—not including the Baltic 

states—and those that have either joined or are trying to join the 

European Union. 

All of the countries of Central Europe—including the Baltic 

states, which themselves needed to overcome a decades-long legacy 

of Soviet media culture and control—are assessed as ‘‘free’’ in Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press Survey. 

Likewise, the vast majority of countries in Western Europe are 

ranked as ‘‘free.’’ In fact, with the upgrading of Italy this year, the 

one remaining exception is now Turkey, which still falls into the 

‘‘partly free’’ category. 

By stark contrast, of the 12 post-Soviet states, 10 are ranked as 

‘‘not free’’ by Freedom House. This indicates that those countries do 

not provide even the most basic guarantees and protections in the 

legal, political and economic spheres to enable an open and independent press. 

The only two countries in the post-Soviet sphere that enjoy ‘‘partly free’’ status are Georgia and Ukraine, which have experienced 

recent political upheaval and democratic openings. 

With this brief overview, I’m going to turn to some of the specific 

countries. I’ll start, again, very briefly, with Russia. 

My colleague already mentioned in the legal sphere the new registration regulations regarding NGOs. She also mentioned the new 

amendments to the law on fighting extremist activities. Both of 

these are, of course, incredibly damaging. 

At the same time, the government already owns outright or controls significant stakes in the country’s three main national TV networks—this includes Channel One, Rossiya and NTV—and it exerts substantial influence on the content of news reporting. 

12 

As importantly, the government has used these powerful outlets 

to really generate an atmosphere of fear regarding threats from 

both terrorism and religious extremism. And this has contributed, 

certainly, to Russia’s emergence, as has already been stated, as one 

of the world’s most physically dangerous environments for journalists. 

I want to also note something that hasn’t been talked about, 

which is the fact that, unlike in the Soviet days, the Russian TV, 

as you’ve seen, is incredibly professional and glossy. And so, Russians who view it find it entertaining and think that they’re seeing 

something that is incredibly professional. 

I would also note that that affects many of those individuals who 

live in other countries of the former Soviet Union, who look to the 

Russian press as what they think as a real source of independent 

information. 

Nonetheless, Russians, who otherwise are enjoying a period of incredible economic prosperity, due to the high prices of oil, should 

be outraged that their country now finds itself on par in terms of 

press freedom with countries like Ethiopia, Burundi, Chad, the 

Gambia, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, in terms of press freedom. 

I’ll now turn to the situation, actually, in Azerbaijan and 

Kazakhstan. Unlike Russia, actually, neither country has broken 

out of the ‘‘not free’’ status since Freedom House began evaluating 

them as independent countries in 1991. 

Again, I’ll be brief on Azerbaijan. My colleague has already 

talked a great deal about it. The media there operate, as she said, 

under significant governmental and legal pressure. Despite the 

draft law on defamation that would decriminalize libel, journalists 

continue to be prosecuted for criminal libel and insult charges. 

Last year, the Interior Minister alone filed five lawsuits. And 

just a few months ago, the editor of Azerbaijan’s largest independent newspaper was sentenced to 30 months in prison. 

As was said, harassment and violence against journalists also remains a serious concern, particularly as Azerbaijan is slated to 

hold parliamentary and presidential elections in the coming year. 

Kazakhstan, which has—with no apparent appreciation for the 

irony of it—put itself forward as a candidate to chair the OSCE in 

2009, has seen a steady monopolization of media since Freedom 

House began ranking it as an independent country. 

As in a number of the former Soviet states, the broadcast media 

was taken directly into the hands of members of the presidential 

family or those with close ties to it. In fact, President Nazarbayev’s 

daughter ran several television stations, controlled two of the nation’s leading newspapers and at one time headed the state news 

agency. 

Journalists there face criminal charges, particularly under article 

318 of the criminal code, which imposes penalties for ‘‘undermining 

the reputation and dignity of the country’s president and hindering 

his activities.’’ 

The level of repression against such a critical pillar of democracy, 

as well as Kazakhstan’s dismal performance in other key areas, 

such as permitting genuine elections, are clear proof that 

13 

Kazakhstan has no business taking over the chairmanship of the 

OSCE in 2009. 

And now for something more bright. In Turkey—which boasts a 

vibrant media, including notably a vast array of private television 

and radio stations—unfortunately, a major impediment remains to 

press freedom through the prosecution of journalists under provisions of the new Turkish penal code, which came into force in June 

of 2005. 

Article 301 of the penal code allows for imprisoning journalists 

anywhere from 6 months to 3 years for the crime of denigrating 

Turkishness, and has been used to charge journalists for crimes 

such as stating that genocide was committed against Armenians in 

1915, discussing issues like the division of Cyprus, or writing critically, for instance, on anything to deal with the security forces. 

Last year, almost 300 journalists and writers were prosecuted for 

insulting Turkishness under this provision. Seven of them were 

convicted. 

Although Prime Minister Erdogan declared his commitment to 

revising article 301 in September, he nonetheless continued to 

launch defamation suits against the media, filing a total of 59 cases 

in 2006 alone. 

Moreover, other legal impediments present great obstacles for 

Turkish journalists. Article 216, for instance, penalizes individuals 

for ‘‘inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples,’’ and has been 

used against journalists who write about the Kurdish population. 

Despite these concerns, however, Turkey has by and large seen 

an impressive improvement in press freedom over the past decade. 

In 1996, Turkey received a very low score of 74 out of a worst possible 100 on our Press Freedom Survey and was ranked as ‘‘not 

free.’’ By the year 2000, Turkey had jumped to a rating of 58 and 

jumped into the ‘‘partly free’’ category, where it has stayed. It now 

has a score of 48. 

We hope that, despite these developments in the past year, and 

with scrutiny by the OSCE and other international organizations, 

Turkey will continue, will right its path once again and continue 

to improve that score and not backslide. 

In summary, while there has been tremendous progress in the 

level of press freedom in OSCE countries over the past decade, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, this stands in stark contrast to the developments in the countries of the former Soviet 

Union. 

The OSCE has played a vital role in supporting democratic development of its members, not only in terms of enhancing media freedom, but also in other key areas such as free and fair elections. 

We hope that the OSCE will continue to play an influential role 

towards those countries whose journalists and whose citizens are 

still denied basic rights. And the imminent decision on OSCE leadership is an important test of whether or not its member countries 

will maintain the will to do so. 

For its part, the United States should be playing a leadership 

role in ensuring the OSCE’s effectiveness. And I want to note that 

the upcoming OSCE Human Dimension Meeting in Warsaw in September, the OSCE ministerial meeting that will take place in Vienna in November, provide two very important fora during which 

14 

the OSCE can determine a plan of action to address the repression 

of free media, including directing the OSCE representative on freedom of the media to undertake an investigation into these countries. 

I thank you again for allowing me to testify and look forward to 

any questions. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Ms. Schriefer. 

In your remarks just then you said that the ministerial was in 

Vienna. I’d just like to correct you. It’s actually in Madrid. 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. I’m glad you know where it is. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS. That said, the responsibilities that you put forward are certainly critical and hopefully will be undertaken at the 

ministerial, as well as the Human Dimension Meeting in Warsaw. 

We’ve been joined by our colleague, Joe Pitts, from Pennsylvania. 

And Mr. Pitts, I don’t know whether you have any statements at 

this time? OK. 

We will now go to questions, and I’d like to call upon my colleague from California, Ms. Solis, to begin our questioning. 

Once again, I say to the audience, if there are questions, if you 

would pass them to the staff—written questions—then we’ll go to 

you. 

Ms. Solis? 

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And really, I want to commend Fatima Tlisova. I hope I pronounced that correctly. I am very encouraged by your brave statement and the fact that you feel very strongly that there’s a need 

to become more transparent, and that we see that journalists there, 

in Russia in particular, have a cloud around them, whatever they 

report. 

And it’s very interesting for me to hear this from you first hand. 

Sometimes we don’t always get that—— 

Mr. HASTINGS. Give the—— 

Ms. SOLIS. I’m sorry. I’m assuming she—— 

Mr. HASTINGS. He wasn’t doing simultaneous. 

Ms. SOLIS. I am curious also, because in this country sometimes 

we don’t always get the right information through our media. But 

I know that in Russia it’s somewhat of a very different situation 

there, where lives are at stake, and reporting for journalists is almost a life-threatening job. And that’s very hard for some of us 

here in this country to imagine. 

But I take your testimony at its word, that there is much that 

we can do as the Commission and through the OSCE. 

And I would just like to ask you a few questions, what you think 

that the impact that the recent closure of the Educated Media 

Foundation, what will that have—what impact will that have on 

journalists like yourself and others? 

Ms. TLISOVA [through interpreter]. This is not an isolated event. 

This will lead to a series of other consequences. This needs to be 

viewed in a certain context. 

And I think what it leads to is more censorship, more self-censorship, less educated journalists and less educated people who are 

able to operate in a democracy. 

Ms. SOLIS. I have another question, if I can, Mr. Chair. 

15 

Russian authorities have claimed that they have made progress 

in the investigation of the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. I’m 

sorry, I’m not pronouncing that right. 

Do you think her killers will ever be apprehended or charged? 

Ms. TLISOVA [through interpreter]. Not under this regime. Maybe 

under some other regime in Russia, but not under this regime. 

I think these people have enough grounds to hide who the real 

killers are. 

Ms. SOLIS. It’s clear that Moscow has tried to put an information 

blockade around Chechnya. Do you think that this has been successful? And do you think Russian policy in Chechnya would have 

changed if there had been more reliable reporting from Chechnya? 

Ms. TLISOVA [through interpreter]. The war in Chechnya is not 

an isolated war. I believe there is a war in the entire North 

Caucasus, in Circassia. I am from Circassia. I was born there and 

I know what is going on. 

Regular Russian troops conduct so-called special operations 

against civilians in that region. Oftentimes, innocent victims die, 

because of this special operations. And their relatives have to collect money to buy back the bodies of their relatives. 

I believe this needs to be exposed, and I wanted to say something 

else. 

So, I believe there was no peace in Chechnya, despite all proclamations that there is peace in Chechnya. I believe there is a war 

going on in the entire North Caucasus, and I believe we need to 

address that. 

The declaration that there is peace in Chechnya is just not true. 

I know what I am talking about, because I was there. 

Ms. SOLIS. So, the lack of your ability or journalists to report, 

then gives a misimpression, a misleading impression to the rest of 

the world and, obviously, to other folks that live in that region. 

Is that something that you would agree with? 

Ms. TLISOVA [through interpreter]. Yes, indeed. The answer is 

yes. 

And once again I would like to stress that many of the things 

that I am describing are now happening in Chechnya. In my laptop 

I have pictures taken not during the Chechen war, that are taken 

two or three years ago. There are innocent victims. And some pictures are taken as we speak. And some of these you wouldn’t be 

able to look at. 

I have pictures of murdered people who are under 18. I am also 

aware of a murder of an 8-month-old girl during one of the special 

operations. And when I interviewed General Yedelev and asked 

him what happened to the girl, he denied everything, and her body 

disappeared and I was not able to establish the truth. 

But once again, this is happening now. 

Ms. SOLIS. Mr. Chairman, I just have one last question, and then 

I have to leave. 

But I wanted to ask Paula Schriefer if you could just elaborate 

for me the definition of Turkishness. You mentioned that, and I am 

not clear about that. So, if you could please elaborate on that. 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. That’s actually part of the problem. When you 

use language like that in law, that is extremely vague, then it 

16 

leaves it up to prosecutors and judges to determine whether or not 

somebody is in violation. 

So, I’m not better able to define what Turkishness is than you 

are. And that’s part of the reason why you had 300 different prosecutions taking place. 

Now, the comforting news is that there were only seven convictions out of those cases in the past year. But as you can imagine, 

not only the stress that that imposes in terms of self-censorship 

among Turkish journalists, who don’t want to fall in contradiction 

of this very vague wording, but it also puts a huge stress on the 

legal system in terms of clogging up the courts in these types of 

cases. They just have no place in a society like Turkey today. 

So, it is intentionally vague. 

Ms. SOLIS. So, if there is any statement that’s made negatively 

about Turks period, like the Armenian genocide, then that is 

viewed as a part of—perhaps could be viewed as a part of that definition? 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. That’s exactly right. And that is, then, a very 

frequent situation in which people have been held according to that 

particular legal provision. 

Other incidences have been, for instance, people who report on 

the state of the Kurdish situation. So, they’re seen as insulting 

Turkishness under that part of it. 

There’s also another separate piece of legislation under the antiterror law, that precludes the dissemination of statements and 

propaganda by terrorist organizations. Well, since many of the proKurdish groups are classified as terrorist organizations by the 

Turkish Government, journalists who even cover what these organizations might be doing are sometimes being prosecuted under 

this, as well. 

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Ms. Solis. 

We’ve been joined also by our colleague, Mike McIntyre, from 

North Carolina. 

Mike, do you have any statement you wanted to make? [Shakes 

head,] 

OK. I’d like to take notice of the fact that Ms. Solis and Mr. 

McIntyre and I were in Ukraine, and we had opportunities there 

to talk with the press. 

And I’ll go now to—and there were some interesting observations. 

I would like to take just a moment of personal privilege. 

The last award of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe came under the aegis 

of Freedom of the Media. Largely, that was instituted—that award 

was instituted in large measure by a German colleague, Freimut 

Duve. And the person that received our last award was Ms. 

Politkovskaya. 

And it hurts me a great deal—there is a reference that says that 

he and, I gather, she who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. 

And to have stood on that stage and see her receive that award, 

and then to later learn of her death was shattering to me personally. I’ve had this happen with others who were not journalists and 

17 

a few other journalists that I’ve gotten to know through the years, 

and it’s particularly troubling. 

That said, I’d like to yield the floor to my colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts, for any questioning. And Mike, I’ll come to you 

after Joe. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your thoughts on 

the award and what happened to her. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on 

freedom of the media in the OSCE region. The freedom of the 

media, a free and independent news media, is a cornerstone of democracy. And all those of us who hold office have sort of a lovehate relationship with the Fourth Estate, because they hold us accountable. 

But they are absolutely important in upholding human rights 

and the principles of freedom and rooting out corruption and dealing with many of the issues that we deal with in the OSCE. 

My question, first, I think would be for the representative of 

Freedom House, Paula. 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media has expressed concern about increased attempts to label offending or critical views as punishable extremism or hate speech. 

Do you share this concern? Do you see signs that anti-terror laws 

are being used to curb controversial or critical speech? 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. We absolutely do, even in the countries that 

were highlighted in today’s testimony as we talked about in Russia. 

Certainly, even in a county like Turkey, but as well as in most of 

the former Soviet states, but also in other non-OSCE repressive 

countries around the world, this is increasingly being used as a 

mechanism to suppress not just the media, but all free forms of expression, actually. 

We’re a little bit lucky—should I say lucky—now that, so far, 

there is still access to the Internet, for instance, in a country like 

Russia. Although, given some of the statements that have been 

made by President Putin recently, clearly the Kremlin is looking 

very closely at how it might restrict that, as well. 

But this has been a major tool to impede freedom of expression. 

And I just wanted, if I may, to follow on something that Chairman Hastings said about the death of Anna Politkovskaya, which 

not only was disheartening to all of us who knew her and worked 

with her, but keep in mind, the publication for which she worked, 

Novaya Gazeta, is probably, I would argue, the only major—if you 

call it that; I think it’s produced twice a week—independent, somewhat independent, remaining publication, print publication in Russia today. 

You know Kommersant was bought out fairly recently. There’s 

practically nothing left, other than the Internet. So, we have to 

really keep our eyes on that and make sure that that last remaining vestige is there. 

Now, of course, keep in mind, not everybody has access to the 

Internet, and not everybody who goes on the Internet is interested 

in looking at news. 

Again, a lot of Russians look at Russian TV, and see it as very 

impressive. It’s entertaining. It’s glossy. It’s well done. And they 

18 

think that they’re getting good information about what’s going on 

in the world—very dangerous. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I feel like that about American television. [Laughter.] 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. Did you watch ‘‘Good Morning America’’ this 

morning? 

Mr. PITTS. I’d like the other panelists, if they wish to comment 

on these attempts. Do you see attempts to label offending comments, critical views as extremism or hate speech? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Sure. I mean, just most recently on July 26, 

President Putin signed a second set of amendments that expand 

the definition of extremism in Russia. These amendments are sent 

to several different legislations in Russia, but they’re all connected 

with the term ‘‘extremism.’’ 

And even though the definition is expanded, the term itself remains very vague. It could be selectively interpreted to target critical voices. 

I’ll just mention several of the amendments that were just signed 

into law. 

A law on fighting extremist activity requires that all news outlets can label as extremist in their reports any organization that 

has been banned as extremist. 

Another amendment expands the definition of extremist activity 

to include public justification of extremism or another terrorist activity. The bill does not define what exactly is meant by ‘‘justification of extremism.’’ So, pretty much any public debate or mention 

of terrorist activity or of extremism could now be construed to 

mean extremism. 

An amendment to Russia’s administrative code would regulate 

the production and distribution of extremist material. But the 

amendment does not specify what is meant by ‘‘extremist material.’’ 

Another amendment to the criminal code expands the definition 

of extremism as a crime motivated by hatred or hostility toward a 

certain social group. ‘‘Social group’’ is never defined. It could mean 

business people. It could mean oligarchs. It could mean politicians. 

It could really mean anything. 

And another amendment, for example, to the law on surveillance 

is now giving broader grounds to tap telephones. Under the amendment, a court can approve for phone tapping any suspect of a minor 

crime, such as hooliganism. 

Critics say that this new bill will give legal carte blanche to 

eavesdrop on critics, including critical journalists which are inconvenient to the administration. And just in recent history, the record 

shows how Russian officials can and do use such measures. 

A media law on institutes—a Moscow-based law institute—said 

that a government regulator has issued 32 warnings to Russian 

media outlets only in 2006, that concern coverage of reported extremist activity. 

The independent radio station, Ekho Moskvy—which is really the 

only independent broadcaster on the Russian media market—received 15 warning letters by the FSB officials and prosecutors that 

questioned the station for interviews that they have had with Gary 

19 

Kasparov and Eduard Limonov, the two opposition leaders of the 

Other Russia coalition. 

So, yes. To cut a long story short, this could be very widely or 

selectively arbitrated and used to target critics of this government. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. 

Ms. TLISOVA [through interpreter]. I can explain how this works 

in practice against journalists in Russia. 

I used to carry in all my things, in all my possessions and all 

the things that I used in my work, notebooks and laptops, article 

29 from the constitution that was written under Boris Yeltsin. The 

article guarantees the freedom of speech. 

This would help me in the situations when police would try to 

stop some of my reporting. They would try to raise barriers in what 

I did professionally. 

Today, the Russian Constitution has five new amendments that 

effectively make article 29 null and void. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. 

I have a question, also, those of us on the Helsinki Commission 

know we’re, I guess, sometimes lobbied. Kazakhstan is currently 

seeking to serve as Chair-in-Office of the OSCE in the year 2009. 

And I would be interested, because this would affect the OSCE, the 

chair position. 

How do you view the free media trends in that country? I’ll start 

with Freedom House. 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. Freedom House has very clearly come out 

against the chairmanship of Kazakhstan for the OSCE. Looking at, 

for instance, the Charter of Paris and other documents that all 

OSCE members have agreed to. Even though it was the Soviet 

Union at that point when Kazakhstan came in, it obviously agrees 

to that, as well. 

Human rights, respect for democracy, respect for freedom of 

speech are clearly prioritized in all of these documents. 

It would be absurd to have a country, which not only has problems in these areas, but, in fact, is getting increasingly worse from 

what was already bad. 

You know, looking back to the other chair positions of the OSCE, 

you’ve had some countries, like Romania, for instance, when Minister Geoana held the chair position, that certainly had some issues 

with press freedom and ownership issues, et cetera, at the time. 

But nonetheless, it was a country that was committed, I think, to 

trying to move forward and improve in those areas. 

The same cannot be said, clearly, of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is 

really near the bottom. I don’t know if you have a copy of it, but 

we produced a chart of all of the 56 OSCE participating countries. 

And I think the only country that actually ranks worse is 

Turkmenistan in terms of press freedom of those particular countries. And Uzbekistan is worse, as well. 

Anyway, it’s bad. So we don’t support it, and we think that it 

simply makes a mockery of the principles upon which the OSCE 

was founded. 

Mr. PITTS. And does your overview take into consideration efforts 

to intimidate or violence against journalists? 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. Absolutely. It looks at three different areas. 

20 

We’re looking at the political environment, and often that is an 

enabling environment for violence against journalists, which certainly is the case in a country like Kazakhstan. We’re looking at 

the legal environment and we’re looking at the economic environment. 

In all three of those areas Kazakhstan fares very, very poorly. 

Mr. PITTS. I don’t know if anyone else wants to comment. You 

don’t have to. OK. 

Let me—just one more question, Mr. Chairman. 

The U.S. Government has supported financially an independent 

printing press in Kyrgyzstan, which has helped independent and 

opposition newspapers to continue functioning. 

Do you think our government should try to establish such printing presses in other former Soviet republics? If it could be arranged 

in other countries, would it likely be effective? Nina? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Yes. In fact, I just had the pleasure to meet 

with several Azerbaijani journalists who came to CPJ last week. 

And we talked about exactly that. 

And I’m basically passing their work view. They think that this 

is the only way that independent media could be preserved in countries, especially the transitional democracies. 

Because oftentimes, print houses—there’s a pressure on print 

houses to not print opposition newspapers, to refuse ink, to refuse 

distribution of opposition and independent outlets. And this is the 

only way that they can survive, through having their own presses. 

So, yes, very much so. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. 

Ms. TLISOVA [through interpreter]. I believe that in the North 

Caucasus, such a program would be essential and absolutely necessary. 

I believe that one way to make things better is to establish a 

U.S. program where young journalists could come train in the 

United States. They could bring back Western standards, Western 

understanding about what quality media is. And I think this program would help a great deal. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much—— 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. If I could just comment on the printing press. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Sure. 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. Freedom House actually worked with the State 

Department to help set up the printing press to which you’re referring, in Kyrgyzstan. And I agree with my colleagues that that kind 

of thing can be useful in other countries. But I also just want to 

lay out a caution. 

When we were debating on whether or not we would undertake 

this tremendous task—and it was a tremendous task to get this up 

and running in that country—we were well aware that printing 

and the ability to print is just one of the many constraints that a 

country can put in terms of restricting the press. So, there are certainly other means. 

And so, people need to be realistic that an independent printing 

press is not going to be the solution to all of the problems. 

I also want to note that it required tremendous political will on 

the part of the U.S. Government to support us in getting that press 

21 

up and going. As an NGO, we would never have been able to do 

it without tremendous diplomatic work behind the scenes and backing. 

We would never endeavor to do so in another country without 

that kind of backing. 

And so, I think Azerbaijan would be a very excellent candidate 

to do something like that. But we have to make sure that our embassy there on the ground is 100 percent behind such an effort, because it will take that level of backing to make it work. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. McIntyre? And then we’ll go call for a vote. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Ognianova, if I can ask you—I know we’re getting ready to 

go to a vote, so I’ll ask you if you can answer this. 

You mentioned in your testimony that, regarding Russia, as the 

country nears parliamentary elections slated for December and the 

Presidential vote is expected in March 2008, the Kremlin has 

pushed critical journalism out of the public space. 

As Mr. Hastings alluded to, he and Ms. Solis and I were at the 

OSCE Parlimentary Assembly meeting in Ukraine recently. And 

we met with the Russian delegation at the OSCE meeting and 

talked with them about the elections coming up. 

And there was a sense, not only in the formal meeting, but afterward when we got to talk with some of the delegates there, that 

the candidates were pretty much hand-picked by Mr. Putin, and 

that only those who were favored toward his position would be the 

ones that would have an opportunity really to be known by the average voter. 

So, I want to ask you. Assuming that the press and electronic 

media will be disinclined to criticize Mr. Putin’s political allies, do 

you think the average voter will be able to at least acquaint themselves with the candidates in their positions and understand who 

the opposition candidates are? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Let me just say that above 80 percent of voters 

at large get their news from national television. We’re not talking 

about Moscow or St. Petersburg or the big urban centers. We’re 

talking about the country at large. 

In some regions, in some local villages and settlements, television is the only, the only medium left. So, when President Putin, 

who is a television president, is the only candidate whose speeches, 

whose platforms are heard, that’s the only thing that the public at 

large is acquainted with. That’s the only thing that the public at 

large knows. 

So, in urban centers, it is possible for those who have access to 

the Internet, for those who have access to more print editions with 

a variety of coverage—or at least more varied coverage—to get access to the opposition candidates. 

But in the smaller areas in the provinces, it’s virtually impossible. There’s a blockade of coverage on the opposition. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Do you think the press would at least make a 

pretense of covering contested elections? Or do you think there 

would be a hesitation on the press’ part to cover those contested 

races? 

22 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. I think there will be some very scripted and 

very limited coverage of the faces. But they will not be given a real 

chance to present their platforms and to get a chance to lay them 

out for voters, no. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you, ma’am. 

And if I can, since our time is squeezed because of having to go 

to votes, let me switch gears and ask any witness that feels they 

can answer. 

We also had concerns at the OSCE meeting in July, when we 

were in the Ukraine, about some issues involving Belarus, and 

there were many different concerns that were raised at that. 

One of the concerns that I had raised was a concern about religious freedom. And just the prior week, several Protestants and 

Catholics had been arrested, and we know that many other minority religious groups have been oppressed there, as well. 

I want to ask you, with regard to the energy situation and energy prices, we also had a discussion about energy independence 

and freedom at OSCE. 

And I wonder if there are any signs of change in the media situation in Belarus since the beginning of this year, in light of the fact 

that Russia has put a squeeze on Belarus by sharply increasing energy prices, if there’s a freedom to discuss that, if you see any 

openness in that in the Belarus press—Belarusian press. 

Ms. SCHRIEFER. I don’t know how that particular issue has been 

covered in the press in Belarus. 

I can tell you that Belarus is, remains ranked extremely low on 

our press freedom survey. It’s an 89 out of a worst possible 100. 

I don’t see that improving any time soon. 

I would certainly say in regard to the oil issue more broadly, certainly, looking at the former Soviet Union and the lack of democratic development there, the fact that many of these countries are 

extremely oil-wealthy has exacerbated the lack of democracy, because it creates, obviously, tremendous resources through which a 

government that in most cases has not been competitively elected 

can maintain a certain economic level in society, and ultimately 

have its citizens feel like things are getting better, even though 

they’re controlling a number of those resources. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. And let me—because time’s running 

out—let me just ask you along that line, I mentioned the concern 

about religious freedom and oppression in Belarus. Do you feel like 

the press gives that adequate coverage when those types of incidents occur? 

Ms. OGNIANOVA. Well, I mean, again, I can answer this more 

broadly. I haven’t really looked into the energy issue and how it’s 

covered. 

But very broadly speaking, the press in Belarus is functioning as 

an extension to the government—at least the state-licensed press. 

And the independent press, the handful of beleaguered newspapers and magazines which are left over, are functioning basically 

on the basis of samizdat. They have to distribute—their editors and 

publishers have to distribute them in a set-up way. 

And the issues that are discussed in these papers, again, only get 

to a limited number of people who manage to get these distributed 

copies. 

23 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mike. If you would go and vote, and 

if you would let them know in the cloakroom I’m hurrying right behind you. 

I would say, though, just shortly before you leave, Russia cut off, 

or threatened to cut off, Belarusian oil the day before yesterday, 

because, allegedly, Belarus owes $458 million to them. 

My experience, reading at least three newspapers on that subject, is one carried nothing here in the United States, and two others carried limited information—regrettably. 

Although we have a free media, many is the time that we learn 

a great deal more about Lindsay Lohan and Michael Vick than we 

do about matters of critical import to this nation. 

Thank you very much. 

I’d like to do something a little bit different, and I’m going to try 

to take 3 minutes to do it. 

First, I’d like to thank all of our witnesses. I would hope that it 

hasn’t gone unnoticed that all of our witnesses are women. I make 

some of those decisions, and too often we have too many gray suits 

here, from my judgment. 

Ms. Ismayilova from Voice of America Azerbaijan—as well as all 

of the questions, every one that was put was different. So, I’m 

going to challenge my staff to take these questions, put all of them 

on the Internet from our Web site, and then answer them to the 

best extent we can and follow-up with our witnesses. I would like 

to publish them as best I can. 

Her question was, ‘‘Were there any attempts to create international investigation of groups of journalists to investigate such 

cases as’’—and she identified several of them. ‘‘The FBI participated in an earlier investigation of this case. Did CPJ or any other 

group ask for their findings?’’ 

And another of our audience participants asked, ‘‘Can you describe the level of public concern regarding declining press freedoms? Is it just the media versus the government? Or do average 

citizens somehow resist the worsening media situation? 

And for Ms. Ognianova, you said, according to this person, ‘‘the 

United States cannot be indifferent and should do something about 

the situation with the press in Russia. What should the United 

States do? And what of these can be done in Russia and in the 

North Caucasus, particularly?’’ 

And for Ms. Tlisova, ‘‘Are human rights abuses in northwestern 

Caucasus related to native people of the Caucasus, or a desire to 

regain Circassian national identity?’’ I would need to refine that. 

And ‘‘should the OSCE put efforts to send investigation commissions to investigate human rights abuses in Circassia?’’ 

And because of time, I will only do the one other that I would 

have asked, and appreciate the person putting it. 

What role can the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the 

Media play, given the apparent desire of some former Soviet states 

to restrict the free flow of information? And there’s another more 

lengthy one. 

I’d ask our witnesses to allow staff, please, to follow up with asking those questions and ask one additional one. 

24 

What specific steps—and I heard a few here—can the United 

States take—under the aegis of the OSCE or otherwise—to encourage countries to move further along? 

If you all would be so kind as to just take a few minutes to make 

sure you have the questions. And then I’d like to see them up on 

the Web site and answers, in [inaudible] to those in the audience 

that they will available to you. 

One of my favorite expressions here is, it’s hard to apologize for 

working, but I do have to go and vote. 

I thank you all so very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

25 

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this hearing on one 

of the most fundamental human rights recognized by the international community in the post-World War II era. 

Sadly, the deaths last fall of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Ogulsapar Muradova, who died under suspicious circumstances while in a Turkmenistan prison, and the apparent contract killing of Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya 

illustrate just how dangerous the profession of journalism can be. 

This year, we have witnessed the tragic murder of Turkish journalist Hrant Dink, not to mention violent attacks on journalists in 

Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia. In Kazakhstan, reporter Oralgaisha 

Omarshanova has been missing since late March. 

There are, of course, many ways in which freedom of the media 

can be restricted, curtailed or impeded. One time-tested favorite of 

authoritarian governments is the imposition of criminal sanctions 

for journalistic work. The 7-year prison sentence handed down to 

Umida Niyazova, an Uzbekistan journalist investigating the 2005 

massacre in Andijan, was particularly harsh and clearly intended 

to send an intimidating message to other journalists. 

Occasionally, we see genuinely positive developments. In this regard, I commend efforts underway in Albania to repeal criminal 

defamation and insult laws, and I hope the Czech parliament will 

take similar steps as part of its ongoing overhaul of its penal code. 

But in a number of OSCE countries, improvements for media freedom remain stalled or in reverse. I am particularly concerned regarding the situation in Azerbaijan, where currently seven journalists remain imprisoned for legitimate professional activities. 

Moreover, there are new challenges that must be addressed. The 

Internet, for example, presents extraordinary challenges. Access to 

YouTube was temporarily blocked in Turkey for several days this 

March until YouTube agreed to remove four videos that were considered to be ‘‘insulting’’ to Turkey’s founding leader, Mustafa 

Kemal Ataturk. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the 

Media has stated he will be monitoring implementation of a new 

law on the Internet, adopted after the YouTube incident, according 

to which it will be a punishable criminal offense to ‘‘insult the 

memory of Ataturk.’’ 

As a Member of the Helsinki Commission, I have long advocated 

that governments vigorously prosecute violent hate crimes committed against persons, communities, and their property. Not 

enough is being done, and I will continue to encourage OSCE governments to tackle this scourge. 

At the same time, I am alarmed by instances in which so-called 

‘‘hate speech’’ laws have been blatantly abused. In one recent case, 

two Georgians were charged under the Czech Republic’s hate 

speech law for protesting, in front of the Russian Embassy in 

Prague, Russia’s policies toward Georgia. (Thankfully, non-governVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:00 Dec 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\080207 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
26 

mental organizations were able to successfully get these charges 

dropped.) In Azerbaijan, journalist Rafiq Tagi and editor Samir 

Sadatoglu were sentenced in May for ‘‘incitement to religious hatred’’ for publishing an essay discussing Islam and Christianity. 

Also in May, the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet 

Union (UCSJ) wrote to Russian authorities to protest the conviction of journalist Boris Stomakhin under Russia’s hate speech law: 

‘‘While UCSJ,’’ they wrote, ‘‘does not agree with all of Mr. 

Stomakhin’s views, we believe that his prosecution under rarely applied hate speech statutes is a case of politically motivated selective 

justice motivated by the fact that he violated the chief taboo in 

Russian politics—criticizing the Kremlin’s policies in Chechnya.’’ 

Along these same lines, I am concerned by the potential misuse 

or abuse of laws that are nominally anti-terror laws but which, in 

practice, can be or are being used in ways that restrict freedom of 

speech or other fundamental rights. In this regard, I would add my 

voice to the concerns raised by a number of NGOs regarding recently adopted amendments to Russian laws which purport to combat ‘‘extremism.’’ 

Finally, I would add that although the OSCE Representative on 

Freedom of the Media could not be with us here today, I commend 

him for his detailed, thoughtful and constructive work in this field, 

and I hope will be able to have him join us on another occasion. 

27 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

We can all be very happy that since 1990 the OSCE region has 

made remarkable progress in freedom of the media. All of the Eastern European countries which have now joined the EU enjoy remarkable media freedom. Great progress continues to be made in 

the Balkans. 

But this does not mean we can rest satisfied. It is shocking how 

many OSCE countries do not enjoy media freedom—all of them 

countries of the former Soviet Union. The only former Soviet Republics where media freedom has been largely achieved are the 

Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. 

In all of the other former Soviet republics, the restrictions on 

media freedom are severe. In some of them, such as Turkmenistan 

and Uzbekistan, the state’s grip on the media is as choking as in 

Soviet times. Other former Soviet republics, such as Russia itself, 

claim to have media freedom, but what freedom exists is restricted 

by cleverly-crafted legislation and government pressures—which 

are sometimes brutal. 

Congress must continue to raise its voice on the lack of media 

freedom in Russia, where one of the chief tactics used to control the 

media in Russia has been the murder of journalists. These murders 

continue to go on, because they are almost never solved. 

I emphasize Russia because the failure to punish those responsible for these murders in Russia weighs heavily on the entire 

OSCE region. Sadly, the techniques of official control exercised in 

Russia are often taken as a model by officials in other former Soviet countries. 

And, in respect of media freedom, what a terrible model Russia 

is. Russia holds the second worst position in the world in the number of journalists killed in the last ten years, according to the International News Safety Institute. Reporters Without Borders counts 

21 murdered journalists since March of 2000. This is a conservative 

number; it does include the murders of Paul Klebnikov, Anna 

Politkovskaya, but not the death under extremely suspicious circumstances of Ivan Safronov. Many observers think government officials have ordered most of these murders, or at least connived at 

them, because these journalists investigated government corruption 

or human rights abuses in Russia. There is good reason to think 

that people in very high places are protecting the murderers. We 

know this: very few of these murder cases have been resolved. 

Bearing in mind the effect of these unsolved murders on officials 

in the other former Soviet republics, I recently authored a Congressional resolution, H. Con. Res. 151, calling upon President Putin to 

seek competent, outside law enforcement assistance in the investigation of these unsolved murders. In May this resolution was approved by the House. 

Mr. Chairman, In early July I visited Russia, in order to meet 

with Russian legislators who want to adopt anti-trafficking laws 

similar to our own. I saw for myself how the Russian economy is 

booming, and I am happy for the Russian people that they can finally enjoy economic growth and prosperity. 

28 

While I was in Moscow, I met Father Gleb Yakunin, a member 

of the Moscow Helsinki Group who in 1976 created the Christian 

Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers, and served 

7 years in prison and labor camps for it. In Russia great figures 

like Father Gleb and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn have kept the national conscience alive under the Communist dictatorship. 

Now the Russian nation is being robbed by a corrupt officialdom, 

and the journalists who are working to inform and awaken the 

public to the crimes are being killed. Let our country stand with 

them as in the past it stood with Father Gleb and Solzhenitsyn. 

That would be one of the greatest services we could do for the 

Russian people, and the people of the other former Soviet republics. 

29 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FATIMA TLISOVA, RUSSIAN 

INDEPENDENT JOURNALIST 

Chairman Hastings and Members of the Commission: 

Thank you for this opportunity to talk to you about the work conditions for journalists in Russia’s North Caucasus. 

More than ten years I worked as a correspondent for different 

newspapers and agencies in the North Caucasus—the land between 

the Black and Caspian Seas in southern Russia. This region was 

the arena of war a hundred years ago. It still remains an arena of 

war. 

Russia’s statements about the fight against global terrorism in 

the North Caucasus have nothing to do with the truth. It is a war 

against nations that tried to become independent. Russia has been 

using in this region military policies that are very close to genocide. 

I can describe those policies as massive and regular violations of 

human rights, even the basic right to life. 

This is the truth that the Russian government tries to hide. And 

the best way to hide information is by destroying the freedom of 

speech and the independent press. Most famous Russian journalist 

Anna Politkovskaya was murdered only for one reason—for her job 

in the North Caucasus, for telling the truth. 

I don’t need to tell you the statistics on freedom of speech in Russia—these numbers are very familiar to all who interested in the 

situation. My personal story is also well-known. 

But there are dozens of stories beyond the statistics—stories that 

remain unknown. I want to tell you only one of those stories, about 

a friend of mine who still lives and works in Russia. For this reason I can’t call him by name. 

When he started to work as a correspondent for one of Russia’s 

central newspapers he never used his legal name—he uses only 

pseudonyms. He started to write articles that were very different 

from the ones appearing in the official press. His stories were full 

of details. They were mirrors of what was really happening in his 

region. He wrote about kidnapped young people, about murdered or 

tortured civilians who were called terrorists after their death. 

Then, only after a few weeks, he suddenly disappeared. I tried 

to call him—his cell phone was switched off. No one in his family 

had any idea where he could be. On the second day, the news of 

his abduction came. Someone saw the man being kidnapped near 

an Internet cafe ́ by masked militants. For Caucasians this means 

only one thing—his relatives should start to collect cash to pay for 

the return of the dead body. 

I was on my way to his town when he called me. His voice was 

changed; at first I couldn’t understand who was calling from his 

cell phone. He said: ‘‘Do not come please, I will be soon in your 

city.’’ 

A few hours later, in the evening, we met in a cafe ́ in Nalchik. 

He was very angry and sad. He used the paper napkins on the 

table to write down for me what had happened. (He could not 

speak about it.) 

Five or six masked men kidnapped him. He had with him a cell 

phone, flash card and tape-recorder, when they took him. They took 

all this stuff from him, and then pushed him inside a car. He was 

brought to a neighboring town. After arriving there, they left him 

30 

in a small room and all his guards disappeared. The door was 

locked. There was only one table and two chairs in this room. He 

heard men’s voices screaming like wild animals. He realized they 

were being tortured. 

Then two men came in, wearing civilian clothes. They did not 

hide their faces. And they showed him IDs—both of them were 

FSB officers. They asked him how he became a journalist. Their 

tone was smug, superior. 

‘‘There are dozens of journalists in your region, but only a few 

of them were here like you. Do you understand why?—They asked 

him. They put all his articles, signed by different pseudonyms, in 

front of him on the table. Then the questions changed. They asked 

him: Is he a spy? What Western secret services was he connected 

to? ‘‘You can’t write articles like you wrote if you are only a journalist, you must have someone strong behind you,’’ they told him. 

He tried to explain: he wrote only the truth. They were laughing: 

who needs your truth, you must write what you must, nothing 

more! 

This lesson lasted until midnight. Then they left him alone for 

the night. The next morning he received instructions. Every time 

he wrote something for the central newspaper he must first send 

it to them for checking; once a week he must come to meet the officer who will work with him. ‘‘We know where you all the time; we 

are watching you, we are hearing you,’’—they told him when they 

gave him back his cell phone. They made him sign an agreement 

to keep silent. At last they told him: ‘‘If you break our agreement— 

you will be disappeared forever.’’ 

Two weeks after our meeting he received access to a closed security zone on the border of Russia and Azerbaijan. He started writing articles about the ‘‘very good’’ relationship between the Russian 

security services and local civilians. 

I am not afraid to make things worse for this journalist because 

of this testimony because I know dozens of stories like his. They 

will not realize which one of the dozens is my hero. They are not 

unusual—these official methods I described. But the most useful 

methods are much more simple. 

A year ago I had an interview with an officer from the FSB. He 

spoke incognito. I asked him about methods they use to keep under 

control the local press. I was interested—have they really met with 

every journalist? ‘‘We are not interested in every journalist’’: he 

told me.—‘‘We have our people in every press bureau. We know 

what they write about before it becomes public. If something is 

wrong we need to just call the editor, that’s all. You must truly believe—if you disagree with us you must change your profession or 

we are strong enough to make you much more flexible.’’ 

I can name those methods used against the journalists to make 

them ‘‘flexible.’’ You can be beaten, kidnapped, tortured, arrested. 

Things can be done not only to you but to your family, too. Even 

your seventy-year-old father can be beaten, so terribly that he loses 

an eye—this is what happened to the father of one journalist who 

freelances for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Or your sixteenyear-old, innocent son can be arrested. Your house and your parents’ house can be searched any time they want to. Your name can 

appear on the pages of very ‘‘flexible’’ newspapers with unseemly 

31 

commentaries. You can be erased from the list of journalists who 

have access to official information or who are allowed to attend official press conferences. You can be banned from working for foreign 

news agencies, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will never 

give you the accreditation; and without accreditation your work is 

illegal. If you didn’t become ‘‘flexible’’ after all, you can suddenly 

die, or be publicly executed—as it happened to Anna Politkovskaya. 

These are my observations after ten years of work as a journalist 

in the North Caucasus region of Russia. 

32 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NINA OGNIANOVA, EUROPE AND 

CENTRAL ASIA PROGRAM COORDINATOR, COMMITTEE TO 

PROTECT JOURNALISTS 

Chairman Hastings and members of the commission: 

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing on 

media freedom in member states of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe. My name is Nina Ognianova. I coordinate the Europe and Central Asia program at the Committee to 

Protect Journalists, an international, independently funded organization that defends press freedom worldwide. It is an honor to 

speak to you today. 

In my testimony, I will first address the issue of impunity in 

journalist murders—the gravest danger to press freedom in the 

countries of the former Soviet Union. I will then focus on the press 

freedom records of Russia and Azerbaijan, where media conditions 

have severely deteriorated, according to CPJ research. 

INTRODUCTION 

Governments in several former Soviet states have strengthened 

their grip on power by restricting independent activities—from 

journalism and human rights defense, to religious activity and political dissent. In particular, the central administrations in Russia 

and Azerbaijan have stepped up efforts to silence critical voices in 

the run-up to national votes scheduled in their countries over the 

next 14 months. 

Politicians, state officials, government regulators, security agencies, and pro-government businesses have relied on a variety of 

methods to consolidate control of influential broadcasters, to sideline critical journalists, and to intimidate them into self-censorship. 

Such methods include the selective use of bureaucratic regulations to inhibit media outlets; the passage of vague laws to silence 

independent voices; the use of politically motivated criminal investigations against critics; the imprisonment of independent journalists on trumped-up charges (often accompanied by the closure of 

their media outlets); the purchase of controlling interest in independent news outlets; the aggressive harassment of journalists by 

security services; and the failure to bring justice in the murders of 

journalists and in other violent attacks against the press. 

IMPUNITY 

Impunity in journalist murders remains the gravest danger to 

press freedom, and threatens democracy in the transitional countries of the former Soviet bloc. Critical, investigative reporters— 

who work to uncover social ailments such as corruption, corporate 

crime, human rights violations, and abuse of power—are the usual 

targets of this lethal censorship. As violence against these messengers goes unpunished, fewer journalists are willing to risk their 

lives in pursuit of difficult stories, the press is forced to compromise its role as a watchdog; and the public is kept in the dark 

about important issues. 

When it comes to impunity in journalist murders, Russia sets a 

sad regional standard. It is the third deadliest country in the world 

for journalists over the past 15 years, according to CPJ research, 

33 

behind only the two war-riven nations of Iraq and Algeria. A total 

of 47 journalists have been killed in Russia since 1992, the vast 

majority of the killings unsolved. Since year 2000, under President 

Vladimir Putin’s tenure, 17 journalists have been killed in Russia 

in the line of duty—14 out of them murdered in direct retaliation 

for their professional work. None of the murders have been solved. 

Five suspects are currently on trial in the 2000 murder of Novaya 

Gazeta journalist Igor Domnikov, but the masterminds of the 

crime, though known to law enforcement, are still at large. The 

trial of two suspects in the 2004 murder of Forbes Russia Editor 

Paul Klebnikov is now in limbo because one suspect in the killing 

went missing in March. Progress is being made in last year’s highprofile assassination of Anna Politkovskaya, Moscow prosecutors 

say, but after 10 months they have yet to report any results. 

On February 1, responding to an international outcry over the 

murder of Politkovskaya, President Vladimir Putin publicly 

pledged to protect the press during his annual news conference at 

the Kremlin’s Round Hall. But only a month later, another death 

of a prominent journalist shook the Russian press corps. 

On March 2, Kommersant military correspondent Ivan Safronov 

fell to his death from an upper-floor staircase window in his apartment building. The circumstances surrounding his death, coupled 

with the sensitivity of Safronov’s reporting beat, prompted many to 

suspect he had been murdered. Just days earlier, while on a business trip to Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates, Safronov had 

uncovered sensitive information about alleged Russian arms sales 

to Syria and Iran, his colleagues said. Moscow prosecutors initially 

said the death was a suicide. Later, they opened a criminal investigation into what they called ‘‘incitement to suicide,’’ an article of 

the Russian penal code that is defined as provoking a suicide 

through threats or abusive treatment. In late June, however, authorities ruled out foul play in the case, and said they had not 

found any link between Safronov’s work and his untimely death. 

Investigators said they continue working on other possible motives, 

including Safronov’s private life. They did not explain their rationale behind ruling out foul play. 

The investigators’ behavior in Safronov’s case is hardly unusual. 

Local authorities regularly reject professional motives in journalist 

killings, instead classifying them as street crimes or domestic disputes. Karen Nersisian, a lawyer representing the families of three 

killed journalists whose cases CPJ has documented said it is easier 

for investigators to deal with murders where hooliganism or robbery is the motive. If they admit the murders had been ordered, 

Nersisian says, prosecutors oblige themselves to look for the masterminds. And in Russia, where politics, business, and crime sometimes converge, going after a mastermind can be a dangerous business. 

Russia remains the political and moral force in much of the region, so its official hostility to independent media, sloppy police 

work in the investigation of journalists’ deaths, official 

stonewalling, and judicial inertia are widely emulated. 

In Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev called the March 2005 assassination of prominent opposition editor Elmar Huseynov a 

‘‘provocation against the Azerbaijani state’’ and an ‘‘act of terVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:00 Dec 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\080207 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
34 

rorism.’’ Despite these strong words, authorities have shown little 

intention of identifying the killers. More than two years after 

Huseynov, founder and editor of the opposition newsweekly Monitor, was gunned down in a professional-style hit in his apartment 

building in the capital, Baku, Azerbaijani authorities have reported 

no progress in the investigation. A harsh critic of the president and 

his administration, Huseynov had endured scores of politicized lawsuits, tax inspections, and suspensions during the Monitor’s sixyear existence. 

A month after the killing, investigators identified two Georgian 

citizens as suspects but never provided evidence to persuade officials in Georgia to extradite them. The trail soon grew cold. Then, 

in July 2006, a former Azerbaijani Interior Ministry officer, on trial 

on unrelated charges, suddenly professed that he helped plot 

Huseynov’s assassination. His abrupt confession was met with deep 

skepticism by Huseynov’s colleagues and others, who suspected it 

had been coerced. 

In Belarus, Aleksandr Starikevich, editor of the opposition newspaper Solidarnost in the capital, Minsk, is also skeptical of the official probe into the October 2004 murder of co-worker Veronika 

Cherkasova. Colleagues of Cherkasova launched their own investigation into her death, saying officials treated the killing as a common crime and ignored forensic evidence pointing to a professional 

slaying. 

Two years after Cherkasova was found in her Minsk apartment 

with multiple stab wounds, prosecutors suspended the investigation for what they called a ‘‘lack of suspects.’’ A Minsk investigator 

said the killing did not appear premeditated and continued to refer 

to it as a common crime, allegedly the result of a domestic quarrel. 

Authorities ignored Cherkasova’s articles on surveillance by the 

Belarusian state security service (KGB) and her investigation of alleged arms sales by Belarus to former Iraqi President Saddam 

Hussein. 

Close to the second anniversary of Cherkasova’s death, the Agency for Journalistic Investigations, an association of Belarusian reporters, released the findings of its own probe. Contrary to the official report, the association said, the murder appeared to have been 

carried out by a professional who made it look like a crime of passion. The assassin, the report said, covered his tracks skillfully. Although stabbed repeatedly, Cherkasova had died from a single 

wound. Investigators have ignored the findings of the agency’s investigation. 

In Turkmenistan, even after a journalist died in official custody, 

authorities refused to investigate. Ogulsapar Muradova, 58, a correspondent for the Turkmen service of the U.S.-funded Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), was arrested on June 18, 2006, 

and held incommunicado for more than two months in an Ashgabat 

jail. A day after her arrest, then-President Saparmurat Niyazov 

called her a traitor to the motherland on national television. Last 

August, she was convicted on a bogus charge of possessing ammunition and sentenced to six years in jail after a closed-door trial 

that lasted only minutes. Three weeks later, authorities released 

Muradova’s body to her family, refusing to give the time and cause 

of death and denying requests for an autopsy. 

35 

Muradova’s relatives said the body bore a large head wound and 

multiple neck bruises. To this day, Turkmenistan has ignored 

international calls for an independent inquiry into Muradova’s 

death. Press freedom and human rights advocates believe she was 

murdered in prison because of her work for RFE/RL—a broadcaster 

that Niyazov, who died in December, considered an enemy. 

Niyazov’s successor, Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov—whose election to the presidency in February was neither free nor fair—has 

pledged to follow on Niyazov’s footsteps. This does not bode well for 

the handful of remaining independent journalists in the country. 

Those affiliated with international media outlets, along with their 

families, are routinely harassed, persecuted, and placed under surveillance; some are imprisoned, tortured, or forced into exile. Local 

media provide no alternative information; they essentially function 

as state propaganda tools. 

WORST BACKSLIDERS ON PRESS FREEDOM 

Russia and Azerbaijan, in particular, have backtracked on press 

freedom. On May 3, World Press Freedom Day, each earned a spot 

on CPJ’s list of top the world’s worst press freedom backsliders 

over the past five years. It is important to note that both nations 

are to go to the polls in the next 14 months. 

RUSSIA 

Influential media under Kremlin control 

As the country nears parliamentary elections slated for December and the presidential vote expected in March 2008, the Kremlin 

has pushed critical journalism out of the public space. Independent 

reporting is now limited to a small number of print publications 

and news Web sites, which, compared to national television, have 

only marginal influence on public opinion. All three national television channels, from which most Russians get their news, are 

under Kremlin control. Authorities have recently shifted attention 

to print publications. Last August, for instance, Kremlin-friendly 

businessman Alisher Usmanov, general director of Gazprom subsidiary Gazprominvestholding, bought the business daily 

Kommersant, one of the last independent newspapers with national 

reach. Two years before that, the popular independent daily 

Izvestiya was purchased by Gazprom; it no longer provides critical 

coverage of the Kremlin. 

Restrictive new law to target critics 

Most recently, on July 26, President Putin signed into law a 

package of amendments that expand the definition of extremism to 

include public discussion of such activity, and give law enforcement 

officials broad authority to suspend media outlets that do not comply with the new restrictions. The measures will take effect in December. 

Ostensibly designed to fight extremism—including the growing 

nationalist and neo-Nazi movements—the new measures would 

have the effect of muzzling critical voices. The bill’s vague language 

36 

turns ‘‘extremism’’ into a catchall term that could be used to silence 

any critic. 

This is the second set of amendments focusing on ‘‘extremism’’ to 

be adopted in Russia in as many years. Amid domestic and international criticism, Putin signed similar amendments in July 2006 

that broadened the definition of the term to include media criticism 

of state officials. As with the 2006 bill, the new set of amendments 

was approved quickly despite concerns from media, human rights, 

and political opposition groups. 

Here are the points of particular concern for freedom of expression: 

Amendments to the Law on Fighting Extremist Activity require 

news media to label as ‘‘extremist’’ in their reports any organization that the government has banned as such. 

Another amendment expands the definition of extremist activity 

to include ‘‘public justification of terrorism or other terrorist activity.’’ The bill does not define the term ‘‘justification,’’ leaving critics 

to suggest that it will be interpreted very broadly. 

An amendment to Russia’s Administrative Code would regulate 

the production and distribution of ‘‘extremist’’ material. The 

amendment does not specify what constitutes extremist material 

even as it introduces new penalties for journalists, media outlets, 

and printers found guilty of the offense. Penalties range from fines 

and confiscation of production equipment, to the outright suspension of media outlets for up to 90 days. 

Amendments to Russia’s Criminal Code expand the definition of 

extremism as a crime motivated by ‘‘hatred or hostility toward a 

certain social group’’ without clarifying the term ‘‘social group.’’ 

Such broad language could prevent media from reporting on public 

officials or powerful businesspeople, analysts said. 

An amendment to the Law on Surveillance gives officials broader 

grounds to tap telephones. Under the amendment, court approval 

for phone taps may be obtained for suspected crimes as minor as 

hooliganism. Critics say this new bill gives a legal carte blanche to 

authorities to eavesdrop on their opponents, including critical reporters. 

Recent history offers a guide as to how the new measures might 

be used. 

The Moscow-based Media Law and Policy Institute said 

Rosokhrankultura, the government’s media regulator, issued 32 

warnings to Russian media outlets in 2006 concerning their coverage of purported extremist activity. The independent radio station Ekho Moskvy—the most critical broadcaster remaining in Russia’s media market—recently reported receiving 15 warning letters 

from FSB officials and prosecutors in the past two months. Authorities demanded that the station explain why it interviewed opposition leaders Garry Kasparov and Eduard Limonov of the coalition Other Russia. 

Nongovernmental groups under attack 

Russia’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have experienced legal pressure as well. In January 2006, President Putin 

signed into law a restrictive bill regulating the work of nongovernmental organizations, including those dedicated to promoting press 

37 

freedom and supporting independent media. The measure gives the 

Justice Ministry’s Federal Registration Service broad authority to 

shutter NGOs for engaging in activities that are counter to the ‘‘political independence of the Russian Federation’’ or that violate the 

constitution. The measure also empowers the service to close NGOs 

that engage in prohibited—but unspecified—activities. Under this 

law, the government closed down the Russian-Chechen Friendship 

Society (RCFS), a human rights group based in the city of Nizhny 

Novgorod, whose online newspaper—Pravo-Zashchita (Rights Defense)—was regarded as one of the few reliable sources of news on 

Chechnya. On January 23, Russia’s Supreme Court upheld a lower 

court’s earlier decision to liquidate RCFS because its director, 

Stanislav Dmitriyevsky, had been convicted in February 2006 of inciting ethnic hatred. Dmitriyevsky had published comments from 

Chechen rebel leaders calling for peace talks in 2004 in PravoZashchita. Under the January 2006 law, no one with a criminal 

record can head an NGO. 

Other NGOs, such as the Institute for War and Peace Reporting 

(IWPR), the Russian Union of Journalists, and the successor of 

Internews Russia have also been harassed. 

In April, Moscow law enforcement effectively closed the Educated 

Media Foundation, the successor to Internews Russia, after economic police searched its premises for 11 hours, seized all financial 

records, and shut down the organization’s servers. Officers said 

they were checking the organization for financial improprieties. 

Since 1997, Internews Russia had played a key role in the development of the country’s independent media. According to the group’s 

statistics, about 15,000 people have taken part in its programs 

through the years, receiving training in areas such as reporting, 

media management, and broadcast production. 

The foundation’s director, Manana Aslamazian, said the raid was 

connected to a criminal case opened against her in February on 

charges of bringing foreign currency into Russia. Aslamazian acknowledged the error but said it was unintentional. 

Despite appeals by key Russian journalism organizations, who 

asked authorities to consider Aslamazian’s contribution to the development of independent media in Russia and to investigate her 

case as an administrative rather than criminal violation, prosecutors have not relented. The Educated Media Foundation remains 

shuttered, and Aslamazian has fled abroad, fearing possible jail 

time. 

Journalists imprisoned 

Aslamazian has reason to be fearful. Russian authorities imprisoned two journalists in recent months—Vladimir Chugunov and 

Anatoly Sardayev—in retaliation for criticizing local authorities in 

their newspapers. Chugunov’s case is especially disturbing. 

The founder and editor of the independent weekly Chugunka in 

the town of Solnechnogorsk, Chugunov was arrested on January 

21, on a charge of ‘‘threatening to murder or cause serious health 

damage.’’ Authorities did not disclose the details of the charge. 

After spending more than four months in state custody, during 

which he was shuttled between prison cells, hospital wards, and 

psychiatric wards, authorities conditionally released Chugunov on 

38 

May 27 from the Butyrskaya prison hospital in Moscow. The journalist had been held at Butyrskaya on an undisclosed diagnosis. 

Chugunov said he was given medications that were not disclosed 

to him and that he had become infected with lice and scabies during his stay. He went on a 10-day hunger strike to protest the 

treatment. Authorities did not give any explanation for the release. 

Chugunov had long angered local authorities with his articles 

criticizing the Solnechnogorsk’s government and judicial officials. A 

series of stories, for example, examined the consequences of the 

local government’s takeover of a chicken farm. In July 2002, 

attackers beat Chugunov and broke his right hand, saying, ‘‘Here 

you go now, writer, write if you can!’’ The attackers were never 

found. The local municipality-owned printing house refused to print 

Chugunka in January 2005, compelling Chugunov to produce his 

paper at home. Chugunka went dormant with the editor’s arrest in 

January. Upon releasing him in May, the Solnechnogorsk prosecutor’s office instructed Chugunov to sign a statement promising not 

to leave the area while the case against him is pending. 

News from and about the North Caucasus obstructed 

I’ll defer to my colleague, Fatima Tlisova, in discussing authorities’ aggressive efforts to prevent independent reporting in and 

about Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus. Tlisova is 

a witness to the brutality and, unfortunately, to the effectiveness 

of these methods. I would note that since the beginning of the Second Chechen War in 1999, the Federal Security Service (FSB) has 

taken a lead in harassing and obstructing independent journalists 

who seek access to the volatile region. The government imposes restrictive accreditation requirements—journalists are allowed to 

travel with military escort only and are banned from interviewing 

rebels. The main purpose of these restrictive policies seems to be 

the prevention of news about the conflict’s death toll and human 

rights abuses from reaching the Russian public and turning its 

opinion against the war. 

AZERBAIJAN 

Seven journalists in jail for their work 

Azerbaijan is the other regional backslider on press freedom, CPJ 

research shows. With seven behind bars, the country now sets the 

regional record for jailing journalists. As the country prepares for 

presidential elections scheduled for next October, these work-related imprisonments severely damage Azerbaijan’s reputation. Despite calls from CPJ and other local and international press freedom groups to release the journalists on July 22, National Press 

Day, authorities continue to hold them. 

Here are the cases: 

Sakit Zakhidov, a prominent reporter and satirist for the Bakubased opposition daily Azadlyg, was arrested on June 23, 2006, and 

charged with possession of heroin with the intent to sell. Zakhidov 

said a police officer planted about a third of an ounce of the drug 

in his pocket. His arrest came three days after Ali Akhmedov, executive secretary of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan party, publicly urged 

39 

authorities to silence Zakhidov. At a June 20 panel on media freedom, Akhmedov said: ‘‘No government official or member of parliament has avoided his slanders. Someone should put an end to 

it.’’ Zakhidov, who suffers from heart disease, was sentenced to 

three years in prison on October 4. He was taken to Bailovsk prison in Baku, where he has no access to adequate medical care. 

Samir Sadagatoglu, editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper 

Senet, and reporter Rafiq Tagi were arrested on November 15, 

2006, in connection with a November 1 article headlined ‘‘Europe 

and Us.’’ Tagi, who wrote the article, suggested that Islamic values 

were blocking development in the oil-rich Caspian Sea nation. The 

article referred to Islam as a cause of infighting. On May 4, a Baku 

judge convicted Sadagatoglu and Tagi on charges of inciting religious hatred. Sadagatoglu was sentenced to four years, Tagi to 

three. On July 6, an Azerbaijani appellate court in Baku upheld 

the convictions. 

Faramaz Novruzoglu of the weekly independent newspaper Nota 

Bene was sentenced to two years in prison by a Baku court on January 30. He was convicted of criminal defamation for a series of articles critical of Interior Minister Ramil Usubov and other senior 

government officials. The articles, published in December, focused 

on friction and corruption in the Interior Ministry. 

Eynulla Fatullayev, editor of the independent Russian-language 

weekly Realny Azerbaijan and the Azeri-language daily Gu ̈ndalik 

Azarbaycan, was sentenced on April 20 to 30 months in prison on 

charges of libeling and insulting Azerbaijanis. On May 20, local authorities evicted Realny Azerbaijan and Gu ̈ndalik Azarbaycan from 

their Baku offices, saying that the building violated safety regulations. On July 3, the Ministry of National Security (MNB) brought 

additional charges of terrorism and incitement to ethnic and religious hatred against Fatullayev; the ministry interrogated several 

journalists from Gu ̈ndalik Azarbaycan the next day. Together, the 

new charges could mean up to 17 years in prison for Fatullayev. 

They stem from a commentary headlined, ‘‘The Aliyevs Go to War,’’ 

published earlier this year in Realny Azerbaijan. The commentary, 

which focused on President Ilham Aliyev’s foreign policy regarding 

Iran, contained harshly critical language about the Azerbaijani government. MNB officials did not elaborate on the charges or explain 

how the piece amounted to terrorism and incitement of hatred. 

Rovshan Kebirli, editor-in-chief of the opposition daily Muhalifet, 

and reporter Yashar Agazadeh were sentenced in May to 30 

months in prison apiece on charges of defaming Jalal Aliyev, the 

president’s uncle and a member of parliament. Jalal Aliyev filed a 

libel complaint against the journalists after a February article criticized his business activities and those of his family. The story, 

which relied partly on a Turkish news report, said the Aliyevs’ import-export business profited from the family’s political connections. 

Most disturbing in all these cases is the fact that most journalists are held on criminal charges filed by public officials. Defamation remains a criminal offense in Azerbaijan; removing it from the 

country’s penal code will be an important first step in reversing 

this record. According to CPJ research, led by Interior Minister 

Usubov, public officials filed at least a dozen politicized lawsuits 

against critical journalists in the summer of 2006 alone. 

40 

Impunity in physical attacks against reporters 

And while journalists are punished as criminals, crimes against 

journalists remain unaddressed. The 2005 murder of opposition 

editor Elmar Huseynov is still unsolved. So are the brutal 2006 attacks against two opposition journalists—Fikret Huseinli, investigative reporter with the opposition daily Azadlyq, and Bakhaddin 

Khaziyev, editor-in-chief of the opposition daily Bizim Yol. 

Huseinli, who was investigating alleged government corruption, 

was kidnapped on March 5, 2006, and his throat slashed by unidentified assailants in the Patamdar area, a southwestern suburb 

of Baku. The journalist had received several prior death threats by 

phone, warning him to discontinue his reporting. Huseinli survived 

the attack and returned to work. On May 19, five men abducted 

Khaziyev on the outskirts of Baku, beat him over several hours, 

and drove over his legs with a car, according to news reports. 

Khaziyev survived but suffered serious leg injuries. Shortly before 

the attack, Khaziyev had written articles in Bizim Yol, criticizing 

high-ranking officials from the Ministry of National Security. 

Politicized bureaucratic harassment 

In addition to imprisonment and physical violence, independent 

journalists were recently targeted by politicized evictions. In November 2006, a Baku court said the State Property Committee 

could evict the opposition newspaper Azadlyq from its premises, 

along with tenants that included the Turan news agency, Bizim Yol 

newspaper, and the Institute for Reporters Freedom and Safety. 

Azadlyq had occupied the municipally owned building in Baku 

since 1992. 

The day of the eviction ruling, the Azerbaijani government closed 

the country’s oldest independent radio and television broadcaster. 

Authorities sealed facilities and confiscated broadcast equipment 

on November 24, 2006, of the Azerbaijan News Service (ANS), effectively taking foreign radio programming off the air for most 

Azerbaijanis. ANS, a popular broadcaster set up in 1991, had rebroadcast programs of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. The federal 

broadcasting licensing authority said ANS had violated media laws 

and failed to pay fines. Facing mounting international criticism, 

Azerbaijani authorities lifted the restrictions on ANS in December 

and allowed it to back on the air in April. 

In May, local authorities evicted the independent Russian-language weekly Realny Azerbaijan and the Azeri-language daily 

Gu ̈ndalik Azarbaycan from their Baku offices, saying that the publications’ building violates safety regulations. The actions came on 

the heels of the politicized imprisonment of the papers’ editor, 

Eynulla Fatullayev. 

CONCLUSION 

The international community, including the United States, cannot afford to be indifferent to the deteriorating press freedom 

records of Russia and Azerbaijan. Journalists increasingly resort to 

self-censorship to avoid dangerous, even deadly repercussions. As a 

result, the Russian and Azerbaijani public suffers—uninformed 

41 

about sensitive issues such as human rights abuses, corruption, 

high-level crime, and, in the case of Chechnya, an ongoing war. 

CPJ urges the Helsinki Commission to take the lead in making 

press freedom a priority of U.S. foreign policy. Eclipsed by strategic 

defense and energy concerns, human rights and press freedom 

issues have suffered in recent years. This sends a dangerous message to the world—that the United States is willing to tolerate impunity in journalist murders, the imprisonment of critical reporters, and the closing of independent news outlets in Russia and 

Azerbaijan. Now more than ever the United States should take a 

firm stand against the repressive actions in these nations. 

42 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAULA SCHRIEFER, DIRECTOR OF 

ADVOCACY, FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Hastings, Co-Chairman Cardin, members of the Helsinki Commission and staff, thank you for calling this important 

hearing today and for inviting Freedom House to testify. 

I am honored to be here with my colleague, Nina Ognianova, 

from CPJ, an excellent organization that does vital work for the 

protection of journalists, and I am particularly honored to once 

again be on a panel with Fatima Tlisova, a courageous and inspirational journalist. It is a terrible tragedy for the Russian people that 

Ms. Tlisova can no longer perform her important job within the 

borders of her own country. 

Freedom House has been monitoring press freedom around the 

world for more than two decades now. Freedom House’s annual 

press freedom survey evaluates press freedom by answering a series of questions under three areas that historically have been used 

to place restrictions on freedom of expression: 1) legal environment, 

2) political environment, and 3) economic environment. 

We are talking today about the state of media freedom in the 

OSCE countries and I have been asked to specifically focus on four 

countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkey. 

I will start by pointing out that among the 55 countries that 

comprise the OSCE, there is a stark and troubling dividing line in 

the state of press freedom between members of the Commonwealth 

of Independent States (CIS) and those that have either joined the 

European Union or are on a path to do so. 

All of the countries of Central Europe, including the Baltic 

States, which themselves needed to overcome a decades-long legacy 

of Soviet media culture and control, are assessed as Free in Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press survey. 

Likewise, the vast majority of countries in Western Europe are 

ranked as Free. With the upgrading of Italy to Free this year, the 

one remaining exception is Turkey, which is ranked as Partly Free. 

In the Balkans, the majority of countries have risen from Not 

Free to Partly Free status over the course of the past decade, with 

Slovenia ranking as fully Free. 

By stark contrast, ten of the twelve post-Soviet states are ranked 

as Not Free by Freedom House, indicating that these countries do 

not provide basic guarantees and protections in the legal, political, 

and economic spheres to enable open and independent journalism. 

The only two that enjoy Partly Free status, Georgia and Ukraine, 

have experienced recent political upheaval and democratic openings. 

With this brief overview, I’ll turn to some of the specific countries 

of interest. 

Russia Press Freedom Ranking: 75 Press Freedom Ranking: 75 Status: Not Free Status: Not Free 

Our survey has shown that Russian media have been under increasing pressure, limiting both their freedom and independence, 

since 1994, when Russia received its best ever score since gaining 

independence, with a 40 out of a worst possible 100. The score 

plunged to 55 the following year and has continued to decline. Russia would hang on by a thread to the Partly Free category until 

2003, when we registered another sharp decrease from 60 to 66, 

43 

putting it in the ranks of the Not Free countries, and its score has 

declined every year since, with a current dismal score of 75. 

Russians, who are otherwise enjoying a period of increased economic prosperity due to the sky high prices of oil, should be outraged that their country now finds itself on par with countries like 

Ethiopia (77), Burundi (77), Chad (74), The Gambia (77), Iraq (70), 

Azerbaijan (75), Kazakhstan (76), and Tajikistan (76) in terms of 

press freedom. 

Two recent developments have been particularly damaging for 

the state of press freedom in Russia. First, the new regulations related to the registration and functioning of NGOs that went into 

effect in January of last year have deprived Russians of an important source of independent information about both the functioning 

of government and human rights abuses. Second, amendments to 

the Law on Fighting Extremist Activity, signed by President Putin 

in July, expanded the definition of extremism to include media criticism of public officials, and authorized up to three years’ imprisonment for journalists as well as the suspension or closure of their 

publications if they are convicted. 

At the same time, the government already either owns outright 

or controls significant stakes in the country’s three main national 

TV networks (Channel 1, Rossiya, and NTV) and exerts substantial 

influence on the content of news reporting. As importantly, the government has used these powerful outlets to generate an atmosphere of fear regarding threats from both terrorism and religious 

extremism, which has contributed to Russia’s emergence as one of 

the world’s most physically dangerous environments for journalists. 

The situation is equally troubling in both Azerbaijan and 

Kazakhstan. Unlike Russia, neither country has broken out of the 

Not Free status since Freedom House began rating their levels of 

press freedom in 1991. 

Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Press Freedom Ranking: 75 Press Freedom Ranking: 75 Status: Not Free Status: Not Free 

In Azerbaijan, the media operate under significant governmental 

and legal pressures. Despite a draft law on defamation that would 

decriminalize libel, journalists continue to be prosecuted for criminal libel and insult charges. Last year, the interior minister alone 

filed five lawsuits and just a few months ago, the editor of Azerbaijan’s largest independent newspaper was sentenced to 30 

months in prison. 

Harassment and violence against journalists also remains a serious concern. To cite just a few examples, in March 2006 Azadliq 

journalist Fikret Huseynli was kidnapped and stabbed before being 

released. In May, Bizim Yol editor Bakhaddin Khaziyev was kidnapped, beaten, and ordered to stop reporting on sensitive issues, 

including corruption. In October, Eynulla Fatullayev ceased the 

publication of Realny Azerbaijan to secure the release of his kidnapped father. 

While the government passed a freedom of information law in 

December 2005, implementation of the law is not being fully implemented. For instance, journalists viewed as independent or as critical are banned from public hearings. 

44 

As Azerbaijan looks to hold presidential and parliamentary elections next year, these limitations on press freedom will very likely 

result in yet another noncompetitive election process. 

Kazakhstan Kazakhstan Press Freedom Ranking: 76 Press Freedom Ranking: 76 Status: Not Free Status: Not Free 

Kazakhstan, which has put itself forward as a candidate to chair 

the OSCE in 2009, has seen a steady monopolization of media since 

Freedom House began ranking it as an independent country. As in 

a number of former Soviet states, Kazakhstan’s broadcast media 

was taken into the hands of members of the presidential family or 

those with close ties to it. For example, President Nazerbayev’s 

daughter ran several television channels, controlled two of the nation’s leading newspapers, and at one time headed the state news 

agency. 

Journalists frequently face criminal charges, particularly under 

Article 318 of the criminal code, which imposes penalties for ‘‘undermining the reputation and dignity of the country’s president 

and hindering his activities.’’ 

In July 2006, amendments to media legislation were signed into 

law by President Nursultan Nazarbayev that imposed costly registration fees for journalists, broadened criteria for denying media 

outlets registration, required news outlets to submit the names of 

editors with their registration applications, and necessitated re-registration in the event of an address change. 

This level of repression against such a critical pillar of democracy, as well as its dismal performance in other key areas such as 

permitting genuine elections, are clear proof that Kazakhstan has 

no business taking over the chairmanship of the OSCE in 2009. 

Turkey Press Freedom Ranking: 49 Press Freedom Ranking: 49 Status: Partly Free Status: Partly Free 

In Turkey, which boasts a vibrant media, including notably a 

vast array of private television and radio stations, the primary impediment to press freedom has been the prosecution of journalists 

under provisions of the new Turkish Penal Code, which came into 

force in June 2005. Article 301 of the penal code allows for imprisoning journalists from six months to three years for the crime of 

‘‘denigrating Turkishness’’ and has been used to charge journalists 

for crimes such as stating that genocide was committed against Armenians in 1915, discussing the division of Cyprus, or writing critically on the security forces. 

Earlier this year, a number of media outlets, including Kanal 

Turk TV, which is perceived to be critical of the ruling AK party, 

complained of attempts by the government to curtail its critical reporting through financial and tax inspections of journalists and 

family members. 

Despite these continuing concerns, Turkey has by and large seen 

an impressive improvement in press freedom over the past decade. 

In 1996, Turkey received a lowly 74 out of a worst possible 100 in 

press freedom and was ranked as Not Free. By the year 2000, Turkey had jumped to a rating of 58 and into the Partly Free category 

and it currently received a score of 48. 

In summary, while there has been tremendous progress in the 

level of press freedom in OSCE countries over the past decade, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe and in Turkey, this stands 

in stark contrast to developments in the countries of the CIS. The 

45 

OSCE has played a vital role in supporting the democratic development of its members, not only in the enhancement of media freedom, but in other key areas such as free and fair elections. Freedom House hopes that the OSCE will continue to play an influential role towards those countries whose journalists and citizens are 

still denied basic rights. The imminent decision on OSCE leadership is an important test of whether its member countries maintain 

the will for it to do so. 

The United States should be playing a leadership role in ensuring the OSCE’s continued effectiveness. The upcoming OSCE 

Human Dimensions Implementation Meeting in Warsaw in September and the OSCE Ministerial in Vienna in December provide 

two key forums to determine OSCE’s plan of action to address repression of free media, including directing the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media to undertake an investigation into 

these countries’ practices. 

I again thank the commission for asking me to testify at this 

hearing and look forward to your questions. 

Press freedom scores are based on Freedom House’s Freedom of 

the Press 2007. Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 

100 (worst) on the basis of a set of 23 methodology questions divided in three categories: legal environment, political environment, 

and economic environment. Countries with a score of 0 to 30 are 

designated as ‘‘Free,’’ 31 to 60 as ‘‘Partly Free,’’ and 61 to 100 as 

‘‘Not Free.’’ 

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49 

RESPONSE OF NINA OGNIANOVA TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS 

SUBMITTED BY THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Question. Were there any attempts to create an investigative group 

of international journalists to investigate such cases as Elmar 

Huseynov’s assassination? The FBI participated in early investigations of this case. Did CPJ or any other groups ask for their findings? 

Answer. In the case of Elmar Huseynov, an FBI agent—Brian 

Parman—participated in the forensic investigation early in the 

murder probe. However, there wasn’t a follow-up and the Azerbaijani government has not sought help from U.S. authorities since. 

As for creating an international investigative journalist group: on 

May 28, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) announced in Moscow the launch of an international commission of 

inquiry into the killings of Russian journalists. (It was during the 

IFJ Congress, which was hosted by the Russian Union of Journalists in Moscow this year.) The commission’s research is to mainly 

be the work of two leading Russian press freedom group—the Center for Journalists in Extreme Situations (CJES) and the Glasnost 

Defence Foundation (GDF). 

Question. Seven journalists are currently detained in Azerbaijan. 

What are the recorded numbers of detained journalists in other 

countries in the region—Armenia, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan? 

Answer. Azerbaijan is the leading jailer of journalists in the region. Uzbekistan is the runner-up in this dishonorable ranking— 

with five behind bars. Russia and Armenia come third and fourth— 

with two and one behind bars, respectively. CPJ publishes an updated list of journalists in prison in December every year. It can 

be accessed at: www.cpj.org. 

Question. Nina Ognianova said the U.S. cannot be indifferent 

and should do something about press freedom in Russia. What are 

some of the things can and should the U.S. do, particularly in 

North Caucasus? 

Answer. 1. The U.S. government should take every opportunity 

to make press freedom a priority, which would include raising 

press freedom concerns consistently in any bilateral meetings or 

international summits involving states from the region. 

2. Concerning press freedom in Russia: 

• The U.S. government should publicly renew its offer to assist 

Russian authorities in the investigation of the 2004 murder of U.S. 

journalist Paul Klebnikov. The Moscow City Court jury trial of two 

suspects in the killing is currently in limbo because of Russian authorities’ inability to locate and apprehend one of them—Kazbek 

Dukuzov—who went missing in March. CPJ encourages the U.S. 

government to press for the apprehension of Dukuzov, and to press 

Russian authorities to further identify and apprehend the alleged 

masterminds of Klebnikov’s murder, who remain at large more 

than three years after the crime. • The U.S. government should request regularly reports from 

Russian authorities updating the progress of the murder investigations of both Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya. Both 

Klebnikov and Politkovskaya—who was slain in a contract-style hit 

50 

in 2006—were U.S. citizens; due to that fact, the U.S. government 

is uniquely placed to positively influence the progress in each of 

their murder investigations. The solving of both these high-profile, 

journalist assassinations would set a positive precedent. Fourteen 

journalists have been murdered for their work with impunity in 

Russia since 2000; justice in Politkovskaya’s and Klebnikov’s cases 

would finally help overturn this record. • The U.S. government should continue keeping close taps on the 

progress of the investigations of the twelve other work-related murders of journalists committed in Russia since 2000. One case where 

the Russian authorities are making marked progress is that of the 

2000 murder of Novaya Gazeta journalist Igor Domnikov. Five suspects currently stand before a court in Kazan, in the republic of 

Tatarstan, for killing Domnikov. But the alleged masterminds of 

the murder are not prosecuted. The U.S. government should call on 

Russian authorities to ensure that the criminal investigation includes prosecution of the intellectual authors of the crime. If the 

masterminds in this case were to be prosecuted, Domnikov’s case 

would become the first journalist murder case in contemporary 

Russia, where both the immediate killers along with those who 

hired them would finally be brought to justice. This would set a 

watershed precedent. 

3. Concerning press freedom in Azerbaijan: 

• The U.S. government should encourage Azerbaijani authorities 

to resolve the contract-style slaying of opposition editor Elmar 

Huseynov in Baku in March 2005. To date Azerbaijani authorities 

have made no known progress in finding and prosecuting his killers. One former colleague of Huseynov’s—independent editor 

Eynulla Fatullayev—was jailed on trumped-up charges of allegedly 

defaming Azerbaijanis shortly after publishing his own investigation into Huseynov’s murder in his now-shuttered weekly Realny 

Azerbaijan. Huseynov’s murder and Fatullayev’s imprisonment 

have had a chilling effect on the practice of critical journalism 

across the country. Violence against Azerbaijani reporters is not 

only frequent but it also nearly always goes unpunished. The U.S. 

government should press Azerbaijani authorities to resolve 

Huseynov’s murder and the 2006 brutal attacks against opposition 

journalists Fikret Huseinli and Bakhaddin Khaziyev. After having 

received phone death threats that warned him to discontinue his 

reporting, Huseinli, who was investigating alleged government corruption at the time, was kidnapped on March 5, 2006, and his 

throat slashed by unidentified assailants in a Baku suburb. After 

having written articles critical of high-ranking security officials, 

Khaziyev was abducted by five men on the outskirts of Baku on 

May 19, 2006. The assailants beat him over several hours, and 

drove over his legs with a car. Both Khaziyev’s and Huseinli’s 

attackers are still at large. 

• The U.S. government should press Azerbaijani authorities to 

release journalists held behind bars for their work. Azerbaijan currently imprisons seven journalists, making the nation the top jailer 

of journalists in Europe and Central Asia. Most disturbing in all 

these cases is the fact that most journalists are held on criminal 

charges filed by public officials. Defamation remains a criminal offense in Azerbaijan. The U.S. government should call on AzerVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:00 Dec 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\080207 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
51 

baijani authorities to release the seven jailed journalists, and to 

also take steps to decriminalize defamation as part of an effort to 

reverse the country’s deplorable press freedom record. 

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