CTTIPriesmey er, I n c. wa s known as Centra l Texas Tilt wall, Inc. at the time of the 1 c on tr a c t. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00051- CV

CTTI Pr iesm eyer , Inc. form erly know n as Ce nt r al T e xa s Ti lt wall, Inc ., App e lla nt

v. K& O Limite d Par tnership, a Texas Li m ited P artner ship , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN001816 , HO NORAB LE SCOTT H. JENKI NS, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N
The owne r of an office and war ehouse, K& O L imited Par tnership, sued the g ener al contra ctor, CTTI

Priesmey er, Inc., and othe rs for c rac ks that develope d in the concr et e slab foundation of its building. Prior to tr ial, K& O settled with a ll de fenda nts e x cept CTTIand Duke 1 Gar wood Arc hitects, I nc. The jury found C TTI liable for brea ch of c ontrac t, and Gar wood liable for its neg lige nce. Duringtrial, K& O enter ed into a hig h-low settlement ag ree ment with Garw ood. The tr ia l c ourt e nte re d ju dg me nt o n th e ve rd ic t a g a ins t CT TI and de nie d a ny se ttl e me nt c re dit s. CTTIraises f

ive issues urg ing that, as a matter of law, the parties’ su

b s e q uent contra ct
r e g ar d in g r e p a ir

o f th e c r a c k s in

th e s la b w a s a n o v a ti o no f

th e o r ig in a l c o n tr a c t w ar r an ti n g the2

building, or in the a lternative, that the jury ’s fa ilure to find novation was a g ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. CTTI also relied on the “one satisfaction rule” t o claim that it was entitled to settlement cre dits. W e hold that t he novation issue was properly submitt ed to the jury

and that the g reat weig ht of the evide nce doe s not pr eponder ate ag ainst the jury ’s ver dict. Fur thermore , we r ely on the supreme court’s r

uling in Crown L ife Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W .3d 378 (Tex. 2000), to h old that th e tr ia l court pr op e rl y de nie d the se ttl e me nt cr e dit s bec a us e tor tf e a so rs c ann ot be joi ntl y and seve rally

liabl e fo r co n trac t damag es, and that other contra ct def endants a re only jointly and
se ve ra lly lia ble fo r b re a c hes of

c on tr a c ts t o w hic h th e y are a pa rt y or that pr omi se the same pe rf or manc e . We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. BACK GR OUND I n 1997, K& O entered int o a contract with C TTI for the c onstruction of an of fice and
war ehouse building . K& O also enter ed into a contra ct with Duke Ga rwood Ar chitects, Inc. to serve as the a rchitec t on the projec t. A s such, Gar wood’s plans and specific ations wer e incorporated as part of the overa ll contrac t documents. The sourc e of the controve rsy in this case is the building’ s slab foundation that CTTI poured in the summer

of 1997. Construction was substantially completed in October

1997, and K& O moved into the fa cility at the end of

that month. Cr a c ks in t

he sla b a pp e are d a s e arl y a s late Au g us t 19 97 , and c on tin ue d to inc re a se in both siz e and numbe r as the building was oc cupied a nd used. K& O consulted with CTTI , Duke Gar wood, and Joh n Buf

ord, the proje ct’s eng ineer , reg ardingthe cr acks; they wer e told that the
c ra c ks we re ty

pic a l f or a sla b of that size. B uf

or d re c omm e nd e d th a t K & O c on ta c t a c on c re te re pa ir expert. The re pair ex pert confirmed that the cracks were the ty pical re sult of concr ete shrinka g e and3

rec ommended that K& O wait about f our to five months for the slab to cure completely . The e x pert
rec ommended that af

ter the slab ha d cure d, epoxy be applied to r epa i r t h e crac ks. K& O obtained an estimate of

$182,000 as the c ost to complete such re pairs. Pur su ant t o th e e xpe rt ’s re po rt and re c omm e nd a tio ns , K & O an d CTT Ie nte re d in to
a ne w a g re e me nt i n Apr il 1 99 8, in whic h CT TI a g re e d to make the re c omm e nd e d e po xy re pa ir s in return f or K& O’s fina l completion pay ment. Whether this new repair ag ree ment was a novation of the orig inal ag ree ment is at issue on appe al. The a g ree ment detailed the ne cessa ry repa irs to the slab fl oo r, and pr ov ide d, in p e rt ine nt p art :
“The work of this Ag ree ment is subject to all terms of the Ge nera l Condit ions of the Con tr a c t f

or Con str uc tio n ( a pa rt of the Con str

uc tio n Con tr a c t be tw e e n the pa rt ie s) (the “ Gene ral Conditions”) with the ex ce p t i o n of the pa y ments provision of such Gene ral Conditions.” and

“ No tw ith sta

nd ingthe te rm s o f t

he part ie s’ Con str

uc tio n Co ntr a c t de a lin g wi th resolution of disputes, it is the parties’ ag ree ment that this Agr eeme nt shall gove rn the re so lut ion

of the ir dis pu te re g ard ingc or

re c tio n o f c e me nt f

loo r s la b p ro ble ms i n lieu of ar bitration. All other terms of suc h Construction Contract shall apply to the extent practica l.”
CTTIrepa ired a test are a in Dec ember 1998, but never

repa ired the e ntire slab. As the slab continued to de teriorate, K& O bec ame c onvinced that the r ecommende d repa irs would not stop the deterioration. K& O aga in consulted a concr ete repair e x pert re g ardingthe condition of the slab. This time the eng ineer s and experts ag ree d t h at t he slab ha d been imprope rly desig ned and
c on str uc te d. Th e te sti mony

a t tr ia l in dic a te d th a t mu lti ple fa c tor s c on tr ibute d to the pr ob le ms w ith the sla b. Som e of

the pr ob le ms w e re de sig n r e late d, su c h a s th e imp ro pe r s pa c ingof c on tr ol j oin ts4

and insuffic ient desig nated concr ete streng th. Other fac tors wer e re lated to the construc tion of the slab, such as misplace ment of rebar and the us e of materia ls other than those desig nated in the plans
and sp e c if ic a tio ns . K& O f iled su it in O c tob e r 1 99 9 a g a ins t CT TI , G arw oo d, Com me rc ia l Ind e mni ty I nsuranc e Company

(the sure ty

on the repair contract), and ML A L abs, Inc. (the g eotec hnical firm that had per formed te sting on the site) . K& O later joined Bur

ris Construction, I nc., the subcontractor who provided the fill material for the sla b base. CTTI

joined J ohn Buf

ord, the proje ct eng ineer , as a third-pa rty defe ndant. Prior to trial, K& O settled with the surety , the g eotec hnical firm, a nd the fi ll su bco ntr a c tor , a

nd su c h s e ttl e me nts we re re a d in to t he re c or d at tr ia l. T ri a l pr oc e e de d a g a ins t CTTI , Garw ood and B uford in Apr il 2003. K&O a lleg ed that CTTI brea ched both the or igina l construction contr act a

nd the sub s eq u en t repa ir contra ct. K& O re ache d a hig h-low settlement ag ree ment with Garw ood befor e the c ase w as submitted to the jury
.

Ni ne qu e sti on s w e re su

bmi tte d to the ju ry , of whic h f our a re the su bje c t of thi s appea l: Ques tion 1—Did CTTI fail to comply with the construction contr act; Que stion 2—W as CTT I ’s fa il u r e t o c o mp l y e xc u s e d b y a n e w a g r e e m e n t ; Q u e s t i o n 3

—W h a t d a m a g e s f l o w f r om a po sit ive ans we r t o q

ue sti on 1 and a ne g a tiv e ans we r to qu e sti on 2; a nd Qu e sti on 6— What r e a so na

ble at t o rn ey s ’ f

ee s ar i s e fr o m a f

i n d i n g o f b re ac h o f c o n t ra ct
. Al t h o u gh K& O a l l ege d i ni t s p l ea d i n gs that CTTIhad bre ache d the re pair a g ree ment, a question as to that brea ch was not submitt ed to t he jury , and K& O did not object to such omission.

The jury found that CTTIhad bre ache d the construc tion contrac t, that CTTI ’s bre ach
wa s not exc us e d by the re pa ir a g re e me nt, and that Bu fo rd and Ga rw oo d w e re ne g lig e nt. On the ba sis5

of its findings the jur

y awa rded K &O $561,750 for CTTI ’s bre ach of co ntrac t and $400,000 for attorney s’ fee s. The jury also awa rded K& O $187,250 for Ga rwood a nd Buf ord’s ne g lige nce, a

nd further deter mined that 70% of the neglig ence that cause d the damage s was attributable to Garw ood
and 30 % attr ibuta

ble to B uf

or d. Ho we ve r, unde r t

he hig h- low

a g re e me nt, K& O s e ttl e d w ith Gar wood for $190,000 f

or neg lige nce da

mag es. The tr ial court e n t er ed j u dg ment on the ver dict
awa rding K& O a total of $1,071,714.48 f rom CTTI . This amount included pre judgme nt and postjudgment intere st, as well as attorney s’ fees and court costs; the t rial court refuse d to gr ant CTTI any settlement cre dits. This appeal followed.
DI SCU SSIO N Stand ard of Review

CTTIraises f

ive issues on appea l. F our of CTTI ’s issues are raised a s matters of law
. CTT I ’s se c on d is su e is a

fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y po int
. Whe n r e vie wi nga

pa rty ’s asser

tio n th a t it s c la im o r d e fe ns e wa s e sta bli sh e d a s a matter of la

w, and whe re a jury has m ade an adverse f inding of fac t on that issue, we apply a spec ial analy sis. Se e Ho lle

yv . W att s , 629 S.W .2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982). We must first ex amine the r ecor d for ev i d en ce that supports the court’s f indings, while ig noring all evidenc e to the contr ary . Id. If there is no evidence to support the fac t-finder ’s conclusion, then t he entire rec ord m ust be examined to see if the c ontrary

proposition is established as a matter of law. Id. When review ing a

fac tual sufficie ncy

challeng e, we must assess all of the evide nce and may not substit ute our judg ment for that of the trier of fac t. When the challeng e is to a finding on which the pr evailing party had the bur den of pr oof, we may reve rse the judg m en t only if the6

c ha lle ng e d f

ind ingsh oc ks the c on sc ie nc e or c le arl y sh ow s b ia s, or

if the fav ora

ble e vid e nc e is s o
weak as t o make the judgme nt clea rly wrongand manife stly

unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W. 2d 62 9, 63 5 ( Te x. 19 86 ); Cai n v . B ain , 70 9 S. W.2 d 1 75 , 1 76 (T e x. 19 86 ). I f t he c ha lle ng e is to an adve rse f

indi n g, o r fa i l u re to find, on which the a ppellant had the bur den of pr oof, we may
reve rse only

if the fa ilure t o find is so contra ry to the overwhelming weig ht and prepondera nce of the evidenc e as to be clea

rly wrongand manife stly

unjust. Ames v . Ames , 7 7 6 S. W. 2 d 1 5 4 , 1 5 8 ( T e x. 19 89 ); Cropper v. Caterpillar T ractor Co., 754 S.W .2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988).
Novation I n its fir st two issues, CTTI contends that the repa ir agree ment was a novation of the orig inal contra ct as a

matter of la

w, and in the a lternative, that the jury ’s fa ilure to find a novation
wa s a g a ins t th e g re a t w e ig ht an d p re po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e . T he pa

rt y ur g ingno vatio n a s a defe nse bea

rs the burde n of proof

. Honey cutt v. Billingsley , 9 9 2 S. W.2d 570, 576 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d)
. Thus , CTT I ha d the burd e n to pr ov e (1 ) t he va lid ity of the pre vious obligation; (2) a n ag ree ment among all parties to ac cept a new c ontrac t; (3) the exti ng uishment of t h e p re v i o u s obligation; and (4) the va lidity of the ne w ag ree ment. Vicke ry v. Vi c k e ry , 99 9 S.W.2 d 342 , 356 (T e x. 19 99 ); Fulcrum Central v. Autotester, Inc

. , 102 S.W .3d 274, 277 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pe t.). A cour t may infer that a new ag ree ment is a novation of an
ear lier ag ree ment when the ne w agr eeme nt is so inconsistent with the ear lier agree ment that the two ag ree ments cannot subsist toge ther. Fulcrum Central , 10 2 S. W.3 d at 27 7; Scalise v. M cCallum, 700 S.W .2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, wr it ref’ d n.r.e)
.7 Whe re the re are no inc on sis te nt p ro vis ion s, “ a se c on d c on tr a c t w ill op e ra te a s a novation of a first contra ct only when the parties to both contra cts intend and ag re e t h at t he obligations of the second sha ll be substitut ed for , and oper ate a s a discharg e of, the obligations of the first.” Chastain v. Cooper &Ree d , 25 7 S.W.2 d 422 , 4 24 (1 95 3) . Ane w a g re e me nt c an e sta bli sh novation as a matter of law when the state of the e vidence is suc h that rea sonable minds cannot diff er
as t o i t s ef

fect. Id. Wh e th e r

a la te r a g r e e me n t w o r

k s a n o v a ti o no f

ane ar li e r o n e is a qu e s ti o nof intent. Al lst

ateIn s. Co. v . Cl

ar k , 471 S.W .2d 901, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). The intent must be c lear ; novation is never pr esumed. Id. CTTIcontends that the la ng uag e of the repa ir con t ra ct is unambig uous and conclusively

establishes that CTTI

and K& O intended the repa ir contra ct to replac e the c onstruction
c on tr a c t w ithre sp e c t to the de fe c tiv e sla b. Whil e we a g re e that the re pa ir c on tr a c t is un a mbi g uo us , we f ind that the repa ir contra ct and the orig inal contra ct do not have inc onsistent provisions. R ather , the pr ov isi on s re g ard ing the sp e c if ic ste ps to be take n to c omp le te the re pa ir s su pp le me nt t

he te rm s of the original construction contra ct. Other provisions ex pressly

incorporate the ter

ms of the orig inal contra ct. The only

signific ant modification to the orig inal contra ct was the provision stating that any disputes over the r epair of the slab would not be subject to the binding a rbitration provision of the orig inal contra ct.

A n ov a tio n o c c ur s if

a c on tr a c t e vid e nc e s an int e nti on to r e lin qu ish

and e xtinguis h pre- exis ting c laims and rig hts of action. Here, the repa ir contra ct does not ext inguish a ll claims of the pre vious contrac t, as CTTI argues, but instead incorpor ates a nd rea ffirms the r ights unde r that contra ct to the extent feasible. An ag ree ment to make fina l pay ment upon completion of the re pairs8

and not to require arbitration for any disput e over that repa ir is not inconsistent with t he g ener al terms of the ori gi n al contra ct. The most important of these terms, that CTTIwar rants deliver

y of a def ect- fre e buil d i n g, is in fact re fer ence d at least twice in the repa ir ag ree ment, with the clea r intention of maintaining its applica bility to the extent possible. Parag raph 3( b) of the r epair contra ct states, “I t is the understanding of the pa rties that such wor

k should approxim ate ( as close a s possible) the standar d orig inally

intended by

contra ct.” Par ag raph 5 state s that “[a]l l o t h er t er m s of such Con str uc tio n Con tr a c t sh a ll a

pp ly to the e xten t pr a c tic a l.” Th e se state me nts a dd re ss t he po ssi bil ity that even a fter the repa ir work, the building might not me et the defe ct-fr ee standard war rante d in the orig inal contra ct. The statements serve to a llow va riation from the war

ranty to the extent necessar

y but no further . They

clea rly evidenc e the intention that the orig inal contra ct remain in forc e to the extent possi ble.

We a g re e wi th K & O that th e tw o c ontr a c ts o n th e wh ole a dd re sse d dif fe re nt i ssu e s: the or ig ina l c on tr a c t c ov e re d th e e nti re c on str uc tio n p ro c e ss an d warr ante d the fi na l pro du c t, whil e the re pa ir c on tr a c t c ov e re d o nly the re pa ir of c ra c ks in t

he sla b f ound a tio n. Th e ne w c on tr a c t me re ly repr esente d the par

ties’ ag ree ment as to how to resolve the dispute over repa ir of the c rac ked slab in lieu of arbitration. Be cause there is no express lang uag e of novation and no inconsistent provision in the repa ir ag ree ment, we f ind that CTTIcan not surmount the f irst hurdle, that there is no evidence to su pp or t the jur y ’s c on c lus ion that the re pa ir c on tr a c t wa s no t a no vatio n o f t

he or ig ina l c on tr a c t. See H olley , 629 S.W .2d at 969. That be ing the case , we ne ed not examine the record to determine i f C T T I’ s p r o p o s i t i o ni s e s t a b l i s h e d a s a m a t t e r o f l aw ; t h e i s s u e w a s p r o p e r l y s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r

y.9 I n the alter

native, CTTI

argues that the jury ’s fa ilure to find novation is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. This is a challeng e to the factual suffic iency of the evidenc e. In the abse nce of inconsistent provisions, we look to the i ntent of the pa rties to deter

mine novation. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 1 S. W.2 d at 90 7; see also Scalise, 70 0 S. W.2 d at 68 4 ( statin g that on ly wh e re te rm s are inc on sis te nt m ay no vatio n be inf

e rr e d) . T he int e nt o f t

he pa rt ie s is a lw ay s a question of fact. See Chastain, 257 S.W .2d at 424 (in the absenc e of an express ag ree ment as to the int e nt o f t he pa rt ie s, int e nt i s a

qu e sti on of fa c t unle ss t

he state of the e vid e nc e is s uc h th a t r e a so na ble minds could not differ)
.

The e vidence and testimony prese nted at trial provide d ample support for the jury ’s decision that the repair contrac t was not a novation and did not excuse CTTI ’s per formanc e under the or ig ina l c on tr a c t. Mr
. O’ He arn , a 50 % ow ne r of K& O, te sti fi e d that K & O i nte nd e d th e re pa ir contra ct to allow the parties to resolve the exis ting dispute ove r the slab without havingto arbitrate , and that ther e wa s n o intention to relieve CTTI of the wa

rra nty provided in the orig inal contra ct. Specifica lly , he stated that in light of the fa ct that the slab, at the time of the repa ir ag ree ment, was le s s t h ano n e y e ar

o l d , K & O w a s n o ti na

p o s i t i o nt o r e l e a s e C T T If r o m an y w ar r an t y w o r k
. T h is testimony , combined with the terms of both c ontrac ts, c annot be held to be so weak as to prec lude an adve rse f

inding on the issue of novation. Ther e wa s contrar y testimony

prese nted by

both parties that the ag ree ment was intende d to gove rn the e ntire dispute over the re pair of the slab. Howeve r, there was a lso disagr eeme nt as to what wa s cover ed by t h e “d ispute reg ardingcorr ection of the
ceme nt floor sl ab problems.” There was some question as to whether it covere d all potential disputes over the slab or just the d i s p u t e i n exis tence at the time of the a g ree ment. Where ther e ar e10

i n co n s i s t en ci es i n

t h e t es t i m o n y

p re s en t edat t ri al , i ti s t h e j u ry as fa ct -f i n d er t h at i s t h e so l e j u d ge of the c redibil i t y o f wi t n esses and the weig ht to be aff orded the testimony
. Lyva v. Pachec o , 358 S.W .2d 547, 549 (Tex. 1962)
. T h e jurors may resolve f

or themselves a

ny inconsistencies by choosing to believe one witness and disbelieve another
. McG alliard v. Kuhlmann , 722 S.W .2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986). This Court may not se cond g uess or substitut e our judg ment for that of the trier of fa ct. Pool , 715 S.W .2d at 634.

CTT I als o argue s th a t th e ba sic te ne ts o f c on tr a c t in te rp re tatio n mu st b e a pp lie d in thi s c a se . Pa

rt ic ula rl y , CT TI argue s th a t be c a

us e the repair con tr act is n ot a mbi g uo us , p aro le
e vid e nc e re g ard ingthe pa rt ie s’ int e nt sho uld be ina dmi ssi ble , a nd that if the re is a ny a mbi g uit y , it
s h o u l d b e re s olved ag ainst K& O as the dr afte r of the a g ree ment. S e e A T& T C

o r p . v . R y la n d e r, 2 S.W. 3d 54 6, 55 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) (s tatin g g e ne ra l r ule that do c ume nt i s
con st ru e d s tr ic tly

a g a ins t a uth or ). Whil e the se pr inc ipl e s o f c on tr a c t in te rp re tatio n a re a c c ur a te ly stated, they

do not serve to r elieve a

party asser ting novation of the burde n of provingan esse ntial element of

that defe nse. CTTI

still must prove the existence of a mutual ag ree ment to form a ne w
c on tr a c t th a t e xtinguis he s th e old c on tr a c t. I

n th is c a se , if

we we re to f

ind a mbi g uit

y and re so lve it aga i nst K&O , CTTIhas still failed to establish the intent element of its def ense. S e e Computed Imaging Serv ., Inc. v . Faye tte Mem ’l Hosp. , 2001 Tex. App. L EXI S 183, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin, J an. 11, 2001, no pet.) (not desig nated f or publication) ( afte r re solving any ambig uities in c ontrac t ag ainst draf

ter, if e x istence o f m u t u al ag ree ment to form new c ontrac t is not proven, defe nse of novation has fa iled).I n its fi ft h is su e , CT TI

c on te nd s in

the a lte rn a tiv e that it

is e nti tle d to a

c re dit fo r o nly tho se 2 settlements made pr etrial. 11

By virtue of the nature of the a g ree ment’s languag e, the a ctions of the par ties, and the testimony at trial, rea sonable minds c ould dif fer over whether

the re quisite intent was shown. Ames , 77 6 S. W.2 d at 15 8; Cropper , 75 4 S. W.2 d at 65 1. B e c a us e we fi nd

that CT TI

c ou ld n ot e sta

bli sh novation as a matter of law and that ther e was ample evide nce to support the jur y ’s fa ilure to find a novation, we overr

ule CTTI ’s first and se cond issues.
Settlem ent Cr edits

I n its thi rd and f

ifth issues, CTTIcontends that it is entitled to settlement credits under the “one satisfac ti o n ru l e. ” I t argues that bec ause the conduct of both CTTIand the se ttling de fe nd ants c omb ine d to c a us e a sin g le , in div isi ble inj ur

y of a de fe c tiv e sla

b, it is e nti tle d to c re dit s ag ainst its judgment for a ll undisput ed settlements. K& O counter s that under the holdingin Hunt 2 v. Ellisor & Tanner , CTTIis n ot entitled to settlement credits. See 7 3 9 S. W. 2 d 9 3 3 , 9 3 8 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 1987, w rit denied). The c ourt in Hunt held that a c laim for bre ach of contra ct does not give rise to compar ative ca usation. Id. Ba sed on the supre me cour t’s more re cent discussion of the one satisfaction rule, w e re ach a simil ar c onclusion. The one satisfac tion r u l e i s the long standing proposition that a plaintiff should not be compe nsated twice for the same injury
. See Ste wart T itle Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W .2d 1, 7 ( Te x. 19 91 ); Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ. , 84 S.W .2d 703, 705 (Tex. 1935). The supre me cour t has addre ssed the issue of se ttlement cre dits in relation to the one satisfaction rule on se vera l occa sions since the Hunt

opinion. I n Ste war t Tit le , the cour t noted that wher e all tortfea sors cause d a sing le,12

indivisi ble injury to the plaintiff, eve n though the ir ac ts were technica lly differ ent, the non-se ttling defe ndant would be entitled to a se ttlement cre dit so as to prevent the pla intiff from obtaining more than one r ecove ry

for the sa me injury
. Id. I t is important to note t hat all defendants in Ste war t Tit le , including the settling pa

rties, wer e tortfe asors. Se e als o Fi rst Titl e Co. of W

aco v . G arre tt , 860 S.W .2d 74, 79 (Tex. 1993) (holding that if multipl e tortfe asors have contr ibuted to whole of indivisi ble injury , non-settling pa rty is entitled to settlement credits). More rece ntly , the s upreme court discussed se ttlement cre dits in Crown L ife Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W .3d at 391-92:
Un de r t he on e satis fa c tio n r

ule , th e no ns e ttl ingde fe nd ant m ay on ly c la im a c re dit ba se d on the dama g e s fo r whic h a ll t or tf e a so rs are joi ntl y

lia ble

. . . . the nonsettling defe ndant is entitled to offset any liability for jo i n t an d s ever al damag es by the amount of common dama g es paid by the s ettling defenda nt, but not for any

amount of sepa rate or punitive damag es paid by the settling de fenda

nt.
Id. The c ourt’s use of

the words “ tortfea sor” a nd “li ab i l i ty ” lea ds us to conclude that the one satisfac tion r

ule applies only

to tort claims, not to breac h of contra ct claims. The supr eme c ourt’s further insistence that a nonsettl ing defe ndant receive settlement cre dits only for se ttlements based
on damag es for which ther e is joint and sever al liability confirms this understanding . I t is also telling that while Texas has four

differ ent contribution scheme s, eac h is only applicable to pa

rticular ty pes of tort claims and not to contra ct claims. See First T itle Co. of W

aco , 860 S.W .2d at 78. J oint and sever al l iability arises in tort claims based on the conduct of the tortfea sors and the nature of the injury
. “I f the indepe ndent tortious conduct of two or more pe rsons is a leg al
cause of an indivisible injury , eac h person is jointly and seve rally

liable for the rec overa

ble damag es13

c au se d b ythe tor tio us c on du c t.” RESTATEMENT (THI RD) OF TORTS: APP ORTI ONMENT O F L I AB I L I TY § A 18 (2 00 0) ( emp ha sis a dd e d) ; see also RES TA TE ME NT (T HI RD ) O F TO RTS : APPORTI ONMENT O F L I AB I L I TY §10, cmt. b (2000) (explaining that joint torts are de fined a s those committed by m u l tiple defe ndants ac ting in conc ert to ca use indivisible injury). Texas has adopted a threshold version of t his g ener al rule in its proportionate re sponsibili ty statute, wher eby in order to r ecove r at a ll, a plaintiff must not be more than 50% responsible for the injury

suffe red. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.001 (West 1997). Additionally , the statute re quires that the trier of

fac t determine the perc entag e of r esponsibilit y of ea ch cla imant, defe ndant, settling person, a nd responsible third par

ty
. S e e id . § 33.003 (West Supp. 2004-05). The same chapte r addre sses rig hts t o co n t ri bution for the var ious parties, including rig hts to offsets to ref lect settlements with other par ties. Se e id
. § 33.012 (West Supp. 2004-05). These statutes apply when the ca use of a ction is based in tort. Se e id . § 33.002(a) (West Supp. 2004-05). B y c on tr a st, joi nt an d sev e ra l li a bil ity ari se s in c on tr a c t ba se d u

po n th e re latio ns hip b e tw e e n th e p arti e s an d th e e xis te n c e o f w h a t a mo u n ts to jo in t pr omises. See RESTATEMENT (S ECO ND ) O F CO NT RA CTS § 1 3 I N NT (1 98 1) (m or e c omm on us a g e of joi nt a nd se ve ra l li a

bil ity
re fe rs to r ig hts and

du tie s c re a te d b y pro mi ses of same pe rf

or manc e ). I n th e c a se wh e re mul tip le fac tors combined to produc e t he plaintiff’ s injury , there are differ ent appr oache s in the tort and cont ra ct fields. I n tort, when the torts of othe rs wer e contr ibuting fa ctors, they may be held to be “joint tortfeasor s,” ea ch liable f or t he whole loss or harm. 11-55 C ORBI N ON CONTRACTS § 999 (2004). “ I n the contra ct field, howe ver, if the acts of othe rs (whe th er wr o n gfu l or not) ar e14

contributing fac tors, those others are not the reby joined with the defe ndant as having committed the brea ch of c ontrac t.” Id.

We acknowle dg e that ther e ar e ca ses in which the c ourts have a pplied the one satisfac tion rule and g rante d settlement cre dits or require d an election of re medies whe re the re a re
co-e x isting tort and c o n t ra ct claims. See B urke v Union Pac. Re

s. Co., 1 3 8 S. W. 3 d

4 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 04 , p e t. f

ile d) ; Oyster Cree k Fin. Corp. v. Richwood Inv. II, I nc. , No. 01-02- 00788, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 7269 ( Tex. App.—Houston [ 1st Dist.] Aug . 12, 2004, pet. denied) ; Goose Cree k Consol. Indep. Sc hool Dist. v. Jarrar’s Plumbing, Inc. , 7 4 S. W. 3 d 4 8 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 02 , p e t. d e nie d) . In th ose ca se s, the c ourt s h a ve fo c us e d o n th e ind ivi sib le
n a tu r e o f th e in ju r y to th e p la in ti f

f s , an d h a v e n o t d is c u s s e d th e r e qu ir e me n t o f jo in t li a b il it y . We f in d th a t f o c u s to b e mi s p la c e d an d d e c li n e to f o ll o w th o s e d e c isions. See RESTATEMENT (THI RD) OF TORTS: APP ORTI ONMENT O F L I AB I L I TY § 26, cmt. g (2000) ( indivisi ble nature of the injury

is only the prope r i nquiry wher e the contributing fa ctors ar e all ac tions of the plaintiff and tor tfe as or

s ). I f we wer e to hold that, due to the i ndivisibl e natur e of the resulting injury , brea ch of c on tr a c t de fe nd ants and tor t def e nd ants are joi ntl y and

se ve ra lly lia ble fo r a ll d a ma g e s, we wo uld be for ced to hold a pe rson not a par ty to a contra ct liable for

the bre ach of

that contra ct. CTT Ic on tr a c te d w ith K& O dir e c tly
. Th a t c on tr a c t sp e c if ic a lly inc lud e d a

pr omi se to de liv e r a

de fe c t- fr e e bu ild ing . Wh ile oth e r d e fe nd ants a lso ha d c on tr a c ts w ithK& O, no ne of tho se
c on tr a c ts m a de the pr omi se wh ic h is the su bje c t of this c a

us e of a c tio n—

that K & O r e c e ive a

de fe c tfr e e bu ild ing . T he re fo re , e ve n if the pr e -t ri a l se ttl e me nts wi th o the r p art ie s w e re to s e ttl e se pa rate contra ct claims, those contr acts did not pr omise the same perf ormanc e as CTTI . Thus, there can beCTTIargues that once it put the settlements into t he re cord, it satisfied its burde n to prove 3 its right to a se ttlement cre dit. See F irst T itle Co. of W

aco v. G arrett, 8 6 0 S. W. 2 d 7 4 , 7 8

- 7 9 ( T e x. 1993). The bur den then shifts, it argues, to K &O to a llocate the settlement betwe en those damag es for whic h CTTIwas jointly liable and those for w hich the settling party was sepa rate ly liable. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W .2d 917, 927-28 (Tex
. 1998) (holding that afte r def endant put settlement s i n to rec ord, plaintiff then ha d burden of allocatingsettlements betwee n damag es for which nonsettling defe ndant was jointly liable and punitive dama g es, fo r whi ch ther e is not joint lia bil ity ; if pla int if

f fa ils to a llo c a te , d e fe nd ant r e c e ive s c re dit fo r f ull a mou nt o f s e ttl e me nt) . T his burden shifti n g ap p lies only wher e ther e ar e at lea st some damag es for which ther e could be joint and se ve ra l li a

bil ity . B e c a

us e we fi nd

that th e re c an b e no dama g e s fo r wh ic h CTT Iis j oin tly lia ble with other settling pa

rties, K& O had no bur den to allocate the settlements. 15 no joint and severa l liabilit y between t h e various contrac ting pa rties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13 I N NT (1981). Gar

wood may

have ma de a pr omise to provide
ar ch i t ec tu ra l an d

s u p erv i s o ry s erv i ce s , b u ti td i d

n o tm ak e ap ro m i s e t o d el i v er a d ef ec t -f re e b u i l d i n g. I t the ref ore did not promise the same perf ormanc e to K &O as CTTI , prec luding joint and s ev era l lia bil ity . M or e ov e r, the jur

y fo un d Ga

rw oo d did no t br e a c h it s c on tr a c t but w a s li a ble on ly fo r i ts own neg lige nce. T he settlement ther efor e cove red da mag es ca u s e d by Gar wood’s neg lige nce, which by definition involves no promise whatsoeve r.

The supre me cour

t’s decision in Cro wn Li

fe is controlling in this case and re quires that se ttl e me nt cr e dit s be ap pli e d o nly if the pa rt ie s w e re joi ntl y

and se ve ra lly lia ble fo r t he dama g e s. See Crown Life Ins. Co. , 22 S.W. 3d a t 39 1- 92 . B e c a

us e tor tf e a so rs c ann ot b e joi ntl y

and se ve ra lly liabl e fo r contract damag es, and othe r contra ct def endants a re only jointly and seve rally

liable for br e a c he s o f c on tr a c ts t o w hic h th e y are a pa rt y or that pr omi se the same pe rf or manc e , we ov e rr

ule CTT I ’s thi rd

and fi ft h is su e s and

a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to d e ny any se ttl e me nt c re dit s. 3 Havingoverr

uled CTTI ’s claim for

settlement cre dits, we nee d not addre ss the
c omp la int ra ise d in its fo ur th i ssu e re g ard inga tto rn e y s’ fe e s.16 CO NC LU SION Havingfound that the que stion of novation was prope rly submitt ed to the jury , that the jury ’s ver dict was not ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e, and that CTTI was not entitled to any

settlement cre dits, we aff irm the judg ment of the district cour t.

__________________________________________ Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pury ear Affir med Filed: May

5, 2005