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THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION ON THE 

KOREAN PENINSULA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

CARTE P. GOODWIN, West Virginia 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

SEPTEMBER 16, 2010

Page 

Gregson, Hon. Wallace C., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific 

Security Affairs .................................................................................................... 5 

Campbell, Hon. Kurt M., Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia and Pacific 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 11 

Sharp, GEN Walter L., USA, Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command; and Commander, U.S. Forces-Korea ................................................................................. 16 

(III) 

(1) 

THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION ON THE 

KOREAN PENINSULA 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD– 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, McCain, Thune, LeMieux, and Brown. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Roy 

F. Phillips, professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Brian F. Sebold, and 

Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator 

Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to 

Senator Begich; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to 

Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van 

Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian Walsh, assistant to 

Senator LeMieux. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Today’s hearing is to 

receive testimony on the current security situation on the Korean 

Peninsula and discuss the implications of recent developments such 

as the March 26 attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) naval ship 

Cheonan, the decision to delay the transfer of wartime operational 

control (OPCON) of the ROK armed forces from the United States 

to the ROK, and the prospects for regime change in North Korea, 

among other issues. 

On behalf of the committee, let me first welcome our witnesses: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 

2 

and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell; and General Walter Sharp, 

USA, Commander of United Nations Command (UNC), Combined 

Forces Command (CFC), and U.S. Forces-Korea (USFK). 

The committee appreciates your service, each and every one of 

you. Your insights on this important topic are of great significance 

to us. 

While many of our Nation’s military and diplomatic efforts remain centered on the continuing mission in Afghanistan, we must 

also keep focused on challenges in other regions of the world. One 

such region is northeast Asia and in particular the Korean Peninsula, which has been embroiled in various stages of conflict since 

the start of the Korean War. 

This year, as we commemorate 60 years since the beginning of 

that war, it is appropriate that we recall the noble and extraordinary service and sacrifice of the service men and women of the 

United States and allied armed forces that fought in the Korean 

War, as well as those who have served on the Korean Peninsula 

since, sacrificing selflessly and giving of themselves tirelessly to 

help preserve the fragile peace that we hope will one day develop 

into a firm and reliable peace. 

Although the fighting ended in 1953, today the North and South 

remain technically at war. Over the nearly 6 decades since the armistice agreement was signed, the Korean Peninsula has become 

a tale of two countries, standing as a true testament to the power 

of democracy and free society on the one hand and serving as a 

stark reminder of the debilitating and destructive nature of a repressive totalitarian regime on the other. 

Indeed, the 60 years of relative stability on the peninsula has enabled the Republic of Korea (ROK), to the south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), to thrive, developing into one of the world’s 

most vibrant, accomplished, and prosperous democracies. But to 

the north, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as 

North Korea is known, continues to wither under the weight and 

pressure of its own destructive policies, with its people suffering 

from hardships and neglect caused by a regime seemingly concerned only with its own survival and determined to use threats 

and aggression to achieve that end. 

As a result, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains precarious, and recent events remind us that it is one of the 

most uncertain geographic areas in the world, due in large measure 

to the longstanding reign of a regime unwilling to conform to even 

the most basic standards expected of a sovereign nation and a responsible member of the global community. 

Characterized mainly by unpredictability, the words and actions 

of the North Korean Government have for the past several decades 

vacillated between modest cooperation and unabashed aggression. 

International efforts to rid the peninsula of nuclear weapons 

through the Six-Party process have come to a virtual standstill, 

and since nuclear inspectors left North Korea more than a year 

ago, the actual status of North Korea’s nuclear program has been 

largely unknown. 

It is important that we do not lose focus of the key goal of 

denuclearizing the peninsula. The United Nations (U.N.), through 

various Security Council resolutions such as 1718 and 1874, has 

3 

provided tools to sanction and pressure North Korea to conform its 

policies and behavior to international principles. While the North 

Korea issue and the specter of proliferation of nuclear technology 

garner much of the international attention, and rightly so, also of 

concern are the intentions of the North Korean regime, which 

maintains a robust conventional military and continues to pursue 

and develop a ballistic missile capability that represents a substantial threat to stability and security on the peninsula and throughout the region. 

Equally alarming, of course, is that North Korea maintains that 

costly military while millions of its people are starving and suffering from the lack of even the most basic human needs. 

Highly disturbing is the willingness of North Korea to attack 

without warning or provocation, as was the case on March 26 when 

the South Korean naval ship Cheonan was split in two and sunk, 

killing 46 South Korean sailors, by what an international team of 

experts determined to be a torpedo fired by the North Koreans. The 

Cheonan incident underscores the uncertainty of the peninsula and 

highlights the need to maintain a high state of readiness and to 

protect against unprovoked aggression. In the aftermath of the attack, the United States and the ROK have begun an enhanced 

schedule of combined exercises, which includes more naval exercises in the waters around the peninsula. 

Other recent developments of interest to the committee include: 

the decision by President Obama and South Korean President Lee, 

announced in June, to delay the transfer of wartime OPCON of the 

ROK forces from April 2012 to December 2015; developments in 

North Korea, including reports that the regime may be preparing 

plans for a succession in leadership; indications of possible proliferation of nuclear weapon technology by North Korea to other 

countries, such as Burma; and the current state of the North Korean ballistic missile program. 

Of course, it’s important to view developments on the Korean Peninsula not just in the context of their effect on the peninsula 

itself, but also in the context of their effect on Northeast Asia as 

a whole and on the security and stability of the broader Asia Pacific region. To that end, we will also be interested in hearing the 

witnesses’ views on how recent developments on the peninsula impact the region at large and implicate the military and diplomatic 

dynamics in countries like Japan, China, and Russia. 

The ROK remains one of the United States’ most steadfast and 

reliable allies and the military alliance is vital to a lasting security 

on the peninsula and throughout the region. As the United States 

and the ROK move forward with plans to strengthen that alliance, 

it is important that both countries remain committed to making 

the investments needed to support the realignment of U.S. forces 

and to prepare for the transfer of wartime OPCON in 2015 now. 

Security and stability in this region must remain a top U.S. priority as the international community works to achieve the complete 

and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to establish reliable pathways for the delivery of assistance and aid to the people 

of North Korea, and ultimately to secure and preserve a lasting 

peace in this important part of the world. 

4 

Again, we welcome our witnesses and we look forward to their 

insights on this very timely subject. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us this 

morning and for their service to our Nation. 

I’m very pleased we’re holding this important hearing today. The 

Asian Pacific is one of the most consequential regions in the world 

today. It’s the main driver of the tectonic shift in the global distribution of power that is reshaping our world. It’s increasingly at 

the heart of our Nation’s security, our prosperity, and our global 

diplomacy. It is a region in which the United States finds both 

some of our greatest allies as well as some of the worst threats to 

international security. 

All these factors come together most vividly in Northeast Asia, 

and in particular on the Korean Peninsula. 60 years after the start 

of the Korean War, the peninsula remains very tense. But while 

the situation in North Korea has rarely been worse, our alliance 

with South Korea has never been better. 

Under the strong leadership of President Lee Myung-bak, the 

ROK is realizing its goal of becoming a responsible global leader 

and our alliance is flourishing as a result. Seoul will host the next 

meeting of the G–20 and our two militaries are in the midst of 

some of the most sophisticated and important joint exercises we 

have ever conducted in the seas around the Korean Peninsula. I’m 

very pleased that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have joined as 

observers. 

In addition, the ROK recently announced strong additional sanctions against the Iranian Government for its pursuit of a nuclear 

weapons capability. This decision was not easy or cost-free for Korea’s Government and companies, and it’s another reminder that 

Congress must pass the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 

The success of our Korean ally stands in stark contrast to the situation in the North, which has been deteriorating dramatically. In 

the past 18 months, the North Korean regime has tried twice that 

we know of to ship arms to Iran. It has conducted a second nuclear 

test. It carried out a catastrophic revaluation of its currency. It 

wiped out a lifetime’s worth of savings in a matter of hours for 

most North Koreans. 

According to the Pentagon’s 2010 ballistic missile defense review, 

if North Korea continues on its current trajectory it could soon 

have the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon, not only to its 

neighbors, but to the United States. 

Most recently, a complete and thorough investigation by the ROK 

with the participation of numerous independent parties determined 

conclusively that a North Korean torpedo was responsible for the 

sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan and the loss of 46 

of her sailors. It now appears that Kim Jong Il is attempting to 

pass his tyrannical power to his young son, so the odds of further 

North Korean provocations could be growing. 

The administration has taken some good steps to impose additional pressure against North Korea, including a new presidential 

5 

authority to sanction persons and entities that facilitate North Korea’s trade in arms, drugs, counterfeit goods, currency, and other 

illicit activities, the real lifeblood of the Kim Jong Il regime. Yet 

it’s not clear what objective the administration is seeking to 

achieve with this pressure, nor is it clear why the North Korean 

regime would choose to give up its nuclear weapons now when it 

has never been willing to do so before, despite repeated international attempts to negotiate, cajole, bribe, and pressure them 

into nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, China’s recent behavior 

makes it even harder to imagine how to formulate an effective 

strategy on North Korea. 

China’s response to North Korea’s recent provocations calls into 

question its willingness to act as a responsible stakeholder in the 

international system. Rather than support the ROK after the sinking of the Cheonan, acknowledge North Korea’s blame and use its 

leverage with North Korea to change its behavior, China has instead worked to water down the response of the U.N., shielded 

North Korea from accepting culpability for its aggressive acts, and 

even challenged the right of the United States and our allies to 

conduct joint exercises in international waters. 

Meanwhile, the additional sanctions against Iran that Japan and 

the ROK recently adopted highlight how increasingly out of step 

China is with the requirements of global leadership on this vital 

security issue. 

The challenges we face on and around the Korean Peninsula 

make it all the more important for the United States and our allies 

to organize ourselves well for our mutual defense. While it was 

right to delay the transfer of OPCON for the defense of the ROK, 

there’s no doubt in my mind that South Korean forces are among 

the most capable and best equipped in the world, and that the 

CFC’s Strategic Alliance 2015 Initiative will lend even greater credence to the U.S. commitment to South Korea and our mutual defense. 

Today’s hearing is an opportunity to discuss this and many other 

issues pertaining to our forces in Korea, as well as the growing 

challenges we face in Northeast Asia, and I want to thank our witnesses again for appearing here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Let us begin with you, Secretary Gregson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WALLACE C. GREGSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS 

Mr. GREGSON. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, 

members of the committee; thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today to discuss the Department of Defense (DOD) views 

on the Korean Peninsula. I’m pleased to report that 2010 has been 

a landmark year for the U.S.-ROK alliance. The U.S.-ROK alliance 

is a key pillar of U.S. strategy for a region undergoing tremendous 

political, economic, and security-related change. This comprehensive relationship, spanning the defense, diplomatic, and economic 

spheres, continues to serve as a source of stability in the face of 

unpredictable and provocative North Korean behavior. 

6 

This past June marked the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of 

the Korean War. At its most basic level, the mission of our alliance 

today remains the same as it did 60 years ago, to deter aggression 

against the ROK, and to fight and win should deterrence fail. 

North Korea’s 26 March torpedo attack on the ROK naval ship 

Cheonan, which killed 46 sailors, is a somber reminder of the active threat that North Korea poses to regional stability. In such a 

high threat environment, the U.S.-ROK alliance’s mission to deter 

and defend takes on added significance and remains our primary 

focus. 

While this deter-and-defend mission remains the top priority of 

the alliance, the U.S. investment in Korea’s security has helped 

create an alliance whose value extends far beyond the security of 

the Korean Peninsula. America’s stake in the peace and prosperity 

of the Korean Peninsula transcends social and economic interconnectivity, to include shared identities as liberal democracies 

that promote a peaceful and prosperous Asia. In the ROK, the 

United States has a partner that contributes to upholding international norms and promoting international peace and stability. 

In stark contrast, North Korea poses a multifaceted threat to 

peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia Pacific 

region. Pyongyang possesses a large conventional military and its 

active pursuit of a nuclear capability, ballistic missile testing and 

development, and weapons export activities cause serious concern. 

The threat North Korea poses exceeds any simple measurement of 

military power. Its proven track record of marrying capabilities 

with deadly intent has resulted in unnecessary crises, tension escalation, and, as the attack on the Cheonan demonstrated, the tragic 

loss of life. 

North Korea has adapted to the U.S.-ROK alliance’s conventional 

military superiority by developing tactics and weapons systems 

that equip them with offensive capabilities that avoid confronting 

the military strength of the alliance head up. In the context of 

North Korea’s efforts to develop a nuclear program, its ballistic 

missile efforts become an even greater concern. Nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, if developed and fielded, would pose a threat to regional peace and stability that would be orders of a magnitude 

greater than the already heightened threat that its current unconventional capabilities pose. 

North Korea may become emboldened to pursue even more provocative activities than we have witnessed in recent years if it 

makes significant strides in its development of nuclear weapons 

and ballistic missile technology. 

At the same time that North Korea develops conventional, unconventional, and WMD capabilities for its own purposes, it continues 

to export military technologies. We’re working closely with the 

international community to deter, track, and stop North Korean 

arms sales. 

I’d like to touch just briefly on the strategic value of the U.S. 

military’s presence on the Korean Peninsula. Since the armistice 

agreement was signed in 1953, the U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula and in the region more generally has been successful in preventing major war from erupting again. Deterrence has 

worked. Fundamentally, the presence of U.S. forces on the Korean 

7 

Peninsula continues to generate a security dividend that has allowed countries like the ROK and Japan to flourish economically 

and politically. Those countries’ contributions to international 

peace and stability would be impossible if not for the security assurance our military presence provides. 

To preserve our security commitment to the ROK, the United 

States must maintain a forward military posture. 28,500 troops 

stationed somewhere in the United States do not have the same deterrent effect as the same number stationed in the ROK. It is our 

forward presence that most effectively communicates our resolve to 

defend our allies and preserve our vital interests in Asia. Successful deterrence relies on credibility as much, if not more than, capability. 

The security dividend resulting from our longstanding military 

presence in the region is generally well known, but ongoing efforts 

to transform the alliance deserve attention. I will defer to General 

Sharp on the details of this effort, but I will note that Strategic Alliance 2015 is an important umbrella concept that encompasses 

and harmonizes many different alliance transformation efforts. 

The foundation of Strategic Alliance 2015 is the plan to transition wartime OPCON of forces to the ROK joint chiefs of staff. 

Some of the related initiatives that support OPCON transition, 

which is now scheduled to take place by December 2015, will result 

in a more strategically positioned military footprint, as well as 

military plans and exercises that are updated to better account for 

the most probable threats that we could face today and in the near 

future. 

The United States is a resident Pacific power, as shown by our 

U.S. military presence and the interests we protect. Our presence 

on the Korean Peninsula and our strong relationship with the ROK 

promote peace and stability in the region and enduring interests of 

the United States and the world. 

Thank you for allowing me to appear before you today and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gregson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. WALLACE ‘‘CHIP’’ GREGSON

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain and members of the committee, 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense (DOD) views on the Korean Peninsula. I am pleased to report that 

2010 has been a landmark year for the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance. The 

U.S.-ROK Alliance is a key pillar of U.S. strategy for a region undergoing tremendous political, economic, and security-related change. This comprehensive relationship, spanning the defense, diplomatic, and economic spheres, continues to serve as 

a source of stability in the face of unpredictable and provocative North Korean behavior. 

Since joining the Office of the Secretary of Defense last year as Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, I have observed important changes in 

the nature of the threat posed by North Korea, as well as the structure and vision 

for the U.S.-ROK Alliance. During my testimony today, I hope to expand on these 

changes by discussing DOD’s views on the following topics: 

• the importance to the United States of peace and stability on the Korean 

Peninsula; 

• North Korea’s unconventional threat to Peninsular and regional security, 

to include its nuclear program; 

8 

• the value of forward-deployed/postured forces on the Korean Peninsula; 

and, 

• the ongoing transformation of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. 

U.S. INTERESTS IN KOREAN SECURITY

This past June marked the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. At 

its most basic level, the mission of our Alliance today remains the same as it did 

60 years ago: to deter aggression against the ROK, and to fight and win should deterrence fail. North Korea remains as much of a threat now as it did 60 years ago 

when it initiated hostilities with the ROK in an attempt to unify the Peninsula 

under the banner of communism. As North Korea’s conventional military capability 

slowly deteriorates, the unconventional threat it poses only increases, posing new 

challenges to the U.S.-ROK Alliance. North Korea’s March 26 torpedo attack on the 

ROK Naval Ship Cheonan, which killed 46 ROK sailors, is a somber reminder of 

the active threat that North Korea poses to regional stability. In such a high-threat 

environment, the U.S.-ROK Alliance’s mission to deter and defend takes on added 

significance and remains our primary focus. While this mission remains the top priority of the Alliance, the U.S. investment in Korea’s security has helped create an 

alliance whose value extends far beyond the security of the Korean Peninsula. 

America’s stake in the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula transcends social and economic interconnectivity to include shared identities as liberal democracies that promote the norms and institutions contributing to a peaceful and prosperous Asia. In the ROK, the United States has a partner that contributes to upholding international norms and promoting international peace and stability, to say 

nothing of its robust economic relationship with the United States. 

For 60 years the United States has supported the ROK as it transformed from 

a poverty-stricken agrarian society to a global leader in the information age, touting 

the 14th largest economy in the world with a dedication to democratic governance. 

Today, U.S. prosperity is inextricably linked with that of the ROK. The ROK is the 

seventh largest trading partner of the United States; more than 120,000 U.S. citizens live and work in the ROK, with the vast majority residing in Seoul; and, more 

than two million ethnic Koreans reside in the United States, playing an active role 

in our local communities and national economy. 

THE NORTH KOREA THREAT

North Korea poses a multi-faceted threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region. Pyongyang’s large conventional military, active pursuit of a nuclear capability, ballistic missile testing and development, and 

weapons export activities—all in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions—are enough to cause serious concern, but these factors in and of themselves 

are not what make North Korea so threatening. Other nations possess material capabilities that match or exceed what North Korea possesses, but North Korea poses 

a unique threat because of its proven willingness to match resources and capabilities with provocative, unpredictable behavior, and its continued export of illicit 

items to other states that seek to harm the United States and our allies and friends 

around the world. The danger posed by North Korean weapons and military 

strength are amplified greatly by the regime’s willingness to dedicate its meager resources to maximizing its lethality. Time and again, North Korea has displayed a 

lack of regard for what the rest of the world considers acceptable behavior, flouting 

international law and ignoring the will of the international community. 

North Korea still maintains a large conventional military force postured against 

the the ROK, the United States, and other international forces on the Korean Peninsula. Its large numbers belie its actual capabilities, however, as decades of economic isolation have hindered North Korea’s ability to provide proper maintenance 

and upgrades to its military hardware, leading to a qualitatively inferior conventional military force compared to the ROK. North Korea’s Air Force, for example, 

relies mostly on Russian technology from the 1960s and 1970s. 

North Korea’s decline in conventional military terms has led to an evolution in 

the nature of the North Korea threat, not a diminution of it. North Korea has adapted to the U.S.-ROK alliance’s conventional military superiority by developing tactics 

and weapons systems that equip them with offensive capabilities that avoid confronting the greatest military strengths of the alliance, in an attempt to compete 

on what it likely perceives as a more favorable playing field. The AN–2 Colt, for 

instance, is a case study of the threat North Korea poses in the face of significant 

resource constraints. A propeller-driven biplane made mostly of cloth and wood, the 

AN–2 gives off virtually no signature on radar, making it difficult to identify in the 

event it is used in troop insertion or infiltration missions. When combined with 

9 

more than 100,000 Special Operations Forces, North Korea’s AN–2 aircraft has 

truly lethal potential, illustrating how North Korea could disturb the peace even as 

it faces difficulty modernizing its conventional force. 

North Korea has also invested considerable effort in developing, testing, and 

growing its ballistic missile arsenal. North Korea has continued its ballistic missilerelated activities in contravention of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 

1874. As North Korea gets closer to perfecting its missile technology over time, its 

arsenal poses more of a threat to U.S. interests in the region and at home. Although 

North Korea’s Taepodong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile has not yet reached the 

requisite level of technological refinement, the missile is theoretically capable of 

striking U.S. territory. North Korea test-fired an earlier generation version of this 

missile, the Taepodong-1, over Japan in 1998, demonstrating that at a minimum, 

it is capable of striking U.S. interests and allies in the Asia-Pacific. 

In the context of North Korea’s efforts to develop a nuclear program, its ballistic 

missiles become an even greater concern. Nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, if developed and fielded, would pose a threat to regional peace and stability that would be 

orders of magnitude greater than the already heightened threat that it poses. 

It is important, moreover, to underscore that North Korea’s provocations aren’t related exclusively to weapons development; they also include the use of these capabilities, as tragically demonstrated in the case of the North Korean sinking of the 

ROK vessel Cheonan. We have stood steadfast with our ROK ally through the 

search and rescue operations and the multinational investigation that decisively 

concluded that a torpedo from a North Korean submarine, fired under cover of 

night, produced a shockwave and bubble jet effect that split open the hull of the 

Cheonan and sank it nearly immediately, all in a ‘‘pillar of white flash.’’ We have 

undertaken bilateral exercises to improve alliance capabilities, demonstrate readiness, and send a strong signal of alliance resolve. These exercises are entirely defensive in nature, and represent one component of a broader whole-of-government approach to the range of North Korean provocative actions, including missile tests, announced nuclear tests and the sinking of the Cheonan. That also includes high-level 

diplomacy at the United Nations and in the region, and the issuance of Executive 

Order 13551, which imposes new sanctions on targeted entities and individuals involved in North Korean conventional weapons sales and procurement, luxury goods 

procurement, and illicit activities. 

At the same time that North Korea develops the conventional and unconventional 

capabilities that I’ve just discussed for its own purposes, it also makes them available for export to other states that pose a direct threat to U.S. allies, friends, and 

interests in other regions—a significant source of income for the regime and a phenomenon that vividly illustrates that North Korean behavior is not a problem only 

on the Korean Peninsula or in Asia, but one that spans the globe and connects with 

other dangerous actors. Our efforts to deter, track, and stop North Korean arms 

sales include working closely with the international community. Cooperation on the 

enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which 

prohibit North Korea from transferring all arms and related material as well as 

WMD, to include related equipment and technology, and their delivery systems, is 

paramount in this arena and has produced results. In the past year, a number of 

states in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have successfully seized arms and related materiel coming from North Korea and bound for other customers. Despite 

these successes, enforcement of sanctions remains a formidable challenge. North 

Korea uses various methods to attempt to circumvent UNSCRs 1718 and 1874; as 

a result we continue to strengthen our implementation efforts and cooperation with 

allies and partners. 

THE VALUE OF THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN KOREA

I would like to touch briefly on the strategic value of the U.S. military’s presence 

on the Korean Peninsula. Since the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, the 

U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula, and in the region more generally, 

has been successful in preventing major war from erupting again. Deterrence has 

worked. 

Fundamentally, the presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula continues to 

generate a security dividend that has allowed countries like the ROK and Japan to 

flourish economically and politically, in spite of the persistent threat from the north. 

The U.S. military footprint in Korea today thus serves the same basic objective that 

it has for more than half a century. Our presence in Korea guards against the unthinkable, serving as a physical demonstration of our commitment to the security 

of our Korean ally, as well as a symbolic reminder to the region that the peace and 

stability of the Asia-Pacific is a vital U.S. interest. 

10 

The threat from North Korea must be kept at bay; stability must be preserved. 

To achieve this, the United States must maintain a forward military posture. 28,500 

troops stationed somewhere in the United States do not have the same deterrent 

effect as the same number stationed in the ROK. Successful deterrence relies on 

credibility as much as, if not more than, capability. It is our forward presence that 

most effectively communicates our resolve to defend our allies and preserve our vital 

interests in Asia. Our presence is far more than an important symbol. It stands as 

an irrefutable, tangible manifestation of our commitment to the defense of our allies 

and our commitment to peace and stability in the region. 

But the value of the U.S. military’s forward presence in Korea is not limited to 

preventing war. U.S. forces in Korea will increasingly contribute to regional capacity 

building, maritime interdiction efforts, counter-piracy missions, and humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief operations. U.S. bases in Korea are strategically positioned to be able to immediately address these types of contingencies throughout the 

region in a manner much more efficient than deploying troops from the United 

States. 

While our forward deployed force posture is crucial to preventing the outbreak of 

a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula, it is not a panacea. As I already mentioned, North Korea’s development of a range of threatening capabilities, and its 

willingness to employ them, poses a different type of threat than we faced from 

North Korea 60 years ago. This asymmetric challenge illustrates the need for the 

U.S.-ROK alliance to adapt to a new security environment in the region. It is in this 

vein that I wish to highlight the alliance transformation initiatives going on as we 

speak. 

ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION

I will defer to General Sharp’s testimony to provide the details of our many lines 

of effort in the transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance, but I would like to take 

a moment to emphasize the net benefit that these various initiatives provide. The 

security dividend resulting from our longstanding military presence in the region is 

generally well known, but the ongoing efforts to transform the alliance for the future deserve some attention. 

Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA2015) is an umbrella concept that encompasses and 

harmonizes many different alliance transformation efforts. The foundation of 

SA2015 is a plan to transition wartime operational control (OPCON) of forces to the 

ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. Originally scheduled to transition in 2012, the United 

States agreed to postpone OPCON transition at ROK request, after assessing the 

strategic security environment and considering the many changes in the alliance to 

take place over the next 5 to 10 years. Some of the related initiatives that support 

OPCON transition, which is now scheduled to take place by December 2015, will 

result in military plans and exercises that are updated to better account for the 

most probable threats we could face today and in the near future; other initiatives 

will strategically redistribute U.S. forces on the Peninsula; still other efforts will 

produce restructured command relations so that after OPCON transition takes place 

in 2015, U.S. forces in Korea will be comprised of a warfighting command that supports ROK forces, who will then lead the warfight. 

Increasingly, there is also a regional and global dimension to our bilateral alliance 

with the ROK. Over time we have both come to realize that we share in common 

many interests that go beyond the Korean Peninsula. In the Gulf of Aden, the ROK 

has taken the lead in Combined Task Force-151, a multinational counter-piracy mission. In Lebanon, as the United States has sought to support the Lebanese people 

by strengthening their government against the forces of extremism, the ROK has 

done the same, by contributing troops to the U.N. peacekeeping mission there. In 

Haiti, a country that once provided development aid to Korea following the ravages 

of war, the ROK has aid workers on the ground, helping that country rebuild, not 

only with financial assistance, but also with labor, materials, and technical expertise. The ROK is an active member of the Proliferation Security Initiative, will host 

a series of PSI-related activities this fall, is a party to several international agreements promoting nonproliferation of WMD, and will even host the Nuclear Security 

Summit in 2012—symbolically, a complete repudiation of the path North Korea has 

taken. In Afghanistan, the ROK provides an entire Provincial Reconstruction Team 

of more than 400 military and civilian personnel to support the stability and reconstruction operations under the aegis of the International Security Assistance Force. 

Our alliance with the ROK thus benefits the United States and the international 

community. The ROK has evolved to become one of the key underwriters of international peace and prosperity, helping to promote globally the values on which our 

alliance firmly rests. 

11 

CLOSING

The United States is a resident Pacific power, as evidenced by our U.S. military 

presence and the interests they protect. Our presence on the Korean Peninsula and 

our strong relationship with the ROK promote peace and stability in the region, 

which is an enduring interest of the United States and the world. Thank you for 

allowing me to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Secretary Gregson. 

Secretary Campbell. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KURT M. CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it’s an honor to 

testify before all of you gentlemen, and it’s also terrific to be with 

my colleagues and friends here on the panel before you today. 

I’d like to submit my full testimony for the record and just summarize a few brief points for you as we get started here this morning. 

Let me first fully support every word each of you said in your 

opening remarks this morning. I think it is well understood that 

the United States faces enormously consequential challenges in 

South Asia. Currently our young men and women are involved and 

engaged actively on challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. 

But it is also the case that increasingly the drama of the 21st century is playing out in the Asian Pacific region. The United States 

has to understand that for us to be successful as a Nation we have 

to be more actively engaged in every aspect of diplomacy, economic 

security, and other deliberations that are under way now in the 

Asian Pacific region. 

I must say that I think President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and 

Secretary Gates appreciate that, and we have tried to act in accordance with this fundamental reality of the 21st century. 

One of the key national priorities of the United States is the 

maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. I 

think as each of you, Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain, have underscored, we’ve faced some urgent challenges on the peninsula 

over the course of the last many months, and we have worked 

closely with our friends and allies to respond accordingly. 

The basis of our strategy in Northeast Asia rests on two very 

strong and important allies. The United States’ relationship with 

Japan remains the cornerstone of our engagement and our security 

partners in the Asian Pacific region. We have worked, with the 

strong support of General Gregson and others, on continuing to revitalize that effort, that security partnership, an effort that was undertaken with great effect over the course of the Bush administration. We’ve tried to build on that. We recognize the importance of 

Japan. It’s hard to be successful in Asia without that very strong 

and central relationship. 

We also have taken real steps in recent years to strengthen the 

critical partnership, as General Gregson has underscored, with 

South Korea. That partnership is increasingly not simply centralized on the Korean Peninsula. It’s a global alliance. Korea is working with us in a variety of places, in Afghanistan, as Japan is as 

well. We’re very pleased by the direction of both of these critical 

alliances in Asia. 

12 

It is also the case that we are recognizing important milestones. 

This is the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. 

Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton were both recently in South 

Korea to commemorate that solemn occasion. Later this year, 

President Obama and in fact most of the administration will be in 

Japan to recognize the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of our security partnership and treaty with Japan. So important times in 

both relationships, in Japan and South Korea. 

I think the sinking of the Cheonan provided a very clear and 

stark reminder of the dangers on the Korean Peninsula, and I 

think the last 6 or so months have been a case study in close coordination, not just between the United States and South Korea, 

but also with our other allies and friends in the region. We’ve 

worked hard on every single element of our overall strategy. General Sharp will talk about our military steps, our exercises, other 

steps to increase and enhance our deterrence capabilities, our diplomacy, both in the region and in the U.N., and more recently 

steps associated with sanctions policy and the like to send a very 

clear message that such provocative actions as undertaken by the 

North Koreans cannot be tolerated, and there must be a united 

front to confront such provocative steps. 

I must say again I’d like to underscore very clearly the point that 

both the chairman and Senator McCain made about President Lee 

Myung-bak. He has been an extraordinary partner in South Korea, 

one of the most able and effective leaders that we’ve ever had the 

pleasure to work with in Asia. I think he has conducted himself in 

the wake of the Cheonan with a statesmanship and a calm that has 

been truly inspirational at every level, and we’re very grateful to 

have the chance to work with him going forward. 

I must say that in the current environment I think it’s clear that 

the United States has to be prepared for every and all situations 

on the Korean Peninsula and we are attempting to do that through 

very quiet, intimate, internal deliberations on a variety of circumstances, through planning exercises, through external diplomacy. It’s also the case with the recent visit of Ambassador 

Bosworth and Ambassador Sun Kim throughout the region. 

We’re also prepared for truly productive diplomacy with North 

Korea. We stand ready, working with our allies, to do so under the 

right circumstances. 

I must also say that we also have to take important steps in Asia 

to underscore our leadership. I must associate myself strongly with 

Senator McCain on the Korea FTA. I think this is a strategic priority of the United States. I think the imperatives there are clear. 

I think President Obama has indicated the way forward in this regard. 

I think the situation in Northeast Asia is extraordinarily complex. It requires the strong leadership of the United States, and 

with the strong support of Congress and the Senate and the colleagues sitting before you today, I think we’re up to that challenge. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:] 

13 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. KURT M. CAMPBELL

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, it is 

a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and our alliances in Northeast Asia. I want to thank the committee 

for its continued leadership role on Asia-Pacific issues and commend it for understanding the importance of the Asia-Pacific for American national interests. 

The Obama administration entered office with a deep appreciation of the strategic 

importance of the Asia-Pacific to U.S. national interests. America’s future is intimately tied to that of the Asia-Pacific, and our economic and strategic interests in 

the region are among the most important in the world. The region is home to almost 

one-third of the Earth’s population and accounts for almost one-third of global gross 

domestic product. Strong coordination between the United States and key Asian 

economies was instrumental for the global economic recovery. Currently, more than 

60 percent of our exports go to the Asia-Pacific. American and Asian companies are 

among the most dynamic in the world, and our economies are growing increasingly 

interdependent. The region is also home to critical strategic chokepoints for global 

commerce, emerging power centers that will have profound implications for U.S. and 

international interests, and a foundation for American power projection in the greater Asia-Pacific. 

In recognition of our deep and abiding interests in the region, we are working 

hard to ensure our alliances in the Asia-Pacific are among our strongest and most 

active. Our alliances have underwritten peace and security for over 50 years and 

provided a context for economic prosperity that in many ways has enabled the 

‘‘Asian economic miracle.’’ This year we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the 

U.S.-Japan alliance and also commemorating the 60th anniversary of the start of 

the Korean War. Our alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea have evolved 

from strategic bulwarks against Soviet expansionism to truly global partnerships. 

The Obama administration is committed to developing and enhancing each and 

every one of our strategic alliances in the Asia-Pacific. 

Our alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in Asia. The 

May 2006 agreement on defense transformation and realignment will enhance deterrence while creating a more sustainable military presence in the region. We are 

working with Japan to create a more durable and forward-looking vision for the alliance that not only enhances our mutual defense capabilities, but also develops Japan’s role as a global leader on issues such as climate change and development assistance. As we mark the 50th anniversary of the alliance, we will continue to work 

closely with Japan to develop and maximize our joint capabilities as alliance partners. 

Together with our Asia-Pacific allies, we are working to respond to both traditional and nontraditional security challenges ranging from proliferation to climate 

change, as well as developing more robust regional architecture that will help enhance regional capacities to both deal with problems and seize opportunities for 

greater integration and stability. The emergence of transnational challenges necessitates that the United States work with other partners to find solutions. We will 

continue to work with our traditional allies on these issues, while enhancing relationships with countries like China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. I would like to 

take the opportunity to emphasize the bilateral, regional and global dimensions of 

our engagement with the Republic of Korea. 

PENINSULAR, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS

U.S. leadership is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security on the 

Korean Peninsula. Recognizing this fact, the administration has undertaken steady 

and broad engagement throughout the region, with a particular focus on broadening 

our alliances with Japan and South Korea. In November of last year, President 

Obama visited Japan and South Korea (in addition to China and Singapore) and 

has subsequently had many bilateral meetings with his Japanese counterpart and 

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. Secretary Clinton has visited the region 

five times since taking office, with her initial journey as Secretary of State to the 

Asia-Pacific, and her first visit to Japan. Secretary Clinton has enjoyed a strong 

working relationship with Foreign Minister Okada and continues to underscore the 

central importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to American engagement and strategic 

interests in the region. Most recently, Secretary Clinton attended a historic ‘‘2+2 

meeting’’ with Secretary Gates and their counterparts in Seoul, underscoring and 

charting a forward looking vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance. President Obama will 

travel to Seoul this November for the G–20 Summit and will attend the APEC Summit in Yokohama, Japan. 

14 

We are working closely with the Republic of Korea to achieve a partnership that 

is truly global and comprehensive in nature. President Obama and President Lee 

Myung-bak have charted a forward-looking agenda for the alliance, outlined by the 

June 16, 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement. The U.S.-ROK alliance continues 

to evolve rapidly and has provided a solid foundation for security in the Asia-Pacific 

region for more than half a century. This security has helped make possible economic and political development in the ROK that was unimaginable at the end of 

the Korean War. Today Korea is a vibrant democracy with the 14th largest economy 

in the world and is our seventh largest trading partner. Our economic ties continue 

to serve as a strong foundation for the U.S.-ROK partnership. This is why President 

Obama underscored his support the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement by undertaking to resolve outstanding issues by the time he visits Seoul in November. Its 

successful implementation will benefit both economies, create jobs, and bolster the 

enduring strength of this strategic partnership in an important and rapidly growing 

region. It can also contribute to the strengthening of our overall bilateral alliance. 

In November of this year, Korea will host the next G–20 Summit in Seoul, a first 

for a non-G–8 nation and a first for an Asian country. 

The United States and ROK are also working closely to modernize our defense 

alliance, which remains a key element of our overall bilateral relationship. We are 

working closely to adjust our force posture and presence to be better positioned to 

respond to current and future security challenges. We are moving towards a posture 

and presence that reflects a relationship of equals and that ensures a forward-stationed deployment of 28,500 American troops in South Korea. We recently moved 

the date of Wartime Operational Control transfer from 2012 to 2015 in order to 

strengthen the transition plan. This change will allow us to more closely synchronize the ROK lead of the combined defense with other ongoing alliance transformation efforts. In addition to military cooperation, our broader bilateral relationship outside the military realm also contributes to and enhances the security of the 

Korean Peninsula. 

The closeness of our alliance with the Republic of Korea is also demonstrated by 

the existence of a series of institutional consultative mechanisms, including the Security Consultative Meeting, the Military Consultative Meeting, and the Security 

Policy Initiative. These mechanisms bring together high-level officials to discuss 

critical issues of mutual concern. Secretary Gates will meet with his counterpart on 

October 8 at the next Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, DC. We also 

have regular and increasingly broad trilateral dialogue with the Koreans and Japanese. The last formal Defense Trilateral Talks were held on September 13 in Washington. 

As the ROK has grown and prospered, we have seen a convergence of interests 

between our two countries throughout the world. The ROK continues to be an increasingly active partner in global affairs, and our bilateral and multilateral cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region. 

For example, the ROK is currently deploying a destroyer to the Combined Maritime Forces’ counter-piracy operation Combined Task Force 151, and a Korean Admiral currently holds the rotating command of this task force. Separately, the Koreans will chair the fall plenary meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast 

of Somalia in New York. Korea is deploying a Provincial Reconstruction Team to 

Parwan Province in Afghanistan, and the Korean Government quickly deployed 

peacekeepers to Haiti in the wake of the terrible earthquake there this past January. Korea is also involved in peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon, and they also deploy 

military observers and staff officers to a host of other U.N. peacekeeping missions. 

The ROK has also pledged $200 million towards development in Pakistan. The 

ROK, along with Japan, recently took steps to implement additional sanctions 

against Iran, similar in scope to the excellent measures adopted by the EU, joining 

a growing global consensus and strengthening our efforts to send a unified message 

to Iran that it should uphold its nuclear nonproliferation obligations and negotiate 

seriously on its nuclear program. 

Korea made the leap from aid recipient to aid donor in a very short time span, 

and we are looking for opportunities to work together on development issues going 

forward. The ROK is an exemplar of development and has much to teach the developing world. In less than 30 years after the end of the U.S. Peace Corps program 

in Korea, thousands of idealistic young Koreans have volunteered for similar missions in the developing world. 

NORTH KOREA

South Korea’s successful and positive role as a regional power is in stark contrast 

with North Korea. North Korea poses the most immediate risks to both South Korea 

15 

and the stability of East Asia. North Korea’s unprovoked attack on the Republic of 

Korea naval ship Cheonan on March 26, 2010, claimed the lives of 46 South Korean 

sailors. This attack gave the international community yet another reminder of the 

unpredictable and enduring threat posed by North Korea. 

The United States has responded to a number of provocative actions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—diplomatically, militarily, and economically. Let there be no doubt about U.S. conviction here. In the case of the Cheonan 

sinking, the United States worked closely with member states in the U.N. to craft 

a strong response. As a result, on July 9, the U.N. Security Council issued a Presidential Statement condemning the attack on the Cheonan and demonstrating the 

Council’s unity in confronting threats to international peace and security. 

The United States and the ROK have also coordinated closely on a series of combined military exercises to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression. These 

defensive exercises are designed to send a clear message to North Korea that the 

United States and ROK are committed to enhancing their combined defensive capabilities. The first exercise, Invincible Spirit, a combined maritime and air readiness 

exercise, occurred from July 25–28 in the Sea of Japan. On August 16–26, the Combined Forces Command completed the annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, 

which focused on ensuring our readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against 

the full range of provocations on the Korean Peninsula both now and in the future. 

The United States and ROK will continue to routinely conduct joint military exercises to enhance interoperability and increase our ability to respond to threats to 

peace. These steps enhance security on the peninsula by sending a clear message 

of our capabilities and determination. 

In addition, the United States has taken additional steps through the adoption 

of new sanctions targeting DPRK proliferation and illicit activities. By adopting 

these new measures, the United States is sending a signal to the DPRK that its 

provocative actions, including its announced test of a nuclear device, missile 

launches, and the sinking of the Cheonan, are not without costs. On August 30, 

President Obama signed an Executive order implementing new country-specific 

sanctions against the DPRK. The Executive order directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to target for sanctions individuals 

and entities that support the Government of North Korea through arms sales and 

illicit economic activities, including money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods 

and currency, bulk cash smuggling, and narcotics trafficking. The new Executive 

order supplements existing U.S. sanctions targeting proliferators of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and those who support them and strengthens our enforcement 

of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. The additional sanctions are 

not directed at the North Korean people, who have suffered too long, nor are these 

measures targeted at those who provide legitimate humanitarian relief to the people 

of North Korea. These sanctions target only the North Korean military and leaders. 

As Secretary Clinton has said, ‘‘From the beginning of the Obama administration, 

we have made clear that there is a path open to the DPRK to achieve the security 

and international respect it seeks. . . . If North Korea chooses that path, sanctions 

will be lifted, energy and other economic assistance will be provided, its relations 

with the United States will be normalized, and the current armistice on the peninsula will be replaced by a permanent peace agreement. But as long as it makes a 

different choice—if it continues its defiance, provocations, and belligerence—it will 

continue to suffer the consequences.’’ 

WAY AHEAD

The Republic of Korea is a key partner and contributor to regional and global 

peace and stability. The Obama administration is unwavering in its resolve to uphold its treaty commitments to defend its allies. We highly value our broad relationships with the ROK and Japan and are deepening our security relationships with 

both countries as well as with our other partners in the region to ensure peace and 

stability on the peninsula. The U.S. position on the DPRK has remained constant: 

we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons power. The United States has 

underscored numerous times that North Korea can only achieve the security and 

international respect it seeks by ceasing its provocative behavior, improving its relations with its neighbors, complying with international law, and taking irreversible 

steps toward fulfilling its denuclearization commitments under the September 2005 

joint statement. 

The attack on the Cheonan served as a stark reminder of the importance of our 

alliance in the face of continued North Korean provocations and raised tensions to 

a level not seen in many years. This unprovoked aggression reinforces the need to 

be prepared for a broad range of security challenges from the north and all manner 

16 

of unpredictable developments. American, Japanese, and ROK commitment to the 

peace and security of Northeast Asia will remain critical to deal with North Korea, 

but also to ensure a context for peace and stability in the greater Asia-Pacific. 

As President Obama has stated, the United States is a ‘‘Pacific power.’’ Our alliance relationship with the Republic of Korea serves as a critical anchor for our strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific. Looking back over the past 60 years, it is 

amazing to see the evolution of the U.S.-ROK relationship. The relationship is no 

longer defined solely through the monocular lens of North Korea, but is increasingly 

global in scope. Our shared interests and democratic values will prove instrumental 

in ensuring a context of peace and prosperity for the Asia-Pacific for the coming 

years. 

Thank you for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on this timely and 

important issue. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Campbell. 

General Sharp, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF GEN WALTER L. SHARP, USA, COMMANDER, 

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF 

KOREA-U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND; AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-KOREA 

General SHARP. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator 

McCain, distinguished members of the committee; I thank you very 

much for this opportunity to update you today on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. 

Before I start, if I may, sir, I’d like to introduce my Command 

Sergeant Major, Bob Winzenried, who is here with me, who is so 

critical in taking care of those 28,500 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines that are part of the peninsula. It’s an honor for both of us 

to be here today, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. A warm welcome to you both, and please pass 

along to those 28,500 men and women and their families our 

thanks and our gratitude to them for their service. 

General SHARP. Thank you, Senator. 

Actually during my last testimony in front of you on March 26, 

North Korea launched a premeditated and unprovoked attack on 

the ROK Navy ship the Cheonan. After aiding our Korean allies 

with recovery operations, a multinational investigation led by Korean, British, Australian, Swedish, Canadian, and United States 

experts concluded the following: A shock wave and bubble effect 

generated by an underwater explosion of a North Korean-launched 

torpedo at a depth of 6 to 8 meters and 3 meters left of the center 

of the ship caused the ROK ship the Cheonan to split apart and 

killed 46 sailors. 

After the publication of these findings, the UNC Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission established a special investigation team which, based on a 

multinational investigation, concluded that North Korea attacked 

the Cheonan and it was a major armistice violation. 

Our ROK allies and the United States have launched a series of 

sea, air, and land exercises to better prepare us to deter and defeat 

North Korean provocations. The first of these exercises, Invincible 

Spirit, was successfully led in the seas off the east coast of Korea. 

Others are scheduled in the near future and, along with our regular exercises such as Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve, 

these exercises have all greatly expanded to include training that 

17 

focuses both on deterring and defeating future provocations by 

North Korea. 

The attack on the Cheonan along with the continued development and testing of nuclear and ballistic weapons in violation of 

multiple Security Council resolutions, demonstrates that North 

Korea continues to be a great threat to peace and prosperity in 

Northeast Asia. The continuing focus of North Korea on WMD, ballistic missile technology, special forces, long-range artillery threats 

to civilian populations, and asymmetrical means, along with the declared regime goal of North Korea to become a great and powerful 

nation by 2012, suggest that it will continue to threaten the region 

and the ROK in the future. 

On the ROK-U.S. alliance front, the Korean President, Lee 

Myung-bak, requested and President Obama agreed to adjust the 

transition of OPCON from April 2012 to 2015. Although the ROK 

and the United States were on track militarily to complete the 

OPCON transition in 2012, this adjustment will allow the alliance 

to synchronize a number of ongoing alliance initiatives, of which 

transition of OPCON is just one of them. 

The new, much more comprehensive plan, called Strategic Alliance 2015, goes well beyond OPCON. It synchronizes all the transformation initiatives currently under way, to include refining and 

improving our OP plans, more realistic training and exercises, the 

development of new organizational structures, the acquiring, organizing, and training, improved capabilities, and the movement of 

U.S. forces to two enduring hubs. 

Strategic Alliance 2015 will enable the ROK and U.S. forces to 

successfully confront future security challenges and set the conditions for lasting peace in the Korean Peninsula and in the region. 

Tour normalization complements our other transformation efforts 

by providing the command with soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who are highly trained in all of our contingency plans, who 

possess in-depth knowledge of the North Korean threat, and who 

have a strong professional and personal knowledge of and training 

with our Korean counterparts and hosts. It also clearly demonstrates the commitment of the United States to the region and 

to the ROK, a factor that I think is both critical now and even 

more so in the future. Tour normalization also reduces the stress 

on our military by eliminating an unneeded unaccompanied tour. 

Your continued support in this initiative is critical and very 

much appreciated. 

An important part of the command’s Yongsan Relocation Program (YRP) and land partnership initiatives is housing. To meet 

our future housing needs at Camp Humphreys, the Department is 

developing a Humphreys Housing Opportunities Plan (HHOP). 

This plan is examining the combination of several housing options. 

First is the HHOP and second is Army Family Housing Military 

Construction (MILCON). 

The Army Housing Opportunities Program draws upon the private sector development, financing, and operational support for the 

construction and operation of housing units without the need for 

military capital investment. MILCON, if approved, supports the 

housing needs for the additional families that HHOP cannot house. 

Combining new financial models with traditional means of funding 

18 

moves us significantly closer to our goal of providing 

servicemembers and their families with quality housing and facilities after they move to Camp Humphreys under the YRP and the 

Land Partnership Program. 

Again, your support is greatly appreciated. 

Northeast Asia and Korea remain the location of some of the 

greatest security opportunities and challenges. The North Korean 

threat continues to transform itself. The conventional threat continues, but we now face an enemy capable of using a number of 

asymmetrical means to threaten its neighbors in hope of gaining 

concessions, while also violating past agreements, international 

norms, and the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. 

The ROK and the United States are more strongly united than 

ever before to deter North Korean provocations and aggression and 

to defeat them, if necessary. Strategic Alliance 2015 will provide us 

with the means with which we will successfully maintain peace 

and promote freedom in Northeast Asia. 

Together, the ROK and the United States have kept the peace 

in the region for 57 years. I am confident that we will continue to 

do so until a lasting peace has been established in the region. 

Again, I thank you for your support and for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Sharp follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN WALTER L. SHARP, USA 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 

privilege of appearing before you today to discuss the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to update the committee on affairs in Korea since the last time I appeared before you last March. The year 2010 

marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, a 3-year conflict that 

resulted in millions of military and civilian casualties and has yet to be concluded 

by a formal peace agreement. U.S. Forces Korea and our component commands, in 

cooperation with government and veterans organizations in the Republic of Korea 

(ROK), have been conducting a host of events to honor Korean, U.S., and United 

Nations veterans who fought courageously side-by-side to repel North Korea’s aggression of 6 decades ago. The year 2010 also marks the 57th anniversary of signing 

the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. Serving as a cornerstone for the broader 

U.S.-ROK Alliance, mutual commitments under the treaty have allowed both nations to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on the 

Korean Peninsula and throughout the broader region of Northeast Asia. As observed 

by President Obama in his Korean War Veterans Armistice Day Proclamation of 

July 26, 2010, the U.S.-ROK Alliance is rooted in shared sacrifice, common values, 

mutual interest, and respect, where the partnership is vital to stability in Asia and 

the world. Despite the Alliance’s promotion of stability, however, North Korea’s 

sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan last March and other provocations by 

Pyongyang shows that a comprehensive peace has yet to settle over the Korean Peninsula. 

STATE OF AFFAIRS IN KOREA

North Korea remains a threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and 

in Northeast Asia as a whole. Pyongyang continues to build its asymmetric and conventional military capabilities despite the dire economic conditions faced by its people and threatens the use of these capabilities as a means to manipulate the international community. Its long-range artillery and missile forces are an immediate 

and daily threat to the ROK’s capital city of Seoul—which is located approximately 

30 miles from the military demarcation line—as well as to over 23 million people 

that inhabit the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area (Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi 

Province). While responsible nations of the world are working toward reducing the 

19 

existence of weapons of mass destruction, North Korea continues to develop these 

weapons and the means to deliver them. Pyongyang also develops and maintains 

robust asymmetric warfare capabilities as exemplified by the large size and aggressive positioning of its Special Operations Forces. Based upon past behavior, North 

Korea has great potential to proliferate weapons of mass destruction and related 

technologies. Thus, in both conventional and increasingly asymmetric terms, North 

Korea and its provocative behavior remains a threat not only to the ROK and 

United States, but also to the broader region of Northeast Asia. 

The threat posed by North Korea received heightened attention on March 26, 

2010, when it conducted a premeditated and unprovoked attack on the ROK naval 

ship Cheonan. At the time of the attack, the Cheonan was patrolling off the west 

coast of Korea in the vicinity of Paengnyong Island. North Korea’s unprovoked attack sank the ship and took the lives of 46 sailors and several rescue personnel during the rescue attempts. In the aftermath of the Cheonan tragedy, the ROK Government acted in a responsible manner and led a joint civilian-military investigation 

group to determine the cause of the Cheonan’s sinking that included the participation of experts from foreign governments. The investigation conducted by the group 

was performed in an objective, scientific, thorough, and deliberate manner, concluding that North Korea was responsible for the ship’s sinking. This finding was 

assessed by a special investigative team from the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). The special investigation team determined 

that North Korea’s action, by failing to enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities 

in Korea, failing to respect the waters contiguous to the island of Paengnyong, making an armed intrusion and/or the firing of a torpedo into Paengnyong Island’s contiguous waters, and making a deliberate and premeditated armed attack on the 

Cheonan, constituted major violations of the Armistice Agreement. This determination made by the UNCMAC special investigation team was endorsed by the Neutral 

Nations Supervisory Commission. It should be noted that our Korean partners and 

friends greatly appreciated the resolution passed by the U.S. Senate last May that 

expressed sympathy to the families of those killed when the Cheonan sank. 

In response to this unprovoked act of aggression, President Obama directed his 

military commanders to coordinate closely with their ROK counterparts to ensure 

readiness and to deter future aggression. As a result of this direction Secretary of 

Defense Gates and his Korean counterpart Kim Tae-young announced last July that 

a series of combined military exercises would be conducted. These exercises are designed to send a clear message to North Korea that its aggressive behavior must 

stop and the United States and ROK are committed to enhancing their combined 

defensive capabilities. The first exercise held in this series, a combined maritime 

and air readiness exercise held from 25–28 July 2010, was called Invincible Spirit 

and occurred in the seas east of Korea. The naval portion of the exercise featured 

20 Alliance ships that conducted extensive training in the areas of anti-submarine 

warfare, battle group air defense, and surface warfare training to include live-fire 

exercises. Complimenting the naval events was a robust air component composed of 

over 200 Alliance aircraft flying a variety of missions in the skies over and around 

the ROK. Approximately 8,000 Alliance Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine personnel participated in the Invincible Spirit exercise. 

Following Invincible Spirit was the Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise that was 

held from 16–26 August 2010. This annual exercise, like all other training events 

conducted by the Combined Forces Command, was designed to improve the Alliance’s ability to defend the ROK. The exercise was focused on ensuring our readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against the full range of provocations on 

the Korean Peninsula both now and in the future. It helped teach, coach, and mentor Command personnel on staff and leadership decision-making processes. 

Ulchi Freedom Guardian was supposed to be followed by a 5-day anti-submarine 

warfare exercise from 5–9 September in the waters off the west coast of the Korean 

Peninsula. Regretfully, the conduct of this exercise has been delayed due to adverse 

weather conditions created by a typhoon that swept through the region earlier this 

month. Once held, the focus of this exercise will be anti-submarine warfare tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. The exercise is scoped to send North Korea a clear message about its provocative behavior while at the same time enhance Alliance capabilities and demonstrate the flexibility and interoperability of U.S. and ROK forces. 

It will be defensive in nature, reinforce regional stability, and send a message of 

deterrence to Pyongyang. Planning is ongoing for combined exercises in addition to 

those discussed above that will continue to strengthen U.S.-ROK capabilities and reinforce a message to North Korea that its aggressive behavior must stop and that 

the Alliance remains committed to enhancing combined defense. 

20 

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 2015

Since I appeared before you last March, President Obama and President Lee of 

the ROK agreed to adjust the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) 

until December 2015. Although the United States and ROK were on track militarily 

for OPCON transition in 2012, this adjustment will provide the Alliance additional 

time to synchronize a variety of ongoing Alliance initiatives of which wartime 

OPCON transition is just one. The adjustment of OPCON transition also allows the 

ROK and U.S. to ensure Alliance initiatives collectively support the U.S.-ROK Joint 

Vision Statement of June 2009. 

At the U.S.-ROK Foreign and Defense Minister’s Meeting last July all four ministers agreed to develop a comprehensive Alliance transformation plan that goes beyond simply OPCON transition. This plan will be called Strategic Alliance 2015 and 

will be completed and signed by next month’s Security Consultative Meeting. Strategic Alliance 2015 will align all of the transformation initiatives currently underway to include the ROK’s ongoing defense reform program and U.S. transformation 

program, with a goal of building adaptive capabilities to deter and defeat any future 

provocations on the Korean Peninsula and to fight and win if deterrence fails. The 

Alliance is creating an overarching and synchronized combined transformation plan 

that has agreed to end states and milestones to ensure a smooth evolution of combined defense for the ROK. Initiatives falling under the Strategic Alliance 2015 construct include OPCON transition, refining and improving combined plans, the definition and development of new organizational structures, the procurement and certification of ROK capabilities to lead the warfight, and the consolidation of U.S. 

military units located in Korea onto two enduring hubs. End state conditions for 

Strategic Alliance 2015 include ROK assumption of the lead for the combined defense by late 2015, synchronization and completion of most Alliance transformation 

initiatives, and collective support for the U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement. Current 

plans to transition USFK to U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be implemented 

on schedule. As a result of the delay in OPCON transition, however, KORCOM staff 

will be dual hatted as the U.S. contribution to Combined Forces Command until the 

latter organization is disestablished by OPCON transition in 2015. After OPCON 

transition, KORCOM will play a supporting role to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The ROK is already in the process of procuring the equipment, conducting the 

training, and making the organizational changes needed to eventually lead the 

warfight. Until all these ROK actions are completed, however, the U.S. will provide 

agreed upon bridging and enduring capabilities. By adjusting the date of OPCON 

transition to late 2015 the ROK has more time to field many of the critical systems 

that are part of an ongoing defense reform initiative and to ultimately assume lead 

of the warfight. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan will improve readiness by allowing 

time for the ROK to establish key warfighting headquarters and to acquire critical 

command and control systems and capabilities. As a result, the OPCON transition 

process will progress smoother and ultimately end in stronger Alliance forces. 

TOUR NORMALIZATION

Another initiative under implementation by the Command is tour normalization. 

In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense committed 

itself to the long term goal of normalizing the stationing of U.S. forces in the ROK 

from unaccompanied to accompanied tours. Indeed, we are in the process of changing U.S. force presence in the ROK from being one of forward-deployed to one of 

being forward-stationed with the presence of family members. In December 2008 the 

length of tours for servicemembers assigned to Korea changed to 3/2-year accompanied and 1-year unaccompanied. Since the summer of 2008, the number of families in Korea has increased from 1,700 to around 4,200, with a Command sponsorship waiting list of over 500 servicemember families. The Command’s goal is to tour 

normalize 85 percent of the force as the required resources and infrastructure become available sometime near the end of this decade. At that time, approximately 

12,000 servicemember families will be in the ROK and most military personnel will 

be on 3-year accompanied/2-year unaccompanied tours similar to the forces stationed in Europe and Japan. 

Tour normalization provides a host of benefits. Implementation will improve combat capability and force readiness by decreasing personnel turnover—85 percent of 

the force in Korea today is on a 1-year assignment. Tour normalization also demonstrates a greater commitment on the part of the United States to the ROK as well 

as the larger Asia-Pacific region. By extending tours to 2- and 3-years in length, less 

stress will be placed on servicemembers and their families. Finally, the timing for 

normalization is right, because it can leverage off other Command transformation 

21 

initiatives to include the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan 

(LPP). 

HUMPHREYS HOUSING PLAN

An important part of the Command’s transformation program and YRP/LPP initiatives is housing. Future housing needs at U.S. Army Garrison (UASG) Humphreys will be satisfied through the Humphreys Housing Plan, which consists of two 

components: the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program (HHOP) and Army 

Family Housing (AFH) Military Construction (MILCON) funds. The HHOP involves 

a partnership between the U.S. Army in Korea and private industry that will create 

modern housing accommodations for servicemembers and families assigned to the 

ROK. 

The HHOP draws upon private sector development, financing, and operational 

support for the construction and operation of 1,400 housing units at USAG Humphreys under a permitted SOFA Use Agreement without the need for Army capital 

investment. Costing approximately $800 million, HHOP units will be built on land 

granted by the ROK under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and is one part 

of a larger effort to construct 2,902 units of housing on the garrison. Units built 

under this program will be rented to servicemembers using their Overseas Housing 

Allowance (OHA) as the means of payment. No guarantees on occupancy or terms 

of rent will be made, however, to the private operator. Units constructed under 

HHOP will include a mix of three, four, and five bedroom apartments, each offering 

ample living space, modern interior finishes, comfortable floor plans, and embedded 

with family support infrastructure such as playgrounds, community centers, and 

athletic fields. By leveraging permitted land under the SOFA with market demand, 

HHOP is able to construct modern affordable housing that meets servicemember 

needs at no capital investment cost to the Army. 

In addition to the 1,400 housing units built under the HHOP, the Humphreys 

Housing Plan requests the application of AFH MILCON funds toward the overarching plan of building 2,902 units in total on USAG Humphreys. If approved, 

AFH MILCON funding will be used to construct 1,127 housing units. Both the 

HHOP and AFH MILCON funding are vital components of the Command’s objective 

of accommodating 60 percent of the servicemember housing requirement at USAG 

Humphreys onpost. 

SUMMARY

Pyongyang’s attack on the Cheonan last March shows that North Korea remains 

a serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast 

Asia as a whole. In response to the threat posed and belligerent actions taken by 

North Korea, the U.S.-ROK Alliance has conducted—and will continue to conduct 

in the future—exercises designed to increase the combined capability, reinforce the 

message that Pyongyang must stop its aggressive behavior, and to demonstrate the 

Alliance remains committed to enhancing its combined defense. U.S. commitment to 

defense of the ROK remains unshakable. As announced in a joint statement by Defense Secretary Gates and his Korean counterpart Kim Tae-young in Seoul last 

July, we remain committed to ensuring sufficient combined force capabilities and 

the provision of extended deterrence through the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities while maintaining an enduring U.S. 

military force presence and the current level of American troops in the ROK. It is 

in everyone’s interests—to include North Korea—for Pyongyang to stop its provocative behavior, cease threatening its neighbors, take actions to promote peace and 

stability on the Korean Peninsula, and implement irreversible steps to fulfill its 

denuclearization commitments. 

The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan will better synchronize ongoing transformation 

efforts between the United States and ROK. Additionally, the plan reaffirms U.S. 

commitment to the ROK, ensures both nations are better prepared to deter and defeat aggression, and will ultimately result in a stronger Alliance. As movement is 

made towards the plan’s end state, the Alliance will have the right operational 

plans, right organizational structures, the right capabilities and systems, right exercises, and right force structure and alignment to ensure that the Alliance grows 

stronger and is ready to fight tonight across the entire spectrum of conflict. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General Sharp. 

We’re going to have votes throughout the morning, so we will 

just need to try to work through those votes. Let’s try a first round 

of 7 minutes. 

22 

General, South Korea showed great restraint in not retaliating 

for the attack on the Cheonan. Were you surprised by the relatively 

mild response to this unprovoked attack? 

General SHARP. Sir, I think starting on March 26 South Korea 

acted very, very responsibly, in that they first, in the international 

community, had to go to determine what caused the incident. As 

you recall, back on March 26 there was clearly uncertainty as to 

what caused the sinking of the ship. Had it run aground? Was 

there a mine? It was unclear. 

What Lee Myung-bak did is he said: ‘‘We have to be clear and 

determine exactly what the cause was.’’ So he had an international 

group of experts come in and take a look at it, and work through 

the next several weeks. Then it became clear that this was a premeditated attack by North Korea. 

I think that during that time period President Lee made it very 

clear that he was not going to stand for any future provocations. 

But his big focus at the time—and I think rightfully so—was determining the exact cause and then working this through the U.N. in 

order to be able to condemn North Korea. 

Chairman LEVIN. When President Lee says he’s not going to 

stand for future provocations, what does that mean, given the fact 

that there was no response of a significant nature from South 

Korea to this attack? This isn’t just a provocation, this is an attack, 

a premeditated attack. 

General SHARP. Sir, he has done some things and the military 

has done things. They have changed some of their tactics and techniques, both along the DMZ and especially out in the West Sea, of 

how they operate in order to be able to ensure that this does not 

happen again and that they are better prepared to respond to it in 

the future. 

I think what he did was work very closely on the diplomatic side 

in order to be able to garner international support to blame North 

Korea and to call on them to stop doing these types of acts in the 

future. 

Chairman LEVIN. China has been reluctant to publicly criticize 

North Korea for its actions generally, and most recently was unwilling to acknowledge North Korea’s involvement in the attack 

and sinking of the ship. Let me address this to you, Secretary 

Campbell. Why is China reluctant to hold North Korea to account 

for its actions? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say very 

quickly in terms of the previous question, I think the fact is that 

South Korea responded across a range of areas: sanctions, very 

strong and clear language to the nation, military steps that General Sharp has underscored, and also an effort at the U.N. 

I think there was a profound recognition of what are the stakes 

involved. Later this year, South Korea is holding what for them is 

probably the most historic international event in their history, the 

G–20, the first time it’s been held in South Korea. So in truth, I 

think this was an act of great statesmanship and restraint, a very 

difficult act, and one which I hope the United States supported 

fully. 

As you indicate, Mr. Chairman, the truth is that the Cheonan incident makes clear that China has a very complex calculus that 

23 

they look at on the Korean Peninsula. I think at a strategic level 

the United States and China share some things in common. We 

want to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. We 

seek a Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons. But it is also 

the case that they have a long historic relationship with North 

Korea. They also have over the course of the last 10 to 15 years 

built a very strong relationship with South Korea. 

I think through some of the diplomacy they have undertaken at 

the U.N., which, as President Obama and others have indicated, we 

were disappointed in certain circumstances during the course of 

some of that diplomacy. Ultimately, we were relatively satisfied 

with the outcome in terms of the overall statement, but the process 

was quite difficult. 

I think through some of those actions they have complicated 

their relationship with South Korea. I think they’re going to have 

to take steps over the course of the next several years to rebuild 

that relationship. 

In recent meetings, both the visit of the Vice Foreign Minister 

here to Washington, Cui Tiankai, and also the visit last week with 

Deputy National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and Larry Summers, I think there was an appreciation that the United States and 

China must step up its dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, and we 

are seeking to do so. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’ve heard about stepping up dialogue with 

China for a long, long time, and it hasn’t resulted in anything as 

far as I’m concerned. You say that this event and their failure to 

take a decent position in response to the attack on the ship you 

said complicates their relationship with South Korea. It sure 

doesn’t help their relationship with us as far as I’m concerned. I 

think it’s totally unacceptable that China is so unsupportive of 

strong action against North Korea when you have not just a provocation—that word is pretty mild—you have an attack, premeditated attack on a ship, that killed 46 sailors. 

I think it’s totally unacceptable and I think China ought to be 

told, in no uncertain terms, that it complicates its relationship, not 

just with South Korea, but with us as well. 

Now, the delay in terms of the transfer of wartime control of 

South Korean troops from 2012 to 2015, it seems to me is also troubling. Maybe it’s the result of the attack on the ship. If that’s the 

main cause, that’s one thing. But if it’s the result of their not being 

prepared to take on that responsibility in April 2012 the way they 

were supposed to, that’s something very different, because I think 

we have to expect that South Korea has to step up in terms of 

costs, in terms of responsibility. 

The cost of maintaining our troops is a high cost. The cost of just 

shifting the location of our troops has now gone up significantly. 

The share of that cost was supposed to be 40 percent, I believe, of 

the $10 billion cost would go to South Korea. It’s now $13 billion. 

We’re not asking them, we never would and never have, to pay our 

troops, but when it comes to the cost of maintaining our troops in 

their country, it seems to me it’s very different. 

I’m troubled by the delay, I must tell you. Was this requested, 

General, by President Lee or was that our idea? 

24 

General SHARP. Sir, that was requested clearly by President Lee 

to President Obama in June, and there were lots of discussions 

about the delay. I believe what it boiled down to is President Lee 

did not feel that 2012, with what’s going on in North Korea and 

in other places around the world, was the best time to make such 

a major change in this alliance and to disestablish CFC and to go 

into a supporting and supported relationship. 

What we have done is to make sure that the additional time between 2012 and 2015 makes us stronger, and I do believe that 

when we come out of this, the synchronization of the initiatives 

that I talked about in my opening statement, we will be a stronger 

alliance because of it. 

We have made very clear to the ROK that this is not business 

as usual. This is not just a delay of 3 years and just extend the 

milestones. In fact, I joined the Two Plus Two in July when our 

two secretaries were there. The base plan for Alliance 2015 was 

agreed to. When Secretary Gates and Minister Kim Tae-Young 

meet on October 8 here in Washington for the SCM, they will sign 

some very detailed annexes which cover the very details of what we 

mean when we say we’re going to develop new, realistic plans 

based upon what we see going on in North Korea and the region 

to deal with the full range of possible contingencies; that all of our 

exercises now and in the future will exercise against those types 

of contingencies; that the ROK will buy, organize, and train the capabilities they need in order to be able to truly lead the warfight 

by 2015. We’ll have a comprehensive certification program, not only 

on OPCON, but all of the different programs, and that we will synchronize that with our move south and our move down to Camp 

Humphreys. 

So again, from an alliance perspective, I believe that President 

Obama, after talking with our alliance partner, at the request of 

our alliance partner, agreed to delay it in order to be able to help 

improve our capabilities over the next several years. 

Chairman LEVIN. As you remember, in March this committee 

was informed that the transfer of wartime control of Korean troops, 

not ours but Korean troops, which has been planned for so many 

years, delayed a number of times, we were assured in March it was 

on track for April 2012. So this is another—it’s a long delay, and 

I hope it’s the last one. But I’ve heard this explanation before and 

I think it just basically takes some of the pressure off South Korea 

to do what they need to do to control their own troops operationally 

in time of war. 

So I’m troubled by that length of the delay. I think symbolically 

the delay because of the attack may have been appropriate, for 1 

year. But the 3-year delay to me is excessive and sends the wrong 

signal to the South Koreans in terms of what they have committed 

to do for a decade now, which is to be ready to take OPCON of 

their own troops. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Campbell, would you agree that one of the strongest 

measures we could take to affirm our relationship with South 

Korea would be to ratify the U.S.-South Korea FTA? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would agree with that, sir. 

25 

Senator MCCAIN. Isn’t it true that South Korea is now concluding FTAs with other countries? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is correct, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Which gives us a disadvantage in the long run 

by not having those same kinds of agreements? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would simply stand by the first statement that 

you made, yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Gregson, does North Korea have a reliable nuclear capability? 

Mr. GREGSON. We know that North Korea aspires to a nuclear 

capability. 

Senator MCCAIN. I’ll repeat the question: Does North Korea have 

a reliable nuclear capability? 

Mr. GREGSON. Not to our knowledge. 

Senator MCCAIN. Does North Korea have the capability to deliver 

a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. GREGSON. Not to our knowledge. 

Senator MCCAIN. That’s very interesting, because published reports indicate that they certainly have a—do they have a nuclear 

capability, then, Secretary Gregson? 

Mr. GREGSON. They have demonstrated the ability to detonate 

nuclear devices. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Campbell, one of the reasons why we 

get a little cynical around here is exemplified by the comment you 

made about China. I wrote it down: ‘‘step up its dialogue,’’ ‘‘step up 

its dialogue.’’ Remarkable statement. The Chinese have not only 

not helped us with Korea over the years, they have been an obstacle to increased sanctions. They warned the United States that we 

shouldn’t send an aircraft carrier into international waters. So we 

need to ‘‘step up the dialogue.’’ 

Secretary Gregson, do you currently see any evidence of technology transfer between North Korea and Iran? 

Mr. GREGSON. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could you in open hearing, or maybe it’s classified, give us an idea of what kind of technology transfer is taking 

place between North Korea and Iran? 

Mr. GREGSON. I’d rather do that in a different session. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you admit, though, that this is serious? 

Mr. GREGSON. Yes. North Korea has demonstrated frequently 

their intent to violate a number of international norms, sanctions, 

and resolutions to transfer forbidden military technology to more 

than one other party. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have any information that the North 

Korean submarine that sank the Cheonan was using Iranian technology? 

Mr. GREGSON. I’d rather go into that in a separate session. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is it possible that the same act of ‘‘provocation’’ 

could have been committed against a U.S. warship just as easily? 

Mr. GREGSON. Certainly the ability to attack from ambush, to 

conduct a surprise attack, is a threat, yes, that could have been attempted. I would not characterize it as ‘‘just as easily.’’ 

26 

Senator MCCAIN. The North Korean submarine had the capability to launch an attack on a U.S. ship just as they did a South 

Korean corvette. 

General Sharp, in light of the usual turmoil that accompanies 

the succession imbroglios that we’ve watched in the past as far as 

North Korea is concerned, have you seen increased acts of provocation on the part of the North Koreans and/or military buildup on 

the other side of the DMZ? 

General SHARP. Sir, not military buildup. The summer training 

cycle they have gone through over the last several months has been 

a normal or maybe even slightly below normal summer training 

cycle. Up to that point before that, the acts, especially out in the 

northwest islands with some artillery firings out in the West Sea, 

were clearly acts to demonstrate—I also don’t like the word ‘‘provocation,’’ but to clearly demonstrate to the people of South Korea 

that they have the capability to do things at their will. So we have 

seen those continue until very recently. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gregson or Secretary Campbell, it 

seems that the youngest son will be the successor. Is that the tea 

leaves reading that we get out of this? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Your guess is as good as ours, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. That’s an interesting comment on our intelligence capability in North Korea. 

General Sharp, what is, in your view, the readiness and capability of the North Korean military? 

General SHARP. Sir, it’s an extremely large force that is positioned very close to the DMZ, and we believe that if they wanted 

to do an all-out attack they could do that with very little notice. 

We have seen them over the last several years primarily putting 

their money into their ballistic missile force, their nuclear capability, and their special operating forces. They have not put as 

much money, we do not believe, in their conventional forces. 

But when you really take a look at it, with that many millions 

of North Korean soldiers that have one mission, to attack south 

and to kill as many as you can, you don’t need a whole bunch of 

technology to be able to do that, and money going into it. We still 

see the great majority of North Korean money going into their military-first policy. 

Senator MCCAIN. That, in the scenario, would be a devastating 

artillery attack on Seoul? 

General SHARP. Sir, they clearly have well over 200 long-range 

systems that could strike the heart of Seoul today without moving 

either their weapons or their ammunition, and with a city of 28 

million that’s within that range. We work very hard in our war 

plans to be prepared to quickly take that artillery out, both by 

counterfire artillery and by joint fires, by our naval and our air 

forces, both on the ROK and the U.S. side. We work that very hard 

throughout the year in many, many different exercises. 

But I have to be realistic. We’re not going to be able to stop all 

that artillery and there will be a lot of destruction if they choose 

to do that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gregson, if we feel it necessary will 

we continue to send aircraft carriers and other naval vessels into 

27 

the region, which China has ‘‘warned’’ us that we shouldn’t send 

carriers or naval power into these ‘‘international’’ waters? 

Mr. GREGSON. Yes, we will. The ability to exploit freedom of the 

seas has been a principle of our republic since the beginning. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you and 

Senator McCain for convening this hearing. It reminds us, I think, 

that not so long ago, certainly as the last century was ending and 

we were looking to this century, we were saying that our focus 

would be in the Asia Pacific region in terms of the opportunities 

and the security challenges. Needless to say, because of September 

11, 2001, our focus has been on the Middle East and South Asia. 

But that doesn’t mean that history has stopped moving in the direction it was moving in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific. 

This area remains, as the opening statements of the chairman, the 

ranking member, and your statements and questions and answers 

now reveal in some detail, a very dynamic, dangerous, and important area for our national security. 

We are a Pacific Nation and our presence there is not only critically important to our security and our economic well-being, but to 

the security and economic well-being of the region. It’s important 

to say that so many of the countries in the region depend on our 

presence there. 

So I appreciate the opportunity that the leadership of this committee has given us to focus on this, and of course our relationship 

with South Korea just gets better and better. This is an increasingly strong and important alliance to us of real mutual benefit. 

I couldn’t agree more about the strategic importance of the Korea 

FTA. I do want to say for the record that Senator Webb and I 

reached out to some of our Democratic colleagues in the Senate to 

show that there was bipartisan support and 10 of us, a month or 

so ago, sent a letter to President Obama urging him to expedite 

movement of the FTA this year through Congress. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony, also for their 

leadership, particularly in the time since the North Korean attack 

on the Cheonan. I appreciate President Obama’s strength and solidarity with President Lee and our allies in South Korea in the 

aftermath of the Cheonan and all that we’ve done. 

I must say that this morning in the New York Times former 

President Carter had an op-ed piece which contrasted so dramatically and disappointingly for me with the policy that the administration has followed, in which he says: ‘‘North Korea wants to 

make a deal.’’ There’s one really stunning omission here. President 

Carter finds it possible to say that the North Koreans he spoke to 

expressed concern about several recent American actions, including 

unwarranted sanctions, ostentatious inclusion of North Korea 

among nations subject to nuclear attack, and provocative military 

maneuvers with South Korea. But he fails to mention the Cheonan 

incident and that certainly puts in doubt his conclusion that the 

leadership of North Korea that he spoke to is anxious to reengage 

again. 

28 

In this regard, I want to read from a great statement that I 

thought Secretary Gates made at the Shangri-La conference in 

Singapore last year: ‘‘I think that everyone in the room is familiar 

with the tactics that the North Koreans use. They create a crisis 

and the rest of us pay a price to return to the status quo ante. As 

the expression goes in the United States, I’m tired of buying the 

same horse twice.’’ 

Secretary Gregson, Secretary Campbell, in my opinion President 

Carter is asking us to buy the same horse that we bought many 

times before. It seems so inconsistent with the direction of the administration policy regarding North Korea that I wanted to invite 

either your reaction to the Carter statement, which I think is 

awful, or your statement of where the administration is on North 

Korea today. 

Secretary Gregson or Secretary Campbell? 

Mr. GREGSON. We were very pleased with Secretary Gates’ comment at the Shangri-La dialogue. Part of it was prepared, part of 

it was pure Secretary Gates, so that was not a staff product. That 

was Secretary Gates. 

We in DOD believe that it has been North Korea’s history to create a crisis, to conduct an attack, and then we make concessions 

to bring them back to the table for dialogue, as Senator McCain 

characterized. We’re determined not to do that this time. We have 

the sanctions in place that we think can make a difference. As 

General Sharp eloquently discussed, we’re reinforcing our alliance 

capabilities in every way possible. We are pressing on the international community to maintain a consensus that will ameliorate 

or stop the illegal North Korean activities, and we want to see a 

meaningful change, meaningful reactions by North Korea, before 

we even begin to have negotiations. 

If they will negotiate and begin to do it in good faith, with all 

that lies under that, then many things are possible. But as Secretary Gates eloquently capsulized, we don’t want to buy the same 

horse again. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Campbell, do you want to add to that? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, thank you, Senator. Frankly, I too was surprised by the omission of the Cheonan in President Carter’s op-ed 

today. I must say we were grateful that he was successful in his 

mission to free the American citizen, Mr. Gomes, who had wandered into North Korea. We have gratitude for that and obviously 

for much of the work that he does. 

I think the statements that he put out from the North Koreans 

are well known to us. We’ve heard many of these before in previous 

interactions with the North Koreans. I would just note that the 

sanctions that he reports that the North Koreans are concerned by 

are not simply the sanctions that have recently been put in place 

by our Treasury Department, but more specifically the U.N. sanctions, which China was a strong supporter of, 1874. Those have 

really bitten and caused some anxiety among the senior leadership 

in North Korea. 

I think it would be fair to say that we’re looking for several 

things. One is some degree of reengagement between North and 

South Korea. That is an inevitable process that must take place, 

29 

and we’re looking in many respects to the lead from South Korea 

on how that process goes forward. 

But, as General Gregson has underscored, we are looking not to 

repeat the process of the last 10 or 15 years. We are looking for 

a sincere and clear signal from the North Koreans that they want 

to embark on a real process of negotiations on its nuclear and other 

capabilities. 

I must say that I think we’re trying to exhibit what Secretary 

Clinton describes as strategic patience. I think to date we’ve been 

relatively successful in this regard. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

My time’s up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, thank you to all three of you for your service. I want 

to start by asking a question to Secretary Gregson. The firing upon 

the Cheonan by the North Koreans, do you consider that an act of 

war? 

Mr. GREGSON. It can be characterized as such, yes. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Certainly if one of our military ships was fired 

upon by the North Koreans, we would consider it an act of war, 

wouldn’t we? 

Mr. GREGSON. Yes. 

Senator LEMIEUX. We have a treaty, a mutual defense treaty, 

with the South Koreans. In the firing upon the ship, and then the 

evaluation that determined that it was the North Koreans who in 

fact fired upon the ship, has there been any evaluation of our obligations under that treaty? 

Mr. GREGSON. Continuous obligations. The decision on how to respond is an alliance decision, with due consideration for achieving 

our overall goal, which is protecting the ROK and protecting peace 

and stability in Asia. 

As we know, the Cheonan is not the first provocation. North 

Korea is a country that attempted deliberately to assassinate the 

cabinet of the ROK, that executed a deliberate attack on the Blue 

House, their equivalent obviously of our White House. Since 2002, 

we’ve seen an uptick or an increase in attacks of a different kind, 

of a lesser impact than that on the Cheonan, of course—seizure of 

fishing ships, things like that. 

This is a consistent type of behavior from North Korea, unfortunately. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Now that the information is in, the analysis 

has been concluded that this was an attack from the North Koreans, do you expect some kind of military response from South 

Korea? 

Mr. GREGSON. I expect that we will continue to stay in close consultation with the ROK on actions that we will take in the future. 

I agree with General Sharp’s characterization that President Lee 

Myung-bak demonstrated tremendous statesmanship under considerable pressure in the reaction of the ROK to this attack. 

Senator LEMIEUX. This attack and the other ones that you just 

mentioned, aren’t they sufficient justification for us to—and perVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:13 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63690.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
30 

haps this is a question for Secretary Campbell—put North Korea 

back on the state sponsor of terror list? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Our judgment was that these provocative actions 

required a separate action, and so we have issued an Executive 

order, very broadly conceived, that identifies a whole range of activities in North Korea. So yes, in many respects this is a definitional issue and so I would actually, Senator, agree with you. 

Senator LEMIEUX. This was an act of terrorism, wasn’t it? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Act of war, actually. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Are we moving forward on putting them back 

on the list? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. We have a process that’s underway that is specific associated with looking at various actions that North Korea 

has undertaken in the past and could undertake in the future that 

are involved with international terrorism. That is different than 

the specific act associated with the sinking of the Cheonan. So we 

have taken very specific actions with regard to the sinking of the 

Cheonan with the new Executive order that is extraordinarily 

broad, very deep, a variety of military steps—exercises, enhanced 

deterrence. 

Actually, I think the decision on OPCON transfer was the right 

one. We have done a number of things in Northeast Asia to send 

a very clear signal of our direction forward. 

Senator LEMIEUX. But does that mean that we’re putting them 

back on the state sponsor of terror list or we’re not? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think I’ve answered, I’ve tried to answer your 

question. 

Senator LEMIEUX. The answer is no or yes? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. We have a process, an ongoing process, that is 

associated with evaluating data associated with what North Korea 

is doing in a global context associated with terrorism. The sinking 

of the Cheonan—— 

Senator LEMIEUX. Because that’s separate and apart, then. But 

have you, separate and apart from that attack, evaluated whether 

or not to put North Korea back on the list? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. We are constantly evaluating that, yes. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Is there a decision point that you see coming 

forward? Is there a time when I should expect that you will make 

a decision? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think that is an issue that we could address in 

private session, yes. Thank you. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Okay. 

Mr. Secretary, Senator McCain was asking you about the FTA 

and the importance of it, and you agreed the importance of having 

that FTA entered into. We also have one pending with Colombia 

and Panama. Do you know when the administration is going to 

send these agreements to Congress to have them approved? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I don’t know, Senator. It’s outside of my area of 

responsibility in terms of Latin America. I do know that President 

Obama has indicated his desire to move in the near term on the 

Korea FTA, and I would just associate myself with your comments 

about the importance. It’s not only important at an economic level, 

but it has enormous strategic consequences as well. 

31 

Senator LEMIEUX. I was talking to our National Security Adviser 

and he was telling me that he believed it was a national security 

issue for Colombia certainly. Would you agree that it’s a national 

security issue for South Korea that we enter into this agreement? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I could just even go further, Senator, I think 

it’s just not a national security issue for South Korea; I think it is 

for the United States. I would just underscore one thing. I’ve spent 

the last year and a half out in Asia considerably, and there are 

doubts about our staying power and our ability to play the dramatic leadership role in the future that we played in the past. It 

requires an all-hands-on-deck approach. It has to be multifaceted. 

It has to be intense diplomacy, not just bilateral but multilateral. 

It requires the kind of military effort that General Sharp indicates. 

Also it requires the kind of initiative that you underscore on the 

Korea FTA. 

So, yes, it’s not just for the South Koreans. It’s for us as well. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you very much. 

I want to switch gears a little bit and talk about succession plans 

for North Korea, allegedly the third son being put in line, Kim 

Jong-un. If the succession doesn’t happen or for some reason North 

Korea fails, do the Departments of State and Defense have a strategy for trying to ensure that this nuclear material does not get lost 

or turn up in the hands of someone else? Is there a security strategy for that? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I’d like to just apologize at the outset. I actually 

made a flip answer to Senator McCain’s very important and timely 

question about the succession. The truth is, though, what I was 

trying to underscore, is that in fundamental ways North Korea is 

still a black box. We have some glimpses and some intelligence and 

the like. But the truth is oftentimes, in retrospect, some of that intelligence has proven to be wrong. It’s a very, very hard target, 

probably the hardest target that we’ve faced in the global arena. 

I will just tell you that we have to be prepared for all circumstances, and I mean all circumstances, and the level of interaction that is undertaken inside the U.S. Government is intensive, 

and that extends also to a dialogue and extremely close coordination with South Korea and Japan. So I would answer your question 

that way. 

Senator LEMIEUX. If I could just conclude, Mr. Chairman, with 

a question to General Sharp. 

General, you and I have spoken before about the status of the 

military housing for our young men and women who are serving us 

there. Are you getting the MILCON dollars you need to make sure 

that there are good conditions in the houses for our folks who are 

serving? 

General SHARP. Sir, for where we are right now we are okay. We 

are working through within DOD, some options on how to be able 

to continue providing those houses as we move down to Camp 

Humphreys. I mentioned in my opening statement a couple of the 

options DOD is looking at right now. 

I actually have some meetings this afternoon to discuss them 

with several members of the appropriate committees to get your 

thoughts, because it is critical that we take care of our servicemembers and their families. We’ve all talked here so far this mornVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:13 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63690.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
32 

ing about how important it is for us to maintain our commitment 

in Korea and to demonstrate that, not only to the Koreans, but to 

North Korea and to China. I think clearly having our families 

there, having the force level there, demonstrates we’re going nowhere. So being able to properly take care of them with housing 

is absolutely critical, and we will have to work through very quickly how to be able to do that as we move down to Pyongtaek and 

to Camp Humphreys. 

Senator LEMIEUX. We share that priority with you. So thank you 

for your commitment to that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Secretary Gregson and Secretary Campbell, first, have we been 

able to establish the motivation, the rationale, the objective, of the 

attack on the South Korean vessel by the North Koreans? Or is 

that something that’s still difficult to determine? Was it a bureaucratic miscue? Was it directed on high? Do we know anything about 

it? 

Mr. GREGSON. Senator, there are two theories. One is that it’s a 

reaction to the November 2009 naval firefight between forces of the 

ROK and North Korea. The other theory is that it’s somehow tied 

into the mysterious succession politics inside North Korea. I’m not 

personally aware that anybody has a definitive answer beyond 

those two competing theories. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Senator Reed, could I just add a third to that if 

I could? I first of all associate very closely with the answer of General Gregson. But I think that, as General Gregson underscored, 

this is not the first time something like this has happened. They 

have happened periodically. 

I think you find, if you look at a calendar of events, these kinds 

of provocations tend to occur before major events in South Korea 

that highlight the success of South Korea, the Seoul Olympics and 

the like. Again, as I stated at the outset, the upcoming G–20 is a 

very big deal, a very big deal for the South Koreans. It’s the arrival 

of South Korea on the global stage, probably again the biggest diplomatic achievement in their history. One could imagine that this 

would play into part of the dynamic that we’ve seen in North 

Korea. 

But I have to underscore that in many respects this is a black 

box. We really don’t know very much about the motivations, ultimate goals and ambitions behind such a dangerous and provocative 

act. 

Senator REED. Let me change gears. I understand—and correct 

me if I’m incorrect—that the Chinese were not aware beforehand 

of this attack, that they had no information either. It seems clear 

from every rational source that this was a torpedo attack by the 

North Koreans. What’s the motivation for the Chinese to reject 

what is obvious, what is dangerous, and also something that apparently they weren’t even tipped off to? 

Any views on that? I know we’re trying to make estimates about 

very difficult issues. 

33 

Mr. CAMPBELL. It is our best judgment that China had no foreknowledge of the action, as you indicated, Senator. I tried to indicate at the outset that we believe that the calculations for the Chinese on the peninsula are complicated, very complex. They have 

been supportive in the past of certain initiatives. UNCR 1874 in 

the aftermath of the nuclear weapons detonation is a very powerful 

signal to the international community, including China. 

They’ve taken other steps. They’ve played, I think, an important 

role during certain critical junctures in the Six-Party Talks. I 

wouldn’t want to put words in the mouths of Chinese friends. I 

think they believe that this is an incredibly critical period, perhaps 

a somewhat uncertain period in North Korea, and they have told 

us that they believe that certain steps could drive North Korea to 

the wall and that was not in their strategic interests. 

Senator REED. We talk about the complicated dynamics for the 

Chinese. We also have complicated dynamics. This is a general 

question and it might just elicit a nod, but to what extent are our 

strategic objectives complicated or indeed compromised by our economic relationship with the Chinese? There are issues like this 

where we could take a much firmer course with the Chinese, but 

we have other issues at play. Do you want to—will I get more than 

a nod? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I could say, I understand your question, Senator. But I actually think those considerations do not come to play 

in this regard. If you listen carefully to how General Gregson answered the question, our most important guiding principle on the 

Korean Peninsula is the objectives, the wishes and desires of the 

South Korean people. So what we have tried to do is steer our 

course with the South Koreans, and that has been our primary objective in this regard. 

The truth is that we took a very strong line at the U.N. and we 

worked very hard with our allies and others to get the Presidents’ 

statements through. This was tough diplomacy, very challenging 

diplomacy. But the most important consideration for us on the peninsula really is to ensure that we are closely aligned with the 

South Koreans in all our strategies. 

Senator REED. General Gregson, do you have a comment? 

Mr. GREGSON. Yes, I do, thank you. I concur completely with Secretary Campbell’s statement. I’d also like to emphasize that there 

is a very strong alliance consensus for our way forward and has 

been since before the Cheonan incident. The consensus accelerated 

after the May 2009 North Korean alleged nuclear device detonation 

and the missile test, certainly accelerated with the Cheonan. That’s 

the cooperation is U.S., ROK, and Japan; ROK of course most directly affected by the Cheonan attack, but Japan has also been victim of kidnapping actions by North Korea, has been victim of attempted incursions by North Korean infiltration vessels, various 

things. So they are very closely aligned here. 

All three of our nations are firmly in agreement on the importance of peace, stability, deterrence in Northeast Asia and all three 

of us consult continuously on the ways forward, the actions to take, 

our sensing of the situation. 

On that alliance consensus, we have been building the international consensus to constrain North Korea’s attempted transfer 

34 

of illegal materials to other countries of interest and things like 

that. 

This abiding consensus allows us to take a solid alliance approach to these various actions by North Korea and allows us also 

to have an alliance consensus to the reported—underline, ‘‘reported’’—gestures lately by North Korea to want to talk about various matters. 

Senator REED. Very good. 

My time has expired. Let me commend General Sharp for his 

leadership and for that of his soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Thank you very much, sir, and we look forward to seeing you 

soon. Good luck. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

We have a vote on. Senator Reed, are you going to want to have 

a second round? Do you need a second round? 

Senator REED. The chairman has been most gracious. I have a 

reprieve, unfortunately, gentlemen. 

Just two quick questions, one to General Sharp. In your plans 

going forward, you are pulling the bulk of your forces away from 

the DMZ as I understand it, but your training areas historically 

are close to the DMZ. Are you going to have some issues with 

training, particularly in a country that is rapidly developing and 

urbanizing and wealthy like Korea? 

General SHARP. That’s part of the plan, sir. Actually, we are 

keeping all of our training ranges, Rodriguez Range and the other 

ranges that we have up near the DMZ right now. In fact, we’re continuing to modernize those ranges. 

The move south has been accounted for. There will be a railhead 

as part of the plan put into Camp Humphreys and a rail line going 

up. So it will be a very similar movement to what we do in Germany to get to De Graef and to Hohenfeld. So we have accounted 

for that, sir. 

Senator REED. Very well. 

Just a final question to the Secretaries. Just a general evaluation 

of the sanctions, their effectiveness, the cooperation. Particularly— 

again, I don’t want to be a broken record—the cooperation by the 

Chinese. I do sense that the Japanese, the South Koreans, and the 

United States are clearly shoulder-to-shoulder, but that’s only part 

of the team that you need. So can you just give me a quick reaction, General Gregson, Secretary Campbell also? 

Mr. GREGSON. I think we’re very encouraged with Chinese support on that front. 

Senator REED. This is the question I got the nod. So thank you 

very much. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. 

I’m just going to ask a few questions, and if none of my colleagues are back when I’m done, because I have to go vote, too, 

then we’re going to recess for a few minutes until a colleague comes 

back. 

General, you’ve indicated that continuing attempts to develop its 

nuclear and missile capabilities by the North is your number one 

concern. Is there an appropriate balance in your judgment between 

35 

our contributions to missile defense in the region and South Korean contributions? Or do you look for South Korea to increase its 

contribution to regional missile defense? 

General SHARP. Sir, South Korea has recently bought Patriots. 

They will have several more of them and increased missile capability delivered over the next several years, to include some command and control additional things to be able to link them in with 

ours. They have now two Aegis ships. They just launched their second Aegis ship about a week ago and have another one in the 

railyard. They are increasing that capability. 

We are trying to work very hard—in fact, Secretary Gregson has 

worked very hard—to try to work with the three countries of South 

Korea, the United States, and Japan to do some better coordination 

in order to be able to have regional type ballistic missile defense, 

and we’re working through those initiatives. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, you’ve indicated that our tour normalization program demonstrates a commitment to South Korea and 

to the region. How do you respond to those who suggest that we 

shouldn’t be using our military families to demonstrate that commitment in a potentially dangerous location? 

General SHARP. Sir, I believe that the long-term tours of our 

servicemembers in Korea greatly increases my combat capability if 

I don’t have to train a new soldier every year. I believe that Korea 

is a safe place for our families to live and that we have very detailed and very exercised Noncombatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations (NEO) plans. That would be a huge task if we had 

to NEO everyone out, but I’m confident that we could do that. 

I think that the deterrent value of our military, the 28,500, and 

the demonstration that we are here for the long run, that not only 

we say in words but we say it in our actions of having family members and properly taking care of them over there, is a strong deterrent value. I was in Fulda in the mid-1980s with families that 

helped and that demonstrated that we were staying in West Germany and weren’t going to stand for the threat of the Soviet Union 

at the time. 

Our obligation, my obligation as the commander there, is to 

watch very closely for indications that it’s time to get those family 

members out of harm’s way, so that we can truly be prepared to 

defend the ROK. I take that very seriously. We work it very hard 

in exercises throughout the year. We have a very detailed plan for 

NEO that we have worked, not just on the U.S. side, because it will 

require a lot of Korean support. But the plan is very, very detailed 

and South Korea also understands that responsibility. 

So I believe that tour normalization is extremely important, not 

only to our families, but more importantly to our capability and to 

our commitment to the region. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, what’s your assessment of the current 

level of readiness of the Combined Forces to respond to aggression 

from North Korea? 

General SHARP. Sir, I think the Combined Forces is ready to respond to aggression from North Korea. We just finished up in August Ulchi Freedom Guardian Exercise, our annual summer exercise, which was based upon an attack from North Korea. As I stated in my opening statement, we have expanded our exercise proVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:13 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63690.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
36 

gram to really take a look at how we think North Korea would do 

some limited attacks, what sorts of different incidents would they 

do prior to a conflict to try to prevent us from the reinforcements 

that are going in, to try to prevent us from taking our defensive 

positions, some things that they could do very early on. 

The exercise went very well. I was very pleased with the fact 

that we’re getting at some of the much more difficult issues, but 

the very realistic issues. I am confident that we’re prepared for an 

aggression, whether it’s limited or all-out from North Korea. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you say we’re in a high state of readiness? 

General SHARP. Sir, we are in a high state of readiness. 

Chairman LEVIN. As I mentioned before, General, the cost of 

moving U.S. forces originally further south was $10 billion. The 

South Korean share was $4 billion. The cost is now estimated at 

about $13 billion. Is that a fairly firm estimate now or is that going 

to continue to climb? Does the South Korean share go up? In other 

words, are they going to take on about 40 percent of that additional 

$3 billion? Is that part of the deal? 

General SHARP. Senator, when we agreed in the Yongson relocation program to move out of Seoul, the ROK said they were going 

to pay for all of those costs, minus the housing that we have off 

post. They are doing that. 

We also said when we wanted to move the Second Infantry Division, which is called the Land Partnership Program, and consolidate them at the same location, the Koreans agreed to get the land, 

but they said we had to create the facilities. The costs of those facilities are being borne in combination by both the United States 

and the ROK. 

This actually is a big question going on in the news over in 

Korea right now, about are we using some of the burden-sharing 

money in order to be able to build what we need down at Camp 

Humphreys. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m not sure what your answer is. I’m afraid 

I’m going to have to cut you short because I have to vote. I’m sorry 

to do that. But if the increased cost overall goes from $10 billion 

to $13 billion and the original Korean share as I understand it was 

$4 billion, is that $4 billion going to increase proportionately now 

that the total is $13 billion or not? 

General SHARP. Sir, the Koreans are paying a lot more than $4 

billion. 

Chairman LEVIN. So that’s your answer, the $4 billion figure is 

wrong? 

General SHARP. That’s right. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of the increase in the estimated 

cost, will they pay a proportionate share of that increased cost? 

General SHARP. Sir, I’d rather cover that in a closed session. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Or for the record. 

General SHARP. For the record, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I hope that’s not a classified issue. 

General SHARP. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. But if you can give us that for the record, that 

would be more than satisfactory. 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. 

37 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Requirements established for moving U.S. forces in Korea under the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP) have evolved over the years 

as conditions change. In particular, certain delays due to factors such as securing 

the necessary land, acquiring the program management consortium, and negotiations over better defined cost estimates have created cost and schedule growth. The 

Republic of Korea is committed to paying its appropriate share of this cost growth 

in accordance with the relevant YRP/LPP agreements and associated arrangements. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. We’re going to be in recess now until a 

colleague comes back, which I expect to be any minute, hopefully 

not more than 10 minutes. But let’s say we will recess for 15 minutes or when a colleague comes back on either side of the aisle, 

whichever is earlier. 

[Recess from 11:03 a.m. to 11:10 a.m.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. The hearing will come back to 

order. I thank all of you, my colleagues. I went and voted on the 

first. There’s a second. I think by the time I finish my questioning 

somebody else will be back. 

I thank you very much for your testimony. General Sharp, I had 

a different reaction than Chairman Levin did to the transfer, to the 

delay of the transfer of OPCON. My own feeling was, as I heard 

it, that it was not really related to the capabilities of the military 

of the ROK, but more to the surrounding political and diplomatic 

environment, the concern about various anniversaries coming up 

and North Korea, provocative action by them, elections coming in 

the United States, perhaps transition of power in China—just an 

unsteady time in the region, and going back to what Secretary 

Campbell said about the doubts in the region about our staying 

power, that motivated that delay mostly. That’s why I greeted it 

positively. 

Was I right? In other words, am I right that not any significant 

part of the delay is based on a concern about the capabilities of the 

military of the ROK? 

General SHARP. Sir, over the last 2 years we have gone through 

numerous exercises to ensure that the military, both on the ROK 

side and the U.S. side, is properly organized and trained and had 

the right plans in order to be ready for 17 April 2012. Very detailed 

certification checklist that was done by external evaluators. 

I had to report that to Secretary Gates and Minister Kim TaeYoung at the yearly SCM. My report was, and I still hold by it, is 

that militarily we were on track in order to be able to move into 

a supported-supporting relationship by 2012. 

I was not there, but my understanding when President Lee and 

President Obama talked back in June was that they talked much 

broader than just on the military side; all the other incidents, some 

of which that you met, I’m sure, came up in that discussion; and 

that President Obama agreed for the sake of the alliance for the 

ability to be able to continue to strengthen the alliance over the 

next 3 years, he agreed to that delay. 

What Secretary Gates charged us to do is then to make it a much 

more comprehensive plan than simply moving into a supportedsupporting relationship, so that the synchronization will allow us 

to do some things over the 3-year period to get us stronger versus 

some things we would have done in parallel. That’s what the curVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:13 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63690.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
38 

rent plan is that we’ll codify here on October 8 when the Secretary 

and the Minister get together again. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, I appreciate that answer. 

Secretary Campbell, let me ask you to pick up some on your comment about some of the doubts in the region about our commitment 

to stay strongly in the region. I think you raised it around the Free 

Trade Act as a way for us to express in one way our commitment 

to the region. I want to come at this from a slightly different path, 

which is China. 

Regarding the aggressiveness of the Chinese both toward us and 

their neighbors. I was interested that recently, and I think for the 

first time publicly, Prime Minister Singh of India commented on 

that, questioning the greater aggressiveness of the Chinese. 

They’re obviously spending a lot of money to build up their military. I noticed Andy Krepinevich had an op-ed piece this week in 

which he worried publicly about the danger that in a few years 

China will have the capability to make it much harder for us to 

project power and defend our allies in the Asia-Pacific, and that 

their military buildup seems to be specifically built around area denial and an anti-access strategy. 

So I wanted to invite your general comment on the way in which 

China’s military buildup and more aggressive posturing fits into 

your concern, which I agree with, that there’s concern in the region 

about whether we’re there to stay. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. If I may, let me 

just harken back quickly to the question that you asked General 

Sharp. My own sense is that your assessment of the complex motivations behind the decision are completely accurate. So I would associate myself with what you are indicating going forward, a very 

complex time in the region. 

There are many factors at play in the Asia-Pacific region. One of 

them is the extraordinarily rapid ascent of China as a global player 

and a global power, a country that withstood some of the challenges of the global economy in the last several years, very well positioned accordingly. 

We are in a situation where we have a very complex relationship 

with China. There are a number of areas that we’re seeking to 

work very closely with them on: climate change; issues associated 

with nonproliferation; they’ve worked with us on Iran; again in circumstances on the Korean Peninsula; and in certain circumstances 

associated with piracy and the like. 

So there are areas that we have been able, oftentimes through 

exerted diplomatic effort, to work closely together. There are invariably areas where we compete. We seek to compete in peaceful 

ways. But at the same time, as the Pentagon military report recently stated and as Secretary Gates has underscored publicly at 

Shangri-La and elsewhere, there are some military developments 

that we seek greater clarity into, that have raised concerns about 

our own forward deployments overall. 

There have been a number of interactions with China in recent 

months on issues that are of mutual concern, and some of those 

interactions can be quite tense. Our overall desire, however, is to 

maintain a steady-as-she-goes relationship with China, with the 

recognition that there will inevitably and invariably be areas where 

39 

we have differences, and sometimes those differences are quite intense. 

I would simply say I would use a slightly different word than 

‘‘aggressiveness.’’ I think they are more ‘‘assertive’’ on the global 

stage. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right, and in the neighborhood. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. In the neighborhood, yes. But I think it is also 

the case that I have never seen an environment in Asia in which 

the United States is more welcomed to play a more significant role, 

not just in Northeast Asia, where we’ve talked primarily today, but 

Southeast Asia, as well. I think one of the desires of the administration is to take a multifaceted approach, deeper integration in regional diplomacy, in multilateral institutions, working with India, 

drawing India in more to the Asia-Pacific region, working towards 

consequential diplomacy with China. 

This is not a relationship, Senator, I think as you know, that the 

United States has much experience with. We’ve had a monochromatic kind of relationship in the past with the Soviet Union. 

That’s not what the relationship is like with China. It’s deep, it’s 

complicated. There are areas of cooperation. There are areas of discord. How we manage that is going to be the primary diplomatic 

challenge for the United States over the course of the next generation. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer. 

I don’t want to take the time today, but at some point we all 

ought to come back together and talk about how we should respond 

if, in fact, what the Chinese are basing their military buildup on 

is—and I know we’re already focused on this to some extent—an 

area denial and anti-access strategy. 

But I want to move on to another subject. You said, Secretary 

Campbell, earlier, and I agree with you, that our historic relationship and alliance with Japan has been at the center of our policy 

and relations in this part of the world, and that remains so. Obviously, we’re very grateful for the extraordinary depth, growing 

depth, of our relationship with South Korea. 

In that regard, I wanted to say that I’ve been impressed by the 

degree of trilateral cooperation between the United States, South 

Korea, and Japan in the wake of the Cheonan attack, including the 

dispatch of those Japanese advisers to the U.S.-ROK exercises in 

July. I wanted to ask any of the three of you or all of you, if you 

want, to speak to the efforts that we are making now to improve 

trilateral security cooperation among these three great democracies 

and whether there are opportunities that you see to institutionalize 

greater trilateral cooperation going forward. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. First of all, thank you for the question, Senator. 

I have to say that in many respects the architect and implementer 

of this extraordinarily important trilateral interaction on defense 

and diplomacy is General Gregson. 

I want to say one thing very quickly about our relationship with 

Japan. I think too often, particularly in media reports, there is a 

focus on one issue and only one issue, this very challenging issue 

associated with a base in Okinawa, Futenma, and what is often 

overlooked are the extraordinary commitments and contributions 

Japan has made. 

40 

So when you ask people who is the second, behind the United 

States, largest contributor to various reconstruction and other efforts in Afghanistan, very few people will realize that it’s Japan. 

That is a decision that was taken by this new government in 

Japan. 

Recent sanctions put in place against Iran; who is one of the 

leading countries that got out in front of this? We didn’t have to 

twist their arms. Japan. Very much unlike a situation that we 

faced in the past. 

Which country has put money behind various initiatives to deal 

with the global issues associated with climate change in the aftermath of Copenhagen? Japan. 

Which country has contributed to the piracy efforts in the areas 

around Africa? Japan. 

Who has stepped up considerably with the kind of support necessary for us to sustain our military and security relationship in 

Northeast Asia? Japan. 

So, unfortunately in this environment, where we are working on 

a very challenging issue in Okinawa, Japan has not gotten the 

credit it deserves for really working, not only closely with the 

United States, but through General Gregson and others at the Pentagon, much closer coordination on the Korean Peninsula. 

What we have seen with this new government in Japan is a rapprochement with countries that have had problems with Japan because of a variety of historical issues. You’ve seen a real coming together between Lee Myong-Bak and the Japanese leadership about 

the need to focus more on the future than on the past. 

I think we can build on that further. I’ll leave it to Chip to talk 

about that in greater detail. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I appreciate that answer. 

General Gregson. 

Mr. GREGSON. I would just briefly add that Secretary Campbell 

gives me too much credit. Secretary Gates and the ministers of defense of our two closest allies investments have been instrumental 

in bringing this cooperation together. May 2009 at Singapore, in 

the immediate wake of the North Korean reported or claimed nuclear device detonation and the missile launches, saw the first trilateral defense ministerial meeting amongst the three allies, and 

the cooperation has just built from there. 

I mentioned earlier—I think you were out—that the alliance consensus, United States, Japan, ROK, on how to respond to North 

Korea is the foundation of the international consensus that we’ve 

built and sustained, thanks to the State Department and others, to 

constrain North Korea. 

Our bases in Japan are just as necessary to the defense of the 

peninsula as they are to security throughout all of Asia. We are undergoing two very complex alliance realignment efforts at the same 

time, General Sharp’s effort in the ROK and then the other realignment effort across the Pacific. As Secretary Campbell mentioned, 

one airfield gets almost all the attention, but a number of other 

really breathtaking initiatives with Japan to better realign our 

forces, our bilateral capabilities, for the future, have gone on with 

relatively no drama. 

41 

I’m very much an optimist on our ability to not only sustain our 

presence in the western Pacific, but actually to increase it and improve it. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks for the answer. It struck me as you 

began that you haven’t learned a lot around Washington, because 

you’re giving other people credit, which is not what happens. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GREGSON. Well, you know what I mean. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I think you deserve a lot of the 

credit, but so do the other two ministers. 

General Sharp. 

General SHARP. Sir, just some specifics. What we’re trying to 

work and what we have done over the last several years specifically on the U.N. rear bases which are in Japan is, there have been 

many folks from the national assembly in Korea that have gone 

over and visited those to understand the importance of Japan to 

our warfight. We’re working very closely with them, as I said earlier, on ballistic missile defense, on search and rescue missions, to 

be able to do that, and on PSI type of activities. So that the military-to-military cooperation, we’re trying to continue to improve 

that, so if there was a major conflict we’d be prepared for that from 

a trilateral perspective. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I’m going to ask one more question. This is 

a bit more diplomatic than military, so I’ll focus on you, Secretary 

Gregson. I’ve been troubled by what seems to be the Chinese ambivalence and reluctance on the Iran sanctions. They’ve put themselves in a position of being outside what is a really impressive 

and, I think, effective, growing global consensus. Japan and South 

Korea are playing very strong, initiating, proactive roles here. 

I noticed in one of the papers today that the Chinese had cancelled Mr. Einhorn’s visit to Beijing. I just wanted to ask you to 

reflect a bit on what we can do in the midst of all of this, because 

we all want to manage our relationship with China well, to bring 

them more into the global consensus on a really critical security 

issue and diplomatic issue like Iran. 

Mr. GREGSON. As Secretary Campbell has stated a couple of 

times today, our relationship with China is complex, to say the 

least. We’re continuing to work not only with China, but with all 

other concerned nations, to find an answer to our issues with Iran. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Campbell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me try on that, Senator. I’d build on what 

General Gregson has said. I think there are a couple of ingredients 

that go into when you are successful in these circumstances with 

Chinese friends. Number one is persistence. This has to be undertaken over an extended period of time. 

Number two is that any time you sit down with Chinese friends 

you have a hierarchy of issues. You want to make sure that hierarchy is consistent and that the issue in question is near or at the 

top, not just from one interlocutor but all of them. I think both of 

those have been the case, vis-a-vis China to date. 

Number three is to make the powerful case about why moving 

in a certain direction is not just an American or larger interest, but 

in Chinese interests, and to try to articulate that reason why the 

sanctions effort with an attempt to change the very provocative beVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:13 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63690.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
42 

havior of the Iranian leadership with regard to nuclear weapons at 

this juncture is our best option. 

I think lastly is to undertake a diplomatic campaign whereby 

China does not feel that it wants to be perceived as the odd man 

out. 

So I think we’re going to see over the course of the next couple 

of months an increasing recognition of a successful campaign, 

which I think you rightly and accurately portray, in which you 

have European, Russian, South Korean, Japanese, and other efforts at very broad and biting sanctions. I think it’s going to be 

very clear to Chinese friends that they do not want to be an outlier 

in this regard. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excellent. 

I’m afraid I do have to go back to that second vote, so I’ll put 

the hearing in recess, or at least at ease, until Chairman Levin returns. I want to thank the three of you. This for me has been a 

very informative, educational hearing, honest, direct. Your testimony has been very strong and impressive, so I’m grateful for the 

leadership that the three of you are giving in this critically important part of the world. 

See you soon. 

[Recess from 11:30 a.m. to 11:38 a.m.] 

Chairman LEVIN. We’re going to come back in session just for a 

couple of minutes. I think there will not be other Senators able to 

get back, so I just have one additional question. Unless other Senators arrive, this will be it. 

It has to do with the Six-Party Talks. Secretary Campbell, let me 

ask you the question. As has been mentioned, the Six-Party Talks 

were stalled at the end of 2008, and then the North Koreans expelled the international nuclear inspectors. There is little reason 

since then to believe that North Korea will end its nuclear program. As a matter of fact, it appears somewhat contrary, that they 

remain intent to pursue a nuclear weapons program. That is evidenced by the test of June 2009, as well as the statements to that 

effect which they’ve made. 

Now, the administration has consistently said that it wants to 

see North Korea demonstrate through concrete actions its commitment to the complete and verifiable abandonment of nuclear programs. So my question to you is this. What conditions need to be 

met in your judgment before the Six-Party Talks can be restarted? 

What are the prospects for restarting the talks with North Korea, 

whether in a Six-Party format or perhaps some other format? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You’ve 

fairly accurately stated our position in your question, but I’ll try to 

restate aspects of it back to you. First of all, Ambassador Bosworth 

and Ambassador Sung Kim are just completing their trip, consultations through the region. I think our position has been clear, it’s 

been consistent, that we are prepared, under the appropriate conditions, to reconvene the Six-Party framework to deal with the difficult challenges posed by the nuclear provocations on the part of 

the North Koreans. 

In the current environment, given what has just transpired, we 

think an essential first step needs to be some reengagement between North and South Korea. I think that is going to be critical 

43 

going forward and, as we have long held, we also think that it’s 

going to be significant that North Korea again, as we’ve said in the 

past, underscores its commitment to fulfill its commitments that it 

took in 2005. 

We are looking very clearly for those signs. I think that in the 

coming days Ambassador Bosworth and Ambassador Sung Kim will 

be publicly underscoring what they learned on this particular trip 

to Japan, South Korea, and China. 

Chairman LEVIN. If there were a change in the leadership, we 

don’t have any idea as to where that would lead? I think your answer was accurate, that our intelligence doesn’t give us any clear 

suggestion as to who would be the likely successor. You may have 

stated that in a way which was overly succinct, but it was also accurate. 

Do we have any assessment as to whether or not it would be 

more likely that the Six-Party Talks would get back underway 

again if there were a change in the leadership? Is it more or less 

likely that, to the extent that you can make this assessment or that 

the intelligence community can make it, that the current leadership would be more likely to find a way back or take steps that are 

essential for the Six-Party Talks to resume than its potential successor? 

Is there anything on that issue, as to Six-Party Talks resuming, 

and who would be the leader? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, it’s an appropriate question and 

it’s a very difficult, very hard hypothetical. In fact, we just don’t 

know enough to know. I think one of the things that we are trying 

to do in this environment is to state very clearly what our position 

is, which we feel has been consistent over time. 

I think there is a great benefit to that consistency, very clear 

statement of our purposes and our joint efforts on the part of both 

Japan and South Korea, and also I think on China. I believe that 

what is changing is perhaps a greater desire on the part of China 

to see progress in the Six-Party Talks. How that desire will be 

manifested, again the conditions will tell. But I think they understand very clearly the dangers and the risks that the current situation poses. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you all again for your service, and 

for your testimony. Unless any of you have something you want to 

add, we will stand adjourned. Thank you. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

1. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gregson and Secretary Campbell, according to some 

media accounts, North Korea’s ruling party could meet in the near future to choose 

new leadership for that country. It is important for the stability of the region and 

beyond that there be a smooth transition of power in North Korea. What do you 

think the results will be and what implications do they have for American foreign 

policy towards North Korea? 

Secretary GREGSON. Though the ruling regime might use the Korean Workers’ 

Party (KWP) Conference to initiate a more public phase of leadership transition, 

this process will likely unfold over many months, if not years. The important issue 

for American foreign policy is not who rules North Korea, but how. We will continue 

to pay close attention to the policies that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK) leadership pursues, and we will focus on whether or not North Korea is seVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:13 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63690.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
44 

rious about following through on its denuclearization commitments under the 2005 

Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. Other important issues include refraining 

from provocations, taking steps to improve its relations with its neighbors, complying with international law and obligations, and improving human rights conditions and joining the international community for the betterment of its own people. 

If we see concrete evidence that the new leadership is changing its behavior on 

these issues in a sincere manner, then we have an opportunity to engage productively. We will respond appropriately working in close coordination with our allies. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. We are watching very closely as events in North Korea unfold. North Korea appears to have used the KWP Conference to launch a more public phase of leadership transition. This transition process will likely continue over 

many months, if not years. The important issue for U.S. foreign policy is not who 

rules North Korea, but the policies that the DPRK leadership will pursue. The path 

that will lead the DPRK to the peace and prosperity it says it wants is one that 

upholds its denuclearization commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the 

Six-Party Talks, refrains from provocations, takes steps to improve its relations with 

its neighbors, complies with international law and obligations, improves human 

rights conditions, and joins the international community for the betterment of its 

own people. 

If we see concrete evidence that the North Korean leadership is changing its behavior on these issues in a sincere manner and demonstrates its serious intent to 

negotiate, then we have an opportunity to engage productively. In that event, we 

will respond appropriately working in close coordination with our allies. 

We will continue to engage in our dual-track strategy on the DPRK nuclear issue. 

We will continue to be open to engagement while continuing to pursue the full and 

transparent implementation of sanctions. We will not lift or lessen sanctions just for 

the sake of resuming talks. 

SOUTH KOREAN SANCTIONS ON IRAN

2. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gregson and Secretary Campbell, South Korea recently announced independent sanctions on Iran for its contentious nuclear program. These sanctions, however, may have long-term implications for South Korea. 

Iran is South Korea’s biggest trade partner in the Middle East. South Korea relies 

on Iran for 10 percent of its crude oil imports. Also, some 2,000 small- and midsized enterprises have tapped into the fast-growing Iranian market. Could you comment on the possible implications that these sanctions could have on South Korea 

and what they mean for the United States and its allies? 

Secretary GREGSON. My colleagues at the Department of State are best positioned 

to comment on this from the overall policy perspective, but let me just express the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) appreciation for South Korea’s principled stand on 

this issue, which is consistent with our collective effort to pressure North Korea to 

make the right decision to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. We do not expect 

Iran’s threats of retaliation to negatively affect South Korea. 

Secretary CAMPBELL. South Korea publicly announced that it would join the 

emerging consensus of states, including the European Union, Australia, Canada, 

Norway, and Japan, in levying national sanctions against Iran. In doing so, it has 

taken a principled stand to pressure Iran to abandon its illicit nuclear activities. We 

recognize and appreciate that, given Iran’s significant trade with South Korea, this 

decision to robustly implement U.N. Security Council resolution 1929 is not without 

cost. We applaud in particular South Korea’s decision to impose sanctions on a number of Iranian economic sectors that have been exploited for proliferation-related 

purposes by entities and individuals of concern. We will continue to work closely 

with the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government to ensure full implementation of 

these measures. 

TRILATERAL SUMMIT MEETING

3. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Campbell, the leaders of Korea, Japan, and China 

held the Third Trilateral Summit Meeting in late May of this year and discussed 

regional and global issues along with economic development measures among the 

three countries. How can the United States take advantage of arrangements such 

as this to encourage greater cooperation to promote regional peace? 

Secretary CAMPBELL. The U.S. Government is supportive of the Third Trilateral 

summit meeting. We view meetings such as these as critical forums for laying the 

groundwork to improve security throughout Northeast Asia. We encourage close cooperation among our regional partners, in both regional and bilateral forums, and 

45 

assess that increased communication between the three will benefit the United 

States when we engage each bilaterally. 

U.S.-SOUTH KOREAN ALLIANCE

4. Senator AKAKA. General Sharp, the United States is committed to providing a 

robust defense and maintaining an enduring and capable military presence on the 

Korean Peninsula. Our long-term commitment is signified by our plans to make 3- 

year-accompanied tours the norm for most U.S. troops in Korea. However, we must 

restructure the way we are postured, the way we operate, and the way we think 

to meet the challenges of emerging and changing threats in the region. What are 

some nontraditional missions and security issues that the United States and South 

Korea must face? How can we best deal with those issues? 

General SHARP. The United States and the ROK face a series of challenges at a 

time of significant change in the international system. As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, in addition to ongoing conflicts such as Afghanistan and 

maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, a complex and uncertain 

security environment exists worldwide where the pace of change is accelerating. 

‘‘Nontraditional’’ challenges in this evolving complex security environment include 

the growing influence of non-state actors, the spread of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) and other destructive enabling technologies, and an ongoing need for the 

conduct of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. 

These evolving challenges pose profound challenges to international order. Just as 

the United States has committed itself to working with the international community 

to address these challenges, so has the ROK under its goal of building a ‘‘Global 

Korea.’’ 

As non-state actors become more active and powerful, U.S. and ROK interests in 

and assured access to the global commons takes on added importance. The global 

commons—in particular sea and air—are important for the free flow of goods upon 

which the economic prosperity of both nations depends. In this regard, the United 

States and ROK have supported anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa to ensure unhindered access to this key component of the global commons. Similarly, the 

spread of WMD and other destructive enabling technologies threatens U.S. and 

ROK security. It is important to note that the ROK has recently elevated its role 

in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and in mid-October 2010 hosted a PSI 

drill that practiced the maritime intercept of vessels suspected of carrying WMD. 

An American destroyer and P–3C Orion aircraft participated in the exercise. Additionally, both the ROK and United States have made substantial progress in developing military plans related to a range of situations that could occur on the Korean 

Peninsula. Finally, simmering regional conflicts and last January’s earthquake in 

Haiti indicate the continued need for international peacekeeping and humanitarian 

assistance/disaster relief operations. The ROK is currently participating in about 10 

U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping operations and has been actively involved with assistance operations for Haiti. 

In order to best deal with these and other nontraditional missions in the future, 

active cooperation between the ROK and United States will be required, particularly 

within the guidelines established in our Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. Both nations—separately and as an alliance—will also have to continue cooperation with 

international organizations such as the U.N. as well as multinational groupings 

such as the PSI. 

WARTIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL TRANSITION

5. Senator AKAKA. General Sharp, the United States agreed to a request by South 

Korea to delay the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of forces on the 

Korean Peninsula. Originally scheduled for 2012, the proposed transfer will not take 

place until 2015. Beyond what was contained in your opening statement before the 

committee, how will this delay affect our forces in Korea? What issues do you see 

and how are you addressing them? 

General SHARP. Though the ROK military was fully prepared to complete wartime 

OPCON transition in 2012, the delay—at the request of the Korean Government— 

contains both positive and negative implications for our forces in Korea. 

On the positive side, the delay presents us with an opportunity to better synchronize OPCON transition with other ongoing alliance and U.S. initiatives in 

Korea, including the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan (LPP) as 

well as the normalization of tours for U.S. servicemembers in Korea. The delay also 

affords us the opportunity to take a more deliberate look at OPCON transition and 

46 

to refine our efforts in the implementation as it becomes an element of the bilateral 

whole-of-government Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan 

was agreed to and signed by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of 

National Defense on 8 October 2010. 

The most significant challenge presented by the delay in OPCON transition is the 

extended requirement for our forces in Korea to sustain a dual focus in which we 

must continue to be prepared to ‘‘fight tonight’’ under the current alliance construct 

even as we aggressively plan, train, and validate/certify ourselves to execute 

OPCON transition in December 2015. 

I believe that the comprehensive bilateral Strategic Alliance 2015 plan effectively 

leverages the positive aspect of OPCON transition delay by integrating into a single 

plan all the ongoing alliance transformation initiatives. The plan, I believe, also 

strikes the proper balance between articulating a process for planning, training, and 

validating OPCON transition while at the same time sustaining ‘‘fight tonight’’ 

readiness under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) structure. 

Maintaining the confidence of the American and Korean people that we are successfully navigating the challenge inherent in OPCON transition is critical to conveying to North Korea that this extended period of transition does not present them 

with any opportunity for adventurism or provocation for reward. It is vitally important that our public messaging regarding OPCON transition leaves no doubt on the 

part of North Korea or others in the region that the ROK–U.S. alliance remains 

steadfastly committed and capable of meeting our mutual defense treaty and armistice obligations to defend the ROK. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

2010 DEFENSE BALLISTIC MISSILE REVIEW

6. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gregson and General Sharp, I believe one of the 

most serious threats facing the United States is North Korea’s nuclear program. A 

Council on Foreign Relations report noted, ‘‘The North’s nuclear arsenal, its pursuit 

of more advanced missile technology, and the possibility that it could transfer nuclear weapons or materials to others (whether states or terrorist groups) pose significant dangers to the United States and its allies in the region and beyond.’’ The 

urgency of the threat is clear. Analysts believe that North Korea’s missile arsenal 

is becoming more accurate and can reach U.S. bases in Guam. In addition, North 

Korea continues to threaten its neighbors, including South Korea, and remains in 

a fragile position with regard to the possible succession of Kim Jong-Il. 

DOD’s 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) suggested that our system 

of ground-based midcourse defense and inceptors is capable in the foreseeable future 

to counter the projected threat from North Korea. Given the present threat and 

North Korea’s known ability to reach U.S. bases in Guam with their land-based missile systems, are you comfortable with the BMDR’s assessment and our ability to 

interdict North Korean missiles? 

Secretary GREGSON. Yes, I am comfortable with the assessment of the 2010 

BMDR. The BMDR says that the U.S. Homeland is currently protected against the 

threat of a limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. Based on the improvements we are making to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, 

we possess the capacity to counter the projected threat to the U.S. Homeland from 

North Korea for the foreseeable future. 

In terms of the regional threat from North Korea, Secretary Gates notes in the 

BMDR’s preface that he has made defending against near-term regional threats a 

top priority of our missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities. The BMDR acknowledges that our regional missile defense capabilities are modest compared to 

the expanding regional missile threat. The administration has taken steps to address this problem by making additional investments in regional missile defense capabilities, such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems and SM– 

3 Block IA interceptors beginning with the fiscal year 2010 budget. 

In addition, the BMDR highlights the need to think strategically about the deployment of regional missile defenses. We are pursuing a phased adaptive approach 

(PAA) to missile defense in East Asia that is tailored to the threat and security requirements of the region. This regional approach focuses in part on bolstering partner capabilities, as well as acquiring our own capabilities that are mobile and 

relocatable so that we can surge defenses into the region in times of crisis. 

General SHARP. North Korea possesses an overmatch capability versus the ROK 

and U.S. anti-tactical and ballistic missile capabilities. North Korea simply has 

more tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) and ballistic missiles than U.S. Forces Korea 

47 

(USFK) and CFC can defend against. Additionally, no layered defense exists in the 

ROK. There are eight U.S. Patriot batteries defending assets against TBM. The 

ROK Patriot batteries will conduct air breathing defense of assets and on order a 

limited TBM defense (upon OPCON Transition; Strategic Alliance 2015, the ROKs 

will conduct TBM defense primarily and on order conduct ABT defense) of those assets. In Guam, there is no dedicated anti-Ballistic Missile Defense or TBM system. 

U.S. Pacific Command has several plans which look at missile defense of Guam with 

a THAAD Battery. There is one such test battery located in Hawaii but there is currently no dedicated THAAD unit for the missile defense of Guam. 

PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

7. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gregson and General Sharp, how do you anticipate the implementation of the PAA for missile defense in Europe will affect our 

nuclear contingency plans in the region, and how does North Korea fit into that calculus? 

Secretary GREGSON. Missile defenses are an important element of the U.S. commitment to strengthening regional deterrence architectures against states acquiring 

or using nuclear weapons and other WMD. They also support U.S. and allied capacities for mutual defense in the face of coercion and aggression. In these ways, missile defenses strengthen U.S. goals of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance. While missile defenses play an important role in regional deterrence, other 

components will also be significant. Against nuclear-armed states, regional deterrence will necessarily include a nuclear component (whether forward deployed or 

not). 

The PAA we apply in East Asia will look different from PAA in Europe, but the 

principles are the same. It will be phased in the sense that we will bring new technologies on line as they become available, and it will be adaptive to the particular 

security needs and the security architecture of the region. Missile defense cooperation in East Asia cannot utilize a formal defense infrastructure like NATO, but we 

are enhancing our ability to protect forward deployed U.S. forces, allies, and partners. We are promoting multilateral cooperation wherever possible. 

The missile threat from North Korea is a primary focus of our PAA efforts in East 

Asia. The improvements we are making will strengthen our defense against such 

threats. 

General SHARP. The major impact of the PAA for the region will be to improve 

the interoperability and target acquisition capability of regional missile defense systems. This will provide a measure of additional protection to our allies and U.S. 

forces in the region. Deterrence will be enhanced by limiting North Korea’s confidence in the effectiveness of using their missiles to attack the ROK and U.S. forces 

stationed there. This will reinforce strategic deterrence as a critical component of 

extended deterrence for our allies and assuring them of U.S. commitment to it treaty allies and partners. Overall, risk will be reduced because missile defense will reinforce strategic deterrence and reduce our reliance on any one component of extended deterrence to deter North Korea. 

8. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Gregson and General Sharp, do you feel a PAA 

will provide added protection to our allies and partners and enhance our ability to 

canvass Northeast Asia? 

Secretary GREGSON. Yes. Regional missile defenses are a valuable component of 

our security strategy in the region. As I noted earlier, the phased aspect of the approach refers to bringing new technologies on line in response to the threat and as 

they become available, which means that we will have our most effective systems 

in the field. Our cooperative development program with Japan has been particularly 

valuable in this regard. 

In addition, by emphasizing the adaptive nature of this approach, we have enough 

flexibility to promote cooperation with allies and partners as opportunities arise. We 

can press ahead with deep cooperation with one partner, while we reassure other 

partners that we can still work together to address their needs without enlisting 

them in a rigid, region-wide architecture. Our near-term focus is to develop a more 

detailed and widely shared picture of potential missile launch activity in the region 

(by increasing the number of sensors that can ‘‘talk’’ to each other), which will provide added protection for our allies and partners, as well as for our forward-deployed forces. 

General SHARP. The PAA is a strategy to incrementally enhance and improve missile defense of U.S. forces as well as our allies. Adopting this approach will allow 

those partners who contribute to and support a multinational regional missile deVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:13 Jan 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63690.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
48 

fense strategy to better negate an improving missile threat. The United States has 

several bilateral agreements with partners in Northeast Asia and the Pacific Rim 

which individually improve the ballistic missile defense in the region. Only through 

multilateral/multinational agreements, however, can the synergistic effects of integrated missile defense reach its true potential. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

CONSTRUCTION OF FAMILY HOUSING

9. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, my staff has been recently briefed that, according to the current plan, it may cost military families anywhere from $4,000 to 

$6,000 per month to rent an apartment-style housing unit constructed by a private 

developer on Camp Humphreys. This cost is just for rent for a house on the base— 

it doesn’t include utilities or any other costs. The alternative to this extremely high 

rent is equally as expensive—an estimated $1.4 billion to build housing with military construction funds. What can be done to reign in these incredibly high costs? 

General SHARP. The 2003 National Defense Authorization Act authorized a 

$35,000 lease cap for family housing in Korea. The purchasing power of the $35,000 

leases was only $38,799 for fiscal year 2008. At the time, the Build-To-Lease (BTL) 

program required purchasing power of about $61,000 per unit per annum ($5,000/ 

month). The Office of Management and Budget scored 2,100 leases at $629 million. 

Eventually, BTL did not have the support of Congress to increase the purchasing 

power to enable construction of houses. Additionally, in fiscal years 2008/2009, a requirement emerged for the Army to develop a military construction option when 

statutory limits did not support BTL. The military construction option was estimated at $1.4 billion for 2,400 houses—of which only $125 million (204 houses) was 

supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Simultaneously, the Army developed the Humphreys Housing Opportunity Program (HHOP–I) to meet the housing needs in Korea. HHOP–I uses the Soldier’s Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) 

entitlement as capital for a developer to construct and operate family houses in support of Korea transformation. 

The city of Seoul, ROK, has consistently been in the top 10 of the world’s most 

expensive cities. Rapid population growth in the ROK continues to expand the commute area for those who work in Seoul and live as far away as Pyeongtaek. 

The monthly rental rate of $4,200/month for HHOP–I is based on a competitive 

process to develop, construct, operate, maintain, and revitalize for 45 years. 

10. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, do you have an estimate of how many additional families will require housing in additional to the 3,400 housing as a result 

of normalizing tours? 

General SHARP. Full tour normalization can only be achieved when all required 

infrastructure is in place to meet the needs of servicemembers and their families. 

Family housing is one of those requirements. There needs to be enough available 

housing units on and in the vicinity of enduring installations to support all command-sponsored families choosing to come to Korea. My goal is for 60 percent of 

command-sponsored military families to reside on-post. USFK’s current baseline is 

3,490 family housing units. Over the course of Korea transformation, 1,150 of those 

units will be demolished or returned to the ROK because they are either at locations 

that will block developmental plans at enduring installations or exist on a facility 

that will be returned to the ROK. Subtracting these 1,150 units from the current 

family housing baseline of 3,490 units leaves a net baseline of 2,340 units. Achieving 

my goal of housing 60 percent of military families on post requires a total of 7,215 

family housing units. Thus, an additional 4,875 family housing units will need to 

be built. Subsequent to the September 2010 testimony, the Secretary directed a 

housing market assessment to review the available off-base housing around the 

Humphreys area. This assessment will cause USFK to update the housing requirement for review and decision by the Secretary of Defense in the spring of 2011. 

11. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, do you have an estimate of the overall costs 

to taxpayers to provide the housing, schools, and other community facilities and infrastructure to support your goal of normalizing tours? 

General SHARP. Achieving the Secretary of Defense-approved DOD goal for full 

tour normalization in Korea requires additional housing, schools, and other community facilities. USFK currently projects an overall cost of approximately $2.5 billion 

to the United States that will be spread over fiscal years 2012–2020 for these additional tour normalization facilities. The investment in tour normalization provides 

49 

several benefits. Implementation will improve combat capability and force readiness 

by decreasing personnel turnover. Today, 85 percent of the force in Korea is on a 

1-year assignment. When complete, almost all military personnel will be on 3-year 

accompanied or 2-year unaccompanied tours. Tour normalization demonstrates a 

greater commitment on the part of the United States to the ROK as well as the 

larger Asia-Pacific region. Two- and 3-year tours reduce stress on servicemembers 

and their families by decreasing separations and reducing the number of permanent 

change-in-station moves. Finally, the timing for normalization is right, because it 

leverages other Korea transformation initiatives such as the Yongsan Relocation 

Plan and LPP. 

12. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, do you even have the available land on 

Camp Humphreys to build the housing required to support the additional families? 

General SHARP. The current U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys master plan 

calls for 2,902 units on that installation to support a command-sponsored population 

of 3,198 (3,740 total for Korea). We have also developed options to locate 1,477 additional family housing units on USAG Humphreys for a fiscal year 2020 commandsponsored population of 7,762 (8,667 total for Korea), thus providing on-post family 

housing for 56 percent of all command-sponsored personnel. 

HOST NATION FUNDING

13. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, I have a question about the use of host nation funding provided to support our forces in Korea. Can you provide what amount 

and through what year the current Status of Forces Agreement requires for contributions by the ROK to support your construction requirements for all U.S. forces 

on the peninsula? 

General SHARP. The ROK has been providing contributions to help offset the costs 

of stationing American military forces in Korea since 1991. Provisions dictating current cost-sharing contributions made by the ROK are established in the Special 

Measures Agreement (SMA). Currently, we are operating from a 5-year SMA, which 

is in effect through 2013. Under this SMA, ROK cost-sharing contributions are divided into three categories: 

(1) Labor: cash payments for the salaries and benefits of Korean national employees working for USFK; 

(2) ROK Funded Construction: cash and in-kind transfers used for USFK’s military construction and military construction-like requirements; and 

(3) Logistics: in-kind provision of logistics equipment, supplies, and services to 

USFK. 

During calendar year 2011 the ROK cost-sharing contribution will be valued at 

812.5 billion won ($688 million). Of this 812.5 billion won, 333.2 billion won ($282 

million) will be allocated toward ROK funded construction. Future increases in the 

annual ROK cost-sharing contribution are tied to changes in the ROK consumer 

price index. Thus, it is not possible at this time to specify what the ROK cost-sharing contribution will be valued at in 2012 and 2013; it depends on future changes 

in the ROK consumer price index. That being said, USFK plans on allocating about 

$300 million of the ROK cost-sharing contribution in 2012 and 2013 to ROK funded 

construction. 

Since the current SMA expires in 2013, it is not possible at this time to make 

definitive statements on what the ROK cost-sharing contribution will be after 2013. 

But it should be noted that the ROK has provided cost-sharing support since 1991. 

Thus, we expect such support will continue well after 2013, although the total value 

of that support has yet to be determined (and will be negotiated during the development of a post-2013 SMA). A portion of this future cost-sharing support will be allocated to projects that fall under the category of ROK funded construction. 

14. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, what is your plan for spending that money, 

broken down by proposed investments on each military installation? 

General SHARP. All expenditures for construction (ROK funded construction component of the SMA program) through 2013 (the last year of the current SMA) will 

be prioritized toward supporting U.S. responsibilities under the LPP at USAG Humphreys. Semi-annual reviews will be conducted, however, to consider non-LPP requirements on a case-by-case basis for funding with ROK funded construction support. The urgency of these requirements will be weighed against the possibility of 

delays in execution and completion of the LPP. 

50 

15. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, are we using all contributed funds to pay 

for the consolidation of Army forces at Camp Humphreys while in effect starving 

other critical facility and infrastructure requirements on the peninsula? 

General SHARP. We are not starving other critical facility and infrastructure requirements on the peninsula. USFK holds semi-annual boards to consider other requirements on a case-by-case basis for funding. The urgency of the requirements is 

weighed against slippage in execution and completion of the LPP. In the past 2 

years, 11 non-LPP requirements were approved for construction; 7 of the approvals 

were on Army installations, 2 on Air Force installations, and 1 each on Navy and 

Marine Corps installations. 

FUTURE FORCE POSTURE

16. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, despite the delay in OPCON transfer authority, will the Army brigades, currently stationed in Korea, be available for worldwide 

deployment as part of the Army’s Force Generation program? Why or why not? If 

so, when will the first U.S. Army brigade from Korea be set to deploy off the Korean 

peninsula? 

General SHARP. [Deleted.] 

HOUSING REQUIREMENTS IN KOREA FOR ADDITIONAL FAMILIES

17. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, what is the status of the decision within 

DOD to proceed with the plan to normalize tours for U.S. personnel in Korea? 

General SHARP. The Secretary of Defense provided a memorandum, subject: USFK 

Tour Normalization, dated October 18, 2010, codifying his decision directing full 

Tour Normalization on September 23, 2010. 

The Secretary of Defense directed USFK and the Services to proceed with full 

tour normalization for Korea, as affordable, but not according to any specific 

timeline. Full tour normalization in Korea will further our long-term commitment 

to support our forward stationed troops and their family members. This decision 

also directed the Army to execute the HHOP–I immediately for 1,400 units and to 

continue pursuing MILCON for additional family housing. The Army was also directed to perform a study of the off-post housing market in Pyongtaek and other 

areas (including off-base Osan) impacted by tour normalization, to be completed 

within the next 120 days. The Secretary further directed USFK, United States Pacific Command, the Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and other relevant OSD organizations to 

provide him—no later than March 31, 2011—with a feasible and affordable plan to 

continue this momentum towards full tour normalization on the Korean peninsula. 

18. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, given the precarious succession situation on 

the peninsula and our collective inability to curb North Korea’s bad behavior, is this 

the right time to normalize and add accompanied tours? 

General SHARP. This is the right time to normalize tours in Korea. Tour normalization contributes to increased capability and readiness (decreased permanentchange-of-station turnover of 85 percent compared to 1-year assignments); reduced 

stress on 7,389 servicemembers and families per year; demonstration of greater U.S. 

commitment to the Asia-Pacific region; and enhanced agility and availability for regional exercises and humanitarian assistance/disaster recovery operations. 

TRAINING IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

19. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, regarding training of forces on the peninsula, I am concerned about the availability and quality of ranges available to U.S. 

forces to support land maneuver and air training. What is your assessment of the 

current status and quality of ranges available to U.S. forces? 

General SHARP. Ranges available for air-to-ground weapons training were sufficient on the Korean peninsula up until August 2005. At that time, the ROK Government closed the only range available for U.S. exclusive use due to political pressure 

concerning encroachment issues as well as the opening of a new runway at Incheon 

International Airport. This range provided 60 percent of all USFK air-to-ground 

training—approximately 4,000 sorties per year. The training shortage caused by this 

closure was immediately apparent and the combat ready status of USFK aircrew 

has suffered ever since. ROK Air Force and U.S. Air Force squadrons share training 

time on the two air-to-ground ranges currently available on the Korean peninsula. 

However, even if U.S. Air Force assets received 100 percent of the negotiated time, 

51 

we would still not meet our training requirements. Furthermore, these ranges are 

of such small size that realistic tactical training is severely limited due to restrictions on ordnance types. These limitations are especially restrictive with regard to 

live precision-guided munitions such as laser and GPS guided bombs as well as airto-surface missiles and electronic warfare training. 

Attempts to mitigate the effects of this training shortfall have resulted in some 

minor improvements to the scheduling and utilization processes. Some areas of improvement include extending range operational hours, allowing USFK to utilize 

ranges on official ROK holidays, and temporary approval to expend limited types 

of live ordnance. However, these improvements are marginal in nature and will do 

little to fix the overall problem of not having sufficient range space and available 

time. 

All discussions with the ROK concerning the opening of a new air-to-ground training range have been unsuccessful and we have had no movement. USFK is left with 

no other alternative but to mitigate this training shortfall by annually deploying flying units stationed in Korea to other training areas in Alaska and the Continental 

United States to accomplish the training required to maintain combat readiness. 

Eighth United States Army (8A) possesses adequate training resources to maintain unit Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) readiness on the Korean peninsula. Ongoing modernization of live training facilities and our ability to export our live training technologies to ROK Army training lands provided under international agreements ensures our ability to sustain live training for the foreseeable future. Under 

these current international agreements, 8A has access to numerous ROK ranges and 

training facilities allowing 8A to meet and overcome the capabilities gap currently 

present on U.S. ranges and training facilities on the Korean peninsula. To ensure 

full capacity to train to FSO, 8A is aggressively leveraging virtual and constructive 

technologies to achieve high levels of training readiness at division level and below. 

In fiscal year 2014, 8A will be fielded with the newest live, virtual, constructive integrated training environment (ITE) that will provide significant improvements in 

the efficiency and effectiveness of FSO training delivery. The ITE coupled with current modernization projects at our enduring live training centers, and upgrades to 

our current simulator systems, will produce an 8A FSO training capacity on par 

with any other, Army wide. 

20. Senator MCCAIN. General Sharp, please provide an update of what initiatives 

you have undertaken or planned to improve access and the quality of ranges for 

U.S. forces. 

General SHARP. I have directed the Combined Air Component Command to undertake a mitigation study to address the lack of air-to-ground training opportunities. 

This study will continue through December 2010. However, the results of this study 

will only allow small improvements in the efficiency of the range scheduling and utilization processes. It will not solve the underlying problem of simply not having sufficient air-to-ground ranges on the Korean peninsula. Until the ROK Government 

addresses the issue and undertakes the construction of a new air-to-ground range, 

USFK will continue to deploy forces outside the peninsula in order to accomplish 

required training. 

The 8A has adequate access to ranges needed to sustain FSO readiness. 8A is 

seeking access to an additional ROK Army facility that is capable of providing an 

alternative source for limited armor, mechanized, and aviation gunnery to supplement our existing U.S. facilities when required. The quality of Army ranges has 

achieved a significantly higher level in 8A as compared to just a decade ago. For 

example, this year, we are modernizing our primary armor, mechanized, and aviation qualification ranges to full digital capabilities. This postures us to fully support 

the weapons modernization the 2nd Infantry Division will undergo beginning in 

January 2011 to become a digital force. Our Program Objective Memorandum 12– 

17 range modernization plan continues our efforts to establish sufficient live-fire capacity and quality capabilities across the Korean peninsula culminating with the 

Yongsan Relocation Plan. 

[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

Æ