After more than 15 years of war, the operational effectiveness of 

Army Special Operations Forces remains without equal. However, the 

future operating environment will continue to evolve with highly 

adaptive state and non-state adversaries seeking to challenge the 

status quo and our national interests. The forms of conflict employed 

by adversaries in the future are expected to be hybrid in nature, 

blending conventional and irregular capabilities, and will more often 

challenge the stability of regions through indirect means.

Preventing or deterring hybrid conflict short of all-out war is 

demanding. It requires persistent forward engagement at points of 

vulnerability around the world. It requires operators to understand the 

political, cultural, and geographic complexities of austere operating 

environments and the unique challenges faced by our allies and 

partners. It also requires an advanced understanding of adversaries 

and how they are evolving in an effort to gain a position of advantage. 

In order to meet these requirements and to counter hybrid threats of 

the future, ARSOF must provide the nation with a portfolio of complementary capabilities enabled by institutional and operational agility.

USASOC 2035, like its forerunner ARSOF 2022, provides facts and 

details for use by members of the force when communicating the 

ARSOF narrative in engagements with joint force commanders, 

interagency partners, and other audiences worldwide. It also provides guidance for the further development of ARSOF institutional 

and operational capabilities needed to counter future threats across 

the spectrum of conflict, especially in gray zones between peace and 

overt war. USASOC 2035 incorporates ARSOF 2022 initiatives still in 

progress and builds upon those capabilities already established. It 

presents objectives for developing future capabilities that will move 

ARSOF from the force of today to the force of tomorrow. 

KENNETH E. TOVO

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

Commanding

Sine Pari – Without Equal

FROM THE

COMMANDER

Acknowledgments:

USASOC 2035 was a collaborative effort 

that included many advisers and 

contributors. LTG Kenneth Tovo, the 

USASOC Commanding General, would 

like to personally thank the following 

individuals for their dedication to this effort: 

The USASOC Commander’s Initiatives 

Group: COL John Silkman, CW5 Linc 

Glenister, LTC Ryan Burkert, LTC Christian 

Sessoms, LTC Jon Bleakley, MAJ Doug 

Graham, and Dr. Alex Heidenberg; the 

USASOC G3, COL Tim Ladouceur, and the 

G3 Staff; the USASOC G5, COL Kyle Lear, and 

the G5 Staff to include MAJ Kyle Packard, 

primary author of USASOC Campaign Plan 

2035; Dr. Michael Krivdo and Dan Telles of the 

USASOC Historian's Office; and the USASOC 

CSC and CSU Command Teams. Special 

thanks to the Special Warfare Magazine 

staff: Janice Burton, Jennifer Angelo and 

Juan Barrera. Finally, a special thanks to 

LTC Duane Mosier, primary author and 

researcher of USASOC Strategy 2035 and this 

magazine issue — USASOC 2035.
CONTENTS

The ARSOF Narrative

04 | The Pillars of 

 ARSOF Capability

14 | A Year In Review

16 | ARSOF Effects

20 | How We Build

 Partner Forces

28 | SOF-CF I3

Preparing for the Future

30 | Future Operating

 Environment

32 | The Way Ahead

USASOC 2035 is a special edition produced under the auspices of Special 

Warfare by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 

Center and School’s Office of Strategic Communication.

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly publication of the 

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 

Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development 

of special operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of 

established doctrine and new ideas.

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

Headquarters, Department of the Army • PB 80-17-SE • PIN: 201983-000

By order of the Acting Secretary of the Army:

Patrick J. Murphy

Official:

GERALD B O’KEEFE

Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1716605 | Headquarters, Department of the Army
////04///// USASOC 2035

 The indigenous approach is a means to address 

challenges to regional stability with and through populations and partner forces empowered by persistent ARSOF 

engagement. Through the approach, ARSOF leverage 

nascent capability within populations, transforming 

indigenous mass into combat power. Since World War II, 

ARSOF elements have amassed unique institutional and 

operational expertise in living among, training, advising, 

and fighting alongside people of foreign cultures, 

achieving effects with and through partner forces. 

 Today, ARSOF training pipelines, unlike any other in the 

Department of Defense, produce regionally oriented, 

culturally astute, and language-capable personnel who can 

apply an indigenous approach across the spectrum of 

conflict in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. 

The indigenous approach provides low-cost, high-impact 

options to address state and non-state threats, set conditions for conventional force success, and execute sensitive 

activities through minimal force commitment. 

Precision targeting operations involve direct action 

and counter-network activities enabled by SOF unique 

intelligence, targeting processes, and technology, such 

as ARSOF rotary wing capabilities and armed unmanned 

aerial systems. Precision targeting operations are 

employed against uniquely difficult target sets that may 

require operating in uncertain or hostile environments, 

careful and focused application of force, and significant 

intelligence and operational preparation. These 

operations are executed by highly trained, rapidly 

deployable, and scalable ARSOF personnel and formations that are employed to buy time and space for other 

operations to gain traction, as seen in counterinsurgency campaigns. They create precise physical and 

psychological effects and can be used to collapse threat 

networks through deliberate targeting of critical nodes, 

as demonstrated in counterterrorism campaigns. They 

also include sensitive activities in support of targeting 

processes and the execution of operations.

ARSOF Strategic Value to the Nation: Four Pillars of Capability

For more than 60 years, ARSOF have served at the tip of the spear in defense of the nation. Today, the U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command represents a force of approximately 33,000 personnel and more than half of the nation's SOF. ARSOF elements consistently fill more 

than 60 percent of all U.S. SOF deployments worldwide with ARSOF Soldiers deployed in more than 70 countries on any given day of the year, 

delivering strategic value to the nation through four complementary capabilities — the Pillars of ARSOF Capability: an Indigenous Approach to 

Operations, Precision Targeting Operations, Developing Understanding and Wielding Influence, and Crisis Response. They are employed 

throughout the operational spectrum and across all campaign phases, including interagency- or Coalition-led campaigns and operations. 

Together, the Pillars of ARSOF Capability provide options to shape or prevent outcomes in support of our national interests. These capabilities, 

coupled with tailorable mission command nodes and scalable force packages that are low-signature and employ a small footprint, are 

particularly suited for employment in politically sensitive environments.

INDIGENOUS APPROACH PRECISION TARGETING

PILLARS OF ARSOF CAPABILITY 
USASOC 2035 /////05////

Formally assessed and selected 

ARSOF soldiers, trained to an 

elite level, deliver strategic 

value to the nation through four 

complementary capabilities —

The Pillars of ARSOF Capability

Developing understanding and wielding influence are 

essential aspects of the value ARSOF capabilities provide 

joint force commanders and the nation. The SOF network of 

personnel, assets, and international partnerships represents 

the means to obtain early understanding of emerging local, 

regional, and transregional threats and where opportunities 

exist for advancing U.S. objectives. The SOF network 

provides capabilities needed to influence outcomes in all 

campaign phases and especially in conflict short of overt war.

Engagement worldwide allows ARSOF to develop 

long-term partner nation relationships and an advanced 

understanding of complex environments. Operating in 

culturally and politically complex environments requires 

ARSOF personnel to be adept at interacting and coordinating with multiple agencies and partners. Institutional 

training and education programs unique to ARSOF, along 

with long-term regionally aligned employment, provide the 

expertise necessary to understand complex environments 

and the ability to influence people and circumstances.

Crisis response, provided through CONUS and OCONUS 

stationed alert forces and persistently deployed and 

dispersed units, provides national decision makers with 

agile, tailorable, and rapidly employable special operations 

formations necessary to respond to emergencies. These 

forces provide options to rescue people under threat, to 

recover sensitive materials such as weapons of mass 

destruction components, to provide humanitarian relief, or 

to address other short notice requirements. 

ARSOF crisis response capabilities leverage the SOF 

network and partner-nation relationships established 

before crisis occurs. Persistent engagement develops 

relationships and the advanced understanding needed in 

times of crisis for ARSOF to effectively employ unilateral 

capabilities and those created during partner-force 

development. Through ARSOF crisis response, a small 

number of operators can rapidly address emergencies in 

an effort to enable host nation solutions to local or 

regional security challenges. 

The four pillars are a new way to talk about ARSOF capabilities 

and represent a way to define ARSOF value using simple terminology. 

Military doctrine contains terms that are not universally known. There 

are times when doctrinal terms should be used; however, when 

conveying the strategic value of ARSOF capabilities to a wide range of 

audiences, we need to simplify the narrative. The four pillars represent 

a means by which every member of the force can explain ARSOF 

capabilities to those unfamiliar with how the force provides value to 

joint force commanders, interagency leaders, and the nation. 

UNDERSTAND & INFLUENCE CRISIS RESPONSE
////06///// USASOC 2035

Task Force Viking N. Iraq 2002-2003

Details:

The invasion of Iraq began March 20, 2003; however, in November 2002 Army 

Special Forces teams began infiltrating Northern Iraq to partner with and 

organize approximately 52,000 Kurdish Peshmerga forces. Operating with and 

through Peshmerga forces, SFOD-A-s harassed, disrupted, and destroyed enemy 

units they faced, ultimately breaking through Iraqi defenses to seize all ground 

occupied by Iraqi Army divisions to their front. Task Force Viking Special Forces 

operators and their partner Peshmerga forces continued to advance against Iraqi 

forces until April 14 when they reached the outskirts of Baquba, north of 

Baghdad. Ultimately, Task Force Viking successfully fixed 13 Iraqi Army divisions, 

defeated 700 Ansar Al-Islam extremists, captured Kirkuk and Mosul, and set 

conditions for the success of the Coalition invasion. 

Enemy Units Faced by TF Viking

» 13 Iraqi Army divisions (2 Republican Guard divisions, 2 mechanized divisions, 

1 Armored division, 8 Infantry divisions, and Fedayeen Saddam Militia).

» Ansar Al-Islam - jihadist extremist group with ties to al-Qaeda; known to experiment with chemical and biological weapons.

TF Viking Personnel & Units: 

» TF Viking (5,200 person force): 

• 10th SFG (A) Headquarters (JSOTF-North)

• 3 Special Forces Battalions

• Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs elements

• U.S. Air Force 352nd Special Operations Group elements

• 173rd Airborne Brigade and U.S. Marine Corps 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(tasked to help JSOTF-N secure Kirkuk and Mosul) 

» TF Viking Partner Peshmerga Opposition Forces:

• 30,000 Kurdish Democratic Party

• 22,000 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Geographic Location:

» Iraq

Dates:

» 2002 - 2003

Highlighted Pillars:

» Indigenous Approach

» Understand and Influence

Outcomes: 

» Under the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)-led Task Force Viking, 42 Special Forces 

ODAs applied an indigenous approach to 

operations with Peshmerga partner forces that:

• Successfully fixed 13 Iraqi Army divisions (more 

than 100,000 in personnel strength) along a 

350 kilometer front known as the Green Line.

• Enabled Coalition success by preventing these 

Iraqi divisions from reinforcing the defense of 

Baghdad or attacking the Coalition invasion 

force, which was driving north from Kuwait.

• Defeated approximately 700 Ansar Al-Islam 

extremists fortified in a mountainous region of 

Northeastern Iraq.

• Captured the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul.

• Transferred control of Kirkuk and Mosul to 

conventional Coalition Forces on April 15, 2003.

PILLARS OF ARSOF CAPABILITY 
USASOC 2035 /////07////

SOJTF-OIR Syria/Iraq 2016-Present

Details:

In early 2016, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) stood up Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve to synchronize the effects and 

activities of multiple subordinate commands in the fight against ISIS across Syria 

and Iraq. SOJTF-OIR serves as the SOF component headquarters of Combined 

Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve and the central headquarters 

coordinating and directing all SOF train, advise, assist, and accompany operations 

with partner forces in Syria and Iraq. 

SOJTF-OIR is achieving substantial gains against ISIS and has liberated cities and large 

swathes of territory with and through partner forces, employing an indigenous 

approach to operations. SOJTF-OIR advisors represent an economy-of-force effort 

that is achieving operational effects with victory after victory against a desperate and 

fractured transregional enemy. However, the key to long-term success against ISIS is 

preventing them from taking advantage of conditions favorable to their resurgence. 

Outcomes:

» Since the January 2016 stand-up of SOJTF-OIR through June 14, 2017, Coalition 

Forces conducted more than 12,000 air strikes in Syria and Iraq against ISIS.

» In Syria, as of June 2017, SOJTF-OIR partner opposition forces liberated approximately 35,000 square kilometers of territory from ISIS, including cities such as 

Tabqah, Manbij, and Shaddadi.

» In early and mid-2017, SOJTF-OIR partner forces dedicated efforts to seize 

Raqqah, Syria, the ISIS capital city, isolating much of the city in preparation for 

its liberation.

» In Iraq, as of June 2017, Iraqi Security Forces and SOJTF-OIR advisors liberated 

approximately 70 cities, including Tikrit, Haditha, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Hit.

» In early 2017, Iraqi Security Forces, with Coalition SOF support, successfully 

liberated Eastern Mosul and by June, freed most of Western Mosul.

» These highlights demonstrate aspects of the SOJTF-OIR strategy against ISIS 

designed to defeat them militarily through committed and capable indigenous 

partner forces fighting to liberate their own people and lands.

» Success of the indigenous approach to operations is seen in the many cities and 

thousands of people freed from ISIS control with and through partner forces, 

enabled by mature, highly trained, and dedicated SOF.

Geographic Location:

» Syria & Iraq

Dates:

» 2016 to present

Highlighted Pillars:

» Indigenous Approach

» Precision Targeting

» Understand and Influence

Actions on the Ground:

» SOJTF-OIR advisors on ground in Syria and Iraq 

provide battlefield presence, enhanced 

situational awareness, communications, and 

cutting-edge technology to vetted Syrian 

Opposition Forces and Iraqi Government 

efforts against ISIS. 

» SOF operators advise and assist battlefield 

commanders, provide intelligence and 

targeting support, and generate Coalition 

firepower against ISIS forces. 

» U.S. SOF have also begun training the Raqqah 

Internal Security Force to secure Raqqah, Syria 

after it is liberated. 

» In Syria, SOJTF OIR supports and enables 

vetted Syrian Opposition Forces including 

Syrian Democratic Forces (approximately 

50,000 in strength). 

» In Iraq, SOJTF-OIR supports and enables Iraqi 

security forces, including:

• The Iraqi Counterterrorism Service

• The Federal Police

• The Iraqi Emergency Response Division

• Tribal forces
////08///// USASOC 2035

Details:

In 2006 and early 2007, the outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom was largely in 

doubt as violence threatened stability throughout Iraq. Coalition casualties would 

peak in 2007 with 961 fatalities in Iraq, an increase from 872 in 2006. A Sunni 

insurgency in Central, Northern, and Western Iraq was in full swing as Shia militias, 

supported by Iran, attacked Coalition Forces and Iraqi officials across the south. 

In an effort to address violent conditions across Iraq, General David Petraeus 

implemented an offensive campaign known as “The Surge.” The campaign brought 

additional U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams into Iraq with the focus of stemming 

the tide of violence. For the effort to gain traction, Army Special Operations Forces 

were called upon to provide breathing room for stability operations to take root. 

U.S. SOF Response:

Between March and November 2007 the Special Forces led CJSOTF-AP executed 

partnered precision targeting operations and other activities with forces established 

and developed by ARSOF units. These actions provided time and space for longer-term stability operations associated with The Surge to take effect. The activities, 

with and through partnered forces, and relationships with local citizens, influenced 

conditions across the country and set conditions necessary for The Surge to succeed.

Outcomes: 

» Partnered precision targeting operations executed by CJSOTF-AP teams suppressed insurgent cells and, in many cases, collapsed those cells by targeting 

critical nodes. Each partnered operation relieved pressure on conventional forces 

striving to establish long-term stability across Iraq.

» Over the course of the 2007 deployment, CJSOTF-AP (a brigade-sized SOF 

element with countrywide reach):

• Conducted 1,783 partnered direct-action operations

• Captured 1,138 primary targets and 1,743 persons of interest

» The CJSOTF indigenous approach strengthened The Surge and empowered local 

citizens to speak and act against the presence of foreign fighters within Western 

and Northern Iraq, giving rise to what would be known as the Sunni Awakening.

» CJSOTF-AP teams also conducted 4,644 FID training events, averaging 15 partnered 

training events per day, and 3,011 tribal engagements during the 2007 deployment. 

» CJSOTF-AP execution of precision targeting operations and other activities with 

and through partner forces directly contributed to Coalition success, providing a 

strategic impact through tactical actions.

Geographic Location: CJSOTF-Arabian Peninsula

» Iraq

Dates:

» 2007

Highlighted Pillars:

» Precision Targeting

» Indigenous Approach

» Understand and Influence

Actions on the Ground: 

» CJSOTF teams were not restricted by battlespace 

boundaries; they operated wherever critical 

enemy nodes were identified.

» The application of an indigenous approach to 

operations enabled CJSOTF-AP forces and 

partnerships to cover 70 percent of populated 

cities and LOCs in Iraq, advancing the Coalition’s 

understanding of threats and where opportunities 

were emerging to defeat a determined enemy.

» CJSOTF-AP engaged local residents, tribes, 

city, and provincial government officials to 

gain influence.

» CJSOTF-AP leveraged PAO, CA, and PSYOP for 

non-kinetic targeting/influence.

Units & Equipment: 

» 1 CJSOTF – SF Group Headquarters

» 3 SOTFs 

• SOTF-North in Taji (SF Bn.)

• SOTF-Central in Baghdad (SF Bn.)

• SOTF-West in Al Fallujah 

(USN SEAL Bn. equivalent)

» 7 AOBs

» 38 SFOD-As

» 3 Naval Special Warfare TUs

» 6 SEAL Platoons

» PSYOP and CA teams/personnel embedded from 

CJSOTF down to team levels 

» CJSOTF-AP trained, advised, & assisted: 

• 6 ISOF Battalions

• 19 Iraqi Police Battalions

• 39 Iraqi Army Battalions

• 99 percent of operations were with and 

through Iraqi forces 

PILLARS OF ARSOF CAPABILITY 
USASOC 2035 /////09////

ARSOF Gray Eagles

Details:

Precision targeting operations represent the actions of highly skilled operators 

executing direct action against specified targets, enabled by SOF intelligence, 

targeting processes, and technology. These operations are also enabled through 

the precision intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and kinetic strike capabilities of ARSOF Gray Eagle (MQ-1C) unmanned aerial systems. 

The Army Special Operations Aviation Command currently has one company of 

Gray Eagles flown and maintained by the 160th Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment. ARSOF Gray Eagles originated from quick reaction companies stood up 

and stationed at Fort Huachuca. Deploying to multiple sites in Afghanistan since 

2009, they supported SOF and conventional operations with armed overwatch, 

precision strike, and persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

In 2014, Co. E, 2nd Battalion, 160th SOAR was established at Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky. The value of MQ-1Cs is demonstrated through the agility of the 

platform, supporting ISR and kinetic aspects of the fight against ISIS or other 

determined enemies worldwide. 

Outcomes: 

» In 2014, E/2-160th SOAR assumed the MQ-IC mission in Afghanistan.

» In 2015, MQ-1Cs were sent to Iraq in support SOF operations, providing immediate 

impact in the fight against ISIS.

» In 2016, the unit executed more than 700 kinetic strikes in support of Iraqi security 

forces and Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve advisor 

operations to liberate the territory, cities, and citizens of Iraq.

» In 2016, MQ-1Cs were moved from Afghanistan to Cameroon in support of 

operations in the U.S. Africa Command area of operations.

» USASOC will obtain a second Gray Eagle company in Fiscal Year 2018 with the Army 

transfer of a MQ-1C company from INSCOM to USASOC. The addition of a second 

Gray Eagle company will enable ARSOF to continue organic ISR and kinetic strike 

support to joint force commanders around the world without negative impact to 

personnel, dwell, or asset maintenance schedules.

» ARSOAC is pursuing rapid deployment of a munition that increases MQ-1C 

lethality. Efforts include expediting acquisition and fielding of a MQ-1C compatible Lightweight Precision Munition, with the intent to provide greater capability 

for deployed commanders.

Geographic Location:

» Deployable worldwide

Dates:

» 2014 to present

Highlighted Pillar:

» Precision Targeting
//// 10 ///// USASOC 2035

Operation Yarborough

Details:

In early 2008, Jaysh Al-Mahdi-Special Groups (JAM-SG), supplied and trained by 

Iran, worked hard to undermine the stability of Southern Iraq through a clandestine campaign of subversion, intimidation, and assassination against Iraqi citizens 

and leaders. Since the April 2007 withdrawal of British forces from Maysan 

Province, JAM-SG dominated the capital city of Al Amarah and controlled the 

province. Iranian lethal aid flowed freely across the Iran-Iraq border into Al 

Amarah and moved deeper into Iraq from that city. 

In late March, the Government of Iraq surprised Coalition leaders by suddenly 

shifting Iraqi national security focus to the port city of Al Basra in Southern Iraq, 

where the rule of law had ceased to exist. Prime Minister Maliki ordered an 

immediate assault by ISF to expel JAM and other militias controlling the city, 

initiating the Battle of Basra on March 25. Despite initial success, the poorly 

planned Iraqi assault stalled after 72 hours, requiring CJSOTF-AP Special Forces 

ODAs and their partner Iraqi forces to come to the aid of the ISF assault. The 

support turned the tide and by April 5 the battle was won. 

The militia defeat in Al Basra left Al Amarah as the primary JAM-SG stronghold in 

Southern Iraq. The Coalition needed a plan that would head off a sudden charge 

by the Iraqi government into Maysan. The task fell to CJSOTF-AP and Army 

Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs planners, who created a 

multi-component military deception campaign named Operation Yarborough. It 

would become the Multi-National Corps-Iraq main effort for May-June 2008 and 

the largest deception campaign conducted during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Actions on the Ground: 

» Employed understanding of JAM-SG networks to psychologically disrupt them.

» Pressured JAM-SG until offensive could begin in June to retake Al Amarah.

» Three iterations of Yarborough were executed (May 9 – June 19, 2008). 

» First planned/executed by 5th SFG (May 2008) and then 10th SFG (June 2008).

» Operation Yarborough campaign included:

• Whisper campaign messaging designed to create fear of an imminent ISF attack 

• Multiple raids into Al Amarah by USSF/ISF (DA for psychological effects); supported by entire CJSOAC contingent

• Multiple iterations of day or night snap tactical checkpoint operations in Maysan 

Province (vic. Al Amarah); air assault insertions by 160th SOAR or ground insertion 

by RG-33 armored vehicles

• Zero collateral damage JDAM bomb drops in vacant areas surrounding Al Amarah

• Fixed wing A/C shows of force/demonstrations over city

• False infiltrations conducted by 160th SOAR MH-60s (vic. Al Amarah)

• Predator Hellfire missile strikes against lethal threats

• MISO radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, and messaging via multiple conduits

Outcomes: 

» Positioned MNF-I to prevent another Battle of Basra scenario and forced JAM. 

militants into a state of constant alert, degrading their morale and combat power

» Al Amarah clearing operations began June 19, 2008; June 19-22, Coalition and Iraqi 

forces seized 117 small arms caches, over 2100 mortar/artillery rounds, 873 mines, 347 

RPGs, 267 rockets, 109 IEDs, 27 explosively formed projectiles, and captured over 60 

JAM leaders – the city was taken without firing a shot.

Units & Equipment: 

» 2x SFOD-As

» 1x Co Iraqi Special Operations Forces

» 1x Co Iraqi Army

» CJSOTF-AP PSYOP

» Multiple armed Predator UAVs

» ISR orbits

» Entire CJSOAC fleet of MH-60, HH-60, MC-130 

refueler, AC-130, and EW/SI platforms

» Fixed wing A/C sorties (F-16s/F-15s)

» MNC-I/CJSOTF IO & PAO support

» JSTARS

» Other CF and CJSOTF assets/enablers

Geographic Location:

» Iraq, Maysan Province

Dates:

» May 9 - June 19 2008

Highlighted Pillars:

» Understand & Influence

» Indigenous Approach

» Precision Targeting

PILLARS OF ARSOF CAPABILITY 
USASOC 2035 ///// 11 ////

Counter-Lord's Resistance Army

Details:

For almost two decades, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army abducted more 

than 60,000 children, killed tens of thousands of civilians, and caused the displacement of more than 2 million people in Northern Uganda. After moving from 

Uganda into Central Africa, the LRA continued to terrorize communities in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. 

In response to the threat, Special Operations Command Forward-Central Africa 

executed Operation Observant Compass from 2011 to April 2017 to advise, assist, 

and accompany partner forces in the conduct of full spectrum CLRA combat 

operations across South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic 

Republic of Congo. The U.S. Special Operations Command’s determination to rid 

Central Africa of the LRA is reflected in the outstanding work of Military Information 

Support Teams, Special Forces ODAs, and Civil Affairs teams over six years. Critical to 

SOCFWD-Central Africa efforts to render the LRA incapable of threatening partner-nation forces, host-nation governments, and local civilians was the employment of ARSOF PSYOP Soldiers in Regional Military Information Support Teams.

Actions on the Ground: 

» ARSOF efforts in the mission spanned four countries and included countless 

ARSOF engagements with the local populace including medical and veterinarian 

civil-action and advise/assist programs that bolstered partner forces.

» Regional Military Information Support Teams supporting this mission used an 

array of platforms such as aerial loudspeakers, leaflet drops, and key-leader 

engagements to counter LRA narratives while simultaneously bolstering 

partner-nation forces and protecting the local populace.

» RMTs collaborated with non-governmental organizations to counter the LRA 

leading to the establishment of an early warning network for local villages to 

inform authorities of LRA activities. The network degraded LRA freedom of 

movement and stemmed LRA efforts to force abducted children into its ranks.

» The mission contributed to populace protection, secured lines of communication, enabled border stability for multiple African countries, built competent 

partner forces, and developed strong partner relationships.

Outcomes: 

» The Operation Observant Compass MISO program was recognized in House 

Resolution 394 as one of the most effective MISO programs conducted by the 

Department of Defense. 

» Successfully attrited the LRA from 2,000 members to approximately 100.

» Joseph Kony was rendered irrelevant on the world stage.

» The RMTs developed and implemented multiple programs to counter LRA narratives, 

create division within the extremist group, and persuade members to defect.

» In FY16, LRA defection increased 24 percent from the previous year with the 

cumulative number of defections reaching 331.

» Approximately 95 percent reduction in civilians killed since 2010.

» Approximately 70 percent drop in LRA abductions since 2010.

» Five of six LRA leaders were KIA or turned over for trial at The Hague.

» Mitigated regional instability on the borders of multiple African countries in an 

operational area the size of California.

Personnel & Units: 

» ARSOF: Multiple PSYOP RMTs, Special Forces ODAs, 

and Civil Affairs teams operating across Uganda, 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, 

and the Central African Republic.

» ARSOF Partner Forces: Ugandan People’s Defense 

Force, Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Force 

Armees Centrafricaines, Forces Armees Democratique du Congo, Forces Regional Intervention.

» Partner NGOs: Invisible Children; Catholic Relief 

Services; Disbarment, Demobilization, Repatriations, Reintegration, Rehabilitation; Pathways to 

Peace; World Vision; Enough; and Resolve.

Geographic Location:

» Central Africa: Uganda, the 

Democratic Republic of Congo, 

the Central African Republic, 

and South Sudan

Dates:

» 2011 - 2017

Highlighted Pillars:

» Understand & Influence

» Indigenous Approach
//// 12 ///// USASOC 2035

Mali Hotel Terrorist Attack 2015

Details:

The morning of Nov. 20, 2015, terrorists armed with AK-47s stormed the Radisson 

Blu Hotel in Bamako, Mali, shooting anyone that came into view as the attackers 

entered the hotel. The hotel, located in an upscale neighborhood in Bamako, 

served as a hub for international guests. At the time of the shooting, the hotel 

was hosting diplomats working on a peace process for the country following a 

period of conflict with Islamic extremists involving UN and French forces in 

support of the Malian government.

The gunmen drove up to the hotel at the same time as a car with diplomatic 

plates and opened fire. Approximately 140 guests and 30 employees were in the 

hotel when the attack began, many of whom became hostages in the multi-hour 

siege that followed. At least 27 people were killed in the attack. 

U.S. SOF Response:

U.S. Special Operations Forces played a key role in response to the terrorist attack 

on the Radisson Blu Hotel. An ARSOF team leader and two Marine Special 

Operations Command members working for SOCAFRICA responded immediately 

to a call for assistance from the U.S. Embassy in Bamako. They coordinated with 

SOCAFRICA for support and then accompanied the Embassy’s Regional Security 

Officer to the hotel where they located and assisted extraction of Malian and 

American civilians, despite grenade and automatic weapon fire. 

Outcomes: 

» Actions taken by U.S. SOF operators at 

the time of the crisis resulted in the 

rescue and evacuation of 19 Malian and 

American civilians.

» 27 civilians were killed in the hotel by 

terrorist gunmen before Malian security 

forces secured the scene. Many more 

would likely have been killed if not for 

the actions of a few U.S. SOF operators.

» The U.S. Embassy reported that the 

rescue was possible because of the aid 

of U.S. SOF personnel and praised them 

for effective teamwork and interagency 

cooperation during the crisis.

» These SOF operators successfully 

evacuated the civilians without 

sustaining any casualties.

» The incident displays the high return on 

investment that the DoD gets from 

placing mature, experienced SOF 

operators forward in likely trouble 

spots; connecting them across a 

common network and providing 

command relationships that enable 

viable, rapid responses to crises.

Actions on the Ground: 

» Units/Personnel stationed in Mali: 

ARSOF team leader and two 

MARSOC Marines assigned to 

SOCAFRICA who worked with 

U.S. Embassy and SOCAFRICA 

Headquarters personnel.

» ARSOF team leader and MARSOC 

operators notified SOCAFRICA 

Headquarters personnel who 

shifted aviation assets from 

Niamey, Niger, for ISR coverage of 

the incident site and casualty 

evacuation via non-standard 

aviation aircraft.

» SOCAFRICA forward-staged and 

increased the alert posture of the 

AFRICOM Crisis Response Force at 

Ramstein Air Force Base for 

on-order movement to Mali.

» ARSOF operators, working with 

French SOF from Burkina Faso, 

accompanied the French force 

that deployed to Bamako and 

advised/accompanied the Malians 

and French on-site at the hotel.

Geographic Location:

» Bamako, Mali, West Africa

Dates:

» November 20, 2015

Highlighted Pillar:

» Crisis Response

PILLARS OF ARSOF CAPABILITY 
USASOC 2035 ///// 13 ////

Bosnia Flood Response 2014

Details:

In 2014, the ARSOF Civil Military Support Element Bosnia and Herzegovina was 

called on to respond to devastating flooding that hit the country May 15-25. 

Bosnia and Serbia were hardest hit as the River Sava and its tributaries reached 

the highest level in more than 150 years, affecting more than 2.6 million people. 

BiH is a complicated and dynamic environment. The national government is 

designed to give three opposing ethnicities (Serb, Croat, and Bosniak) a voice and 

position within the government, with the three ethnicities having representation 

in each of the national offices. Further, the country is divided into two entities 

and one district: The Federation of BiH, whose population is mostly composed of 

Bosniaks and ethnic Croats; the Republika of Srpska, which is primarily comprised 

of ethnic Serbs; and the Brcko District, which is less than 1 percent of the size and 

population of BiH.

The CMSE worked to enhance the reputation and utility of the Armed Forces of 

BiH (AFBiH) in the eyes of the population. In response to the flooding, the team 

coordinated with the Republika of Srpska Civil Protection Forces and the AFBiH to 

put together an appropriate response. 

NATO and EUFOR Althea forces also supported the AFBiH in the effort to save 

lives in Bosnia, while the Russian Emergency Situations Ministry deployed a small, 

high-risk rescue force to assist in Serbia. The Russian contingent was comprised 

of only 70 personnel, but its effect in the region caused many Bosnian Serbs to 

look toward Russia for help.

Actions on the Ground: 

» The CMSE countered the destabilizing effect of the Russian response by focusing 

on efforts to clean up overwhelming damage caused by the flood and landslides. 

The team also supported thousands of dislocated persons.

» The ARSOF CMSE, European Union, UN, NATO, numerous non-governmental 

agencies, and the AFBiH began a “Build Back Better” campaign that included 

school refurbishment. During a school event, the team learned that many isolated 

mountain communities had not received support. These areas had ties to the 

Mujahedeen, making them a target of Islamic extremist recruitment efforts.

» Working through the FBiH Ministries of Health, the UN’s disaster response Health 

and Sanitation cluster, Austrian Forces Disaster Response Unit, and the U.S. 

Country Team, the CMSE:

• Identified five villages that met criteria for support (proximity, susceptibility, 

location, addressable disaster-related issues).

• By placing the AFBiH in front and using AFBiH aviation, the CMSE expanded its 

influence and that of the BiH national government, while building a system 

that facilitated CMSE recurring engagements with local powerbrokers in 

specific targeted areas.

• Impacted five villages in the targeted area in less than two weeks using their 

skills and OPFUND. Two weeks later, the program spread through local leaders 

to 10 additional villages, reaching more than 25,000 people.

• Joint project with UNDP and USAID spent $40,000, reaching 80,000 people, 

increasing CMSE influence with international partners and expanding CMSE BiH 

operations into 13 communities in less than 30 days.

Outcomes:

» Contained or mitigated the effects of the disaster 

and prevented further loss of life or property.

» Restored order in the immediate aftermath of the 

flood. Reestablished normality through reconstruction and rehabilitation shortly thereafter.

» Gained access and exerted influence over a vulnerable population with the intent to legitimize an 

identified powerbroker and/or government.

Geographic Location:

» Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkan 

Peninsula, Southeastern Europe

Dates:

» May 15-25, 2014

Highlighted Pillars:

» Crisis Response

» Understand and Influence
//// 14 ///// USASOC 2035

USAFRICOM USCENTCOM USEUCOM

ARSOF Highlights 2016-2017 

ARSOF remain fully engaged worldwide, operating in small numbers with the autonomy, authorities, funding, and skills necessary 

to make a difference at the strategic level. The past year continued a trend of high operational tempo across the force as ARSOF 

elements were persistently engaged in all six Geographic Combatant Commands. 

In the U.S. Central Command area of 

operations, ARSOF operated with 

partner forces, to maintain pressure on 

insurgent networks in Afghanistan, 

enabling Afghan forces to retain control 

of key cities under threat from Taliban. 

Additionally, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) established Special 

Operations Joint Task Force-Operation 

Inherent Resolve as the SOF component headquarters of Combined Joint 

Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve 

and is synchronizing SOF activities and 

effects in the fight against ISIS in Iraq 

and Syria. The stand-up of SOJTF-OIR is 

impacting the fight as ARSOF Soldiers 

and other U.S. SOF members and their 

partners make gains, including the 

liberation of Tikrit, Haditha, Ramadi, 

Fallujah and many other cities and areas 

in Iraq. In Syria, SOJTF-OIR efforts have 

enabled opposition forces to seize key 

cities and more than 35,000 square 

kilometers of territory from ISIS.

In the U.S. Africa Command, 

USASOC Soldiers enabled host-nation 

partners to counter violent extremist 

organizations in Somalia, Mali, 

Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and other 

countries where the influence of ISIS 

ramped up hostilities by affiliated 

organizations like Boko Haram. 

Special Forces Soldiers continue to 

man SOC-Forward-North/West Africa 

to synchronize joint SOF effects on 

behalf of Special Operations Command-Africa. Special Operations 

Command-Africa's top priorities also 

include support to humanitarian 

assistance/disaster response across 

the Continent and building the 

capacity of African partner nations to 

address their issues using a regional 

approach. The goal of the command 

is to take care of problems when they 

are small instead of allowing them to 

become larger issues.

In the U.S. European Command 

area of operations, Special Forces, 

Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs 

Soldiers, and Army Special Operations 

aviators are countering Russian 

aggression through combined 

training with our European partners 

and allies. Atlantic Resolve is a 

demonstration of the U.S. government's commitment to collective 

security by strengthening alliances 

through military exercises and 

training events. These partnerships 

built SOF capabilities in countries like 

Ukraine, the Baltic States, and 

Uzbekistan, to name a few. The 

Special Forces establishment of 

Special Operations Command-Forward Eastern Europe synchronized 

those efforts in the region with 

tremendous impact on the counter-Russia line of effort and in countering the ISIS recruitment message in 

countries like Bosnia and Kosovo. 

A YEAR IN REVIEW
USASOC 2035 ///// 15 ////

USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOUTHCOM USEUCOM

These missions represent a small percentage of those executed by ARSOF over the past year. They serve to amplify the fact that 

ARSOF is the only U.S. Special Operations Command formation to maintain a worldwide presence year round in all Geographic 

Combatant Command areas of responsibility. 

In U.S. Pacific Command, Special 

Forces, Rangers, the Special Operations 

Aviation Regiment, Psychological 

Operations, and Civil Affairs maintain 

an enduring presence throughout the 

theater to develop key relationships 

with vital U.S. partners. Recent 

engagements included partner force 

capability development in Cambodia, 

Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Japan, 

Taiwan, Thailand, and Nepal. USASOC 

also maintains a Special Forces 

battalion forward stationed in theater, 

committed to Special Operations 

Command-Pacific and a rotational 

Special Forces company on the Korean 

Peninsula in support of Special 

Operations Command-Korea. 

USASOC’s PACOM-focused elements 

are dedicated to indigenous partnerships and interagency coordination 

with key strategic allies. 

In U.S. Northern Command, Special 

Operations Command-North, in 

partnership with the interagency and 

regional SOF, synchronizes operations 

against terrorist networks, employing 

ARSOF to defend the homeland and 

respond to crisis. USASOC Soldiers in 

the U.S. Northern Command provided 

training, advice, and assistance to 

Mexican partner forces and enabled 

their operations against transregional 

criminal organizations through fusion 

cell activities. 

SOCNORTH's Area of Responsibility encompasses the continental 

United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, 

and the surrounding water out to 

approximately 500 nautical miles. It 

also includes the Bahamas, Puerto 

Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

In U.S. Southern Command, Special 

Forces, Psychological Operations, and 

Civil Affairs teams trained with 

host-nation forces in Belize, El Salvador, 

Honduras, and Guatemala. These and 

other efforts in the region focused on 

achieving effects against the trafficking networks leading to the U.S. 

southern border. 

In Colombia, ARSOF Soldiers 

enabled a host-nation mission that 

captured and destroyed drug making 

chemicals and labs valued in excess of 

$28 million. Instability caused by drug 

traffickers, if left unchecked, can 

threaten hard-won stability in Colombia 

and elsewhere in the region. SOCSOUTH is also responsible for the 

annual Fuerzas Commando, a special 

operations skills competition and senior 

leader seminar designed to promote 

military-to-military relationships, 

interoperability, and regional security.
//// 16 ///// USASOC 2035

ARSOF Through the Joint Campaign Phases

ARSOF EFFECTS ACROSS THE JOINT CAMPAIGN PHASES

ARSOF capabilities are particularly 

suited for employment in the gray zone 

between peace and overt war; however, 

ARSOF capabilities are applicable to all 

phases of joint campaigns. A critical 

aspect of SOF-CF interdependence, 

interoperability, and integration (SOF-CF 

I3) is to ensure conventional and interagency partners understand how ARSOF 

capabilities can open windows of 

opportunity for their success in joint 

campaigns. Achieving this goal requires 

members of the force to accurately 

describe ARSOF effects across all joint 

campaign phases.

ARSOF elements represent a 

multi-spectrum force, focused on the 

human terrain, and optimized for 

competition in the gray zone; however, 

SOF capabilities in gray zones and later 

phases of joint campaigns are largely 

dependent on developing relationships 

and an advanced understanding of 

complex environmental dynamics before 

Phase 3 conflict occurs. 

The current joint campaign construct, 

represented by sequential phases, is 

linear in nature. As a result, campaign 

phasing tends to drive attention toward 

the generation of physical and lethal 

effects on a road to war in Phase 3. In 

actuality, these phases are not independent of one another or compartmented. 

Conditions in an operating environment 

are often complex, with activities for 

various phases bleeding into other 

phases without a clearly defined beginning or ending. 

ARSOF capabilities available in Phase 

3 require preparatory efforts in earlier 

phases. These capabilities include 

leveraging indigenous mass, transforming it into combat power that can 

be employed in support of major combat 

operations. Providing a trained and 

capable partner force for Phase 3 

operations requires investment of time, 

ARSOF personnel, and resources in early 

phases. It is within peacetime or gray 

zone environments that ARSOF develop 

relationships that lead to an advanced 

understanding of trends, emerging 

threats, social, and political friction 

points, and cultural complexities in an 

The Pillars of

ARSOF Capability

Phase 0

SHAPE

Phase 1

DETER

Phase 2

SEIZE 

INITIATIVE

Phase 3

DOMINATE

Indigenous

Approach

Precision

Targeting

Understand

& Influence

Crisis

Response

TASK FORCE DAGGER: AFG

Leverage Indigenous Mass To Create Combat Power

TASK FORCE VIKING: IZ

Establish and Build Relationships, Leverage Indigenous Mass To Create Combat Power

PANAMA

Joint Forcible Entry

ARMED UAS: SY/IZ

High Value Targets & Suppress/Collapse Threat Networks

BALTICS

Regional Relationship Development INFLUENCE OPS: SY/IZ

Narrative Shaping, Deception Operations

PHILIPPINES, NEPAL, HAITI, PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN ———

Crisis Response Through Persistently Deployed and/or CONUS-based Forces

ARSOF EFFECTS 
USASOC 2035 ///// 17 ////

operating environment. Such knowledge 

becomes an enabling factor for conventional force commanders as conditions 

escalate toward overt war. 

A few examples include efforts to 

train, equip, and assist with organizing 

indigenous forces to resist an occupation 

or delay enemy consolidation of gains. 

These efforts create the ability to 

synchronize resistance activities with 

joint force commanders in a way that 

opens windows of opportunity for 

conventional forces. Leveraging indigenous mass and transforming it into 

combat power provides the ability to 

attack enemy C2 nodes, air defense 

systems, and lines of communication with 

and through partner forces. Preparation 

efforts in early phases of joint campaigns 

also enable mobilization of populations 

to act through demonstrations, work 

force strikes, social discord, and reporting 

on enemy activities.

ARSOF engagement and human 

interaction in early phases provide 

situational understanding of key local 

personalities of influence and a means to 

gain information, enabling intelligence 

and targeting processes. Building partner 

capacity in counterterrorism and police 

forces in Phase 0 leads to establishment 

of security forces capable of assisting 

with rear area and population security, 

targeting enemy forces, and providing 

counter-intelligence support to mitigate 

subversion and sabotage in Phase 3. 

Additionally, understanding of human 

terrain in early phases can help promote 

national resilience, counter enemy 

narratives, and influence populations to 

create cognitive effects and multiple 

dilemmas for the enemy.

During Phases 0-2, the joint force 

conducts multi-domain activities to 

expand maneuver, generating both 

physical and cognitive effects in order to 

deter adversaries, assure allies, and deny 

or defeat enemies. Persistent SOF 

activities in Phases 0-2 can reduce the 

quantity and intensity of conflicts that 

reach Phase 3 combat operations, 

allowing the joint force to concentrate 

efforts. The key is employing SOF early so 

capability options are available in Phase 

3 that can be leveraged to open windows of opportunity for joint force 

success in high intensity conflict. 

Phase 4

STABILIZE

Phase 5

ENABLE CIVIL 

AUTHORITY

Phase 0

SHAPE

PLAN COLOMBIA

Support to Populations & Governance, Leverage Indig. Mass To Create Combat Power

SOJTF-AFGHANISTAN

High Value Targets & Suppress/Collapse Threat Networks

OPN YARBOROUGH: IZ

Full Spectrum PSYOP Campaign, Narrative Shaping 

——— NATURAL DISASTERS

SOUTHERN IRAQ 2008; JAM VS. ISF

Crisis Response With/Through Indigenous Forces
//// 18 ///// USASOC 2035

TASK FORCE DAGGER: AFGHANISTAN

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. homeland, Army Special Operations Forces were called upon to deliver the nation's first response. In October 

2001, a small number of Special Forces Soldiers from 5th Special Forces Group 

(Airborne), serving in Task Force Dagger infiltrated Afghanistan aboard 160th 

Special Operations Aviation aircraft from Karshi-Khanabad Airbase in Uzbekistan. 

Once on the ground, they applied an indigenous approach to partner with the 

Northern Alliance through Phases 1-3 of the joint campaign. Their efforts 

leveraged and organized the indigenous mass of multiple factions, enabling 

employment of partner force combat power against the Taliban. Through that 

partnership, Special Forces Soldiers developed an advanced understanding of 

the environment and the enemy, enabling efforts to influence conditions and 

outcomes. The Northern Alliance and their SF advisors, along with interagency 

partners, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and other SOF elements, overthrew the 

Taliban government, effectively clearing the way for an interim government to 

be sworn into office late December 2001.

Examples of ARSOF effects across joint campaign phases 

Following are operational examples of ARSOF effects across joint campaign phases. These examples demonstrate that the four 

Pillars of ARSOF Capability are complementary, creating a layered portfolio of tactical capabilities that can have strategic effects in 

support of joint force commanders and their campaigns. 

CJSOTF – ARABIAN PENINSULA: IRAQ

In Iraq, the indigenous approach was employed by Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs units to enable Coalition stability operations 

during Phases 4-5 of the joint campaign (2003-2011); an effort that was enabled 

by 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and 75th Ranger Regiment 

operations. Under Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian 

Peninsula, Special Forces units built, developed, and advised more than 20 Iraqi 

Special Operations Forces and Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics battalions. 

Special Forces executed thousands of partnered direct action operations with 

these units to suppress insurgent cells. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs 

Soldiers worked with and through these and other partner forces, as well as the 

local population, to understand and influence conditions in support of the 

Coalition stability mission. Together, these efforts bought time and space for 

Coalition force stability operations to gain traction and achieve long-term 

effects. The ARSOF indigenous approach in Phases 4-5 also established enduring 

Iraqi units of action that now spearhead the Government of Iraq’s fight against 

ISIS in Phase 3; a fight that is enabled by ARSOF and joint SOF advisors. 

The long-term and often repeat rotational application of ARSOF in Iraq 

developed understanding of the complex cultural, political, and adversarial 

dynamics at play within the operating environment. Advanced understanding 

enabled ARSOF to wield influence within cities, rural communities, and over 

enemies. Relationships developed over years of commitment in Iraq provided 

ARSOF with the contextual understanding needed to respond with and through 

partner forces to crisis when hostile entities took hostages, attacked Iraqi 

Security Forces, or attempted to take control of city centers, as seen when the 

Jaysh Al-Mahdi militia attempted to seize cities across southern Iraq in 2008. 

Photos from top: SF Soldiers blend in with their Afghan counterparts in 

Afghanistan while calling for close air support in 2001. U.S. Army photo; Soldiers 

from the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) comprised Task Force Dagger in the 

opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom. Known as the Horse Soldiers, the 

teams rode horseback in Afghanistan while working with factions of the Northern 

Alliance. U.S. Army photo; Members of An Nasiriyah ISWAT prepare for a partnered 

direct action raid with their SF advisors in 2008. U.S. Army photo

ARSOF EFFECTS
USASOC 2035 ///// 19

ZAMBOANGA CRISIS: PHILIPPINES 

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces have maintained an enduring relationship 

with the Philippine Armed Forces since 2002, building partner capacity to address 

threats to stability and the established government. In September 2013, the 

long-term partnership between ARSOF, primarily 1st Special Forces Group (A), and 

Filipino forces was put to the test in an environment characterized as Phase 5 of 

the joint campaign construct.

On the morning of Sept. 8, 2013, the town square in Zamboanga City was 

engulfed in a 28-day crisis that left more than 100,000 people homeless and 180 

insurgents dead. The Sulu State Revolutionary Command attacked the city to 

disrupt peace talks concerning a long-standing dispute over representation of the 

Muslim population in the government. During the crisis, more than 200 people 

were taken hostage. 

Within 24 hours of the attack, the Government of the Philippines deployed 

troops to the city and emplaced a naval blockade. Filipino leaders, including the 

President of the Philippines and key members of the military and police forces, 

converged on the area. Advised by ARSOF operators in country, the Filipino leaders 

established their first ever fully operational joint TOC. At the TOC, ARSOF members 

stayed in constant contact with partner forces operating across Zamboanga, 

guiding and mentoring them as fighting continued. On Sept. 16, negotiations 

between insurgents and the government failed, leading to an escalation in 

violence. Over the next several days, fighting spread and the death toll rose until 

Filipino forces were finally able to overwhelm the insurgents and force their 

surrender, enabling the Philippine Government to take control of the city.

The Filipino and ARSOF response to the attack on Zamboanga City validates the 

effectiveness of 15 years of partnership. It also represents how the ARSOF indigenous 

approach to operations generates combat power for use when crisis erupts. 

These examples highlight actions executed by USASOC members that made a strategic difference in support of joint campaigns 

and efforts to address crisis. They are a few of the many examples of how ARSOF operators employ the four Pillars of ARSOF 

Capability in complex environments.

Photos from top: Army SOF with Philippine Partner Forces, survey damaged areas of 

Zamboanga City, Philippines, after rogue members of the Sulu State Revolutionary 

Commandattacked the district. U.S. Army photo by SPC Andrew Robertson; An Army 

Special Forces Soldier studies the hide site of an enemy sniper after the attack. The 

snipers were taken out by recent graduates of the Philippine Army sniper course 

developed by U.S. Army Special Forces. U.S. Army photo; Haitians left homeless following 

the earthquake in 2010 gather in a displaced persons camp. U.S. Army photo.

PORT-AU-PRINCE EARTHQUAKE: HAITI

On Jan. 12, 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck the capital of Haiti, Port-auPrince, killing as many as 300,000 people and destroying much of the city infrastructure 

and that of its surrounding areas. In response to the crisis, the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion 

conducted humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations in the country from 

January through April, working through Phases 4 and 5 of the joint campaign. The 

battalion established a humanitarian-assistance coordination center that assessed and 

analyzed civil vulnerabilities, conducted civil-information management, and developed 

the humanitarian common operating picture. The battalion played a critical role in the 

evolution of Operation Unified Response from the life-saving phase through the 

life-sustaining phase and into recovery and transition. 

CA teams augmented the disaster-response team from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and performed liaison with the UN’s Office for 

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. They also provided the JTF-H commander, 

Lieutenant General P.K. Keen, interface with USAID, the UN, the international humanitarian community, and specific representatives of the government of Haiti. ARSOF CA 

efforts were essential to normalizing life in Haiti following the earthquake.
Partner Force Capacity / Capability

Time

////20///// USASOC 2035

ARSOF Model for Building Enduring Partner Capability

Indigenous Cadre Led /

SOF Advised Efforts

Recruit / Vet 

Candidates

Recruit / Vet 

Candidates

Recruit / Vet 

Candidates

SOF Advisor Led

Assessment /

Selection Course

SOF Advisor Led

Assessment /

Selection Course

SOF Advisor Developed /

Led Qualification Course

(Cadre Assist)

Additional Cadre

Identified in

Selection Courses

SOF Advisor Developed /

Led Formal Cadre

Qualification Course

Unit Leadership / Cadre Development

(Initial Selectees)

SOF Advisor Led Training / Operations

Army Special Forces

Advisor Led Efforts

Force Generation

Institution

SOF establishes institutional system for

host nation force generation

Connection to

Host Nation Gov’t

SOF connects partner force to 

legitimate government and legal processes

HOW WE BUILD PARTNER FORCES
USASOC 2035 /////21 ////

Members of ARSOF continue to build and 

develop effective partner forces in countries 

around the world to win against determined 

enemies. The success of those forces is facilitated 

by the way in which ARSOF build partner capacity. 

Aspects of the ARSOF approach include:

» Deliberate focus on rapport building 

» Advisor/trainer continuity across multiple 

rotations of engagement

» Establishment of an institutional system for 

partner training and force generation

» Emphasis on leader development including a 

proactive cadre of noncommissioned officers 

» Advisor proximity to the partner force in 

living, training, and operating environments 

» Recognition that partner capacity building 

takes time 

» Development of unit identity, esprit de corps, 

and a unique organizational culture 

» Quality of partner-force equipment

The vignettes on the following pages highlight 

successes of the ARSOF approach to building 

partner forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia. 

Each example demonstrates cases in which ARSOF 

built, trained, and developed effective partner 

forces through persistent and deliberate engagement. These vignettes represent only a few of the 

many partner forces around the world that endure 

and succeed as a result of ARSOF partnership. 

TRANSFORMING

INDIGENOUS MASS 

INTO COMBAT POWER

ARSOF Approach to 

Building Partner Forces

Indigenous Cadre

Led / SOF Advised

Assessment / 

Selection Course

TRADITIONAL AREA OF JOINT SOF SUPPORT TO

ARSOF CAPACITY BUILDING MISSIONS.

Indig. Cadre Led /

SOF Advised Qual. & Cadre 

Courses

SOF

Advised 

Operations

Multiple iterations conducted over time, as needed, to 

grow the force while ensuring quality of training. 

Critical to keep student to instructor ratio low.

Essential for partners

to sustain an enduring capability

Legitimizes capacity building effort; establishes

means to pay, equip, and sustain the force
////22///// USASOC 2035

Iraqi Counterterrorism Service

The Iraqi Counterterrorism Service 

represents an elite military force, organizational structure, and institutional force 

generation capability, all of which were 

built by U.S. Army Special Forces beginning in late 2003. Growth and development of the force was fostered through 

partnered training and operations with 

U.S. Special Forces and other SOF elements through December 2011. Following 

the official U.S. military withdrawal from 

Iraq in 2012, advise and assist efforts with 

the CTS were again initiated by U.S. Special 

Forces under the U.S. State Department. 

The U.S. Special Forces advisor relationship 

with CTS continues today as the Government of Iraq faces new security challenges. Current composition of this Iraqi 

force includes the CTS Headquarters, the 

Counterterrorism Command (CTC), three 

Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigades 

operationally controlled by the CTC, and a 

training institution known as the Academia. Approximately 10,000 Iraqi soldiers 

now serve under the CTS with each ISOF 

Brigade containing 2,000-2,500 soldiers. 

Over the course of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (March 17, 2003-August 31, 2010) 

and Operation New Dawn (Sept. 1, 

2010-December 15, 2011), U.S. Special 

Forces established and developed various 

Iraqi military special operations and 

police special weapons and tactics units 

in cities across Iraq. The effort to build 

and develop the CTS stands as one of the 

most successful of these initiatives. It 

began with U.S. Special Forces recruiting 

and screening Iraqi personnel in late 2003 

following directives issued by the U.S. 

Secretary of Defense. The directives 

called for the establishment of the 36th 

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Battalion and 

the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force. These 

two battalions were formed, trained, and 

employed by U.S. Special Forces until May 

2004 when U.S. Central Command 

directed the stand-up of an ISOF brigade. 

U.S. Special Forces incorporated the two 

partner units into the new brigade, 

making the 36th ICDC Battalion, the 1st 

Battalion (Commandos), and ICTF the 2nd 

Battalion of the new ISOF Brigade. U.S. 

Special Forces also established a force 

generation and training institution within 

ISOF in 2004, designated the Iraqi Special 

Warfare Center and School (later renamed 

the Academia) that was modeled on the 

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special 

Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. 

U.S. Special Forces and ISOF partnered 

training and combat operations steadily 

expanded the size and capabilities of 

ISOF between 2004 and 2007. By 

December 2007, the ISOF Brigade reached 

HOW WE BUILD PARTNER FORCES
Photos: Iraqi Army soldiers go through the CTS selection 

process. The CTS is Iraq’s elite counterterrorism force and 

has proven to be an effective fighting force against ISIL. 

U.S. Army photos by SSG Alex Manne

USASOC 2035 /////23////

a personnel strength of 3,500 highly 

trained Iraqi soldiers. In the spring of 

2007, U.S. Special Forces created the CTC 

to operationally control ISOF and the CTS 

Headquarters to advise the Iraqi Prime 

Minister on counterterrorism and related 

issues. The CTC and CTS were designed 

to connect ISOF to the Iraqi Government 

and provide a conduit for resourcing the 

formation after the U.S. withdrawal. The 

CTC became subordinate to the CTS soon 

after being established, effectively linking 

ISOF to the legitimate authority of the 

Iraqi Government. 

Between 2008 and 2009, U.S. Special 

Forces began transitioning control of CTS, 

to include the CTC and the ISOF Brigade, 

to the Iraqi Government while partnered 

operations and training continued. In May 

2008, Iraqi Government and CTS leaders 

decided to expand ISOF to 8,500 personnel and by July 2009, with the support 

of U.S. Special Forces advisors and 

trainers, the 2nd ISOF Brigade was 

established. The 3rd ISOF Brigade was 

established in the spring of 2013, also 

with the support of U.S. Special Forces 

advisers. Following the stand-up, CTS 

personnel strength peaked at approximately 13,000 in the fall of 2013. 

Although the CTS faced challenges 

related to force expansion and moves by 

the Iraqi Prime Minister to advance 

sectarian agendas post U.S. withdrawal, 

the CTS remained highly effective. From 

2004 through 2011, partnered U.S. Special 

Forces and CTS operations detained more 

than 9,000 insurgents and terrorism 

suspects. Similar trends in detainee 

The Iraqi 

Counterterrorism 

Service represents 

an elite 

military force, 

organizational 

structure, and 

institutional force 

generation 

capability, all of 

which were built

by U.S. Army

Special Forces.

numbers were seen through 2013 as well, 

indicating ISOF effectiveness beyond U.S. 

Special Forces partnered operations. 

The rise of Islamic State, or Daesh, 

opened a new chapter in CTS history and 

provided new evidence of ISOF effectiveness, resiliency, and adaptability. Daesh 

occupation of Fallujah and much of 

Ramadi in early 2014 created an emergency for the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi 

response fell largely to the CTS as the force 

designated to spearhead attacks to retake 

the cities and other occupied areas within 

Western Iraq. In each case, the CTS 

displayed tenacity and valor uncommon 

to other Iraqi forces as they gained ground 

and surged to new areas of Daesh 

occupation to again lead attacks. Amid the 

intense combat responsibility carried by 

CTS forces in early 2014 as they battled 

Daesh, ISOF operators successfully rescued 

approximately 1,000 university students 

held by Daesh in Ramadi. 

Today, the CTS is the Iraqi Government’s force of choice to lead attacks to 

retake Daesh-occupied cities, shouldering 

the majority of the combat burden in the 

current fight. The CTS spearheaded 

operations to retake Tikrit, held on at the 

Baiji oil refinery when other Iraqi units 

retreated, routed Daesh at Haditha, and 

liberated Ramadi. In April 2016, the CTS 

seized the city of Hit from a Daesh 

occupying force. While many Iraqi units 

are seen as ineffective against Daesh, the 

CTS holds key terrain and seizes new 

ground against a determined enemy. 

As the CTS faces new challenges in the 

fight against Daesh, it has adapted and 

transformed. CTS forces, once designed for 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

precision raids have transformed into 

combined arms maneuver forces that 

employ armor and indirect fires in a 

synchronized manner. The organization is 

countering Daesh tactics and continues to 

demonstrate the will to fight, the innovation 

to succeed, and dedication to assigned 

missions despite shouldering the heaviest 

combat burden of any Iraqi force. 
////24///// USASOC 2035

The Afghan Special Operations Kandaks 

represent battalions primarily built and 

developed by U.S. Special Forces with 

training support from other SOF elements 

including U.S. Navy SEALs, U.S. Marine 

Corps Special Operations Teams, and NATO 

SOF members. There are now 10 SOKs 

divided between two brigades under the 

Afghan National Army Special Operations 

Corps headquarters (ANASOC). ANASOC 

also contains a force-generation institution, 

the ANASOC School of Excellence, in 

charge of selecting and training SOK 

Soldiers. The SOKs, two brigade headquarters, ANASOC headquarters, and the 

institution were established in a partner 

capacity-building effort that began in 2007. 

Each Kandak consists of three Afghan 

National Army Commando companies 

and one company of ANA Special Forces. 

The Afghan Commando companies are 

modeled after U.S. Army Ranger formations and represent elite light-infantry 

forces that execute reconnaissance, direct 

Afghan Special Operations

action, and internal defense operations. 

They are often employed to clear 

insurgents from key terrain normally held 

by Afghan local police forces. The ANASF 

are modeled on U.S. Army Special Forces 

units and conduct a variety of similar 

missions to their U.S. counterparts 

including air assaults, reconnaissance, and 

partner-force training. The ANASF aid U.S. 

Special Forces in training and mentoring 

Afghan local police. 

In order to create the ANA Special 

Forces companies, the best performers 

were selected from the Commando 

companies to fill leadership roles in the 

new Special Forces elements. While the 

Commandos were trained in direct action 

techniques and skills by U.S. Special Forces 

teams, it was to the Afghan Special Forces 

personnel that U.S. Special Forces advisors 

passed on some of their most important 

lessons: how to think strategically, how to 

negotiate complex challenges, and how to 

engage the population and build trust.

 Before the December 2014 U.S. 

troop reduction, the Afghan SOKs were 

advised and accompanied by U.S. Special Forces. Now the SOKs primarily fight 

independently; an option made possible 

by the successful application of the ARSOF 

approach to building partner forces.

On Sept. 28, 2015, the SOKs and other 

ARSOF partner forces were put to the test 

when Taliban militants took control of 

Kunduz City. The response of Afghan 

special operations units was swift and 

effective, as the SOKs played a substantial 

role in recapturing the city on Oct. 1. The 

victory highlighted the increased role of the 

SOK soldiers in countering insurgent 

operations around the country. Jawid 

Kohistani, a Kabul-based military analyst, 

explained that by, "using their superior 

tactics and training, they were able to take 

control of Kunduz with minimal casualties 

and inflict maximum casualties on the 

enemy." The swift recapture of Kunduz 

proved that the SOKs represented, "elite 

HOW WE BUILD PARTNER FORCES
“It was to the Afghan Special Forces that 

the U.S. Special Forces passed on some of 

their most important lessons: how to

think strategically; how to negotiate 

complex challenges; and how to engage 

the population and build trust."

Photo left page: U.S. Army Special Forces work alongside partner forces in Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo by SSG. Russell Lee 

Klika. Photos right, from top: Afghan key leaders of the 6th Special Operations Kandak and their U.S. mentors conduct a 

mission readiness exercise near Kabul, Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo by SPC Connor Mendez; An Afghan commando leader from 

the 6th SOK gives a mission brief to his company about an upcoming operation. U.S. Army photo by SPC Connor Mendez; 1st SOK 

Commandos speak with a villager in Nangarhar province. U.S. Army photo by PFC Sha'Quille Stokes; A 1st SOK Commando finds 

drugs after searching a compound. U.S. Army photo by PFC Sha'Quille Stokes; Soldiers from the 8th SOK and partner Coalition 

special operations forces conduct a patrol near Daykundi province. U.S. Navy Photo by Petty Officer First Class Jacob Dillon

USASOC 2035 /////25////

fighters who can win battles,” according 

to Sediq Sediqqi, spokesperson for the 

Afghan Interior Minister. In yet another 

positive assessment of SOK capabilities, 

Atiqullah Amarkhail, a military expert and 

former Afghan general, said, "When it 

comes to local forces, they're the 

best-trained and best-armed to deal with 

the security challenges in our country." 

In early 2017, there were 17,000 

Afghan special operations troops and in 

March 2017 the Afghan Government 

announced a long-term plan to double 

the size of the force, which currently 

carries out nearly 70 percent of ANA 

offensive operations countrywide. 

ANASOC forces represent a small fraction 

of the 300,000-strong Afghan Army; 

become trusted friendships over time 

between ARSOF and partner force operators. ARSOF personnel influence the culture 

of partner units through these strong 

connections, transferring values to the 

partner force; respect for human rights, rule 

of law, and civilian control of the military. 

Persistent engagement and proximity to a 

partner force are key aspects of the ARSOF 

approach to building partner capacity and 

essential to establishing enduring connections between forces. 

While visiting the U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 

at Fort Bragg in 2011, then-Brig. Gen. 

Lawang, head of ANA Special Operations 

Forces, acknowledged the unique relationship between his forces and U.S. Special 

however, they are the force of choice for 

the Afghan Government in times of crisis 

and for the most challenging operations.

As seen in countries around the world 

where ARSOF elements build partner 

forces, persistent engagement and close 

proximity to the partner force in living, 

training, and operating environments 

produce results. Persistent engagement 

and close proximity facilitate development 

of strong relationships between advisors 

and partners. Professional relationships 

Forces. He noted that while U.S. Special 

Forces have long been referred to as a 

"brotherhood," he had the opportunity to 

see a new brotherhood develop out of the 

unique relationship between his force and 

the U.S. partners. "Our partnership has 

changed to brotherhood between our 

forces," he explained. "We work together, 

train together, eat together, and we spend 

time together. When we go into the field 

and shed blood — we do it together." 
////26///// USASOC 2035

Colombian Armed Forces 

U.S. SOF engagement in Colombia is 

regarded by many diplomats and military 

officials as one of the most effective 

capacity-building efforts to date and 

serves as a reminder that persistent 

engagement is critical to success. ARSOF 

partner-capacity building in Colombia 

began during the 1960s and included 

military trainers, Civil Affairs personnel, 

and Psychological Operations specialists 

tasked with establishing new units. U.S. 

Special Forces established the first 

Colombian Special Forces battalion in 

1970. By the end of the decade, three 

Colombian Special Forces battalions were 

active and receiving persistent training. 

American interest in Colombia increased in 

response to the rise of the Colombian 

cocaine industry and the brutality of drug 

kingpins. The U.S. deployed multiple SOF 

elements to train Colombian forces for 

operations against the cartels. 

The U.S. efforts expanded in 1998 

under Plan Colombia to address threats 

posed by multiple insurgent groups and 

in response to the transition of operations by the Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia, or the FARC, from guerrilla 

warfare to overt conventional warfare. 

Plan Colombia increased resources 

available to the armed forces and 

concentrated on elite civil and military 

units and capabilities. It increased the U.S. 

military advisory presence, permitted the 

provision of advanced technology to 

Colombian forces, and increased the size 

of the anti-narcotics police commandos, 

known as the Junglas, from one to four 

companies under the training and 

mentorship of SF. The plan funded the 

creation of a counternarcotics brigade 

consisting of battalions with access to the 

quantity and quality of helicopters used 

by U.S. air assault battalions. 

From 1999-2007, SF worked to establish 

and expand partner capacity in the Junglas. 

In 1999, SF began creating the dedicated 

counternarcotics battalions and their 

brigade headquarters. The expansion of 

Plan Colombia widened the scope of SF 

training to include counternarcotics, 

counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. In 

support of the wider scope, SF also focused 

on boosting the capabilities of two 

additional existing elite units. Those units 

were the Special Forces Commando 

Brigade and a dedicated hostage-rescue 

unit designated the Unified Action Groups 

for Personal Liberty. Additionally, SF Soldiers 

were instrumental in establishing the 

Commando Brigade, Rapid Deployment 

Force, and the Urban Counterterrorism 

Special Forces Group. Other U.S. SOF 

support to Colombian partner forces 

between 1999 and 2007 included U.S. Civil 

Affairs and Psychological Operations 

personnel who worked to advance the 

legitimacy of the Colombian government 

over that of insurgents and drug traffickers. 

U.S. Navy SEALs also conducted partnered 

training for riverine units tasked with 

patrolling Colombia’s 18,000 km of 

navigable waterways. 

By 2007, Colombian units were motivated and actively engaging insurgents and 

traffickers in enemy controlled territory and 

in safe havens outside of Colombia. 

Colombian Soldiers were following strict 

codes of conduct and using discretion in 

their application of force. The former 

officer-centric Colombian Army model was 

replaced with one that centered on a 

proactive NCO cadre focused on solving 

problems at the tactical level. Additionally, 

the U.S. SOF built, trained, and developed 

partner forces were beginning their own 

efforts to train partners across Central and 

South America to include Argentina, Belize, 

Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 

Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. 

The Colombian government and 

security forces demonstrated the results of 

long-term U.S. SOF engagement in 2008, 

locating and rescuing 15 high-profile 

hostages held by the FARC. These hostages 

included three American citizens captured 

in 2003 and the former Colombian 

presidential candidate, Ingrid Betancourt. 

During the operation, disguised Colombian 

SOF personnel met with FARC captors and 

led them to believe that the disguised 

operators were members of a sympathetic 

organization. The hostages were freed 

without firing a shot. 

By 2010, Colombian SOF units were 

considered by U.S. advisors to be on par in 

training and equipment with U.S. SOF and 

more capable than many of their counterparts from countries around the world. 

Additionally, Colombian SOF and police 

units were executing partnered training in 

more than 20 countries in Central and 

South America and Africa while contributing to Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. 

These measures of effectiveness stand as 

proof that persistent efforts to build partner 

capacity in Colombia were successful. 

HOW WE BUILD PARTNER FORCES
USASOC 2035 /////27////

Each of the examples in this section from Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Colombia demonstrate that 

the ARSOF approach to partner capacity 

building is deliberate, persistent, and requires a 

long-term view of how a partner unit will progress. These 

and other key aspects of the SOF approach follow: 

Rapport Building

Strong rapport between advisors and members of a 

partner force is an essential and foundational aspect of 

the ARSOF approach to capability development. All 

efforts to build partner capacity begin with developing 

strong rapport and trust between advisors and the 

partner force.

Advisor/Trainer Continuity

Aligning the same units for multiple rotations with a 

partner force provides continuity of focus and a consistent 

trajectory for partner force development. Advisor and 

trainer continuity also enables stronger rapport to develop 

over years of engagement.

Institutional Development

The establishment of an institutional system for the host 

nation to conduct force generation through standardized 

training allows partners to sustain an enduring capability. 

Establishing an institutional framework is integral to the 

ARSOF approach to partner capacity development. 

Although not detailed in this document, an institutional 

focus was also instrumental in Colombia, as with all 

successful ARSOF partner capacity-building efforts. 

Leader and Cadre Development

Successful ARSOF efforts to build partner capacity include 

a major emphasis on developing partner force leaders and 

a trained cadre of proactive NCOs (‘train the trainer’). 

Quality of Equipment

Partner forces should be equipped in a manner that facilitates 

execution of assigned missions and operations at the level of 

performance expected of them. Appropriate equipment 

further facilitates development of a partner force’s confidence, esprit de corps, and unit identity. When considered in 

context with methods of assessment and selection, training, 

and partnered operations, equipping becomes a multiplying 

factor for the development of a resilient force.

Proximity in Living, Training, and 

Operating Environments

ARSOF trainers practice what they teach in combat and other 

operations with partner forces, when possible. Proximity in 

training and operations equates to greater gains in partner 

abilities over a shorter period of time. Ideally, ARSOF 

members live among, train, and fight alongside the partner 

force. Personal observation during accompanied operations 

allows U.S. advisors to evaluate partner force performance 

and provide feedback during operations to more rapidly 

advance partner force learning. Proximity is also crucial in 

transferring values to the partner force — respect for human 

rights, rule of law, and civilian control of the military are best 

inculcated in the partner force as they see it modeled on a 

daily basis by their U.S. advisors. In Colombia, U.S. SOF 

members were not permitted to accompany partner forces 

during combat operations. The constraint required a longer 

period of partnership before gains in capability translated to 

operational successes for Colombian forces. 

Partner Capacity Building Takes Time

Building quality elite units cannot be rushed and requires 

sustained and persistent effort over years, even when 

advisors are permitted to accompany and advise partner 

forces during combat operations. After forces are built and 

institutional development is complete, episodic reengagements are often necessary to help the partner force evolve 

to changing demands.

Unit Identity, Esprit de Corps, and

Unique Organizational Culture

Resilience in a partner force is fostered over the long-term 

through strength of unit identity, esprit de corps, and a unique 

organizational culture. ARSOF enable development of these 

aspects by treating partner force members as respected peers 

that are specially selected and trained to a degree that fosters 

trust in combat between advisor and partner. ARSOF capacity 

building efforts seek to create conditions within a partner unit 

that develop confidence and bond members while building 

strong unit identity, esprit de corps, and a special organizational culture. Without these elements, a partner force will 

likely fracture when faced with adversity. 

Building effective security forces is challenging. 

However, through deliberate employment of the ARSOF 

approach to building partner capabilities, partner forces 

can develop, endure, and succeed.

The ARSOF Approach to Partner Capacity Building
////28///// USASOC 2035

A Joint Force, Global Network, and 

Advocate for SOF-CF I3 

U.S. Special Operations elements operate and fight as a joint force with operators and 

units serving as nodes in a global network. Each node contributes to greater SOF 

understanding of transregional trends, opportunities, or threats in support of joint force 

commanders, Ambassadors, or other elements of the U.S. Government. SOF capabilities 

are rapidly deployable, scalable, and tailorable by nature with worldwide reach. Within 

the joint force, many ARSOF personnel and formations are regionally aligned, contrib-

— Army Campaign Plan 2017 —

“Interdependence, interoperability,

and integration between conventional 

forces and special operations across the 

Total Army complements strategic 

readiness to conduct decisive action.” 

uting to the SOF network’s understanding of environments through use of advanced 

language skills and a high level of cultural and regional expertise. These aspects uniquely 

position SOF, and specifically ARSOF, to contribute to joint campaign success through 

better SOF-conventional force interdependence, interoperability, and integration. As the 

nation faces dynamic and changing conditions in the global security environment, it is 

SOF-CF I3 that will help maximize effectiveness of our nation’s military operations across 

all phases of joint campaigns. 

SOF-CF I3
USASOC 2035 /////29////

USASOC Efforts to 

Advance SOF-CF I3

In 2015, USASOC initiated efforts to 

improve the way in which SOF and CF 

elements function together in training and 

operating environments. These efforts 

continue and build upon successes 

achieved in past years through:

» SOF-CF training at home station 

and OCONUS

» Establishment of the U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 

School (the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence) Security 

Force Assistance Foreign Weapons 

Course for CF Soldiers

» ARSOAC support to conventional 

aviation units preparing for campaign 

plan requirements

» Special Operations Center of Excellence 

collaboration and exchanges with the 

Army Centers of Excellence

» 75th Ranger Regiment personnel 

contributions to CF (75th Ranger 

Regiment Charter)

» USASOC and FORSCOM partnership for 

SOF-CF communications/network 

connectivity testing and validation 

» USASOC units participating in 16 

Combat Training Center rotations and 

four of nine MCTP iterations in FY16

» USASOC units participating in 18 CTC 

rotations, one JMRC rotation, and five 

MCTP (Warfighter Exercises) in FY17

» Participation in Army Force 2025 and 

Beyond (F2025B) processes

 ARSOF elements conduct partner capacity building around the world with a daily 

presence in more than 70 countries; however, there are more than 190 nations on 

Earth. Geographic Combatant Command requirements for building partner capacity 

far exceed SOF's capacity to address the needs of all nations and partner forces. 

In recent years, the U.S. Army has fielded forces for advise and assist missions by 

assigning elements from within Brigade Combat Teams to fill partner capacity 

building requirements; a mission the Army has had for more than 40 years. 

Assigning these missions to BCT units deconstructs brigades and negatively 

impacts their readiness to address high-intensity conflict contingencies. 

There is a capability gap when it comes to dedicated forces trained and 

available to meet GCC partner building capacity demands. The U.S. Army is 

moving to address the capability gap through establishment of Security Force 

Assistance Brigades. The SFABs will provide dedicated force structure to instititionalize the Army’s commitment to SFA and to meet GCC SFA demands without 

deconstructing BCTs or degrading readiness. They will also provide senior 

Army leaders the capability and flexibility to expand the force in the event of a 

larger contingency. 

In early 2017, the U.S. Army announced its intent to stand-up six SFABs — five 

Active Component and one National Guard — between 2017 and 2024. Although 

these elements will be much smaller than a traditional BCT, they will provide a platform 

from which the Army can quickly build full BCTs if requirements emerge for force 

expansion. The SFAB initiative represents the Army's effort to optimize force structure 

to address a long-standing mission requirement the U.S. Army has had since Vietnam. 

As an example of past efforts, the U.S. Army established the Military Advisor 

Training Academy at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the 1960s to address 

requirements for Vietnam. The Army intends to establish a new MATA at Fort 

Benning, Georgia, as part of the training pipeline for SFAB members with a 

projected capacity to graduate 750 Soldiers per year. Language and cultural 

training will also be part of the training pipeline. SFAB members will be trained to 

focus on advise and assist missions in permissive or semi-permissive environments. ARSOF is positioned to enable SFAB success through training efforts such 

as the USAJFKSWCS SFA Foreign Weapons Course and other collaborative 

initiatives specifically designed to train conventional U.S. Army personnel. 

Ultimately, SFABs are a means for the Army to address its long standing requirement to advise and assist host nation conventional forces and to fill often unaddressed capacity development requirements in GCCs globally.

Photos left page (top left, down): SOF and CF Soldiers 

participate in a role playing exercise at the Joint Readiness 

Training Center, Fort Polk, La. U.S. Army photo; CF Soldiers 

receive training on all-terrain vehicles from SF Soldiers.

U.S. Army photo by SPC. Robert Venegas; SOF and CF Soldiers 

collaborate during a joint exercise at the Joint Readiness 

Training Center, Fort Polk, La. U.S. Army photo; SF Soldiers 

receive training on TOW missiles from CF Soldiers during a 

live fire exercise. U.S. Army photo by SPC Alexis Concepcion; 

Photo left page (top right): CF Soldiers attend the Security 

Force Assistance Foreign Weapons Course at the U.S. Army 

Special Operations Center of Excellence. U.S. Army photo 

by SSG Robert Burley; Photo right page: MG William P. 

Yarborough is briefed on the MATA Course at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina, circa 1962. U.S. Army photo.

SFABs + SOF: Winning in a Complex World
////30///// USASOC 2035

The Future Operating Environment 

While ARSOF elements maintain 

long-standing missions like those in 

Colombia and Mali, the force must also 

prepare for the future. The future operating 

environment will be populated by state and 

non-state adversaries that employ hybrid 

forms of conflict to challenge U.S. influence 

internationally. Competing nations such as 

Iran, Russia, North Korea, and China will 

challenge the current international security 

dynamic as they seek greater influence over 

regional neighbors. Additionally, a variety 

of violent extremist and criminal organizations will attempt to advance their agendas 

transregionally at the expense of populations and established forms of governance. 

These state and non-state actors will likely 

exploit opportunities to diminish U.S. 

military, economic, and/or political 

dominance until internal conditions or 

exterior deterrence changes their course. 

Although the possibility of overt 

confrontation remains a persistent aspect of 

the future environment, adversaries will 

more likely challenge the stability of regions 

and U.S. interests through indirect means in 

the gray zone between peace and overt 

war. Adversarial actions in gray zones will 

seek to achieve irreversible gains at the 

expense of U.S. interests, as our adversaries 

leverage asymmetric technologies, 

disaffected minority elements of populations, and exploit weak governance. This 

changing character of war is enabled by the 

hyper-connected nature of the global 

environment, allowing hostile entities to 

influence vulnerable populations and hijack 

local grievances in ways that threaten 

regional security. The growing nature of this 

threat was highlighted by the raging fire of 

the Arab Spring, and continues today. 

Threats to stability in gray zones will likely 

emerge more rapidly, requiring the U.S. to 

have immediately employable options to 

counter adversarial actions. Ultimately, these 

challenges have driven, and will continue to 

drive, the need for ARSOF’s unique capabilities and skills, broadening the lens and 

challenging the idea that ARSOF should 

train for a certain threat matrix or execute 

campaigns in a single kind of conflict. 

Forms of Future Conflict: 

The chosen forms of conflict for future 

adversaries are expected to be hybrid in 

nature, blending conventional, irregular, 

informational, and Cyber capabilities to 

advance state and non-state agendas. 

The Cyber environment will be central to 

many adversarial actions as hostile state 

and non-state actors attempt to influence 

populations. Hostile entities will continue 

to challenge stability in the security 

environment through actions short of 

maneuver warfare and approaches that 

may be indirect in nature. Hybrid forms of 

conflict offer cost effective means to 

challenge U.S. influence internationally. 

Indirect approaches allow adversaries to 

avoid confronting U.S. power or provoking an international response while 

seeking irreversible gains in the regional 

balance of power. As a result, hybrid 

forms of conflict that challenge U.S. 

dominance and influence through 

indirect approaches are the likely choice 

for adversaries of the future.

Globalization, Technology, and 

Speed of Threat Development:

In a world shaped by globalization, 

unpredictable and rapid technological 

change will force shifts in political, 

FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
USASOC 2035 /////31 ////

ARSOF effectiveness over the next 20 years requires USASOC to evaluate 

implications of the future operating environment and to initiate action in an effort 

to provide capabilities for use by the force in the years ahead. Following are 

aspects of the future operating environment that warrant specific focus for 

USASOC capability development and their implications on the force. 

1. State actors of the future will likely possess advanced access denial and 

communications detection, denial, and encryption technology; transregional 

non-state actors will employ evolving technology to conceal and encrypt 

communications and deliver lethal attacks with minimal personnel, requiring 

ARSOF to:

» Employ targeting processes/systems that maintain an advantage over adversaries 

» Avoid or mitigate detection and geolocation in denied, semi-permissive, and 

permissive environments 

» Be capable of moving greater distances and with more efficiency (aviation and 

other mobility capabilities) 

» Employ integrated air defense system penetration capabilities for rotary wing 

and unmanned aerial systems 

» Employ advanced unmanned aerial systems and intelligence collection capabilities at the tactical level 

» Engage hostile threats over greater distances 

2. Forms of conflict in the future are likely to be hybrid in nature, blending 

conventional and irregular capabilities, requiring ARSOF to: 

» Advance direct-action and hostage-rescue capabilities 

» Develop and leverage strong joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partnerships 

» Achieve SOF-CF interdependence, interoperability, and integration 

» Maintain a portfolio of complementary capabilities across the spectrum of 

special operations 

» Fully understand the aspects of hybrid conflict and codify doctrine for operations 

to counter hybrid threats 

» Evolve intelligence collection, analysis, and synthesis capabilities, particularly with 

regard to understanding and characterizing the Human Domain and indicators/

warnings for gray zone threats 

3. Cyber-based technology will become more important for targeting, situational 

awareness, intelligence analysis, mission command, and to influence vulnerable populations and governments, while Cyber security will become more 

difficult to guarantee. These issues require ARSOF to: 

» Counter threat communications, influence, and operational planning/execution 

in the Cyber realm 

» Protect friendly networks from advanced Cyber threats 

» Integrate Cyber capabilities into operations (influence operations, digital 

deception, communication disruption, and disinformation campaigns)

4. Threats to stability in operating environments are likely to emerge more 

rapidly in the future, requiring ARSOF to: 

» Achieve sustainable full-spectrum readiness across the force 

» Be rapidly deployable to counter emerging threats 

» Quickly detect, analyze, and understand emerging threats 

» Enable swift/sound decision making processes at the tactical/operational levels

» Establish strong relationships with host-nation partners using advanced language, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities 

5. Diminishing costs associated with WMD technology and the potential for 

destabilized governments to lose control of weapons require ARSOF to: 

» Be capable of tracking, monitoring, and countering WMD 

» Be educated/trained for counter WMD related operations

military, and economic power. The barriers 

for adversaries to acquire and develop 

advanced technology, including Cyber and 

access denial systems, will diminish. 

Adversaries will need minimal investment 

to employ social media and informational 

technology to influence vulnerable 

populations, spread their ideologies, 

gather support, fund operations, crowdsource intelligence, and share techniques. 

Access to advanced technology provides 

adversaries with viable alternatives to 

high-intensity warfare. It provides a means 

to initiate less-attributable forms of conflict 

to offset U.S. strengths, particularly in the 

gray zone. These aspects of the future 

environment will accelerate the speed with 

which threats can develop.

Proliferation of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction: The proliferation of 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

high-yield explosive weapons, and the 

means by which they are delivered will pose 

an increased threat to U.S. interests and 

international security in the future. The 

diminishing costs associated with WMD 

technology and the potential for destabilized governments to lose control of 

weapons will challenge security and 

interests of nations around the world to an 

unprecedented degree. 

Decision Space in Gray Zones: 

The first, and possibly most important, 

step to preventing and mitigating these 

threats is detecting emerging threats 

before they irreversibly erode U.S. influence and destabilize regions. Early 

understanding of emerging threats will be 

essential in the future operating environment for national leaders to have adequate 

decision space necessary to develop 

policies and plans that counter adversarial 

actions. The U.S. will require the means to 

obtain early understanding of threats and 

the capability to control escalation of crisis 

to deter threats from developing into 

greater challenges that require a large 

commitment of national resources.

Impacts on ARSOF Capabilities
////32///// USASOC 2035

Technology

» USASOC is exploring wide field of 

view night vision devices. The 

WFOV-NVG is a PVS-31A with canted 

lenses that increases the field of view 

from 40 to 70 degrees. 

» USASOC G6 is executing a plan to 

field SOF SIPR/BICES networks and 

computers at each of the National 

Guard Special Operations Detachments to support upcoming deployment requirements. SODs are 

planning augmentation teams that 

are now OPCON to USASOC.

» USASOC G3/G9 staff members are 

examining currently fielded counter-UAS systems and those available 

in the near future. Effort includes 

USASOC Component Subordinate 

Command/Component Subordinate 

Unit vignettes that enable comparison of known threats and capabilities. G3/G9 members participated in 

test evaluation events during early 

2017, identifying near-term solutions 

for deployed force requirements.

Current USASOC Initiatives Underway

USASOC is executing the following efforts as short term (0-2 year) initiatives to better 

position the force to address current requirements worldwide. These initiatives represent 

aspects of USASOC Strategy 2035 and USASOC Campaign Plan 2035. Summaries of both 

documents are presented in this section.

1. Restore Balance: to achieve a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio for all ARSOF 

formations and to implement use of Army-wide readiness systems and processes.

2. Solidify 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) as a Deployable and Force Providing Headquarters: to complete the manning of 

1st SFC (A) while advancing Cyber, ISR, and Counter-UAS capabilities in 1st SFC (A) 

and across the force.

3. Communicate the ARSOF Narrative: to communicate the unique 

nature and capabilities of ARSOF to various audiences, including SOF components, conventional forces, and interagency partners.

USASOC Strategy 2035 — Summary

In an effort to define capabilities required to enable ARSOF to counter threats of the 

future and to open windows of opportunity for joint force success, USASOC produced 

Strategy 2035. It contains objectives for capability development categorized across time; 

short-term (Ready the Force), mid-term (Mature the Force), and long-term (Invest in the 

Future Force). These categories and related objectives represent guidance from the 

USASOC Commanding General for ARSOF readiness to fulfill requirements of the current 

operating environment, to mature the force to meet mid-term demands, and to invest in 

future capabilities. The categories and objectives follow (note: below numbers are for 

reference only and do not suggest a particular order or priority):

The full USASOC Strategy 2035 can be downloaded from the USASOC website at 

www.soc.mil — click on the link under Hot Topics on the right-hand side menu.

READY the Force (Short Term):

1. Maintain advanced hostage rescue and direct action capabilities 

2. Develop and implement new ARSOF Sustainable Readiness Model 

3. Improve SOF-CF interdependence, interoperability, and integration 

4. Improve joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partnerships 

5. Improve understanding of the full range of ARSOF capabilities with external audiences

6. Identify the right ARSOF Active Component/Reserve Component balance 

7. Invest in language, regional expertise, and cultural capability development 

8. Identify more responsive mechanisms to deploy forces when needed (e.g. address 

the slow nature of the Request for Forces process) 

9. Review unfinished ARSOF 2022 objectives; complete valid unfinished requirements

10. Improve ARSOF human/spiritual performance, behavioral health, social readiness, and 

resilience (objective recently added to represent Preservation of the Force and Family)

MATURE the Force (Mid Term):

1. Adapt ARSOF hostage rescue and direct-action capabilities to incorporate improved 

technology, processes, and techniques

2. Develop capabilities to track, monitor, and counter WMD

Standard View Wide View

THE WAY AHEAD
USASOC 2035 /////33////

Readiness

» Civil Affairs personnel from 3rd 

Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training 

Group (Airborne) partnered with U.S. 

Army and Japanese leaders to 

establish the first Civil Affairs course 

for the Japan Self Ground Defense 

Force. A pilot of the 40 hour course 

was held in May 2016, with 24 

students. Content of the course 

focused on CA support to peacekeeping/stability operations at the 

theater level. In June 2016, 3rd Bn., 

1st SWTG (A), sent instructors to a 

Civil Affairs Humanitarian Assistance/

Disaster Response SME Exchange, 

which also included trainers from 

New Zealand, Malaysia, and Canada.

» USASOC 's request to upgrade 32 

Warrant Officer positions in the 160th 

SOAR was approved by HQDA Force 

Management. The action upgrades 

pilot positions from CW2 to CW3 and 

adds additional CW5 positions 

effective 2018.

» USASOC is partnered with Johns 

Hopkins University's Applied Physics 

Lab to develop a readiness tracking 

program and dashboard interface. 

The intent is to integrate all readiness 

related data sources into a user 

friendly interface that allows easy 

viewing of personnel/unit status, 

deployment to dwell, language 

ratings, special skills, equipment and 

other aspects of readiness. It will allow 

users to query unit-level status/data or 

drill down to the individual level.

3. Incorporate education/training into ARSOF learning institutions to enable operations that track, monitor, and counter WMD 

4. Empower decentralized Mission Command (COP and situational awareness via 

hand-held data, blue force tracking systems, and secure communications) 

5. Increase ARSOF clandestine and low visibility technology (mobility platforms, 

weapons systems, and communications technology — secure, unsecure, and 

non-attributable systems) 

6. Improve ARSOF intelligence collection, analysis, and synthesis capabilities that 

enable understanding and characterization of the human domain and provide 

indicators/warnings for gray zone threats 

7. Codify ARSOF doctrine and education for foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, 

counterterrorism, and support to resistance movements (up to and including UW) 

8. Invest in education initiatives that prepare operators to develop effective partnerships in foreign cultures and to build partner capabilities 

9. Create and implement education models that train operators to rapidly integrate 

into, and excel within, ambiguous environments 

10. Invest in hybrid conflict research/education within ARSOF institutions 

11. Integrate IT networks across organizational/institutional boundaries 

12. Streamline resourcing/capability development processes to be more agile/adaptive 

INVEST in the Future Force (Long Term):

1. Procure the technology and weapons systems that keep ARSOF on the cutting edge 

2. Procure mobility systems that are agile enough to quickly deploy, resilient enough 

to operate in austere environments, and require minimal maintenance/logistics 

3. Procure C2 and intelligence technology that improve the speed and ease with 

which we process/synthesize information at the tactical and operational levels 

4. Procure communications and intelligence systems that facilitate rapid collective 

understanding of the environment, adversarial actions, and emerging threats 

5. Develop and integrate systems and processes that enable operator/leader level 

decision making 

6. Develop and incorporate methods and technology that improve our ability to 

influence populations and to understand/address how adversaries and their proxies 

do the same (Cyber and related capabilities) 

7. Integrate Cyber capabilities into operations to include influence operations, digital 

deception, communication disruption, and disinformation campaigns at the tactical 

and operational levels 

8. Obtain technology to protect friendly networks from advanced Cyber threats 

9. Obtain next generation unmanned aerial systems that provide longer operational 

range, over horizon observation, and can be launched/recovered by tactical units 

10. Obtain the next generation of ARSOF rotary wing capabilities for transport and fire 

support that have longer range and greater fuel efficiency 

11. Obtain capabilities for ARSOF rotary wing and unmanned platforms to penetrate 

integrated air defense systems 

12. Create the system/opportunities to retain enabler personnel in ARSOF for more of 

their careers

13. Implement alternative military/civilian career models that are more attuned to the 

demands of the future operating environment 
////34///// USASOC 2035

USASOC Campaign Plan 2035 — Summary

In order to initiate capability-development actions that meet the objectives 

identified in the previous section, USASOC created Campaign Plan 2035. The campaign 

plan operationalizes USASOC Strategy 2035, synchronizing objective completion with 

commander priorities and the strategic planning process; the process responsible for 

programmatically producing future capabilities for the force. The campaign plan 

strategic framework links USASOC's enduring mission statement responsibilities (man, 

train, equip, educate, organize, sustain, and support) to USASOC Strategy 2035 objectives 

and the SPP. This linkage highlights how commander priorities, force development 

efforts, and resources interact to produce decision points and identify areas of potential risk. The campaign plan strategic framework captures the Ends, Ways, and Means of 

achieving the commander's vision. The strategic framework depicts the command's 

enduring mission responsibilities as Lines of Effort (The Means), that extend across 

three time horizons (The Ways). The Ends for all capability development efforts are 

represented by the four Pillars of ARSOF Capability.

Sub-LOE

USASOC Campaign Plan 2035 — Strategic Framework

WAYS = Strategic Framework (Time-phased approach)

MEANS = Readiness Centric LOEs and Sub-LOEs

LOE #1: PREPARE "...ARSOF to meet the nation's demands"

LOE #2: PROVIDE "...the nation's premier SOF to JFCs & IA Leaders"

LOE #3: PRESERVE "...our force & unique mandate"

Prepare authorized personnel by grade & skill

Provide trained & ready forces

Enable & preserve our team & legacy

Prepare Soldiers & units

Provide equipment to trained & ready forces

Prepare current & future ARSOF personnel

Provide force sustainment

MAN

ORGANIZE

SUPPORT

TRAIN

EQUIP

EDUCATE

SUSTAIN

Sub-LOEs

Sub-LOEs

Position the force for

the demands of the current

operating environment.

Advance ARSOF capabilities

to meet mid-term demands.

Develop capabilities to meet 

challenges of the future operating 

environment.

READY (0-2 YEARS) MATURE (3-7 YEARS) INVEST (8-20 YEARS)

THE WAY AHEAD
USASOC 2035 /////35////

Campaign Plan LOEs and Sub-LOEs: The campaign plan aligns the 

objectives for capability development listed in USASOC Strategy 2035 under one of three 

lines of effort: Prepare, Provide, and Preserve. The objectives are then categorized under 

sub-lines of effort (sub-LOEs) assigned to specific USASOC staff sections or subordinate 

commands. The sub-LOEs are: Man, Train, Equip, Educate, Organize, Sustain, and Support. 

The following pages present the LOEs, sub-LOEs, and objectives, with each of the 

objectives organized in the time horizon intended for delivery of new capabilities; 

Ready-short term (0-2 years), Mature-mid-term (3-7 years), and Invest-long term (8-20 

years). By organizing the objectives in this way, the campaign plan assigns execution of 

capability development efforts to offices or commands of primary responsibility, ensuring 

a single point of contact is identified and accountable for delivery of capabilities the force 

needs, now and into the future. 

Note: A summary of the campaign plan is presented here and on the following 

pages. The full USASOC Campaign Plan 2035 can be downloaded from the USASOC 

website at www.soc.mil — click on the link under Hot Topics on the right-hand 

side menu.

ENDS = Pillars of ARSOF Capability

The indigenous approach is a different lens through which to view challenges to regional stability, to 

view them as problems to be solved by empowered populations living in the region. It includes core 

tasks such as foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare and involves advise, assist, and 

accompany type activities. Through an indigenous approach, ARSOF personnel live among, train, advise, 

and fight alongside people of foreign cultures, achieving effects with and through partner forces.

Indigenous 

Approach

Precision Targeting operations involve direct action and counter-network activities enabled by SOF 

unique intelligence, technology, and targeting processes. Precision targeting operations can be 

employed against uniquely difficult target sets that require long range movement and careful application of force. They can be employed to buy time and space for other operations to gain traction, as seen 

in counterinsurgency efforts. Precision targeting operations also collapse transregional threat networks 

through deliberate targeting of critical enemy nodes as seen in counterterrorism campaigns.

Precision 

Targeting

Developing understanding and wielding influence are essential aspects of the value SOF capabilities 

provide the nation. The SOF network of personnel, assets, and formations represent means by which to 

obtain early understanding of trends, emerging transregional threats, and where opportunities exist. 

Employment of the SOF network also provides capabilities needed to influence outcomes, especially in 

environments experiencing conflict short of overt war.

Understand 

and Influence

Crisis Response through alert forces and persistently deployed and dispersed units, provides national 

decision makers with the agile and rapidly employable special operations formations necessary to 

respond to emergencies. These forces provide options to rescue people under threat, to recover sensitive 

materials such as weapons of mass destruction components, or other short notice requirements.

Crisis

Response
////36///// USASOC 2035

Medical Developments

» USASOC has partnered with the Army 

Medical Command to develop a pilot 

telemedicine program for SOF 

physician assistants and medics. The 

effort addresses a capability gap in 

trauma treatment in low-intensity/

asymmetric operating environments. 

The program will train PAs and medics 

to perform specific trauma surgeries 

with the aid of trauma surgeons at a 

military treatment facility hub via 

telemedicine technology.

» 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) and CJSOTF-S recently fielded 

remote telemedicine pilot program 

kits to deployed units in the 

CENTCOM theater of operations. It 

enables on-call virtual medical 

consultation and integrates CONUS 

and forward-based medical personnel into the patient treatment 

cycle at outstations until medical 

evacuation is possible.

» USASOC is also working with trauma 

medical staff at Ryder Trauma Center 

in Miami, Florida, to explore future 

integration of ARSOF into the RTC 

telemedical network. The intent is to 

teleconnect ARSOF medics with 

CONUS-based surgeons when 

surgical stabilization is required in 

remote locations worldwide.

» USASOC medical personnel are 

evaluating the latest advances in 

ultrasound guided musculoskeletal 

and spine medical procedures. The 

findings will be shared with other 

Army medical personnel to expand 

treatment options for wounded and 

injured Soldiers. 

Each of the objectives in the following section has a reference number at the end to 

show its corresponding location in USASOC Strategy 2035 (example: [ READY #1 ]). 

LOE #1: PREPARE

PREPARE ARSOF to meet the nation’s demands. This LOE focuses primarily on 

USASOC Institutional or Generating Force responsibilities, which are those missions that 

generate or maintain the operational capabilities employed by joint force commanders. 

The USASOC mission statement reflects this responsibility as it identifies requirements to 

MAN, TRAIN, and EDUCATE ARSOF. These requirements comprise the three sub-LOEs for 

capability development in this section.

>> MAN

Prepare authorized personnel by grade & skill. Sub-LOE manager: USASOC 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G1. 

READY (Short-Term)

» AC/RC Balance: Identify the right ARSOF Active Component/Reserve Component 

balance [ READY #6 ] 

INVEST (Long-Term) 

» MIL/CIV Models: Implement alternative military/civilian career models that are 

more attuned to the demands of the future operating environment. [ INVEST #13 ] 

>> TRAIN 

Prepare Soldiers and Units. Sub-LOE manager: USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff, G3.

READY (Short-Term)

» Maintain HR/DA: Maintain advanced hostage rescue and direct action capabilities. 

[ READY #1 ] 

MATURE (Mid-Term)

» HR/DA Adaptation: Adapt ARSOF hostage rescue and direct action capabilities to 

incorporate improved technology, processes, and techniques. [ MATURE #1 ]

» CWMD Tracking: Develop capabilities to track, monitor, and counter WMD.

[ MATURE #2 ]

INVEST (Long-Term) 

» Cyber Integration: Integrate Cyber capabilities into operations to include influence 

operations, digital deception, communication disruption, and disinformation 

campaigns at the tactical and operational levels. [ INVEST #7 ] 

>> EDUCATE 

Prepare current & future ARSOF personnel. Sub-LOE manager: U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

READY (Short-Term)

» LREC Investment: Invest in language, regional expertise, and cultural capability 

development. [ READY #7 ] 

MATURE (Mid-Term)

» Train CWMD: Incorporate education/training into ARSOF learning institutions to 

enable operations that track, monitor, and counter WMD. [ MATURE #3 ]

» Codify Doctrine: Codify ARSOF doctrine and education for FID, COIN, CT and 

support to resistance movements (up to and including UW). [ MATURE #7 ]

» Partner Investments: Invest in education initiatives that prepare operators to 

develop effective partnerships in foreign cultures and to build partner capabilities. 

[ MATURE #8 ]

» Ambiguity Education Models: Create and implement education models that train 

operations to rapidly integrate into, and excel within, ambiguous environments. 

[ MATURE #9 ]

» Institutionalize Hybrid Conflict: Invest in hybrid conflict research/education within 

ARSOF institutions. [ MATURE #10 ]

THE WAY AHEAD
USASOC 2035 /////37////

Information Sharing

USASOC G2 is leading an effort 

designed to provide Intel analysts from 

across the Department of Defense and 

intelligence communities access to 

SOF-specific reporting that was 

previously inaccessible. The project 

integrates Special Forces, Civil Affairs, 

Psychological Operations, and other 

SOF-specific reporting into a DCGS 

compatible repository known as the 

ARSOF Data Warehouse. The data can 

then be shared through the DCGS 

Integrated Backbone federation with all 

who have access to DCGS-Army and 

DCGS-A Lite. For the first time, analysts 

across the intelligence community will 

be able to access valuable SOF-specific 

reporting and include that data in their 

assessments as they support operations 

globally. The project represents a 

substantial breakthrough in SOF, CF 

and JIIM interdependence, interoperability, and integration.

LOE #2: PROVIDE

PROVIDE the nation’s premier SOF to JFCs and interagency leaders. This LOE 

focuses primarily on operational or Operating Force responsibilities, which are those 

missions that support units in combat or other operations. The USASOC mission statement reflects this responsibility as it identifies requirements to ORGANIZE, EQUIP, and 

SUSTAIN ARSOF. These requirements comprise the three sub-LOEs for capability development in this section.

>> ORGANIZE

Provide trained and ready forces. Sub-LOE manager: USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff, G3.

READY (Short-Term)

» Readiness Model: Develop and implement a new ARSOF Sustainable Readiness 

Model. [ READY #2 ] 

» Improve SOF/CF I3: Improve SOF-CF interdependence, interoperability, and 

integration. [ READY #3 ]

» Improve JIIM-P: Improve joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 

(JIIM) partnerships. [ READY #4 ]

» Build the ARSOF Brand: Improve understanding of the full range of ARSOF capabilities with external audiences. [ READY #5 ]

» Responsive Force: Identify more responsive mechanisms to deploy forces when 

needed. [ READY #8 ]

>> EQUIP

Provide equipment to trained and ready forces. Sub-LOE manager: USASOC 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G8.

READY (Short-Term)

» ARSOF 2022 Requirements: Review unfinished ARSOF 2022 objectives; complete 

valid unfinished requirements . [ READY #9 ]

MATURE (Mid-Term)

» Decentralized MC: Empower decentralized Mission Command (COP and situational 

awareness via hand-held data, blue force tracking systems, and secure communications). [ MATURE #4 ]

» Increase Clan Tech: Increase ARSOF clandestine and low-visibility technology 

(mobility platforms, weapons systems, and communications technology – secure, 

unsecure, and non-attributable systems). [ MATURE #5 ]

» Agile SPP: Streamline resourcing and capability development processes to be more 

agile/adaptive. [ MATURE #12 ]

INVEST (Long-Term) 

» Edge Tech: Procure the technology and weapons systems that keep ARSOF on the 

cutting edge. [ INVEST #1 ] 

» Agile Mobility: Procure mobility systems that are agile enough to quickly deploy, 

resilient enough to operate in austere environments, and require minimal maintenance/logistics. [ INVEST #2 ] 

» Improve C4I: Procure C2 and intelligence technology that improve the speed and 

ease with which we process/synthesize information at the tactical and operational 

levels. [ INVEST #3 ] 

» Expedite OE Understanding: Procure communications and intelligence systems 

that facilitate rapid collective understanding of the environment, adversarial 

actions, and emerging threats. [ INVEST #4 ] 

» Decision-enabling: Develop and integrate systems and processes that enable 

operator/leader level decision making. [ INVEST #5 ] 
////38///// USASOC 2035

» Population Influence: Develop and incorporate methods and technology that 

improve USASOC's ability to influence populations and to understand/address 

how adversaries and their proxies do the same (Cyber and related capabilities). 

[ INVEST #6 ] 

» NEXGEN UAS: Obtain next generation unmanned aerial systems that provide 

longer operational range, over horizon observation, and can be launched and 

recovered by tactical units. [ INVEST #9 ] 

» NEXGEN Rotary: Obtain the next generation of ARSOF rotary-wing capabilities 

for transport and fire support that have longer range and greater fuel efficiency. 

[ INVEST #10 ] 

» NEXGEN Counter-IADS: Obtain capabilities for ARSOF rotary-wing and unmanned 

platforms to penetrate integrated air defense systems. [ INVEST #11 ] 

>> SUSTAIN

Provide force sustainment. Sub-LOE manager: USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff, G4.

INVEST (Long-Term)

» Enabler Careers: Create the system/opportunities to retain enabler personnel in 

ARSOF for more of their careers. [ INVEST #12 ] 

LOE #3: Preserve

PRESERVE our force & unique mandate. This LOE focuses primarily on USASOC's 

responsibility to ensure the personal readiness of assigned Soldiers, Army Civilians, and 

their Family Members. The USASOC mission statement reflects this responsibility as it 

identifies the requirement to SUPPORT ARSOF. This requirement, therefore, becomes the 

single sub-LOE for this section.

>> SUPPORT

Enable & preserve our team & legacy. Sub-LOE manager: USASOC Deputy Chief of 

Staff, G8.

READY (Short-Term)

» Health of the Force: Improve ARSOF human/spiritual performance, behavioral 

health, social readiness, and resilience. Recently added as an objective to represent 

Preservation of the Force and Family. [ READY #10 ] 

MATURE (Mid-Term)

» Gray Zone Indicators: Improve ARSOF intelligence collection, analysis, and synthesis capabilities that enable understanding of the Human Domain and provide 

indicators and warnings for gray zone threats. [ MATURE #6 ] 

» IT Network Integration: Integrate IT networks across organizational/institutional 

boundaries. [ MATURE #11 ] 

INVEST (Long-Term)

» Cyber Defense Tech: Obtain technology to protect friendly networks from 

advanced Cyber threats. [ INVEST #8 ] 

CONCLUSION

In an era of uncertainty, ARSOF must continue to provide the nation with a portfolio 

of complementary capabilities to address future hybrid threats. USASOC Strategy 2035

defines how ARSOF will evolve to meet the demands of the future operating environment. The strategy outlines the future operational and institutional capabilities necessary 

to counter threats across the spectrum of conflict. USASOC Campaign Plan 2035 operationalizes USASOC Strategy 2035 and guides the command's capability development efforts. 

Together, the Strategy and Campaign Plan represent the way forward for ARSOF capability development in an effort to ensure the force remains without equal for decades to 

come.

Campaign Plan 

Assessment

While the campaign plan synchronizes 

the command's activities toward 

achieving capability development, it 

requires regular venues to assess 

progress. The Campaign Plan assessment methodology allows for both 

bottom-up feedback and top-down 

guidance to adapt the plan as necessary. There are a number of assessment 

forums to gather this information:

» Capstone Assessment: 

USASOC Commanders' Conference 

serves as the semi-annual venue for 

commanders to receive updates on 

objective completion based on the 

Commanding General's priorities. Key 

outputs from this forum are prioritization of resources and approval of 

changes to the strategy.

» Commander Informed Assessment: 

The EOC oversees the continuous 

improvement of the strategic 

planning process as it relates to 

USASOC 2035. This assessment is a 

targeted evaluation of the enterprise's efforts as determined by 

commander priorities and in preparation for the Capstone Assessment. 

Objectives rotate quarterly so that 

each receives an annual assessment. 

The Deputy Commanding General 

for Force Modernization and Development and the Deputy to the 

Commanding General co-chair this 

event. The key outputs are preparing 

objectives for commander review 

and vetting recommendations for the 

strategy, campaign plan, or POM.

» Steady State Assessment: 

Solutions-based assessment that 

offers a holistic assessment of the 

enterprise's efforts toward achieving 

the force of 2035. This assessment is 

unconstrained by priorities. The 

Deputy to the Commanding General 

chairs this meeting on a bi-monthly 

basis. The key outputs are linking 

solutions to objective completion 

and identifying/proposing improvements to the campaign plan.

THE WAY AHEAD

Formally assessed and selected ARSOF Soldiers, trained to an elite level,

deliver strategic value to the nation through four complementary capabilities —

THE PILLARS OF ARSOF CAPABILITY

INDIGENOUS APPROACH

PRECISION TARGETING

UNDERSTAND & INFLUENCE

CRISIS RESPONSE