Slip Op. 09-10
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

______________________________ : GALLANT OCEAN : (THAILAND) CO., LTD., : : Plaintiff, : : Before: WALLACH, Judge v. : Court No.: 07-00360 : UNITED STATES, : PUBLIC VERSION : Defendant. : ______________________________: [Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Agen cy Record is DENIED and the Agency’s Determination is AFFIRMED.] Dated: January 30, 2009 Trade Pacific PLLC (Robert G. Gosselink , Jonathan Michael Freed , and Ji Hyun Tak ) for Plaintiff Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co., Ltd. Michael F. Hertz , Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, Patricia M. McCarthy , Assistant Director, Commer cial Litigation Branch, Civ il Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Stephen Carl Tosini ), for Defendant United States. OPINION Wallach, Judge:
I INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co., Ltd. (“ Gallant”) appears before the court on its Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2, challenging an aspect of the United States Department of Co mmerce’s (“Commerce” or “Department”) findings in Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand: Final Results and Final Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review , 72 Fed. Reg. 52,065 (September 12, 2007) (“Final2 Results ”). This court has jurisdic tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). Because Commerce’s determination was supported by subs tantial evidence and in accordan ce with law, it is sustained and judgment is entered for the Defendant United States.
II BACKGROUND In April 2006, Commerce initiated the admi nistrative review of the antidumping duty order on certain frozen warmwater shrimp from Thailand for 145 companies. Notice of Initiation of Administrative Reviews of the Antidumpi ng Duty Orders on Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Brazil, Ecuador, India and Thailand , 71 Fed. Reg. 17,819 (April 7, 2006). The period of review was August 4, 2004 to January 31, 2006. Id. Commerce asked Gallant, and all other companies for which a review was reque sted, to submit a quantity and value (“Q&V”) questionnaire, available on Commerce’s we bsite, on or before April 28, 2006. Id. at 17, 829. Thirty-two companies including Gallant did no t timely respond. Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From Thailand: Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of Anti-Dumping Duty Administrative Review , 72 Fed. Reg. 10,669, 10,673 (March 9, 2007) (“Preliminary Results ”). Commerce provided the unresponsive companie s with a second opportunity in May 2006. Id. Commerce informed them in correspondence that a “failure to respond to this questionnaire may result in the Department’s deeming your co mpany uncooperative in this proceeding. In such case, the Department may assign your comp any an antidumping duty margin using adverse inferences in accordance with” 19 U.S.C. § 16 77e(b). Letter from Shawn Thompson, Program Manager, Office 2, AD/CVD Operati ons, U.S. Department of Comm erce, to Representatives of Non-Cooperating Companies (“To Whom it Ma y Concern”), Re: 2004-2006 Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Cert ain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand3 (May 11, 2006), Public Record (“P.R.”) 144. Si x companies including Gallant did not timely respond to this subsequent request. Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,673. On March 9, 2007, Commerce found that the unresponsive companies “withheld requested information and significantly im peded the proceeding.” Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,673. Commerce preliminarily determined that these companies, including Gallant, “did not act to the best of their abilities . . . b ecause they failed to respond to the Department’s requests for information. Therefore, an adverse in ference is warranted in selecting from the facts otherwise available with resp ect to the companies.” Id. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), Commerce selected an adverse facts available (“AFA”) antidumping margin for the unresponsive companies. Id. The Department “preliminarily assigne d a rate of 57.64 percent, which is the highest rate alleged in the petiti on, as adjusted at the initiation of the less-than-fair value (LTFV) investigation.” Id. Commerce set forth its rationale for selecting the petition margin to be the AFA rate in the Preliminary Results . Because this rate relied upon s econdary evidence, it had to be reasonably corroborated. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). Commerce explained its corroboration as having compared the petition margin to the transac tion-specific margins calculated for the three mandatory respondent companies: Good Luck Pr oduct Co., Ltd. (“Good Luck Product”), Thai IMei Frozen Foods Co., Ltd. (“Thai I-Mei”), and Pakfood Public Company Limited and its affiliated subsidiaries (collectively “Pakfood”). 1 Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,669–70.

1 The Pakfood Public Company Limited affiliated su bsidiaries are Asia Pacific (Thailand) Company Limited, Chaophraya Cold Storage Company Limited, Okeanos Company Limited, and Takzin Samut Company Limited (collectively “Pakfood”). Ce rtain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From Thailand: Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review , 72 Fed. Reg. 10,669, 10,670 (March 9, 2007) (“Preliminary Results ”).4 Commerce preliminarily found the 57.64 percent pet ition rate to be “reliable and relevant because the petition rate fell with in the range of individual trans action margins calculated for the mandatory respondents.” Id. at 10,673. Commerce explained th at both Good Luck Product and Pakfood had multiple transactions with marg ins higher than the petition rate, although Commerce did exclude one Thai I-Mei margin hi gher than 57.64 percent for being aberrational. Memorandum from Brianne Riker, Analyst, Offi ce 2, AD/CVD Operations, U.S. Department of Commerce, to The File through Shawn Th ompson, Program Manager, Office 2, AD/CVD Operations, Re: Corroboration of Adverse Facts Available for the Preliminary Results in the 2004-2006 Administrative Review of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand (February 28, 2007), P.R. 475, Confidential Record (“C.R.”) 134 (“Preliminary AFA Corroboration Memo.”), at 1. The Department further found that th e 57.64 percent petition margin was “sufficiently adverse so as to induce cooperation” and stated an inability “to find any information that would discredit the selected AFA rate.” Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,673–74. On March 27, 2007, Gallant submitted a co mpleted Q&V questionnaire to Commerce. Final Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 52,066. Commerce reject ed this questionnaire as untimely pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.302 and returned it to Gallant on April 2, 2007. Id. ; Letter from James Maeder, Director, Office 2, Office of AD/CVD Operations, U.S. Department of Commerce, to Robert Gosselink, Trade Pacific PLLC, Re: Antidumping Duty Administrative Review on Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand (April 2, 2007), P.R. 495. Gallant thereafter requested that Co mmerce not apply the petition ma rgin as the AFA rate. See Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co., Ltd. Corroboration Case Br ief (April 16, 2007), at 1–2, C.R. 143. Gallant contended that Commerce erred in its prelim inary formulation by: employing transaction-5 specific margins that were aberrational, re viewing sales from the mandatory respondent companies that did not corroborate the 57.64 pe rcent AFA rate, and selecting sales for comparison that were atypical. Id. at 2–4. According to Gallant, the sales that Commerce used did not represent normal transactions of Good Lu ck Product, Thai I-Mei and Pakfood because of their product type, sale quantities, or costs. Id. On September 12, 2007, Commerce published its fi nal determination fo rmally assigning the 57.64 percent AFA rate to Gallant and the other non-cooperating companies. Final Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 52,068. Commerce reite rated its preliminary findings that: Gallant had not acted to the best of its ability, an adverse inference was warranted in selecting facts otherwise available, 57.64 percent was the hi ghest margin alleged in the pe tition as adjusted, and the AFA rate was sufficiently advers e to induce cooperation. Id. In addition to its initial efforts to corroborate the 57.64 percent pe tition rate, Commerce undertook additional corroboration in support of the Final Results . Id. at 52,068; Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, to David M. Spooner, Assistant Secretary for Import Admini stration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Re: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Antidu mping Duty Administrative Review on Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand – August 2004, through January 31, 2006 (September 5, 2007), P.R. 532 (“Final Decision Memo. ”) cmt. 2, at 8–9, n.3. Prior to formalizing the 57.64 percent AFA ra te, Commerce conclude d that the petition margin was sufficiently corroborated. Id. cmt. 2, at 8. Commerce stated that the “margin falls within the range of transaction-specific margin s calculated for the mandatory respondents”. Id. at 6; Memorandum from Brianne Riker, Analyst, Office 2, AD/CVD Operati ons, U.S. Department of Commerce, to The File through Shawn Th ompson, Program Manager, Office 2, AD/CVD6 Operations, Re: Final Results of the 2004-2006 Re view of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand: Corroboration Analysis (S eptember 5, 2007), C.R. 152, P.R. 535 (“Final Corroboration Analysis”), at 1. The Department de termined that the volumes of the transactions it examined were neither atypical nor had an aber rational effect on the margin calculations. Id. at 2. Commerce explained that that the AFA rate was based on both re presentative transactions and official United States import statistics. Final Decision Memo. cmt. 2 at 8–9. Dissatisfied with the 57.64 percent AFA rate, Gallant timely initiated the present challenge to that aspect of the Final Results

. III STANDARD OF REVIEW This court will uphold an administrative antidumping determination unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” SKF United States v. INA Walzlager Schaeffler KG , 180 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) ). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonabl e mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Aimcor, Ala. Silicon, Inc. v. United States , 154 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States , 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). “The possibility of drawing two inc onsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being suppo rted by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed.
Mar. Comm’n , 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966). In determining the existence of substantial evidence, a reviewing court must consid er “the record as a whole, including evidence that s upports as well as evidence that ‘fairl y detracts from the substantiality of the evidence.’” Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United States , 322 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. United States , 744 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).7 While the court must consider contradictory evid ence, “the substantial evidence test does not require that there be an absence of evidence detr acting from the agency’s conclusion, nor is there an absence of substantial evidence simply becau se the reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion based on the same record.” Cleo Inc. v. United States , 501 F.3d 1291, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB , 340 U.S. 474, 487–88, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951)). When evaluating Commerce’s statutory interpre tation the court uses a two step analysis, first examining whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). If this is the case, courts then must “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43; see Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig , 541 U.S. 232, 239, 124 S. Ct. 1741, 158 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2004). If instead Congress has left a “gap” for Commerce to fill, the agency’s regulation is “giv en controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contra ry to the statute.” Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843–44. Additionally, in matters of statutory construction this court will show “great defe rence to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency char ged with its administration.” Udall v. Tallman , 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S. Ct. 792, 13 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1965). The ag ency’s construction need not be the only reasonable one or even the same result this cour t would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in a judicial proceeding. Id. (citing Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon , 329 U.S. 143, 153, 67 S. Ct. 245, 91 L. Ed. 136 ( 1946)). It is not the court’s duty to “weigh the wisdom of, or to resolve any str uggle between, competing views of the policy interest, but rather to respect legitimate polic y choices made by the agency in interpreting and8 applying the statute.” Suramericana de Al eaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States , 966 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
IV DISCUSSION A Overview Of The AFA Statute Commerce is entitled to make adverse infere nces in its antidump ing duty investigation when it determines that an intere sted party has “failed to cooperat e by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). The AFA rate may be generated using information from: “(1) the petitio n, (2) a final determination in the investigation . . . , (3) any previous review . . . , or (4) any other information placed on the record.” Id. The Department selects a proxy rate that represents a “reasonabl y accurate estimate of the respondent’s actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to noncompliance.” F. Lii De Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. Borden, Inc. , 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“De Cecco ”). Commerce is afforded extraordinary but not unlimited deference in formulating this AFA rate, as the Federal Circuit explains: In the case of uncooperative respondents , the discretion granted by the statute appears to be particularly great . . . . [T]his court has repeatedly held that Commerce’s special expertise makes it the “master” of the anti-dumping law, entitling its decisions to great defere nce from the courts. Thus, factual determinations supporting anti-dumping ma rgins are best left to the agency’s expertise. . . . Commerce is in the be st position, based on its expert knowledge of the market and the individual respondent, to select adverse fact s that will create the proper deterrent to non-cooperation w ith its investigations and assure a reasonable margin. Commer ce’s discretion in these matters, however, is not unbounded. . . . [T]he purpose of section 1677e (b) is to provide respondents with an incentive to cooperate, not to impose punitive, aberrational, or uncorroborated margins. Id. at 1032 (citations omitted).9 In formulating an AFA rate using secondary information, Commerce must, “to the extent practicable, corroborate that info rmation from independent source s that are reasonably at [its] disposal.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). “The statute does not prescribe any methodology for corroborating secondary information.” Mitt al Steel Galati S.A. v. United States , 491 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1278 (CIT 2007). Legislative history and implementing regul ations provide that such information is to have “probative value.” Id. at 1275 (citing Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 870 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4199 (“SAA”)); 19 C.F.R. § 351.308( d). “Commerce assesses the probative value of secondary information by examining the re liability and relevance of the information to be used.” Mittal Steel , 491 F. Supp. at 1278. Commerce may in its corroboration examine: “published price lists, official import statistics and customs data, and information obtained from parties during the instant inve stigation or review.” SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199; 19 C.F.R. § 351.308(d). “Commerce’s determination of [AFA] rates must be legal, reasonable, and supported by evidence, but is unfettered by absolu te numerical limitations.” Universal Polybag Co., Ltd. v. United States , 577 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1301 (CIT 2008).
B The Parties’ Contentions Gallant presents a narrow questi on for review. As it explains: Gallant Ocean does not dispute that it should have responded to the Commerce Department’s request for Q&V data and th at it is appropriate for Gallant Ocean’s rate to be based on adverse facts availabl e. The record shows, however, that in the Final Results , the transaction-specific margins for the mandatory respondents that Commerce attempted to use to corr oborate the petition were aberrational, punitively high, and did not reflect the margins of the mandatory respondents. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Suppo rt of Gallant Ocean’s Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) at 5. “By failing to adequately corroborate” the10 57.64 percent AFA rate, Gallant contends that “Com merce ignored the judicial mandate that the AFA rate have a rational relationship to commerci al practices in the pa rticular industry.” Id. at 7. Gallant argues that “Commerce focused its anal ysis on whether information showed that the AFA margin it selected had been discredited ra ther than sufficiently questioning whether the sales used for corroborati on purposes were ‘normal,’ representative sales.” Id. at 15 (emphasis removed). Defendant counters that the 57.64 percent AFA rate is supported by substantial evidence. 2
C The AFA Rate Is Supported By Substantial Evidence And Is In Accordance With Law
1 Commerce Acted In Accordance With Law Commerce lawfully assigned an AFA rate to Ga llant. After Gallant missed two deadlines for compliance, Commerce determined that Gallant di d not act to the best of its ability in failing to timely “respond to the Department’s requests for information.” 3 Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,673. Gallant contends that its tardy submission of the questionnaire to Commerce precludes imposition the 57.64 percent AFA rate. See Reply by Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co., Ltd., to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record (“Plaintiff’s Reply”) at 13–14. There is no evidence supporting Gallant’s

2 Defendant United States does not, and need not, co unter Plaintiff Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co., Ltd.’s (“Gallant”) lone reference to the “arbitrary, capric ious, or . . . abuse of discretion” standard. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in S upport of Gallant Ocean’s Motion for Judgme nt on the Agency R ecord (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) at 7. This court has recognized that the stan dard may merely rephrase the “substantial evidence and in accordance with law” standard. See Fujian Mach. & Equip. Imp. & Exp. Corp v. United States , 25 CIT 1150, 1156, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (2001). Moreover, the Federal Circuit holds that AFA rates are to be reviewed using the substantial evidence standard. Ta Chen St ainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United Sates , 298 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

3 The statute provides four bases for the application of determinations on the basis of the facts available. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(A)-(D). Gallant withheld “information that has been requested by the administering authority.” Id. § 1677e(a)(2)(A). Therefore, th e court need not consider the “significantly impedes” basis, id. § 1677e(a)(2)(C), that was ad ditionally relied upon by the United Stat es Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,674.11 claim that its failure to comply was “not deliberate and its at tempts to cooperate, although untimely, were sincere.” 4 Id. at 11. Moreover, it is simply not relevant. Gallant concedes that it failed to timely submit the requested information, Plaintiff’s Motion at 5, thereby triggering the application of an AFA rate pursuan t to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(A), (b). 5 Once Commerce properly determines that a respondent is uncooperat ive, it need not factor the circumstances in formulating an AFA rate. See Heveafil Sdn. Bhd. v. United States , 58 Fed. Appx. 843, 849–50 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (“While the antidumping statute distinguishes between respondents who have not cooperated and those w ho have, neither the statute nor the pertinent regulations address the weight to be given to different degrees of cooperation. . . . [T]here is no established formula requiring less adverse marg ins when respondents have been partially cooperative.”). Similarly, Gallant’s position that “it had absolutely nothing to gain from its own lack of cooperation”, Plaintiff’s Reply at 14, 6 is both unsupported in the record and irrelevant in the formulation of an AFA rate for a non-cooperating respondent. 7

4 The court does not view Commerce’s returning of Ga llant’s untimely questionnaire as support for this proposition. See Letter from James Maeder, Director, Office 2, AD/CVD Operations, U.S. Department of Commerce, to Robert Gosselink, Trade Pacific PLLC, Re: Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand (April 2, 2007), Public Record (“P.R.”) 495.

5 Gallant cannot claim that its untimely attempt to co operate prevents the imposition of any adverse facts available (“AFA”) rate because “the statute does not contain an intent element . . . . The statutory trigger for Commerce’s consideration of an adverse inference is simply a failure to cooperate to the best of respondent’s ability, regardless of motivation or intent.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States , 337 F.3d 1373, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

6 Gallant misplaces reliance on Mittal Steel Galati S.A. v. United States , 491 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (CIT 2007). There, the court sustained an AFA rate greater than the margin that Commerce pr eliminarily selected after “Plaintiff’s conduct led Commerce to infer that Pl aintiff’s actual dumping rate was higher.” Id. at 1278. However, Mittal Steel does not hold that the extent to which a respondent benefits from its failure to cooperate is relevant in the AFA formulation, as Gallant implies. See Reply by Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co., Ltd., to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Rule 56.2 Motion fo r Judgment on the Agency Record (“Plaintiff’s Reply”) at 13–14.

7 The court does not construe legislative history that an objective of the AFA rate is to “ensure that the party does not obtain a more favorable result by failing to cooperate than if it had cooperated fully” as making the potential gain to an uncooperative respondent relevant in the AFA rate formulation. Uruguay Round Agreements Act Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 870 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4199.12 2 The 57.64 Percent AFA Rate Is Supported by Substantial Evidence Commerce formulated the AFA rate by sele cting the highest margin alleged in the petition, as adjusted. Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,673 The AFA statute explicitly authorizes Commerce to use the “petition” wh en a respondent is uncooperative. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1). Gallant alleges that Commerce im properly selected the 57.64 percent petition margin based upon an absence of information to di scredit the rate. Plaint iff’s Motion at 15. The Department acknowledges initially taki ng this approach. Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,674; Final Decision Memo. cmt. 2, at 8. Commerce may be gin its AFA rate selection by ascertaining whether the petition margin is disc redited, provided that th e rate is ultimately supported by substantial evidence. This star ting point is appropria te where Commerce has incomplete information due to non-compliance. See Shanghai Taoen Int’l Trading Co., Ltd. v. United States , 29 CIT 189, 199, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (2005). “To corroborate the petition margin,” the Department compared it to the ra tes calculated for Good Lu ck Product, Thai I-Mei and Pakfood, and found that the petition “rate fell within the range of i ndividual transactions margins calculated for the mandatory respondents.” Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,673. After reviewing actual sales of Good Luck Product and Pakfood, Commerce found multiple transaction-specific marg ins “within the range of the AFA rate, but slightly lower” and several others “higher than 57.64 percent.” Memorandum from Bria nne Riker, Analyst, Office 2, AD/CVD Operations, U.S. Depart ment of Commerce, to The File through Shawn Thompson, Program Manager, Office 2, AD/CVD Operations, Re: Corroboration of Adverse Facts Available Rate for the Final Results in the 2004-2006 Administrative Review of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand (Septemb er 5, 2007), C.R. 153 (“Final Corrobroation13 Memo.”), at 1. With respect to Thai I-Mei, Commerce excluded a single outlier, 8 and found the remaining margins within the range of the AF A rate. Preliminary AFA Corroboration Memo. at 1. In all, Commerce relied upon nineteen transa ctions of Good Luck Product, Thai I-Mei and Pakfood within the range of the petition marg in to support the 57.64 percent AFA rate. See Final Corroboration Analysis at 1, Atta chments 2–4. This data includes sales identified by Commerce subsequent to the Preliminary Results in response to Gallant’s concerns. Final Corrobration
Memo at 1. 9 [[ The margins for the nineteen transactio ns ranged from approximately 50 percent to 130 percent. Final Corroborati on Analysis, Attachments 2–4. ]] This court has sustained Commerce’s comparis on to transaction-speci fic margins of other respondents as an appropriate means to corroborate AFA rates. See, e.g. , NSK Ltd. v. United
States , 28 CIT 1535, 1561–62, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (2004), aff’d , 481 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Shanghai Taoen , 29 CIT at 199. The 57.64 percent AF A rate was “corroborated by actual sales data.” Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United Sates , 298 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Ta Chen ”). Commerce compared this petition rate with multiple actual sales, whereas

8 Gallant argues that the lack of analysis supporting the exclusion of this one transaction establishes the 57.64 percent AFA rate being unsupported by substantial evid ence. Plaintiff’s Motion at 11 n.3; Plaintiff’s Reply at 4. This Thai I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., Ltd. (“Thai I-Mei”) margin was [[ extremely high, many ]] times the petition margin. Memorandum from Brianne Riker, Analyst, Office 2, AD/CVD Operations, U.S. Department of Commerce, to The File through Shawn Thompson, Program Manage r, Office 2, AD/CVD Operations, Re: Corroboration of Adverse Facts Available for the Prelim inary Results in the 2004-2006 Admini strative Review of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand (February 28, 2007), P.R. 475, Confidential Record (“C.R.”) 134. The court finds that its exclusion by Commerce is self-explanatory and does not render the petition rate unsubstantiated.

9 The seven additional transaction-specific margins perc ents are [[ a little higher and a little lower than the 57.64 AFA rate. ]] Memorandum from Brianne Riker, Analyst, Office 2, AD/CVD Operations, U.S. Department of Commerce, to The File through Shawn Thompson, Program Manager, Office 2, AD/CVD Operations, Re: Corroboration of Adverse Facts Available for the Prelimin ary Results in the 2004-2006 Administrative Review of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thaila nd (September 5, 2007), C.R. 153, at 1.14 the Federal Circuit in Ta Chen sustained an AFA rate for an uncooperative respondent that was based upon a single transaction. Id. Gallant argues that because Ta Chen involves sales information of the plaintiff, as opposed to othe r companies, the holding is not relevant for 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) corroboration purposes. Plaintiff’s Reply at 10–13 (citing Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States , 24 CIT 841, 846 (2000)). The court does not agree that Ta Chen is distinguishable on this basis and instead finds the precedent applicable to AFA rate corroboration using actual sales data, irrespective of whethe r those transacti ons involve the plaintiff or secondary informa tion under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). See Ta Chen , 298 F.3d at 1339–
40. Commerce sufficiently corroborat ed the 57.64 percent AFA rate. The statute qualifies the obligation as “to the extent practical”, 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c); “the corroboration requirement itself is not mandatory when not feasible.” NSK , 28 CIT at 1561–62. After comparing the rate to industry statistics, Commerce conc luded that the petition margin “was not based on a unique or unusual set of circumstances that would render it unrepresentative of the experience of a typical shrimp importer from Tha iland.” Final Decision Memo. cmt. 2 at 8. Commerce thereby “assure[d] itself that the margin it applie[d] is relevant, and not outdate d, or lacking a rational relationship to” Gallant. Ferro Union, Inc. v. United States , 23 CIT 178, 205, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (1999). In formulating the 57.64 percent AFA rate, Commerce neither “overreach[ed] reality,” Ta Chen , 298 F.3d at 1340 (citation omitted), nor made a mere assumption, Ferro Union , 23 CIT at 205. The nineteen transactions with in range of the petition margin and compared to industry statistics demonstrate that Comme rce did not improperly “‘cherry pi ck’ select sales arbitrarily” as a means of corroboration. NSK , 28 CIT at 1556 (citation om itted). The 57.64 percent AFA15 rate has both a “relationship to commercial practi ces in the particular industry,” D & L Supply Co. v. United States , 113 F.3d 1220, 1223–24 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and a “basis in reality,” De
Cecco , 216 F.3d at 1034. The AFA rate was therefore not selected solely and impermissibly for punitive purposes as Gallant alleges. See Plaintiff’s Motion at 7. “While Commerce may have chosen the . . . rate with an eye toward dete rrence, Commerce acts with in its discretion so long as the rate chosen has a relationship to the actual sales information available.” Ta Chen , 298 F.3d
at 1340. Gallant contends that Commerce erred in failing to corroborate the AFA rate “with representative margins of the mandatory res pondents.” Plaintiff’s Motion at 13. Gallant emphasizes that the nineteen tr ansaction-specific margins used comprise only [[ a very small percentage ]] of all sales reporte d by Good Luck Product, Thai I-Mei 10 and Pakfood for the review period. Id. at 12. Gallant argues that becaus e this fraction does not “represent a significant portion of the transacti ons that occurred duri ng the period of review ,” the sales within range of the petition rate should be disregarded as “high-margin transactions [that] are the exception rather than the rule.” Id. at 10–11 (quoting PAM, S.p.A. v. United States , 495 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1371–72 (CIT 2007) (citations omitted) (emphasis removed)). However, this court recently sustained an AFA margin based upon act ual sales of cooperati ng respondents being “in a range above and near the AFA rate chosen,” notwithstanding an argument that the “low number” of these transactions constituted “evidence of its unre liability.” Universal Polybag , 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1298–99, 1301. Defendant is correct that “Ta Chen now controls this issue.” Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Moti on for Judgment Upon the Agency Record (“Defendant’s Opposition”) at 13. Ta Chen establishes that Commerce need not consider the

10 Gallant calculates the two Thai I-Mei sales used for corroboration as representing “a scant [[ very small ]] percent of all Thai I-Mei sa les.” Plaintiff’s Motion at 11.16 portion of sales represented by transaction-sp ecific margins used for corroboration. See Ta Chen , 298 F.3d at 1339–40; Pam, S.p.A. v. United States , Slip Op. 08-75, 2008 Ct. Int’l Trade LEXIS 73, at *11 (July 9, 2008) (“Pam II ”). Gallant claims that Commer ce should not have used certain Pakfood and Good Luck Product sales because their atypical volumes rendered them aberrational. 11 See Plaintiff’s Motion at 18–20. Prior to the Final Results , Commerce in response undert ook detailed analyses of each corroborating margin an d “found they were based on representative transactions.” Final Corroboration Analysis at 2, Attachment s 1–4. The Department concluded that: Good Luck Product and Pakfood reported multip le U.S. sales transactions with volumes in the same range or smaller than the transactions used in the corroboration analysis . . . . Therefore, we do not find that the quantities in question are unusually smaller or atypical. In addition, we note that the margins varied greatly for transactions of simila r volumes to those used for corroboration purposes. Thus, we disagree with Gallant Ocean that the margins calculated for the sales transactions in question were driven by the volume of those sales. Final Decision Memo. cmt. 2, at 9 (citation omitted). This volume analysis supports th e 57.64 percent petition margin bei ng selected as the AFA rate. As with the number of corrobora ting transactions, there is no nume rical requirement with respect to the volumes of those sales. Universal Polybag , 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1299–1301 (rejecting an argument that “the low . . . volume of indivi dual transaction margins” used for corroboration invalidated the AFA rate). Gallant challenges Commerce’s use of the Pakf ood transactions because half “were not normal sales of subject merchandise, but instead were [[ Product A ]].” Pl aintiff’s Motion at 16. Gallant claims that they [[ are priced differently ]] and therefore should not be used for AFA rate

11 Gallant challenges one Good Luck Product sale as being a shipment of only [[ a small weight ]] and all twelve Pakfood sales for comprising only [[ a very small pe rcentage ]] of all shrimp that Pakfood sold to the United States during the period of revi ew. Plaintiff’s Motion at 18, 19–20.17 corroboration purposes. Id. Commerce initially excluded [[ Pr oduct A ]] based on the absence of a reasonable methodology to include such sales, but expressed an expectation to reexamine the issue. Notice of Final Determination of Sale s at Less Than Fair Value and Negative Final Determination of Critical Circumstances: Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp From Thailand , 69 Fed. Reg. 76,918 (December 23, 2004), att ached Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Cert ain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand cmt. 4. Commerce subsequently stated that it would use Pakfood’s sales of [[ Product A ]] for comparison purpos es, (Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,674), despite the merchandise not being identical. Inclusion of Pakfood’s sales of [[ Product A ]] does not detract from the substantial evidence supporting the 57.64 percent AFA rate . Commerce addresse d this concern by referencing the absence of evidence to indica te such sales being under-representative and emphasizing that it “did not rely solely on margins calculated for Pakfood,” but those of the other mandatory respondents that Gallant did not allege were of “unusual merchandise”. Final Decision Memo. cmt. 2 at 9. Gallant concedes that [[ Product A is included within the scope of the order ]]. Plaintiff’s Motion at 16. More compelling, however, is Commerce’s specific matching in advance of the Final Results , of the merchandise types. Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,674. 12 Commerce does not need to replicate the preci se business activities of a non-cooperating respondent in formulating the AFA rate. See Nat’l Candle Ass’n v. United States , 29 CIT 365, 372, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (2005) (Commerce not required “to apply product-specific margins”);

12 Gallant asks the court to disregard this explanation by Commerce as improperly post hoc . Plaintiff’s Reply at 7. However, a statem ent in the Preliminary Results remains part of the record irrespective of whether it is reiterated by Commerce in subsequent documentation formalizing the AFA rate.18 Reiner Brach GMBH & Co. KG v. United States , 26 CIT 549, 565–66, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1338–39 (2002) (AFA rate need not consider a non-cooperating respondent’s unique “product line” and “sales revenue”). Therefore, Commerce did not err in corrobora ting the AFA rate with either the Pakfood margins involving [[ Product A ]] or the one other Pakfood transaction and two Good Luck Product sales that consisted of [[ Product B ]]. As with [[ Product A ]], the antidumping order scope encompasses [[ Product B ]]. Preliminary Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 10,671–72. Gallant acknowledges that Comme rce responded to some of the concerns raised during the administrative process. Plaintiff’s Motion at 6. Gallant contends that the Department improperly ignored a specific challenge to fourPakfood transactions of shrimp sold in onepound bags. Id. at 17; Plaintiff’s Reply at 9. Gallant be lieves that these four sales had unusually high normal values, as it claims to be demonstrat ed by them having the highest total costs of any of Pakfood’s products sold duri ng the period of review. Id. Nevertheless, Commerce analyzed every Pakfood transaction and found each to be su fficiently representative in advance of the Final Results . Final Corroboration Analysis at 2, and Attachments 1, 3. Even if the one-pound bag sales are not used for corroboration, the fi fteen remaining margins comprise substantial evidence supporting the 57.64 percent AFA rate in accordance with Ta Chen . For these reasons, despite Commerce’s failure to directly addre ss Gallant’s one-pound bag argument, the selection of the petition margin as the AFA rate is supported by subs tantial evidence. Gallant attempts to discredi t the 57.64 percent AFA rate w ith reliance on the 4.31 percent rate that Commerce calculated fo r the cooperating select ed respondents. Plaintiff’s Motion at 21– 22 (citing Final Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 52,069). However, the margin ultimately applied to the cooperating respondents does not cas t doubt upon an AFA rate that is supported by substantial19 evidence. See Universal Polybag , 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1298–1301 (rejecting argument based on a “large gap between the petition rate and th e dumping margin calculated by Commerce for any cooperative respondents” (citation omitted)). More over, the Federal Circu it upheld an AFA rate where the corroborative data refl ects actual sales as opposed to th e rate ultimately imposed for cooperating respondents. See Ta Chen , 298 F.3d at 1340. Gallant also attempts to support its pos ition with reference to the overall dumping margins for the mandatory respondents rangi ng between 2.58 and 10.75 percent. Plaintiff’s Motion at 10–11 (citing Final Results , 72 Fed. Reg. at 52,069). Gallant claims that, “[t]herefore, it is apparent that any transaction margins high er than (or slightly lo wer) than 57.64 percent are aberrant.” Id. at 10–11. However, as Defendant observes, necessarily “there will be sales above and below the average.” Defendant’s Opposition at 12. Furthermore, Gallant’s position would give companies having transactions above the ra nge of the mandatory re spondents a disincentive to cooperate with Commerce so that they can obtain the benefit of a lower margin. Gallant proposes alternate approaches that it believes Commerce should have employed in formulating the AFA rate. Gallant suggests th at Commerce articulate both the criteria for determining why margins are excluded and its app lication to each transaction-specific margin in the corroboration analysis. 13 Plaintiff’s Motion at 20. Galla nt details methodologies it believes to be appropriate. See id. at 20–22 (the highest margin within a band that represents at least ten percent of the margins); 14 Plaintiff’s Reply at 5–6 (the highest margin within one standard deviation of the mean). However, because of Gallant’s “noncooperation,” it “cannot pick and

13 Gallant finds support for this approach in Nat’l Steel Corp. v. United States , 18 CIT 1126, 870 F. Supp. 1130 (1994). Plaintiff’s Motion at 20. The court ther e remanded for Commerce to articulate criteria as Gallant proposes. Nat’l Steel Corp. , 18 CIT at 1133. However, as Defendant points out, Nat’l Steel Corp. predates Ta Chen

. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record (“Defendant’s Opposition”) at 13. Commerce is now able to corroborate AFA margins usin g actual transaction data rather than having to articulate criteria for determining when rates are aberrant. See Ta Chen , 298 F.3d at 1339–40.20 choose which rate it feels would be more appropriate in the circumstance.” NSK , 28 CIT at 1562. Gallant hindered Commerce’s antidumping investigation by failing to timely submit the Q&V questionnaire and was warned about the consequences of non-compliance. “Ultimately, respondents have the responsibility of creating an adequate record.” Id. at 1558. AFA “cases operate in a world of less-than-perfect information.” PAM, S.p.A. v. United States , 577 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 (CIT 2008) (denying reconsideration of Pam II by rejecting the argument that Ta Chen is undermined by Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker , 128 S. Ct. 2605, 171 L. Ed. 2d 570, 76 U.S.L.W. 4603 (2008) 15 ). Commerce need not speculate as to the actual rate had the respondent cooperated. See SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199. Commerce is only required to formulate an AFA rate that is supported by subs tantial evidence and in accordance with law. Ta Chen , 298 F.3d at 1335. This standard is met by the 57.64 percent AFA rate that Commerce applied to Gallant. V CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, Commerce’s de termination in Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand: Final Results and Fi nal Partial Rescission of Antidumping Duty

14 Gallant references three 1999 antidumping proceedings in which Commerce employed this methodology. Plaintiff’s Motion at 21. Defendant in response informs th e court that “[t]his is not current practice. Commerce has since established a practice of using actual transaction specific margins of other respondents for corroboration.” Defendant’s Opposition at 16. The court need not review a methodology previously employed by Commerce to formulate an AFA rate because Commerce has “broad disc retion to change its methodology,” Nat’l Steel Corp. , 18 CIT at 1130, provided that “a methodology consistent w ith its statutory authority” is ultimately employed, AlliedSignal Aerospace Co. v. United States , 28 F.3d 1188, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

15 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the maximum award of punitive damages allowed under maritime law was equal the jury’s award of compensatory damages. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker , 128 S. Ct. 2605, 171 L. Ed. 2d 570, 76 U.S.L.W. 4603 (2008).21 Administrative Review , 72 Fed. Reg. 52,065 (September 12, 2007) is AFFIRMED.

__/s/ Evan J. Wallach____ Evan J. Wallach, Judge
Dated: January 30, 2009 New York, New York