Supreme Court of Florida

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No. SC18-1713

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MICHAEL BERNARD BELL,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

November 7, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Michael Bernard Bell, a prisoner under two sentences of death, appeals the 

circuit court’s summary denial of his second successive motion for postconviction 

relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have 

jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., and review the summary denial de 

novo, see Rodgers v. State, 242 So. 3d 276, 276 n.1 (Fla. 2018).

Bell’s first-degree murder convictions and sentences of death have been 

final for over twenty years, see Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1997), cert. 

denied 522 U.S. 1123 (1998), implicating the one-year time limitation of rule 

3.851(d)(1) for filing the motion at issue. However, Bell argues that his motion is 
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timely based on the exception provided by rule 3.851(d)(2)(B), which applies to a

motion that asserts a “fundamental constitutional right” that “was not established 

within the [one-year time limitation] provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has 

been held to apply retroactively.” Specifically, Bell argues that, in Buck v. Davis,

137 S. Ct. 759 (2017), the United States Supreme Court established, as a new

fundamental constitutional right, that the injection of racial bias and prejudice into 

a criminal trial constitutes per se ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He further urges us to hold that this “new” 

right retroactively applies to convictions and sentences like his that became final 

before Buck and argues that Buck requires us to grant him a new trial because

certain arguments that his trial counsel made to his jury injected racial animus into 

his trial.

We disagree that Buck established a new right. Rather, as the circuit court 

correctly ruled below, in Buck, the Supreme Court applied Strickland’s longestablished standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

to the specific facts of the case before it. See Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775-77. Nothing 

in the Supreme Court’s decision purports to replace Strickland with a new per se 

rule. Therefore, Bell’s motion is untimely. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d).

Bell’s motion is further procedurally barred because we previously

addressed the arguments at issue in affirming the denial of his initial 
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postconviction motion and held that they did not warrant relief. See Bell v. State, 

965 So. 2d 48, 59-61, 64-66, 68 (Fla.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1011 (2007); cf.

Zeigler v. State, 116 So. 3d 255, 258 (Fla. 2013) (holding that claims “seeking 

additional DNA testing based on variations of the same arguments [the defendant] 

made in his previous motion for DNA testing” where the Court had “already 

affirmed the circuit court’s decision of these issues against [the defendant]” in a 

prior case were procedurally barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel). 

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of Bell’s motion.

It is so ordered. 

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LAGOA, LUCK, and 

MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 

Charles Warner Arnold, Jr., Judge - Case No. 161994CF009776AXXXMA

Robert A. Norgard of Norgard, Norgard, & Chastang, Bartow, Florida,

for Appellant

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Donahue, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, Florida, 

for Appellee