NISTIR 8041

Proceedings of the Cybersecurity for 

Direct Digital Manufacturing (DDM)

Symposium

Celia Paulsen

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8041

 
NISTIR 8041

Proceedings of the Cybersecurity for 

Direct Digital Manufacturing (DDM) 

Symposium

Celia Paulsen

Computer Security Division

Information Technology Laboratory

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8041

April 2015

U.S. Department of Commerce

Penny Pritzker, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Willie May, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting Director
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National Institute of Standards and Technology Internal Report 8041

143 pages (April 2015)

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8041

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an 

experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or 

endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best 

available for the purpose. 

There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in 

accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and 

methodologies, may be used by Federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, 

until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain 

operative. For planning and transition purposes, Federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of 

these new publications by NIST. 

Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback 

to NIST. All NIST Computer Security Division publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

Comments on this publication may be submitted to:

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory

100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

Email: csddm@nist.gov
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Reports on Computer Systems Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical 

leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test 

methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance 

the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the 

development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for 

the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in 

Federal information systems.

Abstract

Direct Digital Manufacturing (DDM) involves fabricating physical objects from a data file using 

computer-controlled processes with little to no human intervention. It includes Additive 

Manufacturing (AM), 3D printing, and rapid prototyping. The technology is advancing rapidly 

and has the potential to significantly change traditional manufacturing and supply chain 

industries, including for information and communication technologies (ICT).

On February 3, 2015, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Information 

Technology Laboratory (ITL) Computer Security Division hosted a one-day symposium to 

explore cybersecurity needed for DDM, to include ensuring the protection of intellectual 

property and the integrity of printers, elements being printed, and design data. Speakers and 

attendees from industry, academia, and government discussed the state of the industry, 

cybersecurity risks and solutions, and implications for Information and Communications 

Technology (ICT) supply chain risk management.

Keywords

3D Printing; Additive Manufacturing; Cyber Physical Systems; Cybersecurity; Direct Digital 

Manufacturing; Industrial Control Systems; Information Security
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Acknowledgements

The NIST Information Technology Laboratory would like to acknowledge Kevin Jurrens, 

Richard Ricker, Kim Schaffer, and Bill Newhouse of NIST for their contributions in putting 

together this symposium. NIST would also like to acknowledge each of the presenters for their 

participation.
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Executive Summary

Information Technology has increasingly been incorporated into every segment of the 

economy. In manufacturing, the basic technology of Direct Digital Manufacturing 

(DDM) been around for dozens of years. This involves the creation of a physical object 

from a digital design using computer-controlled processes with little to no human 

intervention. With the popularization and advancement of Additive Manufacturing (AM) 

and 3D printing, it is becoming much more common. These technologies have the 

potential to significantly change traditional manufacturing and supply chain industries, 

including information and communications technologies (ICT).

On February 3rd, 2015, the NIST Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) Computer 

Security Division hosted a one-day symposium to explore the cybersecurity aspects of 

DDM. There were approximately 50 attendees from government, industry, and academia 

representing a broad array of DDM practitioners, cybersecurity professionals, 

researchers, and manufacturing innovation organizations.

During the symposium, speakers and attendees discussed DDM cybersecurity risks, 

challenges, solutions, and implications for ICT supply chain risk management. Although 

the presenters were all from diverse backgrounds representing a variety of viewpoints, 

each had similar arguments: 

 Cybersecurity risks to DDM are very real; 

 Cybersecurity threats have the potential to disrupt the manufacturing revolution;

 There is real opportunity to improve the security of the manufacturing supply 

chain, and

 The time to build cybersecurity in to the DDM process is now.

During discussions and the concluding working session, participants generally agreed 

that the biggest challenge to building cybersecurity into DDM is culture. Organizations –

especially small businesses - may not recognize that AM or 3D printing devices have any 

cybersecurity risks and may be unwilling to compromise efficiency for security. Other 

key areas discussed included cost-effective technological capabilities, technical 

standards, and general guidance. While several existing technical standards were 

identified, most were not specific to cybersecurity in DDM. Attendees noted that 

technical and standards-based solutions for DDM are limited and do not address the 

rapid, changeable, and distributed manufacturing environment of the future. NIST SP 

800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and 

Organizations[1], and the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 

Cybersecurity[2] were identified as potential starting points for developing risk 

management guidance for DDM.

.
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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... v

1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 1

2 Abstracts and Presentations........................................................................................ 2

Welcome...................................................................................................................................2

James St. Pierre

Deputy Director of the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), NIST

Invited Talk ..............................................................................................................................2

Michael F. Molnar

Director, NIST Advanced Manufacturing Program Office

Director, Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office (AMNPO)

Presentation..............................................................................................................4

Presentation 1: An Analysis of Cyber Physical Vulnerabilities in Additive 

Manufacturing........................................................................................................................19

Christopher B. Williams

Associate Professor, Virginia Tech Department of Mechanical Engineering

Abstract..................................................................................................................20

Presentation............................................................................................................22

Presentation 2: Applying and Assessing Cybersecurity Controls for Direct Digital 

Manufacturing Systems ..........................................................................................................51

Scott Zimmerman, CISSP-ISSEP

Principal IT Advisor, Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC)

Dominick Glavach, CISSP, GCIH

Principle Fellow, Information Systems Security Engineer, CTC

Abstract..................................................................................................................52

Presentation............................................................................................................55

Presentation 3: Cybersecurity for Advanced Manufacturing – Securing the Digital 

Thread ....................................................................................................................................65

Dr. Michael F. McGrath

NDIA Manufacturing Division

Abstract..................................................................................................................66

Presentation............................................................................................................67

Panel: Opportunities for Secure 3D Printing .........................................................................65

Robert Zollo (moderator)

President, Avante Technology
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Abstract..................................................................................................................76

Presentation............................................................................................................77

Dr. Claire Vishik

Trust and Security Technology and Policy Director, Intel Corporation

Presentation............................................................................................................90

Andre Wegner

Founder, CEO at Authentize

Presentation............................................................................................................98

3 Summary of Attendee Perceptions .......................................................................... 118

4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 120

List of Appendices

Appendix A— Response Sheet Results .................................................................. A-1

Appendix B— Working Session Results................................................................. B-1

Appendix C— Biographies ....................................................................................... C-1

Appendix D— Attendee List..................................................................................... D-1

Appendix E— Acronyms ...........................................................................................E-1

Appendix F— References..........................................................................................F-1
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1 Overview

Direct Digital Manufacturing (DDM) involves fabricating physical objects from a data file using 

computer-controlled processes with little to no human intervention. Traditionally, these 

technologies have not been widely adopted, but with the popularization of Additive 

Manufacturing (AM) and 3D printing, they are becoming increasingly common. These 

technologies are advancing rapidly and have the potential to significantly change traditional 

manufacturing and supply chain industries, including for information and communication 

technologies (ICT).

On February 3, 2015, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Information 

Technology Laboratory (ITL) Computer Security Division hosted a one-day symposium to 

explore the cybersecurity aspects of DDM, to include ensuring the protection of intellectual 

property and the integrity of printers, elements being printed, and design data. 

There were approximately 50 attendees from government, industry, and academia representing a 

broad array of DDM practitioners, cybersecurity professionals, researchers, and manufacturing 

innovation organizations. During the symposium, speakers and attendees discussed cybersecurity 

risks, challenges, solutions, and implications for Information and Communications Technology 

(ICT) supply chain risk management. 

The agenda contained an invited talk, four presentations, and a panel discussion that exemplified 

diverse perspectives. A concluding working session captured the viewpoints of the attendees in 

several key areas. In addition, attendees provided inputs on the risks, challenges, existing 

solutions, and potential/theoretical solutions for cybersecurity in DDM. Responses focused 

around culture / humans, threats to the integrity of design, technological capabilities – especially 

around quality control and event detection, and guidance specific to cybersecurity in DDM.

The remainder of this publication is structured as follows:

 Section 2 contains a summary of each presentation, and speaker submitted abstracts 

and presentations where applicable. Presentations are included in the order they were 

given during the symposium.

 Section 3 contains an analysis of attendee perceptions based on completed attendee 

handouts / response sheets and the concluding working session.

 Section 4 presents conclusions, including possible future steps and recommendations.

 Appendix A contains data from completed handouts / response sheets.

 Appendix B contains data collected during the concluding working session

 Appendix C contains biographies of the presenters as contained in the agenda.

 Appendix D lists acronyms used throughout the document.
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2 Abstracts and Presentations

This section contains a brief summary of each presentation along with the abstracts speakers 

submitted, when applicable, and any slides used. Presentations in this section are listed in the 

order they were given during the symposium. 

Welcome

James St. Pierre

Deputy Director of the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), NIST

Key Points:

 NIST’s mission is to promote “U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness.”

 Safeguarding the “digital threads” of the manufacturing process is critical to 

promoting innovation and industrial competitiveness.

 The core principles of NIST’s ITL efforts include collaboration, openness, and 

transparency.

 We welcome the opportunity to collaborate to identify risks, challenges, gaps and 

opportunities as we look to “build security in” to the direct digital manufacturing 

processes and discuss ways forward.

Invited Talk

Michael F. Molnar

Director, NIST Advanced Manufacturing Program Office

Director, Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office (AMNPO)

Key Points:

 The first two manufacturing revolutions were about bringing capabilities together. 

The third and current manufacturing revolution is about new capabilities – creating 

things we never could have before.

 Misconceptions about manufacturing include that it is “dirty and declining,”

meaning it may not be an attractive job field.

 Manufacturing plays a central role in the U.S. economic base.

 In 2013, the National Network of Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) was created 

with bi-partisan support to advance the US’s manufacturing capabilities.

 The Revitalize American Manufacturing Innovation (RAMI) Act of 2014 (H.R. 

2996/S. 1468) calls for open-topic proposals for creating additional NNMI 

institutes. Currently 8 are planned with a goal of 45 total.
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 Ed Morris was invited to speak about the first pilot NNMI institute - America 

Makes. He spoke about how they examined cyber implications and how advanced 

manufacturing would not exist without the digital component. 

 Dean Bartles was invited to speak about the second pilot NNMI institute – the 

Digital Manufacturing and Design Innovation Institute (DMDII) in Chicago, 

Illinois. The DMDII focuses on digital design solutions and that cybersecurity 

ranked among the top five concerns of manufacturing leaders. DMDII Project Call 

15-01 is specifically focused on cybersecurity and closes March 20, 2015.

 With digital manufacturing, the U.S. is regaining its focus on manufacturing and 

raising a new generation of makers.
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Presentation:
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Presentation 1: An Analysis of Cyber Physical Vulnerabilities in Additive 

Manufacturing

Christopher B. Williams

Associate Professor, Virginia Tech Department of Mechanical Engineering

Key Discussion Points:

 Current research in Cyber Physical Systems is focused on Supervisory Control and 

Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, but Additive Manufacturing is different.

 Researchers were able to intercept a job initialization file and decode it, allowing 

attackers to potentially alter printer parameters mid-print. The STL (or newer 

AMF) standard files are especially vulnerable to attacks which alter a design.

 The presenters described an experiment run on students at Virginia Tech. Seven 

groups of students were given an “extra credit” assignment to design a standard dog 

bone, print it, and test it. An exploit was easily developed which inserted a void in 

the STL file. Students failed to recognize any anomalies prior to printing and 

testing. No students correctly diagnosed the anomalies as a cybersecurity problem.

 Recommendations include improved quality control processes, hashing, improved 

process monitoring, and operator training.

 Some attendees commented that other forms of manufacturing have similar 

vulnerabilities.

 Cybersecurity solutions should be built under the assumption that manufacturers 

are not cybersecurity experts.
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An Analysis of Cyber-Physical Vulnerabilities in 

Additive Manufacturing

Logan Sturm1, Christopher B. Williams1, Jaime A. Camelio2, Jules White3, Robert Parker4

1Department of Mechanical Engineering, 2Department of Industrial & Systems Engineering, 3Department 

of Computer Science

1,2Virginia Tech, 3Vanderbilt University, 4VT-ARC

1,2,4Blacksburg, VA, USA

Keywords—Additive Manufacturing; 3D Printing; 

Cyber/Physical security

EXTENDED ABSTRACT

While the “digital thread” of advanced 

manufacturing technologies enables a more 

efficient design process, it also presents 

opportunities for cyber-attacks to impact the 

physical word. A cyber-attack on manufacturing 

systems could cause injury to plant workers and 

damage to the machine itself. More insidiously, an 

attack could be designed to cause a process to 

produce faulty parts that might find their way into 

end-user products. With the rise in both the 

number of cyber-physical systems connected to 

networks and in malicious cyber-attacks, there is a 

clear need for research to understand the 

vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems. While 

methods exist for detecting cyber-attacks on 

computer systems, no such research has been done 

on detecting an attack from the physical parts 

created by the attack. 

In this work, the authors scope their research 

solely on Additive Manufacturing (AM; also 

referred to as “3D Printing”) technologies. The 

AM process chain has unique vulnerabilities that 

warrant a detailed investigation due to their ability 

to fabricate parts in a layer-wise fashion. Because 

of the potential damage from a cyber-physical 

attack, there is a need to look at AM systems to 

determine what vulnerabilities exist and how to 

prevent and mitigate the threat of cyber-attacks.

The digital nature of the AM process chain 

provides an opportunity for a cyber-attack to cross 

into the physical world. There are four main steps 

on the process chain where an attack could take 

place: the CAD model, the .STL file, the toolpath 

file, and the physical machine itself. While the 

authors will discuss attack vectors at each of these 

steps within the process chain, their focus will be 

on vulnerabilities within the .STL file as it is the 

one vulnerability that does not require specific 

modification for an individual AM machine. As 

STL file creation occurs at the beginning of the 

process chain and the file format is standardized 

across every AM machine, a focused attack could 

have severe implications across an AM production 

line regardless of the machine type or 

manufacturer.

The current defacto standard in AM, the STL 

file only contains the surface information of the 

part. This information is stored as a list of 

triangular elements (specified by the a set of x,y, 

and z coordinates of three vertices) in ASCII or 

binary format. An attack that simply edits the STL 

file could subtly alter the part geometry. STL file 

edits/attacks could take the form of (i) part scaling, 

(ii) surface indents or protrusions, (iii) vertex 

movement, and (iv) insertion of internal voids 

within the part. While most of these vectors affect 

the surface of the part geometry – and thus could 

possibly detected using standard quality control 

dimensional measurements – the void attack is 

completely enclosed inside the model. Because of 

this, such an attack would be undetectable by 

dimensional measurements and may be difficult or 

impossible to find visually. The use of supporting 

material in many processes also renders the void 

undetectable by weighing, since the void is filled 

with a structurally deficient, but equivalently 

dense material.

To ascertain the potential impact of this 

specific attack, two experiments were performed. 

First the authors evaluated the effect of a “printed 

void” on the mechanical strength of a printed 

specimen. Several ASTM Standard D638-10 

tensile test specimens with and without voids were 

printed on via Powder Bed Fusion (a Sinterstation 
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2500 Plus machine) using Nylon 12 powder. Upon 

testing, all of the specimens containing voids 

fractured at the void location, while the specimens 

without voids failed normally. The average 

reduction in yield load was 14%, from 1085N to 

930N, and the strain at failure was reduced from 

10.4% to 5.8%. 

Second, a case study was performed to 

determine the feasibility of a cyber-attack on a 

simple AM system and to evaluate the ability of 

AM operators to detect an attack. In this 

experiment, upper-level and graduate engineering 

students were challenged to manufacture and test a 

tensile test specimen. Unknown to the participants, 

the computer used was infected with .STL attack 

software that automatically inserted voids into 

their files before fabrication. Upon completion of 

the printing, none of the participants detected the 

presence of the voids in their parts. Upon breaking 

the part, all participant teams identified that their 

parts failed prematurely. Two teams detected the 

presence of a void at the fracture location; 

however both of these teams concluded that the 

placement was due to problems with the machine. 

Two teams did not notice the voids and attributed 

the failure to the anisotropic nature of additively 

manufactured parts. 

Based on the results of this study, it appears 

that a real threat from cyber-physical attacks exists 

and that further research needs to be done on how 

to mitigate such attacks. The inclusion of software 

checks, hashing, process monitoring, and worker 

training are proposed as methods of reducing these 

threats. Future work includes the development of 

physical hashing techniques and of improved side 

channel process monitoring and control.
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Presentation:
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Presentation 2: Applying and Assessing Cybersecurity Controls for Direct 

Digital Manufacturing Systems

Scott Zimmerman, CISSP-ISSEP

Principal IT Advisor, Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC)

Dominick Glavach, CISSP, GCIH

Principle Fellow, Information Systems Security Engineer, CTC

Key Discussion Points:

 Digitization of manufacturing increases the risks for theft, disruption, and sabotage. 

There are vulnerabilities in preproduction software, data storage and data transfers, 

the StereoLythography (STL) file format, printer components, and engineering / 

production practices.

 The presenters discussed their experience with obtaining a 3D printer and the 

cybersecurity challenges experienced when setting it up. 

 Many AM machines contain old firmware, cannot be patched easily, and have poor 

authentication processes. It was commented that this is not unusual for 

manufacturing systems. 

 The AM process is also complex, variable / changeable, and tends to leave a lot of 

residual data in various places, making cybersecurity without interfering with 

functionality a challenge.

 There is a significant opportunity to be proactive rather than reactive regarding 

cybersecurity due to the nature of the technology and the state of the industry. The 

authors presented several recommendations for cybersecurity controls and 

highlighted the value of traditional cybersecurity controls such as firewalls. 

 Participants stressed the need for focusing on people – a recent attack was 

described that began with a phishing scam. One participant commented that 

manufacturers and users are not security aware, yet DDM supports minimal digital 

knowledge - any security solution needs to be simple and usable.
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Applying and Assessing Cybersecurity Controls 

for Direct Digital Manufacturing Sytems

Scott Zimmerman, CISSP-ISEP

Concurrent Technologies Corporation

Johnstown, PA USA

zimmerms@ctc.com

Dom Glavach, CISSP

Concurrent Technologies Corporation

Johnstown, PA USA

dg@ctc.com

Abstract – Applying meaningful and assessing 

impactful cybersecurity controls are ongoing and 

significant challenges for the Direct Digital 

Manufacturing (DDM) Community. These issues 

will be significant as the technology moves into 

the mainstream manufacturing supply chain. This 

presentation will, therefore, address cybersecurity 

threats to DDM, including insight into potential 

attack scenarios and motivations, gained through 

direct observations. We will discuss the details of 

a security assessment performed on an Additive 

Manufacturing (AM) system used for rapid 

prototyping and complex part production within 

the defense industry. Protocols and associated 

recommendations for incorporating security best 

practices during system installation and 

subsequent operation will also be presented. 

Keywords—additive manufacturing, cybersecurity, 

direct digital manufacturing, programmable logic 

controllers

1 INTRODUCTION

Based on the expectation and potential impact in 

revitalizing the U.S. and global manufacturing 

landscape, Direct Digital Manufacturing (DDM), 

including Additive Manufacturing (AM) and other 

similarly disruptive technologies, will have a 

significant impact on national security. According 

to the National Defense University, “The 

propagation of this technology has generated a 

host of national security considerations, which 

connect to broader economic and policy 

developments.... Additionally, the deployment of 

AM technologies in manufacturing will likely 

promote greater interaction between the national 

security community and the private sector, as 

businesses will be able to produce prototypes and 

sophisticated components more inexpensively and 

quickly than before.” 1 While supply chain 

implications and benefits are numerous, 

cybersecurity remains a significant challenge.

The Economist (April 2012) refers to the potential 

for DDM to create the third industrial revolution2, 

noting that the disruption to manufacturing will be 

as significant as digitization was to 

telecommunication, office equipment, 

photography and publishing. While digitization 

creates an incredible growth potential within 

manufacturing, it also comes with many of the 

associated cybersecurity risks that impact other 

digitized industries. 

Due to the potential economic and security 

implications of DDM, the industry is challenged to 

address cybersecurity risks in a timely way and 

develop standards, systems and processes for 

security before such wide scale adoption of the 

technology limits, or prohibits, the deployment of 

protection mechanisms. The negative impacts of 

failure to include security protocols at start-up can 

be seen within the power and energy sector, which 

has large deployments of programmable logic 

controllers (PLC) and supervisory control and data 

acquisition (SCADA) systems. At the time of 

design and deployment, these systems were not 

equipped with adequate security mechanisms to 

contend with the threats of the connected world in 

the current environment. Now these systems are 

so tightly woven into the fabric of the power grid, 

retrofitting security is a much larger task than if it 

had been tackled in the beginning. 
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2 CHARACTERIZING THE THREAT

The technical advances and economic impact

associated with the DDM revolution attracts an 

innovative and entrepreneurial audience. History 

illustrates that new technologies have a tendency 

to influence a criminal opportunity via unexpected 

exploitation avenues. From the stagecoach to 

smart thermostats, security has often been an 

afterthought in new technology design and 

implementation. Hathaway states that corporate 

and government leadership are reactive in nature 

to cybersecurity needs and only act to mitigate 

security issues after a significant event occurs. 

She further concludes that additional legislation 

may be needed to incentivize corporate and 

government leadership to get serious about 

cybersecurity.3

The complexity and critical nature of some 

products being produced by DDM, ranging from 

fuel nozzles to human organs, render these 

systems obvious targets for cyber criminals, 

espionage actors, or digital activist groups. 

Regardless of motivation, gaining access to an 

industrial DDM system is not a trivial action and 

requires an intricate, but likely, attack scenario, 

resulting in one of the following: 

1. Theft (processes and property)

2. Disruption (slowing or stopping the DDM 

process)

3. Sabotage (inserting unforeseen time-delayed 

failures)

The combination of system complexity, 

installation methods and manner in which digital 

models become manufactured objects create a 

large attack surface. The proposed presentation 

explores possible attack scenarios and associated 

risk evaluations in the areas of:

1. Model file formats 

2. Data storage and transfers

3. Printer components software and firmware

4. Preproduction software 

5. Engineering and production practices

3 SECURITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS

System Installation

With the opportunity to conduct a security 

assessment on a newly installed AM system, we 

have identified risks at the inception; it begins 

with internal coordination and communications 

between enterprise Information Technology (IT) 

and shop floor personnel. In general, the focus 

and priority of the 

materials/manufacturing/engineering staff are 

installation and operation, which includes 

connection to the internal and possibly an external 

network, so the relevant parts can be produced. 

Their initial concerns are not about how to make 

this system secure. 

In the particular case under consideration, the AM 

equipment was delivered to the ‘manufacturing’ 

floor, unboxed and set up all without the 

awareness of the IT department. Once installed, 

the AM engineering team connected with the 

Enterprise Help Desk and requested “...can you 

help connect our new printer to the network?” 

Unwittingly, the request was executed. Needless 

to say, the original equipment manufacturer 

(OEM) was unable to connect to the AM 

equipment, since it was behind the corporate 

firewall. Subsequent requests were submitted to 

the Enterprise Help Desk requesting OEM access 

to the equipment through the Internet for finetuning. The printer was transferred to an open 

Internet connection normally provided to 

corporate guests. This channel is monitored yet it 

has minimal shielding. It was only after 

subsequent investigation by the information 

security team that it became clear that the “printer” 

was in fact a metal DDM system, not a typical 

office document printer. Following this discovery, 

the security team has moved the printer to a secure 

and scrutinized subnet on the network. Now, 

additional security controls and enhanced logging 

occur routinely and yet where it is still possible for 

the engineering team to work directly through the 

network with the manufacturer. 

Assessment Methodology

AM systems can be complex, consisting of several 

central processing units (CPU) and PLCs, 

operating systems, and applications (including 

both AM-specific ones as well as applications that 

support the user experience, such as web-browser 

and Portable Document Format (PDF) readers). 

The CPU/PLCs communicate via standard 

network protocols such as TCP/IP within the 

printer and then to a gateway interface for larger 

network access. The operating systems and 
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applications on these controllers process design 

data to produce 3D components.

We deployed both the corporate security 

assessment methodology as well as the security 

risk assessment provided in the NIST DRAFT 

NISTIR 8023, Risk Management for Replication 

Devices. We will present and discuss specific scan 

results and findings. In addition, we will propose a 

series of security protocols as best practices for 

any DDM system implementation. We list a 

selection of possible solutions below and we will 

expand on the requirements for success in this 

presentation. 

Recommendations

 Mandatory scanning (enumeration) of system 

prior to deploying to the network and disable 

all unneeded communications/system 

processes,

 Review of user accounts/groups on the system 

including their level of privilege and adjust 

accordingly,

 Removal of all unneeded applications installed 

on the system (browsers, readers, games, etc.),

 Enable host based firewall to allow 

communication via secure ports to know IP 

addresses for manufacturer communications 

(disable this connectivity when not in use)

 Processes developed for system 

updates/upgrades

Conclusion

High-end AM printers are expensive, highly 

calibrated machines, increasingly complex, and 

generally not ‘plug-and-play’ systems. With 

respect to the system discussed in this 

presentation, there has been a great deal of 

ongoing support from the OEM in order to 

optimize printer operational performance. This 

type of support requires remote connectivity to the 

system. When the manufacturer is a foreign entity, 

this situation compounds security challenges and 

complicates protocols due to the need to comply 

with International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) 

regulations that may prohibit collaborations. At a 

minimum, many security assessment protocols and 

mitigation procedures implemented typically for 

enterprise business systems should be applied or 

adapted for implementation and operation of DDM 

systems. 

REFERENCES

C.M. McNulty, N. Armas, “Toward the Printed World: 

Additive Manufacturing and Implication for 

National Security,” September 2012 Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University, Defense Horizons

The Economist, “A third industrial revolution”. 

Accessed November 2014, 

http://www.economist.com/node/21552901

M.E. Hathaway, “Leadership and Responsibility for 

Cybersecurity”, Georgetown Journal of 

International Affairs, pages 71-80, March 2013.

f
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Presentation 3: Cybersecurity for Advanced Manufacturing – Securing the 

Digital Thread

Dr. Michael F. McGrath

National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Manufacturing Division

Key Discussion Points:

 The intersection between cyber/cybersecurity and manufacturing is critical.

 The presenter described three concerns expressed by manufacturers: theft, 

alteration, and disruption. These closely mirror the traditional Confidentiality, 

Integrity, and Availability (CIA) security objectives..

 IT solutions don’t always fit the manufacturing world. Manufacturers often have a 

mix of old and new equipment. The new can be secured, but securing the old is 

much more difficult, and the old has to work with the new.

 Culture change is necessary. Some participants indicated the industry has to change 

– vendors will say anything to sell a product; manufacturing CEOs place 

productivity over security, and CISOs don’t have much say regarding the 

manufacturing operations. 

 Requirements are beginning to be seen – e.g. Defense Acquisition Regulations 

System (DFARS) clause which requires flow down of responsibility to subsuppliers.

 Some companies may be especially vulnerable as they may not recognize a risk. 

Interconnected supply chains with a lot of data sharing may be especially 

vulnerable if they use small company suppliers who don’t recognize cybersecurity 

risks in manufacturing.

 Manufacturing presents a unique set of problems combining cyber plus Industrial 

Control System (ICS) vulnerabilities. Existing cybersecurity controls may not be 

sufficient in a DDM environment. The problem is not unique to AM, but AM 

presents a significant opportunity to build security in.

 An NDIA working group regarding cybersecurity in manufacturing is currently 

being formed. 
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Cybersecurity for Advance Manufacturing --

Protecting the Digital Thread

Dr. Michael McGrath

National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Manufacturing Division

Arlington, VA, USA

mfm@mcgrath-analytics-llc.com

Abstract: Government and industry have 

focused much effort on protecting technical 

information in business and engineering 

information systems. Relatively less action 

has been taken to improve protection of 

technical data in factory floor networks and 

control systems, which are increasingly 

subject to cyber threats. NDIA’s 

Manufacturing Division and Cyber Division 

jointly developed a White Paper in 2014 to 

heighten awareness of the need for better 

practices and technical solutions to protect 

against theft of technical data transiting or 

residing in manufacturing systems, 

alteration of the data (thereby compromising 

the physical parts produced), or interference 

with reliable and safe production operations. 

Direct digital manufacturing is not 

inherently more vulnerable than other types 

of manufacturing, but it presents a very 

inviting target for would-be Intellectual 

property thieves or counterfeiters -- the full 

set of product and process information is 

available in one place, and the barriers to 

entry are low. This presentation offers 

several recommendations for enhancing 

protection of technical data in factory floor 

networks and in direct digital manufacturing 

systems in particular.
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Panel: Opportunities for Secure 3D Printing

Robert Zollo (moderator)

President, Avante Technology

Dr. Claire Vishik

Trust and Security Technology and Policy Director, Intel Corporation

Andre Wegner

Founder and CEO, Authentize

Key Discussion Points:

 There are many opportunities for building security into the design of DDM 

machines abound.

 During its development, security wasn’t high on the list of priorities for the ISO 

Additive Manufacturing File Format (AMF)[3], but it has “hints” of security –

there is a space in the metadata where security could be inserted. In the future, it 

may be added in.

 The Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) Public Working Group (PWG) considers 

manufacturing devices like 3D printers as cyber physical systems. AM devices are 

similar in that they use the same protocols and firmware.

 There are privacy concerns when considering cybersecurity controls. For example, 

putting in automatic, machine-generated ID numbers for asset inventory or forensic 

purposes could lead back to a particular printer and a particular person.

 One of the biggest impacts of AM may be on the supply chain. Distributed 

manufacturing with localized production can dramatically reduce logistics costs. 

AM provides an opportunity to enhance the resilience and security of the supply 

chain in ways not available before.

 The biggest obstacles to cybersecurity in manufacturing include: awareness; the 

culture; uninformed decision makers; loss of process control; people and 

organizations not working together; not willing to invest in security.

 Attendees disagreed as to whether the economy would need to provide an incentive 

for organizations to include cybersecurity in their processes. Some attendees stated

that customers desire more secure solutions to protect their intellectual property and 

systems. Other attendees disagreed but were uncertain whether the market could be 

incentivized to be proactive or if solutions would always be reactionary. 

 Attendees and the panel stated that there were no on-going activities regarding 

security standardization. It was noted that standards reduce costs significantly in 

the semiconductor and other fields, but the standards processes around AM devices 

have just begun and attendees were unsure how security standards could be applied.

 
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“Virtual Part” Perspective on Cyber-Security

Designing Security Components into 3D Printing Hardware, Software & Printed

Objects

Robert Zollo

President

Avante Technology, LLC

Bellevue, WA USA

bobz@avante-technology.com

I. INTRODUCTION

The author will provide a “ground up” view of

security issues from the printer hardware and related

control software perspective, and introduce the

concept of the “virtual part”, a term for the software

and meta data that define the item to be printed, and

its revisions as it moves and evolves throughout it’s

life in the integrated supply chains of future factories.

He will provide insight on how to employ the new

ISO/ASTM standard for 3D printing file descriptions

to begin building security components within the file

meta data and use it with security functionality that

can be designed in to the printer firmware and control

software. He will propose some simple steps to begin

building a cyber-security capable environment on the

shop floor and in the engineering lab.

II. THE “BRILLIANT FACTORY”

CONCEPT

A brief overview of the integrated “brilliant

factory” of the future as described by GE in their

recent white paper on DDM. The concept of

integrating thousands of intelligent machines located

in multiple locations by people within and without

the manufacturing organization in a “completely

transparent supply chain” is introduced. Security

issues relating to the “virtual part” as it moves

through the supply chain to the factory floor and back

for revisions are highlighted.

III. THE “STATE OF THE PRACTICE”

A brief overview of some typical 3D printers will be

offered to highlight areas of potential breach of

security in the firmware, controlling software and the

file description software. Opportunities for

introducing simple security measures are identified.

IV. LEVERAGING ISO STANDARDS

An overview of two ISO standards relating to the

definition, transfer and use of 3D files is provided.

Ideas on how these standards may be used to begin

building some security mechanisms into the “virtual

part” package as it moves through the design and

supply chain.

V. INTEGRATING SMALL SHOPS FOR

SECURITY

Suggestions are made on how to implement a simple,

scalable, integrated security mechanism using

components embedded in the printer firmware,

control software, file management software, and file

description software that is applicable to small to

small manufacturing shops as well as enterprise scale

brilliant factories.

VI. INVITATION TO DIALOG

Panelists will be invited to comment on how the

suggested

security mechanisms might fit within a larger scale

security architecture in enterprise factories.

REFERENCES

1. M. Annunziata and S. Biller, “The Future of Work”, General

Electric white paper; 2014.

2. ISO/ASTM 52915 standard framework for an interchange

format to address current and future needs of additive

manufacturing; 2013

3. ISO IS14306 standard for viewing and sharing lightweight

3D product information: 2012.
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Presentation by Robert Zollo:
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Presentation by Claire Vishik:
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Presentation by Andre Wegner:
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3 Summary of Attendee Perceptions

This section summarizes attendee perceptions as gathered throughout the symposium, including 

during presentations and through information gathering exercises. At the start of the symposium, 

attendees were asked to anonymously list as many thoughts / items as they could under each of 

the following categories: 

 Risks; 

 Challenges; 

 Existing Solutions, and 

 Potential / Theoretical Solutions. 

20 percent of attendees submitted their responses, listed in Appendix A. 

In addition, during the closing session, attendees were asked to identify thoughts / items under 

the following categories: 

 Standards; 

 Guidance; 

 Tools, and 

 Gaps. 

The responses from this exercise are listed in Appendix B. 

Several attendees identified culture / humans as a significant risk or challenge to the 

cybersecurity of DDM, and to cybersecurity in general. Cybersecurity education at all levels of a 

manufacturing organization was desired. Changing the priorities and culture of manufacturing 

organizations is challenging due to a lack of understanding of cybersecurity risks and benefits. 

Business cases or examples were desired. A few attendees mentioned legal requirements as a 

potential solution and there were a few comments questioning who bears the burden of the risk 

of an attack – the IP owners, the vendor(s), or the government.

Threats to the integrity of designs and systems were a common thread in responses. Some

mentioned confidentiality of intellectual property as a concern and only a few identified 

availability concerns. Software vulnerabilities were called out a few times, but most responses 

focused on the final product. The nature of the digital supply chain was identified several times 

as a challenge with attendees specifically calling out the volume and types of data to be protected 

in a distributed and open manufacturing environment. 

Quality control and event detection capabilities were desired. A few attendees mentioned the use 

of encryption throughout the manufacturing process as a potential solution. Other potential / 

desired technical capabilities identified by respondents included: distributed network security 

solutions, authentication mechanisms, automated and real-time monitoring and control, 

embedded security solutions, and residual data removal tools. It was stressed in responses and 

throughout the symposium that any technical solution must be simple and easy and preferably 

all-encompassing– “an easy button”.
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Another common thread in responses was the suggestion for guidelines specific to DDM based 

on NIST SP 800-53 [1], the NIST Cybersecurity Framework [2], existing ISO standards, and 

industry best practices. Technical standards, such as protocols and formats, were also mentioned 

by several as representing a gap, or opportunity, for improving cybersecurity. Attendees 

provided the following list of standards and guidelines as providing a potential foundation for 

future DDM-specific cybersecurity standards and guidelines.

 IEC 62264-1:2013 - Enterprise-control system integration -- Part 1: Models and 

terminology [4]

 ISA-95, Enterprise-Control System Integration [5]

 ISO / ASTM52915 – 13, Standard Specification for Additive Manufacturing File Format

(AMF) Version 1.1 [3]

 ISO 10303 -242:2014, , Industrial automation systems and integration -- Product data 

representation and exchange -- Part 242: Application protocol: Managed model-based 

3D engineering [6]

 ISO 14306:2012, Industrial automation systems and integration -- JT file format 

specification for 3D visualization [7]

 ISO 14739-1:2014, Document management -- 3D use of Product Representation 

Compact (PRC) format -- Part 1: PRC 10001 [8]

 ISO/IEC 27000:2014, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information 

security management systems -- Overview and vocabulary [9]

 NAS 9924, Cybersecurity Baseline [10]

 NIACAP-DIACAP (now obsolete, see DoDI 8510.01 and [11] CNSSP No. 22[12])

 NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [2]

 NIST IR 8023, Risk Management for Replication Devices [13]

 NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information 

Systems and Organizations [1]

 NIST SP 800-82, Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security [14]
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4 Conclusions

Direct Digital Manufacturing is poised to revolutionize the manufacturing industry. A 

collaborative public and private approach is necessary to improving the cybersecurity of DDM 

processes and technology. This symposium was intended to be a step in that direction.

Although the presenters were from diverse backgrounds representing a variety of viewpoints, 

each made similar points: 

 Cybersecurity risks to DDM are very real; 

 Cybersecurity threats are the Achilles heel of the current manufacturing revolution;

 There is a real opportunity to make the manufacturing supply chain more secure than it 

has ever been, and

 The time to build cybersecurity in to the DDM process is now.

Attendees identified several risks and opportunities for building cybersecurity into DDM. Many 

attendees identified the integrity of designs and machines as a major risk while a few also 

mentioned intellectual property concerns. Gaps and potential solutions were grouped into four 

categories:

 Education / awareness of risks and cost/benefits;

 Technical solutions such as encryption capabilities and network monitoring;

 Technical standards such as a security option in existing standard file formats, and

 Guidance / best practice documents based on existing NIST publications.

With its expertise in advanced manufacturing and information technology, NIST is well poised 

to address these concerns. The NIST ITL has already developed cybersecurity guidance related 

to Cyber Physical Systems and Industrial Control Systems. There is an opportunity to include 

DDM cybersecurity considerations into future revisions of existing programs and publications. 

Also, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) has begun to look at how to 

help manufacturers be more aware of cybersecurity risks that they may not have recognized. 

Additionally, the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) uses existing standards 

and technology to architect solutions to difficult cybersecurity problems and DDM may be a 

candidate. Results from this symposium will help guide future efforts in these areas.
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Appendix A: Response Sheet Results

At the beginning of the symposium, attendees were asked to list as many items/thoughts as they 

could under the following categories: Risks, Challenges, Existing Solutions, and Potential / 

Theoretical Solutions. Attendees were not limited as to the scope of their responses and 

encouraged to write whatever came to mind. The following is a compilation of the responses 

received in each category. Responses are listed in alphabetical order and were transcribed as 

closely as possible, including grammar, abbreviations, and spelling. References have been added 

where possible and are included in Appendix F. An analysis of the responses, along with

responses in Appendix B, is provided in section 3 of this publication.

Risks:

 Altering data to change specs of finish products

 Availability

 Components in sensitive applications may have unintended / undesirable performance 

characteristics that are undetectable

 Confidentiality

 Corruption of imbedded software @ machine

 Corruption of STL files

 Damage of manufacturing equipment

 Design tools vulnerability -> CAD & pre-cad part of

 Detection of inherent flaw - pilphereal IP is analyzed for existing flaw

 Ensure the small & medium enterprise have the tools are reasonable price point

 EtherCat or Industrial IP security?

 Getting tools to the right level capability at right price / affordable

 Government entities each seem to have their own program for cyber security. The risk is 

two-fold: (1) they are talking, but not WORKING together. Wasting resources and efforts 

(2) Government is way behind industry, and not bringing them in to address this 

substantial gap

 Integrity

 IT/OT convergence --> how do I secure this... ...

 IVV of file transport from central storage to production facility

 Modification of model

 OEMs not ensuring security (& keeping backdoors open for "maintenance")

 Tainted products (additional functionality)

 The human aspect (social engineering)

 Theft of intell property

 Theft of IP

 Treats to RF specturm - wireless is increasing the comms component of choice on factory 

floor. 802.3, 802.11ad etc

 Understanding 3D printer, direct digital in the context of 3D phenomenon [i.e. same files 

could be used for manufacturing or decision support

 Uneducated workforce
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 Un-maintained manufacturing equipment (outdated OS, virus definitions, firewall, 

firmware, etc.)

Challenges:

 3D, HD, FMV 

 Automated

 Automation security

 Balancing benefits of open-source / open architecture machines & file formats with 

dangers of cyber vulnerabilities

 Digital rights management / digital asset management

 Digital supply chain

 DISTRIBUTED manufacturing --> factory to factory

 eCommerce --> Will be part of the supply chain and will provide its own set of

challenges

 Educating workforce about cyber-physical concerns

 Embedded system / PLC, SCADA, ACS security

 Front end costs of cyber controls are hard to justify

 Having the right folks be the custodian of data / system

 How to capture design intent for validation / certification

 Integration of various data warehouse within enterprise that have to interface with each

other (i.e. PDM/PLM, MRP/ERP/MES and Accounting/HR) to provide the integrity, 

availability, & confidentiality

 Intellectual property management

 Lack of business case

 Manufacturing systems are not often updated (patches, firmware, more IT functionality 

than needed)

 Mfg culture, gap to IT culture

 Modeling and simulation precursor to decision to manufacture and design for 

manufacturing

 MOM [Manufacturing Operations Management Security]

 Organizational change management

 PCII - protected critical infrastructure Information

 PMI - production Manufacturing Information

 Poor acquisition policy that doesn't drive security

 Poor secure engineering design techniques (hardware & software)

 Prioritization of what is really important

 Quality control of microarchitecture

 Real-Time systems (synchrophasor, EtherCAT, etc)

 Role based access for M2M (machine to machine) exchanges

 Security as a requirement for the PLC and PLC of infrastructure and PLC of FW/SW

 Sensor network security

 The value proposition

 Trust
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 Understand tools, techniques and processes to protect fidelity from design thru 

production - what tool, at what cost, at what reduction in efficiency

 Volume of 3D digital media

Existing Solutions

 5 layer manufacturing protocol stack [5, 4]

 Encryption

 Fundamental best practices are available in 800 series SPs and some contemporary IT 

security publications

 NIST framework is good starting point

 Training / awareness

 Use of existing protocol for traditional manufacturing

Potential / Theoretical Solutions

 20 Critical controls for manufacturers

 Anecdotal

 Benchmark DoD/DOE defense contractors for best practices

 Content distribution networks - edge computing security

 Encrypt lifecycle

 Encrypted streaming

 Factory of the future dialog

 Focus on model based ecosystems: provides an architecture and governance

 IACAP-DIACAP - 800-134 (guess at #) - DoD continues to evolve "mandatory" standard

 Increased use of encryption

 Need a single entity that government can use to advance itself in this area. To succeed 

needs non-government owner who can bring all gov. entities together pooling resources, 

and incorporate industry to get current best practices. Suggest DMDLL as they are 

already doing a project on this involving government and industry. Possibly a more 

comprehensive follow on project

 NEED AN EASY button for manufacturing floor

 NTSB and auto - safety - manufacturers are responsible for standards - policy and law 

follow recommendation but a federal law was necessary to institute the mandate for 

commercial sector

 Standards are probably the best way of balancing concerns of vulnerabilities, openness, & 

privacy (& business)

 What risk reduction strategies, tools, and solutions exist? - A primer for manufacturing 

would be great!! Perhaps a good project for NAMII?

 When we take people out of the loop a lot of vulnerabilities go away
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Appendix B: Working Session Results

During the working session, attendees were asked to identify any standards, guides, or tools that 

could be applied to cybersecurity in DDM. They were also asked to identify any gaps in those 

areas, or anything that was missed during the symposium. Attendees were not limited as to the 

scope of their responses. The following is a compilation of the responses received in each 

category. Responses are listed in alphabetical order and were transcribed as closely as possible, 

including grammar, abbreviations, and spelling. References have been added where possible. An 

analysis of the responses, along with responses in Appendix A, is provided in section 3 of this 

publication.

Standards:

 AMF & ISO JT [7]

 IEC [16]

 IEEE [17]

 ISO ? Dealing with PDF / PRC format [8]

 ISO [18]

 ISO 10303 AP 242 [6]

 ISO 27000 [9]

 ITSI

 NAS 9924 [10]

 National Aerospace STDs published by Aerospace Industries Assoc. www.aia-nas.org

[19]

 NIST 800-53 [1]

 Sector SIGs

 Security Spec for ISO AMF standard [3]

 See references to draft CPS PWG working group report [20]

 Step 242 [6]

Guides:

 Cyber awareness for the shop floor

 NIST SP 800-82 [14]

 Overlay for 800-53 [1] is important in bridging IT to OT thinking

 Risk Management adapted for DDM

Tools:

 DEA tools

 NICE [21]

 Residual data removal tool

 Threat data sharing mechanisms
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Gaps:

 Authentication of Articles Connected to IoT

 Awareness of costs associated with NOT integrating security

 Breach Disclosure

 Drivers for secure hardware & software design

 Encryption approaches

 FBI is an active player in cybersecurity

 Flaw hack marketplace

 Formats

 Integration approaches

 International laws and agreement to prosecute the sources of cybersecurity event and bad 

actors

 Manufacturing Protocol Stack (Purdue) [15]

 Material quality standards - powder (distribution, properties), polymer

 NEED a guide for Business Case Analysis (for cybersecurity in mfg); NEED data/case 

examples to support

 Rule of unfettered Innovation / open software mode

 Transport protocols

 Who owns the problem

 Who owns what? - IP ownership

 Who will own the solution - if industry doesn't does it roll over to government
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Appendix C: Speaker Biographies

The following are speaker biographies as included in the agenda for the symposium, in 

presentation order.

Michael F. Molnar

Director, NIST Advanced Manufacturing Program Office

Director, Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office (AMNPO)

Mike Molnar likes to be introduced simply as "a manufacturing guy from industry" with nearly 

30 years of experience in advanced manufacturing. To help provide an industry focus in 2011 he 

was named the first Chief Manufacturing Officer of the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology. Today Mike leads the NIST Advanced Manufacturing Program Office for 

extramural manufacturing programs and also serves as the director of the interagency Advanced 

Manufacturing National Program Office. As called for by the Advanced Manufacturing 

Partnership initiative, the AMNPO's mission is to foster industry-led partnerships and to form a 

"whole of government" approach to strengthen competitiveness and innovation in U.S. 

manufacturing.

Mike's experience includes leadership roles in advanced manufacturing, metrology, 

manufacturing systems, quality, technology development, sustainability and industrial energy 

efficiency. His credentials include service as a Federal Fellow in the White House Office of 

Science and Technology Policy, and election as Fellow of both the American Society of 

Mechanical Engineers and the Society of Manufacturing Engineers. He is a licensed Professional 

Engineer, a Certified Manufacturing Engineer and a Certified Energy Manager. He received a 

Master of Business Administration from the University of Notre Dame, and both a Master of 

Science in Manufacturing Systems Engineering and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical 

Engineering from the University of Wisconsin. He is an active member of professional societies, 

consortia and volunteer organizations.

Christopher B. Williams

Associate Professor, Virginia Tech Department of Mechanical Engineering

Christopher B. Williams is an Associate Professor with a joint appointment with the Department 

of Mechanical Engineering and the Department of Engineering Education at Virginia Tech. He is 

the Director of the Design, Research, and Education for Additive Manufacturing Systems 

(DREAMS) Laboratory and Associate Director of the Macromolecules & Interfaces Institute. 

His research contributions have been recognized by six Best Paper awards at international 

design, manufacturing, and engineering education conferences. He is a recipient of a National 

Science Foundation CAREER Award (2013), the 2012 International Outstanding Young 

Researcher in Freeform and Additive Fabrication Award, and the 2010 Emerald Engineering 

Additive Manufacturing Outstanding Doctoral Research Award. Chris holds a Ph.D. and M.S. in 

Mechanical Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology (Atlanta, Georgia) and a B.S. 

with High Honors in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Florida (Gainesville, 

Florida).
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Scott Zimmerman CISSP-ISSEP

Principal IT Advisor, Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC)

Dominick Glavach CISSP, GCIH

Principle Fellow, Information Systems Security Engineer, CTC

Scott Zimmerman, CISSP-ISSEP is a Principal Technical Advisor at Concurrent Technologies 

Corporation with 20 plus years of Cyber Security experience. Mr. Zimmerman specialized 

expertise includes cyber security, cloud/mobile computing and systems engineering. Mr. 

Zimmerman’s education includes a BS in Management Information Systems and AS in 

Electronic/Computer Technology. He is a Certified Information Systems Security Professional 

(CISSP); Information Systems Security Engineering Professional (ISSEP).

Mr. Glavach is a Principle Information Systems (IS) Security Engineer and CISO at Concurrent 

Technologies Corporation (CTC). He serves as the Cyber Security technical lead in CTC's 

Enterprise Infrastructure, provides CTC‘s clients with Cyber technical leadership and Subject 

Matter Expertise (SME). Mr. Glavach received his BS in Computer Science from the Indiana 

University of Pennsylvania, is a Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP), an 

active member of the Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center SME Program and 

member of the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA).

The speakers specialize in cyber attack methods, attack warning and detection, and cyber 

countermeasures. They have presented numerous talks on cloud forensics, cyber adversaries and 

advanced persistent threats to a wide range of public and government audiences.

Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC) is an independent, nonprofit, applied scientific 

research and development professional services organization providing innovative management 

and technology-based solutions to government and industry. Established in 1987, CTC operates 

from more than 50 locations with a staff of over 1,400 employees. As a nonprofit 501(c)(3) 

organization, CTC’s primary purpose and programs are to undertake applied scientific research 

and development activities that serve the public interest. We conduct impartial, in-depth 

assessments and technical evaluations that emphasize increased quality, enhanced effectiveness, 

and rapid technology transition and deployment. CTC offers a broad range of services and 

capabilities, coupled with real-world experience. For more information about CTC, visit 

www.ctc.com.

Dr. Michael McGrath

NDIA Manufacturing Division

Michael McGrath is an independent consultant who provides analytic support for government 

and industry technology programs. He is also a Senior Technical Advisor (and former Vice 

President) at Analytic Services Inc. (ANSER), a not-for-profit government services organization. 

He previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, 

Test and Evaluation (DASN(RDT&E)), where he was a strong proponent for improvements in 

technology transition, modeling and simulation, and test and evaluation. In prior positions, he 
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served as Vice President for Government Business at the Sarnoff Corporation, ADUSD for Dual 

Use and Commercial Programs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Assistant 

Director for Manufacturing at the Defense Systems Research Projects Agency (DARPA-DSO), 

and Director of the DoD Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistics Support (CALS) program. 

While at DARPA, he managed the Affordable Multi-Missile Manufacturing Program and the 

Agile Manufacturing program. He was also heavily involved in DARPA’s dual-use Technology 

Reinvestment Project and has been a strong advocate for defense use of commercial technology 

advances. His early government career included positions in Logistics Management at Naval Air 

Systems Command and in Acquisition Management in OSD. He is a Senior Fellow at the 

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, a director of South Carolina Research Authority Applied 

R&D, and a member of the National Research Council’s Materials and Manufacturing Board, the 

Defense Materials, Manufacturing and Infrastructure Committee (chair), the Penn State ARL 

Materials and Manufacturing Advisory Board, and the Georgia Tech Manufacturing Institute 

Advisory Board. 

Dr. McGrath holds a BS in Space Science and Applied Physics and an MS in Aerospace 

Engineering from Catholic University, and a doctorate in Operations Research from George 

Washington University. 

Robert Zollo

President, Avante Technology, LLC

Mr. Zollo is President and Founder of Avante Technology, LLC, a privately held company that 

develops, markets and licenses advanced 3D printing technology to 3D printer OEM, 

manufacturers and engineering firms. Prior to that he was President and Founder of Software 

Architects, Inc. a developer of electronic systems for OEM in a variety of industries, including 

3D printing, digital imaging and optical recording. As Chairman of the Optical Storage 

Technology Association, Mr. Zollo was responsible for the development of ISO 13346, the 

international standard that defines the digital file format used in all DVD’s, Blu-ray discs, CAT 

scan, MRI and digital X-ray systems. He also led the development of four patents relating to 

digital file management, image manipulation and file interoperability, and is the inventor of 

a patent pending method for controlling the printing of new engineering grade composite 

materials in FDM printers. Mr. Zollo holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering from the 

U.S. Military Academy at West Point, an MBA from Southern Illinois University and conducted 

his graduate technical studies at the University of Southern California’s school of engineering. 

He is currently working on enhancements to the new ISO AMF standard defining the 3D file 

description language for additive manufacturing applications.

Dr. Claire Vishik

Trust and Security Technology and Policy Director, Intel Corporation
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Dr. Claire Vishik’s work at Intel Corporation focuses on hardware security, Trusted Computing, 

privacy enhancing technologies, some aspects of cryptography and related policy issues. Claire is 

a member of the Permanent Stakeholders Group (Advisory Board) of ENISA, the European 

Network and Information Security Agency. She is an advisor to a number of cybersecurity R&D 

and policy projects, initiatives, and organizations, including the cryptography program at the 

University of Bristol or Oxford Cybersecurity Center for Capacity Building and is on the 

leadership teams of several organizations and initiatives tasked with the development of R&D 

strategies in cybersecurity in the US, Europe, and beyond. Claire is active in standards 

development and is on the Board of Directors of the Trusted Computing Group and on the 

Council of the Information Security Forum. Claire received her PhD from the University of 

Texas at Austin. Prior to joining Intel, Claire worked at Schlumberger Laboratory for Computer 

Science and AT&T Laboratories. Claire is the author of numerous papers and reports and an 

inventor on 30+ pending and granted U.S. patents.

Andre Wegner

Co-founder & CEO, Authentise

Andre Wegner is co-founder and CEO of Authentise (www.authentise.com), the licensing and 

services platform for Distributed Manufacturing. Authentise secure streaming and quality 

assurance technology for 3D printing enables design owners to share their digital manufacturing 

designs with confidence, and get paid per print. Authentise Consulting also assists Fortune 100 

corporations put 3D printing at the heart for their business. He is a frequent speaker on emerging 

intellectual property issues in 3D Printing and opportunities of distributed manufacturing at 

events such as Singularity University, Rapid, Designer of Things, Inside 3D Printing, 3D Print 

Show, Pacific Crest & WIRED. He has been quoted in publications such as BBC News, MIT 

Tech Review, Chicago Tribune, and Bloomberg. Prior to founding Authentise he managed a 

venture capital fund in Nigeria and advisory services in India. He is a graduate of St. Andrews 

University (UK), ESSEC (France) and Singularity University (California).
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Appendix D: Attendees List

Registrant Name Organization

Clara Asmail NIST MEP

Lawrence Balash Nova Corporation

David Barrett Department Of Navy-Chief Of Naval Operations

Dean Bartles UI Labs

Michelle Bezdecny Anser - OSD/Mantech

Allen Egon Cholakian IRDFproject Harvard / Columbia

Bill Coccoli NGC

Thomas Conkle G2, Inc.

Khershed Cooper NSF

Charles Crum Office Of Inspector General, Us Postal Service

Nicholas Deliman MDA Information Systems

Tuong-Vy Do

Gavin Garner University Of Virginia

Dom Glavach

Daniel Green Space And Naval Warfare Systems Command

Ryan Hayleck NAVSEA

Paul Huang NIST

Brian Hubbard G2, Inc.

Michele Hughes

Lawrence John Analytic Services Inc.

Waide Jones Lockheed Martin

Ben Kassel Naval Sea Systems Command

Bruce Kramer NSF

Francis Lee Howard County Public School Systems

Michael Mcgrath Analytic Services Inc (Anser)

Mike Molnar NIST

Ed Morris NCDMM

Wesley Old Coyote State Of Montana

Yaowe Ong CSC
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Celia Paulsen NIST

Al Payne Theta Solutions 

Paul Petronelli Palm Associates, Inc.

James Rentsch Aerospace Industries Association

Chris Root NAVAIR Fleet Readiness Center Southwest

Scott Storms NAVSSES

Rebecca Taylor NCMS

Joe Veranese NCDMM

Patrick Violante NAVSSES

Claire Vishik Intel

R Wachter

Andre Wegner Authentise Inc

Eric Wilcox SAIC

Craig Young DDC-ITS

Scott Zimmerman CTC

Robert Zollo Avante Technology, Llc
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Appendix E: Acronyms

ACS Access Control System

AM Additive Manufacturing

AMF Additive Manufacturing File Format

CAD Computer Aided Design

DDM Direct Digital Manufacturing

DEA Data envelopment analysis

DMDII Digital Manufacturing and Design Innovation Institute

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

ERP Enterprise resource planning

FMV Full Motion Video

FW Firmware

HD High Definition

IoT Internet of Things

IP Intellectual Property

ISO International Organization for Standardization

IT Information Technology

IVV Independent Verification and Validation

MES Manufacturing Execution System

MOM Manufacturing Operations Management

MRP Material requirements planning

NAMII National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute

NIST National Institute of Standards and Development

NICE National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education

NNMI National Network for Manufacturing Innovation

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer

OS Operating System
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OT Operations/Operational Technology

PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information

PDM Product data management

PLC Programmable Logic Controller

PLM Product Lifecycle Management

PMI Production Manufacturing Information

RF Radio Frequency

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

SIG Special Interest Group

STD Standard

STL Stereolithography

SW Software
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Appendix F: References

[1] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for 

Federal Information Systems and Organizations, Gaithersburg, Maryland, 2013, 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4

[2] Cybersecurity Framework, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/, 2014

[3] ISO / ASTM52915 - 13, Standard Specification for Additive Manufacturing File Format 

(AMF) Version 1.1, Astm, 2013, http://www.astm.org/Standards/ISOASTM52915.htm

[4] IEC 62264-1:2013, Enterprise-control system integration -- Part 1: Models and 

terminology, International Organization for Standardization, 2013, 

http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=57308

[5] ISA-95, Enterprise-Control System Integration, International Society of Automation, 

https://www.isa.org/isa95/

[6] ISO 10303-242:2014, Industrial automation systems and integration -- Product data 

representation and exchange -- Part 242: Application protocol: Managed model-based 

3D engineering, International Organization for Standardization, 2014, 

http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=5762

0

[7] ISO 14306:2012, Industrial automation systems and integration -- JT file format 

specification for 3D visualization, International Organization for Standardization,2012, 

http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=60572

[8] ISO 14739-1:2014, Document management -- 3D use of Product Representation 

Compact (PRC) format -- Part 1: PRC 10001, International Organization for 

Standardization, 2014, http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=54948

[9] ISO/IEC 27000:2014, Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information 

security management systems -- Overview and vocabulary, International Organization for 

Standardization, 2014, http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=63411

[10] NAS9924, Cybersecurity Baseline, Aerospace Industries Association,2013, 

https://global.ihs.com/doc_detail.cfm?&rid=AIA&input_doc_number=NAS%209924%2
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CNA&item_s_key=00601403&item_key_date=861003&input_doc_number=NAS%209

924%2CNA&input_doc_title=#abstract

[11] Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01, Risk Management Framework 

(RMF) for DoD Information Technology (IT), Department of Defense, 2014, 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/851001_2014.pdf

[12] Policy on Information Assurance Risk Management for National Security Systems, 

Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), CNSSP No. 22, 2012, 

http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/CNSSP_22.pdf

[13] Dempsey, Kelley and Paulsen, Celia. NIST Internal Report (IR) 8023, Risk Management 

for Replication Devices, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2015, 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8023

[14] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-82 Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control Systems 

(ICS) Security, second public draft, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 

Gaithersburg, Maryland, 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-

82r2/sp800_82_r2_second_draft.pdf

[15] Williams, Theodore J. "The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture", Computers in 

Industry, 24 (1994), pp. 141-158, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-3615(94)90017-5. 

[16] International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), http://www.iec.ch/, 2015

[17] IEEE, https://www.ieee.org/index.html, 2015

[18] ISO - International Organization for Standardization, http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html, 

2015

[19] Aerospace Industries Association, National Aerospace Standards Aerospace Industries 

Association, http://www.aia-aerospace.org/national_aerospace_standards/, 2015

[20] Cyber-Physical Systems Public Working Group, http://www.cpspwg.org/, 2015

[21] The National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), National Institute of 

Standards and Technology, http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/, 2015