NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

THOMAS NOUAN, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0503 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 1997-93519

The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED AND RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Tennie B. Martin, Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Petitioner
STATE v. NOUAN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Thomas Nouan petitions this Court for review from 

the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. We have 

considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant review 

and deny relief. 

¶2 A jury convicted Nouan of first degree murder and armed 

robbery; offenses he committed when he was 14 years old. The trial court 

sentenced Nouan to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 

25 years, consecutive to the 10.5-year sentence imposed for armed robbery. 

While the applicable sentencing statute at the time provided for the 

possibility of parole after 25 years, the Legislature abolished parole in 1993 

when it amended A.R.S. § 41–1604.06. See A.R.S. § 13–751(A) (sentences for 

first degree murder); 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255 § 86 (1st Reg. Sess.) 

(amending A.R.S. § 41–1604.06). Therefore, when the court sentenced 

Nouan, the only way Nouan could obtain release after 25 years was through 

commutation of his sentence or pardon. See A.R.S. §§ 31–402(C), –443. A 

sentencing scheme that abolishes parole for life sentences and provides for 

release based only on commutation or pardon does not provide a 

meaningful opportunity for release from a life sentence. See Graham v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 57 (2010); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983).

¶3 Nouan filed a successive notice of post-conviction relief, 

challenging his sentence based on the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Miller v. Alabama. See __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 

Miller held “that mandatory life [sentences] without parole for those under 

the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” __ U.S. at __, 132 S. Ct. at

2460. Nouan argued Miller was a significant change in the law that required 

resentencing.

¶4 The trial court considered Nouan’s claims with those of other 

petitioners who raised identical claims. The court ordered the parties to file 

briefs that addressed whether Miller was retroactive and whether the 
STATE v. NOUAN

Decision of the Court

3

petitioners had cognizable claims given that they had not yet served 25

years of their sentences. The trial court then held a hearing on the 

consolidated claims, after which it denied relief. The court held in relevant 

part that Miller was a significant change in the law and was retroactive, that 

Arizona law did not mandate life sentences without a possibility of parole 

for juveniles, and that commutation or clemency did not provide 

meaningful opportunities for release to offenders sentenced to life with the 

possibility of release. The court further held, however, that the Legislature’s 

recent passage of House Bill (“H.B.”) 2593, which re-established parole for 

juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with a possibility of 

parole, resolved any issues about whether Nouan’s sentence “violated the 

letter and spirit of Miller.” Nouan now seeks review. We review the trial 

court’s summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 219 ¶ 9, 368 P.3d 925, 927 

(2016). 

¶5 In his petition for review, Nouan argues the trial court 

deprived him of the opportunity to challenge H.B. 2593 more fully. 

Specifically, Nouan argues that the trial court should have granted relief 

and ordered that Nouan be resentenced so that during those proceedings, 

Nouan could investigate and present claims that H.B. 2593 and the resulting 

statutory changes were not retroactive, violated the prohibition against ex 

post facto laws, and did not otherwise satisfy Miller. 

¶6 We deny relief. First, Miller is a significant change in the law 

and is retroactive. Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 

(2016); State v. Valencia, 239 Ariz. 255, 259 ¶ 17, 370 P.3d 124, 128 

(App. 2016). Second, “A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting 

juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by 

resentencing them.” Montgomery, __ U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. at 736. Therefore, 

even assuming arguendo that Nouan’s sentence violated Miller, H.B. 2593

and the resulting statutory changes remedied that violation. Through H.B. 

2593, the Legislature enacted A.R.S. § 13–716, which now permits juvenile 

homicide offenders to be considered for parole:

Notwithstanding any other law, a person who is sentenced to 

life imprisonment with the possibility of release after serving 

a minimum number of calendar years for an offense that was 

committed before the person attained eighteen years of age is 

eligible for parole on completion of service of the minimum 

sentence, regardless of whether the offense was committed on 

or after January 1, 1994.
STATE v. NOUAN

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Further, any person sentenced to life imprisonment and who is eligible for 

parole pursuant to A.R.S. § 13–716 is now expressly subject to the parole 

eligibility provisions of A.R.S. § 41–1604.09, which H.B. 2593 amended. See

A.R.S. § 41–1604.09(I)(2). Addressing Nouan’s other contentions, this Court 

has already considered and rejected arguments regarding the retroactivity

of H.B. 2593 and the resulting legislative changes. See State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 

571, 576 ¶¶ 21–22, 334 P.3d 754, 759 (App. 2014) (concluding that H.B. 2593 

is not impermissibly retroactive and does not impermissibly infringe “on 

the role of the judiciary”). 

¶7 Regarding Nouan’s ex post facto argument, Nouan claims that 

A.R.S. § 13–716 violates the ex post facto doctrine because the statute “takes 

away the vested right to a hearing to be absolutely discharged from parole, 

instead requiring defendants to remain on parole for the remainder of their 

lives.” However, before the statute’s effective date, Nouan had no 

substantive right to parole eligibility; a fortiori, he had no “vested right” to 

a hearing regarding his absolute discharge from parole.

¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we grant review but deny relief.