IN PERSISTENT BATTLE

U.S. MARINES IN OPERATION HARVEST MOON 

8 DECEMBER TO 20 DECEMBER 1965

NICHOLAS J. SCHLOSSER, PHD

MARINES IN THE VIETNAM WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES
This pamphlet history, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the Vietnam War, is published for the education and training 

of Marines by the History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, as part of the U.S. Department of Defense 

observance of the fiftieth anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of 

the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation.

Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Director of Marine Corps History

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Commemorative Series Historian

Paul Westermeyer

Senior Editor

Angela J. Anderson

Visual Information Specialist

Robert A. Kocher

2017

PCN 2017936260

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ublishing

ISBN 978-0-16-093690-6

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In Persistent Battle | 1

The U.S. Marine Corps’ war in Vietnam was a mixture of large-scale conventional battles against main Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 

units and smaller pacification operations designed to secure 

the South Vietnamese population from Communist insurgents. During the latter half of 1965, Marine forces fought 

repeated engagements against large Viet Cong units, most 

notably the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The first battle, a fight in 

August to secure the area around Chu Lai called Operation 

Starlite, inflicted significant casualties upon this force. However, within just a few months, the Communist unit reconstituted itself, forcing the Marines to launch another operation 

to destroy the formation in December. The Marines codenamed this action Operation Harvest Moon.

Operation Harvest Moon has largely been overlooked in 

histories of the Vietnam War. While Operation Starlite was 

considered a major success and a clear demonstration of the 

superiority of America’s conventional military forces compared to the Viet Cong, Harvest Moon was less decisive. 

The following year, the Marine Corps’ attention also began 

to shift north toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as more 

regular North Vietnamese combat forces put pressure on the 

Marines’ area of operations. Consequently, the battle was 

overshadowed by larger engagements. 

Nevertheless, the operation was important for a number 

of reasons. Harvest Moon was the Marines’ last large-scale, 

conventional operation of 1965 in Vietnam. Fought in the 

valleys and hills between the city of Tam Ky and the inland 

outpost of Hiep Duc, it was the largest combined operation 

between Marine units and the South Vietnamese military 

to that date. Perhaps most importantly, the battle demonstrated many of the frustrations and problems faced by all 

the American forces in South Vietnam as they tried to defeat 

the Viet Cong-led insurgency. The disparity in the fighting 

abilities between the Marines and South Vietnamese Army 

units hindered combat effectiveness. The lack of coordination between the two forces, and between the Marine Corps 

and U.S. Air Force, also led to heavy losses on the allied side. 

Enjoying logistical support from North Vietnam, the 1st Viet 

Cong Regiment was able to defeat South Vietnamese forces 

while largely evading American units. 

The battle revealed a number of problems in how Marines 

coordinated counterguerrilla operations and used helicopters to lift formations into combat zones. In the course of 

the operation, the commanding general was relieved due to 

his inability to provide clear direction to his units. Although 

the Marine forces involved in Operation Harvest Moon were 

able to exact a heavy price from their Viet Cong adversaries, 
2 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

nevertheless, the main enemy units were able to retreat and 

regroup, leaving the valley far from secure. Marines would 

return to the valley complex two months later to fight the 

same Viet Cong unit. Thus, although the engagement did not 

produce the seemingly decisive result of Starlite or later battles like Hue City, Harvest Moon was arguably more representative of the American experience in Vietnam as a whole.

The United States Marine Corps in Vietnam: 1965

The first deployment of large Marine units to South Vietnam arrived on 8 March 1965. On that day, the 9th Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB) landed to provide security for the air base at Da Nang. As more units arrived to 

reinforce the brigade, and as their mission expanded to conducting counterinsurgency operations in the countryside 

outside of Da Nang, the 9th MEB’s headquarters was deactivated and replaced by the III Marine Amphibious Force (III 

MAF), commanded by Major General Lewis W. Walt. By 

mid-1965, the large air-ground task force included a reinforced division (3d Marine Division [3d MarDiv], plus regiments from the 1st MarDiv) and the 1st Marine Aircraft 

Wing (1st MAW). 

III MAF’s mission in South Vietnam was multifaceted, 

but ill-defined. Initially, the U.S. commander in South Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, USA (commander 

of United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or 

USMACV), had intended the main mission for the Americans to be security. However, within days of the landing, 

President Lyndon B. Johnson demanded that Westmoreland initiate more aggressive operations designed with the 

express purpose of attacking and killing Viet Cong forces. 

He renewed these orders throughout the subsequent months. 

“At the present time,” said Johnson, “we are limited as to 

what we can do in [North Vietnam], but we have almost free 

rein in [South Vietnam], and I want to kill more Viet Cong.” 

At the end of July, Johnson announced that he would expand 

the size of the American expeditionary force in South Vietnam to 125,000 men.

The Viet Cong had conducted an aggressive and persistent insurgency against the government of South Vietnam 

since 1960. Initially, the southern republic, led by Ngo Dinh 

Diem, was able to hold its own against the aggressive insurgency, although it was never able to gain a clear advantage 

and was weakened by internal conflicts. Diem’s corrupt, nepotistic, and heavy-handed governing style alienated significant constituencies within South Vietnam’s population and 

led to mass protests against his regime during 1963. Convinced that Diem’s unpopularity made him more of a liability than an ally in the fight against the Communists in South 

Vietnam, the John F. Kennedy administration backed a coup 

d’état launched by South Vietnamese military leaders that 

led to Diem’s overthrow and assassination and to the creation 

of a military junta to govern the fragile state.

The collapse of Diem’s regime did little to abate South 

Vietnam’s problems. Between 1963 and 1965, the South 

Vietnamese government was continuously shaken by successive coups, as different factions within the military deposed 

the other. Largely because of its heavily politicized nature 

and rampant cronyism, the South Vietnamese Army was 

sorely deficient as a combat force. The Viet Cong were able 

to exploit the seemingly endemic weaknesses of the South 

Vietnamese state. Enjoying ample logistical support from 

North Vietnam, which ferried supplies south through Laos 

and Cambodia, the Viet Cong operated throughout South 

Vietnam’s countryside with relative freedom. While the U.S. 

Air Force and South Vietnamese Air Force had carried out 

interdiction campaigns against these supply routes, they 

were limited and did little to hinder the flow of personnel 

and materiel into the Viet Cong’s hands. The Viet Cong also 

enjoyed significant influence throughout South Vietnamese 

villages, using a mix of persuasion and terror to turn the population against the increasingly corrupt and unstable government in Saigon.

Since 1964, the Johnson administration had carried out 

an intermittent bombing offensive against North Vietnam in 

the hope that graduated pressure would convince Hanoi to 

cease its support of the southern insurgency. Following Viet 

Cong attacks in late 1964 and early 1965 against American 

installations in South Vietnam, the administration decided 

to dramatically escalate the bombing effort, and in February 

began Operation Rolling Thunder.* The need to secure the 

air bases used for this large-scale campaign necessitated an 

infusion of conventional American combat forces. 

*From March 1965 to December 1968, Operation Rolling Thunder represented one of the largest sustained air attacks on North Vietnamese territory.
In Persistent Battle | 3

At the same time that the United States was taking more 

aggressive action against North Vietnam, General Westmoreland grew increasingly concerned about the survivability 

of South Vietnam. The ineptitude of the South Vietnamese forces convinced the USMACV commander that substantial American ground forces would need to take the field 

to engage and destroy the Viet Cong formations operating 

throughout the South Vietnamese countryside. These concerns, coupled with the president’s demand that Americans 

do what they could to rack up a high body count of Viet 

Cong fighters, transformed America’s commitment to South 

Vietnam in a radical and rapid way over the course of 1965. 

Westmoreland confronted a complex enemy force. On the 

one hand, there were the guerrilla units operating throughout the South Vietnamese villages. These forces operated 

amongst the populace and utilized irregular tactics, such as 

booby traps and terrorist actions, to turn individuals away 

from the government and to weaken the effectiveness of the 

South Vietnamese Army. It is these forces that most often 

come to mind when one thinks of the Viet Cong during 

the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, Vietnam’s Communists had 

used these types of forces out of necessity, as their resources 

and personnel were limited. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese preferred using organized, conventional arms when 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A183819 

Marines of the 9th MEB wade ashore at Da Nang on 8 March 1965. By December 1965, this small Marine contingent would 

mushroom into a Marine amphibious force comprised of two divisions and an aircraft wing.
4 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

they could, and by 1965, there were numerous large-scale 

formations of Viet Cong, known as main Viet Cong or main 

force Viet Cong, operating throughout the South Vietnamese countryside. These units were made up of both Viet Cong 

fighters and North Vietnamese soldiers who had infiltrated 

into the south.

It was the main force Viet Cong that most concerned 

Westmoreland. From the moment the first U.S. conventional 

units landed in Vietnam, there was debate between Westmoreland and some senior officers in the Marine Corps as 

to where the center of gravity of the Viet Cong insurgency 

actually lay. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) commander Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak believed that 

the key to winning the war was pacifying and securing the 

coastal population centers village by village.* This methodical 

approach would ultimately isolate the Viet Cong from the 

people, robbing the insurgents of intelligence, supplies, and 

safe havens. Krulak contended the Viet Cong would ultimately be forced to abandon their infiltration efforts and 

cede control to the South Vietnamese government. 

From Westmoreland’s perspective as the overall commander of U.S. forces, controlling the population centers 

would mean little if the main force Viet Cong was permitted 

to maneuver throughout the highlands away from the coast 

unimpeded. Westmoreland calculated that he was facing 

a dual threat and that one was far more pressing than the 

other. As historian Dale Andrade comments:

By way of analogy, he referred to them as “bully boys 

with crowbars” who were trying to tear down the house 

that was South Vietnam. The guerrillas and political 

cadre—which he called “termites”—could also destroy 

everything, but it would take them much longer to 

do it. So his attention turned first to the “bully boys,” 

whom he wanted to drive away from the “house.” 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A188991

In this photo from 1967, Gen Wallace M. Greene Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, and LtGen Robert E. Cushman Jr., commander III MAF, meet with USMACV commander Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA. Westmoreland and the Marines in I 

Corps often disagreed on the best way to defeat the Viet Cong insurgency.

*Pacification was a program set in place by the South Vietnamese government and the United States to suppress the insurgency by way of an agency 

composed of both military and civilian personnel, such as Civil Operations 

and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). However, pacification 

was an imprecise term and there was never an agreement by Americans in 

Vietnam on what it was or how it might be achieved. 
Westmoreland thus concluded that the only way to secure 

South Vietnam was to destroy the main Viet Cong force and 

cut off its supply lines from the north. As his authority was 

limited only to South Vietnam, Westmoreland could do little 

to solve the latter problem. He could devise a strategy for 

addressing the second challenge, however. The sudden infusion of conventional American forces provided an appropriate means for defeating the more conventional Viet Cong 

units and North Vietnamese combat forces. The task of pacification would be left to the South Vietnamese Army, while 

the mission of locating and destroying the main Viet Cong 

units would fall to the U.S. forces.

Although Marines, such as Krulak, believed that substantial attention needed to be paid to pacification, III MAF 

was largely equipped and organized to conduct the largescale conventional operations envisioned by General Westmoreland. Even Westmoreland was struck by the large 

amount of artillery and tanks the Marines brought ashore 

when the 9th MEB landed, as he believed such equipment 

would make little impact on the counterinsurgency effort. 

Commandant of the Marine Corps General Wallace M. 

Greene Jr. characterized the pacification mission as secondary and a diversion of Marine forces. Many senior Army and 

Marine commanders alike believed the best use of III MAF’s 

Marines was in the conventional war against the main Viet 

Cong formations.

Just as strategic disagreements existed between United 

States military commanders in Vietnam, so too did tensions 

exist between the political and military officials in the Viet 

Cong and in North Vietnam. The primary dispute concerned 

just how the Democratic Republic of Vietnam could best 

assist the insurgency in the south. While some advocated a 

more hands-off approach that focused on providing advisory 

and logistical assistance, others such as Central Committee 

First Secretary Le Duan believed that the northern Communist state needed to make a substantial commitment of 

combat units to the struggle in the south. They believed the 

key to winning what they referred to as the United States’ 

“special war” (the phase of the conflict in which the Americans served in an advisory capacity) was intended to destroy 

the South Vietnamese Army using large formations of Viet 

Cong and North Vietnamese military forces. In early 1965, 

General Nguyen Chi Thanh, the party secretary for the 

North Vietnamese political office in South Vietnam (the 

Central Office for South Vietnam or COSVN), called for an 

aggressive and substantial expansion of conventional combat 

power. General Thanh concluded that “We must be prepared 

to defeat the enemy’s ‘special war,’ but if we want to defeat 

this type of war we must commit regular main force units to 

the battle, and we must begin to build main force fists powerful enough to break the backbone of the enemy’s ‘special 

war’—the puppet government’s regular army units.”

The expansion of American combat forces beginning in 

March 1965 derailed the North Vietnamese hope of preventing the escalation of the “special war” into a “limited 

war,” which would entail combat against large American 

units. The People’s Army of Vietnam’s official history states 

that the North Vietnamese forces “now faced a new battle 

opponent: the American expeditionary army, an aggressor 

army that possessed modern equipment, heavy firepower, and 

incredible mobility.” The Communist forces concluded that 

the best way forward was to crush the Americans in open 

battle and thwart their attempt to mount a counteroffensive 

the next year. 

Both sides of the war in I Corps found the opportunity 

to wage a big-unit battle in the summer of 1965. During 

U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Research 

Library, Center for Military History, Vietnam Studies

Soldiers of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese 

Army) around 1966. The main Viet Cong units the Marines 

in South Vietnam faced were often augmented with regulars 

from the north.

In Persistent Battle | 5
6 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

July 1965, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment began to build up its 

strength in what the North Vietnamese designated Military 

Region 5, the area of northern South Vietnam in which the 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) I Corps and III 

MAF operated. The regiment was an effective, experienced 

combat force that had achieved a series of victories against 

ARVN units throughout the area. In May, it successfully 

overran a South Vietnamese outpost at Ba Gia south of Chu 

Lai. In July, the regiment attacked the same position again, 

inflicting 130 casualties. Westmoreland subsequently ordered 

General Walt to sortie his Marines out of III MAF’s coastal 

bases, locate the regiment, and destroy it. 

Between 18 and 24 August 1965, the 7th Marines conducted Operation Starlite, a search-and-destroy operation 

that bludgeoned the Viet Cong force. The operation combined a battalion-size helicopter assault and the landing of 

a battalion from the sea. It was indicative of the Marines’ 

preference to utilize their amphibious shipping assets and 

capabilities, rather than extend their lines of communications into the South Vietnamese highlands. By airlifting the 

2d Battalion, 4th Marines, west of the Phuoc Thuan Peninsula and then landing the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, south 

of the peninsula with landing craft, the Marines were able 

to entrap the 1st Viet Cong Regiment around the town of Van 

Tuong, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy formation in 

the process. The Marines also were able to call in more than 

1,500 rounds of naval gunfire. Coupled to the more than 

5,000 rounds expended by the Starlite force’s artillery support and the 65 tons of bombs, 4 tons of napalm, 523 rockets, and 6,000 rounds of ammunition from the aircraft of the 

1st MAW, the battle also exemplified the Corps’ utilization 

of massive firepower to strike the Viet Cong unit.

American intelligence estimated that between 614 and 

1,430 Viet Cong soldiers were killed in action during the 

engagement. The Marine forces suffered 51 killed and 203 

wounded. Assuming that contemporary intelligence estimates of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s strength of 2,000 were 

accurate, a casualty rate of 30–71 percent was seemingly 

decisive. In September, Krulak presented General Greene 

with an optimistic assessment of the battle, believing that 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A185824

Marines of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, patrol and search a small village during Operation Starlite. Fought at the end of August 

1965, the operation was the first major battle between Marines and the main force Viet Cong.
the losses were so significant that the Viet Cong would 

likely cease attempting to confront Marines in conventional 

engagements.

The 1st Viet Cong Regiment Returns

Ultimately, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s defeat at Chu Lai in 

August was less decisive than it seemed. The regiment proved 

to be an elusive, resilient, and resourceful combat formation, demonstrating an ability to sustain incredible casualties 

and still rebuild itself. It was aided in this regard by ample 

reinforcements of North Vietnamese regular combat troops 

infiltrating into South Vietnam. In September, the Communist’s COSVN began to beef up its conventional forces in the 

south, creating five infantry divisions and one artillery division. In October, the office stood up the 2d Infantry Division, 

consisting of the aforementioned 1st Viet Cong Regiment and 

the North Vietnamese 21st Regiment. By the fall of 1965, 

and infused with North Vietnamese regulars, the Viet Cong 

regiment had recovered its strength. 

While Starlite may have taught the Viet Cong the dangers of openly fighting the Marines, it did not dissuade them 

from actively seeking battle with South Vietnamese forces. 

On 17 November 1965, three of its battalions overran and 

seized the South Vietnamese outpost of Hiep Duc, about 

40 kilometers west from the city of Tam Ky. The base sat 

on a strategic crossroads where the western highland region 

known as the Nui Loc Son Basin became the Que Son 

Valley. The outpost was a gateway for the Communist forces 

moving from the western mountains into the coastal planes. 

During the monsoon seasons, Viet Cong formations and 

supplies could advance through the region without threat of 

detection. The loss of Hiep Duc consequently gave Communist forces the opportunity to move about the countryside 

unimpeded. The outpost’s strategic importance necessitated a 

South Vietnamese and American recovery effort. 

The counteroffensive entailed airlifting two battalions 

of South Vietnamese troops into Hiep Duc using Marine 

Sikorsky UH-34D Seahorse helicopters from Marine Aircraft Groups 16 and 36 (MAG-16 and MAG-36). The 

groups’ commander, Colonel Thomas J. O’Connor, recalled 

the grisly sight as he orbited the outpost: 

The area was ominously quiet. We didn’t see a living 

soul. There was much evidence of the fight the day 

before. The typical triangular-shaped French fortification in the village had been penetrated in several 

places. There were several corpses hanging on barbed 

wire around a few of the outposts across the Song Thu 

Bong.

As Marine helicopter pilots would soon discover throughout 

operations in the Que Son Valley complex, the Viet Cong 

were skilled at hiding their presence from Marine reconnaissance flights. When the relief force began to land, they 

immediately encountered fierce resistance from Communist fighters on the ground. Although he was able to land a 

company, Colonel O’Connor was forced to hold off further 

landings until fixed-wing aircraft from MAG-11 in their 

McDonnell Douglas F-4B Phantoms and MAG-12 in their 

Douglas A-4 Skyhawks could soften up the landing zones. 

Just as the South Vietnamese troops already on the ground 

were about to be surrounded, O’Connor was able to insert 

the remainder of the two battalions.

Several days of difficult fighting followed, but on 19 

November, the South Vietnamese successfully retook the 

outpost, losing 33 killed and 73 wounded in action. However, 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A421698

A bomb-laden McDonnell F-4B Phantom II from Marine 

Fighter Attack Squadron 115 takes off to perform a strike 

against Viet Cong targets in 1967. Phantoms, such as the one 

pictured here, provided critical close air support throughout 

Operation Harvest Moon.

In Persistent Battle | 7
8 | Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

a few days later, the 18th North Vietnamese Regiment and 45th 

Viet Cong Heavy Weapons Battalion struck the South Vietnamese outpost of Thach Tru. With their forces stretched to 

the limit, I Corps commander General Nguyen Chanh Thi 

and General Walt chose to abandon Hiep Duc and use their 

available forces to reinforce the defense of Thach Tru.

The need to withdraw from Hiep Duc was a symptom 

of the general problem faced by U.S. and South Vietnamese commanders as they struggled to neutralize Viet Cong 

activity. American forces were stretched thin as they worked 

to balance the task of pacifying South Vietnam’s population 

centers, secure the countryside, and destroy the main force 

Viet Cong. Using the monsoon season to their advantage, 

North Vietnamese and main Viet Cong formations were able 

to infiltrate South Vietnam at a time when U.S. air power 

was severely constrained by the weather. The Viet Cong were 

thus able to attack a variety of targets simultaneously, forcing III MAF and I Corps to spread their units throughout 

the region and limit their ability to concentrate forces and 

hold significant amounts of territory. It was a microcosm of 

the dilemma facing General Westmoreland throughout the 

country: how to counteract the Communists’ vast numbers 

with USMACV’s limited forces. 

The loss of Hiep Duc prompted the USMACV to order 

III MAF to plan and carry out a spoiling attack in the Que 

Son Valley against the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The operation was code-named Harvest Moon—a large-scale ambush 

using battalions from the Marine Corps and South Vietnamese Army. Its primary objectives were to prevent the 

Communists from taking Que Son, to allow the South Vietnamese to reestablish their lines of communications in the 

valley, and to wear down the Viet Cong forces in the region. 

If the Americans and South Vietnamese did not have the 

numbers to retake the outpost, General Westmoreland 

believed they could nevertheless rely on their maneuverability and firepower to conduct a search-and-destroy sweep that 

Hiep Duc

Que Son

Cam La

Thang Binh

Tam Ky

1 534

535

90/1

VC

80

VC

60/1

VC

49

VC

70

VC

1

VC

Map adapted by History Division

Operation Harvest Moon’s area of operations and suspected Viet Cong positions in early December 1965.
would disrupt Communist plans in the valley complex itself. 

The target would be the Communist combat forces rather 

than South Vietnamese territory.

The location where Harvest Moon would take place 

was shaped like a rough triangle. The eastern boundary was 

formed by Route 1, the principal north-south artery linking 

the urban areas along I Corps’ coast. The north point of this 

side of the triangle was the town of Thang Binh, the site of 

the South Vietnamese command post. Almost two kilometers to the north was Task Force Delta’s logistic support area. 

The southern point, a little more than 17 kilometers south, 

was Tam Ky. The second side of the triangle was formed 

by Routes 535 and 534. The two parallel roads proceeded 

roughly west-southwest from Route 1. The northern route, 

535, passed through Que Son and merged with 534 about 

nine and a half kilometers east of Hiep Duc. The third side of 

the triangle was formed by the Khang River and Route 586. 

The Khang flowed from Hiep Duc in a southeasterly direction. About 22.5 kilometers east of Hiep Duc began Route 

586, a 12.9-kilometer thoroughfare connecting Route 1 with 

the interior, hilly countryside drained by the Khang and Thu 

Bon Rivers.

The area within this triangle was a valley complex of rice 

paddies framed by craggy mountains. The hills ranged from 

200 to 500 meters in height. While some of the country 

hosted terraced paddies, for the most part, the high ground 

was defined by tangled, thick brush and rain forest. Larger 

hills, those ranging between 400 and 500 feet, were covered 

with tall trees that reached a height of 100 feet. The high 

points were grouped in three prominent areas, and together 

they carved the Que Son Valley into narrow channels. The 

first mass commanded the approach southwest along Route 

534. The second stood along the west part of the valley and 

created a narrow canal between Hiep Duc and the wider 

valley beyond to the east. The southern part of the valley was 

pockmarked with another ring of hills.

Most of the villages in the area could be found huddled 

along the base of the mountains. The hamlets, along with 

cane stands, hedgerows, and pine stands, afforded Viet Cong 

units ample cover and the ability to maneuver throughout the valley undetected. Rivers, streams, and rough terrain 

combed by the Viet Cong created obstacles like cut roads 

and destroyed bridges and obstructed approaches into the 

complex. The Viet Cong forces operating in the area made 

extensive use of these features, along with a network of manmade and natural caves and tunnels. They also made use of 

underground rooms for protection, storage, and living quarters. Rooms ranged in size from 10 x 10 x 15 feet to 30 x 30 

x 10 feet.

December also fell in the middle of the northeast monsoon season, meaning that rain and low cloud cover would be 

a constant hindrance to visibility and air operations. Of the 

11 days of the operation, 9 of them were marked by either 

bad or marginal weather. During even marginal weather, 

cloud ceilings were no higher than 1,200 feet and visibility 

no greater than one to three miles.

Although intelligence reports confirmed the 1st Viet 

Cong Regiment was operating in the Que Son Valley area, 

there were still unanswered questions regarding the size and 

makeup of the formation. Harvest Moon’s intelligence summary indicated that the “VC [Viet Cong] have considered 

this area as being relatively secure.” The total strength of the 

enemy regiment was estimated at between 1,800 and 2,150 

personnel. The force consisted of four battalions: the 40th, 

45th, 60th, and 90th. The 40th and 45th Viet Cong Battalions

were estimated to be 200–350 strong each, while the 90th

was believed to consist of 400 Viet Cong fighters. There also 

were a number of other Viet Cong units reported in the area, 

including the 500-strong Chu Dong Battalion and three other 

battalions of varying strength: the 49th (350 personnel), 70th

(500 personnel), and 80th (400 personnel). An unidentified 

battalion also was reported in the valley, though intelligence 

reports surmised that this was in fact the 1st Viet Cong Regiment’s 60th Battalion. In all, Americans estimated Viet Cong 

strength was about 4,700 fighters dispersed throughout the 

valley, with the bulk of forces occupying positions south of 

Route 534.

The Viet Cong forces in the valley were a mixture of 

conventional main forces and guerrilla units. The Viet 

Cong fighters were observed wearing diverse fighting garb, 

including black pajama-style uniforms, khaki uniforms, 

and steel helmets. Their arsenal of weaponry was extensive, and throughout the battle, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces encountered fire from North Vietnamese-built 

K44 sniper rifles and Chinese carbines. They were also armed 

with an extensive range of American-built arms, presumably 

In Persistent Battle | 9
10 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

captured from the South Vietnamese, including M1 Garand 

rifles, Thompson submachine guns, and M1918 Browning 

Automatic Rifles. The Communist forces also used 60mm 

and 81mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, hand grenades, 

12.7mm machine guns, and an array of booby traps.

Brigadier General Melvin D. Henderson completed 

his planning work with Brigadier General Hoang Xuan 

Lam, commanding general of the 2d ARVN Division, on 7 

December 1965. The operational order was subsequently distributed to all relevant commands. D-Day was designated 

as 8 December 1965. Harvest Moon involved two multibattalion formations: the 2d ARVN Division’s 5th Regiment 

and a provisional Marine force designated Task Force Delta. 

Task Force Delta, commanded by General Henderson, 

was comprised of Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter’s 2d 

Battalion, 7th Marines; Lieutenant Colonel Joshua W. 

Dorsey III’s 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; and a provisional 

artillery battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joris J. 

Snyder. Smaller supporting units included a logistical support 

unit commanded by Major Daryl E. Benstead; Company 

C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion; Company C, 3d Engineer 

Battalion; and the 3d Motor Transport Battalion. Lieutenant 

Colonel Robert T. Hanifin Jr.’s Battalion Landing Team 

2d Battalion, 1st Marines (BLT 2/1), the ground combat 

element of the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the Seventh 

Fleet, would serve as a floating reserve. 

On D-Day, the 5th ARVN Regiment would move from 

Thang Binh southwest into the Que Son Valley toward Hiep 

Duc. Planners anticipated the large ARVN formation would 

draw out the 1st Viet Cong Regiment and bring it to battle. 

On 9 December, Task Force Delta would land two battalions behind the Viet Cong forces: 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 

from Tam Ky and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, from Huong 

Xuan to the north. The ARVN regiment would subsequently 

serve as the anvil on which Task Force Delta would hammer 

the 1st Viet Cong Regiment from behind. Lieutenant Colonel 

Ralph E. Sullivan, Task Force Delta’s operations officer, was 

quite blunt when describing the role of the ARVN force: “It 

is unstated, but they were the bait.” 

Task Force Delta would rely on the 1st MAW’s fleet 

of UH-34D medium utility helicopters to bring its units 

together. Airlifting two battalions into the heavily populated, 

rice paddy-strewn Que Son Valley was difficult enough. 

While the 3d MarDiv had conducted helicopter assaults 

before, notably during Operation Starlite, those operations 

were usually near the coast and carried out in coordination 

with a seaborne amphibious landing. Harvest Moon would 

take place much farther inland (about 32 kilometers from the 

coast) in territory that had been overrun by Viet Cong units. 

There were only a few areas in the region to land the number 

of helicopters needed to lift a whole battalion at a safe distance from villages and hills potentially teeming with Viet 

Cong units.

Fire support for both ARVN and Marine forces would 

come from Task Force Delta’s provisional artillery battalion. 

Batteries would be set up throughout the perimeter enclosing the area of operations. Four 155mm howitzers from Battery M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, would be positioned 

near the ARVN command post to the north. Six 155mm 

pieces from Battery L, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines, would 

be located farther south along Route 1. Six smaller 105mm 

howitzers from Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, were 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

BGen Melvin D. Henderson, Task Force Delta’s first commander. Gen Henderson was an experienced veteran who had 

seen combat in some of the harshest battles of World War II.
positioned at Que Son itself. Company F, 2d Battalion, 

12th Marines, would contribute another six 105mm pieces. 

Always operating within range of these batteries, the ARVN 

and Task Force Delta forces could draw on ample artillery 

support throughout the battlefield. The allied forces would 

also be able to draw on close air support from 1st MAW. 

Supplies would be shipped in via Route 1 to a logistical support area at Thang Binh, north of the area of operations. 

Helicopters would then lift provisions into the battlefield as 

necessary. A company of the 3d Engineer Battalion would 

work to keep the route open throughout the operation.

As noted, Task Force Delta was given the option of using 

the SLF as a tactical reserve. However, this option presented 

a number of problems in its own right. The ground component of the force, Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin’s BLT 2/1, had 

already conducted five amphibious raids against Viet Cong 

forces along the South Vietnamese coast between September and December. Having seen considerable action, the 

SLF began to redeploy out of theater on 6 December. The 

majority of the landing team (the command group, Companies F and G, and attached artillery, armor, and amtrac units) 

aboard the USS Valley Forge (LPH 8) and USS Monticello

(LSD 35) steamed to Okinawa, Japan, while the remainder 

of the team (Companies E and H), aboard the USS Montrose

(APA 212), took a detour to Manila, the Philippines, to pick 

up landing craft. In the middle of the night on 6 December, 

the SLF received word from General Walt that it would be 

needed for Operation Harvest Moon. The Valley Forge and 

Monticello sped back to the South Vietnamese coast and were 

ready for operations by the morning of 8 December. Unfortunately, the Montrose was already well on its way to the 

Philippines when it received the recall order, meaning that 

it would not arrive in time for D-Day. BLT 2/1 would consequently go into battle without two of its rifle companies, a 

significant portion of its combat strength.

From the start, and in the words of a Headquarters 

Pacific Air Forces study, the plan left “much to be desired.” 

The operation order sacrificed detail in favor of concision. 

Hiep Duc

Que Son

Cam La

Thang Binh

1 534

535

90/1

VC

80

VC

60/1

VC

49

VC

70

VC

1

VC

Viet An

11 Ranger

1/5

TF

DELTA

X

3/3

2/7

5

2/1

BLT

Tam Ky

Map adapted by History Division

The Operation Harvest Moon plan of operations, 8 –10 December 1965.

In Persistent Battle | 11
12 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Nevertheless, it was a complex design requiring coordination between a wide range of command levels. Most importantly, it would necessitate close cooperation between ground 

and air units. In general, three basic, interrelated problems 

undermined the operation: the ad hoc, provisional nature of 

Task Force Delta; an overwhelming concern about secrecy 

on the part of its planners that hindered clear communication between subordinate units; and the South Vietnamese 

military’s weaknesses as a combat force. 

Rather than form Task Force Delta around the headquarters of one of his regiments, General Walt cobbled together 

an ad hoc organization comprised of disparate battalions and 

various elements of his own headquarters. Colonel Oscar F. 

Peatross, commanding officer of the 7th Marines, recalled 

that “most of the members of the [Task Force] Delta staff had 

just come into Vietnam.” He went on to note that “Although 

individuals were extremely competent, there seemed to me 

to be too many new comers [sic] to start right out in a combined operation with the ARVN.” A board of investigation 

convened by General Walt shortly after the engagement concluded that this approach had led to undue confusion and 

recommended that “consideration should be given to using a 

regimental staff in operations such as ‘Harvest Moon’ in lieu 

of forming an ad hoc staff for the purpose.”

Naval History and Heritage Command, No. NH 96946

The Essex-class USS Valley Forge (LPH 8). Converted carriers such as Valley Forge and purpose-built helicopter carriers such as 

the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) granted Marines the capability of launching vertical assaults from sea-based positions. 
Task Force Delta’s two battalions were not only from different regiments but from different divisions; 3d Battalion, 

3d Marines, came from the 3d MarDiv while 2d Battalion, 

7th Marines, was a formation of the 1st MarDiv. The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, was a composite force made up of the 

battalion’s Headquarters and Service Company, its Company 

L, and Companies E and G from 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 

and Company G from 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. The force’s 

provisional artillery battalion was also task organized and 

consisted of batteries from both the 11th Marines and the 

12th Marines. At the time the operation was set to begin, all 

of these units would be separated geographically; the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, was north at Da Nang, and the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, was south at Chu Lai. They would not 

converge until at least two days after the operation was set 

to begin. Face-to-face communication between the battalion 

commanders during the planning phase of the operation was 

thus impossible.

The man tasked with commanding this composite force, 

General Henderson, was a seasoned Marine who had taken 

part in some of the toughest fights of World War II, including Saipan and Iwo Jima. He earned a Bronze Star with 

combat “V” for his service as the executive officer of the 4th 

Engineer Battalion during the Battle of Iwo Jima. In many 

ways, he was well suited to head the complex operation. His 

career highlights included command of the 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines (1952), the 6th Marines (1958–61), and lengthy 

tours in numerous logistics billets with the 2d MarDiv and 

at Headquarters Marine Corps. Before deploying to Okinawa in 1965 for service with the 3d MarDiv, he had been 

the assistant chief of staff, G-4 at Headquarters Marine 

Corps. Following that tour, Lieutenant General Leonard F. 

Chapman Jr., chief of staff to the Commandant, stated that 

Henderson was “fully capable of handling any assignment, 

command or staff, with distinction.”

Arriving at the 3d MarDiv in the summer of 1965, General Henderson undertook a range of duties. As the commanding general, 3d MarDiv (Rear), he oversaw the rapid 

transfer of the division’s headquarters and units from Okinawa to III MAF in South Vietnam. During this period, 

Henderson also served as the commanding general for Fleet 

Marine Force, Seventh Fleet, overseeing the constitution of 

the SLF as a floating reserve for III MAF. In August, with 

the majority of 3d MarDiv now in South Vietnam, Henderson joined his division at Da Nang where he served as one 

of that formation’s two assistant division commanders. Consequently, although his experience was primarily that of an 

engineer and logistician, Henderson was not a stranger to 

combat and had experience commanding large formations. 

He also was experienced working with the SLF. He enjoyed 

the confidence of his superiors, and just a few months before 

the operation, General Walt wrote that Henderson was 

a “very energetic, hard-driving, ‘can do’ type of officer who 

would be a credit to any organization. I consider him to have 

high potential for more responsible assignments.”

What Henderson lacked, however, was any experience 

commanding large units in combat. Of course, the same 

could be said for many of the senior Marines with III MAF 

at this early stage in the Vietnam War. Operation Harvest Moon was the first time Henderson led a multibattalion force into battle. His headquarters was cobbled together 

from 3d MarDiv headquarters personnel, meaning that few 

of the principal planning officers had much experience working with one another. While this was certainly not unprecedented, it was a severe hindrance in light of the operation’s 

complexities and potential friction. 

In Persistent Battle | 13
14 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

General Walt would be an imposing presence throughout 

the course of the operation. A bullnecked bear of a man, Walt 

was a seasoned combat veteran whose courage and determination earned him two Navy Crosses, the Silver Star with 

combat “V,” the Bronze Star with combat “V,” and a Purple 

Heart on the battlefields of World War II and Korea. His 

service in World War II brought him to some of the bloodiest battlefields of the Pacific war, and included Guadalcanal, 

Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. An infantryman to the core, he 

preferred to command from the front and get his hands dirty, 

a practice that earned him the reputation of being a “threestar grunt.” Although intended as a term of endearment, it 

also conveyed Walt’s tendency to hover over subordinates.

Operation Harvest Moon’s organizational and command 

problems were exacerbated by an overriding concern with 

security and secrecy. In general, secrecy was a prevailing concern that underscored the Harvest Moon planning process. 

The only instructions to the force afloat in the order dated 

7 December was that control of the unit would fall to Task 

Force Delta once the landing force arrived in the objective 

area. The battalion landing team was expected to be “prepared to land by helicopter to reinforce, block, counterattack 

or exploit gains by Task Force Delta.” Ironically, the order 

submitted to the Special Landing Force on 9 December was 

even less precise, stating that the force should be “prepared 

to land by helo in designated [landing zone]’s and carry out 

missions as assigned by [Task Force] Delta.” The lack of 

information critically hindered the SLF’s ability to prepare 

for its deployment. The aforementioned board investigating 

the battle noted: 

since no coordinated planning or briefing was conducted by principal units concerned with the helo 

assault of [2d Battalion, 1st Marines] the key decisionmaking personnel were not in possession of sufficient 

information to make sound decisions nor the means to 

disseminate their decisions once they were made to all 

who needed to know.

The 7th Marines commander, Colonel Peatross, later noted 

“There was entirely too much secrecy during the planning, 

secrecy to the extent that units involved [sic] supply and similar support were unaware of their role unless they found out 

by accident.” For example, part of the logistics plan for Harvest Moon involved moving a convoy of 200 trucks from Da 

Nang down Route 1 to the logistic support area at Thang 

Binh, where it would unload, and then continue to Chu Lai. 

At Chu Lai, the trucks would reload with rations and ammunition and then move back up Route 1 to Thang Binh. The 

only Marine force available to provide escort duties for the 

convoy at Chu Lai was the 7th Marines (less its 2d Battalion, 

which was part of Task Force Delta). Peatross only learned 

of these convoys from 2d Battalion, 7th Marines’ commander Lieutenant Colonel Utter. Despite the fact that there had 

never been a convoy run between Da Nang and Chu Lai 

at that point, the logistics commander at Chu Lai was left 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A186279

III MAF and 3d MarDiv commander MajGen Lewis W. Walt 

(center) confers with Capt Richard E. Theer (far right), the 

commander of Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, during 

Operation Harvest Moon. This photo was taken near Hill 407.
ignorant of the role his post would be playing in the coming 

operation. Peatross believed the lapses could be “attributed only to the lack of experience in Vietnam of the Harvest 

Moon planners.”

The drive for secrecy stemmed, in large part, from concerns that the South Vietnamese Army had been infiltrated 

by Viet Cong spies. The operation’s planners denied the 2d 

ARVN division air liaison officer access to their sessions. The 

5th ARVN Regiment commander was initially told that his 

force would be conducting a “routine ‘sweep and clear’ along 

highway 1 to the vicinity of Ky Lam.” He was only briefed 

on his true mission on 7 December, one day prior to D-Day. 

Remarking on the high level of secrecy, Colonel Sullivan, 

noted:

General Thi warned us on 4 December not to discuss this operation with any of the ARVN except 

for a select few in his own Headquarters and that of 

General Lam’s. The fact that at 1330, 8 December the 

11th ARVN Ranger Battalion walked into a prepared

ambush is prima facie evidence that if Col Khoah [sic] 

was kept in the dark, the commander of the 1st VC 

[Viet Cong] Regiment was not.

These concerns about spies working inside ARVN forces were 

indicative of a general lack of faith in the South Vietnamese 

military as a whole by III MAF’s commanders. The working 

relationships between the commanders of III MAF and the 

ARVN I Corps were less than harmonious. Although personally cordial with one another, General Walt had a low regard 

for the fighting ability of General Thi’s South Vietnamese 

forces. Harvest Moon also was not the first time Walt had 

chosen to leave his ARVN counterparts in the dark about a 

major operation. The previous August, Walt only informed 

General Thi and the commander of the 2d ARVN division 

when he decided to carry out Operation Starlite, keeping 

details of the operation from the rest of I Corps. Walt would 

later justify this decision, telling General Westmoreland, “I 

am further inclined to believe that the pique and sensitivities 

of the Saigon generals, while certainly a political factor in our 

relationships with the [government of Vietnam], should not 

disproportionately influence the conduct of the battle when 

significant numbers of U.S. lives are concerned, and, when the 

responsibility of the U.S. commander determines that a larger 

measure of success can be achieved by unilateral operations.”

In general, Marine leaders found the commanders of the 

regular South Vietnamese forces unreliable and overly politicized. General Thi, for example, had participated in a range 

of attempted coups against the South Vietnamese government and was effectively a warlord of South Vietnam’s five 

northern provinces. To be sure, the lack of regard was mutual, 

as General Thi consistently underrated the Marines’ abilities 

to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations, as seen in 

his efforts during the spring of 1965 to keep III MAF’s area 

of operations isolated to Da Nang.

Yet, for all of the ARVN’s deficiencies as a combat force, 

the success of Harvest Moon depended largely on the effectiveness of Brigadier General Hoang Xuan Lam’s 2d ARVN 

Division on the battlefield. Task Force Delta’s operations 

officer, Colonel Sullivan, noted that “The major implication 

of the concept was that the 5th ARVN Regiment was to 

make and hold contact with the 1st VC [Viet Cong] Regiment after luring them out of the hills.” If the ARVN could 

not fix the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, then the Viet Cong forces 

would be afforded complete freedom of maneuver throughout the area of operations, allowing them to refuse battle 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A183734-B

From left: BGen Hoang Xuan Lam (commander 2d ARVN 

Division), MajGen Nguyen Chanh Thi (commander I Corps), 

and BGen Frederick J. Karch (commander 9th MEB) confer 

shortly after the landing of Marines at Da Nang on 8 March 

1965. Lam and Thi were the principal commanders of ARVN 

forces during Operation Harvest Moon.

In Persistent Battle | 15
16 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

with the reinforcing Marines, escape without suffering any 

substantial casualties, and continue to hold Hiep Duc and 

the entry point to the Nui Loc Son Basin.

D-Day and the Ambush of the 5th ARVN Regiment

At 0830 on 8 December 1965, the 5th ARVN Regiment 

departed Thang Binh and proceeded southwest along Route 

534 toward Hiep Duc. The force comprised two battalions: 

the 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment, and the 11th Ranger 

Battalion. As with other ARVN formations, it included 

American advisors serving alongside South Vietnamese soldiers. The 11th Ranger Battalion also included a four-man 

artillery forward observer team from Battery C, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines.

At 1000 that morning, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 

began its motor march from Chu Lai to Tam Ky. At around 

the same time, the SLF’s commanders—Colonel John R. 

Burnett, Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin, and Lieutenant Colonel Mervin B. Porter (commander of Marine Medium 

Helicopter Squadron 261 [HMM-261], the SLF’s aviation 

component)—departed USS Valley Forge and arrived at III 

MAF’s headquarters in Da Nang to receive orders. The Valley 

Forge had just arrived off the coast of Chu Lai that morning. Although Henderson and Walt furnished the SLF commander with the Harvest Moon operation order, questions 

remained as to what its actual mission was to be as the order 

did not specify, and Burnett was simply told to “Be prepared 

to land . . . it looks like we may use you this time.” Burnett 

was then told to assign a liaison officer to Task Force Delta 

headquarters and returned with Porter and Hanifin to Valley 

Forge where they awaited their orders.

The 5th ARVN Regiment continued its advance toward 

Hiep Duc when, at 1330, its advance was disrupted when the 

70th Viet Cong Battalion launched a sudden attack against the 

11th Ranger Battalion. The ambush took place about five and 

a half kilometers east of Que Son, in the vicinity of a mountain designated Hill 43. As a formation fight under the operational control of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment, the Viet Cong 

battalion attacked from the northwest and southwest, mauling the ranger battalion in a devastating engagement. In less 

than 15 minutes, the ARVN force was reduced in strength 

by nearly one-third. A U.S. Air Force report on the engagement quoted one advisor serving with the ranger battalion: 

“They hit us with rockets, mortars, machine guns, small arms, 

everything. They attacked in mass and hit us from all sides. 

It was not an ambush as you think of an ambush. They were 

strategically positioned.”

The battered 11th Ranger Battalion had no choice but to 

abandon its position, and withdrew 1,200 meters north. The 

1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, attempted to assist with supporting fires, but was held back by Viet Cong mortar fire. At 

1434, helicopters from HMM-161 carrying elements of the 

1st Battalion, 6th ARVN Regiment, lifted off from Tam Ky 

to reinforce the battered South Vietnamese ranger unit. Providing prompt close air support to the strikes proved difficult. The Marine forward observer team attached to the unit 

was missing in action (three were dead), and contact was lost 

between the airborne and ground direct air support centers. 

An Air Force forward air controller took over command of 
airborne operations in the area and subsequently directed 47 

Air Force and Marine sorties. However, these were against 

preplanned targets and the strikes actually prevented the 

1st Battalion, 5th Regiment’s forces from relieving the 11th 

Ranger Battalion. The Viet Cong broke contact at 1445 and 

headed north, leaving the ARVN forces to regroup, stabilize 

their lines for the night, and recover casualties.

Harvest Moon had almost been derailed before it had 

even begun. Initially conceived as an ambush, Operation 

Harvest Moon had become a rescue operation. Colonel 

Sullivan, Task Force Delta’s operations officer, recalled that 

after the failure of the 5th ARVN Regiment, “any reasonable chance of [Task Force] Delta achieving its objective was 

emasculated.” The rapid collapse of the 11th Ranger Battalion had allowed the Viet Cong to retain control of the area 

around Que Son and necessitated the airlifting of reinforcements. Unfortunately, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, was still 

moving to Tam Ky at the exact time the Viet Cong struck, 

and would not arrive at the city until 1515 that afternoon. 

The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, was still in Da Nang. Henderson, thus, was limited in the reinforcements he could provide. Along with the 1st Battalion, 6th ARVN Regiment, he 

also ordered Battery M, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, to move 

its 155mm towed howitzers farther south to Thang Binh and 

used helicopters to lift two ARVN 105mm howitzers to Que 

Son.

At 0500 the next day, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

departed Da Nang and proceeded south to the logistic support area along Route 1. Unfortunately, Henderson’s Marines 

were still too far away to aid the 5th ARVN Regiment when 

it was attacked a second time at 0645, this time by the 60th 

and 80th Viet Cong Battalions. The regiment’s commander 

was killed in the engagement, and at 0702, the ARVN 

perimeter was broken and overrun. South Vietnamese forces 

retreated in disorder 6,000 meters east. An Air Force Cessna 

O-1F Bird Dog observation plane ensured that the rout did 

not become a massacre, directing the retreating South Vietnamese forces away from ambushes and toward the position 

of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment. The retreat was nevertheless disorderly, and at one point, the O-1F spotted the remnants of the regiment (50 men led by a corporal) retreating 

directly toward a Viet Cong position. The Air Force forward 

air controller aboard the Bird Dog then directed close air 

support strikes from Marine aircraft and an Air Force Douglas AC-47 Spooky gunship, which inflicted heavy casualties 

on the Viet Cong forces. A second enemy attack against the 

1st Battalion, 6th ARVN Regiment, was less successful, and 

the Viet Cong were unable to dislodge that particular formation from its position. At noon, the 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN 

Regiment’s American advisor led the battered battalion’s survivors up Hill 43.

The situation for ARVN forces was dire. Two of the 

three battalions committed by the ARVN I Corps had been 

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

Operation Harvest Moon lasted 11 days, and 9 of those days 

were marked by bad or marginal weather. This photo of Task 

Force Delta Marines taken during the operation illustrates 

the persistent mist that clung to the landscape throughout the 

battle.

In Persistent Battle | 17
18 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

shattered by well-executed Viet Cong ambushes. The regimental headquarters had been destroyed. General Henderson did not learn about the second ambush until 0800, 

shortly after arriving at the ARVN command post at Thang 

Binh. He boarded a helicopter and proceeded to Tam Ky, 

where he personally ordered Lieutenant Colonel Utter to 

insert his 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, behind the Viet Cong 

positions and rescue the remnants of the 1st Battalion, 5th 

ARVN Regiment. At 1000, HMM-161 and HMM-361 

began transporting the Marine battalion west to a landing 

zone designated Spruce, southwest of Que Son and about 

8.8 kilometers west of the ARVN position. The initial elements of the battalion began arriving at the zone at 1040, 

and the airlift of the unit was completed by 1330. Over the 

course of the next six hours, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines’ rifle 

companies secured the landing zone and then advanced 

about 4,000 meters east, where the unit successfully secured a 

mass of hills by 1645.

As 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, entered the battlefield, 

Henderson established a command post in Que Son. Once 

there, he ordered 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, to find and relieve 

the 5th ARVN Regiment. The unit, which had been en route 

via a motor march from Da Nang since 0500, arrived at the 

logistic support area at 1030. At 1400, HMM-261 began 

airlifting the battalion to a landing zone 2,500 meters southeast of Hill 43. The initial elements, made up of the battalion 

headquarters, Company L, and two platoons from Company 

E, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, landed and began to move west 

at 1500. Upon landing, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, made contact with elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment, southeast of Hill 43. 

While the battalion continued advancing, its Company L 

pivoted north across an open rice paddy and made its way 

toward the high ground. At 1700, just as the company was 

shifting direction north, Viet Cong forces opened fire on the 

company’s rear, with 100 fighters striking from the north, 50 

from northwest, and another 50 from the west. Staff Sergeant Robert F. Moe, the leader of 3d Platoon, recalled that 

“We had moved within a thousand meters of our actual 

objective and it seemed like the whole area just erupted with 

Viet Cong fire. They had us with machine gun fire, automatic 

weapons fire, and hit us with 60[mm] mortars and 81[mm] 

mortars, which was quite effective and quite accurate, on our 

company.” With his Marines taking fire from three sides, 

Moe was determined to get his platoon out of the open rice 

paddy in which they were pinned down and up to nearby 

high ground. Luckily, despite being caught by surprise, the 

Marines of Company L quickly began to lay down effective 

counterfire. As Moe recollected, “They caught us more or less 

in a . . . what we considered at the time and what I still consider now as a disorganized ambush. With their effective fire 

and the volume of firepower that they had, they could have 

done a whole lot more damage to us had they been a little 

more organized.” The Marines of 2d Platoon served as a base 

of fire for 3d Platoon’s assault, with the company’s 60mm 

mortars striking the Viet Cong force to the north. 

With two squads, Moe attacked a Viet Cong force numbering about 100 personnel. “With full knowledge of the 

hazards involved and with complete disregard for his own 

safety, he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire while 

directing his platoon to a favorable position for the assault on 

the hill.” Maneuvering his platoon to high ground, Sergeant 

Moe was able to establish a strong firing position. Moe’s 

actions, which thwarted the Viet Cong’s effort to eliminate 

both Company L and what remained of the 1st Battalion, 

5th ARVN Regiment, earned him the Navy Cross. 

The fighting lasted for an hour and a half. As the 3d 

Platoon took the nearby hill, Marine helicopters arrived to 

begin evacuating casualties. Concerned about the potential threats below, the airborne tactical air coordinator from 

Marine Observation Squadron 2, Major Donald J. Reilly, 

flew his Bell UH-1E Iroquois to Company L’s position, but 

ordered his wingman to remain aloft. Under cover of darkness, with almost no visibility, Reilly relied on the Marines 

on the ground using flashlights for direction. He was greeted 

with heavy small-arms fire, but nevertheless pressed on. 

He was then struck by a bullet and lost control of his aircraft. The “Huey” plummeted 50 feet and crashed into the 

battalion’s position. Although his three crewmembers survived, Reilly suffered mortal wounds in the crash. He posthumously received the Navy Cross for his efforts to try and 

evacuate Marines in difficult circumstances. 

The battle ended at 1830, with the 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines, suffering 11 killed in action and 17 wounded in 

action. Additionally, 75 Viet Cong fighters were killed in 

action through a combination of Company L’s counterattack, 
The Vietnam War was the first major American conflict that saw the deployment of a formally organized 

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). The Marine 

Corps had been working to integrate its air and ground 

units as standing task forces since the 1950s. In principle, the MAGTF was meant to function as a cohesive, 

well-integrated team. The concept could be traced back 

to the small wars of the 1920s, where Marines on the 

ground relied on aviation assets for supply, lift, and close 

air support as they fought guerrilla forces in the jungles of Nicaragua. The use of Marine fighter-bombers 

to provide effective, timely close air support to ground 

forces during World War II and the Korean War further entrenched aviation forces as fundamental supporting arms. Following World War II, Marine planners also 

began to experiment using helicopters as a means to airlift assault waves during an amphibious landing. By the 

early 1950s, the belief that aviation played a significant, 

integral role on the amphibious battlefield had become 

accepted doctrine.

The MAGTFs were designed to be elastic and adaptable. They all consisted of four basic elements: command, 

ground combat, aviation combat, and combat support. 

The smallest task force—the Marine expeditionary 

unit (MEU)—entailed a battalion, a helicopter squadron, and supporting logistic elements. The larger Marine 

expeditionary brigade (MEB) combined a regiment and 

an air group, along with logistical support. The largest 

organized task force—the Marine expeditionary force 

(MEF)—coupled a division, an air wing, and logistical 

elements. In 1965, the Marine Corps fielded three expeditionary forces, or MEFs: the I and III MEFs in the 

Pacific and the II MEF in the Atlantic. Since they could 

be easily expanded in size and had organic aviation and 

logistic capabilities, MAGTFs were particularly useful as a 

quick reaction force.

Since the late 1950s, the United States had recognized 

the possibility that it might have to expand its involvement 

in South Vietnam. Operation Plan 32, drafted in 1959, 

slated a MEB for deployment to Da Nang should such 

a need arise.* In 1965, the commander of U.S. Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), General 

William C. Westmoreland, called for a substantial expansion of U.S. forces in South Vietnam to protect major facilities. The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (9th MEB) 

landed in March 1965. The rapid expansion of Marine 

units into the country necessitated the replacement of 9th 

MEB with the III MEF. In response to General Westmoreland’s concern that the Vietnamese would associate the 

term “expeditionary” with the French Far East Expeditionary Corps (France’s main combat force in the Indochina War of 1945–54), the Marines dutifully changed the 

unit’s name to III Marine Amphibious Force, or III MAF.

Commanded by Major General Lewis W. Walt in 

December 1965, III MAF consisted of the 3d Marine 

Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and a force logistic support group. The division was reinforced with its 

normal complement and expanded with the 7th Marines, 

two battalions from the 1st Marines, and a battalion from 

the 11th Marines. The division was concentrated in two 

major areas: around Da Nang and around Chu Lai to the 

south.

The III Marine Amphibious Force 

and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force

*Operation Plan 32 represented a four-phase war plan for Indochina. 

Phase one focused on existing levels of terrorism and hostilities; phase two 

on a full-scale armed insurgency; phase three on the invasion of regular 

North Vietnamese units; and phase four on reinforcement by Communist 

China.

In Persistent Battle | 19
20 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

artillery fire, and close air support from the 1st MAW. The 

battalion established a perimeter defense on the high ground 

seized by Company L for the night and prepared to continue 

its march to Hill 43 the next morning. 

With his two battalions committed to battle, Henderson 

now faced a range of decisions as he worked to recover the 

battered ARVN units and take the battle to the Viet Cong. 

Unfortunately, beginning that afternoon, he became overly 

concerned with the security of his headquarters, leading to a 

critical collapse of Task Force Delta’s command-and-control 

functions. Between 1530 on 9 December and 0930 the next 

morning, General Henderson ordered his command post 

disassembled and moved three different times. In the course 

of these efforts, he also continued to make critical decisions, 

most importantly calling for the commitment of the SLF on 

the morning of 10 December. By the evening of 9 December, Operation Harvest Moon, a complex operation to begin 

with, had already encountered a number of serious setbacks 

due to the Viet Cong’s attack on the 5th ARVN Regiment 

and on 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. 

Task Force Delta had begun the process of moving its 

headquarters to Que Son during the morning of 9 December. It had completed the effort by 1045, setting up shop in 

a building inside the village. Meanwhile, the task force’s provisional artillery battalion established a perimeter 300 meters 

south of the village, setting up 105mm howitzers from Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines. That afternoon, General 

Henderson ordered his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Doehler, to move the Task Force Delta command post to inside the artillery perimeter due to concerns 

about the command post’s security. Doehler recalled a few 

weeks later, “Apparently the Commanding General of the 

Task Force felt that or was concerned about the position of 

the Command Post and the possibility of it being overrun by 

VC [Viet Cong] elements which may have been in the area.”

Since Colonel Doehler had chosen the command post 

site himself, he was unsure why General Henderson was so 

concerned. “I considered the village because of the ARVN 

elements and the fact that it had not been hit in over nine 

months or a year and had never been actually attacked, relatively secure. And to my knowledge there were no intelligence 

estimates or information that would have indicated that the 

village was in danger.” To be sure, Henderson’s concerns were 

not wholly unfounded. The 70th Viet Cong Battalion’s surprise 

attack on the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion demonstrated 

that the Viet Cong units were closer to Que Son than Task 

Force Delta had believed. The command post also received 

fire from what Doehler’s staff surmised “may have been a 

81[mm mortar],” though the executive officer believed there 

was just as much likelihood that the mortar fire was an accidental discharge from friendly forces. 

Task Force Delta began displacing its command post 

that evening at 1700. Fortunately, the headquarters had the 

staff and equipment to establish rear and forward command 

posts, ensuring continuity between the old position in Que 

Son and the new one to the south. However, since Doehler 

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

A Marine rifleman of Task Force Delta at the ready with the 

standard infantry arm of the period—the M14 selective fire 

semiautomatic rifle. 
Navy Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Staff Sergeant Robert 

F. Moe (MCSN: 1096741), United States Marine Corps, for 

extraordinary heroism as Platoon Commander, Third Platoon, Company L, Third Battalion, Third Marines, THIRD Marine Division 

(Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in the Republic of Vietnam on 9 December 1965. The company was engaged in an operation to rescue the 

remnants of an Army of the Republic of Vietnam regiment which was overrun by the Viet 

Cong in Quang Tin Province. As it came under 

heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and accurate mortar 

fire on three sides from a numerically superior Viet Cong 

force of battalion size, Sergeant Moe, without hesitation, 

assaulted the objective, which contained approximately 100 

Viet Cong. With full knowledge of the hazards involved 

and with complete disregard for his own safety, he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire while directing his platoon 

to a favorable position for the assault on the hill. Sergeant 

Moe secured the objective within thirty minutes of the battle, which lasted one hour and 

thirty-five minutes. In the face of continuing 

heavy enemy fire he led his platoon to a position 

where it could bring fire to bear on the enemy’s 

flank. As a result of his professional abilities and 

stirring leadership, he penetrated and eliminated the enemy, who were in a position to attack 

the remaining forty or forty-five Vietnamese 

troops on Hill No. 43 approximately 300 meters north. By 

his daring actions and loyal devotion to duty in the face of 

personal risk, Sergeant Moe reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the finest traditions of 

the United States Naval Service.

Navy Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pride 

in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Major 

Donald Joseph Reilly (MCSN: 0-61230), United States 

Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as a 

Helicopter Pilot in Marine Observation Squadron TWO (VMO-2), Marine Aircraft Group 

SIXTEEN, First Marine Aircraft Wing, in 

the Republic of Vietnam on 9 December 1965. 

With his squadron engaged in air support operations for Task Force Delta in Quang Tin Province, Major Reilly was designated as Tactical 

Aircraft Coordinator (Airborne). Reporting on 

station about 1800, he immediately answered an emergency 

request for support from a Marine company which was part 

of a mobile alert force that had been helicopter-lifted into a 

hostile area where it was heavily engaged by the Viet Cong 

using mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms. Although 

exposed to hostile rifle and machine-gun fire, he, with selfless determination and skill, fearlessly delivered devastating fire from low altitudes upon the Viet Cong who were 

encircling the company. Later, in response to a request for 

evacuation of eleven of the company wounded, he prepared 

to land. In darkness and under a 1200 foot overcast with 

three miles visibility he arranged for the company to guide him on the final approach with 

a flashlight. Directing his wingman to remain 

aloft and assist only if he were successful, he 

turned off aircraft lights and resolutely commenced his approach. Although encountering intense small-arms fire, he pressed on with 

determination and while slowing for landing, 

received a severe bullet wound. His copilot was 

unable to take over in time and the aircraft crashed on landing in the friendly zone. No further evacuations could be 

attempted due to enemy resistance until several hours later 

that night and by that time Major Reilly had succumbed to 

his grievous wound. His self-sacrificing action in the face of 

overwhelming odds sustained and enhanced the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the cause of freedom.

Major Donald J. Reilly

Staff Sergeant Robert F. Moe

In Persistent Battle | 21
had assumed Task Force Delta would be using buildings in 

Que Son to house the unit’s command post, the task force 

lacked an adequate number of tents to set up a new post at 

the artillery perimeter. In the new location, the intelligence 

and operations staff shared cramped space in the communication officer’s tent. “It was very crowded and very limited,” 

Task Force Delta’s operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel 

Sullivan, noted afterward. The task force communications 

officer, Major Fred E. Clark Jr., stated that the displacement 

“was accomplished amid considerable confusion.”

Adding to this confusion was the marginal radio communications between Task Force Delta and the 3d MarDiv’s 

headquarters. From the start of Operation Harvest Moon, 

Task Force Delta had to deal with problems with its radio 

sets. The headquarters had brought AN/PRC-47 batteryoperated units to allow it to facilitate long-range communications over the mountainous terrain (something that FM 

equipment could not do). However, even with these units, 

Task Force Delta found it was difficult to conduct clear communications with either Da Nang or the logistic support 

area. Major Clark noted that communications were “marginal,” and recalled that the connection with the division was 

garbled and drowned out by static. However, at 2200, Henderson ordered the command post’s batteries shut down for 

security reasons, preventing any repair work from being done 

and leaving the radios inoperable.

While moving the command post to the artillery perimeter was a challenge, the Task Force Delta staff accomplished 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A187927

A 12th Marines’ 105mm howitzer fires at Communist targets along the DMZ in 1966. Task Force Delta’s provisional artillery battalion provided timely and effective fire support throughout Operation Harvest Moon.

22 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
it by that evening. Though it was crowded, and a steady rain 

exacerbated the lack of enough tents for the staff, the post 

functioned and the commanding general was able to maintain contact with his battalions to the south. 

General Henderson Commits 

the Special Landing Force

As Henderson was moving his command post, the decision 

was made to commit the Special Landing Force. It is difficult to ascertain exactly who—General Walt or General 

Henderson—made the decision. Since Henderson’s headquarters was in a constant state of flux, the SLF received all 

its notices regarding the landing from surrogates within Task 

Force Delta and III MAF. The plan was to use the SLF’s battalion landing team as a blocking force. As of the night of 

9 December, Task Force Delta’s two battalions were rapidly converging on the 5th ARVN Regiment’s initial objectives along Route 534. Landing south of the route, the SLF 

was intended to prevent Viet Cong fighters in that area from 

withdrawing south. It was a complex maneuver requiring 

good air-ground coordination. 

However, the constant movement of the task force command post meant that the SLF received no clear directions during the critical hours before landing. BLT 2/1’s 

staff did not receive detailed plans until 1330 on 9 December. At 1400, the SLF’s operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Gleason, left the Valley Forge for the Task 

Force Delta command post to report as the SLF liaison officer to Henderson’s headquarters. That afternoon, Henderson 

told Lieutenant Colonel William R. Quinn, his air officer, that he would “probably” commit BLT 2/1 to the battle 

sometime the next day. However, it was Lieutenant Colonel 

Doehler and General Walt who briefed Gleason on the plan 

at around 1615. 

Walt wanted two companies to land at first light at a 

site about 1.6 kilometers south of Route 534 between the 

positions of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. Upon hearing this plan, Gleason reminded 

Walt that the SLF was reduced by two companies. The III 

MAF commander recognized this shortcoming, but nevertheless reiterated that he wanted all available elements of the 

battalion landing team committed to the engagement. At 

1800, Gleason ordered one of his subordinates to return to 

the Valley Forge to inform Colonel Burnett of the imminent 

landing. As soon as he heard the plan, BLT 2/1’s commander, 

Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin, was so surprised that Walt 

wanted to commit the reduced battalion that he ordered a 

flash message be sent to III MAF asking for detailed instructions and to confirm the commanding general’s orders. 

However, radio problems disrupted all direct communications between Valley Forge and Da Nang. Hanifin would not 

receive an official answer from III MAF headquarters until 

the afternoon of the next day, at which point his battalion 

had already been committed to the battle. 

Confusion remained aboard Valley Forge that evening. 

Colonel Hanifin knew he would be taking his battalion into 

a landing site somewhere south of Route 534 sometime after 

first light. However, neither he nor SLF commander Burnett 

had any information regarding the exact time, the exact coordinates for the landing zone, or the enemy situation. The battalion intelligence officer, Captain Ray E. Lavan Jr. recalled, 

“We still had no idea when, where, or how we would be 

committed.”

As the SLF was trying to figure out the specific details of 

its mission, General Walt ordered III MAF’s operations officer, Colonel Edwin H. Simmons, to draft a message for the 

Combined Task Force 76, informing it to prepare to land the 

SLF. The communiqué was vague, typical of the information 

being transferred between the SLF and III MAF that day, 

though it did indicate that the landing needed to take place 

at some time before 0800 the next morning. The exact time 

and place would be dictated by General Henderson. It is not 

known whether Simmons was aware Henderson was in the 

process of shutting down his command post as he drafted 

the message. The SLF would not receive this order until 0600 

the next morning, when Colonel Burnett met with Walt and 

Simmons in person.

As the SLF struggled to get answers from III MAF, Task 

Force Delta’s operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan, was growing concerned about the cramped conditions at 

the task force command post outside of Que Son. At 0100, 

he told General Henderson that he believed the post should 

return to its original site inside the village: 

The absence of adequate blackout working space 

and crowded condition of the ground itself militated 

In Persistent Battle | 23
against the [command post] remaining there. We 

knew that an infantry company was to be committed 

in the morning for the defense of the artillery position 

and I recommended that we move back to the Que 

Son village area itself, the next morning, lift in the 2d 

battery of 105[mm howitzer]’s and wrap the infantry 

company around the entire position.

A move back to Que Son, Sullivan further argued, would 

also strengthen Task Force Delta’s command-and-control 

functions, as the village post was closer to the task force’s 

maneuvering elements. Henderson and Sullivan discussed 

the matter for about an hour. At 0200, the Task Force Delta 

commander decided to move the command post yet again. 

However, this time it would be more than nine kilometers 

northeast to the logistic support area. Rather than bring his 

headquarters closer to his two maneuver battalions, he would 

be moving the post even farther away. 

It is difficult to know exactly what General Henderson’s 

reasons were for moving his command post a third time in 

less than 12 hours. Unlike most of his staff, he was neither 

deposed nor questioned by the board of investigation convened to examine the landing of BLT 2/1. At 0430, Sullivan informed Lieutenant Colonel Doehler of the general’s 

decision. This sparked a heated discussion between Doehler 

and Henderson. Doehler noted that to his “recollection the 

staff was unanimously opposed to such a move and a strong 

recommendation was made to the Commanding General 

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

An elevator aboard USS Valley Forge (LPH 8) brings Marines of BLT 2/1 to the flight deck, where they will board UH-34s (background, left) and then be lifted into battle during Operation Harvest Moon. Note the haze and rain-soaked deck.

24 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
that [Task Force Delta command post] remain at Que Son.” 

Sullivan concurred, remembering that “to the best of my 

knowledge, each expressed as a group and individually the 

inappropriateness of returning to the [logistic support area].” 

After intense argument, Doehler took Henderson aside and 

spoke for half an hour. Although the exact content of the 

conversation is unknown, Henderson’s decision held, and the 

staff immediately made preparations to move the Task Force 

Delta command post once more. The drawbacks of the displacement were many, but perhaps the most significant was 

that it would mean a loss of command-and-control functions just as the SLF was preparing to make its assault. As of 

0530, BLT 2/1 still had no idea when the landing hour (or 

L-Hour) would be or the exact location of its landing zone. 

Task Force Delta had not even conducted aerial reconnaissance to locate a suitable place for the landing. 

The morning of 10 December saw a flurry of activity as 

the SLF prepared to join the battle. At 0600, Colonel Burnett boarded a helicopter and left the Valley Forge to meet 

with General Henderson. Likely due to the communications 

problems, he assumed the Task Force Delta commander was 

at the logistic support area, not Que Son. There he found 

General Walt and Colonel Simmons instead. It was only 

then that Simmons learned that Burnett had not yet received 

the landing order he had drafted the previous evening. 

Unable to reach General Henderson by radio, Simmons, 

Burnett, and several SLF staff officers boarded a pair of helicopters and headed south to Que Son to find Henderson. 

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

Marines of Task Force Delta board a UH-34 helicopter. The UH-34 was the workhorse of the Corps’ rotary-wing force. It lifted in 

Marines and supplies and evacuated casualties from the battlefield.

In Persistent Battle | 25
He was not there either. Ironically, Henderson actually was 

en route to the logistic support area. Simmons and Burnett 

then flew back to that site, where they finally found the Task 

Force Delta commander.

With the principal officers finally in one place, Simmons, 

Burnett, Henderson, and members of the Task Force Delta 

and SLF staffs departed the support area in two UH-1Es 

and headed south to scout prospective landing zones for 

BLT 2/1. There is some disagreement between the participants of this flight regarding how long it took and at what 

altitude. Burnett believed it lasted from 30 to 40 minutes and 

was at an altitude of between 200 and 900 feet. Simmons 

stated the flight was 20 minutes and was “as low as 500 ft,” 

though he acknowledged he did not look at the altimeter. 

Meanwhile, the flight’s lead pilot, Major James E. Gillis, testified that he flew at an altitude of between 1,000 and 2,000 

feet, and stated that “BGen Henderson indicated that he did 

not want to get too low or to remain in the area for an excessive period of time.” Gillis estimated they orbited the area for 

about 10 minutes, at some point between 0900 and 0930. As 

the lead pilot, Gillis was likely one of only four Marines (his 

copilot and the pilot and copilot of the second Huey being 

the others) who would have been monitoring the altimeter 

and fuel gauge of his aircraft constantly, giving greater credence to his account of the events. 

The length and altitude of the flight is important in light 

of subsequent events. Considering the heavy cloud cover, it is 

difficult to imagine the staff officers aboard the Hueys gaining much solid intelligence on ground conditions at 2,000 

or even 1,000 feet. As noted above, a Task Force Delta after 

action report stated that, even in marginal conditions, visibility was difficult above 1,200 feet. The flight focused on 

a region between Route 534 and two prominent hills to 

the south, designated Hills 403 and 407, respectively. The 

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

Bell UH-1E Hueys, such as the one pictured here, served as observation aircraft, transports, and gunships during Operation Harvest Moon.

26 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
scouting party settled on an island amidst a sea of rice paddies a little more than three kilometers south of Route 534, 

just north of Hill 407. The total area was about 200 x 200 

meters. Simmons noted, “No unusual activity was observed. 

There were some figures, presumably farmers, working in the 

rice paddies. They were dressed in usual peasant costume, 

chiefly black pajamas and conical straw hats. To the best of 

my knowledge we did not draw any enemy fire.” Burnett was 

less confident with the zone, however, recalling with frustration that “I had no information on the enemy situation nor 

of the specific mission of BLT 2/1 at this time.”

Upon returning to the logistic support area, Henderson 

ordered Burnett to land BLT 2/1 at the zone north of Hill 

407 at 1010. The battalion’s mission “would be to seize the 

[landing zone], organize a defensive blocking position, and 

to be prepared to move in the direction of BLT 2/7 or BLT 

3/3.” When Henderson informed his air officer, Lieutenant 

Colonel Quinn, of the planned landing time, Quinn balked, 

given “that it would be very difficult to have one that early. 

It wouldn’t give us sufficient time. I told him that we needed 

a minimum of two hours to get the airplanes on station.” 

Henderson responded that the landing team needed to be 

brought in as soon as possible to relieve the ARVN units. He 

relented somewhat, however, and pushed the landing hour 

to 1030. 

Quinn approached Major Robert D. Purcell, the operations officer of Marine Observation Squadron 6, who had 

taken a section of aircraft to the logistic support area from 

Da Nang that morning to serve as a tactical air control 

system. It was slightly after 1000, and Purcell had only been 

at the support area 10 minutes, when Quinn informed him 

that he would be serving as the tactical air coordinator (airborne) for the landing of BLT 2/1. Purcell was taken aback 

by the timing:

Hiep Duc

Cam La

Thang Binh

Tam Ky

1 534

535

VC

Unit

70

VC

Viet An

ARVN

(-)

TF

DELTA

X

3/3

2/7

2/1

BLT

(-)

Que Son

Map adapted by History Division

The ambush of the 5th ARVN Regiment and the insertion of BLT 2/1, 9–10 December 1965.

In Persistent Battle | 27
28 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

Platoon leaders of Company G, BLT 2/1, are briefed before moving out to seize a hill during Operation Harvest Moon.
I recalled remarking to the Colonel, “it is slightly after 

ten o’clock now, how much prep is to be given to this 

thing?” [sic] He said about twenty minutes. I said that 

we can’t possibly get down there to the Landing Zone 

which I had not seen, recon the thing, check it out, and 

bring aircraft in at 1030.

Tasked with organizing the landing of two companies in less 

than 30 minutes, Purcell worked to gather as much information as he could. 

Unfortunately, Quinn was unable to provide many crucial 

details. How many aircraft did they have for landing zone 

prep? What were their call signs? How many troops would 

be coming to land? What was the call sign of the lead helicopter? How many helicopters would actually be landing? 

Quinn was unable to supply any of these answers, and told 

Purcell to acquire the information from the direct air support center (DASC) once he was airborne. All Purcell knew 

was the landing zone coordinates and that the landing would 

take place at 1030. And it was already 1005.

Major Purcell’s flight of UH-1Es took off and immediately contacted the airborne DASC. Despite Quinn’s 

assurance, it was unable to provide him with any more information. As Purcell left, the operations officer for the 1st 

MAW, Colonel Michael R. Yunck, arrived at the logistic support area, where he informed Quinn that adequate strike aircraft were not on station to prepare the landing zone. Quinn 

told Yunck that the landing was going to take place regardless, and the wing operations officer took to the air with the 

intent of assisting Major Purcell as the airborne tactical air 

coordinator.

Meanwhile, the Task Force Delta command post was in 

the process of being taken down and moved to the logistic 

support area. Despite ordering an L-Hour of 1030, General 

Henderson’s headquarters lacked “control and communications during its displacement to the [logistic support area] 

between 0830 and 1130, 10 December 1965.” Lieutenant 

Colonel Doehler spent the morning monitoring the movement as helicopters ferried equipment and personnel from 

Que Son to the north. At 0920, Doehler took a flight to the 

support area where he was approached by General Walt, 

who immediately asked what was going on. Although about 

two-thirds of the command post had been set up at the 

new location, Walt ordered Doehler to move the post back 

to Que Son. It would be the fourth time the post moved in 

a day and was the first indication that the III MAF commander was beginning to lose faith in his subordinate’s ability to lead Task Force Delta.

At 0930, Colonel Burnett arrived aboard Valley Forge and 

gave Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin the order to land his battalion at the coordinates near Hill 407. As noted, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines’ Companies E and H were still out of range 

aboard USS Montrose. However, the landing team also would 

go into battle without most of its attached units: its tanks, 

artillery, and Ontos. The SLF helicopter commander, Lieutenant Colonel Porter, immediately asked for information on 

escort aircraft and approach lanes. Neither Hanifin nor Burnett knew any details. At 1012, the first wave of BLT 2/1 

lifted off from Valley Forge. Twenty-two UH-34Ds carried 

two platoons and the command element from Company F, 

2d Battalion, 1st Marines, escorted by UH-1Es. 

Just as the assault force lifted off, Colonel Yunck contacted the DASC and requested preparatory airstrikes to 

soften up the landing zone. When the DASC sent in the 

request, the response came back that it would be at least an 

hour before the aircraft could arrive on station, as they still 

had to have their ordnance loaded. With the lead elements of 

BLT 2/1 already inbound, Colonel Quinn decided he needed 

to delay the landing. He called the DASC and ordered them 

to direct the SLF’s UH-34Ds and UH-1Es to reroute their 

approach and head to the logistic support area. There they 

could wait until the adequate landing zone preparatory 

strikes could take place. The DASC quickly responded, and 

by 1025, the helicopters had landed at the logistic support 

area. They waited aboard their helicopters for more than 30 

minutes.

Colonel Yunck had effectively taken control of the landing 

operation. He did not really have much of a choice. Regardless of Henderson’s initial orders, a helicopter assault could 

not be successfully carried out by 1030. The Task Force Delta 

command post was in transit yet again, and Yunck could not 

reach either Henderson or Doehler. BLT 2/1’s Company F, 

thus, had to wait as F-4B Phantoms from MAG-11 and 

Douglas A-4 Skyhawks from MAG-12 arrived on station at 

around 1100 and began strafing runs across the prospective 

landing zone.

In Persistent Battle | 29
Colonel Yunck surveyed the prospective landing zone as 

the airstrikes began. He quickly spotted a small hamlet near 

the zone, and both he and his fellow pilots could see women 

and children throughout the town’s streets and in the adjoining fields. Apparently, it had been missed during that morning’s reconnaissance flights. Fearing civilians would be killed 

in the bombing and assault, Yunck ordered the strikes shifted 

to the south and west of the zone. The colonel now faced 

another crucial decision. The presence of a large civilian population alongside the site of a prospective helicopter assault 

carried with it a range of risks. The likelihood of civilian casualties was great. Where there were civilians, there also were 

potentially Viet Cong infiltrators who could easily strike the 

landing Marines with automatic weapons and mortars. In 

light of both these dangers, Yunck made the unilateral decision to designate an area of muddy rice paddies and dikes 

600 meters west of the original zone as the new landing area. 

There was some disagreement between Yunck and his subordinates about why the zone needed to be moved. When 

asked why Yunck changed the landing zone, his pilot, Major 

Edward L. Kuykendall, reported “there wasn’t any indication 

of people being close, it was a very large rice paddy here. The 

main reason, generally speaking was to get away from this 

village and the tree tops.” Kuykendall’s observation underlined that, between Hill 407, the rice paddies, and villages, 

there were few optimal areas around Hill 407 to carry out 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A801157

A Douglas A-4 Skyhawk from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 225 taxies on the runway during Operation Piranha in September 1965. Skyhawks provided close air support to Marines and South Vietnamese soldiers throughout Operation Harvest Moon.

30 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
a helicopter assault of any significant size. To land in such a 

small area, the UH-34s were required to bunch up tight in 

an area measuring 150 x 50 meters. Strictly speaking, Colonel Yunck’s decisions should have been referred back to the 

Task Force Delta commander. However, the board of inquiry 

investigating the landing recognized that “time was short and 

communications would not have permitted it anyhow.” Satisfied that the area was quiet, Yunck ordered the strike aircraft 

to break off their attacks, marked the new alternate zone with 

yellow smoke, and gave the all clear for the landing.

The first wave of BLT 2/1 left the logistic support area 

a little after 1100 and proceeded to the landing zone. As 

the helicopters approached the new target, the Marines on 

board immediately realized they were in for a fight. “We were 

receiving fire on our approach and one airplane was hit as 

we approached and everybody pushed in there pretty fast. 

We took some VC [Viet Cong] under fire,” Colonel Porter 

reported. He also remembered seeing rifle-bearing Viet Cong 

running parallel to the helicopters as they descended. Just as 

the assault began, Colonel Yunck was struck in the leg by 

Communist fire, and Major Purcell took over as the tactical air officer. Yunck’s wound was serious, and ultimately he 

would have to have his leg amputated five inches below the 

knee. The most senior Marine on the battlefield had been 

knocked out of the fight.

The intensity of the Viet Cong response to the landing 

was evidence that the preparatory bombardment had failed to 

effectively neutralize enemy activity in the zone. Unlike the 

U.S. Army, which relied on heavily armed helicopter gunships 

to escort utility and transport helicopters, the Marine Corps 

stipulated that fixed-wing aircraft were better suited for this 

purpose. Doctrinally, a helicopter landing zone was treated 

much as a landing beach: a large area to be saturated with 

preparatory bombardment from bombs, rockets, and missiles 

launched from fixed-winged airframes. Consequently, planners felt that dedicated helicopter gunships were redundant. 

Marines with experience in Vietnam had been questioning 

Headquarters Marine Corps’ reluctance to develop gunships 

since the early days of the Service’s involvement in Southeast Asia. The jungle terrain, the Viet Cong’s generally elusive character, and the large number of villages dotting the 

countryside led many Marines in Vietnam to suggest using 

helicopters for both landing zone preparation and close air 

support. Since helicopters could move slower and hover, their 

pilots could deliver fires with greater precision and gain a 

better sense of where civilians and enemy forces were located 

on the battlefield. The ambush of BLT 2/1’s Company F demonstrated that the Viet Cong were fully capable of evading 

the devastating bombardment delivered by the Marine Corps’ 

F-4Bs and A-4s.

Company F’s Marines disembarked under heavy fire. The 

battalion’s artillery liaison officer, Captain Robert C. Gregor, 

described the landing: “As we came in for the landing, both 

gunners in my plane opened fire and appeared to be firing in 

every direction. As soon as the helicopter touched down, I 

jumped out and ran across one rice paddy and hit the ground, 

taking cover in the next.” The fire emanated from between 

300 and 500 meters to the south and east at the tree line 

that circled the base of Hill 407. Within a matter of minutes, both platoon commanders and Company F’s commanding officer, Captain James E. Page, were wounded in action. 

Page’s wounds were so severe that he was pronounced dead 

on the field of battle (though he would ultimately survive his 

injuries). Captain Ray E. Lavan Jr., the battalion’s intelligence 

officer, observed, “We immediately took cover behind rice 

paddy dikes. At this time we noticed that there were about 

100 Marines scattered over the rice paddy and pinned down 

as we were, at this time. We guessed that these Marines were 

the first wave of ‘F’ Company.”

Ten minutes after successfully pinning Company F with 

rifle fire, the Viet Cong began laying down mortar rounds. 

Within half an hour, the two platoons of Company F suffered 

approximately 35 casualties: 8–9 killed in action and 24–25 

wounded in action. Colonel Hanifin recounted that “After 

that they were pretty well pinned down and they kept down. 

They were unable to advance or withdraw, either way, they 

were right in the low ground in the paddies and they couldn’t 

get over the dykes on the other sides.” Casualties and heavy 

enemy fire precluded any type of advance or withdrawal. 

Captain Lavan, who had assumed command of the company, 

decided to hold out where they were and await orders from 

the battalion commander. He redeployed his scattered platoons to strengthen their defensive positions and ensured the 

company’s one remaining machine gun was put into action. 

The company also began firing its 3.5-inch rockets at Viet 

Cong machine gun positions. Fortunately, the company’s 

In Persistent Battle | 31
forward air controller also was able to maintain contact with 

the tactical air coordinator, ensuring that 1st MAW’s A-4s 

and F-4s could provide air support.

Waiting aboard the Valley Forge, Lieutenant Colonel 

Hanifin had no idea what was happening to Company F. 

Not knowing that the assault force had been rerouted to the 

logistic support area, he assumed the landing had taken place 

on schedule at 1030. It was now well past 1100, and he was 

thus left to wonder why it was taking the helicopters so long 

to get back. He would be unable to send in the second wave 

until they did. As the aircraft finally began to return to the 

Valley Forge, Hanifin listened to the radio chatter between 

the helicopter pilots. It was only then that he learned Company F was “being shot up” and receiving mortar fire. Hanifin realized that, if he did not send in his follow-on forces 

immediately, his battalion would be “chewed up” wave by 

wave. He assembled his command group and two more platoons and departed the Valley Forge at 1145.

But where would the second wave land? Any additional landings in the vicinity of Company F would have 

been “disastrous” and meant “almost certain suicide” for the 

follow-on force. Continuing to perform the duties of the airborne tactical air coordinator, Major Purcell chose to move 

the new landing zone to where he had observed elements of 

2d Battalion, 7th Marines.* Throughout the morning, that 

battalion continued its advance east. By about 1100, it had 

swept most of the area north of BLT 2/1’s position. Finding 

the best high ground outside Viet Cong mortar range, Purcell marked the area with smoke and informed the incoming 

UH-34Ds of the new site. 

Upon spotting the next assault force, the Viet Cong 

opened fire. Hanifin remembered: “On the way in I was looking out the window of the helicopter, I’d put one of the helmets on, we were getting mortar fire, and I saw the landing 

zone, went on by the landing zone, did a 180 and started 

heading east again, and then dropped in.” The entire wave 

did not land. “I couldn’t figure out where the other ones went,” 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A193985

Members of Company H, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, watch an airstrike against a Viet Cong position as they prepare to move out.

*Purcell recounted, “I believed, and still believe, that any further landings in 

the LZ [landing zone] chosen would have been disastrous.” 

32 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Hanifin reported. As he disembarked, he spotted Marines, but 

did not recognize any of them. He had landed in the middle 

of Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, about 2,500 meters 

from his own Company F. Hanifin immediately tried to raise 

the beleaguered company on the wireless, only to find his 

transmissions were being jammed inadvertently by Marine 

aircraft radio transmissions. Despite the fact that the Harvest 

Moon operation order had included a detailed communications annex to specify which frequencies would be assigned to 

each unit, the aviation assets in the area used frequencies not 

designated in the order. The helicopters orbiting the battlefield also were broadcasting with such power that they were 

causing interference in communications on the ground. The 

battalion radio officer, Captain Harold D. Read, frantically ran 

the dial through various FM frequencies to try and find a clear 

channel with which Hanifin could communicate.

Luckily, Company F’s forward air controller was uninjured and able to reach Hanifin, as he was keyed into the 

same frequency as the aircraft. Company F’s gunnery sergeant, Joseph Thurmond, was then able to provide Hanifin 

with the first clear briefing on the status of the company 

since it had departed two hours earlier: 

They were pinned down in a rice paddy about 1,200 

meters west and south of their designated helicopter 

landing zone. They had approximately eleven (11) 

KIA’s [killed in action] and between 30– 40 WIA’s 

[wounded in action]. The time was about 1230, on 10 

December 1965. The Company Commander had also 

been seriously wounded.

Upon hearing the report, Hanifin sent a message to Task 

Force Delta headquarters informing them that he would 

begin assembling the disparate elements of the second wave 

and then move to relieve Company F.

The Relief of General Henderson 

and Operations to Rescue Company F

It is not clear if Hanifin was aware that when he sent his 

intentions to Task Force Delta’s command post, he was not 

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

The Operation Harvest Moon battlespace was riddled with obstacles and difficult paths, including muddy trails, paddy dikes, 

and boulders.

In Persistent Battle | 33
actually sending them to General Henderson. At about the 

same time that the first wave of BLT 2/1 was leaving the 

logistic support area for the landing zone at Hill 407 (around 

1100), Henderson was engaged in a private discussion with 

General Walt at Que Son. The conversation lasted about 30 

minutes. After the conversation, Walt approached Lieutenant Colonel Doehler, informed him that Henderson was 

no longer in command of Task Force Delta, and ordered 

Doehler to take over. Doehler’s first task was “to untangle 

the situation and get the battalions as close together as possible in a mutually supporting position by dark and prepare 

to continue the attack on the following day.” Having spent 

the entire morning transferring the task force command post 

between three different locations, Doehler had little sense of 

what the situation was on the actual battlefield. He immediately boarded a helicopter and flew south to find Lieutenant 

Colonel Hanifin. 

General Henderson’s failure to carry out effective command and control of Task Force Delta led to considerable 

confusion on the Harvest Moon battlefield. This confusion 

partially drew Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, into 

an ambush at Hill 407 by Viet Cong units. Nevertheless, 

the official records and histories do not include much specific information regarding Walt’s decision to relieve General Henderson. The Marine Corps History Division’s official 

history states simply, “As darkness fell on the battlefield that 

day, General Walt relieved General Henderson.” Aside from 

giving the incorrect time of day when the relief occurred, the 

historical record provides the barest narrative of the events, 

giving little detail regarding the breakdown of communications that ultimately led to the landing of Company F, 2d 

Battalion, 1st Marines, into the midst of a Viet Cong force. 

Even the statements and testimony taken by the board of 

inquiry assembled by General Walt to investigate the landing 

skirted the issue. In a memorandum sent to General Greene, 

General Walt informed the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps that 

Since it is neither desired nor intended that this report 

be used as a basis for official criticism of any individual as such, and the procedure adopted ( JAG [ Judge 

Advocate General] Manual technique) was merely a 

means to attain the ultimate objective of obtaining 

information on which to base improvement, designation of parties at this time is neither appropriate or 

desirable, even though candid comment on individual 

action is necessary to lay bare the mistakes committed.

Henderson’s decision to move the Task Force Delta command post three times contributed to a general collapse of 

command and communications. His operations officer, Colonel Sullivan, noted later that “What these movements did 

to staff cohesion, and the resultant all but total lack of support for and control of three Marine battalions, one of which 

being in a desparate [sic] fight ([BLT] 2/1), is best left to 

the imagination.” As discussed above, it is not entirely clear 

why Henderson ordered the command post moved. His staff 

members unanimously opposed the decision, but the commanding general was nevertheless convinced that Que Son 

was not a secure position, despite a lack of evidence to support that conviction. 

A reporter asked General Walt about the relief two days 

later in a press conference. Walt explained that Henderson 

“was sick when this operation started. I finally forced him to 

retire because of his personal health.” Perhaps anticipating a 

follow-up inquiring why he placed the seemingly sick Henderson in command in the first place, Walt went on to point 

out that “I have two assistant division commanders, General 

Henderson and General [ Jonas M.] Platt, and when he took 

ill, I put Platt in his place. Henderson had it first because he 

was senior of the two.” In light of Walt’s claim, it is notable that at no time during the board’s proceedings was Henderson’s health mentioned or given as a reason to explain his 

decision making as the commander of Task Force Delta. 

That mistakes were made is clear from the board of 

inquiry’s records, though all of them cannot be laid at General Henderson’s feet. The continuous transfer of the command post largely exacerbated problems endemic to Harvest 

Moon’s planning and execution. It was an operational plan 

that had friction embedded in its DNA. The decision to 

commit BLT 2/1 to the battle seemed to be made with little 

thought or consideration to the complexities of conducting helicopter assault operations. It is important to note 

here that the order to land the team came from both Walt 

and Henderson. Tasked with serving as the airborne tactical air coordinator, Major Purcell was unable to acquire 

34 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
basic information about the mission, including the number 

of inbound helicopters, the number of Marines, and the relevant call signs and radio frequencies. Notably, Henderson 

made the decision to land the battalion landing team without even considering how much time was needed to prepare 

the landing zone with air strikes. There was even a lack of 

familiarity with these missions as demonstrated by staff officers of the Special Landing Force itself. When asked how 

much space was needed to land 20 helicopters, the SLF’s 

operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gleason, confessed that he did not know. 

Walt also potentially exacerbated the command problems 

by relieving Henderson when he did. The need to replace 

the Task Force Delta commander was likely self-evident to 

Walt and to the task force staff, who had been unanimous 

in opposing the decision to move the command post. Walt 

personally countermanded the final movement of the post to 

the logistic support area. By the morning of 10 December, it 

is likely that Henderson had lost the confidence of both his 

commander and his subordinate staff. It is unclear whether 

he needed to be relieved at the very moment BLT 2/1 was 

landing its lead elements and engaging the enemy, however. 

The board of inquiry observed that “the replacement of the 

Commanding General, Task Force Delta and the wounding 

of the [tactical air coordinator (airborne)] who was the Wing 

G-3 occurred almost simultaneously with the landing of 

Company ‘F’ and each undoubtedly had an affect on events 

during the next few hours.” The board did not go any further than this in its analysis of the consequences of Henderson’s relief.

The lack of coordination between air and ground elements was another problem that could not be laid entirely at 

General Henderson’s feet. From the moment the 5th ARVN 

Regiment was ambushed by Viet Cong forces, there was 

little harmony between the Marine and Air Force air officers regarding the direction of close air support. In one particularly self-aggrandizing assessment, an Air Force report 

declared: “U.S. Air Force forward air controllers, who were 

denied access to planning for the operation, saved the day 

when they took over air strikes and led retreating ARVN 

units to safety on the 8th and 9th of December.” Nevertheless, the report did highlight issues recorded by Marine 

sources, notably the failure of the aviation elements to coordinate radio frequencies with ground forces, blocking the 

efforts of the battalion landing team’s commander to communicate with his companies and with his headquarters. 

When General Walt relieved General Henderson of 

command, all three of Task Force Delta’s battalions were 

engaged with Viet Cong forces. One of those units, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, was scattered and one of its companies 

was pinned down at the base of Hill 407. The men from 3d 

Battalion, 3d Marines, had been advancing west all morning. 

At 0930, the battalion reached Hill 43. There, they encountered about 40 ARVN soldiers, survivors of the previous days’ 

battles against the Viet Cong. As the Marines searched the 

area for any dead and wounded still on the hill, they found 

the body of the 5th ARVN Regiment’s commander. As helicopters lifted the bodies of the dead and wounded from Hill 

43, the battalion continued its march west toward Hill 63 

that, incidentally, was one of the 5th ARVN Regiment’s 

original objectives before it was attacked two days earlier.

Colonel Doehler decided to consolidate the three battalions around Hill 63. He ordered 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 

to send its Companies E and G southeast to reinforce BLT 

2/1’s scattered companies around Hill 407. The situation at 

the hill showed no sign of improvement for the besieged 

Company F. At 1300, the company’s second-in-command, 

Defense Department (Marine Corps) A186243 

LtCol Joshua W. Dorsey III (left), commander of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, confers with Task Force Delta commander BGen Jonas M. Platt (right) just before the battalion moves 

into the Phouc Ha Valley. 

In Persistent Battle | 35
First Lieutenant Barry N. Beck, who had landed with the 

second wave, was able to contact his unit. “The radio operator informed me that the company commander had been 

wounded, along with the first and second platoon commanders. He stated that the first platoon had absorbed ‘heavy 

casualties’ but could not give an accurate count. I received 

the picture from the radio operator that the company was 

stretched out in the paddies in small groups and that things 

were badly disorganized.” Hanifin’s Marines came under 

“extremely heavy fire” from the base of Hill 407 as they 

advanced toward the high ground. 

At 1415, Brigadier General Platt, the 3d MarDiv’s second 

assistant division commander, arrived to assume command of 

Task Force Delta from Lieutenant Colonel Doehler. Like 

Henderson, Platt was a seasoned combat veteran. Serving 

with distinction during such battles as Peleliu and Okinawa, he was a recipient of the Navy Commendation Medal 

with combat “V,” the Bronze Star with combat “V,” and the 

Purple Heart. He also earned a Legion of Merit with combat 

“V” during the Korean War, where he led the 1st Battalion, 

5th Marines. Before arriving in Vietnam in November 1965, 

he had been the commanding officer of The Basic School at 

Quantico, Virginia.

Platt continued Doehler’s efforts to relieve the pressure 

on Company F. He attached Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th 

Marines, to BLT 2/1, giving Colonel Hanifin two companies 

with which to recover Company F. Under ample air cover, 

the battalion landing team’s Companies G and E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, proceeded south toward Cam La, with 

Company G on the left and Company E on the right. Their 

 Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

A Task Force Delta Marine, looking out across one of the numerous valleys that dotted the Harvest Moon area of operations, 

watches smoke rise following an airstrike against Viet Cong positions.

36 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
goal was to wedge between the Viet Cong forces at Hill 407 

and Company F. 

Unfortunately, the advance of the two companies was 

badly coordinated. In the face of heavy enemy fire, Company G fell back, and a fissure formed between the two rifle 

companies. The Viet Cong forces immediately exploited 

the breach and assaulted Company E with withering enfilade fire. In the words of one 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 

veteran, “Company E was shredded and mercilessly battered. Wounded and dying Marines were scattered over a 

wide area, and further movement became virtually impossible as more and more wounded men were immobilized and 

needed protection.” In spite of the heavy casualties, Company E continued to inch forward, carrying their casualties 

with them. They eventually closed with the Viet Cong forces 

and became locked in a close-quarters, hand-to-hand struggle. The fight did have the unintended effect of drawing the 

Viet Cong away from Company F, and Hanifin was able to 

extricate the frayed company and its casualties. By 1730, the 

three companies linked up and prepared defensive positions 

for the night. At 1800, helicopters arrived to begin medical 

evacuations of the wounded Marines. 

Unfortunately, small-arms fire from Hill 407 remained 

a threat, and the Marines had to wait for nightfall before 

moving most of the wounded to the battalion’s command 

post. BLT 2/1’s Companies G and F and 2d Battalion, 7th 

Marines’ Companies E and G, which also were placed under 

Hanifin’s command, waited tensely through the night as 

enemy 12.7mm automatic weapons fire and a driving rain 

prevented the evacuation of the wounded. The remainder 

 Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

Task Force Delta Marines ascend a terraced rice paddy during Operation Harvest Moon.

In Persistent Battle | 37
of the battalion’s casualties would not be helilifted until the 

early morning hours, beginning at around 0400. For the battalion landing team, the cost of relieving Company F had 

been substantial. In total, Company F had suffered 10 killed 

in action and 22 wounded in action. Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, suffered 8 killed in action, and 31 wounded 

in action. Accentuating the sacrifice by those Marines was 

the relatively low casualties suffered by the defending Viet 

Cong.

For Marines, 10 December proved to be the costliest day 

during Harvest Moon. It also saw the collapse of cooperation between U.S. Marines and ARVN forces. By midday, 

as BLT 2/1 was making its landing, the last of the ARVN 

survivors were evacuated. Bitter at what he perceived to be 

the Marines’ slow response to relieve his unit, I Corps commander General Thi withdrew his remaining units from the 

combined operation. The South Vietnamese forces would 

subsequently operate independently from Task Force Delta. 

The ARVN commanders declared that they would rely on 

the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces alone for close 

air support and subsequently divided the area of operations 

into two areas of responsibility. Henceforth, the Marines 

would be responsible for the area south of Que Son, while 

the ARVN forces would move east and north of the outpost. 

The original operational scheme, by which the South Vietnamese forces would work in coordination with the Americans to trap the Viet Cong, was abandoned. Harvest Moon 

became a basic search-and-destroy effort with Marines and 

ARVN soldiers operating independently of one another.

As day broke on 11 December, Brigadier General Platt 

boarded a Huey helicopter and took to the air to ascertain 

the situation around Hill 407. He found no indication of any 

Viet Cong activity in the area, and concluded that the outpost had been abandoned. At 0800, he met with Lieutenant 

Colonel Hanifin and ordered him to take his battalion landing team toward the high ground northeast of Hill 407 and 

prepare to attack southwest along the hill’s eastern slope. The 

battalion moved out at 1030. Two hours later, it was joined 

by its remaining two companies, which would be arriving off 

the coast aboard USS Montrose that evening.

As BLT 2/1 moved south, Colonel Utter’s 2d Battalion, 

7th Marines, ascended Hill 407 and seized and secured the 

summit at 1600, discovering that the Viet Cong had indeed 

withdrawn. As 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, patrolled east and 

west of Hill 63, it encountered little Viet Cong activity, but 

did uncover an abandoned network of caves and tunnels west 

of the hill. With the region around Que Son and the highways leading to it secured by three Marine battalions, Platt 

deduced that the 1st Viet Cong Regiment had withdrawn into 

the Phuoc Ha Valley to the south.

Operation Harvest Moon Moves South

The Phuoc Ha Valley was a forbidding complex of hills 

that had long been a center of Viet Cong operations. With 

rougher terrain than the flatter Que Son Valley to the north, 

any operations Platt hoped to conduct looking for the 1st 

Viet Cong Regiment would necessitate heavy use of helicopters to transport Marines and supplies. The problems that 

had occurred with the landing of BLT 2/1 could very well 

have been on General Platt’s mind when Brigadier General William E. DePuy, USA, visited the Task Force Delta 

headquarters and suggested Platt utilize Air Force Boeing 

B-52F Stratofortresses to soften up the valley. Serving as tactical support aircraft under the codename Arc Light, each 

B-52 was capable of carrying an immense payload of 60,000 

pounds of bombs. An Arc Light strike through the valley 

would have a devastating effect and potentially destroy Viet 

Cong positions in preparation for the Marine assault south. 

Platt agreed, and on the morning of 12 December, Stratofortresses struck the Phuoc Ha Valley. The B-52 strikes 

were a physically and psychologically shattering experience 

for those Viet Cong fighters who survived them. Flying at 

50,000 feet, the massive bombers could neither be heard nor 

seen from the ground. Save for surface-to-air missiles, they 

also were out of range from any kind of ordnance fired from 

the ground. Thus, the first physical sign of a B-52’s arrival 

was often the explosions of the plane’s 500-pound bombs. A 

Viet Cong veteran, Truong Nhu Tang, recalled that “The first 

few times I experienced a B-52 attack it seemed, as I strained 

to press myself into the bunker floor, that I had been caught 

in the Apocalypse.” He noted that from “a kilometer away, 

the sonic roar of the B-52 explosions tore eardrums, leaving many of the jungle dwellers permanently deaf. From a 

kilometer, the shock waves knocked their victims senseless. 

Any hit within a half kilometer would collapse the walls of 

an unreinforced bunker, burying alive the people cowering 

38 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
inside.” The strike would transform the Vietnamese countryside into a cratered wasteland. “It was as if an enormous 

scythe had swept through the jungle, felling the giant teak 

and go trees like grass in its way, shredding them into billions 

of scattered splinters.”

The strikes could be just as unnerving to the Americans. 

Sergeant Rick A. Lee, a fireteam leader with Company G, 2d 

Battalion, 7th Marines, remembered that “it was still raining, 

you couldn’t see more than, at times, you couldn’t see more 

than four–five hundred yards in front of you, you couldn’t see 

the B-52s, you couldn’t hear them. But we, sometimes, when 

we were sitting on a hill, we could see the bombs bursting, 

not more than a quarter mile away from us.” According to 

one account, the commander of Company F, 2d Battalion, 

7th Marines, Captain James N. Nolan, was unaware of what 

the code name Arc Light even stood for. He learned soon 

enough when he was shaken awake by a series of violent 

explosions during a raid. The concussive effect of the explosions of hundreds of 500-pound bombs was amplified further by the thick, low cloud cover.

The B-52s conducted two days of strikes. With the bombardment completed, General Platt set about deploying 

Task Force Delta into the valley. He divided his force in two. 

First, he sent the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, southeast to the 

Khang River, deep into the valley. The battalion would then 

advance east, back to Tam Ky. The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

and BLT 2/1 would advance along the northern part of the 

valley, east and northwest. The three battalions’ mission was 

to seek out Viet Cong forces and hopefully compel those 

forces to expose themselves to attack. 

It would be a difficult march for all the Marines involved. 

The grim weather conditions showed no signs of abating. 

A stubborn mist was frequently punctuated with heavy and 

persistent rainfall. Everything was wet. Sergeant Lee recalled 

Hiep Duc

Cam La

Thang Binh

Tam Ky

1 534

535

Viet An ARVN

(-)

TF

DELTA

X

3/3

2/7

2/1

BLT

Que Son

Map adapted by History Division

B-52 Arc Light strikes against the Phouc Ha Valley, 12–13 December 1965.

In Persistent Battle | 39
that “Sometimes at night, we slept in six inches of water.” 

The rough terrain meant that most of the advance east would 

have to be carried out on foot along narrow, muddy trails, 

damp paddies, and treacherous boulders. The rice paddies 

and rain-saturated terrain made immersion foot, also known 

as trench foot, a grim and persistent threat to the combat 

effectiveness of the Marine units. All three battalions participating in Operation Harvest Moon had been in South Vietnam for at least six months and many of their Marines were 

walking in well worn, sodden field boots that rotted quickly, 

chafed the feet when wet, and needed to be replaced fairly 

often. Task Force Delta supplied its Marines with thousands 

of pairs of socks to try and combat the immersion foot problem. Wherever possible, the Marines also built fires to dry 

their sopping feet. Staff Sergeant Moe of Company L, 3d 

Battalion, 3d Marines, remembered that “We had to, every 

chance we got, we had to more or less stay on the trooper and 

make him get his boots off and get his feet out in the air for 

as little a time, or as much time, as he could.”

Nevertheless, lacking the protection of adequate footwear 

meant that the feet of many Marines became soaked, dirty, 

and susceptible to infection. An ample supply of socks was 

often not enough. As Moe noted, “you put them on your feet 

dry, or partially dry, and five minutes later they’re just as wet 

as the pair you took off.” Sergeant Lee, a fireteam leader with 

Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, also commented on 

the perennial challenge of staying dry, as his unit “couldn’t 

keep our socks dry, couldn’t keep our gear dry, it was hard to 

keep our [ammunition] magazines clean, hard to keep your 

rifle clean, we used many cans of oil. I wished I’d put more 

socks in my pack.”

Symptoms of the condition included numbness, swelling, and the cracking of skin around the toes and on the 

soles. “Once you get immersion foot,” noted Sergeant Lee, 

“your feet swell up, they turn bloody and blistery, just like you 

burned it with a cigarette lighter.” At its worst, the malady 

led to gangrene and necrosis and the effective disintegration 

of the foot. In the most severe case, a Marine could not walk, 

necessitating an airlift for immediate medical attention.

On 13 December (the second day of B-52 strikes), 

General Platt replaced the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines’ battered Company E with Company H from 2d Battalion, 9th 

Marines. Its ranks somewhat replenished, Colonel Utter’s 

battalion then moved west along a dirt road to secure the 

Official U.S. Air Force photo 94836 

An Air Force Boeing B-52 Stratofortress takes off from its base 

in Guam for an air strike against Viet Cong forces in August 

1965. Originally designed as a nuclear bomber, the B-52’s 

range, high service ceiling, and ability to carry massive payloads made it a devastatingly powerful conventional bomber.

Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

This image illustrates the difficult terrain of the Que Son 

Valley complex. Two Marines move through a village, waist 

deep in a flooded rice paddy.

40 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
South Vietnamese outpost at Viet An, with two companies seizing the high ground to the north (Company F) 

and east (Company G) and another (Company H) occupying the town itself that evening. Company H, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, maintained its positions on Hill 407. With 

the outpost secured, the battalion was resupplied, acquired 

intelligence on Viet Cong activity to the south, and helped 

evacuate dead and wounded South Vietnamese soldiers.

The next day, the reduced 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, conducted a helicopter lift south to the Khang River. Company 

F and Company G carried out the initial landing shortly 

before noon, following air strikes on the landing zone. As they 

landed, the Marines faced intermittent 12.7mm machinegun fire from fleeing Viet Cong. The rifle companies quickly 

secured the landing zone and were soon joined by Company 

H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. The battalion then established 

defensive positions along high ground overlooking a ferry 

crossing along the river they suspected was used by the Viet 

Cong.

As the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, moved deep into the 

Phuoc Ha Valley, Task Force Delta’s other two battalions 

began to move south and east. BLT 2/1 had been conducting 

a general patrol south along the eastern slopes of Hill 407 

since 12 December. The unit temporarily paused its movement for two days to avoid accidentally entering the blast 

radius of the B-52’s strikes on 12 and 13 December. With 

the exception of the eight Viet Cong fighters dressed as 

women apprehended on 13 December, the battalion encountered little enemy activity on these days.

Meanwhile, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, maintained its 

general advance southeast into the valley’s northern area as 

it assessed the damage inflicted by the B-52 attack. On 13 

December, the battalion discovered ample evidence of just 

how well provisioned and secure the Viet Cong forces had 

 Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

A Marine suffering from immersion foot is carried away from a helicopter aboard the USS Valley Forge. In the most severe cases, 

Marines suffering from the ailment could not walk or even stand and needed to be transported out of the battle zone.

In Persistent Battle | 41
been during the operation, uncovering abandoned caves 

stuffed with cots, blankets, medical supplies, uniforms, batteries, and sewing kits. It was another reminder that the 

Marines operating in the Phuoc Ha Valley faced an enemy 

who knew the terrain better than they did, and thus could 

retain a significant advantage in terms of where and when 

to strike. Underscoring this point was the simple fact that 

the Communist fighters were usually able to sleep with a 

dry roof over their heads, whereas the Marines were forced 

to endure the monsoon season day and night in muddy 

foxholes.

Over the course of the next three days, Task Force Delta 

continued its eastward advance. The Marines of 2d Battalion, 

7th Marines, moved east from the Viet Cong ferry crossing 

over the Khang River and continued in that direction along 

the river’s northern bank, uncovering a Communist medical aid station along the way. Battalion Landing Team 2/1 

reached the southern boundary of the area that had been 

devastated by the Arc Light strikes two days earlier on 15 

December and then pivoted to the northeast with the intent 

of joining the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. As it crossed a ridge 

of hills separating the two formations, it encountered a force 

of about 40–50 Viet Cong at 1130 on 16 December. The 

adversaries exchanged fire for several hours before the Viet 

Cong broke contact and left the battlefield. During the next 

two days, the battalion continued its patrol and finally exited 

the valley complex on 18 December, where its tired companies were lifted by helicopter to Phu Bai. The companies of 

3d Battalion, 3d Marines, left the complex between 17 and 

18 December and proceeded via helicopter to the logistic 

support area during the next two days.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, faced a more difficult 

march. As the battalion moved out from the ferry crossing 

site on 15 December, it did not initially encounter significant enemy activity. On 18 December, the battalion continued its march with the aim of reaching the town of Thon Hai 

Hiep Duc

Que Son

Cam La

Thang Binh

1 534

535

80

VC

Viet An

TF

DELTA

X

2/1

BLT

Tam Ky

Ky Phu

ARVN

(-)

3/3

2/7

2/1

 Map adapted by History Division 

Task Force Delta operations in the Phouc Ha Valley, 13–20 December 1965.

42 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
by nightfall. As it advanced, the battalion passed through the 

village of Ky Phu, a little more than eight kilometers west of 

Tam Ky. The town was eerily quiet. Major Alvin J. Doublet, 

the battalion operations officer, described the town as being 

“particularly devoid of civilian activity.” A fireteam leader 

recalled that there were no men to be found and women were 

seen huddling in corners, clutching their children.

While 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, had received harassing 

sniper fire throughout the day, Colonel Utter did not believe 

this was the precursor to a major attack. The anxious civilians 

of Ky Phu could have been just as nervous about the advancing Marine column as they were about Viet Cong activity 

in the area. Utter also was confident that his patrols, roving 

between 500 and 700 meters along his advance guard’s 

flank, would spot any possible ambushes. The battalion was 

hardly in the best state to confront such an assault. It had 

been moving on foot for about 32 kilometers along a dirt 

road that was barely worth the name; it was, in fact, a narrow 

paddy dike. As with so much of the terrain covered by the 

Marines participating in Harvest Moon, the area was damp 

and muddy. “There were a considerable number of rice paddies and almost all the terrain was flooded due to the heavy 

rains that we had had,” the battalion’s operations officer, 

Major Doublet, remembered. More than 50 of the battalion’s 

Marines suffering from immersion foot had to be lifted out 

of the area by helicopters the day prior. 

The unit’s three companies advanced in a column. Company G was on point, followed by Company F. The two lead 

companies advanced in a “V” formation, and were followed 

by the Headquarters and Service Company. Company H, 

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, formed the rear of the column. 

The area around Ky Phu was largely made up of rice paddies interspersed with small villages and hedgerows. To the 

south ran a low ridge no higher than 30 meters that commanded the western approach to the small market town. The 

battalion passed through the village with little incident save 

the aforementioned sniper fire. By 1330, roughly half of the 

battalion had left the village when Companies F and G came 

under heavy fire from machine guns and recoilless rifles. 

Utter continued to believe that the attack was only harassing 

fire, and subsequently ordered Company G to turn south and 

use the battalion’s 81mm mortars to clear the road. He then 

ordered Company F to displace Company G as 2d Battalion, 

7th Marines’ advance guard. However, as Major Doublet 

noted, it was becoming “obvious that Company G’s action 

was something bigger than snipers as they now reported 

receiving mortar fire themselves.”

Utter’s miscalculation placed his already-frayed battalion at considerable risk. The attacks were not merely harassing actions, but were actually part of a large-scale ambush 

staged by the 80th Viet Cong Battalion designed to take out 

the entire Marine unit. As they moved ahead beyond Ky 

Phu, a gap emerged between the two advance companies and 

the lightly armed Headquarters and Service Company. Two 

Communist companies then struck from both north and 

south of the road through the town. They aimed to exploit 

the gap, split the battalion in two, and roll up each half. 

Thanks to the actions of a number of Marines, and the perseverance and fighting skill of the entire battalion, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, not only survived the ambush but inflicted 

massive casualties against the enemy formation. 

Utter, who was with Company F, lost contact with the 

rest of his battalion when his radio operators were killed. 

The commander of the battalion’s Headquarters and Service Company, Lieutenant Nicholas H. Grosz Jr., described 

the intensity of the Communist fire: “For the first couple 

of hours there we were pinned down, we could hardly even 

move. Most of the casualties of the people that I took were 

in the head and the shoulders, just from firing back over the 

rice paddies.” In an ironic turn of events, the muddy terrain 

that had been such a thorn in the side of Task Force Delta 

since Harvest Moon actually helped the Marines in this particular firefight. As the Communist mortars landed on both 

sides of the Headquarters and Service Company, the ground 

absorbed much of the explosion, leaving the remainder to 

explode directly into the air. “So I didn’t take as many casualties as I would of if it was during the dry season,” Grosz 

noted.

The gap between Headquarters and Service Company 

and Company F was widening to such a degree that a small 

number of Viet Cong forces were able to advance into the 

opening and set up a 12.7mm machine gun position with 

which to rake the beleaguered company with enfilade fire. 

At some spots, hand-to-hand fighting took place and pistol 

fire was exchanged. Discerning the perilous situation, Grosz 

ordered runners to make contact with Utter and Company 

In Persistent Battle | 43
F and get the company to come back to close the gap. The 

withering gauntlet of Communist fire made this task deadly: 

the first two messengers were both killed as they desperately 

tried to dodge Viet Cong fire, “shot to rags and riddled by the 

heavy machine-gun and AK-47 fire pouring down the trail.” 

Grosz then took it upon himself to make contact, evading 

heavy enemy fire. His clothing and canteen were both punctured. Fortunately, he was able to reach the company commander, who immediately moved his command to the west. 

Grosz’s day was far from over. Returning to his company with 

the lead elements of Company F, where they engaged about 

10 Viet Cong fighters who had crossed the road, he began to 

evacuate wounded Marines, rallied his men, and, using a grenade launcher, covered the withdrawal of those wounded who 

could still move without assistance. His valiant actions earned 

him the Navy Cross.

Upon receiving Utter’s orders, Company F quickly turned 

around and headed back to Ky Phu. Using the battalion’s 

tactical net, Utter was able to relay a request for supporting 

fire to Task Force Delta’s provisional artillery units. Battery 

M, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines’ 155mm howitzers opened 

fire on the Viet Cong forces south of the battalion, allowing the Marines to regain the initiative. The arrival of Company F also broke the Viet Cong efforts to set up a machine 

gun position inside the battalion’s area. The company then 

set up one rifle platoon to serve as a base of fire facing south 

and then deployed its remaining platoons to the right of the 

Viet Cong position. The platoons inflicted heavy casualties. 

Headquarters and Service Company Marines armed with 

flamethrowers also contributed to defeating the ambush, 

destroying two machine gun positions.

As the battle around Ky Phu slowly turned in the Marines’ 

favor, the battalion’s rear came under heavy fire when Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, was ambushed. During 

the initial assault, the company’s commander, Captain Paul 

L. Gormley Jr., and radio operator, Lance Corporal Robert 

J. Wilkins, were both killed by a 57mm recoilless rifle. Command of the company fell to an artillery observer from 2d 

Battalion, 12th Marines, who had been with the unit for only 

about a week, First Lieutenant Harvey C. Barnum. Recounting the event, Barnum stated: “I ran 50 yards, picked [the 

company commander] up and brought him back to a covered 

H&S 2/7

F/2/7

G/2/7

H/2/9

80

VC

Ky Phu

 Map adapted by History Division 

The ambush of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, at Ky Phu, 18 December 1965.

44 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
position, and he died in my arms. At that time I went from 

being a forward observer to being the company commander.”

Barnum faced multiple challenges: he needed to restore 

command and control over Company H, secure and evacuate the dead and wounded, and break out of the ambush so 

that he could join his company up with the rest of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. To establish command over the unit, 

he ran to the company’s fallen radio operator and strapped 

the AN/PRC-25 radio to his back. The radio’s long antennae ascended into the air, making Barnum a prime target 

for snipers. Nevertheless, recognizing the necessity of maintaining clear communications with the battalion and any 

incoming air support, Barnum took the risk and was able to 

make contact with Colonel Utter. Utter ordered Barnum to 

regroup with 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Barnum responded 

that he would need to evacuate the wounded before making 

a breakout.

Over the course of the next four hours, Barnum’s company held off the Viet Cong forces as they worked to secure 

a landing zone from which wounded Marines could be evacuated from the battlefield. In the words of one of his platoon 

Navy Cross Citation

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure 

in presenting the Navy Cross to First Lieutenant Nicholas H. 

Grosz, Jr. (MCSN: 0-85461), United States Marine Corps, for 

extraordinary heroism as Commanding Officer 

of Headquarters and Service Company, Second 

Battalion, Seventh Marines, FIRST Marine 

Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, 

in the Republic of Vietnam on 18 December 

1965, during Operation HARVEST MOON in 

Quang Tin Province near the hamlet of Ky Phy. 

When savage small arms, automatic weapons and 

mortar fire pinned his company down in a muddy 

and exposed rice paddy area, Lieutenant Grosz immediately 

informed his battalion of the seriousness of the situation and 

summoned help. Completely ignoring his own personal safety, 

he repeatedly ran the gauntlet of intense enemy fire to personally evacuate four wounded Marines. He returned to his men 

and gave them encouragement as he rallied them and directed their fire toward Viet Cong positions. In order to permit a 

few of the lesser wounded to make their way to relative safety 

while a rifle company was coming to the rescue, 

he personally engaged automatic weapons with a 

grenade launcher while enemy rounds were striking his pack and equipment. After returning to 

retrieve weapons and sundry abandoned gear, and 

to make certain that none of his men were left 

behind, he finally made his way to the main battle 

position and organized his company to support 

the battalion in its subsequent attack and mopping up operations. By his daring actions, indomitable fighting 

spirit, and loyal devotion to duty in the face of great personal 

danger, Lieutenant Grosz reflected distinct credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions 

of the United States Naval Service.

First Lieutenant Nicholas H. Grosz Jr. 

sergeants, Staff Sergeant Gene Stenton, Barnum was “calm, 

cool, collected” throughout the engagement as he worked to 

bring order to the chaotic situation. Three UH-1E Iroquois 

soon arrived to provide close air support. With a 3.5mm 

rocket launcher, Barnum fired white phosphorus projectiles to light up prospective targets. When “the 3.5 ran out 

of ammunition, I stood up there and was pointing with my 

arms outstretched at the targets, and the chopper pilots flew 

down the axis of my arms at the targets.”

As the company focused on engaging the ambush south 

of the road, a Company H platoon secured a landing zone 

to the north. Two UH-34 Seahorses then began the task of 

evacuating the wounded. The fighting lasted for six to seven 

hours. With the company’s wounded lifted out of the battlespace by helicopter, but with ammunition desperately low, 

Barnum began the difficult process of fighting eastward to 

rejoin the rest of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Using fireteam 

rushes and close air support from helicopters, Company 

H broke through one squad at a time. By that evening, the 

entire company—living, wounded, and dead—had regrouped 

with its battalion. That night, Barnum sat down to take 

In Persistent Battle | 45
Harvey Curtiss Barnum was born on 21 July 1940 in Cheshire, Connecticut. After 

high school, Barnum attended Saint Anselm College in New Hampshire, where 

he joined the Platoon Leaders Class, one of the Marine Corps’ officer commissioning programs. He graduated in 1962 as a newly commissioned second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. In 1965, Barnum accepted appointment to the 

Regular Marine Corps and was stationed at U.S. Naval Base Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 

where he then volunteered for temporary duty in Vietnam. Now a first lieutenant, he joined Company H, 2d Battalion, just two weeks prior to Operation Harvest Moon.

Captain Harvey C. Barnum

The President of the United States of America, in the name of 

Congress, takes pleasure in presenting the Medal of Honor to 

Captain Harvey Curtiss “Barney” Barnum (MCSN: 0-84262), 

United States Marine Corps, for conspicuous gallantry and 

intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call 

of duty on 18 December 1965, while serving with the Company H, Second Battalion, 

Ninth Marines, THIRD Marine Division 

(Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force in action 

outside the village of Ky Phu, Quang Tin 

Province, Republic of Vietnam. When the 

company was suddenly pinned down by a 

hail of extremely accurate enemy fire and was quickly separated from the remainder of the battalion by over 500 meters 

of open and fire-swept ground, and casualties mounted rapidly. Lieutenant Barnum quickly made a hazardous reconnaissance of the area, seeking targets for his artillery. Finding the 

rifle company commander mortally wounded and the radio 

operator killed, he, with complete disregard for his safety, gave 

aid to the dying commander, then removed the radio from 

the dead operator and strapped it to himself. He immediately 

assumed command of the rifle company, and moving at once 

into the midst of the heavy fire, rallying and giving encouragement to all units, reorganized them to replace the loss of 

key personnel and led their attack on enemy positions from 

which deadly fire continued to come. His sound and swift 

decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly decimated units and his gallant example as he stood exposed repeatedly 

to point out targets served as an inspiration 

to all. Provided with two armed helicopters, he moved fearlessly through enemy fire 

to control the air attack against the firmly 

entrenched enemy while skillfully directing one platoon in a 

successful counterattack on the key enemy positions. Having 

thus cleared a small area, he requested and directed the landing of two transport helicopters for the evacuation of the dead 

and wounded. He then assisted in the mopping up and final 

seizure of the battalion’s objective. His gallant initiative and 

heroic conduct reflected great credit upon himself and were 

in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps 

and the United States Naval Service.

Medal of Honor Citation

46 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
account of the unit’s wounded: “That was the hard part—I 

didn’t know those gallant warriors. It was very emotional that 

night, sitting with the company gunny, looking at the dog 

tags and reading supplies. None of the dead and wounded 

names registered with me.”

Total casualties for the battalion were 14 killed in action 

and 73 wounded in action. Headquarters and Service Company suffered seven Marines killed in action. Company F 

lost three Marines, and Companies G and H each lost two 

Marines. Nine of the casualties were radio operators, who 

along with platoon and company commanders were usually 

the first targets during the Viet Cong ambushes. The bodies of 

104 Viet Cong fighters were found on the battlefield, killed by 

both 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, and supporting artillery fire.

The action at Ky Phu was the last major engagement of 

Operation Harvest Moon. Over the course of the next two 

days, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, continued its march east 

back to Tam Ky. At the same time that the Marines were 

vacating the valley complex, the ARVN forces garrisoning 

Hiep Duc also withdrew their forces. On 17 December, the 

3d Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment, local officials, and 100–

150 refugees made their way east to Viet An. By 18 December, they arrived at Que Son. By 19 December, all three of 

Task Force Delta’s Marine battalions had completed their 

movements out of the Harvest Moon area of operations. The 

operation officially came to an end on 20 December 1965. 

The Marine Corps concluded that at least 407 Viet Cong 

were killed during Operation Harvest Moon. The South 

Vietnamese Army’s losses were 108 killed in action and 

Marine losses were 56 killed in action.* Most of the South 

Vietnamese losses occurred during the early phases of the 

operation, during the ambush of the 5th ARVN Regiment 

and its attached units on 8–9 December. Most Marine losses 

were suffered on 10 December, during the ambush of BLT 

2/1’s Company F and the subsequent efforts by Company 

E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, to relieve that formation. The 

ambush of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, on 18 December at Ky 

Phu also was a costly engagement. It was a marked contrast 

with III MAF’s previous duel with the 1st Viet Cong Regiment during Operation Starlite. During that engagement, III 

MAF inflicted more than twice as many casualties at a loss 

of 51 Marines. This time, however, the 1st Viet Cong Regiment had learned from its mistakes. By drawing the Marines 

inland, away from the sea, the Communists were able to 

engage the Marines where and when they chose, while also 

limiting the impact the Marines’ amphibious capabilities 

could bring to the battle.

Conclusion

Contemporary observers in the United States were quick to 

declare Operation Harvest Moon a success. An article by 

Sergeant Frank Beardsley published in Leatherneck a year 

after the operation read:

The Marines on Operation Harvest Moon set out to 

do a job—to kill as many Viet Cong as possible, to 

drive the survivors out of their valley stronghold and 

to prevent the Communist attack on the Que Son outpost. The South Vietnamese flag still flies over Que 

Son, and more than 1,000 Communist troops will 

never lift another weapon. Their surviving comrades 

were driven away from an area they had considered 

theirs for years. The Marines had done the harvesting.

Both the Marine Corps History Division’s account and the 

FMFPac’s own history of the operation also were positive, 

stressing the significant numbers of Viet Cong forces killed 

or wounded in the operation compared to the Marine Corps 

forces.

An assessment produced by FMFPac Headquarters also 

was positive, if less triumphalist. It declared that “In this 

operation, Marine Corps doctrine of long standing was tried 

and again proven valid.” Examples included: “The timely 

amphibious landing of a Marine battalion blocked enemy 

elements from escaping a trap formed by units ashore, thus 

validating the amphibious ‘force-in-readiness’ concept developed by the Marine Corps,” and “The value of immediate 

*Marine casualty figures for Operation Harvest Moon vary across sources. 

Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. Johnson in U.S. Marines in Vietnam: 

The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, state that 45 Marines were killed in action and 218 were wounded. FMFPac’s history, Operations of the U.S. Marine Forces, states 45 were killed in action, 26 died of wounds, and 218 were 

wounded in action. Added up, this produces a total killed in action figure of 

71. This figure was listed in a summary of operations included with Force Requirements and Long Range Estimates for I Corps Republic of Vietnam, a Headquarters Marine Corps planning document produced in 1966. However, a 

survey of those listed as killed in action on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC, indicates the number of killed in action was likely 

smaller, with 56 Marines confirmed as having been killed in action or dying 

of wounds suffered during the operation.

In Persistent Battle | 47
48 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

availability of the close air support organic to the Marines 

was again demonstrated. HARVEST MOON was an airground team success.” 

A close inspection of the events of the battle would have 

shown both assertions needed to be qualified. The landing 

of BLT 2/1, while timely, was carried out amidst much confusion and did not succeed in preventing Viet Cong forces 

from “escaping a trap” and withdrawing south. Indeed, had 

the 1st Viet Cong Regiment actually been trapped, as the official history claimed, then Task Force Delta would not have 

needed two days of B-52 raids to soften up the area in which 

the Viet Cong units were believed to be operating. Furthermore, the lack of coordination between ground forces 

and both rotary-wing and fixed-wing forces throughout the 

battle were hardly the strongest evidence that the operation 

was “an air-ground success.” Recognizing these problems, 1st 

MAW worked to ensure greater coordination in the future 

by making sure that a senior aviator would be assigned to any 

provisional headquarters tasked with planning an operation 

on the scale and complexity of Harvest Moon.

Privately, Marine leaders were more considered in their 

assessment of the operation. The opening phase of the 

engagement had been a muddle. A board of inquiry was 

convened by General Walt to examine why the landing of 

BLT 2/1 had been carried out in such a confused manner. 

The board drew a number of conclusions, most of which 

focused on the lack of clear communications between Task 

Force Delta’s commanding general and the landing forces. 

This lack of communication was both caused and exacerbated by General Henderson’s decision to move his command post multiple times during the opening days of 

Harvest Moon. The board, perhaps recognizing that Henderson would never be given another combat command, 

decided that further disciplinary action and censure were 

unnecessary. Henderson was transferred to Okinawa, where 

he served as the commander of FMFPac (Forward) before 

retiring from the Marine Corps in the spring of 1966. 

A consequence of the decision to let the matter of Henderson’s relief rest was that Operation Harvest Moon’s failures were largely overlooked in subsequent official histories. 

The official accounts, most notably the one found in U.S. 

Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 

excessively utilize the passive voice to chronicle the events 

of the engagement, clouding who exactly was responsible for what during the opening days of the battle. Henderson’s decision to move his command post, the lack of 

clear command and control, and the absence of communication between Marines and Vietnamese and between 

Marines and airmen were left out. As a result, readers had no explanation for why General Walt seemingly, 

and without warrant, relieved the commanding general.

The plan as a whole was faulty. The operation’s planners 

laid out an elaborate set piece battle that assumed the 1st 

Viet Cong Regiment would be unable to figure out what Task 

Force Delta was trying to do: force a large-scale confrontation in which the Marines could exploit their advantages in 

firepower and mobility to decimate the regiment just as they 

had during Starlite.* The operation lacked a mechanism for 

addressing the likely possibility that the Viet Cong would 

not give battle. Thus, as soon as the Viet Cong sprung their 

own trap and attacked the ARVN battalions entering the 

Que Son Valley, Harvest Moon immediately transformed 

from an elaborate ambush to a large-scale rescue operation as 

the Marines entered the valley to recover the shattered South 

Vietnamese units. Subsequently, the engagement became a 

series of patrols as the Marines of Task Force Delta searched 

for the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in an effort to engage the unit. 

The Communists were able to effectively utilize large, conventional forces without necessarily having to use those units 

in a set piece battle. 

Despite the fact that this constituted the largest allied 

operation in I Corps to this point, planning between Marine 

Corps and South Vietnamese forces was superficial. Most 

problematic was the vast divide between the combat effectiveness of the 5th ARVN Regiment and Task Force Delta 

Marines. Throughout 1965, Walt held a fairly dim view of 

the South Vietnamese Army’s abilities. This was surely confirmed by the inability of the 5th ARVN Regiment to conduct independent operations in the Que Son Valley. From 

the perspective of the South Vietnamese commanders, the 

lack of speed with which Task Force Delta entered the Que 

Son Valley to relieve the beleaguered ARVN units was a 

sign that the Americans were not concerned with the heavy 

*A set piece battle is fought by forces that have some knowledge of each 

other’s strengths and dispositions, are reasonably familiar with the terrain, 

and have had time to develop a battle plan. 
South Vietnamese losses. By the third day of the battle, the 

South Vietnamese decided to operate independently from 

the Marines for the remainder of the engagement.

Task Force Delta and III MAF also failed to coordinate 

adequately with the 2d Air Division and other U.S. Air Force 

units in the area. Alongside the reasons for General Henderson’s relief, the complete lack of acknowledgment that 

Air Force forward air controllers and direct air support centers helped coordinate support throughout the early phase of 

Harvest Moon is the most glaring omission from the Marine 

Corps’ official accounts of the engagement. Nevertheless, Air 

Force observation craft and bombers played an instrumental role in allowing the remnants of the 1st Battalion, 5th 

ARVN Regiment, and the 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion to 

escape capture or death. 

In their own way, the Air Force’s accounts of the engagement were just as obfuscating as the Marines’, with authors 

claiming that Air Force personnel saved the allied forces 

from a “potentially disastrous situation.” Even so, the official report touches on a significant point when it records 

that “Shortly after Harvest Moon, General Westmoreland, 

COMUSMACV [commander U.S. Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam], requested that the 2d Air Division 

examine the possible advantage of placing Marine tactical air 

under the direction of the 2d Air Division.” Harvest Moon 

sparked a controversy that would plague inter-Service relations well into 1968, with the Marine Corps and Air Force 

fighting a heated feud over the issue of a “single manager” for 

air operations in South Vietnam.

To be sure, there was much about which the commanders of III MAF could feel positive with regards to Harvest 

Moon. Once it came under the command of Brigadier General Platt, Task Force Delta proved to be a highly mobile 

combat force capable of operating deep in Viet Cong territory. As in previous operations, the Marines consistently 

demonstrated their tactical superiority over their Viet Cong 

opponents. Engagements—such as the 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines, fight at Hill 54 on 9 December 1965 and the 18 

December 1965 ambush of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, at 

Ky Phu—testified to the superior skill of Marine small unit 

leaders. Although often caught by surprise by the Viet Cong, 

Marine riflemen were still able to counter their enemies with 

superior organization and firepower, leading to substantial 

losses for the Communist attackers. The landing of BLT 2/1 

on 10 December 1965 demonstrated the ability of Marine 

air officers to think on their feet in the midst of a deteriorating situation. The 1st MAW was also able to provide effective 

close air support when both the weather and lines of communication were clear. Injured Marines also could depend on 

the wing’s helicopters to ferry them out of the battle zone. 

Fire support from the task force’s provisional artillery battalion also was effective throughout the operation.

In many ways, Operation Harvest Moon encapsulated 

the basic problems and difficulties faced by III MAF as it 

tried to defeat the Viet Cong insurgency in the I Corps 

zone. Emboldened by the smashing victory of Operation 

Starlite, III MAF’s planners had hoped to draw the 1st Viet 

Cong Regiment into another engagement in which it could 

wear the Viet Cong down. The results were hardly as decisive, however. Following Starlite, many officers in III MAF, 

FMFPac, and Headquarters Marine Corps were hopeful that 

a pivotal blow against the Viet Cong was imminent. Harvest 

Moon was a reminder that the war for I Corps actually was 

going to be a long and hard one.

 Photo courtesy of Leatherneck

Task Force Delta Marines advance along a narrow dike during 

Operation Harvest Moon.

In Persistent Battle | 49
50 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

This account of Operation Harvest Moon is based on documentary sources from the National Archives and Records 

Administration in College Park, MD; the Alfred M. Gray 

Marine Corps Research Center in Quantico, VA; the Virtual Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University in Lubbock; 

and numerous secondary sources. Of particular value was 

the descriptively titled “Record of Proceedings of a Board of 

Investigation Convened at Da Nang Vietnam, by Order of 

Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force and 

Naval Component Command, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to Inquire into the Circumstances Surrounding the Landing of Battalion Landing Team 2/1 in the 

Vicinity of BT 074216 and BT 045298 on or About 1030, 

10 December 1965, Ordered on 21 December 1965, (convened on 23 December 1965).” This document entails several hundred pages worth of testimony and depositions from 

Operation Harvest Moon participants as the board of inquiry sought to determine the source of the command-andcontrol problems that occurred when BLT 2/1 landed south 

of Que Son on 10 December 1965. Until recently, this document was classified and contained within the personal papers 

of Gen Wallace M. Greene Jr., Commandant of the Marine 

Corps from 1963 to 1967. The recent declassification of those 

papers affords us the opportunity to reassess Harvest Moon.

The author also drew on the command chronologies of 

the most significant units that participated in the operation: III Marine Amphibious Force; 3d Marine Division; 1st 

Marine Aircraft Wing; the Special Landing Force; 2d Battalion, 7th Marines; 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; and 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. These are all available, either online or 

onsite, at the National Archives in College Park. A number 

of important reports produced in the wake of Operation 

Harvest Moon also were helpful in constructing the narrative. These include “Operation Harvest Moon, Hq PACAF 

Tactical Evaluation Center, Project CHECO (Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations) Southeast 

Asia Report,” 3 March 1965; “After Action Report Operation Harvest Moon [Task Force Delta],” 28 December 1965; 

and “Lessons Learned 54: The Battle of Ky Phu, Headquarters United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,” 

27 January 1966. All of these are available online at the Vietnam Virtual Archive at Texas Tech University.

A number of official histories also proved helpful. Two 

were produced by the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific: Operations 

of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, 1965, and the U.S. Marine 

Forces in Vietnam, March 1965–September 1967: Historical 

Summary, and copies can be found at the Marine Corps History Division, Historical Reference Branch, in Quantico. The 

History Division’s U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and 

the Buildup, 1965 by Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. 

Johnson features a detailed account of the battle. Merle L. 

Pribbenow’s translation of the People’s Army of Vietnam’s 

official account of the war, Victory in Vietnam: The Official 

History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, published 

by the University Press of Kansas covered the Viet Cong’s 

side of the engagement. Several memoirs were also useful: 

Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. 

Marine Corps (1991); LtCol Alex Lee’s Utter’s Battalion: 

2/7 Marines in Vietnam, 1965–66 (2000); and Truong Nhu 

Tang, with David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, A Viet Cong 

Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its Aftermath (1985).

Sources
Finally, the author is indebted to the numerous historians 

and researchers who have contributed scholarly works on 

the Vietnam War. These proved invaluable for establishing 

the strategic context of the operations conducted in December 1965 and include: John Prados, Vietnam: The History of an 

Unwinnable War, 1945–1975 (2009); Mark Moyar, Triumph 

Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (2006); Gregory A. 

Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy 

in Vietnam (2013); Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (1991); and Warren 

Wilkins, Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Viet Cong’s BigUnit War against the U.S., 1965–1966 (2011).

In Persistent Battle | 51
Acronyms and Abbreviations

APA..................................................................................................................................................................Attack Transport

ARVN....................................................................................................................................Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

BLT...................................................................................................................................................... Battalion Landing Team 

COSVN .................................................................................................................................Central Office for South Vietnam

DASC .................................................................................................................................................. Direct air support center

DMZ..............................................................................................................................................................demilitarized zone 

FMFPac ............................................................................................................................................ Fleet Marine Force Pacific

JAG .......................................................................................................................................................Judge Advocate General

KIA ....................................................................................................................................................................Killed in Action

LPH .............................................................................................................Landing Platform Helicopter (Helicopter Carrier)

LSD............................................................................................................................................................. Landing Ship Dock

MAF .................................................................................................................................................Marine Amphibious Force 

MAG...................................................................................................................................................... Marine Aircraft Group

MarDiv..............................................................................................................................................................Marine Division

MAW.......................................................................................................................................................Marine Aircraft Wing

MEB ...........................................................................................................................................Marine Expeditionary Brigade

HMM ............................................................................................................................ Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

NVA .....................................................................................................................................................North Vietnamese Army 

PAVN.................................................................................................................................................People’s Army of Vietnam

RVN...........................................................................................................................................................Republic of Vietnam 

SLF...........................................................................................................................................................Special Landing Force

USMACV ............................................................................................................U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

VC.............................................................................................................................................................................. Viet Cong

WIA.............................................................................................................................................................Wounded in Action

52 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series
Acknowledgments

This commemorative pamphlet would not have been possible without the valuable assistance from colleagues at the 

Marine Corps History Division and Marine Corps Archives. 

They include former chief historian Charles D. Melson, senior 

editor Angela J. Anderson, senior reference historian Annette 

D. Amerman, historian Paul W. Westermeyer, field historian 

Colonel Rod Andrew Jr., designer Robert A. Kocher, senior 

archivist Gregory Cina, and archivists Christopher Ellis and 

Alisa Whitley. 

In Persistent Battle | 53
54 |Marines in the Vietnam War Commemorative Series

Nicholas J. Schlosser is a historian with the U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, where he is currently working on an official history of the Iraqi surge campaign of 2007–8. Before coming to the 

center in 2014, he was a historian at the U.S. Marine Corps History Division, where he produced studies and research guides on 

Marine operations during the Iraq War. He received his doctorate from the University of Maryland in 2008. He is the author 

of Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against 

East Germany (2015), The Battle for Al-Qaim and the Campaign to 

Secure the Western Euphrates River Valley (2013), published by the 

Marine Corps History Division, and coedited Counterinsurgency 

Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond (2011), published by 

the Marine Corps University Press. 

Nicholas J. Schlosser, PhD

Photograph courtesy of the author