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ISIS AND THE THREAT FROM FOREIGN FIGHTERS

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 2, 2014

Serial No. 113–232

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert Bradtke, Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on 

Syria Foreign Fighters, U.S. Department of State ............................................ 11

Mr. Tom Warrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 19

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert Bradtke: Prepared statement ........................................... 14

Mr. Tom Warrick: Prepared statement .................................................................. 21

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 64

(1)

ISIS AND THE THREAT FROM FOREIGN 

FIGHTERS 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittees will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions 

and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Whether it is ISIS, or al-Nusra, or Khorasan, there are thousands of jihadists in Iraq and Syria threatening global security. In 

Syria, the influx of foreign fighters far surpasses anything we have 

even seen in Afghanistan. The scale of this mass migration is unprecedented and it results in deadly attacks. 

More foreign fighters have flocked to Syria and Iraq to fight for 

radical Islamic groups like ISIS in the last 2 years than fought in 

Iraq and Afghanistan in the last 12 years. 

We have a map, I hope we can put that up on the screen, that 

shows the areas that these fighters have come from. They have 

come from all over the world. According to estimates, around 

15,000 jihadists from over 80 countries have traveled to Syria to 

fight. Two thousand of these killers are from Western countries, including the United States and the EU; 500 are from the U.K., 700 

from France, 400 from Germany, and over 100 from America. All 

of these Western passport holders can travel freely in Europe and 

even to the United States once they have finished their tour of duty 

in Syria. 

None of this is hypothetical. We have seen returning jihadists go 

on murderous rampages before. In May, a returning French 

jihadists from Syria killed three people during a shooting spree at 

a Jewish museum in Brussels. In October, a wannabe jihadist who 

traveled to Syria killed a Canadian soldier. Seven American 

wannabe jihadists were arrested in the last 15 months trying to 

travel to Syria to join ISIS. 

2

The senior Obama administration official in September said that 

some Americans who have fought with ISIS in Syria have returned 

to the United States. One known example is the case of Eric 

Harroun. Harroun actually fought with al-Nusra in Syria on an 

RPG team. On March 27, 2013, he flew to Dulles International Airport where he was taken into custody by the FBI. He was brought 

up on charges for conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. He pled guilty of lesser charges and 

was released in September of that same year. Harroun died of a 

drug overdose in 2014. He isn’t the only American we need to be 

concerned about. 

European jihadists are just as much a threat to U.S. security 

since they travel freely to the United States under the Visa Waiver 

Program. I doubt that U.S. and European intelligence services 

know who every one of these individuals may be. 

Just as a side note, the DOD and the FBI were both invited to 

be here today to testify at this hearing and they would not come. 

Some say these individuals will slip through the cracks. Even 

more concerning is this administration does not seem to have a 

whole government approach to combat ISIS’ global recruitment program. The network is global, sophisticated, and effective. ISIS uses 

its global network to recruit, fundraise, and smuggle fighters into 

and out of Syria. This is a much more sophisticated network than 

anything we know of from core al-Qaeda operatives out of Pakistan 

and Afghanistan. 

The best way to reduce the threat that these foreign fighters 

pose is to identify how the ISIS recruitment network works and to 

develop a global strategy to destroy it. We need to understand what 

countries these fighters are coming from, but also how they are getting into Syria once they leave their home country, the main countries being used by foreign fighters to get into Syria, and what kind 

of political pressure are we using on these countries to go after 

these networks? We are not sure what that is. That is part of the 

purpose of this hearing today. 

Complicating issues further, there are a number of Gulf countries who are either unwilling or unable to crack down on jihadists 

trying to get into Syria. Many of these countries act as the hub for 

foreign fighters. We need to do more to enlist the cooperation of 

these Middle Eastern countries to tackle the threat, but we can’t 

do this without a comprehensive plan. 

We also need to combat ISIS’ online recruitment network. Social 

media is crucial to the ISIS network of recruiting. They have a 

whole media center dedicated to producing high-quality propaganda videos, Tweets and the like. This is how their recruitment 

works: After initial vetting by an ISIS recruiter, travel logistics are 

finalized. Turkey is the most common-used route and recruiters 

have extensive contacts on both sides of the Turkey-Syrian border 

to bring fighters in and out of Syria. So-called religious and physical training begins followed by testing the foreign fighters with 

small tasks. After that, recruits are given their marching orders to 

go and fight. They are paid, they have been given weapons. This 

is a well-oiled machine and very organized. ISIS is only going to 

get better, more efficient, and more deadly at this and it will turn 

more attention to attacks on the West in years to come. 

3

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning. I will 

now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from California, for 

his 5-minute opening comments. 

Mr. SHERMAN. ISIS is evil and they found ways to convince 

Americans that they are more evil than other forces in the Middle 

East. But the fact is that the enemies of ISIS are at least nearly 

as evil, and I think demonstrably more dangerous to us in the West 

than is ISIS. 

In destroying ISIS, not only is it impossible without huge American casualties—impossible in the present decade—but begs the 

question, what will flourish in the territory, both the cyber territory, the ideological territory, and the physical territory that ISIS 

now occupies. 

ISIS’ enemies include the Shiite axis of Hezbollah, Assad, the 

Shiite militias of Iraq under Iranian guidance, and, of course, Iran 

itself. Those enemies also include al-Qaeda, and of course, its fullyauthorized branch the al-Nusra Front. 

There is talk that ISIS might be able, maybe, to carry on an operation outside the Middle East. Compare that to its enemies. In 

1983, we saw Americans die by the hundreds in Beirut. In the 

1990s, we saw attacks in South America from Hezbollah and Iran, 

and there was the attempt by Iran to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador recently right here in Washington, DC. 

No one should doubt that the Iranians, the Syrian Government, 

and Hezbollah have a capacity to get their agents into Western 

countries and the United States. After all, there is an Iranian Embassy just a couple hundred miles north of where we sit at the 

United Nations. 

As to al-Qaeda, their capacity to carry out attacks in the West 

was demonstrated on September 11th. And the Khorasan group, 

which we hit on September 22 was operating in Syria as part of 

and in alliance with the al-Nusra Front. 

So just as important as destroying ISIS is asking: What would 

occupy its cyber, ideological, and physical space? As to Turkey, we 

have to urge Turkey to seal its borders and to prevent fighters 

from joining ISIS, but the Turks seem much more focused on what 

they see as their enemies, Assad and many of the Kurdish fighters. 

They have not allowed us to use Incirlik to attack ISIS unless 

we alter our policy and decide to use our air force against Assad. 

Whether we should do that depends in part as to who would take 

over Syria if Assad was destroyed. Right now, al-Nusra and ISIS 

seem to be first and second in line, perhaps not in that order. 

In addition, the President does not have the legal authority to 

wage war for more than 60 days under the War Powers Act on the 

Assad regime. He claims that authority with some support, the authority, that is to say, to go after ISIS on the theory that it is a 

splinter group of al-Qaeda, and in 2001, this Congress authorized 

every effort against al-Qaeda. 

We must urge countries to seal borders and to deter their citizens from joining ISIS and other extremist forces in Syria and Iraq. 

We must dispel this notion that the people can go fight, and then 

return and be monitored. If a foreign fighter returns, they must be 

imprisoned. And U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 passed in 

September requires countries to pass laws, as we have had for decVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
4

ades, that would put such terrorist operatives in jail. That would 

do a lot, making it clear, especially from European countries, that 

returning fighters are not going to be monitored, they are going to 

be imprisoned. It is not only consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution, but will act to deter foreign fighters. 

Finally, I will be using these hearings to once again urge the 

State Department to hire people for their expertise in Islamic theology and law, not because a Fatwa issued by the State Department would have credibility, but because the State Department’s 

efforts to persuade legal scholars—Islamic legal scholars around 

the world—consists of going to them and saying, these guys were 

terrible, you think of the legal authority, you think of the legal arguments that will allow you to come out against them. 

No one would go to an American jurist and say, my adversary 

is evil; you, sir, come up with the doctrine. Instead, you hire lawyers who know the law and you come to plead not only the justice 

of the case, but the legality of your argument. And when we get 

recognized legal scholars in the Islamic world on our side, that will 

be helpful, but we haven’t hired a single lawyer and we are going 

to courts around the world. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on 

the Middle East and North Africa, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from 

Florida, for her opening statement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Judge Poe. Since the beginning of this Congress, our two subcommittees have held joint 

hearing to explore the conflict in Syria, the crisis in Iraq, and the 

rise of ISIL, and we have yet to see a coherent or comprehensive 

strategy to address these issues from the administration. 

For more than 3 years now, the administration has failed to address the Syria crisis head on, and instead has let the country become a safe haven for more and more terrorists who seek to harm 

the United States and our interests. 

We on this committee have continued to sound the alarm and 

have been pleading with the administration to be more proactive 

in Syria to avoid a spillover affect that can further destabilize the 

region. Unfortunately, our calls have gone unanswered. Even 

former officials from the same administration have been public 

about their own criticism of the President’s Syria strategy or lack 

thereof. 

The longer the administration delays and fumbles about, the 

greater the danger for both U.S. national security interests and 

those of our allies. We must have a comprehensive strategy that 

not only removes Assad from power, but addresses the Iran issue 

and links Iraq, Syria and ISIL together. All of this does not give 

me much confidence that our officials have a satisfactory plan in 

place to address the foreign fighter threat. 

While it is important that we refrain from hyperbolic rhetoric 

and overreaction when talking about ISIL and foreign fighters, it 

is equally important that we not downplay the threat. The CIA estimated in September that ISIL now has between 20,000 and 

31,500 total fighters in Syria and Iraq, and at least 15,000 of whom 

are foreign fighters from 80 countries. 

U.S. intelligence officials have acknowledged the difficulty in providing an exact number saying that, due to ‘‘the changing dynamics 

5

of the battle field, new recruits, and other factors, it is difficult to 

assess the precise number of individuals.’’

What we do know is that the majority of foreign fighters are 

from nations in the Middle East. However, there is a significant 

number, over 2,700 according to DHS testimony, that come from 

western countries, including over 100 Americans. And as we know, 

many of these individuals do not need a visa to enter the United 

States. 

The reach of this terrorist organization has extended beyond our 

initial assessment as we saw in the tragic killing of four people at 

the Jewish Museum of Belgium, in Brussels, or the attack in Melbourne where, days after ISIL called for attacks against Australians, an 18-year-old stabbed officers at a police station in the 

hand, body, and head after offering to help the officials with their 

investigation. 

The possibility of homegrown or lone wolf attacks like these inspired by ISIL should be of grave concern to law enforcement officials everywhere. The European Union, which has been soft on terrorism in the past, must take heed of these examples and tighten 

their terrorism laws, as well as increase their cooperation with us. 

We must also remember that the process of foreign fighters joining ISIL and the group’s radicalization of Westerners are still in 

the beginning stages. It took years before we saw the results of individuals joining Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, 

and the complete threat posed by ISIL foreign fighters remains to 

be seen. 

Yes, it is true that the problem of foreigners joining a terrorist 

group is not a new problem, this should not allow us, however, to 

be complacent. The sheer number of foreign fighters joining ISIL 

is cause for alarm, and any attempt to downplay the threat is only 

misguided and dangerous. We must look at all options available to 

us to prevent fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq from returning 

to the United States and the recruitment in the first place. 

Whether that is tightening travel restrictions on those who try 

to enter certain countries or come back to the U.S., increasing penalties for providing support to terrorist groups, enhancing cooperation with our allies, especially visa waiver countries that may be 

vulnerable to tracking these dangerous individuals, all of those are 

things that we must do. 

We have to have a realistic debate about the measures necessary 

to take on foreign fighters, to monitor them here and overseas, to 

arrest and detain them before and after an attack, all while ensuring that our civil liberties are protected. Rhetoric that attempts to 

whitewash the threat or pretend that those who raise concerns are 

fear mongers does us all a disservice. 

I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to hearing from our witnesses 

about what exactly the administration is doing to tackle this problem in both the short and long term, as well as to encourage a debate we all need to be having. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. POE. I now turn to the ranking member of the Subcommittee 

on the Middle East and North Africa, Mr. Ted Deutch from Florida 

for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chair RosLehtinen, for holding today’s hearing. 

6

The issue of foreign fighters adjoining ISIS and other extremist 

groups in Syria and Iraq pose a grave threat to global security and 

deserves this Congress’ full attention. 

I want to thank our esteemed witnesses for their many years of 

service to this country and for appearing here today. 

The rise of ISIS has been truly unprecedented. In roughly 2 

years, ISIS broke with al-Qaeda, transformed into a well-organized 

and well-funded terrorist group wreaking havoc across Iraq and 

Syria. But ISIS has not just focused its efforts on the battlefield; 

it has developed a propaganda machine that is spreading its message to nearly every corner of the earth. ISIS produces videos, 

pamphlets, and has generated a disturbing amount of attention via 

social media. 

Whereas terrorist organizations have long recruited members locally, setting up cells in villages, in towns, with Twitter and 

YouTube ISIS has a direct line across the world. In a grotesque display of disregard for human life, ISIS has used brutal beheadings 

of Americans as a propaganda tool. Whether enticed by the idea of 

an Islamic caliphate, claiming to be agitated by the policies of the 

West, or simply looking for steady income, young men and women 

from the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and beyond, have 

signed up to join the fight in Syria. Estimates now put the number 

of foreign fighters at over 16,000. 

Three years ago, we were first alarmed by reports of fighters 

coming into Syria from other countries in the region, mainly from 

Saudi Arabia and North Africa. We should be particularly concerned about the alarming number of fighters coming from North 

Africa. 

The chaos that followed the revolution in Tunisia and Libya have 

yielded two very different results. Tunisia has proceeded with a 

dramatic transition, struggling at times, but eventually presenting 

a constitution, elections and a new government. 

Libya has been overrun by competing militias, unable to form a 

strong central government or security force, it is on the verge of becoming a failed state. However, Tunisia’s young, mostly educated 

population has struggled with unemployment, and Tunisia does not 

have Libya’s oil resources to keep the country afloat. 

So despite Tunisia’s success and post-Arab Spring transition, the 

country with the largest number of foreign fighters in Syria and 

Iraq is now Tunisia. The recent Washington Post article examined 

the factors contributing to the rise of young Tunisian men joining 

jihadist groups. Following years of religious repression by the Ben 

Ali government, the revolution allowed Tunisians more religious 

freedom than ever before. As the article reported, the modern 

Islamist-led government elected after the revolution granted new 

religious freedoms after a half century of harshly enforced secularism when the state banned women’s veils and almost other displays of piety, and jailed thousands of people suspected of holding 

Islamic beliefs. 

Unfortunately, that freedom was exploited by extremists who 

want to attack inside Tunisia and begin recruiting in mosques and 

online. The new government has struggled to maintain a balance 

between security and religious freedom. I raise the issue of Tunisia 

7

to highlight the attraction of jihad for many years, even in what 

would traditionally be considered moderate countries. 

In addition, Africa’s proximity and long-standing ties to Europe 

provide easy transit to the continent and the porous borders in the 

Sahel countries give radicalized fighters returning home many opportunities to exploit already destabilized populations. 

Elsewhere in the Middle East, smaller extremist offshoots are 

now aligning themselves with ISIS. Terrorists self-claiming allegiance to ISIS have launched multiple attacks on Egyptian security 

forces in the Sinai. Shiite populations in Saudi Arabia have been 

attacked by ISIS-aligned groups. There are over 500 foreign fighters from Lebanon, a country already suffering enormous affects 

from the Syrian conflict. 

Our strategy to combat ISIS can’t just focus on the battlefield. 

We must counter ISIS before it grabs hold of youth in Tunisia, and 

in France, and in Australia, and even here at home. Governments 

and religious leaders must take initiatives to speak loudly to the 

Muslim world, about ISIS’ perverted brand of religion. 

On his return from a visit to Turkey last week, Pope Francis encouraged Muslim leaders to issue global condemnations of terrorism. He told President Erdogan that all Islamic religious, academic, and political leaders should speak out clearly and condemn 

this terrorism and violence, because doing so would help the Muslim people. 

The U.S. and our partners should also encourage training for 

Imams. The mosque should not be a breeding ground for terrorism. 

The State Department is launching efforts specifically aimed at 

countering the spread of extremism on social media. And Ambassador Bradtke, I hope you will discuss in greater detail the work 

of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication. 

We must continue to utilize our foreign aid to foster programs 

that counter violent extremism in schools and among other vulnerable populations. This is a global threat. It warrants a global response. No country is immune to the threat of terrorism. And even 

as the United States leads over 60 nations in the fight against 

ISIS, we will always be the face of this coalition, and we must remain vigilant about the threat of radicalization or of lone wolf attacks—similar to the recent attacks in Canada—here within our 

border. 

Again, I want to thank both of our witnesses for appearing here 

today. I look forward to a productive discussion on this incredibly 

challenging effort to counter radicalization, stem the flow of foreign 

fighters in and out of Syria, and prevent future threats to the 

United States and our allies. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will now recognize 

other members for 1-minute opening statements. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On Sunday, both the 

FBI and the Department of Homeland Security issued warnings to 

American military personnel within the United States regarding 

possible threats from ISIL. Sadly, this comes after Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson incorrectly, on September 14th, anVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
8

nounced: ‘‘At present, we have no credible information that ISIS is 

planning to attack the homeland of the United States.’’

He said this in New York City before the Council on Foreign Relations. This incorrect statement by Secretary Johnson preceded his 

unconstitutional review of illegal aliens. As a member of this committee, as well as chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Military Personnel, I am grateful to promote the wellbeing of 

military members and their families both at home and abroad. 

National radio talk show host Kim Komando, today in her program during her digital minute worldwide, restated the FBI and 

DHS warnings of ISIS threats here in America to military families. 

I look forward to the hearing today on how we can protect American families from the grotesque threat of persons who seek to conduct mass murder of American families in our country. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Connolly, for 1 minute. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would hope that we 

guard against facile answers about Syria. Some of the President’s 

loudest critics, of course, just couldn’t quite bring themselves to 

support his request to retaliate in Syria against the use of chemical 

weapons. And had the President heeded their advice 11⁄2 years, 2 

years ago, ISIL today would be better equipped and better trained, 

because it drew from the very insurgence the President’s critics 

were urging us to arm and train. 

I think there are three questions in today’s hearing. What motivates these men and women, especially men, to join this barbaric 

movement? It is a very troubling question for the west and for 

Islam itself. 

Secondly, how are they recruited? Widely reported accounts of 

the use of social media, very sophisticated, what is its appeal? Do 

we understand it? 

Finally, what are our options? It seems to me option number 1, 

priority number 1 is to prevent them from getting to Syria, because 

once they get to Syria, we have a whole different set of challenges 

that require a whole different set of answers. So I am looking forward to exploring those questions in today’s hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Cook 

for 1 minute. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, it is a sad commentary on what is going on in the world right now. Just when you 

think you put down one terrorist group, there is another one that 

arises from the ashes. And it is something, I think, that underscores the fact that we must stay ever vigilant. And quite frankly, 

we have to have a military that doesn’t have its budget cut to the 

bone, and is what is called a C–1 readiness, because you would 

never know what is going to happen tomorrow. 

I have been on this planet a long time, it is probably—Ted, I saw 

that smirk in your face—it is probably—in my opinion, the world 

is probably the most dangerous it has ever been since I have been 

involved in these things. I have been in combat, I have been at 

war. And now, you strive to go forward and make the world safe, 

9

not only for your country, but for your kids and your grandchildren. 

So thank you for having this hearing. 

I think this is something we cannot fall asleep on. And as I said 

earlier, we have got to be ever vigilant, and we have got to find 

out what is going on, and I appreciate our folks joining us to give 

us an update. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Higgins, for an opening statement. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

The Islamic State’s rapid conquest of a territory covering large portions of Syria and Iraq is, in part, going to the prolific recruitment 

of foreign fighters who now number an estimated 16,000, nearly 

half of the Islamic State’s fighting force. 

Consequently, the integral part of the strategy to degrade and 

destroy ISIS must be an effective plan to stem the flow of foreign 

fighters who not only add to the Islamic State’s fighting strength, 

but to also represent a serious terror threat when they return to 

their countries of origin. 

Of greatest concern are the roughly 2,000 foreign fighters originating in western countries, many of which would not need visas 

to enter the United States or Europe. Until it can be properly addressed, the Islamic State’s proficient use of social media and other 

mediums to continue to facilitate the recruitment of self 

radicalization of these individuals, countering these threats will require constant vigilance and enhanced coordination with our allies. 

I look forward to today’s discussion with our witnesses and I yield 

back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Kinzinger, for 1 minute. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to both committees on which I serve, thanks for holding this hearing. And to our 

witnesses, thank you for being here. 

We are bombing ISIS, that is good, I wish we had started that 

back in January when there were only a few thousand of them. 

Today we are playing a lot of catch-up. I just recently got back 

from Iraq, I guess, probably 2 months ago now, 11⁄2 months. When 

I left in ’09, as a pilot in the military, the war was won, and when 

I went back, just a few months ago, it was very devastating to see. 

I hope that we begin to hear from this administration a strategy 

for Syria. I echo what a lot of people have said. Two hundred thousand dead Syrians today, at least many of which are women and 

children by the evil dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, who by the 

way is no protector of Christianity. He is an evil, bad person, and 

the incubator of ISIS. 

The reason this rebellion exists, the reason people would even be 

attracted is they see ISIS, in some cases, some people see them as 

the best alternative to Assad. So I think it is important for us to 

plus up the FSA and protect them as we allow them to clear their 

own country out of ISIS. Hopefully we will begin to hear that from 

this administration. It has been a few years, maybe we will catch 

some good news here soon. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, 

Mr. Cicilline for his opening statement. 

10

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman 

Poe, and Ranking Members Deutch and Sherman for holding today’s hearing on this very important issue. The continuing threat 

that ISIL poses to international stability is a serious concern of the 

United States and our allies. 

Addressing that threat with the comprehensive and carefully developed and thoughtful strategy must be a top priority of U.S. foreign policy. It is our responsibility to develop a response to ISIL’s 

insurgency in Iraq and Syria that ensures that all options and 

their consequences are carefully considered. Even as the administration wraps up its response with a $5.6 billion request from the 

President to fund the military response in Iraq and Syria, and an 

operation to train and equip rebels in Syria, ISIL continues to attract foreign fighters, including fighters from western countries. 

We must do all we can to stop this flow of foreign fighters into 

the region. And as part of this effort, we must examine how and 

why ISIL is successfully engaging foreign fighters and how the 

United States can best restrict ISIL’s access to additional personnel 

and battle resources. 

I look forward to hearing the perspective of the witnesses that 

we have assembled on these important issues. With that I yield 

back. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back his time. Are there any 

other members on the majority side? 

The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Frankel, 

for 1 minute. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you very much for being here. Well, I have 

to confess just a little bit of uneasiness what we should be doing 

with ISIL. So there are two issues that have been floating around 

in my mind that I want to try to articulate. 

Just based on some things I have read and heard and I would 

like to get your reaction as you go forward. One, to pick up own 

my colleagues who talked about al-Assad and hundreds of thousands of his own people that he slaughtered. And causing many of 

them thousands to flee into other countries such as Turkey, destabilizes those countries. 

I know some who will say that ISIL is the enemy, the fiercest 

fighter against Assad. So one question I would have is: How do you 

balance going after ISIL and then are we helping Assad in that regard? 

And then the second issue that I have read and heard people say 

is that our actions, whether it is bombing, air strikes or whatever, 

that we tend to inflame certain folks that will cause them to use 

our actions as a recruitment for ISIL. And I would like to hear your 

reaction to that. 

I yield back, Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Anyone else wish to make an opening statement? Mr. 

Kennedy for 1 minute. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

chair and ranking members of this committee for holding this hearing. And to our witnesses thank you for coming to testify today, 

thank you for your service to our country. 

A number of my colleagues have already touched on the issues 

around trying to limit the number of foreign fighters coming into 

11

Syria and the region, and obviously that is critical. The other aspect to this is our ability to monitor their movements after they are 

there and once they return home. This puts an awful lot of pressure on our intelligence agencies’ apparatus to try to make sure we 

can successfully identify those who have traveled, and once they 

try to leave, their routes of entry back into Europe, and potentially 

back into the United States and Canada. 

I would love to hear your own assessment of those capabilities, 

how much confidence we have in our intelligence communities in 

order to conduct those operations, if they need additional resources 

in order to do so, and what road blocks I might see in terms of 

making sure that they are right every time, and that somebody 

doesn’t slip through the cracks. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider, for 1 minute. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses for 

joining us today and sharing what is being done in a very serious 

concern. It seems that there are three challenges we face. One is 

cutting off the source of these fighters. I would be interested in 

hearing your take, as was mentioned earlier, on why so many are 

coming from five countries. Five countries represent half the total, 

Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. 

What is being done to interdict their progress toward Syria and 

Iraq? How we can prevent them from going and again a discussion 

how we make sure that they are not allowed to come back? 

With that, I yield back my time. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. Anyone else? 

I will introduce our witnesses and give them time for their opening statements. The Honorable Robert Bradtke serves as Senior 

Advisor for Partner Engagement on Syria Foreign Fighters at the 

Department of State. Ambassador Bradtke has more than 40 years 

experience in dealing with foreign policy national security issues 

and previously served as our Ambassador to Croatia. 

Mr. Thomas Warrick is a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 

Prior to joining DHS, Mr. Warrick spent several years as an international lawyer in private practice before a decade-long tenure at 

the Department of State where he focused on the Middle East. 

Ambassador Bradtke, we will start with you, you have 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT BRADTKE, SENIOR 

ADVISOR FOR PARTNER ENGAGEMENT ON SYRIA FOREIGN 

FIGHTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Chairman Poe, and Chairman RosLehtinen and distinguished members of the subcommittees. Thank 

you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of the State Department at this hearing on ISIS and the threat of foreign fighters. 

I would ask that the full text of my statement be included in the 

record and I will proceed with the summary of my statement. 

Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, the State Department, along 

with other agencies in the United States Government, is deeply 

concerned about the threat posed by foreign fighters who have 

traveled to Syria and Iraq to participate in the conflicts there. 

12

These fighters, many of whom have joined ISIL, al-Nusra Front 

and other terrorist organizations are a threat to people across Syria 

and Iraq and endanger the stability of the entire region. They are 

also a serious threat to the United States and our partners globally. We are concerned that these trained, battle-hardened fighters 

will try to return to their home countries or other countries and 

carry out attacks. 

To respond to this threat, the United States has been working 

closely with our foreign partners for more than 2 years. And this 

summer, with a growing threat posed by ISIL, the United States 

has intensified its response by building a coalition of more than 60 

countries with the goal of degrading and defeating ISIL. General 

John Allen is leading the comprehensive strategy across five lines 

of effort, including military support to our partners, disrupting the 

flow of foreign fighters, stopping ISIL’s financing and funding, addressing humanitarian crises in the region, and exposing ISIL’s 

true nature. 

Today I would like to describe for you how we are pursuing the 

foreign fighter line of effort. Not only within the context of our ISIL 

strategy, but also within the broader framework of the threat posed 

by other terrorist organizations and groups, such as al-Nusra and 

the Khorasan group. 

Critical to countering this threat is our engagement with our foreign partners. The State Department has been leading a whole-ofgovernment outreach effort with foreign partners, an effort that is 

being carried out at all levels across the United States Government, including by our intelligence agencies, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, our military commands, as well as our Embassies overseas. 

In my capacity as Senior Advisor for Partner Engagement on 

Syria Foreign Fighters, I have led interagency delegation visits to 

17 countries, from Europe to Southeast Asia, to address this issue 

with our partners. We and our partners recognize that we must use 

all the tools at our disposal and cooperate across a wide range of 

activity. 

Let me outline for you very briefly seven areas where we are engaging with our foreign partners. First is information sharing. To 

prevent and interdict the travel of foreign fighters, we are working 

bilaterally to bolster information sharing on known suspected terrorists. And we have called upon our partners to make increased 

use of multilateral arrangements for sharing information, specifically Interpol’s foreign fighter fusion cell. 

Second is law enforcement cooperation. We are using formal and 

informal mechanisms to help police and law enforcement authorities in our partner countries bring suspected terrorists to trial. 

Third is capacity building. We have worked closely with a number of partner countries, including Tunisia, to help them strengthen their infrastructure to tackle the foreign fighter threat, including stronger counterterrorism legislation and improved interagency 

coordination. 

Fourth is stopping the flow of external finance into terrorist organizations. Together with the Treasury Department, we have agVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
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gressively raised with our partners cases where we believe individuals or organizations are raising funds that are used to support 

ISIL or other terrorist groups. 

In recent months, as ISIL is gaining control of more territory, we 

are also engaging with our partners in the regions to cut off the 

funding ISIL derives in the sale of oil and isolate it from the international financial system. 

Fifth is counter messaging. We have sought to expose the true 

nature of ISIL and other terrorist groups through the work on social media and the Internet at the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. 

Sixth is counter and violent extremism. In my meetings with foreign partners, I found that all of us are looking for ways to keep 

individuals from being radicalized. We have been sharing our own 

experience encountering violent extremism programs which are 

carried out in the United States. And we are working with partners 

to build their capacity to engage their own communities. 

Seventh and lastly, is border and aviation security. My colleague 

from the Department of Homeland Security will go into this area 

in greater detail. 

Parallel with this bilateral engagement, we have also joined with 

our partners in multilateral 4. In September, President Obama presided over a session of the United Nations Security Council that 

approved the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, a 

binding resolution that calls upon all the countries, among other 

things, to prevent and suppress recruiting, organizing, transporting 

or equipping of foreign terrorist fighters, and to take action to prevent radicalization to violence. 

Also in September, at a meeting chaired by Secretary Kerry and 

the Turkish foreign minister, the Global Counterterrorism Forum 

adopted the first ever set of international good practices for a more 

effective response to the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon. 

The inaugural plenary of the GCTF foreign terrorist fighters 

working group chaired by the Netherlands and Morocco will take 

place in Marrakesh, December 15 and 16. 

Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, in a speech at West Point, 

President Obama stated, we must shift our counterterrorism policy 

to ‘‘more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold.’’

As I hope I have indicated in this statement, we are engaging 

with our partners and using all the tools at our disposal in the effort to deal with the threat posed by foreign fighters. A threat unfortunately that will be with us for years to come. 

I stand ready to address some of the issues that members raised 

during their statements and answer your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bradtke follows:]

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Mr. POE. Mr. Warrick, the Chair recognizes you for your 5-

minute opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. TOM WARRICK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WARRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, 

Ranking Member Sherman, Ranking Member Deutch and members 

of the subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today about the efforts by Department of Homeland Security to 

protect our Nation from terrorists operating out of Syria and Iraq. 

I want to address how DHS helps to protect the homeland from 

foreign fighters who are not from Syria or Iraq, but who travel 

there to participate in the conflict and who may then seek to attack 

the United States, U.S. persons, U.S. interests, or U.S. allies. 

For today, let me discuss the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant. 

I am not going to give this as a full threat briefing on ISIL, that 

would be best in a classified setting. Suffice it to say that at 

present, DHS is unaware of any specific, credible threat to the U.S. 

homeland from ISIL. 

However, as has been noted, ISIL has encouraged its supporters 

to carry out attacks. Such attacks could be conducted without specific direction from ISIL with little or no warning. 

In addition, terrorist groups have shown interest in attacks on 

U.S. bound airplanes. Terrorists have tried to conceal improvised 

explosive devices in commercial electronics, in areas of the body 

that they think won’t be thoroughly searched, and in shoes, cosmetics, or liquids in order to try to defeat airport security screening. 

Let me turn to seven specific security measures put in place in 

response to the terrorist threat from Syria and Iraq. First, aviation 

security. In early July, Secretary Johnson directed the Transportation Security Administration to enhance screening at a number 

of overseas airports with direct flights to the United States. 

Subsequently, TSA increased the number of additional airports 

overseas to use enhanced screening methods. DHS will work with 

air carriers and foreign airports to adjust screening measures to 

take account of changes to the threat. 

Second, preclearance. One of Secretary Johnson’s initiatives is to 

increase the use of preclearance at overseas airports with flights to 

the United States. Preclearance means that before a plane takes 

off, all passengers and their baggage are inspected by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers, using their full legal authorities, and using enhanced aviation security approved by TSA. 

We have had preclearance in airports in Canada and the Caribbean and we recently expanded it to Ireland and the United Arab 

Emirates. DHS is working with the aviation industry, airport authorities and other governments to expand the number of U.S. 

bound flights covered by the security benefits that preclearance 

brings. 

Third, tracking foreign fighters. DHS, along with the FBI, the 

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the U.S. Intelligence community is making greater efforts to track foreign fightVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
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ers who fought in Syria who come from the United States or who 

seek to enter the United States from another country. 

Fourth, we are encouraging other governments to collect their 

own information on foreign fighters. This topic is almost always 

item number 1 on DHS’s agenda with European governments. We 

are helped by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178, which has 

provided a new push for European and other governments’ newest 

technology like advanced passenger information (API) that DHS 

has long used to detect known and previously unknown terrorists 

by giving us information on terrorist travel. 

Fifth, enhancing the Electronic System for Travel Authorization 

(ESTA) and the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), DHS is increasing 

our ability to track those who enter and leave Syria and may later 

try to travel to the United States without a State Departmentissued visa under the Visa Waiver Program. 

On November 3, DHS began requiring additional data elements 

that will allow CBP to conduct better screening and better security 

vetting of prospective VWP travelers before they board aircraft for 

the United States. The additional data provides an additional layer 

of security for the VWP. 

Sixth, DHS is continually working to help communities identify 

Homegrown Violent Extremists. Secretary Johnson regularly 

speaks of the challenge posed by the independent actor or lone 

wolf. In many respects, this is the hardest terrorist threat to detect 

and one of concern to DHS. 

We help detect HVEs through outreach and community engagement. Secretary Johnson has personally participated in community 

meetings in Chicago, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles that 

focus on community concerns and building trust and partnership to 

counter violent extremism. 

Seventh, information sharing within the U.S. Government. DHS 

and our interagency partners evaluate threat data and ensure relevant information reaches DHS personnel in the field, as well as 

our state, local and tribal and territorial partners. DHS, jointly 

with the FBI, releases joint intelligence bulletins to provide context 

and background for them to use. DHS and our interagency partners work continually to share information with each other about 

possible foreign fighters. 

Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, since sanction 9/11, DHS and 

our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence community 

have vastly improved the Nation’s ability to detect and disrupt terrorist plots. We ask for your support as we continue to adapt to 

emerging threats and to improve our ability to keep our Nation 

safe. 

Thank you very much. We obviously are happy to answer your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Warrick follows:]

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Mr. POE. I thank both of you. And I recognize myself for 5 minutes for some questions. The United States is conducting air 

strikes; how have U.S. air strikes affected the flow of foreign fighters into Syria? If it has. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. It is perhaps a question that might be 

better addressed to some of our colleagues in the intelligence community, but my sense—looking at the numbers—is that it is hard 

to say at this point what the impact is. It is relatively soon after 

these strikes are taking place, the numbers that we monitor—the 

numbers that we track—are estimates at best. And so, again, I 

think it is probably early to determine precisely what the impact 

is. It is obviously something again that our intelligence community 

is looking at and it is possible that in a classified briefing they 

might be able to give you their assessment. But, again, from my 

perspective, the numbers can vary for a variety of reasons. Sometimes it is because we get better information from our partners and 

that results in an increase in the number——

Mr. POE. So we don’t know if it is effective or not. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I would say that if the issue is ‘‘is this effective in reducing the flow of foreign fighters?’’ I would say, at this 

point, I would want to see more evidence before I would come to 

a conclusion. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Warrick, do you have a different answer? 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, no. Again, there is an answer to that question, but I think it really does need to be delivered in a classified 

setting. 

Mr. POE. Turkey appears to me to be complicit to some extent 

of allowing foreign fighters to flow from Turkey into Syria. Would 

you weigh in on your opinion of what the Government of Turkey, 

their position is on foreign fighters going through Turkey into 

Syria? Ambassador, you will be first. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Mr. Chairman, Turkey is a very important partner of ours in the region. We share a very important common interest with them. We have a shared interest in seeing a political settlement in Syria that removes Assad; we have a shared 

interest in combating the terrorist organizations that are operating 

Syria and Iraq; we have a shared interest in dealing with the humanitarian crisis, and also a shared interest in promoting stability 

in Iraq. 

Mr. POE. I understand that, Ambassador, but that is not my 

question. My question is, is the Government of Syria—excuse me, 

Turkey, complicit in allowing foreign fighters to go through their 

country and fight for ISIL? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I was trying to explain some of the perspective on this problem, sir. The Turks have more than a million 

refugees from Syria inside Turkey. Turks have a 900 kilometer border with——

Mr. POE. I have been to one of those Syrian camps. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. There are 37 million tourist arrivals in 

Turkey every year, 37 million. We believe Turkey—we have had an 

extensive dialogue with them on this issue for some time—is taking 

steps to try to deal with the flow of foreign fighters. 

The Turks have added a considerable number of names to their 

denied entry list. The Turks are working with us to try to cut off 

28

the flow of funding that might come from oil sales to the foreign 

terrorist organizations. 

Mr. POE. Isn’t Turkey buying oil from ISIL that eventually comes 

to Turkey from ISIL? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. There is considerable traffic that we have 

discussed with Turks across the border. Again the latest information is the Turks are taking steps to try to deal with——

Mr. POE. Are they buying oil from ISIS? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. If you are saying, is the Turkish Government buying oil from ISIS? No. If you are saying, is there smuggling taking place across the border? The answer is yes. That is the 

issue we are trying to deal with is to cut off working with the 

Turks. The other thing I would mention is the sharing of information with Turkey. I think we are seeing much better information 

sharing with Turkey with the United States, also with our European partners. 

Mr. POE. So they are not complicit, that is really my question. 

Are they not complicit? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. My answer is no, they are not complicit. 

Mr. POE. Social media. We know it is obvious recruitment is 

being done in a very effective manner, it appears through social 

media. There is the argument by some in our law enforcement 

agencies not to shut down social media because that is how they 

track and keep up with terrorist organizations and individuals. 

What is your opinion on that? Doing more, or less, or leaving it 

alone? The issue of all of social media, how it is effective in tracking and the recruiting of terrorists to join ISIL. Should we be 

proactive to try to shut that network down? Legally, of course. Or 

should we just do what a law enforcement says: We want to watch 

this to see where these guys are going. What is your opinion on 

that, Ambassador? And then get Mr. Warrick and then that will be 

it. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. The issue of freedom of the Internet, freedom of expression on the Internet is one that goes well beyond my 

responsibilities. We clearly watch very closely the use of the Internet by these organizations, we have a dialogue with the service 

providers in cases where the posts that are being used, the use of 

social media counts is, perhaps in our view, contrary to the terms 

of service. So again, this is a complex question, this is a complicated question, it goes well beyond my responsibilities. 

Certainly any use of the Internet for illegal activities, such as 

fundraising or excitement to violence, is something we take strong 

legal action against. There are gray areas here of the use of Internet and social media and the question is how one responds to that. 

I think we also believe that if you shut down one site, you shut 

down one account, the chances of that popping back up somewhere 

else are quite high and quite great. So the other tool we use is 

counter messaging ourselves through the Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications that was mentioned earlier. We 

try to put out counter messaging on social media, on the Internet 

to push back in that way rather than simply try to take down the 

message that they are putting out. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Warrick, I will let you put that in writing since we 

are out of time. 

29

I am going to have to recognize the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Let me first clarify a statement I 

made toward the end of my opening statement. The State Department has thousands of experts in American law, you don’t particularly need more. We also have experts in international law. Those 

experts help us persuade Western countries of the righteousness of 

our positions. 

I have been pushing on the State Department for, I think the 

better part of a year, to hire an expert in Islamic law. And the response I get is: Well, we hope Islamic jurists will issue statements 

that are helpful to us and we will just call them and ask them to 

come up with something on their own. Or, now and then we will 

call a professor of Islamic law and get all the information, we don’t 

need to hire anybody. 

And so I analogized that to what you would do if you were trying 

to persuade an American jurist. Would you contact an American jurist and just say, ‘‘My cause is just, please come up with the legal 

theories and support me’’? Would you just rely on hiring or whatever free advice you could get from a professor on the phone? Or 

would you hire somebody who is an expert in American law to try 

to get an American jurist to issue a statement helpful to you? 

It is incredibly important that we get Islamic scholars, experts, 

and jurists to issue rulings adverse to ISIS and favorable to the 

United States. It is about time that the State Department hire its 

first Islamic legal expert to work full-time on that, maybe a couple. 

And it is time that at least somebody be hired at the State Department, not because they went a fancy American school or because 

they did well on the foreign service exam. 

Ambassador, Security Council Resolution 2178 requires U.N. 

members to criminalize those who go to Syria and Iraq to fight 

with the extremists. Have our European allies, particularly visa 

waiver countries, complied with that? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. If I may just comment briefly on your first 

point about Islamic lawyers, Islamic scholars. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ambassador, please move the mic closer. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I have limited time, so I will ask you to address 

my question first. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Your question about——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, Resolution 2178, U.N. Security Council. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. We have demarched all of our partners, 

through our Embassies in Europe and elsewhere, to engage with 

these countries on implementing 2178. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Can you provide, for the record, a list of which 

visa waiver countries are in compliance, which have promised to 

become in compliance, and which are not in compliance that have 

made no very serious promise to us? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. We have had 2 months, sir, since the resolution was passed. The legislative process is in many countries——

Mr. SHERMAN. I didn’t—I am just asking for a chart. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I will be happy to provide a list of countries.

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WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT BRADTKE TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN


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Mr. SHERMAN. Their legislative process may be slow, but I know 

your staff will be fast and get a chart for our record and then we 

will identify what those countries. Likewise, if you could provide a 

second chart of Islamic, particularly Arab states, particularly the 

five the gentlemen from Illinois identified as the major senders of 

foreign fighters, whether they have passed laws that would criminalize going to Syria or Iraq and fighting with al-Nusra or ISIS. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I would be happy to do that.


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WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT BRADTKE TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN


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Mr. SHERMAN. But I take it from your answer that we are doing 

everything we can to push our friends in the Arab world and Europe——

Ambassador BRADTKE. There are countries that have already in 

place, as we do, laws that prohibit, that criminalize, for example. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are there any countries that have said, no, we 

will just let these folks come back and we will monitor them? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. No country has taken such a cavalier attitude toward fighters. There are countries that do believe that some 

of the fighters who come back have been disillusioned by their experience, participated in no terrorist activities while they were in 

Syria. And they believe in this case, those fighters should been 

monitored rather than incarcerated. That is a decision that those 

countries make based upon the evidence available. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Is that in compliance with U.N. Resolution 2178, 

that view? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I am not a lawyer myself. I would have 

to take a look at that issue, but I think that there are different approaches to how you deal with returning fighters, particularly ones 

who have not carried out——

Mr. SHERMAN. Look, I don’t care if you are just peeling potatoes 

in the mess, if you are part of the ISIS Army, you belong in prison 

until this war against Islamic extremism is over. That seems to be 

what U.N. Security Council Resolution 2178 said, and I hope you 

will add to your chart a list of those countries that have told us 

that we do not think that we should criminalize those of our citizens and residents who went to ISIS, joined the army, but say they 

didn’t actually kill anybody. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. There is also an issue, sir, being able to 

prove in a court of law this kind of activity. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is fine. 


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Ambassador BRADTKE. Have people on the ground in Syria who 

can come to a courtroom to testify. 

So, again, I think our partners use different tools, depending 

upon what they know about a particular individual in the case. 

That is all I would say. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

ISIL’s reach into the United States has been documented. We 

also know that ISIL is known to be tech savvy, as we have discussed, has used social media tools to its advantage to help recruit 

foreign fighters to its cause. 

And we have seen ISIL graffiti here in DC, pictures of individuals holding the group’s symbol in front of U.S. landmarks, including the White House. 

And, Mr. Warrick, you testified that DHS is ‘‘unaware of any specific credible threat to the U.S. Homeland from ISIL.’’

Following up on what Mr. Wilson said in his opening statement, 

on Sunday, DHS and FBI issued a joint bulletin urging our 

servicemembers to scrub their social media accounts, to use caution 

with their posts. 

Is there a specific threat to our servicemen and -women, most of 

whom are stationed here in America? 

And I will have you hold that thought. 

On funding, ISIL is known to finance its operations from a variety of sources, including illicit oil sales, extortion, organized crime, 

selling of ancient artifacts, donations from of outside sources. We 

have seen terrorist groups like Hezbollah fund their terror activities through the sale of drugs, often from sources in the western 

hemisphere. 

What are we doing to target ISIL’s funding? What kind of ISIL 

collaboration with drug cartels? Is there any evidence of that, especially here in our hemisphere? And, if so, what are we doing to 

fight this? 

And, lastly, on our allies. In order to defeat ISIL, we are going 

to need full cooperation with our coalition partners, especially those 

from the Middle East. The ministers of the GCC, the Gulf Cooperation Council, have scheduled multiple meetings to discuss the ongoing threat of ISIL and possible ways to fight this terrorist entity. 

And just yesterday Bahrain foreign ministers announced that the 

Gulf States are setting up a joint military command based in Saudi 

Arabia to not only counter the ISIL threat, but the threat from 

Iran as well. 

So I will ask: In what ways are we working with the Gulf nations 

to fight this radical Islam ideology? And is this joint command a 

signal that they may be willing to put boots on the ground in 

Syria? 

Mr. WARRICK. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Let me start on that, and then, obviously, Ambassador Bradtke 

will have things to say about the last part. 

First, I am going to do this in reverse order—on the ISIL funding 

issue, that question actually probably would be best addressed to 

the Treasury Department. Under Secretary Cohen and Assistant 

36

Secretary Glaser are working very intensively in efforts to try to 

address the ISIL funding issue. DHS plays a small role in that in 

terms of criminal investigations about funding activities that go on. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Is there a specific threat to our servicemen 

and -women? 

Mr. WARRICK. I am working backwards to that one. 

On that one, let me go back to what we said over the weekend. 

There were statements—public statements—by ISIL in September 

to the effect of calls for attacks against U.S. servicemembers, U.S. 

officials, and members of the intelligence community. 

We are not aware of any specific threat saying that, at a particular time, there would be an attack on a particular 

servicemember. But we really do want to be able to have members 

of the State and local law enforcement and members of the military 

community and their families take certain reasonable precautions 

to further reduce the risk of any types of events taking place. 

We are very mindful of the techniques of the use of social media 

that you described and that ISIL is able to use. And, obviously, 

they are able to survey social media as well as themselves. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ambassador, on the issue of our allies, are they fighting back 

this radical Islam ideology? And do you have any info about whether they are willing to put boots on the ground in Syria? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Well, we have a very close partnership 

with the countries in the Gulf. They are members of this coalition 

that I mentioned of 60 countries that General Allen has worked to 

put together. 

A number of them are carrying out air strikes in Iraq. So we are 

getting that kind of assistance from them. We are working very 

closely with them to cut off funding. 

I was in Kuwait and Qatar over the summer. Qatar has just 

passed a new law on private charities which will try to be more effective in regulating the flow of funding in cases where individuals 

have contributed money, thinking it was going to some humanitarian cause and was ending up going to a terrorist organization. 

So they are taking steps in that regard. 

They are also working with us on the counter-messaging front. 

There was just a conference in Kuwait that Under Secretary of 

State Stengel went to where we talked about what we are doing 

on counter-messaging, how we are working through the Center for 

Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. 

A number of our partners in the Gulf are interested in setting 

up similar operations, perhaps, or having a regionally based 

counter-messaging operation. So, again, we have a very close partnership with them. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. My time is up. 

But is the graffiti that we have seen in DC and other cities—are 

those legitimate or do you think that they are not? 

Mr. WARRICK. That would actually be a question that I think 

would be better addressed by either the FBI or domestic law enforcement. They would be able to help you with that. 

Mr. POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Deutch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

37

Ambassador Bradtke, I would just like you to pick up where you 

left off on your discussion of counter-messaging, on the conference 

that just took place, on the Center that we have in place. 

Can you speak in a little more detail about the efforts that we 

are undertaking, our friends from around the world who are sharing those efforts with us, and how do we determine whether we are 

being successful? And is there any evidence at this point that we 

are? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Let me say, as someone who has worked 

for a long time in the State Department and the United States 

Government, I find the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications a very interesting and really unique operation. 

It is an effort to push back in a very direct, very blunt, forthright 

way, putting out some very tough messages on the Internet, on social media. 

The kinds of themes that are used include putting on social 

media the atrocities that al-Qaeda and ISIL are carrying out so 

people can see the true nature of ISIL. 

They highlight the fact that the main victims of ISIL are Muslims so that the people understand that this is not a way of helping 

other Muslims, that, in fact, these organizations are killing other 

Muslims. 

They talk about what ISIL and other groups are doing to local 

populations, Sunni tribes, others. So, again, very powerful, very direct messages. 

Some of the numbers in the last period of time, perhaps the last 

10 or 12 months—they have done 25 videos. They have put out 

more than 1,000 anti-ISIL posts or tweets. 

And the way that we have some sense this is having an impact—

there are actually two ways. One, you get a number of hits on the 

sites, the number of followers to the CSCC’s operations. The other 

way is the efforts by ISIL and these groups to take down the 

CSCC’s sites through hacking. 

So they are obviously worried that our message is getting out. 

They are obviously worried enough that they actually want to take 

action to do something about it. 

Other countries have been very interested in what we are doing. 

We have had a number of countries, ranging from Belgium and 

France to some of our North African partners, who have come to 

visit the CSCC’s operation here in Washington. 

As I said, we had this conference in Kuwait where our partners 

in the Gulf and other places are looking at whether they can do 

something similar. 

The European Union is interested in trying to get its own 

counter-messaging up and running. The EU is providing funding 

for the U.K., which has a counter-messaging program, to try to explain and share its experience with other EU member States. 

So, again, this whole area of counter-messaging is very active. 

My own sense is we can’t know for sure whether some individual 

has seen something on our Web site and has said, ‘‘That is the true 

nature of ISIL and I won’t go to Syria,’’ but the fact that we get 

hits on the site, the fact that the site has been subject of hacking 

by these groups, indicates to me that there is some effectiveness 

here. 

38

Mr. DEUTCH. Can you share with us how many times the videos 

have been viewed, how many hits there have been either on the—

the posts, how many tweets have been viewed? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I would be happy to get that for the 

record so I have the latest information.

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT BRADTKE TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE THEODORE E. DEUTCH

The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications’ (CSCC) Arabic language videos were viewed 959,187 times from June 10 to December 5, 2014. Urdu 

videos were viewed 3,947 times and Somali videos 26,676 times.* Combined numbers of tweets for the Arabic, Urdu, and Somali languages from January 1 to December 1, 2014 were 25,844 with a total reach of over 7.3 million. 

CSCC launched its pilot English Language Initiative (ELI) on Twitter in August, 

2013 and began messaging on Facebook in August, 2014. Twitter followers reached 

19,100 from August 2013 to November 2014. The number of followers for CSCC’s 

English Facebook page rose to 8,868 from August 2014 to November 2014. The 

English YouTube account, which launched in August 2014 rose to 2,840 followers 

in November, 2014. There have been 3,150 tweets with total impressions of 12.2 million, 315 Facebook posts with a total reach of 678,000, and 14 YouTube videos with 

total views at 1,003,000.

*These numbers do not include numbers for Vimeo accounts (access to those figures is a fee-based service).

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. And you said that the U.K. has a center. Is 

the work that we are doing meant strictly—who are we focusing 

on? And, clearly, I would imagine the message would be slightly 

different targeting an Australian audience than a Belgian audience 

or America. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. And that is why we think it is important 

that other countries develop a capability. The CSCC is doing its efforts in three languages: Arabic, of course; Urdu, because of its 

messaging that goes beyond the Syrian-Iraq front; and then 

English as well. 

The English messaging is a more recent development. But, as 

you say, there are needs for others—for example French. We know 

the fighters in Belgium, France. And that is why we think it is important that other countries also develop this capability. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And in my remaining seconds, Mr. Warrick, this 

may be something that you will be able to respond to in your discussions with some of my colleagues. If not, if you could respond 

in writing after. 

Your testimony about the efforts by the Secretary to increase the 

use of preclearance at overseas airports, I would very much like to 

know what the plan is, what airports we have targeted, by when, 

and how many we have already put in place to date. 

Mr. WARRICK. Thank you very much. 

Actually, that is a question we would prefer not to address in an 

open session. You will appreciate the sensitivity, not just in terms 

of discussions with foreign partners, but we have no intention of 

laying out a roadmap of where we are not because of what effect 

that might have on the thinking of our adversaries. But in a closed 

setting, we can get someone who can give you a great deal more 

information on that. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I was only following up on the countries identified 

in your testimony. But I look forward to discussing that in the appropriate setting. 

39

Mr. WARRICK. Where we have it, it is obviously a public matter 

and people see our officers in their uniforms. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Chair recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

And thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, for this joint subcommittee hearing today. This is very important. 

Both of your testimonies have been very enlightening. But I am 

just very concerned. The American people need to know, as the 

President, I believe, is ignoring the jihadist threat, that ABC News, 

of all people, Monday night reported, ‘‘The day before the U.S. 

launched its biggest air blitz against the terrorist group in Iraq and 

Syria in late September, ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammad alAdnani called upon Muslims in the U.S. And Europe to attack 

members of the military.’’

The direct quote: ‘‘Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek 

anyone’s verdict. Kill the believer, whether he is a civilian or military, for they have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers. 

Both of them are considered to be waging war,’’ Adnani said in an 

audio speech posted online on September the 21st. 

Mr. Warrick, what is your current threat assessment of an attack 

by a domestic jihadist or foreign fighters on the U.S. homeland? 

Mr. WARRICK. Thank you very much. 

That statement was posted in social media by a foreign participant attributing it to Adnani, as you said. 

Obviously, he was not in the homeland when the statement was 

made, but he was intending that his message reach out to prospective sympathizers here in the United States. 

There are obviously a number of things that DHS tries to do to 

prevent people from becoming radicalized to violence. This is 

through the community efforts which I addressed in my testimony. 

In addition, there are other steps that other law enforcement organizations, like the FBI, do in terms of trying to track activity and 

where there are steps, especially toward foreign travel, that prospective sympathizers may make. Then this gets them on the radar 

screen of people at DHS. 

So there are a number of measures to address people who might 

be sympathetic to that kind of radicalizing to violence message. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, the grotesque nature of that statement, along 

with people carrying signs in English in, say, Tehran, ‘‘Death to 

Israel,’’ ‘‘Death to America’’—the creed of Hamas the American people need to know, and that is that ‘‘We value death more than you 

value life.’’

This is serious. I am just very concerned that the President is focused on other items, i.e., congressional campaigns, and has been 

missing the danger. 

Based on the bulletin that was issued by DHS and FBI regarding 

soldiers’ online media accounts, what level of danger do you feel for 

our military and our military families? 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, as I said, there is no specific credible threat 

targeting specific people in a specific place. 

40

But we do think that it is appropriate that people are prudent 

and that social media postings should not describe military operational activities, nor should they describe law enforcement activities or other measures. 

This is something that we just caution people in our own organization and, indeed, in our military, to be prudent in what they post 

on social media. 

But for people who take those reasonable steps, it is obviously 

very difficult for foreign fighters in Syria to get to the United 

States, and my Department is working to make it even harder for 

that to happen. 

So what we really do is encourage people to exercise reasonable 

prudence. And then, obviously, there is the support that we need 

from communities to help be on the alert for things that they may 

notice at a local level far before we in the Federal Government 

would ever see anything. 

Mr. WILSON. And with this warning by the FBI and Department 

of Homeland Security, are you aware of any steps that the Department of Defense has taken to alert, again, servicemembers, military families, veterans, to what threats may be? 

Mr. WARRICK. The Department of Defense, we know, has guidance on that. But, obviously, I would leave it to them to describe 

their guidance to servicemembers about social media postings. 

We just felt it was prudent for us to remind people that this is 

a time in which they should be prudent in measures about any activities or postings they may have. 

But the Department of Defense has a number of procedures and 

rulings that are in place and, obviously, you can get that information from them. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Connally, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Bradtke, I was looking at your long and distinguished record of service to your country and the State Department. But allow me, without being disrespectful, to follow up on 

Mr. Sherman’s question. 

Do you speak Arabic? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I do not speak Arabic. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you have any expertise in the Arab world? 

Did you ever serve in the Arab world? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I don’t consider that to be a primary area 

of expertise, but I have traveled with Secretary Christopher extensively when he was negotiating——

Mr. CONNOLLY. But you were never assigned to the region? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. No. I was not assigned to the region. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So is it not true that most of the foreign fighters 

recruited by or attracted to ISIL in Syria come roughly from a 

handful of countries, mostly Arab countries? Is that not true? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Many of the foreign fighters come from 

North Africa, from Arab countries. That is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It just—I mean, maybe you do or don’t subscribe 

to, I think, the premise behind Mr. Sherman’s question. 

41

But as the United States moves forward, it just seems to me that 

the State Department needs to be promoting leadership from within that has particular focus on this region, since that is what we 

are dealing with. 

And I mean that with no disrespect. Because sometimes somebody can function very well without any expertise in a particular 

subject matter because of their managerial skills, their organizational skills. Presumably, that is true about you. 

But I do think that Mr. Sherman has a point, that longer term, 

the United States has got to get serious about this region and expertise in this region if we’re going to address the challenges we 

face. 

Let me ask a question. In looking at your seven point, you know, 

here is what we are doing, I didn’t see a mention of strengthening 

our relationship with the Peshmerga and to the Kurdish community, which seems to be one of the military allies we have got in 

the region and has a military capacity but needs to be reinforced. 

Why not? Why didn’t you talk about that? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. If you will permit me, Mr. Connally, I do 

feel I want to say a word or two that your——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I have to ask you to move closer to the mic. It 

is very hard to hear you. Thank you. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I would like to say a word or two about 

your initial comments. 

I was happily retired, Mr. Connally. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I saw that. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. And was asked by senior officials in the 

State Department to come back and take this job. 

I was asked to take this job not because of my expertise in Arabic or countries of the Middle East. I was asked to take this job 

because there was a belief that in 40 years of working for the State 

Department I was able to deal with a the wide variety of countries, 

that I could conduct dialogues with those countries on an effective 

basis, and that I could draw on the many experts in the State Department who are experts on those parts of the world. 

This is not an effort I undertake by myself. This is an effort that 

I have the support of many people within the Department of State. 

I have found as I have traveled—I have been in Morocco, Tunisia, 

the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait—that I don’t think the fact that I don’t 

speak Arabic has been a hindrance. 

I have had meetings with the leaders of the Islamic community 

in countries I have visited. The fact that I am not an expert on the 

Islam has not prevented, for example, when I met the leader of the 

Islamic community in Malaysia, I had a very good discussion with 

him about steps they can take to put out the word about ISIL, 

about ISIL’s not being representative of Islamic values. 

I don’t feel that the discussion I had with him was in any way 

hindered by the fact I am not an Islamic——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Ambassador, I completely agree. That is why 

I really meant what I said without disrespect. I honor your career 

and I know you came back. 

But I think Mr. Sherman has a point long-term. 

This region is unraveling. It is a long-term challenge if not threat 

to us and to the West. It is profoundly disturbing, what is hapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
42

pening. We have to have expertise in the region. That is not a comment about you. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. No. There is no disagreement. I believe 

there are some really brilliant new generation diplomats. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good. And I——

Ambassador BRADTKE [continuing]. Who are coming up thorough 

the ranks, who are serving in some of our Embassies now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I repeat, I honor you for your service. I meant 

no disrespect at all. I was just simply trying to reinforce this point. 

Now I beg you to address the Kurdish question because we are 

running out of time. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. The reason I didn’t get more deeply into 

that is that it is not really in my area of partner engagement on 

Syria foreign fighters. It is one of the lines of effort that General 

Allen is pursuing. I mentioned the five lines. One of those lines is 

support for our partners on the ground and that absolutely applies 

to the Kurds. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would hope if we have another round we can 

get into sort of what has worked. Because I am troubled sometimes 

by some of the conversation we are having about, okay, when they 

return to a given country, what do we do? It almost sounds like 

deprogramming from a cult. I don’t think that is going to work, 

given the numbers. So I would be interested in hearing from both 

of our witnesses about, well, are there examples of things that have 

worked in, A, preventing people from going, and, unfortunately, if 

we fail on that, helping to reintegrate them in a genuine successful 

way when and if they come back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is up. 

Mr.POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Colonel 

Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Ambassador, I wanted to ask you about the role of Hamas and 

the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of perhaps facilitating the information on people, recruitment, in some of the smuggling activities, 

or if you had any insight at all from a diplomatic standpoint. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Specifically, I do not, sir, no. 

Mr. COOK. No personal feelings on that terms in enabling them? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I don’t have any basis on which to give 

you a good answer, sir. 

Mr. COOK. Let me switch gears a little bit. 

Chairman Poe was talking about the relationship with Turkey. 

And I think a number of us on this committee and the House 

Armed Services Committee are very, very nervous about Turkey 

and its reluctance to have strike aircraft be flown from Incirlik. 

And the other base that we have is obviously in Qatar. And it is 

almost like we are giving them a free pass, those two countries 

there, that—we are very, very nervous about there maybe have 

been activities in supporting ISIS and some of the other terrorist 

groups. 

Do you have any comments at all about the Turkish situation in 

terms of being somewhat of a squishy ally, at least in my opinion? 

A member of NATO and everything else and yet I just don’t trust 

them. 

43

Ambassador BRADTKE. As I said earlier, I think Turkey is a very 

important partner of ours. It is a member of the coalition. 

Mr. COOK. Have we given them a free pass on this, though? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. We just had Vice President Biden in Turkey. General Allen has visited. He have had an ongoing discussion 

with Turkey about what we can do on the border between Turkey 

and Syria. Those discussions are going on. At this point, that is as 

much as I could say, sir. 

Mr. COOK. I understand that. But every time the question comes 

up of smuggling and black market activities and who its buying the 

oil and everything, a couple of countries come up. It is like they get 

a free pass. And sooner or later we are going to have to—is there 

anybody that is reevaluating who our true allies are and who 

aren’t? 

It is almost like it is the military Stockholm Syndrome, because 

we have two bases in those key countries. We don’t pressure them. 

That is basically what I am asking. Are they getting a bit of a free 

pass on this? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I would not say they are getting a free 

pass. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. We have a very strong and open dialogue 

with them. And that those discussions about what you were talking 

about, those discussions continue, and we’ll have to see where that 

goes. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. We talked about a lot of these foreign fighters 

coming through Turkey. How about through some of the another 

areas? Turkey is one area. Do they also come through—and I notice 

there is a large preponderance of the group from Jordan. Are these 

primarily from the refugee camps? Is that where they are being recruited? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. The numbers of foreign fighters coming 

from other countries are much smaller than Turkey. Turkey is the 

primary transit point. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon have lesser numbers. 

Obviously, in the case of Iraq and Jordan, their are efforts to curb 

the flow of foreign fighters. Lebanon as well, although that is somewhat more difficult situation. Goes beyond what I could talk about 

in this session as well. 

Mr. COOK. The last question I had was in regards to the ones 

coming from Russia. And I suspect this relates to the Chechnya? 

Is Russia facilitating their leaving the country and going to another area simply because of the problems that they are going to 

cause internally in Russia? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I am not aware of any evidence they are 

facilitating the Chechen fighters to leave Russia to get rid of them, 

as you just said. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we need to forget for a moment from where these foreign 

fighters are coming and really ask the fundamental question which 

we are not asking, and that is why they are coming. ISIS’ most poVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
44

tent recruitment tool is momentum. It is success. It is the conquest 

of territory covering large portions of Syria and Iraq. 

ISIS’ ability to sustain their momentum in their territorial conquests will determine their future recruitment from the region and 

from the West. 

Why has ISIS been so effective in their territorial taking strategy? Because there has been no effective countervailing force to 

confront them. You know, the United States spent $25 billion, $26 

billion building up an Iraqi Army, and during the first test, the 

Iraqi Army ran. Not only did we not put up a front to ISIS, they 

also took our weaponry that we paid for over many, many years. 

So the New York Times reported this morning that there was a 

major deal between the Abadi government in Baghdad and the 

Kurdish leadership Erbil. That was a permanent, long-term deal to 

provide 17 percent of the national budget to the Kurdish region. 

In addition, $1 billion to pay for the salaries and weapons for the 

Peshmerga in the Kurdistan area. 

The Kurdish Army, or the Peshmerga, otherwise known as those 

who confront death, is estimated to be between 250,000 and 

357,000 fighters. They are experienced, they are an effective army, 

they are pluralistic. They are proven allies of the United States in 

assisting us in the invasion of Iraq, they fought side by side with 

the American troops, they helped the United States capture Saddam Hussein. 

ISIS is estimated to be between 31,000 and 41,000 fighters. This 

seems to be a major change in the dynamic as it relates to Iraq’s 

ability to push back ISIS. I don’t know if you caught the news of 

this deal this morning. But, I would like you to comment on it. Because I think unless and until you can break the momentum of 

ISIS, it doesn’t matter where foreign fighters are coming from. The 

fact that they are coming is what is more important. And the success, the momentum that has been sustained by ISIS over a long 

period of time, is the only reason you have foreign fighters coming 

to Iraq and to Syria to fight, regardless of where they are coming 

from. 

So I think this is a major breakthrough. And I would like to hear 

your comments on how this changes the dynamic in the region. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. That question would take me well beyond 

my responsibilities, Mr. Higgins. I think it is better addressed to 

my colleagues in our Near Eastern Bureau, who are the experts on 

these areas. I gather there will be a subsequent hearing where 

they will testify. Again, I am not the expert on the Kurds, I am 

not the expert on the Iraq situation.

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT BRADTKE TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE BRIAN HIGGINS

Regarding ISIL’s momentum in Iraq, the military campaign against ISIL, which 

is centered on degrading ISIL from the air and defeating ISIL by working with 

ground forces to clear and hold territory, has halted the main ISIL offensive. Precision airstrikes by Coalition partners (the United States, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) have helped 

Iraqi central government and Kurdish forces hold or take back key terrain, and degraded ISIL’s ability to mass and maneuver. The Coalition has also killed a number 

of ISIL’s top leaders, and those who remain on the battlefield can no longer easily 

communicate with ISIL formations and combat units. In Mosul, ISIL’s stronghold 

in northern Iraq, ISIL has disabled mobile phone towers to prevent Mosul residents 

45

from providing intelligence to Coalition forces and organizing attacks, but that has 

further degraded its own communications. 

Thus far, combined operations have restored strategic sites like the Mosul Dam 

and Baiji Refinery to state control, held off ISIL offensives in Anbar province, 

strengthened the defensive corridor around Baghdad, and secured major roadways 

and supply routes. There is hard fighting ahead, and ISIL sometimes responds with 

localized offensives and atrocities, but ISIL is now being rolled back.

Ambassador BRADTKE. But I want to come back to the point you 

make. Yes. Clearly, the perceived success of ISIS is one reason that 

some people have been attracted to fight for them. But the situation in Syria itself has been a powerful magnet for——

Mr. HIGGINS. But what does ISIS depict on social media? Their 

success in taking over critical territory. 

So if you forget about the medium, if you take away the fundamental recruitment, the emphasis, the success of ISIS, they don’t 

really have a story to tell because a lot of this is about the narrative. 

I interrupted. Continue. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I was agreeing with you that that is one 

very important element and why people are attracted to fight for 

ISIS. 

But there are other factors as well. There is the situationin Syria 

itself. Where ISIS, al-Nusra, have made very powerful use of the 

idea that they are defending Sunnis inside Syria. Again, that is 

something we try to push back again. 

Also there are other factors ranging from the idea in some cases 

of economics. I have been in countries where the fighters from 

those countries, the primary motivation is actually the idea that 

they can escape situations——

Mr. HIGGINS. I understand. Let me claim back my time. Respectfully, Ambassador. Let me just—because it is a very, very important point that I think is being missed. And that is combating, confronting effectively ISIS in Iraq helps us and the Free Syrian Army 

more effectively confront ISIS in Syria. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I don’t think there is any disagreement on 

that point, sir. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I yield back. 

Mr.POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

DeSantis, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, has the State Department canceled the passports of 

any of U.S. citizens who have joined terrorist groups in Syria and 

Iraq? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. To my knowledge, the State Department 

has not canceled any passports of——

Mr. DESANTIS. Why is that? Because we had Secretary Kerry 

here a couple months ago. He said he has the authority under 

exiting law. I think he is right about that. I know some of our allies 

have taken steps to cancel passports. 

So what is the reasoning behind not doing that? 

I ask that because the director of the FBI was on ‘‘60 Minutes’’ 

several weeks ago, maybe a couple months ago by now. He was 

asked about people that he have identified as joining ISIS or joining the al-Nusra front, and could they come back to the United 

States, he was asked. 

46

He said, Well, if they have a valid passport, they are entitled to 

return. 

A lot of my constituents were really floored by that. They would 

say, you go and you choose jihad, you leave America behind, you 

are waging jihad over there. The idea that you now have an entitlement to come back simply because you have a valid passport, and 

we are not going to really do much. I guess he said we would track 

them. But that struck me and a lot of my constituents as insufficient. So how does the State Department handle this issue? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. You are correct, sir, Secretary Kerry said 

he does have the authority to revoke passports. 

This is something we would only do in relatively rare and unique 

circumstances because of the importance for average Americans of 

the freedom to travel. We would only——

Mr. DESANTIS. And obviously an ISIS fighter would be an extreme circumstance if they are cutting off Americans’ heads. So I 

just wanted to make sure——

Ambassador BRADTKE. May I continue, sir? We would only do it 

also in consultations with law enforcement authorities. We have 

not yet had any request from law enforcement authorities to cancel 

passports of ISIS or foreign fighters. 

So, again, we have the authority. It is one tool. We do have other 

tools to use as well until this regard. 

Mr. DESANTIS. No, I understand. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. We would only do it in consultation with 

law enforcement. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Warrick, maybe you can—so if a known terrorist comes back to the United States, they are being ‘‘tracked by 

law enforcement,’’ what does that entail? How can we be sure that 

they will not commit a lone-wolf attack, for example? 

Mr. WARRICK. Congressman, if we have indications that someone 

on the No-Fly List is trying to fly back to the United States, we 

would deny them boarding if we have the authority to do so. Or 

we would recommend even to a foreign government that they or 

the airline deny such a person the right to get on an airplane to 

fly to the United States. 

If someone shows up in the United States, and there is indications that that person has been a foreign fighter in Syria, it would 

be referred to the FBI. Then it would be a matter for law enforcement. 

We would have the ability at the border to ask any questions 

that were necessary and appropriate. We would have the ability 

and the authority to inspect their luggage, inspect their personal 

possessions in order to determine whether they were or were not 

a foreign fighter who had been fighting with ISIL in Syria. 

Anything like this, I can assure you, is taken extremely seriously. The notion that we are going to let somebody into the United 

States who is a foreign fighter just to have them monitored, sir, 

that is not what we are going to be working on. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I think his comments, maybe he didn’t express himself well. But I think that was not——

What happened with Munir Mohammed Abou Saleha? He was a 

U.S. citizen from Florida. He went over, trained with al-Nusra 

Front in Syria. Then, according to the New York Times, came back 

47

to the United States for a time period and then chose to return to 

Syria. And he committed a suicide attack in Syria. We didn’t have 

any intelligence on him. Is that how he was able to do that? To go 

over, train with al-Nusra, then come back here to the United 

States unimpeded? 

Mr. WARRICK. The intelligence that he had been fighting with 

ISIL was only developed after he had departed. And certainly, obviously, you know, it is unfortunate he choose the path that he did. 

Had he come back into the United States, there would have been 

measures taken in his specific case based on the status that he had 

at the time we learned that he had joined ISIL. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Ambassador, my final question is, a couple weeks 

ago it was reported in the Wall Street Journal that the President 

wrote a personal letter to the Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran stressing, according to the article, that there were some mutual interests 

between the United States and Iran with respect to fighting ISIS 

in Iraq. 

As somebody who has served in Iraq and saw, you know, Iran 

and Iranian-backed terrorist groups, I mean, they killed hundreds 

of U.S. service members. So that was something that I flinched at. 

But let me ask you: Do we consider the Iranians to be a partner 

of any sort in terms of fighting ISIS, even if just in the Baghdad 

area or throughout in the region? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I can say from my point of view I certainly do not consider Iranians to be partners in the efforts that we 

are undertaking. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. 

Cicilline, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the 

witnesses. 

Ambassador, could you talk for a moment about what the impact 

is of foreign fighters, how they are being used? Are they engaged 

in actual military conflict? In suicide bombings? Or are they being 

used in propaganda videos? What is actually the impact of the foreign fighters and what is the magnitude of the presence of those 

fighters relative to the indigenous people? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Again, some of this is information that 

probably could be better shared in a classified setting. But let me 

share what I can here, my overall impressions from the work that 

I have been doing. 

Some of this is drawn from the work that academic experts are 

doing, some of it is drawn from the analysis that comes from inside 

the U.S. Government. 

The first distinction I would make is that ISIL has been more 

willing to take on foreign fighters. Al-Nusra, which is the al-Qaeda 

affiliate, has been somewhat less willing, been more selective, more 

careful about the foreign fighters that it has brought on. So you 

have first that distinction. 

The foreign fighters have been used in variety of ways. Some of 

them have—and this is a little bit different than the foreign fighters in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Very typically, in those two conflicts, the primary use for foreign 

fighters was as suicide bombers. I think now there a perception, alVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
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though some are used as suicide bombers, that they are more valuable, that they may have skills that can be used, whether it is 

skills that involve social media, whether it is skills involving the 

repair and maintenance of equipment, whether it is medical or 

other skills. I think they are being put to use in those areas as well 

as being used as fighters themselves. And I am talking here about 

ISIL. 

The other very disturbing thing that we have seen, and academics have—a man named Peter Neumann, who has done some 

very good analysis of foreign fighters, has concluded that foreign 

fighters are often used for some of the most distasteful, if that is 

the right word, things that ISIL is doing. If you noticed, for example, the beheadings, these are apparently being carried out by 

someone with a British accent, a U.K. person. 

The analysis that Peter Neumann has of this is that because foreign fighters come to Syria, they have no real attachments, they 

don’t speak Arabic, they are anxious to impress ISIL, they are anxious to impress the organizations, and they are willing to do things 

that the local recruits will not do. So we have seen that. Which I 

think is a very disturbing thing about the foreign fighters. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I know some prior colleague referenced U.N. Resolution 2178. 

There was not only creation of a new policy, but there was a set 

of protocols and a framework that was created as a result of that. 

Is that a successful and useful tool? What is the status of that? 

I mean, that imposes an obligation on countries to undertake serious efforts to prevent the ability of foreign fighters to transit. So 

what is the current status of that? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. As I was saying earlier, 2178 is a legally 

binding resolution which requires countries to criminalize a variety 

of activities related to foreign fighters, including ones that they 

perhaps had not previously criminalized. 

I have just come back from Indonesia, where their counterterrorism law criminalized domestic terrorists because they never had 

a problem with people carrying out terrorist attacks outside of Indonesia. They are now looking at how to change that law to deal 

with terrorists who might go to training camps outside of Indonesia. 

So countries are very much looking at that resolution and trying 

to see where the gaps in their own legislation are. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And I think it would be useful for us to have a 

sense of where countries are in meeting those obligations. So 

maybe you could follow up with the committee on that. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I have already committed to doing that, 

and I would be happy to do it. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Finally, I want to turn to Turkey. I 

know you have said that they are not complicit, though I think it 

is pretty clear that they have not been an enthusiastic, wonderful, 

reliable partner in this effort. I mean, just last week there were 

several foreign fighters who traveled through Turkey. 

So are they, in fact, assisting us both in sharing intelligence, in 

counterterrorism efforts to really stop the flow of foreign fighters? 

You keep saying they are an important partner. I think we recognize they have value if they act the right way. But there are real 

49

questions, I think, about what they are actually doing on the 

ground with us. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Again, if you want a detailed analysis of 

exactly what our cooperation with Turkey is, you probably need to 

do that in a classified session. But I would say the following: We 

have seen increasing steps by Turkey to cut off the flow of oil, to 

stop the flow of foreign fighters, to get better control of their border. And the information sharing we have with the Turks has been 

improved. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr.POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Kinzinger, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for 

putting this together and thank you to the witnesses, thank you for 

being here. I appreciate it. 

Let me just ask, ask you both if you can just—or whoever is better advised to answer this. I wasn’t here for part of the hearing; 

I am sure you guys explained it. But just to explain to me briefly, 

very briefly, what is our policy in Syria? What are we doing there? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Again, I am not here as the administration spokesman on our——

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, you are kind of the administration guy 

right now in front of me. And it says you are the partner engagement on Syria foreign fighters. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. That is my area of responsibility. Working 

with partners to deal with the foreign fighter problem. It is not to 

make or explain or articulate our entire Syria policy. 

Mr. KINZINGER. But you have been briefed on our policy in Syria, 

though. Otherwise, you are in a tremendous silo right now. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Our policy—and I will give you the onesentence answer—is to bring about a political settlement which 

would provide the Syrian people an opportunity to have a democratic future without Assad in power. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay. I like the line. I mean, I do. I will point 

out that, in fact, during the discussion of the red line, the infamous 

red line 1 year ago, I was one of the vocal supporters of the need 

to enforce that red line. There was a lot of discussion about an 

offramp for Assad during that time period. You know, let’s give him 

money and send him somewhere else. You know, let’s get him out 

of government. 

It was the failure to enforce that red line that I have not heard 

articulated a single serious proposal to get Assad out of office now. 

I agree with you, I mean, I think toppling him by force is not the 

best answer. The best is a peaceful transition to maintain the 

state. But, it is what it is right now. 

So you do engage with FSA elements, am I right, in terms of 

being involved with foreign fighter? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I do not, no. 

Mr. KINZINGER. You have no engagement with them. 

Who in State does any of that? I mean, because, obviously, FSA 

would be a part of counter ISIS, if that is our strategy, would obviously have to be involved with the foreign fighters, and they would 

obviously be on the front line of why are these people are being reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
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cruited. So where does that connection happen? So if you are the 

foreign fighter guy, where is the——

Ambassador BRADTKE. My task, my responsibilities, the things 

that I have been asked to do are to pursue a diplomatic strategy 

with our foreign partners, our foreign countries on foreign fighters. 

So I do not engage directly with the Syrian opposition. Ambassador Rubinstein is our envoy for that. Certainly others in the 

State Department are dealing with this issue, others in the Pentagon in terms of military and our intelligence agencies also. But 

I personally do not deal with that. 

Mr. KINZINGER. So let me ask you this: Why is it that ISIS is 

attracting foreign fighters, versus foreign fighters coming to FSA, 

al-Nusra Front, those kinds of groups? What is it about ISIS that 

attracts? I mean, is it just the jihadism? What is it that you have 

seen? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I think it is partly the discussion I was 

having earlier. It is the perception that they were successful, perception that joining them is a way of trying to combat Assad. It is 

in some cases the way they have marketed, if that’s the right word, 

themselves as being a place where you can come and you can be 

involved in this adventure. That is one of the perceptions. 

It is their declaration of a caliphate, which has attracted people 

who misunderstand exactly what ISIL is doing and what this 

means. 

So these are some of the factors that have caused ISIL to attract 

foreign fighters. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I agree with you. I mean, I think that is right. 

I think success brings success, right? I mean, I have seen some of 

the ISIS propaganda. And it is powerful. It looks like, if you are 

a young person, if you are in your teens and you are looking for 

something fun to do, they make it look fun, right? Come here and 

do whatever you want to do, be with a bunch of guys that are out 

pushing this idea of jihadism and the caliphate. You can see that. 

I think my concern—and you are not the guy to talk to about 

this, evidently—but my concern is the message that we have been 

sending for years about the Free Syrian Army is quite the opposite. 

These are the people that we actually want to be emboldened, 

these are the people we want to be part of a post-Assad Syria. 

Instead, the message we send them, we have a lot of Members 

of Congress that question, that basically say they are no different 

than ISIS, which is actually offensive, if you have met any of these 

folks. Sure, anywhere on a battlefield, you are going to have allegiances switch. 

But the other thing is, if you are somebody looking to overthrow 

Assad, what is attracting you to the FSA? There is no no-fly zone 

over their territories as of yet. There has been a lot of talk that 

the United States is helping to train and equip, but you really 

haven’t seen it. Now the discussion is in our new-found strategy 

that we may train a few thousand fighters over the next year. I 

mean, that would not attract anybody. 

So I agree with you on that. And I hope—I am not going to go 

past my time—but I hope that this administration really wrestles 

with the issue of Syria and understands you are not going to defeat 

51

ISIS until you take care of the Syria problem. It is the incubator 

of the problem. 

So with that, thank you for your testimony. And I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Grayson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Warrick, is joining ISIS a crime under U.S. law? 

Mr. WARRICK. Certainly giving material support to ISIS is a violation of the Federal statutes, yes. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Is that true of both U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens? 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, I mean, the question of whether a foreign 

citizen violates foreign law——

Mr. GRAYSON. No. U.S. law. 

Mr. WARRICK. Oh, U.S. law. We have been known to prosecute 

foreign nationals who are in the United States for violation of material support statutes, yes. 

Mr. GRAYSON. So let’s be specific about this. Let’s talk, for instance, abut the 26 Irish residents or residents of Ireland who apparently have joined ISIS. 

What would happen if one of them traveled to the United States? 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, I am not going to get into exact 

hypotheticals. I do want to say, however, that where somebody has 

been identified as a foreign fighter fighting for ISIL in Syria, and 

it is possible to watch-list such a person, they are going to be in 

all likelihood on a no-fly list or another list of the U.S. Government 

that is going to attract a great deal of attention before they are allowed to get on board an airplane to the United States. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Again, let’s be as specific as we can. Tell us, regarding the no-fly list, what would that mean? They would never 

be able to many come to the United States, right? 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, they wouldn’t be able to fly here. The no-fly 

list obviously doesn’t apply to other modes of transportation. However, I can assure you that there are equal or equivalent measures 

in place so that somebody on the no-fly list is almost certainly not 

going to be allowed entry into the United States if they come by 

cruise ship or if they fly to Canada, for example, which they may 

not be able to do if they are no-flied for us and they were to try, 

let’s say, to come across the U.S. Canadian border. 

Mr. GRAYSON. What are the names of those lists? 

Mr. WARRICK. I’m sorry? 

Mr. GRAYSON. What are the names of the lists that you are referring to, not the no-fly list, but the no-cross-the-border list. 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, these are all systems managed by the Terror 

Screening Center, which is an arm of FBI but includes participation by DHS and others. DHS, however, has the authority to make 

admission decisions when someone presents him or herself at a 

border or at an airport. So we have the authority to refuse someone 

entry into the United States if they are deemed inadmissible. 

There are specific grounds in the Immigration and Nationality 

Act that allow us to say someone who is reasonably suspected to 

be a terrorist or to have given material support to terrorist groups 

that that person can be denied entry into the United States. I can 

52

assure you, Congressman, we exercise that authority when it’s appropriate for us to do so. 

Mr. GRAYSON. So regardless of whether they’re in a country that 

requires a visa or not for nationals of that country or the United 

States, they are simply not going to be let in. Right? 

Mr. WARRICK. If they meet the standard of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, we are going to comply with the law, I assure you. 

Mr. GRAYSON. By not letting them in; right? 

Mr. WARRICK. There are a host of footnotes and exceptions that 

I am not going to go into in open session. But essentially, no, we 

are not going to do that. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Let’s talk about the U.S. citizens, the ones with 

U.S. Passports, reputed to be 130 of them. What do we know about 

them? Do with we know their names, for instance. 

Mr. WARRICK. You actually should ask that question to the FBI. 

But when they give numbers, which I would describe only as greater than 100, the numbers that you see on this chart are a private 

groups’ estimates. 

So the FBI is the better source for actual statistics. In those 

cases what we are talking about are identities where the name of 

the person is known as well as certain other information that allows us to be reasonably precise as to who it is. We at least have 

in mind when a decision, for instance, on someone being on a nofly list is made. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Or, for instance, when they come back. When they 

come back, if they are identified as a foreign fighter of ISIS, according to what you said earlier, they have committed a crime, and 

they can be arrested upon entry; correct? 

Mr. WARRICK. That’s correct. 

Mr. GRAYSON. And, in fact, that has happened; correct? 

Mr. WARRICK. Yes, it has. 

Mr. GRAYSON. Then what happens after that? They are put in 

prison; right? 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, first of all, they are referred to the FBI for 

further investigation and prosecution, that actually is outside of 

the DHS’s purview and into the FBI’s purview. 

So if you want to start tracking people from that point forward, 

I would refer you to the FBI and then to the Department of Justice. 

Mr. GRAYSON. But you are familiar with the procedures; right? 

Mr. WARRICK. I am familiar with the procedures, yes. 

Mr. GRAYSON. You work with the FBI to get that done; right? 

Mr. WARRICK. Yes, we work very closely with the FBI and with 

our partners in the intelligence community. State and local law enforcement. 

Mr. GRAYSON. So hearing all that, I guess we can sleep a little 

more soundly; right? 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, sir, yes, you can. However, as we always tell 

everyone, prudence and vigilance is something that is the responsibility of all of us. 

Mr. GRAYSON. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for your time. 

53

Ambassador, a few months ago, taxpayers were asked to spend 

a couple hundred million dollars or several hundred million dollars 

for the training and I guess some equipping of FSA fighters. 

Can you give me and us any update, we are quickly approaching 

the time when that proviso was to expire. What has our investment 

gleaned us at this point? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Again, that is an area, and there was a 

previous line of questioning in the same direction. I am not the person who deals with the of Free Syrian Army or the Syrian opposition, so that is really beyond my responsibilities and my mandate 

at the State Department. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. But that is unfortunate. It is very frustrating for us, right? You come here. We have questions that we 

have to respond to our constituents. Either you don’t have or won’t 

give the answers. So we just walk away with nothing. So it is very 

frustrating. 

You have no indication whatsoever, like you are not even aware 

where—I mean, you are aware that program is happening, and 

that is your complete knowledge of it? Like mine? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Again, I am not an authoritative spokesperson——

Mr. PERRY. What do you know? Do you know anything? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Congressman, I have testified here for the 

better part of 2 hours about what I am trying to do leading an effort to deal with foreign fighters, about our engagement with our 

partners, about the different approaches we are taking with those 

partners. 

Again, I am not responsible for our overall Syria policy or our relations with the Syrian opposition. My understanding is that you 

have a hearing scheduled in the reasonably near future with someone who will be able to address those issues. But if there are specific questions that you want addressed, I am confident that we 

will find someone at the State Department who can provide 

you——

Mr. PERRY. Listen, I can appreciate that you have got a long 

record of service. And thank you very much for that. 

But you must understand when you come to these things as a 

representative of the Department of State, you should have a modicum of information regarding many subjects, specifically the one 

that we are talking about. As a Member of Congress, when I go out 

to a town tall meeting, I can’t say, well, look, I’m not involved with 

other appropriations; it’s not my responsibility. I’ll see you later. 

My constituents don’t accept that. And with all due respect I don’t 

feel like your answer is acceptable at this time. 

But with that having been said, if you can give me the unclassified version of a long-term—unclassified—of a long-term strategy 

regarding a peaceful transition in Syria. Look, we have got a couple 

minutes here. Do the best you can. Give me the high points. I 

mean, Syria doesn’t like us—or Turkey doesn’t like Assad, so they 

are not helping us with ISIS. We don’t like Assad or ISIS, but we 

picked ISIS as the more problematic one of the two at this time. 

But paint some picture of where we are going. Because we just 

spent $500 million for Free Syrian Army fighters which we can 

provide no answers on, and the American people are supposed to 

54

continue to support the administration in some policy, I am asking 

what the heck it is. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Congressman, I was asked to come up 

and testify, and the subject that the testimony was to be ISIS and 

the threat from foreign fighters. That is what I have tried to do to 

the best of my ability. I was not asked to be a witness on our 

broader Syria policy or to be prepared to discuss the future of 

Syria. 

I have said that the essentials of our policy are to try to have 

a political settlement inside Syria that enables the people of Syria 

to have a democratic future without Assad, that enables them to 

be else free from terrorist threats, from terrorist organizations as 

well. 

I really feel that if you want to delve more deeply into our Syria 

policy then someone who can be an authoritative spokesman on our 

policy on Syria should be asked to come and testify. 

Mr. PERRY. I appreciate that. Those are great platitudes that all 

Americans can agree with and probably all people around the 

world can agree with. 

Let me ask you this, then: The Khorasan Group. Are you familiar? Can I ask questions about that. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I am familiar with the Khorasan Group. 

Some of the questions may involve classified answers, but I would 

be happy to try to answer your questions, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. They are described as seasoned al-Qaeda operatives 

in Syria. Would you agree with that? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Yes, I would. 

Mr. PERRY. So when al-Qaeda, seasoned al-Qaeda operatives. 

So when the President told us a couple years ago that—and I 

don’t remember the exact verbiage, but it was something similar to, 

al-Qaeda is decimated and on the run. 

Would that comport with the success of the Khorasan Group in 

Syria? Or would that be counter-vening? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. What I would say, sir, is that my understanding of what the President meant was al-Qaeda was an organization that had been severely damaged. That did not mean that all 

the individual elements of al-Qaeda had been defeated. 

We see al-Qaeda in the Mahgreb, we see al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula. And this group of fighters who had gone to Syria coming 

in some respects from Pakistan and Afghanistan, from core alQaeda, have tried to create space to operate in Syrian territory. 

Mr. PERRY. So could I say it was a little true and maybe a little 

deceptive, or untrue, or whatever you want to call it, it wasn’t completely factual? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I don’t share your view, Congressman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Again, I want to thank 

the witnesses for joining us today to specifically talk about the 

threat of foreign fighters going into Syria, vis-a`-vis ISIS. Looking 

at the numbers that were presented to us and the sources or locations of where many of the fighters are coming from of the 16,000, 

roughly 5,000 are coming from North Africa, as I mentioned earlier; about another 2,500 from Europe, 40 percent of those from 

55

France. And then from the Gulf states, you have another 4,000 

roughly. 

So my general question and I will ask you a couple of questions 

and leave you to answer—my general question is are there any 

common threads attracting these fighters from these different regions? Are there specific regional trends that draw those fighters 

and how do we with deal with that? Those are my general questions. 

And Ambassador, you mentioned Peter Neumann, who released 

a study in the spring and specifically identified Ahmad Jibril as a 

cleric, a Muslim cleric who has a large following, happens to be 

here in the United States. Not necessarily sending people to fight, 

but preaching a way that inspires those folks to fight. What are we 

doing specifically about folks like that, not just in the United 

States but globally, the specific concern of people preaching from 

the United States? With that I will leave it to the witnesses. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Just to address briefly your question 

about regional trends, there are differences. I think the one common theme is the attraction of foreign fighters to the conflict in 

Syria. The idea that Sunni Muslims are being attacked and need 

to be defended. This is a fairly common theme throughout the conversations I have had with our foreign partners as to the primary 

reason the foreign fighters are attracted to conflict. But there are 

variations on this statement. In the western Balkans, for example, 

I have had conversations with officials there who have pointed to 

the fact that the foreign fighters from their countries are coming 

from the poorest areas, and that foreign fighters from those countries are being told if you go to Syria you will get paid, you will 

have a job and status. 

The ideological, if you will, element is less important. I have 

talked to partners in Southeast Asia where, in some cases, the motivation seems more to go to get training, to get skills that can be 

brought back to the home country to potentially be used in terrorist 

activities in the home country. Again, not so much an ideological 

motivation. So there are regional variations to individual variations, but the most important, the most powerful motivation does 

seem to be the conflict in Syria, the attraction of the idea that we 

need to go defend our Muslim brothers, our Sunni Muslim brothers 

in Syria. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I can, the large number coming from France, 

almost a 1,000 fighters from France, are those residents or citizens 

of France who have connections to Tunisia or Morocco or Libya, or 

are they disconnected? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Many of them are from North Africa originally, but many of them are second or third generation. These are 

not necessarily first generation immigrants. And that raises another kind of regional variation. 

Certainly the problem, the inability of some of our European 

partners to integrate their immigrant populations into their societies has left a degree of alienation that has made some of these 

people susceptible to the kind of propaganda that ISIL’s putting 

out. 

There is also another element here, sir, which I think can’t be 

totally neglected. I believe it is hard to come up with specific eviVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:35 Jan 13, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_TNT\120214\91661 SHIRL
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dence of this, but there are some foreign fighters who are simply 

attracted to the violence that is taking place. There was a mention 

of Mr. Namosh, who was alleged to have committed these killings 

at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. This is a man with a very deep 

criminal background. And again, I think there is an element of that 

in some of the attraction of foreign fighters, it is the attraction to 

violence itself. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And as far as some of the preachers the study 

put out by Mr. Neumann and two others said that they specifically 

identified two preachers globally who were having a disproportionate influence on promoting fighters going into Syria. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I don’t know whether my colleague wants 

to address that. The State Department does not do activities inside 

the United States of this nature. I am not really the right person 

to answer that question. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Warrick? 

Mr. WARRICK. So I am not going to obviously address the specifics of any individual case, but I do want to make the point that 

in all the work that we do in community outreach, working with 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement, we are very mindful of 

the distinction between those who are exercising their free speech 

rights and those who are, to the contrary, urging people to carry 

out acts of violence. The former is a protected constitutional right 

and the latter is a crime. 

And we distinguish, in all that we do, carefully between those 

two characteristics. So I am not going to assess the statements of 

any individual religious leaders from the table here today, other 

than just to assure you that we are very mindful of the distinction 

and use that in all the work that we do. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. With that I time is expired and I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Collins, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. 

I want to follow up, Ambassador, just on a couple of quick things, 

because I was unable to be here for the whole time, but I have 

watched the hearing, and on several times, you have basically, and 

even with my friend from Pennsylvania, sort of punted the issue 

of commenting on the administration’s policy on Syria. To an extent, I understand that. 

I do have a question, because you are part of the policy of working with foreign fighters coming into Syria and how we deal with 

that, correct? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Correct. 

Mr. COLLINS. Do you understand the policy of the administration? I am not asking you to comment on it, I am just asking do 

you understand it? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Again, I am not the authority—do I understand what the main elements are? Yes, I think I do. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. I am not going to chase that last ‘‘I think 

I do.’’ Because this is an important part to me, I am not trying to 

pin you down, but punting the question like the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania said I think is a direct issue of what we are dealing 

with here, because there are a lot of folks just trying to understand 

our policy in Syria and what we are trying to do, and for someone 

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like my friend who has served in Iraq and served in this region 

during wartime this is very much of a concern. If we don’t understand the policy and you are trying to carry out a bigger part of 

that policy, to say that you do at least attempt to understand it is 

encouraging. 

My question is, if you understand it, what is your understanding 

of that policy? As short as you can be, what is your understand of 

the administration’s policy? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. The President has spoken of our policy; 

the Secretary of State, has spoken of our policy; Ambassador Ann 

Patterson who was the Assistant Secretary for the Near East and 

has spoken of our policy; Brett McGurk, her deputy, has spoken 

about the policy. 

Mr. COLLINS. With all due respect, I can read theirs. I want 

yours, because in a job description, you are given a job, you were 

there to carry out your part of the policy, correct? 

Okay, from your understanding of what the policy is on how we 

are to contain and how we are to fight and how to curb these fighters, because I have other questions on the violence aspect, which 

I tend to agree with you, I think they are just the soldier-of-fortune 

kind of attitude among some of these. They want to go, they get 

their experience and go. 

Do you have a clear enough understanding of the policy objectives inside of Syria and then the influences to carry out your function. And if so, what do you feel like your part of that policy is? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I think I do have enough of an understanding to carry out my role, sir, because as I understand the policy, that—again, I am not the spokesperson, it is to try to bring 

about a political settlement in Syria that will allow the Syrian people to have a Democratic future that will be a future without 

Assad. That is the core, the fundamental policy. That is the basis 

on which I try to do what I do, which is the idea that why we are 

trying to deal with this foreign fighter problem, there are bigger 

Syria pieces that are being dealt with by the Secretary, by the 

President, by Ambassador Patterson, Ambassador Rubinstein, who 

is responsible for our Syria policy. 

Mr. COLLINS. So you are actually dealing with what I think is 

part of the problem because there is basically a 3-prong kind of attack, however you want to look at it with the Assad regime, the 

fighters against Assad, and then you have the fighters against the 

fighters of Assad, and you have fighters coming in from all over to 

fight here. We did not address that. And I have read and listened 

to the President speak about this, we basically chose to leave the 

current regime sort of off the table when we are training free Syrian fighters to go after ISIS or ISIL, however you describe it, just 

the Islamic State. And we are saying we will deal with the Assad 

part of this later. 

I am trying to figure out what are you doing to curb outside 

fighters coming in on his behalf? Is that part of your policy? And 

if it is, that contradicts the policy of basically leaving him for another day. 

Ambassador BRADTKE. It is—certainly, most of the efforts that I 

have talked about here today are related to Sunni foreign fighters. 

They are fighters who are going to fight for ISIL or al-Nusra, the 

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Khorasan group, those groups. We are concerned about the other 

foreign fighters, if you will, that come into Syria. The Shi’a foreign 

fighters, the Hezbollah foreign fighters. The reality is we have 

fewer tools to deal with the fighters. 

Mr. COLLINS. Would you say that those fighters are in it more 

for the fight? You know we all grew up in neighborhoods, you just 

had one of those guys in class, they are just going to fight. And 

sometimes there is a reason and sometimes there is not a reason. 

Would that classify more on the fighters? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I would say it again without being the expert on the subject that I feel the fighters who have gone to fight 

on the side of Assad are different than the fighters who are coming 

from other countries to fight for ISIL or al-Nusra. It is a more organized effort a supported-by-outside-countries effort. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, I appreciate your understanding because I do 

believe you have a difficult job and understanding the policy is important, at least your part whether you comment on the bigger 

part. I still think that we need to be arming those who want to 

fight, that is the Kurds. We need to get them involved in the fight 

and anybody else who wants join, you have a tough job, I commend 

you for doing it. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the patient gentlewoman from 

Florida, Ms. Frankel, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I often feel like the Agatha Christie novel, And Then There Were None. 

Mr. COLLINS. I have been there many times. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you very much gentlemen for being here. 

Well, this has been a very interesting discussion to listen to. And 

to me, it sounds like the problem is the problem, and I say that 

not to be facetious, but this sounds to me like one of these rockand-a-hard place situations, not to be trite. 

I think some of the frustration you have heard is there is an old 

saying the knee bone is attached to the thigh bone and so forth, 

so it is difficult for us to hear a discussion just of the foreign fighters without an overall discussion of the strategy. So I will try, out 

of respect, to narrow my questions to the foreign fighters, and if I 

ask a question that deviates, you just have to say—I will respect 

your answer. 

So let’s start with this proposition, we are to assume that these 

foreign fighters coming back to our country or to our allies pose an 

immediate present danger to our security, is that something we 

should assume? 

Mr. WARRICK. Well, we certainly treat them as if they are a 

threat, if they have been a foreign fighter for ISIL, that is going 

to be taken with enormous seriousness. I think we do need to recognize that there is the possibility that some foreign fighters 

walked away from the fight because they decided that ISIL was not 

like it was advertised to be and its social media, which I would 

echo Secretary Johnson’s characterization as slick, is totally at odds 

with the reality that people experience when they are actually 

fighting for ISIL. And so, undoubtedly there are people who are 

walking away from the fight——

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Ms. FRANKEL. I have other questions, could you just answer, is 

it an immediate threat? I am just trying to understand the seriousness of it. 

Mr. WARRICK. The answer has to be some are and we are treating everyone that way until otherwise it can be established. 

Ms. FRANKEL. I want to get back to you, Ambassador. I think you 

said that these fighters that are coming from other countries, many 

of them are going to fight Assad, is that what you said? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I said I think that is one of the primary 

motivations. 

Ms. FRANKEL. So when we go after ISIL, air strikes let’s say in 

Iraq, when we try to denigrate ISIL, we are, in a sense, helping 

Assad; is that correct? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I don’t think we are helping Assad. I 

think Assad’s problems go well beyond whatever we do with ISIL. 

And certainly, if he is taking some consolation in the fact that we 

are attacking aisle I think he is making a big mistake. 

Ms. FRANKEL. I am just trying to figure this out. If ISIL is coming in, the fighters are coming in to fight Assad, we are trying to 

denigrate ISIL, so do we encourage or incite more fighters to come 

in? I guess that is the question, are our actions, or our inactions, 

either our actions to go after ISIL inciting more fighters to come 

in, or our inaction to go after Assad, is that inciting more fighters 

to come in? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. I am not sure I can give you a definitive 

answer here, because I can’t point to specific evidence. It is hard 

for me to put myself in the head of a foreign fighter who sees air 

strikes being carried out. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Well, what about in terms of the advertising that 

they do to bring the fighters in? Do they use our actions or inactions? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. We believe they are trying to use our actions as an incentive or as a motivation for people to come and 

fight, but I can’t point to specific evidence at this stage particularly 

in this setting that says whether this is, in fact, happening or not. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Are most of the fighters coming in through Turkey? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Yes, Turkey is the primary——

Ms. FRANKEL. And so it seems to me another countervailing issue 

here is Turkey is under deluge from Syrians who are fleeing Assad. 

And so, their resources are hurting badly. So it seems to me that 

they want somebody to be fighting Assad. So do you think that that 

is a factor in their not keeping the borders more secure? 

Ambassador BRADTKE. Turkey has made no secret that one of the 

primary elements of its policy is to see Assad go, but at the same 

time, I think Turkey also understands the threat that ISIL, in particular, poses to Turkey. We had an incident back in March where 

some ISIL fighters crossed over into Turkey and engaged a shootout with Turkish policemen, killing Turkish policemen. 

We had ISIL kidnapping and holding hostage Turkish diplomats 

in Mosul, and Turkish truck drivers in Mosul. We had a case in 

October where Turkey broke up an ISIL group inside Turkey that 

had gathered weapons and explosives. So again, I think yes, Turkey wants Assad to go, that is certainly a key element of its policy, 

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but I think at the same time, they recognize that ISIL is also a 

threat to Turkey itself. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank is you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. You yield back all the time. 

Thank you very much. I want to thank the gentlemen for being 

here for this hearing. This hearing of the joint subcommittees is 

concluded. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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