The estimated cost of report or study 

for the Department of Defense is 

approximately $45,000 in Fiscal 

Years 2015-2016.

Generated on 2016 Jan05

RefID: 3-A116136
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Military and Security Developments Involving 

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

2015

A Report to Congress

Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2012

Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-

81, as amended by Section 1292 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013 and Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 

provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and 

unclassified form, on the current and future military power of the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea” (DPRK). The report shall address an assessment of the security situation 

on the Korean Peninsula, the goals and factors shaping North Korean security strategy and 

military strategy, trends in North Korean security, an assessment of North Korea’s regional 

security objectives, including an assessment of the North Korean military’s capabilities, 

developments in North Korean military doctrine and training, an assessment of North 

Korea’s proliferation activities, and other military security developments.
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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION 3

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY 3

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS 4

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY 5

STRATEGIC GOALS 5

NATIONAL STRATEGY 6

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR 6

CHAPTER THREE: THE CAPABILITIES AND MODERNIZATION 

GOALS OF NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY FORCES 9

OVERVIEW 9

AN AGING FORCE...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES 10

CHAPTER FOUR: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

PROGRAMS AND PROLIFERATION 21

NORTH KOREA’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROGRAMS 21

PROLIFERATION 22

CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE SALES 22

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 22

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS 23
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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) remains one of the most 

critical security challenges for the United States and the broader international community. 

In particular, North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing 

behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its continued development of 

nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its proliferation of weapons in 

contravention of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) pose a serious threat 

to the United States, the region, and the world. 

Since assuming control in December 2011, Kim Jong Un has solidified his grip on power by 

embracing the coercive tools used by his father and grandfather. His regime has used 

force and the threat of force combined with inducements to quell domestic dissent and 

strengthen internal security; co-opt the North Korean military and elites; develop strategic 

military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenge the ROK and the U.S.-ROK 

Alliance. In April 2013, Kim announced the “byungjin” policy, which emphasizes the parallel 

development of the country’s economy and nuclear weapons program, to reinforce his 

regime’s domestic, diplomatic, economic, and security interests.

North Korea fields a large, conventional, forward-deployed military that retains the 

capability to inflict serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and 

aging hardware. The U.S.-ROK Alliance has deterred large-scale conventional attacks by 

maintaining a robust combined defense posture and strong military readiness. On a smaller 

scale, however, the DPRK has demonstrated a willingness to use military provocation to 

achieve national goals. In August 2015, two North Korean landmines exploded in the 

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which seriously wounded two ROK soldiers, raised tensions on the 

Korean Peninsula for several weeks, and was resolved through high-level inter-Korean talks. 

North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and development 

of intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile programs underscore the growing threat it 

poses to regional stability and U.S. national security. North Korea’s pursuit of a submarinelaunched ballistic missile capability also highlights the regime’s commitment to diversifying 

its missile force, strengthening the missile force’s survivability, and finding new ways to 

coerce its neighbors. Furthermore, North Korea continues to proliferate ballistic missile 

technology prohibited under UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094, exacerbating the security 

challenge for the United States and the international community.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

2

Given the continued and growing threat from North Korea, its nuclear and missile 

programs, and its proliferation of related technology, the U.S. Department of Defense will 

continue to manage the North Korean security challenge through close coordination and 

consultation with the international community, particularly the ROK and Japan. The United 

States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations and steadfast 

in its commitments to allies in the region, including the extended deterrence commitments 

provided through both the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

3

CHAPTER ONE: 

ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH 

KOREAN AND PENINSULAR 

SECURITY

Over the past year, the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or 

North Korea) leader Kim Jong Un has 

solidified his grip on power and continued 

to implement his broader national 

agenda. Kim has embraced the coercive 

tools used by his father and grandfather —

force and the threat of force combined 

with inducements — to quell domestic 

dissent, strengthen internal security, and

co-opt the North Korean military and elites. 

Under Kim’s leadership, North Korea has 

continued to develop strategic military 

capabilities to deter external attack and 

challenge the Republic of Korea (ROK or 

South Korea) and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. In 

April 2013, Kim announced the “byungjin” 

policy, which emphasizes the parallel 

development of the country’s economy 

and nuclear weapons program, to 

reinforce his regime’s domestic, 

diplomatic, economic, and security 

interests.

In early 2015, Kim began reaching out 

diplomatically to Southeast Asia, Africa,

and Russia to improve North Korea’s 

economy, lessen its dependence on 

China, and counteract international efforts 

to disparage the regime’s human rights 

record. These efforts have had little 

success, and North Korea remains unable 

to significantly expand ties with foreign 

partners. 

In August 2015, Kim undertook another 

coercive campaign against the ROK. 

Tensions on the Peninsula surged after 

North Korean landmines severely injured

two ROK soldiers inside the Demilitarized 

Zone (DMZ) on August 4. In response, the 

ROK resumed the use of loudspeakers

across the DMZ for propaganda 

broadcasts, the first time in over 11 years. 

In addition, the ROK placed military units 

on heightened alert, and U.S. Forces Korea 

adopted an enhanced watch posture.

North Korea responded with loudspeaker 

broadcasts of its own. On August 20, ROK

forces reported incoming artillery fire from 

North Korean units and responded by firing 

artillery into the DMZ. North Korea then 

issued an ultimatum demanding South 

Korea disable the loudspeakers. With 

tensions remaining high, the two sides met 

to discuss an end to the crisis. After more 

than 43 hours of high-level talks, North 

Korea expressed regret over the August 4 

landmine incident, South Korea agreed to 

stop propaganda broadcasts, and both 

sides agreed to hold further talks on 

improving relations. 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

4

The two Koreas also agreed to hold family 

reunions, which took place on October 20-

26. It is unlikely, however, that such 

engagement will prevent North Korea from 

undertaking another provocation should 

Kim so choose. Moreover, North Korea 

could return to confrontational behavior, 

such as conducting a ballistic missile 

launch or an unconventional attack on 

the ROK, at any time. 

North Korea continues to advance its 

nuclear program. In September 2015, the 

DPRK’s Atomic Energy Institute noted that 

its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including 

the uranium enrichment plant and 

reactor, have been “adjusted and 

altered,” and that operations have 

restarted for the purpose of building its 

nuclear force.

North Korea has also maintained efforts to 

develop its nascent space program, likely 

as an attempt to provide a veneer of 

legitimacy to its ballistic missile program. In 

mid-September 2015, North Korea’s

National Aerospace Development 

Administration announced that it was 

pressing forward with development of 

weather and geostationary satellites and 

that more long-range space launches to 

place satellites into orbit would occur.

North Korea’s space-vehicle launches use 

ballistic missile technology similar to the 

type used in inter-continental ballistic 

missiles, which is prohibited by UNSCRs

1874, 2087, and 2094.

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY 

PERCEPTIONS 

North Korean security perceptions have 

not substantially changed in the past two 

years. These include the expanding gap in 

national power compared to South Korea, 

North Korea’s deepening political and 

economic isolation, the need to eliminate

perceived internal threats to the Kim 

family, and a political culture that is 

defined by an unending existential 

struggle with outside forces.

The regime sees threats emanating from 

inside and outside the country. It does not 

trust regional actors, including China and 

Russia, nor does the regime trust its own 

population. The regime continues to 

portray a garrison state worldview of 

imminent threat, which serves to justify 

draconian internal security controls, vast 

expenditures on the military, and the 

continued unchallenged rule by the Kim 

regime.

Internally, the Kim regime seeks to 

maintain ideological control over a

citizenry that is growing less reliant on the 

State because it is no longer the primary 

source of basic goods and services. The 

regime continues to prioritize ideological 

indoctrination, intimidation, and 

preferential treatment of the privileged 

elite in Pyongyang and of select military 

units.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

5

Songun (Military-First Ideology)

North Korea’s songun or military-first 

ideology, a derivative of its Juche (selfreliance) ideology, elevates the Korean 

People’s Army as the ultimate defender 

of the country’s sovereignty and the 

main force of the revolution. Introduced 

in the mid-1990s by Kim Jong Il as a way 

to consolidate power and mitigate the 

precarious security environment 

following the death of Kim Il Sung and 

the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this 

policy co-opts the military by giving it 

primacy in the regime’s domestic, 

foreign, economic, and social policy 

decision-making. The military is viewed 

as one and the same with the State and 

party, unified with the working class as 

the backbone of North Korean socialism.

The Korean People’s Army participates 

in all aspects of daily life and is prioritized 

in resource allocation. The military-first 

approach, which views military strength 

as the best way to deter and defend

against foreign aggression, also bolsters

the centrality of nuclear weapons to the 

regime’s survival.

CHAPTER TWO: 

UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY

STRATEGIC GOALS

North Korea’s goals and strategies stem 

from the regime’s political isolation, 

economic deprivation, and deteriorating

conventional military, as well as the

increasing political, economic, and military 

power of nearby states. The strategic goal 

of the regime is to ensure Kim family rule in 

perpetuity. The overarching national 

security objectives to achieve this goal

under Kim Jong Un have remained largely 

consistent over the last two years: 

international recognition as a nucleararmed state; maintenance of a viable 

deterrent capability; the simultaneous 

development of its economy and nuclear 

weapons program (i.e., the “byungjin” 

line); reinforcement of its military-first 

approach to domestic and foreign affairs 

(“songun”); tight control over 

communications, borders, movement, and 

trade; and reunification of Korea under 

North Korea’s control. North Korea uses

reunification with South Korea as a key 

component of its national identity narrative 

to validate its strategy and policies, and to 

justify sacrifices demanded of the 

populace. However, North Korea’s leaders 

almost certainly recognize that achieving 

reunification under North Korean control is, 

for the foreseeable future, unattainable.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

6

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Beyond its fundamental role as a guarantor 

of national and regime security, the North 

Korean military supports the Kim regime’s 

use of coercive diplomacy as part of its 

larger foreign policy strategy. North Korea 

uses limited provocations — even those 

that are kinetic and lethal in nature, such 

as military actions and small-scale attacks

— to gain psychological advantage in 

diplomacy and win limited political and 

economic concessions. 

Closely tied to its coercive diplomatic 

strategy are North Korea’s nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs. DPRK leaders see 

these programs as necessary for a credible 

deterrent capability essential to its survival, 

sovereignty, and relevance, and 

supportive of its coercive military threats 

and actions. 

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND 

BEHAVIOR 

North Korea remains focused on extracting 

economic aid and diplomatic concessions 

from the international community while 

defending against perceived threats to its 

sovereignty. Since 2013, North Korea has 

increased diplomatic overtures to other 

countries in an attempt to secure foreign 

investment and improve its economy, but 

such outreach has failed to produce 

meaningful gains due to international 

sanctions and stigmatization related to 

concerns about its nuclear weapons 

program and human rights record. North 

Korea likely believes periodic “charm 

offensives” will eventually lead to 

improvements in regional relationships and 

gradual advancement of its strategic 

objectives.

In 2015, Kim Jong Un declined invitations to 

travel abroad to Moscow and Beijing for 

celebrations marking the 70th anniversary 

of the end of World War II, instead sending 

senior government officials. These 

important events could have afforded 

North Korea the opportunity to improve 

relations with its powerful neighbors, 

though during these visits Kim would have 

risked criticism of his nuclear program and 

unflattering comparisons to other world 

leaders in attendance. 

Relations between North and South Korea 

remained stalled this year until the two 

sides met in August to resolve the 

confrontation resulting from the landmine 

attack. The ROK’s responses may have 

surprised Kim Jong Un and led to the 

decision to deescalate the situation, but it 

is unclear whether continued talks will lead 

to a significant improvement in relations 

with Seoul. 

North Korea remains dependent on China 

as its key economic benefactor, and North 

Korea’s leaders are conscious that efforts 

to advance its nuclear and missile 

capabilities angers China. Nevertheless, 

the regime likely thinks China prioritizes the 

preservation of regional stability and will 

refrain from punishing North Korea too 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

7

severely or entirely cutting off diplomatic or 

economic ties. 

North Korea also maintains friendly relations 

with Russia, though the relationship is less

robust than North Korea’s relationship with 

China. Long-stalled plans for the creation 

of a natural gas pipeline from Russia to 

South Korea through North Korea — a 

project that could earn North Korea millions 

of dollars annually in transit fees — have 

made little concrete progress in recent 

years.

North Korean relations with Japan thawed 

somewhat in 2013 when North Korea

accepted a visit by a Japanese 

delegation and indicated it might be 

willing to discuss the longstanding issue of 

Japanese citizens abducted by North 

Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. In May 2014,

the Japanese and North Koreans held 

official talks in Stockholm, Sweden, which 

resulted in North Korea agreeing to reopen its investigation into the fate of the 

Japanese abductees and provide Japan 

with a report, in exchange for Japan 

easing some of its unilateral sanctions 

against North Korea. To date, however, 

North Korea has not provided Japan with 

any new substantive information. In August 

2015, North Korea claimed to have a report 

but that the Japanese refused to receive it, 

a claim Japan denies. Regardless, Japan 

continues to seek resolution with North 

Korea on the abductee issue.

North Korea remains willing to disrupt 

temporarily relations with regional 

neighbors, including Russia and China, and 

absorb the associated cost when it 

believes coercive actions toward South 

Korea or the United States will advance its 

strategic objectives. 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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CHAPTER THREE: 

THE CAPABILITIES AND MODERNIZATION GOALS 

OF NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY FORCES

OVERVIEW

The North Korean military poses a serious 

threat to the ROK, its other neighbors, and 

U.S. forces in the region despite its many 

internal challenges and constraints,

including deterioration of its conventional 

capabilities.

North Korea’s national military strategy is 

designed to support its national security 

strategy by defending the Kim regime’s 

rule and enabling the regime to conduct 

coercive diplomacy. This strategy relies 

heavily on deterrence, strategically

through its nuclear weapons program and

supporting delivery systems and 

conventionally by maintaining a large, 

heavily-armed, forward-deployed military

that presents a constant threat to South 

Korea, especially the greater Seoul 

metropolitan area. These two aspects of its 

military strategy are meant to be mutually 

supporting; the threat posed by one is 

employed to deter an attack on the other.

North Korea’s force modernization goals 

are aimed at maintaining the credibility of 

its conventional forces through more 

realistic training and the modest 

production of new systems; enhancing the 

credibility of its strategic deterrence by 

advancing its nuclear and missile 

programs; and developing new or 

improved means to support its coercive 

diplomacy – most notably via its cyber 

and missile programs. North Korea directs 

its limited resources to areas where it sees 

the potential for localized comparative 

advantage. 

Despite resource shortages and aging

equipment, North Korea’s large, forwardpositioned military can initiate an attack 

against the ROK with little or no warning, 

minimizing the logistics strain it would incur 

if deploying forces from further away. The 

military retains the capability to inflict 

significant damage on the ROK, especially 

in the region from the DMZ to Seoul.

Although North Korea is unlikely to attack 

on a scale that would risk regime survival 

by inviting overwhelming U.S.-ROK

counterattacks, North Korea’sthreshold for 

smaller, asymmetric attacks and 

provocations is unclear. Recent 

provocations (e.g., the November 2014 

cyber attack against Sony Pictures 

Entertainment and the August 2015 DMZ 

landmines incident) suggest that North 

Korea sees some value in such attacks. 

Indeed, North Korea’s special operations 

forces (SOF), growing artillery, and missile 

forces provide significant capabilities for 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

10

small-scale attacks that could rapidly 

escalate into a larger scale confrontation.

North Korea is making efforts to upgrade

select elements of its large arsenal of 

mostly outdated conventional weapons. It 

has reinforced long-range artillery forces 

near the DMZ and has a substantial 

number of mobile ballistic missiles that 

could strike a variety of targets in the ROK 

and Japan. However, the DPRK’s force 

modernization will likely emphasize

defensive and asymmetric attack 

capabilities to counter technologically

superior ROK and U.S. conventional forces. 

North Korea will likely continue to develop 

and test-launch missiles, including the 

Taepodong (TD)-2 intercontinental ballistic 

missile (ICBM)/ space-launch vehicle (SLV).

North Korea’s desire to enhance 

deterrence and defense and to improve 

its ability to conduct limited attacks 

against the ROK drives its road-mobile 

ICBM development, missile tests, and 

programs to improve unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAV), denial and deception,

cyber, electronic warfare, and 

submarines.

AN AGING FORCE...WITH 

EMERGING CAPABILITIES

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) — a 

large, ground force-centric organization 

comprising ground, air, naval, missile, and 

SOF — has over one million soldiers in its 

ranks, making it the fourth largest military in 

the world. Four to five percent of North 

Korea’s 24 million people serve on active 

duty, and another 25 to 30 percent are

assigned to a reserve or paramilitary unit 

and would be subject to wartime 

mobilization. With approximately 70 

percent of its ground forces and 50 

percent of its air and naval forces 

deployed within 100 kilometers of the DMZ, 

the KPA poses a continuous threat to the 

ROK and U.S. forces stationed there. The 

general disposition of the KPA has not 

changed in the last two years.

The KPA primarily fields legacy equipment, 

either produced in or based on designs 

from the Soviet Union and China dating

back to the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 

Although a few weapons systems are 

based on modern technology, the KPA 

has not kept pace with regional military 

capability developments. The KPA has not 

acquired new fighter aircraft in decades, 

relies on older air defense systems, lacks 

ballistic missile defense, its Navy does not 

train for blue water operations, and 

recently unveiled artillery systems include 

tractor-towed rocket launchers while most 

other countries are improving the mobility 

of such systems.

Kim Jong Un seems to prioritize the 

development of new weapons systems, as 

demonstrated by his numerous 

appearances with military units and 

research and development organizations. 

He has personally overseen land- and seabased ballistic missile and anti-ship cruise 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

11

missile testing activity in 2014 and 2015. He 

has also overseen events designed to 

demonstrate the proficiency of his 

conventional military forces.

Ground. The KPA’s ground forces are 

predominantly regular and light infantry 

units, supported by armor and 

mechanized units and heavy 

concentrations of artillery. These forces are 

forward-deployed, fortified in several 

thousand underground facilities, and 

include long-range cannon and rocket 

artillery forces that are capable of 

reaching targets in Seoul from their 

garrisons. 

The ground forces possess numerous light 

and medium tanks, and many armored 

personnel carriers. The KPA’s large artillery 

force includes long-range 170-mm guns 

and 240-mm multiple rocket launchers

(MRL), many deployed along the DMZ 

posing a constant threat to northern parts 

of the ROK.

In October 2015, North Korea paraded 

what appears to be a large-caliber MRL —

larger than its 240-mm MRL — that carries 

eight tubes on a wheeled chassis. In 

recent years, North Korea has unveiled

other new ground force equipment, 

including tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, 

and infantry weapons. The display of these 

systems shows that North Korea continues 

to produce, or at least upgrade, limited 

types and numbers of military equipment. 

Air and Air Defense. The North Korean Air 

Force (NKAF), a fleet of more than 1,300 

aircraft that are primarily legacy Soviet 

models, is primarily responsible for 

defending North Korean air space. Its 

other missions include SOF insertion, 

transportation and logistics support, 

reconnaissance, and tactical air support 

for KPA ground forces. However, because 

of the technological inferiority of most of its 

aircraft fleet and rigid air defense 

command and control structure, much of 

North Korea’s air defense is provided by 

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA).

The NKAF’s most capable combat aircraft 

are its MiG-29s, procured from the Soviet 

Union in the late 1980s, its MiG-23, and its 

SU-25 ground-attack aircraft. However, the 

majority of its aircraft are less capable 

MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-19s (F-6), and MiG21s. The NKAF operates a large fleet of An2 COLT aircraft, which are 1940s vintage 

single-engine, 10-passenger biplanes, likely 

tasked with inserting SOF into the ROK. The 

Air Force is rounded out with several 

hundred helicopters that would be used 

for troop transport and ground attack,

including predominantly Mi-2/HOPLITE and

some U.S.-made MD-500 helicopters 

obtained by circumventing U.S. export 

controls in 1985.

North Korea possesses a dense, 

overlapping air defense system of SA-2, 

SA-3, and SA-5 SAM sites, mobile SA-13 

SAMs, mobile and fixed AAA, and 

numerous man-portable air-defense 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

12

systems like the SA-7. As the NKAF’s aircraft 

continue to age, it increasingly relies on its 

ground-based air defenses and on hiding 

or hardening assets to counter air attacks.

During a 2010 military parade, North Korea 

displayed a new mobile SAM launcher 

and accompanying radar, which bore

external resemblance to the Russian S-300 

and Chinese HQ-9. 

North Korea publicized a March 2013 

military live-fire drill that for the first time 

featured an unmanned aerial vehicle 

(UAV) in flight. The UAV appeared to be a 

North Korean copy of a Raytheon MQM107 Streaker target drone. North Korean 

press coverage of the event described the 

UAV as being capable of precision strike 

by crashing into the target. The drill also 

featured the UAV as a cruise-missile

simulator, which was then shot down by a 

mobile SAM.

Naval. The North Korean Navy (NKN) is the 

smallest of the KPA’s three main services. 

This coastal force is composed primarily of 

numerous, though aging, small patrol craft 

that carry a variety of anti-ship cruise 

missiles, torpedoes, and guns. The NKN 

maintains one of the world’s largest 

submarine forces, with around 70 attack-, 

coastal-, and midget-type submarines. In 

addition, the NKN operates a large fleet of 

air-cushioned hovercraft and 

conventional landing craft to support 

amphibious operations and SOF insertion.

The force is divided into East and West 

Coast Fleets, which each operate a 

variety of patrol craft, guided-missile patrol 

boats, submarines, and landing craft. 

The NKN has displayed limited 

modernization efforts, highlighted by 

upgrades to select surface ships and a 

continued program to construct 

submarines. North Korea unveiled a new 

submarine in mid-2015, which it claims was 

developed domestically and can fire a 

ballistic missile. 

Special Operations Forces. North Korean 

SOF are among the most highly trained, 

well-equipped, best-fed, and highly

motivated forces in the KPA. As North 

Korea’s conventional capabilities decline 

relative to the ROK and United States, 

North Korea appears to increasingly 

regard SOF capabilities as vital for 

asymmetric coercion.

Strategic SOF units dispersed across North 

Korea appear designed for rapid offensive 

operations, internal defense against 

foreign attacks, or limited attacks against 

vulnerable targets in the ROK as part of a 

coercive diplomacy effort. They operate in 

specialized units, including

reconnaissance, airborne and seaborne 

insertion, commandos, and other 

specialties. All emphasize speed of 

movement and surprise attack to 

accomplish their missions. SOF may be 

airlifted by An-2 COLT or helicopters (and 

possibly Civil Air Administration transports),

moved by maritime insertion platforms, or 

travel on foot over land or via suspected 

underground, cross-DMZ tunnels to attack 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

13

high-value targets like command and 

control nodes or air bases in the ROK.

Ballistic Missile Force. North Korea has 

several hundred short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs)

available for use against targets on the 

Korean Peninsula and Japan. A

developmental intermediate-range 

ballistic missile (IRBM), though untested 

and unreliable as a weapon, could also 

be launched at targets in the region. 

North Korea has an ambitious ballistic 

missile development program in addition 

to its deployed mobile theater ballistic 

missiles. Since early 2012, North Korea has 

made efforts to raise the public profile of 

its ballistic missile command, now called 

the Strategic Rocket Forces. In 2014, Kim 

Jong Un personally oversaw several 

ballistic missile launch exercises, and North 

Korea launched an unprecedented 

number of ballistic missiles. The State 

media covered the usually secretive 

events, including reporting on two launch 

cycles in the same week. Kim’s public 

emphasis of the missile force continued 

into 2015, when he appeared at what 

North Korea portrayed as the test launch 

of a submarine-launched ballistic missile 

(SLBM). In late November 2015, the ROK’s 

Yonhap news agency reported that North 

Korea appeared to conduct an SLBM test 

but it ended in failure with no indication 

that the missile successfully ejected from 

the vessel.

North Korea is committed to developing a 

long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is 

capable of posing a direct threat to the 

United States. Pyongyang displayed the 

KN08 ICBM, which it refers to as Hwasong13, on six road-mobile transporter-erectorlaunchers (TEL) during military parades in 

2012 and 2013. If successfully designed 

and developed, the KN08 likely would be 

capable of reaching much of the

continental United States, assuming the 

missiles displayed are generally 

representative of missiles that will be 

fielded. However, ICBMs are extremely 

complex systems that require multiple flight 

tests to identify and correct design or 

manufacturing defects. Without flight tests, 

the KN08’s current reliability as a weapon 

system would be low. In October 2015, 

North Korea paraded four missiles on KN08 

TELs. These missiles are noticeably different 

from those previously displayed on these 

TELs.

North Korea also continues to develop the 

TD-2, which could reach the continental 

United States if configured as an ICBM. In 

April and December 2012, North Korea 

conducted launches of the TD-2

configured as a SLV, which used ballistic 

missile technology. The April launch failed

but the December launch succeeded. 

Developing an SLV contributes heavily to 

North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile 

development, since the two vehicles have 

many shared technologies. However, a 

space launch does not test a reentry 

vehicle (RV). Without an RV capable of 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

14

surviving atmospheric reentry, North Korea 

cannot deliver a weapon to target from 

an ICBM. 

Advances in ballistic missile delivery 

systems, coupled with developments in 

nuclear technology discussed in Chapter 

4, are in line with North Korea’s stated 

objective of being able to strike the U.S. 

homeland. North Korea followed its

February 12, 2013 nuclear test with a 

campaign of media releases and 

authoritative public announcements 

reaffirming its need to counter perceived 

U.S. hostility with nuclear-armed ICBMs. 

North Korea continues to devote scarce 

resources to these programs, but the pace 

of its progress will also depend, in part, on 

how much technology and other aid it 

can acquire from other countries. 

Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea 

has an offensive cyber operations (OCO)

capability. Implicated in malicious cyber 

activity and cyber effects operationssince 

2009, North Korea probably views OCO as 

an appealing platform from which to 

collect intelligence and cause disruption in

South Korea and other adversaries 

including the United States. North Korea

likely views cyber as a cost-effective,

asymmetric, deniable tool that it can 

employ with little risk from reprisal attacks, 

in part because its networks are largely 

separated from the Internet and disruption 

of Internet access would have minimal 

impact on its economy. On November 24, 

2014, North Korean cyberactors using the 

name “Guardians of Peace” attacked 

Sony Pictures Entertainment, shutting down 

employee access and deleting data. As a 

result of North Korea’s historical isolation 

from outside communications and 

influence, it is likely to use Internet 

infrastructure from third-party nations.

Intelligence Services. North Korean 

intelligence and security services collect 

political, military, economic, and technical 

information through open-source, human 

intelligence, cyber, and signals 

intelligence capabilities. North Korea’s 

primary intelligence collection targets 

remain South Korea, the United States, and 

Japan.

The Reconnaissance General Bureau 

(RGB) is North Korea’s primary foreign 

intelligence service, responsible for 

collection and clandestine operations. The 

RGB is comprised of six bureaus with 

compartmented functions including 

operations, reconnaissance, technology 

and cyber, overseas intelligence, interKorean talks, and service support. 

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is North 

Korea’s primary counterintelligence 

service and is an autonomous agency of 

the North Korean government reporting 

directly to Kim Jong Un. The MSS is 

responsible for operating North Korean 

prison camps, investigating cases of 

domestic espionage, repatriating 

defectors, and conducting overseas 

counterespionage activities in North 

Korea’s foreign missions.
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The United Front Department (UFD) overtly 

attempts to establish pro-North Korean 

groups in South Korea such as the Korean 

Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic 

Reconciliation Council. The UFD is also the 

primary department involved in managing 

inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea’s 

policy toward South Korea.

The 225th Bureau is responsible for training 

agents to infiltrate South Korea and 

establishing underground political parties 

focused on fomenting unrest and 

revolution.

Command, Control, and Communications.

North Korea’s National Defense 

Commission (NDC) is the official authority 

over the North’s military and security 

services. The Ministry of People’s Armed 

Forces (MPAF) is the administrative superior 

of the KPA, while operational command 

and control is exercised by the General 

Staff Department. The 1992 constitution 

gives control of North Korea’s military to 

the NDC, and Kim Jong Un exercises 

control of the military as “First Chairman” 

of the NDC and “Supreme Commander”

of the KPA. Kim Jong Un further exercises 

control as “First Secretary” of the Korean 

Worker’s Party (KWP) and “Chairman” of 

the KWP’s Central Military Commission.

North Korea has a nationwide fiber-optic 

network, and has invested in a modern 

nationwide cellular network. However, 

telecommunication services and access 

are strictly controlled and all networks are 

available for military use, if necessary.

Cell phone subscribership reportedly 

exceeds three million nationwide with 

continued growth of Koryolink, a joint 

venture between Pyongyang and Egypt’s 

Global Telecom Holding. Mobile phone 

users are concentrated in major cities, with 

growth in small towns and villages.

However, most cell phones cannot access 

the Internet and can only make domestic 

calls. In 2014, Orascom suggested the 

future of Koryolink was uncertain, in part

because the North Korean Government 

had launched a competing cellular 

network. In addition, Global Telecom cited 

international sanctions and the absence 

of a free-floating currency exchange as 

impediments to the transfer of its profits out 

of North Korea. This could sour further 

investment by global investors into North 

Korea’s telecoms sector. The Government 

restricts most North Koreans from using the 

Internet, but some are able to access the 

national intranet, which is insulated from 

the World Wide Web. The intranet hosts 

government-approved websites, primarily 

to support academic research and 

government businesses.
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Forces

System # of Launchers Estimated Range 

Toksa

Fewer than 100

75 miles 

SCUD-B 185 miles

SCUD-C 310 miles 

SCUD-ER 435-625 miles

No Dong Fewer than 50 800 miles 

IRBM Fewer than 50 2,000+ miles

TD-2 Unknown* 3,400+ miles**

SLBM At least 1 Unknown

KN08 At least 6 3,400+ miles**

Note: North Korea has produced its own version of the SCUD B, and the SCUD C, 

an extended-range version of the SCUD B. North Korea will continue using and 

improving the TD-2, which has only been used in a space-launch role, but could 

reach the United States with a nuclear payload if developed as an ICBM. North 

Korea is also developing the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and has paraded six 

launchers for the system. The KN08, an IRBM, and an SLBM have not been flighttested and their current reliability as weapon systems would be low. 

* Launches of the TD-2 have been observed from both east and west coast 

launch facilities.

** ICBM is defined as a ballistic missile (land-based) capable of a range in 

excess of 5,500 kilometers (or 3,418 miles).
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CHAPTER FOUR: 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

PROGRAMS AND PROLIFERATION

NORTH KOREA’S WMD 

PROGRAMS

Nuclear Weapons. North Korea continues 

to pursue a nuclear weapons program, 

having conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 

2009, and 2013. In April 2013, less than two 

months after its third nuclear test, North 

Korea promulgated a domestic “Law on 

Consolidating Position as a Nuclear 

Weapons State” to provide a legal basis

for its nuclear program and another signal 

that it does not intend to give up its pursuit 

of nuclear development. The law states 

“the nuclear weapons of the DPRK can 

only be used by a final order of the 

Supreme Commander of the Korean’s 

People’s Army (Kim Jong Un) to repel 

invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear 

weapons state and make retaliatory 

strikes.” North Korea continues to invest in 

its nuclear infrastructure and could 

conduct additional nuclear tests at any 

time. In 2010, North Korea revealed a 

uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon 

that it claims is for producing fuel for a light 

water reactor under construction. In April 

2013, North Korea announced its intent to 

restart and refurbish the nuclear facilities 

at Yongbyon, including the nuclear 

reactor that had been shut down since 

2007 and the uranium enrichment facility. 

The director of the DPRK Atomic Energy 

Institute confirmed in September 2015 that 

all of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, 

including the uranium enrichment plant 

and reactor, were “adjusted and altered” 

following the April 2013 announcement 

and restarted for the purpose of building 

its nuclear force. The director also claimed 

that scientists and technicians were 

enhancing the levels of various nuclear 

weapons in quality and quantity.

These activities violate North Korea’s 

obligations under UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087,

and 2094, contravene its commitments 

under the September 19, 2005 Six-Party 

Talks Joint Statement, and increase the risk 

of proliferation.

Biological Weapons. DoD assesses that 

North Korea may consider the use of 

biological weapons as an option, contrary 

to its obligations under the Biological and 

Toxins Weapons Convention (BWC). North 

Korea continues to develop its biological 

research and development capabilities, 

but has yet to declare any relevant 

developments and has failed to provide a 

BWC Confidence-Building Measure 

declaration since 1990.
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Chemical Weapons. North Korea probably 

has had a longstanding chemical 

weapons (CW) program with the 

capability to produce nerve, blister, blood, 

and choking agents and likely possesses a 

CW stockpile. North Korea probably could 

employ CW agents by modifying a variety 

of conventional munitions, including 

artillery and ballistic missiles. In addition, 

North Korean forces are prepared to 

operate in a contaminated environment; 

they train regularly in chemical defense 

operations. North Korea is not a party to 

the Chemical Weapons Convention.

PROLIFERATION

North Korea has been an exporter of 

conventional arms and ballistic missiles for 

several decades. Despite the adoption of 

United Nations Security Council resolutions 

(UNSCRs) 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094,

which prohibit all weapons sales and the 

provision of related technical training from 

North Korea, the DPRK continues to 

market, sell, and deliver weapons-related 

goods and services. Weapons sales are a 

critical source of foreign currency for North 

Korea, which is unlikely to cease export 

activity in spite of UN Security Council 

sanctions; the implementation of 

Executive Order 13382, under which

designated WMD proliferators’ access to 

the U.S. and global financial systems are 

targeted; or increased international efforts 

to interdict its weapons-related exports.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS 

AND MISSILE SALES 

North Korea uses a worldwide network to 

facilitate arms sales activities and 

maintains a core, but dwindling group of 

recipient countries including Iran, Syria,

and Burma. North Korea has exported 

conventional and ballistic missile-related 

equipment, components, materials, and 

technical assistance to countries in Africa, 

Asia, and the Middle East. Conventional 

weapons sales have included ammunition, 

small arms, artillery, armored vehicles, and 

SAMs.

In addition to Iran and Syria, past clients for 

North Korea’s ballistic missiles and 

associated technology have included 

Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen.

Burma has begun distancing itself from 

North Korea but concerns remain

regarding lingering arms trade ties.

North Korea uses various methods to 

circumvent UNSCRs, including falsifying 

end-user certificates, mislabeling crates, 

sending cargo through multiple front 

companies and intermediaries, and using 

air cargo for deliveries of high-value and 

sensitive arms exports.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

North Korea’s demonstrated willingness to 

proliferate nuclear technology remains 

one of our gravest concerns. North Korea 

provided Libya with uranium hexafluoride, 

the form of uranium used in the uranium 
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enrichment process to produce fuel for 

nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons, 

via the proliferation network of Pakistani 

nuclear scientist AQ Khan. North Korea

also provided Syria with nuclear reactor 

technology until 2007.

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS

Global concern about North Korea’s 

proliferation activities continues to mount, 

leading various nations to take action. 

Notable recent interdiction events 

pursuant to UNSCRs include:

 In July 2013, Panamanian authorities 

stopped and inspected the North 

Korean flagged vessel Chong Chon 

Gang, finding hidden cargo including 

two MiG-21 fighter aircraft and 

associated engines, SA-2 and SA-3 SAMrelated equipment, and unspecified 

missiles. Cuba issued a statement 

acknowledging ownership of the 

military equipment and claiming it was 

being sent to North Korea for overhaul.

 In June 2011, the M/V Light, a merchant 

vessel bound for Burma suspected of 

carrying military-related cargo, returned 

to North Korea after refusing a U.S. Navy 

inspection request.

 In February 2010, South Africa seized 

North Korean-origin spare tank parts 

destined for the Republic of Congo.

 In December 2009, Thai authorities 

impounded the cargo of a chartered 

cargo plane containing about 35 metric 

tons of North Korean weapons,

including artillery rockets, rocketpropelled grenades, and SAMs.

 In October 2009, the ROK seized North 

Korean-origin chemical warfare 

protective suits destined for Syria.

Although some of its weapons-transfer 

attempts have been interdicted by the

international community, North Korea will 

continue to attempt arms shipments via 

new and increasingly complex routes. 
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