Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 27077 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2015–09–05 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–18151; Docket No. 

FAA–2014–0429; Directorate Identifier 

2014–NM–039–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective June 16, 2015. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 747–400 and 747–400F airplanes, 

certificated in any category, as identified in 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–25A3640, 

dated January 8, 2014. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 25, Equipment/Furnishings. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by reports of 

cracking in the main equipment center (MEC) 

drip shield and exhaust plenum. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent water penetration 

into the MEC, which could result in an 

electrical short and potential loss of several 

functions essential for safe flight. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Installation 

Within 24 months after the effective date 

of this AD, install a fiberglass reinforcing 

overcoat on the MEC drip shield, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 

747–25A3640, dated January 8, 2014. 

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (i) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair 

required by this AD if it is approved by the 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization 

Designation Authorization (ODA) that has 

been authorized by the Manager, Seattle 

ACO, to make those findings. For a repair 

method to be approved, the repair must meet 

the certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically refer to this AD. 

(4) If any service information contains 

steps that are identified as RC (Required for 

Compliance), those steps must be done to 

comply with this AD; any steps that are not 

labeled as RC are recommended. Those steps 

that are not labeled as RC may be deviated 

from using accepted methods in accordance 

with the operator’s maintenance or 

inspection program without obtaining 

approval of an AMOC, provided the steps 

labeled as RC can be done and the airplane 

can be put back in a serviceable condition. 

Any substitutions or changes to steps labeled 

as RC require approval of an AMOC. 

(i) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Francis Smith, Aerospace Engineer, 

Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems 

Branch, ANM–150S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA 98057–3356; telephone: 425– 

917–6596; fax: 425–917–6590; email: 

Francis.Smith@faa.gov. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747– 

25A3640, dated January 8, 2014. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For Boeing service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & 

Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 

2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 

5680; Internet https://

www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA. For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 17, 

2015. 

Victor Wicklund, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–10069 Filed 5–11–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0636; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–037–AD; Amendment 

39–18154; AD 2015–09–08] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Airbus Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, 

and B4–605R airplanes; Model A300 

F4–605R airplanes; Model A300 C4– 

605R Variant F airplanes; and Model 

A310–204 and –304 airplanes; powered 

by General Electric (GE) Model CF6– 

80C2 series engines. This AD was 

prompted by reports of two singleengine flameout events during 

inclement weather. This AD requires 

installing a shunt of the rotary selector 

(introducing an auto-relight function); 

and, for certain airplanes, a wiring 

modification to a certain circuit breaker 

panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent 

a long engine restart sequence after a 

non-selection of continuous relight by 

the crew and a flameout event of both 

engines, which could result in reduced 

controllability of the airplane, especially 

at low altitude. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective June 

16, 2015. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of June 16, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov/

#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus SAS, 

Airworthiness Office—EAW, 1 Rond 

Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac 

Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 

96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email 

account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; 

Internet http://www.airbus.com. You 

may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES

27078 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. It is also 

available on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0636. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; telephone 425–227–2125; 

fax 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to 

amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD 

that would apply to certain Airbus 

Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, and B4– 

605R airplanes; Model A300 F4–605R 

airplanes; Model A300 C4–605R Variant 

F airplanes; and Model A310–204 and 

–304 airplanes; powered by GE Model 

CF6–80C2 series engines. The SNPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12424). We 

preceded the SNPRM with a notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that 

published in the Federal Register on 

June 18, 2012 (77 FR 36211). 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Union, has issued EASA Airworthiness 

Directive 2014–0156, dated July 3, 2014 

(referred to after this as the Mandatory 

Continuing Airworthiness Information, 

or ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe 

condition on Airbus Model A300 B4– 

601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes; 

Model A300 F4–605R airplanes; Model 

A300 C4–605R Variant F airplanes; and 

Model A310–204 and –304 airplanes; 

powered by GE Model CF6–80C2 series 

engines. The MCAI states: 

Two single flame-out events, attributed to 

inclement weather, occurred on Airbus Wide 

Body (WB) aeroplanes powered with GE 

CF6–80C2 engines. 

In the original design of Airbus WB 

aeroplanes, no auto-relight function is 

embodied. This means that, in case where the 

flight crew does not select continuous relight 

and a flame-out event occurs, a long engine 

restart sequence is necessary. 

This condition, if not corrected (if both 

engines have flamed out simultaneously), 

could possibly result in significantly reduced 

control of the aeroplane, especially at low 

altitude. 

To address this potentially unsafe 

condition, Airbus designed a modification by 

introducing auto-relight function for 

aeroplanes powered by GE CF6–80C2 engines 

and EASA issued AD 2011–0113 to require 

installation of that auto-relight function to 

increase restart capability without flight crew 

action. 

Since that [EASA] AD was issued, 

erroneous instructions have been identified 

in various revisions of related Airbus Service 

Bulletins (SB) A310–74–2003, SB A300–74– 

6003 and SB A300–74–9001, which meant 

that some of the instructions could not be 

accomplished and resulted in additional 

work for aeroplanes already modified. 

For the reason described above, this 

[EASA] AD retains the requirements of EASA 

AD 2011–0113, which is superseded, allows 

additional compliance time and requires the 

modification of the aeroplanes in accordance 

with the instructions of the latest applicable 

Airbus SB revision. 

For aeroplanes that have already been 

partially modified by an earlier (incorrect) 

issue of an SB, as applicable, this [EASA] AD 

requires additional work. 

You may examine the MCAI in the 

AD docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;

D=FAA-2012-0636-0002. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

have considered the comments received. 

The following presents the comments 

received on the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, 

March 5, 2014) and the FAA’s response 

to each comment. 

Request To Withdraw the SNPRM (79 

FR 12424, March 5, 2014) Based on the 

Rarity of Flameout Events 

FedEx stated that data presented by 

GE showed that since January 2008, a 

total of seven engine flameouts 

attributed to inclement weather have 

been reported across the entire global 

population of all GE Model CF6–80C2 

and CF6–80El series engines. FedEx 

pointed out that this corresponds to 

around 30 million flight hours and over 

7 million flight departures. FedEx stated 

that the last event affecting an Airbus 

airplane was reported in 2006 and 

involved a power management 

controlled (PMC) engine. FedEx asserted 

that there has never been an inclementweather-related engine flameout on a 

full authority digital engine control 

(FADEC) CF6–80C2-powered Airbus 

airplane reported to GE. FedEx stated 

that, in the text of the SNPRM (79 FR 

12424, March 5, 2014), the FAA cites 

the occurrence of two single-engine 

flameout events. FedEx stated that, 

while it cannot be certain which events 

the FAA is referring to, it can 

confidently assert that those events did 

not occur on a FedEx-operated airplane. 

FedEx remarked that, if an event has 

occurred within the last eight years and 

involved a FADEC-controlled engine, 

GE is unaware of it. FedEx asked that 

the FAA consider, based on this 

experience, the extreme unlikelihood of 

such a rare event occurring on a GEpowered Airbus airplane 

simultaneously with the non-selection 

of continuous relight by well-trained 

crew members. 

From these statements, we infer that 

FedEx is requesting that we withdraw 

the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 

2014) based on the rarity of engine 

flameout events. We disagree with this 

request. EASA’s determination for 

corrective action in the MCAI is based 

on a risk assessment of the worldwide 

fleet, and not limited to the experience 

of the commenter’s operations. While 

these events might not have happened 

on the commenter’s airplanes, 

inclement weather is likely to occur 

during any flight, and at any altitude. 

Both the PMC-controlled and FADECcontrolled engines remain susceptible to 

flameout during inclement weather 

without corrective actions to address the 

unsafe condition. While we frequently 

utilize flightcrew procedures as interim 

actions to address an unsafe condition, 

when available we consider a design 

solution to mitigate the unsafe condition 

to be more effective than relying on 

flightcrew procedures alone. We have 

determined that it is necessary to 

proceed with issuing this AD to 

adequately address the identified unsafe 

condition. Affected operators, however, 

may request approval of an alternative 

method of compliance (AMOC), as 

specified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD 

(designated as paragraph (i)(1) of the 

SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014), 

by submitting data substantiating that 

the AMOC would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. We have not changed 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Withdraw the SNPRM (79 

FR 12424, March 5, 2014) Based on 

Unreasonable Risk Factor 

FedEx stated that one of the primary 

justifications the FAA is using to 

establish the need for the SNPRM (79 

FR 12424, March 5, 2014) is the concern 

that a long engine restart sequence 

could result in reduced controllability 

of the airplane ‘‘especially at low 

altitude.’’ FedEx agreed that an inability 

to achieve timely relight at low altitude 

would present a greater risk of an unsafe 

condition occurring and would perhaps 

provide ample justification for the 

subject modification. However, FedEx 

asserted that all data provided by GE 

indicate that this phenomenon does not 

occur at low altitudes. FedEx also stated 

that analysis of the primary root cause 

for the engine flameouts suggests that 

the flight envelope of concern is 

between approximately 10,000 feet 

above sea level (ASL) and 35,000 feet 

ASL during idle descent. FedEx 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 27079 

remarked that the average altitude at 

which these events have historically 

occurred is 22,000 feet ASL, with the 

lowest recorded altitude for a multiengine event being 17,500 feet ASL. 

FedEx stated that in every recorded 

event, the flameout engines were 

restarted and continued to operate 

normally. FedEx concluded that, based 

on all the empirical data collected to 

date regarding the altitude at which 

these events occur, the momentary 

delay in restart time that is intended to 

be corrected by the modification does 

not seem to be significant enough to 

qualify as a reasonable risk factor. 

From these statements, we infer that 

FedEx is requesting that we withdraw 

the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 

2014) based on data showing that the 

events do not indicate a reasonable risk 

factor. We disagree with the request. 

Any delay in the ability to restart 

engines could result in an unsafe 

condition regardless of the altitude 

where the flameout occurs. Inclement 

weather may exist below 10,000 feet 

ASL and the possibility of terrain could 

also reduce altitude available to allow 

an engine restart. As we stated 

previously, we consider a design 

solution to be a more effective 

mitigating action to address an unsafe 

condition rather than relying on 

flightcrew procedures alone and the 

past experience of flightcrews having 

difficulty restarting engines following 

flameout. We have not changed this AD 

in this regard. 

Request To Reduce the Proposed 

Applicability 

FedEx requested that the FAA 

consider reducing the applicability 

stated in the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, 

March 5, 2014) to include only the 

(relatively) higher-risk PMC-powered 

airplanes. FedEx stated that a factor 

specific to its operation addresses a 

point raised by the FAA, which is the 

small size of its non-FADEC fleet of 

Airbus airplanes. FedEx highlighted that 

data suggest that, since the 

implementation of the FADEC software, 

improvements of the rate of flameout 

events on all FADEC-controlled engines 

has dropped significantly and is well 

below corresponding rates on PMCcontrolled Model CF6–80C2 series 

engines. FedEx stated that there are no 

recorded instances of a dual-engine 

flameout in inclement weather on any 

FADEC-controlled Model CF6–80C2 

series engine installed on Airbus 

airplanes. FedEx also stated that it 

operates a much larger GE-powered 

Airbus fleet with FADEC-controlled 

engines than with PMC-controlled 

engines. FedEx agreed with the FAA 

statement that ‘‘not all affected airplanes 

have FADEC-controlled engines 

installed,’’ and that FedEx’s exposure in 

this area is very limited. 

We disagree with the commenter’s 

request to reduce the applicability of 

this AD. The identified unsafe condition 

addressed in this AD applies to both 

types of GE Model CF6–80C2 series 

engines. The comparatively better inflight shutdown rate of FADECcontrolled engines to PMC-controlled 

engines is inconsequential to the 

vulnerability in both engine designs due 

to flameout from icing conditions. Icing 

conditions are anticipated to occur, and 

no mitigating actions have been offered 

to address icing vulnerability in both 

engine designs. As we stated previously, 

a design solution is more effective than 

reliance on flightcrew procedures alone. 

We have not changed this AD in this 

regard. 

Actions Since SNPRM (79 FR 12424, 

March 5, 2014) was Issued 

Since the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, 

March 5, 2014) was issued, EASA has 

issued AD 2014–0156, dated July 3, 

2014, which supersedes EASA AD 

2011–0113, dated June 17, 2011. EASA 

AD 2014–0156 adds revised service 

information (Airbus Service Bulletin 

A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014, and Airbus Service 

Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06, 

dated January 27, 2014). The revised 

service information includes actions for 

previously modified airplanes. We have 

changed paragraph (g) of this AD to 

reference the revised service 

information. We also added a new 

paragraph (h) to this AD to specify 

actions for previously modified 

airplanes. We have re-designated 

subsequent paragraphs accordingly. 

The revised service information also 

reduces a certain compliance time to 12 

months. However, for that action, this 

AD retains the compliance time 

proposed in the SNPRM: Within 2,200 

flight hours or 30 months after the 

effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs later. We have determined that 

this compliance time adequately 

addresses the identified unsafe 

condition. We have determined that the 

compliance time, as proposed, 

represents the maximum interval of 

time allowable for the affected airplanes 

to continue to safely operate before the 

modification is done. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

with the changes described previously 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the SNPRM (79 FR 

12424, March 5, 2014) for correcting the 

unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, 

March 5, 2014). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of this AD. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

Airbus has issued Service Bulletin 

A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014, and Service Bulletin 

A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014. The service 

information describes installing a shunt 

of the rotary selector; and, for certain 

airplanes, a wiring modification to a 

certain circuit breaker panel. This 

service information is reasonably 

available at http://www.regulations.gov 

by searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2015–0636. Or see ADDRESSES for 

other ways to access this service 

information. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 47 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Modification ............................................................... Up to 98 work-hours × 

$85 per hour = $8,330.

Up to $18,417 ................. $26,747 $1,257,109 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES

27080 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in 

Alaska; and 

4. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov/

#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

AD, the regulatory evaluation, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Operations office (telephone 

800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2015–09–08 Airbus: Amendment 39–18154. 

Docket No. FAA–2012–0636; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–NM–037–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD becomes effective June 16, 2015. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Airbus Model A300 B4– 

601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes; Model 

A300 F4–605R airplanes; Model A300 C4– 

605R Variant F airplanes; and Model A310– 

204 and –304 airplanes; certificated in any 

category; all serial numbers, powered by 

General Electric (GE) Model CF6–80C2 series 

engines. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 74, Ignition. 

(e) Reason 

This AD was prompted by reports of two 

single-engine flameout events during 

inclement weather. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent a long engine restart sequence after 

a non-selection of continuous relight by the 

crew and a flameout event of both engines, 

which could result in reduced controllability 

of the airplane, especially at low altitude. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Modification 

Within 6,000 flight hours or 30 months 

after the effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs later: Modify the airplane by installing 

a shunt of the rotary selector (introducing an 

auto-relight function), in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus 

Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, 

dated January 27, 2014 (for Model A300 B4– 

601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes; Model 

A300 F4–605R airplanes; and Model A300 

C4–605R Variant F airplanes); or Airbus 

Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06, 

dated January 27, 2014 (for Model A310–204 

and –304 airplanes). 

(h) Actions for Previously Modified 

Airplanes 

For airplanes which have already been 

modified in accordance with the 

requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD 

before the effective date of this AD: Within 

2,200 flight hours or 30 months after the 

effective date of this AD, whichever occurs 

later, accomplish the work tasks, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of the service information 

specified in Table 1 to this paragraph of this 

AD. 

TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (h) OF THIS AD—WORK TASKS

For Model— Previously modified using— Accomplish the identified work tasks in accordance with 

the instructions of— 

A300 B4–601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes, Model 

A300 F4–605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R 

Variant F airplanes.

Airbus Service Bulletin 

A300–74–6003, dated 

July 2, 2010.

Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus 

Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014. 

A300 B4–601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes, Model 

A300 F4–605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R 

Variant F airplanes.

Airbus Service Bulletin 

A300–74–6003, Revision 

01, dated April 1, 2011.

Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus 

Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014. 

A300 B4–601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes, Model 

A300 F4–605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R 

Variant F airplanes.

Airbus Service Bulletin 

A300–74–6003, Revision 

02, dated February 9, 

2012.

Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus 

Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014. 

A300 B4–601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes, Model 

A300 F4–605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R 

Variant F airplanes.

Airbus Service Bulletin 

A300–74–6003, Revision 

03, dated May 10, 2012.

Work Task 831–803001 using Airbus Service Bulletin 

A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated January 27, 

2014. 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 27081 

TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (h) OF THIS AD—WORK TASKS—Continued 

For Model— Previously modified using— Accomplish the identified work tasks in accordance with 

the instructions of— 

A310–204 and –304 airplanes ......................................... Airbus Service Bulletin 

A310–74–2003, dated 

July 2, 2010.

Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus 

Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014. 

A310–204 and –304 airplanes ......................................... Airbus Service Bulletin 

A310–74–2003, Revision 

01, dated April 1, 2011.

Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus 

Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014. 

A310–204 and –304 airplanes ......................................... Airbus Service Bulletin 

A310–74–2003, Revision 

02, dated February 9, 

2012.

Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus 

Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014. 

A310–204 and –304 airplanes ......................................... Airbus Service Bulletin 

A310–74–2003, Revision 

03, dated May 10, 2012.

Work Task 831–803001 using Airbus Service Bulletin 

A310–74 2003, Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014. 

(i) Credit for Previous Actions 

(1) This paragraph provides credit for the 

actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD, 

if those actions were performed before the 

effective date of this AD using the applicable 

service information specified in paragraphs 

(i)(1)(i) and (i)(2)(ii) of this AD, and provided 

that the additional work in Airbus Service 

Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated 

January 27, 2014; or Airbus Service Bulletin 

A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated January 

27, 2014; is done, as required by paragraph 

(g) of this AD. 

(i) For Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, and 

B4–605R airplanes, Model A300 F4–605R 

airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R Variant 

F airplanes: Airbus Mandatory Service 

Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 04, dated 

January 9, 2013, which is not incorporated by 

reference in this AD. 

(ii) For Model A310–204 and –304 

airplanes: Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin 

A310–74–2003, Revision 04, dated January 9, 

2013, which is not incorporated by reference 

in this AD. 

(2) This paragraph provides credit for the 

actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD, 

if those actions were performed before the 

effective date of this AD using the applicable 

service information specified in paragraphs 

(i)(2)(i) and (i)(2)(ii) of this AD. 

(i) For Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, and 

B4–605R airplanes, Model A300 F4–605R 

airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R Variant 

F airplanes: Airbus Service Bulletin A300– 

74–6003, Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013, 

which is not incorporated by reference in this 

AD. 

(ii) For Model A310–204 and –304 

airplanes: Airbus Service Bulletin A310–74– 

2003, Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013, 

which is not incorporated by reference in this 

AD. 

(j) Other FAA AD Provisions 

The following provisions also apply to this 

AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the International Branch, send it to ATTN: 

Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–2125; fax 425–227–1149. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-116- 

AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using 

any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector, or lacking a principal 

inspector, the manager of the local flight 

standards district office/certificate holding 

district office. The AMOC approval letter 

must specifically reference this AD. 

(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain corrective 

actions from a manufacturer, the action must 

be accomplished using a method approved 

by the Manager, International Branch, ANM– 

116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA; or 

the European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA); or Airbus’s EASA Design 

Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by 

the DOA, the approval must include the 

DOA-authorized signature. 

(k) Related Information 

(1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information (MCAI) EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2014–0156, dated 

July 3, 2014, for related information. This 

MCAI may be found in the AD docket on the 

Internet at http://www.regulations.gov/

#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636-0002. 

(2) Service information identified in this 

AD that is not incorporated by reference may 

be viewed at the addresses specified in 

paragraphs (l)(3) and (l)(4) of this AD. 

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Airbus Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, 

Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014. 

(ii) Airbus Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, 

Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness 

Office—EAW, 1 Rond Point Maurice 

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; 

telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 

93 44 51; email account.airworth-eas@

airbus.com; Internet http://www.airbus.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 10, 

2015. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–10181 Filed 5–11–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–1107; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–216–AD; Amendment 

39–18143; AD 2015–08–07] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Zodiac 

Aerotechnics (Formerly Intertechnique 

Aircraft Systems) Oxygen Mask 

Regulators 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Zodiac Aerotechnics (formerly 

Intertechnique Aircraft Systems) oxygen 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES