U. S. MARINE CORPS

SPECIAL UNITS

OF

WORLD WAR II

By

Charles L. Updegraph, Jr.

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Printed 1972

Reprinted 1977

PCN 19000413200
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock No. 008-055-00113-7
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

FOREWORD

"Special Marine Units of World War II" is a brief narrative of experimental special purpose units organized by the Marine Corps for World War II. It is published for the infor- mation of those interested in the special units and the events

in which they participated.

Charles L. Updegraph, Jr., has been on the staff of the Historical Division since June 1971. Previously he had oc- cupied a variety of staff positions with Headquarters, United States Air Force. He received his B. A. with Honors in

United States History from Hobart College in 1964. In 1969

he was awarded a ft. A. in International Affairs from the

School of Public and International Affairs of the George Washington University.

In the interest of accuracy and objectivity the Historical Division welcomes comments from key participants, Marine Corps activities, and interested individuals on this pamphlet.

(

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Reviewed and approved:

111

PREFACE

During World War II, a variety of new and experinental

units were organized by Marine Corps to enhance the capabilities of the Corps. For the first time under one cover, this

historical reference pamphlet tells of the development, deployment, and eventual demise of the five types of special

units: raiders, parachutists, glider forces, barrage balloon

squadrons, and base defense battalions. Official records of

the Marine Corps and appropriate historical works were utilized

in compiling this chronicle.

Final editing of the manuscript was accomplished by

Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian and Head, Histories

Section, Historical Branch. Miss Kay P. Sue typed the final

draft. Maps were prepared by Sergeant Jerry L. Jakes. All

illustrations are official Department of Defense photographs

from the files of the Combat Pictorial Branch, G-3 Division

of this Headquarters.

CHARLES L. UPDE A H, J

V

Foreword.

Preface

Table of Contents

Introduction

The Raider Battalions . Marine Parachute Battalions

The Glider Group

Barrage Balloon Squadrons

Defense Battalions

Conclusion. . . . . . . Footnotes . Appendix A - Unit Commanding Officers.

Appendix B - Unit Battle Honors. . . Appendix C - Unit Tables of Organization

Appendix D - Unit Tables of Equipment (TIE).

Appendix E - U. S. Naval Ships Named for Men of the 1st Raider Battalion. . . .

. . I • I •

Table of Contents

V

• • Vii

• . ix

. . 1

. • 36

. . 47

• . 54

• • 61

• . 78

• . 79

84

93

(110) 99

102

. • . . 105

vii

Introduction

Among the proudest traditions of the United States Marine Corps is the legend "First to Fight." This recognized ability

to deploy effective forces in a minimum of time to meet any

contingency is not easily maintained. It requires a careful evaluation of international trends and a constant reappraisal of the tactics and forces necessary to meet any crisis. The

types of forces which must be maintained, and the structure of

these forces, must be reviewed and updated.

During the middle and late 1930s, concurrently with the

Japanese expansion into northern China, the Marine Corps studied and refined its amphibious doctrine. Subsequently, the Corps stepped up its experimentation with new theories and methods to meet world-wide contingencies. Especially in the

aftermath of the outbreak of war in Europe, the United States military establishment undertook a reexamination of its re- sources and capabilities. The Marines were among the most aggressive when it came to adapting current forces to future

requirements.

A number of the units which emerged from this period, and

from the early war years, were either overtaken by events during the course of the war, or never lived up to their original promise. In these cases, the Marine Corps reorganized or dis- banded the units as dictated by the tactical requirements. This monograph traces the origin, formation, deployment, and eventual demise of five such units.

ix
x
The Raider Battalions(l)

Throughout the decade of the Thirties, the Marine Corps experimented with the concept of raider-type forces, generally as elements of larger operations. The annual Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEXs) included deployment of raiding and patrolling parties, generally operating from high speed transports and

destroyers, going ashore in rubber boats. The continuing interests in these units was demonstrated by the formation of "Provisional Rubber Boat Companies" from Companies A, E, and I

of the 7th Marines during FLEX-7 in February 1941. Reconnais- sance patrols and landing raids had been discussed extensively

in the first "Tentative Landing Manual" compiled in 1935.

The idea matured during the two years prior to U.S. entry

into the war. The British commandos executed raids against German installations on the European continent and in Africa. The raids suggested a certain audacity which had an immediate appeal in the United States, especially after Pearl Harbor, during the six months when American fortunes were very low. Among those intrigued by the idea of forming a U.S. version of

the commandos was President Roosevelt. Only a month after Pearl Harbor, Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR, the President's son, wrote to the Commandant of the Marine Corps proposing the

formation of a unit "for purposes similar to the British Com- mandos and the Chinese Guerrillas."(2) Roosevelt noted the

successes of the British in Europe and of the guerrillas oper- ating with the Chinese (Communist) Eighth Route Army in north- ern China. Especially in China it was observed that these

tactics were devasting when the Japanese lines became extended. The line of Japanese-occupied islands in the Pacific which

threatened U.S. contract wth Australia-New Zealand presented an obvious parallel as an inviting target for, raider operations. Roosevelt continued:

It is submitted that the position of our forces in

the Pacific would be greatly aided by similar action on

Japanese positions in the Mandated Islands, and perhaps later the Philippines by units based to the South; even more devastating action frontly by landing on Japan proper from Mito north to Aomori would certainly de- moralize the enemy.(3)

The Marine Corps already had taken steps to initiate a

program. On 6 January 1942, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines was redesignated the 1st Separate Battalion and was transferred

from the 1st Marine Division to Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, there to be available for the execution of individual raids or to operate as part of a larger force. Concurrently, Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant of the Marine Corps,

1
noted the similarity to the British commandos but directed

that the term "Marine" was alone sufficient "to indicate a man ready for duty at any time and that the injection of a special name, such as Commando, would be undesirable and superfluous." General Holcomb went on to state:

The organization, equipment, and training of infantry units of the Marine Divisions should, in prac- tically all respects, be identical to that of the 'Commandos'....In general, it may be stated that the

training of all units in the two Marine Divisions pre- pares them to carry out either offensive operations on a large-scale, or small-scale amphibious raids of the

type carried out by 'the Commandos.'

On 14 January 1942, the Commandant of the Marine Corps advised the Commanding General , Amphibious Force, Atlantic

(Major General Holland M. Smith) and the Commanding General, Department of the Pacific (Major General Charles F. B. Price) of a proposal to appoint Colonel William J. Donovan, USA, to

brigadier general USMCR with duty as commanding officer of the raider project. Both generals were requested to comment on the proposal, and both used the opportunity to comment generally on the entire raider concept.

General Smith recommended against the appointment of Donovan on grounds that the Marine Corps should not have to go outside of its ranks to secure leaders. He also opposed the

raider concept on philosophical grounds, noting that all Amphibious Force, Atlantic Marines could be trained in raiding tech- niques by their own officers if it were deemed important. (4) General Smith noted that there were enough "by-products" in

the Corps and that "all Amphibious Force Marines are considered

as commandos," thereby expressing a view that would become in- creasingly common among senior Marine officers, namely, that there was no task that the "elite" raider units could perform any more effectively than regular line units.

General Price's reply noted that the rapid expansion of

the Marine Corps was resulting in an extreme shortage of qualified officers and senior NCOs with the requisite command

experience. He therefore concurred with the raider concept only if the personnel were recruited directly rather than by drawing on already thin Corps resources.(5)

On 4 February 1942, the Commanding General, Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet, in response to a Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet directive, ordered the formation of four company- strength raider units. Concurrently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps ordered organization of the 2d Separate Battalion

on the west coast. The 2d Separate Battalion designation was

thus assigned to the then—organizing raider companies. In

order to comply with CinCPacFlt's directive that four companies

2
be formed, a reinforced company was detached from the 1st Separate Battalion at Quantico and reassigned to the 2d Separate Battalion.

In early February, General Holcomb wrote to General Smith, acknowledging the latter's letter, and offering some details on the matter of appointing Donovan.(*) Apparently the impetus for this appointment originated with a "very high authority" and only the Commandant's "utter disapproval" stayed the matter. It was apparent that the Marine Corps' expanded interest in raider units was at least partly the result of intense high- level political pressure. General Holcomb stated:

...we must act and act quickly. We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our most important missions, viz.; the execution of amphibious raids.... in view of the situation now facing us, It is impera- tive that we intensify this type of training....(6)

In a similar letter to Major General Clayton B. Vogel, Commanding General, 2d Joint Training Force (subsequently

redesignated Amphibious Force, Pacific), the Commandant stated:

From this long letter I am sure you and all others concerned will appreciate the importance of getting

this project underway immediately. It is really a matter of grave concern to me, as it may have a very important influence on our future.(7)

In a move at least partly precipitated by a desire to avoid a political appointee as leader of the raider units, Lieutenant Colonels Merritt A. Edson and Evans F. Carison

were designated to command the two battalions. Edson had served in France in World War I, had been a Marine pilot, captain of the Marine Rifle and Pistol Team, and an observer of the Sino-Japanese hostilities around Chapel, China. Carison had travelled extensively with the Chinese (Communist) Eighth Route Army guerrillas and had observed their tactics and organization. The executive officer of Edson's 1st Raider

Battalion was Major Samuel B. Griffith who had observed the British commando training program.

The basic mission of the two new raider units was three- fold: to be the spearhead of amphibious landings by larger

forces on beaches generally thought to be inaccessible; to

conduct raiding expeditions requiring great elements of sur- prise and high speed; and to conduct guerrilla type operations

(*) Donovan was subsequently selected to be Chief of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime forerunner of the CIA.

3
for protracted periods behind enemy lines.

The 1st Separate Battalion was redesignated the 1st Raider Battalion, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet on 16 February

1942. It was organized initially with a headquarters company and four rifle companies; in a reshuffling two days later a

fifth rifle company was formed, but the total reverted to four in a later reorganization. Lieutenant Colonel Edson was

commanding officer.

The 2d Separate Battalion, then forming at Camp Elliott

in San Diego, was redesignated the 2d Raider Battalion, Am- phibious Force, Pacific Fleet on 19 February 1942. Lieutenant Colonel Carlson was commanding officer and Major James Roosevelt was his executive officer. The 2d Raider Battalion remained in California in training throughout the spring. During the spring, high-level interests in the raider project was maintained. In a personal note of 27 March, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, asked General Holcomb for

information on the status of the raider units.(8) The Commandant was able to report on noticable progress.

The 1st Raider Battalion had split into forward and rear echelons. The former, with 29 officers and 638 men and full equipment left Quantico on 1 April en route to Samoa via San

Diego. Embarking on the USS Zeilin (AP-9) on 12 April, it arrived in Samoa on 28 April. The rear echelon, under Major Griffith, remained at Quantico until June when, after con- ducting extensive landing exercises, it moved to San Diego and

embarked on the USS Heywood (AP-l2) for Samoa. By early July, 1942, all elements of the 1st Raider Battalion were in Samoa

and ready for assignment.

The 2d Raider Battalion had completed its basic training

in mid-April. On 23 April, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Com- mander in Chief, Pacific notified Admiral King that the battalion was trained and ready to move to Hawaii for advanced in- struction in rubber boat operations and landings from sub- marines. The battalion, minus Companies C and D, arrived and

disembarked at Pearl Harbor on 17 May 1942. Companies C and D were detached and sent to reinforce the Ilarine units on Midway where they participated in the battle of Midway, 4-6

June 1942, while attached to the 6th Defense Battalion.

Following the departure of the raiders after Stateside

training, a number of views emerged on whether these units were necessary and, if so, how they should be organized and utilized. Writing some time after the event, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, at the time Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division, recalled the formation of the raider units:

...we progressed well in further filling, equipping, and training the units [of the 1st Marine Division]. But

4
now the first blow fell. Merritt Edson, armed with ap- propriate orders, arrived to comb our units for officers and men deemed suitable for his 1st Raider Battalion---

a new organization. I had known about the raiders in

Washington. Neither General Holcomb nor I favored forming elite units from units already elite. But Secretary of

the Navy Colonel Frank Knox and President Roosevelt, both of whom fancied the British commandos directed us

to come up with a similar organization....

Before forming the raiders we sent two young captains, Sam Griffith and Wally Greene, to England to observe the Commandos--largely on the basis of their recommendations General Holcomb authorized two raider battalions, one

under Merritt Edson on the east coast and one under Evans

Carison on the west coast. Edson's levy against our di- vision, coming at such a critical time, annoyed the devil out of me, but there wasn't one earthly thing I could do about it.(9)

In addition to disrupting personnel and training in regular units, the formation of raider battalions generated a

variety of requests for new and exotic equipment. Typical re- quests were for riot type shotguns, Lewis machine guns, collapsible bicycles, chain saws, scaling ropes, rubber boats, bangalore torpedoes, and sufficient automatic pistols to issue

one per raider.(lO)

Edson discussed the armament of raider battalions in a

letter to the Commandant in April.(l1) He compared the 81mm mortar with the 60mm, generally favoring the latter. He noted

that the inclusion of an 81mm mortar platoon would exceed the

capacity of an APD--high speed transport--(a recurring para- meter in raider organization was the carrying capacity of an APD which was envisioned as the standard raider transport. To

exceed this capacity would require splitting companies among

several ships with the resulting disadvantages). Furthermore, because of its greater weight, the 81mm would be less suited

to contemplated operations. The supply of ammunition would be an especially severe problem in fast-moving actions. Edson

suggested that, if it was felt that the 81mm was indispensible,

it be carried in the Weapons Company minus personnel. It could

then be operated by the 60mm personnel when required in stable

situations. Edson also suggested that the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) used by squad leaders in the 60mm mortar platoon be replaced with pistols or M-l carbines because the weight of

the BAR plus ammunition would be too great if the squad leaders were also carrying the mortar base plate, cleaning brush, and

field glasses.

Major Griffith, while with the rear echelon of the 1st Raider Battalion at Quantico, also discussed battalion organi- zation.(12) Griffith compared the organization of the 1st

5
Raider Battalion (four line companies, a weapons company and a headquarters company) with that of the 2d Raider Battalion (six

line companies and a headquarters company). The arrangement of the 2d Raider Battalion was thought to be more conducive to

raider operations, especially with a weapons platoon in each

company. Ideally, Griffith felt that a raider battalion should

be organized around six line companies and a headquarters and

service company which could be split, one element to each

company. Each company would include two rifle platoons, a weapons platoon, and a company headquarters. The platoons would be composed ofthree squads, each of which would include a squad leader and three-man fire teams. The fire teams would

be armed with BAR, an M-l rifle, and a Thompson submachine gun. This would permit engaging an enemy at up to 500 yards with

the M—l and the BAR, while having the support of the Thompson at close range or in street fighting.

These views reflect one of the greatest assets of the raiderbattalions, namely a constant reappraisal of troop organi- zation, and an ability to realign forces either permanently or for specific short-term objectives. The raider units were

characterized by intense review of weapons and tactics and a willingness to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. Raider

operations were envisioned as requiring forces in increments of company strength, hence the alignment around a company base of fire by organizing weapons platoons in each company.

By the summer of 1942, both raider battalions were in the

field, preparing for the types of missions they had been trained

to undertake. Within weeks, the 1st Raider Battalion would go

ashore at Tulagi during the Guadalcanal landings while the 2d Raider Battalion would carry out the diversionary raid on Makin Island.

General Vandegrift, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

split the Guadalcanal force into two groups. One, under Van- degrift, would execute the main landings at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The other, under Brigadier General William H. Rupertus, Assistant Division Commander, would land across the Sealark Channel in the Florida Island group. General Rupertus' force consisted of the 1st Raider Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Edson), the 1st Provisional Battalion (Major Robert H. Williams), and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans).

Tulagi is an island in Gavutu Harbor which is formed by

the irregular southern coast of Florida Island. Surrounded

on three sides by large coral beds, Tulagi is a long, narrow, hilly, heavily wooded mass. It is approximately 4,000 yards

long by 1,000 yards wide. The axis is roughly northwest to

southeast and the northern two-thirds is dominated by a wooded 350-foot-high spine. A lesser ridge, separated from the larger by a saddle depression, sits astride the southeastern end. The

6
GUADALCANAL -TULAGI

OBJECTIVE AREA

7 AUGUST 1942

Enemy occupied area

2

NAUTICAL MILES

4

NEVILLE

ZEILIN

HEY WOOD PRESIDENT JACKSON

CALHOUN GREGORY LITTLE

McKEAN

SEALARK

CHANNEL

IUNTER LIGGETI

ALCHIBA

I FOMALHAUT

I BETELGEUSE

CRESCENT CITY

I PRESIDENT HAYES

PRESIDENT ADAMS

ALHENA —i FULLER

I J AMERICAN LEGION

BELLATRIX

IMcCAWLEY tntioI BARNETT

Area I ELLIOT

I \LIBRA

Final

Arec

LU/I/GA ROADS

GUADALCANAL

7
island had been the seat of the British Solomon Islands Government and most development was centered around the southeastern

tip and in the saddle.

The initial landing, spearhead by Companies B and D of the

1st Raider Battalion, was made at 0800 on 7 August 1942 near

the western tip. The Japanese apparently were not expecting a

landing to occur at this point because of heavy coral out- croppings, and the assault was unopposed. This was fortunate

as the landing craft hung up on the reef, some 30 to 100 yards

from the beach. All assault troops had to wade ashore in water up to armpit depth. Companies B and D landed without incident and were followed by Companies A, C, and E. Following the oc- cupation of the native village of Sasapi, the battalion de- ployed in a line across the ridge. Company B extended from the waterl me on the north coast to a point halfway up the ridge where it intersected the left flank of Company D, which in turn

extended to the crest. On the southern slopes of the ridge, Company A took up position, its right flank intersected Company C which filled the line down and rearward to the waterline on

the south coast. Company E, with the 60mm mortars, took up positions near the landing area and provided beach security. The line advanced against sporadic resistance until it reached

the area separating the wooded ridge from the cultivated saddle. Here resistance mounted, especially in front of the Company C

sector, but was overcome with small arms fire and grenades.

The most serious opposition developed in a ravine located

in the smaller, southeastern ridge. The ravine was parallel to the line of advance and was defended so as to enfilade ap- proaching forces. Edson decided to go into positions for the

night outside the ravine as darkness was approaching.

The first night on Tulagi set the pattern for many others

to follow during the Pacific War. The enemy launched four separate attacks against the raider lines, occasionally making minor penetrations. In each case the Japanese failed to con- solidate their position and did not exploit the gain.

On the morning of 8 August, the ravine was flanked on both sides by raider units and in the rear by Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines which had moved up during

the night. From these positions a heavy concentration of 60mm mortar rounds from the raiders' weapons and heavier 81mm fire

from the mortars of 2/5 was directed against the enemy defenses. At 1500 the raiders rushed the ravine and cleaned up all remaining resistance. Tulagi was secure by nightfall, 8 August 1942.

The next raider operation, the Makin Island action of 17- 18 August 1942, was intended primarily as a diversion, up- setting Japanese plans to reinforce Guadalcanal and hopefully

forcing the enemy to divert some of those reinforcements to

8
\ —

9

—

I-

=
the relief of the Makin garrison. The raiders would also

gather valuable intelligence and destroy enemy personnel and installations on akin.

Makin Island is an atoll in the Gilberts, roughly tn— angular in shape, running northeast to southwest. Butaritari, the principal island, is located at the southwest point, just below the main lagoon entrance, and is approximately eight miles long by less than one-half mile wide. The entire island

was covered by a thick growth of coconut palms which extended to the waterline. The landing was scheduled for the ocean (south) side of the island.

The raiding force was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Carlson, commanding officer of the 2d Raider Battalion. The force was composed of Company A (less one rifle section) under Lieutenant 11erwyn C. Plumley and Company B (less one

rifle section) under Captain Ralph H. Coyte. Denoted Task Unit 7.15.3. the raiding party totaled 13 officers and 208

enlisted men.

The raiders embarked on the transport submarines USS Nautilus (SS-168) and USS Argonaut (APS-l) and departed Pearl Harbor at 0900, 8 August 1942. The two subs separated at r!ightfall and proceeded independently because the Nautilus was required to arrive off 4akin early enough to make a peri- scope reconnaissance. There was no contact with enemy ship- ping en route, and almost the entire voyage was made on the

surface. The Nautilus made landfall at 0300 on 16 August and

conducted a submerged reconnaissance of both the primary and

secondary landing sites although strong tides and a lack of distinguishing features complicated the task. A successful

rendezvous was effected with the Argonaut at 2116 (16 August)

in a heavy rain squall.

The two subs moved to the debark.tion point, arriving at 0300 under scattered clouds. The unloading was complicated by a one and one-half knot westward current which pulled the subs

in toward the reef and required a constant reverse to maintain

a 500—yard distance. All rubber boats were cleared on schedule despite confusion resulting from heavy swells and a last min- ute requirement that several boats launched from Argonaut pick up landing force personnel from Nautilus. Voice communi- cations were very difficult due to the roar of the surf and

the noise of the sea washing through the limber holes of the

subs. Although the original plan had specified two landing

beaches, confusion during the launch, together with several outboard motor failures, dictated a last minute change. Lieutenant Colonel Carlson ordered all boat to follow him to

landing beach Z opposite Government Wharf. Fifteen of the

boats managed to land together; two others landed about a mile north and their occupants joined up with the main body during the initial fire fight. The last boat came ashore over a mile

10
t :-'

-Th

Tulagi under attack. (USN Photo 80-G-11649)

Raiders return to Pearl Harbor from ilakin Island.

(USN Photo 80-G-13859)

11

\L

I

___, —

A 1— r
to the south, well behind Japanese lines.

The landings were unopposed, but while the two companies were forming up on the beach, one trooper accidently discharged his rifle, giving the alarm to the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel

Carlson ordered Company A to cross the island, seize the lagoon

road, and report back on its position relative to the wharves. Shortly before 0600, Company A reported its point at Government Wharf and stated that Government House had been captured with- out opposition. Proceeding south, the 1st Platoon of Company A made contact with the enemy along the lagoon road. The enemy defense included four machine guns, a flamethrower, two grenade

launchers, and infantry, armed with automatic weapons and sup- ported by well concealed snipers. A platoon from Company B re- inforced the right flank and finally broke through by 1130.(*) Meanwhile, two enemy ships had been spotted entering the lagoon, one a 3,500-ton transport, the other a 1,500-ton patrol craft. Both were sunk by well placed shots from the submarines' deck

guns.

Shortly after 1130, two Type-95 reconnaissance planes flew

over and, after scouting the area for 15 minutes, dropped two

bombs and departed. At 1320 a group of 12 aircraft appeared

--2 Kawanishi flying boats, 4 Zeroes, 4 Type-94 reconnaissance

bombers, and 2 Type-95s (possibly the same 2 from the morning). For over an hour they made passes over the island, occasionally dropping bombs and strafing.

On the ground, in an attempt to draw out the snipers around the main point of resistance, Lieutenant Colonel Carison ordered the center and right flank of his line to withdraw 200 yards to an area offering a clear field of fire, while leaving his left flank in position to enfilade the

enemy advance. Unfortunately, this ploy was not successful. Nevertheless, during the final air attack at 1630, the po- sitions from which Carlson had withdrawn were heavily bombed by Japanese planes, inflicting some casualties on advance

enemy elements.

At this point, time became a serious factor in the raid. Withdrawal was scheduled for 1930 and the raiders had been unsuccessful in taking any prisoners or destroying any facili- ties. The decision was made that an orderly withdrawal was a necessity and that to continue pressing the attack might jeop- ardize the tight time schedule. The flanks were pivoted to

the rear and by 1930 the boats were ready to enter the surf.

(*) The Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously to Sergeant Clyde Thomason of Atlanta, Georgia for conspicuous gallantry during this engagement.

12
The raiders had had extensive practices in launches through

the surf, and the surf around Making had not appeared partic- ularly difficult during the predawn landings. Unfortunately, the rapid succession of the breakers and their great force had

not been taken into account. The ensuing struggle was "so intense and so futile that it will forever remain a ghastly nightmare to those who participated."(l3)

Individual crews fought the surf for up to an hour, al- most invariably being washed back onto the beach. Most equip- ment was lost during the struggle and several men probably drowned at this time. Not over one-third of the raider force

managed to return to the subs on schedule. Heavy rains, the

loss of weapons, the probable arrival of Japanese reinforce- ments, and renewed air attacks all added to the general dis- pair. At dawn (18 August) further attempts to master the surf failed.

The submarines were forced to submerge after repeated air alerts but set a new rendezvous for 1930. Faced with the pros- pect of another day ashore, Lieutenant Colonel Carison sent out patrols to search for enemy food and weapons. Slowly it became apparent that very few Japanese remained alive on the island. Patrols sh:'t two enemy, but were otherwise unopposed. Upon

returning to the scene of the previous day's engagement, the

bodies of 83 enemy dead were counted(*) while the remains of 11 raiders were recovered. Three other raiders killed on the

17th were attached to the boat which had landed behind enemy

lines. This crew had harassed the enemy rear throughout the day before reembarking and successfully reaching the Nautilus.

During the late afternoon, one patrol uncovered almost 1,000 barrels of avgas which it fired with TNT. It also inspected the office of the Japanese commander who had been

killed in the fighting and removed a number of documents and charts.

In the evening, the four remaining rubber boats were car- ried to the lagoon side of the island where they were lashed

to a native outrigger. At 2030 the force put out across the

lagoon and arrived at 2308 arrived alongside the Nautilus off Funk Point at the entrance to the lagoon.

(*) The true casualty figures are in dispute. In a letter

(19Nov62), the Chief, War History Office, Defense Agency, Japan, stated to Head, Histories Branch, G—3 Division, HQMC (RefBr, I-IistDiv, HQMC) that total Japanese forces on the island on 17 August numbered approximately 70, of whom 43 were killed, 3 were declared missing, and 27 survived.

13
Total raider dead numbered 30, of whom 14 were killed in

action, 7 were drowned and, unbeknown to the United States until after the war, 9 were tragically left behind. It is unclear how they were left ashore. Perhaps they were actually

left on the island or it may be that they were in a boat which

unsuccessfully fought the surf on the 17th and drifted down- shore. In any case, they were captured by the Japanese forces

reoccupying the island following the raid and were executed after a brief captivity.

The evaluation of the raid was mixed. Casualties were

higher than expected and equipment losses were very extensive. General Holland M. Smith, commenting on the raid some years later,opined that it served no useful military purpose and had in fact alerted the Japanese to our intentions in the Gilberts, resulting in the heavy fortification of Tarawa.(14) Nevertheless, two ships, two aircraft, petroleum stores, and

radio facilities were destroyed and a number of enemy were killed. Also, the Japanese found it necessary to divert ele- ments of a relief force which had been forming at Truk to reinforce enemy positions on Guadalcanal. Finally, a number of

lessons emerged which would be taken into account in later operations. In retrospect, the Makin Island raid might best be viewed as a testing ground for the raider concept, incon- clusive in itself, •but of marked value in later operations.

The raiding force returned to Pearl Harbor and disembarked

on 25 August 1942. After a short rest it embarked for its new

permanent camp at Espiritu Santo, stopping at Canton Island and Noumea, New Caledonia en route, finally arriving on 20

September 1942. The arrival in Espiritu Santo occurred con- currently with a heated debate involving three senior admirals and General Holcomb, and concerned the formation of additional raider battalions. The genesis of the problem was a message

from Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific to the Commanding Officer, Marine Detach- ment, 2d Marines, Espiritu Santo. Admiral Turner directed that a "2d Provisional Raider Battalion" be formed consisting

of six rifle companies and a small headquarters. Subsequently, the admiral indicated his intention to order the formation of similar raider battalions in the 7th and 8th Marines, stating in part:

...In many circumstances in the future amphibious warfare in the South Pacific it is believed that a Marine

Regiment, or a part of a Marine Regiment, or two Marine Regiments, will be the size of force appropriate for offensive and defensive amphibious operations. The employ- ment of a division as a landing unit seems less likely. In some cases, night landings by small units will be

useful for preparing bridgeheads for the main landings

the next day. The problem of mopping up outlying detachments will exist throughout the campaign. For this

14
reason, the Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific, has reached the conclusion that Marine regiment will not be an entirely suitable combat unit for operations in the South Pacific unless it has, as an integral part of its organization, either a Raider or a Parachute Battalion. The previous concept that Raider and Para- chute Battalions are always division or corps troops is no longer agreed to.

In view of the foregoing, and in order to prosecute

promptly the operations required by prospective tactical situations, the Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific, will, unless directed to the contrary, proceed with the organization of Provisional Raider Battalions in the 2d, 7th, and 8th Marines, and give these already trained

troops such additional specialized training as seems ap- propriate. Furthermore, he recommends that Marine Corps Headquarters issue directions for the permanent organiza- tion of Raider Battalions as integral units of all Marine

regiments now attached to, or ultimately destined for, the Amphibious Force, South Pacific.(l5)

Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander, South Pacific Force, forwarded the letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps via Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Nimitz. Admiral

Ghormley discounted the requirement that raider battalions be

formed as regimental forces and stated:

The organization of Raider Battalions from the

organic troops of the 7th and 8th Marines should be withheld pending a declaration of policy by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.(l6)

Admiral Nimitz also opposed the reorganization to put one

raider battalion in each regiment on grounds that raiders should

remain corps troops, and noted that all Marine units are basically capable of raider type operations. Admiral Nimitz

stated:

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is

of the opinion that Raider Battalions are specialized

troops and should be reserved for appropriate tasks-- and that extemporized organization of Marine Forces should be made only in the case of dire necessity.(17)

The position of the Commandant of the Marine Corps was well known on this point. As recently as 2 September, General Holcomb had advised the Chief of Naval Operations that he op- posed the formation of added raider battalions because all available personnel were required for the three Marine divisions then forming or in the field, because the results of the raider operations were of questionable value, and because the raider units had taken some of the best leaders from existing units.

15
Edson 's Ridge near Henderson Field, Guadalcanal (USMC Photo 50007)

Raider patrol with native guides, Guadalcanal.

(USMC Photo 51728)

16

*JJ
He observed that the commanders in the field seemed, however, to favor the formation of more raider.units and that he would

interpose no objection as the threat to Samoa seemed to have eased and a 3d Raider Battalion could be formed from volunteers

in the two regiments and three defense battalions then on

Samoa. (18)

In replying to Admiral Nimitz, General Holcomb noted

"with much concern" Admiral Turner's order regarding the for- mation of temporary battalions based on units of the 2d, 7th, and 8th Marines. General Holcomb "noted with regret" that Admiral Turner had failed to discuss the matter with the

Commanding General, 1st Marine Division.

In light of this controversy, the "2d Provisional Raider Battalion" was disbanded within two days of the arrival of the authentic 2d Raider Battalion at Espiritu Santo. The overriding importance of the episode is the clear reiteration, at several senior command levels, of the principle that raiders were to be separate, permanent, and distinct combat units. In the aftermath, the 3d Raider Battalion was activated

at American Samoa on 20 September 1942, and the 4th Raider Battalion was organized on 23 October 1942, initially at Camp

Linda Vista, California with a move in early November to Camp Pendleton. The Commandant of the Marine Corps directed that the 4th Raider Battalion be organized in excess of its authorized strength, the overage to be used to form a Raider Training Detachment for replacement training purposes. As a result, Raider Company, Training Center, Camp Pendleton was organized effective 5 February 1943.

During mid-September, while Carison's raiders were re- covering from the Makin raid and moving to their permanent camp on Espiritu Santo (the two companies from Midway had

since rejoined), Edson's 1st Raider Battalion was heavily en- gaged in Guadalcanal. Ecison's raiders had crossed over to

Guadalcanal on 31 August after the mop up on Tulagi had been

completed. The 1st Raider Battalion, with the 1st Parachute Battalion attached, went into bivouac west of the Lunga River behind Kukum. On 2 September, two companies of the raider battalion embarked on high speed transports for what proved

to be an uneventful patrol on neighboring Savo Island. Fol- lowing this action, the raiders and parachutists were organized

into a provisional battalion and moved into defensive positions

o.n the southern rim of the perimeter below Henderson Field, the strategically located airfield behind Marine lines.

Meanwhile, Edson was developing plans for an amphibious

raid behind enemy lines near Tasimboko where a Japanese build- up was reported. Just before dawn on 8 September, Companies A, B, and C went ashore east of Tasimboko and moved west to- ward the enemy rear. With the support of Marine Aircraft Group

(MAG) 23 aircraft and naval gunfire from the USS Manley (DD-74)

17
18

EDSON'S RIDGE

FINAL PHASE

NIGHT OF 13 SEPTEMBER 1942

—Main effort by Kawoguchi Detachment

J —Enemy secondary attacks

J—Marine front line as of dusk

_________

—Final defensive line held by Marines

—Routes of retirement of final

defensive position
and USS I'4cKean (DD-90), the raiders moved against the enemy, finally encountering stiff resistance at 1045. The parachute battalion arrived and, in a coordinated attack with the raiders, overran the Japanese positions. The enemy forces, however, estimated at 4,000, elected to break contact, permitting the

destruction of their abandoned encampment. As it developed,

these enemy forces were part of the Kawaguchi Force which was preparing a strong counterattack on the airfield and which would be blocked by the determined resistance of Edson's raiders

in the Battle of Bloody Ridge four days hence.

The raider-parachutist force was withdrawn and placed in

division reserve until 12 September when General Vandegrift ordered it into a 4,000-yard defense line maintained by the

1st Marines east of the Lunga. Sporadic contact marked the night of 12 September along the ridgeline which had been as- signed to the raiders and parachutists. Throughout the day- light hours of the 13th, while under periodic sniper fire, the Marines dug in for another night.

Shortly after dark, Kawaguchi launched his first attack against the center and right of the line. By 2200 it was estimated that two understrength parachute companies plus

Company B (less one platoon) of the raiders were facing at

least two enemy battalions. Through the night, Kawaguchi initiated at least a dozen assaults in an attempt to break the Marines on Bloody Ridge. By daylight the attacks dwindled and

the stragglers were bombed and strafed during their retreat. This action destroyed the unity of the Kawaguchi Force; the

remnants withdrew around Mount Austen toward Kokumbona and

were never again a viable threat. Colonel Edson, who com- manded the joint raider-parachutist force, was awarded the Medal of Honor for the Bloody Ridge action. Major Kenneth D. Bailey, killed in a later engagement on Guadalcanal, was awarded

the Medal of Honor posthumously for leading his troops in handto-hand combat for over ten hours on the Ridge.

On 20 September Colonel Edson took over command of the 5th Marines while the 1st Raider Battalion executive officer, Lieu- tenant Colonel Griffith, replaced him as battalion CO. The

raider battalion sailed from Guadalcanal, arriving at Noumea, New Caledonia on 17 October to rest and reorganize.

After its respite at Espi ri tu Santo, the 2d Raider Battal -

ion, still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carison, moved to Guadalcanal and, on 4 November, spearheaded a landing at Aola on the northeast coast, starting the famous "Thirty Days behind

the Lines." After covering the landing of a construction battalion and a defense battalion at Ada, the raiders moved inland and to the west to intercept enemy units reportedly oper- ating near Gogende and Reko. After intermittant contact, the

battalion moved to the area between the Balesuma and Metapona Rivers where company-size patrols were sent out from the base

19
CARL SON'S PATROL 0 Enemy forces

encountered

Route of main

body

4 NOVEMBER - 4 DECEMBER 1942

U.S. Perimeter

Subsidiary patrols * — —

5000 0 5000 10000

9 NOV - Base established

at Binu.

B NOV- Ambush by small ene- - my force of Reko.

20

Neville

TASK

FORCE %ltewood

65

Fomalhaut

.J. JAIISS

YARDS /

30 NOV- Surprises 100 enemy

in bwouoc, killing 75,

the final action of the patrol.

NOV- Found and destroyed

large bivouac area

including supplies and artillery.

24 NOV- Patrol reaches upper

Tenaru River and establishes bose for systematic patrolling of this area.

II NOV- Main body engages

Japanese battalion

at Asamano and awaits return

of Co F Patrol.

________

14 NOV - Co F Patrol encounters and destroys 15

man outpost in defile near Binu.

7NOV- Patrol by-passes reported enemy concentration ot Koilotumaria.

4 NOV- 2d Raider Bn (less dets) lands at Aolo

Boy together with elements of

147th tnt and 5th Def Bn.

Raiders move out on combat

patrol.
camp at Binu. During the period 11-17 November, the raiders engaged in repeated and heavy exchanges with a large force of Japanese which had eluded an envelopment by the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines west of Tetere. After destroying the main enemy

force and scattering the remnants, the raiders were ordered to

a position on the upper Tenaru River. From here they could pa- trol south in the direction of the Lunga in order to locate a

suspected trail over which the enemy was moving up reinforcements.

Lieutenant Colonel Carlson divided his force into three

combat teams of two companies each. One team plus headquarters set up a base camp while the other two teams were deployed on the flanks several miles out. These teams in turn sent out patrols to search for the supply trails. This arrangement permitted Lieutenant Colonel Carlson to maintain close control over the operation and made possible rapid reinforcement of either team by the team remaining at base camp. Several trails

were discovered, three major bivouac areas were destroyed, and

company-size forces of enemy troops were engaged. This oper- ation near the Tenaru accounted for approximately 175 enemy dead against raider losses of 6. The battalion returned and

entered 1st Marine Division lines near Matanikau on 4 December.

General Vandegrift cited the battalion for "outstanding

service" and noted the heavy enemy losses in men and materiel attributed to the raiders. The battalion had, for the most part, eradicated the scattered enemy positions in the hinterland behind the Marine positions along the Matanikau.

Shortly after the excursion behind the lines, Lieutenant Colonel Carlson took time to discuss at some length the organization of the 2d Raider Battalion.(19) The organization was based on a squad of one corporal and nine riflemen. The men

were organized into fire teams of three each, and each team

had a BAR, an M-l, and a Thompson submachine gun. Carlson

noted that this arrangement enhanced fire control as the squad

leader had to deal with three fire team leaders rather than with nine individuals. Also, it permitted better observation of leadership potential prior to rating. The 2d Raider Battalion

companies were organized around two rifle platoons of three

squads each and a weapons platoon. The weapons platoon had

two sections of l9l9A4 light machine guns (two guns per section) and one section of 60mm mortars. Carlson firmly believed that

the location of weapons platoons within companies, instead of weapons companies within the battalions, resulted in better

liaison and improved coordination. He also reiterated his de- sire for a third rifle platoon but noted that the longstanding

limit of 143 men per raider company (the capacity of an APD) precluded this addition. In partial compensation for the mis- sing rifle platoon, he set up a utility group of 14 men in

headquarters company. Composed of snipers and demolitions men, the group also functioned as a company reserve.

21
The 2d Raider Battalion was itself organized around six

line companies and a headquarters company. The companies could be used individually, or in groups as was the case on Guadalcanal when the battalion had been split into three groups of two companies each. Total battalion strength was 46 officers and 1,062 enlisted men. General Vandegrift concurred in the opinion that this organization was superior to that of the 1st Raider Battalion. (20)

The 3d Raider Battalion was organized in American Samoa on 20 September 1942 and moved to Espiritu Santo in early

1943. The new raider battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. "Harry the Horse" Liversedge. Lieutenant

Colonel Liversedge had served in Santo Domingo, Haiti, and China, and had been an active participant in a variety of international athletic events, including the Olympic Games of 1920 and 1924.

During the period 10-18 February 1943, the battalion moved

to Guadalcanal to stage for a planned operation in the Russell Islands (Operation CLEANSLATE). The 3d Raider Battalion was

to land at Pavuvu Island in support of a U. S. Army force which would assault the neighboring island of Banika simultaneously. The raiders moved by Transport Division 12 from Guadalcanal to Pavuvu during the night of 20-21 February and made an unopposed

landing at 0700 on 21 February along beaches on Pepasala Penin- sula. Patrols occupied the islands in West Bay and fanned out over the main island. It was found that all enemy forces had

been withdrawn and, after an uneventful month of garrison duty, the raiders were taken off on 20 March.(2l) For some months thereafter the raiders were involved in training until, in September 1943, the 3d Raider Battalion joined the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional) at Noumea in preparation for the Bougain- ville operation.

The 2d Raider Battalion, withdrawn to Espiritu Santo after

its extended operation behind Japanese lines on Guadalcanal, also underwent an extended period of rest and training. The

battalion spent two weeks in Wellington, New Zealand in Febru- ary 1943, then returned to Espiritu Santo where it conducted amphibious training exercises in conjunction with the Nautilus during March. On 25 April, the battalion embarked on the USS

Tryon (APH-1) for movement to Noumea. At this time, due to the

shortage of replacements, the battalion strength had slipped

to 23 officers and 653 enlisted men.

The 4th Raider Battalion formed on 23 October 1942 under

Major James Roosevelt. The battalion embarked on the USS

President Polk (AP-1O3) and arrived at Espiritu Santo on 26

February 1943. Throughout the spring of 1943 the battalion was busy with training exercises. On 4 May command of the unit passed to Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Currin.

22
— - —-----— — -—.-- — .—- —-'. _-:-i —-- ---, J -

__

- - —-- -- Raiders go over the side to rubber boats prior to occupation of Russell Islands. (USMC Photo 54763)

Final honors for those who fell at Viru Harbor, New Georgia.

(USMC Photo 57581)

23

qr
On 15 March 1943, the 1st Raider Regiment, I Marine Amphibious Corps (IMAC) was organized at Espiritu Santo, con- sisiting of a Headquarters and Service Company and the four raider battalions. Colonel Liversedge became regimental com- mander while Lieutenant Colonel Samuel S. Yeaton replaced him

as 3d Raider Battalion CO. The regimental headquarters was

located at Espiritu Santo, as were the 2d and 4th Raider Battalions. The 3d Raider Battalion joined them on 20 March after the Pavuvu operation. The 1st Raider Battalion, although organizationally attached, remained in Noumea.

The 1st Raider Regiment (minus the 2d and 3d Battalions) was designated as part of the New Georgia Occupation Force and, during late May, completed preparations for moving to

staging areas on Guadalcanal. The Headquarters and Service Company, 1st Raider Regiment plus the 4th Raider Battalion em- barked on the USS John Penn (AP-51) on 31 May and arrived at Tetare, Guadalcanal on 2 June. The 1st Raider Battalion sailed

from its base in Noumea aboard the USS President Hayes (APA-20) on 7 June, arriving in Guadalcanal on 11 June.

Under Operation ELKTON a drive was to be mounted which aimed at overrunning the Northern Solomons and, if possible, capturing Rabaul, the Japanese area headquarters on New Britain. ELKTON was tentatively scheduled to begin on 30 June 1943, but was stepped up to 21 June when a message was received from

an Australian coastwatcher on Segi Point, New Georgia requesting assistance in opposing an approaching Japanese force. The

message reached Admiral Turner at Guadalcanal and he decided

to dispatch the 4th Raider Battalion which was then staging

for the planned 30 June offensive against New Georgia. Companies 0 and P and half of the Headquarters Company under Lieutenant Colonel Currin went ashore at Segi Point at 0530 and moved inland toward Segi Plantation where the coastwatcher met

them. On the next day, two Army companies and an airfield sur- vey party came ashore to start work on developing a limited fighter landing strip.

Lieutenant Colonel Currin next turned his attention to

Viru Harbor, the best protected anchorage on the New Georgia

coast. The harbor would be required as an operating base for small patrol craft during the assault on Munda. The harbor

entrance is through narrows only 300 yards wide between coral cliffs. Previous reconnaissance had indicated that the Viru

defenses were centered around the village of Tetemara on the west side of the narrows, and included a 3-inch coastal gun. An occupation force was scheduled to enter the harbor on 30 June

to secure it for operations, and the approaches would have to

be taken by that date. Currin embarked his force in rubber boats at Segi Point and led the flotilla himself in a Melanesian

war canoe. Paddling eight miles across the bay formed by the mouths of the Akuru and Choi Rivers to Regi, it went ashore

at 0100 on 28 June. After two days of intermittent contact

24
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with Japanese patrols and interminable mangrove swamps and heavy rains, Lieutenant Colonel Currin split his force, sending two platoons from Company P to secure Tombe which was across

the narrows from Tetemara. On the 30th, the occupying force

embarked on three transports at Guadalcanal and steamed to the

entrance of Viru Harbor where they were briefly engaged by the

coastal guns which had not yet been silenced by the raider force.

The transports took up positions off-shore and out of range, but close enough to come to the raiders' assistance if needed.

The raiders arrived outside Tetemara near midnight of 30

June-i July after an exhausting trek through waist deep water

in another mangrove swamp. At 0900 on 1 July, the two platoons

sent to capture Tombe attacked their target and carried it with

no Marine casualties. The firing alerted the Tetemara garrison, but Lieutenant Colonel Curri n attacked on schedule and, after almost six hours of strong resistance, moved as far as the edge of the village. A final banzai attack by the Japanese defend- ers was beaten back and by evening of 1 July the position was

secure. After being relieved, the raider force withdrew to Guadalcanal

Another prelude to the primary New Georgia landings at

Munda occurred on 30 June when the remainder of the 4th Raider

Battalion-—Companies N and Q and half of the Headquarters Company--went ashore at Oloana Bay on Vangunu Island. The

raiders were to contact a scouting party already ashore, then

establish a beachhead for Army forces which would land one- half hour later. The seizure of Vangunu would permit establish- ment of a base along the supply route which connected Guadal- canal with the main landing area. After a difficult landing

in which poor weather, heavy seas, and communications break- downs resulted in a scattered force, the Marines regrouped on

shore and, together with Companies F and G of the lO3d Infantry, moved toward Kaeruka where the main enemy garrison was located. The force reached the Kaeruka River bank by midafternoon and engaged Japanese units in the main enemy camp on the far side. Heavy fighting ensued during which contact between raider and Army companies was broken, but by nightfall the position was carried and hasty defense lines were set up on the beach. This was fortunate as a Japanese supply convoy of three barges approached at 0200 on 2 July and attempted to come ashore, not realizing that the position had changed hands. The raiders

made short work of the barges, sinking one and forcing the

other two to beach.

After mopping up a pocket of survivors at Cheke Point, the raiders returned to Oloana Bay on 4 July. They remained

there until 8 July when they crossed the strait to neighboring Gatukai Island in search of a reported Japanese force occupying

the island. No contact was made and on 12 July the raiders withdrew to Guadalcanal where they joined up with Lieutenant Colonel Currin's force which had just returned from the Segi

26
27

0

4

0

>

x
Point-Viru Harbor operations. The 4th Raider Battalion regrouped and was reequipped at Tetere, Guadalcanal until 17

July when it embarked for Enogai to reinforce the 1st Raider Battalion which had landed there on 5 July.

The landings at Enogai were intended to support the Munda

campaign then underway to the south. It was discovered that a

primitive but passable jungle trail connected Bai roko, at the

southern end of Leland Lagoon, with Munda, thus raising the possibility that the Japanese forces at Munda might be reinforced and resupplied via Bairoko. The 1st Raider Regiment,

less the 2d and 3d Battalions, had been designated ready re- serve for the Munda landings at Zanana Beach but after dis- covery of the trail from Bairoko, it was decided to make a

landing near Enogai and move into blocking positions between Bairoko and Munda.

Designated the Northern Landing Group of the New Georgia Occupation Force, Colonel Liversedge's force consisted of the Headquarters Company of the 1st Raider Regiment, the 1st Raider Battalion, the 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry (U. S.

Army) and the 3d Battalion, 145th Infantry (U. S. Army). The

last named was added just before departure when it was dis- covered that the 4th Raider Battalion would not be able to withdraw from operations at Segi/Viru/Vangunu in time to join

the force. The landing group was given a multiple mission: after landing proceed southwest, capturing and killing enemy

forces; establish roadblocks severing connections betwen Bairoko and Munda; block withdrawal of Japanese garrison forces at Bairoko.

The landing was made on 5 July .1943 on beaches about 500

yards upstream from the mouth of the Pundakona River at Rice Anchorage on the northwest coast of New Georgia, across the Kula Gulf from Kolombangara Island. Fortunately, the landing was unopposed, as the landing area was only wide enough to permit four boats at a time to unload. After regrouping the

force started to move south along parallel trails. The first

night's bivouac was established at the Giza Giza River. The

force split on 6 July; the 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry continued to the south to set up a block on the Munda trail while the remainder of the force turned to the west in the direction of the Dragon's Peninsula, a spit of land between Enogal Inlet and Bairoko Harbor. Reinforced patrols wiped out small garri- sons on the coast of Enogai Inlet as the main body continued westward toward the main enemy concentration. The force reached

the outskirts of Enogai in the late afternoon of 9 July. An

initial assault was repelled and Colonel Liversedge called off further attacks until the next morning. After a 60mm mortar

barrage at dawn, Colonel Liversedge renewed the attack and overran the enemy positions by early afternoon. Over 300 Japa- nese dead were counted, but 47 raiders had been lost.

28
29

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Once in possession of Enogai, the raiders sent out patrols

for the next week to scout Japanese positions at Bairoko. Reports indicatedthat Japanese working parties were observed

constructing emplacements east of the harbor and generally im- proving their defensive positions around Bairoko. Colonel

Liversedge's force was reinforced on 18 July when the 4th Raider Battalion came ashore from four transports off Enogai Point. The raider forces moved toward Bairoko on 20 July and en- countered the first opposition at 1015. Within minutes the

Marines were in violent battle, pinned down by withering auto- matic weapons fire and harassed by snipers. The enemy positions centered around a series of log and coral bunkers built under sprawling banyan roots on a ridge forward of the raider po- sitions. The enemy defenses could only be overcome with intense small arms fire and demolitions; 60mm mortars could not be used due to the thick jungle canopy and flamethrowers were not available. Throughout the early afternoon the raiders continued to press the attack, suffering debilitating casual- ties. The 4th Raider Battalion was committed to the line to

assist the 1st Raider Battalion and the advance continued, but the progress was measured in yards. At 1445, the enemy 90mm mortars opened up and found the range, inflicting further casualties. This barrage was followed by an enemy counter- attack, directed at the Company D sector. The raiders in turn

mounted an attack with Company Q but the unit was repulsed with losses so heavy as to render it ineffective. At this point

the raider units had suffered about 30% casualties (250 men) and 150 men were required to assist in the evacuation of the wounded. Colonel Liversedge had no alternative but to order

the withdrawal of his men. The wounded were carried out during

the night of 20-21 July and by 1400 on 21 July all troops had

retired to defensive positions around Enogai.

Aggressive patrols were mounted over the next week to re- connoiter enemy positions. Also during this period PT boats and destroyers shelled Bairoko from offshore and on 2 August,

the enemy defenses were bombed by B-l7s. On 3 August, XIV Army Corps reported enemy positions were being overrun at Munda and

requested that units be dispatched south toward Zieta to inter- cept retreating Japanese. Scattered contact was experienced

around Bairoko until 24 August when one company from the 3d Battalion, 145th Infantry entered the village unopposed; the

Japanese had evacuated the position by barge.

During the night of 28-29 August, the raiders embarked on

transports and returned to Guadalcanal. Lieutenant Colonel Griffith's 1st Raider Battalion had suffered 74 killed and 139 wounded; Lieutenant Colonel Currin's 4th Raider Battalion had

lost 54 dead and 168 wounded. Of the 521 men remaining in

the 1st Raider Battalion, only 245 were judged effective; the 4th could count only 154 effective of 412. The last entry in

the 1st Raider Regiment Journal, on 31 August 1943, at 2400, is significantly eloquent: "1st Raider Regiment relaxes (bunks,

30
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,:-" •.-:

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Raiders cross a river on approach to Enogal , New Georgia.

(USMC Photo 59009B)

Captured Japanese 6-inch gun near Enogal, New Georgia. (USMC Photo 59009B)

31

.-

5
movies, beer, chow)."(22) Unbeknown to the men, this was the

final operation for the 1st and 4th Raider battalions. They entered rest and reorganization schedules in September and

saw no further action.

The final step in the capture of the northern Solomons was

the Bougainville operation, and on 12 September 1943, the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional), Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley

commanding, was activated at Noumea specifically to coordinate raider participation in the landings. The regiment consisted of a Headquarters Company and the 2d and 3d Raider Battalions, and was assigned to the 3d Marine Division on 3 October. Headquarters Company, 2d Raider Regiment and the 2d Raider Battalion were attached to the 3d Marines and the 3d Raider Battalion

was attached to the 9th Marines.

Bougainville is the largest of the Solomon group, nearly 30 miles wide and 125 miles long, and it sits astride the

northern end of "the Slot" which separates the two chains of

the Solomons. The contiguous islands of Bougainville, Buka, and Shortland had six large Japanese airfields and numerous naval installations. The area was used as a major staging and supply point for support of operations against the Allies in

the southern Solonions. As the island-hopping front moved north- ward, Bougainville became an important link in the defenses of Rabaul. The island is dominated by a series of mountain ranges starting at the northern end and gradually lowering into a

broad plain in the southern extreme. The landing zones were around Cape Torokina at the extreme north of Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville's southwest coast.

The 2d Raider Regiment participated in landing exercises and rehearsals on Efate Island in the New Hebrides on 16-18

October then embarked on transports and proceeded via Gu'adal- canal to a rendezvous with the remainder of the assault force

on 31 October. D-Day was 1 November 1943.

The 2d Raider Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. McCaffery) was one of the four landing teams and went ashore on Green Beach, flanked by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Marines. The 3d Raider Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Fred S. Beans),

less Company M, landed on the offshore island of Puruata where an estimated reinforced rifle platoon of Japanese was overcome

and the island secured by 1800 on 2 November. Company M landed with the main force over Green Beach 2 and moved inland on the trail leading to the Buretoni Mission, establishing a roadblock

some 1,000 yards from the beach. The raiders reinforced the

1st Battalion, 3d Marines in overrunning enemy defenses on Cape Torokina then took up positions at trail blocks on the Piva Trail, one of several paths leading inland. On 9 November, the raiders launched an attack to clear the enemy from positions

forward of the raider lines. By 1500, despite stubborn enemy

resistance, the raiders had advanced to the intersection of the

32
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33
Piva and Numa Numa Trails. On 13 November, the 2d Raider Battalion took up positions to support the supply lines extending to the 21st Marines, engaged at the time in the Battle

of Coconut Grove. The 3d Raider Battalion, attached to the

3d Marines on 17 November, relieved the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines during the night of 18 November, permitting the latter unit to attack enemy positions above the Nunia Numa trail block. On 29 November, Company fl of the 3d Raider Battalion

participated with the 1st Parachute Battalion in a raid on

Japanese positions 10 miles south of Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay (see the Parachute Chapter for more detail).

The raider units continued to support the 3d, 9th, and

21st Marines until 22 December when, in conjunction with ele- ments of the 1st Parachute Regiment, it relieved the 3d Marines in the line. On 11 January 1944, the raiders were in turn relieved by the l32d Infantry of the Americal Division and the

2d Raider Regiment withdrew to Guadalcanal.

By early 1944 the face of the Pacific war had changed and the demand for raider units was not sufficient to justify main- taining special units for the purpose. Senior t4arine officers had never really taken to the concept of separate "elite of

the elite" units, and as the requirement for such units came

into question, this opposition became more effective.

In December 1943, a memorandum emerged from the Pacific Section of the War Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations which summed up the opposition:

The Marine Corps has always felt that its infantry elements are essentially raiders and that Pacific conditions are different from the European which resulted in

the establishment of commandos. It would like to end its

raider program so as to make all infantry organizations uniform and to avoid setting up some organizations as elite or selected troops. It feels that any operation

so far carried out by raiders could have been performed equally well by a standard organization specially trained for that specific operation. In lieu of abolishing

raiders the Marine Corps proposes to organize them as a separate regiment which will be specially trained for

raider operations but will be organized and equipped so

it can be effectively employed as a standard infantry

regiment. Experience has shown that such a separate

regiment will find frequent employment in contemplated Pacific operations, primarily as shock troops or to

augment divisional troops.(23)

One day later, the Chief of Naval Operations approved in principle the transfer of the 1st and 2d Raider Battalions to

the 4th Man nes , and authorized deletion of the 5th and 6th

Raider Battalions from the Current Force Operating Plan.(24)

34
Plans were already underway to form the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to assist the 3d Marine Division in the re- capture of Guam and to provide a basis for the 6th Marine Di- vision. The brigade was to include two reinforced regiments, one of which was to be the 22d Marines. The other was to be

the 4th Marines which would be a new organization bearing the name and honors of the original regiment which was lost in the Philippines in 1942. The raider units were selected to form

the new 4th Marines. On 26 January 1944, the 2d Raider Regi- ment was disbanded and the 2d and 3d Raider Battalions were

attached to the 1st Raider Regiment. On 1 February, the Head- quarters and Service Company, 1st Raider Regiment, and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Raider Battalions were redesignated as Headquarters and Service Company and the 1st, 3d, and 2d Battalions 4th Marines respectively. At the same time, the 2d Raider Battalion was disbanded and its personnel assigned to the Regimental Weapons Company, 4th Marines. The Raider Battalion, Training Center, Camp Pendleton was disbanded and its personnel assigned

to the 5th Marine Division.

35
Marine Parachute Battalions(25)

As had been the case with the rai der units, the Marine Corps parachute units(*) could trace the impetus for their development to the employment of special purpose forces by the European powers during World War II. Although the Marines had had limited previous experience with parachutists (as early as 1927 a group of 12 Marines parachuted from a transport plane over Anacostia in Washington, D. C.), realization of the para- chute concept on an enlarged scale occurred only after the

outbreak of the Second World War.

In May 1940, Major General Holcomb, Commandant of the Marine Corps, tasked the Division of Plans and Policy with the preparation of a plan for the utilization of Marine parachute

troops. For planning purposes the force would consist of:

One battalion of infantry at full strength

One platoon of 75mm pack howitzers (2 guns)

Three units of fire for all arms

Three days rations and water

No vehicles other than hand—drawn

Added light antiaircraft and antitank

protection as appropriate (26)

The resulting paper envisioned the employment of parachute units in three distinct tactical situations:

As a reconnoitering and raiding force with a limited ability to return to its parent organization. This assumed that the objective was sufficiently im- portant to warrant the sacrifice of the force.

As a spearhead or advance guard, to seize and hold strategic installations or terrain features until arrival of larger forces.

(*) During World War II, the Marine parachutists were popularly known as "paramarines" but the term has fallen into disuse due to the possible connotation of para-marine (i.e. part or sometimes Marine). The Navy's submarine crews have

this same name problem (i.e. submariner meaning less than a mariner).

36
As an independent force operating for extended periods, presumably in a guerrilla role in hostile

territory. (27)

The Marine plans for parachute units gained added impetus after inspection of Army training facilities by several Marine

officers in the summer of 1940, and after naval attaches began

to collect reports on the use of parachute forces by the Germans, Russians, and French. By October of 1940, the Commandant had decided that one battalion of each infantry regiment would be

trained as "air troops" to be transported and landed by air- craft. Each air troop battalIon would include a company of parachutists, with an estimated requirement for 750 parachute personnel for the entire Corps.

An initial detachment of 40 trainees (2 officers/38 enlisted) arrived at the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey on 26 October 1940 where they were quartered while in prelimi- nary parachute training. Using towers in nearby Hightstown,

the detachment completed tower training on 6 November and moved

to the Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia for added physical con- ditioning prior to making jumps from aircraft.

Concurrently, the Commandant indicated that the training of parachutists should proceed "as fast as facilities and per- sonnel are available" in order to train the estimated 750 men

in the shortest time.(28) In implementation of this decision, a second detachment of 3 officers and 44 enlisted personnel underwent tower training at Hightstown from 30 December 1940

to 15 January 1941. On 26 February, both classes graduated to- gether, the first qualified as parachute jumpers and riggers while the second were jumpers. Training of subsequent groups continued throughout the spring and by July 1941, a total of 225 jumpers had graduated from the Lakehurst course.

Unfortunately, the facilities at Lakehurst, and the avail- able towers at Hightstown, were inadequate for the demands of

the Narine Corps and Captain Marion L. Dawson was sent to San Diego in February 1941 to prepare additional facilities there. In March, the entire second class together with six riggers, from the first transferred to San Diego too, and formed the

1st Platoon, Company A, 2d Parachute Battalion. The third

class from Lakehurst was subsequently transferred as well,

forming the second platoon of Company A.

Company A, of what would become the 1st Parachute Battalion, was formed at Quantico on 28 May 1941 and the Headquarters Company was formed on 10 July. The battalion itself was officially organized effective 15 August 1941, Captain Marcellus

J. Howard commanding. On 20 September, Company A of the 2d Parachute Battalion was redesignated Company B of the 1st Para- chute Battalion. On 28 September, the battalion moved from Quantico to New River for further training and there, on 28

37
March 1942, the battalion was completed with the formation of Company C.

Company B, 2d Parachute Battalion was formed on 23 July 1941 at San Diego, and the battalion organization became effective on 1 October, Captain Charles E. Shepard, Jr., commanding. A new Company A, to replace that detached in September, was

formed 7 February 1942, and the battalion went to full strength

on 3 September 1942 when Company C was organized.

There was no shortage of volunteers for parachute training although the qualifications were stiff. An applicant was re- quired to be unmarried, athletically inclined, above average

in intelligence, 18-32 years of age, and have no physical or mental impairments. Extra pay amounting to $50 per month for enlisted personnel and $100 per month for officers was authorized in June 1941 and surely resulted in increased numbers of volunteers. Nevertheless, the aura of adventure surrounding

the parachutists and the promise of action seemed more important to most applicants.

In May 1942, the Parachute School Detachment was formed within the Marine Barracks, Naval Air Station, Lakehurst but

the war had so increased the Marine Corps' training require- ments that it was decided to establish two Marine parachute

schools. The Commandant received approval from the Secretary of the Navy to establish Parachute School, Marine Corps Base, San Diego effective 6 May 1942, and Parachute School, New River effective 15 June l942.(29)

Facilities were so tight at San Diego that tent quarters at Bern camp were utilized for initial classes. Even so, the

school was able to plan on classes of 36 students at an entry

rate of one class per week for the ten week course. The first

group entered on 27 May 1942 and was followed by a second on 1 June. This schedule would be maintained until September when

the new training facility at Camp Gillespie was ready. Once

established at Camp Gillespie, the school standardized its

course at 361 hours (6 weeks), with a new class entering weekly. The training was in three phases. The first was ground training which included instruction in parachute tactics, map read- ing, demolitions, techniques of fire, scouting and patrolling, combat swimming, and weapons training. Phase two concerned

parachute materiel and included training in parachute packing, flotation gear, and cargo containers. The final phase was jump instruction which started with controlled and free tower

jumping, covered the use of suspension lines, and led to six actual jumps after which parachutist's wings were presented. The course was difficult: a 40 per cent washout rate was

standard.

Organization of the school at New River was beset by diffi- culties and delays from the beginning. Initial attempts to

38
locate qualified instructors were unsuccessful and finally re- sulted in a request to the Commandant for permission to select personnel from the 1st Parachute Battalion, assigned at the

time to the 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force. Greater problems arose concerning facilities. The camp was built from

the ground up and, although the parachute towers were scheduled

for completion by late August, heavy rains and a shortage of contract labor delayed them until 25 September. Similar de- lays afflicted the parachute building and the training building, neither of which was ready until November. Of a total of 250

parachutes requisitioned, only 50 had arrived by October and most had to be sent on to the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point for repair prior to use.

The New River facility never did attain the size of that at Camp Gillespie although it did turn out 50 graduates per month. Camp Gillespie produced 70 per month, and increased

this to 100 per month by early 1943. This increase, coupled with a relatively static demand for parachutists, permitted the

closing of the New River parachute school on 1 July 1943, after which all training was accomplished at Camp Gillespie.

The lst•Parachute Battalion left New River on 7 June 1942, travelling by train to Norfolk, Virginia where it embarked on

the USS Mizar (AF-l2) on 10 June. It sailed via the Panama

Canal, arriving at Wellington, New Zealand on 11 July. One

week later the battalion, less a rear echelon, embarked on the USS Heywood (AP-l2) and sailed to Koro, Fiji Islands where it participated in rehearsals prior to the Guadalcanal landings.

The 1st Parachute Battalion, together with the 1st Raider Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, made up that portion of the Guadalcanal landing force which, under Brigadier General William H. Rupertus (Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division) was scheduled to land in the Florida Island

group, across the Sealark Channel from Guadalcanal. The 1st

Parachute Battalion, under Major Robert H. Williams, went ashore on Gavutu at H-plus four hours. The delay resulted from a shortage of landing craft--the parachutists had to wait until the raider landings on Tulagi had been completed and those landing craft available. The landing was made in three waves each of company strength. The first landed against

light opposition and made limited progress inland. The next

two waves met heavier fire and were pinned on the beach until Company B overran enemy positions on and near Hill 148, Gavutu's lone hill. Reinforced by Company A, Company B then captured the remaining Japanese positions atop Hill 148 and by nightfall the parachutists were engaged in mopping up the island. Shortly after the initial assault, Major Williams was wounded

and relieved as CO by Major Charles A. Miller. On 9 August, two days after the landing, the battalion moved from Gavutu to Tulagi where it took up positions as a security force near the

government buildings.

39
On 8 September, the 1st Parachute Battalion and the 1st Raider Battalion, both under Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson, carried out a raid in the vicinity of Taivu near the

village of Tasimboko, Guadalcanal. The raiders landed at

Taivu Point and advanced toward Tasimboko, while the para- chutists landed some 2,000 yards east of the village and took up positions to protect the flank and rear of the raider advance. After an intense fire fight with enemy forces defending

the village, the raiders and parachutists entered the base

area and destroyed food, medical equipment, and military stores

left by the fleeing Japanese. By evening of 8 September all units had reembarked and returned to the Kukom landing area.

Several days after this raid, the 1st Parachute Battalion, again in conjunction with the 1st Raider Battalion, was ordered

to occupy the ridge southeast of Henderson Field, Guadalcanal. Enemy activity increased starting on 11 September and reached a peak during the night of 13-14 September when the Marine

lines repulsed strong and repeated assaults by determined

enemy units. Known afterward as the Battle of Bloody Ridge or Edson's Ridge, this action scattered the Kawaguchi Force

against which the earlier Tasimboko raid had been staged.

On 18 September, the 1st Parachute Battalion was withdrawn

from Guadalcanal, proceeding by ship to Noumea, New Caledonia, where it was quartered in a temporary camp while constructing

a new camp to be named Camp Kiser. After moving into Camp Kiser on 8 November, the battalion picked up a rigorous two- phased training schedule. The parachutists were reindoctri- nated in jump techniques, parachute packing, and patrolling! scouting. They also received tactical training in the form

of platoon, company, and battalion problems. This training

period lasted into 1943.

The 2d Parachute Battalion, at full strength after the

organization of Company C on 3 September 1942, sailed from

San Diego on 20 October 1942 and arrived at Wellington, New

Zealand on 31 October. The battalion went into camp at Titahi Bay, south of Wellington, until 6 January 1943 when it sailed to Noumea to undergo further training with the

1st Parachute Battalion.

The 3d Parachute Battalion (Major Robert 1. Vance) was organized on 16 September 1942. Initially composed of Head- quarters Company and Company A, it was assigned to the new

3d Marine Division, then forming in San Diego. Company B was activated on 10 November and Company C on 10 December 1942. The battalion was attached to Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, at Camp Elliott on 4 January 1943, and on 5 and 13

March it departed for Noumea in two echelons. All units had

arrived and settled in Camp Kiser by 27 March, there to continue training with the 1st and 2d Parachute Battalions.

40
41
On 1 April 1943, the 1st Parachute Regiment was activated at Tontouta composed of the 1st, 2d, and 3d Parachute Battalions, Regimental Headquarters and Service Company, and Regimental Weapons Company. Companies A, B, and C of the 2d Para- chute Battalion were redesignated Companies E, F, and G, while Companies A, B, and C of the 3d Parachute Battalion were re- designated Companies I, K, and L. Lieutenant Colonel Robert

H. Williams, recovered from wounds suffered on Gavutu, was appointed regimental commander.

The 4th Parachute Battalion was organized starting 2 April 1943 with the formation of Company B at Camp Elliott.

On 1 July the New River Parachute Training Battalion was re- organized and designated Headquarters Company, Company A, and Company C of the 4th Parachute Battalion. These units joined Company B at Camp Pendleton where the entire battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Marcellus J. Howard) remained in a training

status until disbanded on 19 January 1944.

After an extended period of training, the 1st Parachute Regiment started movement in September 1943 to Guadalcanal. On 18 September, the 2d Parachute Battalion with advance elements of the 1st and 3d Parachute Battalions, sailed

from Noumea on the USAT Noordam, arriving at Tassaforanga

on 22 September. The remaining units of the regiment em- barked on the USS American Legion (APA-17) and sailed from

Noumea on 26 September, arriving at Guadalcanal on 28 Septem- ber. On 29-30 September, the entire regiment reembarked and sailed to Vella Lavella.

Shortly after the arrival of the regiment on Vella Lavella, Lieutenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak, commanding officer of the

2d Parachute Battalion was summoned to I Marine Amphibious Corps Headquarters on Guadalcanal. He was advised of the impending

(1 November) Bougainville landings, and ordered to land with a raiding force on the island of Choiseul, there to create as great a disturbance as possible in order to confuse the enemy and to mask the true location of the major assault. Krulak

returned to Vella Lavella to map out a plan for the raid and was joined on 24 October by an Australian coastwatcher who sup- plied last minute information on enemy forces and locations. Prior to becoming a parachutist, Lieutenant Colonel Krulak had

served in Shanghai as a company commander with the 4th Marines and was with the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet from 1941 until he volunteered for parachute training.

The raiding force consisted of Companies E, F, and G, reinforced by a communications platoon, a regimental weapons

company with eight light machine guns, and a detachment from

an experimental rocket platoon. Total strength was 30 officers

and 626 men.

42
Paratroop raiding party awaiting relief on the beach at Koiari, Bougainville. (USMC Photo 69793)

Machine gun position near Piva Trail roadblockb Bougainville. Note enemy dead at upper right. (USMC Photo 70771A)

43

I —. 'I

— .- '——,

a

S a
Embarked in four high speed transports (USS McKeon, Gosby, Kilty, and Ward), the force left Vella Lavella in the evening

of 27 Octobir, escorted by the destroyer USS COnway (DD-507). The battalion landed unopposed near Voza and moved inland a mile and a half to set up a base camp. On 28 and 29 October, patrols were sent out to reconnoiter Japanese positions at Sangigai to the south and on the Warrior River to the north.

The attack on Sangigai started at 1100 on 30 October when Company E opened fire on enemy forces in the village. The

Japanese defenders quickly retreated toward the mountains, directly into positions prepared by Company F which had executed

an enveloping movement through the mountains in order to attack

the enemy flank. On the heels of the retreating Japanese, Company E entered the garrison area and destroyed all buildings and facilities, a barge, and about 180 tons of supplies. By 0800 the raiding party had returned to its base camp having

suffered 6 dead and 12 wounded while killing at least 75 of

the enemy.

On 31 October, a second raiding party (Major Warner T. Bigger) was sent north to Nukiki and then overland to the Warrior River. This group bombarded Japanese installations on nearby Guppy Island with 143 mortar rounds, starting several large fires. After encountering strong enemy resistance near

the Warrior River, the party was withdrawn aboard personnel landing craft (LCPs). On 1 and 2 November, Krulak continued

to send out patrols from the base camp and maintained aggres- sive contact with the enemy. By 3 November, the Japanese were slowly realizing the limited size of the raiding force and

started closing in on the beachhead area. The battalion was

taken off Choiseul during the night of 3-4 November after

laying extensive minefields and booby traps.(*) The proximity of the approaching Japanese was attested to by the sounds of exploding mines as the last parachutists boarded LCIs.

On 22 November, the 1st Parachute Battalion (Major Richard Fagan) embarked 23 officers and 596 enlisted personnel on four infantry landing craft (LCIs) and departed Vella Lavella for Bougainville. It arrived off Empress Augusta Bay the next day and, after going ashore, was attached to the 2d Raider Regi- ment in I Marine Amphibious Corps reserve. On 27 November, the 1st Parachute Battalion, with attached units, was designated

the task organization for a raid on Japanese supply facilities near Koiari, south of Cape Torokina. In addition to the para- chute battalion, the group included Company M of the 3d Raider Battalion and a forward observer team of the 12th Marines.

(*) The commander of one of the relief craft which returned

the raiding party to Vella Lavella was Lieutenant, later President John F. Kennedy.

44
Major Fagan's force embarked on landing craft at Cape Torokina early in the morning of 29 November and, after a one

hour voyage southward, moved in toward the beach at Koiari. It had been intended that the Marines would land a short distance from known Japanese forces and attack from the rear but,

immediately after landing, it was discovered that the raiding

force had come ashore in the midst of a major enemy supply

area. The Marines dug in after forming a hasty perimeter. They were surrounded on three sides by Japanese and had their backs to the ocean. A fierce battle raged for several hours during which the parachute forces were under almost constant

fire from mortars and machine guns. By afternoon casualties were mounting and ammunition was nearly exhausted. Shortly before 1800, three destroyers arrived off the beach after having been diverted from escort duty. They opened fire directly to the flanks of the Marine beachhead while 155mm guns

from Cape Torokina fired parallel to the shore. Thus protected by a three-sided box of fire, the battalion was able to board

rescue boats which dashed in to the beach. Total Marine

casualties were 15 killed, 99 wounded, and 7 missing of a

landing force which had numbered 24 officers and 505 enlisted

personnel

On 3 December, the 1st Battalion on Bougainville was joined by the rest of the 1st Parachute Regiment (less the 2d Battalion which stayed in camp at Vella Lavella). Two days later

the regiment was sent to the 3d Marine Division front and for

the next four days fought off enemy patrols, snipers, and am- bushes. On 10 December the force was relieved by elements of the 9th and 21st Marines and moved to the 9th Marines regimental reserve position. Later, on 22 December, the 1st Parachute Battalion, Weapons Company, and a Headquarters and Service platoon were attached to the 2d Raider Regiment and relieved

the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines near Eagle Creek. The unit remained there, generally strengthening the positions, until it was in turn relieved by elements of the l32d Infantry Regiment, Americal Division on 11 January 1944.

This would be the final combat role for the 1st Parachute

Regiment. The 2d Parachute Battalion moved from Vella Lavella

to Guadalcanal on 2 January 1944 and remained there until 18

January when it embarked for San Diego. On 15 January elements of the regiment on Bougainville started embarkation, also destined for San Diego and reorganization.

The disbandment of the parachute units had been under study for many months at Headquarters Marine Corps. The requirement for trained parachutists had been met fully by Spring

1943 and training quotas were revised and lowered. Earlier

the weekly student assignment quota at the parachute school, Camp Gillespie, had been reduced from 70 to 50 and in mid- April it was further reduced to 30. Later in April, the Com- mandant determined that the Marine Corps then had enough

45
trained parachutists to meet any current or projected require- ment. It was suggested that the New River parachute school be

disbanded, an action which subsequently was taken when, on 1 July 1943, the school was closed and the personnel used to

form the 4th Parachute Battalion. By the Fall of 1943 it became apparent that abandonment of the parachute program

would release some 3,000 troops and save $150,000 monthly in payments to parachutists who were unable to jump for lack of aircraft. On 30 December 1943, the Commandant ordered the dis- bandment of all parachute forces. The 1st Parachute Regiment, minus air delivery section, was assigned to Fleet Marine Force, San Diego where it would cadre the then—forming 5th Marine Di- vision. The reorganization was effective on 29 February 1944.

There were no combat jumps by Marines during World War II. During the summer and fall of 1943, consideration had been

given to drops at Kolombangara and Kavieng, but plans were

never developed. This failure to utilize the parachutists was the result of four factors, three of which were peculiar to the Pacific war. First was a lack of sufficient airlift

capability--at no time did the Marines have resources to air- lift more than one battalion (i.e. six transport squadrons). Next, land-based staging areas were not available for mass flights. A third factor was the long distances involved, both

from the ConUS and among the island targets. Finally, the

objectives assigned to the Marine Corps were generally small, densely defended islands unsuited for large-scale parachute

operations. Although determined to be a 'iuxury which the Marine Corps could not afford, the parachute units had made noteworthy contributions to the tradition of the Corps, and

the esprit and high state of professionalism inculcated in

their personnel would be apparent one year later when the 5th Marine Division went ashore on Iwo Jima.(*)

(*) The Marine Corps continues to qualify limited numbers of parachutists, primarily for reconnaissance operations, but

the development of the helicopter and vertical envelopment

techniques have made the parachute entry of combat forces into battle obsolete.

46
The Glider Group(30)

The Marine Corps' interest in gliders was closely associated with its parachutist program. Both programs grew

out of high-level interest in the successful German invasion

of Crete in May 1941 which was accomplished largely with air- borne forces. Secretary of the Navy Knox was particularly

impressed with this new facet of modern warfare and directed

that the Marine Corps determine whether it held any promise

as a tactic in amphibious operations. Although interest was

focused primarily on the parachute delivery of personnel and

equipment, the Crete invasion force had included 75 gliders

carrying 750 troops. Therefore the Marine Corps also studied gliders as an element of airborne operations.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Holcomb, had

indicated in October 1940 that one battalion of each Marine

regiment would be designated as "air troops," to be trans- ported by aircraft. Each of these air troop battalions would

include one company of parachutists. The remaining troops in each battalion would be air-landed, and it was as an air delivery system for these forces that Marine interest in gliders

developed. The glider idea offered economy over powered air- craft, and permitted the landing of forces on terrain unsuited

for general flight operations.

Although the Marine Corps had been approached by an in- dustrial source as early as 1930 with an offer to develop a radio controlled glider filled with explosives as a type of guided bomb, it was only after the Crete invasion that serious glider studies were undertaken.(31) Once committed, however, the Marine Corps wasted no time in exploring all approaches to developing a viable glider force.

The Navy Department's Bureau of Aeronautics was assigned

responsibility for the procurement of gliders and support equipment while the Marine Corps would be responsible for per- sonnel training. The Commandant of the Marine Corps advised

the Chief of Naval Operations that a call would be issued for volunteers, preferably 2d Lieutenants, to enter glider pilot

training and that, ultimately, noncommissioned officers would be selected for training as copilots.(32)

Concurrently the Bureau of Aeronautics was oking into

glider development but was somewhat less than enamoured with

the whole idea. The Navy had experimented with gliders at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in 1933 to check on the feasability of utilizing gliders in primary flight training. The results

were inconclusive but indicated that gliders did not make any substantial contribution to flight training as long as sufficient

47
numbers of powered aircraft were available. The Chief of the

Bureau of Aeronautics recalled these experiments when, in June

1941 , he advised the Chief of Naval Operations that towed glider design studies were underway at the Naval Aircraft Factory.(33) The BuAer chief noted that, although projects had been assigned for the development of both land and sea- based gliders, he had serious reservations about the practicality and economy of gliders.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps issued his call for volunteers in July 1941, advising all officers through the

grade of captain that the Marine Corps intended to train 50

officers and 100 noncommissioned officers as pilots and co- pilots during fiscal year 1942 (July4l-June42).(34) Initially

training would be at civilian schools and would be restricted to officers until service schools were set up.

The Marine Corps planning at this time indicated a re- quirement for about 75 12-man gliders, each with pilot and copilot, to transport one "Air Infantry Battalion." The largest glider constructed in the United States to that time

had a capacity of four people, crew included. Although large gliders had been built in Europe, the United States was at a

distinct technological disadvantage, having never considered gliders as anything but items of sport. The limited domestic

glider production capability was oriented toward that demand

and consisted of one- and two-man sport models. Likewise, glider instruction was available only through a small number of gliding clubs and schools, usually equipped with only a few gliders and located at civilian airports. Hence, not much was known about glider design or glider pilot training.

To assist the Bureau of Aeronautics in its design study,

the Marine Corps set forth those features which it believed to be desirable in a transport glider. These included:

a. A capability to take off from land or water.

b. A capability to transport equipment, including

light cars and 37mm antitank guns, and light tanks if possible.

c. A capability to be configured for static line

paratroop jumping.

d. Machine gun mounts to permit defense while airborne.

e. A transport capacity of at least 12 men figuring

250 lbs per man.(35)

The Bureau of Aeronautics had two different types of gliders under consideration, both of which fulfilled Marine Corps requirements. One type was an amphibious, float-wing

48
model capable of transporting 12 troops which had, by August 1941, reached the stage there manufacture could be opened to

bids. It was Intended that three would be procured initially, one for static tests and two for flight testing. The second

type was a twin—hulled seaplane glider, the development of which was being delayed pending the revision of drawings to

reflect two 12-man hulls rather than two 6-man hulls. To permit interim training prior to delivery of the three proto- types of the float-wing model, the Bureau of Aeronautics is- sued procurement orders for eight smaller one- and two-seat commercial gliders.(36)

As with glider design and development, glider pilot

training presented unaccustomed problems. Lieutenant Eschol

N. Mallory was sent to the area near Elmira, New York in early

July 1941 when it was 1earned that a soaring school was in oper- ation there and that several Army officers had been enrolled

as students. Later it was learned that the Army also had six

students enrolled in a course offered by the Lewis School of Aeronautics in Lockport, Illinois. Lieutenant Mallory went out to the Chicago area in August, stopping at the Lewis facility and at another school, located in Harvey, Illinois, called the Motorless Flight Institute. Marine Corps thinking at this time envisioned training a cadre of pilots at a suit- able civilian facility with a transfer of activities to a

service school once the initial cadre had been trained and a few of the military gliders delivered. With this in mind, Lieutenant Mallory, himself a naval aviator, inspected the

schools and prepared a report for the Commandant.C37) The

report reflected an understandable prejudice in favor of re- stricting glider training to qualified naval aviators, observing that control problems, navigation, and night/instrument flying

precluded safe operation with inexperienced pilots. Never- theless recognizing that the required 150 glider pilots could

not be siphoned from existing resources, Lieutenant Mallory urged that novice pilots be sent to the Lewis School where more extensive facilities and better primary training devices were available, while the qualified pilots be sent to the Motorless Flight Institute. The latter school could offer 25-35 glider

flying hours in a four week course to four students at a time with an approximate cost of $500 per man. The Lewis school was capable of handling 20 students at a time for a nine week course aimed at those with little or no prior flight training. The

tuition was $775 per man with an added housing and messing charge of $2.00 per day for officers and $1.50 per day for noncommissioned officers.

A series of conferences was held in September 1941 at Headquarters Marine Corps to evaluate the progress thus far and to re-evaluate the Marine Corps glider program. The general consensus which emerged was that the prognosis was favorable and that steps should be taken to procure the equipment neces- sary for the airlift of two air infantry battalions. Assuming

49
that both the 12- and 24-man models proved feasible, one battalion would be placed on the east coast and equipped with one

model while the other battalion was on the west coast, equipped

with the second model.

By early October, the Headquarters position had been fully

developed and was enunciated by the Commandant.(38) Marine

Corps planning on the tactical employment of gliders envisaged

the use of amphibious models with outboard motors which would permit them to land and maneuver in lagoons and other protected

areas. Airborne forces would be augmented by adding an air

infantry battalion to each division, thereby doubling the

strike capability represented by the single parachute battalion in each division.

Basing facilities presented a problem as the gliders had

to operate in areas where they would not interfere with powered aircraft and where other activities, such as barrage ballons, would not endanger gliders. A study of the facilities at New

River indicated that the upper reaches of the New River Inlet and a planned adjacent auxiliary 1 andi ng field would be appro- priate. For cross-country flights, another base in the vicinity would be required, and in this case Parris Island could

be used after the January 1942 move planned for barrage balloon units then at Parris Island.

Despite the variety of problems concerning equipment, training, and facilities, the Marine Corps was on record by October 1941 as favoring expanded development of a glider capability. The Commandant's position emphasized both the in- ability to foresee all tactical situations which could develop in a war, and a reluctance to preclude future utilization of gliders by reason of inadequate experimentation and training

in peacetime.

Actual training got underway in November when four Marine officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Vernon M. Guymon, enrolled

in the glider pilot course at Motorless Flight Institute. Lieutenant Colonel Guymon had been awarded the Navy Cross for his part in the air evacuation of sick and wounded Marines during

the Nicaragua hostilities in 1929. During the years prior to

the outbreak of World War II, he occupied a variety of air and staff positions.

At the same time, eight officers went to the Lewis School for glider pilot training. The four officers at Motorless Flight Institute, all naval aviators, took the basic glider qualification course which included 30 flying hours. Fifteen

hours were airplane tow time while the remaining fifteen were

split between tinch towing and car towing. The course included cross—country towing, towing to strange airports, and

release and landing in simulation of tactical maneuvers.

50
Training gliders behind tow plane over Parris Island, South Carolina. (USMc Photo 15893)

Gliders on the flight line at Parris Island, South Carolina.

(USMC Photo 517610)

51

I

S
By mid-December the officers had graduated and were anxious to maintain their proficiency. The one- and two-man

gliders previously ordered by the Bureau of Aeronautics were due to arrive at Parris Island shortly, and the Commandant re- quested that all necessary support equipment, including three Navy aircraft (two NAF "Yellow Peril" N3Ns with tow gear and

a North American "Texan" SNJ) be in position by 10 January

1942. Pending the completion of more adequate facilities elsewhere, the initial training would be at Parris Island.

Nevertheless, the program was apparent1yunder close scrutiny again because in early January, the Director of the Division of Aviation recommended a temporary allowance to form

a Glider Detachment rather than the organi zati on of a permanent glider structure.(39) The Commandant concurred with this po- sition and, on 15 January, approved an authorizationof 14

officers/56 enlisted men for the new Glider Detachment.

By mid—March 1942, the one- and two-man gliders had been delivered and were in use. More importantly, the delivery of

the first 12-man gliders was expected shortly. For these

reasons, it was decided to enlarge the glider organization and

provide for a more permanent authorization.(40) On 16 March, the Commandant requested approval of the Chief of Naval Oper- ations to form Glider Group 71, to be initially composed of Headquarters and Service Squadron 71 and Marine Glider Squadron 711 (VML-71l). This approval was granted and, effective

24 April 1942, the Glider Detachment was disbanded and Glider Group 71 was organized with 20 officers and 218 enlisted men

(9/64 in the H&S Sq and 11/154 in VML-711).(41) Concurrently with the reorganization, the unit was transferred from Marine Base, Parris Island to the Marine Corps Air Station, Parris

Island and assigned to the Fleet Marine Force.

Training continued during the spring and early summer of

1942. The Glider Group was equipped with three N3N-3 trainers, one SNJ-2, one J2F—3 (Grumman "Duck"), one JE—l (Bellanco

"Pacemaker"), five two—man gliders, and two additional gliders

in reserve. The two-man gliders were utilized fully for training purposes, but Lieutenant Colonel Guymon, Group-71 commanding officer, noted a growing trend of thought that such training was a waste of time. He felt that, since all pilots so far were naval aviators, only transitional flying was required and

that this could best be accomplished in the 12-man gliders. Unfortunately, these models remained undelivered, apparently sidetracked in the wake of more pressing wartime requirement;.

During the summer of 1942, a number of studies were made, and inspection trips taken, to locate suitable sites for development as glider bases. After reviewing a number of areas, three locations were tentatively chosen. The first was Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas, which eventually did become the main glider training base for the Marine Corps. A second was located

52
at Edenton, North Carolina but was never actually used by gliders. The third location was at Shawnee, Oklahoma. Although this site was never used by gliders either, it was used as an auxiliary to the Navy's primary training base at Norman, Oklahoma. A fourth site, at Addison Point, Florida, was selected but never developed. Construction contracts were

let for facilities at Eagle Mountain Lake, calling for com- pletion by 1 January 1943, with progress by 1 November 1942 to

the point where the site could be occupied by an advance party.

Glider Group-71 left Parris Island on 21 November 1942, arriving at Eagle Mountain Lake on 24 November. Training continued although the 12-man gliders still had not been delivered.

The lowered priority of the glider program became more apparent in February 1943 when it was ordered that no further steps be undertaken in the glider program until more pressing

needs in the Pacific were met. As would be the case with the

parachute troops, it became apparent to senior Marine Corps planners that gliders we'e not suited to the Pacific war. In

the aftermath of the Guadalcanal battle, attention was focused

on planning for other island campaigns, and it was recognized

that gliders would be impractical except under the most favor- able conditions. After securing approval of the Secretary of

the Navy, the Commandant ordered the termination of the Marine glider program, effective 24 June 1943. The glider orders,

few of which had been filled, were assign'd to the Army as were ten LRW-l gliders which had been delivered hut never flown.

The Eagle Mountain Lake facility was utilized as a night fighter

training base for the remainder of the war.

53
Barrage Balloon Squadrons(42)

The first balloon unit in the Marine Corps ias a Balloon Detachment organized on 28 June 1918 under Captain Arthur H. Page (first Naval Academy graduate to enter Marine aviation). The detachment was intended for spotting duties in support of the 10th Marines' heavy artillery which was then being pre- pared for deployment to Europe with the American Expeditionary Force. The unit never went overseas, however, and was finally disbanded in April 1919.

The Marines experimented with balloons intermittently after World War I. In 1924 the Corps established a balloon

observation squadron, ZK-1M, and disbanded the unit in December 1929.

During the spring of 1940, military planners became in- creasingly aware of the problems involved in defending bases against air attack. That summer, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, designated a board to conduct a

"continuous study" of all phases of air defense. The Navy Department Antiaircraft Defense Board, in conjunction with the

Joint Board, went on to formulate the policy which was eventually approved by the Secretaries of the Navy and War. One

agreement to emerge from the two boards was a division of re- sponsibility for barrage ballon and kite defenses protecting

U. S. military installations. By Joint Board Action # 137 of 12 December 1940, the Army was assigned responsibility for barrage balloon defenses at permanent naval bases while the Navy was responsible for similar defenses on shipboard and

"such advanced bases as are not defended by the Army."

The Secretary of the Navy disseminated further guidance

to all bureaus and offices of the Navy on 27 December, di- recting that "the operation of balloon and kite elements of

the antiaircraft defenses of such naval bases as are not defended by the Army is assigned to the Fleet Marine Force."(43) As it developed, the bases which would be Marine responsibilities

were: Guantanamo, Midway, Johnston Island, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guam, and any advanced bases which might be seized in the event of a war. The Chief of Naval Operations requested all divisions within the Navy Department to comment on the program

and offer suggestions on the extent to which the Marine Corps should enter the barrage balloon field. Opinion varied and finally settled into two distinct views.

The first, enunciated chiefly by the Director, War Plans Division, held that balloons were not a reliable antiaircraft defense in the role intended. This view noted that the small

size of several of the islands meant that balloon defenses

54
would be ineffective except against dive bombers. The place- ment of balloons on small islands so as not to interfere with

friendly air operations would probably require moveable barge bases, and this would present difficult anchorage problems. Finally, in an observation noteworthy for its shortsighted- ness, the opponents held that "all bases for which the Fleet Marine Force is now responsible are located at great distances

from the bases where enemy shore-based aircraft could be maintained."(44) Nowhere was any mention made of attack by carri er-based aircraft.

The other view, expounded by the Director of the Fleet Training Division, reflected a strong confidence in the effectiveness of balloons. Relying on British experience with balloons over London (the Battle of Britain had started in August 1940), it appeared that 50-100 balloons were required

to provide adequate area defense. Based on this presumption, the Marine Corps would require two to four squadrons of 24

balloons each, with about 200 men per squadron. Industrial

balloon manufacturing capacity would soon be devoted to pro- duction for the Army, but the Marine Corps could get 150 balloons immediately if it acted quickly before the extended Army factory run started. On the basis of these factors, the

proponents of barrage balloons recommended organization of two squadrons comprising a total of 48 balloons, manned by 20 officers and 400 enlisted personnel.(45) The Chief of Naval

Operations concurred and approved the formation of two squad- rons of 10 officers and 200 enlisted personnel each by the Marine Corps.(46)

The Commandant of the Marine Corps immediately took steps to procure the balloons. Although the two active squad- rons would actually require only 48 balloons, •the technology of balloon manufacture was newly developed and it appeared

that replacement balloons would have to be maintained at squadron level in a 1:1 ratio to those actually flying. Thus

96 balloons would be required in addition to those used at the training facilities or under repair. In light of these

requirements, the Marine Corps initiated procurement of all balloons scheduled to be available from private industry until the Army run started in August l94l.(47)

The next step was the recall to active duty of Major Bernard L. Smith, IJSMCR, and his designation as Officer in Charge of Barrage Balloon Development and advisor to the Com- mandant on matters pertaining to the barrage balloon program. During World War I, Major Smith was an assistant naval attache in France, and had studied lighter—than—air craft in that country. He had been trained by French experts, he had pi- loted a number of balloon flights, and, by the time of his recall to duty, was considered the authority in the field.

55
In late April 1941, Major Smith, Captain Aquillo J. Dyess, USMCR, Captain Robert S. Fairweather, USMC, and 10 enlisted men arrived at the Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia to establish a school staff. After a brief period of administrative orga- nizing, the group ient to the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey for a two—week course in flying the British—made Mark—5 and Mark-6 balloons. After returning to Quantico, the

group moved the school——yet to receive its first student--to

the Barrage Balloon Training School there on 12 June 1941. Over a year later, in September l942 the school was moved to New River, then in January 1943 it was transferred to Training Center, Camp Lejeune.

The school existed initially as a sort of research and

development center for balloons. The first of the Marine

Corps balloons ha not arrived by early summer 1941, so classes were not possible, but the staff kept busy with a

number of tests and evaluations. The Navy Department Anti- aircraft Defense Board sent several varieties of British

defense kites, of the type flown by merchant vessels at sea, to Parris Island for study by the school. Several months

later, the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance utilized the Parris Island

facility to test some rockets and special fuzes on targets

suspended from ballons.(48)

The necessary balloons and support equipment began arriving at Parris Island in late summer and by September classes were underway. The Commandant authorized the formation of

the 1st and 2d Barrage Balloon Squadrons, and they were orga- nized effective 1 October 1941. Concurrently, the Commandant emphasized his desire that "every opportunity be taken to

train barrage balloon units with defense battalions in base

defense operations, and that a report be made covering...the

lessons learned."(49)

By early December, the school was able to advise Head- quarters, Marine Corps that the 1st Barrage Balloon Squadron

(ZMQ-l) under Lieutenant Charles W. May would be ready for overseas duty by about 15 January 1942. This was none too

soon as the Army had requested deployment of a Marine bar- rage balloon unit to the Canal Zone. The final training was

compressed and on 16 December the 1st Barrage Balloon Squad- ron entrained for Norfolk, Virginia where, on 23 December it embarked in the SS WilliamJ. Bradley (ex-Exeter). Arriving

at Fort Randolph, Canal Zone on 30 December, the squadron was attached to the 15th Naval Distrit and remained under the

Navy Department although assigned to the Army's Panama Artillery Command.

It had originally been understood that the squadron's sojourn in the Canal Zone would be short, but the months passed and finally, in late April 1942, the Navy Department requested that the Army relieve the unit as soon as possible.(50) In

56
Inflated barrage balloon ready for ascent, Samoa.

(USMC Photo 51553)

Barrage balloon in background ready in case of air attack on

unloading area. (USMC Photo 51110)

57
response, the Army noted that the defense of the Canal Zone

centered on two barrage balloon squadrons, one Army and one Marine Corps. A new Army unit had been authorized for Panama

and would be formed during the summer-—the Marine squadron could expect relief 15 days after the arrival of that unit.(51)

In September the squadron was finally able to return to New

River (the school had moved to New River by this time).

The 2d Barrage Balloon Squadron (ZMQ-.2) under Captain Henry D. Strunk remained in training at Parris rsland until

late March 1942 when it was ordere to San Diego for deploy- ment overseas. It embarked in April and joined the 2d Marine Brigade in Samoa.

With the outbreak of war, interest in barrage balloons rapidly outstripped the initially authorized total of two

squadrons. For fiscal year 1942, a total of eight squadrons was authorized and $5.4 million appropriated for necessary

equipment. Long—range plans developed during this period set an ultimate goal of 20 squadrons by January 1944, 12 of which would be ready by January 1943.

In light of this new interest, the school and supporting

activities were enlarged. By March 1942 the school was autho- rized a staff of 5 officers and 43 enlisted men. The Barrage Balloon Base Group, also located at Parris Island and respon- sible for the support of the school and maintenance of the

equipment, was authorized an additional 3 officers and 44 enlisted men.

On 16 April 1942 the 3d Barrage Balloon Squadron (ZMQ-3) (Captain Robert C. McDermound) was organized at Parris Island with a strength of 12 officers and 214 enlisted men. The

squadron moved to Norfolk on 4 July where it embarked on

transports and joined a convoy for the Pacific. One month

later, it arrived at Wellington, New Zealand and unloaded its

gear. After a brief respite the squadron embarked in the USS Fuller (AP-l4) and sailed on 26 August for Tulagi, calling en

route at Noumea and Espiritu Santo. The squadron arrived at Tulagi on 8 September but repeated enemy air attacks pre- cluded unloading the transport--each time an air alert sounded

the ship had to clear Tulagi Harbor for the open sea. Finally, on 14 September, the Fuller was forced to leave the area corn- pletely, with most of the unit's equipment still on board. Some of the arms had been unloaded, permitting the squadron's

four sections to equip and man defensive positions centered around eight .50 caliber machine guns, eight .30 caliber machine

guns, two 37mm guns, and five light Lewis machine guns. The

Fuller returned on 9 October and all remaining equipment was

unloaded. The 3d Barrage Balloon Squadron prepared to fly its balloons, but senior officers in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area

resisted the balloons, fearing that they would draw enemy at- tention to the facilities on Tulagi which had, to date, escaped

58
the heaviest bombing.(52) As a result, the squadron did not function as a barrage balloon unit during its time on Tulagi. Depending on the tactical situation, the personnel of the

squadron were used as infantry or as antiaircraft gunners. On 6 April the USS Crescent City (APA-.21 ) entered the harbor and all gear and personnel were loaded.

On 9 April the unit arrived at Noumea where it joined the

1st Barrage Balloon Squadron which had been ordered to the South Pacific in late 1942 after returning from its extended duty in the Canal Zone. Also at Noumea were the 5th and 6th

Barrage Balloon Squadrons, formed after the expansion of the school at Parris Island.

On 1 June 1942 the 4th Barrage Balloon Squadron was formed at Parris Island. The 4th Squadron left in early July for Samoa where it stayed until disbanded on 20 February 1943.

The 5th Barrage Balloon Squadron was organized on 1 July 1942 at Parris Island, and two months later embarked at San Diego for Noumea. Arriving on 22 September, the squadron was ordered to positions in defense of the inner anchorage at Noumea. By 17 October several balloons were flying, but the

limited helium supply (helium was used to inflate the balloons until hydrogen generators were operational) precluded full operation so it was decided to maintain an alert, launching

balloons only when attack was imminent. By late December the hydrogen generator was functioning and the unit was in full operation when the 1st and newly formed 6th Barrage Balloon Squadrons arrived on 22 December 1942.

The 6th Barrage Balloon Squadron was formed on 9 November at New River by detaching a cadre of officers and men under Captain Charles E. Ferree, Jr. from the 1st Barrage Balloon Squadron after the latter's return from Panama. Brought up to full strength by drawing on recent enlistees, the squadron left New River on 15 November 1942 for San Diego where, on 2 December,

it embarked with the 1st Barrage Balloon Squadron for Noumea. At the time of its arrival in Noumea, the 6th Barrage Balloon Squadron comprised 10 officers, 223 enlisted men, and 2 corpsmen.

A number of command and materiel problems had plagued the barrage balloon squadrons during 1942. These problems were rooted primarily in the questionable role of such units in an

island war. It is noteworthy that as of the end of 1942, four of the six squadrons (the 1st, 3d, 5th, and 6th) were in static defense positions around the support facilities at Noumea while

the other two (the 2d and 4th) were similarly employed at American Samoa. Among the results of this situation were ex- tended requisitional lead time and long periods of time during which the units were under Army operational control.

The more serious problem involved supply of necessary ma- teriel. For example, although the Operating Force Plan for

59
fiscal year 1943 provided for eight barrage balloon squadrons, and the first revision to that plan called for seven more, the Bureau of Aeronautics was hard-pressed to keep the existing units supplied. The most critical shortage was high-pressure hydrogen cylinders, 4,000 of which were required for each

squadron. A total of 120,355 were contracted for in June

1942, but peak deliveries of 14,500 per month would not be

realized until January 1943.(53)

0.n 10 January 1943, partly in an attempt to remedy some of the problems while fostering improved coordination and

control among the barrage balloon units, the Marine Barrage Balloon Group was activated at Nouniea. The commanding officer was Major Charles W. May.

Gradually, in the spring of 1943, it became apparent that antiaircraft guns offered a greater defense against air attack

than barrage balloons did. The disenchantment with barrage balloons became manifest at Headquarters Marine Corps in June

1943 and the Commandant decided to ask the Army to take over full responsibility for balloon activities. This was a logi- cal step, especially in light of the fact that the four squadrons at Noumea were all under operational control of the Army. Also, during the summer and fail of 1943 the Marine Corps was inspecting the functions of all of its units very closely, attempting to reorganize where indicated and disband those units which were superfluous to the Marine mission. On 26 June 1943, the Army agreed to assume 'full responsibility, gradually freeing the approximately 60 officers and 1,200 enlisted men in- volved in Marine barrage balloon duties.(54)

Starting in March, 90mm antiaircraft guns had been assign- ed experimentally to selected barrage balloon squadrons. The

first unit to receive the guns was the 5th Squadron which took over four 90s located on Mount Coffin above Nouniea. In late

April the 6th Squadron was assigned a 90mm battery. In June

the same squadron was reorganized as a composite defense unit consisting of a balloon section, a 90mm gun battery, and a

headquarters and service section. By July it became necessary to limit balloon flying in order to free added men for the antiaircraft batteries. Finally, on 6 August, the 6th Squadron was ordered to secure all balloons and devote full time to the

90mm guns. The other squadrons shared essentially the same ex- perience so that, by the fall of 1943, all were devoting most of their time to antiaircraft gun instruction and test firing.

The 2d Barrage Balloon Squadron was disbanded on 21 August 1943 on Samoa, and all personnel were transferred to the 2d Defense Battalion. The 4th Barrage Balloon Squadron, also on Samoa, had been disbanded on 20 February 1943.. At Noumea, the

1st Squadron was disbanded on 15 December 1943, the '3d on 9 De- cember 1943, the 5th. on 7 December 1943, and the 6th on 8 Decem- ber 1943. Most of the personnel were transferred to defense battalions.

60
Defense Battalions(55)

The origins of the defense battalions reach much further back into Marine Corps history than hoseof most other World War II special units. Marines had traditionally been charged with the capture and defense of base's which were required by

the Navy in time of war.., On 8 December 1933, the Fleet Marine Force was established as an integral part of the fleet organization. The primary responsibility of the Fleet Marine Force was "the seizure and temporary defense of advance bases, in

concert with operations of the Fleet."(56) Previously, it had been clearly set forth that "[it is] the fundamental war func- tion of the Marine Corps to assist the Fleet in the seizure

and initial defense of such advanced bases as the Fleet may

require in its war operations."(57) Thus, a long—standing Marine Corps responsibility was formalized in a variety of policy statements.

A second thread in the origins of the defense battalions may be traced to the series of disarmament conferences which met in the United States and abroad during the Twenties and

early Thirties (e.g. London Naval Conference, Washington Naval Conference, Kellogg-Briand Pact). In the hopeful euphoria of the day it was assumed that international limitations on arma- ments, especially naval vessels, would assure lasting peace. At the same time, with a stroke of the pen, the great powers

eschewed warfare as a tool in international relations.' The

result of all this was that Congress, at least, started thinking in largely defensive terms. Increased manpower authorizations were not approved, and budgetary requests were subjected

to very careful scrutiny. Of even more importance to the Marine Corps, the requirement to maintain a ready force to

seize and defend naval operating bases was called into question. Rather than thinking simply in terms of seizing and defending

an advanced base, a new frame of reference emerged in which

the Marine Corps would defend already existing temporary and

permanent overseas bases.(58) Significantly, this change in

roles did not disrupt the Marine Corps to the extent that might have been expected, despite the Corps' previous role as a pre- dominately offensive force. The long string of United States possessions and territories stretching out across the Pacific

to Manila was vital to the Navy, and the security of these areas was perceived as a legitimate Marine Corps responsibility.

Another thread in the development of defense battalions originated with the review of the military duties assigned to

the Army and the Navy. Throughout the early 1930s, the division of responsibilities was studied by a variety of boards, es- sentially with a view to preventing duplication of effort. One

school of thought, generally associated with the Navy and

61
Marine Corps, held that the Army should be responsible for continental land defensewhile the Navy andpresumably the Marine Corps) would be respQnsible for all ILoverseas defenses .11(59)

All of these threads seemed to merge by about 1937 when Marine Corps Security Detachments were first discussed. These

Security Detachments were to be established on certain vul- nerable islands immediately upon implementation of the early phases of Plan Orange (Orange was the code name assigned to

the basic plan for operations against Japan). The planning

for Security Detachments indicated that at least a battalion- sized force was envfsioned.(60)

By 1938, 0-1 Plan Orange specifically called for the establishment of Defense Detachments (ex Security Detachments) on Midway, Wake, and Johnston Islands, °on or before M-Day, in sufficient strength to repel minor naval raids and raids by

small landing parties."(61) The proposed Midway detachment would consist of 5—inch coastal defense guns, 3—inch AAA guns, a machine gun battery, a searchlight battery, and 28 officers! 482 enlisted men. The Wake group would include the same arma- ment with 25 officers/420 enlisted men. A smaller group on

Johnston Island was planned to include the 3—inch AAA guns, a machine gun section, a searchlight section, and 9 officers! 126 enlisted men.

The Commandant authorized an inspection trip of facilities on the three islands in the Fall of 1938. A full survey was made with special attention to fields of fire, possible gun

positions, and required personnel support.(62)

By the summer of 1939, the proposed units wereknown as defense battalions, and tentatively were to be equipped with:

12 - 3-inch AA guns 48 - .50-caliber AA machine guns 48 - .30-caliber AA machine guns

6 - searchlights

6 - sound locaters

6 - Navy 5—inch guns*

(*) A single Table of Equipment (T/E) and Table of Organization

(Tb) were never developed for the defense battalions. Weaponry and personnel assigned reflected the specific requirements of the unit's assigned destination. During the war, defense battalions, on occasion, included infantry units and tank platoons although variations on the machine guns, AAA guns, and 5-inch

guns reflected above were most common.

62
The enlisted complement of each battalion would total 711

and each man would be assigned a battle station as on.ship- board. Under this arrangement, the battalions would be es- sentially immobile after they were landed, but a mobile anti- aircraft battalion could be organized i.f the heavy guns and searchlights were left behind. A total of four such battalions was planned initially, and their relative importance in rela- tion to the total Marine Corps is noteworthy. A request to

increase the personnel ceiling from 19,000 to 27,000 had been

submitted with indications that, of the new total, 9,000 would

be in the Fleet Marine Force, and 2,844 of these would be in the four defense battalions.(63)

The actual formation of defense battalions started in

late 1939 and, by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, seven were in existence. The 1st, 2d, 6th, and 7th were formed

at the Marine Base, San Diego while the 3d, 4th, and 5th were organized at the Marine Base, Parris Island.

The first defense battalion to operate in what would be

considered a potentially hostile environment was the 5th

(Colonel Lloyd L. Leech) which was deployed to Iceland in June

1941 as part of the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional). The

brigade, which also included the 6th Marines, the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, and various supporting units, was sent to Iceland in support of British forces there to block any attempt by the Germans to invade the island country. The defense battalion's

.30—caliber and .50—caliber machine guns and its 3-inch anti- aircraft guns were integrated into the British air defense

system deployed around the airfield and harbor at Reykjavik. This arrangement provided the battalion personnel with invalu- able training and spared them from the labor and construction duties which befell the 6th Marines.

As time passed, it became less likely that a German offen- sive was planned for the north Atlantic, especially in light of the stiffening resistance offered by the Soviets on the

eastern front. Relief of the Marine Brigade in Iceland was, however, contingent upon the arrival of Army forces, and statu- tory provisions in effect priOr to Pearl Harbor prohibited the

assignment of nonvolunteers to posts outside of the western

hemisphere. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, this legal re- striction was swept aside by Congress and an Army force was organized. With its arrival in March 1942, the 5th Defense Battalion, along with the remainder of the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional), returned to the United States for reassignment.

Of the remaining six defense battalions which had been or- ganized by the time of Pearl Harbor, all but one, the 2d, were deployed on station in the Pacific at the time of the attack. The 2d (Lieutenant COlonel Raymond E. Knapp), although still

in the United States in December 1941, oined the 2d Marine Brigade and arrived in Samoa in January. Already set up in

63
Samoa was the 7th Defense Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Lester A. Dessez) which had arrivedthe previous March—-its arrival on 15 March gave it the distinction of being the first Fleet Marine. Force unit to operate in the South Pacific. Both the

2d and 7th Battalions had been formed in 1940 at San Diego, but while the 2d h.ad crossed the country to spend a half year at Parris Island, the 7th shipped to Samoa where it set up

preliminary defenses and undertook the training of the 1st Samoan Battalion, a native reserve unit.

The 3d Defense Battalion had been formed in late 1939 and, after an extensive training period, embarked for Pearl Harbor

in April 1940. In September an initial increment left Hawaii for Midway where it made preparations for the arrival of the

remainder of the battalion in February 1941. The 3d remained

on Midway until the following September when it was relieved by the 6th Defense Battalion. At this point, the 3d returned

to Hawaii and was at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.

The 6th Defense Battalion, which had been organied in March

1941, stayed on Midway, further developing and improving the defenses in preparation for its baptism by fire on 7 December.

Also at Pearl Harbor, in addition to the 3d, were the 1st (Lieutenant Colonel Bert A. Bone) and 4th (Colonel Harold S. Fassett) Defense Battalions. The 4th had been formed at Parris

Island in February 1940 by splitting off personnel from the 3d shortly before the latter's departure for Hawaii. The 4th Battalion moved to Guantanamo in June 1941, remaining there until October when it embarked for. Pearl Harbor, arriving a scant seven days before the attack.

The 1st Defense Battalion had been formed by a redesignation of the 2d Battalion, 15th Marines in November 1939. The

unit remained in San Diego until February 1941 when it moved

to Pearl Harbor. Shortly after its arrival, a portion of the

battalion, designated Detachment A, departed Pearl Harbor and, after stopping to leave six Marines and two Navy enlisted men on Johnston Island, continued on to Palmyra Island, arriving

on 10 March. Work immediately got underway on gun emplacements and barracks buildings.

On 12 April 1941, the 5-inch battery of the Palmyra Island group was redesignated Marine Detachment, 1st Defense Battalion, Palmyra Island. Similarly, the Marine Detachment, 1st Defense Battalion, Johnston Island was formed at Pearl Harbor and transferred to Johnston Island in July 1941. Finally, in August, the Marine Detachment, 1st Defense Battalion, Wake Island was organized and immediately deployed to Wake. Thus, at the time of the 7 December attack, the 1st Defense Battalion had detachments at three locations in addition to the

parent unit which remained at Pearl Etarbor.

64
By earl.y December 1941, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, and Wake were defended by Marine defense units. The global war plan then in effect, redesignated Rainbow 5, called for

the development of bases, primarily airbases, at all of these sites. Only Guam, located in the center of the Japanese-occu- pied Marianas, had been written off in the war plan. The early

capture of the island and its small Marine barracks detachment was conceded to the Japanese. The intention behind the deci- sion to establish these forward bases was two-pronged. First, the Samoan base would assist in protecting the routes of com- munication with the Southwest Pacific; second, the other bases would provide forward defense for the Pearl Harbor installations.

In large measure, the form which a defense battalion as- sumed depended on the place to which it was sent. By December 1941, the standard organization reflected a total of 900 men, and consisted of a headquarters battery, three 5-inch coastal defense batteries, three 3-inch antiaircraft batteries, a

sound locator and searchlight battery, a .50-caliber antiair- craft battery, and a battery of .30-caliber machine guns for beach defense. Nevertheless, specific island requirements

varied, and while Midway received a full complement, Johnston and Palmyra were so small in land area as to physically pre- clude assignment of anything more than a defense detachment.

As of early December 1941 , personnel were deployed as reflected below:

Pearl Johnston Palmyra Midway Wake O/E 0 / E 0 / E OLE OLE

1st Def Bn 20/241 7 /155 7 /151 --I—— 16/406

3d Def Bn 40/823 -- / -- --I -- --I 1 --I -- 4th Def Bn 38/780 -- / -- --I-- --I-- --I-- 6th Def Bn 4/ 17 -- / -— ——I—- 33/810 -—I—-

The island detachments were armed as shown in the follow- ing table:

Midway Johnston Palmyra Wake

5-inch guns 6 2 4 6

3-inch AA guns 12 4 4 12

.50 cal MG 30 8 8 18

.30 cal MG 30 8 8 30

65
The 7th Defense Battalion on Samoa was configured some- what differently. Organized with a strength of 25 officers! 392 enlisted men, its table of organization called for a head- quarters, an infantry company, and an artillery battery. The

artillery consisted of four 6—inch naval guns and six 3-inch antiaircraft guns.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor started at 0755 on 7 December, and during the two hours that it raged, the defense battalions were able to offer limited but generally ineffectual opposition from their stations in and around the navy yard. There were several reasons for this poor showing, none of which was really the fault of the defense battalions. First, and most obvious, the surprise nature of the raid, and its

timing early on a Sunday morning, resulted in a haphazard response. Second, and closely tied to the first, was the "peace

psychology" of the U. S. forces which meant that certain advance preparations necessary to mount an effective defense had

not teen taken. For example, ammunition stores had been dis- persed and secured, thus precluding a ready supply of ammo to

the gun crews. Shortly after the attack began, ammo trucks were dispatched to the Lualualei Depot for 3—inch antiaircraft ammunition but the trucks did not make it back until 1100, an

hour after the last enemy planes departed. Finally, not all of the defense battalions' weapons had been unloaded from the

ships and set up ashore.

Nevertheless, within six minutes of the start of the

attack, eight machine guns were set up and firing. Within one

half—hour of the start, 13 machine guns were in action, and this total climbed to 25 over the next hour and a half. Three

planes were downed, one of which was jointly claimed by a

shipboard gun crew. None of the defense battalions' heavier

weapons were ever fired.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, steps were taken to reinforce the outlying island garrisons. Substantial forces

got underway for Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. Drawn from

the 1st, 3d, and 4th Defense Battalions at Pearl Harbor, these

reinforcements of men and equipment were in place by the end

of December. Included in Midway's strengthened defenses were 17 scout bombers which made the over water flight from Hawaii on 17 December. These planes were being ferried to Midway aboard the aircraft carrier Lexington (CV-2) whn the attack occurred and the carrier was recalled to Pearl. The resulting over water flight from Hawaii to Midway (1,137 miles) was the

longest single engine landplane massed flight then on record.

The situation on Guam was bleak. The defenders included

Lieutenant Colonel William K. McNulty's 122 Marines of the Sumay barracks plus 28 Marines who were assigned to the is- land's police force. Within hours of the attack on Pearl

Harbor, Saipan-based Japanese bombers were over Guam. On 10

66
December a Japanese landing force came ashore in the dark and by 0600 the island was surrendered to the overwhelmingly

superior number of Japanese.

Although too small in area and too near Hawaii to be worthy of risking an amphibious assault, Johnston Island was a tempting target for Japanese submarines. The partially

completed airfield and the temporary seaplane facilities on

nearby Sand Island made the atoll an inviting target for sur- face shelling. The outbreak of hostilities found Major Francis B. Loomis, Jr., Executive Officer of the 1st Defense Battalion on Johnston as part of an inspection trip. As senior Marine

officer present, he assumed command. The first contact with

the Japanese occurred after dark on 12 December when a sub- marine surfaced 8,000 yards off Sand Island and began firing

green star clusters which exploded high overhead. The fire was returned by the 5-inch battery and the sub stopped firing. On the night of the 15th, two ships were detected off-shore.

The enemy opened fire, damaging a number of buildings and an oil storage facility. The 5-inch guns ashore delivered search- ing fire but the Japanese withdrew before suffering any appar- ent damage. Enemy submarines returned on the nights of 18, 21, and 22 December to fire sporadically at the Marine defenders. By the end of the month, reinforcements had arrived from Hawaii,

including an additional 5—inch battery, another 3-inch battery, and 16 more machine guns. This apparently dampened further Japanese interest as no new raids were made on Johnston Island for the duration of the war.

Palmyra Island's lone attack came on 24 December when a

Japanese submarine surfaced 3,000 yards offshore and began firing its deck guns at a dredge located in the lagoon. The 5-inch battery immediately drove the raider away. By the end of the month, Lieutenant Colonel Bert A. Bone, Commanding Of- ficer of the 1st Defense Battalion, arrived with men and

equipment to reinforce the garrison. In March, the Palmyra garrison was redesignated the 1st Defense Battalion and other detachments of this unit located elsewhere were absorbed by

the local commands.

Prior to this time, however, the attention of the world

had been riveted on Wake Island. People everywhere were electrified by the exploits of the isolated Wake Detachment of

the 1st Defense Battalion, as it opposed the Japanese.

On 7 December 1941, the Wake detachment totalled barely 400 Marine officers and men. This included 9 officers and

200 enlisted men who had been ashore only one month, having

arrived aboard the USS Castor (AKS-l) on 2 November. The detachment commander, Major James P. S. Devereux, had arrived in mid-October. Air support was built around the 12 F4F—3 Grumman Wildcats of Major Paul A. Putnam's VMF-2ll which had been fer- ried out on the USS Enterprise (CV-6), arriving on 4 December.

67
Major Putnam was responsible to Major Devereux who, in turn, reported to the island commander, Navy Commander Winfield S. Cunningham.

The situation on Wake was not promising. The detachment

was so understrength that one 3-inch battery was entirely un- manned while the other two could man only three of the four guns assigned to each. Battery E had no height-finder gear. The ground and antiaircraft machine guns were only half manned. There was no radar and no sound locator equipment.

At the time that word of the Pearl Harbor attack was received on Wake, the dawn air patrol was already up. The remaining planes were dispersed on the ground and the defense battalion personnel manned their posts. Shortly before noon

an attacking force of 36 Japanese bombers appeared and dropped

their bombloads, mostly on the airstrip where seven of the

eight Wildcats on the ground were destroyed. Aviation gas storage tanks were fired and 23 of the 55 aviation personnel on Wake were killed. During the following days the bombers

returned, always at the same time of day, and continued to

inflict casualties and destroy equipment.

Finally, at 0300 on 11 December a Japanese assault force

appeared offshore. It was nearly dawn before the Japanese warships moved in to initiate their firing runs. By 0615 the Marine guns opened fire and in the ensuing exchange, the enemy

cruiser Yubari was badly damaged and the destroyer Havate

sunk. A light cruiser, two destroyers, and a transport were

lightly damaged. The Japanese force withdrew in tatters to Kwajalein. It was subsequently confirmed that the purpose of

the Japanese assault had been to land a 450-man force on Wake. Thus did the Wake garrison drive off the initial enemy attack.

Enemy bombers continued their runs over Wake, sometimes missing a day, other times returning several times on the same

day. Within the next week, the Marines suffered the loss of three more fighters (by 22 December only two could still fly), half of their trucks and engineering equipment, most of the

diesel fuel and dynamite plus the complete destruction of the

garage, warehouse, machine shop, and blacksmith shop. The last

two Wildcats were lost on 22 December while trying to defend

against another flight of enemy bombers. Wake was without eyes in the sky. Ominously, this last flight of bombers had been carrier-based, suggesting that it was only a matter of time before another landing, this time with carrier air support, would be attempted.

In the early dawn of 23 December, another enemy assault force materialized offshore. Among the troops aboard the

Japanese ships were 1,000 naval landing force personnel and 500 sailors in a reserve capacity, available for committment ashore if needed. The first units came ashore near the end

68
-.• :1

Defense battalion personnel man a sound locator unit, Guadalcanal. (USMC Photo 59371)

40mm antiaircraft ciun ernDlacement on Bougainville. Note five enemy flags on gun barrel. (USMC Photo 74010)

69

-1.;

a. -.
of the airfield at 0245 and were immediately engaged by defenders manning the .50-caliber machine guns at that point. Unfortunately, the 5-inch batteries were so positioned that they could not take the destroyer-transports under fire. The 3-inch batteries opened fire but gradually more enemy troops made it ashore and forced the Marines back. It was very appar- ent at this pointthat one of the major weaknesses of the defense battalion organization was the lack of infantry units. Only by neglecting their heavy weapons could the guncrews de- fend themselves against the Japanese attackers. By 0500 it was clear that the situation was deteriorating. The Japanese had a large force firmly established ashore and were moving rapidly to exploit their advantage. Shortly after daybreak the enemy forces were supported by the arrival of fighters and dive-bombers from the carriers Soryu and Hiryu. At this point the issue was no longer in doubt and, at 0700, Major Devereux advised the island commander, Commander Winfield S. Cunningham, that organized resistance could not be maintained much longer. At 0730, Major Devereux walked out of his com- mand post with a white flag to meet the Japanese.

The fighting on adjoining Wilkes Island had raged fiercely

through the early morning hours and had developed so well that at daybreak Captain Wesley McC. Platt ordered a counterattack which completly destroyed the landing force on Wilkes. By 0800 Platt was reorganizing his men and trying to reestablish

contact with Wake, unaware of the surrender there. Unable to raise Wake, Platt set out with his men to find the enemy. At 1330 he spotted Devereux approaching with a Japanese officer and only then learned of the surrender. All resistance ended

and the island complex was in Japanese hands.

On Midway, Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Shannon's 6th De- fense Battalion was ordered to general quarters as soon as word of the attack had been received from Pearl Harbor. No action developed during the day, but shortly after dark, two Japanese destroyers, the Akebono and the Ushio, arrived and prepared for their first firing run. Early rounds hit the is- land's power plant and disrupted the communications center.(*)

As the enemy destroyers closed for their second run, Lieu- tenant Colonel Shannon's crews were ordered to engage targets of opportunity. Battery A's 5-inch guns remained silent due

to a communications breakdown, but Battery B's 5—inch tubes

(*) First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, although severely wounded in the initial shelling, refused evacuation until the

communication center, located in the power plant, had been re- established. First Lieutenant Cannon died shortly after

reaching the aid center. For his bravery he was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously, the first Marine to receive the

medal in World War II.

70
opened fire as did Battery D's 3-inch antiaircraft guns. The

.50-caliber machine guns were also firing as the targets were well within their range. Both destroyers departed shortly

thereafter.

Reinforcements poured into Midway and by late December

the bastion included the 6th Defense Battalion, heavily reinforced by elements of the 4th from Hawaii. Also operating

from the island's airfield were a scout-bomber squadron (VMSB- 231 with the 17 SB2U—3 Vindicators which had flown over water

from Pearl Harbor); a fighter squadron (VMF-221 with 14 F2A-3 Brewster Buffaloes which flew in off the Saratoga (CV-3) on 26 December after an abortive attempt at relieving Wake Lsland); and a patrol-bomber squadron (VP-21 with 12 PBYs). Among the heavy weapons to arrive were several 7-inch guns. These old

weapons had been removed from pre-Worid War I battleships and been in storage in navy yards until shortly before the outbreak of war. Midway's defenses were thus well armed and manned by early 1942. The defenders had frequent opportunities to test their skills against enemy naval and air units which raided the

island throughout the winter and spring, but these actions were insignificant in comparison to the developments which would unfold on and near the island in June.

The bastion was further reinforced during the spring, culminating in the arrival, during May, of three more 3-inch

batteries, a 37mm antiaircraft battery, a 20mm antiaircraft battery, and two rifle companies from the 2d Raider Battalion. Also sent in for good measure was a platoon of five light

tanks. In March, Midway's air arm, still organized around the Brewster Buffaloes and the aging Vought Vindicators, had been

redesignated Marine Aircraft Group 22 (MAG—22). In May it was strengthened with the arrival of 16 SMD-2 Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers and 7 Grumman Wildcat fighters.

As the battle of Midway unfolded on 4 June 1942, it be- came apparent that the defense of the atoll was of secondary

importance in comparison to the air engagement then shaping

up. Nevertheless, the atoll was the bait which had drawn the

Japanese task force into range of the U. S. carrier-based

planes and the Marines ashore were ready for any eventuality.

A patrolling PBY spotted enemy naval units approaching Midway at 0900 on 3 June. This sighting was reported and re- sulted in a B-17 raid that afternoon, but none of the enemy

ships were hit. At 0545 on 4 June another PBY spotted a Japa- nese air attack force of over 100 "Kate" torpedo planes, "Val"

dive-bombers, and "Zero" escort fighters approaching Midway

from the northwest.

Planes were in the air within ten minutes, flying to intercept the flight. The Zeroes took a heavy toll of the less maneuverable Buffaloes, but a number of bombers and Zeroes

71
were shot down. The survivors arrived over Midway at 0630 and started their bomb runs despite heavy antiaircraft fire

from the defense battalion units. The attack was over by 0700, the only air strike that would hit Midway. Sources are conflicting but the defense battalion's guns apparently claimed

at least 10 enemy planes. The battle, anticlimatic as it was

for the men of the 6th Defense Battal ion, was of critical im- portance in the naval war. Coming as it did on the heels of

the Japanese reversal at Coral Sea, Midway marked the end of the defensive phase and permitted the U. S. to assume the of- fensive in the Pacific. The 6th Defense Battalion had made its contribution to this turn of events.

As the war moved into the offensive stage, increasing

numbers of Marines arrived in th? South Pacific. These were

men that had enlisted after Pearl Harbor, and many found their way into defense battalions. The Corps continued to form these units after the outbreak of war, in fact, by the

end of 1942 their number had doubled to a total of 14. By early 1944, the total had grown to 20. All but two of these

units saw service overseas before the end of the war.

During the first major amphibious assault of the war, the Guadalcanal operation, defense battalion forces were drawn

from the more experiened units. It fell to the veteran 3d to

provide support to the 1st Marine Division landings. During

late June and early July, the battalion engaged in amphibious exercises in Hawaii. Shortly thereafter the unit embarked in

the USS Zeilin (APA-3) and the USS Betelgeuse (AKA-li) and

joined the Guadalcanal assault force. The battalion's units

were split between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The machine guns and 90mm antiaircraft batteries(*) went ashore almost with the

first waves, but the 5-inch guns were not finally brought ashore until late August. In early September, the 90mm battery on Tulagi was relieved by elements of the 5th Defense Battalion, permitting it to rejoin its parent unit in the defense of Hen- derson Field on Guadal canal . At this point the entire 3d was on Guadalcanal except for one 5-inch battery remaining on Tulagi. The battalion manned Defensive Sector One straddling

the Lunga River during the mid-October Japanese counteroffen- sive. Later in the month the 3d's 5-inch guns scored three

hits on a Japanese destroyer which approached too closely. These guns were again employed in November against grounded enemy transports.

Toward the end of the year, the 3d was joined by elements of the 9th Defense Battalion which had been formed at Parris

(*) The 90mm antiaircraft guns, which were gradually re- placing the World War I vintage 3-inchers, fired a 23-lb

projectile with a maximum range of 39,500 feet.

72
Island the previous February. The defense forces remained in

positions around Henderson Field and Koli Point until February 1943 when the 3d departed for New Zealand and a much deserved

rest. The 9th stayed on until June when it joined the Rendova

assault force and, subsequently, the New Georgia force. On

Tulagi, the detachment of the 5th which had relieved the 3d in September, together with the 3d's 5-inch battery which had re- mained on Tulagi, were redesignated the 14th Defense Battalion

in January 1943.

During the New Georgia phase of the Northern Solomons campaign, various defense battalion units were utilized. In

August, six tanks of the 10th Defense Battalion were detached

from the parent unit and assigned to the Headquarters XIV Corps,

U. S. Army at Rendova. These ta.nks, together with those of the 9th and 11th Defense Battalions, supported infantry ele- ments of the 43d Army Division in assaults against entrenched

enemy positions on New Georgia.

The 9th Defense Battalion supported the assault on the Munda Peninsula, initially with its 155mm gun batteries on Rendova. In July, four of its 40mm guns and four .50-caliber machine guns were sent to Zanana Beach on New Georgia to pro- vide antiaircraft and beach defense. Shortly thereafter, twin

20mm guns and two .50-caliber machine guns went to Liana Beach

for similar purposes. The accuracy of the battalion is attested

to by the fact that, in one group of 16 enemy bombers, 12 were shot down with 88 rounds of 90mm ammunition. When New

Georgia was declared secure on 5 August 1943, the 9th was promptly moved to new positions near Munda Airfield. Battery A with its 155mm guns was sent to Piru Plantation from where it could fire on the Vila region of Kolombangara Island.

Also indicative of the accuracy attained by the antiair- craft units of the defense battalions is the 4th's record on

Vella Lavella. Designated part of the Northern Landing Force

in the Vella Lavella operation, the 4th Defense Battalion got most of its light antiaircraft units ashore on D-Day, and had all remaining units in position within a week. The air defense

units, during the period 15 August to 6 October 1943, met 121

separate air attacks and shot down 42 Japanese planes.

In planning for the Bougainville operation, the 3d Defense Battalion was again selected to provide air defense. The unit's 90mm batteries landed right behind the initial wave, and by nightfall of D-Day, 20 40mm guns, 8 20mm guns, and all .30-caliber and .50-caliber machine guns were ashore and ready for action. The guns were used in their intended AA role as well as in coastal defense (the 90mm battery suc- cessfully opposed enemy barges supporting the Japanese counterlanding near the Laruma River), while the 155mm guns protectively bracketed the raiders and parachutists caught on the beach during the Koiari raid. The 3d was finally withdrawn

73
Defense battalion searchlight at dusk. (USMC Photo 51539)

74
from Bougainville in June 1944, the last of the initial assault units to be relieved.

Among the last of the major operations in which defense battalions participated was the assault on Guam in July 1944. Elements of both the 9th and 14th went ashore on 0-Day. One 90mm group of the 14th was in position by nightfall and firing

on the left bank of Red Beach in direct support of the 3d Marines. Ultimately the battalion assumed responsibility for

the defense of Orote Peninsula and Apra Harbor.

The 9th had been relieved on New Georgia in January 1944 and moved to Banika Island to prepare for the Guam operation. On 0-Day, the battalion went ashore at Agat Bay and took over responsibility for beach and perimeter defenses within the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade's zone. The second echelon, con- sisting of the Heavy Antiaircraft Group and the Seacoast Artillery Group, arrived in late August.

By the spring of 1944, there were 20 defense battalions

in the Marine Corps-designated the 1st through the 18th, and the 51st and 52d. The last two were composed of Negro Marines, and were organized at Camp Lejeune. The 51st was

organized initially around a Headquarters and Service Battery and Battery A, but was later enlarged with the addition of a

90mm group, a 155mm battery, a 75mm pack-howitzer battery, and a reinforced rifle company. The battalion saw service in

the Ellice and Marshall Islands.

The 52d Defense Battalion was organized in December 1943, and after several reorganizations, it departed for the Pacific. Detachments of the unit were variously located on islands in

the Marshalls and Marianas groups.

As the war progressed in the Pacific, it slowly became

apparent that, once an island was secured from the enemy, attempts at its recapture were very unlikely. The Japanese were increasingly hard-pressed to defend the areas they already occupied, and were unable to assume the offensive. As a result, the defense battalions gradually lost their mission. When engaged, they were primarily concerned with an occasional marauding Japanese aircraft. The 5—inch guns went unused. In

line with this development the defense battalions were slowly phased out, starting in April 1944. By 1 July 1944, only 5 of

the 20 remained. The others were either phased out entirely or redesignated as antiaircraft units. The heavy guns were detached and sent to artillery units, and the remaining arma- ments were beefed up with the addition of more 90mm antiair- craft guns.

In large measure, the demise of the defense battalions grew out of the fact that the enemy was incapable of threatening

an area effectively once the area had been secured by Marines.

75
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The basic idea of base defense had been and continued t be

sound. Although the units disappeared, the functiop remains, even today, an important Marine Corps responsibility. Most

notable at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Marines continue to defend an advanced naval base, a mission not unlike that assigned to Marine defense battalions of World War II.

77
Conclusion

The decade of the 1930s had been one of ferment for the

Marine Corps, a period during which major emphasis was directed

toward perfecting the theories of amphibious warfare. An im- portant result of this drive for perfection and excellence was an interest in special purpose forces, units specially trained for very specific combat situations. As would be expected, the need for these units was based on challenges to the United States as perceived by prewar planners.

The nemesis of the special units was rooted in a single

inescapable factor--certain elements of the Pacific war did

not develop as the planners had foreseen. The assault and

capture of small, heavily defended land areas became the objective, and it was apparent that the specialized units were, at best, no better suited to the task than were regular Marine infantry forces.

The raiders' skills became superfluous as the primary military objective was to wrest control of island groups from

enemy forces. Harassment and distraction became less important. The parachute troops, and their supporting glider forces, could not be used effectively in the Pacific island environment. The defense battalions and barrage balloon squadrons were in- tended for static defense. They tended to wind up in the back- water of hostilities, an uncomfortable situation for Marines accustomed to frontline combat.

In each case, as the war progressed the special units were reformed or reorganized. The barrage balloon squadrons were disbanded with personnel going to the defense battalions. The defense battalions were, in turn, reorganized, ultimately becoming either artillery or antiaircraft units. The raider

and parachute forces became cadres around which new infantry units were formed. The glider personnel, never numerically strong, were divided among other units, primarily aviation

squadrons.

The demise of these forces closed a colorful chapter in the history of the Marine Corps, but the professionalism of

their personnel was diffused throughout the Corps and contributed greatly to the competence and espirt of the "First to Fight."

78
FOOTNOTES

1. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from 1st Raider Regt WarD, Mar43-Feb44; 1st Raider Regt AAR, (New Georgia) 4Ju143-29Aug43; 1st Raider Regt R-2

Jnl (New Georgia) Jun-Aug43; 1st Raider Bn AAR (Guadalcanal) 7-90ct42; 2d Raider Bn WarD, lMay43-3lAug43; 3d Raider Bn WarD, l5Jun43-3lJul43; USPacF1t AR (Makin) 17-l8Aug42; 3d Raider Bn AAR (Russell Islands) 9Apr43; T.U. 7.15.3 AR to ComSubPacFlt, 21Aug42; T.U. 7.15.3 OpOrder #1-42, 7Aug42; T.G. 7.15 AR to CTF-7, 24Aug42; 2d Raider Bn AAR (Guadalcanal), 4Nov-4Uec42; Raider Bn SubjFiles, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC; Maj John L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, (Washington, HistDiv, HQMC, 1949JTLtCo1 Frank 0. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadal canal—-- History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v. I

(Washington: HistBr, G—3 Dlv, HQMC, l958)T Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj Douglas T. Kane, Isolation of Rabaul—-—History of

U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v. II (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1963); Benis N. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Victory and Occupation---History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations inVr1d War II, v. V (WashTiTgton: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, l9).

2. Capt James Roosevelt ltr to CMC, dtd 13Jan42 (Raider

folder, CentFiles, HQMC).

3. Ibid.

4. MajGen Holland N. Smith ltr to CMC, dtd 16Jan42 (CentFiles,

HQMC).

5. MajGen Charles F. B. Price ltr to CMC, dtd 16Jan42

(CentFiles, HQMC).

6. CMC ltr to CG, PhibForLant, dtd 11Feb42 (CentFiles,

HQMC).

7. CMC ltr to MajGen Clayton B. Vogel, dtd 10Feb42 (CentFiles,

HQMC).

8. CNO memo to CMC, dtd 27Mar42 (CentFiles, HQMC).

9. Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC (Ret), with Robert B. Asprey, Once a Marine (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 100.

10. CG, PhibForPacFlt ltr to CMC, dtd 30Mar42 and CU, 1st Raider Bn ltr to CMC, dtd 7Apr42 (CentFiles, HQMC).

11. CU, 1st Raider Bn ltr to CMC, dtd 7Apr42 (CentFiles, HQMC).

79
12. GO, R. Ech. 1st Raider Bn ltr to dIG, dtd 14Mar42 (Cent- Files, HQMC).

13. GO, iu 7.15.3 rpt to ComSubPacFlt, dtd 21Aug42 (CentFiles,

HQMC).

14. General Holland M. Smith, USMC (Ret), Goral and Brass

(New York: Scribner's Sons, 1949) P. 132.

15. ComPhibForSoPac ltr to GomSoPacFor, dtd 29Aug42 (CentFiles,

HQMG).

16. GomSoPacFor ltr to GMC via GinCPac, dtd 6Sep42 (CentFiles,

HQMG).

17. CinGPac ltr to CMC, dtd 24Sep42 (GentFiles, HQMC).

18. CMC memo to CNO, dtd 2Sep42 (CentFiles, HQMG).

19. GO, 2d Raider Bn memo to GG, •IMAC, dtd 28Dec42 (CentFiles,

HQMC).

20. CG, 1st MarDiv ltr to GG, IFv1AG, dtd 5Dec42 (CentFiles,

HQMG).

21. GO, 3d Raider Bn rpt to GO, 1st Raider Reg, dtd 9Apr43

(CentFiles, HQMG).

22. 1st Raider Reg Jnl, 31Aug43 (Raider File, RefBr, HistDiv,

HQMG).

23. Asst, PacSec, WarPlansDiv, GNO memo to ACS, Plans, dtd

24Dec43 (CentFiles, HQMC).

24. GNO ltr to CMG, dtd 25Dec43 (GentFiles, HQMC).

25. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1st Parachute Reg WarD, Sep—Dec43; 1st Parachute Bn AAR Guadalcanal, 13-14Sep42; 1st Parachute Bn AAR, Gavutu, n.d.; 1st Parachute Bn AAR Lunga Ridge, n.d.; 2d Parachute Bn Hist May4l—Feb43; "2d Parachute Battalion" in SubiFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC; "U. S. Marine Gorps Parachute Battalions in World War II" dtd 16Dec53 in SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC; "1st Marine Parachute Battalion and 1st Marine Parachute Regi- ment" dtd 15Feb49 in SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC; Maj John H. Johnstone, United States Marine Gorps Parachute Units, Marine Gorps Historical Reference Series pamphlet #32 (Washington: HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMG, 1962); LtGol Frank 0. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcenal, History of U. S. Marine Gorps Operations in WorlffWa II, V. I (Washington: HistBr, G—3 Div, HQMC, 1958)T Henry r. S1Tw, Jr., and Maj Douglas 1. Kane, Isolation of Rabaul , History of U. S. Marine Gorps Operations in World War II, v. II TWashinTon:

80
HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1963).

26. Internal memo, Division of Plans and Policy, HQMC, dtcl 14May40 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

27. Internal memo, Division Plans and Policy, HQMC, 15 May 1940 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

28. CMC ltr to Chief, Bureau of Navigation, dtd 22 Oct 1940

(SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

29. CMC ltr to SecNav, dtd 22May42 (Central Files 1520-30-135 HQMC); SecNav ltr to CMC, dtd 22May42 (Central Files 1520-30- 135, HQMC).

30. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from information and reports in the unit and Subject Files, Reference Branch, Historical Division) HQMC.

31. E. F. McDonald, President, Zenith Radio Corp. ltr to Admiral W. A. Moffett, BuAer, dtd 28Apr30 (CentFiles, HQMC).

32. CMC memo to CNO, dtd 25Jun41 (CentFiles, HQMC).

33. Ch, BuAer memo to CNO, dtd 19Jun41 (CentFiles, HQMC).

34. CMC Circular ltr, dtd 11Jul41, Subj: Glider Pilot

Training (CentFiles, HQMC).

35. CMC ltr to Ch, BuAer, dtd 25Jul41 (CentFiles, HQMC).

36. Ch, BuAer ltr to CMC, dtd 2Aug41 (CentFiles, HQMC).

37. Lt E. M. Mallory report •to CMC, dtd 12Aug41 (CentFiles,

HQMC).

38. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 1Oct41 (CentFiles, HQMC).

39. Dir, DivAviation memo to CMC, dtd 6Jan42 (CentFiles, HQMC).

40. Dir, DivAviation ltr to CMC, dtd 13Mar42 (CentFiles, HQMC).

41. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 16Mar42 and CNO ltr to CMC, dtd

30Mar42 (CentFiles, HQMC).

42. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1st BB Sq RcdsFile, 1940-41; 3d BB Sq OpLog, 160ct42-16Mar43; 3d BB Sq OpRpts, Ju142-Ju143; 3d BB Sq RcdsFile, May42-Jun43; 3d BB Sq Daily Log, Ju142-Dec43; 5th BB Sq WarD, Ju142-Jun43; 6th BB Sq WarD, Nov42—Dec43.

43. SecNav ltr to all Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Dept, dtd 27Dec40 (SubjFiles, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

81
44. Director, War Plans Div memo to Director, Naval Districts Dlv, dtd 26Feb41 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

45. Director, Fleet Training Div memo to CNO, dtd 15Mar41

(SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

46. CNO ltr serial 026612 dtd 21Mar41 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

47. Director, DP&P memo to CMC, dtd 29Mar41 (CentFiles, HQMC).

48. Senior Member, Navy Dept Antiaircraft DefBd memo to CNO, dtd 29May41 and Ch, BuOrd ltr to CMC, dtd 25Sep41 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

49. CMC ltr to CG, MB Parris Island dtd 7Oct41 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

50. CinCUSF1t ltr to CSA, dtd 26Apr42 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

51. Asst CSA memo to CinCUSF1t, dtd 20May42 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

52. 3d BB Sq OpRpt, 15-3lDec42, dtd 14Jan43 (RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

53. Ch, BuAer ltr to CMC, dtd 31Mar42 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

54. CSA ltr to CinCUSF1t, dtd 26Jun43, and CinCUSF1t ltr to CMC, dtd 1Jul43 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

55. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is based on information and reports contained in the unit files, Reference Branch, Historical Division, HQMC and on material contained in LtCol Frank 0. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal—-—History of

U. S. Marine Corps Operations i World 11ar II, v. I (Washington: iTisBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1958); id HenryT 1Taw, Jr., and Maj Douglas T. Kane, Isolation of Rabaul---History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v. II (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, T9). — —

56. AsstSecNav memo to SecNav, dtd 24Sep35 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

57. Rpt of the General Board, dtd 10Aug32, noted in CMC menio to SecNav, dtd 25Sep35 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

58. Div P&P memo to CMC, dtd 12Oct32 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv,

(HQMC).

82
59. CMC memo to SecNav, dtd 13Apr33 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv,

HQMC).

60. CO. MB, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor ltr to CG, DepPac, MCHQ, San Francisco, Cal, dtd 23Dec37 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

61. Dir DivOps&Tr memo to CMC, dtd 21Sep38 (SubjFile, RefBr, (-!istDiv, HQMC).

62. CMC ltr to CG, FMF, MCB, San Diego, dtd 30Sep38 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

63. CMC memo to the President, dtd 27Jul39 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).

83
Appendix A

Unit Commanding Officers

Commanding Officers, Marine Raiders

1st Marine Raider Regiment

Col Harry B. Liversedge 15 Mar 1943-26 Dec 1943

LtCol Samuel D. Puller 27 Dec 1943-25 Jan 1944

LtCol Alan Shapley 26 Jan 1944- 1 Feb 1944

2d Marine Raider Regiment (Provisional)

LtCol Alan Shapley 12 Sep 1943-26 Jan 1944

1st Marine Raider Battalion

LtCol Merritt A. Edson 16 Feb 1942-19 Sep 1942

LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II 20 Sep 1942-26 Sep 1942

Maj Ira J. Irwin 27 Sep 1942—13 Jan 1943

LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II 14 Jan 1943— 8 Sep 1943

Maj George W. Herring 9 Sep 1943- 2 Oct 1943

Maj Charles L. Banks 3 Oct 1943— 1 Feb 1944

2d Marine Raider Battalion

LtCol Evans F. Carison 19 Feb 1942—21 Mar 1943

LtCol Alan Shapley 22 Mar 1943-30 Aug 1943

LtCol Joseph P. McCaffery 1 Sep 1943- 1 Nov 1943

Maj Richard 1. Washburn 1 Nov 1943-25 Jan 1944

Capt Bernard W. Green 26 Jan 1944-31 Jan 1944

84
3d Marine Raider Battalion

LtCol Harry B. Liversedge 20 Sep 1942-14 Mar 1943

LtCol Samuel S. '(eaton 15 Mar 1943—15 Jun 1943

LtCol Fred D. Beans 16 Jun 1943—14 Jan 1944

Maj Ira J. Irwin 15 Jan 1944—31 Jan 1944

4th Marine Raider Battalion

Maj James Roosevelt 23 Oct 1942—28 Apr 1943

Maj James R. Clark 29 Apr 1943— 3 May 1943

LtCol Michael S. Currin 4 May 1943-14 Sep 1943

Maj Robert H. Thomas 15 Sep 1943- 1 Feb 1944

Commanding Officers, Marine Parachute Troops

1st Parachute Regiment

LtCol Robert H. Williams 1 Apr 1943-15 Jan 1944

Maj Richard Fagan 16 Jan 1944—29 Feb 1944

1st Parachute Battalion

Capt Marcellus J. Howard 15 Aug 1941- 1 Oct 1941

Capt (Maj) Robert H. Williams 2 Oct 1941— 7 Aug 1942

Maj Charles A. Miller 8 Aug 1942-17 Sep 1942

Capt Harry L. Torgerson 18 Sep 1942—26 Sep 1942

LtCol Robert H. Williams 27 Sep 1942-31 Mar 1943

Maj Brooke H. Hatch 1 Apr 1943—27 Apr 1943

Maj Robert C. McDonough 28 Apr 1943- 9 May 1943

Maj Richard Fagan 10 May 1943-10 Jan 1944

Maj Robert C. McDonough 11 Jan 1944-29 Feb 1944

85
2d Parachute Battalion

Capt (Maj) Charles E. Shepard, Jr. 1 Oct 1941— 4 May 1942

Maj (LtCol) Richard W. Hayward 5 May 1942—31 Mar 1943

LtCol Victor H. Krulak 1 Apr 1943- 7 Nov 1943

Maj Warner 1. Bigger 8 Nov 1943—29 Feb 1944

3d Parachute Battalion

Maj Robert T. Vance 16 Sep 1942- 9 Dec 1943

Maj Harry L. Torgerson 10 Dec 1943—29 Feb 1944

4th Parachute Battalion

LtCol Marcellus J. Howard 1 Jul 1943-30 Sep 1943

Maj Tom M. Trotti 1 Oct 1943—19 Jan 1944

Commanding Officers, Glider Units

Marine Glider Detachment

LtCol Vernon M. Guymon 10 Jan 1942-24 Apr 1942

Marine Glider Group 71

LtCol (Col) Vernon N. Guymon 24 Apr 1942—23 Jun 1943

Marine Glider Squadron 711

Capt (Maj) Eschol M. Mallory 24 Apr 1942- 7 Feb 1943

Capt (Ma,j) Barnette Robinson 8 Feb 1943-23 Jun 1943

86
Commanding Officers, Marine Barrage Balloon Squadrons

1st Barrage Balloon Squadron

lstLt (Maj) Charles W. May 1 Oct 1941-22 Aug 1943

Maj Karl W. Kolb 23 Aug 1943- 9 Dec 1943

Maj Robert C. McDermond 10 Dec 1943-14 Dec 1943

2d Barrage Balloon quadron

Capt Henry D. Strunk 1 Oct 1941-14 Jan 1942

2dLt William W. McKinley 15 Jan 1942- 5 Feb 1942

Maj Chester R. Allen 6 Feb 1942-28 Aug 1942

Capt John P. Brody 29 Aug 1942— 7 Feb 1943

Capt Claude Davidson, Jr. 8 Feb 1943-20 Aug 1943

3d Barrage Balloon Squadron

Capt (Maj) Robert C. McDermond 16 Apr 1942- 8 Dec 1943

4th Barrage Balloon Squadron

Maj Claude W. Stahl 1 Jun 1942-19 Feb 1943

5th Barrage Balloon Squadron

lstLt Ralph C. Margeson 1 Jul 1942-17 Sep 1942

Capt William W. McKinley 18 Sep 1942- 6 Aug 1943

Capt Harold P. Katherman 7 Aug 1943- 6 Dec 1943

6th Barrage Balloon Squadron

Capt Charles E. Ferree, Jr. 9 Nov 1942-26 Apr 1943

Capt George F. Vaughan 27 Apr 1943-23 Oct 1943

Capt Gordon C. Piatt 24 Oct 1943- 8 Dec 1943

87
2d Defense Battalion

3d Defense Battalion

Commanding Officers, Defense Battalions

1st Defense Battalion

LtCol Bert A. Bone 1 Nov 1939—28 Feb 1940

Maj Augustus W. Cockrell 1 Mar 1940-15 Jul 1940

LtCol Bert A. Bone 16 Jul 1940-23 May 1942

Col Curtis W. LeGette 24 May 1942-22 Sep 1942

LtCol John H. Griebel 23 Sep 1942-31 Oct 1943

LtCol Frank P. Hager, Jr. 1 Nov 1943— 4 Dec 1943

Col Lewis A. Hohn 5 Dec 1943-20 Apr 1944

LtCol Jean H. Buckner 21 Apr 1944- 7 May 1944(*)

LtCol Bert A. Bone 1 Mar 1940—14 Jul 1940

Maj Lewis A. Hohn 15 Jul 1940—31 Jul 1940

Col Thomas E. Bourke 1 Aug 1940-24 Nov 1940

LtCol Charles I. Murray 25 Nov 1940-28 Feb 1941

LtCol (Col) Raymond E. Knapp 1 Mar 1941-26 Sep 1942

LtCol Norman E. True 27 Sep 1942- 2 Oct 1942

Col Raymond E. Knapp 3 Oct 1942-24 May 1943

Col Norman E. True 25 May 1943-16 Apr 1944(*)

LtCol Robert H. Pepper 10 Oct 1939-27 Aug 1940

Col Harry K. Pickett 28 Aug 1940- 6 Feb 1941

LtCol (Col) Robert H. Pepper 7 Feb 1941-14 Mar 1943

LtCol Harold C. Roberts 15 Mar 1943-14 May 1943

(*) Effective date of unit redesignation.

88
LtCol Kenneth W. Banner

LtCol Samuel G. Taxis

LtCol Edward H. Forney

None listed

Col

Col Harold S. Fassett

15 May 1943-12 Aug 1943

13 Aug 1943—25 Aug 1943

26 Aug 1943—14 Jun 1944(*)

4th Defense Battalion

1 Feb 1940- 3 Apr 1940

4 Apr 1940-30 Nov 1940

1 Dec 1940- 4 Feb 1941

5 Feb 1941-18 Oct 1941

19 Oct 1941— 3 Nov 1941

4 Nov 1941-15 May 1944(*)

Col Lloyd L. Leech

Col George F. Good, Jr.

LtCol Willis E. Hicks

(*) Effective date of unit redesignation.

89

1941

1941

1942

1942

1942

1942

1943

1 943

1944

Maj George F. Good, Jr.

Col Lloyd L. Leech

LtCol Jessee L. Perkins

William H. Rupertus

5th Defense Battalion

1 Dec 1940—13 Nov 1942

14 Nov 1942- 4 Dec 1943

5 Dec 1943-16 Apr 1944(*)

LtCol

Col

LtCol

LtCol

LtCol

Maj

Charles I. Murray

Raphael Griffin

(Col) Harold D. Shannon

Lewis A. Hohn

Rupert R. Deese

Robert E. Hommel

6th Defense Battalion

1 Mar 1941-14 Mar

15 Mar 1941-14 Oct

15 Oct 1941- 5 Aug

6 Aug 1942— 9 Sep

10 Sep 1942-26 Oct

27 Oct 1942- 3 Nov

4 Nov 1942- 3 Nov

4 Nov 1943-25 Dec

26 Dec 1943-27 Mar

LtCol Lewis A. Hohn

LtCol

LtCol

John H. Griebel

Ch'arles T. Tingle
7th Defense Battalion

LtCol (Col) Lester A. Dessez 16 Dec 1940-21 Dec 1942

Col Curtis W. LeGette 22 Dec 1942- 6 Dec 1943

LtCol Henry R. Paige 7 Dec 1943—16 Apr 1944(*)

8th Defense Battalion

Augustus W. Cockrell 1 Apr 1942— 3 Aug 1943

Earl A. Sneeringer 4 Aug 1943-17 Aug 1943

Clyde H. Hartsel 18 Aug 1943—20 Oct 1943

Lloyd L. Leech 21 Oct 1943-16 Apr l944(*)

Col Robert Blake

LtCol Wallace 0. Thompson

1 Jun 1942- 8 Aug 1943

9 Aug 1943-28 May 1944(*)

LtCol Frank P. Hager, Jr. 28 Mar 1944—30 Dec 1944

LtCol Robert L. McKee 31 Dec 1944—29 Apr 1945

LtCol Herbert R. Nusbaum 30 Apr 1945— 1 Jul 1945

LtCol Wilfred Weaver 2 Jul 1945-. 4 Oct 1945

Maj Bruce F. Hillam 5 Oct 1945—24 Jan 1946

Maj George R. Helmer 25 Jan 1946— 1 Feb 1946(*)

LtCol

LtCol

Col

Cal

Maj

None

Cal

LtCol

LtCol

9th Defense Battalion

Wallace 0. Thompson

listed

David R. Nimmer

William J. Scheyer

Archie E. O'Neil

10th Defense Battalion

1 Feb 1942-27 Jun 1942

28 Jun 1942-30 Sep 1942

1 Oct 1942-17 Apr 1943

l8Apr 1943- 2 Nov 1943

3 Nov 1943— 1 Sep 1944(*)

(*) Effective date of unit redesignation.

90
11th Defense Battalion

Col Charles N. Muidrow 15 Jun 1942-15 May 1944(*)

12th Defense Battalion

Col William H. Harrison 1 Aug 1942- 1 Feb 1944

LtCol Merlyn D. Holmes 2 Feb 1944-15 Jun 1944(*)

13th Defense Battalion

Col Bernard Dubel 25 Sep 1942-14 Feb 1944

Col Richard N. Cutts, Jr. 15 Feb 1944-15 Apr 1944(*)

14th Defense Battalion

Col Galen N. Sturgis 15 Jan 1943—23 May 1943

None listed 24 May 1943-22 Jun 1943

LtCol Jesse L. Perkins 23 Jun 1943— 2 Mar 1944

LtCol William F. Parks 3 Mar 1944— 1 Sep 1944(*)

15th Defense Battalion

LtCol Francis B. Loomis, Jr. 1 Oct 1943- 3 May. 1944

LtCol Peter J. Negri 5 May 1944- 7 May 1944(*)

16th Defense Battalion

LtCol Richard P. Ross, Jr. 10 Nov 1942— 5 Jul 1943

LtCol Bruce T. Hemphill 6 Jul 1943-14 Mar 1944

LtCol August F. Penzold, Jr. 15 Mar 1944-16 Apr 1944(*)

17th Defense Battalion

LtCol Thomas G. McFarland 22 Mar 1944-19 Apr 1944(*)

(*) Effective date of unit redesignation.

91
Oct 1943—16 Jan 1944

7 Jan 1944-16 May 1944(*)

52d Defense Battalion

Augustus W. Cockrell 15 Dec 1943-11 Jul 1944

Joseph W. Earnshaw 12 Jul 1944- 9 Jan 1945

David W. Silvey 10 Jan 1945- 9 May 1945

Thomas C. Moore, Jr. 10 May 1945-21 Apr 1946

Alfred L. Booth 22 Apr 1946-15 May l946(*)

18th Defense Battalion

LtCol Harold C. Roberts 1 LtCol William J. Van Ryzin 1 51st Defense Battalion

Samuel A. Woods

William B. Onley

Floyd A. Stephenson

Curtis W. LeGette

Gould P. Groves

Col

LtCol

LtCol

Col

LtCol

Col

LtCol

LtCol

LtCol

LtCol

18 Aug 1942-10 Mar 1943

11 Mar 1943-20 Apr 1943

21 Apr 1943—26 Jan 1944

27 Jan 1944—13 Dec 1944

14 Dec 1944-31 Jan 1946(*)

(*) Effective date of unit redesignation.

92
Appendix B

Unit Battle Honors

Raider Battle Honors

2d Raider Regiment

Occupation and Defense of Cape Toroki na

Consolidation of Northern Solomons

1st Raider Battalion

Guadalcanal-Tulagi Landings

Capture and Defense of Guadal canal

New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu Occupation

Presidential Unit Citation

(attached to 1st Marine Division) Solomon Islands

Makin Island raid

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal

Occupation and Defense of Cape Toroki na

Consolidation of Northern Solomons

Presidential Unit Citation

(attached to 1st Marine Division) Solomon Islands

1st Raider Regiment

New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu Occ•pati on 5 Jul 1943—28 Aug 1943

1 Nov 1943—15 Dec 1943

15 Dec 1943—12 Jan 1944

Midway

2d Raider Battalion

7—9 Aug

10 Aug 1942—16 Oct

5 Jul T943—28 Aug

7 Aug 1942- 9 Dec

4-6 Jun

17—18 Aug

4 Nov 1942-17 Dec

1 Nov 1943-15 Dec

15 Dec 1943-12 Jan

7 Aug 1942— 9 Dec

1942

1942

1 943

1942

1942

1942

1942

1943

1944

1942

93
3d Raider Battalion

Consolidation of Southern Solomons 21 Feb 1943—20 Mar 1943

Occupation and Defense of Cape 1 Nov 1943—15 Dec 1943

Toroki na

Consolidation of Northern Solomons 15 Dec 1943-12 Jan 1944

4th Raider Battalion

New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu 21 Jun 1943-11 Jul 1943

Occupation and 18 Jul 1943—28 Aug 1943

Parachute Battle Honors

1st Parachute Regiment

Vella Lavella Occupation

Choiseul Island Diversion

Occupation and Defense of Cape Toroki na

Consolidation of Northern Solomons

1st Parachute Battalion

Guadalcanal—Tulagi landings

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal

Vella Lavella Occupation

Occupation and Defense of Cape Toroki na

Consolidation of Northern Solomons

Presidential Unit Citation

(attached to 1st Marine Division) Solomon Islands

94

4—16 Oct 1943

28 Oct 1943— 4 Nov 1943

4—15 Dec 1943

15 Dec 1943-12 Jan 1944

7— 9 Aug 1942

10 Aug 1942—18 Sep 1942

4-16 Oct 1943

23 Nov 1943-15 Dec 1943

15 Dec 1943-12 Jan 1944

7 Aug 1942—18 Sep 1942
2d Parachute Battalion

Vella Lavella Occupation 1 Sep 1943—16 Oct 1943

Choiseul Island Diversion 28 Oct 1943— 4 Nov 1943

3d Parachute Battalion

Vella Lavella Occupation 7-16 Oct 1943

Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina 4—15 Dec 1943

Consolidation of Northern Solomons 15 Dec 1943-12 Jan 1944

4th Parachute Battalion

None--in training status until disbanded.

Defense Battalions--Battle Honors

1st Defense Battalion

Defense of Pearl Harbor 7 Dec 1941

(less Wake Detachment)

Defense of Wake Island 8-23 Dec 1941

(Wake Detachment only)

Defense of Wake Island 15-22 Dec 1941

(Johnston Island Detachment only)

Occupation of Kwajalein and 1-8 Feb 1944

Majuro Atolls

Occupation of Eniwetok Atoll 17 Feb 1944- 2 Mar 1944

Presidential Unit Citation 8-22 Dec 1941

(Wake Island Detachment only)

2d Defense Battalion

Gilbert Island Operation 24 Nov 1943- 8 Dec 1943

95
3d Defense Battalion

Defense of Pearl Harbor 7 Dec 1941

Battle of Midway 4 Jun 1942

(3-inch AAA Group only)

Guadal canal —Tul agi landings 7—9 Aug 1942

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal 10 Aug 1942- 8 Feb 1943

Occupation and Defense of Cape 1 Nov 1943—15 Dec 1943

Torokina (1st Echelon only)

Occupation and Defense of Cape 11 Nov 1943-15 Dec 1943

Torokina (2d Echelon)

Consolidation of Northern Solomons 15 Dec 1943—15 Jun 1944

4th Defense Battalion

Defense of Pearl Harbor 7 Dec 1941

Occupation of Vella Lavella 15 Aug 1943-16 Oct 1943

5th Defense Battalion

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal 8 Sep 1942-15 Jan 1943

(Detachment only)

Gilbert Islands Operation 2 Oct 1942- 8 Dec 1943

6th Defense Battalion

Defense of Midway Island 7 Dec 1941

Defense of Midway Island 3-6 Jun 1942

Navy Unit Commendation Jun 1942

(Midway)

7th Defense Battalion

Gilbert Islands Operation 20 Nov 1943— 8 Dec 1943

8th Defense Battalion

Gilbert Islands Operation 28 Nov 1943- 8 Dec 1943

96
9th Defense Battalion

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal 30 Nov 1942- 8 Feb 1943

Consolidation of Southern Solomons 8 Feb 1943-30 Jun 1943

Rendova-New Georgia Area 30 Jun 1943—31 Aug 1943

Capture and Occupation of Guam 21 Jul 1944—15 Aug 1944

Navy Unit Commendation 30 Nov 1942-20 May 1943

(Guadal canal)

Navy Unit Commendation 30 Jun 1943- 7 Nov 1943

(Rendova-New Georgia)

Navy Unit Commendation 21 Jul 1944-20 Aug 1944

(Guam)

10th Defense Battalion

Consolidation of Southern Solomons 24 Feb 1943-20 Jun 1943

New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu 26 Jul 1943-13 Oct 1943

Occupation (Tank platoon)

Occupation of Eniwetok 21 Feb 1944- 2 Mar 1944

11th Defense Battalion

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal 17 Jan 1943- 8 Feb 1943

Consolidation of Southern Solomons 21 Feb 1943- 8 Mar 1943

(Detachment only)

New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu 14 Jul 1943-31 Aug 1943 Occupation (Battery "E")

New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu 4-31 Aug 1942 Occupation (Tank platoon)

New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu 7-31 Aug 1943 Occupation (Battery "K")

12th Defense Battalion

Assault and Occupation of New Guinea 30 Jun 1943- 7 Dec 1943

(Woodlark Island)

Cape Gloucester, New Britain 26 Dec 1943- 1 Mar 1944

97
13th Defense Battalion

Remained At Guantanamo Bay until shortly before disbanding.

14th Defense Battalion

Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal 15 Jan 1943— 8 Feb 1943

Admiralty Island landings 20—25 Mar 1944

(One 40mm platoon and two 90mm platoons)

Capture and Occupation of Guam 21 Jul 1944-15 Aug 1944

(Less Seacoast Artillery Group)

15th Defense Battalion

Occupation of Kwajalein and 2-8 Feb 1944

Majuro Atolls

16th Defense Battalion

None.

17th Defense Battalion

None.

18th Defense Battalion

None.

51st Composite Defense Battalion

None.

52d Composite Defense Battalion

None.

98
Appendix C

Unit Tables of Organization

Table of Organization

(1st Raider Battalion)

(24 September 1942)

USMC USN Total

Off/Eni Off/Enl Off/Eni

Raider Bn (Tb D—175) 36/843 2/ 20 38/863

Headquarters Co (Tb D-i74) 9/129 2/ 10 11/139

Bn Headquarters 7/ 72 2/ 10 9/ 82

Communications Pit 1/ 22 -.1—-— 1/ 22

QM and Motor Transport Pit 1/ 35 -I—-- 1/ 35

Weapons Co (Tb D—i73) 7/202 -/ 2 7/204

Co Headquarters 2/ 29 -/ 2 2/ 31

Demolition Pit 2/ 74 -/-—- 2/ 74

60mm Mortar Pit 1/ 35 -I---- 1/ 35

Machine Gun Pit (2) 1/ 32 —/——— 1/ 32

Rifle Co (4) (T/0 0—172) 5/128 —/ 2 5/130

Co Headquarters 1/ 15 -/ 2 1/ 17

Weapons Pit 1/ 29 -I---. 1/ 29

Rifle Pit (3) 1/ 28 -/-—- 1/ 28

99
Table of Organization

(1st Parachute Battalion)

1 July 1942

USMC USN Total

Off/Enl Off/Eni Off/Eni

Parachute Bn (1/0 0-83) 25/540 3/ 15 28/555

Headquarters Co (Tb D—82) 10/ 96 -I--- 10/ 96

Bn Headquarters 9/ 48 -1--- 9/ 48

Demolition Pit 1/ 33 -I--- 1/ 33

Co Headquarters -/115 -I--- -/ 15

Parachute Co (1/0 0—81) (3) 5/148 1/ 5 6/153

Co Headquarters 2/ 34 1/ 5 3/ 39

Parachute Pit (3) 1/ 38 1/--- 1/ 38

Pit Headquarters 1/ 3 -I--- 1/ 3 60mm Mortar Sq -/ 5 -I--- -/ 5 Parachute Sq (3) —/ 10 -/--- -/ 10

100
Table of Organization

(Barrage Balloon Squadron)

10 April 1942

USMC USN Total

Off/Enl Off/Enl Off/Enl

Barrage Balloon Squadron (1/0 0—160) 12/214 -/ 2 12/216

Sq Headquarters 8/ 30 -/ 2 8/ 32

Comm & Aerology Sec -/ 21 -I--- -/ 21

Gas Section -/ 11 -I-—- -/ 11

Maint Section -/ 28 -I--- -/ 28

Balloon Section 1/ 31 -I--— 1/ 31

(4 sections w/6 balloons each)

101
Appendix 0

Unit Tables of Equipment

Raider Battalion Equipment

(1st Raider Battalion)

24 September 1942

NQ Co Wpns Co Rifle Co (4)

Carbine, .30-caliber, Ml 43 62 20

Gun, machine, .30-caliber

Browning, M1919A4 2 8 2

Gun, submachine, .45—caliber 200

Mortar, 60mm 4 3 2

Pistol, .45—caliber 2 24 10

Rifle:

Antitank 4 2 2

Automatic, .30-caliber 22 18

Ml 89 123 76

Ml903, w/telescopic sight 4 9

Trailer:

1—ton, 2—wheel, cargo I

1—ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gal 1 Truck:

1/2—ton, 4 X 4 12

1—ton, 4 X 4, light repair

1—ton, 4 X 4, reconnaissance 4

2—1/2—ton, 6 X 6, cargo 2

102
Parachute Battalion Equipment

(1st Parachute Battalion)

1 July 1942

HQ Co Prcht Cos Total

Gun, machine, .30-caliber,

Johnson, light 6 81 87

Gun, submachine, .45—caliber,

w/folding stock 106 459 565

Launcher, rocket, AT, Ml 9 9

Mortar, 60mm 9 9

Pistol, .45-caliber 2 2 Parachute, set 75 414 489

Truck:

1/4-ton, 4 X 4 2 3 5 1-ton, 4 X 4, cargo 1 1 2 1/2-ton, 6 X 6, cargo 3 3

103
Barrage Balloon Squadron Equipment

10 April 1942

Sq C/A Gas Maint Ball

Sec Sec Sec Sec Total

Carbine, .30—Caliber M—l 15 7 2 2 9 62

Gun, Machine, .30—caliber

Browning, M1917A1 12 12

Gun, Machine, .50-caliber

Browning, M-2, watercooled, flexible 12 12

Pistol 1 ——— ——— ——— ——— 1 Rifle 22 14 9 20 23 157

Rifle, Automatic 6 6 Balloon, Barrage, (*)

(27,000 cu ft) 6 6 30

Winch, Balloon (*) ——— 6 24

Cart, Hand, M—l (Comm) 1 Reel Cart, RL-35 4 --- 4 Tractor, Medium (*) 1 Tractor, Medium, rubbertired, gen purpose (*) 1 ——— 1 Trailer:

1—ton, 2—wheel, elec

lighting unit (*) 1 ——— 1-ton, 2-wheel, water

300—gallon (*) 4 4 2—ton, 4—wheel, 12 ft

platform body (*) 2 2 10-ton, generator,

hydrogen gas (*) 1 ——— 1 10—ton, machinery, low

bed, 8 X 16 ft (*) 2 2 Truck:

1-ton, 4 X 4, recon,

radio—shielded (*) 4 4 3—ton, 4 X 4, cargo (*) 2 2 wrecking (*) 1

(*) Furnished by Navy.

104
Appendix E

U. S. Naval Ships Named For Men of the 1st Raider Battalion

CLASS NAME NAMED FOR

00-575 USS Ahrens PFC Edward H. Ahrens KIA 7 Aug 1942

DDR—713 USS Kenneth D. Bailey Maj Kenneth D. Bailey KIA 27 Sep 1942

APD-39 USS Barr PFC Wodrow W. Barr KIA 7 Aug 1942

DE—450 USS Joseph E. Connolly Cpl Joseph E. Connolly KIA 9 Oct 1942

APD-136 USS Carpellotti PFC Louis J. Carpellotti KIA 7 Aug 1942

APD_130(*) USS Cook Sgt Dallas H. Cook KIA 18 Aug 1942

DD-946 USS Edson MajGen Merritt A. Edson Died 1955

DOR-829 USS Myles C. Fox lstLt Myles C. Fox KIA 8 Aug 1942

DE—367 USS French Cpl Neldon 1. French KIA 9 Oct 1942

DE-5O8 USS Gilligan Pvt John J. Gilligan KIA 8 Aug 1942

DE-444 USS Goss MG Angus R. Goss KIA 20 Jul 1942

DDG-l USS Gyatt Pvt Edward E. Gyatt KIA 7 Aug 1942

DE-449 USS Hanna Pvt William 1. Hanna KIA 9 Oct 1942

DE-5lO USS Heyliger PFC George Heyliger KIA 9 Oct 1942

DE-583 USS George A. Johnson Pvt George A. Johnson KIA 10 Aug 1942

DE-348 USS lstLt Eugene M. Key KIA 7 Aug 1942

DE-577 USS Alexander J. Luke PltSgt Alexander J. Luke KIA 7 Aug 1942

DE-587 USS Thomas F. Nickel Pvt Thomas F. Nickel KIA 7 Aug 1942

DE-578 USS Robert I. Paine Pvt Robert I. Paine KIA 7 Aug 1942

DE-369 USS Thaddeus Parker PhM2 Thaddeus Parker KIA 20 Jul 1942

DDR-863 USS Steinaker PFC Donald B. Steinaker KIA 9 Oct 1942

00-721 USS Woodrow A. Thompson Sgt Woodrow R. Thompson KIA 9 Oct 1942

APD—129 USS Donald W. Wolf Sgt Donald W. Wolf KIA 9 Oct 1942

(*) Named jointly for Dallas Cook and his brother 2dLt A. F. Cook, USMC.

1 05 u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE tn o—246--662

The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military

insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first

appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804.

With the stars changed to five points, this device has continued

on Marine buttons to the present day.