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07/06/2011 15:55 847294B293 FAA AGL 7 COUNSEL PAGE 02/lb 

DLR^RTMEMTO F 

. iRANSPORTATIOi^i 

Served July 6, 2011 OOCKcT OPERATIONS 

D.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSFORTION vdl ilji IQ A iQ: 1 1 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

IN THE MATTER OF 

Rushmore Helicopters, Inc. 

FAA DOCKET NO. CP10GL0002 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

DMS No. FAA-2010-0023 

Agency's Brief on Issue_of Law and Closing Argument 

The Federal Aviation Administration (ComplainaTit), through its undersigned counsel, 

hereby submits this Brief on Issue of Law and Closing Argument for the hearing held on April 

27, 2011 before Administrative Law Judge Richard Goodwin of the Department of 

Transportation in Rapid City, South Dakota. On January 19, 2010, the Complainant issued a 

Final Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty against Rushmore Helicopters, Inc. (Respondent) for 

violation of 14 C.F.R. §9L7(a)and 14C.F.R. § 9L13(a) in the amount of $25,000. Respondent 

requested a formal hearing and Complainant submitted its Complaint on February 2, 2010. The 

complaint alleged as follows: 

1. At all relevant times. Rushmore Helicopters, Inc., operated a commercial air toijr 

operation (CAT operation) in the vicinity of Keystone,"South Dakota. 

2. ]n its CAT operation Rushmore employed the services of a commercial pilot, 

Robert Leroy Leffert (Leffert) and operated a Bell 206 helicopter, registered as 

N2268W and owned by 68 Whiskey LLC. 

3. At all times relevant hereto Leffert acted as pilot in command and operated 

N2268 W as a pilot of, and agent of, Rushmore in the CAT operation. 
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4. At some point during the afternoon of August 6, 2009, Leffert discovered that the 

fuel cap was missing from N2268W. 

5. Rather than secure N2268W until a replacement fuel cap could be obtained, or 

seek the assistance of a certified mechanic to obtain a special flight (ferry) permh, 

Leffert put duct tape over the fuel filler port and flew N2268W, from Keystone, 

South Dakota to the Rushmore and Black Hills Aerial Adventures facility, near 

Custer, South Dakota, approximately 10 miles away. 

6. On August 7, 2009, Leffert operated N2268W in Rushmore's CAT operarion, 

without the benefit of a fuel cap installed and with duct tape over the fuel filler 

port, on at least 10 passengers carrying air tour flights. 

7. N226SW did not meet the type design or type certificate for a Bell 206B 

helicopter when it did not have a fuel cap and when it had duct tape over the fuel 

filler port. 

8. At no time relevant hereto was a special flight (feny) permit issued that would 

allow for the operation of N2268W with duct tape over the fuel filler port rather 

than the appropriate fuel cap. 

9. At all times that Rushmore operated N2268W without a fuel cap and with duct 

tape over the fuel filler port, N2268W was not in an airworthy condition. 

10. Rushmore^s operation of >J2268W without a fuel cap and with duct tape over the 

fuel filler port, as described above was careless and endangered the lives and 

property of others. 

In support of its Brief on Issues of Law and Closuig Argument, Complainant states as follows: 

I. BRIEF ON ISSUE OF LAW 

Issue of Law: Was N2268W in an airworthy condition when Respondent 

operated the aircraft with duct tape over the fuel filler port rather than the 

appropriate fuel cap? 

A. Statutory and Regulatory basis for Airworthiness 

The FAA has a statutory re.sponsibility to enforce minimum safety standards in civil 

aviation. 49 U.S.C. g 44701(a)(1). As part of this endeavor, the FAA issues "type certificates" 

for aircraft "when the Administrator finds that the aircraft...is properly designed and 

manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations and minimum standards prescribed." 

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49 U.S.C, § 44704(a)(1). Purusant to 14 C.F.R. § 21.41, "[e]ach type certificate is considererd to 

include the type design, the operating limitations, the certificate data sheet, the applicableregulations,. ,and any other conditions or limitations prescribed" for the product or aircraft. In 

sum, a type certificate is a design approval issued by the FAA when an applicant has 

demonstrated that a product or aircraft complies with the applicable regulations. And that 

approval is only for the exact design submitted to the FAA for a type certificate. The type 

certificate is the foundation for other approvals, such as airworthiness approval. 

Once an aircraft has received a tj'pe certificate, any registered owner of a U.S. registered 

aircraft may apply for an airworthiess certificate for that aircraft. 14C.F.R. §21.173. The FA.A. 

issues an "airworthiness certificate" for an invidiual aircraft that "conforms to its type certificate 

a n i after inspection, is in condition for safe operation." 49 U.S.C. § 44704(d)(1). Tlierefore, in 

order to obtain an airworthiness certificate, an aircraft must be both in conformance with its type 

certificate and in a condifion safe for flight. 

B. Airworthiness Caselaw 

During their testimony, Inspector Gary Kwasincwski and Inspector James Bad Horse 

explained that an aircraft is "airworthy" only when it both conforms to its type certificate and is 

in a condition safe for fight. Hearing Transcript (HT)pp. 45-48; Fffpg. 95. This airworthiness 

test stems from the above statute and regulations, as wel] as the following caselaw. "The 

airworthiness standard is clear: 'To be airworthy, an aircraft must: (1) conform to a type design ^, 

approved under a type certificate or supplemental type certificate and to applicable Airworthiness ' \ 

Directives; and (2) be in a condition for safe operation.'" In the Matter of Brendan Airways. ^ 

LLC. 2010 ^ X 2326082 at 5 (June 7, 2010) (citing Del. Skyways LLC, FA.A Order No. 2005-6 ^ 

at 2 (Mar 8, 2005) and Cal Helitech, FAA Order No. 2000-18 at 2 n..7 (Aug 1 L 20O0)); In the \ 
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,' 071 736/2011 15:55 8472948293 

Matter ofPi'hitley, 2008 WL 441798 at 6 (Jan. 30, 200S)(stating that to be "airworthy^' an aircral't 

"must conform to its type design ^ must be in a condition for safe flight. This has been for 

many years the well-established criterion for airworthiness). See also /« the.Matter of America 

West Airlines, FAA Order No. 96-3 (Feb, 13. 1996) at 8, 29 n.26 and 27 (affirming ALJ's finding 

that while a minor repair may have no safety implications, the' aircraft is unairworihy if, as a 

result of the repair, die aircraft no longer conforms to its type design); In the Matter of USAir. 

FAA Order No. 96-25 at 1 L See also Administrator v. Copsey. NTSB Order EA-3448 at 5 

(1991) (test for airworthiness is not "fiyability"; the aircraft must be in conformance with its type 

certificate and in condition for safe flight). 

In the appeal of In the Matter of America West Aii'Iines, FAA Order No. 96-3,. 13 (Feb. 

13, 1996), the Administrator found an aircraft unairworthy where speed tape (as opposed to an 

approved sealent or a "flush plug patch") was tised to make repairs, not in accordance with the 

Stmcutral Repair Manual (SRM). The Administrator found that even where the Complainant did 

not introduce as evidence the actual t>T)e certificate, it was clear that speed tape was not in 

conformance with the aircraft's type certificate as it was not a part of the original, approved 

condition of the aircraft or an approved repair. Id, The Administrator stated: 

"Although Complainant did not introduce the type designs, there was ample evidence, 

nonetheless, that the 'aircraft, with this damage and these temporary 'repairs' were no 

longer in confonmance with their type designs. Inspectors Sebring and Kensche testified 

that the aircraft were no longer in their original or properiy altered .conditions, (citation 

omitted). ...Also, Mr. Bororwski testified, in effect, that the speed tape was not included 

in the type designs of the aircraft, (citation omitted)....[T]he aircraft, with the 

delaminalion or hole and with speed tape repairs, no longer conformed to their original 

type designs." /(/. at 13. 

In America West Airlines, the ALJ had found that while a minor, temporary repair using speed > 

tape may not have had extreme safety implications, it still makes the aircraft unairworthy if as a 

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result of the repair the aircraft no longer conforms to its type design. M at 8. The Administrator 

affirmed tlic ALJ's finding of operation of an unairworthy aircraft because the aircraft, with 

speed tape temporarily covereing certain discrepancies, did not meet the tw^o-prong airworthiness 

test of conforming to a type certificate andheing in a condition safe for flight. Id. at 13. 

Although before the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and not the 

Department of Transportion, Administrator v. Foster, 2004 WL 1795341 (June 29, 2004), is a 

comparable and persuasive case to the one at hand. In Foster, a modification was made to an 

aircraft's fuel cap. Foster, 2004 WL 1795341 at ). The Administrative Law ,ludge found that 

such a fuel cap 

"modification is outside the t^-pe design for this aircraft. It was done by someone who is 

not an A&P mechanic, so as a matter of law, it is unairworthy. The modification as a 

matter of law is unairworthy. It does not meet its type design certificate - the fiiel cap. It 

has been changed, and unless it has been changed and approved and accepted, it vs 

unairworthy." Id. at 2, 

Therefore, the Judge found a violation of ] 4 C.F.R. § 91.7(a) when the aircraft in Foster was 

operated with a modification to the fuel cap that was not part of the t)'pc certificate. Id. at 3. 

C. N2268W was unairworthy while duct tape was placed over its fuel port 

rather than the appropriate fuel cap and operation in this condition violates 

14 C.F.R. 91.7(a). 

On August 7, 2009^ Respondent Rushmore Helicopters operated N2268W in an 

unairworthy condition on at least 10 passenger carrying flights, in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 

91.7(a). Section 91.7(a) provides that no person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an 

airworthy condition. In this case, N2268W was not airworthy because it failed to meet both 

prongs of the definition of airworthiness: (1) it did not conform to iLs type certificate and, (2) it 

was not in a condition safe for ftight. 

\ 

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Like the aircraft in In the Matter of America West Airlines and Administrator v. Foster, 

N2268W was not airworthy when Respondent modified the fuel cap by using duct tape to cover 

the fuel port rather than the type certificated fuel cap. With duct tape over its fuel port, N2268W 

first did not conform to its type certificate and, second, was not in a condition safe for flight. 

L N2268W was unairworthy because it did not conform to its type 

certificate. 

First, N226SW was unairworthy because the aircraft did not conform with its type 

certificate. It did not meet its type certificate because, as explained by Inspector iCvvasinewski, 

the ftiel cap is part of the aircraft drawings which are part of the type certificate. HTpg. 45 line • 

20 to pg. 46 line 6. Without the type certificated fuel cap, N2268W could not conform to its type 

design or type certificate. As reiterated by Inspector Bad Horse, the aircraft is manufactured with 

a fuel cap, which is part of its type design for the type certificate. HT pg. 95 lines 15-19. 

Inspector Bad Horse explained that "the aircraft is manufactured and it came out of the factory 

with, obviously, in this case, a fuel cap, so Uiat is part of type design for the type certificate." HT 

pg. 95 lines 15-19; see similar comparison in In the Matter of America West Airlines, FAA Order 

No. 96-3, 13 n. 30 (wimess testified tliat if aircraft came out of factory with speed tape covering 

discrepancies, then it would have conformed to its t>'pe design). The type design, which is part 

of the type certificate, is developed by aeronautical engineers and each component is designed for 

its specific purpose. The be "airworthy," the aircraft must conform to this type design and type 

certicicate. Without the type certificated fuel cap, N2268W did not meet its type certificate and, 

therefore, was not airworthy. 

FAA Inspector Gary Kwasnewski testified at the hearing as to additional evidence he 

gathered supporting the determination that the duct tape over the fuel filler port rendered 
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A 

N2268W unairworthy. HT pg. 49-51. First, Inspector Kwasnewski testified that during his 

investigation, he contacted Bell Helicopter technical representatives from Colorado and 

Minnesota; HT pg. 49 lines 7-16. Both individuals stated that N2268W was tmairwortliy w^hile 

duct tape covered its ftjel port. Id. On April 18, 2011, Inspector Kwasnewski also spoke with 

Bell Engineer Anthony Dickerson. HT pg. 49 line ]9 to pg. 51 line 6. Mr. Dickerson wrote an 

email to Inspector Kwasnewski regarding the airworthiness of a Bell 206, such as N2268W, on 

the following day and stated: 

"The fuel filler cap assembly is an essential (as opposed to optional) component Ihiked to 

te Bell Helicopter model 206 engineering top drawing. Bell Helicopter believes that if 

flight operations are performed when the Helicopters does not have an approved ftie] 

filler cap instaDed, the safety of the helicopter and it occupants is compromised and we 

consider the Helicopter is an unairworthy condition." Agency Hearing Exhibit 7. 

The information from the Bell Engineer again supports Inspector Kwasnewski and Inspector Bad 

Horse's testimony that N2268W was not airworthy. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the fuel 

cap is part of the type certificate (engineer drawings). With duct tape covering the fuel filler port 

rather than the approved fuel cap, the aircraft does not conform to the approved engineering 

drawings. As a result, the aircraft docs not conform to its type certificate and is not airworthy. 

Respondent's President, Mr. Michael Jacobs, and the pilot of N2268W asserted at hearing 

that Mr. Jacobs spoke with a Bell Rcpresentafive on August 7, 2009. HT pg. 82. 118; Agency 

Hearing Exhibit 5. They alleged that Mr. Jacobs was advised thai the fuel cap "was not a 

structural component" of the aircraft and, "though not recommended it was not a \nolation of the 

regulations" to fly without a ftiel cap. Id. However, the FAA is not arguing that N2268W was in 

danger of breaking apart in mid-air because of a .structural failure. Whether or not the fuel cap is 

a "structural component" of the aircraft is not relevant to the issue at hand. What is important is 

that without the fuel cap the aircraft does not conform to its t>T>e certificate and, therefore, the 
fl479qd8293 f'AA AGL ? COUNSEL PAGE u^/i a 

07/06/2B11 15:55 847294829J 

aircraft was not aiworthy. The aeronautical engineering behind the unequivocal design of the 

Bell 206's approved fticl cap is specific to the Bell 206 and is part of the type certificate. The 

aircraft must conform with that type certificate to be considered airworthy. Whoever Mr. Jacobs 

spoke with, that person did not have the compentance to determine what is or is not a FAA 

regulatory violation. On August 7, 2009, N2268W was not in an airworthy condition when it did 

not conform to its type certificate because it had duct tape, rather than its approved fuel cap, 

covering the fuel filler port. 

2. N2268W was also unairworthy because it was not in a condition safe 

for flight. 

Not meeting its t>pe certificate, alone, made N2268W unaiiworthy. HT pg. 46 lines 11-

15: pg. 96 lines 11-15, However, in addition to not meeting its type certificate, the aircraft also 

failed the airworthiness test because it was not in a condition safe for flight. The safet>' of 

N2268W was compromised when its fijel port was covered with duct tape rather than the 

appropriate fuel cap. First, the fuel cap protects the fuel tank from contamination and using duct. 

tape rather than the fuel cap creates a possibilit>' of fijel contamination. ITT pg. 46 line 18 to pg. 

47 line JO; pg. 98 lines 4-15. Fuel contamination, fi"om dirt, debris, grass, etc., could lead to a 

clog in the fuel filter and even fuel starvation, causing an accident. Id. .Additionally, using duct 

tape rather tlian a fuel port also makes an aircraft unsafe for flight because it presents a risk of 

fuel spillage in the case of an incident such as an aircraft roll over. HTpg. 47 lines 14-19. pg. 97 

lines 4-8. As Inspector Bad Horse explained, "if for any reason there was an engine flame out, 

shut down, or an emergency, and he had to set it down, and he set it down and the aircraft was to 

roll over, now you've got that fuel coming out of tliis port. And, with a hot engine, that ftiel. 

specifically, with a hot engine, is - could be cause for a fire." HT pg 105 lines 9-16. 
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Respondent's President, Mr. Jacobs, even testified that he was specifically advised by a Bel] 

representative that the "fuel cap was in place to prevent contaminants, and to prevent spillage in 

theevcnt of a dynamic rollover." HTpg. 118 lines 17-19. Lastly, duct tape in place of a fiiel cap 

could also make an aircraft unsafe because if a fuel cell has a vented cap and the operator uses 

duct tape to completely seal the fuel port, not allowing any venting, a fiiel cell collapse could 

occur, leading to fuel starvation. ITT pg. 48, pg. 97 lines 11-20. However, in this case, the 

aircraft's type certificate did not require a vented fuel cap so, in hindsight, this did not present a 

safet>' issue. HT pp. 47-48, 97-98. Whether Respondent considered this when he covered the 

fiiel port with duct tape is not clear but, regardless, the use of duct tape presents significant safety 

issues rendering the aircraft unairworthy. 

The Bell Engineer's email. Agency Hearing Exhibit 7. also supports the FAA Insepctors' 

testimony tliat N2268W was not in a condition safe for flight when its fiie) port was covered with 

duct tape. Bell Engineer Anthony Dickerson stated that "the safety of the helicopter and it 

occupants is compromised." Id. The components and engineering behind the fuel cap on the 

Bell 206 are known to and designed by the Bell aeronautical engineers, not Respondent. The 

differences between the approved fuel cap and the duct tape Respondent used to cover the fiiel 

filler port has safety implications that obviously were not considered by Respondent on .August 7, 

2009. 

At the hearing, Respondent attempted to argue that because N2268W was operating with 

a less-thaii-ftjllfuel lank, the use of duct tape rather than the type certificated fuel cap did not 

present a safety issue. However, as Inspector Jim Bad Horse explained, regardless of how much 

fuel N2268W carried on August 7, 2009, the aircraft was not airwortliy because it did not meet 

its type design and because it was not in a condition safe for flight. HTpg: 98 line 16 to pg. 99 
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L Q7/0&/2011 15:55 3472948^93 

/;ng 2. Moreover, regardless of how much fijel the aircraft was holding, the safety issues are still 

present. If the aircraft had rolled over, the risk of a small or large fuel spill^e aitd subsequent 

fire, would still be present. Additionally, whether a small amount of ftiel or a large amount of 

fijel is contaminated does not negate the safety concerns testified about by the FAA Inspectors. 

N2268W was not in a condition safe for flight and, therefore, it did not meet the two pronged 

airworthiness test. 

Respondent's aircraft failed to meet either prong of the two pronged defmition of 

airworthiness when it was operated with duel tape covering its fuel port on August 7, 2009 on at 

least 10 passenger carrying flights. Therefore, the aircraft did not meet the airworthiness 

standard required by 14 C.F.R. § 91.7(a). Each flight Respondent operated on .August 7, 2009 

was a separate violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.7(a). 

D. Operation of N2268W was in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) 

Pursuant to FAA Order 2150.3B, "When a person operates an aircraft in violation of a 

specific regulation other than 14 C.F.R. §91.13, ... that violation constitutes a careless or 

reckless operation in and of itself In these cases, the niisconduct may also result in a violation of 

14 C.F.R. § 91.13 if it actually or potentially endangers the lives or property' of others.'' 

Respondent's violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.7(a), operating an unairworthy aircraft on at least 10 

separate passenger carr>'ing flights, constitutes careless operation in and of itself under 14 C.F.R. 

§91.13(a). HTpg. 40 lines 17-21, pp. 7B-17; pg. 118; Agency Hearing Exhibit 4, Agency 

Hearing Exhibit 5. In this case, Respondent's operation of N2268W was not merely a lechnical 

violation of 14 C.F.R. 91.13(a), but the operation was a separate, independent violation. 

Respondent's operation was not only not in an airworthy aircraft, but it was not safe. Respondent 

placed its passengers at risk. 

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FAA AGL 7 COUNSEL ^"^"^ 

11. CLOSING ARGUNtENT 

A. Statement of Undisputed Facts 

1. At all relevant times, Rushmore Helicopters, Inc. (Respondent or Rushmore), 

operated a commercial air tour operation (CAT operation) in the vicinity of 

Keystone, South Dakota. Complaint and Answer. 

2. In its CAT operation Rushmore employed the services of a commercial pilot, 

Robert Leroy Leffert (leffert) and operated a Bell 206 helicopter, registered as 

N2268W and ovmed by 68 Whiskey LLC, Complaint and Answer. 

3. At all times relevant hereto Leffert acted as pilot in command and operated 

N2268W as a pilot of, and agent of Rushmore in the CAT operation. Complaint 

and Answer. 

4. On August 6, 2009, Leffert discovered that the fuel cap was missing fi-om 

N2268W. HTpp. 70-72; Agency Hearing Exhibit 5. 

5. Rather than secure N2268W until a replacement ftiel cap could be obtained, or 

seek the assistance of a certified mechanic to obtain a special flight (ferr^') permit, 

Leffert put duct tape over the fuel filler port and flew N2268W\ from Keystone, 

South Dakota to the Ru.t;hmore and Black Hills Aerial Adventures facility, near . 

Custer, South Dakota. HTpp. 70-73, 118; Agency Hearing Exhibit 5. 

6. On August 7, 2009, Leffert operated N2268W in Rushmore's CAT operation, 

without the benefit of a ftiel cap installed and with duct tape over the fuel filler 

port, on at least 10 passengers carrying air tour flights. HTpp. 73-77. 118; 

Agency Hearing Exhibit 1, Agency Hearing Exhibit 2. Agency Hearing Exhibit 4, 

Agency Hearing Exhibit 5. 

7. N2268W did not meet the type design or type certificate for a Bell 206B 

helicopter when it did not have a fuel cap and when it had duct tape over the ftiel 

filler port. HTpg. 45. line 20 topg. 46, line 15; HTpg. 95, lines 15-19, Agency 

Hearing Exhibit 7. 

8. At no time relevant hereto was a special flight (ferry) permit issued that would 

allow for the operation of N2268W with duct tape.over the ftiel filler port rather 

than the appropriate ftjel cap. HTpp. 52-53, 

B. Violations 

The Complainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence each factual allegation in its 

Complaint. In addition to the undisputed facts above, (he evidence presented at hearing 

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07/0&/2011 15:55 847294829^ 

/ • 

demonstrates that N2268W was not in a condition safe for flight when its fuel port was covered 

by duct tape rather than the approved fuel cap. HTpg. 46-48, 97-98, 105, Agency Hearing 

Exhibit 7. Therefore, as previously discussed, on August 7, 2009, N2268W was not in an 

airworthy condition for two separate, independent reasons. First, the aircraft did not conform to 

its t>pe certificate and, second, the aircraft was not in a condition safe for flight. Consequently, 

the Respondent operated in violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 C.F.R § 91.7(a) 

and 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a)) when it operated N2268W on August 7, 2009 on at least 10 passenger 

carrying flights when the aircraft was not airworthy. 

C. The Agency's proposed sanction is appropriate and •within the range 

provided for by the Agency's sanction guidance. 

The proposed civil penalty of $25,000.00 is sustainable for the cited \^olations and is in 

accordance with the Agency's Compliance and Enforcement Program as outlined in FAA Order 

2150.3B, Appendix B. Sanction Guidance Table. Agency Hearing Exhibit 6. 

FAA Order 2150.3B, Appendix B, Sanction Guidance Table, paragraph B-3-d-(7), page 

B-20 provides for a sanction in the range of moderate to maximum civil penalty for operation of 

an unairworthy aircraft. For a small business concern, such as Respondent, the Sanction 

Guidance Table sets out the civil penalty range for each violation as follows: moderate, S2,200 to 

$4,399 and maximum, $4,400 to $11,000. Therefore, for the ten violating flights, the Sanction 

Guidance Table calls for a total penalty between $22,000 and $110,000. 

The Agency seeks a civil penalty of $2,500 for each of the ten passenger carrynng flights 

operated in an unairworthy condition, totaling $25,000. This proposed civil penalty is well 

within the range provided for by the Sanction Guidance Table and is appropriate for the cited 

violations where Respondent operated an unairworthy aircraft on at least 10 passenger carrying 

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07/06/2011 15:55 8472948293 FAA AGL 7 COUNSEL 

flights. The Agency requests that the Administrative Law Judge issue a civil penalt>' in 

accordance with the Agency's Sanction Guidance and the Agency's Final Notice of Proposed 

Ci\il Penalty. 

m.CONCLUSFON 

In sum, Respondent has violated 14 C.F.R. § 91.7(a) and 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) by 

operating an unairworthy aircraft on at least 10 separate passenger carrying flight on August 7, 

2009. The proposed civil penalty of 525,000 is sustainable for the cited violations and is in 

accordance with the Agency's Compliance and Enforcement Program as outlined in FAA Order 

2150.3B. 

WHEREFORE, Complainant respectfiilly requests the Admiuisti'ative Law Judge issue 

an Initial Decision finding a violation of 14 C.F.R. § 9L7(a) and 14 C.F.R, § 91.13(a) and 

finding that the proposed civil penalty' of $25,000 is appropriate givien the regulatory violations. 

Respectfully submitted, 

a^dn ^ 

cjaha Martino 

Attorney. Federal Aviation Administration 

Office of the Regional Counsel 

Great Lakes Region 

2300 East Devon Avenue 

Des Plaines, EL 60018 

(T) 847-294-7313 

(FJ 847-294-7498 

briana.manino@faa.gov 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

] hereby certify that I have, this date, served the foregoing Agency Brief on Issues of Law and 

Closing Argument by mailing copies to the following addresses as follows: 

Original and One Copy (Facsimile and Regular Mail) 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wriglit Building. Suite 2W1000 

F.AX: 202-493-5141 

Mr. Michael Jacob 

Rushmore Helicopters, Inc. 

24564 Highway 16/385 

Custer, SD 57730 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin 

Administrative Law .Tudge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

East Building Ground Floor 

Room El 2-320 

Washington, DC 20590 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

One Copy 

(Regular and Certified Mail) 

(Facsimile and Regular Mail) 

-th Dated this 6' day of ,Tuly, 2011 

Yol^da Quiles 

Legal Technician 

14