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CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE

U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 13, 2017

Serial No. 115–40

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, senior global fellow, The Joseph H. 

Lauder Institute of Management and International Studies, University of 

Pennsylvania (former United States Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia) .................................................................................................................. 9

The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein, director for gulf Affairs, Middle East 

Institute (former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State) ....................................................... 17

Ms. Karen Elliott House, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ......................................................................................................................... 28

The Honorable Tom Malinowski (former Assistant Secretary for Democracy, 

Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State) ...................................... 36

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Joseph W. Westphal: Prepared statement ................................... 12

The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein: Prepared statement .................................. 19

Ms. Karen Elliott House: Prepared statement ...................................................... 30

The Honorable Tom Malinowski: Prepared statement ......................................... 39

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 66

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa: Letter submitted for the record ................................................... 68

The Honorable Ted Lieu, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

California: Letters submitted for the record ...................................................... 71

(1)

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE 

U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONSHIP 

TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come it order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes 

each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our 

witnesses. 

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. 

And, without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. This hearing has 

become especially timely. In recent days, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 

Egypt, and Bahrain have taken serious diplomatic actions against 

the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nation of Qatar. This move 

surely raised a lot of eyebrows, but it shouldn’t come as a surprise. 

Many of us on this subcommittee have been calling attention to 

Qatar’s history of financing terror, including its support for Hamas 

and its unwillingness to enforce existing sanctions against individuals within its borders. 

In fact, nearly 3 years ago, this subcommittee held a hearing on 

Qatar’s support for Hamas and other extremist groups. We raised 

many of the same issues that Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain also have raised. Shortly after the hearing, I sent a letter 

along with Ranking Member Deutch and Ted Poe and Brad Sherman and signed by 20 other colleagues of the Foreign Affairs Committee to the Treasury Department in 2014 urging more action 

against Qatar and Turkey for their roles in terror financing. 

And, with no objection, I would like to include this letter into the 

record. 

Qatar has long been a permissive terrorist financing environment, and if nothing else, this Saudi-led response will at least get 

the conversation started. This is the same Qatar which was entrusted to monitor the Taliban Five, even though we knew it conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:24 Jul 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\061317\25839 SHIRL
2

tinued to fund ISIS, Hamas, the Taliban, the Muslim Brotherhood, 

and countless other extremist groups. This is a conversation that 

we need to be having. We cannot continue to allow Qatar to get 

away with all that it does against our interests, just because we 

worry about the consequences of our U.S. base station there. Of 

course, it is an important consideration, but let’s not make it the 

only consideration, much like we shouldn’t be overlooking Turkey’s 

support for terror groups like Hamas because Turkey is a NATO 

ally that houses also a large U.S. military base, or Turkey’s negative impact throughout the region working against our interests, 

which includes the unhelpful measure its Parliament approved recently to send troops to Qatar, a move that will surely upset our 

partners in the region. And while it is true that Saudi Arabia has 

presented us with similar problems in the past, the Kingdom has 

prioritized its security cooperation efforts with the U.S. to fight extremism. 

During the previous administration, there seemed to have been 

a concerted effort to realign not just our traditional alliance with 

Saudi Arabia, but to elevate Iran, a U.S.-designated state sponsor 

of terror. We are all too familiar with the quote attributed to President Obama in an article last year where he insisted that Saudi 

and Iran should ‘‘share the same neighborhood and institute some 

sort of cold peace.’’ And I ask: Share the neighborhood with the 

foremost state sponsor of terror; how is that a good plan for regional stability? Because while Saudi Arabia is a key partner in 

our effort to fight ISIS and violent extremism, Iran has worked at 

every turn to undermine the stability of the region and foment terror. 

From its support of the Houthis in Yemen to its support of 

Hezbollah, a group which the Arab League, led by Saudi Arabia, 

designated as a foreign terrorist organization last year, and its support for Assad in Syria, Iran is working against almost every objective we share with Saudi Arabia. It is no secret that, in the lead 

up to, during, and after the Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA, our relations with Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC were strained and 

we were viewed with mistrust as having abandoned our allies for 

Iran. 

I hope that the President’s recent trip shows that we perhaps 

have turned that corner. That is not to say we should turn a blind 

eye to the Kingdom’s shortcomings, particularly its troublesome 

human rights record. On women’s rights more, much more needs 

to be done, my goodness, to ensure a more inclusive society. Instead of arresting opposition dissidents, the Kingdom must allow 

for the free exchange of ideas and a free space for all Saudi citizens 

to express their thoughts. Instead of jailing human rights defenders 

and activists, and those calling for reform, the Kingdom must welcome their calls and listen to ideas in order to implement real reforms. 

The Saudis allege that their Vision 2030 plan will do just that. 

With the Vision 2030 plan, Saudi Arabia has shown that it recognizes that it can no longer rely on its old model of governance. We 

all know there is a large youth population in Saudi Arabia, and if 

we see the Vision 2030 start to take shape and strengthen the viaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:24 Jul 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\061317\25839 SHIRL
3

bility of Kingdom’s future, we have a better chance of steering 

them away from extremism. 

I look forward to hearing from our panel, who between them 

have a wealth of knowledge and experience with the intricacies of 

the U.S.-Saudi alliance on how we can advance our own national 

security interests and objectives in the region together with the 

Saudis. 

I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thanks to our truly esteemed panel for being here today and 

thanks to every one of you for your service. 

We are greatly appreciative of the work of our American diplomats. And I hope that we continue to rely on the experienced diplomats and recognize the importance of diplomacy. I know we have 

an opportunity to show that as we move into the budget season. 

Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is no doubt vital to the Middle East. We should be clear from the outset that we are allies and 

we share common goals. But we should be honest in assessing 

where those goals and interests diverge. 

The President’s trip to Saudi Arabia was welcomed. Few could 

argue that this President needs to do outreach to the Arab world. 

The visit provided a clear message to Iran that the United States 

stands united with our Gulf allies against its dangerous and destabilizing behavior in the region. The affirmation of cooperation on 

counterterrorism and a commitment to increasing regional interoperability and bolstering the defenses of our allies were important 

signals to send. 

But the President’s decision to focus solely on security issues was 

a mistake. While Saudi Arabia has made slow progress on human 

rights, failing to acknowledge abuses occurring in the Kingdom 

gave the impression to the world that the United States is willing 

to forsake human rights, justice, and equality when the messaging 

is inconvenient. 

It is true that reform has begun, albeit slowly, and we should 

praise and encourage those reforms, particularly when it comes to 

women’s rights. Raising human rights is not about lecturing another country, it affects all aspects of our relationship. Foreign 

businesses are skittish to enter a country where they fear corruption or lack of transparency. 

This kind of investment and diversification is critical to the 

Saudi’s Vision 2030, which we should be actively supporting. Jobs 

for youth and the middle class are key to economic stability, which, 

as we have seen across the region, in turn helps stem the tide of 

extremism. 

Moreover, the administration’s visits seem to empower the 

Saudis and others to move ahead with a very public split from 

Qatar. Qatar’s behavior has been problematic and we have long 

struggled to rein in its affinity for harboring terrorists. We should 

push back against Al Jazeera’s biased coverage and promotion of 

groups that destabilize its neighbors. Qatar’s relations with Iran 

are clearly troubling for a region in which Iran seeks to sow instability. However, I am concerned that this crisis could have negative 

impacts on our interests, particularly the operation of the U.S.-led 

collation fighting in Syria. 

4

Today gives us an opportunity to unpack some of these issues, 

like what leverage we have with respect to Qatar’s support of terrorism and the importance of unity in the GCC to U.S. strategic 

objectives. We should be viewing our relationship with Saudi Arabia through the prism of our own interests. How mutually beneficial is our relationship? Where do our priorities align? 

The Saudis have been preoccupied with their campaign in 

Yemen, which they rightfully see as a direct threat to their national security. The U.S. is right to support the defense of Saudis’ 

borders, instability inside the Kingdom will threaten the region, 

and we share the concern that Iran is using the Houthis as a 

proxy. But in terms of our own national security, it has long been 

AQAP operating in Yemen that has been thought to be the most 

dangerous branch of al-Qaeda. 

The conflict in Yemen has also taken the Saudis’ and others’ attention away from the fight against ISIS, arguably our greatest 

threat at this time. Ambassadors, I know you have been intimately 

involved in trying to resolve the Yemen conflict over the past 5 

years. If no political solution is on the horizon, how can we best 

support the Saudis while ensuring that the laws of armed conflict 

are obeyed? Without being a formal member of the coalition, what 

leverage do we really have? And I have been deeply troubled by the 

reports of civilian casualties throughout this campaign. 

The decision to move forward with the sale of precision-guided 

missiles has raised a host of issues surrounding the Saudis’ capabilities to use these weapons in a way that minimizes collateral 

damage. I am not sure that Congress has been convinced that 

these weapons can be used appropriately. Our colleagues Mr. Lieu 

and Mr. Yoho have been leading the effort here to get an accurate 

assessment of the progress that the Saudi Royal Air Force has 

made in its adherence to a no-strike list and, frankly, have yet to 

receive adequate answers from the administration. 

Furthermore, I have real concerns that the sale of offensive 

weapons, like the PGMs and the announced $110 billion arms deal, 

do not provide the Saudis with the real defensive capabilities they 

need to protect and defend their borders or increase counterterrorism operations. 

Frankly, we don’t know yet enough about the proposed sale or 

how it will affect Israel’s qualitative military edge. Following the 

signing of the JCPOA in 2015, the Obama administration launched 

an effort to bolster defense in the Gulf. The U.S. GCC strategic 

partnership aimed to strengthen missile and cyber defense along 

with a host of other technical support from the U.S. Where are we 

on those deliverables that could help our allies defend themselves 

against real threats? 

Finally, being an ally does not mean being given a blank check. 

We must ensure that we are supporting our allies and making decisions that are in our best interest first and foremost. There is no 

shortage of issues to discuss today. We have certainly assembled an 

all-star team of experts, and I look forward to a very productive 

discussion. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch, for that 

thoughtful opening statement. 

5

Now we will turn to our other members for their opening statements, starting with Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

The U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship has been noticeably strained 

in recent years. The degree of discord between the previous administration, the Obama administration, and Saudi leadership, was 

only exacerbated by a number of things: Oil prices, the growing 

threats of terrorism in the region, differences over the Iranian nuclear program, which I intend to believe that the Saudis were right 

and the Obama administration was wrong on that one. And although we may not see eye to eye on everything with our Saudi 

partners, there is no question that having their support in the fight 

against terror in the region is very, very important. 

I am encouraged by President Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia. I believe it could be a great opportunity to strengthen the U.S.-Saudi 

relationship while recognizing the Saudis’ shortcomings in a number of areas, for example funding mosques across the globe, some 

of which have tolerated, if not promoted, radical fundamentalist 

ideology, and that has been a real problem. As well as the suppression of women in their own society; it is just intolerable and continues to be. Even though there have been some improvements, 

they are few and far between. 

So there is a whole range of issues that we need to focus on. I 

apologize, I have several hearings happening at the same time, I 

won’t be able to stay for the whole hearing. But thank you for holding this important hearing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And welcome to our panel. 

I don’t know that I agree with my friend from Ohio, though he 

and I often agree. I don’t know that I am as heartened by the 

Trump visit to Saudi Arabia as he is, because I am worried about 

what was not discussed, including basic human rights, including 

the rights of women, including the suppression of the LGBT rights, 

including the right to assemble, including the right to have political 

opposition. 

Saudi Arabia has been an anchor and a counterweight to Iran 

that has served our interests and I think have served for some stability in that region, but that doesn’t change history. The Saudis, 

at the same time, while condemning Qatari support for terrorism, 

have financed extreme Wahhabism all over the Muslim world. It 

has actually destabilized society in some cases and certainly been 

a source radicalism throughout. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers in 2001 

were Saudis. Osama bin Laden, the master mind of that attack, 

was a Saudi. We have to look at this relationship clear-eyed. We 

have interests; they have interests. But it is anything but a perfect 

or stable relationship. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. Schneider is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

6

And as have my colleagues, I want to thank the panel, a truly 

extraordinary panel on a very important issue as we look at this 

region and the important relationship with Saudi Arabia. 

The recent announcement of the new strategic partnership for 

the 21st century obviously draws much attention. And as was previously stated, as we look to have this conversation today, I hope 

it will touch on the impact it is going to have in the region, in particular with respect to preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge 

in a dangerous region, but also, as you have talked about in your 

written testimony, the importance of U.S. interests, our strategy. 

What are our priorities and goals? And what is the best strategy 

to address those? I think you have to look at those in the broad 

context of the region, not just, as was mentioned, with what is 

going on with Qatar, but Iran and JCPOA, Yemen, Syria, but also 

the generational challenges within Saudi Arabia and the region, in 

particular with respect to Vision 2030. 

So, again, I thank the witnesses. 

I thank the chairman and ranking member for calling this hearing. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And thank you to the witnesses. 

I am going to be paying close attention to what you have to say. 

Over these last 30 years, there has been nothing more perplexing 

than our relations with countries like Saudi Arabia and like Qatar, 

realizing that, for example, as my colleague just said, of the hijackers, 15 of the 19 hijackers on 9/11 were Saudis. And I happen to 

believe that Saudis financed 9/11 as well. And so we need your advice as to how we should deal with a situation like that. What is 

just not the problem, but what is our policy going to be to take 

Saudi Arabia away from supporting terrorists and Qatar away 

from supporting terrorists? What do we do to achieve that goal? 

That should be our main goal. So thank you very much. I will be 

paying attention to your advice. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

We are so pleased to be joined by the chairman of our full committee, but, first, we will go to Mr. Cicilline for his statement, 

thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Deutch, for calling this hearing on Saudi Arabia. 

And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

Saudi Arabia has captured our attention in many ways recently 

so this hearing comes at an opportune time. The President chose 

to make his first foreign trip to Saudi Arabia. And although the administration has not established a clear policy toward Saudi Arabia, what they didn’t say sent its own message. 

Neither the President nor any senior administration officials held 

Saudi leaders accountable for their enduring reckless disregard for 

human rights, nor does it seem there was any discussion about the 

quickly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen where 

7

Saudi Arabia is engaged in an extended campaign with U.S. support against Houthi rebels. 

Saudi Arabia’s recent decision, along with other members of the 

GCC, to cut ties to Qatar, the site of the Al Udeid Air Base, which 

houses the biggest concentration of U.S. military personnel in the 

Middle East, is troubling. And the Trump administration’s handling of this serious situation has been ham-fisted and confounding. 

The relationship with Saudi Arabia, a partner with whom we 

sometimes are at odds, is extremely important and equally complex. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, to hear 

their perspectives on this administration’s engagement thus far 

and their recommendations for how we move forward. 

And thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

And we have been joined, as I said, with the presence of the full 

committee chairman, Mr. Royce of California, and he is recognized 

for as much time as he would like. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I do thank you for holding this important hearing. And let 

me just make an observation at the outset here, and that is Qatar’s 

relationship with Hamas remains very concerning. Senior leaders 

of Hamas and the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which 

is an Islamist group, designated as terrorists by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, all reside in Qatar 

today. And earlier this month, and I think this is what is most concerning for all of us here, more Hamas tunnels were found underneath two U.N. Relief Works Agency’s schools in Gaza. So Hamas 

is still using civilians and children to hide its activities and that, 

to me, does not sound like a legitimate resistance movement. 

And it is deeply concerning that, in the face of mounting international pressure, Qatar has doubled down on its relationship with 

Hamas. Just a day ago, Qatar’s Foreign Minister called Hamas a 

legitimate resistance movement. And that is one of the reasons 

why I have joined with Ranking Member Engel and Representative 

Brian Mast and Representative Josh Gottheimer and several other 

members of this committee in introducing the Palestinian International Terrorism Support Prevention Act. This bill will impose 

sanctions on foreign persons and agencies and, yes, on governments 

that assist Hamas or assist Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the affiliates of these two groups. And, specifically, this legislation will 

sanction anyone that provides Hamas with diplomatic or financial 

support or who shelters their operatives. This practice needs to end 

now. There is no such thing as a good terrorist group. 

And I thank the chairman emeritus for yielding to me and I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for those welcome remarks. 

And I hope that we can move that legislation along. Thank you, 

Mr. Royce. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you very much and thank you to my colleagues from Florida, the chair and ranking member. 

I thank you all for being here. I look forward to your testimony. 

8

I just want to state a concern that I have that maybe you will 

be able to address, I wish there was someone from the State Department here because I would ask them directly, and that is the 

coordination or maybe the lack of coordination between the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, and the State Department in regards to the relationship between Saudi Arabia and their 

alliance and Qatar. We know that Saudi Arabia just announced 

with the coalition the cutting of ties to Qatar, and then it seemed 

like the President, our President, said that was a great thing. Then 

you have the Secretary of State basically trying to calm the waters, 

and so I am a little confused, I don’t really know what the United 

States’ position is. 

So I would be interested to know if any of you know what the 

United States’ position is. I think today, just today, our Ambassador to Qatar resigned because I don’t know if she knows what 

the position of the United States is supposed to be. So I would be 

interested in knowing if you know what it is. And I would also like 

to know what you think it should be. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ms. Frankel. 

And I would like it note that we have been trying to get the 

State Department for years to come in front of our subcommittee 

to talk about Saudi Arabia, but that has not been successful. 

We have been calling the wrong folks, Mr. Connolly? Okay. 

Thank you. 

I am so pleased to introduce our witnesses. We have a star-studded panel today. First, we are delighted to welcome Ambassador 

Joseph Westphal, who served as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia from March 2014 to January 2017. Dr. Westphal 

currently works as a senior global fellow at the Joseph H. Lauder 

Institute of Management and International Studies and as a senior 

fellow at the Center for Leadership and Change Management, both 

at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Prior to 

his appointment, Ambassador Westphal was the Under Secretary 

of the Army, and its Chief Management Officer from 2009 to 2014 

[speaking foreign language], he is a wonderful friend and it is great 

to have him here. 

Next, we would like to welcome back another great friend, Ambassador Feierstein, who was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and served as U.S. Ambassador for Yemen from 2010 to 2013. Over the course of his career, 

the Ambassador has served in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jerusalem, 

Pakistan, Oman, Tunisia. Yikes, all over the place. Mr. Feierstein 

helped develop and implement State Department policies and programs to counter violent extremism. 

Welcome back, friend. 

In addition, we would like to welcome for the first time Ms. 

Karen Elliot House. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

She is currently a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science 

and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Management. She authored ‘‘On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, 

Fault Lines—and Future.’’ So I think she is a good expert on this. 

She is also a chairman of the board of the RAND Corporation and 

9

serves on multiple nonprofit boards, including The Trilateral Commission. 

We look forward to your testimony, Ms. House, thank you so 

much. 

And we would like to welcome Mr. Tom Malinowski—thank 

you—who served as an Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor until this year. Prior to this position, he 

worked as Washington director for Human Rights Watch, a wonderful organization. Mr. Malinowski served as Senior Director for 

Foreign Policy Speechwriting at the National Security Council. 

And we welcome you. We look forward to your testimony. 

So, Mr. Ambassador, we will begin with you, Mr. Westphal. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH W. WESTPHAL, SENIOR GLOBAL FELLOW, THE JOSEPH H. LAUDER INSTITUTE 

OF MANAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA) 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. Good morning, Madam Chair, Ranking 

Member Deutch, distinguished members of the committee. I am delighted to be here. I am delighted to be with you, Madam Chair, 

and thank you for your introduction. 

I am just going to summarize a few points rather than read a 

statement. If you think about it, since the Iranian revolution, and 

that is nearly four decades ago, we have been spending a significant amount of our resources, our focus, and attention in the Middle East region. And there is no end in sight for that. Not only is 

it financial resources, but it is human resources—its stability, its 

security, a lot of issues. 

All of you touched on a number of issues that are critically important for us to be engaged in a more aggressive fashion. Especially if we are going to be able to devote more attention to other 

critical issues around the world than just what is happening in the 

Middle East. 

Funding for terrorist organizations has been something that we 

have been working on and I would urge this committee, Madam 

Chair and Ranking Member Deutch, to consider perhaps bringing 

in the Treasury Department, because we have been working with 

them very extensively—Ambassador Feierstein can speak to this as 

well—on trying to get these Gulf countries and Middle East countries to pass laws and enforce these laws that prevent the movement of money to terrorist organizations. Saudi Arabia, for example—and I think Treasury will verify this—has the strongest laws 

of any country in the Gulf region. Mostly because of our efforts and 

our drive to push that over the last 10 years. We have met with 

a lot of success recently. 

Qatar has not been a success. Kuwait has been an issue as well, 

and there are other countries where this needs to be applied more 

aggressively. 

As some of you pointed out, our relationships can’t be just about 

fighting terrorism. They also have to be about a number of other 

things that affect our security and stability in the region. 

The fact of the matter is that this discord between the Saudis, 

Emirates, and Qatar is long-standing. These are tribal countries. 

10

They have had issues in the past. They just emerged again. And 

it is in our interest. I believe that what Secretary Tillerson said in 

his brief remarks is the right way to go. I think we have to be more 

engaged in trying to resolve these issues by getting these countries 

to have a dialogue, but also, as you said, Madam Chair, to agree 

to end the funding of terrorist organizations. 

The Saudis, for example, imposed a situation where they have 

done due diligence on charities. They have a list of charities that 

one can donate to, that are approved by the government. And only 

those charities can you provide money and resources to as a Saudi. 

And if you provide to any other charity, you are subject to punishment by law. So they are trying very aggressively to do this. Is it 

foolproof? I cannot tell you that, I don’t know. But I think they are 

making some efforts to stop the flow of money, at least through formal banking channels. And, again, I would urge you to consider 

talking to Treasury about that. 

The war in Yemen, another issue you brought up, continues to 

be a real problem for a lot of reasons, not just the human resources 

issue and humanitarian issues. We come very, very close to some 

settlement of the Yemen conflict. And, again, Ambassador 

Feierstein is far more knowledgeable than anybody here on this 

issue, having served there. But there were times when we came 

very close in the recent past to perhaps coming with an agreement, 

working with the Government of Oman and especially with the 

U.N. Special Envoy, who has done a phenomenal job of trying to 

bring everybody together, and as we got close, then things would 

break open. So I think we need to continue that effort working with 

all of the countries. The relationship between Oman and Saudi is 

not a great relationship and that needs—we need to empower these 

countries to work together to resolve these issues. As some of you 

stated, they need to work at it. So I think that that is an area 

where we need to do. 

On the PGM issue, which is going to come up today in the Senate and undoubtedly come to the House for your vote on it, and it 

will be an important issue. We labored with this issue of how to 

provide munitions, offensive munitions, to a country when at the 

same time we are trying to get them to reduce their military operations and come up with some kind of an agreement with the 

Houthis and perhaps Ali Abdullah Saleh’s forces there and some 

resolution without dividing the country. 

So I think, again, our efforts there ought to be to push hard: If 

you are going to receive the assistance from us, these PGMs from 

us, then we insist that we are going to need to work harder to train 

your forces on how to use them. So we are not going to just deliver 

munitions and that is the end of it. We need to be more engaged 

in helping them. And, again, the State Department was doing—

DRL was doing a lot in trying to train them on how to look at civilian casualties and assess their operations. So there is a lot more 

we can do than just sell them a weapons system without any constraints. We can put a lot of constraints. 

I will stop here and say there is a lot more to discuss. We need 

to talk about the transformation plan. It is important for both 

human resources issues as well as military and security issues. 

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sively to partner up with Saudi Arabia, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Westphal follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

And, Ambassador Feierstein, we will go with you. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GERALD M. FEIERSTEIN, DIRECTOR FOR GULF AFFAIRS, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE 

(FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 

BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE) 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Thank you chairman Ros-Lehtinen, 

Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee. Thank you 

for this opportunity to testify about an issue of considerable importance related to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, 

not only in the Middle East but globally. 

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been a principal pillar of regional security and stability. 

It has joined the U.S. in resisting expansionism, advocated moderate solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and cooperated in 

the fight against violent extremism and terrorism. 

Likewise, Saudi Arabia’s role in ensuring price and production 

stability in the oil market has contributed to overall economic 

growth and stability around the world for decades. 

In recent years, our relationship has frayed over differences from 

the Arab Spring to human rights, Iran to Syria. Even Yemen, despite a fundamental agreement on the nature of the conflict and 

the legitimacy of Saudi intervention, became a source of bilateral 

friction. 

Seeing the arrival of the Trump administration as an opportunity 

to repair the damaged relationship, the Saudis made clear their 

support for the three core regional policy objectives identified by 

the administration. The fight against violent extremism, a united 

front challenging Iran, and helping on achieving progress in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

In Riyadh, the two sides announced billions of dollars in new economic cooperation, including bilateral investments designed to advance each side’s domestic political goals. 

For its part, the Trump administration made clear that it would 

roll back some of the restrictions placed on defense cooperation by 

the Obama administration and restore arms sales as well as intelligence and logistics cooperation with the Saudi military. 

It is premature to assess the significance of the new era of cooperation, however. Despite the positive indications, subsequent developments, including the current intra-GCC tensions with Qatar, 

have reinforced the view that much of progress advertised in Riyadh remains nascent and tenuous. 

Among the most well-received elements in Trump’s speech to the 

assembled Arab and Islamic leaders on May 21st was his promise 

that his administration would refrain from lectures on human 

rights and civil liberties. Many of the leaders had viewed the 

Obama administrations emphasis on these issues as overweening 

and overly sanctimonious. But the proper way to restore the balance in our approach is not to adopt a values-free foreign policy. 

The U.S. is locked in a battle of ideas with those who believe that 

there is a model of development that permits rapid economic 

progress while retaining authoritarian political systems. The U.S. 

18

needs to push back on that notion and make clear that the values 

we advocate are central to our conception of the appropriate relationship between the government and its citizens because they reflect a system of political behavior, time tested, that produces stable, durable, and just societies. 

Saudi Arabia represents a particularly difficult challenge for the 

U.S. on human rights issues. Its society is built around fundamentally different conceptions of social relationships and civil rights. 

We have made little progress over the years in convincing them 

that our approach will help them build a stronger society, and 

there is little evidence to suggest that the majority of Saudis agree 

with us, rather than their government, on these issues. 

Vision 2030, however, presages not only a dramatic replacement 

of the public sector by the private sector as the main engine of economic development, it also signals a fundamental shift in the traditional relationship between the government and its citizens. That 

can become a driver for a revamped approach to civil liberties and 

human rights. Thus, economic reality, rather than political or social reform, may become the main instrument for a new, more open 

Saudi society. 

In conclusion, as the U.S. seeks to restore stability and security 

in the Middle East, defeat violent extremism, and roll back Iranian 

expansionism, Saudi Arabia will remain a vital partner. But Saudi 

Arabia itself is at a crossroads and the country will necessarily devote its energy primarily to addressing internal challenges in the 

coming years. Through quiet diplomacy, the U.S. can contribute to 

the kind of economic and social initiatives that will enable political 

reforms, leaving Saudi Arabia a more open, democratic society. 

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to responding 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feierstein follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ms. House. 

STATEMENT OF MS. KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Ms. HOUSE. Thank you. Like Ambassador Westphal, I am going 

to simply make some points. 

As has been said by some of you and the witnesses, there are 

enormous uncertainties in the Middle East now about the stability 

of borders, about the outmoded economic systems and can they provide jobs, as the chairwoman said, for this bulge of young people. 

Those power vacuums are being exploited by both Iran and Saudi 

Arabia, who are in competition for influence in the region. And the 

fact that the U.S. had little strategy or engagement in the region 

over the past at least half dozen years other than promoting the 

security of a nuclear deal with Iran has left the whole region like 

an unruly schoolyard: With no teacher on duty, the biggest bully 

is the winner. 

And I think it is important that we all understand right now 

Iran is the winning this competition. And it is not in the interest 

of the U.S. for Saudi Arabia to be destabilized or feel unsupported. 

So President Trump’s visit to the region has clearly signaled that 

the U.S. is back in the game and back on the side of Saudi Arabia. 

The Saudis and everyone else, as the Ambassador said, it is too 

early to say that this is a lasting change with lasting impact, because it will take more than a high-profile visit to actually rebuild 

the trust that was so badly destroyed over the last half dozen years 

and the consequences of that. 

The decision by the President to back the Saudis and their colleagues against Qatar does signal that he is willing to engage—

that he means what he says about reducing extremism in the region. And as has already been said, the support of the Muslim 

Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Hamas, all by Iran and Qatar, has to be 

a source of concern and something that the U.S. seeks to counter. 

A year ago, the Saudis were fundamentally in a crouched position, feeling unsupported. At least now they are upright with the 

sense that the U.S. is behind them and beginning to at least shadowbox with Iran and Qatar and their adversaries. 

I want to spend my last minute and a half focused on the domestic Vision 2030, because I have just come back from 3 weeks there, 

and I think it is also important that we understand things are 

changing in Saudi Arabia, not as fast as we might wish, but the 

opportunities offered to women, the fact that the government has 

banned the religious police from arresting people for being unveiled 

or gender mixing has produced a quite—in my view—remarkable 

relaxation, even in Riyadh, one of the most conservative places. 

Black abayas are obviously meant to mask a woman’s figure. You 

now see young women not only abandoning black, but fitting them 

at the waist, making the figure very revealed, or walking around 

with them completely open, showing their tight T-shirts and Levis. 

I don’t mean to make too much out of just a dress code change, but 

it is significant in a country where, unlike here, where individVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:24 Jul 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\061317\25839 SHIRL
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ualism is prized; there, being part of the group and not stepping 

outside is what is prized. And the fact that people are courageous 

enough to begin to do these things I think we shouldn’t diminish. 

So I believe that Vision 2030 and supporting economic reform, 

which I believe they now must do, because oil prices aren’t likely 

to recover, is one way the U.S. can begin to expand human rights 

in the Kingdom. 

And I agree with what has already been said, that we should 

make clear that it is important for people to have the right to free 

speech, but Saudis are taking it more and more on Twitter and the 

internet so that there is something of a virtual opposition. And yes, 

the government still arrests people who get too critical. And we 

should make clear that we don’t agree with that. But this is an opportunity for the U.S. to both help stabilize and change Saudi Arabia by supporting Vision 2030 and helping them deal with change 

internally and when they have all these external problems. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. House follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much Ms. House. Mr. 

Malinowski. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Can you pull that microphone a little closer? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Is that good? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Maybe hold the gizmo. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM MALINOWSKI (FORMER 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS 

AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you for having me today. 

I fully agree that it is important for us to try to have a good relationship with Saudi Arabia. We have a lot of interests in common. 

We have done a lot to try to deepen our partnership with the 

Saudis over the last several years. And it is perfectly reasonable 

for a new administration to try to improve the relationship further. 

At the same time, I think we have to be honest that Saudi Arabia’s agenda in the Middle East is not identical to our own. Where 

there is overlap, we should try to cooperate, and where there is not, 

we should be guided by our interests and values. 

How we engage with Saudi Arabia is also symbolically important 

around the world. My responsibilities at the State Department 

were global, and I think I may want to begin with this point because it is something that I saw in my engagement with countries 

all over the world. I think all of us agree, judging from the various 

statements, that defending human rights and democratic freedoms 

in the world is part of who we are as a country and very much in 

our interest. Doing this in Saudi Arabia is obviously very, very 

challenging, but as someone who led our Government’s efforts to 

promote our values around the world, let me stress this is as 

strongly as I can: We cannot have a credible global human rights 

policy unless we also apply it somehow to Saudi Arabia. 

In almost every authoritarian country I dealt with as Assistant 

Secretary, people would ask me, ‘‘Do you criticize your Saudi allies 

the way you criticize us?’’ assuming the answer would be no. Fortunately the answer was yes. Although we may not do it as loudly 

in Saudi Arabia as we do in some places, we have pressed the 

Saudis on dissidents, on women’s and migrants’ rights, on religious 

freedom, on the war in Yemen. I would not have had a leg to stand 

on with Russia or China or Iran or Cuba if I couldn’t have said 

that. 

And that is why President Trump’s very clear public message in 

Riyadh that we will no longer press the Gulf States on these issues 

was so harmful. We can’t have a credible global human rights policy if we say to the whole world that we are giving the Saudis a 

pass. 

And I think Secretary Tillerson’s subsequent very appropriate 

criticism of the Iranian elections was deeply undermined by his refusal to say anything at the same time about Saudi Arabia. That 

is a gift to everybody who wants to portray American advocacy for 

human rights as just a weapon that we use to beat up our enemies 

rather than a principled policy that we try to apply to everybody. 

And I think the problem was compounded by the clear contrast 

between how the administration is engaged with Saudi Arabia and 

37

its treatment of our allies in Europe and elsewhere. It is one thing 

to go to Saudi Arabia with the legitimate aim of improving our relationship. I think it was, frankly, dispiriting and even disgraceful 

for the President to say in Riyadh that we will not lecture countries in that part of the world and then to deliver what was clearly 

a lecture in Brussels to democratic allies that have fought and bled 

with us all over the world and that share our values about what 

they allegedly owe to the United States. I think some corrective 

from the Congress is needed here. 

In the meantime, our approach to Saudi Arabia should be based 

on realistic assessment of where our aims do and do not coincide. 

With the current crisis over Qatar, for example, there is absolutely 

a legitimate concern, as you mentioned Madam Chair, about that 

country’s funding to terrorist groups. But I think it would be a mistake to assume that this is the principal reason why Saudi Arabia 

acted against Qatar given Saudi Arabia’s own extremely complicated, to say the least, relationship with violent extremism. Our 

interest lies in seeing this dispute resolved peacefully and with concerns about terrorist financing addressed by all sides rather than 

trying to take sides. 

With respect to Iran, the United States and Saudi Arabia share 

a paramount interest in opposing that country’s malign influence 

in the region, but this is about countering the policies of the current regime in Iran. It is not in our interest to be seen more broadly as supporting Saudi Arabia and opposing Iran per se in some 

kind of zero-sum struggle for dominance in the Middle East. Absolutely, it is not in our interest to be viewed as aligned with Sunnis 

in an existential struggle with Shia Muslims or to encourage the 

formation of an alliance which is defined in sectarian religious 

terms. We have many Shia friends in the region: In Iraq, we are 

fighting ISIS; in Bahrain; in Lebanon. Why would we signal to 

them that we are somehow engaged on one side of a religious war? 

Finally, with respect to Yemen, the United States and Saudi Arabia clearly have a common interest there in combatting Iranian influence, in denying safe haven to al-Qaeda, protecting sea lanes. 

We do not have an interest in giving the Saudis a blank check to 

make bad decisions for which the United States will then share responsibility. We provided very generous support to the Saudi-led 

coalition. We tried to help them improve their performance, including the effort that Ambassador Westphal mentioned that my bureau led on civilian casualties. But the intervention there clearly 

hasn’t achieved its aims. The Saudis have continued to strike targets that exacerbate the humanitarian situation, suggesting they 

have sometimes made a conscious effort not to follow our advice. 

There is, as you know, a looming famine in Yemen. This is not 

an abstraction. Over 3 million people are now suffering acute malnutrition. There are 100,000 case of cholera. Saudi strikes on 

roads, bridges, and ports have kept aid form those in need. We are 

involved in this. 

Now, if we think unconditionally supporting our ally is worth 

that human cost, then we should honestly say so and accept our 

share of responsibility for that cost. I personally believe it is not 

and that we should therefore temper—not withdraw, but temper 

our support to the Saudis to encourage an outcome more in keeping 

38

with our interests. I think that is what the vote in the Senate is 

about today. 

On all these issues, offering partnership where our interests 

align and honesty where they do not, in my view, is the best way 

to build long-term trust and a better relationship with Saudi Arabia. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you to all of our panelists. And for the panel, I will start 

the questions. 

The JCPOA and the previous administration’s willingness to elevate the Iranian regime’s profile came at the expense of our traditional alliances with the Saudis and the rest of the GCC, and that 

eroded our credibility. Iran is probably the greatest threat to Saudi 

Arabia and is certainly one of the greatest threats to regional stability and U.S. national security interests. Iran’s proxy war in 

Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and the presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon 

have the entire region on edge. 

The new administration is intent on reversing the policy of seeing Iran and Saudi Arabia share the neighborhood with supposedly 

similar beliefs, and we know that that cannot happen. 

What can Congress do with our Saudi partners to address our 

mutual concerns with the Houthis, Iran’s support for Assad and 

Hezbollah, and its desire to spread its ideology throughout the region? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. Well, Madam Chair, in my 3 years 

there, I spent quite a bit of time talking to the Saudi leadership, 

from the King, the Crown Prince, the Deputy Crown Prince, about 

the role of Congress. And I think you have touched on something 

that I think has been—I am not going to say absent—but something that needs to be really pushed harder, which is your role as 

the most important branch of government in these matters. So, for 

example, delegations that travel there, I have been telling the 

Saudis that it is important for them to hear what you are saying 

because you represent the interests of the American people. And 

you speak for the American people in ways that even Presidents 

can’t do because you all represent different constituents. 

As such, I think try to get them to strengthen their relationships 

to have a better relationship with their GCC partners to include 

countries like Oman, for example, which they see as a link to Iran, 

to try to understand how they can carry on a GCC dialogue on 

these issues, much like you do in Congress when you have big differences between parties or ideologies here; you carry on the dialogue. I think that that is important to do. And I think Congress 

can play a role, not in directing foreign policy, but in shaping it in 

the future, given all your interests that you represent. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Anyone else? 

Thank you, Ambassador. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Thank you, very much, Madam Chairman. 

What I would say is that, in the region, you have two elements 

that are the drivers of instability and the weakening of societies 

and governments. You have violent extremism on one side, and 

then you have Iran on the other side. And both of them are fundamentally responsible for destabilizing the region. 

In my own view, the Iranians and the violent extremist organizations pursue the same tactics and achieve success in the same way, 

and that is that they take advantage of the weakness of governments and societies in order to exert their influence through 

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perience in Yemen was precisely that, that Iran was able to establish a foothold, to establish a relationship with the Houthis, primarily because the Government of Yemen was weak and was unable to provide for the needs and the demands of their own citizens. 

And so, in my view, the way to push back on Iranian expansionism is the same way that we push back on violent extremism, 

and that is that we need to help these societies build up their institutional capacity in order to take on their responsibilities and to 

provide governance, to provide law and order, and to address the 

needs of their entire population. So I would hope that the Congress, as it is looking at the budget, as it is looking at the requirements moving forward, would continue the long-standing U.S. position of helping these societies build their states, build their governments, build their institutions, and that is was ultimately what is 

going to allow us to achieve success in these fights. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

I know you would have remarks, but my time is up. 

I am pleased to yield to Mr. Deutch for his time. Thank you. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. More than one of you mentioned the 

issue of Saudi financing of terrorism. There was a New York Times 

piece last year that referred to the Saudis as both the arsonists and 

the firefighters when it comes to the spread of extremism. 

Secretary Malinowski, you describe the Saudi funding of 

Wahhabism around the world as having done incalculable damage, 

even if Saudis leaders have recognized the problem. When Saudi 

and others are demanding that Qatar change its behavior on terror 

financing, how do we reconcile these two positions? Is it appropriate to equate what the Saudis do with what the Qataris do? Is 

one worse than the other? How do we sort that out? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think—I never think it is helpful to kind of 

do a ranking; you know, who is worse than who? Is Iran worse 

than Saudi Arabia on human rights or vice versa? Are the Qataris 

or the Saudis worst in terms of the arsonist part of that equation? 

But I think it is important here to stress that there are a lot of 

complicated things going on in this dispute between Saudi Arabia 

and Qatar. And a principled objection to Qatari financing of groups 

like the ones that you mention I don’t think is really at the very 

top of the list. And I think if we were to lead with what I think 

is our core interest here, which is to reduce and eliminate funding 

for violent extremist groups and the broader phenomenon of tens 

of billions of dollars emanating primarily from Saudi Arabia to 

change the character of how Islam is practiced in many parts of the 

world—if we were to lead with that, we would have a lot to say to 

every country in the region, including Saudi Arabia. And I hope 

that this Qatar crisis, rather than inducing us to simplistically take 

sides with the Saudis and the UAE, forces a deeper examination 

of those problems. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, Ambassador Westphal, I imagine, during your 

tenure, this issue arose frequently. And so what is the correlation 

between the acknowledgment that you received from the leadership 

that this is a problem and steps that were actually taken to address that? 

45

Ambassador WESTPHAL. Well, first of all, President Obama made 

four visits to Saudi Arabia, and in three of those that I sat in, he 

brought up the issue very directly. Now, he brought it up in terms 

of the large disparity between the crime and the punishment issue. 

And then, on the funding, Secretary Kerry and others, and myself——

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Westphal, I am sorry. I don’t question that it 

was brought up by visits from Secretary Kerry and the President. 

But what was the response from the Saudis, and to what extent 

did they acknowledge and to what extent did they address it? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. They acknowledged the issue, and they 

addressed it by actually passing a lot of laws. And, again, like I 

said earlier, working with us in multiple meetings through Treasury and our other agencies to try to stop the flow of resources. So 

they have made some significant progress in my view. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. And just moving on in the remaining time 

I have. I would like to be supportive of the U.S.-Saudi alliance. It 

is critical. But I also believe that it is important for us to ensure 

that the steps we take to strengthen our allies don’t ultimately run 

counter to our own interests, as I said earlier. And as Congress 

contemplates this arms sale, starting with PGMs, help us understand the implications of selling these weapons without having adequate assessment of how the Saudi Air Force can and will use 

them versus the implications of not selling them and the impression that that would give to Iran. Ms. House or Ambassador 

Feierstein? 

Ms. HOUSE. On the weapons sales, I would just like to repeat 

what somebody already said. It is not the selling them weapons 

that actually does any good in my view. We need to be working 

with them to make them a much more efficient and effective military, not largely an employment operation, their defense department. I think they understand that and would be willing to cooperate. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Ambassador Feierstein on the PGMs? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I believe that we should move forward 

on the PGM sale. I think that it is important to help the Saudis 

improve their capability. One of the things that happened over the 

course of the conflict in Yemen is that we actually withdrew some 

of the advice and assistance that we were providing to the Saudis 

in their air operations center. I think we should restore that. It 

was an important element of how we could help them improve. But 

the PGMs themselves, if used appropriately, will actually result in 

reduced civilian casualties and reduced collateral damage. And for 

that reason, I think we should go forward with it. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Could I just pick up on that? We, I think, do 

have a small disagreement on this point. PGMs, in principle, can 

be very helpful in reducing civilian casualties. But that has not 

been the case in Yemen because the problem there has not been 

an absence of precision. The problem there has been that the 

Saudis have been hitting the wrong targets. If you are hitting a 

bridge or a medical facility or a port facility that you shouldn’t be 

hitting, having a very precise weapon is not going to help, and that 

was the reason why we ultimately made the decision to withhold 

those sales. 

46

I am absolutely in favor of selling defensive weapons systems 

and a whole host of other things that the Saudis can use to protect 

their border. But these in particular make us complicit in the 

strikes that are creating the humanitarian crisis. And I think, if 

that is a priority for us to reduce, then I think we do need to temper it. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Donovan of New York. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ambassador Westphal, you had testified before about the Saudis’ 

attempt to curtail terrorist funding by designating specific charities 

and restricting others. Just last year, our Nation gave Iran $1.7 

billion. That was designated as $400 million for sales that we had 

never paid them for in previous decades. And the additional $1.3 

billion was the interest on the $400 million that they gained in our 

financial services community for us retaining that money. There 

are no restrictions, obviously, on the use of that money. And I 

think we all suspect how they used that $1.3 billion in interest 

from American banks. 

As we look toward our allies, our friends in the Middle East, the 

people that we are negotiating with, when we look at ourselves, do 

you think that there are some restrictions that the United States 

could put into place that could curtail what may end up being our 

supporting or giving money to some organizations who may use 

that money then to harm ourselves? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. Yes. I think that as I was leaving the 

country——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Put the microphone on. 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. I am sorry. 

As I was leaving the country and had a conversation with King 

Salman and the other leadership, we talked about the fact that 

sanctions against Iran need to be continued and strengthened. Particularly, I think, their biggest problem with the agreement with 

Iran was that in addition to the nuclear program, we did not negotiate their activities in the region, in Iraq, in Syria, and in Yemen. 

They did not understand why President Obama and the administration did not push harder on those issues as part of the agreement. And so we talked about the fact that maybe, in this new administration, there could be a more aggressive effort to do that. 

Mr. DONOVAN. And to the rest of the panel—apparently my time 

is up already, it started at 1 minute. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It’s alright. We just messed up the time. Go 

ahead. 

Mr. DONOVAN . Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Not for Mark Meadows. Not for New Yorkers. You talk fast. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much. 

For the remaining members of our panel, each of you spoke 

about the difference in our values that we treasure and hold in 

human rights, freedoms of religion, freedoms from persecution, civil 

rights, women’s rights. How do we deal with countries that don’t 

embrace our same values? And at the same time, I guess—because 

we think they are self-governing countries and maybe we should 

47

respect their decisions their countries make, it is hard for us to respect what other nations do to women and people who are persecuted because of their religious beliefs. So I am just curious if 

you guys have an idea of how we balance those two competing interests? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. I have two things that I think are absolutely critically important. The first is primary/secondary education. The Saudis understand that their system is in dire need of 

help, particularly on teacher development and education and the 

curriculum. So, recently, the Minister of Education declared that 

religion would be only taught for a very short period of time during 

school hours. But the curriculum revision needs help. And I offered 

them that we could help in many different ways. They put out a 

proposal for teacher development to bring teachers to the United 

States to mentor their teachers here and got no takers on the proposal. They are going to put another one out. 

So education, primary education, is where all this Wahhabism 

and all this intense religious teaching took its roots. And if you 

change that system and you improve education at the lowest levels—not higher education but lower, primary/secondary. 

And the second is their judicial system. They also said to me: We 

have got old judges. We have got an old system under sharia law 

that needs modification, needs reform. We need to help train 

judges, train prosecutors, train defense attorneys. To do that, you 

will get a better human rights record. You will get a better record 

for business. If you are a businessman and you want to do business 

in Saudi Arabia, you want to make sure your interests are protected and your lawyers can fight for you. Right now, that is not 

always the case. So we need to help them in those two areas in my 

view. 

Ms. HOUSE. And I just reinforce the education point. It is one of 

the opportunities for America. I am shocked to hear that nobody 

responded. The Canadians are helping retrain teachers. When I 

was doing my book, the Saudis were promising to change the textbooks. But as the man in charge of that told me, when you shut 

the door and the teacher is in charge, at some level, it doesn’t matter what the textbook says. So there is a big need for both what 

the Ambassador said, starting at a young age to teach something 

other than hatred of Jews, Christians, Shias. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. House. 

These New Yorkers. You know, give them a finger, they take 

your whole hand. You are out of time. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair and welcome the panel. 

And I am going to ask some rapid-fire questions and ask you to 

be as concise as you can because I want to fit a lot in. 

Mr. Ambassador, in listening to Ms. House, I hear this dystopian 

wreckage of a relationship over the last 6 years, and thank God 

Donald Trump arrives in Riyadh to try to restore some semblance 

of order in the relationship. 

You sat, personally, in meetings with the President of the United 

States and the Saudi King. Is that correct? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Three times? Four. Three. 

48

Ambassador WESTPHAL. [Nonverbal response.] 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Plus the secretary of state separately. 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. [Nonverbal response.] 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. 

Could it be that some of the trouble in the relationship was the 

Saudis were hearing things they did not want to hear? Because if 

I heard your direct testimony, the President personally brought up 

human rights issues and other issues that matter in terms of U.S. 

values. Is that correct? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. That is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And they don’t like hearing that? It was not well 

received? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. You know, the answer——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Go quick. Because I am going to run out of time. 

That is all. Go ahead. 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. The answer is, yes, they didn’t want to 

hear it. But, yes, they did take actions. And, yes, we did follow up. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So it was efficacious even if it wasn’t always welcome. 

Secondly, I think—and I don’t mean to put words in Ms. House’s 

mouth. But I assume she was inferring that one of the big problems was JCPOA, that the Saudis, on principle, did not want to see 

the United States, let alone the Group of 5, engage with the Iranians on anything. Would the Saudis have preferred the kinetic option, as the military refers to it, rather than a negotiated agreement to try to roll back the nuclear development program? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. No. And they clearly said to me, very directly, all of the leaders said: We don’t oppose the nuclear agreement. We oppose the fact that nothing else was tied to it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Got it. But when we negotiated with the Soviets, 

we didn’t apply that standard. When John Kennedy signed the first 

nuclear test ban agreement with Nikita Khrushchev, he didn’t 

make it an all-comprehensive agreement, because that wouldn’t 

have worked. We didn’t try to circumscribe Soviet behavior all over 

the world. We didn’t have a list of objectionable behaviors that, oh, 

by the way, needs to be included in a nuclear test ban agreement. 

We built relationships one agreement at a time, because that is the 

way it works. Fair enough? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. [Nonverbal response.] 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Was that a yes, for the record? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. That is a yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. Malinowski, Ambassador Feierstein said that the Saudis see 

our human rights advocacy—and other advocacies for press freedoms and so forth—as ‘‘overweening and self-righteous’’ sometimes. 

Gee, we don’t want to be seen as overweening or self-righteous, do 

we? I mean, shouldn’t we abandon all of those efforts so that we 

clear that up and we are no longer seen as self-righteous or 

overweening? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. It would be so much easier, wouldn’t it? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Wouldn’t it? That is the argument I hear from 

Duterte in the Philippines, from President Xi of China, from Kim 

Jong-un in North Korea: Stay out of our business. Who are you to 

49

judge? Why do you bring up these ancillary issues that only cloud 

the relationship? 

And I think it is a fair—in terms of the dialectic of American foreign policy, it is a fair question. Always has been, by the way, 

going back to the founding of the Republic. But the idea that we 

would abandon our advocacy of our own values, even if it makes 

other people uncomfortable, is, to me, a very troubling development 

in our own foreign policy. And I wonder, since you had that portfolio, whether you want to comment on that? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Sure. And I would note I think Ambassador 

Feierstein and I agree on this 100 percent. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I don’t mean to say—you weren’t advocating. 

You were describing. I hope I got that right. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Look, in the business of promoting human 

rights and democratic values, you cannot be effective and agreeable 

at the same time. That is almost a truism. Because if we are being 

effective, then an authoritarian regime that doesn’t want to change 

is going to be upset about that. 

We are actually fairly soft with the Saudis. They are a close ally. 

We don’t yell and scream at them the way we yell and scream at 

some countries. And sometimes we are criticized for not saying 

enough, as you well know. 

But we have raised these issues. We did in the Bush administration. We did the in the Obama administration. We were sometimes 

effective. 

I think they care about their international reputation. A very interesting example of this is the case of the blogger Raif Badawi, 

who is still, unfortunately, in prison in Saudi Arabia, but who was 

sentenced to 1,000 lashes because he tried to set up a human 

rights group in the country. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is that because of sharia law? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. It is because he set up——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is there sharia law in Saudi Arabia? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Sharia law, that so many of my friends on the 

other side of the aisle campaigned in the United States against—

we don’t want to see that here—but it is in our solid ally Saudi 

Arabia’s code. Is that correct? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, yes. And, of course, there are many different interpretations of sharia law. And as Ambassador Westphal 

rightly pointed out, there is a huge problem in just the absence of 

clarity about law and what the judiciary is supposed to do. 

But in that case, he was sentenced to 1,000 lashes. Outrageously, 

they subjected him to 50. But I think in part because this is an outcry around the world, this is embarrassing for Saudi Arabia. That 

sentence has not fully been carried out, and I am still hopeful there 

may be a way—and I hope that the Trump administration will continue our efforts in this—to try to get that brave young man out 

of prison. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. My time is up, and I thank you all for your testimony. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

50

Just to remind everyone that, when John Kennedy made that 

great agreement with the Russians, yes, it got a lot of people optimistic, but it was followed by—some of the worst parts of the Cold 

War happened immediately after that. The Soviets did not take 

that as a sign of peace. They took it as a sign of weakness and doubled their support for revolutionary units all over the world. And 

I would suggest that the mullah regime in Iran with their now $1.7 

billion in cash from the Americans probably don’t think of us as 

being anything but patsies and weak for doing such a thing. 

Let me ask about Saudi Arabia. Specifically, do any of our witnesses know if there are still officials in power in Saudi Arabia who 

were in authority at the time when 3,000 Americans were slaughtered on 9/11? Do we still have any Saudis still in positions of authority that were there when that happened? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. Yes. Well, the King was the Governor of 

Riyadh. So he was an authority. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Uh-huh. He was part of the clique that ran 

the country then, right? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. Well, yeah. He is——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So the King—and that is true all the 

way through, right? We have the same clique running Saudi Arabia 

that slaughtered 3,000 Americans. And that shouldn’t be——

Ms. HOUSE. Well, the most important young leader right now, 

Mohammed bin Salman, is only 30. So he was alive, but he was 

not ruling then. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s hope that he doesn’t learn from his elders. 

The fact is, is that most people who I have talked to believe that 

the clique that runs Saudi Arabia knew what Osama bin Laden 

was planning, and they did nothing to stop it. At the worst, they 

did nothing to stop it. Some of them actually probably participated 

in helping. 

So is today that clique in Saudi Arabia helping to finance the 

Taliban and finance Pakistan, of course, who is financing the 

Taliban in Afghanistan? Is any of that money from Saudi Arabia 

going to Pakistan and then, thus, on to the Taliban? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. They have made every effort to stop that 

funding completely. Taliban——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So they don’t give money—Saudi Arabia does 

not give money now to Pakistan? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They cut Pakistan off? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. No. No. No. Saudi Arabia, as does the 

United States, of course, provides money to the Government of 

Pakistan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct. Over some of our objections, 

I might add. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. But we do. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the Saudis are still financing Pakistan, 

who is the main sponsor of the Taliban and other terrorist groups 

in that region. And the Saudis are financing it. Some of the officials who were part of the clique before 9/11 are still there. And 

how about, are the Saudis still using their wealth—to go with some 

of the questions that have been asked—to promote these madrasas? 

51

Or has there been any real reform of the message—of the horrible 

message—that has been given to young people throughout the Islamic world by these madrasas, which is filled with hate for the 

West and Israel but the West as well? 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. I will mention one, Congressman, a very 

recent one. Any imam who leaves Saudi Arabia to go to a conference or to go preach in a mosque anywhere else in the world has 

to have the permission of the government. And to get that permission, they do due diligence on what he is going to say, who he is 

going to speak to, what his own views are. And if an imam goes 

without permission, as was the case at least in one example I 

know, they are arrested and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And they are arrested at—now we are then 

trusting the group that is running Saudi Arabia to make sure that 

those people who are leaving are ideologically correct and philosophically going to promote a better world. Does the rest of our 

panel believe that that is the case? I find it very difficult to believe 

that the establishment in Saudi Arabia is censoring these folks in 

their madrasas—unless you can tell me. I guess you mentioned 

that you think they are. 

What about you? Do you think they are? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think they have made some efforts. But, no, 

I would not say it is nearly what it needs to be. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I will have to say——

Ms. HOUSE. Can I just add on that point——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure. Go ahead. 

Ms. HOUSE [continuing]. The Saudis understand that their reputation here has taken a hit over the last at least 20 years. And 

the fact that—somebody asked earlier, what can Congress do? The 

fact that Congress plays a bigger role and the Kingdom leadership 

is beginning to understand that dealing with America is not as 

simple as just having a meeting with the President. So they do understand that Congress has a bigger role, as Ambassador Westphal 

said, representing the American public. And it is having an impact 

on—not a cure, but a beginning impact—on things like what you 

are discussing. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are going to watch this very closely. I 

don’t think that we can cross our fingers and try to pretend that 

bad things aren’t happening and then they will just go away if we 

show we are friends. And I think there has been a lot of that irrational optimism that has gone into our relations with the Saudis 

over the years. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Irrational exuberance as our former Fed Reserve head said. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you to the witnesses. This has been a very interesting 

conversation here. 

Mr. Malinowski, you, in your testimony or in some answer, you 

said something about what was the real motive of the Saudis to cut 

off the ties from Qatar. What do you think was the real motive? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think there were multiple and very complicated motives. And my first point was that the public talking 

52

point, that it is just legitimate anger over Qatari funding for extremist groups around the world, was probably not the first and 

most important reason. 

I think Saudi Arabia’s most intense preoccupation over the last 

few years has been to combat what we can loosely refer to as the 

Arab Spring, the challenges in multiple countries in the region to 

established authoritarian regimes. Coming from everything, from 

liberal young kids who want to see democracy to the Muslim Brotherhood on the other side. And one of their beefs with Qatar is that 

they view Qatar as having encouraged some of that, funded some 

of that, promoted it through Al Jazeera, which has, you know, a 

lot of stuff on it that I don’t like, but also is a freewheeling space 

for freedom of speech where people can criticize their governments 

and corruption and so forth. And this has led to a rivalry between 

the two States that has played out in the way that we have seen. 

There are a lot of other issues involved, as well, where I don’t 

think it is in the interests of the United States to take sides with 

one country or the other. It is in our interests to try to resolve this 

peacefully as quickly as possible. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Well, if I understand what you just said, you think 

their primary motive actually sounds like the opposite of what they 

publicly said was their motive. I mean, does anyone else want to 

make a comment on——

Ms. HOUSE. The Saudis believe that Qatar seeks to overthrow 

their regime, just like they believe the Iranians do, and that all of 

this terrorist financing is part of destabilizing their country. So it 

is very personal. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Excuse me. That is not what I heard. What I 

heard Mr. Malinowski say is that——

Ms. HOUSE. He wasn’t willing to be as politically incorrect as——

Ms. FRANKEL. No, listen. But what I heard him say—that is why 

I wanted to just make sure—is that they were trying to promote 

an Arab Spring-type situation, which would be—I interpret that as 

something different than promoting terrorism. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Let me put it this way. 

Ms. FRANKEL. All right. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. ISIL wants to overturn the existing political 

order in the Middle East. The United States, to the extent we believe in free elections and human rights, we want to overturn the 

existing political order in the Middle East. So does the Muslim 

Brotherhood in its own way. So do liberal human rights activists. 

So do a lot of people who are profoundly different from one another. 

The problem, I think, with Saudi policy sometimes is that they 

conflate all of these things as if they are part of one threat whereas 

we, the United States, do not conflate all these things. We think 

it would be a good thing if dictatorships in the region evolve toward 

a more democratic form of government. We are at war with ISIL. 

And we want to make sure that our allies are with us primarily 

in that fight. We don’t want to mix it up with all of these other 

things that are, frankly, less legitimate and appropriate from our 

point of view. 

Ms. FRANKEL. All right. 

Someone else made a comment about the United States, I think, 

needs to do more than just sell arms to Saudi Arabia. There was 

53

a comment that we should support Vision 2030. Could you tell me 

what some ideas would be for that? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. There are two components to Vision 

2030. One is the economic side. And, of course, there is a great deal 

of interest on the part of the Saudis to see more U.S. investment, 

to see more engagement by the U.S. private sector in helping—economic diversification is a big part of the Vision 2030. And so the 

United States and American private sector could potentially be a 

major partner in helping to implement those parts of the Vision 

2030. But Vision 2030, of course, goes beyond that and also includes a major fundamental reshaping of what has always been understood as a social contract in Saudi Arabia between government 

and the citizens, the idea being that government would provide cradle-to-grave services. They would provide free health, free education, housing, jobs as the major employer. And so they are fundamentally reshaping that, and they are moving away from that 

and now talking about the role of the private sector as the major 

employer. They are reducing subsidies. They are doing a lot of 

other things that make them less of that cradle-to-grave social support, social safety net, that they used to be. And, therefore, that is 

also changing the way the people relate to the government. If you 

are not going to provide the services, the understanding before was 

that the people would stay out of government, they would stay out 

of public policy, in exchange for all of these services. If you are not 

going to provide the services, then there is an assumption that the 

people will have a greater say in the public policy and some of the 

basic decisions that the government is going to make. 

And so we can help foster that. We can help through some of our 

programs. We can help build up the capacity on the part of people 

to understand how to engage, what are the roles of nongovernmental organizations in civil society, and other things that would 

allow them to be a stronger voice, a stronger advocate for political 

liberalization, hopefully. 

Ambassador WESTPHAL. Can I add one point to this that I think 

is even more significant beyond the economic piece? And that is the 

social/cultural reforms that the transformation is putting forth. So 

the latest version of this is that women, who must have a guardian 

approve all of their legal actions, their education, their travel, their 

visa, everything, now there is a new law that was just passed a few 

weeks ago that allows women now to not use a guardian, to be free. 

Not in every single case, but—yeah. It was just approved. No? That 

is what I heard. 

Ms. HOUSE. The King asked for a review of all the ministries to 

list their restrictions where they had asked a woman to have a 

guardian. But he has not yet removed. You still have to have a 

guardian to get out of prison. You have to have a guardian to get 

married, which most women say is totally un-Islamic. So there is 

a review. But there is not yet a change. 

The hope is, by women, that the fact of asking for the review 

means the change will come. And there are people who believe that 

after Ramadan ends at the end of June, there is a chance women 

will be allowed to drive. You know, there is a hope of a lot of social 

change. And there is already—as I was trying to say, there is some 

social change. I probably didn’t do a good job describing it. But they 

54

understand that they can’t expect people to manage their own lives 

in this new private economy——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. HOUSE [continuing]. With the government controlling everything. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Wild times in the Kingdom. 

Thank you, Ms. Frankel. 

Mr. Meadows, who is my occasional Member of Congress when 

I go with my family for a week in North Carolina, and now you are 

threatening to take that away, you and the Freedom Caucus. Come 

on. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, based on past history, I think your August 

recess is probably safe. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. All right. Look forward to being in North 

Carolina. 

Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank each of you for 

your testimony. 

So let me make sure I have got this right. Ms. House, you are 

supportive of the $110 billion arms deal to the Saudis. Is that correct? 

Ms. HOUSE. Yes. I mean, I am not an arms expert. But, yes, selling weapons so long as——

Mr. MEADOWS. You and I don’t need an interpreter. We use three 

or four syllables for every word, don’t we? Thank you. 

All right. Mr. Malinowski, you are opposed to it. Is that correct? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I am opposed to the PGMs. First of all——

Mr. MEADOWS. And you are opposed to that for what reason? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I am opposed to it because it is an offensive 

weapon that is being used right now in ways that we have advised, 

repeatedly, the Saudis not to use, to strike targets that are exacerbating——

Mr. MEADOWS. So, apparently, for humanitarian purpose—let me 

make sure I understand this. Because, right now, they have 

knocked out bridges and so forth in Yemen and that is why you are 

opposed to them. Is that correct? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We have given them lists of targets that they 

should not strike. And they have continued to strike those targets, 

at least up until the point where I was an Assistant Secretary of 

State. I think, Congressman——

Mr. MEADOWS. So, if that is the case, would you not agree that 

the strategic ability of those arms has nothing to do with whether 

they hit a bridge or not? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think that——

Mr. MEADOWS. Because you are making a circular reasoning. You 

are saying you don’t want them to be strategically able to do it, but 

they are going to do it regardless. So what does that have to do 

with the arms sales? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think it makes the United States complicit in 

something that we have tried to stop. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So it would be better if we sold them nonstrategic 

arms where they could bomb everything and eventually get the 

bridge? 

55

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Absolutely not. I think we should sell them defensive arms that are——

Mr. MEADOWS. Because Mr. Feierstein said that it actually 

helped, from a humanitarian standpoint——

Mr. MALINOWSKI. It does not. 

Mr. MEADOWS [continuing]. Make sure that their strategic target 

actually gets hit the first time instead of the second or third time. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, we don’t want it to be hit. That is the 

point. 

Mr. MEADOWS. But my whole point is, it doesn’t matter; if they 

are going to hit it regardless, I mean, whether it is a strategic 

weapon or not, they are still going to take out the bridge. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, perhaps, we should then sell these weapons to the Russians in Syria, because, after all——

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Well, let’s go there. Because what you 

are suggesting—let’s go there. So you are suggesting that we 

should stay out of it. Is that correct? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Absolutely not——

Mr. MEADOWS. We should take a neutral position as it relates to 

Qatar versus Saudi. I think that was your sworn testimony. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Qatar versus Saudi, yes. I think we should do 

what Secretary Tillerson is trying to do, which is to try to resolve 

this——

Mr. MEADOWS. So they are exactly the same as they relate to 

their support for terrorism? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. No. They are not exactly the same. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So then why should we take a neutral position? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Because we have an interest—first of all, we 

have a very strong alliance relationship with both countries. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I agree. Actually, I have got to go, because I have 

got to meet the Qatari Ambassador here in just a couple of seconds. 

So let me ask you this: How do we send, according to your testimony, a very clear signal on what we should or should not tolerate 

when we take a neutral position? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think we can send a very strong signal to 

both countries about what we do and do not tolerate, as I think we 

have been doing. 

Mr. MEADOWS. But your whole testimony has said that we need 

to make sure that we are clear. And when we take a neutral position, that does not clarify our position from a diplomatic standpoint. So how do we take a clear position from a neutral point of 

view? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We should not be neutral with respect to behavior by either country that we disprove of, but that does not 

mean that we necessarily should be supporting a blockade or potentially acts of war by one country against another; that would not 

be in our interest to support. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So how do we send a clear message? 

What would be the message I should take to the Ambassador here 

in just a couple of minutes? What should be the message that I 

take it from a non-neutral point of view? Because I am not neutral 

in this. You know, I think we have to be very clear that, when 

56

there is an enemy, we expect our allies to support our position. 

Wouldn’t you agree with that? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I absolutely do. And I think——

Mr. MEADOWS. I thought you would. That was a softball. So what 

should I tell them? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think if you have got a concern, and I assume 

you do, about Qatari——

Mr. MEADOWS. I am assuming that you don’t. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I do. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. So we share a concern. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I don’t approve of anyone who supports Hamas. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So, if we are doing that, what should 

be the message? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. The message should be: Cut it out. Now, that 

doesn’t mean that we support a blockade by Saudi Arabia against 

a country that is hosting our troops in the middle of a war against 

ISIS when Saudi Arabia also has some of those problems, which I 

hope you will raise with the Saudi Ambassador when you meet 

him. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, I have. And I will be glad to do that. This 

is one of the reasons why I am in Congress. So let’s look at that. 

If we are saying, ‘‘cut it out,’’ how do we enforce that? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I——

Mr. MEADOWS. Is it just a phone call and all of a sudden a Member from North Carolina says, ‘‘cut it out,’’ and they are going to 

do that? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I think it is pretty clear, given the stakes involved in this crisis, that it is extremely important to both Qatar 

and Saudi Arabia and the UAE and other countries in the region 

to have the support of the United States. And I think we should 

be very stingy——

Mr. MEADOWS. So we should threaten that they won’t have the 

support? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. We should be very stingy in offering that support to both Qatar and to Saudi Arabia and focus on being supportive of the efforts of Secretary Tillerson. I have been critical of 

him on other things. But I think he is doing the right thing here. 

Mr. MEADOWS. But how do we distinguish—you know, you are 

saying be neutral. If one is doing a better job than the other, then 

we can’t be neutral, Mr. Malinowski. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. You have to be a mediator. And that is what 

this situation calls for. It is a mediation between two sides on the 

opposite side of a dispute. If you go into that and you say, ‘‘I am 

on their side 100 percent,’’ you can’t be a mediator. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I don’t think anybody sees us in that form. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. What a great hearing. Thank you, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Again, I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony, for 

being here, and for your work and the conversation we are having 

on, clearly, not a simple issue. 

57

Ambassador Feierstein, you say in your testimony that Saudi 

Arabia—I am going to quote you—are replicating a similar hopeful 

moment from 8 years earlier and—call it a reset. Where do you see 

them making a mistake, if you do, in this hopefulness that they 

sought from 8 years ago? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Well, I think that, 8 years ago, in 2009, 

the Saudis as well as many of the other states in the region, were 

very frustrated with the Bush administration, frustrated with the 

mismanagement of the Iraq invasion and occupation, as well as 

some of the assertions by either members of the Bush administration or those associated with them concerning a very aggressive 

policy of regime change, of structural political change in the region 

that might be imposed through force. 

So, when President Obama came into power, there was a sense 

that he was going to change the approach. He made a very wellreceived speech at Cairo University in 2009 where he talked about 

a new kind of relationship between the United States and the region, where he had pledged to withdraw forces from Iraq. And so 

they saw that as an antidote, if you will, to the things that they 

disliked about the Bush administration. 

As we went along, some of the issues that we have discussed 

over the course of this hearing began to change their perception of 

the Obama administration. And so the unhappiness about the way 

Obama was addressing things—whether we are talking about the 

Arab Spring, throwing Hosni Mubarak under the bus, if you will, 

a perception that was widely held in the region, unhappy about 

what we were doing in Syria, unhappy, as I think Ambassador 

Westphal outlined, not so much about the JCPOA but about what 

they saw as the failed commitment of the Obama administration to 

address these other issues. That was really what the problem was. 

It was that the Obama administration had basically said: If you 

support us on the JCPOA, if you go along with this, we will pledge 

that we will continue to take a very strong position on Iran’s other 

activities, its expansionism, its support for terrorism, its support 

for a number of other things. And then they believed that the 

Obama administration didn’t do that. 

So now we have a new administration in Washington which is 

promising to basically return or to repair some of the things that 

they hated about Obama. So we are going back to a very strong defense and security cooperation relationship. We are supporting 

them on Yemen. We are not going to press them on human rights. 

Those things make them hopeful. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Just because I have only limited time, I understand—if I can turn to you, Mr. Malinowski, you talk about—in 

this reset, I suspect that some of the frustration the Saudis had 

with previous administrations is that we came with expectations, 

that we came with certain priorities and values that reflected our 

interests. And you have raised the concern that we are witnessing 

something different this time, again, from your written testimony, 

and a policy rebalance that may not necessarily serve our national 

interests and may leave us with challenges. I was hoping you could 

expand on that a little bit. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Well, I was trying to put this in a more global 

context. 

58

I think how we should engage with Saudi Arabia is a difficult 

question that we have debated within certain limits for many 

years. It is a close ally. We have to be engaged with them on a lot 

of different issues. We have concerns about some of their conduct 

domestically and internationally. We have to balance these things. 

Ambassador Feierstein and I, we had dozens of conversations 

about this. When we served, we usually agreed. Sometimes we had 

a different emphasis. That is very normal. What I find very striking about the direction that the Trump administration has gone in 

is that it seems that the President at least has simply a far greater 

comfort level dealing with authoritarian, family-run regimes in the 

Middle East than he does with our closest democratic allies in the 

world that have fought and bled with us, that share our values, 

that contribute everything they possibly can to our common security. And I think that contrast is creating questions around the 

world that—you know, people are wondering, what do we stand for, 

and who do we stand with, and has that fundamentally changed? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I agree with you. And I have the concern of, if 

we don’t stand by our principles and values, then people can’t look 

to our Nation and have a clear sense of who we are and what we 

are trying to achieve domestically and internationally. That sends 

very dangerous signals to the rest of the world. So I thank you for 

that. 

I know I am out of time. So I appreciate the extended time. I will 

just add—and for, perhaps, written consideration—that the arms 

sales you all have talked about before and the threat it poses to 

our closest ally, most strategic ally in the region, Israel, I think it 

is imperative for the administration to make very clear that we will 

ensure and protect Israel’s qualitative military edge, not just in the 

context of selling these weapons to Saudi Arabia, but, God forbid, 

any of these weapons were to get into the hands of nonstate actors. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent point. 

Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you, again, to our witnesses. 

My first question, Ambassador Feierstein, is, what do you think 

is Saudi Arabia’s endgame in Yemen? It doesn’t seem as if they 

have been able to militarily prevail or been successful in bringing 

about a diplomatic solution. What do you think is the endgame? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Well, I think that is actually the big 

problem, is that there is no clear endgame. I think that the Saudis, 

like we, in 2015, thought that we would be able to very quickly restore stability, have the Hadi government go back to power in 

Sana’a, and continue the political transition there. It hasn’t worked 

out that way. 

Like Ambassador Westphal, I believe that the Saudis have been 

looking for a political way out of this conflict for at least the last 

year or year-plus. They entered into a dialogue with the Houthis 

to try to bring the Houthis away from the Iranian relationship and 

to support the political dialogue. I think we were all very hopeful 

last summer that there was going to be a political agreement in 

Kuwait in the negotiations led by the U.N. That failed, and we 

have been trying to get back to that point ever since. 

59

I still believe that the Saudis would be very interested in and 

would welcome a political way forward. But what we need to focus 

on is how we can get back to that U.N. negotiation and hopefully 

have a different outcome this time. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

Mr. Malinowski, you looked like you wanted to add something. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. No. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So I think we are all familiar with the horrific 

human rights record of Saudi Arabia: Under sharia law, beheading 

protesters and condemning young people to death for crimes they 

committed as children, flogging bloggers for perceived insults. 

And, Mr. Malinowski, I would ask you whether you have seen 

any evidence of any improvement in their human rights record, 

and what is the impact of the President agreeing to an arms sale 

without attempting to use that desire from the Saudis as a way to 

leverage or at least to raise some expectation that they improve 

their behavior with respect to universal human rights? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I agree with my colleagues here that there 

have been some modest signs of potential improvement. I am qualifying that very carefully. You have less of the religious police out 

on the streets abusing people. There is this potential move on the 

guardianship system that Ms. House described. 

But, fundamentally, these problems do persist. And although I 

think 95 percent, 98 percent, of the dynamic that may lead to 

change is going to come from within Saudi Arabia, I do think there 

is a role for Saudi Arabia’s friends in raising these issues and debating them publicly to create, you know, in the minds of those in 

Saudi Arabia who care about the Kingdom’s reputation the sense 

that they have to keep moving in this direction. And I think it has 

been efficacious on specific cases. No question about that. 

In terms of the arms sale, I have never said that we should hold 

up arms sales to Saudi Arabia because of their general human 

rights record. I am a pragmatist about this. But I do think where 

a specific weapons system is being used in the commission of 

human rights abuses, then I think we have a different kind of obligation and have to have a different kind of debate. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

A significant portion of global terrorist funding emanates from 

Saudi Arabia, and I know that, in the past, the United States’ officials have been frustrated at the limited capacity of Saudi authorities to clamp down on those funding streams. And I wonder whether in anyone’s judgment the situation has improved over the last 

few years. Has the United States been supportive of Saudi efforts 

to rein in terrorist financing? What more can we do? What more 

can they do? But it appears to remain a serious problem. 

Ambassador, looks like you have some thoughts. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Can I just say, I was the number two 

in our bureau of counterterrorism in 2006 and 2007 when we were 

very focused at that time on the issue of counterterror finance. We 

had strong concerns about the records of all of the states in the 

Gulf about their ability, their willingness to actually intercede effectively and aggressively to try to cut off the flow of financing to 

some of these violent extremist organizations. I would have to say 

that, in my own view, while we have not had success in any parVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:24 Jul 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\061317\25839 SHIRL
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ticular, you know, complete way, all of them are better today than 

they were 10 years ago. All of them have taken steps. I do believe, 

actually, that the President’s approach in Riyadh, when he was 

speaking to the assembled Arab and Islamic leaders, was the right 

approach, which is the need to build up a broad-based coalition, 

build a consensus that all of the States need to do a better job, 

need to take on this issue aggressively. I think that that is the 

right way to go forward. 

Unfortunately, where we are right now is that that effort to build 

the coalition is being blown apart by this conflict that we have 

right now with Qatar. And, therefore, I agree absolutely with Assistant Secretary Malinowski and with my other colleagues that 

what we need to do is help resolve that issue peacefully and get 

back to that coalition and consensus-building effort that we were 

engaged in just a few weeks ago. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

And now we turn to the Twitter ninja of the House par excellence, my friend, Mr. Lieu, of California. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That Twitter game is strong. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

I don’t think any of us here objects to the United States assisting 

our ally Saudi Arabia. But what many Members of Congress do object to on a bipartisan and bicameral basis is that the Saudi Arabia-led military coalition has committed multiple war crimes in 

Yemen, and the U.S. is aiding and abetting in those war crimes. 

In addition to refueling some of these Saudi jets that strike civilians, we have also sold them weapons that have struck civilians. 

And this freaked people out so much that the State Department 

lawyers actually started looking at, can our military personnel and 

other personnel be liable for war crimes under international law for 

this assistance? 

So my first question to you, Secretary Malinowski, is did the 

State Department attorneys finish that review or come to a conclusion, do you know, before you left? 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I would say, before I left, they raised these concerns and made them known to policymakers. I don’t know whether 

work has continued on that effort. 

Mr. LIEU. The reason that the Obama administration stopped the 

sale of precision-guided munitions was because the Saudi-led military coalition was using these munitions to target civilians. It is 

not as if they were trying to hit a tank and they accidentally hit 

a hospital. They very precisely hit hospitals. They very precisely hit 

schools. They very precisely hit a wedding party with lots of civilians. They very precisely hit a large funeral twice with munitions. 

So the problem is we are now enabling the Saudi Arabia coalition 

to precisely kill civilians. And that is what was such a huge problem. 

And now that the Trump administration wants to reverse, Ted 

Yoho and I, and other bipartisan Members of Congress, wrote a 

very simple letter to the State Department and Department of Defense basically asking, hey, you just tell us, has the conduct of the 

61

Royal Saudi Air Force changed so that they are no longer precisely 

hitting civilians with weapons the United States sells them? That 

letter is dated April 6. So we got a response on April 26 from the 

Secretary of Defense, response on May 2 from the Secretary of 

State. They basically were nonresponsive letters. 

So, Madam Chairwoman, I would like to enter these letters in 

the record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. LIEU. I want to ask the panel, have you seen changes in the 

operative conduct of their Saudi-led military coalition so that they 

are not striking civilians anymore? Or do they continue to do the 

same thing? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Mr. Lieu, you and I had an opportunity 

to have a conversation about these issues several times when I was 

still with the State Department. And I have to say that I disagree 

with the premise of your question. I don’t believe that the Saudis 

did precisely hit civilians or specifically targeted civilians. 

Mr. LIEU. That is wrong. In the funeral case, the Saudi Arabian 

military acknowledged they hit that funeral. They assumed there 

might be some rebels there, but they intended to strike that funeral. They intended to hit it, and they did. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Mr. Lieu, if you recall exactly what the 

explanation was, they did acknowledge that they hit the funeral. 

And I have to say that friends of mine were killed in that funeral 

home. So I feel very strongly about it. 

Mr. LIEU. Right. And they weren’t trying to hit a tank. They 

were trying to hit that funeral, and they did. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. But they acknowledged, sir, that they 

were basing that on the basis of wrong intelligence. They acknowledged that they hit it, but that it was a mistake that was based 

on poor intelligence that they had received, that that was actually 

a military——

Mr. LIEU. Right. And the weapons enabled that to happen. Look, 

if it is one funeral, I get it. Maybe if it is two funerals, I get it. 

When it is 70-some air strikes documented by multiple organizations, then it is a pattern of either gross incompetence or direct targeting of civilians. So I am just asking, has that conduct changed? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I would have to say, again, that the 

issue was not that they were targeting. And I think——

Mr. LIEU. In that case, they were targeting their funeral. They 

were targeting the funeral. Is that correct? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. They acknowledge that they hit the funeral based on wrong intelligence. 

Mr. LIEU. So they were targeting the funeral, and they hit it. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. But they did not realize it was a funeral. They did not target——

Mr. LIEU. They hit a Doctors Without Borders hospital, right? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN [continuing]. They understood it was a 

military target. 

Mr. LIEU. They hit a Doctors Without Borders hospital. They intended to hit that hospital, correct? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. And I think if you go back and look at 

the bipartisan investigations that have been done on many of those 

instances——

62

Mr. LIEU. They weren’t bipartisan. They were done by the Saudi 

Arabian military itself. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN [continuing]. You would see that, in fact, 

the situation was not the way it was portrayed in the press. 

Mr. LIEU. What was the bipartisan investigation you are talking 

about? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN [continuing]. And that there is——

Mr. LIEU. What is the bipartisan investigation you are talking 

about? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. There is a group of people who have undertaken investigations, at the behest of the Saudis, who are not 

Saudi and who take a look at these things and have come back and 

issued reports. And those reports are available publicly. And you 

can see that, in some of these instances, what was considered to 

be a strike on a Medecins Sans Frontieres hospital or other kinds 

of targets, that, in fact, there were legitimate military targets that 

were colocated or very nearby and that they were not targeting 

these facilities, but, in fact, there was collateral damage from hits 

on legitimate targets. So this is a very complicated——

Mr. LIEU. All right. So my time is up. So I just want to make 

sure that you are really saying this. You are saying the strike on 

a Doctors Without Borders hospital was a legitimate strike? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I think that it was not a strike on a 

Doctors Without Borders hospital. It was a strike on a——

Mr. LIEU. They pretty much demolished it. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN [continuing]. Colocated facility. 

Mr. LIEU. I yield. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Lieu. 

And I think Mr. Deutch wanted to make a statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I did. I was just hoping, Madam Chairman, you 

might introduce the newest members of our subcommittee who are 

here with us today. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am so pleased to be joined by two of our 

eldest granddaughters: Morgan, who will 8 on July 15th, and Caroline, who just turned 5 last week, so she said she is going to be 

6. 

And, with that, thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

With that, our subcommittee will now be adjourned. 

Excellent panelists. Excellent questions. 

Thank you to the audience. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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