No. 84-517 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1985 

KENNETH BYRD, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

-vsRAMSEY ENGINEERING, Employer, 

and 

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO., 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy 

Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey & Jarussi; Neil S. 

Keefer argued, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Herndon, Harper, & Munro; James Edmiston argued, 

Billings, Montana 

Submitted: MaY 231 1935 

Decided: July 2, 1985 

Filed: J~L. 2 1985 

-- P 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Kenneth Byrd, appellant, filed a petition in Workers' 

Compensation Court to resolve a dispute over his disability 

benefits. The matter was heard by a court-appointed Hearing 

Examiner, James P. Harrington, who conducted the hearing, 

considered the evidence, and submitted findings of fact and 

conclusions of law for consideration by the court. The 

Workers' Compensation Court considered the record and findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing examiner 

and entered an order and judgment on November 7, 1984. Mr. 

Byrd appeals this judgment. 

Appellant was injured on August 18, 1976, when he fell 

from the cab of his truck and twisted his knee. Since then, 

appellant has had five operations on his knee and may require 

a total knee replacement in the future. 

At the time of his injury, appellant was employed in 

construction as a truck driver and made $8.10 per hour under 

a Teamsters' Labor Agreement. He has tried to return to his 

old occupation, but has been unable to because of pain. 

Since returning to the labor market, appellant's income has 

been at the minimum wage level. In addition he has been paid 

permanent partial benefits of $81.00 per week since August 2, 

1983. 

The Workers' Compensation Court in its judgment of 

November 7, 1984, awarded appellant 200 weeks of permanent 

partial benefits under the specified injury statute, 

S 39-71-705, MCA. The court ordered $3,150.00 of the benefits to be paid in a lump sum to pay some of appellant's 

pressing debts. 

Appellant appeals the Workers' Compensation Court's 

judgment on the following issues: 
1. Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in 

awarding 200 weeks of permanent partial disability under 

S; 39-71-705, MCA, instead of 500 weeks under $ 39-71-703, 

MCA, on the basis that appellant's back condition and ulcerative proctitis are causally related to his knee injury. 

2. Whether appellant's permanent partial award should 

have all been paid in a lump sum to meet a balloon payment 

due on his home. 

Our standard of review of decisions of the Workers' 

Compensation Court is set forth in Steffes v. 93 Leasing 

Company (1978), 1.77 Mont. 83, 86, 580 P.2d 450, 452, in which 

it was held: 

"Our function in reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Court is to determine whether 

there is substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of that Court. We cannot 

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court 

as to the weight of the evidence on questions of 

fact. Where there is substantial evidence to 

support the findings of the Work~rs' Compensation 

Court, this Court cannot overturn the decision. 

--- Bond v. St. Regis Paper Co., (1977) Mont., 571 P.2d 

372, 34 St.Rep. 1237. ~:bins v. Anaconda Aluminum 

- Co. (1978), Mont., 575 P.2d 67 35 St.Rep. 213." 

The Workers' Compensation Court found that appellant 

failed to prove that his ulcerative proctitis was caused or 

aggravated by his knee injury. There is substantial evidence 

in the record to support this finding. Dr. Walton performed 

three of the operations on appellant's knee. Dr. Wal-ton 

testified that he found no relationship between the knee 

injury and appellant's colitis condition. (Dr. Walton's 

deposition March 5, 1984, p. 21.) 

Dr. Korb, a specialist in intestinal- diseases, testified 

that the cause of the appellant's ulcerative proctitis condition was not known and he could not say "to a reasonable 

degree of medical certainty" that stress from appellant's 
knee in jury caused the intestinal problems. (Dr. Korb's 

deposition p. 30.) 

In fact the great weight of the evidence supports the 

Workers ' Compensation Court finding that the evidence fails 

to establish a causal relationship between the appellant's 

ulcerative proctitis and the industrial injury. We must 

affirm. 

There is no medical evidence that appellant has a back 

problem. The Workers' Compensation Court did not discuss it 

and we find no evidence to support appellant's argument that 

he is additionally disabled by this back problem. We affirm 

the Workers' Compensation Court finding that appellant is 

entitled to 200 weeks permanent partial disability pursuant 

to 5 39-71-705, MCA. 

Lump Sum 

The Workers' Compensation Court ordered that appellant 

was to receive $3,150.00 of his disability payments in a lump 

sum and the rest was to be paid at the rate of $81.00 per 

week. Appellant asked that the entire award be paid in a 

lump sum to meet a $25,000.00 balloon payment on a home loan 

he obtained in anticipation of his disability award. The 

Court found that appellant was not entitled to a lump sum 

advance to pay a house loan intentionally incurred in anticipation of a lump sum award. 

The law in !!lantana on lump sum awards is stated in 

Willoughby v. Genera1 Accident, Fire and Life (1980), 187 

Mont. 253, 256, 609 P.2d 700, 701, as follows: 

"The general rule concerning the award or denial of 

lump sum settlements under the Workers' Compensation Act is well settled in this state. Lump sum 

settlements are only granted in exceptional circumstances. Where the best interests of the claimant 

are generally served by paying compensation in 

regular periodic installments, the conversion of 

benefits to a lump sum settlement has been recognized as the exception rather than the rule. Utick 
v. Utick (State Comp. Ins. Fund) (1979), Mont., 593 

P.2d 739, 741, 36 St.Rep. 799, 801; Kuehn v. Nat. 

Farmers Union Co. (1974), 164 Mont. 303, 307, 521 

P.2d 921, 923; Legowik v. Montgomery Ward (1971), 

157 Mont. 436, 440, 486 P.2d 867, 869; Kent v. 

Sievert (1971), 158 Mont. 79, 81, 489 P.2d 104, 

105. " 

The court goes on to say: 

"Lump sum settlements are only granted where there 

is 'outstanding indebtedness,' 'pressing need,' or 

where 'the best interests of the claimant, his 

family and the genera1 public will be served.'" 

In this case, we are asked to review the Workers' Compensation Court award of a partial rather than total lump 

sum. Where we have considered this issue in other cases, we 

have stated that the decision to award or deny a lump sum 

settlement will not be interfered with on appeal unless there 

has been an abuse of discretion. Willoughby, supra., Utick, 

supra. The findings of the lower tribunal or board will be 

presumed correct and affirmed if supported by substantial 

evidence. The decision will be reversed, however, if the 

evidence clearly preponderates against it. Legowik, supra. 

We have studied the evidence in this case. Appellant 

testified that he purchased a house for his family in anticipation of his Workers' Compensation award. Appellant needed 

$25,000.00 by February 1, 1984 to make a balloon payment. 

Appellant assumed he would receive at least $25,000.00 from 

Workers' Compensation, but when he did not he had to borrow 

the money from Western State Rank with the understanding that 

appellant would earmark the proceeds of his Workers' Compensation case to repay the loan. The Western State Rank loan 

is short term, at a 15% interest rate and must be paid as 

soon as possible. 

Clearly, appellant has made some mistakes with his 

finances. We do not encourage the incurring of a debt in 

anticipation of an award that may not come. But the debt has 
been incurred and the bottom line is that appellant will lose 

his house if he cannot make a substantial payment on his 

1.oan. It is an abuse of discretion to force a man to lose 

his home simply because we do not want to encourage the 

practice of incurring a debt in anticipation of lump sum 

awards. The evidence indicates that there is an "outstanding 

indebtedness", that appellant has demonstrated a "pressing 

need" for the lump sum, and the best interests of the appellant and his family wil.1 be served by awarding a lump sum. 

Appellant should receive the remainder of his 200 weeks of 

benefits in a lump sum. 

Although the lump sum award will not be as large as 

appellant anticipated, hopefully it will be sufficient to 

allow him to refinance his home. 

We remand to the Workers' Compensation Court with directions to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion. 

, A;