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PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM NUCLEAR 

AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 29, 2014 

Serial No. 113–82 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

CURTIS CLAWSON, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN O’HARA, Acting Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania, Vice Chair 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

ALEX MANNING, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES

Ms. Huban A. Gowadia, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

Mr. David C. Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan For Huban Gowadia ...................... 39 

(1) 

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND FROM 

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 

Tuesday, July 29, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE

PROTECTION, AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Meehan and Clarke. 

Mr. MEEHAN. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the Department 

of Homeland Security’s capabilities of protecting the homeland 

from nuclear or radiological attacks. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

The subcommittee meets today to examine a vitally important 

issue: Protecting the homeland from nuclear and radiological attack. I think if we just use those words alone, it identifies the seriousness and gravity of the issue. A nuclear or radiological attack, 

with its very scope, just so remarkably, sort-of, outperforms so 

many other forms of concern that we have. 

So, given the alarming expansion of terrorist safe havens across 

the Middle East and North Africa, along with the increasing sophistication of these groups in organizing and planning attacks, it 

is imperative the Department of Homeland Security is properly 

prepared to detect and deter nuclear threats. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which we often refer to 

as DNDO, is the entity within the Department of Homeland Security responsible for preventing a nuclear attack and is the lead 

agency within the United States Government for coordinating efforts to detect and intercept radiological and nuclear devices that 

may find their way into the United States. DNDO coordinates 

these efforts through an interagency system and the collaborative 

framework that is known as the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO is responsible for implementing that architecture domestically. 

DNDO works with other Department of Homeland Security components, including Customs and Border Protection, as well as State 

and local law enforcement to provide these entities with the equipment and training needed to interdict radiological or nuclear mate-
2 

rial before it can enter the United States. DNDO works closely 

with these components to install radiation portal monitors at ports 

of entry and supply officers with portable radiation monitors. Currently, 100 percent of all containerized cargo coming in is scanned 

at land and sea ports of entry into the United States. 

DNDO also works with State and local law enforcement and first 

responders to strengthen nuclear detection capabilities in the interior. Through the Securing the Cities program, DNDO helps State, 

local, and Tribal governments design and implement detection and 

interdiction capabilities in high-density urban areas. The efforts in 

the New York City region have resulted in a robust detection architecture. Last year, DHS announced the STC program will be expanded to Los Angeles-Long Beach area, and they will select a 

third city in fiscal 2014. 

While these achievements are significant, there is still work to 

be done to address the gaps in the nuclear detection architecture. 

The purpose of this hearing is to address those gaps and find how 

we can best assist DNDO and the Department to prevent a catastrophic nuclear event. 

DNDO has had its share of struggles in the past—among them, 

failed acquisition plans and less-than-optimal working relationships with some of their other interagency components. In its report from 2013, the GAO—and it is important to note that this is 

why we have the GAO here, who has been taking a good arm’slength look at the activities—they noted these deficiencies and recommended approaches towards curing them. I will be interested in 

hearing some of that from our witness. 

Since then, DNDO has successfully worked to implement GAO 

recommendations. I look forward to learning more about it, how the 

office has improved as a result of those efforts. 

I pleased to welcome to this hearing our distinguished panel. Dr. 

Huban Gowadia is the director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, and Dr. David Trimble is the director of Natural Resources 

and Environment at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

DNDO plays a vital and specific role within the Homeland Security, and it is our responsibility to ensure that it has what it needs 

to protect and prevent a radiological or nuclear terrorist attack. I 

look forward to hearing from our witnesses on, and particularly Dr. 

Gowadia, how she envisions the future of DNDO. 

I note also, while I talk about the catastrophic nuclear event that 

is potential in a world in which proliferation, particularly that 

which is going on in Iran and Iraq and other places in which there 

is perhaps not weapons themselves but certainly nuclear-grade material that can be used in other kinds of capacities, including dirty 

bombs and other things, we are talking about a broad spectrum of 

potential threats. 

So we certainly are interested in the future and what DNDO and 

Congress can do and should do to help this office achieve its mission. So I am grateful for your presence here. 

[The statement of Mr. Meehan follows:] 
3 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PATRICK MEEHAN

JULY 29, 2014 

The subcommittee meets today to examine a vitally important issue: Protecting 

the homeland from nuclear and radiological attack. Given the alarming expansion 

of terrorist safe havens across the Middle East and Northern Africa, along with the 

increasing sophistication of these groups in organizing and planning attacks, it is 

imperative that the Department of Homeland Security is properly prepared to detect 

and deter nuclear threats. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is the entity within the Department of Homeland Security responsible for preventing a nuclear attack, and is the 

lead agency within the U.S. Government for coordinating efforts to detect and intercept radiological and nuclear devices coming into the United States. DNDO coordinates these efforts through an interagency systems and collaborative framework 

known as the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), and DNDO is responsible for implementing the GNDA domestically. 

DNDO works with other DHS components, including Customs and Border Protection, as well as State and local law enforcement, to provide these entities with the 

equipment and training needed to interdict radiological or nuclear material before 

it can enter the United States. DNDO works closely with these components to install radiation portal monitors at ports of entry and supply officers with portable 

radiation monitors. Currently 100% of all containerized cargo coming is scanned at 

land and sea ports of entry in the United States. 

DNDO also works with State and local law enforcement and first responders to 

strengthen nuclear detection capabilities in the interior. Through the ‘‘Securing the 

Cities’’ program, DNDO helps State, local, and Tribal governments design and implement detection and interdiction capabilities in high-density urban areas. These 

efforts in New York City region have resulted in a robust detection architecture, and 

last year, DHS announced the STC program will be expanded to the Los AngelesLong Beach area and will select a third city in fiscal year 2014. 

While these achievements are significant, there is still work to be done to address 

gaps in the nuclear detection architecture. The purpose of this hearing is to address 

those gaps and find how we can best assist DNDO and the Department to prevent 

a catastrophic nuclear event. 

DNDO has had its share of struggles in the past. Among them, failed acquisition 

plans, and less-than-optimal working relationships with some of its inter-agency 

counterparts. In its report from 2013, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

noted these deficiencies and recommended approaches toward curing them. Since 

then, DNDO has successfully worked to implement GAO’s recommendations, and I 

look forward to learning more about how the Office has improved as a result of 

those efforts. 

I am pleased to welcome to this hearing our distinguished panel of witnesses: Dr. 

Huban Gowadia, director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Dr. David 

Trimble, director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office. DNDO plays a vital and specific role within homeland security and 

it is our responsibility to ensure that it has what it needs to prevent a radiological 

or nuclear terrorist attack. I look forward to hearing from Dr. Gowadia how she envisions the future of DNDO, and what Congress can and should do to help the office 

achieve its mission. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I now recognize the Ranking Minority Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, for 

any statement she may have. 

Ms. CLARKE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

on the threats of radiological and nuclear smuggling that our country faces. 

I want to thank our witnesses today, Dr. Gowadia, director of 

DNDO, and Mr. Trimble and the GAO team for agreeing to testify 

today. 

The issues before us today include how to measure the balance 

between investment in near-term and long-term solutions for nuclear detection gaps and how we gauge the degree and efficiency 

of Federal agency coordination and especially the mechanisms that 

DNDO employs for setting agency investment priorities. 
4 

Today, we will hear about some of the achievements that the 

hard-working Federal and civilian employees of DNDO have accomplished to protect us. Other testimony today will help us understand the challenges that we experience in such a highly complex 

technological world preventing terrorists from acquiring, transporting, and using radiological materials as a weapon of terror. 

If we are to think about reauthorizing this program, which I understand the Chairman is inclined to do, this subcommittee in its 

oversight responsibilities needs to possess ways to evaluate and 

measure the outcomes of DNDO’s R&D activities, their resource requests, and their asset allocations. 

I think it is safe to say that over the years this subcommittee has 

seen many examples of DNDO pushing for acquisition decisions 

well before some technologies had demonstrated that they could 

live up to the promises made. In my opinion, we must deal with 

this issue directly in any potential legislative language. 

It will be paramount that DNDO policy and strategy be translated into operations, tactics, and implementation that meet the requirements of Department-wide needs and that this subcommittee 

be able to transparently see that process. 

Furthermore, there are natural tensions among Federal agencies 

created by overlapping missions in the nuclear arena, especially in 

the field of nuclear detection. This fact of life does not make matters of policy and strategy easy to implement, nor outcomes easily 

measured. 

Since 2009, after President Obama’s administration, DNDO has 

made important changes and made especially good progress in nuclear forensics. I hope that our Congressional oversight efforts also 

have had a positive effect. 

In 2010, the committee, under then-Chairman Thompson, wrote 

and combined S&T-DNDO authorizations, H.R. 4842, which set out 

the premise that research and development and operations and 

procurement are best left to separate organizations in order to 

avoid obvious and glaring conflicts of interest. While not all goals 

of that legislation were achieved, the message was clearly received 

by the administration. 

What I hope we are going to hear today is: How can DNDO’s 

mission be better-defined? Some claim there is still confusion as to 

whether the office is an end-to-end R&D procurement entity for all 

things nuclear and radiological. Is it a development entity, or an 

operational entity? Some still question whether there is an inherent conflict of interest when an office, agency, or program is both 

an R&D workshop and a procurement platform. I hope we can explore some of these questions today. 

Let me finish with this thought. On the ground and every day, 

our nuclear deterrence effort as a Nation depends on motivated and 

vigilant officers across the globe supplied with the best equipment 

and intelligence we can give them. Officers working out of our Nation’s ports of entry have an especially complex and difficult job. 

Thousands of decisions are made every day to clear a container or 

a personal or commercial vehicle for transit into the United States. 

Other cargo requires further inspection or even denial of entry or 

an interdiction action on a vehicle or person. 
5 

That is the hard, cold, repetitive, and everyday reality of our 

mission to prevent the kind of violent nuclear attack. However, this 

is part of the flow of commerce in the world’s premier, leading trading market, the United States, and we are grateful for all of our 

dedicated women and men in the field who perform these vital 

tasks. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today’s testimony, and I yield 

back. 

[The statement of Ms. Clarke follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER YVETTE D. CLARKE

JULY 29, 2014 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the threats of radiological 

and nuclear smuggling our country faces. I want to thank our witnesses today, Dr. 

Gowadia, director of DNDO, and the GAO team for agreeing to testify today. The 

issues before us today include how to measure the balance between investment in 

near-term and long-term solutions for nuclear detection gaps, and how we gauge the 

degree and efficiency of Federal agency coordination, and especially the mechanisms 

that DNDO employs for setting agency investment priorities. 

Today, we will hear about some of the achievements that the hard-working Federal and civilian employees of DNDO have accomplished to protect us. Other testimony today will help us understand the challenges that we experience in such a 

highly complex technological world—preventing terrorists from acquiring, transporting, and using radiological materials as a weapon of terror. 

If we are to think about reauthorizing this program, which I understand the 

Chairman is inclined to do, this subcommittee, in its oversight responsibilities, 

needs to possess ways to evaluate and measure the outcomes of DNDO’s R&D activities, their resource requests, and their asset allocations. 

I think its safe to say that over the years, this subcommittee has seen many examples of DNDO pushing for acquisition decisions well before some technologies had 

demonstrated that they could live up to the promises made. In my opinion, we must 

deal with this issue directly in any potential legislative language. 

It will be paramount that DNDO policy and strategy be translated into operations, tactics, and implementation that meet the requirements of Department-wide 

needs, and that this subcommittee be able to transparently see that process. Furthermore, there are natural tensions among Federal agencies created by overlapping 

missions in the nuclear arena, especially in the field of nuclear detection. This fact 

of life does not make matters of policy and strategy easy to implement, nor outcomes 

easily measured. 

Since 2009, under President Obama’s administration, DNDO has made important 

changes, and made especially good progress in nuclear forensics, and I hope that 

our Congressional oversight efforts also have had a positive effect. In 2010, the committee, under then-Chairman Thompson, wrote a combined S&T DNDO authorization, H.R. 4842, which set out the premise that research and development, and operations and procurement, are best left to separate organizations in order to avoid obvious and glaring conflicts of interest. While not all goals of that legislation were 

achieved, the message was clearly received by the administration. 

What I hope we are going to hear today is, ‘‘How can DNDO’s mission can be better defined’’? Some claim there is still confusion as to whether the office is an endto-end R&D procurement entity for all things nuclear/radiological . . . is it a development entity . . . or an operational entity? 

Some still question whether there is an inherent conflict of interest when an office, agency, or program, is both an R&D workshop and a procurement platform. I 

hope we can explore some of these questions today. 

Let me finish with this thought. On the ground, and every day, our nuclear deterrence effort as a Nation depends on motivated and vigilant officers across the globe, 

supplied with the best equipment and intelligence we can give them. Officers working at our Nation’s ports of entry have an especially complex and difficult job. Thousands of decisions are made every day to clear a container or a personal or commercial vehicle for transit into the United States. 

Other cargo requires further inspection—or even denial of entry—or an interdiction action on a vehicle or person. That is the hard, cold, repetitive, and everyday 

reality of our mission to prevent this kind of violent nuclear attack. However, this 

is part of the flow of commerce in the world’s premier and largest trading market, 
6 

the United States, and we are grateful for all of our dedicated men and women in 

the field who perform these vital tasks. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today’s testimony, and I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Let me thank the Ranking Member for her opening 

statement but also for her focus on the idea that our objective is 

to do, you know, effective oversight to assure that the resources are 

being appropriately focused. We look forward to the ability for the 

record to speak to those particular issues. 

Other Members of the committee who may come in are reminded 

that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JULY 29, 2014 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and the radiological and nuclear smuggling threats it faces. I want 

to thank the director of DNDO, and the GAO team for coming in to testify today. 

We will hear testimony about some of the successes, and some of the challenges 

that still exist in preventing terrorists from acquiring, transporting, and using radiological materials as a potential weapon of terror. 

We know that our nuclear detection strategy and equipment at the time of the 

9/11 attacks was limited in its capability. Radiation detectors could sometimes detect radiation, but could not identify isotopes. We also found out that sensing equipment could reveal dense objects, but it would be almost impossible to pick out a 

small piece of Special Nuclear Material, or SNM. Today, as technologies have become more capable, they can fill more gaps in the current nuclear detection architecture. 

But there’s still a long way to go to fulfill the goals we set for DNDO, and many 

questions to ask. For example, are we making progress on remote detection that 

might offer a way to monitor chokepoints in the United States that terrorists might 

pass through transporting weapons? 

And, we have identified other gaps, like the need for long-range sensors that can 

operate in isolated areas, and systems that can perform efficiently in highly-congested public maritime areas. These kinds of technologies and sensors do not come 

easily, or inexpensively. 

But, we need to have systems under development that have the potential to reduce false positives, speed the flow of commerce, and reduce false negatives—all of 

which improve security. Over the years, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to deploy systems to prevent nuclear smuggling, and to support R&D on advanced technologies. 

What we hope for is that money Congress spends to achieve these refinements 

can make future technologies more effective, and create an R&D pipeline that is intended to generate a steady stream of new technologies and systems. 

However, Congress must be sure that the money it spends for this technological 

pipeline is used wisely and efficiently, and that testing and certification of these cutting-edge tools are thoroughly evaluated and validated. Over the years, we have 

seen too many reports about detection technologies being deployed without proper 

testing, and without certification. 

The development & procurement of sophisticated technologies is not a simple matter, but it is also not one that should be opaque and overly complicated for Congress 

to understand. 

We know that DNDO has an important role across the Department, and that it 

has close relationships with DHS’s front-line programs, and other Federal agencies, 

who depend on them for support and advice. 

The challenge for this committee is how to evaluate how well DNDO meets the 

operational requirements for DHS programs, how it spends its money and 

prioritizes its R&D, and how it fulfills its responsibilities in coordinating the Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture. 

We will hear testimony from GAO today about the need for a clearer, and measurable picture of its goals, strategies, and procedures. 

It is imperative that the new Secretary makes sure no more money is wasted on 

devices that cannot be properly evaluated, tested, and certified before being procured and placed into duty. Our country’s safety depends on it. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today’s testimony, and I yield back. 
7 

Mr. MEEHAN. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of 

witnesses before us here today on this important topic. 

First, Dr. Huban Gowadia is the director of the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office at the Department of Homeland Security. Under 

her leadership, DNDO develops nuclear detection capabilities, it 

measures detector system performance, it ensures effective response to detection alarms, it conducts transformational research 

and development, and it coordinates the improvement of technical 

nuclear forensics capabilities. 

Before joining DNDO, Dr. Gowadia led DHS’s Science and Technology countermeasures—the countermeasures testbeds and also 

worked as a checkpoint program manager at the Office of Security 

Technologies in the Transportation Security Administration. 

We are joined, as well, by Mr. David Trimble, who serves as the 

director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Natural Resources and Environment Group. Mr. Trimble provided leadership 

and oversight on the United States and international nuclear security and clean-up issues. 

Mr. Trimble joined GAO in 2009, and, previously, he worked at 

the Department of State’s Political-Military Affairs Bureau as the 

director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance. 

The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

I know there are extensive written statements, but I want to give 

you the opportunity to focus on where you would like to go in your 

testimony, Dr. Gowadia. So we now recognize you for your 5 minutes to testify. 

STATEMENT OF HUBAN A. GOWADIA, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC 

NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. GOWADIA. Thank you, Chairman. Good afternoon, Chairman 

Meehan and Ranking Member Clarke. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or 

DNDO’s, progress in protecting the homeland from nuclear and radiological threats. 

I am honored to appear before you today to testify with my distinguished colleague, David Trimble. Your support and oversight 

and constructive feedback from the Government Accountability Office are critical to our improvement and continued success. 

As you are aware, in 2005, DNDO was created within the Department of Homeland Security as an interagency office with a singular focus: Preventing nuclear terrorism. We do so through two 

missions, nuclear detection and nuclear forensics. Let me begin 

with the latter. 

DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was established to provide centralized stewardship, planning, and integration for Federal nuclear forensics and attribution activities. At the 

time, the state of nuclear forensics capabilities were far from perfect, as emphasized in reports by the National Academy of 

Sciences, the GAO, and others. Since then, DNDO has advanced 

nuclear capabilities and improved collaborative National exercises 

by making them remarkably realistic. Focusing on what was then 

an in extremis National capability, DNDO has supported 19 new 

nuclear forensic scientists, and we are on track to add another 35 
8 

into the nuclear forensics field by 2018. I should say, a total of 35 

by 2018. 

So let me switch now to the detection mission. DNDO was established to coordinate the United States Government’s radiological 

and nuclear detection capabilities through the construct of the 

Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. This is a framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive 

materials that are out of regulatory control. In accordance with the 

GAO’s recommendations and along with our interagency partners, 

we developed the 2010 Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic Plan. Recently, we updated it in 2014 based on feedback from 

the National Academy of Sciences. 

DNDO is also mandated to conduct an aggressive program of 

transformational research and development. As a result of our efforts, several breakthrough sensing materials with enhanced detection characteristics have transitioned from the laboratory to commercially available products. 

We also have a robust test and evaluation program. To date, 

DNDO has conducted more than 100 test campaigns and, with the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, developed consensus standards for radiation detection equipment. Today, we 

have a total of 24 standards for homeland security applications. 

To implement the domestic component of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, we have made much progress in equipping 

law enforcement officers and public safety officials with the necessary capabilities, information, and training. For instance, 

through the Securing the Cities program, we now have robust regional nuclear detection capabilities in major urban areas, including the New York City region and the L.A.-Long Beach region. 

Through collaborative interagency efforts, we have provided training to over 27,000 law enforcement personnel across the Nation. 

Annually, we conduct approximately 15 exercises to stress operator 

abilities to detect illicit nuclear and other radioactive material. 

In our role as the Department lead for acquiring radiation assistance, we bring a disciplined approach to procurement. DNDO’s efforts have ensured that all Coast Guard boarding parties carry radiation detection equipment. All incoming general aviation aircraft 

are met by Customs and Border Protection Officers with detectors. 

One hundred percent of conveyances entering our Nation at land 

ports of entry are scanned for radiological and nuclear material, 

and almost 100 percent of maritime cargo is similarly scanned at 

our seaports of entry. Finally, the Transportation Security Administration’s Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams are 

also equipped with radiation detectors. 

To ensure that we do not repeat the same issues that led to the 

cancellation of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program, DNDO 

significantly improved acquisition management governance, policy, 

and processes. We have implemented a disciplined solution development process, establishing a common lexicon with consistent 

practices and deliberately and continually involving operational 

partners. As a result, we have increased efficiencies, promoted programmatic and budgetary transparency, and bolstered accountability for all our programs. 
9 

Looking forward, we will continue to build and sustain critical 

partnerships across the nuclear security enterprise. We will use an 

effective risk-informed approach to guide our efforts. We will strive 

to leverage technical breakthroughs to enhance our National nuclear detection and forensics capabilities. Importantly, we will continue to improve the discipline in procuring and deploying systems 

to meet the needs of our operational partners. 

Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Gowadia follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HUBAN A. GOWADIA

JULY 29, 2014 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I appreciate your interest in the advancements the Department of Homeland Security’s 

(DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has made in preventing nuclear 

terrorism. I am honored to testify with my distinguished colleagues from the Government Accountability Office and the National Academy of Sciences. Your support 

and oversight, and their constructive assessments and feedback, are critical to our 

improvement and continued success. 

Nuclear terrorism remains a serious risk because of its potential consequences. As 

President Obama stated in his speech at South Korea’s Hankuk University in 

March 2012, ‘‘We know that just the smallest amount of plutonium—about the size 

of an apple—could kill hundreds of thousands and spark a global crisis. The danger 

of nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security.’’ To address this risk, DNDO was established as a unique interagency organization with 

a singular focus on preventing nuclear terrorism. Reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism is a whole-of-Government challenge, and DNDO works with Federal, State, 

local, Tribal, territorial, and international partners as well as those in the private 

sector, academia, and the National laboratories to fulfill its mission. 

AUTHORITIES

Recognizing the threat posed by nuclear and other radioactive materials, DNDO 

was created by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)–43 and Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–14 and subsequently codified by Title V of 

the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act (Pub. L. No. 109–347), 

which amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Pursuant to section 1902 of the 

Homeland Security Act, DNDO is required to develop, with the approval of the Secretary and in coordination with the Departments of Energy, State, Defense, and 

Justice, an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture, and is responsible for implementing the domestic portion. The architecture serves as a framework for detecting (through technical and non-technical means), analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control. Non-technical detection refers to an alert caused by law enforcement or intelligence efforts 

and collected by GNDA partners under their statutory authorities and consistent 

with National policy. DNDO is also charged to enhance and coordinate the nuclear 

detection efforts of Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments and the private 

sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response. To accomplish this, DNDO leads 

programs to develop nuclear detection and forensics capabilities, measure detector 

system performance, ensure effective response to detection alarms, and conduct 

transformational research and development for advanced detection technologies. 

In 2006, DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was established by 

NSPD–17/HSPD–4 and later authorized by the 2010 Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act (Pub. L. No. 111–140). The Center was given responsibilities to provide centralized stewardship, planning, and integration for all Federal nuclear forensics and 

attribution activities. The act also established DNDO’s National Nuclear Forensics 

Expertise Development program and required DNDO to lead the development and 

implementation of the National Strategic Five-Year Plan for Improving the Nuclear 

Forensics and Attribution Capabilities of the United States. 

These authorities have directed our focus in preventing nuclear terrorism through 

the enhancement of nuclear detection and technical forensics capabilities. In both 

instances, we rely on the critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and tech-
10 

nology. Thus, to maximize the Nation’s ability to detect and interdict a threat, it 

is imperative that we apply detection technologies in operations that are driven by 

intelligence indicators, and place them in the hands of well-trained law enforcement 

and public safety officials. Similarly, to enhance attribution capabilities, the U.S. 

Government (USG) must ensure that information from law enforcement, intelligence, and technical nuclear forensics is fused to identify the origin of the material 

or device and the perpetrators. 

While we have made significant improvements in both detection and forensics 

over the years, the threat of nuclear terrorism persists, and requires constant vigilance. 

DEVELOPING THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE

As recognized by the Government Accountability Office in past testimonies, 

DNDO has made progress in its strategic planning efforts. In December 2010, 

DNDO issued the first-ever Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic Plan to 

guide the development and implementation of USG detection programs, activities, 

and capabilities. In April 2012, the Secretary issued a DHS Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Implementation Plan, which identified priorities, necessary capabilities, and monitoring mechanisms to assess progress. DNDO has worked with 

interagency partners to update the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic 

Plan. The 2014 Strategic Plan presents an updated definition and vision for the 

global nuclear detection architecture, as well as a mission, goals, and objectives for 

interagency efforts to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear or other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control. 

The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-faceted, layered, defense-indepth framework, with the objective of making the illicit acquisition, fabrication, 

and transport of a nuclear or radiological device, material, or components prohibitively difficult. DNDO also relies on a well-conceived arrangement of fixed and mobile radiological and nuclear technical detection capabilities to present terrorists 

with many obstacles to a successful attack, greatly increasing costs, difficulty, and 

risk, and thereby deterring them. 

To develop such a multi-faceted global nuclear detection architecture, DNDO continually assesses current and planned capabilities against the evolving radiological 

and nuclear threat. DNDO uses rigorous risk assessments as one means to do so. 

Since 2007, and as directed by HSPD–18 (Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction), DNDO has collaborated with the DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) to produce the Integrated Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism Risk Assessment. DNDO leads the biennial radiological and nuclear terrorism risk assessment, which is then combined with similar 

biological and chemical risk assessments. To better address the evolving threat, 

DNDO has improved the threat models in this risk assessment by adding an adaptive adversary model and is working with Department of Energy (DOE) National 

Laboratories to enhance improvised nuclear device models. DNDO has also supported DHS risk assessments such as the Strategic National Risk Assessment and 

the Homeland Security National Risk Characterization. These risk assessments, 

coupled with requirements from our operational partners, inform DNDO resource allocations. 

While USG efforts and programs are critical, developing a global nuclear detection 

architecture relies largely on the decisions of sovereign foreign partners to develop 

and enhance their own National and regional detection programs. DNDO contributes to interagency efforts led by the Department of State by laying the groundwork 

to assist partner nations in developing defense-in-depth approaches to detecting illicitly-trafficked nuclear or other radioactive materials. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Second Line of Defense program is an essential 

component of this defense-in-depth approach. This program helps strengthen the 

global nuclear detection architecture by installing and supporting the installation of 

fixed and mobile radiation detection equipment at high-priority locations outside the 

United States. DNDO has worked closely with NNSA on training initiatives associated with building and sustaining foreign partners’ radiation detection capabilities. 

DNDO has assisted in the development of guidelines and best practices through the 

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) to outline the key characteristics of an effective architecture. To 

date, IAEA has used these guidelines and best practices in regional training courses 

to help more than 20 nations initiate planning of national-level detection architectures, with over 50 national-level planners trained in architecture development. Just 

two weeks ago (July 14–18, 2014), DNDO helped the IAEA expand its Nuclear Security Detection Architecture awareness course during a train-the-trainer session to 
11 

further develop the international instructor pool. By the end of this calendar year, 

the IAEA will have successfully implemented seven regional awareness courses in 

English, French, and Spanish. This strategic partnership will continue to serve as 

a ‘‘force multiplier’’ for USG nuclear security efforts for years to come. 

CONDUCTING TRANSFORMATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPING SYSTEMS

DNDO is also responsible for conducting an aggressive, evolutionary, and transformational program of research and development to generate and improve technologies to technically detect nuclear and radioactive materials. DNDO’s transformational research and development efforts seek to achieve dramatic advancements in technologies to enhance our National detection and forensics capabilities. 

These developments may also reduce the cost and operational burden of using advanced technology in the field to maintain an enhanced level of protection. Annually, DNDO updates its research and development strategy based on prevailing risk, 

advancements in technology, and the availability of funding. 

Although significant progress has been made in addressing the gaps and needs 

of the global nuclear detection architecture and nuclear forensics, several challenges 

remain that require sustained investment. DNDO’s technical challenges include the 

need for systems that: 

• Are cost-effective with sufficient technical performance to ensure wide-spread 

deployment; 

• Can detect special nuclear material, even when heavily shielded; 

• Facilitate enhanced wide-area searches in a variety of scenarios, to include 

urban and highly cluttered environments; 

• Can be used to monitor traffic in challenging pathways, such as between ports 

of entry along our land and sea borders; and 

• Support the forensics determination of origin and process history of seized material. 

DNDO has and will continue to advance fundamental knowledge in nuclear detection and forensics through a sustained long-term investment in our Exploratory Research program and Academic Research Initiative. These efforts directly address the 

aforementioned challenges through basic and early-applied research to feed more 

mature research and development projects such as DNDO’s Advanced Technology 

Demonstrations. 

Equally important, the Academic Research Initiative is building the capabilities 

of universities to develop next generation scientists and engineers in areas such as 

advanced materials, nuclear engineering, radiochemistry, and deterrence theory. 

Since its inception, 57 grants have been awarded to more than 42 academic institutions across the country. In 2013 alone, the Academic Research Initiative directly 

supported 140 students, published 108 papers, and conducted 180 conference presentations. And, we are beginning to see these projects move up the technology pipeline. Just this year, a new room temperature thallium-based semiconductor detector 

transferred from Northwestern University to our Exploratory Research program. 

Nuclear resonance cross-sections measured at Duke University are being used in 

our shielded special nuclear material detection projects and background radiation 

measurements performed by University of California at Berkeley are being used in 

support of operational programs across the interagency. 

Several DNDO-sponsored research efforts have also led to new commercial products that provide enhanced operational capabilities to Federal, State, and local law 

enforcement and public safety personnel. Even before a Helium–3 shortage was 

identified, DNDO teamed with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to explore options for better, more cost-effective alternatives for neutron detection (Helium–3 is 

a gas that is widely used to detect neutrons that are emitted by certain nuclear and 

other radioactive materials. Helium–3 results from the radioactive decay of tritium. 

As the need for tritium for nuclear weapons decreased, so too did the availability 

of Helium–3.) For portal systems, which require the largest quantities of this gas, 

DNDO worked with industry and is now deploying alternative detection technologies that do not require Helium–3. This enables the country to devote the scarce 

supplies of Helium–3 to those applications where no substitutes are possible. We are 

also testing alternative systems for use in mobile, backpack, and hand-held radiation detectors, several of which have already shown performance superior to the 

current-generation systems. Importantly, due to a collaborative USG-wide effort to 

address the shortfall, our USG strategic reserve of Helium–3 has increased by 70% 

since 2009. 

Other recent DNDO technological successes that transitioned from laboratories to 

commercially-available products include: 
12 

• Advanced radiation-sensing materials such as Cesium Lithium Yttrium Chloride, Strontium Iodide, and Stilbene, which have enhanced detection characteristics and can be used to build more capable systems featuring simplified electronics, low power requirements, and greater reliability; • New electronics and advanced algorithms that support networked radiation detection for improved wide-area search capabilities; • Compact dual-energy X-ray generators with improved density discrimination 

and higher shielding penetration that have been integrated into commercially 

available mobile radiography systems; and • Software to automatically detect special nuclear material and shielding material 

in radiography images. 

DNDO continues to develop breakthrough technologies that increase performance 

and reduce the operational burdens of our front-line operators. DNDO continues to 

work closely with other DHS components to improve their mission performance. 

We are collaborating with U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Laboratories and Scientific Services to use machine learning to greatly reduce the number 

of nuisance alarms in radiation portal monitors; working with the Massachusetts 

Port Authority, DHS S&T, and the United Kingdom Home Office to develop and 

evaluate the next generation non-intrusive inspection imaging equipment; and continuing to jointly evaluate parameter-setting modifications to reduce the number of 

alarms from naturally-occurring radioactive material. In fact, after a rigorous program of laboratory tests, modeling and simulation, field trials, and successful pilots 

at two ports of entry, CBP will deploy a new technique to the 26 largest seaports 

by the end of 2014. It is anticipated that this effort will reduce wait times and yield 

operational efficiencies. 

In addition to CBP, DNDO worked closely with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and State and local partners to identify key operational requirements for the design of next-generation radioisotope 

identification devices that can be used by law enforcement officers and technical experts during routine operations to identify radioactive materials. Based on the enhanced detection material lanthanum bromide and improved algorithms, this new 

hand-held technology is easy-to-use, lightweight, and more reliable and, because it 

contains built-in calibration and diagnostics, has a much lower annual maintenance 

cost. The new system is receiving very positive reviews from operators in the field. 

CHARACTERIZING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

DNDO’s technology efforts are coupled with a rigorous test and evaluation program. Over the years, DNDO’s test program has grown and matured. To date, we 

have conducted more than 100 test and evaluation campaigns at more than 40 laboratory and operational venues, and evaluated systems including pagers, handhelds, 

portals, backpacks, and vehicle-, boat-, aircraft,- and spreader bar-mounted detectors, as well as next-generation radiography technologies. To ensure the equipment 

is evaluated in the manner in which it will be used, these test campaigns are always 

planned and executed with operational users. In addition, we include interagency 

partners and use peer-reviewed processes. The results from DNDO’s test campaigns 

have informed Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners on the technical and operational performance of detection systems, allowing them to select the most suitable 

equipment and implement the most effective concepts of operation. 

DNDO leads the development of technical capability standards, and in collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, also supports the development, publication, and adoption of National consensus standards for radiation 

detection equipment. A total of 24 standards, including 11 U.S. standards with the 

American National Standards Institute, 10 international standards with the International Electrotechnical Commission, and 3 technical capability standards now 

exist for homeland security applications. We have assessed commercially available 

detection systems against National and international standards and in various operational scenarios. Notably, we recently completed the Illicit Trafficking Radiation 

Assessment program, a collaboration with the European Commission’s Joint Research Center and the IAEA to evaluate nearly 80 instruments against consensus 

standards. The results enabled our stakeholders to compare the performance of commercially available radiation detection equipment and provided manufacturers with 

constructive feedback on their products. 

IMPLEMENTING THE DOMESTIC COMPONENT OF THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION

ARCHITECTURE

DNDO is instrumental in implementing the domestic component of the global nuclear detection architecture. In conjunction with Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 
13 

territorial operational partners, DNDO applies a disciplined approach to procure 

small- and large-scale radiation detection and/or identification systems and deploy 

them at ports of entry, along our land and maritime borders, and in the interior 

of the United States. In addition, as part of DHS’s Strategic Sourcing efforts, DNDO 

is the Department’s commodity manager for hand-held radiological and nuclear detection equipment. This enables us to take advantage of technical advancements 

and achieve cost savings by leveraging the volume demand of Department-wide and 

other Federal users. 

DNDO’s collaborative system acquisition efforts have ensured that all USCG 

boarding parties carry radiation detection equipment; all in-coming general aviation 

flights are met by CBP Officers with radiation detectors; 100% of conveyances entering our Nation at land ports of entry are scanned for nuclear and other radioactive 

materials; almost 100% of maritime cargo is similarly scanned at our sea ports of 

entry; and the TSA’s Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams are 

equipped with radiation detectors. Our partnership with CBP was leveraged during 

the recovery efforts from Hurricane Sandy. DNDO was able to replace 39 radiological detector panels and nine operator booths within 2 weeks of the storm, thereby supporting the quick resumption of port operations at A.P. Moller, Maher, Port 

Newark Container, New York Container, Global, and Red Hook terminals in New 

York and New Jersey. While technology acquisition and deployments are critical, we 

must also ensure that the training, exercise, and cross-jurisdictional protocols integral to mission success are adopted and sustained by operational partners. As such, 

DNDO provides program assistance services to Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial stakeholders who are developing or enhancing radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. This support includes assistance in developing and integrating 

local or regional programs into the global nuclear detection architecture, guiding the 

development of concepts of operations and standard operating procedures, and developing training and exercise products to ingrain those procedures into day-to-day 

activities. 

DNDO has made considerable progress in enhancing National radiation detection 

capabilities by: 

• Engaging with 29 States to raise awareness and begin developing formal radiological and nuclear detection programs. By the end of fiscal year 2015, DNDO 

plans to expand its efforts to all 50 States. 

• Developing an enduring partnership with State and local jurisdictions, through 

the Securing the Cities program, resulting in a robust regional nuclear detection 

program in the New York City/Jersey City/Newark region. Based on lessons 

learned in this implementation, DNDO expanded the Securing the Cities program in fiscal year 2013 to the Los Angeles/Long Beach area and will select a 

third region later this fiscal year. 

• Supporting domestic maritime capability development by working with regional 

Area Maritime Security Committees to develop operational procedures, training, 

and exercises to reinforce their Area Maritime Security Plans and address the 

small vessel threat. 

• Deploying Mobile Detection Deployment Units to provide radiation detection 

and communications equipment for Federal, State, and local agencies to augment their capabilities during special events or in response to elevated threat 

conditions. To date, these units have been deployed over 150 times. 

DNDO provides training products and support to develop, enhance, and expand 

radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. In partnership with the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) the Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center, DOE, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), DNDO develops and implements protocols and training standards for the effective use of radiation detection 

equipment and associated alarm reporting and resolution processes. DNDO has developed 42 separate courses in support of emerging detection technologies and operational environments to support our Federal, State, and local stakeholders. Since 

2005, more than 27,000 law enforcement and public safety personnel from 35 States 

have participated in DNDO-supported radiological and nuclear detection training. 

DNDO also assists State and local partners in developing, designing, and conducting exercises that are compliant with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation program methodology. The exercises provide valuable hands-on experience 

for personnel performing radiological and nuclear detection operations and assist decision makers in integrating the detection mission into their daily operations. To 

date, DNDO has conducted exercises with 21 States and annually supports up to 

15–20 exercises. DNDO continues to develop and apply standardized and 

customizable exercise templates and guidelines evaluating the implementation and 

performance of Federal, State, and local radiological and nuclear detection programs 
14 

while fostering the exchange of ideas and best practices amongst State and local 

partners. 

DNDO fields a unique Red Team to objectively assess the operational effectiveness and performance of DNDO programs and deployed radiological and nuclear detection capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels. Our Red Team works 

across the inter-agency employing an all-of-Government approach to collectively improving our National capabilities. At the Federal level we partner with the Departments of Energy, Defense, and Justice; within DHS with CBP, FEMA, TSA, USCG, 

and U.S. Secret Service; and with a myriad of State and local agencies across the 

United States. The Red Team evaluates deployed systems and operations and their 

associated tactics, techniques, and procedures, in as-close-to-realistic environments 

as possible. As covert and overt assessments are generally the only opportunity for 

operators of radiological and nuclear detection systems to gain experience detecting 

uncommon nuclear sources, these operations provide valuable feedback on the performance of tactics, techniques, and procedures. This feedback enables operators to 

improve their concepts of operation and readiness. For the past 5 years, DNDO’s 

Red Team has averaged more than 25 overt and covert assessments per year. 

DNDO is responsible for enhancing and coordinating the nuclear detection efforts 

of Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments and the private sector to ensure a 

managed, coordinated response. We also coordinate across the interagency to establish protocols and procedures to ensure that the technical detection of unauthorized 

nuclear explosive devices, fissile material, or other active radioactive material is 

promptly reported to the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy, 

the Attorney General, and others as appropriate for action by law enforcement, military, emergency response, or other authorities. 

DNDO’s Joint Analysis Center is essential in enhancing situational awareness, as 

well as providing technical support and informational products, to Federal, State, 

and local partners. The Joint Analysis Center employs a secure web-based dashboard to collaborate with mission partners and uses a geographic information system to show detection information, detectors, situational awareness reports, and 

other overlays in a geospatial viewer. Using the Joint Analysis Center Collaborative 

Information System, DNDO facilitates nuclear alarm adjudication and the consolidation and sharing of information and databases. This system provides our State 

and local partners with the ability to manage, document, and execute a radiological 

and nuclear detection program. This includes the ability to electronically maintain 

training, certification, and Memoranda of Understanding and Memoranda of Agreement between jurisdictions. The system also consolidates and maintains a database 

of detector equipment and Nuclear Regulatory Commission State licensees. Through 

this information system, we connect to the Triage system, maintained by DOE’s 

NNSA, to enable a seamless transition when National-level adjudication assistance 

is required. To increase awareness of lost and stolen sources and other relevant information, DNDO’s Joint Analysis Center publishes weekly information bulletins, 

summarizing relevant news articles and providing useful facts about radioactive materials. 

In addition to direct interaction with individual States and law enforcement agencies, DNDO hosts biennial State and Local Stakeholder Working Group meetings 

and annual Executive Steering Council meetings with law enforcement and other 

supervisory personnel to exchange best practices and to obtain feedback on DNDO’s 

initiatives. The State and Local Stakeholder Working Group provides a forum for 

DNDO to meet with our stakeholders to discuss their current activities, lessons 

learned, and planned detection initiatives. This forum also provides State and local 

leaders an opportunity to convey their perspective on mission needs and radiation 

detection requirements, so that DNDO can develop the necessary products and services to support their efforts. The Executive Steering Council provides policy coordination and implementation between DNDO and senior-level State and local leaders 

regarding radiation detection programs, and serves as a mechanism to solicit input 

from senior leaders on their successes, evolving requirements, and challenges, as 

well as for DNDO to apprise them of on-going efforts to support their jurisdictions. 

Both the Stakeholder Working Group and the Executive Steering Council have been 

received favorably and continue to reinforce the relationship between DNDO and 

key stakeholders. 

ACQUISITION PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS

Initiated in 2004 and canceled in 2011, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program was started with the goal of improving the performance of the current radiation detection system that is deployed to our seaports and land border crossings. 

To ensure we did not repeat the same issues that led to the cancellation of the pro-
15 

gram, including close end-user collaboration, DNDO and CBP completed a Lessons 

Learned/Post-Implementation Review and identified 32 lessons learned, including 

significant findings in acquisition management. DNDO will share these observations 

with the new DHS Joint Requirements Council to ensure maximum benefit is 

achieved from these past difficulties. Based in part on these lessons learned, DNDO 

has significantly bolstered acquisition management policy and strengthened its implementation via robust and disciplined governance and program management processes. In doing so, we ensure programs are selected based on sound business cases 

and are effectively managed, resulting in an efficient and effective use of DNDO’s 

appropriated funds. 

To enhance mission delivery and improve investment management, DNDO designed the Solution Development Process. Aligned with DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102–01, the Solution Development Process institutes an integrated 

governance approach to program and project oversight throughout the systems engineering life cycle. The process brings all programs and projects under governance— 

establishing a shared language, with common practices to increase efficiencies, promote programmatic and budgetary transparency, and bolster accountability. It 

aligns with DHS enterprise architecture, acquisition management, and capital planning and investment processes. Further, the framework guides management, 

through the Governance Review Board, and Integrated Product Teams in the delivery of new solution concepts to end-users and stakeholders, while maintaining a 

focus on DNDO’s mission, goals, and objectives. As a critical component of the process, it includes active involvement of operational partners, who serve as Lead Business Authorities, and requires rigorous technical reviews at each programmatic 

stage. In adhering to the process, DNDO ensures current and future programs are 

appropriately structured and have the necessary oversight for success. DNDO will 

continue to incorporate lessons learned and process improvements as the process 

matures, sharing them throughout DHS to strengthen Departmental Unity of Effort—one of the Secretary’s top priorities. 

Recognizing the important contributions and innovations of private industry, National laboratories, and academia, DNDO has evolved its acquisition focus from one 

that is predominantly fueled by a Government-funded, Government-managed development process to one that relies upon industry-led development. As such, DNDO 

technology development programs now proceed with a ‘‘commercial first’’ approach; 

engaging first with the private sector for solutions and only moving to a Government-sponsored and -managed development effort if necessary. This approach 

leverages industry-led innovation, takes advantage of industry’s innate flexibility 

and ability to rapidly improve technologies, and reduces Government-funded development efforts. In some cases, shifting to commercial-based acquisitions will reduce 

the total time to test, acquire, and field technology. 

FORENSICS CAPABILITIES

In the event of an act of nuclear terrorism or interdiction there will be enormous 

pressure for rapid, accurate attribution. The resulting USG response will have to 

be supported by sound scientific evidence supporting the determination of who was 

responsible, for which the bar will be set very high by our stakeholders and allies. 

Nuclear forensics—as the technical pillar of attribution—will support leadership decisions. DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center focuses on continuously evaluating and improving the nuclear forensic capabilities with specific responsibilities to: 

• Improve the readiness of the overarching USG nuclear forensic capabilities, 

from pre- to post-detonation, through centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, improvement, and integration; 

• Advance the technical capabilities of the USG to perform forensic analyses on 

pre-detonation nuclear and other radioactive materials; and 

• Build and sustain an expertise pipeline for nuclear forensic scientists. 

Operational readiness has improved markedly in recent years. DNDO has led the 

way in integrating the nuclear forensics community through the alignment of program capabilities, coordination of research and development and operational activities, and accelerated capability development through synchronized interagency investments. The interagency uses two primary DNDO-led mechanisms, the Nuclear 

Forensics Executive Council and Steering Committee, to facilitate consistent coordination across the USG. DNDO is also leading the interagency effort to update the 

National Strategic Five-Year Plan for Improving the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Capabilities of the United States and to synchronize resources among partner 

agencies through an established Budget Crosscut. Requirements are now regularly 
16 

identified and developed by the Nuclear Forensics Requirements Center, co-chaired 

by DNDO and the FBI. 

Since the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, international partnerships in nuclear 

forensics have greatly expanded, resulting in stronger National and international 

capabilities. DNDO provides subject-matter expertise to numerous initiatives, including multinational nuclear forensics table-top exercises and documentation, to 

enhance understanding among policy makers, law enforcement officials, and scientists, and to encourage and assist other nations in developing their National capabilities. 

Forensics exercises have become realistic and complex, with intensive multi-agency planning among the FBI, DOE, Army, Air Force, and DNDO. Many of the exercises now include State and local law enforcement. Other exercises have involved 

the intelligence community, in order to plan and synchronize the fusion of intelligence, law enforcement and technical forensics information, leading to a more efficient and effective attribution process. 

Nuclear forensics capabilities for analysis of nuclear and other radioactive materials have steadily advanced. DNDO’s efforts are focused on continually improving 

the accuracy, precision, and timeliness of material characterization information, and 

linking that information to the process and place of that material’s origin. To date, 

DNDO has developed seven radiological and nuclear certified reference materials, 

which are forensically-relevant calibration standards used by the National laboratories to improve confidence in analytical conclusions. Additionally, DNDO has developed the first-ever laboratory-scale uranium processing capability that allows us 

to determine forensic signatures associated with specific variations in uranium manufacturing processes. This capability enables us to determine forensics signatures 

without having direct access to samples from foreign fuel cycles. We are now beginning development of a similar plutonium processing capability. Further, in cooperation with DOE and the Department of Defense, DNDO has developed and installed 

a nuclear forensics data evaluation capability at Sandia National Laboratories that 

enables forensic analysts to develop and test data analysis tools and evaluate large 

sets of data in order to identify distinguishing characteristics of specific nuclear materials. Together with the remainder of our portfolio, these projects are significantly 

improving the National ability to trace nuclear materials back to their source. 

DNDO’s efforts to restore the expertise pipeline have also shown substantial success to date. The Congressionally-mandated National Nuclear Forensics Expertise 

Development program is a comprehensive effort to grow and sustain the scientific 

expertise required to execute the National technical nuclear forensics mission. 

Launched in 2008, this effort is a key component in assuring a robust and enduring 

nuclear forensics capability and its contribution to the Nation’s efforts at preventing 

nuclear terrorism. In close partnership with eight National Laboratories, the program has provided support to more than 300 students and faculty and 23 universities. In 2008, DNDO commissioned an independent expert panel, the Nuclear 

Forensics Science Panel Education Sub-Panel, to examine the deficiencies in the nuclear forensics expertise pipeline and make recommendations to address them. We 

are steadily progressing toward the initial milestone, as established by the Science 

Panel’s recommendation, of adding 35 new Ph.D. scientists into the nuclear 

forensics field by 2018 to replace anticipated attrition or retirements from the DOE 

National Laboratories. Nineteen new nuclear forensics scientists have come through 

the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development program and been hired 

since the program’s inception. 

CLOSING

While DNDO has made considerable progress since it was established in 2005, 

much remains to be done. It will be a challenge to remain one step ahead of the 

adversary—particularly one that is intelligent and adaptable. We must ensure our 

efforts are robust so that the obstacles terrorists face are many. DNDO’s detection 

and forensics programs, in concert with those of our partners and stakeholders, are 

foundational elements in creating these impediments. Together, we can build upon 

DNDO’s integrated approach to architecture planning, testing, and assessments, research and development, operational support, and nuclear forensics to strengthen 

the Nation’s capabilities to detect and interdict the nuclear threat and to hold those 

responsible accountable for their actions. We remain committed to this challenge 

and we deeply appreciate this subcommittee’s sustained interest and support in 

these shared goals to secure the homeland. 

Thank you again for this opportunity, I would be happy to answer any questions 

from the committee. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Doctor. 
17 

The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from the GAO, Mr. 

Trimble. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and 

Members of the committee—when they arrive—my testimony today 

discusses GAO’s past work related to DNDO and provides preliminary observations from our on-going work for this subcommittee on 

management and coordination of research and development at 

DNDO. 

DNDO’s mission is critical to the Nation’s capability to deter a 

radiological or nuclear attack within the United States. DNDO carries out this mission by coordinating the Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture, developing and deploying radiation detection technology along our borders, and funding research and development of 

radiation and nuclear detection technology. 

Since 2006, we have reported on progress and challenges in 

DNDO’s efforts to develop plans for the GNDA and deploy radiation detection technology. We are pleased to report that DNDO 

has taken actions to respond to the majority of our recommendations in this area, including developing strategic and implementation plans for this effort. 

In 2012, we reported on how DHS coordinates research and development across the agency, including at DNDO. We found that 

DHS did not have a Department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components on how to report R&D investments, 

making it difficult for DHS to track and coordinate these efforts to 

prevent unnecessary duplication. 

In 2013, we reviewed the extent to which DHS coordinates its 

border and maritime R&D efforts and found that work remained to 

be done to ensure these investments are directed towards the highest-priority needs. 

One of the significant findings from our past work on DNDO’s efforts to acquire and deploy radiation detection equipment was inadequate communication. We specifically found that DNDO sought to 

acquire an advanced system for detecting nuclear materials without understanding that the system would not fit in the inspection 

lanes operated by CBP. DNDO cancelled the system and limited 

any further work to research and development. This history highlights the importance of effective coordination in the early research 

and development phases of a system. 

Our on-going work for this subcommittee examines management 

and coordination issues within the research directorate at DNDO. 

DNDO established this directorate, known as TAR, to identify, explore, and develop scientific and technological approaches that address gaps in the GNDA, improve the performance of existing detectors, and increase the efficiency of detection technology for the 

end-users who will operate it. 

Regarding the TAR Directorate’s efforts to manage R&D investments, our preliminary observations are that DNDO has taken 

steps to manage R&D and assess project outcomes, but the direc-
18 

torate may not be able to demonstrate how agency investments 

align with critical mission needs. 

Critical mission needs are identified based on an analysis of gaps 

in the GNDA. However, TAR Directorate officials say they do not 

have systematic approach for evaluating its overall R&D program 

against the gaps in the GNDA. TAR Directorate officials told us 

they understand how projects are intended to make progress on 

those gaps but acknowledge that the only documentation on this 

linkage are large technical project deliverables. 

As a result, the TAR Directorate may not be able to demonstrate 

to key stakeholders, including oversight organizations and potential users of new technologies, that its R&D investments are 

aligned with critical mission needs. 

Regarding the TAR Directorate’s efforts to coordinate R&D, our 

preliminary analysis shows that not all of DNDO’s end-users are 

satisfied with the TAR Directorate’s level of communications. In essence, the TAR Directorate communicates with end-users through 

a middle man. Specifically, staff in DNDO’s planning directorate, 

not the TAR Directorate, communicate with end-users and then 

convey these user needs back to the TAR Directorate. 

Officials at CBP, a key end-user, told us they would prefer direct 

communications so they can assure their operational needs and 

constraints are fully understood during the critical planning stages. 

Past communication breakdowns between DNDO and CBP highlight the importance of improving this communication channel. 

We are continuing our audit work looking at R&D and the TAR 

Directorate and plan to issue our final report in December. 

In summary, DNDO was established to help protect the Nation 

from the threat and terrible consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. Improving communication between DNDO and endusers is essential to maximize the chance that its R&D projects will 

improve the effectiveness of our detection capabilities at the border. 

Similarly, clearly tracking and documenting how R&D investments 

address critical gaps in the GNDA will help DNDO demonstrate 

the benefits of these investments. 

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE

JULY 29, 2014 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–14–783T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Preventing terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material to carry out an 

attack in the United States is a top National priority. Within DHS, DNDO’s mission 

is to: (1) Improve capabilities to deter, detect, respond to, and attribute attacks, in 

coordination with domestic and international partners, and (2) conduct R&D on radiation and nuclear detection devices. GAO has reported on progress and challenges 

in DNDO’s efforts since 2006 and is currently reviewing DNDO’s planning and 

prioritization of its R&D investments. 

This testimony discusses GAO’s past work on DNDO’s efforts to develop the 

GNDA and deploy radiation detection equipment and DHS’s efforts to coordinate 
19 

R&D across the agency, as well as preliminary observations from GAO’s on-going 

review of DNDO’s research directorate’s efforts to: (1) Manage its R&D investments 

to align with critical mission needs and (2) coordinate its R&D efforts internally, 

with other Federal research agencies, and with end-users of the technology it develops. 

To conduct its on-going review, GAO analyzed DHS documents and data related 

to how DNDO plans and prioritizes its R&D program, and interviewed officials on 

coordinating R&D. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. As GAO continues to complete its on-going work, it will consider the need for any new recommendations as appropriate. DHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING.—PAST WORK AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

What GAO Found 

GAO has reported on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) since 2006. GAO has identified challenges and 

made recommendations in the following areas: 

• DNDO’s efforts to develop the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA).— 

In 2008, GAO recommended that DHS develop a strategic plan to guide the development of the GNDA, a framework for 74 independent programs, projects, 

or activities to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling. In 2010, DHS issued a 

plan and GAO reviewed this plan and found that it generally addressed GAO’s 

recommendations. 

• DNDO’s efforts to replace radiation detection equipment.—GAO has found challenges in DNDO’s efforts to develop and deploy radiation portal monitors, which 

scan for nuclear or radiological materials at ports of entry. GAO has made several recommendations throughout the history of these efforts, and DNDO has 

taken actions that have generally been responsive. 

• DHS’s efforts to coordinate research and development (R&D) across the agency.—In 2012 and 2013, GAO made recommendations to help DHS oversee its 

R&D investments and efforts, and in particular its border and maritime R&D 

efforts. GAO’s recommendations focused on strengthening coordination and defining R&D across the agency. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations 

and described actions it plans to take in response. 

Preliminary observations from GAO’s on-going review are that DNDO has taken 

steps to manage R&D and assess project outcomes, but that it may not be able to 

demonstrate how agency investments align with critical mission needs. DNDO officials told GAO that they discuss how research projects may contribute to critical 

mission needs but that they do not document these discussions. Once research 

projects are complete, DNDO officials told GAO they evaluate the success of individual research projects, but DNDO does not have a systematic approach to ensure 

its overall R&D investments address gaps in the GNDA. As a result, DNDO may 

not be able to demonstrate to key stakeholders—including oversight organizations 

and potential users of new technologies—that its R&D investments are aligned with 

critical mission needs. 

GAO’s on-going work indicates that DNDO officials have taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts internally, with other Federal agencies, and with end-users, 

but preliminary analysis shows that not all of DNDO’s end-users are satisfied with 

DNDO’s communication. DNDO directorates work closely to identify critical mission 

needs, and DNDO collaborates with other Federal research agencies to leverage expertise. However, DNDO’s end-users varied in their satisfaction with DNDO’s efforts to coordinate with them. Officials from two end-user agencies told GAO that 

coordination was working well; however, officials from the largest end-user agency 

stated that they were generally dissatisfied with DNDO’s coordination because 

DNDO’s research directorate does not provide them information directly and, in 

some cases, found that project requirements would not meet the agency’s operational needs. This is consistent with GAO’s 2010 finding that inadequate communication caused DNDO to pursue scanning technology that would not meet the operational requirements of the end-user if it were deployed. 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and our preliminary observations on DNDO’s management and coordination of its research and de-
20 

1 U.S. Government partners include State, Tribal, and local governments, the private sector, 

and international partners. 2DNDO was established in 2005 by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)–43/ 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–14 and codified in statute by the Security and 

Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port) Act, Pub. L. No. 109–347 § 501, 120 Stat. 

1884, 1932 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 591). 

velopment (R&D) investments as you consider the reauthorization of DNDO. Preventing terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material to carry out an attack 

in the United States is a top National priority. Terrorists could use these materials 

to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called 

a ‘‘dirty bomb’’). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause 

hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of 

a city would have to be evacuated—and possibly remain inaccessible—until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. A key element of the 

strategy for protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear or radiological terrorism is the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA), a multi-layered framework encompassing 74 independent programs, projects, or activities by 

the Federal Government and its partners to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling 

in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States.1

Within DHS, DNDO is responsible for improving the Nation’s capabilities to deter, 

detect, respond to, and attribute attacks, in coordination with domestic and international partners.2 To accomplish this, DNDO is organized into directorates that 

support elements of its mission. Three of these directorates are relevant to my testimony today: (1) The Architecture and Plans Directorate, which analyzes gaps in the 

GNDA and develops strategies and plans for the GNDA in coordination with its 

partners; (2) the Product Acquisition and Deployment (Acquisition) Directorate, 

which is responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection 

equipment to support the efforts of Federal, State, and local agencies that use radiation detection equipment to carry out their mission; and (3) the Transformational 

and Applied Research (TAR) Directorate, which conducts R&D of radiation and nuclear detection devices and furthers the development of technologies to support the 

domestic component of the GNDA. DNDO established the TAR Directorate in 2006 

to identify, explore, develop, and demonstrate scientific and technological approaches that meet one or more of the following criteria: Address gaps in the GNDA; 

improve the performance of domestic radiological and nuclear detection systems and 

enabling technologies; or increase the operational efficiency of detection technology 

for domestic end-users: primarily DHS’ Customs and Border Protection (CBP), but 

also Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and State and 

local law enforcement. DNDO’s TAR Directorate makes R&D investments based on 

competitive awards to researchers in Government laboratories, academia, and private industry for basic and applied R&D efforts. From fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013, the TAR Directorate obligated approximately $328 million for about 

205 projects focused on basic research, technology prototypes, software development, 

and computer modeling for the detection of radioactive and nuclear materials, 

among other things. The TAR Directorate’s total budget, including R&D, for fiscal 

year 2014 was $71.1 million. 

My testimony today is based on reports we issued from March 2006 to September 

2013, as well as preliminary observations from our on-going review for this subcommittee of the TAR Directorate’s efforts to plan, prioritize, and assess outcomes 

of its R&D program. Specifically, my statement today discusses our past work on 

DNDO’s efforts to develop the GNDA and deploy radiation detection equipment and 

DHS’s efforts to coordinate R&D across the agency, as well as preliminary observations from our on-going review of the TAR Directorate’s efforts to: (1) Manage its 

R&D investments to align with critical mission needs, and (2) coordinate its R&D 

efforts internally, with other Federal research agencies, and with the end-users of 

the technology it develops. 

Detailed information on our scope and methodology for our prior work can be 

found in the reports cited throughout this statement. To develop our preliminary observations on the TAR Directorate’s efforts to manage and coordinate its R&D investments, we reviewed agency documents that identify critical mission needs for 

R&D and the TAR Directorate’s process for planning and prioritizing R&D investments. We also obtained data from the TAR Directorate’s project database that contained information on all on-going and completed research projects funded from fiscal year 2008 through 2013, which we used to determine the total number of TAR 

Directorate research projects and obligations allocated during this period. To assess 
21 

3See, for example GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying 

Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain, GAO–06–389 

(Washington, DC: Mar. 22, 2006); Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office’s Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, GAO–08– 

999T (Washington, DC: July 16, 2008); and Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and 

Coordination of Research and Development Should Be Strengthened, GAO–12–837 (Washington, 

DC: Sept. 12, 2012). 4GAO–08–999T. 

5GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, GAO–09–257 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2009). 6The GNDA strategic plan was an interagency effort jointly developed by the Departments 

of Homeland Security, Energy, Defense, Justice, and State; the intelligence community; and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 7GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, GAO–11–869T (Washington, DC: July 26, 2011) 

and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed Plans for Its Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying Equipment, GAO–12–941T (Washington, DC: 

July 26, 2012). 

the reliability of the data, we interviewed the TAR Directorate officials responsible 

for maintaining the database and determined the data were reliable for providing 

background information on the TAR Directorate’s projects. Our review does not include the TAR Directorate’s nuclear forensics portfolio because projects in that portfolio are not selected using the same planning and prioritization process as projects 

in the TAR Directorate’s other research areas. We interviewed the assistant directors of the TAR Directorate, the Architecture and Plans Directorate, and the Acquisition Directorate. We also interviewed the TAR Directorate’s research managers on 

the TAR Directorate’s process for identifying critical mission needs, selecting research topics and projects, managing and evaluating research areas, coordinating 

R&D, and aligning R&D investments with critical mission needs. We also interviewed officials at Federal agencies with a R&D component and potential end-users 

of technology developed under DNDO’s R&D program to understand how DNDO coordinates the planning of R&D. Specifically, we interviewed officials at the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of 

Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and end-users at 

DHS’ CBP, the Coast Guard, and TSA to understand their involvement in DNDO’s 

R&D planning, prioritization, and evaluation process. We shared the information on 

our preliminary findings with officials from DNDO, CBP, Coast Guard, TSA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and NNSA. DNDO and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency officials provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. We expect to issue a final report on this work in December 2014. 

The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in accordance with 

generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DNDO’S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP THE GNDA AND DEPLOY RADIATION DETECTION

EQUIPMENT, AND DHS’S EFFORTS TO COORDINATE R&D

We have reported on progress and challenges in DNDO’s efforts to develop the 

GNDA and deploy radiation detection equipment since 2006 and have recently reported on DHS’s efforts to coordinate R&D across the agency.3

Regarding DNDO’s efforts to develop the GNDA, in July 2008,4 when DNDO was 

in the early stages of this work, we found that DNDO, in collaboration with other 

Federal agencies, had made progress by identifying critical gaps in domestic efforts 

to prevent and detect radiological and nuclear smuggling but had not clearly articulated a long-term plan for expanding radiological and nuclear detection capabilities 

to close those gaps. As a result, we recommended that DHS develop a strategic plan 

to guide the development of the GDNA and, in January 2009, further recommended 

that DHS develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy.5 DHS has taken actions on these recommendations by issuing an 

interagency GNDA strategic plan in December 2010 and an implementation plan 

about 1 year later.6 In July 2011 and July 2012, when we reviewed these actions, 

we found that they generally addressed our recommendations.7 However, in July 

2012, we testified that it remained difficult to identify priorities among the components of the domestic part of the GNDA. 

Regarding DNDO’s efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment, our past work 

has found challenges in DNDO’s efforts to develop and deploy radiation portal mon-
22 

8See, for example, GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure 

Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO–07–1247T (Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2007); Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced 

Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the New Technology, GAO–09–655 (Washington, DC: May 29, 2009); and Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Recent Testing Raises Issues About the Potential Effectiveness of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, GAO–10–252T (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2010). 9GAO–12–941T. 

10GAO–06–389. 11GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and Oversight Hampered 

DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography System to Detect Nuclear Materials. GAO– 

10–1041T (Washington, DC: Sept. 15, 2010). 12GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Better Evaluate and Coordinate Border and Maritime Research and Development, GAO–13–732 (Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 

2013). 13GAO–12–837. 

itors, which scan for nuclear or radiological materials at ports of entry, at U.S. border crossings, and seaports.8 As we reported in July 2012, deployed portal monitors 

are reaching the end of their expected service lives, and DNDO, with input from 

CBP, will need to make decisions about whether to refurbish or replace them.9 We 

have reported, since March 2006, on programs to replace existing portal monitors 

with more advanced versions and have made several recommendations concerning 

these efforts, most of which DNDO has implemented.10 In September 2010, we 

found that inadequate communication between DNDO and CBP contributed to 

DNDO pursuing the deployment of a system to use radiography to scan cargo for 

nuclear materials without fully understanding that it would not fit within existing 

inspection lanes at ports of entry and would slow down the flow of commerce 

through these lanes, causing significant delays.11 At that time, DNDO and CBP officials said they were communicating much more routinely and that, in their view, 

it would be unlikely that the communication problems we identified would reoccur. 

DNDO decided to cancel the acquisition of the system and limit any further work 

on demonstrating the potential capability of the technology to research and development efforts, highlighting the importance of effective coordination even in the R&D 

phases of a system. 

Regarding DHS’s efforts to coordinate across its components that conduct R&D, 

in September 2013 we reviewed the extent to which DHS and its components, including DNDO, coordinated border and maritime R&D efforts within DHS and 

among other Federal agencies.12 We found that DNDO has mechanisms for coordinating its R&D efforts that vary depending on the maturity of the technology. Specifically, the TAR Directorate did not always interact directly with DHS’ operational 

components because it worked with less mature technologies. We also found, among 

other things, that DHS had taken actions to develop Departmental policies to better 

define and coordinate R&D but that work remained to be done at the agency level 

to ensure border and maritime R&D efforts are mutually reinforcing and are being 

directed toward the highest-priority needs. We made recommendations to help ensure that DHS effectively manages and coordinates its border and maritime R&D 

efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions it plans to 

take in response. In September 2012, we reviewed the management and coordination of R&D at DHS among the Science and Technology Directorate, Coast Guard, 

DNDO, and other components and found that DHS did not have a Department-wide 

policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report R&D activities 

and investments.13 We made recommendations to help ensure that DHS effectively 

oversees its R&D investments and efforts and reduces fragmentation, overlap, and 

the risk of unnecessary duplication. As of July 2014, DHS had taken some steps to 

address two of our recommendations, including establishing a definition of R&D and 

guidance for coordinating R&D across the agency. However, work remains to be 

done to address our remaining recommendation to create a mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated costs across the Department. 

THE TAR DIRECTORATE’S R&D INVESTMENTS MAY NOT ALIGN WITH CRITICAL MISSION

NEEDS

Our preliminary observations from our on-going analysis are that DNDO’s R&D 

component, the TAR Directorate, has taken steps to manage R&D and to assess 

project outcomes, but it may not be able to demonstrate how its R&D investments 

align with critical mission needs. Each year, the DNDO Architecture and Planning 

Directorate identifies critical mission needs based on an analysis of gaps in the 

GNDA and provides this information to the TAR Directorate. According to TAR Directorate officials, research managers within the directorate consider these needs to 
23 

14Our review of the TAR Directorate’s R&D projects from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 

2013 showed that examples of outcomes for completed projects included transferring resulting 

technology to private industry for commercialization, transitioning knowledge gained to a new 

TAR Directorate-funded R&D project for further development, or determining that the technology was not feasible. 

identify the topics for that year’s competitive awards for new basic and applied research. After they select which research projects to fund, TAR Directorate officials 

write contracting documents that guide the goals and milestones of the projects and 

regularly review the progress of their on-going research projects. According to TAR 

Directorate officials, they: (1) Consider the potential for the research to contribute 

to resolving gaps in the GNDA at each step of planning and selecting research 

projects, and (2) discuss this potential with officials from the other DNDO directorates, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and NNSA, but they do not document these discussions. Once research projects are completed, TAR Directorate officials told us they take steps to evaluate the outcomes of individual research projects 

by, for example, requiring researchers to complete deliverables that describe how 

the research performed compared with the initial goals for the project that were outlined in the contract.14

However, our preliminary observations are that the TAR Directorate has limited 

information to demonstrate how its R&D investments align with critical mission 

needs. TAR Directorate officials stated that they understand how projects are intended to make progress on gaps in the GNDA based on the information contained 

in the contract deliverables of individual projects but acknowledged that it would 

be difficult for non-scientists who are not fully involved in a project to understand 

how projects address these gaps based on this information alone. Further, TAR Directorate officials stated that the directorate does not have a systematic approach 

for evaluating its overall R&D program or a mechanism for: (1) Tracking the longerterm outcomes of individual projects, and (2) measuring how those outcomes may 

contribute to addressing gaps in the GNDA. TAR Directorate officials told us that 

the scientific community is small enough that they are usually able to continue to 

follow their funded research after a project ends. TAR Directorate officials also told 

us they have made efforts to disseminate the results of individual projects by posting articles on DHS’s website and discussing successes at conferences. With limited 

information on how R&D investments are intended to make progress on gaps in the 

GNDA, and without a process for assessing and reporting on the results of its R&D 

program as a whole against those gaps, the TAR Directorate may not be able to 

demonstrate to key stakeholders—including oversight organizations and potential 

users of new technologies—that its R&D investments are aligned with critical mission needs. We plan to continue our audit work on this issue and will present our 

findings in more detail in our final report, with any related suggestions for improvement, which we expect to issue in December 2014. 

THE TAR DIRECTORATE HAS TAKEN STEPS TO COORDINATE ITS R&D BUT MAY FACE

COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES WITH SOME END-USERS

Our preliminary observations from our on-going analysis are that the TAR Directorate has taken steps to coordinate its R&D efforts internally, with other Federal 

research agencies, and with end-users of the technologies it develops, but the TAR 

Directorate may face communication challenges with one of its key end-users. As the 

TAR Directorate plans and manages its R&D investments, agency officials we interviewed stated that TAR Directorate officials take steps to coordinate within DNDO, 

across agencies with similar missions, and with potential end-users of resulting 

technology as follows: • Within DNDO.—Our preliminary observation is that TAR Directorate officials 

work closely with officials from DNDO’s Architecture and Plans Directorate and 

the Acquisition Directorate to identify critical mission needs based on gaps in 

the GNDA. For example, according to interviews with officials from all three 

DNDO directorates, officials from the three directorates participate in and provide feedback to the TAR Directorate during individual project reviews at key 

milestones and at annual research reviews. In addition, the three directorates 

coordinate an annual DNDO Industry, Academia, and Lab Engagement Day, 

formerly known as ‘‘industry days’’ where officials from all three directorates 

discuss ways to enhance existing radiation detection devices and develop new 

technologies with members of industry, academia, DOE National laboratories, 

and others. According to DNDO documents, TAR Directorate officials also share 

data and results from R&D efforts to inform the acquisition decisions made by 

the Architecture and Plans Directorate and the Acquisition Directorate. Officials from DNDO’s Architecture and Plans Directorate and Acquisition Direc-
24 

15DNDO has a memorandum of understanding with DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 

DOE’s NNSA, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate National nuclear detection R&D programs, which, according to officials from all three agencies, guides these 

efforts. 16See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of 

U.S. Industrial Radiological Sources, GAO–14–293 (Washington, DC: June 6, 2014). According 

to TAR Directorate officials, the effort to research, develop, and test a radiological tracking device was not a project within the TAR Directorate. 17GAO–10–1041T. 

torate told us that their level of involvement with TAR Directorate officials is 

effective and provides them with a common understanding of how DNDO’s R&D 

investments are aligned with critical mission needs. • Across agencies with similar research missions.—Our preliminary observation 

from our on-going review is that the TAR Directorate coordinates regularly with 

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and NNSA on both a program and individual project level. According to officials from the TAR Directorate, the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, and from NNSA, this coordination is intended to leverage expertise and decrease the opportunity for duplication of research efforts 

while each agency invests in areas to meet its mission needs. For example, 

these officials told us that representatives from these agencies meet regularly 

to discuss their R&D goals, on-going projects, and topics for soliciting new research.15 The officials said that the representatives also participate in each other’s proposal review processes, as well as project review meetings once funded 

projects meet key milestones. Officials from the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency and from NNSA told us that collaboration with the TAR Directorate 

works well and keeps them informed about the status and results of relevant 

research. We plan to continue our audit work on this issue and will present our 

findings in more detail in our final report, which we expect to issue in December 2014. We reported in June 2014 on collaboration between the Architecture 

and Plans Directorate and NNSA on an effort to research, develop, and test a 

new technology for a radiological tracking device and found that although the 

agencies had been meeting quarterly, this mechanism did not always help them 

collaborate and draw on each agency’s expertise.16

• With potential end-users.—Our preliminary observation is that the TAR Directorate has an indirect mechanism for coordinating with potential end-users of 

the technology that the directorate develops during the planning phases of research projects. TAR Directorate officials told us that, rather than communicate 

directly with end-users, staff in the Architecture and Plans Directorate discuss 

technology requirements and operational needs with end-users as part of the 

Architecture and Plans Directorate’s work coordinating the GNDA, and these 

staff relay the information back to the TAR Directorate. Once a project starts, 

TAR Directorate officials told us they meet directly with end-users by inviting 

end-users to project review meetings at key milestones, such as technology demonstrations. 

In the course of our on-going work, however, we found that end-users’ satisfaction with this level of coordination with the TAR Directorate varied. For example, officials from TSA told us that they are generally satisfied with this relationship because they are most interested in acquiring available radiation detection equipment and do not have the technical expertise to engage directly with 

the TAR Directorate’s research efforts. In addition, officials from the Coast 

Guard told us their indirect relationship with the TAR Directorate works well 

because it is based on a defined strategy that outlines the Coast Guard’s shortterm and long-term technology requirements, and the Coast Guard currently 

has three detailees working at DNDO who are able to communicate the unique 

needs of the Coast Guard. However, officials from CBP, which is DHS’s largest 

end-user of radiation detection technologies, told us they are generally dissatisfied with the level of interaction with TAR. Specifically, CBP officials stated 

that they typically do not learn about the TAR Directorate’s projects until after 

the project requirements are written and research contracts are issued and, in 

some cases, has found that project requirements would not meet CBP’s operational needs if the technology were deployed at ports of entry. CBP officials 

told us they would prefer to work directly with TAR Directorate officials at all 

stages of the research process to gain a better understanding of the TAR Directorate’s research goals and to help ensure that its R&D projects align with 

CBP’s operational needs. 

As noted above, in September 2010, we found that poor communication with CBP 

hampered DNDO’s ability to develop an advanced system for detecting nuclear materials.17 In May 2013, we also found that DNDO’s analysis of lessons learned that 
25 

18GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from Cancelled Radiation Portal 

Monitor Program Could Help Future Acquisition, GAO–13–256 (Washington, DC: May 13, 2013). 

it conducted after it canceled an advanced portal monitor program stated that effective outreach, communication, and buy-in from the end-user are critical to successful 

acquisitions.18 We plan to continue our audit work on this and other issues and will 

present our findings in more detail and any related suggestions for improvements 

in our final report, which we expect to issue in December 2014. 

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the subcommittee, 

this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to questions 

that you may have at this time. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I want to thank the panelists for their testimony, 

and I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. 

Before I get into some more generalized questions, Dr. Gowadia, 

could you just take a minute and explain the difference in your 

mind between what is forensics and what is detection? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Certainly, Chairman Meehan. 

Detection is, in our parlance, the ability to know that there is nuclear material present. For technical detection, we use this by way 

of detectors. If you were to use detection writ large, you would say 

the intelligence community’s information would come to bear, law 

enforcement would come to bear, et cetera. But for nuclear detection, when you say nuclear detection, we literally mean detection 

by way of instruments to sense the presence of radioactive material. 

Forensics, on the other hand, is the ability for us to trace back 

the material interdicted, or, God forbid, the material detonated, to 

its origins. So, again, you will hear us talk about the coupling with 

intelligence and law enforcement to be able to attribute a material 

to its origin. 

Does that help? 

Mr. MEEHAN. No, it certainly does, because it could be relevant. 

You might only have part of a cache of something, and you would 

then be able to identify where we would be looking for other materials that are of concern. Well, I am grateful for that explanation. 

I opened my commentary talking about events in the world. You 

know, we are watching not just what had been a history of statesponsored activity in the nuclear era, we have grown up in the 

world of assured mutual deterrence in which you have major players who have been responsibly balancing each other’s presence in 

some way and we have avoided any kind of a nuclear incident, you 

know, since the wars. 

We are watching other countries develop capacities, including 

some who currently have them who you worry about whether they 

become destabilized. But, more recently, just the potential that 

there are, as I have said, other kinds of both interests on the part 

of Iran and others to develop nuclear capability as well as nuclear 

materials, even hospital-grade, but being available to groups that 

want to do—that aren’t necessarily tied directly to nation-states 

but are terrorist organizations and otherwise who want to do harm 

or to use those things to leverage their ends. 

So we are in a dynamic and complex threat environment, and 

more than we have ever faced as a Nation. The conditions indicate 

there is a critical need to bolster homeland security against a 

threat of terrorism that can be colluded, and we can include this 

as one of our top priorities. 
26 

So, from your perspective, what actions should DNDO take to 

bolster the capability to deter and protect against such an attack? 

In particular, what should DNDO’s role be in that regard? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Chairman Meehan, you are absolutely right, we 

are in a dynamic and complex threat environment. Considering the 

dire consequences of this threat, as you clearly pointed out at the 

start, we certainly have to be vigilant, remain vigilant, and agile 

and flexible in our response. So, working with the interagency, we 

need to continue to plan to be ready for the heightened threat and, 

again, be ready should the threat be elevated and we get some 

more credibility and specificity to be agile and responsive. 

As the lead Federal agency for coordinating the efforts for the 

United States Government, our role is predominantly in bringing 

the community together, setting and shaping the strategy, and 

making sure that we are operationally ready to respond. Of course, 

you have entrusted us with precious resources, and we would like 

to apply them—we will continue to apply them so that we can realize the maximum risk reduction. 

Mr. MEEHAN. But how do you mean, sort-of, operationally ready 

to respond? Because, in reality, we are looking at what is always 

a threat. The idea of once something has been detected and it is 

here, if you haven’t interdicted it in a certain way prior to its capacity to be operational, then we are already at sort of a too-late 

point. 

So how do we operate in such a way that, you know, the principal objective is to assure that we don’t get to the step where we 

are worried about it being situated and active here in our own 

homeland? 

Ms. GOWADIA. So there are two pieces to this. The first is our 

strategy, ensuring that we have critical ties to our intelligence community so that we can conduct intelligence-cued searches. Ensuring 

that our law enforcement partners are well-trained, well-equipped, 

that is the second piece. Then, of course, there is the technology 

element, making sure that we have the right technologies so that 

our law enforcement operators can react when the intelligence cue 

comes about. 

To do this, of course, we must train and exercise constantly. A 

lot of us hope that in our lifetimes we will never actually have to 

see this for real. So, to do that, we practice constantly, very remarkably realistic exercises—Federal, State, local, even international partners. We make it so that we are not just exercising 

the decision-making process but also all the way down to boots on 

the ground against realistic materials with our red team, realistic 

materials and interesting configurations, challenging our operators 

to make that be the case. So that is one piece of it. 

I would like to pull the string a little bit on your notion of deterrence for a moment. In the classical sense, nation-states deterrence, we look at it a little differently. Because you would question, 

how does one deter an enemy who values your death more than 

their life? 

So, for us, there are two pieces of it. Certainly, the forensics element adds a notion of deterrence. If you aid and abet a terrorist, 

we have the means to trace back to the origin. Then, not so classically, deterrence by denial. Here I will steal something from Mr. 
27 

Trimble’s colleague, Mr. Maurer, at the GAO, who often says, for 

detection technology right here at our borders to come into play, we 

have to have had law enforcement intelligence failures, treaty failures, our partners have had to fail, everything before we get—the 

security regimes for the material have had to fail, nonproliferation 

regimes have had to fail, and now we are at our borders with technology. 

So it is so important that we build an architecture that is multifaceted, multi-layered, so that the adversary has to be right every 

time they encounter any one of these layers, increasing our chances 

of success and, thus, deterrence by denial. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, I thank you. 

I will turn to the Ranking Member for her questions, but, obviously, we will have the opportunity to go back and forth, and I 

have some other issues I will follow up with you on. 

So, at this point I time, I turn it to the Ranking Member, the 

gentlelady from New York. 

Ms. CLARKE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank both of you for your testimony here this afternoon. 

I would like to turn to the issue of procurement, because that always tends to be the issue. Last month, DNDO issued a request 

for proposal for its Human Portable Tripwire Program. As I understand it, these are essentially personal radiation detectors, PRDs, 

that can also identify the source of radiation. These devices are intended for use by CBP and the Coast Guard. The cost of these devices are going to be $24 million for 26 devices. 

I have several questions about this. Let me start with this one: Why are these costs so high? Over $900,000 a piece for something 

that is worn on an officer’s belt. No. 2, do you expect costs to go 

down for future acquisitions? 

No. 3, why are these devices needed? No. 4, in what type of operational environments will these be used? No. 5, why can’t traditional PRDs be used in these environments instead? 

That is directed to Dr. Gowadia. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Thank you, Ranking Member Clarke. 

So there is some slight confusion with the announcement. The 

systems will not cost nearly a million dollars apiece. The ceiling on 

the contract is $24 million, and our minimum buy is 26. It is not 

appropriate to divide 24 by 26; that would be incorrect. We are expecting these devices to cost no more than $10,000. 

Since it is an active procurement, it would not be appropriate for 

me to share the Government cost estimate, but we are expecting 

much lower than $10,000, depending on the capabilities afforded. 

Does that give you some pause? 

Ms. CLARKE. It does. It does. 

Ms. GOWADIA. So, now to your other questions as to the environment and why we need them. 

Ms. CLARKE. Uh-huh. 

Ms. GOWADIA. These are for our Customs and Border Protection 

Officers and Coast Guard Officers, as you mentioned. Typically, 

what happens in DHS operations is you have your pager, your personal radiation detection system, and all it does is detect radiation. 

Now you need to follow it up with a device that will allow you to 

distinguish benign from threat, the identification device. 
28 

Think of our Border Patrol Officers who are sometimes very far 

removed from the nearest identification device. So it would be so 

much more efficient and convenient in their daily operations to 

have both capabilities built into one. That is what these systems 

were designed to—detect, identify, and store for archival and retrieval purposes that information on board that system. 

So, yes, it would significantly improve our capabilities on the border, improve the efficiency of our operations, and, I think, alleviate 

some of the operational burden for our staff. 

Ms. CLARKE. Very well. Are you confident that the technologies 

to, sort-of, have that 3-in-1 capability already exist? 

Ms. GOWADIA. So we have looked at through a lot of our testing 

certain spectroscopic pagers, particularly in the testing we did with 

our European Commission partners overseas in the ITRAP+10 test 

series. We will use those data to make our assessments. 

Again, since this is an active and open—— 

Ms. CLARKE. Right. 

Ms. GOWADIA [continuing]. Procurement, I think my procurement 

officer would get really upset with me if I were to say very much 

more. 

Ms. CLARKE. Very well, Dr. Gowadia. 

To radiation portal monitors—and this is for both Dr. Gowadia 

and Mr. Trimble. Like many on this committee, we cannot and 

should not forget some of the wasteful acquisitions and deployments of complex security hardware that did not meet the needs 

of the threat or meet requirements of the program it was intended 

for. The ASP program is one of those. 

Would you give us an overview today of the status of the ASP 

program and later give us written details as to the cost and the 

planning documents that will describe the details of the current 

posture of the ASP within your planning strategies? 

Ms. GOWADIA. As you are aware, Ms. Clarke, the program was 

started in 2004 and cancelled in 2011. 

To make the best use of the technologies that we had procured, 

the low-rate initial production units, 36 of those systems are—we 

gave them to universities and National laboratories to continue 

with the science, and some fraction of those were also shared with 

the Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense Program. They 

continue to be operated in the field for overseas scanning operations. 

Five of those portal monitors were given to our States—Georgia, 

Tennessee, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Mexico. Two more are 

on their way to California. 

For the mobile detectors, the ones that were built onto trucks, essentially SUVs, we have some in New York, some in Virginia, and 

some in Alabama and Florida. So seven of nine mobile detection 

systems are also in use today. 

These systems have served as a means for us to gather important technical data—operational data and maintenance data. They 

will certainly factor into all our technology programs moving forward, our acquisition programs moving forward. In fact, they will 

inform our analysis of alternatives for whatever we will do next 

with our radiation portal monitors. 
29 

But, most importantly, we have learned our lessons well on the 

cancellation, the acquisition process. We have turned up the discipline at DNDO so that we have a very rigorous solution development process, which is aligned very nicely with the Department’s 

Acquisition 102–01. We are beginning to share our integrated governance and program management approach across the Department, in concert with the Secretary’s unity-of-effort priority, as well 

as the establishment of the Joint Requirements Council at the Department. So we hope that the lessons we have learned will inform 

not just us, as they have, but across the DHS acquisition community. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I don’t have too much to add to that. A lot of our 

work is a couple years old, at this point. I think what I would highlight is, just sort of from the lessons learned from that experience, 

the importance of communication between end-users and the developers of the system, that that is absolutely critical at all phases. 

Not particular to DNDO, I would note that we did a wrap-up report, I believe in 2013, looking at the lessons learned from the ASP 

program. One of our recommendations from that was to DHS to— 

they have a policy for doing lessons learned, but they didn’t have 

a process to make sure their components were actually following it. 

So, as Dr. Gowadia mentions that they are trying to implement 

these lessons, we had a recommendation to make sure that that 

kind of thing was happening across DHS, because there was not a 

real disciplined process to make sure that was happening. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Dr. Gowadia, in the commentary both from my colleague as well 

as some of the opening statements and certainly some of the other 

written testimony, DNDO has been described before as ‘‘soup-tonuts,’’ in a larger way, maybe, than some other agencies. So you 

start with basic research, all the way through to participating in 

the deployment and even the operations with your stakeholder. 

So explain to me your approach to research and development and 

then how that is tied to your critical needs. But just as significantly, because I think some of the testimony we had before, how 

about the gaps? How is this focused on filling those gaps so that 

we ultimately have this turning into, you know, operational systems and procedures that work and that are cost-effective? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Yes, certainly, Chairman Meehan. 

In thinking through the soup-to-nuts approach, as a result of developing the strategy, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 

strategy, and all the work that we have done so far over our last 

9 years, the authorities you have afforded us by way of the SAFE 

Port Act, I think, are a very effective means for us to combat nuclear terrorism. You have given us a singular focus, making it so 

that we stay on target every day for a threat that has a very low 

probability, very high consequences. 

The holistic, integrated approach, I think, is valuable because we 

are interested in moving capability to the field. Capability is so 

much more than just technology. It is the training. It is the exercises. It is, as you mentioned very appropriately, ensuring that we 

analyze the risk, establish the gaps, and allocate our resources in 

accordance with them. We do this through our R&D program, 
30 

through our test and evaluation that supports the R&D, and certainly through our operations support program. 

So I want to dispel the notion that we are an operational office. 

We are not. But we are very keenly supportive of our operational 

partners. To Ms. Clarke’s point, we bring in our operational partners very early. We are an interagency office. We were established 

that way for a purpose. We do not just have scientists and engineers; we have intelligence officers, we have retired intelligence officers, retired law enforcement officers, policy analysts, acquisition 

professionals—— 

Mr. MEEHAN. But where do you draw the distinction between 

your group and the operational entities? Who are some of those? 

Are those the port entities themselves, among others? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Yes. Yes, sir. So we do the risk analysis and, with 

them, develop the right technologies, with them, test the right technologies. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Which is the improvement you are looking on incorporating—— 

Ms. GOWADIA. Exactly. 

Mr. MEEHAN [continuing]. In, so we avoid the mistakes that led 

to the first overruns that the Ranking Member has discussed. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Exactly, Mr. Meehan. In doing so, we are able to 

develop and buy the right systems for them that are suited to their 

CONOPS. Now, who are they? Customs and Border Protection, 

Coast Guard, TSA, our State and local law enforcement operators, 

our international partners. We do the R&D for across the enterprise even though we don’t buy for across the enterprise. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Right. 

Broadening on the enterprise, we have discussed the concept of 

nuclear, and that is a large part of the focus, but you work in combination on which we are dealing with a number of weapons of 

mass destruction that we are concerned about, not just analysis but 

preparedness, response, again, the soup-to-nuts to these kinds of 

major challenges. The Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment looks 

at things like chemical, biological, radiological, as well as nuclear 

threats. 

So what are your contributions to the risk assessment piece, in 

the first part? How is your collaboration working, particularly with 

the areas of chem and bio that are part of, you know, what is going 

on with the Department of Homeland Security? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Our contributions to the Presidentially-mandated 

Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment is the rad/nuke piece. We 

collaborate with our partners at S&T, S&T Directorate, who do the 

chem and bio pieces. These come together to form that integration. 

Chairman Meehan, I would posit that this is an excellent example of how we can bring unity of effort to bear within the Department—again, something the Secretary has stressed upon—S&T 

and DNDO’s analytical capabilities brought to bear to inform and 

influence and assist our operational partners as they allocate their 

resources, not just at DHS but also in the interagency. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, how have you been able to see that mature 

and grow? 

So often, what we see has been competition or, you know, misdirection even from groups within agencies that sit side-by-side 
31 

that see themselves having a little bit of a different mission or a 

simultaneous mission, in essence, but a different subset of it, and, 

you know, sometimes we break into rivalries. 

How has it been that it has been able to work effectively in this 

fashion, where you have been able to create a common objective? 

Ms. GOWADIA. I think it has been mostly because we have very 

clear lanes. We are responsible for the rad/nuke piece. We have developed a construct that you have seen—and, Ms. Clarke, I would 

love for you to see at your convenience—a construct that looks at 

the risk by virtue of a layered transportation model. 

We have figured out how to work with our National laboratories 

to get the right weapons information, the right radiological threat 

information. We couple that with an adversary model that uses 

game theory as well as probabilistic risk assessments. Using that, 

we are able to lay down 394 nodes in the architecture and score 

each one, allowing us to have a framework for gaps. 

Now, that construct works for the rad/nuke effort. For the chem 

effort and the bio effort, you need different constructs. 

At the working level, repeat constantly to make sure that our inputs can then be coordinated. Different constructs can still render 

results in a similar way to be integrated moving forward. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, you identified how you addressed the gaps 

just in the nuclear side alone—— 

Ms. GOWADIA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MEEHAN [continuing]. But the same concept, then, is worked 

to assure that we are doing the same thing with the other kinds 

of WMD? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Yes. So for the chemical piece—and I don’t want 

to speak too far out of my lane here—for the chem piece, they look 

at things differently because they have a different set of challenges 

by way of their toxins. In the biological realm, their risks are driven differently. 

So we each arrive at common factors that can be rolled up into 

the integrated risk assessment, mostly based on frequency of probable attack, dollar values of consequences, et cetera. These things 

are integrated to allow, for instance, HHS to plan countermeasures, 

medical countermeasures. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Right. Right. Well, I thank you. 

My time has expired for this particular round, so I am going to 

turn it back to my colleague. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to pick up on one of the themes you raised about duplicating efforts. The National Nuclear Security Agency, NNSA, has 

a nuclear forensic mission to collect detailed information on nuclear 

material from across the world. DNDO also has a nuclear forensics 

mission. 

What is DNDO’s forensics mission, and how is it different from 

NNSA’s? In what areas within the forensic mission does DNDO 

take a leadership role, and what areas does NNSA take a leadership role? Are there areas where the missions of NNSA and DNDO 

overlap? 

I want to hear from both you, Dr. Gowadia and Mr. Trimble. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. So, in the area of forensics, this is not an issue, 

especially in regards to, sort-of, roles and responsibilities across the 
32 

agencies, that we have looked at. We have had internal discussions 

that this might be an area for us to discuss with potential Hill clients; it is worthy of an inquiry. 

But we have done, and I have in my portfolio, NNSA, and we 

have done some Classified work regarding, sort-of, accountability of 

some of the nuclear materials overseas as well as some of the 

forensics. But we haven’t done, sort-of, a cross-agency. 

The agency you didn’t mention was also DOD plays in this sandbox, as well. 

Ms. CLARKE. Uh-huh. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Well, for us, in the nuclear forensics realm, we 

have much the same coordination responsibilities as we have discussed on the detection side. 

The forensics mission can be divided up into pre-detonation or 

post-detonation forensics. In the pre-detonation world, we could either capture material or a full device. DNDO is uniquely responsible for the pre-detonation materials element, so the technical capabilities we need to attribute the materials to their source. DOE 

is responsible for the pre-detonation weapon itself. The FBI and 

DOD, depending on whether it is CONUS or OCONUS, are responsible for the post-det side. So that is how we have nicely broken 

up the space, so to speak. 

We could not, again, do this without our intelligence community 

underpinning and the strong support of our National laboratories 

system. So we work together to make sure that we have a common 

strategic plan. We do. We have just set up a requirements center, 

which we co-chair with the FBI, to make sure that we have our 

strategic priorities lined up right. 

The thing that you have given us uniquely, by virtue of law, is 

to establish a nuclear forensics expertise development pipeline program. Many years ago, this was, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, an in extremis capability. We did not have enough graduate students in our universities across the country studying the 

appropriate sciences—radiochemistry, for example. 

We have turned that around. We have established a really good 

pipeline. Nineteen of these students that have come all the way 

through are now already in the laboratories, and we will have 35 

by 2018. So we have gone from 4 in radiochemistry a few years ago 

to suddenly looking at 35 down the line. 

Ms. CLARKE. Well, that is very impressive, Dr. Gowadia. 

Let me just close with this question, and it is about red-teaming 

covert rad/nuke testing. DNDO has a red-teaming directorate that 

independently assesses the performance of planned and deployed 

capabilities, including technologies and procedures. 

A recent GAO report on CBP covert testing of its rad/nuke detection capabilities found that DNDO only works one to three times 

a year with CBP on conducting these types of tests. 

Why isn’t the DNDO red-teaming directorate more involved with 

the CBP covert testing program? Is this a risk-based decision? Is 

it because of resource constraints? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Ma’am, when it comes to our red-teaming efforts, 

we support much more than our Customs and Border Protection 

partners. We certainly value their partnership, but we also have to 

extend that capability to our State and local partners, our inter-
33 

agency partners—DOD, FBI, et cetera, DOE. We also work with 

Coast Guard and TSA in some of those efforts. 

So, yes, actually, it just comes down to these things take a very 

long time to develop and build and execute. That is not where it 

ends. We have to come back, learn our lessons, turn it around into 

documented steps for improvement. So that entire process takes a 

good bit of time. We are able to sustain about, I want to say around 

20 operations a year, overt and covert. 

Ms. CLARKE. Did you want to add anything to that? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I am a little limited in what I can say about that 

recent report. It was issued Friday, but it is restricted. So I would 

be happy to answer questions on it, but it was largely focused on 

CBP, and there were issues about prioritization raised in that. But 

I would be happy to, in another forum, discuss that in more detail. 

Ms. CLARKE. Very well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Trimble, you just talked about CBP, which brings to mind 

a report the GAO had done in 2012 looking at opportunities, you 

know, across the board to reduce duplication, achieve savings, and 

enhance revenue. But it also identified that there was no single 

recognized agency responsible for leading and directing Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. 

Do you feel that there is any kind of fragmentation in these efforts to combat those nuclear threats? If so, are there possible solutions or better consolidation, or are the responsibilities, do you 

think, better articulated now since the report in 2012? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yeah, what I would—and I would have to take that 

for a more full answer for the record. I would have to look at the 

specifics on the 2012 report you are referring to. 

The broader issue of overlapping duplication I know was raised 

in a recent report. We looked at DHS for their R&D program in 

science and technology, where we raised concerns about DHS not 

having a common definition of what research and development 

meant and then having a common reporting guidance so that research and development across DHS could be managed to avert potential duplication across all the R&D activities within DHS. 

Because within DHS you have several components that have 

statutory authority to do R&D. It sort-of has the deconfliction/coordination role, and it was having challenges doing that because 

there wasn’t a common shared understanding of it and there wasn’t 

common procedures on how the reporting could go. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, in such a narrowly-focused—and I don’t 

mean the importance of this is narrowly-focused, but the issue 

itself is somewhat focused, narrowly-focused—how do you assure 

that we are prioritizing R&D and making sure that there is collaboration so that there isn’t duplication or something being done 

over here that is of no benefit to what you consider to be a priority? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yeah, well, that is a great question, and that ties 

very closely to the observations from our current work. 

As my statement said, what we are finding is that DNDO has 

mechanisms to help coordinate and manage their R&D. Where we 

are—you know, again, preliminary observations, but where we are 

seeing a potential for improvement is tracking the specific projects 
34 

back to the gaps. So you have gaps, you create research priorities, 

then you create—they have grand challenges, and then you create 

portfolios of research, and then you actually have the project. 

So they are very good at managing through that to the projects 

and then assessing how you did at the projects at the end of the 

year. But there is the risk—and I don’t want to make it oversimplified, but it is the forest-for-the-trees risk, right? You get to this 

point, but are you forgetting where you started? 

It is just making that—so what our initial observations are, making that linkage back from the specific project you funded to your 

big need could be better documented. We think, overall, there 

needs to be a process for the whole portfolio to evaluate how your 

R&D effort is going. 

That is sort-of where we are going with our on-going work. 

Again, it is preliminary, but the folks are coordinating, there is 

documentation, they say they understand the linkages, they say it 

is in the contract documentation and the project documentation. 

But unless you are a scientist, it is really difficult to come in and 

say, yeah, we are doing great or we are off-track. 

Mr. MEEHAN. But that is something you are, more or less, currently looking at? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. That reflects our, sort-of, current thinking on the 

job today. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, we look forward to your thinking as you draw 

some of your conclusions. 

Let me ask you another question, too, about the reality that— 

well, we talk about nation-states and the concern that there could 

be materials that would find their way, you know, old Russian 

weapons or other things that get into the hand of terrorist organizations like Hamas or otherwise. But there are a lot of other highrisk industrial sources of radiological materials, including mobile 

and stationary sources. We have an inside threat because of their 

presence here. 

So how does DNDO work with the other groups in charge of this, 

you know, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NNSA, and 

others, to secure these materials and prevent theft? Do you think 

that is being adequately done? 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Yeah, well, interestingly, Dr. Gowadia and I testified about a month ago on this very subject, on securing industrial 

sources in the United States. GAO has done a couple of reports. 

Previously, we did a report looking at securing medical sources of 

radiological materials. 

I will let Dr. Gowadia talk to you on her role in that process, but 

what I would highlight from our recent work on this is that it is 

really an NRC licensing issue, because NRC is setting the rules by 

which users of the radiological materials in the United States must 

secure these materials. What our report had found was that the 

NRC guidance and requirements could be improved with more 

specificity. 

So, for example, the regs in the NRC vein would say, you must 

use a lock to secure this radiological material in your truck. Well, 

a lock can be like a simple high school gym locker lock or it can 

be a secure, nice security lock. When we went out in the field, as 

you might expect, everyone is doing something different. 
35 

Mr. MEEHAN. Uh-huh. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Similarly, they had regulations concerning co-location, like, what would trigger—say you have sources of material. If 

you put them in individual cubbies, locks, you didn’t hit the regulatory threshold to have security measures. So, for well logging 

companies, they could have a very large amount of radiological material but not have to implement security measures. So we had 

very pointed recommendations regarding that. 

The other area, on insider threat, very notable in that report. It 

was that we found an instance where someone with two convictions 

for making terroristic threats had been given unescorted access to 

radiological materials. The NRC—to acknowledge that that was 

okay by their regulations. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, I mean, for materials like this, no matter 

where they are, if they are in an industrial setting like a hospital 

or in, you know, a Government facility, isn’t there some level of requirement before you have access to those kinds of things, that you 

pass some sort of background—— 

Mr. TRIMBLE. Well, that—right. That is the NRC—NRC sets 

those requirements, and NRC licenses the material. But the licensing requirements are very general. Then the background check provisions are essentially to say fingerprint, do a background check, 

but there are no ‘‘thou shall nots’’ in the requirements. So even if 

you do a background check and you find someone has an extensive 

criminal record, it is still okay, it is still the company’s decision 

whether to grant that person access. 

The connection I would make—I mean, it is a little—the connection I would—and I made it at the last hearing—is the importance 

of that is, as Dr. Gowadia tightens the noose and makes it more 

difficult to come into this country with these materials, it makes 

it much even more appealing to go domestic, shop local for your 

dirty-bomb material, than try to bring it in from overseas. 

So it is the other side of the equation, right? Your instinct is 

right on this, is, as you make it harder to make this stuff come in 

for the United States, you can’t neglect how easy it is to get it domestically. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Dr. Gowadia, what do you think about that and the 

concept—I mean, I get it, I don’t want to micromanage to that 

level. But, you know, we prevent people who have spent their 

whole college career and they can’t get a teaching degree because 

they had a marijuana thing in their background. Other policy, 

other place, some other time. But that is prevention. It seems to 

me that if you have a criminal record and the record relates to 

some kind of, you know, threats or otherwise, to be able to have 

any access to materials is mind-boggling to me. 

But you can react to other points of Mr. Trimble’s commentary, 

as well as that particular issue, if you would. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Certainly, Chairman Meehan, the more secure 

these materials are, the easier it becomes on us. That layered, 

multifaceted architecture that begins with the material security is 

reinforced. So anything any of us can do to continue to, as Mr. 

Trimble mentioned, to tighten that noose, no matter where you are 

in the chain, would certainly have beneficial cascading effects to 

prevent a successful nuclear or radiological attack. 
36 

Securing the materials themselves is not within DNDO’s purview. We are recipients of the information once it has left regulatory control, and so we have a very close ties with our partners 

at NRC. In fact, NRC sends us a detailee, and DOE, on occasion, 

has sent us detailees, so that we can maintain some of that ongoing dialogue and awareness of an on-going event. 

It is my understanding that both the NRC and DOE have accepted Mr. Trimble’s recommendations. 

Mr. TRIMBLE. I would say a qualified accept. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Qualified. 

But we will certainly partner with them and watch the implementation and encourage best practices to be shared. It can only 

improve the security. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Right. I thank you. 

Well, let me turn to the gentlelady for a final question. 

Ms. CLARKE. Very well, Mr. Chairman. 

Just an ask of you, Dr. Gowadia, if you have a list of authorities 

or program changes that you think are needed that the subcommittee can be of assistance with, we would ask that you submit 

that to us in writing, especially considering the likelihood that in 

the upcoming years we will be seeing some declining budgets. We 

want to make sure that, to the extent that we can make the case 

for maintenance of effort, at least, that we have all of the information that helps us to make the case. 

Ms. GOWADIA. Certainly. Certainly, Ms. Clarke. We definitely 

will do that. We will send you our request in writing. 

We have reviewed our authorities. We don’t see the need to expand them. We do feel that the set, as they are, are extremely valuable. They are manifest in every day that we do our work. 

The only request we really have is to change one of our reporting 

requests from an annual to a biennial status. It would allows us 

to save just at DNDO $800,000 every 2 years if we were to go into 

that cadence. It would actually be more meaningful, because the 

progress—it is hard to see it year on year, but giving us a longer 

integration time, I think, would be more valuable to you, as well. 

So that one our one request. 

There are other things on the margins which we will certainly 

share with all of you and your staff. Again, thank you very much 

for affording us the opportunity to have this reauthorization, and 

we look forward to working with you to move forward on it. 

Ms. CLARKE. Very well. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MEEHAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Let me just ask one, sort-of, closing question or comment, Dr. 

Gowadia, because you have been at this for a short period of time, 

but you project, as well. 

I think if we look at this, just in the 4 years that I have been 

here, we have seen a change in the global environment. We have 

seen more concern about terrorist organizations and others who 

seem to be getting more active and potentially have access to 

things. We have seen Iran in a state in which not only are we worried about the proliferation of their capacity, and there are political 

questions about how well-contained that will be, but it is—I hope 

it is not predictable, but it is foreseeable that if there is any on- 
37 

going Iranian capacity to continue to expand, that you might begin 

to see proliferation of other countries looking, either because they 

want to participate or they want to protect themselves by at least 

having an equal status. We could see, down the road, not just a few 

but numbers of countries, in fact even potentially scores of countries, with access to nuclear capacity, maybe even nuclear weapons. 

So, anticipating the combination of the threat of terrorism and 

the loose—the struggle we have to prevent things being controlled, 

I should say, not loose, but be in control of that which exists, and 

the concern about proliferation and new states, where do you see 

your mission evolving in, you know, 5 and 10 years compared to 

where you began with some of this? What other kinds of challenges 

do you think you might face in the future? 

Ms. GOWADIA. Chairman Meehan, our vision will remain the 

same: A Nation secure from the threat of nuclear terrorism. But we 

will continue with our interagency partners, our State and local 

partners, our international partners to continue to build this multilayered, multifaceted architecture, again, to make it so that the undertaking of such an act would just be prohibitively difficult. 

Now, it goes all the way back to the security of materials, the 

spreading of best practices. We will continue to work with our 

international partners at the IAEA, the National Law Enforcement 

Agency, even partner nations, so that they begin to develop, based 

on our best practices and guidelines, what we have learnt, readily 

to share their other own architectures. So as you have National architectures built up—and by that, I don’t just mean detection systems, I mean regulatory infrastructure, just as we have with the 

NRC—good practices for securing and maintaining their materials, 

accountability, et cetera, developing interior law enforcement capabilities within the nations, not just border capabilities, this begins 

to set up a harder and harder challenge, so even if we do see the 

proliferation, we continue on the blue side to improve capabilities. 

Now, speaking of proliferation, you know that President Obama 

has laid strong priority in reducing the amount of special nuclear 

material that is available in the world today. We have made tremendous progress based on the security summits that he started. 

I don’t have all the facts with me just yet off the top of my head, 

but I do believe the nation-states that had special nuclear materials significantly reduced in the last 6 years. I hope that trend 

continues. Best practices that DOE shares and DOD shares with 

their partner nations, again, for the security of the military programs, is so important. 

Again, multiple layers, multi-faceted layers. If you choose to do 

this, we can look at the money transfers, we can look at the 

SIGINT, et cetera, et cetera. Anything that would give us an advantage and an edge and make it so they have to be right every 

time, giving us better opportunity, is exactly where we are headed. 

Can’t do this without our partners. Our greatest focus will be our 

partners. We have found a way to include them in all our activities, 

all our planning from Day 1, whether it is the risk assessment, the 

capabilities-based assessments. They write the mission needs statements with us. That is a significant lesson learned from our past 

missteps. 
38 

So those partnerships—law enforcement, operational community, 

intelligence community, technical community—we will base our efforts moving forward, particularly in light of the diminishing budget. We don’t have the luxury of having any overlap. We will have 

to strategically partner to advance the cause, even partnering with 

our international partners. We have the British collaborating with 

us in R&D with S&T. So anywhere where we can find a way to leverage, we must and will do so. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, I applaud you for that leveraging with the 

friendly partners in the international community. It seems to make 

sense for all of us to be doing so in that capacity. 

So I want to thank you again for your leadership. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Trimble, for your oversight. 

Collectively, these are continuing explorations of very, very vitally important issues to not only our homeland security but actually global security. So I thank you for your work and your valuable testimony. 

It is possible that some of our Members who will read this transcript will be interested in having additional questions. So if they 

do, you know, we ask that you respond in writing. 

But I thank you again for your testimony. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(39) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN PATRICK MEEHAN FOR HUBAN GOWADIA

Question 1. What is DNDO’s relationship with the DOE labs, and how is DNDO 

leveraging their capabilities and expertise? Are there lessons learned in contracting 

with the labs that would be beneficial to other DHS organizations? 

Answer. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has a good working relationship with the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories and they have 

made significant contributions to all aspects of the DNDO mission. According to the 

Homeland Security Act, DNDO (as part of DHS) has access to the laboratories equal 

to that of DOE; DHS-funded activity is not considered to be ‘‘work for others’’ that 

the labs can refuse if they don’t think it to be within their mission. In fiscal year 

2013, DNDO obligated over $72 million at the DOE National Laboratories and will 

likely obligate over $82 million in fiscal year 2014. 

National Laboratory subject-matter experts’ knowledge of nuclear weapons and 

associated capabilities has been a great asset to DNDO. Their staff provides key 

data and analysis into system threat reviews, including on-going analyses that are 

being used to determine the feasibility of reconfiguring radiation portal monitor settings to reduce the number of nuisance alarms while maintaining threat detection 

sensitivity. We also rely on their unique knowledge and expertise to design, manufacture, store, and transport the special nuclear materials and weapon mock-ups 

(test sources) that we use in our test campaigns and red teaming. 

In fact, testing and evaluation of nuclear detection systems is a key area where 

DNDO leverages DOE National Laboratory facilities and expertise. Scientists from 

the National Laboratories help us to design tests that are rigorous but efficient, 

with many of these test campaigns conducted at DOE facilities. For example, our 

Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex is located 

at the Nevada National Security Site, a DOE facility. Its location, adjacent to DOE’s 

Device Assembly Facility, allows us to utilize the unique sources stored at this facility. Nevada National Security Site personnel maintain and secure our test facility, 

and also provide staff to execute our tests. 

Many of the National Laboratories support cutting-edge research to develop new 

capabilities for nuclear threat detection. This research spans such broad areas as 

advanced materials for gamma-radiation detection, new approaches to neutron detection and other novel techniques for radiation detection, gamma-ray imaging, advanced techniques for the active detection of shielded nuclear materials, and improved capabilities for modeling and simulation to understand detector performance. 

To fulfill its technical nuclear forensics mission, DNDO also relies on the National 

Laboratories. Nearly all research and development to improve technical nuclear 

forensics is conducted at DOE National Laboratories, and we work with them on 

our National Technical Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program to increase the number of scientists capable of conducting the National technical nuclear 

forensics. 

Finally, DNDO was established in the Department of Homeland Security as an 

interagency organization that may receive detailed personnel from the Secretary of 

Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the directors of other Federal agencies, including elements of the intelligence community. Traditionally DNDO has also benefited 

from the inclusion of National Laboratory employees through Intergovernmental 

Personnel Agreements (IPAs). This year, DNDO has had three IPAs working as a 

part of our staff—one from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, one from Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory, and one from Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

When contracting with the DOE labs, DNDO has found it beneficial to provide 

the DOE site office with advanced notification of pending interagency agreements. 

This allows us to identify and make any necessary changes to the Statement of 

Work prior to approval by a DHS contracting officer and submission to DOE. Ad-
40 

vanced notification jump-starts the DHS and DOE review and approval processes 

and shortens the time to codify the interagency agreement. 

Question 2a. Research projects are inherently risky—with great uncertainty about 

the end results of the research. Because of this risk, sometimes research projects 

fail to produce intended results. In some respects, this is part of the cost of doing 

research. 

Does DNDO have any kind of a benchmark for what percentage of research 

projects should end in positive results—meaning that the research leads to the development of a new or improved capability? 

Question 2b. How does the Congress know if it is getting an appropriate yield for 

its investment in DNDO R&D activities? 

Answer. In order to tackle our technical grand challenges while providing nearterm results, DNDO takes a balanced approach to technical risk. To that end, 

DNDO’s R&D budget supports approximately 20% basic research, 40% applied research, and 40% technology development. This approach also supports the establishment of a healthy technology development pipeline. On a regular basis, all projects 

report out their R&D results, either positive or negative, so that the body of knowledge is continuously increasing. 

In addition, annually DNDO reports two DHS management performance measures that demonstrate a robust technology pipeline and a robust human capital, or 

workforce, pipeline. • For the technology pipeline, in 2013 DNDO obtained 42 comprehensive evaluations or demonstrations of new and improved technologies to protect against nuclear terrorism, surpassing its goal of 23. • For the human capital pipeline, in 2013 DNDO granted 71 student fellowships 

and faculty awards in nuclear forensics and radiation detection-related specialties, surpassing its goal of 63. 

DNDO works closely with DHS Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Office 

of Management and Budget to develop performance measures and set targets. The 

targets reflect projected outcomes based on Department priorities and budgetary 

considerations. 

Over the period of multiple years, the success of an R&D program can be demonstrated by technology that transitioned from an idea, to a laboratory prototype, 

to a new operational capability. DNDO has implemented rigorous processes to track 

the progress of individual research efforts by using technology readiness levels, feasibility evaluations, proof-of concept demonstrations, and technology demonstration 

and characterizations. DNDO also employs a phase-based approach to research 

management, where progress is assessed for a given project after every phase in the 

project’s life cycle to determine whether the research should be carried forward or 

discontinued, and all portfolios are periodically reviewed by the DNDO leadership 

team. These processes allow for economy and efficiency in research execution, mitigate technical risk, and permit focusing research to productive end-states. We are 

presently working to comprehensively summarize the transition success of our portfolio, and early indications are that it is on par or above the success of other Federally-sponsored research programs. 

DNDO is beginning to see the results of technology transfers resulting in the 

fielding of detection capabilities. As a result of DNDO’s efforts, there are new 

gamma-ray detection materials, new neutron detectors that are not dependent on 

Helium–3 (a rare material in very short supply that is being reserved for applications in which it cannot be replaced), improved algorithms, and modeling tools that 

are now either commercial products or are broadly available to support the research 

and development community as a whole. Technologies supporting long-range radiation detection and wide-area search operations have also been matured to the point 

where programs of record and commercial spin-offs are feasible. 

Finally, new technologies for the detection of shielded special nuclear material in 

cargo continue to mature, and several have or are achieving significant maturity to 

support operational demonstrations. Together, these successes contribute to improved capabilities, and create core technologies that will support a range of future 

capabilities. 

Question 3. The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was established 

within DNDO in October 2006. As you know, the mission is to serve as program 

integrator and steward for the U.S. Government to ensure a ready, robust, and enduring nuclear forensics capability. Can you update us on this program and has it 

been successful? How do you measure that success? 

Answer. DNDO has had considerable success with our nuclear forensics mission. 

Since 2006, when DNDO was given this mission, the U.S. Government has made 

substantial progress in developing requirements, addressing technology gaps, improving the rigor of exercises, and increasing the expertise pipeline from academia 
41 

to the National Laboratories. DNDO has worked to coordinate the efforts of the U.S. 

Government for planning, operations, and technology development in nuclear 

forensics and attribution. 

Today the interagency constantly plans together, through Executive Council and 

Steering Committee meetings at DNDO and many other planning venues. We develop joint plans, such as the 2010 National Strategic Five-Year Plan for Improving 

the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Capabilities of the United States. 

We established a Nuclear Forensics Requirements Center, which DNDO co-chairs 

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory. For the first time, we’ve identified, developed, and documented technical and operational requirements across the 

nuclear forensics spectrum. 

Technical capabilities are steadily advancing. For example, DNDO has developed 

the first-ever lab-scale uranium processing capability to determine nuclear material 

characteristics that are uniquely associated with specific variations of uranium 

manufacturing processes. This capability allows us to better link the material to its 

origin and possible pathways. 

Forensics exercises have become remarkably realistic and rigorous, with intensive 

multi-agency planning among the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department 

of Energy, the Department of Defense, and DNDO. Many of the exercises now include State and local law enforcement. State and local law enforcement have provided facilities for exercises, as well as air transport and safety escorts for the nuclear forensics teams to collect simulated debris samples for nuclear forensic analysis. 

Another notable success is our Expertise Development program, which was 

launched in 2008. To date, we have provided support to over 300 undergraduate and 

graduate students, as well as faculty members at 23 universities. Nineteen new nuclear forensics Ph.D. scientists have come through our ‘‘pipeline program’’ and been 

hired, primarily by the DOE National Laboratories, since the program’s inception. 

This brings us more than halfway to our goal of adding 35 new Ph.D. scientists into 

the nuclear forensics field by 2018. 

We have a variety of methods for measuring our progress in executing the technical nuclear forensics mission. 

First, we assess our progress in an Annual Report to Congress against the objectives laid out in the National Strategic Five-Year Plan. Further, the annual National Technical Nuclear Forensics Implementation Plan describes how the community will accomplish the objectives outlined in the Strategic Plan. 

Second, with respect to technical capability development, DNDO focuses on providing our operational partners with the ability to accurately and precisely measure 

and characterize nuclear and other radioactive materials in a defensible manner 

that will stand up to outside and legal scrutiny. Guiding this effort is a set of measurement requirements authored by the interagency Bulk Special Nuclear Material 

Analysis Program. DNDO develops analytical methods to meet these requirements, 

and measures success in the transition of approved methods to the DOE’s operational nuclear forensics laboratories. 

Third, in the exercise arena, we have a formal process for evaluating technical 

competencies and areas for improvement during exercises. These areas for improvement are discussed among the partner agencies and documented in Corrective Action Plans, which are implemented, tracked, and verified in subsequent exercises. 

Fourth, for expertise development, we closely track the numbers of students, colleges, and junior faculty members receiving awards, and we monitor their progress 

through our pipeline in conjunction with the quality of their research, as determined 

by our interagency partners, DOE National Laboratory scientists, and our Nuclear 

Forensics Science Panel. We also perform annual assessments to monitor how well 

the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program is meeting the demands of the nuclear forensics workforce. 

Question 4. What is DNDO doing to partner with foreign ports to reach the goal 

of 100% scanning of in-bound cargo? How does DNDO coordinate their efforts with 

DOE and DOS? 

Answer. DNDO’s role in the matter of 100% scanning of in-bound cargo is predominantly focused on supporting the technology used in detection and in mission 

analysis. We develop, acquire, and support the detection systems that could be used 

by our operational partners for this mandate and we assess risk reduction across 

the global nuclear detection architecture. 

We first conduct research and development on technologies that may be applied 

to meet the 100% scanning mandate. We are in the process of characterizing the 

effectiveness and maturity of three different systems that have some ability to detect shielded and unshielded nuclear and other radioactive materials in containerized cargo. 
42 

In addition, DNDO collaborates with DOE’s Second Line of Defense Program on 

requirements development, acquisition strategies, technological advancements, capability improvement, and post-deployment lessons learned and data analysis. DNDO 

has also transferred radiation detectors to DOE for use at foreign ports. 

Recently, DHS DNDO teamed with DHS Science and Technology Directorate, Borders and Maritime Security Division to develop a revolutionary high-energy, nonintrusive inspection (NII) system. This system will not only image and support 

interdiction of shielded and unshielded special nuclear material but will support detection of contraband materials such as explosives, drugs, weapons, currency, and 

bootleg alcohol and tobacco. Previously, this has required two distinctly different NII 

systems focused on different threats. This integrated NII system will be installed 

at a Boston area Massachusetts Port Authority (MASSPORT) facility where it will 

be jointly tested by DHS, MASSPORT, and the UK Home Office, which is also a 

partner in this project and looking for an integrated solution. 

Question 5. Do you feel that the Memorandum of Understanding between DNDO, 

NNSA, DTRA, and DNI is sufficient for achieving maximum efficiency in exchanging information between agencies on radiological and nuclear threats? 

Answer. Yes. The MOU between DNDO and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is a very effective means to coordinate research and development efforts related to nuclear detection. The MOU allows 

full and open access among the parties to on-going research and development, facilitates interagency representation in program reviews and proposal evaluations, and 

affords easy access to R&D findings, thereby increasing efficiency and reducing duplication of effort. The Nuclear Defense Research and Development Roadmap, Fiscal 

Years 2013–2017, developed by the interagency through the National Science and 

Technology Council’s Committee on Homeland and National Security, enables further coordination and information exchange across the interagency. 

DNDO also works closely with DTRA, NNSA, and ODNI to share information on 

radiological and nuclear threats. As part of our risk analysis process, interagency 

experts, including those at DHS/I&A, are surveyed on the likelihood of different 

threat scenarios. DNDO collaborates closely with NNSA to estimate the theoretical 

capabilities of different adversaries to develop improvised nuclear devices. This information is then used to support, develop, and maintain the global nuclear detection architecture and related efforts. 

Question 6. The NSC has established coordination mechanisms, including a Countering Nuclear Threats Interagency Policy Committee, for international nuclear and 

radiological border security efforts. Do you feel that this has significantly improved 

interagency cooperation for nuclear smuggling? If not, how could the coordination 

be maximized? 

Answer. Engagement with staff from the National Security Council is beneficial 

and improves coordination efforts by providing a high-level venue to gain interagency concurrence and address concerns. Indeed, DNDO was created through the 

interagency process and remains committed to working with the National Security 

Council to continue to strengthen interagency coordination. For example, the 2010 

and 2014 Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic Plans and the 2010 National Strategic Five-Year Plan for Improving the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution 

Capabilities of the United States were vetted and approved utilizing the same process. Coupled with other, non-White House-led mechanisms, such as the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Interagency Working Group, the Nuclear Forensics Executive Council, and the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Steering Committee, 

coordination efforts continue to improve to ensure a holistic and efficient interagency approach to detecting nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. 

Question 7a. DNDO is participating in the European Union initiated Illicit Trafficking Radiological Assessment Program, or ITRAP+10, so-called because they are 

revisiting the original assessment 10 years later. This program involved testing of 

numerous types of radiation detection equipment including RPMs. 

Specifically what is DNDO’s involvement in that program? 

Question 7b. How is DNDO using the results of this testing in making decisions 

to procure new RPMs or other radiation detection equipment? 

Answer. The ITRAP+10 program was a true partnership for us with the European 

Commission’s Joint Research Center. Both parties contributed funding, facilities, 

scientists, test personnel, and radiological and nuclear sources to execute this program. ITRAP+10 also included sharing of scientific subject-matter experts for peer 

review, joint test and analysis plans, and sharing of specialized test equipment to 

ensure consistent results. In all, ITRAP+10 tested 79 commercially-available models 
43 

in nine categories of instruments against standards accepted by the American National Standards Institute and the International Electrotechnical Commission. 

Specifically, DNDO: 

• Tested 47 models of instruments to the full complement of consensus standards, 

which included testing to extreme environmental, mechanical, and electro-magnetic influences, 

• Developed novel instrumentation and standardized source kits and test phantoms, 

• Will publish 47 individual vendor reports detailing the performance against 

standards of each of instrument tested, 

• Will publish nine comprehensive reports with the JRC which will survey the 

status of current generation detectors, and 

• Will archive the complete data set for future use. 

Results from the ITRAP+10 efforts have directly supported two acquisition programs for the Department and numerous requests from other Federal, State, and 

local officials. For example, the Small Vessel Stand-Off Detection program has used 

the data from the testing to inform performance and operational testing, and the 

Human Portable Tripwire program was able to leverage the ITRAP+10 spectroscopic 

radiation personal detector tests to revise quantitative requirements at substantial 

savings. 

ITRAP+10 results are also being used to inform the Analysis of Alternatives for 

the Radiation Portal Monitor Program. 

Æ