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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROBERT I. GOFF

Appellant No. 61 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 9, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000735-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 31, 2015

Appellant Robert Goff appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

in the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas following his jury trial 

conviction for delivery of a controlled substance1and criminal use of a 

communication facility.2 We affirm.

On March 15, 2012, police arrested Appellant and charged him with 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”),3

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a).

3 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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conspiracy to commit PWID,4 delivery of a controlled substance, and criminal 

use of a communication facility. On October 14, 2014, a jury convicted 

Appellant of delivery of a controlled substance and criminal use of a 

communication facility. On December 9, 2014, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to 15 to 30 months’ incarceration on the delivery conviction and 2 

years of consecutive probation on the criminal use of a communication 

facility conviction. On January 6, 2015, Appellant timely appealed.5 

Appellant raises the following three (3) claims for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure?

2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to permit defense 

counsel to question a Commonwealth witness concerning the 

facts of her prior convictions?

3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to permit defense 

counsel to introduce prior bad acts of a Commonwealth witness?

Appellant’s Brief, p. 3 (all capitals removed).

A. The Rule 600 Claim.

Appellant first claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. See

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 11-21. He is incorrect.

____________________________________________

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.

5 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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This Court’s standard and scope of review in analyzing a Rule 600 

issue are well-settled:

In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial 

court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon 

facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing 

and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill 

will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is 

abused.

The proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on the 

record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of 

the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court 

is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. 

Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the 

protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the 

protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right 

to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given 

to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both 

to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those 

contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 

600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from 

good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the 

Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy 

trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a 

manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. 

In considering these matters ..., courts must carefully factor into 

the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual 

accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous 

law enforcement as well.
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Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1134-35 (Pa.Super.2011), 

aff’d, 44 A.3d 655 (Pa.2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 

1097, 1100 (Pa.Super.2007) (en banc)).

Rule 600 requires trial in criminal cases to commence no later than 

365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

600(A). The mechanical run date is the date by which the trial must 

commence under Rule 600. Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1102. It is calculated by 

adding 365 days to the date on which the criminal complaint is filed. Id. 

The adjusted run date is the mechanical run date plus any excludable delay. 

Id.; Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). Periods of delay caused by the defendant, such as 

defense continuances, are “excludable delay.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C); see 

also Commonwealth v. Jones, 886 A.2d 689, 702 (Pa.Super.2005) (249-

day period occasioned by defense continuances excludable). Additionally, 

the period of time from the filing of a Rule 600 motion to its disposition is 

excludable time. Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1277 

(Pa.Super.2008); Commonwealth v. Williams, 726 A.2d 389, 392 

(Pa.Super.1999) (“The period of time between a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule [600] and the trial court’s rendering a decision on 

the motion is excludable time under Rule [600].”). 

If the defendant’s trial commences outside the adjusted run date, the 

court must determine whether “excusable delay” occurred. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(G). “Excusable delay” is a period of delay outside the 
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control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the Commonwealth’s lack 

of due diligence. Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1102. 

“[D]ue diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it 

does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing 

the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.” Commonwealth v. 

Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 704 (Pa.2012). “The Commonwealth cannot be 

held to be acting without due diligence when a witness becomes unavailable 

due to circumstances beyond its control.” Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 

A.2d 1175, 1191 (Pa.Super.2005); see also Commonwealth v. Kostra, 

502 A.2d 1287, 1291 (Pa.Super.1985) (“So long as [a] witness[’s] 

unavailability is through no fault of the Commonwealth, . . . an extension is 

proper.”). This Court has explained that, “[i]t is well settled that when a 

witness becomes unavailable . . . due to illness, vacation or other reason not 

within the Commonwealth’s control . . . an extension of time is warranted.” 

Commonwealth v. Corbin, 568 A.2d 635, 638 (Pa.Super.1990). 

Accordingly, this Court has determined that a witness’ unavailability to 

testify was beyond the control of the Commonwealth in a variety of 

analogous circumstances. See Kostra, 502 A.2d at 1291 (illness of a 

Commonwealth witness); Commonwealth v. Burke, 496 A.2d 799, 801 

(Pa.Super.1985) (police officer on vacation); Commonwealth v. Reihart, 

449 A.2d 35 (Pa.Super.1982) (Commonwealth witness seriously ill); 

Commonwealth v. Caden, 473 A.2d 1047, 1052 (Pa.Super.1984) 
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(Commonwealth’s essential eyewitness ill and hospitalized); Hyland, supra

(military deployment of police officer).

Further, judicial delay is not chargeable to the Commonwealth. See 

Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1104 (a “clogged trial court docket [is a] 

circumstance[] beyond the control of the Commonwealth[.]”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Nellom, 565 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa.Super.1989) (noting 

that when a case is scheduled for the earliest possible date consistent with 

the court’s business, delay from this scheduling is not chargeable to the 

Commonwealth).

The trial court outlined the procedural posture relevant to Appellant’s 

Rule 600 motion to dismiss as follows:

On May 10, 2013, the date by which [Appellant’s] trial had to 

commence, also known as the “adjusted run date,” was January 

24, 2014.1 A pre-trial conference for the case was scheduled for 

May 10, 2013.2 The Commonwealth requested a continuance of 

the pretrial conference because the lead investigators on the 

case would not be available during the then-upcoming trial term. 

The [c]ourt granted the Commonwealth’s request for a 

continuance over [Appellant’s] objection. The case was 

continued to August 16, 2013.

1 The Deputy Court Administrator of Lycoming 

County Court of Common Pleas provided this 

adjusted run date.

2 In Lycoming County, a case believed to be 

ready for trial receives a pre-trial conference 

date. If the case is indeed ready for trial, the 

case goes to the Call of the List. If the case is 

called at the Call of the List, it receives a jury 

selection date and a trial date in the trial term. At 

[Appellant’s] pre-trial conference preceding the 

May 10, 2013 pre-trial conference, [Appellant] 

requested and was granted a continuance. This 
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continuance meant that the trial could be delayed 

up to June 21, 2013, the last day of the trial term 

corresponding with the May 10, 2013 pre-trial 

conference. In her determination of the adjusted 

run date, the Deputy Court Administrator 

excluded the time to June 21, 2013.

On July 16, 2013, in light of the Supreme Court [of the 

United States’] decision in Alleyne v. United States, [, __ U.S. 

___, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013),] the Commonwealth filed a Motion 

to Amend the Information. A pre-trial conference was held on 

August 16, 2013. On August 27, 2013, the case went to the Call 

of the List but was not reached. Consequently, a trial was not 

scheduled. A pre-trial conference was held on September 20, 

2013. The case was scheduled to go to the Call of the List on 

October 1, 2013, but on September 27, 2013, the 

Commonwealth requested a continuance because of its pending 

motion to amend the information. The [c]ourt granted the 

Commonwealth’s request for a continuance over [Appellant’s] 

objection. The case was continued to December 6, 2013.

On November 7, 2013, the [c]ourt granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion to amend the information. On 

November 7, 2013, [Appellant] filed a motion requesting the 

[c]ourt to certify the matter for an interlocutory appeal. On 

December 6, 2013, the [c]ourt denied [Appellant’s] motion for 

certification. Also on December 6, 2013, the Deputy Court 

Administrator continued the case to January 14, 2014 because 

the Defense indicated that he was appealing the [c]ourt’s 

November 7, 2013 Order. On January 3, 2014, [Appellant] filed 

a document titled “Petition for Permission to Appeal” with the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania. This petition was served on the 

Commonwealth but was not filed with the Lycoming County Clerk 

of Court. On January 10, 2014, the [c]ourt ordered [Appellant] 

to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. 

On January 14, 2014, the Deputy Court Administrator continued 

the case to March 18, 2014 because she believed the appeal 

issue was ongoing. On January 31, 2014, [Appellant] filed his 

concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. On 

February 20, 2014, the Superior Court issued an Order denying 

[Appellant’s] “Petition for Permission to Appeal.” For reasons 

unknown, this Order was never filed with the Lycoming County 

Clerk of Court.
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On February 28, 2014, [Appellant] filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the Order granting the motion to amend the 

information. In that motion, [Appellant] stated that on February 

20, 2014, the Superior Court denied the “Petition for an 

Interlocutory Appeal.” A copy of the motion for reconsideration 

was served on the Commonwealth. On March 4, 2014, the 

[c]ourt issued an Order granting [Appellant’s] motion for 

reconsideration and striking the amendment to the information. 

The Deputy Court Administrator did not list the case for a pretrial conference on March 18, 2014 because of “Alleyne/appeal 

issues.” The Deputy Court Administrator did not list the case for 

a pre-trial conference on May 6, 2014 again because of 

“Alleyne/appeal issues.” On July 29, 2014, [Appellant] filed a 

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 600. A pre-trial conference 

was held on August 12, 2014. On August 18, 2014, [Appellant] 

requested a continuance. The [c]ourt granted this continuance 

and indicated that the time from August 26, 2014 to November 

14, 2014 was excludable for Rule 600 purposes.

In his motion to dismiss, [Appellant] argues that the time 

from December 6, 2013 to August 18, 2014 is not excludable for 

purposes of Rule 600. He argues that the [c]ourt did not lose 

jurisdiction when he filed the “Petition for Permission to Appeal” 

with the Superior Court. [Appellant] argues that [the] 

Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in bringing 

[Appellant’s] case to trial, and, therefore, [Appellant’s] right to a 

speedy trial has been violated. He asks that the charges against 

[Appellant] be dismissed with prejudice. In response, the 

Commonwealth argues that the time from December 6, 2013 to 

August 18, 2014 is excludable for Rule 600 purposes because 

the delay was due to administrative errors by court 

administration and misleading court filings.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, filed September 22, 2014 (“Rule 600 Order”), 

pp. 1-3.6

____________________________________________

6 The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporates the Rule 600 

Order. See Trial Court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed March 4, 2105, p. 

1.
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The trial court concluded that multiple periods of delay in this matter 

were not attributable to the Commonwealth. See Rule 600 Order, pp. 4-10. 

The trial court made the following rulings:

 May 10, 2013 through June 21, 2013: excludable delay occasioned by 

a defense continuance. See Rule 600 Order, pp. 1 n. 2, 4-5; see also

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C); Jones, supra.

 June 21, 2013 through August 27, 2013: excusable delay occasioned 

by the unavailability of the Commonwealth’s investigator. See Rule 

600 Order, p. 5; see also Burke, supra.

 August 27, 2013 through September 27, 2013: excusable delay 

occasioned by the trial court’s schedule. See Rule 600 Order, pp. 5-

6;7see also Nellom, supra.

 December 6, 2013 through February 4, 2014: excludable delay 

occasioned by Appellant’s attempts to appeal the trial court’s 

November 7, 2013 Order granting the Commonwealth leave to amend 

the information. See Rule 600 Order, pp. 7-9.8

____________________________________________

7 The trial court acknowledged, and the Commonwealth conceded, that the 

period from the Commonwealth’s September 27, 2013 continuance request 

through the next available pre-trial conference date on December 6, 2013, 

was time chargeable to the Commonwealth for Rule 600 purposes. See Rule 

600 Order, p. 6.

8 The trial court determined that its determination on Appellant’s requested 

appellate certification request was beyond the control of the Commonwealth 

and therefore excludable time.
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 January 14, 2014 through May 2, 2014: the trial court explained its 

determination that this period of time was excusable delay by stating:

On January 14, 2014, the Deputy court Administrator 

continued the case to the next pre-trial conference date 

because she believed the appeal [of the trial court’s refusal 

to certify Appellant’s issue regarding the court’s grant of 

the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the information] 

was ongoing. Once again, the Commonwealth could have 

reasonably believed that the continuance was an indication 

that the [c]ourt wanted to wait for the Superior Court 

decision before proceeding further. This reasonable belief 

was strengthened by the [c]ourt’s request for a concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal. Such a 

request typically means that the [c]ourt intends to address 

the appeal. Furthermore, the Superior Court had not yet 

decided whether to grant [Appellant’s] petition for review, 

so it is again difficult to believe that [Appellant] would 

have been willing to go to trial at that time. Since the 

decision of whether to proceed further in the case was not 

in the hands of the Commonwealth, it did not fail to act 

with due diligence.

Rule 600 Order, pp. 9-10.9

 August 18, 2014 through November 14, 2014: excludable delay 

occasioned by a defense continuance request.

As a result of these excludable and excusable periods of delay, the trial 

court concluded:

____________________________________________

9

The Commonwealth further argues that the entire period between January 

14, 2014 and August 12, 2014 should be excusable, as it was occasioned by 

the Deputy Court Administrator’s error. See Commonwealth’s Brief, pp. 4-

10. In fact, the Commonwealth notes the fact that it discovered and pointed 

out the problems to Court Administration evidences, if anything, its own due 

diligence in the face of errors not of its making. Id.
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[O]n May 10, 2013, 106 days of non-excludable time had 

elapsed. Therefore, the Commonwealth had 259 days to 

commence the trial in order to comply with Rule 600. May 10, 

2013 to July 29, 2014 encompasses 445 days. Of the 445 days, 

249 are excludable, and 196 are not excludable. The [c]ourt 

finds that adding 196 days to the 106 days in the case equals 

302 days elapsed[,] leaving the Commonwealth with 63 days to 

commence the trial in order to comply with Rule 600. Therefore, 

[Appellant’s] Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 600 is denied.

Rule 600 Order, p. 11. 

After reviewing the record, we find that, when all the excludable and 

excusable time is taken into account, Appellant’s Rule 600 claim fails. We 

agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth had over two months 

remaining in which to bring Appellant to trial.10 The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying this claim.

B. The Trial Court’s Evidentiary Rulings.

Appellant’s remaining claims concern the trial court’s rulings pertaining 

to a Commonwealth witness. These claims afford him no relief.

This Court has stated the well-established standard of review for 

admission of evidence claims as follows:

The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to the 

admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the 

trial court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or 

committed an error of law. Thus, [this Court’s] standard of 

____________________________________________

10 Because of our disposition, we need not determine whether the 

Commonwealth correctly argued that the entire period between January 14, 

2014 and August 12, 2014 should be considered excusable. See Footnote 9, 

supra.
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review is very narrow. To constitute reversible error, an 

evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful 

or prejudicial to the complaining party.

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81 (Pa.Super.2012). 

1. Denial of questioning regarding underlying facts of Commonwealth’s 

witness’s prior conviction.

Appellant first claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

cross-examine Commonwealth witness Stevannah Helminiak11 regarding the 

underlying facts of her prior crimen falsi conviction for theft.12 See

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 21-24. He is incorrect.

In Pennsylvania, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as 

otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” 

Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact 

____________________________________________

11 The trial court summarized Ms. Helminiak’s relevant testimony as follows:

[Ms.] Helminiak [] testified that she was staying at Steven 

Timlin’s (Timlin) house on March 15, 2012. [Ms.] Helminiak 

called [Appellant] after she received money from a confidential 

informant (CI) to purchase crack cocaine. [Appellant] drove to 

Timlin’s house, and [Ms.] Helminiak entered [Appellant’s] 

vehicle. There was a piece of tissue in between the vehicle’s 

seats; the tissue had crack cocaine in it. [Ms.] Helminiak 

grabbed the tissue, put money in between the seats, and exited 

the vehicle. She returned to the CI, took one bag of heroin, and 

gave the rest of the bags to the CI.

1925(a) Opinion, p. 1.

12 Ms. Helminiak’s prior convictions included forgery and theft by deception 

convictions, both crimen falsis, as well as convictions for conspiracy and 

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.
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more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the 

fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. Further, 

“[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.

As to crimes, wrongs, or other acts, our Rules of Evidence specifically 

prohibit the use of evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act to prove a 

person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 

acted in accordance with the character. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, such 

evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). Again, in a criminal case 

such evidence is subject to a balancing of probative value against prejudicial 

effect. Id.

At sidebar during Ms. Helminiak’s testimony, defense counsel 

forwarded the following argument in an attempt to introduce the 

circumstances of Ms. Helminiak’s prior theft conviction:

[Defense Counsel]: Here’s the situation, Your Honor, and I don’t 

even have to get into what was taken; but the facts are she 

steals stuff from [the victim of her prior theft], she gets a ride, 

she’s out of town, she’s going out and gets stopped and 

arrested. Our [d]efense in [the current matter] is that she was 

trying to get a ride away from this place. I think this goes to the 

same fact pattern that [resulted in Ms. Helminiak’s prior theft 

conviction].
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N.T. 10/14/2014, p. 70. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s 

objection.

The trial court disposed of this argument as follows:

Essentially, [d]efense [c]ounsel argued that the 

circumstances surrounding [Ms.] Helminiak’s theft conviction 

show that [Ms.] Helminiak entered [Appellant’s] vehicle not with 

the intent to purchase cocaine, but with the intent to get a ride 

away from Timlin’s house. [Ms.] Helminiak entering a vehicle is 

the only similarity between the facts of Helminiak’s theft 

conviction and the facts surrounding the present case. There 

was no testimony that [Ms.] Helminiak stole from the CI or 

Timlin before entering [Appellant’s] vehicle. [Ms.] Helminiak 

received money from the CI, and after [Ms.] Helminiak exited 

[Appellant’s] vehicle, she gave the bags of cocaine. The facts of

[Ms.] Helminiak’s theft conviction are too different from the facts 

of the present case to support the inference that [Ms.] Helminiak 

entered [Appellant’s] vehicle to get a ride away from Timlin’s 

house.

Even if the circumstances surrounding [Ms.] Helminiak’s 

theft conviction are relevant, their probative value was 

outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury. As mentioned 

above, there was no evidence that [Ms.] Helminiak stole from 

the CI or Timlin before entering [Appellant’s] vehicle. If the 

[c]ourt permitted the introduction of the circumstances 

surrounding [Ms.] Helminiak’s theft conviction, the jury could 

have been misled into believing that [Ms.] Helminiak had stolen 

from the CI or Timlin before entering [Appellant’s] vehicle. 

1925(a) Opinion, pp. 2-3.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion 

and preventing defense counsel from inquiring into the facts of Ms. 

Helminiak’s prior conviction.
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2. Denial of questions regarding Commonwealth’s witness having absconded 

from supervision.

Next, Appellant claims the trial court erred by not allowing him to 

cross-examine Ms. Helminiak regarding the fact that she absconded while on 

supervision for a prior act. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 24-25. Again, he is 

incorrect. 

“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 

person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 

acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). 

The following discussion also occurred at the above-referenced sidebar 

during Ms. Helminiak’s testimony:

[Defense Counsel]: While we’re here you’re going to object to 

this then as well. Can we get into the fact that she absconded 

while she was on supervision [for her prior convictions]? Under 

[her theft conviction]?

[Prosecutor]: Same objection. How is it relevant that she 

absconded? It’s relevant that she’s convicted of a crime, crimen 

falsi. How is it relevant that she’s avoiding her probation officer?

[Defense Counsel]: Judge, it goes to lack of respect for 

authority. It goes to her character as an individual. There is a 

bench warrant issued for her. She’s on the run. This is all prior 

to the current case. They want to make it sound like all of a 

sudden she’s doing this wonderful thing by coming in and 

testifying of her own free will. I want to show her character is 

not that at all.

[Prosecutor]: That’s exactly why it’s not relevant. It’s character 

evidence.

N.T. 10/14/2014, pp. 70-71. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s 

objection.
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing questioning 

into Ms. Helminiak’s character as evidenced by her absconding from 

supervision.

For the preceding reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/31/2015