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NASA SECURITY: ASSESSING THE AGENCY’S 

EFFORTS TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INFORMATION 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE & 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 20, 2014 

Serial No. 113–81 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

KATHERINE CLARK, Massachusetts 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi, Chair 

RALPH M. HALL, TEXAS 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MO BROOKS, ALABAMA 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

June 20, 2014 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Steven M. Palazzo, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

Statement by Representative Dan Maffei, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 13 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 16 

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 17 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Witnesses: 

Mr. Richard Keegan, Associate Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20 

Ms. Belva Martin, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 31 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 33 

Ms. Gail A. Robinson, Deputy Inspector General, National Aeronautics and 

Space 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 48 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 50 

Mr. Douglas Webster, Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration 

and Principal, Cambio Consulting Group 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 57 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 59 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 75 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. Richard Keegan, Associate Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration ................................................................................... 90 

Ms. Belva Martin, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 112 

Ms. Gail A. Robinson, Deputy Inspector General, National Aeronautics and 

Space ..................................................................................................................... 119 
Page

IV 

Mr. Douglas Webster, Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration 

and Principal, Cambio Consulting Group .......................................................... 126 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Submitted statement for the record by Representative Donna F. Edwards, 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 142 

Responses submitted by NASA for information requested by Chairman Broun 

during the course of the hearing ......................................................................... 144 
(1) 

NASA SECURITY: ASSESSING THE AGENCY’S 

EFFORTS TO PROTECT SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION 

FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEES ON SPACE & 

OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven Palazzo 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space] presiding. 
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Chairman PALAZZO. This joint hearing of the Subcommittee on 

Space and the Subcommittee on Oversight will come to order. 

Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing titled, ‘‘NASA Security: Assessing the Agency’s Efforts to Protect Sensitive Information.’’ In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, 

biography, and truth-in-testimony disclosure for today’s witnesses. 

Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing involving two 

Subcommittees, I want to explain how we will operate procedurally 

so all Members understand how the question-and-answer period 

will be handled. We will recognize those Members present at the 

gavel in order of seniority on the full Committee, and those coming 

in after the gavel will be recognized in order of arrival. 

I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

Welcome to today’s joint hearing on NASA’s ability to protect 

sensitive information. Recent events have reminded us that protecting sensitive aerospace information is more than a matter of 

national pride; it is also a matter of national security. Yet NASA 

continues to struggle with the protection of sensitive information, 

even as the agency is persistently targeted by our adversaries. 

Today, we discuss the reports that have shown that NASA’s casual and negligent approach to foreign national access and failure 

to control sensitive information is allowing our nation’s prized aerospace technology to be compromised. The purpose of today’s hearing is to ensure that NASA follows through on addressing these 

failures. 

On March 16, 2013, Federal agents conducted a search of a foreign national contractor from the Langley Research Center before 

departure to China. This search was prompted by concerns that the 

individual was inappropriately granted access to sensitive information. Despite the fact that the individual pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense, the nature of the information on his computer 

and how he obtained it remains under investigation. 

Also, a multiyear investigation dating back to 2009 showed that 

foreign nationals were granted inappropriate access to information 

and facilities at NASA’s Ames Research Center. As a result, 

NASA’s Office of the Inspector General issued a detailed 41-page 

report highlighting troubling cases where improper access was 

granted under direction from senior center leadership. 

Today’s hearing is one in a series of Congressional actions to address these matters. In addition to a hearing held last Congress in 

this Committee, Dr. Paul Broun, Chairman of the Oversight Committee, requested a GAO review of NASA’s export control processes. And Representative Frank Wolf petitioned NASA to work 

with the National Academy of Public Administration to conduct an 

independent review of NASA’s Foreign National Access Management. Unfortunately NASA has only released a summary of this report. 

These reports confirm our worst fears: that the incidents at 

Langley and Ames are not isolated incidents. Among conclusions 

from these reports we find most centers continue to release scientific and technical information that has not been reviewed for export control purposes. NASA lacks both clear export control policies 

and the oversight necessary to enforce them. The NASA network 
12 

has indeed been compromised and these vulnerabilities could have 

significant impacts on national security. 

And finally, a troubling trend we have seen across agencies in 

this Administration: the failure or the willingness—unwillingness 

to hold accountable those responsible for these errors. 

Congress has also continued addressing these matters in the 

NASA Authorization Act that recently passed the House by an 

overwhelming bipartisan vote of 401 to 2. Our bill directs NASA to 

give a timely report on compliance efforts in response to the recommendations of the NAPA report. It also calls for a GAO review 

of NASA’s compliance and directs NASA to take national security 

into consideration when conducting technology transfers. 

My goal as Chairman of this Committee is to hold NASA accountable while working with the agency to correct these serious 

matters. I understand that NASA has its challenges. The original 

Space Act directed the agency to simultaneously ‘‘provide for the 

widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information 

concerning its activities’’ while also directing the agency to protect 

classified, trade secret, and confidential information. 

Additionally, NASA, like other Federal agencies, is subject to the 

requirements of the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act. Too often, enforcement is left to the discretion of 

center leadership in a NASA culture that ‘‘has a tendency to lapse 

back into old habits once the spotlight is off the area under review.’’ I will point out that this is more than my personal assessment; it is the independent opinion as expressed in the NAPA report. 

I am pleased that NASA’s Office of the Inspector General is here 

today to discuss these two reports, as well as their yearly report 

to Congress on NASA’s compliance with Federal export controls 

laws. I am also pleased that two other outside groups have also reviewed the topic, the National Academy of Public Administration 

and GAO. 

While much of the focus of today’s hearing will be to identify the 

failures within NASA’s current structure, it is also an opportunity 

to identify ways Congress can improve and clarify its own roles in 

providing oversight and accountability over NASA activities. I believe this is in the best interest of all involved as we look to the 

future in a world where our nation’s space interests are impacted 

by both the cooperation and competition of international players. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Palazzo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

CHAIRMAN STEVEN M. PALAZZO

Welcome to today’s joint hearing on NASA’s ability to protect sensitive information. 

Recent events have reminded us that protecting sensitive aerospace information 

is more than a matter of national pride; it is also a matter of national security. Yet, 

NASA continues to struggle with the protection of sensitive information, even as the 

agency is persistently targeted by our adversaries. Today we discuss the reports 

that have shown that NASA’s casual and negligent approach to foreign national access—and failure to control sensitive information—is allowing our Nation’s prized 

aerospace technology to be compromised. The purpose of today’s hearing is to ensure 

that NASA follows through on addressing these failures. 

On March 16, 2013 federal agents conducted a search of a foreign national contractor from the Langley Research Center before departure to China. This search 
13 

was prompted by concerns that the individual was inappropriately granted access 

to sensitive information. Despite the fact that the individual pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense, the nature of the information on his computer, and how he obtained it, remains under investigation. 

Similarly, a multi-year investigation dating back to 2009 showed that foreign nationals were granted inappropriate access to information and facilities at NASA’s 

Ames Research Center. As a result, NASA’s Office of the Inspector General issued 

a detailed 41 page report highlighting troubling cases where improper access was 

granted under direction from senior center leadership. Today’s hearing is one in a 

series of congressional actions to address these matters. In addition to a hearing 

held last Congress in this Committee, Dr. Paul Broun, Chairman of the Oversight 

Committee requested a GAO review of NASA’s export control processes. And Rep. 

Frank Wolf petitioned NASA to work with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to conduct an independent review of NASA’s foreign national access 

management. Unfortunately NASA has only released a summary of this report. 

These reports confirm our worst fears: that the incidents at Langley and Ames 

are not isolated incidences. Among conclusions from these reports we find: most centers continue to release Scientific and Technical Information that has not been reviewed for export control purposes. NASA lacks both clear export control policies 

and the oversight necessary to enforce them.The NASA network has indeed been 

compromised, and these vulnerabilities could have significant impacts on national 

security. And finally, a troubling trend we’ve seen across agencies in this Administration: the failure or the unwillingness to hold accountable those responsible for 

these errors. 

Congress has also continued addressing these matters in the NASA Authorization 

Act that recently passed the House by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 401 to 

2. Our bill directs NASA to give a timely report on compliance efforts in response 

to the recommendations of the NAPA report. It also calls for a GAO review of 

NASA’s compliance and directs NASA to take national security into consideration 

when conducting technology transfers. 

My goal as Chairman of this Committee is to hold NASA accountable while working with the agency to correct these serious matters. I understand that NASA has 

its challenges: the original Space Act directed the agency to simultaneously ‘‘provide 

for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination of information concerning 

its activities’’ while also directing the agency to protect classified, trade secret, and 

confidential information. Additionally, NASA—like other federal agencies—is subject 

to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration 

Act. Too often, enforcement is left to the discretion of center leadership in a NASA 

culture that ‘‘has a tendency to lapse back into old habits once the spotlight is off 

the area under review.’’ I will point out that that is more than my personal 

assessment- it is the independent opinion as expressed in the NAPA report. 

I am pleased that NASA’s Office of the Inspector General is here today to discuss 

these two reports, as well as their yearly report to Congress on NASA’s compliance 

with federal export controls laws. I am also pleased that two other outside groups 

have also reviewed the topic—National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) 

and GAO. While much of the focus of today’s hearing will be to identify the failures 

within NASA’s current structure, it is also an opportunity to identify ways Congress 

can improve and clarify its own roles in providing oversight and accountability over 

NASA activities. I believe this is in the best interest of all involved as we look to 

the future in a world where our nation’s space interests are impacted by both the 

cooperation and competition of international players. 

Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Maffei, who—are you 

going to be doing Ms. Edwards’ statement or are you just going to 

go straight into your statement? 

Mr. MAFFEI. I am just going to go straight into mine, I think. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Yes. Okay. Good. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Chairman 

Palazzo. Ms. Edwards does apologize. She was unavoidably detained and will be a little late. I for one though am pleased to see 

two Italian-American names up here, so, you know, a lot of our 

space technology has a lot to owe to Italy and history there. 
14 

I won’t talk long and actually I ask unanimous consent to put my 

full statement in the record. I want to put my full statement in the 

record by unanimous consent and then I will just talk for a minute. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maffei follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

RANKING MINORITY MEMBER DAN MAFFEI

Thank you Chairman Palazzo and Chairman Broun for holding this hearing 

today. 

Ensuring that America’s sensitive technical designs and security related research 

is not intentionally pilfered or inappropriately exported is important to this nation’s 

economic and national security. Each year the U.S. loses billions of dollars’ worth 

of advanced technologies, innovative scientific research, and other sensitive data due 

to economic espionage and data theft. 

This impacts U.S. businesses as well as U.S. government laboratories and research centers. NASA is no exception. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), like other federal agencies, is a prime target of foreign agents and 

global cyber criminals. 

The agency has a lot to offer. NASA leads the world in space exploration, aeronautics research, and other key scientific areas. Controlling the inadvertent release 

of sensitive information or intentional theft of export controlled technologies has always been a difficult task. This is particularly true when that sort of data resides 

in an environment that depends upon international collaborations and access to foreign scientists and facilities. Over its history NASA has had more than 3,000 international cooperative agreements and currently maintains an estimated 600 international agreements with more than 100 foreign countries. Last year NASA approved more than 11,000 foreign national visits to its facilities. At a time of constrained federal budgets and reductions in investments in science and technology, 

NASA is dependent upon these global interactions to ensure its continued success. 

Unfortunately, NASA has suffered from several security incidents in recent years 

that sparked reviews of its security policies and practices. These reviews by the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), NASA’s Office of Inspector General and 

the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) have all identified poor 

practices in protecting sensitive NASA technologies, organizational issues that may 

undermine NASA’s security protocols, and financial constraints that may contribute 

to the inadvertent release of export restricted data. NASA was fortunate, however, 

that the incidents themselves do not appear to have resulted in major losses of sensitive data. 

In one of the most high profile cases involving Chinese national Bo Jiang, who 

was accused of attempting to take a NASA laptop to China without proper authorization while working at NASA’s Langley Research Center in Virginia, federal prosecutors found that, ‘‘none of the computer media that Jiang attempted to bring to 

[China] on March 16, 2013, contained classified 2 information, export-controlled information, or NASA proprietary information.’’ In a separate incident involving two 

foreign nationals working at NASA’s Ames Research Center in California a NASA 

Inspector General report released in February, ‘‘uncovered no evidence to support 

allegations that any foreign nationals at Ames were provided classified information 

during the period covered by our review.’’ 

NASA was lucky it did not sustain a serious loss of critical data or technology, 

but the space agency has unique national assets, innovative technologies, and valuable scientific data that must be properly protected from global economic competitors, foreign adversaries, or individual theft by those seeking to cash in on the agency’s valuable research and innovative discoveries. 

Being able to detect and deter these security threats while at the same time supporting important international scientific collaborations is a delicate and often difficult balance to achieve. I look forward to our witnesses helping us to better understand these issues, evaluating these often conflicting objectives, and recommending 

ways to maintain an appropriate balance. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Ensuring that America’s sensitive technical designs 

and security-related research is not intentionally pilfered or inappropriately exported is extremely important to this nation’s economic and national security, and that is why I am so grateful to 
15 

Chairman Palazzo and Chairman Broun for holding this hearing 

today. It is an extremely important issue. 

Each year, the United States loses billions of dollars worth of advanced technologies, innovative scientific research, and other sensitive data due to economic espionage and data theft, and this impacts U.S. businesses as well as government laboratories and research centers. And NASA, like other Federal agencies, is a prime 

target for this type of espionage. Being able to detect and deter 

these security threats while at the same time supporting important 

international scientific collaboration is a delicate and often difficult 

balance to achieve. 

And I particularly look forward to hearing from our witnesses to 

help us better understand these issues, how we set that balance, 

and evaluate sometimes conflicting objectives to recommend the 

right way to do it. 

So thank you very much, and with that I will yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Maffei. 

I now recognize Dr. Broun, Chairman of the Oversight Committee. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Chairman Palazzo. 

I would like to add my welcome to all of you all witnesses that 

are here today as well. I am looking forward to hearing from you 

about this important matter of which I have been concerned for a 

number of years now. 

This Committee and the Oversight Subcommittee in particular 

have held multiple hearings examining the state of information security at NASA. A hearing two years ago highlighted the unique 

cybersecurity challenges that NASA continues to face with constant 

and ever-changing threats and adversaries. Just last year, the 

Oversight Subcommittee, which I Chair, held a hearing to focus on 

the broad intersection of two very important issues at stake here 

today: finding the appropriate balance between scientific openness 

and protecting our national security. 

We have learned that NASA should not only worry about sensitive information going out of the back door through cyber intrusions and lax protocols but also out of the front door by its inability 

to protect sensitive technology and information from foreign nationals who may have unauthorized access to NASA’s facilities. 

In October of 2012, I wrote to the GAO regarding these frontdoor concerns and requested a review of NASA’s export control program. While I was glad to see the completed GAO report released 

last month, I was troubled by many of the report’s findings. For example, it is very troubling to learn that although NASA’s oversight 

tools have identified deficiencies, NASA headquarters has not addressed them at all as far as I can tell. 

The GAO report states specifically that ‘‘at NASA’s 2013 annual 

review, the Center Export Administrators presented NASA HC export control officials with a list of comments regarding the export 

control program. However, NASA headquarters’ export control officials acknowledged that they have not fully addressed the CEA 

concerns from the most recent program review in March of 2013 

and have not developed specific plans to do so.’’ This is intolerable. 

This is not because of any disagreement between NASA headquarters’ staff and NASA centers’ staff; in fact, the GAO report ex-
16 

plains that NASA headquarters export control officials agree with 

issues raised by the CEAs, yet they have failed to develop an approach to address them. This is wholly inadequate for protecting 

our valuable assets. NASA needs suitable accountability and oversight in order to, at the very least, make certain the agency’s own 

audit findings and suggestions are implemented. 

Further troubling, the report states the GAO ‘‘identified instances where NASA security procedures for foreign national access 

were not followed, which were significant given the potential impact on national security or foreign policy from unauthorized access 

to NASA technologies.’’ 

NASA relies on new and sophisticated technology to accomplish 

its mission. Given the sensitivity of these technologies, many are 

subject to export controls, which restrict the transfer of military 

and dual-use technologies. In order to protect our leadership in 

technological innovations, we must ensure that there is adequate 

and consistent oversight and management of NASA’s export control 

program. It is in our national interest. It must be done. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on their insight and 

recommendations on these matters, and I hope that NASA will do 

everything in its power to address all of the shortcomings discussed 

today to ensure our nation’s space agency can securely support and 

appropriately protect cutting-edge research and technology. 

Thank you, Chairman Palazzo, for holding this very important 

hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT CHAIRMAN PAUL BROUN

Assessing the Agency’s Efforts to Protect Sensitive Information Chairman Broun: 

Thank you Chairman Palazzo. I would like to add my welcome to all of our witnesses here today as well. I am looking forward to hearing from you all on this important matter of which I have been concerned for a number of years now. 

This Committee and the Oversight Subcommittee, in particular, have held multiple hearings examining the state of information security at NASA. A hearing two 

years ago highlighted the unique cybersecurity challenges that NASA continues to 

face with constant and ever-changing threats and adversaries. Just last year, the 

Oversight Subcommittee held a hearing to focus on the broad intersection of two 

very important issues at stake here today - finding the appropriate balance between 

scientific openness, and protecting our national security. 

We have learned that NASA should not only worry about sensitive information 

going out of the back door through cyber intrusions and lax protocols, but also out 

of the front door by its inability to protect sensitive technology and information from 

foreign nationals who may have unauthorized access to NASA’s facilities. 

In October of 2012, I wrote to the GAO regarding these front door concerns and 

requested a review of NASA’s export control program. While I was glad to see the 

completed GAO report released last month, I was troubled by many of the report’s 

findings. For example, it is very troubling to learn that although NASA’s oversight 

tools have identified deficiencies, NASA headquarters has not addressed them. The 

GAO report states specifically that ‘‘at NASA’s 2013 annual review, the Center Export Administrators presented NASA headquarters export control officials with a 

list of comments regarding the export control program.However, NASA headquarters’ export control officials acknowledged that they have not fully addressed 

the CEA concerns from the most recent program review in March 2013 and have 

not developed specific plans to do so.’’ This is intolerable. This is not because of any 

disagreement between NASA headquarters’ staff and NASA centers’ staff; in fact 

the GAO report explains that NASA headquarters export control officials agree with 

issues raised by the CEAs—yet, they have failed to develop an approach to address 

them. 
17 

This is wholly inadequate for protecting our valuable assets. NASA needs suitable 

accountability and oversight in order to, at the very least, make certain the agency’s 

own audit findings and suggestions are implemented. 

Further troubling, the report states that GAO ‘‘identified instances where NASA 

security procedures for foreign national access were not followed, which were significant given the potential impact on national security or foreign policy from unauthorized access to NASA technologies.’’ 

NASA relies on new and sophisticated technology to accomplish its mission. Given 

the sensitivity of these technologies, many are subject to U.S. export controls, which 

restrict the transfer of military and dual-use technologies. In order to protect our 

leadership in technological innovations, we must ensure that there is adequate and 

consistent oversight and management of NASA’s export control program. It is in our 

national interest. It must be done! 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on their insight and recommendations on these matters, and I hope that NASA will do everything in its power to 

address all of the shortcomings discussed today to ensure our nation’s space agency 

can securely support and appropriately protect cutting edge research and technology. 

Thank you again Chairman Palazzo for holding this very important hearing, and 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Dr. Broun. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee for 

a statement, Ms. Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me say good morning to all. 

In the interest of saving time, I will be brief so that our distinguished panel of witnesses will have time to present their views. 

I will say that civil R&D requires openness, collaboration, and 

sharing of results to be successful. NASA’s R&D portfolio has benefited from the culture of openness, but the benefits of that culture 

of openness, collaboration, and sharing must be balanced with appropriate security limit and protections. This can be a constructive 

hearing, especially if we can find ways to enable NASA to strike 

a reasonable balance between information sharing and the need to 

safeguard any sensitive information and technologies from inadvertent disclosure. 

I look forward to discussing this and other issues with our expert 

panel since the issues being addressed today are many of the same 

challenges that confront the other science agencies under the Committee’s oversight umbrella. And so with that, Mr. Chairman, I 

yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FULL COMMITTEEE

RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Good morning. In the interest of saving time, I will be brief so that our distinguished panel of witnesses will have time to present their views. 

Civil R&D requires openness, collaboration, and sharing of results to be successful. NASA’s R&D portfolio has benefitted from that culture of openness. But the 

benefits of that culture of openness, collaboration, and sharing must be balanced 

with appropriate security limits and protections. 

This can be a constructive hearing, especially if we can find ways to enable NASA 

to strike a reasonable balance between information sharing and the need to safeguard any sensitive information and technologies from inadvertent disclosure. 

I look forward to discussing this and other issues with our expert panel, since the 

issues being addressed today are many of the same challenges that confront the 

other science agencies under the Committee’s oversight umbrella. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 
18 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

Chairman PALAZZO. At this time I would like to introduce our 

witnesses. 

Our first witness, Mr. Richard Keegan, is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Associate Deputy Administrator and Associate Administrator for Mission Support. Our second witness, Ms. Belva Martin, is the Director of Acquisition and 

Sourcing Management at the Government Accountability Office. 

Our third witness, Ms. Gail Robinson, is the Deputy Inspector General of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. And 

our final witness, Mr. Douglas Webster, is a Fellow of the National 

Academy of Public Administration and the Principal at Cambio 

Consulting Group. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each after which the Members of the Committee will 

have five minutes each to ask questions. It is the practice of the 

Subcommittee on Oversight to receive testimony under oath. If you 

would now please stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth and 

nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Please sit. 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses participating have taken 

the oath. 

I now recognize Mr. Keegan for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. RICHARD KEEGAN, 

ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. KEEGAN. Mr. Chairman and Members of today’s respective 

Subcommittees, I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss 

NASA’s efforts to manage and safeguard the agency’s export-controlled technologies and information from unauthorized access and 

use. This is a topic which we agree is of great importance to our 

Nation. 

As the world’s premier aerospace agency with expertise in space 

launch vehicles, satellites, aircraft, and other advanced technologies, NASA takes our responsibility for securing sensitive export-controlled information at our facilities very seriously. To be 

clear, all NASA employees have a responsibility to comply with export control regulations and Foreign National Access Management 

requirements. That is why the NASA Administrator himself has 

communicated to every employee that these requirements are critically important and that there will be appropriate consequences for 

those who fail to appropriately safeguard sensitive technologies and 

information. 

The recent independent reviews that will form the basis of today’s hearing have already provided invaluable guidance to the 

agency in our efforts to protect sensitive information and to improve our Information Technology Security, Foreign National Access Management, and Export Control Management programs. 

Therefore, NASA is working to implement these recommendations 
19 

in an expeditious manner, beginning immediately. In parallel, 

NASA will continue to improve and implement appropriate policy 

and process changes that we ourselves identify during our own internal audits and reviews. 

Cooperation with other nations is one of the agency’s founding 

principles and thus we would like to thank the GAO and NAPA for 

recognizing this core principle during their recent reviews about 

NASA security issues. In doing so, these independent reviewers 

also highlighted the need for NASA to strike the right balance between protecting sensitive export-controlled technologies from unauthorized access and the need for the agency to share important 

scientific information to further our public and international partnerships. In striking the appropriate balance, NASA recognizes 

that the agency must have clear export control policies and procedures and that all NASA employees must understand and abide by 

those policies and procedures. 

NASA is redoubling our efforts to ensure that we are doing all 

we can to safeguard the sensitive and valuable resources entrusted 

to us. As specific examples, NASA is working to improve training 

for employees who deal with export control and foreign nationals. 

We have established a new Foreign National Access Management 

program office. We are strengthening our foreign national access 

and export control policies and procedures. We are augmenting the 

civil service staff dedicated to counterintelligence activities. And we 

are increasing collaboration with other Federal agencies to share 

intelligence on threats and vulnerabilities to our information technology and other assets. 

In conclusion, let me assure you that NASA takes seriously our 

responsibility to secure sensitive export-controlled information. Additionally, the agency’s security issues and threats will continue to 

have the focused attention of NASA’s most senior managers, including the Administrator himself. 

Lastly, NASA will continue to follow through on the valuable recommendations made by the GAO, NAPA, and our own Inspector 

General with regard to these issues. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for 

your ongoing support for NASA’s missions and its workforce. I 

would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Keegan follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Keegan. 

I now recognize our next witness, Ms. Martin. 

TESTIMONY OF MS. BELVA MARTIN, DIRECTOR, 

ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. MARTIN. Thank you, Chairmen Palazzo, Broun, and Ranking 

Member Maffei, and Members of the Subcommittee for this opportunity to participate in this hearing. I will summarize my written 

testimony and ask that the entire statement be placed in the 

record. 

Mr. Keegan has summarized actions that NASA is taking or 

plans to take to address recommendations from GAO, the IG, and 

NAPA. GAO issued its report in April. Today, I will focus on one 

area: developing a risk-based approach to compliance where NASA 

can leverage existing resources to make improvements that can 

help it to effectively balance its mission of protecting sensitive technologies and information and supporting international agreements 

on the one hand and disseminating important scientific information 

as broadly as possible. 

But in order to develop a risk-based approach, NASA needs to 

know where technologies it is trying to protect and where they are 

located. We found that NASA headquarters officials and some of 

the front-line managers, the Center Export Administrators, or the 

CEAs, lack a comprehensive inventory of the types and locations of 

export-controlled technologies at the centers, severely limiting their 

ability to identify and internal and external risks to compliance. 

This is not a new issue. The NASA IG identified this issue as early 

as 1999. 

While acknowledging the benefits of obtaining comprehensive 

knowledge of export-controlled technologies, NASA headquarters 

officials state that doing so is resource-intensive. But as I have just 

stated, NASA has an opportunity to leverage existing resources. So 

absent a NASA-wide initiative, three centers began recent efforts 

to identify export-controlled technologies at their centers. At one of 

these centers the Counterintelligence Office collaborated with the 

CEA to identify the most sensitive technologies and develop protective measures. This is one example of a risk-based approach that 

could be implemented NASA-wide to enable NASA to target resources to first identify the most sensitive technologies and then 

ensure the location of these are known to staff and are protected. 

NASA concurred with our recommendations in this area. 

As I mentioned, the export-control—I am sorry, the Export Center Administrators are the front-line managers. These professionals 

are responsible for ensuring that all center program activities comply with U.S. export control laws and regulations. However, our review found wide variations across the centers in position and resource allocation for these professionals. 

For example, seven of ten CEAs are at least three levels removed 

from the center director. We were told by some CEAs that such 

placement makes it difficult to maintain authority and visibility to 

staff and to obtain the resources necessary to carry out their responsibilities. We found variations among centers and resource allocation and in particular found indications that the resources as-
32 

signed to export controls at centers did not always appear to be 

commensurate with the export control workload. NASA concurred 

with our recommendations to define the appropriate level and 

placement for the CEA function and to assess workload to determine appropriate resources needed at each center. 

In closing, ensuring compliance with export controls is important 

because just one instance of unapproved foreign national access to 

NASA information or unapproved release of scientific and technical 

information increases the risk of harm to national security. Therefore, it is important that NASA leverage existing resources to identify export control items and assess vulnerabilities in adopting a 

risk-based approach to ensuring compliance. Effective oversight is 

also important to ensure consistent adherence across NASA centers. Moreover, it will be important for NASA to be vigilant in assessing actions taken to help ensure effective implementation and 

to avoid a relapse into former practices. Unless this is done, NASA 

will remain at risk of unauthorized access to its export-controlled 

technologies. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, this concludes my oral statement. I will be happy to address any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Martin follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Martin. 

I now recognize our next witness, Ms. Robinson. 

TESTIMONY OF MS. GAIL A. ROBINSON, 

DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about 

our work examining NASA’s management of foreign national access, compliance with export control laws, and related security 

issues. 

As you mentioned, in January of each year the OIG submits to 

the House and Senate Appropriations Committees a letter describing the audits and investigations we conducted the preceding year 

that shed light on the extent to which NASA is complying with 

Federal export control laws. In our most recent letter we cited four 

audits examining security controls for NASA’s information technology assets, many of which contain data subject to export control 

laws; and also a special review examining a Chinese national’s access to Langley Research Center, which has also been mentioned. 

Subsequent to that letter, we also completed our review involving 

foreign national access and export control issues at Ames. I summarized those reviews in my written testimony and also described 

several of our audits. 

In my oral statement, I would like to highlight several themes 

from our oversight work that echo findings that the GAO and 

NAPA made as well. First, our work leads us to conclude that 

NASA needs to take a more standardized and systematic approach 

to its management of both foreign national access and export control. In the Langley matter, we were struck by the highly bureaucratic nature of NASA’s process for reviewing foreign visit requests. 

For example, we noted that many individuals involved in the process appeared to view their roles in isolation with little consideration or understanding of the role played by others. 

Similarly, in the Ames review we found a lack of early coordination between project and export control personnel as well as deep 

disagreement between those groups regarding whether work performed by foreign nationals involved export-controlled technology. 

Indeed, the issue only surfaced when the Ames scientists sought to 

publish a paper many months after work on the project had begun. 

In addition, it appeared that NASA lacked an efficient mechanism 

to resolve the dispute. We believe that NASA needs to work towards a model that encourages agency scientists and engineers to 

consult with export control professionals when projects involving 

foreign nationals are initiated and develop a mechanism for resolving disputes in a timely manner. 

Second, we believe export control professionals at the various 

NASA Centers should improve their understanding of the type and 

location of export-controlled technology and information at their 

Centers and at other facilities under their control. For example, in 

the course of a recent investigation we learned that a Center Export Control Administrator was not aware that an off-site lab 

under his responsibility contained export-controlled equipment and 
49 

data. Center export control personnel need this information to ensure that foreign nationals do not have access to those areas. 

Third, we encourage NASA to study the best practices noted in 

the GAO and NAPA reports and adopt them at all of their Centers. 

As we have learned through our oversight work in other areas, 

NASA Centers often work independently from one another and do 

not consistently learn about or benefit from successful practices developed at other locations. We were particularly intrigued by the 

discussion about the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s success with using 

engineers and scientists as Export Control Representatives to work 

with the Lab’s export control staff, a model that could help address 

the lack early interaction between project managers and export 

control staff we observed at Ames as well as provide a mechanism 

for dispute resolution. 

Finally, we agree that NASA needs to improve and expand training to provide its scientists and engineers with a deeper understanding of the importance of complying with the rules and regulations governing export control and foreign national access. 

That concludes my remarks and I would be pleased to answer 

any questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Robinson follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Ms. Robinson. 

I now recognize our final witness, Mr. Webster. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DOUGLAS WEBSTER, FELLOW, 

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC 

ADMINISTRATION AND PRINCIPAL, 

CAMBIO CONSULTING GROUP 

Mr. WEBSTER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Committee. I thank you for the opportunity to present the National 

Academy of Public Administration’s assessment of NASA’s Foreign 

National Access Management. 

NASA’s charter to work cooperatively and share information with 

other nations while safeguarding its classified and proprietary information and assets can prove to be a challenging task. Security 

incidents involving foreign nationals at NASA research centers 

have led to justifiable scrutiny by NASA, the media, and Congress. 

Having a well-run Foreign National Access Management, or 

FNAM, program is in the best interest of NASA both in terms of 

protecting vital U.S. security and proprietary information, as well 

as capitalizing on the talents of foreign nationals. 

The panel report describes a number of important steps the 

agency can take to improve Foreign National Access Management 

and has proposed 27 specific recommendations which I will summarize under six topic areas, the first of which is a recommendation 

to manage Foreign National Access Management as a program. 

There is no systematic approach to FNAM at NASA. It is not 

managed as a program but rather in a more stove-piped organizational fashion. Individual headquarters elements produce program 

requirements which are in turn subject to broadly varying interpretations by NASA centers. Additionally, headquarters has inadequate means for determining the overall efficacy of these processes with a resulting broad range of outcomes, many of which are 

unsatisfactory. 

The second topic area is to reduce the flexibility given to centers 

to interpret FNAM requirements. The panel believes that NASA 

FNAM directives are overly broad and subject to too much interpretation in the field combining too much flexibility for interpreting 

largely procedural processes with a stove-piped organizational 

structure that produces organizationally specific directives, results 

in inconsistent, ineffective, and often fundamentally flawed outcomes. 

The third topic area is for NASA to determine critical assets and 

build mechanisms to protect them. NASA needs to improve how it 

protects all of its valuable technical—excuse me, technical data and 

proprietary information, not simply the proprietary sensitive and/ 

or classified information potentially exposed to foreign nationals. 

The panel recommended that NASA strengthen its risk management capability by building on existing agency risk review processes to compile a comprehensive assessment of risks and threats. 

The fourth topic area concerns information technology. The panel 

believes that NASA needs to correct long-standing information 

technology security issues. During this review, NASA IT professionals expressed strong concerns about the security of the agency’s 

non-classified systems with some believing that these systems have 
58 

already been compromised. This finding is reinforced by other reviews of NASA’s information technology, including those done by 

the NASA IG. 

The fifth topic area concerns NASA organizational culture, which 

in many ways is exemplary, but when considering FNAM, NASA 

needs to change several aspects of its culture. The first aspect of 

NASA culture involves unnecessary competition between NASA 

field centers. Some centers struggle to solve problems that other 

centers have already resolved, wasting time and money. NASA also 

needs to approach its current budget situation in an organizationally united fashion. 

A second aspect concerns accountability. The belief that individuals are not held accountable for ignoring or deliberately failing to 

comply with FNAM requirements is widespread at NASA and includes both managers and rank-and-file employees. 

A third aspect of NASA culture that needs to be addressed is the 

organizational tendency to revert back to prior lax habits once a 

problem has been solved and the tension of the moment has 

passed. 

The sixth and final topic area involves communicating the importance of these FNAM changes clearly, firmly, and consistently. The 

importance of security, the existence of real-world threats to NASA 

assets, and the need for improvements in handling foreign national 

issues have not been clearly and consistently communicated 

throughout NASA. Senior leaders must communicate their total 

commitment to an effective Foreign National Access Management 

program. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me note that I believe the Academy 

has provided NASA with a good template for building a more robust and effective FNAM program and that the agency has the 

right leadership and commitment to make that happen. The Academy is in a prime position to assist NASA and this Committee in 

implementing the panel’s recommendations and providing the Committee with information to the extent to which NASA has complied 

with the recommendations. With the Committee’s support and 

oversight, I am certain this program will continue to provide NASA 

with the foreign talent it needs to fulfill its mission while capably 

safeguarding sensitive information. 

Thank you for providing me this opportunity to share these findings with you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Webster follows:] 
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Chairman PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Webster. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

Reminding Members that Committee rules limit questioning to 

five minutes, the Chair will at this point open the round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

The NASA IG report on Bo Jiang stated Jiang admitted that the 

laptop computer he carried with him when he attempted to leave 

the United States in March contains some NASA information. According to these Department of Justice officials, the nature of the 

information on Jiang’s computer and how he obtained it remains 

under investigation. The OIG report also states that Jiang had access to a NASA employee’s computer that specialized in technology 

that would allow for real-time video image enhancement to improve 

aircraft safety by making it easier for pilots to fly in poor visibility 

conditions. 

Ms. Robinson, are you aware of the status of this investigation? 

Has anyone looked into whether Jiang transferred any information 

electronically prior to being stopped at the airport since he had access to NASA information long before he attempted to leave the 

country? 

Ms. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman, to my knowledge the investigation 

is still open. The FBI is the cognizant law enforcement agency in 

that regard. 

Chairman PALAZZO. So it is ongoing and active? 

Ms. ROBINSON. As far as I am aware, it is still open. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Okay. The IG’s report on Bo Jiang incident 

states that from an individual perspective, the preponderance of 

the evidence available to us suggest that one of Jiang’s sponsors inappropriately authorized Jiang to take the laptop to China. Mr. 

Keegan, has that individual been reprimanded, and if so, how? 

Mr. KEEGAN. We appreciate the Office of Inspector General—— 

Chairman PALAZZO. Your mike, please. 

Mr. KEEGAN. We appreciate the Office of Inspector General’s report on the entire Bo Jiang incident and we have concurred with 

all those recommendations. 

With respect to personnel actions, I can’t discuss them here, but 

I can assure you that that report got the personal attention of the 

Administrator and appropriate actions have been taken or will be 

taken at the appropriate time. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Will you be able to provide some of that information to professional staff, Committee staff? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I don’t think I can discuss specific individuals with 

respect to personnel actions. I would also note because of the ongoing investigation, there are some actions that NASA could not have 

appropriately taken until that investigation is concluded. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Okay. Thank you. 

The IG’s Ames report states that a foreign national working at 

Ames inappropriately traveled overseas with a NASA-issued laptop 

containing ITAR-restricted information. The report also stated, ‘‘we 

believe several Ames managers exercised poor judgment in their 

dealings with foreign nationals.’’ With respect to ITAR issues, we 

found that several foreign nationals, without the required license, 

worked on projects that were later determined to involve ITAR-restricted information. In addition, on two occasions, a senior Ames 
76 

manager inappropriately shared documents with unlicensed foreign 

nationals that contained ITAR markings or had been identified as 

containing ITAR-restricted information by NASA export control 

personnel. 

Mr. Keegan, similar to the other question, were any of these individuals reprimanded, and if so, how? 

Mr. KEEGAN. As noted in Ms. Robinson’s opening statement, 

there was a great confusion and disagreement at Ames about what 

was the appropriate roles and responsibilities and whether exportcontrolled information was involved or not, and those pointed to 

weaknesses in our guidance and in our policy and procedures, and 

we have concurred with the recommendations to improve those 

items and we are moving to implement those changes. 

Again, with respect to personnel actions, I can’t discuss those but 

I will say in that case, again, the Administrator personally got involved with that report in response to it and appropriate actions 

have been taken. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Keegan. And we respect the fact that you are not going to be able to directly talk 

about personnel actions. That is private in nature. We may delve 

more into it at a later time but, you know, it goes back to the culture of, you know, just kind of shrugging off these incidents, not 

taking them seriously. And if senior officials don’t reprimand, you 

know, the parties that are allowing this sensitive information to 

possibly be compromised, it sends the wrong message across the 

entire institution. So we hope you will continue taking these recommendations and not just concurring with them but actually implementing them and then punishing those going forward if they 

continue to violate ITAR restrictions. 

My last question, the GAO report states that NASA headquarters export control officials and Center Export Administrators 

lack a comprehensive inventory of the types and location of exportcontrolled technologies and centers limiting their ability to identify 

internal and external risks to export control compliance. This is not 

new. The GAO report also recognized that NASA’s lack of comprehensive inventory of its export-controlled technologies is a longstanding issue that the NASA Inspector General identified as early 

as 1999. I know Ms. Martin’s testimony touched on this. 

So Mr. Keegan, how can NASA protect what it doesn’t know it 

has? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I think the reports that you cited pointed out opportunities for NASA to improve its sort of centralized approach to 

categorizing the risk and the vulnerable technologies in our system. 

NASA has concurred with those recommendations and is consulting 

with our own internal Chief Technologist Office, Protective Services 

and the Mission Support Directorate to identify existing catalogs of 

technologies that would prove useful in implementing a risk-based 

assessment of Key technologies. We are also working to improve 

our internal reviews and audits in both export control and Foreign 

National Access Management and to strengthen compliance and accountability mechanisms to address the issue you raised in your 

comment that individuals need to be held accountable for knowing 

their responsibilities and for fulfilling those responsibilities. 
77 

Chairman PALAZZO. Well, I appreciate that. You know, the issue 

has been out there for 15 years. You know, Congress wants to trust 

NASA that they are going to take corrective action this time and 

fix the problem. 

At this time I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Maffei. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It seems to me that we are just lucky that even more sensitive 

information hasn’t been compromised. I will ask Mr. Keegan, why 

is international collaboration so critical to NASA’s mission and 

should we just suspend international cooperation until these security concerns are addressed? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Cooperation with international nations is actually 

part of the NASA’s foundational legislation, the Space Act, and 

NASA has derived great benefits from our international cooperation. Over half the operational science missions have significant 

international participation and contributions. The International 

Space Station obviously depends heavily on international contributions, and humans have inhabited that facility continuously for 13 

years. So a lot of NASA’s best, greatest accomplishments have depended on international contributions and cooperation. 

Given those benefits, we need to balance that with our duty to 

protect sensitive export-controlled information, and that is, you 

know, a balance that has been mentioned by a number of the reports we are talking about today. And when the Administrator first 

became aware of issues, that sort of shook his confidence that we 

were able to fulfill that responsibility. Therefore, he took immediate action to stand down, for example, to issue a moratorium on 

foreign national access until each center director could validate 

their compliance with existing rules and policies through internal 

reviews, and he also took down a NASA website, the NASA NTRS 

website, which is the website through which we share publicly the 

results of NASA’s scientific and technical research until we could 

validate that all the documents, over a million on that website, had 

proper internal controls. 

And as a result of these actions and other actions we are taking 

in response to the reports we are discussing here today, NASA is 

confident that we can assure the security of sensitive export-controlled information. 

Mr. MAFFEI. All right. Thank you, Mr. Keegan. 

Mr. Webster, are you satisfied that NASA is making due 

progress in addressing the concerns of your organization? 

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, I can say that they were very receptive and 

very cooperative with the study. The study has not reviewed the 

progress that they have made since our recommendations, and so 

that progress remains to be seen. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Ms. Martin and Ms. Robinson, can you comment on 

the progress since the study? 

Ms. ROBINSON. We have not gone to see what NASA has done 

since the study in terms of an audit or anything like that, but I 

agree that they have been very receptive to our recommendations 

and I believe they are working hard on the matter. 

Ms. MARTIN. Likewise, NASA agreed with all seven of our recommendations. We were certainly encouraged that the Administrator issued a memo to all staff reiterating the importance of ex-
78 

port controls and also met with the Center Export Administrators. 

So that is an example of the tone from the top. But again, we have 

not fully evaluated all of the actions. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Mr. Keegan, Mr. Webster talked about, in his testimony, some cultural changes that would need to take place at 

NASA. Those are very challenging for any Administrator to implement. Do you feel if the current Administrator is able to change 

some of the culture at NASA? How are you approaching that? 

Mr. KEEGAN. In a couple ways. NASA is looking at our whole 

competition model as to the advantages and to the drawbacks of 

that model and we acknowledge that that sometimes creates incentives not to share information across centers in a way that is helpful to NASA as a whole. I think the Administrator has emphasized 

directly both to me and Associate Administrator Robert Lightfoot 

and to the Center Directors and Mission Directors who report to 

Mr. Lightfoot that they will be held accountable for implementing 

the actions in response to these reports and for emphasizing and 

complying with the requirements in these areas and for seeing that 

that is done in their organizations. 

Mr. MAFFEI. I thank the witnesses and yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Dr. Broun for five minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Keegan, I am a little perplexed—actually a little more than 

perplexed about NASA’s priorities toward protecting sensitive or 

secure information. Chairman Palazzo has called this hearing because of multiple points highlighting NASA’s poor oversight and 

management in protecting sensitive information, yet your written 

statement discusses a request for ‘‘new’’ statutory authority for— 

to allow NASA to withhold from the public certain technical data 

requested under FOIA. 

It is also my understanding that NASA has resisted the Committee’s efforts to make public the NAPA report even with an offer for 

the agency to redact it. 

Now, don’t get me wrong; I am certainly not encouraging NASA 

to release sensitive information. But to be clear, it is NASA’s position that the entire NAPA report, the entire NAPA report, is sensitive and that no aspect whatsoever can be released without compromising security vulnerabilities. 

If so, would you please provide this Committee a detailed list of 

the specific passages and concerns NASA is worried about releasing? For instance, I find it hard to believe that the background section has anything of concern within it. 

Mr. KEEGAN. NASA appreciates the comprehensive, thorough, 

and detailed analysis that the NAPA panel did on our security 

vulnerabilities and problems with our systems and processes, internal deliberations, IT assets, and so forth. We also appreciate the 

fact that they rank-ordered their 27 recommendations with an assessment of risk associated with each one so that we could 

prioritize our actions and response. But the combination of that information would serve to make vulnerable the very information 

that we are trying to protect by improving our processes in these 

areas. The information that would provide—you know, too much information about our vulnerabilities—is interwoven throughout the 

report, so to meaningfully and thoroughly redact it, to take that 
79 

out, would in our opinion make the report no more useful than the 

executive summary which summarizes the six areas of recommendations and at the same time still pose a risk to security. 

So NASA has no plans to publicly release that report, although we 

have provided a copy of the full report—an SBU full report to the 

Committee Chairman at his request. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Webster, do you believe there is any specific information in the NAPA report that is sensitive, and if so, could it 

be redacted that the entire—that the public could read the rest of 

the report? We have just heard what Mr. Keegan said. 

Mr. WEBSTER. I do believe that there is some information in 

there that is sensitive and I do understand the basic underlying 

premise that you can take individually—information that is standing on its own is not sensitive, but when you piece it together with 

other related pieces of information, it can provide insight to an adversary that might be useful they would otherwise not gain. So I 

understand the philosophy. I am not in a position to judge if you 

will because we haven’t done that analysis and we don’t really have 

that charter to provide that type of analysis, but I do understand 

the basic logic. 

Mr. BROUN. Ms. Robinson, ironically, it appears that—as though 

NASA is more concerned about protecting this report rather than 

its own sensitive information. As this hearing demonstrates, this 

Committee is very aware of the impact of releasing sensitive information. I am worried, however, that NASA is suppressing this report not because it would compromise security but because it would 

embarrass the agency. Would the NASA Office of Inspector General 

be willing to conduct a review of the decision to classify this report 

as sensitive but unclassified? 

Ms. ROBINSON. Well, I have to admit I haven’t thought of that. 

We certainly could take it under advisement. 

Mr. BROUN. I hope you will do so because I am very concerned 

about this. And as Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee, it is 

my responsibility in our Committee to make sure that we have all 

the information, and it seems to me that NASA has been more— 

has let sensitive information out. 

Mr. Chairman, I have got a question if you would allow me to 

go over my time a half-minute. 

But, Mr. Keegan, without divulging personal information, how 

are the individuals that have allowed these compromises been punished, reprimanded, or dealt with? Now, you can tell us that in 

open session like this. And I realize that also we can go into closed 

session. We can go into whatever means it takes to protect a personal—a person’s identity, et cetera. Certainly I am not asking you 

to divulge any personal information here today, but can you tell us 

how have these individuals been reprimanded, punished, or dealt 

with? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Their management has certainly spoken with the 

responsible individuals about the incidents and the facts underlying the report and I would say taken appropriate personnel action for which the—— 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Keegan, that is not an answer. If you would just 

please—whatever—would you provide that to our Committee or the 

Committee staff? 
80 

Mr. KEEGAN. I don’t—I believe as a matter of privacy we can’t 

provide information about employee discipline. 

Mr. BROUN. Well, I think you can provide how—individuals, that 

is true. You cannot tell us how an individual particularly has been 

reprimanded, punished, or dealt with, but I think you can give us 

an idea. People need to be reprimanded. What I have seen over and 

over again in this Oversight Subcommittee, not only in this Committee but others, is people violate what they are supposed to be 

doing, they violate security, and nothing ever happens. And I am 

sick of it. And I hope that you all will provide this Committee some 

information. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. Thank you. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. 

Edwards. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our 

witnesses today. 

You know, when you look back at NASA and the establishment 

of the Space Act in 1958, it is an important consideration to look 

at NASA’s mission and the complications of balancing both the 

openness that is expected in the scientific and research innovation 

community and cooperation around the world with these really important security interests, and so for me it really, you know, raises 

a question about intent of the agency and the civil servants versus 

a culture that we need to work to change and shape so that there 

is more consideration of security, still respecting the overall mission of the agency. And I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today. 

I especially want to commend Ms. Martin. I know that you are 

here and you are in your waning days after 36 years of public service, and so I want to thank you for that. I am reminded all the 

time, especially as one who represents a local Congressional District here in the Metropolitan Washington region in Maryland 

about all of the important and valuable work of our civil servants, 

wherever they fall. 

And so it leads me to the question about what is going on at the 

agency. And so, Ms. Martin, I would like to address this to you if 

you would, and other witnesses, please chime in. I wonder if, in 

looking at the conclusions of your three reports, whether you conclude that the security weaknesses that you found stem from an inconsistent application of policies and guidance on protecting sensitive information, technologies, and other assets of the agency and 

centers rather than from a conscious disregard of security measures by NASA personnel? 

Ms. MARTIN. Well, first, Ms. Edwards, I would like to thank you 

for your very kind remark, and it is indeed a pleasure to have this 

opportunity to testify before this Committee, the Subcommittees, a 

week before I am actually due to retire. It has been indeed an 

honor and a pleasure to serve the Congress and the American public for 36 years. So thank you very much for that. 

And to your question, we certainly did not find any widespread 

indications of overt attempts to circumvent policies and procedures. 

As we state in our report, there were certainly some lack of clarity 

in terms of the policies and procedures, and as you well know, 

NASA devolves a lot of responsibility to its centers, and so we 
81 

found variations across those centers in terms of how they implemented policies and procedures. And no doubt accountability is important, but there was not any widespread indication in terms of 

our work that someone went about, you know, deliberately trying 

to circumvent policies and procedures. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much for clarifying that. And it 

then leads me, Mr. Webster, to a question for you, and that is 

around the culture at NASA and what you are doing because it 

strikes me—and I worked at Goddard Space Flight Center, so I 

know this—the importance of devolving a lot of responsibilities to 

the agency because in part that is what creates an environment of 

innovation and creativity. And so how do you then balance security 

concerns and preventing breaches of release of sensitive information with a culture in which you want to encourage innovation and 

creativity? What can you do to bring a lot more consistency to the 

application of these issues within the agency? 

Mr. WEBSTER. I believe that the cultural issue is perhaps one of 

the largest challenges being faced as a result of this review because 

unlike information technology or policies that can be changed and 

so on, changing the culture is a long-term effort. It may be that 

NASA and the workforce looks at its mission as a set of objectives 

and then the rest of what NASA has to do is sort of what they have 

to do in order to be able to execute the mission. And that would 

be unfortunate. And I suspect that is the case in many cases because instead, the housekeeping types of things that need to occur 

needed to be viewed as part of the mission so it is not this balancing what do we have to put up with in order to achieve the mission? It is recognized as part of the mission. 

And going back to your earlier question, I would say that in my 

perception, and I believe it is reflected in our study, is that NASA 

has consistent policy but it is inconsistently applied, and so that is 

where I think getting the culture to understand that as part of 

their mission is important. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, if you can indulge me 

with Mr. Broun’s 30 seconds, I would appreciate it. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I will. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So I want to go to Mr. Keegan. I mean there has 

been some discussion about an oversight body such as the internal 

Asset Protection Oversight Board that has been advocated by 

NAPA to oversee safety concerns. What is your view about the necessity and how NASA would view the necessity of standing up 

such a board? 

Mr. KEEGAN. We think that is a valuable recommendation and 

we agree that that function would be useful to help us address 

challenges in this area and we are looking to set up something 

along those lines that would then report up to the agency’s Mission 

Support Council to implement that recommendation. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dick Thornburgh, panel chair, testified before Congress on April 

the 8th of 2014 that the National Academy of Public Administration, or NAPA, as we have been referring to it, found that ‘‘there 
82 

is little accountability for noncompliance when identified through 

specific incidents or periodic assessments. This validates the identified perception among NASA personnel that ’mandatory compliance’ means little as there are few if any consequences for deliberate or inadvertent violations of the mandates.’’ NAPA further 

found that ‘‘NASA headquarters officials and center directors have 

not adequately communicated that strict compliance was and is required for a foreign national hosting, sponsoring, and escort policy 

and procedures.’’ Finally, NAPA also found that ‘‘a number of 

NASA leaders also noted that the agency tends not to hold individuals accountable even when they make serious preventable errors. 

Whenever an example of such an error was mentioned during 

interviews, Academy staff would follow up with: what happened to 

those responsible for the error? In almost every instance, the answer was either ’nothing’ or ’I don’t know’.’’ Mr. Keegan, who at 

NASA is responsible for ensuring accountability for protecting sensitive information at NASA? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Ultimately—the ultimate accountability for that is 

the Administrator and I think the Administrator has made it clear 

through his actions in response to these reports that he takes that 

responsibility very seriously. He or the Associate Administrator has 

traveled to every center to emphasize that every employee has the 

responsibility in this area. His message that Ms. Martin mentioned 

earlier that he sent to every employee at NASA said he wanted 

to—I am quoting—‘‘I also want to remind each of you of your responsibility to comply with all export control regulations and our 

foreign national management requirements. This is a serious matter and penalties for noncompliance can include fines and imprisonment, as well as administrative personnel actions such as reduction 

in grade or even termination.’’ And he has directed us, as we improve the internal audit functions for both export control and foreign national access, to address strengthening compliance and accountability mechanisms. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, inasmuch as it is clear that there are many 

NASA employees who are not doing their jobs protecting NASA’s 

sensitive technology and information or protecting America’s national security by protecting information of a national security concern, why haven’t these individuals been fired or otherwise seriously punished? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I am not sure the specific incidents to which you 

are referring. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, you just testified that you have got the NASA 

Administrator, Associate Administrator talking to these individuals 

who apparently aren’t following our sensitive information and national security interest, and that there is a problem in NASA according to the NAPA report. How many of them have been fired, 

the employees who have not been in compliance with NASA’s own 

rules and regulations concerning protection of sensitive information 

and protection of our national security? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I am not aware of any findings of intentional misconduct on the part of NASA employees but rather problems with 

understanding the roles and responsibilities as spelled out by the 

policies and procedures. 
83 

Mr. BROOKS. So if the employees are just not doing their jobs, 

they are not paying attention, they are negligent, grossly negligent, 

NASA doesn’t terminate them because they are doing a bad performance job? 

Mr. KEEGAN. We have—we acknowledge that we have shortcomings in this area of accountability and I think the Administrator has taken strong actions to address those shortcomings. 

Mr. BROOKS. And does that strong action include the threat to 

terminate the NASA employees who intentionally or negligently or 

through gross or reckless misconduct fail to protect sensitive NASA 

material, thereby also failing to protect America’s national security? Do we have assurances that in the future these people will 

be fired if they risk our country’s sensitive information and national security? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Well, you have NASA’s assurance we will take the 

appropriate disciplinary actions, the most serious of which include 

termination. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I hope in the future that termination will be 

an option that NASA will utilize because I can assure you in the 

private sector those folks are gone. And in the public sector we 

should treat employees who fail to do their jobs similarly. Thank 

you for your responses. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Ms. Bonamici. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony, for being here 

today. This is an important topic. Of course it has national security 

implications but also we are pondering whether the recommendations made by the reports that we are discussing here today, 

whether they could impact some of the core elements of NASA’s 

mission. 

Also, I have to say that the public is really looking to us to find 

the right balance, and we heard that word this morning, balance, 

quite a lot, between of course keeping our country safe and protecting sensitive research and data, maintaining our country’s leadership role, but also understanding that there is importance in 

NASA publicly disseminating the results of research and the scope 

of its scientific activities. I have to say that that is important for 

many reasons but especially to help educate the public about the 

benefits of NASA’s work. So it is finding that right balance. 

I do want to point out that, Dr. Webster, you said in your testimony that NASA provided complete cooperation for this review and 

NASA interviewees were candid, cooperative, and eager to offer 

both suggestions and be involved in problem-solving, and I just 

wanted to point that out, that you recognized that when you did 

your assessment. And that is so important. 

We look at the report from the NAPA, National Academy of Public Administration, and they acknowledge that foreign national participation in NASA programs and projects is an inherent and essential element in NASA operations. So considering the implications that the OIG and the NAPA reports have on these areas, I 

am interested in whether our witnesses see any potential to improve international collaboration through the recommendations of 

these reports if they are all implemented. Might there be a possibility that international collaboration is improved? If you just want 
84 

to each state briefly whether you agree that there is any potential 

there? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I think the thoughtful recommendations from all 

three of the reports that we are talking about here this morning 

offer the opportunity for NASA to strengthen its foreign national 

participation by having clear guidance and by assigning roles and 

responsibilities that everyone understands and complies with. This 

will sort of make it easier for involving foreign nationals as appropriate in our research. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Does anyone disagree with that? Ms. Martin? 

Ms. MARTIN. No. I would agree that it is not an either/or, and 

obviously foreign participation, international agreements are important to NASA’s work, as Mr. Keegan and others have said, but 

it is important to have those clear policies and procedures and we 

think that risk-based approach to compliance is really one way that 

can help NASA with that balance. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Ms. Robinson, Dr. Webster, do you agree with—— 

Ms. ROBINSON. Yes. 

Mr. WEBSTER. I do as well. I believe it is a risk-based approach 

and it is a balancing act. I mean you can obviously have more collaboration by ignoring security, but there is a cost to be paid for 

that. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Right. And thank you. I want to follow up on 

questions that were just asked. It seems listening to the testimony 

and reviewing what you have submitted that the core problems described in the reports are because individual NASA employees did 

not appropriately follow existing policies or procedures. So I want 

to start with Mr. Keegan. Do you see that as resulting from inadequate training, ineffective organizational structure, or a lack of resources, or some of each? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I think that it is a combination, and we are taking 

action. One of the earlier reports mentioned that there was confusion and bureaucracy in the implementation of these requirements, 

so we are trying to address that through clarified policy, through 

clarified training. And also we have detailed a full-time person who 

is a project engineer who can sort of put these export control requirements in language and in the training sort of in terms of the 

process that flight project folks understand in terms of what their 

responsibilities are. So we think there are improvements to be 

made in all three areas. 

And we are allocating, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

increased resources to this area as well. And I think the Foreign 

National Access program will pull together, you know, the coordination of the various elements in this area of responsibility across 

the agency. 

Ms. BONAMICI. And the recommendations that NASA is implementing, do you see those as realistic fixes? Once implemented, 

will they resolve the problems that were brought to light by the assessment? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Absolutely realistic fixes and we hope they will address all of the issues, but in my 32 years at NASA I have never 

seen a strong external review that has failed to identify some areas 

where we could continue to improve as well. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. 
85 

And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Keegan, I think you are aware everybody on this panel, probably everyone in this room I think is a friend to NASA. They recognize NASA does many wonderful things. They want them to do 

many more things. But like everybody in this room, NASA is not 

perfect. We can’t expect anybody to be perfect. But we are talking 

about matters of national security now and we need to be as close 

to perfect as we can possibly be. And when Members ask questions 

like about disciplinary action in the past, you know, and they kind 

of get rope-a-dope here, you know, the bobbing and weaving, no direct answers. It sounds petulant, arrogant, defiant. It seems like an 

us-against-them, and I know that you don’t intend that but that is 

how it comes across. 

This is not my first rodeo with issues like this. Financial Services 

Committee, the Securities and Exchange Commission played ropea-dope with us for a couple years. They let Bernard Madoff steal 

$70 billion from people, innocent people. People died because of it. 

People went broke. People are living in poverty now instead of a 

comfortable retirement because about 50 people in that agency 

didn’t do their job. And we had great Inspector General reports, IG 

reports, made recommendations about what the accountability 

should be, and we got the rope-a-dope from the SEC for years. 

Well, we are working on it. Some of these things are still pending. 

We can’t talk about them. It is a big secret. 

So finally, basically under Freedom of Information Act, we find 

out that none of the recommendations for disciplinary actions were 

taken. Everybody was let off easy. One explanation that was supposed to make us happy is the Secretary said, well, it might please 

you to know that half the employees are no longer with the agency 

that let him do all these things bad. I said, well, you know, great. 

That is problem solved. A pedophile moved into a different neighborhood. No. I mean they are retired on the government’s dime. 

They took jobs as investigators or compliance people for other agencies maybe. That doesn’t solve any problems because they are not 

with the agency. 

So we wonder how many of people in your agency that we are 

going to find out three years from now, oh, well, we let them hang 

in there until they got a better job and could double their salary 

on K Street or whatever, you know. I mean we would like some serious answers and I think you owe them. 

And my question to you now, has any disciplinary action ever 

been taken? And you can tell me yes or no and tell me what kind 

it was. 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes, disciplinary action has been taken. I know certainly of instances of counseling. I don’t know of—— 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. 

Mr. KEEGAN. —any other specifics related to the issues in these 

reports we are talking about here today. I certainly know about instances elsewhere in NASA where—I mean I don’t think NASA 

shies away from taking appropriate discipline up to and including 

removal. 
86 

Mr. POSEY. Has anyone ever been removed, do you know? 

Mr. KEEGAN. At NASA? 

Mr. POSEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KEEGAN. Sure. 

Mr. POSEY. Over security breaches? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I don’t know that. 

Mr. POSEY. Could you find out for us? We would like to kind of 

have a summary. You can tell us what actions have taken and you 

don’t have to name employees. The IG has even named specific employees and said this employee did this; they should be disciplined 

like such. Of course they weren’t, you know, but I think we would 

like to know what the history is, with the track record is, if actions 

have really been taken. I mean do these people write these reports 

to come in and give them to Congress and then the agencies just 

blow them off and say, those suckers, they can’t make us do anything? 

I mean that is the way it seems sometimes. That is the way a 

lot of the taxpayers feel at home. They see that there is a lack of 

accountability in government. We come here, we hold hearings, and 

yeah, we will check into that, yeah, we will report on that, and 

sure, we will get back with you. But we don’t. I mean I have got 

stacks of unanswered correspondence, you know, over my head. It 

seems like, you know, some of the agencies just refuse to do any 

compliance and it just—it seems like it is us, government, against 

them, the public or their representatives. And we would like to 

think that that culture is not pervasive in NASA, but when we 

can’t get straight answers, that is the conclusion people tend to 

think. And it makes it hard. 

I mean we want to get funding for NASA to big things. It takes 

money. And the public perception is, you know, that NASA gets 20 

percent of the budget. We know the reality you get 1/2 of one percent and we know that is plundered. We know that comes through 

like a big pı ̆nata from everything from the COPS program to whatever other pet projects people want to steal from NASA because, 

number one, we don’t do a good PR job in NASA and I could spend 

a couple hours talking about that; and number two, people already 

think we spend too much money on it; and number three, there is 

cases like this where they don’t see a lack of accountability. 

So I would hope that when you come in here to share with us, 

we work toward changing that, that it is not us against them. We 

are just trying to see that there is some fundamental accountability. We try and teach our children that in school. You know, everybody in the private sector has it that I know about and we just 

want to see that that is in place at NASA, too. 

And again, we are not talking about personalities. We are literally, we are literally talking about the national security of this 

Nation. We are talking about people that come here from another 

country and we can’t expect you to profile everybody who is going 

to have access to any information because they shake down everybody when they get home, from tourists, to students, to everybody 

else. We know that is tough but we have to get off the dime and 

move in that direction. And when people seemingly almost willfully 

violate or transgress guidelines that make this nation secure, they 
87 

need to be held accountable and you need to let us know that that 

is happening. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to associate myself with some of the comments that 

my colleague Mr. Posey said. I am a big fan of NASA. I mean I 

grew up on Buck Rogers and Star Trek and enamored by space 

travel. I have got NASA, Glenn, in Ohio. I am a big, big fan of 

NASA’s. 

But, Mr. Keegan, some of your responses don’t rise to the level 

of credibility with what we are dealing with here today. How did 

you go about preparing for this hearing today? You knew this was 

going to be about security breaches and personnel having done 

those, but we are getting a lot of ‘‘I don’t know’’ answers. What did 

you do to prepare for today’s hearing? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I reviewed the reports and—— 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. You did review the reports? 

Mr. KEEGAN. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Okay. That is a good start because you 

said earlier that you were not aware of any deliberate actions by 

NASA employees to violate security protocols. Have I got that 

right? Is that what you said earlier? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I am not aware of any specific employees that 

have—— 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Okay. Well, in the report—— 

Mr. KEEGAN. —been identified—— 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. —from—in the report from GAO they 

state that in some instances in terms of trying to avoid export control review, they said it was the result of deliberate action by authors to avoid export control review of papers prior to release. And 

yet you say you read the reports and to come to this hearing and 

not know whether or not people have been addressed and disciplined for those types of deliberate actions, that doesn’t rise to a 

level of credibility for me, and I worked for almost 26–1/2 years in 

the Air Force, much of that in top-secret and classified conditions. 

I know at least in the environment I worked in where the buck 

stopped. You are pretty close to where the buck stops. I am a little 

incensed that you don’t know the answers to these questions that 

you are saying you don’t know the answers to. 

Let me go back to one that Mr. Posey asked you. You said that 

there have been people removed from NASA but specifically in your 

written testimony you noted that penalties for noncompliance with 

export control regulations, of which reviews are part of and Foreign 

National Access Management requirements, that those penalties 

could include fines, imprisonment, or administrative personnel actions. Well, let me ask you again—and you don’t have to give me 

a specific name of anyone—but do you—has anyone in NASA received any of those things—fines, imprisonment, or administrative 

personnel actions—for a security breach—for a deliberate security 

breach, as noted by GAO? Has anyone been disciplined to that 

level? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I will take that question for the record and provide 

you a response. 
88 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Okay. I would appreciate that. Thank you 

very much. 

Ms. Robinson’s testimony noted that NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory has had success using engineers and scientists as export 

control representatives to work with the export control personnel, 

so I will ask, Mr. Keegan, if you know the answer to this. Maybe 

others on the panel want to comment. Can someone provide a more 

detailed explanation of the process of working with scientists as export control representatives? I mean what do the scientists at 

NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory do that scientists at NASA centers do not do? How do they work differently with export control 

personnel? 

Mr. KEEGAN. I would like whoever reviewed that as a model that 

we can look at to describe it. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Okay. So we are not sure. Okay. 

Ms. ROBINSON. I think it is just—again, this was not in our report; it was something that I noted in the other reports, but I think 

it is a process that they have in place, a way to have interactions 

between the two groups of professionals so they are having conversations and they are understanding what kind of projects are we 

working on, are there foreign nationals working here, how do we 

resolve these issues? So it is a process. 

Mr. JOHNSON OF OHIO. Okay. All right. Well, that five minutes 

went fast. 

Mr. Chairman, I guess I will yield back the balance of my time, 

the one second I have got. 

Chairman PALAZZO. Are you sure you don’t want 30 more seconds or a minute? Okay. 

That is perfect time and I do believe votes were just called or did 

they go back in session? Well, the buzzer went off. 

Well, it is absolutely obvious that this Committee takes our national security very importantly. It is a bipartisan issue. It is also 

obvious that when you look at the global events around the world 

that the world is not becoming safer; it is becoming much more 

dangerous. And America’s leadership in space isn’t just about national pride; it is about national security. And we are not going to 

wait 15 years to make sure that these recommendations are being 

implemented by NASA. We are going to be looking forward to reports every year and we are going to be taking a hard look at this. 

So I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the 

Members for their questions. Members of the Committee may have 

additional questions for you and we will ask you to respond to 

those in writing. The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written questions from Members. 

The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 
(89) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
90 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Richard Keegan 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 

Responses by Ms. Belva Martin 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 

Responses by Ms. Gail A. Robinson 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 

Responses by Mr. Douglas Webster 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 

(141) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
142 
143 
144 

RESPONSES SUBMITTED BY NASA FOR INFORMATION REQUESTED BY CHAIRMAN BROUN
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