[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12318

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSEPH BROME JACKSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-tp-20037-KMM-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12318

Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Jackson appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for early termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(1). He argues that the district court’s order was insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review. After thorough review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

The relevant background is this. In August 1998, a jury in 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida 

found Jackson guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) 

prepared at the time of his conviction reported prior convictions 

for robbery and battery, and arrests without conviction for child 

abuse, arson, and aggravated assault. The district court imposed a 

248-month sentence, followed by ten years of supervised release. 

In December 2008, the district court reduced Jackson’s sentence to 240 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 706. In July 2015, Jackson completed his prison term and began serving his ten-year term of supervised release. In June 2018, 

his case was transferred to the Southern District of Florida, where 

he would serve the remainder of his supervised release term. In 

October 2018, Jackson moved for early termination of supervised 

release. The court denied his motion in a paperless order, based on 

its “review of the motion, the record, and being fully advised in the 

premises.” Jackson’s appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. 

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In August 2020, Jackson filed a motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 

5194 (“First Step Act”), arguing that a prior conviction used to enhance his sentence had been vacated. The government responded 

in September 2020, but the district court has not yet ruled on it. 

In November 2022, Jackson filed the instant motion, seeking 

once again early termination of supervised release. He reported 

that since his release from prison in July 2015, he had not committed any supervised release violations; in fact, the U.S. Probation Office agreed -- in a letter quoted by Jackson about its position on his 

motion for early termination -- that he had “maintained stable residence with his family members and as of August 2019, he has 

owned and operated Live Life Love Handymen, LLC, a labor company[; and h]e recently obtained a Certified Driver License.” The 

Probation Office also confirmed that Jackson had satisfied his DNA 

testing requirements; paid his special assessment; submitted to all 

required random drug screenings and received negative results; 

and complied with all other conditions of supervision. But the Probation Office said that as for whether Jackson met “the criteria for 

early termination, set forth in . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” he had a

violent criminal history that prevented him from “meeting criteria 

for our office to be in favor of early termination,” although it 

“[g]ranted [that] these arrests occurred more than 20 years ago.”

Jackson responded to the Probation Office’s concerns by arguing in his motion that: (1) the Bureau of Prisons had not classified 

him as a violent offender and had primarily held him in low 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12318

security prisons or prison camps; and (2) he had been substantially 

rehabilitated (for instance, turning over to police a firearm he 

found) and become a productive member of the community. He 

attached letters from community members -- including a pastor, a 

police officer, and several others -- attesting to his good character. 

The government responded to Jackson’s motion. It noted 

that he had received a sentence reduction and previously had been 

denied early termination. But the government mistakenly said that 

Jackson’s pending First Step Act motion was the motion at issue,

providing in one place that: “In the instant motion [sic], the Defendant moves the court to reduce his sentence under the First Step 

Act because his Georgia conviction was vacated in 2004.” On the 

next page, the government referred to the correct motion, arguing

that Jackson was unqualified for early termination of supervised release, despite his rehabilitative efforts, because of “his prior criminal [sic], which includes strongarm robbery, child abuse, arson, and 

aggravated assault.” The government did not cite to § 3583(e) or § 

3553(a) or otherwise delineate the factors.

The district court denied Jackson’s motion in a paperless order without holding a hearing. The court correctly noted that the

motion sought early termination of supervised release and that the 

government had responded, and held: “UPON CONSIDERATION 

of the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, the relevant 

statutory factors, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, 

it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for 

Early Termination of Supervised Release . . . is DENIED.” 

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This timely appeal followed.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for early termination of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017). “A district court 

abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows 

improper procedures in making its determination, or makes clearly 

erroneous factual findings.” United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 

1345 (11th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 

1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“A district court abuses its discretion 

[in applying the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing] when it (1) fails to 

afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant 

weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the 

proper factors.”) (quotations omitted).

A district court overseeing supervised release may terminate 

that term of supervised release after at least a year, upon considering certain factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant 

released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) (citing 

the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D) & (a)(4)–(7)).1 

1 The specified § 3553(a) factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for 

the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to 

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the 

defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 

other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines; (4) 

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Notably, the statute permitting early termination leaves out these 

two § 3553(a) factors: (1) “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to 

reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 

law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; and (2) “the 

kinds of sentence available.” Id. §§ 3583(e)(1), 3553(a)(2)(A), (3).

However, our review of “a district court’s denial of a motion 

for early termination of supervised release . . . under an abuse of 

discretion standard . . . is not simply a rubber stamp.” Johnson, 877 

F.3d at 997 (quotations and citations omitted). Importantly, a district court must explain its decision sufficiently to allow for meaningful appellate review. Id. at 994–95, 997–98; United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2021) (considering a First Step 

Act sentence reduction). To do so, the “court must demonstrate 

that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors” when ruling on the 

early termination of supervised release. Johnson, 877 F.3d at 997. A 

district court “is not required to articulate the applicability of each 

factor, as long as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors 

were taken into account.” United States v. Douglas, 576 F.3d 1216, 

1219 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted) (considering a 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2) motion); Johnson, 877 F.3d at 994–95 (holding the necessity for meaningful appellate review of early termination decisions “mirrors our 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) precedent on the matter”

policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 

been found guilty of similar conduct; and (6) the need to provide restitution 

to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D) & (4)–(7).

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(footnote omitted)). Thus, an order may be sufficient for appellate 

review if the district court notes that it considered the parties’ arguments, and the arguments cite and discuss the relevant statutory 

factors. United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 

2021). The fact that the district court conducted a releasee’s trial 

and sentencing can also provide context and allow its order to be 

meaningfully reviewed. Johnson, 877 F.3d at 999 (noting that “[p]residing over a defendant’s trial acquaints the sentencing judge with 

a wealth of information relevant to the § 3553(a) factors”). 

“But where the order is deficient in explanation, the record 

must clearly imply that the relevant factors were considered -- enough so 

that meaningful appellate review of the factors’ application can 

take place, rather than speculation of whether they were taken into 

account in the first place.” Id. at 998 (emphasis added). The district 

court “must make clear that [it] had a reasoned basis for choosing” 

to deny the motion. Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Chavez-Meza 

v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1966 (2018)). For instance, it is not 

sufficient to merely refer to past orders when circumstances have 

changed and new arguments are raised. Id. Further, an order lacking explanation may be deficient where the defendant’s “brief 

made no mention of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and the Government was not ordered to respond.” Johnson, 877 F.3d at 1000. 

Here, the district court’s order does not allow for meaningful appellate review. For starters, the district court did not conduct 

Jackson’s original trial or sentencing. The court also did not hold a 

hearing on Jackson’s first motion for early termination of 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-12318

supervised release, and in denying that motion, it gave no explanation other than that it “review[ed] . . . the motion, the record, and 

[was] fully advised in the premises.” Thus, we cannot look to that 

order to find “an explanation for its [subsequent] decision.” Id. at 

998. Then, when the court ruled on the instant motion -- Jackson’s

second motion for early termination of supervised release -- it again 

did not hold a hearing and still did not make clear “that it looked

back at [the defendant’s] trial or sentencing record,” id., only generally saying that it reviewed “the pertinent portions of the record.”

Further, we cannot say for sure that the district court considered all the relevant § 3553(a) factors in denying Jackson’s instant 

motion. As we’ve explained, the statutory provision concerning 

early termination of supervised release -- 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) --

includes all but two of the § 3553(a) factors. But while the district 

court said that it considered the “relevant statutory factors” in 

denying Jackson’s motion, the court did not expressly state that it 

considered “the § 3553(a) factors,” much less the § 3553(a) factors 

as pared down in § 3583(e)(1), nor did it discuss them in substance.

Moreover, looking to the record before the district court,

Jackson’s motion (including the section quoting the Probation Office’s position) and the government’s response did not cite any particular statutory factors, and can fairly be read to have focused on

just one -- criminal history. Yet the Probation Office’s treatment of 

this factor was somewhat equivocal, claiming on the one hand that 

Jackson’s criminal history prevented it from “favor[ing]” termination of supervision, while also stressing the age of his prior crimes. 

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For its part, the governmentsaid only that Jackson’s “prior criminal

[sic], which includes strongarm robbery, child abuse, arson, and aggravated assault render him unqualified for early termination of supervised release,” without any statutory citation. It’s also worth 

noting that the government’s response incorrectly described the 

“instant motion” as seeking to reduce Jackson’s sentence under the 

First Step Act, when the “instant motion” actually sought to terminate his supervised release. Importantly, a motion under the First 

Step Act does not require a consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. 

Stevens, 997 F.3d at 1316. So, at the very least, it is not crystal clear 

that the government fully addressed the “history and characteristics” factor found in the relevant statutes, or perhaps that it even 

squarely addressed termination of supervision at all.

In any event, assuming that we could “clearly imply” from 

the record that the district court considered § 3553(a)(1)’s “history 

and characteristics” factor based on the parties’ filings, we’ve identified criminal history as something that may be viewed differently

over time. In Johnson, we remanded to the district court for further 

explanation of its cursory denial of a § 3583(e) motion although that 

very court had presided over the defendant’s trial twenty years 

prior, since “the violent conduct and prior convictions that concerned it at Johnson’s 1997 sentencing are now between twenty 

and thirty years old.” 877 F.3d at 999. As we explained, “[t]heir 

impact on the Court’s decisionmaking could certainly have diminished with the passage of time.” Id. “Without any indication from 

the Court, it would be unacceptable speculation to impart sentencing considerations from 1997 to this case.” Id.

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This case is on all fours with Johnson. Jackson’s original trial 

and sentencing occurred in 1998, and the instant motion was denied in 2023. This means that when the relevant filings mentioned 

Jackson’s criminal history, all of it occurred at least twenty-five

years ago. And while Jackson touched on his rehabilitation efforts 

and his good behavior since he was released, which both the Probation Office and the government confirmed, there is no clear indication that the district court considered this more recent mitigating evidence nor how it should be weighed against his prior criminal history. Again, all the district court told us is that it was denying 

Jackson’s § 3583(e) motion based on its consideration of “the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, the relevant statutory 

factors, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises.” 

On this record, as in Johnson, we simply cannot say that 

“clear and compelling reasons to deny relief leap out from the record.” Id. at 998 (quotations omitted). It is particularly muddled in 

this case since all three positions that were before the district court -

- Jackson’s, the government’s, and the Probation Office’s -- recognized the conflicting circumstances surrounding Jackson’s distant 

and recent past. Without more, the district court’s order is insufficient for us to determine if it considered all the factors made relevant by § 3583(e)(1), if it considered improper factors, or if it made 

a clear error of judgment based on the information it considered. 

Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER 

PROCEEDINGS.

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