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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ) CLARK COUNTY WASHINGTON, ) CITY OF LA CENTER, GM ) CAMAS,LLC ) No. 85989-2 ) Petitioners, ) ) MACDONALD LIVING TRUST and ) RENAISSANCE HOMES, ) ) Respondents, ) EnBane ) and ) ) BIRCHWOOD FARMS, LLC ) ) Respondent-Intervenor, ) 

### MAR 2! 2013 ) Filed v. ) ) WESTERN WASHINGTON ) GROWTH MANAGEMENT ) HEARINGS REVIEW BOARD, ) JOHN KARPINSKI, CLARK ) COUNTYNATURAL RESOURCES ) COUNCIL, and FUTUREWISE ) ) Respondents. )No. 85989-2 GONZALEZ, J. -·This case presents a straightforward issue ofappellate procedure. The question is whetherthe Court ofAppeals erred by reviewing separate and distinct claims that had beenresolvedbelow and were not raised on appeal. The parties were not challenging the disposition ofthose claims, and thus, the claims had been finally adjudicated. The Court ofAppeals nevertheless addressed the abandoned claims sua sponte and reversed the lower court's unchallenged rulings. In orderto promote finality,judicial economy, predictability, and private settlement ofdisputes, and to ensure vigorous advocacy for appellate review, we prohibitreview ofseparate and distinct claims thathave notbeenraised on appeal. We thus vacate the portion of the Court ofAppeals' opinionreversing the superior court's unchallenged rulings. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This case originates from a September 25, 2007, Clark County ordinance (the 2007 Ordinance) de-designating certain lands from status as agricultural land oflongterm commercial significance (ALLTCS), 

### see RCW 36.70A.170, and designating the
same land as urban growth area (UGA), 

### see RCW 36.70A.l10. These designations
are part ofthe comprehensive planning required under the GrowthManagementAct (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW. Underthe GMA, land that is outside ofa city must meet certain substantive requirements to be designated UGA, RCW 36.70A.l10(1), and no city may annex territory outside ofa UGA, RCW 35.13.005; RCW 35A.l4.005.

2No. 85989-2 OnNovember 16, 2007, Respondents John Karpinski, Clark CountyNatural Resources Council, and Futurewise (the Challengers) filed a petitionwiththe Growth Management Hearings Board (the Board) alleging that Clark County was not in compliance withthe GMA. See RCW 36.70A.280. The Challengers specifically argued thatunder the requirements ofthe GMA, the various lands affected by the 2007 Ordinance hadto be designated ALLTCS and could not be designated UGA. Numerous parties were allowed to intervene. InDecember 2007 and January 2008, the cities ofCamas and Ridgefield began proceedings to annex certainparcels-areasnow referred to generally by the parties
as CA-l, CB, and RB-2 (collectively, the Annexed Lands)-thathad been designated UGAby the 2007 Ordinance. Notwithstanding the ongoing dispute before the Board, the Challengers did not contest the annexations ofthe Am1exed Lands in any proceeding, nor did any party bring the annexation proceedings to the attention ofthe Board. InApri12008, Camas and Ridgefield completed their annexations ofthe Annexed Lands. OnMay 14, 2008, the Board issued its final order, finding that Clark County
was not in compliance withthe GMA. The Board specifically found that certain land designations from the 2007 Ordinance were clearly erroneous, including designation ofthe Annexed Lands as UGA. The Board also found that Clark County's clearly
erroneous designations would substantially interfere withthe fulfillment ofthe goals

3No. 85989-2 · ofthe GMA and thus were invalid. See RCW 36.70A.302(1). The Boardwas still
unaware thatthe Annexed Lands hadbeen annexed. OnJune 11, 2008, intervenor city ofLa Center filed a petition for review in the Clark County Superior Court, appealing the Board's final order. See RCW 36.70A.300(5); RCW 34.05.514. OnJanuary 7, 2009, Clark County filed a briefwith the superior courtrequesting reversal ofthe Board's order regarding Clark County's designations under the GMA. OnFebruary 26, 2009, the Challengers entered into a stipulation with intervenor GM Camas LLC (GMC)-the owner ofcertainproperty contained within CA-l-and agreed thatbecause GMC's property had been annexed bythe City of Camas, GMC had prevailed. The stipulating parties submitted an orderto the superior court, which was entered, reversing the Board's order as to GMC. OnJune 12, 2009, the superior court entered an orderthatresolved the various remaining claims on appeal, including claims related to the AnnexedLands. The court acknowledged its prior stipulated order regarding CA-l and concludedthat due to annexation, all claims related to RB-2 also were moot. The superior court also reversed the Board's finding that Clark County's designation ofarea CB as UGA was clearly erroneous, apparently unaware that CB also hadbeen annexed. The Challengers filed a timely notice ofappeal seeking review ofthe superior court's June 12, 2009, order. The Challengers' brieffocused on substantive issues related to various parcels not at issue here. OnMay 17, 2010, the Court ofAppeals, 4No.**85989~2**
on its own motion, ordered supplemental briefing regarding issues related to the Annexed Lands. In response, the Challengers acknowledged the stipulation regarding
area CA-l and represented that all claims related to areas CB and RB-2 were moot due to annexation. The Challengers explained thatthe Annexed Lands were not "encompassed in theirpetition ofappeal," that they "didnot ... intend to seekreview related to those areas ... which were annexed," and "didnot include argumentrelated thereto in their briefing." Appellants' Suppl. Br. at 1-3. Unsatisfied, the Court of Appeals on June 1, 2010, ordered additional briefing regarding the authority underlying the annexations by Camas and Ridgefield. The Challengers noted that they had not challenged the annexations before the superior court. Atthis time, the city ofCamas represented to the Court ofAppeals that it would be a necessary party to any adjudication ofthe validity ofthe annexations. OnAprill3, 2011, the Court ofAppeals rendered its opinion. 

### Clark County v. 

### W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings ReviewBd., 161 Wn. App. 204, 254 P.3d 862 (2011). The Court ofAppeals first addressed the validity ofthe annexations. The court acknowledged that "theparties
... objected, arguing thatthe validity ofthe annexations [was] notproperly before [the] court," butthe court reasoned that "issues related to the annexations directly impact our ability to resolve pending issues on parcels CA-l, CB, and RB-2 raised in this appeal." 

### Id. at 222. The Court ofAppeals then framed the issue as "what effect, ifany, the annexations had on the Growth Board'sjurisdictionto determine GMA compliance for parcels CA-l, CB, and RB-2." 5No.**85989~2** Id. at 223. The court concluded that "challenged county legislative actions pending review are not final and no party may act in reliance on them," and thus the annexations "didnot deprive the Growth Board of jurisdiction overthe challenge to the County's actions." Id. at 223-24. Acknowledgingthe concerns ofthe city of Camas as "anecessary party to the consideration ofany questions involving the validity ofthe annexations," the court "limit[ed] [its] holding onlyto the Growth Board's authority to enter findings regarding the validity ofthe County's decisions relating to these parcels." 

### I d. at 226. The Court ofAppeals then went onto address various other claims onreview. See id. at 226-49. Clark County and GMC's successor in interestboth sought discretionary review by this court. The petitions for review assigned error to the Court ofAppeals' discussion ofthe Annexed Lands-whichthe Court ofAppeals framed as a determination ofthe Board'sjurisdiction-andGMC's successor in interest also emphasizedthe stipulationthat hadbeen entered by the parties regarding area CA-1. Although the petitions for reviewraised additional issues, we granted review only on thejurisdictional and parcel CA-l issues. The essential issue now before us is whetherthe Court ofAppeals erred by addressing sua sponte the claims related to the Annexed Lands, whichhad been resolved below and remained unchallenged on appeal.

6No. 85989-2 II. ANALYSIS The Court ofAppeals erred by adjudicating claims that were resolved below,
were not raised on appeal, and remained separate and distinct from the claims that the parties raised on appeal. Appellate adjudication ofclaims resolved below and not raised by the parties on appeal, whennot necessary to properly resolving the claims that are raised bythe parties on appeal, thwarts the finality ofunchallenged stipulations and rulings, expends limitedjudicial resources, diminishes the predictability ofadjudication, discourages the private settlement ofdisputes, and overlooks the need for zealous advocacy to facilitate appellate review. The Court of Appeals' decision to address the AnnexedLands is contrary to our well-established standards ofappellatejurisdiction. An appellate court must not disturbjudgments or rulings except insofar as is necessary to properly resolve the particular claims the parties have presented on appeal. Itis "awell-establishedrule that, on appeal from only a part ofajudgment or decree, the court may notreview rulings which do not affect the part appealed from, except where the part appealed from is so interwoven and connected withthe remainder, or is so dependent thereon, that an appeal from a part involves consideration ofthe whole, and is really an appeal from the whole." Cookv. Commellini, 200 Wash. 268, 270-71, 93 P.2d 441 (1939). In other words, when various portions ofajudgment are "separate and distinct," an appellate court must not review those portions "from whichno appeal [has] been taken." 

### !d. at 271, 272 7No. 85989-2 ("Theportions
...not appealed from [become] resjudicata, and
... legal and binding, and the court [is] withoutpowerto set [them] aside."). This rule promotes finality of judgments, advancesjudicial economy, ensures predictability, and encourages the private settlement ofdisputes. CfHilltop Terrace Homeowner's Ass 'n v. Island County, 126 Wn.2d 22, 30-31, 891 P.2d 29 (1995) (noting analogous purposes ofthe doctrine ofresjudicata). Additionally, requiring an actual challenge prior to undertaking appellate review avoids "the danger ofan erroneous decision caused by the failure ofparties
...to zealously advocate theirposition." Orwickv. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984) (noting analogous purpose ofdismissing moot cases). The scope ofa given appeal is determinedbythe notice ofappeal, the assigmnents oferror, and the substantive argumentation ofthe parties. See RAP 5.3(a) ("A notice ofappeal must ... designate the decision orpart ofdecision which the party wants reviewed
... .

### ");RAP 10.3(a), (g) ("The appellate court will only review a claimed error which is included in an assignment oferror or clearly disclosed in the associated issue pertaining thereto."); 

### RAP 12.1 (providing that "the appellate courtwill decide a case only onthe basis ofissues set forth bythe parties 

### in their briefs" except when "anissue which is not set forth
... should be considered to properly decide a case"); see also State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 318-24, 893 

### P.2d 629 (1995) (court will consider issue on appeal, notwithstanding technical violation of procedural rules, when nature ofchallenge has been made clearwithoutprejudice to 8No. 85989-2 opposing party). Initially, the notice ofappeal mustproperly designate the decision or part ofthe decision that the party wants reviewed. RAP 5.3(a)(3); see also Sargent v. Selvar, 46 Wn.2d 271, 272-73, 280 P.2d 683 (1955); Stewart v. Larkin, 74 Wash. 681, 687-88, 134 P. 186 (1913). This designation also subjects to potential review any related order that "prejudicially affected the designated decision and was entered before review was accepted." In re Dependency of Brown, 149 Wn.2d 836, 840 n.2, 72 P.3d 757 (2003) (citing RAP 2.4(b)). After a decision or part ofa decision has been identified in the notice ofappeal, the assignments oferror and substantive argumentation further determine precisely which claims and issues the parties have brought before the court for appellate review. See, e.g., State v. Sims, 171 Wn.2d 436, 441-42, 256 P.3d 285 (20 11) (rejecting argument thatbroad notice ofappeal brought entire order and all related issues before the Court ofAppeals because "[s]uch a cursory conclusion fails to account for established limiting principles, including, for example, that an appellant is deemed to have waived any issues that are not raised as assignments oferror and argued by brief'); Olson, 126 Wn.2d at 318-24; Johnson v. Johnson, 53 Wn.2d 107, 113-14, 330 P.2d 1075 (1958) (holding that although entire judgmentwas referenced in notice ofappeal, separate and distinct portion not assigned as error, "nothaving beenraised on ... appeal, was resjudicata" (citing Cook)); cfMatthews v. Parker, 163 Wash. 10, 16-17,299 P. 354 (1931) (court would adjudicate onlythat portion ofdecree relevant to the appellant seeking reversal).

9No. 85989-2 An appellate court's review is necessarily limited bythe scope ofa given appeal. The court must address only those claims and issues necessary to properly resolving the case as raised on appeal by interested parties. See Cook, 200 Wash. at 270-71; Johnson, 53 Wn.2d at 113-14; see alsoAjaxv. Gregory, 177 Wash. 465,475, 32 P.2d 560 (1934) ("Ithas long been the settled policy ofthis court, in disposing of
cases presented, to only decide the questions which are necessary to the decision of the particular case."); Matthews, 163 Wash. at 17 ("Itmight be plausibly argued that the excess ... addition should be apportioned equally
....Possibly, the location
... [ofthe] improvements
... will answer that question, should it ever arise upon conflicting claims ofparties in interest. However, that is ofno moment in ourpresent inquiry, since Parker has no interest or title to [that] land
... [and] is the only party to this action complaining ofthe decree."); Stewart, 74 Wash. at 688; Krutz v. Dodge, 66 Wash. 178, 179-80, 119 P. 188 (1911); Littellv. Miller, 8 Wash. 566, 569, 36 P. 492 (1894) (noting that in order to grant reliefto appealing party it would not be necessary to alterjudgmentunder review as to otherparty "notjoining in [the] appeal," and thus, thejudgment as to that other partyremained "infull force and effect" and was not subjectto modification). This "settledpolicy" ensures that appellate review is undertaken only insofar as is necessary to resolve actual and residual disputes between parties in interest. Ajax, 177 Wash. at 4 75. Italso allows interestedparties to rely on unchallenged portions of judgments, notwithstanding any outstanding appeals regarding other, separate and distinct portions ofthosejudgments. See Grignon v. 10No. 85989-2 Wechselberger, 70 Wn.2d 99, 101, 102,422P.2d 25 (1966) ("[A] party is not precluded from enforcing the portion ofajudgmentnot appealed from thoughhe may be appealing from another severable portion ofthejudgment.");Hinchman, 14 Wash. at 356 ("[I]t is apparent thatthe appellant is entitled in any event to all that he received, no matter what disposition is made ofthe case. His appeal is from portions ofthe decree only, and we do not think thatreceiving such ofthe proceeds as would in any event belong to him should be held to estop him from prosecuting the appeal."). In accordance with our settled policy, an appellate court mustnot adjudicate resolved, separate and distinct claims that are notraised by any party on appeal. Appellate courts do retain wide discretion in determining which issues must be addressed in order to properly decide a case on appeal. See, e.g., RAP 12.1(b); RAP 7.3; RAP 1.2. For example, appellate courts are allowed to consider and apply "a constitutional mandate, a statutory commandment, or an establishedprecedent" not raised by the parties when "necessary for decision." City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 269, 868 P.2d 134 (1994); see, e.g., Hall v. Am. Nat'!Plastics, Inc., 73 Wn.2d 203, 205, 437 P.2d 693 (1968) (noting that courts "frequently decide crucial issues whichthe parties themselves fail to present" (emphasis added)); Conardv. Univ. ofWash., 119 Wn.2d 519, 527-28, 834 P.2d 17 (1992) (considering due process claim raised sua sponte that addressed the same underlying dispute actually raised and argued on appeal). Appellate courts are also allowed to seek outbriefing regarding issues deemed importantto proper adjudication. See RAP 10.6(c); RAP 12.1(b). 11No. 85989-2 However, an appellate court must not adjudicate resolved claims that are separate and distinct from the underlying disputes actually raised on appeal; such extraneous claims need not be adjudicated in orderto properly decide a case on appeal, and such judicial action needlessly disturbs resolved matters, wastesjudicialresources, creates unfair surprise, interferes with and deters private settlements, and risks insufficient advocacy on review. Suchjudicial action is notrequired by "themerits ofthe case and the interest of justice" and thus, is not authorized by our court rules. RAP 12.2. Simply put, an appellate court errs by adjudicating separate and distinct claims resolved below and notraised on appeal. The Court ofAppeals erred inthis case by addressing the resolved claims related to the Annexed Lands, which were not raised on appeal. Those claims had been resolved by stipulation, dismissal, and reversal, and no challenge was presented to the Court ofAppeals regarding those claims. Further, those claims, along with the Annexed Lands generally, had no bearing onthe claims and issues that actually were presentedto the Court ofAppeals-involving entirely separate and distinct tracts of land and designations under the GMA. The Court ofAppeals did not contendthat adjudicating the status ofthe Annexed Lands was necessary in order to properly resolve the issues actually presented on appeal; instead the Court ofAppeals simply asserted, incorrectly and without basis, that the issues related to the Annexed Lands actually had been directly "raised in this appeal." 161 Wn. App. at 222. The parties rightfully made clearthatthe Annexed Lands were in no way at issue. For these 12No. 85989-2
reasons, we vacate the opinion ofthe Court ofAppeals insofar as it relates to the Annexed Lands. 

### III. CONCLUSION We vacate the Court ofAppeals' opinion insofar as it relates to the Annexed Lands. All claims related to the Annexed Lands were resolved below, were notraised
on appeal, remained separate and distinct from the claims and issues actually raised on appeal, and should nothave been addressed.

13No. 85989-2



## ,.

WE CONCUR:

14

### Clark County, etal. v. W. 

### Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings ReviewBd., et al.



### No. 85989-2

STEPHENS, J. (concurring)-! concur in the majority's decision to reverse the Court ofAppeals and reinstate the superior court's rulings. But, I would do so on the basis of mootness. The majority purports to rely solely on the appellate rules to hold that the petitioners failed to raise the proper issues. I am not convinced. While an appellate court reviews only those portions ofa decision the appealing party designates, we also liberally construe the rules in determining a party's compliance. RAP 1.2 provides in relevant part: "(a) Interpretation. These rules will be liberally interpreted to promote justice and facilitate the decision of
cases on the merits. Cases and issues will not be determined on the basis of compliance or noncompliance with these rules except in compelling circumstances wherejustice demands, subject to the restrictions in rule 18.8(b)." As the majority recognizes, appellate courts have wide discretion in determining what issues should be addressed in order to properly decide a case. Majority at 11 (citing RAPClark County, etal. v. W Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Review Bd., etal., 85989-2 

### (Stephens, J. 

### Concurrence)

12.1(b), 7.3, 1.2). I believe we do a disservice to the Court of Appeals by not respecting its discretion to address the issues involving the annexed lands. Nonetheless, I would dismiss the claims challenging the annexation as moot in the context ofthis proceeding. The claims in question originated in a petition to the Growth Management Hearings Board (Board) challenging Clark County's designation of certain lands under the Growth Management Act, chapter 36.70A RCW. The cities ofCamas and Ridgefield have annexed the lands in question, and those annexations cannot be challenged in these proceedings. As a result, the question ofwhether the Board properly reviewed Clark County's prior designation ofthe annexed lands is moot. Dismissal should follow. 

### See Seguin v. Barei, 163 Wash. 702, 703, 299 P. 655 (1931) (dismissing appeal where underlying interest in disputed property was dissolved in separate proceeding).

-2-Clark County, etal. v. W Wash. Growth Mgmt. ReviewBd., 85989-2 (Stephens, J. Concurrence)

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