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IMPLEMENTING U.S. POLICY IN THE ARCTIC 

(113–78) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 23, 2014 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida, 

Vice Chair 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

JANICE HAHN, California 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... v 

TESTIMONY 

PANEL 1 

Vice Admiral Peter V. Neffenger, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard ........... 3 

Rear Admiral Jonathan W. White, Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy, 

and Director, Space and Maritime Domain Awareness, U.S. Navy ................. 3 

Ambassador David A. Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and 

Fisheries, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State ................................................................... 3 

PANEL 2 

Captain David Westerholm, USCG, Retired, and Director, Office of Response 

and Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ............. 27 

Kelly Kenison Falkner, Ph.D., Division Director, Division of Polar Programs, 

National Science Foundation .............................................................................. 27 

Edmund Fogels, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources, 

State of Alaska ..................................................................................................... 27 

PREPARED STATEMENTS AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE 

RECORD SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Vice Admiral Peter V. Neffenger: 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

Answers to questions for the record issued by the following Representatives: 

Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California ......................................................... 46 

Hon. John Garamendi, of California ........................................................ 57 

Hon. Rick Larsen, of Washington ............................................................ 61 

Rear Admiral Jonathan W. White: 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 62 

Answers to questions for the record issued by the following Representatives: 

Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California ......................................................... 66 

Hon. Rick Larsen, of Washington ............................................................ 68 

Hon. John Garamendi, of California ........................................................ 68 

Ambassador David A. Balton: 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73 

Answers to questions for the record issued by the following Representatives: 

Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California ......................................................... 81 

Hon. John Garamendi, of California ........................................................ 83 

Hon. Rick Larsen, of Washington ............................................................ 92 

Captain David Westerholm: 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96 

Answers to questions for the record issued by the following Representatives: 

Majority-side Representatives .................................................................. 104 

Hon. John Garamendi, of California, and Hon. Rick Larsen, of Washington ...................................................................................................... 108 

Kelly Kenison Falkner, Ph.D.: 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 111 

Page

IV 

Kelly Kenison Falkner, Ph.D.—Continued 

Answers to questions for the record issued by the following Representatives: 

Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California ......................................................... 119 

Hon. John Garamendi, of California, and Hon. Rick Larsen, of Washington ...................................................................................................... 121 

Edmund Fogels, prepared statement ..................................................................... 124 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Vice Admiral Peter V. Neffenger, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, inserts for the record regarding: 

The number of Northern Sea Route transits in 2013 .................................... 12 

Request from Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington to clarify the dollar 

amount to preserve and drydock the Polar Sea ......................................... 14 

Request from Hon. Don Young of Alaska for the Coast Guard’s perspective on leasing polar icebreakers ................................................................. 18 

Request from Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington for information about 

the Coast Guard’s Arctic policy ................................................................... 24 

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(1) 

IMPLEMENTING U.S. POLICY IN THE ARCTIC 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in Room 

2253, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. HUNTER. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to 

order. Sorry about the room size, small. There are more of us. Anybody who wants to can sit on the front row. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee is meeting this morning to review how the agencies that will play the largest roles in the Arctic 

intend to implement the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 

as well as enhance their presence, understanding, and mission effectiveness in the area. 

As we all know, the ice caps are shrinking in the Arctic, effectively creating new coastline and navigable waters. This opening is 

already providing significant economic opportunities for the energy 

and maritime transportation sectors. However, as human presence 

increases and as other nations continue to make claims in the Arctic, it has also exposed a new set of risks and challenges to our sovereignty and national security. 

The national strategy calls for a strong U.S presence in the Arctic, but the Implementation Plan that accompanies it fails to identify what specific infrastructure or capabilities are required to meet 

those goals, or how or when they will be funded. For instance, 

there is no discussion of requirements for icebreakers, but each of 

the agencies here today requires one to carry out its missions in 

the Arctic. 

While Russia maintains a fleet of nearly 40 icebreakers, and 

China, a non-Arctic nation, is building new icebreakers, the U.S. 

fleet of heavy icebreakers is in a dismal state. I wouldn’t even call 

it a fleet, frankly. One has been rusting away in Seattle for 3 years 

with a busted engine, while the Coast Guard fails to make a decision about its future. The other is operational, thanks to an infusion of $60 million from Congress, but that only gets it 7 years 

longer. 

The Coast Guard has been working with 10 other Federal agencies to develop requirements for a new polar icebreaker, but has 

yet to identify where in its acquisition budget it will find the $1.2 

2 

billion to construct it. I share the concerns raised by Admiral Papp 

at our budget hearing in March, that forcing the Coast Guard to 

pay for a new icebreaker will significantly delay the acquisition of 

other new assets that the Service critically needs. And I agree with 

him that the cost should be shared across all agencies that have 

requirements for an icebreaker. I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses on whether they plan on contributing money, as opposed 

to just missions and requirements, to this whole-of-Government effort. 

I am also interested in hearing the status of negotiations on the 

Polar Code. As vessel traffic increases, the implementation of the 

Polar Code should go a long way toward ensuring the safety of 

maritime transportation and protection of the Arctic environment. 

Establishing vessel construction and operating standards upfront 

will create a predictable operating environment for industry. 

Finally, the United States is set to take the chairmanship of the 

Arctic Council next year. I applaud, obviously, the recent appointment of Admiral Papp as the Nation’s first Special Representative 

for the Arctic. I am interested in hearing more about what role Admiral Papp will play in the chairmanship, as well as the agenda 

that the State Department intends to put forward. 

We need to be protecting our national interests in the Arctic. I 

hope today’s hearing will draw light on how the administration intends to accomplish that. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing today, and look forward to 

their testimony. With that, I yield to Ranking Member Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Chairman Hunter, thank you so very much for 

scheduling this meeting. We have talked about this issue, you and 

I and our staffs, for some time. And here we are, on an extraordinarily important hearing. 

As distant and remote as the Arctic and Antarctic regions may 

appear to most Americans, the reality is that they are two regions 

that are especially important to this Nation, the Arctic ranking at 

the top. We are likely to become more—and likely to become exceedingly important in the years ahead, both geopolitically, as well 

as strategically. 

As our Nation’s primary Federal maritime agency, the Coast 

Guard has played, and will continue to play, a significant role in 

Arctic policy, implementation, and enforcement, while also fulfilling 

its other mission responsibilities of search and rescue operations, 

maritime safety, scientific research, and environmental protection. 

But is the Coast Guard up to the challenge? What about other 

Federal agencies that have key responsibilities in the Arctic and 

the Antarctic, for that matter? Are we in Congress fulfilling our responsibilities to provide the Coast Guard with the resources it 

needs to be semper paratus, always prepared and ready for the rigors of operating in these most inhospitable regions? 

I am heartened that, by the administration’s release of its 2013 

National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and the release earlier this 

year of the Implementation Plan for this strategy. These two documents provide overarching guidance and agency-specific Arctic 

strategies developed by the Coast Guard, the Navy, NOAA, each 

providing greater detail for their respective agencies’ missions and 

objectives. 

3 

But I am compelled to say that I remain disappointed that these 

planning initiatives have not yet taken root in the administration’s 

budget. And if you look at certain programs, especially the Coast 

Guard icebreaking missions—and here I echo you, Mr. Chairman— 

the gap between what is needed to effectively implement the Arctic 

strategy and what is requested and funded is huge, growing, and, 

frankly, doesn’t work. 

Whether or not you believe in the science underlying the projections of warming the—of the Arctic climate, that is immaterial. 

Well, it is not. It is really central to this issue. The stark reality 

is that, with each passing year, the Arctic is becoming more accessible, more open, more warmer, and more compelling economic and 

security priority to the United States. 

Other nations have grasped this reality. We should, too. It is well 

past the time when we can afford to ignore the imminent challenge. Next year, when the United States assumes the chair of the 

Arctic Council for 2 years, we might finally take up this challenge. 

No, we are going to do that today. 

I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the ranking member. On our first panel of 

witnesses today are Vice Admiral Peter Neffenger, Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard; Rear Admiral Jonathan White, Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy—I didn’t 

know that that was an actual title, it is good to go; and Ambassador David Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and 

Fisheries at the Department of State. 

Admiral Neffenger, you are recognized for your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PETER V. NEFFENGER, VICE 

COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD; REAR ADMIRAL JONATHAN W. WHITE, OCEANOGRAPHER AND NAVIGATOR OF THE 

NAVY, AND DIRECTOR, SPACE AND MARITIME DOMAIN 

AWARENESS, U.S. NAVY; AND AMBASSADOR DAVID A. 

BALTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCEANS AND 

FISHERIES, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman 

Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss Coast Guard operations in the Arctic, the 

Coast Guard’s Arctic strategy, and Coast Guard efforts to ensure 

safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in 

this region. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I have written testimony 

for the record, and I will make a brief opening statement. 

In my previous role as Deputy Commandant for Operations, I 

spent a significant amount of time focusing on Arctic and polar 

issues for the Coast Guard. I have traveled extensively throughout 

the Arctic and the Antarctic regions to understand the challenges 

of operating in these extreme environments, the range of national 

and international priorities and initiatives, and the impacts of increasing human activity. 

In the spring of 2013 I represented the United States on an Arctic Council trip to the Russian Far North, which included an overVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:21 Jan 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\7-23-1~1\88818.TXT JEAN
4 

view of Arctic oil and gas exploration, infrastructure development, 

and culminated in travel to the North Pole. I also recently visited 

the Antarctic, with the National Science Foundation, as well as to 

the South Pole to observe operations there and our icebreaker contributions to the U.S. Antarctic Program. 

The primary lesson from these travels is that these regions are 

remote, they are hostile, they are unforgiving, but they nonetheless 

present the potential for substantial economic and scientific gains 

for our Nation. Operations in the polar regions demand detailed 

and deliberate planning, supported by specialized, reliable, and 

unique equipment. 

I mentioned that human activity is increasing in the Arctic. It is 

doing so because the region has become more accessible. There 

really is a new ocean opening, and Coast Guard authorities require 

our presence wherever people operate in U.S. waters. 

The activity we see falls into three general categories: resource 

development, primarily oil, gas, and mineral; opportunities for new 

trade routes; and ecotourism. To address these, the Coast Guard 

recently published its Arctic strategy to outline the Service’s nearterm approach to meeting the mission demands generated by these 

activities. 

Our strategy complements the National Strategy for the Arctic, 

and envisions a mobile, seasonal Coast Guard operational presence 

to meet mission demands over the next decade, and sets forth three 

key objectives: to improve awareness, we need a better understanding of what the operations are up there; to modernize governance, that has to do with managing the various activities that are 

doing so across international lines; and then, to broaden partnerships, we need to know who else has capability up there that we 

can call upon. 

We have recently completed an implementation plan for our 

strategy, and it outlines 12 initiatives in support of our objectives. 

These involve Federal, State, local, tribal, and international partners, and they focus on operations, maritime domain awareness, 

environmental protection, communications, strategic partnerships, 

academic and scientific research, contingency planning, and international cooperation and coordination. 

One such initiative is the establishment of an Arctic Coast Guard 

Forum for the eight Arctic Council nations to coordinate exercises, 

strengthen relationships, and implement the recent Arctic oil spill 

response and search and rescue agreements. 

Today Coast Guard aircraft and vessels patrol nearly 1 million 

square miles of ocean off the Alaskan coast to enforce U.S. laws, 

conduct search and rescue, assist in scientific research, advance 

navigation safety, and foster environmental stewardship. We use 

polar-class icebreakers, National Security Cutters, and icestrengthened buoy tenders, in additional to seasonal air and communication assets to execute these missions. We work with the Department of Defense, specifically the Navy, to advance maritime 

domain awareness by testing Arctic technologies and capabilities, 

including communications equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles, 

and ice radars. We have conducted ice rescue training, exercised 

pollution response capability, and collected scientific data that will 

be used to further the understanding of this Arctic ecosystem. 

5 

And just as we do elsewhere, we respond to emergencies. Healy 

recently diverted from scientific research to respond to a 36-foot 

sailing vessel beset in the ice 30 nautical miles north of Barrow. 

It was about a 6-mile transit in to rescue that individual. 

Current and future operations in the Arctic and Antarctic will 

continue to be informed by the availability of polar icebreakers and 

ice-strengthened vessels. Polar Star’s recent reactivation will provide the U.S. with heavy icebreaker capability for about another 7 

to 10 years. We believe that Polar Star, along with the medium icebreaker, Healy, provide a minimum capability necessary to address 

the Nation’s near-term icebreaking needs in the Arctic and Antarctic, and will give us the time we need to assess longer term national needs and requirements. 

Mr. Chairman, the increasingly accessible Arctic region and the 

opening of Arctic waters present unique opportunities and significant challenges for our Nation. We look forward to working with 

the administration and Congress to ensure that the Coast Guard, 

with its unique authorities, missions, and partnerships, can continue to support U.S. national priorities in the Arctic and Antarctic 

regions, and to remain always ready to meet the demands of 

emerging maritime frontiers. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Admiral. 

Admiral White? 

Admiral WHITE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. First of all, good 

morning, Chairman Hunter; good morning, Ranking Member 

Garamendi; good morning, other subcommittee members. My name 

is Rear Admiral Jonathan White, and I currently serve, as mentioned, as the Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy, and as 

the lead of the Navy’s Task Force Climate Change. I have submitted my full written statement to the committee. I ask that it be 

made part of the hearing record. And, with your permission, I will 

give a brief opening statement. 

I join my colleagues in supporting the President’s National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and appreciate the opportunity to discuss 

the Navy’s preparations in implementing U.S. policy in the Arctic. 

The Arctic Ocean is experiencing significant change in its seasonal 

ice coverage, which is making it more accessible to maritime activity. The diminishing sea ice is slowly opening the region to increased commercial activity and shipping. 

As the maritime domain, the Navy has responsibilities in the 

Arctic. In support of the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the Department of the Defense Arctic Strategy, the Navy 

has identified four strategy objectives: ensure U.S. Arctic sovereignty; provide ready naval forces; to preserve freedom of the 

seas; and promote partnerships. 

We acknowledge that the risk of conflict in the region is currently low. The Arctic Council and other diplomatic venues provide 

effective means to resolve disputes between nations. However, the 

U.S. Navy must be ready to operate in this challenging environment, just as it does routinely on, under, and above every other 

ocean. 

6 

History shows us that the presence of navies on the world’s 

oceans provides security and stability that promote economic development and commerce. As President Theodore Roosevelt stated 

over 110 years ago, ‘‘A good Navy is not a provocation to war, it 

is the surest guaranty of peace.’’ 

The Navy’s existing posture is appropriate to address the nearterm defense requirements in the Arctic, primarily through undersea assets. For the Navy to develop the full range of capabilities 

it has in other oceans will take time. 

This past February, the chief of naval operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, signed the U.S. Navy Arctic Road Map 2014–2030, 

which aligns with the National Arctic Strategy and the U.S. Coast 

Guard Arctic Strategy. It includes a detailed Implementation Plan 

to develop Arctic capabilities and capacity in step with the changing environment. 

Over the next decade, the Navy will continue to develop capabilities and experience, largely through personal exchanges and exercises in the high latitudes, and primarily in the open water during 

the summer season. We will also continue to conduct research to 

better understand and predict the complex Arctic environment and 

how it relates to safe and effective naval operations. 

Our challenge over the coming decade will be to balance the resource demands of current requirements with investments in the 

development of future capabilities. To accomplish this, the Navy 

will emphasis low-cost, long lead-time activities, and use partnerships to ensure we do this in cost-effective and smart ways. Over 

the course of the next few years, the Navy will continue to leverage 

strong partnerships with the U.S. Coast Guard and other national 

and international Arctic partners and stakeholders to cooperatively 

address the challenges of Arctic operation. 

These challenges are substantial, the Arctic Ocean is a vast and 

remote frontier with little shore infrastructure to support operations, frequent extreme hazardous wind and sea conditions, very 

limited navigation aids, dated and unreliable navigation charts, 

and limited communications. By the mid-2020s, we predict the 

summer sea ice will diminish to the point of opening a near-polar 

deepwater transit route across the Arctic for at least several days 

during the late summer. 

As commercial enterprise in the Arctic slowly increase during 

this period, new mission requirements for the Navy will likely be 

to assist the Coast Guard and other nations with search and rescue 

or disaster response. But we may also be called upon to ensure 

freedom of navigation in Arctic waters. We will continue to transition toward the capability to operate on and above the sea for sustained periods, as required. 

By 2030, the Navy looks to have the necessary trained and 

equipped personnel, along with surface, subsurface, and air capabilities to respond to contingencies and emergencies affecting national security in the Arctic. The U.S. Navy must be prepared to 

sail on to distant and remote waters to protect national interests 

and freedom of the seas. 

We are confronted today by the prospect of a newly accessible 

ocean, one that presents significantly more challenges than other 

maritime regions. Fortunately, we have time to prepare. We have 

7 

made significant progress in understanding those challenges, and 

preparing the Navy for success. The key, again, will be to balance 

potential investments with other service priorities. But we are 

moving forward with a flexible approach, and we know we can keep 

pace with the evolving Arctic region, as we protect our national security interests. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Garamendi and 

committee members, for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. This concludes my oral statement, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Admiral. They have a nickname in the 

Navy for the Navigator of the Navy? I mean, do you have a nickname? They call you ‘‘Nav’’ or anything? 

Admiral WHITE. The best job and title for a flag officer in the 

Navy, sir, in my opinion. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HUNTER. That is great. ‘‘The Navigator.’’ 

Admiral WHITE. The Navigator would be better. 

Mr. HUNTER. Ambassador Balton, you are recognized. 

Mr. BALTON. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member 

Garamendi, other members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to be before you today. I also have a written statement 

and I ask that it be included as part of the record. 

The United States and other Arctic nations now face new challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region. I will try to summarize our approach to these issues, with a particular focus on our upcoming chairmanship of the Arctic Council. 

As we have already heard, the Arctic region is experiencing very 

significant change, much of which results from a warming climate. 

Sea ice, glaciers, ice sheets are diminishing, permafrost is thawing, 

coasts are eroding. These and related phenomena are causing very 

serious problems for the roughly 4 million people who live north of 

the Arctic Circle and for the governments of the Arctic nations. 

But, at the same time, these very changes are presenting new opportunities, including increased shipping, offshore hydrocarbon development, tourism, other activities. Our Government and others 

are seeking ways to take advantage of the opportunities in a safe, 

responsible, and sustainable way. 

In promoting our Nation’s interests in the Arctic region and 

strengthening international cooperation, we use the Arctic Council 

as the primary mechanism for multilateral engagement. The Council was created in 1996. It is a high-level intergovernmental forum 

of the eight Arctic States and the Arctic indigenous peoples, as 

well. The challenges and opportunities of the Arctic have grown. 

And, so too, the Council has evolved. It now has six standing working groups, a permanent secretariat, and has taken on some new 

and impressive tasks, including serving as the venue for the negotiation of the first two binding agreements among the eight Arctic 

governments. 

The United States is a leader of the Arctic Council. We have led 

or co-led many of its most important initiatives. And, yes, we will 

assume the chairmanship of the Arctic Council next April for 2 

years. 

8 

The Department of State is currently in the process of developing 

a robust program for our chairmanship through regular meetings 

with our Federal interagency counterparts, the State of Alaska, the 

Alaska congressional delegation, others in Congress who care about 

this, Alaska Native groups, industry groups, environmental groups, 

other interested stakeholders. We have not finalized our proposed 

program yet, but I can tell you it will be in line with the National 

Strategy for the Arctic Region issued in May 2013, and the subsequent implementation plan. 

Current areas we are thinking of highlighting include climate 

change in the Arctic, improving economic and living conditions for 

Arctic residents, and responsible stewardship of the Arctic Ocean. 

Examples of projects in these areas might include improving access 

and availability to clean energy in remote Arctic communities, improving water sanitation, improving black carbon regulation, and 

pursuing an international management framework for living resources of the Arctic Ocean. 

We are still consulting with stakeholders in the United States on 

these ideas and others. We then must present them to the seven 

other Arctic governments; the Council operates by consensus, we 

will have to negotiate our proposed program with our partners in 

the Council. 

As noted, and recognizing the importance of the Arctic, Secretary 

Kerry has appointed Admiral Robert Papp to lead our efforts to 

protect and advance U.S. interests in the Arctic as the State Department’s Special Representative for the Arctic Region. We anticipate that Admiral Papp will soon travel to Alaska to consult with 

those on the front lines of our Arctic State. 

Please allow me to say just a word about the importance to U.S. 

Arctic interests of our joining the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 

The Convention provides the basic legal framework applicable to 

all the oceans, including the Arctic. Its provisions are highly favorable to U.S. national security and economic interests. As we speak, 

the United States and other nations with coastlines on the Arctic 

are working to determine the outer limit of their respective continental shelves. 

Unlike the other Arctic nations, however, the United States is 

not a party to this Convention. And this places us at a very serious 

disadvantage in securing legal certainty and international recognition of the outer limits of our outer continental shelf in the Arctic 

and elsewhere. What is at stake is the exclusive right to resources 

on and under the continental shelf. More broadly, U.S. succession 

to this Convention is a matter of geostrategic importance in the 

Arctic and elsewhere. We need to be a party to fully claim our 

rightful place as an Arctic nation. 

In conclusion, the Arctic presents enormous and growing 

geostrategic, economic, environmental, and national security implications for the United States. We are endeavoring to meet those 

challenges in the Arctic, and to seize the opportunities within our 

grasp. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today. Happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK, thank you, gentlemen. I am going to start the 

questions now, starting with myself. So here is my question. It is 

pretty basic. 

9 

There is a lot of talk about how important the Arctic is, but I 

don’t believe it. I don’t believe it is worthwhile at all, because there 

is no money allocated towards it, the Navy is not putting any 

money towards it, Homeland Security is not putting any money towards it. You have a chart in front of you that I would have liked 

to have made big, but it is not. This shows all the icebreakers that 

other countries have. We have one that can’t even go in the thick 

ice right now at all. 

So, my question is, why is it a national security—why is it important, national security-wise, and why do we really need icebreakers? Can’t we just use Russia’s? Can’t we use Finland’s? Canada’s? Sweden’s? Argentina’s? Australia’s? Chile’s? Estonia? Germany? Japan? Why can’t we use theirs? And, if it is so important, 

why aren’t we doing anything, except talking about it and making 

sure we have groups planning for it and meeting with each other 

to talk more about it, but not really caring to put money in? So it 

must not be that important. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can answer from the 

Coast Guard’s perspective. What I would say is that the Nation— 

we are an Arctic nation, not simply a nation with an Arctic State. 

And I speak purely from the physical fact, that we, as a nation, 

touch Arctic waters. And those Arctic waters are U.S. waters, and 

U.S. laws and regulations apply in those waters, just as they do 

elsewhere. 

And so, from our perspective, we know that it—the region, when 

it was ice-covered all the time, was a region you could choose to 

go to, and we did, as a nation, for many purposes. Some were exploratory in nature and some were defense-related in nature, specifically the establishment of the DEW line back in the fifties. But 

now it is a region where the accessibility is allowing it to be open 

to human activity. And, as I said, that human activity is taking the 

form of extractive resource mining, the potential for development 

of ecotourism, and, of course, new trade routes. 

So, from our perspective, we now have a requirement to be 

present. The Nation expects us to be present to extend its sovereign responsibilities over its waters, wherever there is activity in 

those U.S. waters that demand U.S. Coast Guard presence. And we 

see that in the form of concerns over the amount of—potential 

amount of traffic that is going through. The good news is it is a 

relatively limited development right now, and we have—it is a 

measured evolution of change in the Arctic. But, nonetheless, we 

are seeing increasing traffic and we are seeing increasing activity, 

and we expect that Shell Oil will return to the northwest coast of 

Alaska to attempt to continue its drilling operations that it started 

back in the summer of 2012. 

So, it is purely from an operational standpoint that we see the 

importance of it, and we articulated that. That is why we put out 

an Arctic Strategy. We really wanted to make it clear that, despite 

the challenges associated with the resourcing of Arctic needs, the 

demand for presence won’t go away. And, as I said, as other nations—whether we ultimately develop much off of our own Arctic 

coast, the development that is existing elsewhere in the Arctic, and 

the stuff that I have seen going on through my travels, tells me 

that we are going to want to pay attention to it. 

10 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks. Admiral White, when is the Navy going to 

put forward funds for an icebreaker, if it is so important? 

Admiral WHITE. Sir, we view—and since the mid-1960s, 

icebreaking has been a Coast Guard mission. We support the Coast 

Guard’s strategy and their requirements for icebreaking for the 

Arctic and anywhere else that it may be needed. We rely on them, 

we support them. We are working very closely with them in an integrated planning team—— 

Mr. HUNTER. You support them with money? 

Admiral WHITE [continuing]. Requirements. 

Mr. HUNTER. You support them with money? 

Admiral WHITE. We do not support them with part of our budget, 

sir. They were given the mission, we are a mission-funded organization. And so, we rely on them. But we support them totally with 

the requirements. We work hand in hand, whether it is icebreakers 

or maybe aircraft carriers or landing ships. It is a team approach 

that we do to all the operations that we are involved in together. 

But icebreaking was given to the Coast Guard, and we are in full 

support of them. 

Mr. BALTON. So, unlike my colleagues, the mission of my agency 

is a little bit different. The Department of State has as its mission 

to carry out U.S. foreign policy. We don’t break ice, we don’t operate at sea. 

That said, I agree with you, that—with respect to the importance 

of having icebreaking capability in the Arctic and Antarctic, including for our foreign policy and our presence. But I would not agree 

that is the only measure of the importance of the Arctic to our Nation. There is a lot going on in the Arctic. The icebreaking issue 

is only one facet of many. 

Mr. HUNTER. As I have got 13 seconds left, let me ask this. Does 

the Navy have a national security requirement for a heavy icebreaker in the Arctic? Yes or no? 

Admiral WHITE. The Navy has a requirement for icebreaking to 

support assured access in the Arctic, as—under the Coast Guard— 

agreement with the Coast Guard, that they will do the icebreaking 

for us. Right now we have no requirement to build—for the U.S. 

Navy to build an icebreaker for the Arctic, and we rely on the 

Coast Guard’s capability to break ice. They are meeting the requirements that we have in the near term, and we fully support 

that, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. All right, thank you. Mr. Garamendi is recognized. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Just very quickly on this, the number that I 

have heard for a new icebreaker is somewhere in the half-a-billion 

dollar range. And I would just tell all of us that are on the Armed 

Services Committee that we expect to spend, in the next 10 years, 

some $15 billion rebuilding the B61 bomb that nobody knows what 

to do with. 

So, we have choices, and we ought to look to ourselves about the 

choices we make. We are committed to that $15 billion. We could 

take a half dozen of those unnecessary, unused bombs, and build 

a icebreaker. These are our choices. Responsibility really does lie 

here. 

Enough of that. I want to hit the Law of the Sea. Mr. Ambassador, you spoke quickly to that issue. I would like you to expand 

11 

upon it, and really why it is important. And also, why, in your 

view, it has not yet passed the Senate, so we can blame them, rather than us, on this one. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BALTON. Thank you, sir. The Law of the Sea Convention is 

important for many reasons, including in the Arctic. What I 

touched on in my oral statement has to do with the extended continental shelf. If you know about this, under international law, the 

Law of the Sea, the country with the coastline gets the first 200 

miles off its coast as its continental shelf, regardless of what it 

looks like down there, what it is made out of. And then—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Exclusive Economic Zone. 

Mr. BALTON. No, we are talking about the sea floor under—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. 

Mr. BALTON [continuing]. The Exclusive Economic Zone, the continental shelf. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Got it. 

Mr. BALTON. So you get the first 200 miles as a given. But then, 

if you can demonstrate that the area beyond 200 miles meets certain tests set out in the Law of the Sea Convention, you can claim 

that, too. And there is a process set out in the Law of the Sea Convention to guarantee recognition by other countries to this area of 

sea floor. 

The area of the U.S. continental shelf beyond 200 miles in the 

Arctic and elsewhere may be two to four times the size of California, may have trillions of dollars of resources under there. But 

as a nonparty to the Convention, we don’t have the process to go 

through to get the international recognition of our continental shelf 

beyond 200 miles. That is a serious disadvantage for the U.S. 

There are others, as well, but I think it is one of the most compelling reasons why—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What are the issues why it has not passed over 

the last, what, 15 years or more? 

Mr. BALTON. You probably should ask some of your counterparts 

in the Senate. This administration—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No, I am asking you for your opinion. 

Mr. BALTON. Well, I am saying this administration—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Don’t be diplomatic, just tell us. 

Mr. BALTON [continuing]. The last administration, the administration before that have all supported it. 

Some of the complaints we have heard have to do with worries 

about dispute settlement under the Convention. There is compulsory and binding dispute settlement over most disputes that might 

arise under that. We think that is actually a good thing. We are 

likely to be the plaintiff in most cases, and use the dispute settlement mechanism to enforce the rules of the Convention, which are 

favorable to the United States. 

There are also some concerns about the sharing of resources 

under the Convention. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. I want to—better move on here. 

We have not really had a discussion about the two sea routes, 

and specifically the Northern Sea Route, which is adjacent to Russia. Just quickly, let’s get that on the table so we understand what 

12 

the implications are for the U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy, and then 

the diplomat issues. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, thank you. As you know, the 

Northern Sea Route is a route that was—is proposed and developed 

by the Russian Federation, which travels along their northern Arctic coast, and it allows for, under some circumstances, significantly 

shorter route times from Europe to Asia for certain types of cargo. 

That sea route—the Russians, 2 years ago, established the Northern Sea Route Administration, and established a series of regulatory requirements that have to be met in order for vessels to use 

that. They really are developing this as a potential trade route. 

It has largely been used intra-Russia right now. They are moving 

from port to port within Russia. There have been a couple of transits across that. We are seeing still in the double-digit numbers, 

not much more than that. I think some 47 vessels transited the 

Northern Sea Route last year. I can get the exact number for the 

record. 

[The information follows:] 

Seventy-one (71) vessels transited the Northern Sea Route in 2013. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. But the implications for us are that all of 

those vessels will travel—if they are making the full transit, will 

travel through the Bering Strait, which, as you know, in its narrowest point, is within about 20 miles or so of the Russian Federation. That means that if there were to be a maritime casualty in 

those straits, it would directly affect U.S. interests, and could potentially do significant damage to U.S. environmental concerns in 

Alaska. 

The other concern is simply the management of that traffic 

through there, understanding, you know, how to do so safely. 

So, I would say that the—as we—it will be interesting to watch 

the development of the Northern Sea Route. I know that the Russian Federation has—sees that as one of their key economic development issues with respect to their Arctic coastline. What we are 

mostly seeing is gas and oil moving across there. That poses probably the concern that, if you had a casualty, it could be one that 

would be significantly worse than, say, a cargo vessel moving 

through there. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will come back. I will take up the issue second 

round. 

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Rice would be recognized right now, but we are 

going to recognize Mr. Coble because of his seniority and Coast 

Guard service. And he hates waiting. 

Mr. COBLE. I apologize for my delayed arrival. Admiral 

Neffenger, at the subcommittee fiscal year 2015 budget hearing in 

March Admiral Papp expressed his concern that the Coast Guard 

could not afford to acquire a new polar-class icebreaker on its own 

without significantly delaying its current program to replace its 

aging fleet cutters and aircraft. I think the chairman touched on 

this, at least indirectly. What say you in response to that? Do you 

embrace Admiral Papp’s conclusion? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. I would agree with Admiral Papp. 

I mean he is absolutely right, that under our current fiscal constraints it would be very challenging to insert the cost of a polar 

13 

icebreaker into our capital acquisition budget. We—it would displace other existing high priorities, such as the recapitalization of 

our Medium Endurance Cutter fleet, which is one of our most critical pressing needs. 

So, over the next 2 to 3 years we are going to be looking at the— 

getting a better fidelity on the actual cost to replace, as we look at 

the requirements and some initial design possibilities, as well as 

assess the state of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, to actually build 

an icebreaker, something they haven’t done, and a heavy icebreaker is something they haven’t done in over 40 years. And that 

will give us a better idea. 

But ultimately, we were going to have to face the question as to 

how you put additional monies into a budget to pay for what will 

be a very expensive acquisition. 

Mr. COBLE. I realize, Admiral, this is not your shop. But when 

I was in the Coast Guard, we referred to the Navy as the ‘‘Big Outfit.’’ So what does the Big Outfit say in response to my question? 

Admiral WHITE. And I hope the Big Outfit doesn’t mean we are 

the fatted calf to pay for icebreakers, sir, but thank you for the opportunity. 

We are larger. We certainly have large force structure. But our 

force structure is designed to meet the mission requirements for 

national security and defense, as outlined. 

These are very austere budget times. We are faced with challenges, in terms of replacing our SSBN force in the future: aircraft 

carriers, an aging fleet of other surface combatants, submarines 

and aircraft. We have no plan to build an icebreaker. We have no 

mission for icebreaking. Therefore, we see the great partnership 

that I know you are aware between Navy and Coast Guard, sir, as 

the means by which we will rely on the Coast Guard for that mission, as it stands right now. We are happy with that, and we are 

happy with the Coast Guard’s assessment on how they are going 

to meet those mission requirements in the future, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Ambassador, you mentioned that there are other 

issues in the Arctic, in addition to the Coast Guard icebreaker 

issue. Are any of those other issues as pressing for resolution as 

is the icebreaker issue? That may be subject to personal interpretation. 

Mr. BALTON. Yes, that is kind of an open-ended question. Here 

is my best answer for you, sir. Yes, there are other compelling 

issues in the Arctic beyond those that have direct concern to the 

Coast Guard and the Navy. 

Ways of life in the Arctic are changing very rapidly, as the conditions in that part of the world change, for the indigenous and subsistence populations, particularly in the northern part of Alaska, 

Canada, and Greenland. The role of our Government must be to 

help adapt to the changes that are coming. This includes failing infrastructure, because of permafrost thawing; coastal erosion; health 

issues that are arising. Those are some of the other compelling 

issues that I see there, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Gentlemen, thank you for being with us. Appreciate 

it. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy. I yield back. 

14 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Washington is recognized. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Apparently I have got 

the little kid’s chair from Thanksgiving, so I will try to sit up higher. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LARSEN. So I was wondering, Admiral Neffenger, could you 

tell us more about the preservation work the Coast Guard is doing 

on the Polar Sea, and then tell us how that work affects decisions 

about its future? And third, let us know when the Coast Guard will 

come to a final decision on what to do with the Polar Sea. Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. As you know, the Polar Sea has 

sat dockside for the past 21⁄2 years in an unmaintained status. The 

current—it has not had preservation work done to preserve it for 

a long period of time. And what I mean by that is we put her into 

a dockside status, but still in commission. 

There is $8 million currently in the Senate mark of our appropriations bill, which will provide the funding necessary to do preservation work, to dry dock the vessel, to blank off all the overboard 

discharges, and to arrest the current condition of the vessel. Once 

that is done, then we will have to take a detailed look at it to determine what the true work list and cost would be to reactivate the 

vessel. 

So, the reactivation remains an option for us, but we don’t currently have plans to reactivate it. The current plans are to do the 

preservation work necessary to put it in an arrested status, and 

then conduct the detailed engineering review to determine what 

systems would have to be upgraded and renewed in order to bring 

it back into service. 

Mr. LARSEN. So the business case analysis the Coast Guard did 

at the direction of this subcommittee and the full committee that 

resulted in an approximate $100 million cost to reactivate and 

begin to use Polar Sea, did that $100 million include this approxi- mate $8 million to preserve it, or was that—is that a dollar amount 

beyond the $8 million? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. That would be a dollar amount beyond, as 

I understand it, and I will make sure I get that correct for the 

record. But, as I understand it, the—that $100 million was a snapshot in time, if we were to have begun at that point to reactive the 

vessel. We believe that there has been some additional deterioration in the 21⁄2 years it has been sitting. And it is not as if it is— 

we are actively not concerned about that. But—— 

[The information follows:] 

The $8 million for a preservation drydocking of Polar Sea is in addition to 

the $100 million reactivation estimate provided in the Coast Guard’s Business Case Analysis. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, it doesn’t rain a lot in the Northwest, so it is 

probably not—— 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral NEFFENGER. But I suspect it will be something more than $100 million, once we do the assessment. We learned a lot in 

the reactivation of the Polar Star, and we have discovered some 

things with respect to the systems on the Polar Star that we would 

15 

have to upgrade on the Polar Sea, were we to bring her back in 

service, as an additional bridging strategy, what we consider longer 

term needs. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. You are right, sure. 

So, Admiral White, I came in at the end here, and—of your answer to your question. I got the gist of it. But can you tell—give 

me a sense, and the subcommittee a sense of how the Navy was 

engaged in the construction of our last icebreaker, the Healy? 

About 1990-ish. 

Admiral WHITE. Yes, sir. In the 1980s, Congress provided the 

funding that had been set aside to build Healy to the Navy to run 

the acquisition program. Then, in the building of Healy, it was a 

team effort. So the program management and the actual building, 

outfitting, transition of operations, was a Coast Guard/Navy partnership approach. But it was purely because the funding was put 

into our shipbuilding coffers, not out of hide, as it were, to do that, 

sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. So it was a separate dollar amount, and it was part 

of the overall shipbuilding account, set aside within the Navy shipbuilding account? 

Admiral WHITE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Is that how that worked? OK, yes. Admiral 

Neffenger, any comment on that? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I think he is accurate on that score. I 

don’t—I wasn’t involved in that—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

Admiral NEFFENGER [continuing]. At that time, with the details 

on that. But I do know that the money was given to the Navy shipbuilding account at the time, and we leveraged the capabilities of 

NAVSEA and Navy acquisition professionals to help us with that 

acquisition. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. And I will just finish with Ambassador Balton, 

but with a preface. I met with the Ambassador to Singapore 2 

weeks ago, and they are getting observer status with the Arctic 

Council. 

Can I rephrase? I will just say that again. Singapore is getting 

observer status with the Arctic Council. There is a good reason for 

that, and that is because of Singapore’s long interest in providing 

support services in the natural resource space, and they see that 

as important. And if Singapore is doing that, there are many other 

countries doing that. And I think the U.S. is perhaps falling a little 

bit behind on Arctic Council. 

So, I want to know what is the administration doing to respond 

to the GAO findings that have come out regarding the U.S. policy 

towards the Arctic Council? 

Mr. BALTON. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, you are absolutely 

right. Singapore has already obtained observer status in the Arctic 

Council, along with, at the last meeting, Japan, South Korea, 

China, India, and Italy. Plus, there were others granted observer 

status before that. Clearly, interest in the Arctic region is rising, 

including among States very far from the Arctic indeed. 

Yes, we participated in the GAO audit. We very much appreciated their attention to the issue. We have embraced their recommendations. We are going to do better to make sure that the 

16 

work of agencies within the Arctic Council and pursuing Arctic 

Council projects are properly tracked. We accept those suggestions 

from GAO. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Well, I appreciate the indulgence for a little extra time. And we will help you track those findings, as well. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BALTON. OK. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Jolly is recognized. 

Mr. JOLLY. No questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. No questions? 

Mr. Sanford, any questions? 

Mr. SANFORD. Yes, sir. This may or may not be the case, but I 

have heard it suggested, and that is there is a yearly run down 

each—so I am going to the opposite side of the world, but it ties 

to sort of asset utilization and, therefore, service life of what is obviously a rare resource, Navy or Coast Guard or—in this case, obviously, only Coast Guard—in the world of icebreaking, and that is 

that there is a yearly run down to McMurdo Station during their 

summer to open up the channel into McMurdo. It is used, essentially, for one ship, as I understand it. And then the ship heads 

back up to the Northwest. 

But it is apparently a month down and a month back, sort of a 

2-month voyage. A, is that correct? And what someone suggested 

in the brief conversation I had in this matter was that there might 

be cheaper alternatives to doing that, that in some ways taking 2 

months to run an icebreaker down to the Antarctica and back is 

a very expensive way of doing business. And I would be curious to 

hear you all’s thoughts on that, because, you know, if we didn’t use 

it that way, it would obviously open up some other alternatives, in 

terms of sea routes in the North. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, and on your second panel you have 

got the National Science Foundation, Dr. Kelly Falkner, and she 

can speak directly to the impact of that operation on U.S. national 

interests. 

The Coast Guard support to that is, indeed, to break out the 

channel in McMurdo. And although it is for a couple of ships that 

come in, those ships are very critically important to the—all the operations that we have going down there. 

And during my recent visit down there this past February, I had 

a chance to spend some amount of time looking at not only the scientific research that is going on, but the day-to-day real-time data 

that is being pushed out of there. So I would tell you that it gave 

me an appreciation for how important—— 

Mr. SANFORD. No, no, I wouldn’t question National Science Foundation’s work in Antarctica. But what I would question is is there 

a—I mean does any cheaper alternative jump out to you all, as a 

taxpayer, other than running an icebreaker a month down and a 

month back. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, and I think that is a fair question. 

But the—I think it goes back to maybe the point that I made earlier, and that is that, you know, these are remote regions by definition. So it is going to—there is a certain amount of cost just associVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:21 Jan 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\7-23-1~1\88818.TXT JEAN
17 

ated with getting to that region, if we decide that there are interests in being there. 

And what we found is that there is very little—despite the numbers of icebreakers that other nations are operating, there are very 

few actual heavy polar-class icebreakers in the world that are capable of conducting that mission in a safe and responsible and efficient way. And so—— 

Mr. SANFORD. If I might interrupt, what was suggested—and 

again, I would be curious to get your professional opinion—was 

that contracting with some of those other governments could take 

care of the McMurdo station without the 2-month lift down and 

back, and reserve our activity for further north. True or false? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, they—and I know the National 

Science Foundation did, indeed, contract during—from 2006 to this 

past—until just before this past year, when the Coast Guard did 

not have a heavy icebreaker in operation. 

And my only answer to that would be that contracting is attractive until the contract vessel is not available any more. And I think 

what we found is that other countries have pulled back their icebreakers at times when they needed them, and it has left the U.S. 

Antarctic Program in a challenging situation. 

So, if we want assured access as a nation, then I think the Nation needs to decide whether or not it wants to continue to field icebreaker capability, despite what is arguably a very substantial 

transit time to get down there and back. So I am not sure if that 

answers your—if that is responsive to your question, sir, but that 

is—— 

Mr. SANFORD. Last question. Is it essentially a month down and 

a month back? Is that correct? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Roughly speaking. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SANFORD. Right. I would yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. I got one little quick question. I am going to pass it to Mr. Garamendi here. 

Could you answer Mr. Larsen’s question on whether—why the 

determination hasn’t been made to—whether you are going to move 

forward with the Polar Sea or not? Because that is what your—you 

were going to make a determination. You did an analysis, but no 

determination was made. The determination was, ‘‘We have now 

made an analysis.’’ 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. Actually, it is not that we have 

been avoiding the determination, it is just the timing hasn’t yet 

come forward. 

We have got the Polar Star in operation for the next 7 to 10 

years. That buys us some time to do this requirements analysis 

and assessment that I described as part of the initial acquisition 

stages of a new icebreaker. That doesn’t say we are going to buy 

a new icebreaker, it just says, ‘‘Let’s see what one would look like. 

What are the requirements we have to build into it? How do we 

strip those requirements down, and make this as affordable as possible, given the challenging fiscal environment?’’ 

And then—— 

Mr. HUNTER. It was Polar Sea that he asked about, specifically. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. So when you look at Polar Sea, we 

say, ‘‘There may be a need to extend this interim heavy icebreaker 

18 

capability as a bridging strategy beyond 10 years. If we need to do 

so, then this—the money that we have requested and that is currently in the Senate mark would give us the ability to begin the 

process of assessing the true cost to now bring it back into service, 

and when we might want to bring that back into service,’’ because 

the challenge would be not to bring it into service sooner than you 

need it—otherwise you have got overlapping capability, and you 

may not extend to the point where you could have a new icebreaker 

in the water. 

So, it takes about 3 to 4 years, once you decide to begin reactivating to actually do that. And we think that the—over the next 

2 years we will be able to make a determination as to when you 

want to begin that activation process. Again, I don’t know if that 

is as responsive as you need it to be. 

Mr. HUNTER. No. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. But the decision is that it is an option. We 

have a rough idea of what the costs are going to be to do it. We 

know what it is going to take to preserve that vessel, to hold it in 

stasis until we can get the monies, if we decide to do so, and then 

to begin to make the case as to whether or not we think we need 

that, going forward. 

Mr. HUNTER. And I am glad Mr. Young got here. I think this 

might be our last Arctic hearing that we have on this, because I 

don’t think anybody really wants an icebreaker. 

Mr. Young is recognized. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you. I have problems, 

you know, with the Coast Guard and icebreakers. You are talking 

about repairing an old, old ship. And when you get done, you got 

a ship that is out of style, out of—it doesn’t compete. And you 

know, I have talked to every Commandant I have had, and I don’t 

know if the Coast Guard is—I guess we are going to pass the law 

on the last study we had. 

I still believe leasing is the option we should take place, not foreign vessels. Have you gone to any of the shipyards and said, 

‘‘What could you build for us?’’ Not your—‘‘What could you build for 

us that could do this mission?’’ Have you done that? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. There has been a lot of look at the 

lease. And, as you know, some of the initial evaluations and the detailed analyses don’t show a competitive advantage or a cost advantage to leasing. And I can provide those, again, for the record. 

But let me give you my general thoughts on that—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Let me interrupt you one moment. When was the 

last study done by the Coast Guard on leasing? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. It was done 2 years ago, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Really? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. And there is a—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Have you submitted that to Congress? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, we did. 

Mr. YOUNG. You did? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. It came in the form of a response to queries, but we can—and we can provide that—— 

[The information follows:] 

The most recent analysis on leasing was reported in the Polar Platform 

Business Case Analysis, delivered to Congress on November 2, 2011. The 

19 

Coast Guard analyzed prospective leasing of currently available platforms 

and several build-to-lease alternatives. 

The analysis concluded that leasing a polar heavy icebreaker is not feasible 

or cost effective for the Coast Guard in line with the following reasoning: 

1. There are currently no U.S.-built polar heavy icebreakers available for 

demise or time charter. A prospective leasing entity would need to construct a polar heavy icebreaker. Considering the unique design requirements and crewing restrictions associated with multimission operations 

and defense readiness, and lease terms exceeding that allowed under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines, a lease would prove 

more expensive to the Government than purchasing a polar icebreaker. 

2. OMB Circular A–11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the 

Budget (Appendices B and C) requires agencies to score all long-term 

lease funding authority upfront in the year the lease is started. This 

budgetary requirement makes it difficult, if not impossible, to execute 

long-term capital asset leases, especially considering the high cost of 

polar heavy icebreakers. 

3. Contract structures are typically more complex including sophisticated 

termination liability processes, lease termination clauses and contingent 

liability clauses which will be difficult to calculate and negotiate, which 

increases uncertainty and cost risk for both any prospective leasers and 

the Government. 

4. Unless capable of self-financing, the leaser would be obligated to obtain 

financing for prospectively leased ships and aircraft, creating the potential for liens which, in cases of a leaser’s financial difficulty, could impact 

the availability of the polar heavy icebreaker to conduct its missions as 

required. 

5. The maintenance support method and costs for nonstandard assets are 

unknown but would need to be included in the cost of leasing commercial 

assets. Limited flexibility in maintenance planning may restrict the ability to surge assets or incur significant costs by breaking the terms of the 

lease. Emergency or unscheduled repairs, which are more likely due to 

the nature of icebreaking operations, would result in additional costs. 

6. 14 U.S. Code 665 prohibits constructing a U.S. Coast Guard vessel in a 

foreign shipyard unless the President determines it to be in the national 

security interest of the U.S. to do so and transmits the determination 

to Congress. The Coast Guard currently has no plans to construct or 

lease a heavy icebreaker built in a foreign shipyard. 

Mr. YOUNG. I would appreciate that. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. The real challenge—it is both a challenge 

with respect to requirements in the build, a challenge with respect 

to sovereign requirements, if—as you are operating a military vessel. Some of those are surmountable. 

But the real challenge is—well, it comes on a couple fronts. 

There is a scoring issue. Again, that perhaps is surmountable, but 

there is a scoring issue, which actually makes a lease less desirable, in terms of costs, than an outright purchase. There is the fact 

that we tend to operate our vessels for 40 to 40-plus years. And so 

leases tend to be short-term solutions, bridging strategies to longer 

term. 

For example, we leased our airborne use of force helicopters 

while we were arming and preparing our existing helicopter fleet 

for service. That provided a good, you know, interim bridging strategy until we could get an armed helicopter in place in our existing 

fleet. 

The other problem is that you still have to build heavy icebreakers. There are no heavy icebreakers available for lease. So 

20 

you still have to go through the requirements process, and we are 

still looking at a number of years. 

But the real question is, does a lease answer the question for 

that long-term need? If you only use it for a short period of time, 

then you are going to amortize those costs over a much shorter period. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, you know how I feel 

about this. I actually believe that I can get a proposal to you, if you 

would be receptive, for a vessel to do the job for a lot less. Because 

you are not going to get the $10 billion from this Congress to build 

a new icebreaker. That simple. You are not going to get it. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. You can ask all you want, you are not going to—in 

the meantime, we don’t have icebreakers, and all the rest of the 

countries do have icebreakers. I am looking for a solution to a problem, has American-built icebreaker in the Arctic. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, yes, sir. We would evaluate any proposal that comes our way. We are—like you, we are interested in 

finding effective solutions to what is a daunting challenge, to put 

heavy icebreaker capability back on the water. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, that is—I do appreciate your having 

this hearing, because we are an Arctic nation and, you know—of 

course, we may be—cart before the horse, or horse before the cart, 

I don’t know which one it is going to be. A lot of scientists I talk 

to, contrary to what people in this audience may believe, we may 

be not having—other than a tremendous need for big icebreakers, 

because it may not quite be as warm as they think it is up in the 

Arctic. Everybody says it is going that way, but we will see. 

I want to be flying over this area when I am long gone, as a 

raven. And I want to say if your ancestors get plopped on, it is 

going to be me saying, ‘‘I told you so.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. YOUNG. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. I envision Don more as an eagle when he comes 

back. 

I have got a quick question. What if the Coast Guard just went 

for search and rescue, navigation aids, fisheries, enforcement, oil 

spill recovery? Forget about the other stuff that other agencies 

want you to do, and the Navy’s not—if they are not going to help 

you, they are not going to help you. How much would that cost? 

Just a Coast Guard enforcement-type icebreaker to be up there, 

clear the ice, rescue vessels, and not do anything with national security, meaning not be able to operate any type of military operation off of it. What would that cost? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I can’t give you a dollar amount, but what 

I will tell you is that is essentially what we are looking at, through 

the requirements process. We have spent a lot of time talking to 

other agencies in the work, and we said, ‘‘Look, if we build one of 

these things, we would like to build, basically, a heavy icebreaker, 

and we don’t want to load it down with things that detract from 

the ability to break ice,’’ because, as you know, the more stuff you 

put on to a vessel, the more requirements you ask of it, the more 

compromises you make, in terms of basic hull design, and the like, 

particularly with an icebreaker. 

21 

What I would tell you is that we will probably still need a heavy 

icebreaker, even if you are only conducting Coast Guard missions, 

because you still need the ability to access—and one of the things, 

as I talk to scientists who are looking at a receding ice pack—you 

know, receding doesn’t mean disappearing, to Mr. Young’s point. 

And what you find is that sometimes you have actually much more 

challenging ice conditions as a result of that, because you have ice 

flows moving, they collide into one another, they create pressure 

ridges, and they create much more opportunity, like this character 

that we just rescued from the ice in the Northwest Passage, to get 

beset in the ice and get into trouble real fast. 

In fact, we saw an example of that in the Antarctic last year, 

where you had a medium icebreaker from the Chinese and a medium icebreaker from the Russians beset in the Antarctic ice. And, 

fortunately, before we had fully diverted to go rescue them, the ice 

pack shifted, as a sort of wind shift, and they got themselves free. 

But they were in danger of being there for some extended period 

of time, because they didn’t have the capability to break themselves 

out. 

So, you always want that capability. But I would agree with you, 

that you want to reduce the requirements and descope them as 

much as possible, so that what you have is a purpose-built, heavy 

icebreaker that can conduct the basis round of Coast Guard missions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Just quickly, I think for all of us on this side 

of the panel, the Healy gives us an opportunity and a thought process on how it might be done. Money in the defense budget was used 

to build the Healy through the Navy, a process that we should take 

a look at, if we are serious about having a new heavy icebreaker. 

I want to go back to the Northern Sea Route. We were discussing 

that issue. It seems to me to be one that we need to understand, 

relationships with Russia and the rest. Admiral White, you were 

going to take up that issue. 

Admiral WHITE. Yes, sir, Ranking Member Garamendi, thank 

you. 

The Northern Sea Route represents the most navigable sea route 

that is open for certain periods of time during the late summer 

during the ice minimum in the Arctic. We anticipate, by the mid2020s, that it will be ice free, which, under international definition, 

means less than 10 percent ice coverage, for up to 6 weeks per 

year. That represents significant amount of transit across that passage, even without necessarily having to have an icebreaker. 

We look at the Northern Sea Route, and especially the entrance 

to it through the Bering Strait, as a strategic crossroads that we 

are concerned about, just like we are all those crossroads, this one 

especially because we own part of that strategic crossroads. So, as 

we monitor what is happening in the Northern Sea Route, we do 

so from a national security perspective, but also understanding 

that the way that these routes unfold in the Arctic, we anticipate 

that they will do so peacefully, with low risk of conflict. We have 

no anticipation of that. 

22 

We also, as I mentioned, are looking for a deepwater route to 

start opening up in the mid-2020 timeframe, which would be near 

the pole, and would provide another alternative, although it would 

unfold and open up more slowly, certainly, than the Northern Sea 

Route. But all these routes are going to change the way that the 

Arctic is looked at, and we are monitoring them closely, as we 

watch our missions evolve, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Mr. BALTON. Thank you, sir. I don’t have much to add. You suggested that relations with Russia are problematic; that is certainly 

so. However, our nations do have common interests in the Arctic, 

and one of them is to prevent or prepare for the possibility of a casualty in the Bering Strait region. 

And so, even in these difficult times, we need to be working with 

all of our neighbors, regardless of other problems, to—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well—— 

Mr. BALTON [continuing]. Prepare for just that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The Northern Sea Route appears to be totally 

within the Russian sphere of influence. That is, the economic—— 

Mr. BALTON. Yes, that is true. But vessels that pass all the way 

through the Northern Sea Route come through the Bering Strait. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Understood. 

Mr. BALTON. And that is where our interests kick in, of course. 

Because, if there were an accident there, the effects in Alaska and 

the United States would be palpable. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is that northern route, under the current Russian program—— 

Mr. BALTON. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. Open to all? 

Mr. BALTON. Yes, I do believe so. However, there are requirements Russia has put in place for escorts, Russian escorts, icebreak 

escorts and others. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I noticed the admiral took a real deep breath as 

you began. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So finish, and then the admiral—— 

Mr. BALTON. No, I was just trying to recall what I had heard 

about that. But the answer is yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Admiral, anything to add? 

Admiral WHITE. With the qualifier the Ambassador put in, I 

agree. The Russians are very careful, in that they—certain ships 

going through there must be escorted during certain parts, because 

of the concerns with navigating safely, the hazardous conditions 

that are involved, and some of these choke point areas going 

through the Northern Sea Route. So they do also require that vessels meet a certain limit through the Polar Code and other requirements, in terms of the ship’s ability to maintain and sustain itself 

in going through those passages. 

So, it is open with conditions, I think, is the best way to say it, 

sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. I have completed my questions on 

this particular panel. So I will yield back what time there is. 

Thank you. 

23 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Sanford is recognized. 

Mr. SANFORD. I don’t want to be a broken record, but I do want 

to follow up on what Chairman Young was saying, which is this 

whole leasing alternative. Because when you think about it, essentially, about a third of our heavy-duty icebreaking capacity is built 

around that trip down to McMurdo and back. You know, settling 

in after you get back, the trips through the South Pacific and back 

up. 

And therefore, I mean, if you have that kind of time that is allotted to that one mission in a multibillion-dollar asset, it just begs 

this larger question of free up that time, have that asset utilization 

available for the Northern Sea Route and other, and look at the 

leasing option that the chairman was talking about. And I would 

yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Larsen? 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify, I think 

in my colleague from Alaska’s excitement to be a raven, he said an 

icebreaker cost $10 billion. The only estimates I have seen are anywhere from $800 million to $1 billion. Still a lot, but not $10 billion. Is that right? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. That is correct. Those are current, rough 

order estimates. 

Mr. LARSEN. Unless you want to buy 10. I will yield to Mr. 

Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, as far as I am concerned, I got that number 

because I thought we were going to ask for 10. I mean I never saw 

an agency that didn’t have—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LARSEN. Duly noted. Duly noted. The other thing I just want 

to clarify, having been here late—but I understand a lot of discussion was taking place around icebreakers—but implementing Arctic 

policy is a diplomatic—certainly more and more diplomatic effort. 

But from a Coast Guard perspective, icebreakers do not a policy 

make. There are other assets and other missions you have to implement up there. And you all are trying to figure out how to do 

that. Is that right? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. And I had mentioned earlier that 

we have a number of initiatives to implement our Arctic Strategy. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. But some of those are policy in nature. 

They include support to the chairmanship of the Arctic Council 

coming up, and they also include support to the Arctic Council 

itself. We serve on a number of the working groups. And, in fact, 

directly involved in the negotiations of the two agreements that 

were referred to on search and rescue, as well as on oil spill response. 

We are also looking at, in conjunction with this idea of an Arctic 

Coast Guard forum as a way for the Arctic Council nations and the 

operating agencies, the maritime agencies, the Coast Guards or the 

Coast Guard-like navies of the Arctic nations, to work together, to 

find a way to not just implement those agreements, but to think 

about how you would share information, how you would monitor 

the sharing of that information so that you have awareness of what 

24 

is happening, how you would do—conduct joint exercises, and the 

like. 

So, all of that is designed to take the policies that are being discussed, and figure out how you implement those in a real-world 

basis, because that is what we care about. Somebody hands us a 

policy, you think, ‘‘Well, how am I going to actually carry this policy out?’’ 

We are also looking at standing up a Center for Arctic Studies 

and Policy at our Coast Guard Academy, and this is a low-cost 

standup. This is really an establishment of a venue to begin to look 

at those, at the operational implications of policies that are being 

developed with respect to the Arctic. And it will give us a chance 

to, again, to provide an academic setting for sharing of that information. 

But I think what I owe you is—the committee is just the explanation of that Implementation Plan, and it lays out a number of 

the policy-related initiatives that we have, with respect to operations in the Arctic. But it largely centers on understanding what 

is happening up there, working with partners, and then looking at 

governance issues and how you would implement those. 

[The information follows:] 

The Implementation Plan for the Coast Guard’s Arctic Strategy centers 

around 12 initiatives. These 12 initiatives carry out our strategic objectives 

of Improving Awareness, Modernizing Governance and Broadening Partnerships. The 12 are outlined below: 

1. Enhance Operation Arctic Shield: Operation Arctic Shield is our mobile 

and seasonal operational presence in the Arctic. This initiative seeks to 

enhance our operational effectiveness to meet mission demands. Operations include air and sea patrols for search and rescue, maritime domain awareness, training, and protection of sovereign interests; exercises with Federal, State, local, tribal, industry, and international partners; and evaluation of technologies for pollution response. 

2. Improve Maritime Domain Awareness: Maritime domain awareness 

(MDA) is a tool used for effective Coast Guard Operations. MDA involves 

collection, analysis, and understanding of data pertaining to a wide 

range of information including vessel locations, awareness of current and 

historical passengers, crew ownership, and financial relationships; what 

activities the vessels are conducting; what cargoes they may be carrying; 

and what natural conditions they are facing—wind, seas, tides, currents, 

storms, ice conditions, and marine mammal migrations. With our Federal, State, local, tribal and international partners, the Coast Guard is 

developing improvements within this initiative to provide a more complete operational picture of activities in the Arctic. 

3. Recapitalize Polar Icebreaking: Heavy icebreaking capability is critical to 

providing assured access to the Polar Regions for the U.S. and executing 

the Coast Guard’s statutory responsibilities in areas such as search and 

rescue and marine environmental response. The Preliminary Operational 

Requirements Document (PORD) Integrated Product Team (IPT) has 

gathered and compiled Coast Guard and external stakeholder requirements (Department of Defense, National Science Foundation, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, etc.). The PORD is 

currently in concurrent clearance. The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and Alternatives Analysis has an estimated completion date 

of May 2015. 

4. Improve Arctic communications capabilities: The harsh environment in 

the Arctic has hampered development of a robust communications infrastructure. The Coast Guard is working with the Department of Defense 

to evaluate gaps in communication capability and identify communications needed to support military operations in the Arctic region. 

25 

5. Continue International Maritime Organization (IMO) Polar Code Development: The United States is working through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop and achieve adoption of the Polar 

Code, which includes both mandatory and recommended provisions, to 

cover the full range of safety, design, construction, equipment, operational, training, communications and environmental protection matters 

relevant to ships operating in the Arctic and Antarctic. 

6. Promote Waterways Management: The Coast Guard is developing Arctic 

waterways management regimes including aids to navigation, vessel 

tracking, and ship routing in cooperation with international partners to 

ensure safe, efficient, and free flow of maritime traffic. 

7. Support Arctic Council and U.S. Chairmanship: The United States will 

chair the Arctic Council from May 2015 to May 2017. The Coast Guard 

expects to play a significant role due to our existing engagement in 

Council activities. The Coast Guard is currently participating on the Arctic Council Oil Spill Prevention Taskforce and has served on two previous taskforces that established the 2011 Arctic Search and Rescue 

Agreement and the 2013 Oil Spill Prevention and Response Agreement. 

The Coast Guard is also active within the interagency process, known 

as the Arctic Policy Group, in preparation for U.S. chairmanship of the 

Arctic Council in 2015. 

8. Establish an Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF): The Coast Guard proposes to establish an Arctic Coast Guard Forum to bring all eight Arctic 

coast guards together to collaborate on Arctic issues. Modeled after the 

North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, the ACGF will be a unique arena 

where the maritime governance service of the Arctic countries discuss coordination of exercises, strengthen relationships, and share best practices. The first ‘‘expert-level’’ meeting of the ACGF occurred March 2014 

in Canada, and garnered enthusiastic approval of concept. A senior leadership meeting will occur in September 2014 to approve the Terms of 

Reference and issue a joint statement. 

9. Establish a Center for Arctic Study and Policy: The Coast Guard will develop a think tank to study the operational implications of policies that 

are being developed with respect to the Arctic. 

10. Establish an Arctic Policy Board: The Coast Guard is working with 

DHS to develop an Arctic Policy Board under the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act. The Coast Guard will seek Board members from industry, science, academia, tribal communities, environmental groups, and 

other stakeholders. It will provide a broad range of expertise to the Secretary of Homeland Security on safety, security, and stewardship matters relating to the Arctic region. 

11. Create an Arctic Fusion Center: The Coast Guard plans to study and, 

if warranted, implement a Fusion Center to collect and disseminate 

critical information with Federal, State, local, and tribal stakeholders. 

12. Create an Arctic Maritime Assistance Coordination Center: The Coast 

Guard plans to study and, if appropriate, implement an international 

center for Arctic mission coordination for search and rescue and other 

emergency response. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK, thanks. And for Admiral White, I will just—I 

will follow up with you later about the Navy Arctic Road Map. We 

are—my office is taking a look at that in a little more detail, but 

I will just follow up with you specifically on that later. 

Admiral WHITE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. Unless Mr. Garamendi has 

more questions—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Just a quick question. A lot of the icebreaking 

activities would seem to benefit commerce, specific ships that may 

26 

want to go from here to there. Can you charge for the services, 

breaking the ice so the ship can pass or get unstuck? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I suppose the best example would be, 

if you look at the Great Lakes icebreaking mission that we have, 

we do not charge for those services. And—although, what we have 

done there is develop a tiered approach to it. We keep the major 

arteries open, for lack of a better description, and then we leave it 

to commercial icebreaking services and those contracted for—to 

open up the entrances into the ports and the small harbors. 

We used to do it all, but over the course of the last 6 or 7 years 

we have really changed that, and trying to reduce to simply the 

large—you know, basically the maintenance of the main waterway, 

which is in the interest of the Nation. 

Mr. HUNTER. I have got just one last statement, I guess. I have 

always said whoever—I didn’t say this originally, someone else did, 

but whoever controls the ocean controls the world, right? And now, 

whoever controls space controls the oceans. 

But I think this portends bad things for America. I think you see 

us with one heavy icebreaker, everybody else with more than that. 

And I think, in 20 years, you are going to see all of them in the 

Arctic doing what we should be doing, and not doing it as well as 

us, or as environmentally safe as we would do it, and we will be 

watching. We will be talking about all these policy things we would 

like to implement, and these neat Arctic groups that we talk to 

ourselves in, but with no actual presence in the area. 

I think that is what is happening here. I think we are going to 

look back in 10 years and have absolutely nothing, because it 

doesn’t seem like it is that big of a deal, because money is not 

being appropriated or set aside from the Navy’s $15 billion defense 

budget, or acquisition budget that the Navy has. The Coast Guard’s 

budget is only $1 billion a year. You are trying to recapitalize a 

fleet right now that is 40 or 50 years old. It is not going to happen. 

And I guess what I would say is that until you want it to happen, we are not going to hold another hearing like this, unless specifically requested by another Member for a certain reason, because 

nothing has really changed. I mean there is no Presidential request 

for this, there is no money being put in by the Navy. I guess the 

need just isn’t there right now. If we are happy to let Russia do 

it for us, we will have Russia do it for us. We are happy to have 

them take us into space, too. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. They make our rocket engines. 

Mr. HUNTER. Then we can do that—yes. So, I guess that is what 

you are saying, because it is all talk. It is no action. And it seems 

like it is not that important that we are in the Arctic. Message received here. 

We are not going to force you to do what you don’t want to do. 

And if you don’t want to be there, and you don’t want to build an 

icebreaker, if you don’t want to lease one, or if you are going to do 

study after study for 20 years to see what the best cost analysis 

is to do it, then we just won’t do it, and we will focus on other 

things, like making sure we have enough tunafish for the fleets. 

And we won’t be in the Arctic, and that is fine. 

So, with that, I would like to call our second panel of witnesses. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it. 

27 

Good morning. Our second panel of witnesses today includes 

Captain Dave Westerholm, Director of the Office of Response and 

Restoration for NOAA; Dr. Kelly Falkner, Division Director of 

Polar Programs at the National Science Foundation; and Ed 

Fogels, Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources of the great State of Alaska. 

Captain Westerholm, you are now recognized. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN DAVID WESTERHOLM, USCG, RETIRED, AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND RESTORATION, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION; KELLY KENISON FALKNER, PH.D., DIVISION DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF POLAR PROGRAMS, NATIONAL 

SCIENCE FOUNDATION; AND EDMUND FOGELS, DEPUTY 

COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 

STATE OF ALASKA 

Captain WESTERHOLM. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and members of the subcommittee. My 

name is Dave Westerholm, and I am the Director of the Office of 

Response and Restoration at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA, which is in the Department of Commerce. In this capacity I was recently selected to serve as the Arctic lead for the National Ocean Service. 

Thank you for inviting NOAA to testify today on our work to implement U.S. policy in the Arctic. I am pleased to follow my colleagues from the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and Department of 

State, and I am pleased to join here my colleagues from the National Science Foundation and the State of Alaska Department of 

Natural Resources. We work with all of these agencies to advance 

U.S. security interests, pursue responsible stewardship, and improve maritime domain awareness, safety, and environmental intelligence in this critical region. 

NOAA envisions an Arctic where decisions and actions are based 

on sound science, and support healthy, productive, and resilient 

communities and ecosystems. To achieve this vision, NOAA is 

using state-of-the-art technology and innovative partnerships to improve Arctic marine navigation, provide ocean and coastal observations and weather forecast, promote environmental stewardship, 

and prepare for and respond to maritime hazards. 

Although NOAA provides important stewardship in science in 

the Arctic region, today I would like to focus my remarks on the 

services that NOAA provides, which are deemed critical in various 

Arctic reports to meet our Nation’s maritime safety, economic security, and environmental protection needs. 

One of these services is charting, and NOAA is responsible for 

providing foundational data and services to support safe marine 

navigation and domain awareness. Accurate and up-to-date nautical charts are critical to safe operation, and these charts require 

not only bathymetric data, but also data on shoreline features, 

water levels, sea floor characteristics, and precise positioning. 

NOAA is investing in hydrographic surveys in the Arctic, as well 

as shoreline mapping missions and tide and current surveys, in 

order to enhance our navigation products and services. 

28 

Furthermore, NOAA is working closely with our partners such as 

the State of Alaska, the U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and members of 

the academic community to provide the data needed for safe navigation, science, and more informed coastal decisionmaking. 

Major stakeholders and partners, including those who live, work, 

or are responsible for activities in the Arctic, also require weather, 

water, and sea ice information for planning and decisionmaking. 

NOAA provides this information. However, weather analysis and 

prediction capabilities are not as robust in the Arctic as they are 

in other parts of the United States, due to the limited scope of existing observations. 

Because of Alaska’s vast size, remote population, and environmental conditions, our decision support services are vitally important to Arctic communities. As an example, the decision when to 

deliver heating and fuel oil to a coastal community may require 

weather and sea ice outlooks weeks in advance to ensure safe transit. 

NOAA is also responsible for delivering scientific support to the 

U.S. Coast Guard for marine hazards, including oil spills and marine debris, which can pose additional challenges in the Arctic. 

With decreased summer sea ice, we expect to see continued growth 

in maritime commerce, tourism, and oil and gas exploration. Given 

this growth, we must be prepared in the event that a vessel or exploratory drilling unit has an oil spill. 

To support our planning and preparedness for spill response in 

the Arctic, NOAA has been working with all our partners, engaging 

with Alaska communities, and compiling and developing baseline 

information on natural resources. We are providing access to critical observations and data through the Alaska Ocean Observing 

System, and we have launched a web-based tool to assist emergency responders in dealing with incidents called the Arctic Environmental Response Management Application, or Arctic ERMA. 

Arctic ERMA was tested during the 2013 Arctic Shield operation, 

in collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard. Arctic ERMA is again 

being used in Arctic Shield in 2014 to further enhance our ability 

to respond to an Arctic incident. 

As transportation grows in the Arctic, where there is cargo, tank, 

fishing, cruise, or recreational vessels, the potential for incidents 

will continue to grow, and we must be prepared to give the response community the most accurate navigation, weather, and sea 

ice information possible, as well as sound scientific advice on the 

most effective response strategies. We will continue to build our 

services in the Arctic, working with our Federal and State partners, as well as academic institutions, local communities, and industry. 

In closing, NOAA plays a unique and important role in providing 

critical information and services to support safe, reliable, and efficient navigation in the Arctic. I thank you for inviting NOAA to 

testify today, and I welcome any questions you may have. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Captain. Dr. Falkner is recognized. 

Dr. FALKNER. Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, we appreciate 

this opportunity to discuss how the National Science Foundation is 

implementing U.S. policy and meeting its icebreaking needs for reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:21 Jan 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\7-23-1~1\88818.TXT JEAN
29 

search in the Arctic, as well as for research and operations of the 

U.S. Antarctic Program that NSF manages on behalf of the United 

States. 

To promote scientific progress, NSF bears a critical responsibility 

for providing scientists with access to the oceans. In recent decades, the polar oceans have undergone wide-ranging physical, 

chemical, and biological changes, with implications for global 

change. Moreover, relatively unexplored Arctic and Southern Ocean 

areas remain ripe for new discoveries. I refer you to my written 

statement for important examples of polar marine science objectives. 

So, Mr. Chairman, ice-capable research platforms are essential to 

keeping the U.S. at the forefront of polar research. In addition, 

NSF also requires heavy icebreaker services to conduct vital annual resupply of our Nation’s Antarctic research program. 

So, with respect to Antarctic operations, U.S. policy calls for 

year-round U.S. presence at three research stations in Antarctica: 

McMurdo, Amundsen-Scott South Pole, and Palmer. These support 

an active and influential science presence that ensures the U.S. a 

leading role in governance through the Antarctic Treaty system. 

Last year, after a 7-year hiatus, the Coast Guard successfully 

provided icebreaking services for Antarctic operations via the 38- 

year-old refurbished Polar Star. Barring unforeseen circumstances, 

the Coast Guard expects it will be able to meet this mission requirement for at least the remainder of Polar Star’s projected life 

of 6 to 9 years. We are now at a critical juncture in planning how 

to meet this national need beyond this timeframe. 

In considering how to best fulfill our responsibilities for the U.S. 

Antarctic Program, NSF operates, in accord with U.S. policy and 

instructions contained in Presidential Memorandum 6646, that 

every effort will be made to manage the program in a manner that 

maximizes cost-effectiveness and return on investment. Now, going 

forward, NSF must secure cost-effective and reliable icebreaking 

services for the resupply mission that is critical to supporting the 

broad goals of the U.S. Antarctic Program. 

For research in the Southern Ocean, NSF-supported scientists 

primarily rely on two leased vessels: the light icebreaker, Nathaniel 

B. Palmer; and the ice-reinforced Laurence M. Gould, both owned 

and operated by Edison Chouest Offshore of Louisiana. Over the 

past two decades, this combination of vessels fostered development 

of NSF’s world-class Southern Ocean research and ensured regular 

resupply and personnel movements for Palmer Station. 

In the Arctic, NSF exercises a range of options in order to expeditiously and cost effectively support cutting edge marine research. 

NSF funded the construction in Marinette, Wisconsin, of a highly 

science-capable vessel that can operate in ice up to about 3 feet 

thick. Sikuliaq, to be operated by the University of Alaska, will 

service the U.S. research community from her home port in Seward, Alaska, beginning in early 2015. This vessel will be used to 

study the vital ecosystems and ocean processes in the resource-rich 

waters of the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea, and within the Arctic 

Ocean, as ice conditions permit, or under escort of a more capable 

icebreaker. 

30 

The only other U.S. Government-owned research icebreaker is 

the 15-year-old Coast Guard cutter, Healy. NSF and other agencies 

sponsor Arctic marine research on the Healy, and the vessel can 

routinely operate in ice of up to about 5 feet thick. Since operations 

began in 2001, the vessel has been tasked at capacity. NSF coordinates with the Coast Guard for scheduling and scientific technical 

support of this medium-duty icebreaker that can operate in the 

summer in the High Arctic. 

NSF also engages international partners in a variety of ways to 

facilitate activities of U.S. scientists. International engagement has 

proven to be a very cost-effective way to leverage our research assets, both in the Arctic and in Antarctica. 

In addition, NSF expects to continue to exploit technologies such 

as autonomous underwater vehicles, surface buoys, and moorings 

with innovative sensor systems, as these will increasingly provide 

cost-effective and wide-reaching Arctic and Southern Ocean marine 

observations. 

So, in closing, Mr. Chairman, sustaining U.S. scientific preeminence in the coming decades will continue to demand appropriate research and logistical support, including an efficacious, reliable, cost-effective blend of ice-capable research platforms and 

heavy icebreaking services. 

I thank you for your time and interest, and I will be happy to 

answer any questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Doctor. Mr. Fogels is recognized. 

Mr. FOGELS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Congressman Young, my name is Ed Fogels, and I am the Deputy 

Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources for the 

State of Alaska, in the administration of Governor Sean Parnell. I 

am honored to be here today. 

Alaska appreciates the Federal efforts to include us in the deliberations on the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and the invitation of the Governor’s cabinet to participate as part of the U.S. 

delegation at the Arctic Council meetings. It will be of utmost importance to ensure that the State is welcome as an active collaborative partner in these proceedings. 

The United States is only an Arctic nation because of Alaska. 

Arctic Alaska is mainly remote, presenting challenges that few 

non-Alaskans could comprehend. Everyday essentials are all dependent on the ability to transport people and supplies across vast 

roadless areas. As the committee envisions the future of Arctic 

transportation and infrastructure, the needs and challenges of 

Alaska’s citizens must be kept at the forefront. The very health of 

our communities depends on us. 

We already have a strong framework of existing laws and regulations in place that guide resource management in the Arctic. My 

written testimony lists all these laws that we have that are specific 

to Alaska. We also have broad national laws, a long list that guide 

resource development. We must strive to use these laws and regulations more efficiently, and avoid the unnecessary, overly burdensome application we have seen in recent years. 

The State supports the expanded use of Alaska’s existing military bases: Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex; the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson; and Eielson Air Force Base. And we believe 

31 

these bases and their assets are critical to security in the Pacific 

and the Arctic. 

We need more icebreakers. I really don’t need to go into too much 

more detail, as we have been discussing icebreakers quite a bit 

today. But needless to say, we do support more icebreakers. The 

Coast Guard will also need expanded aviation assets in the U.S. 

Arctic. At this point, we believe that conflicting and unnecessary 

Federal policies, as well as limited financial means appear as obstacles. Fortunately, Alaska Native Corporations and the State are 

willing partners to expedite this expansion of these assets. 

Let me talk a little bit about mapping. Our Arctic needs better 

maps. We have mapped the surface of the planet Mars more accurately than America’s Arctic. The State is leading the way in the 

effort to get better mapping, with excellent collaboration from Federal agencies, under the leadership of the Department of the Interior. And we are making good progress. The State has contributed 

$12 million, the Federal agencies $16 million, but $30 million is 

still needed to complete our Arctic base map of the State. 

We need better oil spill response infrastructure for both future 

development and for the increased shipping. The United States has 

highly prospective oil and gas basins in the Chukchi and Beaufort 

Seas that will provide for the necessary private-sector investment 

in oil spill response systems. 

Let me talk a little bit about our communities. Communities in 

the Arctic are some of the—have some of the highest rates of poverty, suicide, domestic and sexual abuse, and substance abuse in 

the Nation. These social issues are clearly linked to the economic 

well-being of these communities. The Parnell administration has 

invested in clearing pathways of economic opportunity wherever 

possible to allow these communities to take control for a better future. Rather than developing redundant or overlapping regulations 

that hurt our efforts to help these communities, we need to focus 

on ways we can improve infrastructure for access, and streamline 

our regulatory process. 

An example of what we need to do is to develop an Arctic deepwater port. The State and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are 

working together, and we are already far along in the process of 

investigating possible deepwater port sites in Alaska. We would 

like to see expedited analysis, permitting, planning, that would 

make State port investments more economically feasible and certain. 

An example of what we don’t need to do in the Arctic is to unnecessarily block our rural communities from developing access, like 

the Federal veto of a short stretch of road that would connect the 

community of King Cove to a decent airport. Many lives have been 

lost because of this community’s inability to access this airport. 

In closing, I would just like to say that, for over half a century, 

the State of Alaska has been at the forefront of natural resource 

management, employing some of the world’s most accomplished scientists and technical specialists. We are a model for responsible resource stewardship amongst Arctic nations within the United 

States. We don’t need to increase the already overly complex regulatory burden. We need to look for ways to make the system more 

efficient. We need to work together to improve Arctic infrastrucVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:21 Jan 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\7-23-1~1\88818.TXT JEAN
32 

ture. This is critical for not only the health of our communities, but 

for the security of the Nation. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome any questions from the committee. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, sir. 

My first question is for NSF and NOAA. You have requirements 

that you have given to the Coast Guard for what you would like 

to see in an icebreaker. Are you contributing funds? You have a— 

Doctor, your funding for NSF is about $7.6 billion a year. What is 

NOAA’s funding? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. For icebreaking? 

Mr. HUNTER. Just overall. What is your budget? Four billion dollars? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. About $4 billion. 

Mr. HUNTER. $4 billion, $7.6 billion. The Coast Guard’s acquisition budget, again, is just about $1.2 billion. So I am asking. Are 

you willing to put in money? And, if not, why are we here? 

Dr. FALKNER. We do, in fact, reimburse the Coast Guard for the 

day rates of the services that we need. 

Mr. HUNTER. Excuse me, ma’am. Let me clarify. Are you willing 

to put in money to build an icebreaker? 

Dr. FALKNER. We need icebreaking services; we don’t need a fulltime, heavy icebreaker at our beck and call. And we do not have 

the resources to support such. So, as I mentioned in my testimony, 

the most cost-effective way for us to meet our needs is to contract 

for the time that we need. We have worked successfully with the 

Coast Guard for many years, going back to the inception of the program in the fifties. At this point in time, they have that one ancient asset that we are relying on. 

I think the answer to your question is that NSF is not resourced 

to build a heavy icebreaker for the Nation. 

Mr. HUNTER. I didn’t ask that. I asked if you were willing to contribute even a small amount. I guess the answer is no. 

Sir? Captain? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. So my answer would be very similar in 

that, you know, we support the Coast Guard’s icebreaking capability and their long-range plans, and we are working with them, 

but NOAA is also not resourced for the icebreaking mission. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. The answer is no. OK. So that is easy. I guess 

what that means, in the long run, is why should the Coast Guard 

care about your requirements if you are not willing to put any skin 

in the game. That is what I would make sure the Coast Guard does 

not do. Why should they have to spend more on their acquisitions 

for you, when you are not willing to pay to have it made? 

So let’s go from that to the next thing I think Mr. Young is interested in, too. When it comes to leasing, Doctor, you lease from 

Chouest. Is that right? The two smaller—— 

Dr. FALKNER. Our research vessels are leased from Chouest. We 

work with the Military Sealift Command to lease our cargo vessel 

and our tanker. 

Mr. HUNTER. Are they operated by civilian mariners? 

Dr. FALKNER. They are. It is—— 

Mr. HUNTER. They are? And that actually—— 

33 

Dr. FALKNER. Contractor-owned, contractor-operated right now. 

They can also do Government-owned, contractor-operated leases for 

us. 

Mr. HUNTER. The Coast Guard has told us over and over again 

that that is impossible. It is impossible to have merchant marines 

in charge of one of their ships, when the ship’s main goal is just 

icebreaking and research—— 

Dr. FALKNER. They provide icebreaking services with their breaker. They are not doing the resupply of the fuel, and they are not 

bringing in—the cargo in, as part of that mission. They are cutting 

the channel and the ice to McMurdo Station to allow those other 

vessels to come in. 

Mr. HUNTER. But you have a model right now, where you are basically using those leased icebreakers. 

Dr. FALKNER. They are not icebreakers. 

Mr. HUNTER. Oh, they are not? 

Dr. FALKNER. They are ice-reinforced vessels that require escort 

of a leased breaker—— 

Mr. HUNTER. The Nathaniel B. Palmer and—OK, got you. That 

is the Nathaniel B. Palmer and the—how do you say it? 

Dr. FALKNER. Those are our research vessels. That is another set 

of vessels. What I was referring to before were our resupply mission vessels. And we, through the Military Sealift Command, contract each year for a tanker to bring down approximately 6 million 

gallons of fuel, and for a cargo vessel to bring down hundreds of 

containers of materials, and to return materials from the continent 

back. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Somebody has to break the ice. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK, so who actually—who breaks the ice? You don’t 

contract with the icebreakers—— 

Dr. FALKNER. The Coast Guard broke the ice this year. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. 

Dr. FALKNER. Prior to that we had 7 years where the Coast 

Guard did not have an asset capable of doing the job. And those 

7 years, we contracted with foreign breakers to handle that mission. 

Mr. HUNTER. Got you. Where does Chouest come in? I am—— 

Dr. FALKNER. Chouest purpose-built two vessels for us. One is 

the icebreaker, the light—medium icebreaker that I referred to. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. So Chouest did build an icebreaker for you. 

Dr. FALKNER. They did. 

Mr. HUNTER. That they operate? 

Dr. FALKNER. They operate, right. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. 

Dr. FALKNER. They—we, through our prime contractor, contract 

with them to operate our research vessel. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. But it is an icebreaker, it is a small icebreaker. 

Dr. FALKNER. It is. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. And they operate that all the time for you? 

Dr. FALKNER. They do. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. Got you. 

Dr. FALKNER. And we also have an ice-reinforced vessel, the Laurence M. Gould, which runs between Punta Arenas in Chile, to our 

station, Palmer Station, on the peninsula, and performs both the 

34 

resupply and personnel movement for us, as well as does research. 

And it is a shallow draft vessel, which is necessary at the moment, 

to get into that station, given the constraints. 

Mr. HUNTER. How are you able to lease the icebreaker if CBO 

scores it upfront in 1 year, the entire lease? Did you have to work 

through that? 

Dr. FALKNER. All of these arrangements were made before the 

current requirements for scoring were put in place. 

Mr. HUNTER. So it wasn’t scored in 1 year, it was scored over the 

life of the lease, like real life is supposed to be. 

Dr. FALKNER. Right. This was done quite a while ago now. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK, got you. All right, Doctor, thank you very 

much. 

Mr. Garamendi? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very interesting set of questions, Mr. Chairman. In the earlier testimony, we heard discussions about the cost 

of a new icebreaker being significantly greater if there are research 

facilities on board, and it is designed for research. Let’s explore 

that a little bit in the context of the chairman’s questions about 

skin in the game, and participation. 

And the specific question is should we build—if we were to build 

a new heavy icebreaker, would NOAA and the National Science 

Foundation want to—I guess Alaska, also—want to have scientific 

capability on that icebreaker? Yes? No? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. I will start this time, I guess. So I think 

the answer is, to the extent that it can be economically done. 

And I go back to that—I go back to the chairman’s question, and 

I think I need to amplify the fact that, much like our survey vessels, much like our weather and sea ice forecasting, I mean, it benefits the Nation. The Coast Guard’s icebreaking capability benefits 

the Nation. 

So to work ahead on a combined Federal requirement, I think, 

is a smarter plan than to stovepipe into a single set of missions. 

So I think—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So the answer is basically, yes, you would want 

to have scientific research capabilities on the icebreaker. 

Captain WESTERHOLM. Those that would support our missions, 

yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. National Science Foundation? 

Dr. FALKNER. We have participated in the process of defining requirements that Vice Commandant Neffenger described earlier. It 

is NSF’s position that we do not wish to see a heavy icebreaking 

capability compromised by adding on mission. 

We really do need heavy icebreaking in Antarctica. We can’t get 

by with less than that capability. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am working towards a strategy on how we can 

find the money to build such an icebreaker. Timing issues are, obviously, in play here. But it seems to me that, in the budgets of 

the National Science Foundation, and NOAA, and the Coast Guard, 

and the Navy, and a few others, we could put together the money 

necessary to build this with each providing a specific amount of 

capital money for their specific mission requirements. 

So, NOAA, you need a—you want an icebreaker that has some 

capabilities on it. National Science Foundation says, ‘‘Yes, but we 

35 

don’t want to pay for it, and therefore, it is not necessary.’’ OK. But 

I think we can put together something here, if we put our minds 

to it. We are going to have to work across our own committees and 

across various budgets in order to do that. But, anyway, it is the 

strategy that you may want to comment on at another time. 

I want to go to the U.S. Navy and NOAA. We have the navigator 

of the Navy just sitting behind you. The Navy—The Navigator. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How do you coordinate with the Navy on what 

seems to be the same mission? That is, what is going on, how do 

navigation, tides, sea floor, all of those things, how does NOAA coordinate with the Navy on what apparently is the same type of 

mission? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. So I would say it is not exactly the same 

mission, but we do coordinate well with the Navy. I mean, obviously, they need information, but not only mainly in the United 

States, but worldwide, for operations of defense. But certainly in 

the United States, some of the survey information that we have, 

some of the weather, sea ice information, we coordinate. We work 

together with them at the National Ice Center, as well as the Coast 

Guard. 

So, I would say that our mission is to, you know, chart the waters of the United States. And theirs is to defend the United States. 

But certainly we work closely with them—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The navigator seems to have a mission, in addition to defending the United States, which is to what the heck is 

going on in the ocean. What is the weather? What is the tide? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. Absolutely, in terms of national security—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I hear not too much coordination from you. 

Captain WESTERHOLM. I would probably disagree with that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And in written testimony, please tell me exactly 

how you do coordinate—— 

Captain WESTERHOLM. OK. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And since Admiral White is still here, answer 

the same question, please. You can do it in writing. We are running 

out of time here, so—I know you want to speak. You take that deep 

breath and want to jump in, and I like that. But you are not at 

the table at the moment. So, we really need to do that. 

Mr. Chairman, we have had some briefings that are in the classified area that I think are pertinent to this issue of both NOAA and 

the navigator’s tasks. And I would like some opportunity to go back 

through that on the more classified side of it. So, we will do some 

thinking on that, and maybe have a conversation amongst ourselves on how we might be able to bring that kind of information 

into this issue. 

We have had a good discussion about the type of vessels that are 

needed, and the like. It seems to me—and I will just make this as 

my final 8 seconds here—that there is a increasing activity in the 

Arctic and the Antarctic, climate change being a principal piece of 

that, and causing it to happen. That is going to require icebreaking 

capability, more than we have had in the past. And, frankly, I 

think the problem is ours. 

36 

We are hearing basically the agencies or the various Government 

organizations protecting their current budget turf, and saying it is 

somebody else’s responsibility, when in fact they all share the responsibility, which means we are going to have to coordinate. We 

are going to have to find some way to pull together the necessary 

resources from multiple budgets and appropriations so that the 

task of providing sufficient icebreaking capability can be met. 

And so, perhaps from the oil revenues of Alaska we can find 

money. Perhaps from NOAA, NASA, and the Navy, and the rest, 

we can pull together the necessary money. With that, I will yield 

back. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. And the gentleman from 

Alaska is recognized. 

Mr. YOUNG. I can assure the gentleman we—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Give us your money. 

Mr. YOUNG. If we build an icebreaker, we are going to charge the 

hell out of you. I can tell you that right now. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. YOUNG. But this is a national issue, and I think everybody 

understands that. 

But I was interested, Doctor, in your comments. You lease—it 

has worked well? 

Dr. FALKNER. Our leases for our research—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. 

Dr. FALKNER [continuing]. Icebreakers? Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. It has worked well. See, because that is what I am 

saying, Mr. Chairman. It can work. It is this ingrown ‘‘I have got 

to own it’’ atmosphere. We have got a problem. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Ask about the heavy icebreakers. Those are 

light icebreakers. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, they are the same thing. I mean they—we 

have two ships that I know built capable right now to break heavy 

ice by a private company that does this, American made. And that 

is my key, is American made. And I just think we can do it. 

I have to say one thing, Captain. Are you aware that NOAA has 

the authority now to build an icebreaker? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. The—— 

Mr. YOUNG. A high-latitude survey vessel. 

Captain WESTERHOLM. Correct. 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. And that was passed through—that is one thing 

wrong with being here too long—or everybody says that, ‘‘been here 

too long.’’ We passed that law in 2001, and I don’t think any time 

that your organization has asked for that money to build that type 

vessel—— 

Captain WESTERHOLM. And, to my knowledge, sir, we haven’t. 

We have asked for ice-capable vessels which can operate in ice, but 

not icebreaking vessels. 

Mr. YOUNG. OK. Well, I mean, I would be interested. And I am 

like the chairman and the gentleman from California that, you 

know, with everybody interested in this, I think we can solve this 

problem, instead of, you know, working together to get icebreaker 

capability in the Arctic. 

And I have to say, Ed, I was proud of you because you finished 

your testimony exactly on time. You know how rare that is in ConVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:21 Jan 30, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\7-23-1~1\88818.TXT JEAN
37 

gress? I mean very nearly that is about like a rare bird. I go back 

to my raven, as I was saying before. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You still have 3 minutes. 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, I still have 3 minutes. The—it was brought up 

by the gentleman of California. What role is the State playing as 

far as infrastructure in the Arctic for this so-called new boom that 

is going to occur? 

Mr. FOGELS. Yes. Thank you, Congressman Young. I think we 

are participating in a number of ways. We are working with—right 

now, with the Federal Government and with the Bering Straits Native Corporation to look at possibilities of developing a new deepwater Arctic port. We are looking at road infrastructure, both on 

the North Slope and to the Ambler Mining District, about the possibilities of perhaps increasing our road system in Alaska. I believe 

we are working with the Federal Government to try and improve 

our aviation facilities up in Barrow, which will be key to any—supporting any future Arctic activity. 

Mr. YOUNG. How is the cooperation? You getting pushback from 

the Federal Government, or are they willing to do something besides talk? Or how is that working? 

Mr. FOGELS. Congressman Young, on some fronts we are getting 

good cooperation. On other fronts we would like to see better cooperation. We are seeing some conflicting policies, Federal policies, 

as I mentioned in my remarks. 

I think that probably the biggest single conflict that I see is this 

new interest in the Arctic. Wow, we have to do something new in 

the Arctic. But then there is no funding to go along with it, as I 

think has been discussed in this committee, too. So—— 

Mr. YOUNG. And again, for the committee, we—you look at our 

State. You know, if you take all the land east of the Mississippi 

River to the Atlantic Ocean, from the tip of Maine to the tip of 

Florida, that is part of Alaska. And we are surrounded—the State 

is not as you envision a State, because all those States have got 

State borders. But we are a body of land on a map that has the 

State of Alaska scattered all over the State. 

And that is our biggest challenge, because the Federal Government has a tendency not to work with the State on these bodies 

of land, and we do have some on the Arctic. And that is something 

we have to realize, is this is a—you are State of California. But 

this is State of Alaska, scattered all over. And it is hard to put this 

together. And if we don’t have cooperation from the Federal—cooperation, not dictation—then we have a real challenge. And that 

is our biggest challenge we have today. 

One last thing, mapping. Are you doing—are you contracting 

that out? Or how is that working? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. We’re employing three approaches to surveying in the Arctic. We award contracts to private sector surveying firms, which we have done in the Arctic the last 5 years. 

We also conduct hydrographic surveys using NOAA’s fleet. And 

lastly, we use data from the Coast Guard, Navy, and the academic 

community for reconnaissance surveying. 

So, to the extent that our trusted partners are able to collect 

data, and that NOAA is able to use it, we employ all three methods. 

38 

Mr. YOUNG. Now, have you mapped the waters from the Arctic 

north—I am talking about Barrow north—all that activity, as far 

as shoals, upheavals, mountains, depths? Have you done that? 

Captain WESTERHOLM. So the short answer to that is no, there 

is a lot more to do. We have done some surveying in the High Arctic, such as at Delong Marine Terminal, where Red Dog Mine is located. In 2015, we plan to survey at Barrow, Point Hope, Kotzebue, 

the Bering Strait, and Port Clarence. 

NOAA surveys approximately 500 nautical square miles per year 

in the Arctic. There are about 40,000 square miles of priority surveying to be done up there. So it is going to take not only our contracting survey effort and our partners, but it will take some time 

as well. 

Mr. YOUNG. OK. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank the gentleman. And let me get this right, 

too. It seems like NOAA and the NSF and Alaska, just with publicprivate partnerships, would be happy to do what you—you are able 

to do what you do without Government-created vessels, meaning 

you could piggyback on Shell or any of these other big energy companies that are going to be in the Arctic now, the way that they 

are in the central U.S. now. They are going to hit the Arctic in a 

big, big way probably over the next 10 to 20 years, right? 

So, I guess all we are missing by not having the Government 

paid-for icebreakers is the Coast Guard enforcement capability of 

maritime law, and environmentalism, and that type of thing, and 

the Navy’s ability to move freely up there. But I guess those aren’t 

a big deal. So, if you didn’t have those, you are happy. you could 

work off of private ships, right? I mean meaning you could lease 

them, you could piggyback on Shell or other energy companies that 

build their own icebreakers to use for themselves. You could do 

that if you had to, and keep doing what you are doing. Is that correct? 

Dr. FALKNER. Provided the assets existed. They do not, at this 

point in time. What we are talking about is a national mission in 

Antarctica. NSF has a responsibility for coordinating it because, 

under the treaty system, an active and influential science presence 

is central. 

But we have had the pleasure of coordinating since 1957 the 

presence with our military partners, with Department of Defense. 

We work with the Air National Guard, we work with the Air Force, 

Military Sealift Command, and the Coast Guard. And we have had 

a long tradition of that type of cooperation for supporting that national mission. 

So, if you are talking about an alternative that doesn’t yet exist, 

we would be making a change. 

Captain WESTERHOLM. And I think that, for some of our missions 

that we fulfill with ice-capable vessels but not icebreaking capability, the answer is yes, we would still be doing some of those, and 

leasing those. 

I think there is some actual scientific work we do right on the 

sea ice edge. We do some of the oil pollution work in NOAA’s Office 

of Response and Restoration, actually, with the Healy, as I mentioned, and Arctic Shield. So there are some missions that we do 

that benefit from having an icebreaking capability that is able to 

39 

get into and out of areas to give us more information that we need 

for NOAA. 

And I would also mention—and I have earlier—that our sea ice 

and weather forecasts are enhanced by being able to get accurate 

data right at that edge of where the Healy can operate, where vessels with a lesser ice class could not. 

Dr. FALKNER. We are capable of operating our own research vessels. We are cooperating with the Coast Guard. The Healy exists, 

and she has done a good job up until now, and she will exist, presumably, for the rest of her service life, and we would continue to 

cooperate. But if we look beyond Healy, we could imagine the 

science community meeting its needs collectively across Government in other ways. And we have been clear with the Coast Guard 

about that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think we are about ready to wrap up, Mr. 

Chairman. I want to thank you for putting together a very, very 

important hearing, and the information that is coming forth. 

David whispered in my ear that at 500 nautical square miles per 

year, it is going to take some time to map the 950,000 square miles 

in the Alaska region. 

Captain WESTERHOLM. And the 40,000 priority square miles that 

we have already identified, correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So we are going to be at that some time. The 

public-private partnerships that are inevitably going to have to 

take place in order to move that along are something that we 

should probably be encouraging in multiple ways here. 

Mr. Young raised a question about private heavy icebreakers, 

and I think there are several around. I was reminded there was 

one that operates off the east coast of Canada for some mining operation, where they are bringing mineral out of that area. So 

maybe that is something that may be available. We ought to explore that. It seems to be more—and see what potential there is on 

private icebreakers, private heavy icebreakers, and whether that 

could be a stop-gap. 

I do think we need to have a heavy icebreaker for the U.S. Coast 

Guard, and I think we can find a way to do it if we pool together 

the resources from—excuse me, the money from multiple agencies 

that would benefit from such an icebreaker. And we might best be 

able to do that in the defense budget. We will talk about some 

strategies that that might—and the Healy might be a strategy that 

we talk about. 

So, all those out there in the defense industry and the defense 

budget that are protecting your budget, know that I am looking at 

it. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. Admiral White, we can talk offline about 

my question. 

That is it, keeping in mind Mr. Young, who went 1 minute and 

10 seconds over his allotted time, I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the ranking member. Thank you to the witnesses today for your testimony. 

And I think one thing, too. If we bring DOD and Coast Guard in on this, you are looking at a $1 billion heavy icebreaker. If you 

40 

are looking at science research, and simply the ability to break ice, 

you are looking at $500 million for a heavy icebreaker. You double 

the cost by bringing in a defense-capable ship, where you can actually run operations off of it. 

So I think that is a way to look at it, too, is, once again, if you 

are not going to pony up and put skin in the game, then why do 

you get to even give us your requirements? We don’t really care, 

unless you want to put in some money. 

So with that—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, yes, please. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You have said several times in this hearing that 

you don’t care. In fact, you care deeply. Otherwise, you wouldn’t 

be—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Here is what happens here. I have got 4 years to 

chair this subcommittee, just if everything stays as is. Don Young 

has been working the icebreaker issue for decades, literally. And it 

hasn’t gone anywhere. And what I see as an unwillingness on behalf of the parts of Government that need this and actually will use 

it to really try to make it happen, just a lot of talk. 

And what is going to happen is we are not going to have a seat 

at the table when you have these Arctic countries up in the Arctic, 

doing what they are doing. We are going to say, ‘‘Hey, but we have 

a policy that says this,’’ and they will say, ‘‘But you don’t have a 

Coast Guard within 200 miles of us here. So why do we really 

care?’’ 

And we are going to lose power and influence that way with our 

allies and with our enemies, and that is what is happening right 

now, is we are going to fall behind as other countries are ramping 

up, and we are going to look back in 10 years and go, ‘‘Wow, it sure 

would have been great if we had a presence in the Arctic, because 

now we are way, way behind.’’ But that is what I see happening 

here. And it would be nice to get something done within the next 

decade, instead of having the first meeting on whether we can even 

build one scheduled over the next 3 years. That is simply too slow, 

and it is bureaucratic and ineffective. 

So, anyway, so thank you all very much. And, with that, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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