COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Frank Argued at Salem, Virginia

ROSSER LEE BROWN MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0328-03-3 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK DECEMBER 16, 2003 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG J. Leyburn Mosby, Jr., Judge B. Leigh Drewry, Jr. (Cunning ham & Drewry, on brief), for appellant. Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorn ey General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Rosser Lee Brown (appellant) wa s convicted in a bench trial of one count of statutory burglary with the intent to commit robbery while armed with a deadly weap on, in violation of Code § 18.2-90; four counts of robbery, in violatio n of Code § 18.2-58; and f our counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a fe lony, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in not gr anting his motion to suppre ss. He argues the polic e did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle and di d not have probable cause to arre st him. As we find the police had reasonable suspic ion for the stop and develo ped probable cause for hi s arrest, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
BACKGROUND On the evening of November 20, 2001, William Cofflin wa s driving up to his home in Lynchburg when he saw an unfamiliar, gray Jeep Cherokee parked on a pile of leaves in front of his

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1- 413, this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - house. He also saw four black ma les walking down the str eet. As Cofflin pulle d into his driveway, he could see the Jeep’s windows were rolled down, although it was a chilly day. The keys were in the car’s ignition. Cofflin thought it peculiar th at a “nice vehicle” would be parked in a pile of leaves. Cofflin telephoned the police an d reported a suspicious vehicle parked in front of his house. He provided his address, a description of the vehi cle, and the license numbe r. Cofflin testified, “that’s all I told them.” He did not report the reas ons that he characterized the Jeep as suspicious. When Cofflin looked ag ain, the vehicle was driving off down the street in the direction of the Parkwood Trailer Park. Coff lin could not see who was in the car. He found it odd that the headlights were not illuminated, as it was dark. Officer Ferron received the disp atch referencing the suspicious vehicle in front of Cofflin’s house. The dispatch gave Ferron the tag number of the vehicle and its make, a “gray Jeep.” As Ferron approached the address, Co fflin flagged down the officer and told him that th e Jeep had just driven away. Ferron drove in the same directio n as the Jeep. 1 Cofflin testified he did not provide the reasons why he found the Je ep “suspicious” until the police called him later that evening. As Officer Ferron was looking for the Jeep, hereceived a second dispatch about an armed robbery at the Park wood Trailer Court. 2 The suspects were described as four or five black males. Ferron testified at the suppression hear ing that he believed “there was [a] possibility that the suspicious vehicle [Cofflin] had told me about and thisrobbery may be connected.” The officer knew the trailer park was in the “next block down” from Cofflin’s house.

1 When Ferron began to testify what Cofflintold him to explain why he thought the vehicle was suspicious, the trial court sustained appellant’s objection to the hearsay. Therefore, Ferron was not allowed to testify about the information given to him by Cofflin. The trial court only allowed Ferron to testify as to the information contained in the dispatch.

2 The robbery was reported at 8:15 p.m. Coff lin’s call came in sixteen minutes earlier.- 3 - Officer Ferron proceeded to th e Parkwood Trailer Court. After Ferron interviewed the robbery victims, he advised the dispatcher to “put out a be on the lookout for [the Jeep].” Ferron believed the suspicious vehicle reported by Coff lin might be connected to the robbery because it was parked a block away from the trailer court. Over appellant’s objection, Ferro n was allowed to testify how he connected the susp icious vehicle with the robbery: I knew the location of the suspicious vehicle. It was a block away from the trailer court where the robbery supposedly occurred. Both calls, the suspicious vehicle cal l, had four to five black males leaving the vehicle. The robbe ry call was four black males. Officer Ferron did not i ndicate that anyone at th e scene of the robbery had seen the suspects drive away in a Jeep. Investigator Danny Viar was monitoring th e police radio bulletins while driving in his personal car to the police station. Viar testified he heard the dispatch advising that several black males, driving a Jeep with licens e plate number of YGW6 976, were suspects in a robbery. He then saw the Jeep parked at a convenience store. Investigator Viar obse rved several blac k males exit the convenience store and drive away in the Jeep. On Investigator Viar’s order, Officer Sexton activated the lights on his police vehicle and stopped the Jeep. 3 He and other officers approached the Jeep with their guns dr awn. They removed the occupants, including appellant, who was driving. The suspects were hand cuffed and held at the scene of the stop for a “drive by lineup.” Th e police drove each robber y victim by the Jeep to determine if any of them could identify the susp ects as the assailants. Several victims recognized the suspects by their cl othing. No one could recognize their faces. Investigator Viar was informed that the victims had identified th e suspects. Officers at the scene of the stop observ ed a gun and several items taken durin g the robbery, including a Sony Play

3 Sexton did not observe any criminal behavior or traffic violations before he stopped the vehicle.- 4 - Station and CDs, on the back floorboard of the Jeep in plai n view. Based upon this information, Viar ordered the officers on the scene to transport the suspects to police head quarters. During the drive to the police station, appella nt spontaneously asked if he c ould have the BB gun from the Jeep because his mother used it to shoot stray dogs. During a videotaped interview at the police station, taken within two hours of the offense, appellant initially denied an y involvement in the offe nse. However, he late r admitted ta king his gun into the trailer and stealing a car radio. He claime d his cohorts actually committed the robberies. During the suppression hearing, appellant argu ed his detention and arrest were unlawful, contending all evidence flowing from the stop should be suppresse d. The trial court found the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the Jeep. The court also held the victims’ identification of the men by their clothing and the fruits of the crime in the vehi cle provided probable cause for appellant’s arrest.
ANALYSIS In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, “[t]he burden is upon [the defendant] to s how that th[e] ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.” Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). “Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search ” involve questions of both law and fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal. Ornelas v. United States, [517 U.S. 690, 691,]116 S. Ct. 1657, 1659, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). In performing such an alysis, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical factunless “plainly wrong” or without evidence to support them and we gi ve due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. Id. at [699,] 116 S. Ct. at 1663. We analyze a trial judge’s determination wh ether the Fourth Amendment was implicated by applying de novo our own legal analysis of whether based on those facts a seizure occurred. See Satchell v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 641, 648, 460 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1995) ( en banc ); see also Watson v. Commonwealth , 19 Va. App. 659, 663, 454 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1995).- 5 - McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) ( en banc ) (footnote omitted). If the articulated facts support “a reasona ble suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him briefly while attempting to obtai n additional information.” Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985). In reviewing the record to make a determination of reasonable suspicion, we consider the “totality of the circumstances and view those facts obj ectively through the eyes of a reasonable police officer wi th the knowledge, training, and e xperience of the investigating officer.” Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989). Applying these principles to the present cas e, we conclude the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the Jeep. During the motion to suppress, Officer Ferron testified he was dispatched to investigate a “suspicious” Jeep parked on Parkwood Avenue. The dispatcher described the vehicle by its make and license number. When Ferron arrived at Parkwood Avenue, Cofflin “flagged” him down. Although the o fficer tried to testify that Cofflin told him why the vehicle was suspicious, the trial court su stained appellant’s obje ction to that testimony. As Ferron drove off in the direc tion that the Jeep left, he hear d a dispatch that four black males had committed a robbery at a nearby trailer park. At this point, he knew that a vehicle, considered “suspicious” by a known citizen informer, 4 had been parked clos e to the scene of a robbery at the same time as the robbery. He also knew that four or five black males were seen leaving the suspicious vehicle and that four black males were i nvolved in the robbery. He knew

4 On appeal, appellant attempts to argue Coff lin was not a reliable informant and attempts to equate his observations to those of an anonymous tipster. Ho wever, he did not present this argument to the trial court, therefore, he did not preserve this issue for appeal. See Rule 5A:18; Scott v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 461, 464-65, 524 S.E.2d 162, 163-64 (2000).- 6 - the Jeep had departed the area at approximately th e same time the robbers were leaving the area.

Based on this information, Officer Ferron had reasonable suspicion to request issuance of a “be on the look out” for the Jeep. When Investigator Viar saw the Jeep and asked Officer Sexton to initiate the stop, he was not acting merely on an unparticularized “hunch,” but on reasonable suspicion. See Ramey v. Commonwealth , 35 Va. App. 624, 629, 547 S.E.2d 519, 522 (2001). This exact vehicle was observed, park ed suspiciously, clos e to the scene of a robbery at approximately the time of the robbery. The vehicle then left the area at the same time that the robbers were leaving th e area. The same number of men that were involved in the robbery were seen getting out of the vehicle. Based on these factors, the officers could stop appellant, who was driving the J eep, “to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.” 5 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). See also Miller v. Commonwealth , 16 Va. App. 977, 979-80, 434 S.E.2d 897, 899-900 (1993). Appellant also argues the poli ce did not have probable cause to arrest him after the stop. We disagree. Based on the information collect ed during the investigat ive stop, the police did have probable cause to arrest appellant and take him to the police station. A law enforcement officer may lawfully arrest, without a warrant, for a felony or upon “reasonable su spicion” that a felony has been committed by the arrested person. Muscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 443, 10 S.E. 534 (1890). See also Byrd v. Commonwealth , 158 Va. 897, 164 S.E. 400 (1932).

5 Appellant attempts to argue on appeal thatthe length and circumstances of the initial detention changed the nature of the stop into an arrest, for which no probable cause existed. However, at trial he argued that “when the ar rest was actually made, which was the transport down to [the police station], it wa s insufficient grounds to do that.” Again, as appellant did not present his argument regarding th e length and circumstances of th e detention to the trial court, we cannot not consider that argument on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; Scott , 31 Va. App. at 464-65, 524 S.E.2d at 163-64.- 7 - The test of constitutional validity is whether at the moment of arrest the arresting officer had knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a reas onable man in believing that an offense has been committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949); Fierst v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 757, 173 S.E.2d 807 (1970). Bryson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 85, 86-87, 175 S. E.2d 248, 250 (1970). The officers in this case had sufficient facts to warrant a belief that appellant was involved in the commission of an armed robbery. The officers knew that appellant was driving a ve hicle seen in the vicinity of the trailer park both before and after the robbery. He and his companions matched the general description of the robbers. Although the victims could not identify them by their f aces, several of the victims indicated that appellant and his companions were weari ng clothes that the robbers were wearing. Additionally, the police observed a gun and several items taken during the robbery in the Jeep. Based on the “totality of the circumst ances,” the officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. See Washington v. Commonwealth , 219 Va. 857, 862, 252 S.E.2d 326, 329 (1979). As the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the Jeep and pr obable cause to arrest appellant, we affirm the convictions. Affirmed.