NAVY READINESS

Actions Needed to 

Maintain Viable Surge 

Sealift and Combat 

Logistics Fleets

Report to Congressional Committees

August 2017

GAO-17-503

This Report was revised on October 31, 2017 to correct footnote 38 

on page 19. 

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-503, a report to 

congressional committees

August 2017

NAVY READINESS

Actions Needed to Maintain Viable Surge Sealift and 

Combat Logistics Fleets

What GAO Found

The readiness of the surge sealift and combat logistics fleets has trended 

downward since 2012. For example, GAO found that mission-limiting equipment 

casualties—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have increased 

over the past 5 years, and maintenance periods are running longer than planned, 

indicating declining materiel readiness across both fleets (see fig.).

Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleet Historical Mission-Limiting Casualty Reports and 

Projected Sealift Capacity over Time

The Navy has started to develop a long-term plan to address recapitalization of

the aging surge sealift fleet, but this plan has not been finalized. The average 

age of the ships in the surge sealift fleet is nearly 40 years, and the number of 

surge sealift ships reaching the end of their programmed service lives over the 

next 10 years will reduce sealift capacity by over 25 percent. The Navy has not 

finalized these plans, and officials acknowledged that these efforts do not fully 

incorporate leading practices for capital investment planning. For example, Navy 

officials told us that the plan does not include a needs assessment or project 

prioritization comparing the costs and benefits of proposed investments to each 

other. Without effective capital planning to ensure the availability of surge sealift 

capability, the equipment and supplies needed by the Army, Marine Corps, and 

other forces may not arrive when needed, potentially hindering U.S. operations.

The Navy has not assessed the effects of widely distributed operations, which 

could affect the required number and type of combat logistics ships. The Navy 

released its new operational concept of more widely distributed operations—

ships traveling farther distances and operating more days to support a more 

distributed fleet—in 2017. The Navy has not assessed the effects that

implementing this concept will have on the required number and type of combat

logistics ships. These effects could be exacerbated in the event that the Navy is 

less able to rely on in-port refueling—which has comprised about 30 percent of 

all refuelings over the past 3 years—placing greater demand on the combat 

logistics fleet. Given the fleet’s dependence on the combat logistics force, waiting 

until 2019 or 2020 to conduct an assessment, as planned, could result in poor 

investment decisions as the Navy continues to build and modernize its fleet. 

Furthermore, without assessing the effects of widely distributed operations on

logistics force requirements and modifying its force structure plans accordingly, 

View GAO the Navy risks being unprepared to provide required fuel and other supplies. -17-503. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov

Why GAO Did This Study

Military Sealift Command ships 

perform a wide variety of support 

services and missions, including

transporting military equipment and

supplies in the event of a major 

contingency (performed by the surge 

sealift fleet) and replenishing fuel and 

provisions for U.S. Navy ships at sea 

(performed by the combat logistics 

force). An aging surge sealift fleet in 

which some ships are more than 50

years old, and a combat logistics force 

tasked with supporting more widely 

distributed operations (i.e., the 

employment of ships in dispersed 

formations across a wider expanse of 

territory), present several force 

structure and readiness challenges.

House Report 114-537 included a 

provision for GAO to assess the

readiness of the Military Sealift 

Command. This report (1) describes

the readiness trends of the surge 

sealift and combat logistics fleets since 

2012, (2) evaluates the extent to which 

the Navy has plans to address an 

aging surge sealift fleet, and (3) 

evaluates the extent to which the Navy 

has assessed the effects of widely 

distributed operations on the combat 

logistics force. GAO analyzed 3 to 5 

years of readiness, maintenance, and 

exercise data, based on available data;

visited surge sealift and logistics ships;

and interviewed Navy, U.S. 

Transportation Command, and 

Maritime Administration officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy 

incorporate leading practices for 

capital planning in a comprehensive

sealift recapitalization plan and assess

the effects of widely distributed 

operations on the combat logistics 

force. The Navy concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations.
Page i GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Letter 1

Background 4

Surge Sealift and Combat Logistics Fleet Readiness Has Declined 

Since 2012 11

The Navy is Developing a Long-Term Plan to Recapitalize the 

Surge Sealift Fleet but Has Not Incorporated Leading Practices 17

The Navy Has Not Assessed the Potential Effects of Dispersed 

Operations on the Combat Logistics Force 22

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 31

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 33

Table

Table 1: Summary of Leading Practices for Capital Planning 21

Figures

Figure 1: Sixty-One Ships of the Surge Sealift Fleet 7

Figure 2: Twenty-Nine Ships of the Combat Logistics Force 10

Figure 3: Annual Mission-Limiting Casualty Reports for Surge 

Sealift Ships, Fiscal Years 2012-2016 13

Figure 4: Annual Mission-Limiting Casualties for Combat Logistics 

Force Ships, Fiscal Years 2012-2016 17

Figure 5: Projected Surge Sealift Capacity Decreases over Time, 

Based on Programmed Service Life 18

Figure 6: Combat Logistics Force Ships Providing Underway 

Replenishments 24

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

MARAD Maritime Administration

MSC Military Sealift Command

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Page 1 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

August 22, 2017

Congressional Committees

More than 90 percent of U.S. warfighters’ equipment and supplies travels 

by sea, and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) provides ocean 

transportation for all of the military services.1 With over 100 active and 

reserve ships in its fleet, MSC performs a wide variety of support services 

and other missions, including moving military equipment and supplies to 

deployed U.S. forces (performed by the sealift fleet) and replenishing fuel 

and provisions for U.S. Navy ships at sea (performed by the combat 

logistics force). MSC’s sealift fleet consists of both active and reserve 

ships—MSC active sealift ships move military equipment and supplies on 

a daily basis, while MSC reserve sealift ships remain in reduced operating 

status to be activated in the event that additional capacity is necessary to 

assist in a major contingency.2 The Maritime Administration (MARAD) 

also maintains a reserve sealift fleet to meet the needs of a major 

contingency. MSC’s and MARAD’s reserve fleets are collectively referred 

to as the surge sealift fleet and are expected to be a ready source of 

shipping and provide millions of square feet of cargo carrying capacity to 

transport Army, Marine Corps, and other force equipment and supplies. 

However, the surge sealift fleet is aging and some of its ships are more 

than 50 years old, raising questions about the fleet’s readiness to respond 

if it is called to support a major contingency.

MSC’s combat logistics force consists of auxiliary ships that rearm, refuel, 

and re-provision Navy combatant ships at sea during what are known as 

underway replenishment operations. Underway replenishments allow 

Navy ships to stay at sea as long as needed during peacetime and 

wartime, rather than requiring a return to port to refuel and resupply. 

Recently, the Navy has called for its surface fleet to conduct more widely 

distributed operations—a concept of operations referred to as distributed 

lethality that entails more widely dispersing combatant ships to improve 

the Navy’s offensive and defensive capabilities.3 Widely distributed 

 1

Military Sealift Command, The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command 2016 Handbook

(April 2016).

2

A ship in reduced operating status has a small crew onboard to assure the readiness of 

propulsion and other primary systems if the need arises to activate the ship.

3

See, for example, Commander, Naval Surface Force, Surface Force Strategy: Return to 

Sea Control (January 2017).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

operations will require MSC’s combat logistics force of fast combat 

support ships, oilers, and dry cargo ships to adapt to resupplying 

combatant ships over greater distances and potentially performing more 

underway replenishments, because under this new operating concept the 

Navy may not be able to refuel in port.

The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a 

provision for us to assess the readiness of MSC.4 This report (1) 

describes the readiness trends of the surge sealift and combat logistics 

fleets since 2012, (2) evaluates the extent to which the Navy has plans to 

address an aging surge sealift fleet, and (3) evaluates the extent to which 

the Navy has assessed the effects of widely distributed operations on the 

combat logistics force. We also issued a classified report on MSC’s 

offshore petroleum discharge system in June 2017.5

To describe the readiness trends of the surge sealift and combat logistics 

fleets, we analyzed data on ship age, time in maintenance, and 

equipment condition to assess the readiness of the fleets to fulfill their 

missions; interviewed MSC and MARAD officials to understand trends in 

personnel, maintenance, materiel condition indicators such as ship 

readiness rates and casualty reports; and examined related 

documentation.6 We also reviewed reports on the results of rapid 

activation and sea trial exercises from 2012 through 2016 and interviewed 

U.S. Transportation Command, MSC, and MARAD officials to discuss 

surge sealift readiness and the ability to activate these ships within 

required time frames. We selected time frames for each of the data 

series—primarily 5 years of historical data—after assessing their 

availability and reliability to maximize the amount of data available for us 

to determine any trends. We assessed the reliability of each data source 

from the Navy, MSC, MARAD, and U.S. Transportation Command by 

reviewing relevant documentation and discussing with cognizant officials 

the structure of systems, data-collection processes and procedures, and 

data-quality controls. We determined that the data we had obtained from 

these sources were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting 

 4

H.R. Rep. No. 114-537, at 126-127 (2016).

5

GAO, Offshore Petroleum Discharge System: The Navy Has Not Mitigated Risk 

Associated with System Limitations, GAO-17-531C (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2017).

6

Casualty reports reflect equipment malfunctions that affect a ship’s ability to support 

required mission areas and suggest a deficiency in mission-essential equipment.
Page 3 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

trends in readiness, maintenance, replenishment, and rapid activation for 

the surge sealift and combat logistics force ships.

To evaluate the extent to which the Navy has plans to address an aging 

surge sealift fleet, we reviewed MSC and MARAD force structure and the 

programmed service life—the number of years the Department of 

Defense (DOD) expects a ship to be militarily useful—of all MSC and 

MARAD ships. We visited MSC and MARAD surge sealift ships at fleet 

locations with a range of ship types—Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Newport 

News, VA, and San Francisco, Alameda, and Benicia, CA—where we 

interviewed ship leadership, crews, and shore personnel to gather 

perspectives on current readiness challenges and the state of the aging 

surge sealift fleet. We interviewed MSC, MARAD, and Navy officials to 

discuss actions that had been taken to mitigate readiness challenges that 

had been identified in the surge sealift fleet and the status of plans to 

recapitalize the ships in this fleet.7 Finally, we interviewed senior Navy 

officials responsible for drafting a recapitalization plan for the surge sealift 

fleet and assessed the plan using leading practices for capital investment 

planning.8

To determine the extent to which the Navy has assessed the effects of 

widely distributed operations on the combat logistics force, we analyzed 

information on the current and future structure of the combat logistics 

force; interviewed MSC and Navy officials to understand trends in 

underway replenishments and the use of in-port refueling; and examined 

 7

For the purposes of this report, recapitalization refers to the rebuilding or replacing of 

assets. GAO has previously reported on recapitalization efforts for various fleets. See, for 

example, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and Funding 

Needed to Address Shortfalls, GAO-14-450 (Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014).

8

At the time of our review, the recapitalization plan was in draft form and being reviewed 

within the Navy. Capital planning is part of the capital-asset life cycle, which links 

budgeting, managing, and long-range planning of the capital-asset portfolio to meet the 

goals and objectives in the strategic and annual plan. See Office of Management and 

Budget Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, and its 

supplement entitled Capital Programming Guide (July 2017). We have previously 

evaluated the implementation of the concepts that underlie the capital planning best 

practices. See, for example, GAO, Facilities Modernization: DOD Guidance and 

Processes Reflect Leading Practices for Capital Planning, GAO-15-489 (Washington,

D.C.: July 27, 2015) and GAO, VA Real Property: Realignment Progressing, but Greater 

Transparency about Future Priorities Is Needed, GAO-11-197 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 

2011).
Page 4 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

related documentation.9 We also interviewed ship leadership and shore 

personnel from the combat logistics force to gather perspectives on 

current readiness and the effects of more distributed operations. Finally, 

we interviewed Navy officials to discuss widely distributed operations and 

the use of in-port refueling and any actions the Navy has taken to assess 

and analyze their effects on the size and composition of the combat 

logistics force, including wargaming and related assessments. We 

evaluated the Navy’s plans against criteria in federal standards for 

internal control, which state that agencies should use quality information 

to achieve objectives, make informed decisions, and evaluate 

performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks.10

We conducted this performance audit from June 2016 to August 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

MSC, located within the Department of the Navy, provides ocean 

transportation for all military services and maintains 120 active and 

reserve ships, which operate worldwide. MSC reports through three 

separate chains of command, depending on the type of service or mission 

it is performing. It reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Research, Development and Acquisition) for procurement policy and 

oversight matters; U.S. Fleet Forces Command for Navy-specific matters; 

and U.S. Transportation Command for defense transportation matters. 

MSC services and missions fall into five areas:

 9

See, for example, Center for Naval Analyses, Fuel Support of Deployed U.S. Navy 

Combatants (November 2016).

10GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).

Background

Structure of Military Sealift 

Command
Page 5 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

• Sealift: Transports troops, cargo, vehicles, and petroleum products, 

among other things, in support of DOD and other federal agencies 

during both peacetime and wartime.

• Combat Logistics Force: Provides fuel, food, fleet ordnance, dry 

cargo, spare parts, mail, and other supplies to the Navy fleet.

• Service and Command Support: Provides towing, rescue and salvage, 

submarine support, and hospital ships.

• Special Mission: Provides operating platforms to monitor missile 

launches, assists with weapons testing, and supports ocean surveys, 

among other special missions.

• Prepositioning: Provides ships loaded with the military services’

equipment and supplies for forward, at sea staging around the world.

This report examines the ships of the sealift fleet and the combat logistics 

force.

According to DOD documentation, MSC’s active ships provide sufficient 

capacity to support the daily operational needs of DOD and other federal 

agencies during peacetime.11 However, certain DOD operational plans 

and unforeseen crises, such as a natural disaster, may require additional 

capacity from reserve sealift ships.12 MSC owns, operates, and maintains 

15 reserve ships within its sealift fleet in reduced operating status; these 

are among the first ships to activate when additional capacity is needed. 

MARAD, an agency within the Department of Transportation, owns and 

maintains 46 reserve sealift ships in reduced operating status within its 

Ready Reserve Force. Together, the MSC and MARAD ships in reduced 

 11MSC provides logistical support to other federal agencies, such as the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. For example, MSC deployed research technology to 

improve the study of changes in ocean environment for the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, resupplied the National Science Foundation’s McMurdo 

Station in Antarctica, and provided humanitarian aid in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 

for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

12An operational plan describes how DOD will respond to a potential contingency that 

might require the use of military forces. These plans are used to deal with a wide range of 

events, such as terrorism, hostile foreign nations, and natural disasters. Plans generally 

include assumptions that are relevant to the development or successful execution of the 

plan, including the forces involved, the phasing of operations, and the general nature and 

purpose of the operations to be conducted. In addition to supporting the initial phases of 

operational plans, the surge sealift fleet also provides support to sustainment operations in 

the event of prolonged contingencies.

Surge Sealift Fleet
Page 6 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

operating status comprise the 61-ship surge sealift fleet (see fig. 1).13 If 

needed, additional capacity is provided through commercial ships 

enrolled in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, which includes all 

of the ships in the Maritime Security Program.14

 13Ships in reduced operating status have a small crew of about 10 U.S. civilian mariners 

onboard to assure the readiness of propulsion and other primary systems if the need 

arises to activate the ship. The crews are supplemented by additional U.S. mariners 

during activations.

14Under section 53107 of title 46 of the U.S. Code, ships participating in the Maritime 

Security Program must agree to make commercial transportation resources, including 

services, available when the Secretary of Defense determines that they are necessary for 

a contingency operation. In addition, MSC may charter ships to augment capacity as 

needed, which may include foreign-owned charters and commercial liner service ships. 

DOD has never activated the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement or the entire reserve 

sealift fleet to meet sealift capacity needs.
Page 7 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Figure 1: Sixty-One Ships of the Surge Sealift Fleet

Note: Roll-on/roll-off ships facilitate the rapid on-load and off-load of rolling stock and military serviceunique, special mission equipment.

Nearly all of the surge sealift fleet is expected to be fully operational 

within 5 days of activation and to provide millions of square feet of cargo 

carrying capacity to U.S. Transportation Command to transport Army, 

Marine Corps, and other units’ equipment, combat support equipment, 

and initial supply, as called for in the initial phases of various DOD 
Page 8 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

operational plans.15 The ability of surge sealift ships to meet these 

readiness requirements depends on the materiel condition of the ships 

and the availability of U.S. civilian mariners needed to crew them. U.S. 

Transportation Command regularly conducts no-notice activation 

exercises—referred to as turbo activations—designed to assess the 

materiel condition of the ships and test the ships’ ability to meet required 

activation time frames and perform in-port and at-sea operations.

While MSC and MARAD are responsible for the maintenance and repair 

of their respective surge sealift ships, MARAD is responsible for ensuring 

that a sufficient number of U.S. civilian mariners are available to crew all 

surge sealift ships if they are activated. In August 2015, we reported that 

the number of U.S. civilian mariners who would be qualified and available 

to serve during a prolonged activation of the surge sealift fleet was 

uncertain.16 We recommended that MARAD study the potential availability 

of qualified mariners for such an activation. MARAD officials reported they 

are in the process of working to address this recommendation, which we 

believe remains valid. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2017 tasked MARAD to create a maritime workforce 

working group and required this group to identify the total number of U.S. 

citizen mariners in the United States who, among other things, are 

available to crew the U.S. flag fleet and the surge sealift fleet in times of a 

national emergency. The Act also requires the Secretary of 

Transportation to report the maritime workforce working group’s findings 

to Congress within one year of the date of enactment of the Act.

17 As of 

May 2017, MARAD officials reported that they have established a working 

group and plan to report to Congress in December 2017.

 15Activation refers to the process necessary for a surge sealift ship to transition from 

reduced operating status—where ships are maintained with minimal crew members and 

subject to regulatory surveys and maintenance periods—to full operating status, where 

enough crew and equipment are on the ship to support a mission. All but one of the surge 

sealift ships are expected to be ready to execute their mission within 5 days of the 

activation order. SS Petersburg, the surge sealift offshore petroleum discharge system, is 

expected to be ready to execute its mission within 10 days of an activation order.

16GAO, International Food Assistance: Cargo Preference Increases Food Aid Shipping 

Costs, and Benefits Are Unclear, GAO-15-666 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 26, 2015).

17Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 3517 (2016).
Page 9 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

The capability to rearm, refuel, and re-provision Navy ships at sea is 

critical to the Navy’s ability to project warfighting power from the sea. 

MSC’s combat logistics force consists of 29 auxiliary ships that provide 

logistics resupply to Navy combatant ships—aircraft carriers, destroyers, 

and amphibious ships, among others—at sea during underway 

replenishments. Doing so enables Navy combatant ships to stay at sea 

as long as needed during both peacetime and wartime, rather than 

requiring the ship to pull into port to refuel and resupply. The combat 

logistics force provides virtually everything that Navy ships need, 

including fuel, food, ordnance, dry cargo, spare parts, mail, and other 

supplies. According to MSC, in 2015, combat logistics force ships 

transferred more than 8.2 million barrels of petroleum products and over 

90,000 pallets of dry cargo and ordnance during underway 

replenishments.18 Three types of ships are employed in the combat 

logistics force (see fig. 2).

 18Military Sealift Command, The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command 2016 Handbook

(April 2016).

Combat Logistics Force
Page 10 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Figure 2: Twenty-Nine Ships of the Combat Logistics Force

Note: The Navy has two additional T-AKEs assigned to the Military Sealift Command Prepositioning 

Program, which supports the Marine Corps. Vertical replenishment provides fleet with freight, mail, 

and other items using helicopters.
Page 11 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

In the past, the Navy has found that a 29-ship force is required to meet 

the Navy’s resupply needs in peacetime and wartime.19 However, in 

December 2016, the Navy released an assessment that identified the 

need to increase the overall size of its fleet.20 The Navy’s assessment 

called for more combatant ships—aircraft carriers, destroyers, and 

amphibious ships, among others—in all a 15 percent increase in the 

number of all Navy ships required, from 308 to 355 ships. With a larger 

overall fleet to support, according to the new assessment, the Navy called 

for three additional combat logistics force ships, for a total of 32 ships 

required.

The readiness of the surge sealift and combat logistics fleets has trended 

downward since 2012. We found that mission-limiting equipment 

casualties—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have 

increased over the past five years, and maintenance periods are running 

longer than planned, indicating declining materiel readiness across both 

fleets.

The readiness of the surge sealift fleet has trended downward over the 

past 5 years, as shown by increasing equipment casualties and 

decreasing scores on activation exercises.21 As a result, the amount of 

ready sealift cargo carrying capacity, expressed in terms of square feet 

available for transporting equipment and supplies, has been decreasing, 

and the decrease has been particularly steep since fiscal year 2015. MSC 

and MARAD officials explained that the primary factors causing these 

capacity decreases are increases in mission-limiting equipment casualties 

 19These assessments include: Center for Naval Analyses, T-AO(X) Analysis of 

Alternatives (December 2011); Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of 

Capabilities and Resources (N8), Combat Logistics Force Sufficiency Assessment

(February 2015); Department of the Navy, Report to Congress on Requirements for the 

Fleet Replenishment Oiler, T-AO(X) (February 2016); and Center for Naval Analyses, 

Combat Logistics Force Assessment (June 2016).

20Department of the Navy, Executive Summary, 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment 

(FSA) (Dec. 15, 2016).

21U.S. Transportation Command routinely conducts turbo activations, and MSC and 

MARAD record crew manning, functioning of cargo handling equipment, and sea-trial 

performance to report activation exercises on a scorecard. 

Surge Sealift and 

Combat Logistics 

Fleet Readiness Has 

Declined Since 2012

The Readiness of the 

Surge Sealift Fleet Has 

Trended Downward
Page 12 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

and maintenance periods that are running longer than planned;22 both of 

these factors indicate declining materiel readiness across the surge sealift 

fleet.

• Mission-limiting equipment casualties have increased: We found that 

mission-limiting equipment casualties—those that directly affect ship 

readiness—increased significantly, particularly for MSC surge sealift 

ships, during fiscal years 2012 through 2016 (see fig. 3).23

 22The Navy uses casualty reports to provide information on the materiel condition of ships, 

to determine their current readiness. For example, casualty report data provide 

information on individual pieces of equipment or systems that are degraded or out of 

service and without which a ship’s ability to support required mission areas will be

affected.

23For the purposes of this report and consistent with Navy readiness documentation, we 

define mission limiting casualties as those designated as C3/C4, which directly affect ship 

readiness. The Navy defines C3 casualties as mission-limiting and C4 casualties as 

causing a loss of a primary mission. Navy Warfare Publication 1-03.1, Operational 

Reports (Nov. 1987) (change 3, March 2017).
Page 13 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Figure 3: Annual Mission-Limiting Casualty Reports for Surge Sealift Ships, Fiscal 

Years 2012-2016

Note: This chart includes equipment casualties designated as C3/C4, which the Navy defines as 

directly affecting ship readiness. The Navy defines C3 casualties as mission-limiting and C4 

casualties as causing the loss of a primary mission. MSC operates 15 surge sealift ships and MARAD 

operates 46 surge sealift ships.

• Maintenance periods are running longer than planned: During fiscal 

years 2012 through 2016, maintenance periods have run longer than 

planned, potentially affecting the amount of time both the ship in 

maintenance and other ships queued for maintenance at the same 

shipyard are available for activation.24 For MSC’s surge sealift ships, 

10 of 12 (83 percent) scheduled maintenance periods in fiscal years 

2012 through 2016 took more time than planned. In fiscal year 2016, 

these ships came out of maintenance, on average, over a month late, 

 24The Navy generally contracts with private shipyards and other firms for the repair, 

maintenance, and modernization of non-nuclear surface ships, including surge sealift 

ships. Although the Navy operates several government-owned shipyards, those shipyards 

are used primarily to support the repair, maintenance, and modernization of nuclearpowered ships, such as submarines and aircraft carriers. See GAO, Navy Ship 

Maintenance: Action Needed to Maximize New Contracting Strategy’s Potential Benefits, 

GAO-17-54 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2016).
Page 14 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

and extensions of maintenance periods resulted in an average of 

about $1.6 million in unplanned costs per ship.25 Although we were 

unable to obtain historical data on the length of maintenance periods 

for MARAD surge sealift ships, the last four MARAD maintenance 

periods of fiscal year 2016 ran late—on average 38 days late—and 

resulted in an average of about $1.4 million in unplanned costs per 

ship.26

Both the age of the ships and deferred maintenance appear to be 

contributing to the need for more extensive repairs. MSC and MARAD 

officials said that as ships age, unforeseen or complicated repairs cause 

maintenance periods to run longer than planned. In addition, according to 

MSC and MARAD officials, surge sealift ships are experiencing increases 

in maintenance deferrals as a result of limited funding—where work that 

cannot be executed or funded in the current fiscal year is deferred to 

future fiscal years. For example, as of October 2016, MARAD’s deferred 

maintenance work amounts to nearly $51 million in maintenance costs. 

MARAD officials said that as deferrals increase, the materiel condition of 

the ships declines, and the eventual cost of repairs is higher than it would 

have been had maintenance been performed as planned.

In addition to materiel readiness indicators, scores from turbo 

activations—no-notice exercises performed by U.S. Transportation 

Command to assess the materiel condition of a ship and test its ability to 

meet activation time frames—are also declining.27 We analyzed the 

scores from turbo activation exercises for surge sealift ships from fiscal 

year 2014 through fiscal year 2016 and found that they had trended 

downward over the last 3 years.28 Specifically, MSC scores were down by 

 25Some maintenance periods came in under budget, but the total amount of unplanned 

costs for MSC maintenance periods in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 was $6.5 million.

26MARAD conducts maintenance through a continuous maintenance availability, meaning 

that maintenance is primarily completed at a layberth and not in a shipyard or drydock. 

27Joint Publication 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations (Dec. 29, 2015). Turbo 

activations test the ships’ ability to get underway and perform in-port and at-sea 

operations in the required time frame—within 5 days, for the surge sealift fleet. Officials 

assign numerical scores for the individual ship’s ability to meet its readiness requirements: 

100 is a perfect score, and any score equal to or over 86 is recognized as passing, 

according to U.S. Transportation Command’s turbo activation scorecards.

28We requested and received turbo activation scores from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal 

year 2016; however, U.S. Transportation Command could not locate detailed scorecards 

for five of the turbo activations conducted in 2012 and 2013, so we limited our analysis to 

fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2016.
Page 15 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

13 percent and MARAD scores were down by 5 percent.29 These 

exercise scores may not fully reflect the magnitude of declining fleet 

readiness, given that we found that nearly a third of the surge sealift ships 

have not participated in a turbo activation in the last 5 years and that one 

ship we visited had never participated in a turbo activation. Further, we 

found that in at least 22 percent of turbo activations over the last 5 years, 

participating ships have completed less than 72 hours of underway time.30

MSC and MARAD officials told us that the limited number of turbo 

activations and underway time limits their ability to evaluate the readiness 

of ships that have not been activated and the quality of the ship managers 

responsible for maintaining those ships in reduced operating status.

We found that the readiness of the combat logistics force, like that of the 

surge sealift fleet, has trended downward in fiscal years 2012 through 

2016.31 Specifically,

• Operational availability has declined: Operational availability 

measures the amount of time that a ship can get underway and 

execute a mission as required. MSC’s goal is for each combat 

logistics ship to be available for missions 270 days a year, devoting 

the rest of its time largely to maintenance and training. However, the 

fast combat support ship (T-AOE) and the fleet replenishment oiler (TAO) ship classes are not meeting this target and have seen declines 

 29Our review of turbo activation data found that scores for steam-powered ships had 

declined by 3 percent and scores for diesel-powered ships had declined by 9 percent. 

Approximately 43 percent of the surge sealift inventory is steam powered. Of the 52 turbo 

activations from 2014 to 2016, half of them activated steam-powered ships.

30The required underway time for a turbo activation is normally between 72 hours and 60 

days. However, turbo activations are generally planned for 72 hours and, in practice, 

some ships are underway for less than 72 hours during the exercise. We were unable to 

obtain underway time for all turbo activations in the last 5 years. This analysis includes 

underway time for only 48 of the 74 activations from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 

2016, and as a result, there may have been more turbo activations during that period with 

less than 72 hours of underway time.

31DOD officials noted several changes that occurred over the past 5 years that may have 

affected combat logistics force readiness, including revisions to the Navy’s operational 

schedule in the introduction of the optimized fleet response plan and increases in the 

Navy’s use of homeporting ships overseas. We have reported on both of these issues. 

See GAO, Military Readiness: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Navy’s 

Optimized Fleet Response Plan, GAO-16-466R (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2016) and 

GAO, Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed 

to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports, GAO-15-329 

(Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015).

The Readiness of the 

Combat Logistics Force 

Has Trended Downward
Page 16 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

in annual operational availability from 289 to 267 days (8 percent) and 

from 253 to 212 days (16 percent), respectively, over the past 5 

years.32 These declines were due primarily to increases in 

unscheduled maintenance, according to MSC officials.

• Maintenance periods are running longer than planned: During fiscal 

year 2012 through May of 2016, maintenance periods have run longer 

than planned—affecting the amount of time a ship is operationally 

available for missions. In total, maintenance delays for the combat 

logistics force resulted in 795 lost operational days across the combat 

logistics fleet from fiscal year 2012 to midway through fiscal year 

2016.33

• Mission-limiting equipment casualties have increased: We found that 

mission-limiting equipment casualties have increased over the past 5 

years from 69 such failures in 2012 to 122 in 2016 (77 percent). See 

figure 4.34 This trend has been particularly notable for the fleet 

replenishment oilers (T-AO), for which mission-limiting equipment 

casualties have increased 250 percent over the past 3 years, usually 

as a result of failures of aging engines and diesel generators.

 32MSC officials noted that decreases in the operational availability of fast combat support 

ships are largely attributable to the prolonged maintenance of the USNS Supply during 

this time frame, in which the ship underwent extensive modernization.

33The most recent maintenance period data available from MSC were through May 2016. 

34For the purposes of this report and consistent with Navy readiness documentation, we 

define mission limiting casualties as those designated as C3/C4, which directly affect ship 

readiness. The Navy defines C3 casualties as mission-limiting and C4 casualties as 

causing a loss of a primary mission. Navy Warfare Publication 1-03.1, Operational 

Reports (Nov. 1987) (change 3, March 2017).
Page 17 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Figure 4: Annual Mission-Limiting Casualties for Combat Logistics Force Ships, 

Fiscal Years 2012-2016

Note: This chart includes equipment casualties designated as C3/C4, which the Navy defines as 

directly affecting ship readiness. The Navy defines C3 casualties as mission-limiting and C4 

casualties as causing the loss of a primary mission.

The Navy is in the process of developing a long-term recapitalization plan 

for the aging sealift fleet, and cognizant Navy officials acknowledged that 

they have not fully incorporated leading practices for capital investment 

planning into the plan. The average age of the ships in the surge sealift 

fleet is nearly 40 years, and many are approaching the end of their 

programmed service lives.35 The number of surge sealift ships reaching 

the end of their programmed service lives over the next 10 years will 

reduce sealift capacity by over 25 percent (see fig. 5).

 35The average age of the 46 MARAD surge sealift ships is 43 years. The average age of 

the 15 MSC surge sealift ships is 29 years.

The Navy is 

Developing a LongTerm Plan to 

Recapitalize the 

Surge Sealift Fleet 

but Has Not 

Incorporated Leading 

Practices
Page 18 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Figure 5: Projected Surge Sealift Capacity Decreases over Time, Based on Programmed Service Life

Note: U.S. Transportation Command officials noted that they do not include the aviation logistics 

support ships (T-AVB) and auxiliary crane ships (T-ACS) in their mobility capabilities assessments of 

sealift capacity. We included them here for illustrative purposes, because they have militarily useful 

sealift capacity and are part of the surge sealift fleet.

Several types of the surge sealift ships, including the aviation logistics 

support ships (T-AVB) and auxiliary crane ships (T-ACS), are particularly 

old—these ships will reach their programmed service lives of 50 to 55 

years by 2024. DOD officials have noted that the Army and Marine Corps 

rely on the capability provided by these types of ships. For example, 

according to Army documentation, the 6 auxiliary crane ships are critical 

for moving the Army’s prepositioned stocks equipment from storage 

location to point of employment and for the intra-theater distribution of 

ammunition.36

 36MARAD officials reported that, as of April 2017, three auxiliary crane ships have been 

activated to perform containerized ammunition cargo missions for units in U.S. European 

Command and U.S. Central Command.
Page 19 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Recognizing the readiness challenges posed by an aging fleet and the 

impending shortfalls in the surge sealift force, the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense convened a strategic portfolio review on sealift recapitalization 

in 2016. Results of this review showed that billions of dollars will be 

required to recapitalize the aging roll-on/roll-off and other ships in the 

surge sealift fleet. During our review, both U.S. Transportation Command 

and Navy officials agreed that DOD takes on added risk if the surge 

sealift fleet is not recapitalized. In November 2016, in response to the 

strategic portfolio review, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the 

Navy to develop a plan of action and milestones for recapitalizing the 

surge sealift fleet. Navy officials said they are in the process of 

developing a plan of action and milestones that includes a three-pronged 

approach, focusing on service-life extension programs in the near term, 

acquiring used ships in the midterm, and building new ships in the long 

term:

• Service-life extension programs: According to the Navy and U.S. 

Transportation Command, extending a ship’s service life is 

appropriate for some select ships—up to a service life of 60 years. 

However, there are material and economic limits to ship service life as 

a result of factors such as the deterioration of the hull, parts 

availability, and engine condition, and extending the life of steampowered ships could exacerbate the shortage of steam engineers.37

• Purchasing used ships: According to the Navy and U.S. 

Transportation Command, used commercial vessels can be acquired 

less expensively than new ships and could provide at least 25 years 

of service life. However, there is a limited market of U.S.-built ships, 

and Navy and U.S. Transportation Command officials stated that they 

do not purchase foreign-built ships from the commercial market due to 

statutory limitations.38

 37MARAD officials stated that their position is that this can be managed through workforce 

initiatives. MARAD officials reported that they have taken steps to increase the number of 

engineers on steam-powered vessels during activations. For example, in May 2017, 12 

additional engineers were assigned across three activated auxiliary crane ships.

3810 U.S.C. § 2218(c)(1)(E) and (f).
Page 20 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

• Building new ships: According to the Navy and U.S. Transportation 

Command, new ships provide an expected service life of 50 years but 

are the most expensive option.39

Navy officials said they had expected to complete this plan in the spring 

of 2017. However, in May 2017, Navy officials told us that they were 

uncertain when the plan would be finalized, because they are still 

developing a budget request, and the recapitalization plan is contingent 

on funding.

Navy officials responsible for developing the plan of action and 

milestones told us that this plan will be an important first step in providing 

potential decision points for future recapitalization needs but that, at this 

time, they have not included some elements that we believe are 

necessary for a comprehensive recapitalization strategy, as shown in 

table 1.40

 39Navy officials explained that longer-term sealift recapitalization will likely require a new 

construction program, and they intend to focus on building new ships with adaptable 

modular capability, based on a common hull design. 

40Capital planning is part of the capital-asset life cycle, which links budgeting, managing, 

and long-range planning of the capital-asset portfolio to meet the goals and objectives in 

the strategic and annual plan. See Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-11, 

Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, and its supplement entitled Capital 

Programming Guide (July 2017). We have previously evaluated the implementation of the 

concepts that underlie the capital planning best practices. See, for example, GAO-15-489 

and GAO-11-197. 
Page 21 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Table 1: Summary of Leading Practices for Capital Planning 

Leading Practices Description

Needs Assessment • Make use of an accurate and up-to-date inventory of capital assets and facilities, as well as 

current information on asset condition.

Review and approval of 

framework with established 

criteria

• Consider the cost of a proposed asset, the level of risk involved in acquiring the asset, and its 

importance to achieving the agency mission when defining criteria for executive review.

Project prioritization • Have processes in which proposed capital investments should be compared to one another to 

create a portfolio of major assets ranked in priority order.

Strategic linkage • Provide a long-range plan for the capital-asset portfolio to meet the goals and objectives in the 

agency’s strategic and annual performance plans.

Long-term capital plan • Should reflect decision makers’ priorities for the future and be updated either annually or 

biennially.

• Include certain elements, including a statement of the agency’s mission; strategic goals and 

objectives; a description of the agency’s planning process; baseline assessments and 

identification of performance gaps; a risk-management plan; staff requirements; timing issues, if 

involved in a multiagency acquisition; and plans for proposed capital assets once in use.

Source: GAO and Office of Management and Budget guidance. I GAO-17-503

Specifically, Navy officials told us that the Navy’s plan does not include a 

needs assessment with a complete inventory of surge sealift ships and 

their current materiel condition, a framework with established criteria to 

assess recapitalization options, project prioritization comparing the costs 

and benefits of proposed recapitalization investments with each other, 

strategic linkage to DOD sealift requirements, or a long-term capital plan. 

A long-term capital plan would include elements such as baseline 

assessments of current and projected sealift capacity—including the 

identification of capacity gaps, specific timing issues and costs for the 

acquisition of new or used ships, and a complete description of the 

Navy’s process for reaching its conclusions. Our work has shown that 

comprehensive recapitalization strategies should reflect these and other 

leading practices for capital investment planning. Senior Navy officials 

agreed that incorporating such elements would be useful and said that 

they would explore applying these elements as they develop a 

comprehensive recapitalization plan for the surge sealift fleet.

Declining sealift capacity increases the risk that the United States will be 

unable to deliver the equipment, supplies, and forces called for in the 

initial phases of operational plans. Unless the Navy has a comprehensive 

recapitalization plan that incorporates leading practices for capital 

planning such as conducting a needs assessment, providing a framework 

with established criteria to assess options, specifying how projects will be 
Page 22 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

prioritized, ensuring strategic linkage to DOD sealift requirements, and 

developing a long-term capital plan to ensure the availability of surge 

sealift capability in the future, it may not be able to deliver equipment and 

supplies to the Army, Marine Corps, and other forces when they are 

needed to support a major contingency, potentially hindering U.S. 

operations.

The Navy has not assessed the effect that implementing widely 

distributed operations will have on the number and type of combat 

logistics ships required to support the fleet. As early as January 2015, 

senior Navy leaders outlined a new warfighting concept calling for widely 

distributed operations, referred to by the Navy as “distributed lethality.”41

In January 2017, the Navy released its new surface strategy, Surface 

Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control, which includes concepts for more 

widely distributed operations through distributed lethality.42 According to 

the strategy, the security interests of the United States are increasingly 

challenged by near-peer competitors, among others, and the Navy must 

adjust to this changing security environment. Implementing the distributed 

lethality concept is critical to maintaining the Navy’s maritime superiority 

and requires employing its fleet in dispersed formations across a wider 

expanse of territory to increase both the offensive and defensive 

capabilities of surface forces. According to the Navy, these concepts 

complicate enemy targeting by dispersing larger numbers of platforms 

capable of offensive action over a wide geographic area.

According to Navy and MSC officials, a greater reliance on distributed 

operations and the lethality provided by a widely distributed fleet will 

require resupplying ships that are farther apart and generally increase the 

demand on the combat logistics force. This stands in contrast to the 

Navy’s traditional concept of operations, in which Navy combatant ships 

operate in task group formations—such as carrier strike groups or 

amphibious ready groups—and, to support these formations, combat

 41In a January 2015 article in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine, the Navy’s 

surface warfare leaders—Vice Admiral Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Forces; Rear 

Admiral Gumataotao, Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic; and Rear Admiral Fanta, 

Director, Surface Warfare—presented the distributed lethality concept, stating that for 

more power in more places, the Navy should increase the offensive might of the surface 

force and employ ships in dispersed formations. 

42Commander, Naval Surface Force, Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control

(January 2017).

The Navy Has Not 

Assessed the 

Potential Effects of 

Dispersed Operations 

on the Combat 

Logistics Force
Page 23 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

logistics force ships transit with them and replenish them with supplies as 

needed.43 In June 2016, the Center for Naval Analyses’ modeling found 

that spreading combatant ships, such as carrier strike groups, out over 

larger regions would put more stress on the combat logistics force, 

because additional ships would be needed as the groups spread out and 

also because distributing supplies to the individual ships would take 

longer.44 Additionally, combat logistics force ships might need to operate 

independently in small groups—or even alone—which could put them at 

risk in contested environments, according to Navy officials.

Another effect of widely distributed operations is that ships operating 

further from ports might require more underway replenishments (see fig. 

6), which could affect the number and types of combat logistics force 

ships required to support the Navy fleet. Under current concepts, Navy 

carrier strike groups and other ships can typically stay at sea as long as 

needed, because they have the ability to be replenished either in port or 

while underway with fuel, ammunition, and stores transported by the 

combat logistics force. Under distributed operations, geographicallyseparated ships may not be able to be replenished in port during 

peacetime, or it may be too far or too dangerous in wartime for them to go 

into port, according to Navy officials.

 43The Navy refers to this as a shuttle ship/station ship concept of operations, in which 

shuttle ships are primarily responsible for bringing supplies from a distant resupply port to 

the battle force and station ships are primarily responsible for transiting to, and distributing 

those supplies among, the individual combatant ships.

44Center for Naval Analyses, Combat Logistics Force Assessment (June 2016).
Page 24 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Figure 6: Combat Logistics Force Ships Providing Underway Replenishments

Note: “Stores” refers to dry cargo.

Officials from U.S. Pacific Fleet and MSC expressed several concerns 

about the use of and reliance on in-port refueling during peacetime. Navy 

officials explained that in-port refueling is typically completed as a matter 

of convenience, because ships that are in port for port visits or other 

reasons will rarely pass up the opportunity to refuel and resupply. Our 

analysis found a steady reliance on in-port replenishment in recent 

years.45 However, Navy officials expressed concerns, citing force 

protection vulnerabilities while ships are in port, skill atrophy for Navy 

combatant and combat logistics force ship crews as a result of 

participating in fewer underway refueling events, and the potential costs 

associated with in-port refueling at various overseas locations. MSC 

mariners we spoke with emphasized that underway replenishments are 

dangerous and difficult—with speeding ships only a few feet away in open 

water—and require training and practice to gain and maintain skill 

proficiency. Further, it is possible to lose access to in-port refueling, 

 45We analyzed replenishment data from January 2011 through December 2015 and found 

that total replenishment events had decreased by 27 percent in this time frame. Navy 

officials explained that demand for combat logistics force ships has decreased and that 

there has been an increase in in-port refueling as a matter of scheduling preference. In 

November 2016, the Center for Naval Analyses reported that Navy combatants had 

received fuel from non-combat logistics force sources about 30 percent of the time over 

the past three years. See Center for Naval Analyses, Fuel Support of Deployed U.S. Navy 

Combatants (November 2016).
Page 25 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

especially during wartime, according to Navy officials. As we reported in 

May 2015, unforeseen host-nation policy changes can affect 

renegotiation of international agreements, which may restrict base usage, 

or possibly remove the Navy presence entirely.46

Navy officials acknowledged that challenges would likely result if the Navy 

had to rely more on at-sea replenishment but told us that no specific 

analyses had been completed to assess how the potential loss of access 

to in-port refueling would affect the size and composition of the combat 

logistics force. However, the Center for Naval Analyses analyzed 

destroyers’ refueling events in the Pacific Ocean and found that the loss 

of resupply sources other than the combat logistics force in this area 

alone could have a significant effect on the operations and requirements 

of the combat logistics force, potentially increasing the number of 

underway refueling events the force would have to conduct by 81 

percent.47

Navy officials acknowledged that widely distributed operations have the 

potential to affect the size, composition, and employment of the combat 

logistics force but, as of May 2017, the Navy has not assessed the effect 

of this concept of operations on the number and type of ships that will be 

required. Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should 

use quality information to achieve objectives, make informed decisions, 

and evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and addressing 

risks.48 The Navy recognizes the need to refine such concepts, but

officials told us that much remains to be done. The Center for Naval 

Analyses noted in its June 2016 report assessing the structure of the 

combat logistics force that the Navy’s surface warfare community was 

then in the process of developing the concept of operations for widely 

 46GAO, Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment Needed 

to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports, GAO-15-329 

(Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2015).

47The Center for Naval Analyses analyzed destroyers’ refueling events in the 7th Fleet. 

The U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet area of responsibility stretches from the International Date Line 

to the India/Pakistan border and from the Kuril Islands in the North to the Antarctic in the 

South; it includes China, North Korea, Japan, Australia, and India, among other countries. 

See Center for Naval Analyses, Fuel Support of Deployed U.S. Navy Combatants

(November 2016).

48GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).
Page 26 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

distributed operations so, at that time, the effect on combat logistics force 

operations in future warfighting scenarios had not yet been determined.

Over the course of our review, we interviewed officials from the Office of 

the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and MSC to discuss the 

implementation of more widely distributed operations and the extent to 

which they were likely to affect combat logistics force’s structure, 

employment, and operations. Officials from the Office of the Chief of 

Naval Operations said that they would incorporate widely distributed 

operations into campaign and mission analyses—critical steps in 

assessing peacetime and wartime needs—in the future, acknowledging 

that the concept has the potential to affect the size, composition, and 

employment of the combat logistics force. However, officials did not have 

specific plans and time frames for when these analyses would be 

conducted, instead offering that they might occur in fiscal year 2019 or 

2020. Given the fleet’s dependence on the combat logistics force, waiting 

several years for such an assessment could potentially result in poor 

investment decisions as the Navy continues to build and modernize its 

fleet. Furthermore, if the Navy does not conduct a timely assessment of 

the effects of widely distributed operations on the size and composition of 

the combat logistics force and modify its force structure plans accordingly, 

it might be at risk of being unprepared to provide Navy combatants with 

required fuel and other supplies at sea.

The ships of the surge sealift fleet are critical enablers that must be ready 

to provide millions of square feet of cargo carrying capacity to transport 

Army, Marine Corps, and other force equipment and supplies. Over 90 

percent of the equipment, personnel, fuel, and other cargo necessary to 

sustain a major conflict is moved by sealift ships, but the readiness of the 

aging surge sealift fleet is trending downward, increasing the risk that the 

United States will be unable to rapidly deliver the equipment, supplies, 

and forces called for in the initial phases of operational plans. Without a 

comprehensive recapitalization plan that incorporates leading practices 

for capital planning to ensure the availability of surge sealift capability, the 

equipment and supplies needed by the Army, Marine Corps, and other 

forces in the event of a war or major contingency may not arrive on time, 

potentially hindering U.S. operations.

The combat logistics force—which performs key missions like rearming, 

refueling and re-provisioning Navy combatant ships at sea—has also 

experienced declining readiness. Looking to the future, the Navy has not 

assessed the effects of its plan to grow the Navy fleet that the combat 

Conclusions
Page 27 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

logistics force supports and disperse this larger fleet in future operations. 

These widely distributed operations could affect the number and types of 

ships required to support a Navy fleet that is planned to grow by as much 

as 15 percent. Without conducting a timely assessment of the effects of 

widely distributed operations on the size and composition of the combat 

logistics force—and modifying its force structure plans accordingly—the 

Navy may be at risk of being unprepared to provide Navy combatants 

with required fuel and other supplies at sea.

To ensure that the United States has adequate available sealift capacity, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Navy to finalize a comprehensive long-term sealift recapitalization plan 

that incorporates leading practices for capital planning, such as 

conducting a needs assessment, providing a framework with established 

criteria to assess options, specifying how projects will be prioritized, 

ensuring strategic linkage to DOD sealift requirements, and developing a 

long-term capital plan.

To ensure that the Navy is prepared to provide Navy combatants with 

required fuel and other supplies at sea, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a timely 

assessment of the effects of widely distributed operations on the size and 

composition of the combat logistics force and modify force structure plans 

accordingly.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In 

written comments provided by the Navy through DOD (reproduced in 

appendix I), the Navy concurred with our recommendations. DOD and the 

Maritime Administration also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate.

The Navy concurred with our recommendation to finalize a 

comprehensive long-term sealift recapitalization plan that incorporates 

leading practices for capital planning. In its comments, the Navy stated 

that this effort is being finalized and that it is has coordinated planning 

options with the Office of Secretary of Defense, U.S. Transportation 

Command, and the Maritime Administration. The Navy stated that the 

sealift recapitalization strategy includes a three-phased plan to extend the 

service life of select vessels and acquire a limited number of used 

vessels, and also includes a new construction, common-hulled 

shipbuilding program. The Navy added that DOD’s Fiscal Year 2018 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 28 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

legislative proposal submission for the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2018 contained a proposal to authorize the purchase of 

used ships, which if enacted, will enable the Navy to proceed with its 

recapitalization plan.49

The Navy also concurred with our recommendation to conduct a timely 

assessment of the effects of widely distributed operations on the size and 

composition of the combat logistics force and modify force structure plans 

accordingly. The Navy stated that it is continuing to work with the United 

States Pacific Fleet and Military Sealift Command to identify capability 

gaps associated with dispersed operations. The Navy stated that it will 

continue to incrementally assess the impacts from accessibility 

challenges to fixed logistics hubs and from operating in a contested 

environment to the size and composition of the combat logistics force, 

adding that the next full combat logistics force assessment is scheduled 

for 2020. As we stated in the report, we believe a timely assessment of 

the effects of widely distributed operations on the size and composition of 

the combat logistics force is warranted. Given the fleet’s dependence on 

the combat logistics force, waiting until 2020 could result in poor 

investment decisions as the Navy continues to build and modernize its 

fleet.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the 

Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of the Maritime 

Administration. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

 49H.R. Bill 2810 for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a 

provision that would amend section 2218 of title 10 of the U.S. Code to authorize the 

Secretary of Defense to purchase up to five used vessels, regardless of where 

constructed, as part of the Ready Reserve Force component of the national defense 

reserve fleet and the Military Sealift Command surge fleet, on a one-for-one basis with 

new vessels authorized by the National Defense Sealift Fund. The amendment would also 

require the Secretary of Defense, prior to the purchase of a vessel not constructed in the 

United States, to certify that there are no United States constructed vessels available for 

purchase at a reasonable price that are suitable for national defense or military purposes 

in a time of war or national emergency.
Page 29 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix II.

John H. Pendleton

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 30 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kay Granger

Chairwoman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 31 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Page 32 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness
Page 33 GAO-17-503 Navy Readiness

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne Wren, Assistant 

Director; Amy Bush; Patricia Donahue; Cynthia Grant; Joanne 

Landesman; Amie Lesser; Shari Nikoo; Michael Perkins; and Chris 

Watson made key contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100935)
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