The estimated cost of report or 

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Military and Security Developments Involving 

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

2013

A Report to Congress

Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2012

Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 

112-81, as amended by Section 1292 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2013, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both

classified and unclassified form, on the current and future military power of the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (DPRK). The report shall address an assessment 

of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the goals and factors shaping North 

Korean security strategy and military strategy, trends in North Korean security, an 

assessment of North Korea’s regional security objectives, including an assessment of the 

North Korean military’s capabilities, developments in North Korean military doctrine and 

training, an assessment of North Korea’s proliferation activities, and other military 

security developments.
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Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION 3

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY 3

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS 4

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY 6

STRATEGIC GOALS 6

NATIONAL STRATEGY 6

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR 6

CHAPTER THREE: FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS 8

OVERVIEW 8

MAINTAINING THE THREAT 8

AN AGING FORCE... 9

...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES 9

CHAPTER FOUR: SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIES 

OF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES 12

CHAPTER FIVE: PROLIFERATION 20

OVERVIEW 20

CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE SALES 20

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 20

NORTH KOREA’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROGRAMS 20

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS 21
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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’ 

most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s

willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on 

the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic 

missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations 

Security Council Resolutions. 

Under Kim Jong Il, DPRK strategy focused on internal security; coercive diplomacy to 

compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic, and security interests; development 

of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenging the ROK and 

the U.S.-ROK Alliance. We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under North 

Korea’s current leader, Kim Jong Un.

North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflict 

serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware. 

The DPRK continues to be deterred from conducting large-scale attacks on the ROK

primarily due to the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. On a smaller scale, however, the 

DPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use military provocation to achieve national 

goals. In 2010, it sank the ROK naval vessel CHEONAN, killing 46 ROK Navy sailors, and 

shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK Marines and two civilians.

North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and 

development of intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected in 

the December 2012 Taepo Dong-2 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test, 

underscore the threat to regional stability and U.S. national security posed by North 

Korea. These programs, and North Korea’s expressed hostility toward the ROK and 

proliferation of items prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 

1874, 2087,and 2094, make the DPRK a continued security challenge for the United 

States and its Allies and partners. 

North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and subsequent announcement of 

plans to restart and refurbish nuclear facilities at Yongbyon highlight the continued 

challenge posed by its nuclear programs. The September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of 

the Six-Party Talks, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and 

2094 call for the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Given North 

Korea’s unwillingness to abide by these commitments, the U.S. Department of Defense 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

2

will continue to manage the North Korean security challenge through close 

coordination and consultation with the international community, particularly with our 

ROK and Japanese Allies.

The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations 

and steadfast in its commitments to Allies in the region, including the security provided 

by extended deterrence commitments through the nuclear umbrella and conventional 

forces. 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

3

CHAPTER ONE: 

ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH 

KOREAN AND PENINSULAR 

SECURITY

In the past year, the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or 

North Korea) ended its institutional 

readjustment to Kim Jong Un’s leadership 

and began implementation of his 

broader national agenda. Much like his 

father, Kim Jong Un has adopted a 

strategy of using coercive acts—force or 

the threat of force—to influence 

adversaries and achieve policy 

objectives. At the beginning of his 

second year in power, Kim sought to use 

another coercive campaign to advance 

the longstanding goals of gaining

international recognition and de facto 

acceptance as a nuclear state. The 

December 2012 launch of the Taepo 

Dong-2 (TD-2) intercontinental ballistic 

missile (ICBM)/space launch vehicle 

(SLV) led to a series of actions that 

included a nuclear test in February 2013 

and public threats to strike the U.S. 

mainland with nuclear weapons. The 

North also declared itself unbound from

core diplomatic agreements, such as the 

1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement.

In April 2013, after declaring it would no 

longer pursue denuclearization, the 

regime announced it would begin a 

“new strategic line” of simultaneous 

nuclear weapons development and 

economic improvement. By late May, 

the regime began a campaign of 

diplomatic outreach to mitigate the 

long-term political and economic 

damage of its actions. North Korea

began appeals to the international 

community for restored dialogue, and 

dispatched high-level envoys to China 

and Russia. By mid-summer, North Korea

accepted South Korean preconditions to 

resume operations at the Kaesong 

Industrial Complex, after North Korea 

withdrew its workers from the project in 

April 2013. 

As of October, North Korea continued to 

repeat publicly that it was open to 

resuming dialogue with the United States 

and the region, but it was unlikely to 

make significant concessions on 

relinquishing its nuclear program. Its 

earlier campaign of diplomatic outreach 

was tempered by its September 

cancellation of inter-Korean reunions 

and its bellicose rhetoric, including 

statements defaming ROK President Park 

Geun-hye. North Korea’s stated intent to 

advance its nuclear program and 

continue ballistic missile/space launch

vehicle efforts implies that it will 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

4

eventually return to coercive actions to 

achieve its goals in the future.

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY 

PERCEPTIONS 

North Korean threat perceptions are 

shaped by many factors. These include a 

legacy of guerilla warfare dating back to 

its anti-colonial struggle against the 

Japanese, political and economic 

isolation, experience eliminating internal 

threats to the Kim family, and a political 

culture that is defined by an unending 

existential struggle with outside forces.

The regime sees threats emanating from 

inside and outside the country. It does 

not fully trust regional actors, including its 

supposed allies China and Russia, nor 

does it trust its own population. The 

regime continues to portray a garrison 

state worldview of imminent threat, 

which serves to justify draconian internal 

security controls, vast expenditures on 

the military, and continued rule by the 

Kim family as the sole protectors of the 

state. 

Internally, the Kim regime remains 

concerned with ideological control of its 

citizenry, which has grown increasingly 

less reliant on the state for basic goods 

and services. In the absence of largescale economic improvement, the 

regime continues to prioritize ideological 

indoctrination, intimidation, and 

preferential treatment of the privileged 

elite in Pyongyang and of select military 

units.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

5

The Recent Purge of Chang Song-taek

Kim Jong Un’s decision in December 2013 to purge and execute his powerful uncle, 

Chang Song-taek, is unlikely to lead to major changes in defense policy or internal 

stability in the near-term. Chang was a four-star General and vice-chairman of the 

National Defense Commission yet had little formal control over defense and military 

portfolios. His absence will most likely be felt in the economy, as Chang was in charge 

of several high-profile initiatives, particularly with China, to attract foreign currency 

and investment to North Korea.

Chang was believed to be a relatively pragmatic advisor to Kim Jong Un, but his 

influence probably waned in 2013. Chang’s public appearances with his nephew, 

which is used to signal an individual’s importance within the regime, dropped 50 

percent in 2013 compared to 2012. Chang’s execution is the most significant step to 

date in Kim’s establishment of his authority, eliminating arguably the most influential 

senior Party official remaining from his father’s era. The sudden and brutal purge 

sends a strong message to regime elites that the formation of factions or potential 

challenges to Kim Jong Un will not be tolerated.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

6

CHAPTER TWO: 

UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY

STRATEGIC GOALS

North Korean goals and strategies reflect 

the reality of political isolation, significant 

economic deprivation, deterioration of its 

conventional military, and increasing 

political, economic, and military power of 

nearby states. The strategic goal of the 

regime is to ensure the survival of the Kim 

dynasty and ideological control over the 

North Korean population in perpetuity. 

The overarching national security 

objectives to achieve this goal under Kim 

Jong Un have not changed markedly 

from those pursued by Kim Jong Il: 

international recognition as a nucleararmed state, maintenance of a viable 

deterrent capability, and reunification of 

Korea under North Korea’s control. The 

North continues to use reunification with 

the South as a key component of its

national identity narrative, to validate its 

strategy and policies, and to justify 

sacrifices demanded of the populace. 

However, North Korea’s leaders almost 

certainly recognize that achieving this 

objective is, for the foreseeable future, 

unattainable. 

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Beyond its fundamental role as a 

guarantor of national and regime 

security, the North Korean military 

supports the Kim regime’s use of coercive 

diplomacy as part of its larger diplomatic 

strategy. North Korea uses limited 

provocations―even those that are kinetic 

and lethal in nature―such as military 

actions and small-scale attacks to gain 

psychological advantage in diplomacy 

and win limited political and economic 

concessions, all while likely believing it 

can control escalation. 

Closely tied to this strategy of political 

coercion are North Korea’s nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs. DPRK leaders 

see these programs, absent normalized 

relations with the international 

community, as leading to a credible 

deterrence capability essential to its 

goals of survival, sovereignty, and 

relevance and supportive of its coercive 

military threats and actions. 

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND 

BEHAVIOR 

North Korea remains focused on 

extracting economic aid and diplomatic 

concessions from regional nations while 

defending against threats to its 

sovereignty. In 2013, North Korea 

increased diplomatic overtures to 

regional states but such outreach failed 

to produce meaningful political gains 

because of international concerns about 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

7

its nuclear weapons program. The North 

likely believes a “charm offensive” will 

eventually lead to improvements in 

regional relationships and gradual 

advancement of its strategic objectives.

The temporary thaw in inter-Korean 

relations over the summer of 2013 came 

to a stand-still when North Korea 

cancelled inter-Korean family reunions 

just four days before their scheduled lateSeptember start. Although North Korea 

has pressed for a resumption of tourism 

on Mount Kumgang, a potential source 

of revenue for North Korea, the ROK is 

unwilling to begin discussions absent 

progress on family reunions. Despite 

these setbacks, the ROK shows no signs of 

abandoning the Park Administration’s 

trustpolitik policy and remains steadfast in 

insisting that a return to Six-Party Talks be 

predicated on North Korea 

demonstrating its serious commitment to 

denuclearization.

North Korea remains dependent on 

China as a key diplomatic and economic 

benefactor, and North Korea is conscious 

of China’s anger at its actions as it seeks 

to advance its nuclear and missile 

capabilities. Although the North Korean 

regime is aware that China disapproves

of its nuclear program and use of 

coercive actions, the regime likely thinks

China is primarily interested in preserving 

regional stability and will refrain from 

punishing North Korea too severely or 

cutting off diplomatic or economic ties. 

North Korea also maintains friendly 

relations with Russia, though the 

relationship is less robust than North 

Korea’s relationship with China. In 

September, Russia opened a new rail link 

into North Korea. During a November 

summit with South Korean President Park, 

President Putin signed a memorandum of 

understanding encouraging ROK private 

sector investment in the rail link. Longstalled plans for the creation of a natural 

gas pipeline from Russia to South Korea 

through North Korea – a project that 

could earn North Korea millions of dollars 

annually in transit fees – have made little 

concrete progress in recent years. The 

North remains willing to disrupt relations

with regional neighbors temporarily and 

absorb the associated cost when it 

believes coercive actions toward South 

Korea or the United States will advance its 

strategic objectives. 

North Korean relations with Japan

thawed somewhat in 2013. In May, the 

North accepted a visit by a Japanese 

delegation and indicated it might be 

willing to discuss the longstanding issue of 

Japanese citizens abducted by North 

Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. To date, no 

further progress has been made on this 

issue.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

8

CHAPTER THREE: 

FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS

OVERVIEW 

North Korea’s large, forward-positioned 

military can initiate an attack against the 

ROK with little or no warning, even though 

it suffers from resource shortages and 

aging equipment. The military retains the 

capability to inflict significant damage on 

the ROK, especially in the region from the 

demilitarized zone (DMZ) to Seoul.

Although North Korea is unlikely to attack 

on a scale it assesses would risk its survival 

by inviting overwhelming counterattacks 

by the ROK and the United States, North 

Korea’s calculus of the threshold for 

smaller, asymmetric attacks and 

provocations is unclear. North Korea’s 

special operations forces (SOF), artillery, 

and growing missile force provide 

significant capabilities for small-scale 

attacks that could rapidly spiral into a

larger conflict.

North Korea is making some efforts to 

upgrade its large arsenal of mostly 

outdated conventional weapons. It has 

reinforced long-range artillery forces near 

the DMZ and has a substantial number of 

mobile ballistic missiles that could strike a 

variety of targets in the ROK and Japan.

However, the DPRK’s emphasis will likely 

be on defensive and asymmetric attack 

capabilities, and it will attempt to 

leverage the perception of a nuclear 

deterrent to counter technologically

superior ROK and U.S. conventional 

forces. 

North Korea will seek to continue to 

develop and test-launch missiles, 

including the TD-2 ICBM/SLV. Missile tests 

and programs to improve denial and 

deception, electronic warfare, roadmobile ICBM development, and SOF, are 

driven by North Korea’s desire to 

enhance deterrence and defense, and

to improve its ability to conduct limited 

attacks against the South.

MAINTAINING THE THREAT

Although it faces many internal 

challenges and constraints, including 

deterioration of its conventional 

capabilities, the North Korean military 

poses a serious threat to the ROK, its other 

neighbors, and U.S. forces in the region.

Amid a period of heightened tensions In 

March, North Korean media highlighted 

Kim Jong Un's approval of the Strategic 

Rocket Force's (SRF) “firepower strike 

plan” at an emergency operations 

meeting. The report included 

photographs of Kim Jong Un reviewing 

maps purportedly showing

intercontinental strike plans—likely 

aspirational—against the United States. 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

9

AN AGING FORCE... 

The Korean People’s Army (KPA)―an 

umbrella organization comprising ground, 

air, naval, missile, and SOF―ranks in 

personnel numbers as the fourth largest 

military in the world. Four to five percent 

of North Korea’s 24 million people serve 

on active duty, and another 25 to 30 

percent is assigned to a reserve or 

paramilitary unit and subject to wartime 

mobilization. The KPA primarily fields 

legacy equipment, either produced in, or 

based on designs of, the Soviet Union 

and China dating back to the 1950s, 

1960s, and 1970s. Although a few 

weapons systems are based on modern 

technology, the KPA has not kept pace 

with regional military capability 

developments.

...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES

During military parades held in 

Pyongyang over the last three years, 

many new weapon systems were 

displayed for the first time, highlighting 

continued efforts to improve the military’s 

conventional capabilities despite 

financial hardships. 

Ground. The parades featured several 

newly identified North Korean equipment, 

including tanks, artillery, and other 

armored vehicles. New infantry weapons 

were also revealed. The display of these 

systems shows that North Korea continues 

to produce, or at least upgrade, limited 

types and numbers of equipment. 

Air and Air Defense. The North Korean Air 

Force (NKAF) operates a fleet of more 

than 1,300 aircraft, primarily legacy Soviet 

models. The NKAF’s most capable

combat aircraft are its MiG-29s, procured 

from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.

North Korea’s most recent aircraft 

acquisition was in 1999 when it 

surreptitiously purchased used MiG-21s

from Kazakhstan.

As the NKAF’s aircraft continue to age, it 

increasingly relies on its ground-based air 

defenses and on hiding or hardening of 

assets to counter air attacks. During a

2010 military parade, North Korea 

displayed a new vertical launched 

mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM)

launcher and accompanying radar. It 

bore external resemblance to the Russian 

S-300 and Chinese HQ-9. 

North Korea publicized a March 2013 

military live-fire drill that for the first time 

featured an unmanned aerial vehicle 

(UAV) in flight. The drone appeared to be 

a North Korean copy of a Raytheon 

MQM-107 Streaker target drone. North 

Korean press coverage of the event 

described the UAV as being capable of

precision strike by crashing into the 

target. The drill also featured the UAV as 

a cruise-missile simulator, which was then 

shot down by a mobile SAM.

Naval. The North Korean Navy (NKN) has 

displayed limited modernization efforts, 

highlighted by upgrades to select surface 

ships and a continued program to 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

10

construct small submarines. The 

submarine force, unsophisticated but 

durable, demonstrated its capabilities in 

March 2010 when it covertly attacked

and sank the ROK warship CHEONAN with 

an indigenously produced submarine 

and torpedo.

Special Operations. In addition to the SOF 

wartime mission of deep-strike infiltrations 

in a combined arms peninsular attack, 

North Korea could also use its SOF in an 

asymmetric attack for political aims. 

Ballistic Missile Force. North Korea has an 

ambitious ballistic missile development 

program and has deployed mobile 

theater ballistic missiles capable of 

reaching targets throughout the ROK, 

Japan, and the Pacific theater. Since 

early 2012, North Korea has made efforts 

to raise the public profile of its ballistic

missile command, now called the 

Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). Kim Jong 

Un’s reference to the SRF during an April

15, 2012 speech seemed to elevate the 

command to a status on par with the 

Navy and Air Force. During heightened 

tensions on the Korean Peninsula In 

March 2013, North Korea made the SRF 

the focus of its threat to launch a nuclear 

attack on U.S. and ROK targets. The 

targets included the U.S. mainland, 

Hawaii, Guam, U.S. bases in the ROK, and 

the ROK President’s residence.

North Korea displayed what it refers to as 

Hwasong-13 missiles, which appear to be 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),

on six road-mobile transporter-erectorlaunchers (TELs) during military parades in 

2012 and 2013. If successfully designed 

and developed, the Hwasong-13 likely 

would be capable of reaching much of 

the continental United States, assuming 

the missiles displayed are generally 

representative of missiles that will be 

fielded. However, ICBMs are extremely 

complex systems that require multiple 

flight tests to identify and correct design 

or manufacturing defects, and the 

Hwasong-13 has not been flight-tested. 

Without flight tests, its current reliability as 

a weapon system would be low.

North Korea continues to develop the TD2, which could reach the United States if 

configured as an ICBM. In April and 

December 2012, North Korea conducted 

launches of the TD-2 configured as a

Space-Launch Vehicle (SLV). The April

launch was a failure but the December

launch was a success. 

Developing an SLV contributes heavily to 

North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile 

development, since the two vehicles 

have many shared technologies. 

However, a space launch does not test a 

reentry vehicle (RV). Without an RV

capable of surviving atmospheric reentry,

North Korea cannot deliver a weapon to 

target from an ICBM. 

North Korea showcases its ballistic missile

force in high-level national celebrations. 

Most of North Korea’s ballistic missiles 

were paraded in July 2013. In addition to 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

11

the Hwasong-13, they unveiled an 

intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)

and a version of the No Dong mediumrange ballistic missile (MRBM) fitted with a 

cone-cylinder-flare payload at parades 

during the last three years. To date, the 

IRBM, like the new mobile ICBM, has not 

been flight-tested and its current reliability 

as a weapon system would be low.

Development also continues on a solidpropellant short-range ballistic missile 

(SRBM).

Advances in ballistic missile delivery 

systems, coupled with developments in 

nuclear technology discussed in Chapter 

5, are in line with North Korea’s stated 

objective of being able to strike the U.S. 

homeland. North Korea followed its

February 12, 2013 nuclear test with a 

campaign of media releases and 

authoritative public announcements 

reaffirming its need to counter perceived 

U.S. hostility with nuclear-armed ICBMs. 

North Korea continues to devote scarce 

resources to these programs, but the 

pace of its progress will also depend, in 

part, on how much technology and other 

aid it can gain from other countries. 

Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea 

probably has a military offensive cyber 

operations (OCO) capability. Implicated 

in malicious cyber activity and cyber 

effects operations since 2009, North 

Korea may view OCO as an appealing 

platform from which to collect 

intelligence and cause disruption in South 

Korea. 

• From 2009 to 2011, North Korea was 

allegedly responsible for a series of 

distributed denial of service attacks 

against South Korean commercial, 

government, and military websites, 

rendering them briefly inaccessible.

• North Korea was allegedly behind two 

separate cyberattacks in 2013, which 

targeted South Korean banking,

media, and governmental networks, 

resulting in the erasure of critical data.

Given North Korea’s bleak economic 

outlook, OCO may be seen as a costeffective way to develop asymmetric, 

deniable military options. Because of 

North Korea’s historical isolation from 

outside communications and influence, it 

is also likely to use Internet infrastructure 

from third-party nations. This increases the 

risk of destabilizing actions and escalation 

on and beyond the Korean Peninsula.
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

12

CHAPTER FOUR: 

SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIES 

OF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES

The KPA is a large ground force-centric 

military, supported by a large ballistic 

missile arsenal, extensive SOF, and 

smaller air and naval forces. With 

approximately 70 percent of its ground 

forces and 50 percent of its air and naval 

forces deployed within 100 kilometers of 

the DMZ, which has served as the de 

facto shared border since 1953, the KPA 

poses a continuous threat to the ROK 

and deployed U.S. forces. However, after 

decades under a failed economy and 

resulting food shortages, the KPA is a 

weakened force that suffers from 

logistical shortages, aging equipment, 

and inadequate training. 

Ground Forces. The KPA’s ground forces 

are dominated by regular and light 

infantry units, supported by armor and 

mechanized units and heavy 

concentrations of artillery. These forces 

are forward-deployed, fortified in several 

thousand underground facilities, and 

include long-range cannon and rocket 

artillery able to fire deep into the ROK, 

from the DMZ to Seoul, from their 

garrisons. 

The ground forces possess numerous light 

and medium tanks, and many armored 

personnel carriers. The KPA’s large 

artillery force includes long-range 170-

mm guns and 240-mm multiple rocket 

launchers (MRLs), many of which are 

deployed along the DMZ and pose a 

constant threat to northern parts of the 

ROK, including its capital city, Seoul.

Air Forces. The Air Force is primarily 

responsible for defending North Korean 

air space. Its other missions include SOF

insertion, transportation and logistics 

support, reconnaissance, and bombing 

and tactical air support for KPA ground 

forces. However, because of the 

technological inferiority of most of its 

aircraft fleet and rigid air defense 

command and control structure, much 

of North Korea’s air defense is provided 

by SAMs and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). 

The NKAF’s most capable combat 

aircraft are its MiG-29 and MiG-23 

fighters, and its SU-25 ground-attack 

aircraft. However, the majority of aircraft 

are less capable MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG19s (F-6), and MiG-21s. The NKAF 

operates a large fleet of AN-2 COLT 

aircraft, which are 1940s vintage singleengine, 10-passenger, biplanes, likely 

tasked with inserting SOF into the ROK. 

The air force is rounded out with several 

hundred helicopters, predominantly Mi2/HOPLITE and U.S.-made MD-500 

helicopters obtained by circumventing 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

13

U.S. export controls in 1985. The rotarywing fleet is used for troop transport and 

ground attack.

North Korea possesses a dense, 

overlapping air defense system of SA-2, 

SA-3, and SA-5 SAM sites, mobile SA-13 

SAMs, mobile and fixed anti-aircraft 

artillery (AAA), and numerous manportable air-defense systems like the SA7.

Naval Forces. The North Korean Navy 

(NKN) is the smallest of the KPA’s three 

main services. This coastal force is 

composed primarily of aging, though 

numerous, small patrol craft that carry a 

variety of anti-ship cruise missiles, 

torpedoes, and guns. The NKN maintains 

one of the world’s largest submarine 

forces, with around 70 attack-, coastal-, 

and midget-type submarines. In addition, 

the NKN operates a large fleet of aircushioned hovercraft and conventional 

landing craft to support amphibious 

operations and SOF insertion. The force is 

divided into East and West Coast Fleets, 

which each operate a range of patrol 

craft, guided-missile patrol boats, 

submarines, and landing craft.

Special Operations Forces. North Korean 

SOF are among the most highly trained, 

well-equipped, best-fed, and highly

motivated forces in the KPA. As North 

Korea’s conventional capabilities 

decline relative to the ROK and United 

States, North Korea appears to 

increasingly regard SOF capabilities as 

vital for asymmetric coercion.

Strategic SOF units dispersed across 

North Korea appear designed for rapid 

offensive operations, internal defense 

against foreign attacks, or limited attacks 

against vulnerable targets in the ROK as 

part of a coercive diplomacy effort. SOF 

operate in specialized units to include

reconnaissance, airborne and seaborne 

insertion, commandos, and other 

specialties. All emphasize speed of 

movement and surprise attack to 

accomplish their missions. SOF may be 

airlifted by AN-2 COLT or helicopters (and 

possibly Civil Air Administration 

transports), moved by maritime insertion 

platforms, and on foot over land or via 

suspected underground, cross-border 

tunnels to attack high-value targets like 

command and control nodes or air 

bases.

Theater Ballistic Missiles. North Korea has 

several hundred Toksa, SCUD SRBM and 

No Dong MRBM missiles available for use 

against targets on the Korean Peninsula 

and Japan. The developmental IRBM, 

though untested and unreliable as a 

weapon, could also be launched at 

targets in the region. 

Intelligence Services. North Korea 

leverages information collected by four 

intelligence organizations to plan and 

formulate internal policy and to 

undermine the political stability of South 

Korea. North Korean intelligence and 

security services collect political, military, 

economic, and technical information 

through open-source, human 

intelligence, and signals intelligence 
Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

14

capabilities. North Korea’s primary 

intelligence collection targets are South 

Korea, the United States, and Japan.

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is 

North Korea’s primary 

counterintelligence service and is an 

autonomous agency of the North Korean 

government reporting directly to Kim 

Jong Un. The MSS is responsible for 

operating North Korean prison camps, 

investigating cases of domestic 

espionage, repatriating defectors, and

conducting overseas counterespionage 

activities.

The United Front Department (UFD) 

overtly attempts to establish pro-North 

Korean groups in South Korea such as 

the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and 

the Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The 

UFD is also the primary department 

involved in managing inter-Korean 

dialogue and North Korea’s policy 

toward the South.

North Korea’s Reconnaissance General 

Bureau (RGB) is responsible for 

clandestine operations. The RGB includes 

six bureaus charged with operations, 

reconnaissance, technology and cyber, 

overseas intelligence, inter-Korean talks, 

and service support. 

The 225th Bureau is responsible for 

training agents, infiltrating South Korea, 

and establishing underground political 

parties focused on fomenting unrest and 

revolution. 

Command and Control. The DPRK 

National Defense Commission (NDC) is 

the symbolic nominal authority over the 

North’s military and security services. The 

Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces (MPAF) 

is the administrative superior of the KPA, 

while operational command and control 

is exercised by its subordinate General 

Staff Department. The 1992 constitution 

gives control of the North’s military to the 

NDC, and Kim Jong Un exercises control 

of the military as “first chairman” of the 

NDC and supreme commander of the 

KPA. Kim Jong Un further exercises 

control as first secretary of the Korean 

Worker’s Party (KWP) and chairman of 

the KWP’s Central Military Commission.

Telecommunications. North Korea has a 

nationwide fiber-optic network, and has 

invested in a modern nationwide cellular 

network. However, telecommunication 

services and access are strictly 

controlled, and all networks are 

available for military use, if necessary.

Cell phone subscribership increased 

beyond 2 million with the growth of 

Koryolink, North Korea’s 3G cellular 

network. Mobile phone users consist 

primarily of high-ranking officials in 

Pyongyang and their families, though 

ownership is beginning to spread into 

smaller cities and towns. Most cell 

phones cannot access the Internet and 

can only make calls within North Korea. 

North Koreans are restricted from using 

the Internet, but are able to access the 

national intranet, which is insulated from 
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15

the World Wide Web. The intranet hosts 

government-approved websites, 

including Korean Central News Agency 

and North Korean propaganda website 

Uriminzokkiri.
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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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North Korean Ballistic Missile Forces

System Launchers Estimated Range 

Toksa

Fewer than 100

75 miles 

SCUD-B 185 miles

SCUD-C 310 miles 

SCUD-ER 435-625 miles

No Dong Fewer than 50 800 miles 

IRBM Fewer than 50 2,000+ miles

TD-2 Unknown* 3,400+ miles

Hwasong-13 

(Road-Mobile 

ICBM)

At least 6 3,400+ miles

Note: North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development 

program and has exported missile technology to other countries, 

including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea has produced its own 

version of the SCUD B, and the SCUD C, an extended-range 

version of the SCUD B. North Korea will continue using and 

improving the TD-2, which could reach the United States with a 

nuclear payload if developed as an ICBM. North Korea is also 

developing the Hwasong-13, which appears to be a road-mobile 

ICBM, and has twice paraded six launchers for the system. The 

Hwasong-13 and an IRBM have not been flight-tested and their

current reliability as weapon systems would be low. A short-range, 

solid-propellant ballistic missile is also being developed.

* Launches of the TD-2 have been observed from both east and 

west coast launch facilities.
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CHAPTER FIVE: 

PROLIFERATION

OVERVIEW

North Korea has been an exporter of 

conventional arms and ballistic missiles 

for several decades. Despite the 

adoption of United Nations Security 

Council resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718, 1874,

2087, and 2094, which prohibit all 

weapons sales and the provision of 

related technical training from North 

Korea, the DPRK continues to market, 

sell, and deliver weapons-related goods 

and services. Weapons sales are a 

critical source of foreign currency for 

North Korea, which is unlikely to cease 

export activity in spite of UN Security 

Council sanctions or increased 

international efforts to interdict its 

weapons-related exports.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS 

AND MISSILE SALES 

North Korea uses a worldwide network to

facilitate arms sales activities and 

maintains a core, but dwindling group of 

recipient countries including Iran, Syria,

and Burma. North Korea has exported 

conventional and ballistic missile-related 

equipment, components, materials, and 

technical assistance to countries in 

Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Conventional weapons sales have 

included ammunition, small arms, 

artillery, armored vehicles, and surfaceto-air missiles.

• In addition to Iran and Syria, past 

clients for North Korea’s ballistic 

missiles and associated technology 

have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 

Pakistan, and Yemen. Burma has 

begun distancing itself from North 

Korea but remains a conventional 

weapons customer.

North Korea uses various methods to 

circumvent UNSCRs, including falsifying 

end-user certificates, mislabeling crates, 

sending cargo through multiple front 

companies and intermediaries, and 

using air cargo for deliveries of highvalue and sensitive arms exports.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

One of our gravest concerns about North 

Korea’s activities in the international 

arena is its demonstrated willingness to 

proliferate nuclear technology. North 

Korea provided Libya with uranium 

hexafluoride, the form of uranium used in 

the uranium enrichment process to

produce fuel for nuclear reactors and 

nuclear weapons, via the proliferation 

network of Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ 

Khan. North Korea also provided Syria 

with nuclear reactor technology until 

2007.

NORTH KOREA’S WMD 

PROGRAMS

Nuclear Weapons. North Korea 

conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 

and most recently in February 2013. 
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North Korea continues to invest in its 

nuclear infrastructure and could 

conduct additional nuclear tests at any 

time. In 2010, North Korea revealed a 

uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon 

that it claims is for producing fuel for a 

light water reactor under construction. In 

April 2013, North Korea announced its 

intent to restart and refurbish the nuclear 

facilities at Yongbyon, including this 

enrichment facility and the nuclear 

reactor that had been shut down since 

2007. Press reports from September and 

October 2013 claim the reactor has

been restarted and is once again 

operating.

These activities violate North Korea’s 

obligations under UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 

2087, and 2094, contravene its 

commitments under the September 19,

2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party 

Talks, and increase the risk of 

proliferation. 

Biological Weapons. Although North 

Korea is a party to the Biological and 

Toxic Weapons Convention, open 

sources have often reported defector 

allegations of a North Korean biological 

warfare program. These sources indicate 

that North Korea continues to research 

bacterial and viral biological agents that 

could support an offensive biological 

weapons program. Its existing research 

infrastructure, combined with its 

weapons industry, gives North Korea a 

potentially robust biological warfare 

capability. 

Chemical Weapons. North Korea 

probably has had a longstanding 

chemical weapons (CW) program with 

the capability to produce nerve, blister, 

blood, and choking agents and likely 

possesses a CW stockpile. North Korea 

probably could employ CW agents by 

modifying a variety of conventional 

munitions, including artillery and ballistic 

missiles. In addition, North Korean forces 

are prepared to operate in a 

contaminated environment; they train 

regularly in chemical defense operations. 

North Korea is not a party to the 

Chemical Weapons Convention.

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS

Global concern about North Korea’s 

proliferation activity continues to mount, 

leading various nations to take action. 

Notable recent interdiction events 

pursuant to UNSCRs include:

• In early July 2013, Panamanian 

authorities stopped and inspected the 

North Korean flagged vessel Chong 

Chon Gang, finding hidden cargo 

including two MiG-21 fighter aircraft 

and associated engines, SA-2 and SA3 SAM-related equipment, and 

unspecified missiles. Cuba issued a 

statement acknowledging ownership 

of the military equipment and 

claiming it was being sent to North 

Korea for overhaul.

• In June 2011, the M/V Light, a vessel 

bound for Burma suspected of 

carrying military-related cargo,
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returned to North Korea after refusing 

a U.S. Navy inspection request.

• In February 2010, South Africa seized 

North Korean-origin spare tank parts 

destined for the Republic of Congo.

• In December 2009, Thai authorities 

impounded the cargo of a chartered 

cargo plane containing about 35 

metric tons of North Korean weapons,

including artillery rockets, rocketpropelled grenades, and SAMs.

• In October 2009, the ROK seized North 

Korean-origin chemical warfare 

protective suits destined for Syria.

Although some of its weapons-transfer 

attempts have been interdicted by the

international community, North Korea will 

continue to attempt arms shipments via 

new and increasingly complex routes.