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RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE

EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 15, 2017

Serial No. 115–41

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza, vice chairman, Open Russia ...................................... 9

Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya, Ira Weiner fellow, The Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy ................................................................................................... 13

Mr. Brian Katulis, senior fellow, Center for American Progress ......................... 23

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza: Prepared statement ................................................... 11

Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya: Prepared statement .................................................. 15

Mr. Brian Katulis: Prepared statement ................................................................. 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

(1)

RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN THE 

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other 

members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from 

our esteemed panel, and the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record. Members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

For far too long, the United States has acted timidly in the face 

of increased Russian aggression, unwilling to confront Putin for 

fear of provoking a confrontation, even though Putin, like other tyrants, only responds to a position of strength. And it isn’t just the 

executive branch: Congress has played its role too. 

For years, administrations have been offering concessions to Russia, and Congress has allowed this to happen. The Bush administration presented a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, a 123 

agreement to Congress, despite concerns Russia was then providing 

Iran with nuclear technology and providing Syria with advanced 

conventional weapons in violation of the Iran, North Korea, and 

Syria Nonproliferation Act. In fact, the Bush administration had 

sanctioned state-owned Russian entities for Iran-related violations. 

I led the effort then to block that agreement. President Bush withdrew the proposed nuclear accord, but only after Russia invaded 

Georgia. 

That didn’t stop the Obama administration from falling into the 

same trap, officially submitting to the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to Congress in 2010, despite overwhelming 

evidence of Russian involvement in Iran’s nuclear and conventional 

weapons program and congressional efforts to strengthen sanctions 

against Iran. 

Russia repeatedly acted as interference for Iran at the U.N., protecting it from scrutiny and increased sanctions, all the while itself 

2

violating U.S. sanctions against the world’s foremost state sponsor 

of terrorism. Yet we fail to hold Russia accountable. In fact, as part 

of the Obama administration’s reset, the U.S. lifted several sanctions against Russia, including sanctions against the arms exporter 

Rosoboronexport, which admitted it was shipping advanced missile 

defense systems to Syria. 

In 2010, the administration agreed to sign over the control of 

Uranium One, the U.S. uranium processing facility to the Russian 

Government. Again, despite overwhelming national security concerns. As then ranking member of this committee, I spearheaded 

a letter alongside the ranking members of the House Financial 

Services, Armed Services, and Homeland Security Committees urging the Treasury Secretary to oppose this move. 

Another consequence of ignoring Russia’s behavior was the decision to overturn the Jackson-Vanik amendment, paving the way for 

Russia to join the WTO, World Trade Organization, and granting 

Putin permanent normal trade relations. This was part of the deal 

with the Devil in order to get the Magnitsky Act signed into law. 

And though we managed to get that signed into law, an important 

bill, the previous administration failed to use its authorities to 

sanction Russia’s worst human rights violators. 

So where are we now? We have established a long history of failing to use the tools the United States has available to it in order 

to hold Putin and the Russian regime accountable. 

Putin’s support for Assad has guaranteed that the conflict will 

continue and that tens of thousands more will die. His alliance 

with Iran has given Tehran the tools it needs to one day become 

a nuclear power with strong conventional arms, including advanced 

missile defense capabilities. He is bolstering General Haftar in 

Libya, making it almost certain that no progress toward reconciliation will be made there in the near future. Reports indicate that 

Russia may be deploying troops or possibly wanting to set up a 

base at the border of Libya and Egypt. Putin is ensuring that Russia ties itself to the energy and military sectors of many countries 

in the region, giving him leverage and influence in countries that 

have viewed us with mistrust since the Arab Spring and the Iran 

nuclear deal. 

Russia is not our ally, not in Syria, not in Iran, not on human 

rights issues. We should not be afraid to push Putin back. He is 

a strong man, and tyrants like him only respond to strength, not 

just perceived strength but actual strength. Russia is fragile, and 

this show of force is just that, a show by Putin. It is time for the 

U.S. to reclaim our leadership role on the global stage and, particularly, in the Middle East and with respect to Russia. 

Yesterday, the Senate passed an amendment to the Iran sanctions bill that included Russia sanctions. And while I support efforts to hold Russia accountable for its cyber activities and its activities related to Crimea, I hope that this will be only the first 

step toward a more holistic approach to holding Russia accountable 

for its activities, which threaten U.S. national security interests 

and global peace and security. 

And with that, I am proud to yield to my ranking member, Mr. 

Deutch of Florida. 

3

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for 

agreeing to hold today’s hearing. 

Russia has been in the news a great deal lately. But what has 

been absent in much of the reporting is a clear analysis of what 

exactly Russia’s foreign policy objectives are under Putin’s rule. 

Today, we have a chance to focus on the Middle East where Russia has demonstrated again and again a disregard for human 

rights and for human life. Russia’s posture in the Middle East 

would be troubling in any context, but given the bizarre relationship between this administration and Russia, it is even more pertinent that we as the United States Congress understand why ceding 

our role as the leader in the Middle East to Russia runs counter 

to our own national security interests. And we cannot have a full 

understanding of this administration’s foreign policy until we know 

more about this administration’s ties to Russia. 

Russia’s relationship with Iran, its support for the Assad regime 

in Syria, and its willingness to align itself with authoritarians 

shows brazen disregard for international norms and the rule of 

law. 

Are these decisions made solely to counter American objectives 

and form a bulwark against the United States? I mean, the Soviet 

Union was the first country to recognize the Islamic Republic of 

Iran in 1979, and the relationship between Iran and Russia has remained close ever since. No nation has contributed more to Iran’s 

nuclear programs, sold more weapons to Iran, or been more willing 

to defend Iran’s indefensible actions in international fora. As Iran 

has worked to destabilize nearly every country in the Middle East, 

Russia seems willing to overlook every Iranian transgression in 

pursuit of its own ambitions. 

In no Middle East country has Russia done more to deserve 

international condemnation than in Syria. Not only has Russia 

propped up Syria’s war criminal President with arms and funds, 

but Putin’s forces have actively attacked opposition forces aligned 

with the United States, as well as countless civilian targets on behalf of the Assad regime. Reports from Aleppo indicate that Russia 

used bunker-busting munitions to attack hospitals on a regular 

basis, reducing to rubble underground-held facilities that had been 

out of reach to Syrian forces. 

When Assad ordered chemical attacks on civilian populations in 

April of this year, the planes flew out of a base shared with the 

Russians, and one would be hard-pressed not to conclude that the 

Russians were aware that gas was stored at that base. Yet Russia 

chose not to condemn the attack, which violated the very agreement Russia helped negotiate to rid the country of chemical weapons, or to apologize for their complicity. Instead, they spent days 

blocking meaningful U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning 

this heinous attack on children and babies. 

Russian actions in Syria have lent support to Hezbollah, a terrorist organization, and other Iranian-backed militias. There are 

reports that Russia has provided Hezbollah with long-range tactical 

missiles, laser-guided rockets, and antitank weapons, and on more 

than one occasion, Russia has provided air cover for Iran-backed 

operations. 

4

Oddly, the Russian Ambassador to Israel this week went to great 

lengths to explain why Russia doesn’t consider Hezbollah or Hamas 

terrorist organizations, stating that they have yet to attack Russia 

or Russian interests. Claiming his involvement in Syria is a way 

to prevent the spread of ISIS terrorism, Putin has been willing to 

cast aside international norms and order to ensure his own political 

future. 

Our President has repeatedly talked about how nice it would be 

if we could fight ISIS together with Russia, except there is one 

problem. Russia has repeatedly attacked the very forces the United 

States has aligned itself with in the fight against ISIS, while supporting the action’s very regime that we consider the largest state 

sponsor of terrorism. 

I am not sure we need clearer proof that Russia’s strategic objectives in the region are in clear contravention with our own. Is the 

Kremlin’s willingness to align itself with the region’s worst actors 

a projection of strength or, rather, a reflection of Putin’s deep insecurities? We have an administration that seems to be willing to 

give Putin the benefit of the doubt and even to drive policy in the 

region without much questioning. 

We must push back against every effort from this President and 

his allies to legitimize Russian behavior, or to draw false equivalence between Russian actions and those of the United States, as 

the President did on national television when asked on Fox News 

about Putin being a killer. 

Even as Russia supported brutal dictators and worked to undermine American alliances, President Trump has complimented 

Putin, calling him a very strong leader, and benefiting from the 

Russian interference in our elections, suggested partnership with 

the Kremlin, shared the closely held secrets of allied intelligence 

agencies with Russia’s top diplomats. 

There is obviously a lot more to discuss. Russian activity now 

spans throughout the region, but I am confident that our conversation today will only solidify the fact that the United States should 

not, by any means, let Russia drive policy in the critical region in 

the Middle East. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And I will yield to our members for their opening statements. 

And if I may start with Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

The previous administration’s withdrawal from America’s traditional leadership role left a power vacuum around the globe, one 

that Putin gladly took advantage of. And unfortunately, we are 

now paying the consequences. 

Putin’s engagement in Syria and the Middle East has complicated our own strategy for dealing with ISIS and Iran and a litany of other major issues in the region. As the U.S. works to defeat 

ruthless terrorist groups, Mr. Putin undermines our efforts the entire way by lending support to the Assad regime, continuing to test 

the limits of our allies, and supplying weapon systems to Iran. 

It is clear that Putin hopes to restore Russia’s economic, military, 

and geopolitical influence around the world by capitalizing on the 

instability in the Middle East. Putin saw an opportunity to win 

5

over regional leaders by questioning the credibility of long-term 

support from the United States, and to some extent, this strategy 

has worked. However, I also believe that there are plenty of tools 

for this new administration to use to bring both stability and balance back to the region, and I hope we discuss some of those today. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And you and Mr. Chabot and my friends, but to listen to both 

of you, you would never know Donald Trump is in the White 

House. Apparently, everything going on in the Middle East is the 

fault of somebody else whose name is not Donald Trump. 

You would never know that Donald Trump is under investigation 

and his campaign is under investigation because of his ties and 

their ties to Russia. You would never know Russia hacked into our 

election campaign, verified by all of our intelligence community. 

You would never know that Donald Trump boasted of firing the 

FBI director because of the Russia thing with the Russian foreign 

minister. You would never know that it was Donald Trump that 

praised Vladimir Putin as a strong man and liked the fact that 

Putin had said nice things about him. 

Could that be enabling behavior? I think so. And I think that is 

the 800-pound gorilla in the room we need to be talking about. So 

you can pretend all you want that it is all Obama’s fault, but we 

have got a real-life problem right now in real time in this White 

House, and that is the Donald Trump Presidency. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. An enabler. 

Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Four days ago, it was the 30th anniversary 

of President Reagan going to Berlin and saying tear down the wall. 

While having been a senior speech writer for President Reagan for 

71⁄2 years, I had a chance to have some input, but I did not write 

that speech. However, I was the one who smuggled that speech to 

President Reagan so that the senior staff wouldn’t take it out before he had a chance to see it. And once he did see it, he withstood 

enormous pressure to go there and speak the truth. 

Ronald Reagan then led this country to peace with the Soviet 

Union. Ronald Reagan believed in peace through strength. But let’s 

make it very clear, he believed in peace, and he was the one who 

brought whatever good chance we have to have peace in that part 

of the world. He is the one who made it happen. 

And I will tell you that what we have right now, and I am afraid 

I disagree with all of my colleagues, what we hear now is war talk, 

something that will only lead to war, and it is not leading to treating Russia as a power that we need to negotiate with, as Reagan 

did, for the cause of peace. 

I will tell you right now that I called up Condoleezza Rice early 

on when I heard that their economy was in such a free fall because 

the West isolated Russia economically after communism fell. They 

needed to put their scientists to work. They made an agreement 

with Iran. And I said, this is horrible. But they have got to do it, 

because they have to make the money. And I said to Condi, I said, 

look, let’s offer them a deal. They could make two nuclear power 

6

plants in Australia or New Zealand, financed by the World Bank, 

it won’t cost a penny, and then they won’t have this horrible country, Iran, the mullah regime, with nuclear weapons 20 years from 

now. You know what she said? She said, that is never going to happen, Dana. 

Well, I will tell you this much, we have people who can’t get over 

the Cold War, and they are pushing us toward policies of antagonism and repeated unrelenting hostility that will lead us to war. 

Ronald Reagan wanted peace in this world, and so do I. This is not 

the way to a more peaceful world or even a freer world. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Lieu of California. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Madam Chair and ranking member, for 

this important hearing on Russian aggression. 

I find it highly disturbing that just yesterday, The Wall Street 

Journal reported our President still questions the intelligence community’s assessment that Russia engaged in massive cyber attacks 

on the United States last year. 

I am one of four computer science majors in Congress. I read the 

classified report. I have had classified briefings, and the President 

of the United States is simply lying when he says another country 

could have done it. It was Russia. And we cannot properly respond 

to Russia if our own President will not accept basic facts. But 

thank goodness we have Congress. Thank goodness the U.S. Senate 

today overwhelmingly passed increased sanctions on Russia. I urge 

the House of Representatives to do the same. 

We had a foreign power commit hostile acts against this country. 

That is not acceptable. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Lieu. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I guess we are going to be in a debate over the administration 

and not Russia. I will remind everybody, though, that President 

Trump, actually, is the person that enforced the red line in Syria 

and destroyed an airfield as a result of these chemical weapons. 

Madam Chair, thank you for doing this. 

And I thank our guests for being here and giving us your time. 

I just want to say, in my opening statement, that Russia has 

blood on their hands in Syria as well as many other places. 

In 2015, America mistakenly and tragically bombed a hospital in 

Afghanistan. And as a result, the world rightfully called that out, 

and America made amends; we found ourselves accountable. But 

every day, medical facilities, hospitals, places where innocent people live and work and simply try to exist in their life are bombed 

by the Assad regime and backed and bombed by the Russian regime. This is pure and despicable evil. 

When our country makes a mistake, we hold ourselves accountable to it and try to make sure we do it better next time. When 

Russia—they don’t make mistakes. They target with precisionguided munitions innocent lives. This is not a country that we can 

put an olive branch out to and say, you are just like us. You are 

also a great power. This is a country with an economy the size of 

Italy. 

7

With that, Madam Chair, I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very eloquent. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Deutch, for calling this important hearing today. 

And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for offering your 

testimony. 

I want to especially thank you, Mr. Kara-Murza, and say how 

glad I am to see you here healthy and as outspoken as ever, drawing light to the Russian Government’s activities at home and 

around the world. Your bravery in the face of intimidation is an example to us all and a reminder of how lucky we are as Americans 

to be able to speak our mind, question our Government, and call 

out corruption when we see it. We thank you for your continuing 

willingness to speak out. 

There is no doubt that Russia is seeking to expand its influence 

and reach throughout the Middle East. While I hope that we can 

partner with Russia and the horrific conflict in Syria, we have to 

remember that their goals in the region are not the same as ours. 

We seem to have an administration that wants to give Russia the 

benefit of the doubt, despite years of evidence that they will use 

this to manipulate events to their benefit. Moreover, the overwhelming budget cuts proposed by President Trump will leave our 

foreign policy apparatus decimated and unable to respond, namely, 

to crises and provocations. By ceding our leadership role around 

the world so thoroughly, we will be giving Vladimir Putin the opening he has so desperately sought to create over the last dozen years 

to increase his power and influence in the Middle East. 

I hope our witnesses can shed some light on Russia’s intentions 

in the region and suggest steps that Congress can take that will 

ensure that American interests and national security are protected. 

And I will end with one expression of concern, and that is that 

the Senate passed some strong sanctions yesterday. And it is already being reported that the White House is reaching out in an 

effort to weaken these sanctions. And I hope that we can send a 

very strong message that the Congress of the United States is very 

united in ensuring that severe sanctions are put into place and the 

Russians are held fully to account. 

And with that, Madam Chairman, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Well put. Thank you, Mr. 

Cicilline. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman and ranking 

member, for calling this hearing, Russia’s Strategic Objectives in 

the Middle East and North Africa. 

The Middle East and North Africa is a region that our interests 

run both deep and broad, as is going to be said, having read the 

advanced testimony, history matters. I don’t want to take away 

something you said, but history does matter here, and it is important to understand the history of the region, the history of different 

interests in this region. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. Again, thank you for being here. 

But I think we also have to look at this in the context of a discussion that is taking place in this chamber, that is taking place 

8

broadly in the country, and that is the President’s desire to cut our 

investment in diplomacy and in development. It is a three-legged 

stool, and if we are going to promote our interests in this region, 

we need to continue to invest in diplomacy and development as 

well as defense. And I hope the witnesses will be able to touch a 

bit on that. 

I know we are also going to talk about the sale of weapons into 

the region and how that plays out, and I think that is an important 

issue that we understand. 

And finally, I just want to associate myself with my colleague 

from Rhode Island’s remarks about the concern on sanctions. It is 

important that we continue to push back on Russia’s interests and 

Russia’s efforts to destabilize this region. Again, not to take anything away from what the witnesses are going to say, but the sense 

that this is a zero-sum game, if Russia seeks to win, we have to 

lose, we can’t let that be the case. We have to work with our allies 

to secure our interests. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Any other members wish to make a statement? 

And now I am pleased to introduce our wonderful set of panelists. I am delighted to welcome my friend and a true hero of democracy, as Mr. Cicilline referred to him, Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza, 

who currently serves as the vice chair of Open Russia, a Russian 

pro-democracy movement. He was a long-time colleague and adviser to opposition leader Boris Nemtsov. And here he is. And this 

is an actual poster that was used with the bullet holes there. 

Thank you. 

He currently chairs the foundation that bears Nemtsov’s name. 

In response to his activism and opposition, Vlad was poisoned, not 

once but twice, by the vile Putin regime. 

Putin’s cronies continue cracking down on dissidents. Just a few 

weeks ago, his regime detained a popular opposition leader for simply walking down the street and protesting with his presence. 

Many people involved are likely eligible to be added to the 

Magnitsky list. We must show Putin and his henchmen that they 

will not get away with these abuses. 

So thank you, my friend, for continuing to stand up against oppression. We all look forward to your testimony, Vladimir. 

And next, we would like to welcome Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya—

I am so proud, I am going to say it again, Borshchevskaya—who 

serves as the Ira Weiner Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Russia’s policy toward the Middle East. She is also a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously 

with the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the Atlantic Council. 

We look forward to your testimony. Thank you. 

And finally, we want to re-welcome Mr. Brian Katulis. Saying 

that right, too. Mr. Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for 

American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. national security strategy and counterterrorism policy. His past experience includes work at the National Security Council and the U.S. Departments of State and Defense during President Bill Clinton’s administration. 

9

Welcome back. We look forward to your testimony. 

And, Mr. Vladimir Kara-Murza, we will begin with you, Vlad. 

Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MR. VLADIMIR KARA-MURZA, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, OPEN RUSSIA 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Madam Chairman, thank you very much for 

your kind introduction. Far too kind, as always. Thank you also for 

your leadership here on this Hill for so many years on issues that 

are so important for so many people. And thank you, in particular, 

for your leadership. 

You mentioned Boris Nemtsov in your opening remarks, and 

thank you for your leadership in sponsoring the House bill, H.R. 

1863, that would designate the space in front of the Russian Embassy here in Washington, DC, as Boris Nemtsov Plaza to commemorate him and his memory. This is very important to very 

many people. 

Thank you, also, to the member of the subcommittee, Mr. 

Connolly, for cosponsoring this same piece of legislation. 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, esteemed 

members of the subcommittee, thank you so much for holding this 

important and timely hearing and for the opportunity to testify before you. 

Our subject today is Russia’s strategic objectives in the Middle 

East. And I think before we discuss the substance, it is important 

also to clarify the terms. What we are talking about today are the 

objectives of Vladimir Putin’s government. For many Russians, including myself, it is a very uncomfortable equivalence to make between our country and the current regime in the Kremlin that has 

not resulted from democratic elections. 

The Kremlin’s involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs today 

is the most active it has been since the heyday of the Cold War. 

Just like Hafez al-Assad, with whom Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev professed to be ‘‘fighting shoulder to shoulder,’’ was Moscow’s 

ally in the 1970s and 1980s, so was his son, Bashar al-Assad today. 

From the start of the internal conflict in Syria in 2011, Mr. Putin 

has been a staunch defender of the Assad regime, providing it not 

only with political support and diplomatic cover but also, since 

2015, with direct military help as the Russian aerospace forces 

have conducted bombing raids against Assad’s opponents. 

The Kremlin has blocked eight Syria-related resolutions at the 

U.N. Security Council. Most recently, on April 13 of this year, Russia’s acting U.N. Ambassador, Vladimir Safronkov—and I should 

add, behaving in a manner more appropriate for a bar brawl than 

for the U.N. Security Council—vetoed a draft resolution calling for 

an international investigation into the chemical gas attack in Khan 

Sheikhoun. 

Vladimir Putin’s support for the Syrian dictator is consistent 

with his longstanding hostility to popular movements, not only in 

the Middle East, but also in post-Soviet countries, like Georgia and 

Ukraine, where mass protests have toppled authoritarian governments. 

In the fates of these strong men driven from power, he sees his 

own possible fate. In fact, he has himself publicly compared the 

10

mass demonstrations that swept across Russia earlier this year 

when tens of thousands of people went out to the streets to protest 

against authoritarianism and corruption; most recently just 3 days 

ago, both to the Arab Spring and to the Maidan revolution in 

Ukraine. These protests in Russia were met with a very harsh response, with peaceful demonstrators beaten up by riot police and 

with more than 1,500 people arrested on a single day. 

The official foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation that 

was signed by Mr. Putin mentions ‘‘the growing threat of international terrorism.’’ Yet the Kremlin’s approach to this issue has 

been ambivalent at best. For example, unlike the United States 

and the European Union, the Russian Government refuses to recognize Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations. This is 

what Ranking Member Deutch referred to in his opening remarks. 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has met on several occasions with Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. In January of this year, 

Mr. Lavrov hosted a meeting in Moscow at the foreign ministry for 

representatives of several Palestinian groups, which included 

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the popular front for the 

liberation of the Palestine that are also designated by the U.S. and 

the EU as terrorist organizations. 

Asked in a recent interview why the Russian Government considers some terrorists to be bad and others good, the Russian Ambassador to Israel, Alexander Shein, responded that, and I quote, 

‘‘We do not consider them’’—meaning Hamas and Hezbollah—‘‘terrorists at all.’’ This comes despite the fact that Russian citizens in 

Israel have been among the victims of these groups. 

With so many cultural, historical, emotional, and family ties between Russian and Israeli societies, and with fully one-fifth of 

Israelis, including members of Israel’s Government, speaking Russian as their first language, it would seem natural that Russia 

should treat the state of Israel as a close partner. Instead, the 

Kremlin’s principal ally in the region, alongside Bashar al-Assad, 

is the Islamic Republic of Iran, where Moscow remains the largest 

supplier of weapons, where it is actively pursuing new contracts in 

atomic energy, and which it continues to provide for significant diplomatic support. 

Vladimir Putin’s objectives in the Middle East have been consistent both with his domestic behavior and with his approach to 

other parts of the world: Support fellow dictators and undermine 

efforts of democratization, what his foreign policy concept refers to 

as ‘‘ideological values imposed from outside.’’

Military involvement in Syria has also been used by the Kremlin 

for the purposes of domestic propaganda, both to divert attention 

from economic difficulties at home and to back up the claim that 

Mr. Putin has restored Russia’s status as a great power, a claim 

that is hardly consistent with reality. A reminder of this came just 

last month as the leaders of what is now known as the G-7 held 

their annual summit in Sicily, for the fourth time now without 

Russia, which was suspended from the group of major world powers because of Mr. Putin’s violations of international law. 

Thank you very much, once again, for the opportunity to testify. 

I look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kara-Murza follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. 

Good to see you healthy. 

And now we will begin with you. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ANNA BORSHCHEVSKAYA, IRA WEINER 

FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST 

POLICY 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking 

Member Deutch, honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

In my written testimony, I have gone into detail about Russian 

President Vladimir Putin’s strategic objectives in the Middle East 

and how those work against our own national security interests. 

But for the sake of brevity, let me summarize. 

First, Vladimir Putin’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 

had taken many by surprise, but it is important to remember that 

Russia’s presence in the Middle East is not new. It is its absence 

during Boris Yeltsin’s Presidency in the 1990 that is the deviation 

from history. Putin sought to bring Russia back to the Middle East 

from the very beginning when he officially came to power in May 

2000, and he did so in an anti-Western zero-sum approach. For 

Putin to win, the United States had to lose. 

In the Middle East, and especially in Syria, Putin has multiple 

goals, but fundamentally, Putin’s priority is the survival of his own 

regime. He wants to stay in power. And survival for him is connected to undermining the West. Thus, Putin uses the Middle East 

to that end. He steps into vacuums wherever the West retreats and 

asserts Russia’s influence, which sows instability and contributes 

to terrorism. 

Putin says he wants to work with everyone in the region, but his 

actions show a clear preference for the anti-Sunni and anti-U.S. 

forces. Putin’s growing relationship with Iran and continued support pursuing President Bashar al-Assad, two major forces that 

contribute to terrorism, are a testament to this. 

Russia’s growing alliance with Iran, in particular, presents a 

major challenge to U.S. interests in the region. We increasingly 

talk about a post-ISIS environment, and it is in a post-ISIS environment that this issue becomes especially important. Russia-Iran 

military ties continue to grow and, frankly, the overall level of 

closeness between the two countries is unprecedented in the grand 

scope of over 500 years of history. 

Together, Moscow and Tehran are in a better position to undermine the U.S. in the Middle East than on their own. For years, 

Moscow consistently worked to dilute sanctions against Iran and 

claimed that concerns about Iran’s nuclear program were overblown. Moscow also, at the very least, looked the other way when 

Russian weapons reached Hezbollah. And as was mentioned previously, Hezbollah is not designated as a terrorist organization in 

Russia. 

Kremlin’s actions shows that Putin cares more about his own interests than international regional security. In Syria, Putin protected Bashar al-Assad from the very beginning and in multiple 

ways. Putin says he went into Syria in September 2015 to fight terrorists, mainly ISIS, so that they don’t return to Russia. But as 

14

was mentioned several times here today, numerous reports indicate 

that he has primarily targeted everyone else. 

Putin wants to put the U.S. in front of a choice: It is either ISIS 

or Assad. And as Putin enables Assad, Assad continues an ethnic 

cleansing in Syria, which increases refugee flows into Europe, thus 

helping Putin weaken and divide the West. 

Russia’s role in Libya is particularly important to watch. Putin 

has been gaining a foothold there by supporting Libya’s General 

Khalifa Haftar. And in the context of U.S. absence, Putin could attempt to do in Libya what he has effectively done in Syria, step 

into a vacuum, create a short-term fix, and take credit for it and 

cede long-term instability. 

The line between domestic and foreign policy in Russia is often 

blurred, and it is hard sometimes to understand because it is different from the West. It is a point that often gets missed. Putin 

seeks to distract Russia’s domestic audience from his own failings. 

His foreign adventures, pointing to the U.S. as the enemy, these 

are all distractions in many ways. This is how he legitimizes his 

regime. Putin fears domestic protests, and he believes that the 

West orchestrates regime change throughout the world, be it color 

revolutions in the post-Soviet space, the Arab Spring, or domestic 

protests against Putin himself. 

Moscow’s overall military moves from Ukraine to Syria suggest 

that Putin is trying to create antiaccess/denial, the so-called A2/AD 

bubbles, to limit our ability to maneuver in the region. These are, 

essentially, ever-growing buffer zones that he is trying to create. 

Thus, access to warm-water ports has been especially important to 

Putin along with political and economic influence in the region. 

I made a number of policy recommendations in my testimony, 

but my top few are the following: First, Putin cannot be a reliable 

partner in fighting terrorism. We cannot work effectively with 

someone who perceives us as the enemy and seeks to undermine 

us and who enables forces that contribute to terrorism in the region in the first place. 

Second, the United States must actively engage in the Middle 

East, such as increase security cooperation with our partners to reassure our allies and counter Kremlin’s propaganda efforts more effectively. This is the best way to limit Putin’s influence. 

Lastly, we have to remember that there are no quick and easy 

fixes, but with strategic and moral clarity, the U.S. can reclaim its 

leadership position in the region. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Borshchevskaya follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Our next witness. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. KATULIS. Great. I would like to thank the acting chairman 

and the ranking member and all members of the committee for the 

invitation. It is great to be with you today. 

My bottom line analysis upfront is that Russia’s increased engagement and assertiveness in the Middle East since 2015 has accelerated three negative trends within the region that affect U.S. 

national security interests. 

One is it has accelerated State fragmentation; two, it has actually heightened the terrorist threat posed in the region and to the 

United States; and three, it has reinforced a trend toward autocratic and authoritarian rule. It has done this primarily through its 

longstanding cooperation with Iran, but its backing most recently 

of the Assad regime in Syria. 

Another bottom line upfront assessment is that though it is still 

too early to tell in the Trump administration, I believe that we are 

seeing the emergence of a strategic posture of the United States in 

the Middle East that is quite incoherent and not clear where the 

pieces do not add up. 

I would like to use my remarks to talk, first, for a minute about 

the strategic landscape in the Middle East, because I think it is 

very important to stress one key point: That the region itself is in 

the midst of a long and complicated period of fluid change, and the 

drivers of that change largely come from within the region. Outside 

actors like the United States, like Russia, have an important sway 

and influence, but the primary drivers of change inside the region 

come from within the actors. 

Some of it is this competition for influence between Saudi Arabia 

and Iran. Some of it are these tensions we have seen recently between other major actors like Qatar and other Gulf States. And a 

big part of it is this rise of nonstate actors that we have seen over 

the last 15 to 20 years, including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. 

This competition within the region is multidimensional. It has a 

military and security aspect, but it has political and economic features that I am happy to talk about. It is multipolar, meaning that 

there is not one single actor or force that I see as dominant within 

the region. So I think this complicated landscape is one that is subject to fracturing, fragmentation, and every action the United 

States takes, every action outside actors like Russia takes, it 

makes a major impact, and it is quite vulnerable. 

In my written testimony, I outline seven key objectives that I see 

in Russia’s behaviors in the Middle East. I would like to just highlight a few and then move to my assessment of U.S. policy. 

Number one, it is clear to me that Russia and its actions, particularly since 2015, have been aimed to safeguard against attempts to isolate Russia geopolitically for its destabilizing actions 

in Europe, in Ukraine, in the United States, and other parts of the 

world. Part of the reason I think it got engaged was not only to try 

to undermine U.S. influence in the region, but also to, again, arrest 

the attempts to isolate it through various means. 

24

Secondly, it has tried to maintain a degree of military presence 

at strategic locations across the Middle East and North Africa, primarily, we see in eastern Mediterranean and Syria. 

And then, lastly, it states that it seeks to contain Islamist terrorism and prevent its expansion into Russia and its own borders. 

But, again, if you go back to my bottom line assessment, the consequence of its actions have been to exacerbate and to worsen that 

threat. 

In my last minute, I just wanted to briefly talk about what I see 

as very worrisome trends, and I think an important role that Congress has to play in asking questions. We have moved from a policy 

in the previous decade under the Bush administration of, perhaps, 

overreach and trying to do so much to change these societies to one 

under President Obama of reticence and restraint, to what I think 

at this stage, 5 months into a new administration, which is quite 

incoherent at this point. The pieces don’t add up. 

Three points I would stress in the emerging strategic posture in 

the Trump administration and why I think it is important that you 

are having this hearing and Congress should engage on these 

issues: 

Number one, we see a proposed unilateral disarmament of the 

tools of U.S. national security power, particularly in diplomacy and 

economic tools. And that is why this bill that several of the members talked about that is in the Senate, I think is an important tool 

in the arsenal to shape the actions of Russia and Iran in ways that 

benefit our interests. Secondly, we see an overreliance on military 

tactics in the absence of a clear strategy. And thirdly, I also see 

what I term a creeping U.S. military escalation and a silent surge 

of U.S. troops in multiple parts of the Middle East, in Syria and 

Yemen and other places, but all of this is in absence of overarching 

strategy. 

What is the best way to deal with Russia in the Middle East? 

The best and most effective thing is to have a coherent U.S. strategy, something that I would submit that we have not had for more 

than a decade and a half. In large part because of our own unforced 

errors, in large part because of this complicated landscape I tried 

to depict in my written testimony and in my remarks today. But 

Congress has an important role in helping this new administration 

find greater coherence and develop greater coherence in its engagement strategy. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katulis follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much. 

I thank all of our witnesses for appearing today and for their testimony. 

My colleague, Ann Wagner, has to be at a markup in Financial 

Services, so I am going to yield my time and recognize Mrs. Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, I thank the chair very, very much for his indulgence and generosity there. And I thank us all for participating 

in this important hearing, especially our witnesses today. 

It is important that the committee actively tracks Russia’s military partnerships and military sales in the Middle East and in 

North Africa. 

Mr. Kara-Murza—and I hope I am getting everyone’s pronunciations correct today—you are, sir, a brave supporter of Russia’s 

democratic opposition and shoulder great personal risk, sir. I read 

an interview with you in the National Review and was blown away 

by your insight into Putin and obstacles to democracy in Russia. 

I appreciate your leadership. I associate myself with your stubbornness and your willingness to be here today. 

I am wondering if you could flush out for us, on the record, the 

difference between Russia’s perspective on Ukraine and the Baltic 

States? What about Ukraine poses a threat to Putin in a way that 

the Baltics do not? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you very much. Make sure the mic is 

on. 

Thank you, Madam Congresswoman, and thank you for your 

very kind words. Far too kind. Again, it is an honor for me to be 

here. 

And it is a very important question that you pose, and there is 

actually, a qualitative and substantive difference, I think, between 

Mr. Putin’s perception of what is happening, for example, in the 

Baltic States and what is happening in the Ukraine. 

Successful democratic European Baltic States would not necessarily be a direct example for Russian society, because we are so 

different in many ways. A successful democratic European Ukraine 

would be an inspiration to so many people in Russia, because of 

our proximity, we have, in many ways, a shared history. We have 

the same faith. We have a very similar language, many cultural 

links. And when Mr. Putin saw those images of the Maidan in 

Ukraine in 2013 and 2014, when he saw hundreds of thousands of 

people standing on the streets of the capital as the corrupt authoritarian leader, Mr. Yanukovych, was hastily getting in his helicopter and fleeing, that was an analogy too close to home for Vladimir Putin. That was not a precedent he enjoyed. 

He feared that a success of this experiment, of the democratic experiment in Ukraine, would provide an inspiration for many people 

in Russia. And I think the primary motivation for Vladimir Putin’s 

aggression against Ukraine for what he has been doing to Ukraine 

since 2014 has been the desire to prevent the success of the 

Maidan in Kiev before it would become a model for Maidan in Moscow. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you very much. And I concur. 

Ms. Borshchevskaya, you have written extensively on the PutinErdogan relationship. Do you believe that Erdogan’s decision to no 

31

longer voice support for the ousting of Assad is related to Turkey’s 

partnership with Russia in the Syrian war? And further to that, 

how has Russia’s historic support for the Kurdistan Workers Party, 

PKK, in Turkey altered how Erdogan approaches the Syrian war? 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. Thank you for the question. Yes, I believe 

that is exactly the reason why Erdogan has changed his mind. 

Frankly, I am not sure if Erdogan is realizing how unequal the relationship is right now between himself and Putin, precisely for the 

reason that you mentioned, because Russia has longstanding, very 

deep ties to Kurds. The PKK, essentially, was created by a communist proxy, and Moscow’s ties to the Kurds go back over 200 

years. 

This is what Erdogan fears the most. And I think he, essentially, 

changed his position on Assad. He said for years Assad must go. 

He no longer says this in exchange for his ability to at least have 

some sort of influence in Syria. 

Mrs. WAGNER. In my brief time left, Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Andrey Karlov, was fatally shot in December in Turkey. And 

at the time, Russia and Turkey stated that the murder was a result of terrorism. And one Russian center said that the answer 

would be to redouble the fight against terrorism in Syria. 

Ms. Borshchevskaya, can you explain how Russia has directly or 

indirectly reacted to the murder in the months since then? 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. Well, for one thing—you know, the first 

thing that came out in the Russian Kremlin-controlled press that 

I remember, was talk about how these are—the murder, that these 

are all—it is a plot to divide Erdogan and Putin, that there is some 

kind of conspiracy theory. And, therefore, Erdogan and Putin are 

just going to keep working together more closely, that they are not 

going to let these fictitious enemies, these terrorists, keep them 

apart. 

You know, beyond that, there was a very general statement 

about terrorism, but again, as we have talked before, these are not 

real attempts to fight terrorism. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. And I know my time has lapsed. I 

yield back, and again, appreciate the indulgence of the chair. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks, again, to the witnesses for really excellent testimony. We appreciate you being here. 

I would like to start with the point I made in my opening remarks, which gets to the fundamental difference in Russia’s approach to the region, and that is the interview the Russian Ambassador to Israel gave just this week where he made very clear that 

Russia does not view ISIS the same way it views Hezbollah. And 

according to translations of the interview he said, ‘‘You equate ISIS 

with Hamas and Hezbollah, but we think this is wrong.’’

When pressed by the interviewer with, that is all you can say, 

there are bad terrorists and good terrorists, his response was, ‘‘No, 

we do not consider them to be terrorists at all.’’

32

So it is no wonder that Russia has had no problem aligning itself 

with Hezbollah in Syria and Iran, the largest state sponsor of terrorism. 

Russia’s interests in Syria are about making sure Russia isn’t affected by ISIS, and if it means propping up a brutal dictator or empowering a different terrorist organization, one that it sees as less 

of a threat to its own territory, that seems to be just fine. 

Apparently, Russia should be reminded that Hezbollah has 

launched attacks in Europe or that Hezbollah has 120,000 rockets 

aimed at Israel where more than 1 million Russians live. This is 

precisely the reason that when our President says he wants to 

work with Russia to fight ISIS, we have deep concerns. 

I, frankly, see no outcome in which Russia suddenly separates 

itself from the Assad-Iran-Hezbollah alliance. And any deal that 

leaves a permanent Hezbollah or Iranian presence in Syria should 

be unacceptable to the United States. A sustained military presence in Syria would pose a serious threat to our interests in the 

region and only serve to further ferment Iran’s destabilizing behaviors throughout the region. 

So I would ask the panel, what is Russia’s relationship like with 

Hezbollah on the battlefield, and to what extent are they cooperating and coordinating with Hezbollah, Iran, or other Iranianbacked militias? 

Ms. Borshchevskaya. 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. Sure. I can address this. Sorry. There 

have been multiple reports that Hezbollah has been learning from 

the Russian military. They have—and Putin, actually, has made it 

no secret. He repeatedly said that the Syria campaign provided direct life training for the Russian military, and this was one among 

many objectives. He said, you know, that there is no better training 

than real-life combat. And, in fact, the Russian military already 

had three such campaigns in the last several years: Georgia, 

Ukraine, and now Syria. 

So with respect to Iran and Hezbollah, you know, if you look at 

what is happening in Syria right now, on the Syria-Iraq border, as 

you know, it was reported in the press that U.S., in fact, is getting 

more involved. There were some clashes with pro-Assad forces. 

What was happening there is Russia was providing air cover for 

Hezbollah operations. So from reports that we have seen, there’s 

been a lot of learning, and Hezbollah members even talked positively about how much they have learned from watching the Russians operate. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Katulis? 

Mr. KATULIS. If I could underscore a point, Congressman, that 

you stressed. Hezbollah is our adversary. It is an enemy. It has 

threatened, as recently as last week, U.S. troops in southern Syria, 

as Anna just highlighted. There were clashes. And I talked about 

a creeping military escalation and a silencer to the U.S. troops. We 

don’t have the large numbers of troops that we had in Iraq and Afghanistan, thank heavens, in the previous decade, but we do have 

a garrison in southeastern Syria that, just last week, was threatened by Hezbollah. 

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istration of how are you going to work with Russia, which has been 

in alignment with Iran, which is an adversary to Israel? And nobody, I think, has answered that question in any clear way, especially while Hezbollahis threatening our troops. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And just if you could be—if you could be very direct, the result of a Russian-trained Hezbollah force in a post-conflict Syria with Hezbollah remaining in place means what to U.S. 

troops and to our—and to our ally Israel? 

Mr. KATULIS. Well, to our ally Israel, when I go to Israel, they 

talk about Iran being their deepest strategic threat, so this approach is existential. And if I might add, when I look at the Trump 

administration’s budget proposal for 2018 and things that it proposes to do in terms of cutting security assistance to some of those 

partners, including in Lebanon, that are fighting Hezbollah and its 

influence, it seems to me that the Trump administration has an incoherent formula that is going soft on Hezbollah, and it is perplexing. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, the incoherent formula Mr. Katulis describes that 

is not only going soft on Hezbollah but helping to train Hezbollah 

imperils our own troops and imperils Israel, and the administration 

has to acknowledge as much and the policy has to change. That is 

why this hearing is so important. 

I appreciate the opportunity. And I apologize, I am a ranking 

member on another committee that I have to run to, but I thank 

you for your time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Before my friend leaves, let me just note that 

perhaps you have forgotten that Assad has had three decades of a 

truce with Israel. And let me add that, during that time, we were 

allied with countries that wanted to destroy Israel, our now Saudi 

new friends. I just wanted to—in your last statement—yes, please. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Would the gentleman yield? 

I mean, if the gentleman—if my friend from California is suggesting that somehow it is in the best interest of the United States 

to not only accept but encourage a Syria run by a brutal dictator 

propped up by a Russian Government——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is not what my statement was. 

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. Propped up by a Russian Government 

that will simultaneously strengthen Hezbollah and Iran, who is an 

existential threat to Israel——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is not my——

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. I would disagree with that, and I——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, that is the way to dodge my 

point, but you are absolutely wrong in your analysis that Assad, 

over these last 30 years, has been some kind of enemy of Israel. 

The fact is, we have been supporting enemies of Israel for the last 

30 years. Assad is at a truce, the one country where they could 

have had a truce, and—I have given you your chance. Okay. You 

didn’t answer—you didn’t answer it. 

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. The point is Assad is a murderous 

thug, though——

34

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I gave him his chance to answer my disagreement. He chose not to. 

The fact is that we have been allied with people who are much 

more warlike than Assad. And Assad, over these last 30 years, 

have been the one country in which Christians could come and seek 

refuge. Even from countries in which they were our friends, the 

Christians would come and seek refuge with Assad, because we—

they, Assad, was not putting up with the persecution and destruction of the Christian community. Anything—that is what I mean 

by unrelenting hostility, but you can’t see and in any way accept 

that or deal with it. 

We are going to come up with the wrong policies, just like our 

friend—and I respect the open Russia movement. I respect the people that are struggling to get rid of the massive corruption that you 

have in that country. And I—unfortunately, I don’t think you are 

making much headway right now. And it is not just removing 

Putin. It is removing a lot of other people in power, the oligarchs, 

et cetera. 

But with that said, for you to suggest that the removal of 

Yanukovych in Ukraine was part of a democratic experience or experiment, ladies and gentlemen, you had a democratically elected 

government removed by force. And without that happening, I believe that Yanukovych would have been removed overwhelmingly 

in the next election. And collusion with Europe and the United 

States, powerful forces in the Ukraine, overthrew the Yanukovych 

regime, not allowing democracy to work; it destroyed democracy. 

Mr. Chairman, I happen to be the chairman of the committee 

that has oversight over this part of the world, and I would never 

have a panel of at least some disagreement on the panel. And the 

bottom line is, you are about as close to any disagreement on it, 

and you don’t. 

The fact is that we need—if we are going to have peace in the 

world, we have got to make sure we are talking with Russia honestly and trying to confront these issues, whether it is Yanukovych 

or whether—you know, look, our people in the Middle East, they 

are not democratic countries. You think the Saudis are democratic 

countries? And the Saudis were involved with killing 3,000 Americans on 9/11. What about the Qataris we are talking about right 

now? You think they wouldn’t slaughter the large populations they 

have, if they ever rose up against them? 

We have to quit trying to judge Russia on a double standard if 

we want peace in this world. Because we have to reach out to them 

and say, okay. Let’s be honest. What is in your interest? What is 

in our interest? I have to believe that peace is in the interest of 

both of our countries, especially when you have got radical Islam 

that is killing a bunch of Russians just like they are killing Americans. 

So with that said, I will ask a question and try to get—but I am 

disappointed that the panel doesn’t have at least one witness to try 

to have a dialogue about these particular issues. 

By the way, just for my friend—and I am sorry he left, and I 

would have given him a chance to say this as well—but when you 

complain about any type of this administration’s relationship or 

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fore he was President, I mean, no one’s—that doesn’t sound anywhere near as insidious as the tens of millions of dollars that were 

put into the Clinton fund. Look, Clinton has a foundation in which 

oligarchs put millions and millions of dollars and paid her husband 

huge sums of money into his pocket. And what happened very 

shortly after that? Well, they get a contract to have America’s uranium. My gosh. No one’s even mentioning it, as if all the other 

stuff, talking to some—talking to an Ambassador is some sort of a 

secret, insidious thing, which it is not. That is what the Ambassador is there for—versus exchanges of millions of dollars? No. 

We have got—if we want to have peace—I think free people 

should be for peace. Our major goal should be for peace because 

peace will override and destroy lives and destroy democracy every 

time. And I thank God that Ronald Reagan brought peace between 

Russia and the United States. He eliminated the Soviet Union. The 

Russians pulled back in the greatest peaceful removal of force in 

a large chunk of territory dealing with their borders in the history 

of human kind. And then what did we do? We didn’t let them in 

the EU. We isolated them economically. 

And I will just say that I played little parts in this. I mentioned 

the thing about trying to make sure that their nuclear physicists 

wouldn’t be working with Iran. We forced them into the—into this 

relationship with Iran. 

And I will tell you one other incident for the record, because I 

have been following this stuff, the Russians offered to back out of 

the agreement with the Iranians. I had this directly from players 

in this game, not Russians, but Americans. They offered to withdraw their agreement with the Iranian nuclear agreement if we 

would work with them on developing the next generation of nuclear 

power, which is safe and you can’t melt it down, et cetera. And you 

know what? We turned them down. And we said, go play with the 

Iranians. 

So a lot of the problems we have now, I think, have been based 

on we have not reached out to try to work with an honest discussion of differences with the country in which—yes, I am not trying 

to say that Putin is a democratic leader. He is oppressive and he 

has lied, and he is tied in the oligarchs that are crooked and draining the money from the Russian people, which should be used for 

their benefit. So I am sorry. I know it sounds like they are saying 

he is Putin’s man. I am not Putin’s man. But I am the only one 

who is willing to make the arguments on the other side and trying 

to see that in order to create a more peaceful world. 

And so with that said, I am sorry I took up my whole 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would let them refute me, and I will shut 

up. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you. And we will let them do 

that, but let me go to Mr. Cicilline first. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Thank you to our witnesses. I think one of the things that we 

understand is that our military is most effective when it works in 

conjunction with our diplomatic work and, of course, with our development professionals. 

36

And I am just wondering whether or not any of the panelists 

think that it is possible for us to push back against Russian aggression and build the kind of competence in American leadership that 

we need through our military expenditures alone or should we, as 

members of this committee, continue to fight for robust investments in both foreign assistance and development aid that are such 

important parts of our foreign policy. As you might know, the 

President’s budget proposes very deep, deep cuts in those areas. 

Yes? Everyone agrees? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you very much. And I want to just 

briefly say thank you for your kind words also during the introductory remarks. 

I would like, Madame Chairwoman, if you would allow me very 

briefly to respond to what Congressman Rohrabacher said. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. And I won’t take from Mr. Cicilline’s 

time. 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you. First of all, it is very refreshing to 

see disagreement and genuine debate in a legislative body. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. That is something we have long forgotten in 

my country. As you know, as a former speaker of the Russian Parliament, Mr. Gryzlov has said, Parliament is not a place for discussion. And, unfortunately, that is what it has become under Vladimir Putin. 

The last time my country had anything resembling a free and 

fair election was more than 17 years ago, in March 2000. And this 

is not me saying it. This is according to observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. So when I say 

again and again that please don’t equate Russia with the Putin regime, it means very simply that the current regime is not a product 

of Democratic election. It is not a product of a free choice of our 

people. 

And you said, Congressman, one thing which I completely agree 

with. You said, let’s not treat Russia with a double standard, and 

I think this is very important. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. We are not worse than you are. We are entitled to the same rights and freedoms that you have. Russia doesn’t 

exist in a vacuum. Russia is a member of the Council of Europe. 

Russia is a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. We have clear international commitments with regard to such areas as free elections, freedom of assembly, freedom 

of the press, the rule of law and due process. The Putin regime has 

been violating these commitments and these principles for years, 

and it is not okay, if I could say this, for Western politicians, for 

Western political leaders to say, ah, forget it. You know, let them 

do whatever they want to do inside their country. Let’s do realpolitik. Let’s do business as usual with Mr. Putin. Let’s deal with 

him as if he is, you know, a normal democratic-elected leader. That 

is not right. That is insulting. Because, you know, we have political 

prisoners in our country who are sitting in jails for their political 

beliefs. 

Three days ago, we had peaceful opposition rallies on the streets 

of Russia, and more than 1,500 people were arrested and put to 

37

jail, including women, including teenagers. This is not okay. We 

have no freedom of the press in our country on a large scale. All 

the major media, all the major television networks are controlled 

by the government. And as I already mentioned, we have no free 

elections and have not had free elections for many years. 

So I think it is very important to remember the values. You mentioned President Reagan several times today. And what President 

Reagan is remembered for in our part of the world is that he always attached great importance to values. And, yes, he engaged 

with the Soviet leadership on several areas, including arms control, 

but he also, every time he had a meeting with Soviet leader, he put 

on a list on a desk, the list of Soviet political prisoners, and he demanded their release. It would be nice to see something similar in 

terms of principles from the current generation of Western leaders. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. This is sort of building off of those 

comments. According to CNN, our President has spoken positively 

of President Putin over 70 times, calling him ‘‘highly respected 

within his own country and beyond’’ and saying he is doing, and 

I quote, ‘‘a great job.’’

I am wondering if you could share what you think the impact of 

that kind of posture by the American President is with respect to 

our allies in the region and with respect to our enemies in the region. What message does that communicate? It is sort of mystifying 

to me, but I am just wondering what are the geopolitical implications. 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you very much. And, well, I think there 

is enough talk in this town about Russians meddling in your domestic policy, so I don’t want to be one more. So I don’t think it 

is my place to comment on, you know, the administration or any 

political dynamic in the U.S. But I would say this: I think, you 

know, if you watch Russian state TV, if you watch Kremlin propaganda outlets, you will hear that we, members of the Russian opposition, go to the West and we ask for money, we ask for political 

support, we ask for regime change. Of course, none of that is true. 

All we ask for are two things from Western leaders, including the 

Government of the United States of America, the most important 

democracy in the world. We ask only two things. 

One is honesty, to be open and honest about what is happening 

in Russia. Don’t pretend that something is happening that is not 

happening. Don’t call things for what they are not. Just call things 

for what they are. Just be honest and open about the situation. 

That is the first thing. 

And the second thing we ask for of Western leaders, including 

the United States, is please be true and be faithful to your own 

principles. Don’t enable the export of corruption and abuse from 

the Putin regime to the West. Don’t enable this behavior by providing havens, as so many Western countries have for so long, to 

those human rights abusers and those crooks and those corrupt officials from the Putin regime who steal in Russia but prefer to 

spend in the West and who keep their money in Western banks, 

who send their kids to study in Western schools, who buy real estate and properties and mansions and yachts in Western countries. 

38

And the Magnitsky Act, which was passed by this Congress almost 5 years ago, which introduced this very concept of those people who engage in human rights abuse and corruption should not 

be allowed to enter the U.S. or use the U.S. financial system. Boris 

Nemtsov, who was already mentioned in these hearings, he and I 

were sitting in the House Visitor Gallery on the day the Magnitsky 

law was being passed. And I think every one of you present here 

voted for this law. And he called it, Boris Nemtsov called it the 

most pro-Russian law ever passed in a foreign Parliament, because 

it targets those people who abuse the rights of Russian citizens and 

who steal the money of Russian taxpayers. And that is commitment 

to principle. So this is all we would ask for of the U.S. Government 

or any other government in the Western world. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I have two other questions, and I am 

going to just pose them and you will have as much time as you 

need to answer them, I hope, Madame Chairman. 

The first is how is Russia managing to pay for all of its costly 

interventions around the world, particularly in Syria, and to really 

begin to become even more engaged in the areas around the Middle 

East? Are they perceiving that they are getting a good return on 

their investment? And have the Russian people made the connection between a decline in their quality of life and Russian efforts 

in the Middle East? And does that either encourage the Russians 

to more deeply engage or what is the kind of long-term implications 

of that? Because my sense is they don’t have the resources to do 

this without misleading the Russian people about the benefits of 

that. 

And then the second thing is, we now know that Russian propaganda RT, a very powerful outlet for Russian propaganda, has an 

Arabic channel. And I would like to know a little bit about what 

Russia is investing in this propaganda in the Arab world and is it 

having an impact and what should we be doing and thinking about 

in terms of responding to the powerful spread of propaganda by the 

Russians through RT in the Arab world? So those are the two. 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. I want to respond to Congressman Rohrabacher. I agree with everything Vladimir said. I also just want to 

add very briefly in terms of President Reagan, you mentioned him 

a lot. President Reagan didn’t only talk to the Soviet Union, he defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan. For example, he understood that 

military strength was also important. You know, and I as a child 

growing up in the Soviet Union, I——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know that I fought in Afghanistan 

against Soviet troops. You know that, okay? 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. Sure, but I just wanted to make that 

point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I was a special assistant to President 

Reagan. 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. Sure. No, I just want to highlight that 

point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. And in terms of your earlier questions 

about engagement in the Middle East, the military and so forth, so 

first, one thing we can do is we can increase cooperation with our 

regional allies. And this doesn’t require a lot of spending. We need 

39

to increase, for example, and I mentioned this in my testimony, increase port visits to the Eastern Mediterranean to enforce the notion with our regions that America supports our allies but it is not 

retreating. 

The military could augment exercises beyond those that we already conduct with Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan and so forth. This 

is a small but very important, effective measure that we can take. 

More broadly, in terms of strategic thinking in the region, what the 

air strikes of April 7 have shown to Putin for the first time is that 

the United States will stand by certain red lines, that it is not just 

talk. 

Unfortunately, it seemed that it was just a one-off, and as Brian 

had mentioned, we don’t really seem to have a clear strategy. But 

if Putin understands that there is a clear strategy and that we will 

back up our talk with actions, that it is not just talk, that is incredibly important to curbing his influence in the region. 

In terms of spending, in terms of how is Russia managing to do 

this, I don’t have reliable numbers. I am not sure if anybody really 

does, because this is a very opaque system. Officially, what Putin 

had said is that Russia spent something around $400 million in 

March 2016. I suspect the real numbers are probably higher. That 

said, it is still not a lot, if you compare it to the Russian military 

budget. What he has been trying to do is do this on the cheap. 

In Syria, for example, he let Iran do most of the heavy lifting, 

and this is why his interventions have worked so far for him. How 

long this is—whether or not it is sustainable, that is a different 

question. 

And lastly, in terms of your question about RT Arabic, yes, RT 

Arabic is active in the region. It fuels conspiracy theories, frankly, 

just as it does in other languages. What we should do is not be on 

the defensive. We are always on the defensive. We are always trying to refute stories that RT puts out, and one reason for that, and 

I cited a report in my testimony, first impressions tend to be very 

resilient. And because Russian propaganda, Kremlin propaganda is 

not concerned with the truth, they often have a monopoly on first 

impression because they don’t need to think about—investigate 

what really happened. 

We need to work with our regional partners, perhaps establish 

outlets so that we cannot just be on the defensive but actually be 

on the offensive on this issue. Thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

Mr. KATULIS. If I could add, your first question about the cuts 

and the proposed cuts on the State Department, in my opening 

statement, I characterized it as unilateral disarmament. And in the 

type of strategy that Russia has for engaging in the region it truly 

is unilateral disarmament. Just the assistance component of it. 

And, Congressman, you mentioned Christians in the Middle East, 

and it is something that touches my heart and we have done a lot 

of work on at the Center for American Progress. 

Today, the fight in Mosul and Iraq, there is a postconflict stabilization effort where we are not even in the ball game that affects 

those communities. Some of the oldest Christian communities in 

the world over the last decade and a half have been run out of the 

region. And we know what it is like in human history to see when 

40

people are killed and murdered simply for what they believe in. 

And by unilaterally disarming, we are actually leaving those most 

persecuted and vulnerable populations, even more vulnerable, because others will fill the gap. In Iraq, it seems that Iran is coming 

in and trying to buy up property and things like this. And I think 

it is important for us to talk more about it. 

Secondly, on the question of RT, I mean, it is of my view, and 

I mentioned for the last decade and a half, I don’t think we have 

had a coherent strategy across the region, and that is especially the 

case in the battle of ideas, that after the 9/11 attack in our country 

here we had a lot of talk about how do you win that battle of ideas. 

And the latest episode we see I think coming from the Trump administration is his visit to Saudi Arabia and this new countering 

violent extremism center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the image of the 

glowing orb, if you remember this. 

This is a place where the United States and Congress needs to 

ask, what is going on there? What is our involvement? Where is the 

imprint of our values to talk about values? Where is the imprint 

of respect for religious minorities like Christians? Is that part of 

your conception of countering violent extremism in building this 

partnership with these countries? And I am all for building partnerships, I have written about it, with countries like this, but on 

our terms, not their terms. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And I thank the chair, and I yield. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. Donovan is recognized. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Madame Chair. And I am so proud of 

the leader of our committee, our chairwoman, for being able to pronounce your names. It has taken me 2 years to say Ros-Lehtinen, 

and then she announced she is retiring after I got it down. 

So I would just ask all of our panelists the same question. A lot 

of the conversation today has been about the administration’s policies toward the Middle East, toward Russia. Besides restoring the 

proposed cuts in the budget, what do each of you think Congress 

alone could do to have an impact on many of the issues that each 

of you have brought to our attention today? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you. Congressman, thank you for the 

question. I think my answer would be to stay true to their values 

and just to remember the importance of the values, because actually a lot of—we haven’t really touched on this today, but a lot of 

the actions that Vladimir Putin takes on the international arena 

and foreign policy is a direct continuation of what he does domestically in our own country. 

I mean, if you look at modern Russian history, it has certainly 

been a pattern, a longstanding pattern that domestic repression 

eventually will translate into external aggression. Because after 

all, why should you expect a regime that violates the rights of its 

own people and that disregards its own laws to then respect other 

country’s interests or international law? There is no reason. And, 

you know, those people in the leaderships of Western democracies 

for so many years, I must say, turned a blind eye to the abuses of 

democracy, human rights, and rule of law by Putin domestically. 

You know, the violations of freedom of the press, political prisoners, the rigging of elections and so on and so forth one day woke 

41

up to the external aggression of his regime in Georgia and the 

Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and now what he has been 

doing in the Middle East. These things are connected. 

So I think it is very important to remember the importance of 

the principles and the values and issues such as rule of law, 

human rights, and democracy, both in your approach to U.S.-Russian relations and also to wider approach to foreign policy. And 

that is what I would say. Thank you very much for the question. 

Mr. KATULIS. I have two very specific ideas. One, I think it is 

very important for Congress to consider a new authorization of the 

use of military force because of this creeping military escalation, 

that the U.S. actually has more forces nearer to the front lines of 

very complicated battles, and the legal frameworks that we are operating underneath are about a decade and a half old. And it is not 

just a legal issue; it is what is our responsibility as a nation to, 

when we are sending people into harm’s way, to actually have a coherent understanding of the strategy from the administration. And 

I think having that debate over a new authorization can press this 

administration to clarify what it is doing. 

Secondly, there are a number of arms sales that are proposed 

with partners in the region, and I have written before in reports 

like this that we need to use sort of these tools as leverage. We 

have an enormous amount of leverage. And in this year alone, I 

have been to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, a 

number of countries for my studies, and I have talked to most of 

the top leaders. And we are the strategic partner of choice, no matter what Russia has done in the last couple of years. We don’t use 

those tools, including arms sales and military cooperation, to benefit stability. 

So it is those two things. How do we use the tools in addition 

to the toolkit on the diplomacy and development? How do we use 

sort of the authorization for the use of force to press the Trump administration on what its Middle East strategy is? Because we could 

find ourselves in a shooting war with Iran directly at a moment’s 

notice this summer or our troops at the receiving end of a chemical 

attack from ISIS. It is not inconceivable, but we aren’t having that 

debate. 

And then secondly, the levels of weapons sales that have been 

proposed, how does this fit within a strategic concept that brings 

stability to the region? 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. Yes. So I would just add so I think first 

authorization of use of force is very important. You know, one of 

the things that I highlighted in my testimony, and I just want to 

come back to that issue, Putin is trying—he is trying to limit our 

ability to maneuver physically, militarily in the region in the Middle East. He hasn’t quite created full A2/AD bubbles. We can still 

operate, but now we have to think twice. He wants us to think 

twice. He doesn’t want us to just—before, we were able to just go 

in and now we can’t do that anymore. We have to think how is 

Putin going to react. For example, we use cruise air strikes. The 

reason why we are using them is because, again, we are afraid for 

our pilots. 

So authorization of military use of force. And, you know, I agree 

with everything that Brian said. And I certainly agree very much 

42

with the issue of emphasis on values. Holding hearings like this, 

frankly, I think the hearing on Russia and the Middle East like 

this is way overdue. Putin has been involved in this region for a 

long, long time. 

Lastly, I think sanctions, and we have seen this happen just this 

week. Congress is passing sanctions on Iran and Russia. So more 

conversations along those lines are very important. This is very 

concretely what Congress can do. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you to all of you. 

Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Donovan. 

And I will ask questions if that is okay, Mr. Cicilline? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Of course. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I have been in and out. I am 

sorry. Mr. Donovan did a very good job of holding down the fort. 

Vladimir, you know the Putin regime and you have been a target 

of his repression. You understand the motivating factors for his actions. Can you tell us a little bit more about how Putin’s domestic 

issues impact his foreign policy agenda? How important is it for 

him to be able to say that he beat the United States in Syria, for 

example? And what is his mindset when it comes to deciding when 

and how to intervene in many matters in the Middle East? 

Mr. KARA-MURZA. Thank you, Madame Chairman, for this question. And as you know, the Putin regime has been described on 

many occasions as a virtual reality regime because it is so dependent on the propaganda image, on the television that—you know, 

the image that it creates itself. As you recall, one of the first actions of Mr. Putin in office was to shut down or take over all independent national television networks so that he would control the 

entire information picture, almost all of it. 

And so I think it is sometimes underestimated in Western countries how much of what Putin is doing is actually geared for that 

domestic propaganda image. We already discussed this hearing, the 

relationship between his aggression against Ukraine and the domestic needs. He was very unhappy about this precedent of mass 

protests toppling a corrupt authoritarian government. And he was 

certainly not very happy or not at all happy about the prospect of 

something like this happening in Russia. And, again, he has been 

open about it. As we mentioned earlier during the hearing, he has 

himself compared the mass protests against his own rule in Russia 

to the one down in Ukraine to those color revolutions in post-Soviet 

countries, to the Arab Spring, and so on. So a lot of the aggression 

against Ukraine that he has been engaged in was motivated by domestic considerations to prevent the success of the democratic European experiment in Ukraine before it would become a model and 

inspiration for the same thing in Russia. 

And as regards to Middle East and his involvement in Syria, if 

you watch Russian state television, which I would advise you not 

to do if you value your nervous system, but we have to, unfortunately, and if you watch it, you will see that most of it, most of 

the political talk shows, most of the news programs are dominated 

by the foreign policy agenda, by Putin’s foreign policy adventurism. 

Before it was Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine and now in the last couple years it is all mostly Syria, Syria, Syria. 

43

You are not going hear about economic problems in Russia. You 

are not going to hear about the sanctions that Putin himself introduced on the Russian people when he banned imports, for example, 

or food products from the U.S. and European Union 3 years ago. 

You are not going to hear about the problems with healthcare or 

education or the many social political and economic problems we 

have at home. All you are going to hear about, you know, are these 

reports of new military strikes, new bases, or new deals to make, 

you know, to extend the lease of Tartus and Khmeimim. You are 

going to hear about—you are going to see those images of Russian 

troops, Russian air space forces halfway around the world, you 

know, carrying out the valiant mission that President Putin has ordered them to. 

You see this used for propaganda purposes 100 percent, and it 

is a very important reason in many ways for what Putin is doing 

to divert attention of the Russian public from the many problems 

at home and to back up the fraudulent, in my view, image that he 

has created of, you know, a Russia rising from its knees and being 

a great power again. 

All I say to this is, you know, in the 1990s, which according to 

Putin were a time of humiliation for Russia when we had a democratic system of government under President Yeltsin, Russia was 

invited to join the G8, the most prestigious world club, the group 

of leading world powers. Under Vladimir Putin we were expelled 

from the G8, so where is humiliation in there? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. Borshchevskaya, in case you want to chime in on that. 

Borshchevskaya. There we go. 

Ms. BORSHCHEVSKAYA. No. I just want to echo what Vladimir 

said, and I always make the point, and this is why I said earlier 

in my remarks the blurred line between domestic and foreign policy 

in Russia. These are distractions and, you know, it is unclear how 

long Putin is going to be able to sustain this, but the fact of the 

matter is, up to date, he has been able to do that. And I think we 

need to recognize that, you know, we are in this for the long haul, 

that this isn’t just going to disappear in a year or 2, that Putin is 

here to stay, at least in the near future, and we need to have a 

strategic, coherent response. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And finally, Mr. Katulis, you state that the leading powers in the 

region are engaged in a complicated struggle for influence, for 

power, and the key actors use a wide range of tools to assert their 

interests. Obviously, this is playing out between Saudi Arabia, 

UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain against Qatar, and there are concerns 

that this will align Qatar more closely with Iran. Russia and Iran 

obviously have a close relationship. 

So do you think that there is a space that Russia will move in 

to take advantage of, and if, so how? How will it align itself with 

this power struggle? How should the U.S. move to prevent a potential Iran-Qatar-Russia nexus? 

Mr. KATULIS. I think the first thing the United States should do 

is speak with a much clearer and coherent voice than it has. And 

I have met with officials from the Gulf in the past week from a 

number of these countries, and I think it is hard for most AmeriVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:36 Jul 26, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_MENA\061517\25844 SHIRL
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cans to understand the complexities of the tensions there. It kind 

of feels like the Hatfields and the McCoys in Arabia because there 

is a history there and it goes back, and it is a little tribal. Yes, it 

touches upon perceptions of security threats and terrorism and 

things like this. 

But bottom line, the number one thing I think the United States 

should do is have the senior figures in its administration, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and especially the President of the United States, speak with a much more unified voice 

about this, and I think it is in their own self-interest. We have an 

administration which, again, I try to be clinical in my analysis and 

assessments, and I think it is still largely too early to tell what the 

complexion of the Trump administration’s posture in the region will 

be. I think they have not sorted out a lot of their own internal sort 

of debates. Unfortunately, we have seen some of these internal debates sort of fully exposed on Twitter or in different statements or 

in different gestures. 

So the most important thing to prevent a cohesive alignment 

there—and I don’t think it is inevitable in any means, especially 

going back to a point I was making about weapon sales. The 

United States is about to sell billions more to Qatar, which is 

where we have a major air base. This is a point of leverage with 

all of these partners. We are better when our partners are unified, 

and a lot of the messaging and the gestures coming from the 

Trump administration just in the last few weeks cuts against the 

grain of what I think they were trying to do in talking about an 

Arab NATO and other things. 

So a steadier approach, one where we are working together and 

trying to tease out all of these complexities, rather than create this 

unity or present this unity I think would be the most important 

thing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you so much. 

Thank you to all three of you. What excellent testimony, and we 

appreciate it. We hope to have a follow-up hearing on this. And 

thank you to the audience as well and the members of the press 

for being here. 

And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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