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Filed 8/25/14 Daimler AG v. Superior Court CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

DAIMLER AG,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY,

Respondent;

DAVID PIERSON et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

C073449

(Super. Ct. No. 

34-2009-00041066-CU-PL-GDS)

This opinion will be an exercise in brevity. That is because, while the present writ 

proceedings have been pending before us, no less an authority than the United States 

Supreme Court has decided the dispositive jurisdictional issue posed here. In Daimler 

AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. ___ [187 L.Ed.2d 624] (Bauman), the high court 

concluded that Daimler AG’s (Daimler) affiliations with California are insufficient to 
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subject it to general (all-purpose) personal jurisdiction in California. (Id. at p. ___

[187 L.Ed.2d at pp. 637-639].) Consequently, we shall issue a peremptory writ of 

mandate directing the trial court, which did not have the benefit of Bauman, to vacate its 

denial order and to enter an order granting Daimler’s motion to quash service of 

summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.1

This matter involves a product liability claim concerning a 2000 Jeep Cherokee 

designed, manufactured, and distributed by Chrysler Corporation, a corporation Daimler 

owned for a time.2 The Cherokee was sold in California to a California plaintiff, who 

was fatally injured in the vehicle in a California accident.3 According to plaintiff, 

Daimler concedes that personal jurisdiction over Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA) is 

proper; plaintiff describes MBUSA as Daimler’s subsidiary, national distributor in the 

United States, and sales arm in California. 

The issue in this writ proceeding is whether California state courts have general 

personal jurisdiction over Daimler. Plaintiff agrees that California does not have specific 

personal jurisdiction over Daimler on the facts here. 

The due process based personal jurisdiction requirement, for out-of-state 

defendants, of “minimum contacts” with the state (so as not to offend “ ‘fair play and 

substantial justice’ ”), set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S.

 

1 We initially denied Daimler’s petition for writ of mandate, relying on conflicting 

authority before Bauman was decided. The California Supreme Court granted review of 

our mandate denial and, after Bauman was decided, transferred this matter to us with 

directions to vacate our denial and to issue an order to show cause why the relief sought 

in Daimler’s writ petition should not be granted in light of Bauman. After we issued the 

order to show cause, the parties filed, respectively, an amended return and a reply to that 

return.

2 Daimler sold Chrysler in 2007. 

3 In this writ proceeding, plaintiffs are actually the real parties in interest; for simplicity, 

we refer to the real parties as plaintiff. 
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310, 316 [90 L.Ed. 95, 102], foreshadowed the development of two categories of personal 

jurisdiction: (1) specific (or conduct linked) jurisdiction, which has become the 

centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory; and (2) the less well-known general (or 

all-purpose) jurisdiction. (Bauman, supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___ [187 L.Ed.2d at pp. 633-

634, 630].) 

A state court may assert general (all-purpose) jurisdiction over a foreign 

corporation “ ‘to hear any and all claims against [the corporation]’ only when the 

corporation’s affiliations with the State . . . are so constant and pervasive [(e.g., place of 

incorporation or principal place of business)] ‘as to render [the corporation] essentially at 

home in the forum State.’ ” (Bauman, supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___ [187 L.Ed.2d at p. 630], 

quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S.___, ___

[180 L.Ed.2d 796, 803], italics added; see also Bauman, at p. ___ [187 L.Ed.2d at 

pp. 639-640].) 

Plaintiff concedes that California is neither Daimler’s place of incorporation nor 

principal place of business, but argues that Daimler has significant California contacts 

through its exclusive distributor MBUSA—specifically, MBUSA’s sales, marketing, and 

servicing activities are essential to Daimler’s sale of cars in California, and plaintiff’s 

claim involves the sale and servicing of the car at issue. 

However, as Bauman concluded, “Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at 

home in California, and further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler, 

there would still be no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for 

Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.” (Bauman, supra,

571 U.S. at p. ___ [187 L.Ed.2d at p. 639].) 

Admittedly, Bauman’s facts are markedly different from the facts here (in 

Bauman, foreign plaintiffs sued Daimler in federal district court in California for human 

rights violations by Mercedes-Benz Argentina, a Daimler subsidiary; those alleged 
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violations occurred entirely outside the United States, and jurisdiction was predicated on 

MBUSA’s California contacts). (Bauman, supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___ [187 L.Ed.2d at 

pp. 629-630].) But the concept of general (all-purpose) personal jurisdiction transcends 

these facts because it confers a jurisdictional status upon a qualifying out-of-state 

defendant—such a defendant may be sued in that jurisdiction on any and all claims 

against it, wherever in the world those claims may arise. (See Bauman, supra, 571 U.S.

at p. ___ [187 L.Ed.2d at p. 630].) Bauman has determined that Daimler is not subject to 

general personal jurisdiction in California even if it is assumed that MBUSA is at home 

in California and that MBUSA’s California contacts are imputable to Daimler.

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to 

vacate its denial order and to enter a new and different order granting Daimler’s motion 

to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. Daimler is awarded its 

costs in this proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).) 

 BUTZ , J.

We concur:

 HULL , Acting P.J.

 MURRAY , J.