### THE HONORABLE E. RICHARD WEBBER, United S tates District Judge 1 

### for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by designation. ___________ No. 96-2614

___________ Debbie A. Johnson, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * of the Social Security * Administration, * * Appellee. *

__________ Submitted: December 13, 1996 Filed: March 6, 1997

__________ Before McM ILLIAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges, and WEBBER, District Judge. 1

___________ MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Deb bie Johnson appeals the denial of Social Security Disabilit y Insurance and Supplem ental Security Income benefits. The Social Security Commissioner (Commissioner) denied Johnson benefits after determining that , althoughJohnson could not return to her former work, she could perfor m jobs t hat existed in significant numbers in the national economy

. Johnson's sole claim on appeal is that the vocational expert's testimony is insufficient to meet the Commissioner's burden of proof. We disagree and affirm.

### The Honorab le Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge 2 

### for the Southern District of Iowa.
-2- I.

Johnson c laims to be disabled because of a back injury she suffered in a car accident in January 1992. She applied for disability benefits on July26, 1993. The Commissioner denied her initial request for benefits and again denied her request for benefits on reconsideration. Johnso n appealed the denial to an administrative law judge (ALJ). After holding
a hear ing, the ALJ denied Johnson's request for disability benefits

. Johnson appealed the ALJ's decision to an administrative appeals council, which also denied Johnson's request for disabili ty benefits. Johnson then sought judicial review of the council's denial of benefits in distric t court. The district court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner t o

2 deny benefits. Johnson now appeals the district court's decision.
Johnson is thirty-six years old and has had severe back problem s ever sinc e she was involved in a car accident in January 1992. She has tw o herniated disks, and alleges obesity, headaches, and dizziness as further
causes of severe impairment. She has been examined by a variety o f physicians who have come to a variety of different conclusions about her medical condition. None of the physicians, however, has advised her t o stop working. At least one physician has concluded that Johnson should no t lift anything above t hirty pounds. Johnson's own remarks to her treating phy sicians about her headaches and dizziness are inconsistent. She ha s stat ed that her headaches and dizziness are severe enough to requir e missing work two days a week, but she has also d enied having headaches and dizziness. The ALJ f ound that Johnson held a job as a telemarketer after her alleged onset of disability date, but that s he quit the job because of a pay cut.

### -3- Johnson is a single parent who lives with her eleven-year-ol d daughter in a two-story duplex. She has stated that, although her daughte r normallywashes the dishes, she does light housekeeping and the cooking. In addition, Johnson drives her daughter to and from school and drives to and from work and church. This amounts to about thirty miles of driving each week.
According to the ALJ, Johnson's impairments or combination o f impairments do not me et or equal the criteria of any impairment listed in the Social Security Regulation's Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R

. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Johnson takes no medication for her lower back pain, alth ough she describes the pain as persistent. Johnson has no t sought medical treatment since October 1993. She has never been treated for her alleged headaches and dizziness.
Although the ALJ determined that Johnson could not return to he r past relevant work, the ALJ also found that Johnson is capable of performin g jobs that "exist[] insignificant numbers in the national economy . . . . Examples of such jobs are: addresser, document preparer, and telemarketer. " ALJ Op. at 13, Findin g No. 11. In support of this finding, the ALJ noted that t he vocational expert said that Johnson could perform sedentary , unskilled labor like that of an addresser or a d ocument preparer, of which "there are 200 positions in Iowa and 10,000 positions nationwide." ALJ Op

. at 10. The ALJ specifically noted that the vocational expert had stated that these figures were "just a representative s ampling of a larger number of jobs the claimant was capable of doing," incl uding telemarketing, a job in which th e claimant was employed at the time of the hearing. Id

. (emphasis added).
Based on the ALJ's findings that Johnson is able to perform job s that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, the Commissione r denied Johnson's request for disability benefits. On appeal, Johnso n maintains that there do not exist in "significant

### -4-

num bers" jobs that she is capable of performing and, as a result, th e Commissioner did not meet her burden of proof to show that Johnson is not disabled under the Social Security Act.

II.

When reviewing the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits to a claimant, this Court must determine "whether the re is substantial evidence based on t he entire record to support the ALJ's factual findings, an d whether his decision was based on legal error." Clark v. Chater , 75 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (1994). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion." Clark , 75 F.3d at 416 (quotations and citation omitted). T his Court must consider "both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary's decision, but we may not
rever se merely because substantial evidence exists for the opposit e decision." Johnson v. Chater , 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1996). The AL J may dis count subjective complaints that are inconsistent with medica l reports, daily activi ties, and other evidence. See Haynes v. Shalala , 26 F.3d 812, 814-15 (8th Cir. 1994).

The AL J found that Johnson could not return to her past relevan t work. As a result, the burden shifted to the Commissioner to prove that Johnson is not disabled under the Social Security Act. See Pickner v

. Sullivan , 985 F.2d 401, 403 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Only after the claiman t establishes that a di sability precludes performance of past relevant work wil l the burden shift to the Secretary to prove that the claimant ca n perform work."); Evan s v. Shalala , 21 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1994). The burden was on the Commissioner to demonstrate that there are other job s available in the national economy that Johnson c an perform. See Evans , 21 F. 3d at 835; see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1994); 20 C.F.R

. § 404.1560, § 404.1561 (1996).

### -5- One w ay in which the Commissioner can meet the burden of proo f necessaryto show that a claimant who suffers from nonexertional pain is not disabled under the Social Security Act is through the testimony of a vocational expert. Evans , 21 F.3d at 835. Hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert "need only include thos e impairments that the ALJ accepts as true." Haynes , 26 F.3d at 815; see also House v. Shalala , 34 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1994).

To decide whether work exists in significant numbers, this Circui t has ado pted the standards set forth in Hall v. Bowen , 837 F.2d 272, 27 5 (6th Cir. 1988). See Jenkins v. Bowen , 861 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 1988 ) (adopti ng Hall ). After discussing certain factors that a judge migh t conside r in making this determination, such as the reliability of th e claima nt's and the vocational expert's testimony, the Hall court state d that "[t]he decision should ultimately be left t o the trial judge's common
sense in weighing the statutory language as applied to a particula r claimant's factual situation." Jenkins , 861 F.2d at 1087 (quoting Hall , 837 F.2d at 275).
Here, the Commissioner met her burde n of showing that Johnson is not disabled because the vocational expert's testimony was sufficient to show that there exist a si gnificant number of jobs in the economy that Johnson
can perform. The vocational expert testified that a person like Johnson could perform sedentary, unskilled labor. The vocational expert noted tha t the addresser and document preparer jobs were sedentary, unskilled labor that Johnson could perform, and that there existed 200 jobs of addresser
or document preparer in Iowa and 10,000 in the national economy. Th e vocational expert further testified that these figures were merel y rep resentative of a larger category of jobs that Johnson could perform , inc luding telemarketing. The vocational expert did not give figures t o describe t he total number of unskilled, sedentary jobs in Iowa or th e national economy. However, at the

### Johnson rel ies on several district court cases to attempt to 3 

### bolster her contention that 200 jobs in Iowa is not a significant number of jobs and that the Commissioner consequently failed t o show that Johnson is not disab led. See, e.g. , Jimenez v. Shalala , 879 F. Supp. 1069, 1076 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding that "200-2 50 jobs spread across Colorado is not significant"); Waters v. Secretary , 827 F. Supp. 446, 449 (W.D. Mi ch. 1992) (holding that 1000 jobs in Michigan, all of which would require at least 180 miles of travel to get to them, is not a significant number). These cases ar e unpersuasive, however, particu larly in light of the overall record before this Court. The cases Johnson cites are all fact-int ensive, and none stand for the proposition that 200 jobs in Iowa is not a significant number. -6- time of t he hearing before the ALJ, Johnson was engaged in one of th e seden taryjobs that the vocational expert said she was capable o f performing, telemarketing. 3
Finally, the Commissioner's decision to deny Johnson disabilit y benefi ts is bolstered by the fact that Johnson received unemploymen t compensation during the time she claims to have been disabled. This Court has noted that "[a] c laimant may admit an ability to work by applying for
unem ployment compensation benefits because such an applicant must hol d himself out as available, willing and able to work." Jernigan v. Sullivan , 948 F.2d 1070, 1074 ( 8th Cir. 1991); see also Barrett v. Shalala , 38 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 1994). Applying for unemployment benefits "may b e
som e evidence, though not conclusive, to negate" a claim of disability

. Jernigan , 948 F.2d at 1074.

III.

Be cause the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits was supporte d by substantial evidence, we affirm.

### -7- A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.