Filed 5/19/16 P. v. Hargrove CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SHYLA HA RGROVE,

Defendant and Appellant. 2d Crim. No. B267707 (Super. Ct. No. 2010012698) (Ventura County)

Shyla Hargrove appeals from judgment after an order revoking her

postrelease community supervision (PRCS) following her admission that she violated the

conditions of h er release. (Pen. Code, § 3450 et seq.) 1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2013, Hargrove was convicted after plea of guilty to corporal injury to a

spouse or cohabitant. (§ 273. 5 .) The trial court sentenced her to two years in prison.

H argrove was released under PRCS in November 2013. The Ventura

County Probation Age ncy is her supervising agency. As a condition of release, she

agreed to report to her probation officer as ordered, report any change of address to her

probation officer, u se no narcotics or dangerous drugs, submit to drug testing, and

actively participate in substance abuse treatment. She also agreed the probation agency

1 All statutory refer ences are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.2

could, without a court hearing, order “flash incarceration” in a county jail for up to 10

days if she v iolated a condition of her release. (§ 3453, subd. (q).)

In July 2015, Hargrove relocated and did not report her new address, did

not participate in substance abuse treatment, and did not report to her probation officer or

submit to drug testing. On August 4, 201 5, she was arrested. She said she used

methamphetamine four days earlier.

One day after her arrest, Senior Deputy Probation Officer Michelle Larson

met with Hargrove. Larson advised Hargrove in writing that she had the right to written

notice of the alleged violations, the right to an administrative hearing within two days,

and the right at that hearing to speak on her own behalf and present letters and

documents. Larson gave Hargrove a “PROS Hold” form that identified t he alleged

viola tions. Larson advised Hargrove in writing of her right to a formal revocation

hearing at which she would have the right to be represented by an attorney, the right to

call and confront witnesses, and the right to testify or remain silent. Hargrove

acknow ledged and waived all of these rights on a “Postrelease Community Supervision

Waivers of Rights and Admission Form.”

Based on Hargrove’s admission, the probation agency filed a revocation

petition. Hargrove did not move to dismiss it. She appeared in court with counsel 16

days after arrest. The trial court found that her admission and waiver were valid. It

granted the petition.

DISCUSSION

Hargrove contends she was entitled to an arraignment within 10 days and a
judicial determinat ion of probable cause within 1 5 days of her arrest, citing Morrissey v.

Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 4 71 ( Morrissey ) (minimum due process safeguards for parole

revocation); People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 ( Vickers ) (minimum due process

safeguards for probation revocation) ; and Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230

Cal.App.4th 636 (minimum due process safeguards for parole revocation after

realignment). Hargrove forfeited this claim because she did not raise it in the trial court.

( People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 411 [constitutional claim forfeited by failure to3

raise it in the trial court].) She did not cite these authorities in the trial court or argue at

the revocation hearing that she was denied due process. She is not permitted to change

her trial court theo ry on appeal. ( People v. Borland (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 124, 129.)

At the revocation hearing, Hargrove’s attorney did argue that her waiver

was premature and she did not have t he benefit of counsel: “She unfortunately signed a

waiver, it seems, on Aug ust 4th, even though the petition was not filed until August 10th.

She didn’t have the benefit of counsel.”

The record supports the trial court’s determination that the wa i ver was

valid. The PROS H old form gave Hargrove notice of the alleged violation s before she

waived her right to a revocation hearing and admitted the violations. ( Morrissey

, supra ,
408 U.S. at pp. 48 6

- 487 ; Vickers

, supra , 8 Cal.3d at p. 456 .) And Hargrove

acknowledged in writing that she understood she had a right to counsel and th at she

waived it “freely, voluntarily, and without any coercion or promise of immunity.” The

trial court was entitled to rely on her waiver.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN , J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P

. J.

PERREN, J.Donald D. Coleman, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engl er , Chief Assistant

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M.

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.