North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

CONTESTED

TERRAIN:

North Cascades National Park

Service Complex, Washington

An Administrative History

By

David Louter

1998

National Park Service

Seattle, Washington

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cover

Cover: The Southern Pickett Range, 1963. (Courtesy of North Cascades National Park)

Introduction

Part I

A Wilderness Park (1890s to 1968)

Chapter 1

Contested Terrain: The Establishment of North Cascades National Park

Part II

The Making of a New Park (1968 to 1978)

Chapter 2

Administration

Chapter 3

Visitor Use and Development

Chapter 4

Concessions

Chapter 5

Wilderness Proposals and Backcountry Management

Chapter 6

Research and Resource Management

Chapter 7

Dam Dilemma: North Cascades National Park and the High Ross Dam Controversy

Chapter 8

Stehekin: Land of Freedom and Want

Part III

The Wilderness Park Ideal and the Challenge of Traditional Park Management (1978 to

1998)

Chapter 9

Administration

Chapter 10
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Land Use and Protection

Chapter 11

Hydropower and Preservation

Chapter 12

Research and Resource Management

Chapter 13

Visitor Use, Concessions, and Development

Chapter 14

Wilderness Designation and Management

Chapter 15

The Park and the Borderland

Conclusion

Notes

Illustrations

Appendix A : Superintendents

Appendix B : Legislation and Treaty Documents

Select Bibliography

Index (omitted from online edition)

for Stephanie and Gretchen

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

CONTESTED

TERRAIN:

North Cascades National Park

Service Complex, Washington

An Administrative History

By

David Louter

1998

National Park Service

Seattle, Washington

TABLE OF CONTENTS

adhi/index.htm

Last Updated: 14-Apr-1999
North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History (Introduction)

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

INTRODUCTION

Washington's North Cascades rank as some of the country's wildest, most rugged, and

beautiful mountains outside of Alaska. Their breathtaking scenery inspired the name the

"American Alps," a description often used for other ranges in the United States, but one, their

admirers stressed, the northern Cascades deserved without question. More importantly,

perhaps, the North Cascades were considered "true wilderness." In the middle of the

twentieth century, they were known mostly to mountaineers, and before that by a relative

handful of explorers, miners, loggers, settlers, dam builders, and, of course, the Skagit

peoples. The range's deep, glaciated valleys and jumble of precipitous, glacier-clad peaks

formed a nearly impenetrable barrier to human progress. When it was officially opened in

1972, State Highway 20 was the first and only east-west road to cross the formidable country

north of Stevens Pass. To this day, the isolated community of Stehekin, at the head of the

fjord-like Lake Chelan, cannot be reached by road. By accident of geography, wilderness

enthusiasts claimed, the North Cascades had escaped the forces that had shaped modern

America.

In the aftermath of World War II, however, change did come and threatened to alter forever

this magnificent country with clear cuts, mining operations, and motorized recreation. On

October 2, 1968, after a lengthy and controversial struggle, Congress protected around

700,000 acres of this range, some of the nation's finest alpine wilderness, as North Cascades

National Park. The political forces that led to the creation of the park can be seen in the

park's physical form. It is a "park complex," composed of a national park (505,000 acres)

made up of northern and southern units, and two national recreation areas. Ross Lake

National Recreation Area (117,000 acres) is wedged between the park's northern and

southern units. Lake Chelan National Recreation Area (62,000 acres) abuts the park's

southern boundary. While there are specific differences in how these areas are managed, the

park complex as a whole has the purpose of providing the American public a wealth of

scenic, scientific, historic, and recreational opportunities in a wilderness environment.

The significance of North Cascades relates in large part to its mountainous geography. When

the Cascade Range reaches northern Washington, its stately ridges transform into a

bewildering array of uplifted and folded peaks. The mountain building process here was

extremely complex, forming a series of seemingly unending peaks and troughs of deep,

steep-sided valleys. These deep valleys, many of them carved out by glaciers, give the

surrounding mountains an immensely dramatic relief, making them appear higher than they

really are. Though not many peaks are above 9,000 feet, they rise above valley floors that are

mostly under an elevation of 2,000 feet. The relief is so much greater than the higher peaks of

the Sierra or Rockies, noted mountaineer Hermann Ulrichs, that it gives the North Cascades

"a decidedly grander appearance." [1] The peaks of the Picket Range, with such ominoussounding names as Challenger, Fury, and Terror, attest to this observation. Other striking

topographic features of the northern Cascades are the volcanic cones of Mount Baker and

Glacier Peak, more recent additions to the range, towering above it to the north and south

respectively. Unlike Mount Rainier National Park, then, North Cascades National Park gains
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much of its significance not from a single volcano but rather from a "sea of peaks." It is this

crown of jagged ridges, spires, and pinnacles that epitomizes the wilderness character of

North Cascades.

The park owes its rugged topography and extreme relief to the glaciers and rivers that have

deeply incised and shaped the North Cascades. More than three hundred glaciers, many of

them small, remain active at the heads of valleys and make up the greatest concentration of

glaciers in a national park outside of Alaska. The power of their erosive forces carved out

such broad, U-shaped valleys as those of the Stehekin River and Little and Big Beaver and

Thunder creeks, and created distinctive features such as hanging valleys with their cascading

waterfalls. The park's two major watersheds, the Skagit and Stehekin rivers, are fed by the

meltwater of glaciers and snow, rainfall, and the innumerable streams and creeks draining the

mountains. The Skagit is the largest watershed in Puget Sound. This physical reality

highlights the fact that the North Cascades form a striking boundary between climates; the

west slope receives heavy -- and generally warm -- precipitation from the Pacific (from 84 to

over 100 inches) while the east slope lies in a rain shadow (receiving about 30 inches a year).

Water, in all its various forms, is another of the park's popular and significant resources --

from the rivers and lakes clouded with glacier flour to the clear, alpine lakes and ponds

(more than 200) in the park's high country. Four large bodies of water lie within the park's

boundaries. Gorge, Diablo, and Ross lakes are reservoirs formed by dams on the Skagit

River, and are located in Ross Lake National Recreation Area. Lake Chelan is a natural lake

that extends for fifty-five miles through a narrow, glacier carved valley, rimmed by high

peaks in the north that give way to lower and drier mountains in the south near Chelan. In the

late 1920s, however, a hydroelectric dam at the foot of the lake raised the lake's level by

twenty-one feet.

The wild country of the North Cascades is also biologically diverse. The park's two distinct

climatic zones -- a wet and temperate western slope and a drier and colder eastern slope --

support a variety of flora. On the west side of the range, heavy stands of Douglas fir, western

red cedar, and western hemlock dominate the lowland forest. At higher elevations, pacific

silver fir, mountain hemlock, Alaska yellow cedar, and subalpine fir are the most common

species. On the eastern side of the range, grand fir, Douglas fir, aspen, and ponderosa pine

are the dominant trees in the forests at the lower elevations, while whitebark pine and

subalpine larch are the most common at the higher elevations. On either side of the

mountains, a wide variety of plants and vegetation, from ferns to flowering heather, can be

found. More important, perhaps from a popular perspective, are the subalpine meadows or

"mountain parks" that open up past the tree line. For many visitors, they are the high

country's most characteristic feature.

The park's biological diversity extends to fish and wildlife, too. Native and introduced species

of fish live in the park's lakes and rivers. Among the native fish are bull trout, cutthroat trout,

and burbot; and among the introduced fish are rainbow and brook trout, and kokanee and

Chinook salmon. The park's variety of habitats supports nearly 340 species of wildlife.

Sightings of deer, black bear, mountain goats, and various small mammals and birds are

common, whereas encounters with mountain lions, coyotes, bobcats, grizzly bears, and

wolves tend to be far less common.

Together these features -- mountains, glaciers, rivers, lakes, flora, fish, and fauna -- compose

North Cascades National Park's principal natural resources. They are also the source for the

popular perception of the park's quality as a "true wilderness" in a modern age and within

such close proximity to the Puget Sound's metropolitan corridor. This focus on the park's

wilderness resources has tended to obscure the human story of the range's past. The park's

cultural resources are diverse. The prehistory of the North Cascades, for example, reveals that
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perhaps within the last 5,000 years native people used the resources of the range on a

seasonal and permanent basis. Similarly, studies suggest that the historic tribes of

northwestern Washington, such as the Upper Skagit, Chilliwack, Lower Thompson, and

Chelan, also exploited mountain resources traveling through the range's valleys and passes. In

this respect, the North Cascades were thus not the unknown, impervious mountain range

many whites of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries believed.

Evidence of Anglo American interaction with this rough landscape can be seen in the historic

structures and sites that speak to early exploration, mining, homesteading, tourism, federal

land management, and hydroelectric power development. Most of the activities associated

with these structures were arduous undertakings. The range's extreme topography confined

them to the major river valleys; they were transient in nature, and most left only reminders of

their passing in silent mining operations and aging log cabins. However, some pursuits left a

more permanent mark on the region, such as the Stehekin community at the head of Lake

Chelan and the dams erected by Seattle City Light on the Skagit River. The wilderness of the

North Cascades has not been an island in the stream of history, experiencing the occasional

floods of interest. Here history has been, like the mountains, more a question of scale and

perspective than magnitude.

***

This administrative history has several purposes: to provide a summary of the park's thirty

year development, to present a synthesis of the many issues that have concerned park

managers from 1968 to the present, and to offer an analysis of North Cascades and its place

within the history of the national park system and how the politics of its establishment and its

wilderness mission distinguish it from other national parks. This history is organized both

chronologically and topically. The report is divided into three parts corresponding to three

distinct eras in the park complex's history. In some cases, as with the discussion of the High

Ross Dam controversy, this approach has been modified to provide better coverage of a

topic. Within these sections, chapters address such recurring topics as administration,

development, research and resource management, concessions management, hydropower

issues, wilderness management, and land protection. The first part addresses the

establishment of North Cascades as a national park; the park movement spanned more than

seventy years, and the compromises necessary to preserve North Cascades bear significantly

upon the park's management.

The second and third parts reflect distinct eras of planning, and are divided into the park's

first ten years and next twenty years. These sections essentially provide the context for the

birth and growth of a relatively young national park and provide readers with a thematic

framework with which to think of the park's management history. The park complex's first

decade of administration can be characterized by the Park Service's attempts to carry out the

legislative mandates of the North Cascades Act, develop the new park's management on a

strong foundation of research, advance a strong commitment to wilderness preservation, and

contend with the often contradictory aspects of traditional park management. The last twenty

years of management can be characterized by the Park Service's attempts to come to terms

with the park's past as well as its future. On the one hand, the agency addressed longstanding management problems in its attempts to resolve hydropower issues and disputes

over land acquisition and resource use in Stehekin. And on the other, the agency

demonstrated its desire to place wilderness foremost in present and future management

decisions with the creation of a wilderness district. At the same time, it sought ways to

improve visitor services, for example, with the construction of a visitor center. This situation

revealed one of the central themes of the park's management. Most visitors never strayed far

from their cars, and the agency needed a facility to educate the public about the wilderness

few would see.
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***

An administrative history cannot be written without the support of many people, ranging

from park staff to librarians. I have many people to thank, and at the risk of overlooking

some, I will attempt to mention them all. First, thanks go to Gretchen Luxenberg and

Stephanie Toothman who started this project a number of years ago. In the late 1980s,

Stephanie and Gretchen began the research for this project. Their efforts were part of a larger

cultural resource initiative directed at parks in the Northwest; they were also part of the

planning effort undertaken by Superintendent John Reynolds in nearly every facet of

management for North Cascades. Stephanie and Gretchen, then the regional and research

historians, respectively, in the National Park Service's Pacific Northwest Regional Office [2]

in Seattle, Washington, completed most of the archival research. However, funding problems

and time constraints caused the project to be shelved. Meanwhile, Gretchen, who had

produced several important studies on North Cascades, including the park's historic resource

study, completed the park's archives project. The project created a discrete collection of

documentary materials pertinent to the park's administration. In the process, she added still

more material to the bulging files on the park's administrative history in the Seattle office.

Fortunately, funding became available to complete the project beginning in 1995. And it was

around that time that Stephanie and Gretchen passed the responsibility to me. I had already

perused the North Cascades files while looking for a topic for my dissertation and gladly

accepted the task. After some minor interruptions during the Park Service's reorganization in

1996, I was able to complete the study.

The project would not have been completed without the assistance of park staff, those who

still work for the park and those who have moved on. I would like to thank all of the former

superintendents who gave me their insights about the park -- Roger Contor, Lowell White,

and John Reynolds. In addition to giving me his own insights, the current superintendent, Bill

Paleck, read every word of the report, a feat few accomplish. Park staffers answered my

questions with a measure of humor and professionalism. I owe special debts to Bruce Freet,

chief of the park's resource management program, for helping to keep the project alive, and

to Dan Allen, resource management specialist, for answering my questions about nearly every

aspect of the program. As one of the "senior" members of the park's staff, Dan may have had

this privilege forced upon him. Other members of the park's staff, Gerry Cook, Jesse

Kennedy, Bob Mierendorf, Leigh Smith, Reed Glesne, Phil Campbell, Bob Kuntz, and Tim

Manns, among others, were all helpful. I am equally indebted to Jon Jarvis, the park's first

chief of resource management, and Bob Wasem, the park's first biologist, who reviewed the

document and helped me make the report stronger and more accurate. Likewise, Barry

Mackintosh, the Park Service's bureau historian, gave the document his usual close reading

and insightful comments. Frank Norris, Park Service historian in Anchorage, Alaska, and

Doug Dodd, a PhD candidate in history at the University of California at Santa Barbara, also

gave sections of the document a close reading and made the text more fluid. I am also

indebted to the librarians in our Seattle office and especially at the manuscripts division at

the University of Washington, where much of this research was accomplished. I would like to

express my appreciation as well to the staff of the cultural resources division who have

supported me over the years. Finally, I extend my gratitude to my wife, Rebekah, and my

daughter, Arendje, who have gone car camping with me in the park. I will always have fond

memories of my eighteen-month-old daughter sleeping quietly in our tent at Newhalem

Creek Campground on her first camping trip. While many have helped me with this project, I

am ultimately responsible for its content.

***

In closing, there should be some mention of my approach to the research and writing of this

study. The nature of doing "recent" history has changed markedly over the years. The advent
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of electronic mail, for example, has greatly reduced the amount of written material available

to historians. For this reason, I have relied on conversations and interviews with current and

former park staff as well as published reports to fill in the gaps in the historical narrative.

Nevertheless, the narrative trajectory collapses the closer one moves to the present, and I

tried to compensate for this by organizing the park's history into eras. All of this is not to say

that there are no good documentary source materials relating to North Cascades. The history

of the park's establishment and its early management have drawn extensively on the

collections of Henry M. Jackson, Warren G. Magnuson, Lloyd Meeds, the North Cascades

Conservation Council, and other politicians and environmental groups who have figured

prominently in the fight for and management of the national park. There remains, I believe,

more to be done with the environmental movement and the preservation of landscapes like

North Cascades. The Kennedy-Johnson era was a fruitful one for environmental legislation,

and parks such as North Cascades were part of the growing concern for wilderness

preservation expressed by the postwar generation.

Furthermore, North Cascades is a relatively young park compared to the other Washington

parks of Rainier and Olympic, but its issues are as complex as the bureaucratic name "Park

Service Complex" implies. And it was not long before I realized what Stephanie and

Gretchen faced when they started the project. There are really three separate parks, often with

their own separate issues, under one administration. While they all shared the common bond

of legislation and geography, the park and two recreation areas could have had their own

separate histories. And at times, it felt as though I was writing three different studies. This is

especially true for Lake Chelan NRA. I have often thought that if North Cascades were a

ship, it would list toward Stehekin at the head of Lake Chelan. The volume of documents

generated over its management alone supports this statement and warrants a history focused

on events in Stehekin, particularly regarding land policies and resource consumption. But

Stehekin is not alone in generating controversy. Ross Lake NRA has seen its own share of

high profile issues surrounding the hydroelectric power facilities owned by Seattle City Light.

Here, too, a separate study would document in greater detail the relationship between the

Park Service and City Light than I have been able to in this report. North Cascades National

Park proper could also have its own management history written, especially about the

evolution of wilderness management in such a dramatic yet fragile setting. My approach,

however, was to write about the park complex as it is administered by the National Park

Service. I have attempted to place its management issues within the larger context of the park

complex. It is as a "complex," not as a park or recreation areas, that North Cascades has been

administered.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Part I -- 1890s to 1968

A WILDERNESS PARK

One of the most important themes in the history of the northern Cascades has been their

preservation and management as a national park. Like a statue hidden within a block of

stone, some have suggested, the North Cascades have been a national park waiting to be

created. But the park's establishment required more than an artist's imagination and the

region's spectacular scenery to succeed. From the time the first park proposals appeared in the

1890s to when a park was finally established in 1968, the North Cascades have been

contested terrain. That contest has centered on how the range should be managed.

Preservationists wanted the federal government to protect this mountain wilderness as a

national park to preserve its scenic and scientific values for future generations. Their

opponents, on the other hand, wanted the federal government to manage these mountains

under more utilitarian principles in order to realize the full economic potential of their

forests, minerals, and rivers. While this conflict represents a familiar theme in America's

conservation history, it nevertheless helps to explain why the struggle for a park lasted for

more than seventy years.

The history of the park's establishment evolved through three periods. The first was the

Progressive era, from the 1890s to the 1920s, when the idea for a national park emerged

during the conservation movement and was defeated as the rift between utilitarian and

preservation interests grew. The next phase was the Depression and New Deal era when the

National Park Service submitted the first formal proposal for a national park in the North

Cascades only to see it crushed by well-organized opposition during the height of controversy

revolving around the establishment of Olympic National Park (1938). The final stage of the

park's establishment history came in the aftermath of World War II and the rise of modern

environmentalism. This era, charged with political activism and a groundswell of public

support for wilderness preservation, saw the creation of North Cascades National Park -- but

only after considerable compromise among a diverse group of interests, in particular the

long-standing rivalry between the Park Service and United States Forest Service. Attesting to

the controversy surrounding the park's establishment, Congress ultimately created the park

"complex" composed of a national park, divided into northern and southern units, and two

national recreation areas. The park's existence, in the end, attests to the value Americans

invested in wilderness as well as the political realities involved in its preservation.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 1:

CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

NORTH CASCADES NATIONAL PARK

At the turn of the century, the North Cascades were an undiscovered country for most

Americans. While the range's wild, alpine grandeur inspired explorers and tourists, often with

no small measure of terror, its steep terrain and severe climate limited their access and thus

few voices called for its preservation. Material progress, the hallmark of nineteenth-century

America, was the order of the day. Yet the range's stingy environment prevented

developments in overland travel, whether in the establishment of trails, wagon roads, or

railroad routes. It also restricted commercial ventures. Although the range's western drainages

were densely forested, its steep-sided valleys proved difficult to log, and transporting timber

out of the remote range down its narrow canyons and swift rivers was equally difficult and

costly. Similarly, the climate and terrain precluded extensive agriculture and limited ranching

opportunities. The most promising economic ventures were in mining, especially with the

excitement surrounding the Klondike strikes in the late 1890s when prospectors flooded the

range's major drainages in search of precious metals. Yet, while mining was active in the

various districts on the Skagit, Cascade, and Stehekin rivers, it never turned into a large-scale

enterprise. The range's desired storehouse of minerals never adequately offset costs for, and

problems with, transportation, access, short working seasons, inclement weather, and a lack

of capital. Although large companies took over the operations with the greatest potential,

these, too, eventually subsided at the turn of the century when prices dropped and capital

evaporated. [1]

Around this same time, homesteaders gradually moved into the range's major watersheds,

following the miners. Small settlements, such as Marblemount on the Skagit and Stehekin at

the head of Lake Chelan, grew as supply centers for the mines in the mountainous interior.

Homesteaders managed to make a meager living, raising crops and livestock for a local

market. They often supplemented their income by packing in mining supplies, by offering

their cabins as hostelries, by trapping, and by working outside of the mountains part of the

year. Nevertheless, this hard life took its toll; only a relative handful of homesteaders proved

up on their claims. Thus much of the land in the North Cascades remained in the public

domain by the turn of the century. [2]

Some settlers and entrepreneurs, however, envisioned that the economic future of the region

lay not in timber, agriculture, livestock, or mining but in tourism. They did not advocate just

any brand of tasteless entertainment, but tourism based on a close and somewhat comfortable

encounter with nature. By the turn of the century, some had seized the opportunity to provide

more elaborate accommodations for lodging, such as the elegant Field Hotel at the head of

Lake Chelan, to cater to the tourists and travelers who at first shared space with, and later

outnumbered, miners making their way to this impressive mountain district. The period's

upper-class tourists were drawn to the spectacular scenery of mountains, forests, lakes, rivers,

and waterfalls; they also wanted to experience the region's renowned fishing and hunting, and

climb and explore its peaks, alpine meadows, and valleys by foot or horseback. [3] Their
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presence here also represented a growing interest in outdoor recreation and mirrored a

national "back to nature" movement at the turn of the century when more Americans, faced

with a new, urban-industrial society, sought relief for the body and soul in closer contact

with wild lands. [4]

Of all the areas in the North Cascades, the Stehekin River Valley at the head of Lake Chelan

achieved the greatest popularity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In part,

relatively easy access contributed to its popularity. In the 1880s and 1890s, tourists could

reach Stehekin by a "civilized" route, which included a train to Wenatchee, a steamboat up

the Columbia River to Chelan Falls, a stage up to the town of Chelan, and finally a day-long

excursion aboard a comfortable steamer up the fifty-five mile Lake Chelan. More important,

the valley offered tourists the sublime and picturesque scenery they so valued. A mysterious

and secluded world awaited them at the head of the lake where perpendicular peaks, capped

in snow and ice, rose from the shore to heights just under 9,000 feet, towering some 7,000

feet above the level of the lake. Here was scenery, they thought, greater than Switzerland's.

[5]

Not surprisingly, early proposals for a national park in the North Cascades focused primarily

on the Lake Chelan country. This impressive fjord-like lake and backdrop of high, glacierchiseled mountains inspired local residents and tourists with its scenic grandeur. This alone,

they suggested, warranted turning the northern section of the lake and surrounding high

country into a national park similar to Yellowstone, the nation's premier scenic wonder and

symbol of the national park idea. At the same time, park advocates believed a park was

necessary to curb the "encroachments of civilization...already marring the beauties of nature,"

and the wanton destruction of "the immense game preserves," namely the cherished

populations of elk, deer, and mountain goats. They attributed these problems to increased

settlement and visiting trophy hunters staying at several lake hotels. A national park, then,

would meet the needs of protection and tourism, and save for the nation a superb example of

mountain scenery of "a more varied, beautiful and artistic nature" than is found elsewhere in

the "picturesque Northwest." [6]

These were the issues at stake in 1892 when a group of central Washington citizens issued

the first proposal to establish a national park for Lake Chelan. Commercial interests in the

region, however, did not share the group's opinion. Local boosters represented by Chelan land

developer L.H. Woodin, for example, railed against the notion of a national park. Echoing

traditional western sentiments, Woodin argued that a park would restrict unfairly an

individual's right to use land for his own commercial gain. Woodin's opinions reflected the

idea that the public domain was an American birthright -- the right to an abundant supply of

free or cheap land. And since most of Lake Chelan and adjacent country was still in the

public domain, it represented a resource hinterland for present and future growth. Ironically,

he asserted that both the lake country's scenery and natural resources were imperative for

future growth because both attracted settlers. Chelan townspeople, therefore, wanted the lake

"for business and pleasure." Let the laws of the young Washington State protect the wildlife;

neither scenery nor wildlife merited restriction from unfettered use. Thus, Woodin

emphatically urged readers to "answer decisively, No!" to the park petition. [7]

The park petition died, lacking support in face of material arguments, but this early exchange

would be repeated often whenever the park idea was raised for the northern Cascades. At the

heart of the dispute was the schism between preservation and conservation which emerged in

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the 1890s, it was clear that national

expansion, with its combined faith in individualism, the market economy, and natural

abundance, had depleted large tracts of the nation's "inexhaustible" natural resources. Rising

up in response, the conservation movement espoused Progressive era beliefs in efficiency and

scientific management of resources as articulated by Theodore Roosevelt's administration and
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the nation's first scientifically trained forester, Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot, who helped found the

U.S. Forest Service in 1905, preached the doctrine of wise use of resources through federal

management. His agency came to embody not only this principle but also promoted the

concept of managed use as the most effective cure for eliminating wasteful grazing or logging

practices, for example, and ensuring that natural resources on all public lands would produce

the maximum amount of crops or services for generations to come. But conservation was

complex. While Roosevelt and Pinchot found answers to resource problems in the

Progressive era's faith in science and regulated use, others, like the naturalist John Muir,

supported conservation in order to preserve the last tracts of unmodified nature as America

transformed into a more urban-industrial society; wilderness would act as a balm for the ills

of modern civilization. [8]

n the North Cascades, as elsewhere in the country, the complexity of the conservation

movement seemed naturally to lead to a disagreement over what the proper course was to

pursue, for conservation meant different things to different people. The fragile fusion of

conservation and preservation interests exploded with the proposal to dam Hetch Hetchy

Valley in Yosemite National Park, an episode that symbolized the strength of utilitarian

arguments, with their pragmatic and rational emphasis on conservation as a form of wise

development. As Pinchot liked to say, "Wilderness is waste," dismissing aesthetic notions of

conservation held by Muir as "sentimental." Muir's views, after all, reflected the period's

antimodern strain of thought; they were romantic, expressed a longing for the passing frontier

that, in turn, fostered an appreciation of the nation's remaining wilderness and led to the

protection of some of its most wondrous regions. To Muir, nature offered spiritual renewal; it

was the embodiment of the divine spirit, harmonious, and a source of inspiration. It should be

revered, not subdued by the new industrial age's machinery and lust for progress. [9]

The idea of a national park in Washington's northern Cascades confronted this division

between utilitarian and preservation interests, but the lines between the two were not so

clearly drawn. Advocates of a Lake Chelan national park, as well as many scenic

preservationists, shared some of Muir's convictions. Like Muir, they promoted parks as places

that would benefit national health in a modern society. Moreover, by saving "one of the most

picturesque spots in America," they were arguing that national parks were a source of

national pride. The national park idea, as historian Alfred Runte asserts, was born out of

"cultural nationalism," the concern that nineteenth-century Americans felt for their country's

lack of cultural attainments when compared with those of Europe. In their minds, the ageless

wonders of the American West -- its time-hewn canyons, ancient trees, and towering

mountains -- surpassed the Old World's masterpieces of art and architecture. Preserving

monumental scenery for cultural ends proved to be a convincing reason for creating national

parks, as exemplified by the first parks, Yellowstone (1872) and Yosemite (1890). That these

areas were economically worthless also contributed to their protection. But unlike Muir,

many park supporters did not see preservation as an end in itself, for they also strongly

believed that saving places like Lake Chelan as a national park would promote economic

growth. In this respect, the economic argument helped scenic preservationists justify parks

and ensure their protection, especially with loss of Hetch Hetchy, by meeting the utilitarian

arguments of their opponents. In the years after Hetch Hetchy, they successfully championed

parks as economic engines for tourism, as well as places for physical and spiritual wellbeing. Parks, in short, were for people. [10]

Although this justification for parks worked well for the next half-century, the idea of a park

in the northern Cascades was nurtured slowly throughout the late 1890s and early 1900s.

News of the range's scenic wonders spread through regional newspapers and national

magazines with reports about mountaineers, geologists, and adventuresome tourists trekking

through the Stehekin country and surrounding mountains, all of whom extolled the range's

"primeval grandeur." In 1899, for example, William G. Steel, who championed the cause of
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Crater Lake National Park, described the Portland Mazamas' climb up Mount Sahale in

euphoric prose that bordered on a religious experience: "Each moment we were more and

more enraptured of the scene; each moment more helpless to express the deep emotion in our

hearts." [11]

With this burst of enthusiasm, another national park proposal surfaced when Canadian-born

artist Julian E. Itter proposed that the Lake Chelan country be set aside as a national park in

1906. In January of that year, Itter displayed his paintings of the Lake Chelan country's

enchanting natural beauty before a Seattle audience and received wide acclaim. Itter's

popularity, in part, demonstrated that an appreciation of wilderness had developed in urban

settings. Seattle residents, especially its business leaders and members of the Mountaineers,

the city's climbing club, understood the value of natural wonders to the local economy, urban

identity, and recreation with the popularity of the recently established Mount Rainier

National Park (1899). Buoyed by the reception of his paintings, Itter may have been

motivated to propose a national park for Lake Chelan and surrounding mountains some two

months later. Striking a familiar theme, the artist promoted a park, similar in size to the 1892

proposal, as a scenic wonder certain to draw tourists to the region, just as Yosemite had done

for California. More important, visitors would find that this magnificent country rivaled both

Yosemite and Yellowstone in scenic grandeur. [12]

Itter's idea received support from the Mazamas, the Seattle, Spokane, and Wenatchee

chambers of commerce, the Chelan Commercial Club, and the "See America First" league,

but his whirlwind campaign soon withered when Chelan residents protested the park proposal

as an outside threat to the local mining industry -- "the chief source of future wealth for the

Chelan country." Ironically, no large-scale mining operations existed, yet park opponents

argued persuasively that given the choice between a park and the mining industry they would

choose the latter which, once developed, would produce "almost unbounded wealth." [13]

Desperate, perhaps, to appease commercial interests, Itter suggested that the proposed park

could accommodate mining, and that a park might even further the development of mining

operations by attracting wealthy tourists who would invest in their holdings. When he made

this statement, Itter may have been thinking of the mining clause in Mount Rainier's

establishing legislation, or he simply believed, as many did at the turn of the century, that the

main purpose of a park was the protection of its primary wonders rather than its larger

natural values. Nevertheless, Washington's congressional delegation did not believe that such

a balance of mining and scenic preservation could be achieved, that ultimately a park would

prohibit mining, and that purchasing mining claims would be too costly. Moreover, a

parsimonious Congress was averse to creating parks because it did not want to fund their

operations; Mount Rainier's meager budgets attested to this. Instead, Congress treated new

park propositions as ploys to boost the local tourist economy at the expense of the federal

government. Anticipating these problems, the state's congressional representatives sided with

Chelan's vocal mining interests and did not introduce legislation. [14]

Though it failed, the 1906 proposal advanced several important elements of the park idea in

the northern Cascades. First, for the most part, local interests resisted establishing a national

park because they envisioned that the future of their community hinged on the development

of the region's natural resources. They placed more faith in a potential mine to produce

"unbounded wealth" than they did a national park. Second, Itter's willingness to allow mining

and Congress' attitude toward parks pointed up that national parks suffered from the lack of a

clear purpose. Until the creation of the National Park Service in 1916, no standards for

national parks existed and few people had a clear concept of what a national park was: spa or

nature preserve? Even though Yellowstone and Yosemite set the stage for scenic

preservation, by the turn of the century the perception that a national park would boost a local

economy contributed to the creation of some decidedly inferior parks and thus to Congress'
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resistance to their establishment. [15]

Third, an important measure of protection had come to the range in recent years. Empowered

by one of the most significant pieces of legislation in conservation history, the Forest Reserve

Act of 1891, President Grover Cleveland established the Washington Forest Reserve on

February 22, 1897, covering some three and a half million acres. Reaching nearly 150 million

acres by the early twentieth century, the forest reserves withdrew unclaimed timberlands from

the public domain in the American West to protect them from indiscriminate logging

practices and for watershed protection. The Washington Forest Reserve embraced both slopes

of the North Cascades, including land west of Mount Baker, from the Canadian border south

to Lake Chelan, and extended federal control over most of the land which today comprises

North Cascades National Park. [16]

While the forest reserve withdrawal assured that the northern Cascades would remain in

public ownership, the reserves were poorly funded by Congress and thus poorly managed by

the General Land Office within the Department of the Interior. In 1905, Gifford Pinchot

successfully campaigned to have the forest reserves transferred to the newly created Forest

Service within the Department of Agriculture. Under Pinchot's leadership, the Forest Service

fashioned policies of multiple use and sustained yield, which, as noted above, emphasized

programs of forest use for present and future production through scientific management.

Pinchot demonstrated this commitment two years later when he changed the name of the

reserves to national forests to remove any doubt that forests were for use. Reflecting this

change, the Chelan and Washington national forests, whose common boundary was the

summit of the North Cascades, were carved out of parts of the former Washington Forest

Reserve in 1908. Although the Forest Service's management role was mostly custodial, it

developed policies to regulate and promote grazing, timber, water-power projects, mining,

and recreational developments. All of these, following Pinchot's principles, were to take into

account the needs of local industries first. Thus when it came to creating a national park,

scenic preservationists would have to contend with opponents from local communities and

commercial interests who had found a strong ally in the Forest Service and the tenets of

forest management. [17]

The presence of the Forest Service in the northern Cascades, however, did not diminish

enthusiasm for establishing a national park out of some or all of this panorama of craggy

peaks during the first two decades of this century. By this time, scenic preservation had

evolved into a national movement. Influenced by the nation's rapid transformation from a

rural to urban-based society, Americans appreciated nature for recreation and selfaffirmation. With a tinge of romance, Americans envisioned rural life and the outdoors as an

escape from the grimy, crowded, and noisy existence of city life. In addition, marketing

scenery proved lucrative to the local tourist economy and was thus an element in defense of

protecting scenic wonders, such as national parks. In the years surrounding World War I, the

"See America First" movement typified the popularity of scenic preservation. It convinced

many Americans with new-found leisure time to seek out the scenic grandeur of the

American West, particularly its national parks, by rail and later, with the onset of the

automobile revolution, by car. [18]

In the main, preservationists hoped that another park in Washington's Cascade Range would

enhance the state's status as a "scenic summer playground" for both residents and tourists.

The Spokane Chamber of Commerce, for example, took the lead in promoting Lake Chelan

for national park status in 1916, proclaiming that "Another great national park in Washington

will simply kindle additional interest in the hearts of Americans to visit the northwest during

the summer time and will be a great aid in the entertainment of our rapidly growing army of

tourist travelers." Already many national parks had been opened to automobiles, and the

designation of the Parks-to-Parks Highway promised to entice more easterners to visit the
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Northwest. Once developed for tourists, a Lake Chelan national park would be "one of the

greatest assets in this state," like Mount Rainier National Park, "to lure travelers to the great

American Alps." [19]

The qualifications of the northern Cascades for a national park seemed indisputable. Novelist

and national park advocate Mary Roberts Rinehart endorsed the range's park qualities after

visiting the Lake Chelan-Glacier Peak country in 1916. "It is superb," she declared, and

should be a national park, for there is "no other word for it." [20] Rinehart and other scenic

preservationists, however, would be disappointed. No legislation was introduced for a park in

the Lake Chelan-Glacier Peak country. In addition, numerous bills were introduced to create

a national park around the Mount Baker area between 1916 and 1921, but they failed to

secure congressional approval. [21]

It was with a small amount of irony that these park petitions and bills faltered, for the most

part, because the National Park Service opposed them. With its creation in 1916, the Park

Service set out to administer the system of national parks by bringing order to their chaotic

management, setting standards to keep inferior parks out of the system, and strengthening

their preservation through national publicity and the development of park roads and tourist

accommodations to attract visitors and ensure the parks' political support. The agency's

energetic leader, Stephen T. Mather, masterminded this practical mix of business and

preservation in order to assure a conservative Congress that his bureau was worth funding; it

also enabled him to overcome the opposition of the Forest Service to aesthetic conservation

of any kind and the establishment of the Park Service itself.

Standards played an important part in Mather's decision not to pursue a park in Washington's

northern Cascades. From the beginning Mather's small bureau was inundated with numerous

proposals for new parks, many of them of poor quality, and he had created park standards so

that only "areas large enough, primitive enough, and/or unique enough to be national in

interest" were added to the system and thereby keeping alive the original national park idea.

Based on these new guidelines, Lake Chelan was "just not good enough." On the other hand,

the proposed Mount Baker national park, which included Mount Shuksan, was not suitable

primarily because its signature features -- a volcanic cone, rugged mountain crest, and

immense glacier systems -- too closely resembled "the features of Mount Rainier National

Park, which represents the noblest example of this type of scenery." [22]

The fifth national park and Washington's first, Mount Rainier set a precedent for national

parks in the Pacific Northwest. In this respect, all new park proposals in the Cascades

competed with Mount Rainier's scenic grandeur and its ranking as the range's highest peak.

The mountain, hovering above the skyline of the Puget Sound, symbolized the

monumentalism at the heart of the national park idea. For this reason, the Park Service was

not inclined to consider proposals for solitary peaks in the northern Cascades, such as Mount

Baker or Glacier Peak, for fear that the addition of more peaks would diminish the

significance of Mount Rainier -- an argument which maverick conservationist Willard Van

Name called "indefensible nonsense" concocted by Mather to dodge demands for additional

parks. [23] Mount Rainier also established a precedent for the commercial advantages

associated with a national park. The nationally renowned peak was coveted by both Seattle

and Tacoma as a drawing card for a lucrative tourist business. Bellingham residents, for

example, envisioned for Mount Baker a kind of tourist paradise similar to Mount Rainier that

only a national park and Park Service management could bring. [24]

There were political reasons as well. The notion of a park in the northern Cascades was

opposed by the Forest Service. Since most new parks came from areas of exceptional scenery

on national forests, the Park Service grew at the expense of the Forest Service, causing

frequent disputes between the bureaus. There conflicts flowed naturally from differing
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conservation philosophies, the Forest Service representing the principles of utilitarian

conservation, the Park Service the principles of scenic preservation. As Mather's biographer

keenly noted, "unpleasantness was hard to avoid." Although in time the Park Service would

become more aggressive and acquisitive, Mather wanted to maintain friendly relations with

the older and more politically powerful Forest Service in his agency's early years.

Accordingly, he suspended any investigations of Mount Baker in 1919, honoring an

agreement between his agency and the Forest Service to study jointly new park areas which

were on national forest lands. [25]

In the Pacific Northwest, Forest Service officials anticipated that some of the most

magnificent natural wonders in the northern Cascades, such as the Mount Baker, Lake

Chelan, and Glacier Peak regions, would eventually be converted into national parks. They

therefore moved to defend the agency's territory. One common argument the agency

employed was that park propositions were merely a change in name rather than management.

In Mount Baker's case, the Forest Service noted that the proposed park legislation allowed for

continued utilitarian management, such as mineral leases, railroad rights of way, water power

and irrigation developments, and timber sales. Although some of these uses were eliminated

in subsequent bills, the agency interpreted the major thrust of the park proposal as an effort

to capitalize on a national park's attraction to tourists and to take advantage of federal

appropriations for road construction to open the mountain up to auto tourists. The Forest

Service claimed that it could just as easily provide improvements to public campgrounds and

implement a road building program as the Park Service. (The Washington National Forest

supervisor had in fact presented his own park proposal for the Mount Baker area in 1913.)

And thus "the public needs for recreation and pleasure will be quite as well served on the

Washington National Forest as they would be on the Baker National Park, and the results

could perhaps be obtained much more quickly." [26]

Although somewhat misleading, given the Forest Service's commitment to the commercial

management of natural resources, this statement related to another method used to resist the

transfer of forest lands to Park Service jurisdiction: recreation. By the 1920s, the park bureau

had built a national reputation as the federal agency best-suited to manage areas of

exceptional scenery, as well as historic and archaeological features. In the process, it had

gained a powerful political constituency, primarily from an urban-based population, because

it marketed national parks as wilderness playgrounds at a time when outdoor recreation was

experiencing rapid growth. The Forest Service found ways to battle the aggressiveness of its

rival agency by claiming its niche in wilderness preservation, something the tourist and

development oriented Park Service seemed to overlook. Influenced by the wilderness ideas

and advocacy of Aldo Leopold, Arthur Carhart, and Robert Marshall, the Forest Service

displayed a budding awareness of aesthetic values in the 1920s with the concept of primitive

areas, a classification which set aside forest lands to be managed for their wilderness values.

The agency also began to plan more for outdoor recreation which included camping, hunting,

fishing, hiking, as well as leasing land for summer homes, hotels, and stores. [27]

By the early 1930s, the Forest Service had prepared recreation plans for all the forests in the

northern Cascades, and its new emphasis succeeded in quieting calls for parks when they

appeared during this period. In 1926, for example, the service deflected three park proposals.

First, when yet another proposal appeared for a Lake Chelan national park, Chelan residents

were quick to stress that the Forest Service was providing good protection for the region's

scenic beauties, and under these circumstances, they preferred its management to the Park

Service's. Second, by that year the Forest Service had accommodated earlier interest in a

Mount Baker national park by designating the Mount Baker Park Division, a recreation area

of 74,859 acres surrounding the second highest peak in Washington. In addition, the bureau

also helped to finance the construction of a road and leased the site for a private lodge at

Heather Meadows. And third, when Wenatchee citizens pressed for a national park for
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Glacier Peak in 1926, they soon changed their proposal in favor of a recreation area managed

by the Forest Service. In this way, all interests would be served; Glacier Peak's scenic

grandeur would be protected, attract tourists, and keep its natural resources available for

commercial development. [28] In 1931, the Forest Service recommended the establishment of

the Glacier Peak-Cascade Recreation Area, 233,600 acres which would encompass the peak

mostly above timberline. [29] The bureau also extended more permanent protection for

wilderness as part of its recreation program. That same year it established the Whatcom

Primitive Area (172,800 acres) in the extreme northern portion of the North Cascades east of

Mount Baker. In 1935, the service enlarged the area to 801,000 acres; the expanded area,

renamed the North Cascades Primitive Area, straddled the spine of the North Cascades --

some of the range's most rugged terrain -- along the Canadian border. [30]

While the Forest Service may have incorporated recreation into its multiple-use doctrine, it

wore the preservation mantle reluctantly. Passed in 1929, the regulation creating primitive

areas, Regulation L-20, cast doubt on the agency's commitment to wilderness, for it continued

to allow road construction, grazing, and logging. The Forest Service, it seemed, was more

concerned with wilderness preservation as a way to appease preservationists and fend off

Park Service land grabs than as a standard management practice. [31] This became especially

clear during the depression of the 1930s, when the New Deal conservation programs placed

the Park Service in a position to study a park in the North Cascades for the first time.

***

Soon after the federal government's reorganization in 1933, the National Park Service began

to expand at an unprecedented rate; the park system more than doubled in size with the

transfer of national monuments, battlefields, historic sites, and cemeteries from other federal

agencies. The agency also assumed a lead role in administering the emergency relief

programs, which in turn significantly increased its funding and its number of employees.

Moreover, the bureau headed up national recreational planning, primarily because of its

expertise and experience in park planning and because the Park, Parkway and RecreationArea Act of 1936 placed the agency in the lead role. [32]

It was largely through its expanded role in recreation that the Park Service turned its attention

to the Pacific Northwest and the northern Cascades. At the request of the National Resources

Board, the Park Service submitted a report on "Recreation Use of Land in the United States,"

which was published in 1934 as part of the board's report on land planning. In its report, the

agency listed several proposed park areas. One was a park along the Cascade Range in

Oregon and Washington. [33] Three years later, Park Service Director Arno B. Cammerer

appointed a five-member study team to follow up on this proposal. Led by Major Owen A.

Tomlinson, superintendent of Mount Rainier National Park, the team investigated the entire

Cascade Range in Washington, and in a November 1937 report recommended that a national

park be established encompassing the length of the range, primarily its rugged, ice-capped

peaks, the tentative boundaries covering some 5,000 square miles. [34]

The committee believed that the range, with its chain of five volcanic peaks, St. Helens,

Adams, Rainier, Glacier Peak, and Baker, along with its intervening precipitous and glacierclad mountains, was "unquestionably of national park caliber." It was a bold vision for a

national park. The high Cascades (or "Ice Peaks" as it came to be known) would be a kind of

"super park," the report's authors asserted, that "will outrank in its scenic, recreational, and

wildlife values, any existing national park and any other possibility for such a park within the

United States. Establishment of this area as one superb park is an inspiring project to fire the

imagination," they concluded, "worthy of the Nation's efforts." [35]

The park proposal ignited controversy almost immediately. Timber and mining interests, the
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Washington State Planning Council, local communities, and chambers of commerce from

around the state clamored loudly against the proposal because they believed that the park

would lock up the range's resources and unfairly limit their economic well-being, a

particularly harsh reality during the depression. Other factors fueled their outrage, such as the

park's immense size, the current battle to create Olympic National Park, and Secretary of the

Interior Harold Ickes' recent attempts to transfer the Forest Service to his jurisdiction in a

remodeled Department of the Interior known as the Department of Conservation. Ickes'

involvement, moreover, cast a shadow of conspiracy over the study; it was just another play

by the power-hungry and combative Interior Secretary to subject Washington citizens to a

kind of federal land-management dictatorship. The Forest Service objected to the proposal by

defending its multiple-use management policies for the range, and characterizing the plan as

another land grab by its rival agency. Ironically, conservation groups such as the Wilderness

Society and the National Parks Association criticized the proposal, too. They asserted that the

Park Service's expansion in the 1930s limited its ability to protect wilderness areas and

clouded its vision as to whether an area met the highest possible national park standards.

However scenic, they maintained, the entire range certainly did not meet national park

criteria with its pockets of developments and stretches of ordinary scenery.

Even though there were few park supporters, led by the Northwest Conservation League, the

Park Service officials seemed optimistic that their proposal would appeal to a broad spectrum

of the American public. They suggested that a national park of such a grand scale could

accommodate wilderness preservation, traditional park management for scenic preservation

and developments, and even some commercial uses such as mining, which was the most

promising but relatively unproven industry in the range. [36] Moreover, Tomlinson and the

other committee members thought that the conversion of the range into a park would be easy

to achieve since their agency was best suited to manage the nation's premier scenic wonders.

With the exception of Mount Rainier National Park, the Forest Service managed all of the

land in the proposed park, covering five national forests. Creation of the park would only

require a transfer from one agency to the other, rather than an expensive purchase of private

lands.

The Forest Service, however, did not share the same opinion. Historically opposed to national

parks and smarting from the Olympic National Park battle, the agency and its local and

industrial allies fought the Ice Peaks proposal. The bureau relied on tactics that had worked in

the past, namely using recreation and wilderness studies or classifications for sections of the

range under park study to defeat or at least delay the park proposal.

The main proponent of wilderness for the range was Robert Marshall. As early as 1935, the

liberal forester and wilderness advocate had identified the northern Cascades as one of the

country's three "great western wildernesses" on national forest land and recommended that the

range from Stevens Pass north to the border of the North Cascades Primitive Area be set

aside as wilderness, an area of 794,440 acres. No part of the United States, he claimed, was

"so well adapted for a wilderness," for this was some of the most rugged, roadless, and

beautiful country he had seen. At the time, Marshall worked in the Bureau of Indian Affairs,

and while a study report was submitted in 1936, the Forest Service never acted on the

measure. Marshall, who had become head of the bureau's division of recreation and lands in

1937, seized upon the creation of Olympic National Park in 1938 to renew efforts to gain

wilderness classification for the North Cascades. He suggested to Regional Forester C.J.

Buck that establishing the Glacier Peak wilderness would prevent the region from being

turned into a national park, implying that this had been their agency's critical error on the

peninsula. More important, Marshall believed that if the northern Cascades were handed over

to the Park Service it would destroy the range's wild character by extending roads "into its

heart." Marshall gained some success in 1938 when the Secretary of Agriculture officially

approved of the Glacier Peak Recreation Area, comprising 275,200 acres, and in 1939 when
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Chief Forester Ferdinand A. Silcox, Marshall's superior and friend, reopened the Glacier Peak

wilderness for study, temporarily removing it from commercial use. [37]

Marshall's plan, ironically, backfired. The regional forester worried that converting the range

to wilderness status would not protect it from park status but only justify its reclassification

as a national park. A tireless Marshall tried to persuade local foresters to create the Glacier

Peak wilderness as a way to keep it from the Park Service, but to no avail. In September

1939, he conducted what would be his last high country trip through the Glacier Peak region,

hoping to resolve this thorny issue, but he had to cut the trip short because of health reasons

and died two months later of heart failure. [38] In one of his last letters, he acknowledged the

difficult situation created by the furor over the Ice Peaks park study and agreed to delay final

wilderness classification, but he stressed that in order for the Forest Service to keep the North

Cascades "it seems to me our position would be greatly strengthened if we could show the

recreationists that...[we] are... planning to preserve the very values which the Park Service

people claim they are especially equipped to preserve." [39]

Meanwhile, the leaders of the Forest Service and Park Service attempted to reconcile their

differences after years of jousting and fighting over proposed national parks and park

extensions by forming a joint Forest Service-Park Service committee to address these issues.

[40] In the spirit of cooperation, the two bureau leaders appointed an interagency committee

to study the high Cascades national park. But after their first meeting in the summer of 1939,

the group dissolved, as Assistant Chief Forester Leon Kneipp observed, over a "conflict in

philosophy and aspirations," but agreed to conduct separate studies, produce separate reports,

and cooperate with the Washington State Planning Council. [41]

The council had begun its own study of the Cascade Range in the spring of 1939. In

September, the council, under the leadership of Ben Kizer, appointed a seven-member

advisory committee to determine, among other things, the feasibility of establishing a high

Cascades national park. So as not to prejudice the council's findings, both the Park Service

and Forest Service agreed to withhold their reports until the council had reached its own

conclusions. But prejudice seemed to be a foregone conclusion. In the fight over Olympic

National Park, for example, the planning council had organized the opposition to the park,

representing the interests of timber companies, chambers of commerce, and the Forest

Service. Although the planning council was ineffective in the park's final legislation, it spoke

with a more powerful voice across the Puget Sound, where it conducted seven public hearings

on either side of the range. Public response, especially in the state's newspapers, was

overwhelmingly against the proposal, since it would drive a wedge between an east-west

flow of commerce, halt timber harvests, grazing, and any future mining developments, still

considered the most important potential industry in the Cascades. The statement by

representatives of north central Washington civic organizations -- that a new national park

would be created only over their "dead bodies" -- typified the sentiment of park opponents.

[42]

In the spring of 1940, the study teams issued their reports, ending months of apparent secrecy

and intensity surrounding the future of the Cascades, and, needless to say, there were few

surprises. The Park Service stood by its original recommendation, stressing that the high

Cascades deserved to be a national park under its jurisdiction "to insure their greatest

productive use on a non-consumptive basis." Stating that, with qualifications, some

prospecting and mining would be allowed, the report also tried to soothe park opponents

outraged over the proposed park's restrictions on natural resource developments. On the other

hand, the Forest Service, as it had in the past, argued that the entire range was not park

caliber, and that it could manage the range more democratically, providing commercial and

recreational uses of the Cascades that would satisfy the majority. Finally, the Washington

State Planning Council recommended that the Forest Service continue to manage the range
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under multiple-use principles, and strongly advised against the establishment of a new

national park in the Cascade Mountains. [43]

The planning council's report, though only a recommendation to the governor, did not defeat

the park by itself, but it did demonstrate that Washington residents were decidedly against a

new park, and without wide public support, the Park Service could not expect congressional

support for the park proposal. One of the main reasons the park proposal could not expect

support, as the planning council stressed, was that a Cascades park would preclude resource

development. The Columbia River hydroelectric projects, such as the nearly completed Grand

Coulee Dam, would supply energy through electrical distribution networks to tap into the

range's "great storehouse of raw materials." New Deal conservation was characterized by a

holistic view of natural resources and society in which comprehensive planning integrated the

needs of society with wise stewardship of the environment. However, preserving natural

resources in a national park seemed antithetical to the broader benefits of multiple-purpose

dams, for they would provide cheap electricity and regional development by reclaiming desert

lands for farming, providing flood control, and thus aiding a disadvantaged population during

the environmental and economic disasters of the 1930s. [44]

Although preservation also had its place in the broader scheme of conservation in the New

Deal, the National Park Service was not very successful in conveying this message for the

Cascades. In part, the hard feelings generated over the establishment and subsequent

expansion of Olympic National Park in the late 1930s only served to solidify opposition to a

new park in the Cascades. Furthermore, the Olympic situation pointed toward Harold Ickes,

who had been instrumental in that park's creation. Silent on the Ice Peaks proposal, Ickes

denied any knowledge of it prior to the release of the study committee reports. Nevertheless,

critics of the proposed park suspected Ickes was directing the Ice Peaks study, scheming

behind closed doors to gain control of the Forest Service. Indeed, Ickes wanted the northern

Cascades under Park Service management, perhaps as a consolation prize since it was

becoming clear his new department would not be created. In August 1940, he abandoned the

park idea for the range after the Cascades study met so much resistance, and directed Park

Service officials to draw up plans for a national recreation area that would encompass a

similar area, permitting hunting, fishing, prospecting and mining, and water conservation

projects. Only in this way, he concluded, would the scenic resources of the high Cascades be

liberated from Forest Service management, which "does not recognize the importance of one

resource more than another." [45]

In the end, the curmudgeonly secretary of the interior proved to be a liability to the proposed

Ice Peaks park. Goaded by Miller Freeman, editor of the Mining World and planning council

member, Ickes openly criticized the planning council's study as having a Forest Service bias.

In an August 1940 letter to Freeman's journal, he charged that the council had suppressed

material on the park proposal (in particular Ickes' concessions to mining), fomented

opposition to the study at its public meetings, and expanded its study to include resources in

five national forests, giving the public the impression that the park would be much larger than

proposed. The exchange eventually drew the response of President Roosevelt who defended

his administration's conservation record and Ickes himself. Nevertheless, park critics did not

trust Ickes. A year later, while in the Pacific Northwest, Ickes pledged that he would not seek

to establish another park in Washington, yet he still maintained that he would like to see

recreation areas created, presumably in the Cascades. Individuals like Freeman interpreted

this as a thinly veiled attempt to accomplish an earlier agenda, to transfer management of the

northern Cascades from the Forest Service to the Park Service. In this political climate,

neither a national park nor a recreation area managed by the Park Service would find any

public support. [46] With the nation's entrance into World War II, the Ice Peaks proposal

faded from sight, an orphan of the New Deal.
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***

By 1941 the Ice Peaks proposal had been roundly defeated. Moreover, with Marshall dead

and Silcox following shortly thereafter, two strong wilderness advocates within the Forest

Service were gone. In their absence, the agency relaxed the wilderness classification for the

North Cascades, noting that the North Cascades Primitive Area provided enough wilderness

and that the area Marshall proposed as wilderness never had been approved officially. In

addition, the regional forester pointed out that the northern section of Marshall's study area

contained the potential for mining operations near Cascade Pass and the possibility of a

cross-mountain highway in this vicinity. He thus returned this part of the range to regular

multiple-use management. In 1946, instead of creating a wilderness area, the bureau set aside

a more modest area of 325,000 acres, the Glacier Peak Limited Area, which granted the

region wilderness-type protection but delayed permanent classification until later. [47]

At midcentury, despite its lack of formal wilderness classification, the North Cascades were

still one of the most unknown and virtually undeveloped sections of a nation undergoing

rapid population and economic growth after World War II. This growth seemed destined to

consume the last expanses of American wilderness for material gain. Thus when wilderness

preservationists gathered forces in the postwar era, they perceived in Washington's northern

Cascades one of the country's "most untouched primeval regions," a sanctuary from the

complicated life of modern society, "one of the country's last and perhaps its greatest." [48]

Although these words echoed those of Bob Marshall, they were spoken with a greater

intensity, a greater sense of urgency, and by larger numbers of concerned Americans.

As the historian Samuel P. Hays has suggested, World War II and its aftermath gave rise to a

new generation of Americans who valued the natural world as an amenity of life rather than

a commodity for the marketplace. In their minds, preserving the North Cascades as an

unaltered wilderness was more important than any kind of natural resource development.

Vast social changes in the postwar era underpinned this evolution of popular attitudes

towards nature. Rising standards of living, increasing income levels, and growing numbers of

Americans attaining higher levels of education helped foster these new environmental values;

they were the foundation for the postwar environmental movement and the source of

conflicts with the more traditional conservation values that stressed the efficient use of

resources. As more middle-class Americans worried less about daily living needs, they

expressed a greater concern about their quality of life, which was increasingly linked to the

pursuit of the natural world beyond crowded and polluted cities. Their new attitudes were a

driving force in why they sought the enjoyment of life's "amenities," according to Hays, in

vacations to the nation's forests, parks, and wilderness areas. Yearning to experience natural

beauty and escape urban spaces strengthened their support for wildlife protection and

wilderness preservation. [49]

The best example of this new concern arose out of the national debates over the future of the

nation's remaining wilderness areas, the most significant conservation victory coming in 1956

when conservationists won a hard-fought battle to defeat the Echo Park Dam in Dinosaur

National Monument, what historian Roderick Nash has called the American wilderness

movement's "finest hour to that date." The Echo Park victory signaled the emergence of a

new era in the nation's environmental history, for it not only justified the importance of

preserving national parks and wilderness but also marked the growing public support and

political clout needed to ensure the preservation of the nation's wild lands. The Echo Park

controversy brought together nearly eighty organizations into a national movement and gave

national exposure to those groups most closely associated with parks and wilderness, namely

the National Parks Association, the Wilderness Society, and the Sierra Club. Afterwards, the

Wilderness Society revived the campaign for a national wilderness system, and the Sierra

Club achieved a new public image as a hard-hitting, uncompromising national conservation
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group, under the leadership of its executive director, David Brower. [50]

In the years after World War II, the northern Cascades seemed far removed from the

pressures affecting the nation's wild lands, the congestion of its cities, and the explosion of

highway construction and car ownership. An estimated fifty-two million automobiles were

on the road in the middle of the decade, many of them packing the nation's parks, but the

range appeared unaffected; it epitomized the geography of wilderness. It seemed to raise an

impenetrable shield to progress, turning back numerous road projects since the turn of the

century, leaving the heart of the range a wild country so primitive and vast that it seemed

forever new and waiting to be explored. Indeed, even the Beat Generation's most potent

symbol of car culture, Jack Kerouac, reached the end of the road here in the summer of 1956,

when he came to work as a fire lookout on Desolation Peak. [51]

More compelling proof could be found in the community of Stehekin. In the second half of

the twentieth century, no road reached it (though a unimproved road ran the length of the

valley). Stehekin was much as it had been in the late nineteenth century. Some thirty yearround residents inhabited the lower ten miles of the Stehekin River Valley and lived mostly

subsistence lifestyles, hunting, gardening, and bartering. Here in an age of sweeping change a

fragment of the frontier persisted in mythical proportions -- a remote, preindustrial world,

isolated from progress. As one admirer noted romantically, nature seemed in control here,

and for this reason Stehekin remained beyond the modern highway, automobiles, and thus

"the currents of American life racing past the mountain barriers around it." [52]

In the 1950s, however, the Forest Service shattered this illusion when it began to reevaluate

national forests, including the North Cascades, to meet the demands of the postwar housing

boom and the pressures of a rising population. For the first time, the range seemed vulnerable

as the agency considered a variety of uses for the region, including timber harvests, mining,

construction of a cross-mountain highway over Cascade Pass, as well as wilderness

classification for the Glacier Peak Limited Area. In the postwar planning for the greatest

production and wisest use of the nation's limited supply of natural resources, the Forest

Service would ultimately decide how much of the North Cascades would be thrown open to

development and how much would remain as wilderness. This new turn of events forced

conservationists to consider how best to protect the northern Cascades as one of the nation's

finest alpine wildernesses -- national forest or national park?

At first the Forest Service seemed to be the logical choice for preserving the wilderness of the

North Cascades. It had managed the region since early in the century, after all. Foresters like

Bob Marshall had pioneered its wilderness philosophy, and Marshall himself had proposed a

vast wilderness for the range. Yet there were reasons to question the bureau's commitment to

wilderness management in the 1950s. To conservationists, the Forest Service's multiple-use

policy, though it implied managing forests for a balance of timber, range, water, wildlife,

recreation, and other resources, seemed to favor timber harvests over wilderness preservation.

Under the leadership of Chief Forester Richard McArdle and during a Republican

administration, the bureau prepared to meet society's demands for wood by adopting a more

aggressive management style. This involved cooperating with private industry, "upping the

cut" on national forests to operate the agency in the black, building logging roads for timber

access, and conducting a timber resources review to assess the future of the nation's timber

supply, which, it concluded, could only be maintained through intensive management. [53]

David Brower and the Sierra Club worked hard to have the agency guarantee wilderness

protection in its management plans, but a series of confrontations, highlighted by the

reduction of Oregon's Three Sisters Primitive Area for logging, led them to conclude that the

Forest Service could not be trusted to protect wilderness permanently. Even under the "U

regulations," which provided stricter wilderness protection, wilderness was still an
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administrative measure and often viewed as a temporary classification employed until an area

was ready to log. In 1955, during the clash over the Three Sisters, McArdle informed Brower

that wilderness constituted only one kind of recreational use. It was restrictive and enjoyed by

a relatively small number of people, and to make wilderness a permanent classification would

not be in the interests of society's current needs. Therefore, in the spirit of multiple use, the

service would designate as wilderness only those areas that had the slightest commercial

values and where wilderness represented "the highest form of public use." This policy, as

conservationists witnessed, informed the agency's decision to redraw the boundaries around

the Three Sisters Primitive Area to exclude lands for timber harvests, leaving just the high

country of rocks and ice as wilderness. [54]

In 1956, the Forest Service unveiled similar plans for Glacier Peak in Washington's North

Cascades. Especially alarming were proposals to open timber sales in the Stehekin Valley

and the Agnes Creek drainage and to build a road down Bridge Creek to the Stehekin Valley

once a cross-mountain highway was constructed. Alerted to the crisis, Pacific Northwest

conservation groups, such as the Mountaineers and Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs,

joined forces with the Sierra Club (which had opened its first chapter in the region in 1954)

to lobby the Forest Service to expand its Glacier Peak wilderness study to include all of Bob

Marshall's original proposal. In this way they sought to prevent the destruction of this pristine

country and ensure "the preservation of the maximum wilderness area." [55]

Conservation groups favored diplomacy initially because they feared that a confrontation with

the bureau might compromise the progress of the recently introduced national wilderness bill.

They also believed that Marshall's legacy was strong; it held out a glimmer of hope that the

Forest Service might honor his memory in its wilderness study. The Wilderness Society, for

example, kept Marshall's interest in the North Cascades alive after World War II by featuring

the region in its house organ, The Living Wilderness, reminding readers that the fate of this

magnificent country was still undecided but pressured by a modern society. As early as 1949,

the society urged the Forest Service to reopen the study of the Glacier Peak wilderness,

outlined by Marshall. Though the service deferred reclassifying the area, conservationists,

such as the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, continued to petition the bureau for a

similar study in the mid-1950s. In 1956, Seattle's Mountaineers even submitted its own study

and recommendations to the bureau requesting that the Forest Service consider Marshall's

"far-reaching wisdom" in the boundaries he chose for its wilderness evaluation. [56]

The Mountaineers' proposal emphasized Marshall's ideal of wilderness. In a mechanized

society with a swelling population, it was important to set aside a region that was unscarred

by logging and "unencumbered by roads" so Americans could "gain the pioneer feeling of

isolation and adventure so necessary for retention of sanity in our day and age." The

boundaries embraced all of the Glacier Peak country's magnificent beauty -- from its lowland

forests to its rugged alpine peaks -- and extended protection to those areas the Forest Service

had earlier excluded for resource developments. Although the primary reason for contesting

the Forest Service's plans was to protect the virgin forests in the river valleys approaching the

high country of the North Cascades, mining was especially troubling. The bureau could not

legally prevent it in wilderness and typically drew wilderness boundaries to avoid conflicts

with future mining developments. Nevertheless, Philip Zalesky, author of the Mountaineers'

report on Glacier Peak, concluded that the wilderness boundary should include all of

Marshall's original acreage "regardless of any previous conjectures made concerning ore

bodies." Wilderness values "should be allowed to stand on their own merit." [57]

Marshall's memory and his conception of the North Cascades as a true wilderness, however,

were not enough to persuade Forest Service officials to expand their study. Regional Forester

J. Herbert Stone, not known for his love of wilderness, decided to evaluate only the existing

limited area -- because mining, timber, and highway construction had been the main reasons
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for reducing Marshall's recommendation in the first place. The agency's preliminary report,

issued on February 7, 1957, confirmed what conservationists had come to expect from the

Forest Service. As Grant McConnell wrote, for all its friendly talk about "non-market values,"

the Forest Service was still the Forest Service and was "mainly concerned about the

maximization of cellulose." The Glacier Peak wilderness report recommended an area of

434,000 acres. While larger than the limited area, it excluded the Stehekin-Cascade Pass

region from wilderness and at the same time called for roads up many of the range's forested

river valleys for logging and roadside recreation, all of which demonstrated that, just as in the

Three Sisters study, the agency valued the forests of the North Cascades more for the market

than for wilderness recreation. [58]

Fresh from its victory at Dinosaur, the Sierra Club mounted a similar, yet smaller, campaign

to force the Forest Service to reconsider its position, using the most effective tool in the

embryonic wilderness movement -- publicity -- to raise the issue to a national level. Like

Dinosaur's fantastically-shaped canyons, the North Cascades were an unknown wilderness

jewel certain to be lost before Americans even knew what they had. Through pamphlets,

illustrated articles in the Sierra Club Bulletin, and high country trips, the Sierra Club sent this

message to the nation. The Wilderness Society, among other groups, also gave the issue

coverage and even held its 1957 annual meeting below Glacier Peak, as the society's leader,

Howard Zahniser noted, "to deliberate on the future of wilderness." Brower, who had

captivated the public with dramatic images and descriptions of wilderness during the

Dinosaur fight, built on this theme in his film, "Wilderness Alps of Stehekin." Released in

1958, the short color film featured children hiking through the high country in pillars of

sunlight with "America the Beautiful" playing in the background. Similar to Brower's film

about Dinosaur, "Wilderness Alps of Stehekin" became quite popular, was shown widely by

local conservation groups, and circulated to public officials and members of Congress. In

addition, the Glacier Peak cause received national coverage when stories appeared in Sunset

Magazine and the New York Times, when Ansel Adams photographed the northern Cascades

for a display in New York, and when U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas drew

attention to it through his own wilderness travels and writings. [59]

All of these works conveyed the message that the fate of the range's incredible scenery and

unspoiled wilderness hung in the balance of the Forest Service's short-sighted plans. The

issues at stake in the North Cascades were the same as those facing the country's remaining

wild lands in postwar America. Their future was now, and the Sierra Club, based on an

intensive study of the region by David Simons, asserted that the bureau should consider the

range in the interest of the nation rather than local saw mills. Only by using qualitative rather

than quantitative values, however, could the Forest Service serve the national interest and

preserve the range's highest values -- its scenic and wilderness qualities. And this could only

happen, as activists like Grant McConnell argued, if the Forest Service reformed the rather

outmoded policy of multiple use to reflect these values. Otherwise wilderness lovers could

not expect to see the northern Cascades preserved. [60]

In 1959, McConnell's prediction seemed to come true. That year the Forest Service released a

revised proposal for the Glacier Peak wilderness of 422,925 acres, a reduction of

approximately 11,000 acres from its first plan. This revised plan called for even deeper

indentations into the "wilderness core" in order to extend roads farther up the valleys of the

Suiattle and Chiwawa rivers and Railroad Creek. The new boundaries incised the wilderness

area from the west and east, giving it the appearance of a starfish, easily severed at its center

by roads. Regional Forester Stone explained that these new boundaries were in "harmony

with the multiple-use concept of national forest management." When constructed the roads

would provide greater access to the wilderness area, markedly increase roadside recreation in

the valleys leading to the wilderness, and allow access to patented mining claims. [61]
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Stone's plan sent a clear message to members of the Sierra Club, Wilderness Society,

Mountaineers, and the recently formed North Cascades Conservation Council: the agency

had lost its way in its dedication to wilderness preservation. "Where are the blazes with

which Bob Marshall marked the trail toward wilderness?" asked David Brower after the plan

was released. How was the trail "so obviously, so tragically lost as to permit the present

Glacier Peak proposal ever to emerge from the agency he served so well?" [62] In the fall of

1959, the Forest Service held two public hearings on the plan in Wenatchee and Bellingham.

Over one hundred people testified, and greater than half favored the Mountaineers' proposal.

The Mountaineers spoke for many wilderness activists when they called the plan and its new

excisions "a mockery" of the idea of wilderness conceived by more wilderness-minded

foresters like Marshall. Although the testimony and protests of conservationists had no effect

on the regional forester's final decision, a flood of nearly one thousands letters protesting the

plan reached Secretary of Agriculture Ezra T. Benson, which evidently influenced his

decision. Before officially approving the area on September 6, 1960, he added Agnes Creek

and the Suiattle River corridor to the final wilderness boundaries, bringing the total to

458,505 acres, and directed that the Cascade Pass-Stehekin River country should be managed,

primarily, for scenic recreation. [63]

This final concession did little to assuage conservationists. Quite to the contrary, it cemented

their decision to propose a national park for the North Cascades. In this way they could

preserve all of the range proposed by Marshall for wilderness. Wilderness advocates had

debated the park idea since the beginning of the Glacier Peak study but chose to wait for the

Forest Service's decision. On the one hand, the idea of preserving the range as a national

park, while not new, illustrated the extent to which wilderness activists had grown

disenchanted with the Forest Service's wilderness policies in the late 1950s. A park seemed to

offer the most practical alternative to saving the wilderness of the North Cascades. Under the

Forest Service, wilderness received only administrative protection and therefore the agency

was not accountable to Congress and the American people. National parks, however,

represented the nation's premier form of scenic preservation; parks were legally bound to

protect wilderness, for the most part, by their enabling legislation and the Park Service's

Organic Act. On the other hand, the park choice raised the question of whether the Park

Service could preserve the range as true wilderness. Or would the agency, as Bob Marshall

had predicted, drive "roads into its heart."

It was this last point conservation groups grappled with before backing the park proposal.

Preservationists had reason to be hopeful that the North Cascades would become the nation's

"greatest wilderness parkland." As the historian Mark Harvey suggests, the Dinosaur victory

"resoundingly reaffirmed" the sanctity of the national park system -- strengthening the Park

Service's unimpaired doctrine of 1916 -- and firmly associated the protection of national

parks with wilderness preservation in the public mind. But they also had reason to be

cautious. The irony of victory was that while wilderness defenders strengthened parks to

outside threats, the real threats to parks were coming from within during the postwar travel

boom. Public appreciation and support of parks came with a price. It was the old dilemma of

preservation and use but in proportions far greater than during the Park Service's publicity

campaigns of the 1920s. In 1946, nearly twenty-three million tourists visited the national

park system, up nearly 40 percent from before the war. By the mid-1950s, that figure had

almost doubled, with close to 100 percent of park visitors entering the parks in automobiles.

To make matters worse, the parks were not prepared to handle such a deluge of tourists. The

parks faced a crisis; the war years had left them underfunded and understaffed, and their

facilities rundown. In 1956, the Park Service answered the crisis with Mission 66, a ten-year,

billion dollar development program to bring park facilities up to standards. [64]

The major emphasis of the program, preservationists observed, was to improve the parks for

the motoring masses rather than to uphold the high standard of wilderness purity. Mission 66,
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for example, expanded the carrying capacity of national parks to handle an estimated eighty

million automobile tourists by the agency's fiftieth anniversary (1966) by adding more

overnight accommodations, building visitor centers, and constructing park roads. David

Brower and other Sierra Club leaders denounced the program, championed by Park Service

Director Conrad Wirth, as antithetical to wilderness preservation in national parks because it

emphasized too much development. They cited highly controversial highway projects, such

as the Tioga Pass Road in Yosemite, as examples of the program's insensitivity to wilderness

protection.

While Wirth defended such projects as well planned and necessary for better access and

safety, he also tried to disarm his critics through a promotional campaign that portrayed

Mission 66 as "a wilderness preservation program," stressing that "clearly" national parks

were meant to "preserve wilderness values" and that the program's developments would

provide a form of wilderness protection by relieving the pressures inflicted on park resources

by the flood of auto tourists and simultaneously increasing public use as a means to justify

preservation. Wirth's promotion, however, rang of the Park Service's old formula for success,

and convinced few conservationists that Mission 66 would advance park preservation. [65]

Curiously, at the same time Brower and other wilderness activists were criticizing the Park

Service's redevelopment program and the threat it posed to wilderness, they were also

pushing for a national park to protect the wilderness of the northern Cascades. By the time

the final Forest Service plan appeared for Glacier Peak, however, preservationists had come

to terms with the paradoxes associated with national park management, and were in general

agreement that a national park for the North Cascades represented the best way to protect the

range as a wilderness sanctuary. [66]

Perhaps one of the most important exchanges about the park decision took place between

Grant McConnell and David Brower in 1958. While it was true that the Park Service had its

problems of tourists hordes and overdevelopment, McConnell noted, it could provide the kind

of permanent protection for the region which the Forest Service could not. Without concern

for commercial resource use, the Park Service could protect the range's forests, prevent

mining (especially with the Kennecott Mining Company's interests on Miners Ridge near

Glacier Peak), and design roads and developments that were sensitive to scenic preservation

rather than focused on clearcuts. McConnell also knew that a national park could embrace

Stehekin and the valley road omitted from Forest Service plans. Finally, because of

campaigns like the one that saved Dinosaur, the general public would be more mobilized to

support a national park for the range; parks were more widely understood and cherished than

Forest Service wilderness areas. Thus, McConnell concluded, given the Forest Service's

Glacier Peak proposal, a "National park for the Northern Cascades is the only genuine and

possible solution to the area's problems." [67]

Brower agreed. Contradicting his earlier criticism of the Park Service's Mission 66 program,

he stated that "this wrath comes from an honest difference of opinion between groups of

people working for the same goal -- preservation of national parks and their primary asset of

wilderness." True, Brower acknowledged, the Mission 66 program "is a construction

program," but, echoing Conrad Wirth, "the NPS constructs to preserve -- just as the National

Gallery had to be constructed to preserve." Moreover, the Park Service could protect the area

proposed for wilderness by Marshall (and the Mountaineers) just as it had in Kings Canyon,

and unlike the Forest Service make the declaration last. "We have the tremendous advantage,

working with the Park Service, of knowing that all of us seek the same ends -- sustenance for

the national soul, not the local mill." [68]

By early 1959, the National Parks Association, Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, the

Sierra Club, North Cascades Conservation Council, the Mountaineers, and the Cascadians
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had endorsed a national park for the North Cascades, generally, and requested that the Forest

Service suspend its study and invite the Park Service to study the range for its national park

caliber. [69] Bolstering its case, the Sierra Club introduced David Simons' study of the North

Cascades entitled "The Need for Scenic Resource Conservation in the Northern Cascades of

Washington." Simons argued for a national park of some 1.3 million acres, expanding

Marshall's original boundaries to include the lowland forests on the west and east sides of the

range, most of Lake Chelan, the Cascade Pass-Stehekin River country, and Harts Pass. The

Forest Service, however, refused conservationists' requests stating that it was fully qualified

to assess all of the range's values. [70]

The Forest Service's refusal spoke to its long-standing jurisdictional rivalry with the Park

Service over the status of the nation's pristine lands. More specifically, the study proposal

reopened old wounds dating back to the Ice Peaks study of the late 1930s, which would make

any concessions on the part of the Forest Service slim. For their part conservationists

believed they were on solid ground with their park proposal and quoted repeatedly from the

1937 report that a national park in the northern Cascades "would outrank in its scenic,

recreational, and wildlife values, any existing national park and any other possibility for such

a park within the United States." Park advocates used this observation as irrefutable evidence

of the range's park caliber. Ironically, they were trying to protect the wilderness Bob

Marshall had wanted to save using the same Park Service study he had opposed. Only now, it

seemed, Marshall's agency had abandoned his ideals and it was left to the Park Service and

the creation of a national park to realize his vision.

As the Dinosaur campaign had proven, a national park symbolized the nation's wilderness

heritage and the public's growing involvement in its preservation. Thus conservationists

banked on a national park's widespread popular appeal to bring about the park study. But the

park study issue dragged on for several years and evolved into one of the most hotly debated

and politicized topics of the burgeoning environmental movement of the late 1950s and early

1960s.

The poor relations between the Forest Service and Park Service continued to characterize the

issue. In March 1959, Washington Congressman Thomas Pelly intervened on behalf of

conservation groups and asked the Park Service to conduct a study of the range, only to be

told by Director Conrad Wirth that his agency could not embark on such a project without the

Forest Service's permission, according to legal statute. Both Chief Forester Richard McArdle

and Agriculture Secretary Benson ignored the Park Service and secretary of the interior's

requests for a joint study, and it was half a year later before McArdle replied to Pelly denying

his request. McArdle stated, in a rather lengthy letter, that his bureau's fifty-year management

history served as enough reason for his rejection, as did the 1936 Recreation Area Study Act

which, essentially, exempted Forest Service lands from investigations by the Park Service

without the former agency's permission. For his part, Wirth bridled at McArdle's snub and his

public comments against a park in the North Cascades. He informed the interior secretary that

he had sought assistance in good faith but "had not had the courtesy of a reply." [71]

At this point, the park struggle entered the political arena and moved beyond the control of

the Forest Service. Expressing great disappointment in the Forest Service's decision,

Congressman Pelly continued to press the study issue, and with the assistance of the Interior

Department and leaders of the North Cascades park campaign introduced legislation in the

next two sessions of Congress to initiate a Park Service study of the range. Although Pelly's

legislation died, it served notice that there was growing grassroots support across the nation

for a national park study in the North Cascades. In 1961 the North Cascades Conservation

Council presented Pelly a petition containing nearly 22,000 signatures from almost every

state in the union in favor of a park study. [72] That same year, Washington's senators,

Warren G. Magnuson and Henry M. Jackson, prevailed on Orville L. Freeman, the new
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Secretary of Agriculture in John F. Kennedy's administration, to develop a forest

management plan for the area north of the Glacier Peak Wilderness, among other disputed

regions in their state. [73]

To this end, Freeman imposed a moratorium on logging in the region on June 7, 1961, until

the Forest Service had conducted a long-range management plan. But this only brought

temporary relief. In March 1962, when the Forest Service released its high mountain

management policy for Washington's Cascade Mountains, it confirmed conservationists'

belief that the bureau's intent was logging not scenic preservation. The plan proposed to

create landscape management areas in which limited commercial logging would continue in

the approach valleys and high country of the North Cascades, provided that clear cuts (or

"patch cuts") were designed in such a way that panoramic scenery appeared unimpaired from

roads and trails. But after examining the plan closely, conservationists criticized the Forest

Service for placing too much emphasis on timber harvests and failing to protect some of the

most impressive views of the range. Leaders in the park campaign believed that if they were

to have any chance at preserving the North Cascades as a national park, they would have to

prevent the Forest Service from ruining the range's spectacular scenery beforehand. In June,

Pelly once more asked Freeman to impose a moratorium on logging -- this time below four

thousand feet in twenty key valleys and to suspend any long-term development projects in

the region -- until a national park study could be completed. But now, with the high

mountain policy in hand, the secretary denied the request, noting that half of the area's on

Pelly's list would not be developed for the next five years, but the remaining areas would.

[74]

In the early 1960s, the Forest Service's resistance to the park study ran counter to the urgency

expressed by increasing numbers of Americans demanding the preservation of more wild

lands and a clean environment. Groups such as the Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, and

Audubon Society were aggressively pursuing preservation, gaining in membership, and

becoming a formidable political influence. In 1958, Congress had created the Outdoor

Recreation Resources Review Commission to study the recreational needs of the nation, and

many of the recommendations in its 1962 report would form the basis for the establishment

of new recreation areas, national seashores and parks throughout the decade. Ecology also

emerged as a household word, and the health of humans and their relationship to the natural

world came into sharper and sometimes shocking focus. Published in 1962, Rachel Carson's

Silent Spring set the tone for modern environmentalism by pointing out the potential human

health hazards associated with pesticide use and the necessity of environmental protection.

The following year, Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall raised the level of national

consciousness about environmental stewardship with the publication of The Quiet Crisis,

which traced the history of the American conservation movement and set a program for the

future. As Kennedy's Interior Secretary, Udall had embarked on one of the most ambitious

conservation programs of the postwar era, dedicated, with Kennedy's blessing, to wilderness

preservation and expansion of the national park system. [75]

In 1963, the North Cascades study moved to center stage in the Kennedy administration's

conservation program when two of its priority items, the wilderness bill and the land and

water conservation fund, were delayed in Congress. Looking for public support of a

conservation program that seemed stalled, Kennedy was able to announce in February that

both Freeman and Udall had achieved a "milestone in conservation progress." The previous

month, the two secretaries had agreed to settle many long-standing jurisdictional disputes

between the Forest Service and Park Service, what was informally called the "Treaty of the

Potomac." One of the key components featured in this "new era of cooperation" was a joint

study by the two departments to determine whether the North Cascades merited national park

status. Shortly thereafter, the five-member study team, composed of two representatives of

the Department of Agriculture and three of the Department of the Interior, embarked on an
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investigation which lasted some two and a half years. [76]

In their letter to Edward C. Crafts, chairman of the study team, the secretaries related that the

study team's mission was to investigate all federal lands in Washington's North Cascade

Mountains from Washington Pass north to the Canadian border "to determine the

management and administration of those lands that will best serve the public interest." While

they recognized they had handed Crafts "a complex, difficult, and controversial assignment,"

they were anxious that the study team arrive at recommendations that were "soundly based

and in the interest of the people of the area, the State of Washington, the region, and the

United States." [77] It was a rather daunting task. Consider the six major issues the study

team outlined:

1. Should there be a new national park?

2. How much wilderness is enough?

3. How best to provide for the more conventional types of recreation desired by

the great mass of people?

4. How to reconcile national and local interests when the two appear to conflict?

5. How to utilize and manage the timber resources in harmony with other

multiple uses of the area?

6. The extent to which scenic roads should be an essential ingredient in making

the North Cascades available to large numbers of people. [78]

Consider also the public interest in the outcome of the study. Park and wilderness advocates

wanted the maximum amount of the North Cascades preserved, whereas traditional resource

industries such as timber and mining supported continued multiple-use management under

the Forest Service as the optimum way to secure their economic growth. Likewise, outdoor

recreation groups such as hunters, skiers, boaters, fishermen, and off-road vehicle users

wanted their interests ensured as well in the final outcome; and similarly, Seattle City Light

worried that wilderness or park classifications would interfere with its existing and future

projects on the Skagit River. Local communities dependent on the timber economy also

worried about their futures and how they would support services such as public schools. And

finally, Washington State had a large stake in the investigation, with concerns ranging from

fish and wildlife management to highway construction. The team held public hearings in

Seattle, Wenatchee, and Mount Vernon in October 1963 to introduce the study. By the time

the hearing record was closed on November 15, nearly 2,600 people had given oral or written

statements; an overwhelming majority favored establishing a national park in the North

Cascades. The turnout and written statements foreshadowed future hearings as the park

moved toward completion.

An important contribution to the record and the argument for a national park was the

submission of the North Cascades Conservation Council's Prospectus for a North Cascades

National Park. The council by now had become the lead group heading up the park campaign

and the Prospectus presented a solid case for establishing a park for the first time. Edited by

Michael McCloskey, a lawyer, Northwest conservation representative for the Sierra Club, and

consultant to the North Cascades Conservation Council, the document reflected McCloskey's

belief that conservationists needed a clear policy statement if they were to court public

opinion for the park cause. The 120-page document detailed the national park quality of the

range, the inadequacies of Forest Service management, the advantages of Park Service

management, the economic benefits a park would bring through tourism, and draft legislation

for a park that would encompass an area similar to the one identified by David Simons in the
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late 1950s. The park would set aside some 1.3 million acres from roughly the Skagit River

south to Stevens Pass, including all of the highly scenic areas left unprotected in Forest

Service management plans, as well as the Glacier Peak Wilderness Area. Moreover, the park

legislation, written by McCloskey, set down guidelines for minimizing conflicts with existing

commodity uses, such as the well-established sport hunting industry located on the eastern

side of the range. For this reason the legislation offered a large park and a "Chelan Mountain

Recreation Area," of some 270,000 acres, where hunting would be permitted. The draft bill

was also very specific about how the Secretary of the Interior could acquire private land,

manage the park, compensate local counties suffering temporary economic hardships from

reduced timber sales, and provide local residents employment opportunities in the park's

management. [79]

The document represented a significant advance in conservation crusades because it provided

not only a policy statement but a blueprint for action on the part of elected and agency

officials. By the end of 1964, the Prospectus had won the endorsement of all conservation

groups involved in the North Cascades campaign. However, it would take more to join the

two feuding bureaus in a united vision for the future of the North Cascades. The North

Cascades Study Team may have constituted a major advance in land-use planning and was a

major achievement in park movement, but the wide-ranging study had at its center the park

question and ultimately this proved to be its most divisive issue. [80]

As the team's recommendations suggest, the park issue continued to reflect the jurisdictional

dispute between two powerful federal agencies. Intensely loyal to their agencies, the team

members found no common ground on the park proposal. The Forest Service recommended

retaining the region north of Cascade Pass under its jurisdiction and voted against creating a

new national park in the region. Instead of a park, it proposed managing the area under

current management policies with more emphasis on recreation. It advanced its recent plan to

designate this much-disputed section as the Eldorado Peaks High Country of 537,000 acres, a

more formal plan based on its high mountain policy and the Secretary of Agriculture's 1960

directive for the creation of the Glacier Peak Wilderness. The bureau reaffirmed its

commitment to manage this country, cherished by wilderness preservationists, primarily for

its scenic values but also "to open it up and develop it for the use and enjoyment of the large

numbers of people who desire other kinds of outdoor recreation and those unable to engage

in wilderness travel." In addition, it proposed some small additions to the northern section of

the Glacier Peak Wilderness of some 20,000 acres, the creation of the North Cascades

Wilderness Area, 813,000 acres, from the former primitive area by the same name, and

continued maintenance of the Mount Baker Recreation Area. [81]

On the other hand, the Park Service recommended the establishment of two new national

parks -- one centered around Mount Baker and the Picket Range west of Ross Lake and from

the Skagit River north to the Canadian border, and the other centered around Glacier Peak. It

also proposed creating its own recreation area -- the Eldorado-Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area -- encompassing the Eldorado Peaks country, the upper third of Lake

Chelan, and the region extending southeastward to the southern end of the Glacier Peak

Wilderness. The agency also recommended reclassifying the portion of the North Cascades

Primitive Area east of Ross Lake as the Okanogan Wilderness (managed by the Forest

Service). In addition, the agency's proposal envisioned extending protection to some of the

highly scenic areas surrounding these new areas; developing a scenic road system in the

North Cascades, which included a road down the eastern shore of Ross Lake to connect to

Highway 20 when it was finished; and using some new forms of transportation, such as

tramways, funiculars, and helicopters as well as the development of appropriate facilities, to

enable more tourists to visit the new parkland and see its incredible beauty.

The study team's chairman wrote the compromise proposal. Ed Crafts, the director of the
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recently created Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of the Interior, had been a

career employee with the Forest Service for nearly thirty years, ten as assistant chief. He

knew well the contentious relations between the Forest Service and Park Service, yet Udall

and Freeman had agreed on his appointment based on his experience with both of their

departments. Moreover, while Crafts recognized that the question of a national park in the

North Cascades was "undoubtedly the most controversial" issue the study team addressed, he

believed that it deserved a resolution.

Thus in drafting the final report, he proposed creating a park that both sides might accept.

Totaling 698,000 acres, the new park would extend south from the Canadian border to several

miles below the head of Lake Chelan, including Mount Shuksan, Ross and Diablo lakes (as

well as the associated Seattle City Light operations), the Picket Range, the Eldorado Peaks

country, and the Stehekin Valley. In Crafts' opinion, the North Cascades deserved national

park status without question, for the range possessed "superlative mountain features" that

would make it "one of the most outstanding units" in the park system. But physical and

scenic characteristics were among a "great many factors" contributing to the park

recommendation. First, there was the statutory protection a park would provide for the range.

Second, there was "the need for making the area available to significant numbers of people"

by developing the area for "mass recreation use" and providing "adequate access" by "road,

trail, water, and air." Third, a park would cause minimal adverse impact on resources such as

timber. Fourth, a park's stature would bring economic benefits to the region through tourism.

And finally, there was the relationship of the park proposal to the other recommendations.

That is, there was more at stake than creating or not creating a park; the study team made

twenty-one recommendations for future management of the range, all of which represented

an interrelated whole. Among these were the establishment of new wilderness areas (along

the range and bordering the proposed park), the enlargement of the Glacier Peak Wilderness,

and the continued multiple-use management of existing forests under Forest Service

management, as well as the expansion of Mount Rainier National Park.

Nevertheless, Crafts noted that this recommendation was "not unanimous among the team."

Team members revealed their criticism of the park proposal in their comments on the report's

final draft in the latter part of 1965. National Park Service Director George Hartzog, Jr., for

example, responded in an agreeable tone, assenting to the inclusion of the Eldorado Peaks

country in the national park and the continued Forest Service management of Glacier Peak as

wilderness under the stricter provisions of the recently passed Wilderness Act of 1964. But

he strongly disagreed with Crafts' exclusion of Mount Baker, stating it had long been

recognized as having national park caliber; it was necessary for completing the geological

story of the range and important for developing visitor use facilities. Excluding Mount Baker

also eliminated the Nooksack River Valley, a corridor essential for visitor and administrative

developments and access to the western half of the park. [82]

Clearly, representatives of the Department of Agriculture objected to the park plan the most.

George Selke, for example, considered the park proposal "the height of folly." It did not

adequately assess the economic implications of the management changes. Selke disliked the

report's conclusion that tourism could somehow replace resource development. More

important, he resented the report's implication that a change of status, from forest to park,

automatically increased the value of the land and for that matter accorded it greater

protection. "The area has been preserved," Selke reminded Crafts, "largely because it was

designated as National Forest land and was administered by the Forest Service for over sixty

years." In addition, he stated that the park proposal would unfairly preclude hunting, remove

the Picket Range from wilderness management, and create a large national park that

Americans could only use seasonally, in the high country's short summers. [83]

Moreover, because the report recommended a national park, the Forest Service and the
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Secretary of Agriculture pressured Crafts and Udall to delay final publication of the report.

Late in 1965, Freeman wrote to Udall that "the draft I saw struck me as intended to promote

a national park. I do not agree that this is the best course in the resource interest of the

Nation. This is why we should talk about it before we wind up in open opposition." [84]

Freeman's letter allowed Agriculture's two team members, Selke and Forest Service Deputy

Chief Arthur W. Greeley, enough time to submit another statement to clarify the Department

of Agriculture's position. Once again, the Forest Service stated its opposition to a national

park: "We believe strongly that it is neither necessary nor desirable," Selke and Greeley

wrote, to have another national park in the North Cascades. "We think national emphasis can

be given to the recreation and scenic values of this area without establishing a duplicating

organization and administrative unit." Therefore, as an alternative, they recommended the

establishment of a North Cascades National Recreation Area, essentially replacing the

Eldorado Peaks High Country, with the addition of Ross Lake, covering 537,000 acres. On

either side of Ross Lake, they also proposed to establish a Picket Range Wilderness and a

Pasayten Wilderness. The new recreation area, they noted, would solve numerous land-use

issues for the present and future generations, much in the same way a national park would,

except on a much broader scale. As a national recreation area, the North Cascades would

receive "congressional recognition and a national name" without a management change. [85]

In response, Crafts wrote a strongly worded letter to Udall warning him to "stand firm" on

the report and "not to join with Freeman in his efforts to misrepresent, undermine, and

torpedo the North Cascades report." In the previous year, the Forest Service had broken the

team's agreement that the agencies involved would not attempt to influence public opinion on

the study area until the report was released; the Forest Service had conducted a statewide

publicity campaign about its long-range recreational planning for the Eldorado Peaks country,

especially once Highway 20 was completed. Furthermore, the study chairman stated, the

Department of Agriculture's statements were "inaccurate, slanted, misleading, and put the

main emphasis on a Recreation Area" which did not even appear in the report until "the last

minute Selke-Greeley letter." If Udall did not support the study report, Crafts threatened to

resign, for the secretary would undermine the bureau's influence and destroy any hope for a

national park. [86]

Udall held his ground and on January 6, 1966, the study report was released to the public.

Afterwards, conservationists expressed a cautious optimism about the park plan but openly

criticized what they saw as the proposal's inadequacies and the Park Service's development

plans for this wilderness sanctuary. They were disappointed, for example, that the study

report recommended a smaller park than the 1963 North Cascades Conservation Council's

proposal and the Park Service's recommendation in the study report. The compromise

proposal's most glaring omission was the Glacier Peak Wilderness -- "the most superb

section" of the range, deserving both park and wilderness protection since it still faced

mining development by Kennecott. They also questioned the "wretched precedent" of

including hydroelectric projects in national parks and the uniformly bad innovations of

tramways and helicopters, as well as traditional roads, to open up the park's high country.

The former provisions especially, they contended, were poorly conceived concessions to win

the support of the local tourist industry -- and "entirely contrary to the whole idea of parks as

natural preserves." One keen observer who supported the park plan in principle suggested

that in light of these provisions the agency needed to review the meaning of the national park

concept by rereading Thoreau, Muir, and Mather and "get back on the beam." [87]

The concept of what a national park should be, wilderness preserve or natural area modified

for public enjoyment, pervaded the arguments presented by conservation organizations as the

park campaign proceeded over the next several years. The North Cascades Conservation

Council, for example, wondered seriously about the Park Service's commitment to wilderness

preservation considering Hartzog's proposal to install trams and other facilities but more
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specifically the use of helicopters in the Picket Range to promote "mass wilderness

visitation." Council president Patrick Goldsworthy called these plans "a grave tactical error"

certain to rob the park plan of support among many conservationists and enlarge its

opposition. Goldsworthy's comments typified the general consensus among conservationists

who supported a park but also favored "wilderness just as strongly." William O. Douglas, in

fact, advocated protecting the Picket Range as a wilderness area in a national forest using the

1964 Wilderness Act to keep it roadless and remote. Thus, the wild range would receive

better protection and not be subjected to the current over-crowded conditions plaguing the

national parks. [88]

With the hard-fought battle for the Wilderness Act won, preservationists finally had the legal

support to protect wilderness lands inviolate. Perhaps the Forest Service instead of the Park

Service was better prepared to meet this objective. Doubts about the Park Service's cool

treatment of the Wilderness Act lingered in the minds of preservationists; the wording of the

act itself implied misgivings about the agency's wilderness commitment. Echoing the Park

Service's Organic Act, the Wilderness Act stated that wilderness areas were to be managed

"for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them

unimpaired for future use as wilderness." Here the unimpaired doctrine specifically meant

preserving wilderness conditions rather than ensuring the public's enjoyment. [89] The

reality, of course, was that a national park could provide the best and most immediate

protection for the wilderness of the North Cascades. There were no guarantees with the

Forest Service. The Wilderness Act stipulated that federal agencies had ten years to complete

their wilderness reviews and allowed mining to continue for twenty years, during which time

some of the valued lowland forests in the northern Cascades could disappear and the Glacier

Peak country could be scarred forever with an open pit mine.

In the latter 1960s, the battle for the North Cascades became a national issue, thanks largely

to public interest in environmental protection, grassroots politics, and a well-orchestrated

publicity campaign. A significant contribution to the latter was the Sierra Club's publication

in 1965 of The Wild Cascades: Forgotten Parkland, an Exhibit Format book which was part

of the influential series launched by the club in 1960 with This Is the American Earth. Filled

with inspiring photographs, prose, and poems that related the story of this magnificent

country and the need for its protection, The Wild Cascades was widely distributed to

members of Congress and daily newspapers across the country, the timing of its release

coming on the eve of the study report's release and a possible park bill. At stake in the North

Cascades, as Paul Brooks would write later in The Atlantic Monthly, was the opportunity to

save the "last unopened corner of our country" and create "the most beautiful wilderness park

in our entire national park system." Of all the recent conservation battles, which included the

establishment of Canyonlands National Park, passage of the Wilderness Act, and the Land

and Water Conservation Fund Act, the one for the North Cascades presented the greatest and

most important challenge. Here Americans faced the ultimate questions: "What future do we

want for this remnant of wild America, and to whom shall we entrust it?" [90]

The fate of the North Cascades, as with conservation issues across the nation, lay in

confrontation between conservation philosophies and power politics. And though park

supporters could expect better results given the political strength of conservation

organizations and the mood of the public, they needed someone to guide the political process.

While some of Washington's congressional delegation had voiced their support for a park

study and their opposition to a national park, none had yet expressed their support for

creating a park, avoiding a volatile and perhaps politically damaging issue. Who would step

forward? In the mid-1960s, as he looked out across the magnificent view of the northern

Cascades and Olympic Mountains from atop Glacier Peak, even poet and nature philosopher

Gary Snyder wondered: "you mean there's a senator for all of this?" That senator was

Washington's Henry M. Jackson. [91]
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Conservation organizations knew early on in the park campaign that they would need

Jackson's support if they were to see a national park established. Jackson wielded

considerable political power as chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular

Affairs. Although Jackson would later express his love for the North Cascades -- the range's

"natural beauty and power to impress the spirit" -- he remained publicly silent on the park

question, waiting for public opinion to rise in favor of the park and evidence that a park

would not damage his state's economy, particularly the timber and mining industries. Yet he

worked for a national park behind the scenes. He used his influence, for example, to

maneuver through the interdepartmental bickering between Interior and Agriculture to secure

a park proposal from the study team. The report's detailed analysis demonstrated that the

proposed park area would not seriously impinge on commercial interests, satisfying one of

Jackson's central concerns. To satisfy the other, that public sentiment was in favor of a park,

he moved swiftly once the study report was released, recognizing its local and national

appeal. He took the unusual step of holding public hearings on the study team's report,

bringing his committee to Seattle in February 1966. But the senator was confident in the

outcome, for at the same time, he announced that he would introduce legislation, based on the

report's proposal, following the two-day hearings. Jackson's assessment of public opinion was

on the mark. More than two hundred people attended the hearings, the majority of whom

favored a national park. [92]

Even so, it appeared that Jackson might be risking his political career by pressing for a

national park. Lined up in opposition were the traditional park opponents -- the state's timber

and mining industries, hunters, outdoor recreation groups, such as ski area developers, and

local area residents and industry-oriented chambers of commerce, all of whom favored

continued Forest Service management. Similarly, Seattle City Light, with some 700,000

customers in the Seattle area, continued to lobby for protection of its interests under the

proposed Park Service management. Washington State Governor Daniel J. Evans expressed

his doubts about the study's park recommendations, stating that the report did not adequately

account for all of the people and groups "who have an interest in the future of the truly

unique and unusual North Cascades, one of nature's great natural wonderlands." Aware of

how politically divisive the park issue was, Evans stressed the importance of hunting and

fishing, skiing, and federal forest funds to the people of his state, as well as the future

completion and administration of the North Cross-State Highway. To address these issues

and make the state's official recommendation to Congress, Evans created his own study

committee. In July 1966, the seventeen-member committee released its report recommending

a 1.8 million acre North Cascades National Recreation Area, comprised of a series of

recreation areas and wilderness areas managed by the Forest Service, and a small national

park (335,000 acres) in the Picket Range. [93]

Jackson, however, displayed not only his political acumen but his statesmanship in dealing

with the park issue. He sought and received President Lyndon B. Johnson's endorsement for

the park. By securing the administration's approval of the park, Jackson could avoid any

political fallout and pursue legislation more effectively. Committed to preserving the nation's

natural beauty and protecting the environment, Johnson announced his support for the

creation of a national park in the North Cascades during his state of the union address,

entitled "Protecting Our Natural Heritage," on January 30, 1967. While Johnson took some

political heat off of Jackson, he also ended the bitter struggle between Agriculture and

Interior over the park. In late December 1966, Freeman and Udall had presented the case to

the president as the only issue left unresolved from the "Treaty of the Potomac." Their

departments and respective agencies were hopelessly divided on the subject, the secretaries

related. Given the constellation of conflicting interests involving the range, Freeman still

maintained that a park was not the best solution. The president, he concluded, faced a

decision "Solomon himself could not make...that would satisfy everyone." Udall, on the other
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hand, convinced Johnson that creating the park would not only add to the country's precious

crown jewels but also "be a monument to the conservation leadership of this Administration."

[94]

On March 20, 1967, Henry Jackson, along with Senator Warren Magnuson, introduced the

administration's bill as S. 1321. Drafted by the Interior Department, the bill was based on the

study team's report. It proposed to establish a two-unit national park of 570,000 acres and a

Ross Lake National Recreation Area of 100,000 acres; to assign wilderness status to the

portion of the North Cascades Primitive Area east of Ross Lake to be known as the Pasayten

Wilderness, under Forest Service management; to add lands along the Whitechuck and

Suiattle river valleys to the Glacier Peak Wilderness; and to review the national park for

wilderness designation within two years. [95]

This version already reflected several of the compromises necessary to create a national park.

First, the legislation provided for a smaller park, divided into northern and southern units. In

between these two units, it added Ross Lake National Recreation Area encompassing Ross

Lake and the portions of the Skagit River that contained Seattle City Light's operations,

namely the Gorge, Diablo, and Ross dams and lakes. In this way, City Light was assured that

its existing operations and future plans, which involved raising Ross Lake, would not be

jeopardized within a national park. In addition, classifying the lake and its surrounding

environs as a recreation area would permit more intense and diversified activities than those

normally allowed in a national park. [96]

Second, the legislation eliminated Granite Creek from the park and left it under national

forest management. This was the last, unfinished section of Highway 20, and as Secretary

Udall noted, his department eliminated the route so that no part of the highway would

traverse the national park, only the recreation area, and thus "there would be no question of

interference with commercial traffic, and the rights of the State to construct, maintain,

operate, and administer" the highway. And third, in addition to other administrative measures

regarding general park management and financing, the legislation paid special attention to

private landowners, namely Stehekin residents, who found their homes within the boundaries

of the proposed park. It noted that they retained rights of use and occupancy for the rest of

their lives or for twenty-five years. [97]

Afterwards, the Interior Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation conducted a series of

hearings in April and May 1967 in Washington, D.C., and Wenatchee, Mount Vernon, and

Seattle, Washington. The hearings, which lasted for five days, epitomized citizen activism.

Hundreds of individuals testified and well over a thousand submitted letters and petitions for

the record. The hearings consolidated the disparate views expressed by the park's supporters

and opponents. Emotions ran high. Harvey Manning, author of The Wild Cascades and

member of the North Cascades Conservation Council, for example, apologized to future

generations in the year 2000 for not saving enough of the land in the North Cascades that

"needed and deserved protection." Conversely, the mayor of Sedro Woolley, William O.

Pearson, stated that his community, with its timber-based economy, resented "the interference

of the Sierra Club in its attempts to force us to change our mode of living, in its attempts to

curtail our economic and recreational activities." [98]

The conservation community, led once again by the Sierra Club, North Cascades

Conservation Council, and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, among others,

generally supported S. 1321, but it was only a start towards preserving the wilderness park

proposed by the North Cascades Conservation Council in 1963 and the Craft's proposal of

1966. To this end, they recommended eight amendments, most of which dealt with extending

protection to highly scenic lands left out of the bill's boundaries; these approach valleys had

been the catalyst for the park movement. The revisions called for expanding the park to
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include the Granite Creek Valley, the Mount Baker region, the Cascade River Valley above

Marble Creek, as well as adjusting the park boundary to include more of Big Beaver Creek.

[99] Other recommendations called for adding Sulphur, Buck, and Downey creeks to the

Glacier Peak Wilderness, and the Horseshoe Basin area and Lightning Creek to the Pasayten

Wilderness. The remaining amendments suggested immediate wilderness classification for

most of the park under the terms of the Wilderness Act, rather than abiding by the two-year

waiting period as provided in S. 1321, and finding some way to halt the impending plans the

Kennecott Copper Company had for construction of an open pit mine in the Glacier Peak

Wilderness. [100]

The main intent of these revisions, conservationists maintained, was to ensure that the park

preserved as much wilderness as possible. They wanted to include Granite Creek in the park's

boundaries, for example, both for its scenic qualities and as a form of wilderness protection.

As Brock Evans testified on behalf of the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, having a

section of highway within the park would provide the "opportunity for visitors from other

parts of the country to drive through the park," and at the same time would not put pressure

on the Park Service to construct its own roads (for visitor and interpretive services) "into the

existing wilderness which is the prime glory of the North Cascades." [101] Specifically,

conservationists worried that the agency might build a road down Bridge Creek -- or for that

matter any road -- to the Stehekin River Valley, opening this so-called remnant of early

America to the world and in the process destroying this valley and its special qualities as a

wilderness threshold. Ironically, while the Stehekin country had long been compared to

Yosemite in scenic grandeur, preservationists believed that a road to the outside would

swamp the valley with automobiles and create the same kind of overcrowded conditions

choking Yosemite Valley as well as other parks in the late 1960s. In effect, Stehekin would

mirror not the national park ideal but its destruction. Similarly, they advocated immediate

wilderness classification because the North Cascades had been thoroughly studied for

wilderness and because it would prevent the Park Service from implementing its controversial

transportation and development programs. [102]

While conservation groups, with their national following, represented the majority in favor of

a national park, the park's opponents commanded perhaps more attention, due to their

diversity and the political influence. As one historian has argued, opponents influenced the

final shape of the national park more than its supporters. [103] In the months following the

hearings, Jackson, along with his aides and Agriculture and Interior officials, modified S.

1321 to satisfy some, but not all, of the issues surrounding the park's legislation. In general,

Jackson and Interior Department officials met the traditional anti-park arguments with the

traditional argument for a national park: that the lands included within the proposed park's

boundaries were economically worthless, and thus their removal from commercial

development would have little impact on the state's economy.

The most vivid example of the compromises necessary to establish the park appeared in the

committee's amended legislation, which made five main changes. The first, a nod to

conservationists, was the addition of the Windy Peak-Horseshoe Basin area, but not

Lightning Creek, to the Pasayten Wilderness. The second and third changes involved Seattle

City Light and provided for the enlargement of Ross Lake National Recreation Area by

adding more of the Skagit River Valley to accommodate the proposed Copper Creek dam and

reservoir and transferring the lower Thunder Creek basin from the park to the recreation area.

Altogether the size of the recreation area now totaled 105,000 acres. The Senate committee

agreed to these changes on one level to resolve any conflicts the city's utility operations

would have with the proposed legislation or the park's management.

But on another level, City Light and its superintendent, John M. Nelson, successfully lobbied

for these changes based on the lighting department's long and storied history as one of the
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nation's most celebrated city-owned utilities, exemplifying that "public ownership meant low

rates and widespread use of electricity." [105] City Light also capitalized on the work of its

first superintendent James D. Ross who helped the department achieve its fame by

developing popular tours of its facilities, lakes, and company towns at Newhalem and Diablo.

A key aspect of these towns was their impressive landscape design, along with waterfalls that

were illuminated with colorful light displays. After visiting the Skagit River project, Jackson

and other committee members were quite impressed with City Light's recreational

developments, and thus they were willing to agree in principle to the changes the utility

desired. [106] As Patrick Goldsworthy recalled some fifteen years later, Jackson was a master

negotiator and his concession to City Light typified this skill. "Just off the record," Jackson

told Goldsworthy, "we just can't go bulldozing ahead and totally ignore" City Light; without

"some compromises...we're not going to get the park." And, as Goldsworthy remembered, "he

wanted this park." [107]

The fourth significant change to the legislation was the creation of a Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area of 62,000 acres. Of all of the amendments, this one was the most

complicated and controversial, for it attempted to appease a number of interests -- hunters,

fishermen, and private landowners and residents in the Stehekin Valley -- by designating the

lower Stehekin River Valley and upper Lake Chelan areas as a national recreation area rather

than a national park. Ironically, the Stehekin country had inspired the first national park

proposals in the 1890s and, when threatened with logging in the 1950s, sparked the current

park movement. But sportsmen's groups formed a formidable lobby, and led by the

Washington State Sportsmen's Council and the Washington State Department of Game, they

impressed upon the committee members the historical significance of hunting, as well as

fishing, in the North Cascades.

A key figure was John A. Biggs, director of the Washington State Department of Game. An

outspoken critic of creating another national park in Washington, Biggs was a member of

Governor Evans' study committee and played an influential role in developing the state's

proposal. Although Biggs spoke of the need for management policies that allowed a wide

range of recreational opportunities, namely under Forest Service multiple-use management,

his main concern was maintaining his department's jurisdiction over wildlife management in

the northern Cascades. [108] In his testimony before the Senate subcommittee, for example,

the Game Department director stressed that more than 800,000 people hunted and fished in

the state at the present and the creation of a third large national park in the state would have

a serious effect by prohibiting hunting altogether and limiting the state's current fisheries

management and restocking programs in the range's lakes and rivers. Biggs also argued that,

from the perspective of sound wildlife management, a park was a poor decision. Without

hunting, the health of the range's wildlife populations, specifically deer and mountain goats,

would inevitably "deteriorate without population control." One need only look to the

examples of Yellowstone and Grand Teton national parks to see tragic errors of park policies

where "elk by the thousands have been ruthlessly slaughtered by Park Service employees" to

reduce populations. But Biggs also stressed the intrinsic values associated with hunting that

could not be measured by the numbers of deer (1,000) and mountain goats (40) taken

annually by hunters.

Our high mountain deer and mountain goat hunting is the epitome of hunting in

our State. It provides the hunter an opportunity to go into the high mountains

during that period of the year when they are at their greatest beauty, to camp out

and to enjoy this scenic wonderland, while engaging in one of America's most

traditional and honored forms of outdoor recreation -- the hunting of big game.

[109]

While less dramatic, a park would have similar consequences for sports fishing, given the
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range's extensive system of rivers and lakes. Ross and Diablo lakes and the Skagit and

Stehekin rivers, he noted, were the most important fishing waters in the proposed park. These

waters were heavily used yet without his department's extensive restocking program, fishing

would diminish, for they offered "little or no potential for natural restocking." The Stehekin

River figured most prominently in the discussion of fisheries management. The Stehekin was

"the key to fishing" in Lake Chelan because it was the only tributary which had "the physical

characteristics needed to implement modern fisheries management programs," such as fish

hatcheries and artificial spawning channels, all of which were currently underway or in the

process of construction. "Were the Stehekin River to be included in the park," he concluded,

it would interfere with these developments and affect fishing for the entire lake -- far outside

the park. [110]

These arguments and the political pressures exerted by Biggs and the hunting organizations

prevailed. Jackson sought a compromise with the recreation area designation for the Stehekin

country. The Game Department identified the lower Stehekin River Valley at the head of

Lake Chelan as one of the most "important hunting areas" in the proposed park; but hunters

did not get all they wanted because the other area, the Panther Creek-Fisher Basin area,

remained in the park. The Senate subcommittee also approved of another proposal offered by

the Game Department -- that state licenses be required for fishing in the recreation areas and

the park, and for hunting in the recreation areas. In conjunction with this, the legislation

stipulated that the Secretary of the Interior would enter into a cooperative agreement with the

Game Department for the management of fish and game in the recreation areas. (This allowed

the Game Department to continue its fisheries management program in the Stehekin Valley.)

[111]

Stehekin residents, while they represented a less significant political force than hunters, had

some of their concerns addressed in the legislation creating the Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area. Stehekin residents were divided over the national park. Some were happy

with Forest Service administration of the valley management, while others favored Forest

Service management because they feared that under Park Service management they might

lose their property or that the agency would extensively develop the valley for visitor

services. Many, however, shared Grant McConnell's views that national park management

offered the best hope to prevent large-scale logging -- and thus the destruction of the valley's

scenic grandeur -- and the possible construction of a road down Bridge Creek. But it

remained to be seen how exactly the Park Service planned to manage the Stehekin

community, which by modern standards appeared to be a true picture of pioneer America.

The community, however, contained some of the amenities of modern living, such as

electricity from a small hydroelectric plant, a school, several resorts, summer homes, ranches,

original homesteads, and an unimproved valley road and automobiles, among other things.

Park Service Director George Hartzog assured residents that his agency intended to employ

the same policy it had used in 1950 with the creation of Grand Teton National Park, which

also contained privately-owned land. The essence of this policy was that the Park Service

would allow the historic uses of the valley to continue and would not seek to acquire any of

the 1,700 acres of land in private ownership "so long as the lands continue to be devoted to

present compatible uses now being made of them -- such as for modest homesites, ranches,

limited eating establishments, lodges, etc." This policy would also apply to Ross Lake

National Recreation Area. [112]

The final important amendment to the legislation charged the secretary of agriculture and the

secretary of the interior with developing a plan within two years after the park's creation for

coordinating the development of "public use facilities and for administrative purposes." This

change was meant to account for the various land management areas in the range -- national

park, national recreation areas, and national forest. It recognized that the different land

management units of the North Cascades formed a seamless whole. Visitors would approach
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the national park and recreation areas through national forest lands, and in other instances

enter national forest lands through the park or recreation areas. This aspect of the legislation

also grew out of concerns Congress expressed for the expenses related to and incurred by the

duplication of services and facilities when national forests and parks bordered one another.

[113] In addition, subcommittee members intended this section of the bill to appease vocal

outdoor recreationists -- namely the ski management and development associations -- whose

opinions were expressed primarily by the umbrella group, "Outdoors Unlimited, Inc.," with a

reported membership of 27,000. Among the public-use facilities the legislation listed for

identification in a joint study were ski lifts, which, it explicitly stipulated, "should lead to a

plan" for their development on the edge of the national park, within the recreation areas, or in

adjacent areas of national forest. [114]

The Interior Committee, however, did not adopt all of the proposals suggested during the

hearings. Most of these would have been major concessions to conservation organizations.

Although it expressed its concern over the impact that Kennecott's proposed open-pit mining

operations would have on the "natural, ecological, and scenic values" of the Glacier Peak

Wilderness, the committee determined that this specific issue was part of the larger problem

related to mining and the national policy governing the management of the national

wilderness system; therefore, among other factors, the committed decided that considering

this complex issue might "delay unduly congressional action on S. 1321." As for adding more

scenic valleys to the park, namely the Cascade River and Granite Creek valleys, the

committee decided against these proposals, primarily as a concession to the Forest Service,

which planned to manage these scenic approaches to the park under its landscape

management policy (the same one that conservation groups protested against early in the park

campaign). The committee also made another concession to the Forest Service, allowing it to

continue managing Mount Baker as a recreation area under a similar policy. [115]

At the end of October 1967, the Senate Interior Committee reported the legislation with

amendments and recommended that it be passed. On November 2, 1967, Senator Jackson

introduced the bill to the full Senate, announcing from the floor that it was "with great

personal pleasure" that he brought the bill before his colleagues. Praising the North Cascades

as one of the most "distinctive and unforgettable" features of the Pacific Northwest, Jackson

stated that this bill represented a true compromise.

[It] is not an ordinary or even extraordinary national park bill. It is truly a

regional bill. The Committee, in its hearings and investigations, verified the

findings of the Study Team that the greatest potential for this relatively

untouched region was outdoor recreation. To be sure, many persons differed in

specifics as to how this potential should best be managed, but there was widespread agreement that protective administration was needed....I believe the

Administration and the Committee have pieced together a complex of

management units which will keep this area forever a scenic masterpiece. [116]

By the time the legislation emerged from the Senate, it was virtually in its final form. As if

forging this compromise legislation had not been challenge enough, it remained to be seen if

any legislation for the new park would be reported out of the House Committee on Interior

and Insular Affairs, chaired by Colorado Representative Wayne N. Aspinall. A Democrat,

Aspinall gained the reputation as the "most obdurate foe" of the Wilderness Act, delaying the

measure for years and inserting the clause guaranteeing "all established mining claims and

permitting new claims until 1984" as the price of the bill's passage. [117]

The same delays seemed to be in store for the North Cascades bill. These delays, in part,

reflected the political nature of the House itself, for the House Interior Committee would

consider not one but four bills. One was the Senate passed version of S. 1321. The other three
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were introduced by Washington's congressional delegation. The first was H.R. 8970; identical

to the original administration bill S. 1321, it was introduced by Democratic Representative

Lloyd Meeds. The second bill, introduced by Republican Representative Thomas Pelly, was

H.R. 12139, which was identical to the 1963 proposal of North Cascades Conservation

Council, calling for a large park and adjacent recreation area. And the third was H.R. 16252,

introduced by Republican Representative Catherine May, which proposed essentially the

same national recreation area, with a small park, recommended by Governor Evans' study

committee. Meeds and Pelly introduced their bills in April and August of 1967, respectively,

and May submitted her legislation in March the following year. [118]

On March 8, 1968, President Johnson helped move the legislative process along when he

urged the House to create a national park for the North Cascades during his message on

conservation, "To Renew a Nation." The following month, on April 19 and 20,

Representative Aspinall brought the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation

to Seattle, Washington, for hearings on the park legislation. The hearings were grass-roots

democracy at its finest. More than eight hundred people requested to testify, comprising the

largest park proposal hearing and drawing the people from all walks of life. The Seattle

Times captured the drama of the event well: On April 19, shortly before the hearings were

scheduled to begin,

the corridor of the mezzanine floor of the Benjamin Franklin Hotel was jammed.

Elected officials and their assistants rubbed elbows with housewives and

students, with teachers and lawyers, with biologists and engineers, with

mountain climbers and politicians. All were waiting to get into the packed

hearing rooms. [119]

Eventually, everyone who wanted to testify or listen was admitted, although subcommittee

members grumbled about the duplication of testimony and that the hearing process had

ballooned out of proportion. Overwhelmed by the turnout, Aspinall remarked that "he had

never seen anything like it." Who were all these people, he wondered. "Are they hippies or

part of a Seattle drive to get out into the country?" Aspinall was correct in one sense. Most of

the witnesses favored a national park, and the majority of them were from Washington's

metropolitan corridor along the Puget Sound. Even though park supporters and opponents

offered little that was new in their testimony, Governor Daniel Evans presented what might

have been the most crucial statement. After hearing Evans present the official position of the

state, Arizona Representative Morris K. Udall challenged him to choose between the national

park recommended by the Senate or no park at all. In response, the governor stated he would

support the Senate bill. [120]

Afterwards, Representative Aspinall promised to bring a report on the North Cascades bill to

the floor of the House before the current session ended and to hold other field hearings in

Wenatchee, Washington, and Washington, D.C. But the legislative process stalled. In June,

Representative Roy Taylor of North Carolina, chairman of the Subcommittee on National

Parks and Recreation, announced that he had given the North Cascades bill "low priority"

because he had received so much mail in opposition to it. Similarly, Aspinall indicated that it

was unlikely that any action would take place on the bill because there was not enough time

left in the session to resolve the controversy surrounding the proposed park. Indeed the

Interior Committee's schedule was tight. Including North Cascades, it had four major

conservation bills to report on -- Redwood National Park, the Wild and Scenic Rivers

System, and the Scenic Trails System. [121]

But park proponents had other views on why the subcommittee was holding up the

legislation. As Brock Evans, Northwest representative for the FWOC, noted,
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Apparently all the talk about the legislation being 'controversial' and 'not enough

time' is really just smoke-screen language, for a tug-of-war over Central Arizona

legislation now going on between House Interior Chairman Aspinall and Senate

Interior Chairman Jackson. The three to one testimony in favor of the North

Cascade National Park at the hearings in Seattle (ten to one for individuals)

should be adequate evidence that the legislation is not that controversial. [122]

Evans was referring to the Central Arizona Project (CAP), part of the Pacific Southwest

Water Plan, which would have diverted water from the Columbia River to that parched and

growing part of the country. When the proposal first surfaced in the mid-1960s, Senator

Jackson would have no part of the diversion proposal; his state had water to spare but not

electricity, most of which came from dams. In 1965, Jackson had quietly attached a rider to

the Pacific Southwest Water Plan requiring that Congress approve of the Bureau of

Reclamation's feasibility studies first. Jackson's action displayed his annoyance with the

Bureau's tactics of forcing its projects on Congress by arousing public enthusiasm for them in

advance, but it also had the same effect "as if Jackson had strung a six-hundred-volt

electrified fence along the entire south bank of the Columbia River." [123] Thus when the

legislation for CAP appeared before the Senate in 1968 containing a provision for studying

the diversion of the Columbia, Jackson refused to consider it. In doing so, he controlled the

fate of CAP and with it the fate of the North Cascades bill. Aspinall and other congressmen,

who were deeply concerned about the fate of this legislation, agreed to a compromise

eliminating the diversion study, and the water plan bill began moving again in the Senate.

And, at the same time, so did the important conservation matters before the House, including

legislation for North Cascades. As an added political advantage, Jackson's committee was

also considering legislation for the Blue Ridge Parkway, which extended into Representative

Taylor's state and thus its progress was of special interest to him. [124]

In light of the fact that 1968 was an election year, Jackson's negotiations took on more

significance. A new administration could delay the North Cascades bill indefinitely. As one

conservationist observed, if "we do not get legislation this year the bitterness and controversy

will only increase and it will be that much more difficult in the following years." On July 13,

1968, the subcommittee held hearings in Wenatchee, and on July 25 and 26, it convened

hearings in Washington, D.C. During the proceedings, Chairman Aspinall informed the

subcommittee that it would not report out any legislation unless the three representatives from

Washington State could agree on one park bill. A compromise seemed in the making when

Representative Thomas Pelly stated that he would support any of the bills. Interior Secretary

Udall and Park Service Director Hartzog strongly endorsed Meeds' bill; Hartzog even

testified that he would prefer no park to the smaller park proposed by Governor Evans in

Catherine May's bill. May stood by her bill until Evans reached her by telephone and restated

his earlier statement at the Seattle hearings: he would prefer the Senate's version of the park

bill to no park at all. May broke the deadlock when she agreed to support the Senate bill.

[125]

In early September 1968, the subcommittee heard its final testimony on the park bill, and on

September 9, it reported out H.R. 8970. The House subcommittee had accepted the Senate

passed bill, S. 1321, with one amendment restricting land acquisition costs to the $3.5 million

estimate of the Interior Department. On September 16, the House passed the bill, and three

days later the Senate concurred with the House amendment and passed the North Cascades

National Park bill by voice vote, sending it to the White House where President Johnson

signed it into law on October 2, 1968. [126] Signed on the same day as the bill creating

Redwood National Park, the North Cascades bill ranked high among the accomplishments

that earned the 90th Congress the distinction as one of the greatest in conservation history.

The new park was hardly perfect from anyone's perspective, yet as one preservationist

proclaimed: "Here a new park in matchless wilderness has been borne." [127]
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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Part II -- 1968 to 1978

THE MAKING OF A NEW PARK

On October 2, 1968, when President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the bill establishing North

Cascades National Park, he called it "one of the most beautiful regions on God's earth."

Washington State's Senator Henry M. Jackson, the park bill's chief architect who was also

present at the White House ceremony, believed that the new complex of wilderness park and

recreation areas was the pinnacle of the conservation achievements of the 90th Congress. The

North Cascades held "limitless" opportunities for everyone who loved the outdoors. This new

parkland, he predicted, "will be the nation's showcase of natural beauty." [1]

The White House ceremony was a fitting occasion for looking forward. After more than a

decade of intense political struggle and controversy, a national park had become a reality.

Henceforth, Americans could rest assured that this alpine wilderness would be protected. But

just what shape this new park would take remained to be seen. The park's legislation, with its

accompanying congressional hearings and reports, reflected the compromises necessary to

bring this new park into existence and thus held the key to what its management future would

entail.

Besides identifying the mission of the park and recreation areas, the legislation prescribed the

immediate steps for the park's management. Within two years of the park's creation, the Park

Service and Forest Service would produce a plan for the recreational management and

development of their adjoining lands in the North Cascades, and during the same period, the

Park Service would submit wilderness recommendations for the park, in accordance with the

Wilderness Act. The park act also defined the relationship the agency would have with many

of its new tenants and special interest groups. For example, it allowed the continuation of

historic -- or compatible -- uses in the recreation areas and specified the ways in which the

government could purchase private lands, through exchange, donation, or purchase. It also

guaranteed that anyone who had a legal contract, lease, permit, or license issued by a federal

agency at the time of the park's establishment would be allowed to continue that use until its

term expired. Among those who benefited from this were individuals or companies who held

patented mining claims, resort operators, and hydroelectric operators like Seattle City Light.

Additionally, it granted the Federal Power Commission authority and jurisdiction in the

recreation areas, removing the possible threat that the Park Service might interfere with the

existing and future operations of hydropower projects. The legislation also protected the

rights of Washington State, insuring it full control of Highway 20 as it passed through Ross

Lake NRA, as well as assigning it a role in the management of fish and wildlife in the park

complex. Although these and other aspects of the park's enabling legislation covered a range

of topics, they were general and open to a variety of interpretations. Thus questions of

congressional intent would never be far from any management decision.

Expectations for the new area's future, while hopeful, were mixed. Park supporters celebrated

the establishment of the new park, yet they also believed that the Park Service would have to

prove its commitment to wilderness preservation, particularly in light of some of the
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development proposals advanced during the congressional hearings. Moreover, for groups

like the North Cascades Conservation Council, the park's establishment was a partial victory,

and many of its recommendations during the park campaign still needed to be carried out.

Legislation for the addition of Mount Baker to the park, for example, appeared in 1969. One

of the most important involved the protection of Glacier Peak from mining. John McPhee

would capture their struggles in his travels with David Brower, and the book recounting that

experience, Encounters with the Archdruid (1971), would become a primer in the wilderness

movement. Traditional park visitors, those who came by car and wanted to camp, fish, and

hike, for example, would have their own expectations, as would recreationists such as

boaters, skiers, and hunters. Private landowners and lease holders, despite legislative

provisions, also awaited the new Park Service regime with some degree of apprehension.

Similarly, park opponents wondered what the new park and administration would bring to the

gateway communities so long dependent on, and accustomed to, national forest management.

[2]

***

Aside from the specific items in the North Cascades Act, one could gain a sense of the

parkland's management future in the kind of park area Congress had created. Encompassing

some 670,000 acres, the park and recreation areas were conceived of as a park complex. On

the one hand, this combination of park and recreation areas would satisfy the diverse interests

and conflicts which had characterized the park battle. On the other hand, the concept was of

more historic proportions. Few large natural areas became national parks after World War II.

By that time, many of the nation's pristine natural wonders had already become parks, and as

the bitter fight to create a park in the North Cascades demonstrated, those areas that remained

outside of the park system faced great political odds against their conversion into national

parks. Moreover, the complex was the first of its kind; one of the central purposes of the two

recreation areas abutting North Cascades National Park was to provide accommodations for

visitors to the park. In turn, the Park Service would resist pressures to develop visitor

facilities in the national park itself. Rather than a traditional park, with roads and lodges and

the congestion of automobiles occurring in parks like Yosemite, the agency could manage the

new park for its primary purpose of wilderness. [3]

North Cascades National Park's management direction would also reflect the times in which it

was created -- a period of rapid expansion and a new environmental awareness in the national

park system. North Cascades entered the park system during a period when sixty-nine new

areas were added to the system. Only five of these, including North Cascades, were new

national parks classified as natural areas. The park system's expansion was the product of

Park Service diligence and its long-standing mission to protect and exhibit the best examples

of nation's natural and cultural heritage. The system's expansion also benefited from the new

public and congressional support for environmental protection and the funding created from

the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act for the purchase of federal and state parklands.

More importantly, the 1960s marked a turning point for resource management based on

ecological principles in the national parks. Mission 66 improvements enabled more visitors to

access parks without further damaging their natural environments after years of use. The

wilderness movement and outside criticism from groups like the Sierra Club and National

Parks Association (today's National Parks and Conservation Association) spurred the Park

Service to reevaluate its approach to resource management. Critics like Stanley Cain decried

the agency's lack of funding for scientific research and thus the absence of ecological studies

to inform its management decisions. As a result, the Park Service and the Department of the

Interior began to look seriously at ways to reinvigorate a biological approach to management

developed by NPS wildlife biologist George M. Wright and the Wild Life Division in the

1930s. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, who considered environmental degradation
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among the country's worst problems, initiated several studies to assess the status of ecological

management in the national parks, and in turn reoriented Park Service policy in light of the

new values embraced by the environmental movement.

The most influential of these studies was the so-called Leopold Report prepared by the

Advisory Board on Wildlife Management in National Parks. Appointed by Udall, the

advisory board was chaired by A. Starker Leopold, son of ecologist Aldo Leopold, and made

up of leaders in fish and wildlife management with impressive credentials. As a primary goal,

the report recommended that "the biotic associations within each park be maintained, or

where necessary recreated, as nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area

was first visited by the white man." Park managers could, if given the necessary support for

ecological research, strive to create "a reasonable illusion of primitive America." [4] In other

words, the advisory board recommended essentially maintaining, and when possible

restoring, "natural park environments to the greatest extent possible." On May 2, 1963,

Secretary Udall formally approved the advisory board's recommendations and directed that

they become part of Park Service policy. [5]

Other Park Service policies and federal laws arising in the 1960s also pointed to management

of the new park for wilderness preservation. In 1964, Secretary Udall approved of Director

Hartzog's new park categories of natural, recreational, and historical areas, so that each area

would have its own management concept dedicated to the primary purpose of its

establishment. Natural areas, then, were to be "managed for the perpetuation and restoration

of their natural values," a statement which Udall reiterated with emphasis in 1969. Udall's

statement, incorporated into a 1970 handbook on administrative policies, also underscored the

importance of wilderness in park management. Initially, the Park Service considered the

Wilderness Act of 1964 a distraction from its own preservation mission and moved

reluctantly and slowly to designate wilderness areas within national parks and monuments.

By this time, however, the agency had developed its own interpretation of the act, including

a land classification scheme using the concept of a "wilderness threshold" or staging area on

the periphery of wilderness to introduce visitors to the "mood and temper of the wild

country" beyond. [6]

***

During the park's first decade of existence, park officials worked to implement their

management vision of the North Cascades as a wilderness park. Managing a new park -- up

to this point protected largely in a wilderness state by the Forest Service -- brought

opportunities not possible in other park areas. Here was the chance to begin anew, to plan

before developing, and to implement ecological principles from the beginning rather than

revising older, more tradition-bound policies which had caused environmental damage in

older parks.

This section considers how the administration of North Cascades National Park Service

Complex evolved from 1968 to 1978. Chapters look at the business of setting up the park's

administration and park planning (carrying out legislative mandates), examine visitor use and

development issues, and address park concessions. Other chapters examine wilderness

recommendations and backcountry management, resource management, the controversy

surrounding Seattle City Light and the High Ross Dam affair, and issues surrounding the

management of Stehekin.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 2:

ADMINISTRATION

The North Cascades Act created a new park complex in October 1968, but the Park Service

did not take over management of the region until January 1, 1969. The Park Service agreed to

this date with the Forest Service to bring about an orderly transfer of national forest lands,

records, and facilities for the new national park. The memorandum of agreement between the

agencies, once engaged in a bitter dispute over the proposed park, worked effectively and

gave the Park Service time to coordinate interim management of the region with the Forest

Service for such things as recreation and firefighting, and set up its own operations. [1]

Two superintendents, Roger J. Contor and Lowell White, would guide the new park area

through its first ten years. Roger Contor started as the first superintendent of North Cascades

National Park in October 1968. Contor's background in wildlife biology, his experience

working in natural area parks, and developing resource management plans and wilderness

recommendations helped set the tone and direction for the park's management. Not yet forty

years old and a fourteen-year veteran of the Park Service, Contor came to the park complex

from Canyonlands National Park in Utah, where he was assistant superintendent. He

considered the appointment the high point of his career. Prior to assuming his new job,

Contor worked for several months in the Park Service's field office in Seattle, Washington,

set up during the last stages of the park's establishment to aid Senator Jackson's legislative

staff, conduct field work, and plan and promote the proposed park. His experience here

would give him valuable insight into the new area's issues and needs.

Contor and other Park Service officials worked quickly to put the new park's administration

into order in the months following establishment. They conceived of the park complex being

managed as an interrelated whole with one superintendent and his staff, two districts -- the

Skagit and Stehekin -- run by district managers who reported to the superintendent. (The

Park Service borrowed this district manager concept from the Forest Service, but it had also

been experimented with at Glacier National Park in the 1950s.) The agency also established

the park's headquarters at Sedro Woolley, the Skagit District office at Marblemount, and the

Stehekin District office at Chelan. By July 1969, the park's staff consisted of seven permanent

and forty seasonal employees; the former were composed of career Park Service as well as

former Forest Service employees, and the latter, maintenance workers and rangers, were

drawn primarily from local communities. [2]

Selecting former Forest Service workers and local residents as employees of the new park

complex served practical as well as political ends. Despite participating in field

reconnaissance during the North Cascades Study Team's survey of the region and subsequent

field work, the park managers knew little about the area under their care, and they gladly

welcomed the national forest employees and relied on their experience in the early stages of

management. In fact, two former Forest Service employees became the park's first acting

district rangers. [3] On the other hand, hiring from local communities demonstrated the Park

Service's interest in calming fears that a new park would destroy the local economy. It also
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demonstrated the agency's interest in striking up good relations with its new neighbors.

Public relations played a significant role in the park's early management. The park campaign

left many communities, businesses, and residents surrounding the North Cascades resentful,

and some fearful of how the new parkland would affect them. Smoothing over relations was

important then to the new park's success, since park managers would be replacing familiar

faces in Forest Service uniforms and living among and working with those who may have

opposed the park or, at the very least, were leery of the Park Service's new regulations and

its overall management mission. Furthermore, public relations were important to Senator

Henry Jackson and Representative Lloyd Meeds. These were the politicians responsible for

bringing the park to Washington; it lay within their districts, and they had a vested interest in

its success.

In late 1968 and 1969, Jackson and Meeds conducted what amounted to publicity tours with

Park Service and Forest Service officials in tow, holding public meetings with community

leaders in Bellingham, Sedro Woolley, Wenatchee, and Chelan. The meetings enabled the

politicians and agency representatives to show how the Forest Service and Park Service had

put aside their differences and were now cooperating to coordinate the management of the

northern Cascades. The meetings also provided a venue for elected as well as federal officials

to mend relations with locals, discuss national park management philosophies and plans, and

assure them that the new park would be to their benefit -- no matter what horror stories they

may have heard from park opponents, including the Forest Service, during the heated

moments of the park campaign.

Economic incentives helped most to smooth relations. Meeds and Jackson stressed the

advantages communities would experience as service centers for tourists and park

administrators. But gateway communities only stood to gain from the new park, and the

influence of a powerful senator like Jackson, if they worked to support rather than oppose it.

Thus, at Jackson's recommendation, park advisory committees formed in Skagit and Chelan

counties to help "coordinate county and community cooperation" with the new park's

personnel and capitalize on the tourism the parkland would bring to their regions, especially

once Highway 20 opened and the park was developed for visitors. Ironically, many of the

park's opponents turned into some of its biggest boosters. "There is no longer a controversy,"

stated Dave G. McIntyre, chairman of the Skagit Valley Advisory Board. "North Cascades

Park is here and we all know it's here to stay. For those of us who might have questioned the

idea in the beginning it behooves us to work now for its full development....In a matter of a

few years we will be showing the nation one of its most beautiful areas." [4]

The spoils of the park campaign, one might argue, went to the losers rather than the victors.

Placing Park Service offices in Chelan, Stehekin, Marblemount, and Sedro Woolley served

both practical as well as political purposes. In one respect, the selection of these sites

represented a changing of the guard, from Forest Service to Park Service. In another, they

reflected Jackson's influence, promises made or implied to local communities about their

welfare after the park battle had ended. The location of Park Service offices on the west side

of the park complex exemplifies this best. Neither of them lies within the complex's

boundaries. The Marblemount Ranger Station was a logical place to locate a park office, for

it was situated at the confluence of the Skagit and Cascade rivers, the two entryways by road

into Ross Lake recreation area and the park. The ranger station, however, belonged to the

Mount Baker National Forest, and the Forest Service did not necessarily have to turn it over

to the Park Service, Roger Contor recalled, but they did at Jackson's request.

The location of the park complex's headquarters aroused more interest among the

communities in the Skagit Valley. Marblemount, Concrete, and Sedro Woolley vied for the

honor and related commercial benefits. Concrete, for example, wiped away sixty years of
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cement dust after the Lone Star Cement Company phased out its operations and launched a

beautification campaign, aimed partially at attracting the federal government as one of the

town's new employers. Community leaders portrayed Concrete as the "natural" location for

the park headquarters, close to the park but with enough services to support the Park Service

operation. [5]

Similarly, Sedro Woolley wanted to be the park's permanent headquarters and boosted itself

in a similar light but with far more success. The Northern State Hospital was being shut

down, a major source of revenue, it seems, for the city and the park headquarters might fill

the void. The signs that the Park Service would choose Sedro Woolley were good. In 1968,

the Park Service made Sedro Woolley the new park's temporary headquarters. As

Superintendent Contor noted, the city was the "best immediate compromise" in the agency's

search for an "'ideal' headquarters location." It was the largest city near the park, accessible

year round, and close to major highways. In addition, Sedro Woolley was conveniently

situated near sources of supplies, repairs, and services. Moreover, at some sixty miles from

the park complex, it was far enough from any one section of the park "so that all districts

receive equal attention." Politics also worked in Sedro Woolley's favor. The city had the

support of Governor Daniel J. Evans and Senator Jackson. The city commanded their

attention, it seems, not only because of the hospital's closure, but also because the Skagit

Corporation, the area's largest industry, was located there. Thus, in December 1970, Senator

Jackson and Congressman Meeds informed Mayor William O. Pearson (who had vehemently

opposed the park) that Sedro Woolley had been chosen as the park's permanent headquarters.

Governor Daniel J. Evans also participated in the healing process after the park's

establishment. Evans decided that, despite the divisive nature of the park campaign, the state

would back the new park and seek to enhance its management as well as the entire region

around it. To this end, he created the North Cascades Reconnaissance Task Force in

December 1968. The task force served as a forum for the future development and protection

of the North Cascades, especially the access corridors to the new national park and recreation

areas. In this respect, it offered a common ground for government agencies -- federal, state,

and county -- where plans could be addressed and discussed, and where conflicts could be

aired and hopefully resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Moreover, the task force illustrates

the kind of complex management environment Park Service officials worked within; it

suggests the diversity of management concerns and interest in the new parkland which park

managers encountered, and stood to benefit from, as they began to shape the park complex.

One might think of it as Washington State's version of the United Nations for the

management of the North Cascades. [6]

***

The direction the new park's management would take was outlined in three planning

documents: a master plan, wilderness recommendations, and a Park Service-Forest Service

joint management and development plan for the northern Cascades. Together they would

guide the park for the foreseeable future, establishing in the process its management mission

and satisfying its legislative mandates.

Completed in 1970, the complex's master plan, a rather slim and quickly produced document

compared to contemporary plans, gave a broad and conceptual treatment of the new

parkland's mission and management objectives. Simply put, the preservation of the park's

"spectacular wilderness qualities" would inform all development and management decisions,

and the two recreation areas would be managed and developed for "their great recreational

potential, and as wilderness thresholds." Taken together, the park and recreation areas were

united in the overall management of the park complex, the central purpose of which was to

"offer to the American people a wealth of scenic, scientific, and recreational opportunities in
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a wilderness environment." [8]

One of the more significant management considerations for the new parkland was its

proximity to a large urban population. At the time, nearly 75 percent of Washington's

population resided in the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan region. This meant that some 2 million

people were within a two-hour drive of the Skagit Valley and the heart of the park complex.

Historically, residents from those cities had formed the majority of visitors to the state's

oldest national park, Mount Rainier. The area could also expect to draw visitors from an even

wider range of cities in the Puget Sound, Oregon, California, and British Columbia because

Interstate 5 placed these urban centers within "reasonable driving distance" of the North

Cascades.

A key element in that attraction would be Highway 20. Scheduled for completion in 1972, it

would "revolutionize" vacation travel patterns, linking the heart of the new parkland with the

interstate system and other state highways on the east and west sides of the state. Thus the

Park Service expected that the park complex would be used extensively by day or weekend

visitors and perhaps to a lesser extent by those seeking out lengthier encounters with the

park's primary feature and most distinctive attraction, wilderness. The park complex was, as

the master plan stated, the key link in an extensive system of recreational lands in both

Canada and northern Washington, the majority of which were wilderness.

Ironically, the new park complex, despite its wilderness mission, derived its uniqueness from

its close relationship with "major urban and industrial centers," a situation that "exists

nowhere else in the United States." In other words, North Cascades was in the orbit of an

expansive and influential urban-industrial population which would increasingly seek out

unspoiled lands and recreational developments within its reach. Managing the new park as a

wilderness and recreational complex would not occur separate from but in direct relationship

with this urban-industrial region. As the plan concluded, traditional national park

management concerns would be prevalent, for "the importance of this resource to the Nation

and the region makes it essential that all who wish to experience its features be able to -- if

only briefly, and from a distance." [9]

The park's wilderness recommendations and joint management plan also answered questions

about how the park would be administered. First, the wilderness recommendations, produced

around the same time as the master plan, called for preserving approximately 516,000 acres

of the park complex as wilderness. With the exception of roads, private lands, and developed

areas, the majority of wilderness would encompass land within the two park units and a much

smaller amount in the recreation areas. With this review, the Park Service demonstrated its

commitment to wilderness protection. The wilderness of the North Cascades, Superintendent

Contor noted, was "superb." It possessed "the classic attributes of rugged high mountain

character, glaciers, alpine lakes, rivers and streams, alpine forests and meadows, native

wildlife and a sense of remoteness." This "wilderness quality" was central to the creation of

the national park, and its "preservation will be the keystone in the use and management of the

areas." [10]

Second, the coordinated management plan for public-use facilities with the Forest Service,

drafted by 1970 but not officially released until 1974, rounded out the administration of the

new parkland and its relationship with the three national forests (Mt. Baker, Okanogan, and

Wenatchee) surrounding it. Congress had forced the two rival agencies to cooperate for

political reasons; the park and recreation area boundaries followed the lines of least

resistance. They excluded, for example, coveted commercial stands of timber in many of the

approach valleys that led to the new park, such as along the Cascade River. The boundaries

left out the Granite Creek section of Highway 20 to satisfy the Forest Service and the ski

industry lobby, primarily. The revision omitted, as park advocates argued, a scenic entryway
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into the park complex. In this respect, the park complex was one piece of a larger wilderness

and recreation area puzzle that included national forest lands. Thus, it behooved both

agencies to coordinate the management of adjacent lands for financial as well as practical

reasons.

The interagency planning teams, led by Neal Butterfield for the Park Service and Harold

Chriswell for the Forest Service, covered a wide range of concerns -- from the use, transfer,

and maintenance of shared trails, roads, and parking areas to the joint operation of visitor

information centers and ranger stations. The final plan, an amalgam of both agencies' separate

management plans for their respective areas, identified cooperative programs covering fire

management, wilderness and backcountry management, visitor information services, the

development and maintenance of roads and trails, and general assistance in search and rescue

operations, law enforcement, use regulations, permits, and sign programs. The agencies also

identified geographical areas of common interest where they would carry out some

cooperative ventures, such as the North Fork of the Nooksack River, the Baker Lake area, the

Highway 20 corridor, the Cascade River Road and Cascade Pass areas, and Lake Chelan.

[12]

Three places had high priority for early development. One was at Fields Point on the south

shore of Lake Chelan. The Forest Service would acquire Fields Point and create a visitor

information and docking facility staffed by the Forest Service and Park Service. Another was

at Early Winters where the Forest Service would construct a visitor information station to

serve as the eastern portal to the North Cascades on Highway 20. And the third was at

Concrete, where the Park Service would install a visitor contact station as the western portal

to the park complex. Though early plans called for staffing these latter two facilities with

park and forest employees, the final plan omitted this reference and implied that they would

simply complement each other.

Recommendations for ski-area developments were noticeably missing from the plan,

although their proposed development near the park, in the recreation areas or adjacent

national forest lands, had been one of the main reasons behind the joint study. Roger Contor

reported that the team had trouble finding any sites for a ski area close to Highway 20. The

only option within the park complex was Ruby Mountain, and team members ruled it out

because its slopes were too steep, thus ending the threat of ski area development in the new

parkland. [13] The Forest Service's winter sports study expressed little optimism about

developing ski areas in the future, too. The Forest Service looked at thirteen sites on three

national forests and concluded that only one, Sandy Butte near Winthrop, possessed the

"necessary physical characteristics for ski development." The agency, accordingly,

recommended that the ski-area industry concentrate on developing existing sites, like Mt.

Baker, Stevens Pass, and Crystal Mountain. It also recommended that the operators should

improve the physical appearance of these and other ski areas through natural landscaping in

order to maintain a scenic appearance year round. [14]

In what seemed to be an uncharacteristic emphasis on scenic preservation, the Forest Service

appeared to be taking some bold steps compared to past management practices that would

ultimately benefit the park's protection. In its plan, the agency expressed that its guiding

philosophy was "the preservation of outstanding scenic resources, the careful management for

natural beauty of the corridors and approach routes to the scenic core of the North Cascades,

and the recreational development of the area to provide a maximum of diversified

recreational opportunities." Hence, the report proposed to establish three roadless areas and

nine scenic areas, totaling some 800,000 acres, around the perimeter of the park complex.

[15]

The joint study also shed some light on the nature of Forest Service and Park Service
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relations in the wake of the park's establishment. Thrown together by law, park and forest

officials put aside their past differences and entered, at least officially, into a new "spirit of

cooperation." Superintendent Contor expressed a genuine respect and admiration for

Chriswell; he and his staff worked closely with the forest supervisor during the transition

phase of the park's early management. [16]

The planning process, however, revealed some internal struggles within the Forest Service

following the loss of the North Cascades. Chriswell believed that his agency had lost the

North Cascades because "We sat on our hands," and failed to give the public a clear

understanding of how the Forest Service would manage the range for outdoor recreation.

Indecision plagued the agency. "We find ourselves in a serious predicament with the public,"

he told the regional forester. "They have been anxiously watching what we are going to do

with this scenic mountain area (the great beauty of the North Cascades does not stop at the

National Park boundary) as a result of the National Park Act." The forest supervisor urged

his superior to approve the new recreation plan -- or make some firm decision on the

direction the forests would move in. Otherwise, strained relations with both industry

representatives and preservation groups would grow. The former had already criticized the

agency's plan for reducing timber production and accused the bureau of acting "like the Park

Service," while the latter had protested that the agency was not guaranteeing enough scenic

protection. Without a strong stand, the Forest Service stood to lose perhaps more land, as the

recent Mount Baker legislation suggested. Chriswell's emphasis on scenic protection could be

interpreted as an attempt to redirect the management of the national forests around the park

complex to more closely align with outdoor recreation interests and Park Service principles.

[17]

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 3:

VISITOR USE AND DEVELOPMENT

By the time North Cascades National Park had been created, national parks were a century

old, yet the tensions between preservation and development, at the heart of many

philosophical arguments on the purpose and management of parks, continued unabated.

Traditionally, the Park Service had modified parks like Yosemite and Mount Rainier to

accommodate tourists, providing roads, campgrounds, and other conveniences. These

developments increased the popularity of national parks, especially in the first several

decades of this century, but they did so at the expense of wilderness preservation. Moreover,

the Park Service faced a different situation in its development plans for the North Cascades.

The agency inherited a physical plant developed by the Forest Service. True, modifications

were needed to meet park standards, yet at the same time, managers had a system of trails,

roads, campgrounds, front and backcountry ranger stations, waterfront recreation facilities, to

name a few things, at their disposal. However advantageous this situation was, park

managers encountered controversy with their proposals. They still found themselves

pressured by groups interested in different, and often opposing, uses. As was often the case,

the agency tried to find a middle ground between the two, but like shooting at a moving

target, the results were mixed.

As the debates over the establishment of North Cascades demonstrated, Park Service officials

and a large sector of the public had concluded that the answer to overcrowded parks and

imperiled natural resources was not the development of more roads and parking lots but

limitations on, or alternative forms of, visitor access. By the early 1970s, for example,

Yosemite closed off the eastern third of the valley and the Mariposa Grove to automobiles,

offering instead access to both areas by public transportation, and was considering closing all

of the valley to cars. Around the same time proposals for yet another tramway to Glacier

Point surfaced, as a way to relieve pressure from crowds in the valley, setting off a firestorm

of protest. Though the proposal was defeated, it suggested that there were no simple solutions

to decades-old management traditions, only redirection. [1] Even in a park dedicated to

wilderness like North Cascades, Park Service officials confronted similar problems as they

set out to develop the complex for visitor use.

Park managers believed that concentrating visitor services in the recreation areas would solve

the development problems experienced in other national parks. In one of his first discussions

about the new parkland, Superintendent Contor related this management concept:

If the national economy permits, we hope to pursue an aggressive development

program in the next five years. The result of this will be attractive public lodges,

visitor centers, campgrounds, boating facilities and transportation facilities

centered primarily in the two recreation areas. At the periphery of the park will

be road and tramway access -- hopefully with associated skiing opportunities --

bringing all types of visitors to the threshold of the wilderness. The core of the

two park units will remain in a wilderness state. It is not likely that we can do
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anything in the way of manmade developments which could 'improve' the

character of that great wilderness. We only want to introduce it to the public, to

bring them to the doorway in a comfortable and pleasant manner. [2]

The wilderness concept may have been the main focus of management, but traditional

development concerns and park uses were on the minds of many park boosters, politicians,

and Park Service officials. More important, centering development in the recreation areas --

or wilderness thresholds -- merely transferred rather than eliminated tensions between

preservation and use. As one reporter noted, "the park's destiny cannot be realized until both

the highway and mass-recreation facilities are completed." Otherwise, a wilderness park

inaccessible to the American people "is only an exercise in futility." [3]

The park's 1970 master plan proposed the most traditional park experiences for the Skagit

Valley, lying within Ross Lake NRA. Here the majority of developments would be oriented

toward automobiles. Once Highway 20 opened, windshield tourists would drive through the

narrow valley surrounded by rugged terrain and view the park's scenery from their cars. For

this reason, the agency planned to improve upon existing Forest Service facilities and install

new conveniences for tourists along the highway. As we have already seen, both the Forest

Service and the Park Service planned visitor centers on the eastern and western entrances to

the new parkland. Moreover, from the highway, visitors would find access to Ross, Diablo,

and Gorge lakes, ascend to the high country in one or more tramways for a territorial view of

the peaks, and take advantage of a series of overnight accommodations, such as

campgrounds, hostels, and lodges. In addition, to the Skagit Valley, the plan proposed

expanded facilities for boating and camping (and a possible ferry terminal) at Hozomeen at

the north end of Ross Lake.

On the other hand, visitors to the Stehekin Valley in Lake Chelan NRA would have a less

traditional park experience, one not as oriented toward the automobile, since no outside road

reached Stehekin. The emphasis would focus more on the slower pace of valley life and the

region's impressive scenery. In the Stehekin River country, all developments should, the plan

stated, "center around its isolated, relaxed, 'away-from-it-all' character and its unique

position as a wilderness threshold."

The master plan proposed developments for two areas outside the recreation areas as well.

These, like the Skagit, would also focus on windshield tourists. One area was the Nooksack

Cirque near Mount Shuksan in the far northwestern corner of the national park.

Superintendent Contor was particularly fond of this proposal, for it would have brought

motorists within easy reach of, but not directly to, one of the park's most significant

resources: glaciers. Here the agency could interpret the park's glacial and geologic story in

dramatic scale with the Nooksack Glacier pushing down the slopes of Mount Shuksan in the

foreground. The other area was the popular Cascade Pass. It is one of the few places where

visitors could drive close to the park's scenic high country and reach the pass after a

relatively short hike or ride on horseback. Because of this easy access, it is one of the most

popular entrances into the park and, for that reason, the sensitive alpine environment suffered

serious impacts. Rather than expand developments here, the agency proposed its first

limitations on the use of the park.

In June 1970, the Park Service held public hearings on its master plan, including its

wilderness recommendations. In general, preservationists "praised" the National Park Service

for producing "one of the best plans" they had seen. It recognized the "truly superb

wilderness character" of the park complex, and displayed a progressive "vision and

willingness" in its decision to designate sections of the recreation areas as wilderness.

Overall, it demonstrated the agency's willingness to place biological resources above hurried

development -- and to study the potential impacts its plans could have on the region's
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environment. [4]

Not surprisingly, preservationists, who made up the majority of those who attended the

hearings, reacted strongly to any potential threats to wilderness protection. The most

controversial items that emerged out of the hearings had their roots in the study team's

proposals, especially those offered by Park Service Director George B. Hartzog, Jr., regarding

access. Initial plans had called for building four aerial trams at Price Lake, Arctic Creek,

Colonial Peak, and Ruby Mountain. Preservationists fought to have them removed from the

park's final plan, and only two were retained in the final plan, one for Arctic Creek, the other

for Ruby Mountain. This latter tramway received the greatest emphasis, since its terminal

would be the most developed site in the complex, serving visitors along Highway 20 with

facilities for eating, parking, and interpretation.

The question of whether tramways should be built in the park and recreation areas touched

upon important issues confronting national parks in the late 1960s and 1970s -- overcrowding

by automobiles -- for which North Cascades became an important testing ground for Park

Service policy. During the congressional hearings on North Cascades, Hartzog stated that

both the nation and national parks were at a crossroads in their relationship with the

automobile. In the past, "we have taken the view that access to the great national parks should

be by roads," but with a rising population and thus rising visitation, "we are simply strangling

to death in roads," and "I don't believe that we can continue to build roads to take care of the

people who want to see these parks by automobile." The historic concept of automobiles as

one of the primary means of seeing a national park had become "obsolete," and there must be

"some other access or we will destroy the very values that we are trying to save." [5]

In Hartzog's mind, substituting tramways for roads in the North Cascades would protect its

wilderness values, much in the same way his predecessor, Conrad Wirth, justified the

construction of roads during the Mission 66 program. The idea of installing tramways in

national parks was not new; various proposals had arisen during the first decades of the Park

Service's existence. This was the first time, however, that the agency considered them

appropriate -- as "a substitute for automobiles and a highway." Secretary of the Interior

Stewart L. Udall supported Hartzog's proposal, for example, as a serious "attempt to solve

some of the old [park access] problems in a new way and to show that we can provide

transportation in parks by means other than the automobiles." Nevertheless, the tramway

concept appalled park supporters who saw trams as a way of defacing the very natural

wonders they were supposed to be bringing visitors to see. "We had one proposed on top of

the Grand Teton," Senator Clifford Hansen stated. "Everybody in Wyoming...was up in arms

about it." Were the Park Service to reverse its policy and build tramways in a park, he

concluded, where would it stop? [6]

Hartzog and Udall assured members of Congress that the tramways would be unique to the

North Cascades. They were a substitute for roads but not for the traditional kind of national

park experience -- the ability to have a territorial view of the park landscape. Park Service

policy, Udall stated, has not been to keep machines out of national parks," since most

national parks have roads. Furthermore, those roads led motorists to the rim of the Grand

Canyon or through the ethereal heights of Rocky Mountain. Nothing like this was available to

visitors to North Cascades without a tramway. Unlike the other national parks, Udall noted,

"you really have to get up high." Building a road to a peak would have been exceedingly

difficult and expensive from an engineering standpoint and, more importantly,

environmentally costly. Even the contemplated road down Ross Lake, Hartzog declared,

would have desecrated the range's alpine scenery, for it would have blasted away so much of

the narrow canyon that it would have looked like any interstate highway. [7]

The debate over automobiles and trams introduced a new direction in how Americans visited
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and experienced national parks, and it called into question the "basic park philosophy" of

Stephen Mather, the Park Service's first director. Mather, who had promoted road building

and automobile use in the national parks, helped shape a vision of parks as large, wilderness

settings in which people were welcome and certain modern conveniences, such as roads and

cars, were allowed as long as the majority of the park landscape was preserved in its natural

state. At a time when traffic jams and air pollution made roads and cars increasingly out of

fashion in American life, Secretary Udall reflected on the Mather era as a time when the

agency was "a bit too addicted to the idea of roads." In a period of rising ecological

awareness, the Park Service was already considering ways to limit automobile access to

national parks, such as Yosemite, as a way to protect biotic resources. North Cascades, Udall

concluded, offered a park where "we can plan from the beginning." Were Yosemite coming

into the park system today, we might not "plan to put a road right in the heart of the valley.

We might very well decide that we would have people park at the edge of the park and have

electric trains run into the heart of the valley and keep the automobile with all its noises and

odors out of the center of the national park." [8]

As further justification for building tramways, Director Hartzog suggested that his agency

would use design principles similar to those employed by Park Service landscape architects

to build park roads in harmony with the natural landscape during the 1920s and 1930s. That

is, he envisioned tramways as roads by another name. Typically, ski lifts or European

tramways, such as those found in Switzerland or Germany, were built in wide-open spaces

with high tension cables cutting a swath through a forest or across the horizon like power

lines. Instead, Park Service planners had carefully chosen the routes of the trams for the

North Cascades to screen them from the park's wilderness high country or popular hiking

trails up the Big and Little Beaver creeks adjacent to Ross Lake. The Arctic Creek tram, for

example, would fit inside the valley's "compressed and compact" terrain, and as Udall

elaborated, the agency planned to blend and hide it in "the natural setting to the highest

degree possible." Like park roads, tramways would provide visitors the "magnificent views"

of the North Cascades and conform to topographical features as much as possible.

Seemingly, they, too, would not intrude on the park landscape. [9]

The debate over tramways struck at the heart of wilderness protection for the nation's parks

as well as North Cascades. The question on the minds of many was: What kind of wilderness

experience should parks provide? Should wilderness be accessible or remote? Legal scholar

Joseph L. Sax argues that national parks should promote "reflective recreation" in a setting of

unmodified wilderness, and thus preserve as much wilderness as possible. "To make

wilderness areas more accessible by installing roads there, he asserts, "would put the visitor in

the wilderness without exposing him to it, and would also intrude upon others' opportunities

to experience challenging wild areas." Tramways should not provide a convenient solution

for most visitors who wanted a wilderness experience but neither had the time nor the ability

to hike into a park's backcountry. Transporting them to the top of a mountain might give

them a truly "wilderness threshold experience," but "Peering into the wilderness from a

tramway station, however, is not a wilderness experience; the sense of wilderness is not

achieved by standing at its threshold, but by engaging it from within." Visitors should have

the choice whether to experience true wilderness, which tramways or similar devices only

"falsified or domesticated." [10]

There were no simple answers to the problem of access and wilderness protection.

Preservationists, led by the North Cascades Conservation Council (N3C), objected to the

tramways in North Cascades for reasons advanced by Sax. They were willing, however, to

accept the Ruby Mountain tram -- only after extensive environmental analysis -- because it

lay entirely inside Ross Lake NRA, and would not invade or infringe upon the park's

wilderness setting. Ironically, N3C, with the endorsement of the Sierra Club, Federation of

Western Outdoor Clubs, and National Parks Association, had earlier suggested constructing a
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spur road from Highway 20 to the top of Little Jack Mountain as an alternate "high-vistapoint." Finally, conservationists were not always united in their views on tramways and

access. Ira L. Spring, noted outdoor photographer, proposed Colonial Peak to the Park

Service as a "very exciting possibility" for a tramway," one "as spectacular as any ride in the

Alps." [11] And renowned mountaineer James Whittaker heartily approved of tramways in

North Cascades as one of the best ways to view the range's scenic magnificence.

Though retained in the park's master plan, the Ruby Mountain tram was, like many

controversial topics, debated for years. Both Superintendent Contor and his successor, Lowell

White, supported the project; they believed the views that the tramway would offer were

superlative. The congressional delegation of Senator Jackson and Representative Meeds also

pressed for the project. Meeds was especially active in seeking to develop the park for mass

recreation. Even though North Cascades was a wilderness park, Meeds wanted its

management to be "pro people." [12]

The Ruby Mountain tram would be a significant step in this direction, particularly when

Highway 20 opened in 1972 bringing hundreds of thousands of visitors to the upper Skagit

Valley. Meeds feared, of course, that they would have no place to stop and nothing to see,

and thus the new park would be a political failure. But in the early 1970s, the cost of building

the tram and related facilities -- from planning to finished product -- hovered near $8 million,

a significant sum that delayed the project. In addition, upper level officials within the Park

Service were uncomfortable with the project and did not support it. Although indebted to

Meeds as a political ally, the agency apparently did not want to fight a political battle with

environmentalists over the tramway's design and construction. In addition, Park Service

managers were ill at ease with the environmental damage that the tramway's installation

would cause. They also knew that once built the tramway would create more development

pressures, since skiers would pressure the agency to develop a ski area on Ruby Mountain. In

the meantime, other construction programs both in the park and throughout the service were

given higher priority, primarily to satisfy basic visitor needs and special initiatives. By the

late 1970s, estimates for the tramway and related facilities had inflated to more than $13

million, forecasting still more delays. Finally, when Meeds left office late in the decade, the

tramway project lost its biggest supporter and suffered a crippling blow. [13]

Another controversial development project was proposed for Roland Point on the eastern

shore of Ross Lake, several miles north of Ross Dam. Like the Ruby Mountain tram,

Congressman Meeds pressured the Park Service to complete this large-scale waterfront

development, which included an overnight lodge, marina, and campground, to serve the

multitude of automobile tourists traveling through the park complex along Highway 20. More

than the Ruby Mountain tram, park planners believed, Roland Point would be the major

development complex connected to the highway for windshield tourists.

Meeds saw Roland Point as critical to the park's success. It would open the southern end of

Ross Lake to cars and boats; otherwise visitors could only reach the lake from the north over

a long, unsurfaced road from Hope, British Columbia, to Hozomeen. With road access from

Highway 20, the Roland Point development would help fulfill Meed's vision of the park

complex as "people friendly." It would make Ross Lake NRA a model of visitor dispersion;

here people would leave their cars behind and head off onto the lake to boat, fish, hike, camp,

or hunt. Roland Point would be a key point in the concept of the recreation area as a

wilderness threshold. Visitors could explore the lake and surrounding environment with a

modicum of solitude, freedom, and comfort, using shoreline campgrounds, backcountry

hostels, and possibly the Arctic Creek tramway. A passenger ferry would also operate on the

lake, carrying visitors from north to south, for example, in place of a road along the lake's

eastern shore.
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Preservationists objected to the Roland Point development because it emphasized

automobiles and power boats. A high concentration of cars and motor boats, they contended,

would ruin the serenity of the fjord-like lake (no matter that it was man made) damage the

fisheries, and pollute the aquatic environment with gas, oil, and sewage. Groups like N3C

supported using Roland Point for camping but wanted it accessible by water and trail only.

[14]

The park's master plan retained the Roland Point access road, despite these protests, primarily

to appease Meeds. However, just as in the case of the Ruby Mountain tram, the Park Service

seemed reluctant to press forward with the project. The critical element in the Roland Point

development, as with so many park developments, came down to the construction of a road:

the five-mile access road from Highway 20. The spur road would have created a long, ugly

scar across the southern and western slopes of Jack Mountain, a scar visible from both the

lake and the highway. Environmental assessments determined that the road's construction

would have a significant impact on the natural landscape as well, causing serious erosion in

the steep terrain. Finally, construction costs were substantial, ranging from $6.5 million to

$10 million. [15]

Initially, Meeds lobbied the Park Service to build the road and request the funding. He

charged that the agency was dragging its feet and that it would be ill-prepared for the

onslaught of tourists after Highway 20 was completed in the fall of 1972. As Meeds wrote to

Director Hartzog in March 1972, "We've known all along that when the highway opens this

September, it will be only a short time before the North Cascades becomes very heavily

visited. And where are the people going to go?" [16] Without the development at Roland

Point, the congressman anticipated that sightseers would be frustrated and resentful. More

important, he would bear the brunt of their dissatisfaction.

Eventually, park managers convinced him that the road to and development of Roland Point

was not feasible at the time. Similar to other plans, the Roland Point facility had been

proposed prior to detailed studies and in advance of environmental assessments and

environmental impact statements required by the recently enacted National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA). Another factor working against the development of Roland Point was

Seattle City Light's proposal to raise the height of Ross Dam and subsequently the level of

Ross Lake by some 125 feet. Were this to happen, it would have inundated most of Roland

Point, and because the dam project turned into an international environmental issue with

Canada, dragging on from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, the Park Service shelved its plans

for Roland Point indefinitely. [17]

Nevertheless, the central issue of visitor services still needed to be addressed. The crux of the

problem was drive-in campgrounds along the highway corridor in the upper Skagit Valley. At

the time the North Cascades Highway opened, there were less than eighty campsites available

in the recreation area. Visitation climbed from 250,000 people before the highway opened to

750,000 afterwards. "The facilities to accommodate more than a handful of the people who

want to visit this magnificent park just don't exist," Meeds observed. "Unless you can afford

a boat or you are hardy enough to carry a pack, there is almost no camping space available

for you in the North Cascades National Park." [18]

Early on park planners estimated that there would be approximately 800 campsites in the

upper Skagit Valley, half of them at Roland Point. (After further study, planners trimmed this

figure to 140 sites.) The others were to be found at Colonial Creek and at a campground

planned for Newhalem. The loss of Roland Point forced the Park Service to make up the

difference by enlarging the proposed Newhalem campground from 250 to 300 sites, adding

200 sites on the north side of the highway at Goodell Creek, and increasing the number of

sites at Colonial Creek to 150. There was also the possibility of building 100 sites on Diablo
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Lake, east of the Diablo Lake Resort. [19]

By the mid-1970s, with Meeds leading the charge, the park had made significant advances in

campground expansion. Colonial Creek, for example, had been enlarged to more than 160

campsites and included boat launching facilities and other visitor services. Hozomeen

campground, though outside the Skagit corridor, was doubled in size (to 72 sites). But this

still only brought the drive-in capacity to just over 230 sites. [20]

A major source of the problem had been the new park's modest appropriations for

construction programs. This situation had distressed, naturally, both Meeds and Jackson and

thus the Park Service. In addition, some of the problem stemmed from the fact that many of

the park's projects were still in the planning stages, and that some of the park's more

controversial proposals also came with high price tags. Nevertheless, Meeds put some of the

blame on the Park Service. In 1975, while requesting $2.5 million for the Newhalem

campground before the House Interior Subcommittee, he noted that North Cascades ranked

seventh out of thirty-eight major parks with serious development backlogs. "Parks are for

people," he stated, "and I am disturbed at the Park Service's reluctance to recognize this." By

the late 1970s, park managers seem to have come around to Meeds' way of thinking and

identified the development of the Newhalem campground as the park's "highest priority,"

expanding its capacity to 450 sites. [21]

Improving campground facilities at Colonial Creek and Newhalem marked an important

achievement in visitor services and development during the park complex's first decade. As

Superintendent Lowell White remembered, they released political pressure from developing

Roland Point. There were, of course, other improvements being carried out to accommodate

increased numbers of visitors. At the Stehekin Landing, for example, park managers barged

out old, abandoned cars, constructed a new sewage and water system, provided for (or

assisted in) garbage removal, and carried out renovations to the docks. Other improvements,

such as a ranger station at Hozomeen, were accomplished, and water quality projects for this

site, as well as Marblemount and Colonial Creek, were in the planning stages. As for Ross

Lake, the High Ross controversy limited, or put on hold, many improvements except for basic

maintenance of shoreline campgrounds, trails, docks, and other recreational developments

inherited from the Forest Service. [22]

***

Roads

Issues revolving around tramways and campgrounds illustrated one of the challenges of

managing North Cascades as a wilderness park -- when it came to access and services,

traditional national park developments prevailed. Rather than walk, visitors still expected

some mechanical means of conveyance. Hence roads still played a central role in

experiencing the park.

Highway 20. Highway 20 lies entirely within Ross Lake NRA, but nevertheless for most park

visitors, this is their park -- and wilderness -- experience. They follow the Skagit River past

City Light's dams, with their chain of emerald-green lakes; the company towns of Newhalem

and Diablo, with their well-kept homes, trim lawns, playgrounds, and picnic tables. Nature

along this corridor is more engineered than truly "wild." Most visitors, however, never

differentiate between the recreation area and national park, never fully realizing where one

ends and the other begins. Off in the distance and ethereal heights, sharped-edge peaks,

snowfields, and glaciers enter the viewshed of drivers, making this a truly windshield

wilderness.
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The history of the highway's construction is a colorful and dramatic story, nearly a century in

the making, but the essential theme is how the Park Service approached its management. As

we have seen already, the park's master plan focused on developing the majority of the park's

visitor services along the highway corridor. Yet the agency did not own the road. As part of

the park complex's creation, law makers had allowed the state to retain control of the road's

construction and maintenance. The state's main concern had been any possible limitations the

Park Service might impose on the highway, especially since at the time the park was being

created the road was not yet finished. Specifically, the state was concerned that the Park

Service might limit, or impose fees for, commercial traffic on the highway itself. At the time,

the highway's main purpose had been to tie the eastern and western portions of the state into

a closer economic relationship as well as open up more forest lands to timber harvesting.

Once the highway opened, however, tourism soon became the road's greatest boon.

Symbolizing this was the state's decision to change the name from the North-Cross State

Highway to the North Cascades Highway.

Like so much of the park complex's management history, any involvement in managing the

highway involved other agencies or local governments in some form of cooperative

management. In 1968, the Park Service issued a special use permit to Washington State for

the highway crossing federal land (basically transferring the one originally issued by the

Forest Service.) The Park Service also entered into a memorandum of understanding with the

highway department that would outline the park's relationship with that state agency, namely

in such matters as establishing the right-of-way boundaries. [23]

But park managers also asserted their role in the highway's completion and future

management through their involvement with the governor's North Cascades Reconnaissance

Task Force. Superintendent Contor, for example, was able to have his agency's concerns

recognized regarding the highway's alignment in order to protect and enhance the natural

beauty of the drive. This included adding several viewpoints and pullouts at strategic

locations along the highway -- Gorge Dam, Gorge Falls, and Diablo Lake overlooks among

them. In addition, Contor voiced his agency's concern with maintaining the aesthetics of the

drive leading into the park complex. Mainly, Contor recalled, "we wanted to avoid creating

another West Yellowstone or Estes Park" in gateway towns like Winthrop or Marblemount.

And they did. The task force reached an agreement with Okanogan and Skagit county

commissioners, who agreed to limit commercial development -- at least along the highway

corridor near the entrances of the park complex -- by zoning for residential, agricultural, and

recreational uses. [24] The fact that the road was closed in the long winter months of the

North Cascades helped the agency prevent the new park area from being over used and kept

its approaches from being commercially developed.

Cascade River Road. Highway 20 may have run through or between the northern and

southern halves of North Cascades National Park, but there were few roads that actually ran

into it. Short, dirt roads led up Damnation and Newhalem creeks from Highway 20; however,

they offered few impressive views of the park's alpine grandeur. The only road that did was

the Cascade River Road. This unsurfaced, twenty-five-mile road led from Marblemount

along the Cascade River to Mineral Park. There it forked; one section turned to follow the

North Fork of the Cascade River and extended some five miles inside the park's boundary to

the foot of Cascade Pass. Here motorists, daring the narrow, tortuous old mining road, could

view the range's scenic charms -- its awesome relief, chiseled peaks, and hanging glaciers. A

hike or ride on horseback up a trail several miles would provide a park visitor an even closer

encounter with this subalpine country. One could ascend to the pass and drop down into the

Stehekin River Valley. In the distant and recent past, this route had been known as "the way

through," one of the easier passes through the rugged northern Cascades. Used by native

peoples, it was coveted by miners, boosters, and highway builders as the natural route for a

transCascade road, for it would unlock the mineral and scenic riches of the range. For various
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reasons, those dreams were never realized, and the establishment of North Cascades as a

national park ended further plans to join the Cascade River Road with the Stehekin Valley

Road.

The road and river valley were also at the center of controversy over access to the new park.

During the park campaign, preservationists had argued for including the Cascade River

Valley in the park to protect its scenic and wilderness qualities from destructive forest

management practices. Based on Forest Service plans to manage the area for its natural

beauty, politicians left the valley out of the park. After the park was established, however, the

main point of contention became the protection of the sensitive, subalpine environment of

Cascade Pass and nearby lakes.

The pass, easily accessible to millions of urban denizens of the Puget Sound, helped

popularize the otherwise hidden wonders of the North Cascades. At peak periods in the

summer, it was estimated that some one thousand people a day drove to the foot of the pass.

[25] The problem, of course, was that this sensitive terrain suffered serious damage from

overuse, and the Park Service found itself in a familiar paradox of preservation and use. By

controlling access, park managers could restore the natural environment -- revegetate, remove

campgrounds, renovate trails, ban or limit horses, and impose day-use policies. Yet they also

had to satisfy a traveling public who were accustomed to automobile access to national parks,

an expectation rendered all the more serious given the uniqueness of Cascade Pass.

The park's first master plan declared that the Park Service would limit access to Cascade

Pass, especially once Highway 20 opened, so its fragile environment could heal. In 1974,

park managers followed through on this statement with the Cascade Pass plan to help repair

the area's natural conditions. An important part of this plan was controlling access to the pass

itself by closing the Cascade River Road just beyond the North Fork Bridge, building a

parking lot here, and implementing a shuttle service to transport visitors for most of the

remaining distance, approximately three-and-a-half miles. The shuttle buses would stop near

the park boundary (at the Valuemine access road), leaving less than a mile (.7 miles) for

visitors to walk to road's end and the trail head to the pass. The former parking lot at the end

of the road would be converted into a small campground. [26]

Getting visitors out of their cars and into closer contact with the natural world was a trend in

park management during the mid-1970s. As the plan's authors noted, until the shuttle system

was operational, visitors would have "the privilege of walking this very scenic" section of

road. But it was this aspect of the plan to which most people objected. At the public meetings

held in Mount Vernon and Marblemount in the spring of 1974, for example, those in

attendance protested restrictions on their "equal access rights," a perspective that resonated

throughout the history of national parks and the belief that they belong to the American

people, all of whom have a right to see them. [27]

Those who protested the road's closure represented a cross-section of the general public who,

for one reason or another, were not endeared to public transportation. Climbers did not like

the shuttle system because its schedule might inconvenience them. More important, others

noted that the road offered the only vehicle access to one of the park's most scenic places. To

close it would unfairly deny those who could not easily walk the last section of road -- the

elderly, physically challenged, and families with young children. Though it was only a short

distance to walk, the road here was rugged and steep, and the most spectacular view of the

pass and surrounding alpine scenery was at the end of the road. [28]

Other factors worked against the road's closure as well and typified some of the problems

managers confronted in the new park. The Park Service inherited the road from the Forest

Service but not ownership of the entire road within the park's boundaries. Only the last
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several miles of the road were on government land and managed by the Park Service. The

rest of the road, both in and outside the park's boundaries, belonged to Skagit County.

Although Skagit County commissioners initially supported the road closure plan, they later

opposed it after the plan's public meetings; it was simply politically unwise for them to back

the proposal. Without the county's consent, the Park Service decided to scuttle the road

closure and shuttle bus plan from its plan approved in the summer of 1974. In addition, while

the county had the final word on the subject, park managers had to seek out the support of

the Forest Service for constructing a parking lot on its lands and private property owners,

namely the owners of the Valuemines, to assure them that they could still reach their

operations. Gaining the cooperation of all groups, let alone one, exemplified the steps park

managers had to take in most of their projects.

Stehekin Valley Road. The Stehekin Valley Road was the only road to penetrate for any

distance into an otherwise roadless national park. Yet, as a result of the park campaign and

subsequent legislation, it remained the "road to nowhere," confined to the U-shaped valley

and cutoff from the outside world. To residents of Stehekin and preservationists like Grant

McConnell, the road had a "quality of perfection." It had evolved almost organically. True,

various government entities -- Chelan County, the Forest Service, and state -- had influenced

its development, but it developed through human use over time and only then because people

followed the natural corridor of travel: from the landing, along the river, through the woods,

up the valley until it narrows, steepens, and ends some twenty-five miles later near today's

Cottonwood Camp. Travel over it was always subject to weather and the changing conditions

of the mountains. [29]

The reality of Park Service management, however, was much different than the idyllic

landscape McConnell described, and the Stehekin Valley Road posed the greatest controversy

for the new park where a road was concerned. On the one hand, preservationists believed that

the road should be closed to motor vehicles at Bridge Creek, several miles into the southern

unit of the national park. In this way, nature could soften the final eleven miles of the road,

and return the valley to its wilderness state. On the other hand, the Park Service saw the

road's purpose differently. Similar to Highway 20 and the Cascade River Road, it allowed

park visitors to experience this new parkland in a familiar way; it was a way familiar to the

Park Service as well -- by automobile and from the roadside. For this reason, one of the

agency's first development projects was the reconstruction of the Bridge Creek Bridge in

1970, which had been closed because it was unsafe for vehicles. Afterwards, the service

reopened the valley road to Cottonwood Camp.

The conditions in the Stehekin country differed, of course, from the park's other roads. There

were a limited number of automobiles in the valley, and most visitors relied on private taxi

services or the Park Service's successful shuttle service (entirely beyond High Bridge), which

it instituted shortly after the park's creation. Still, the Park Service's decision to leave the

entire length of the road open to Cottonwood was rooted in tradition, to ensure that all people

could see the park. "Our main reason," Superintendent Roger Contor wrote, was "to provide

the non-hiker and the elderly visitor a recreational opportunity in the Valley." (Ironically, the

agency had proposed the opposite for the Cascade River Road.) Contor added that there was

also a resource protection aspect to this position. By having the road end at Cottonwood,

some five miles from Cascade Pass, instead of Bridge Creek, it would lighten the impact on

Cascade Pass because hikers could reach the pass in a day hike and would be less inclined to

camp overnight, a serious source of erosion for the area's fragile plants and soils. (This held

true for hikers trekking up the pass from either the east or west sides.) [30]

The decision to keep the road open aroused considerable publicity and a "divergence of

opinion," Contor observed, but the superintendent and agency officials tried to disarm their

critics by assuring them that just as the road had been reopened above Bridge Creek, it could
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also be closed at a later date. Nevertheless, preservationists like McConnell and his fellow

members of N3C fired back that the Park Service's actions to limit vehicle traffic in the

recreation area and park had been ambiguous. To be sure, through its shuttle busses the

agency had controlled the number of cars motoring up the road during the tourist season.

However, the agency was missing an opportunity to "restore the wildness of the upper

Valley" and give visitors the chance to have a "wilderness experience" by rationing the

"heavily used high country near Cascade Pass." [31]

In fact, its improvements to the road over the years portended increased visitation and traffic

in this otherwise wild country. In addition to Bridge Creek, for example, the agency replaced

two other major bridges along the road, Tumwater (1973) and High Bridge (1975). It also

expended considerable sums of money to maintain the entire road, but especially the upper

section that was prone to heavy snows, avalanches, and washouts. Nature wanted to reclaim

the road, but the Park Service resisted.

Perhaps the most troubling improvement came in 1973 when the agency paved the lower

valley road, from the landing to Harlequin Bridge, to solve problems with dust during the dry

season. While park managers surfaced the road to reduce maintenance costs (grading and

snow removal), they also improved the road to please visitors accustomed to modern

roadways -- or at least roads in other national parks -- and make their tour of the valley

smoother and more enjoyable. Seemingly an innocent act, surfacing the road changed the

character of the Stehekin Valley in the minds of McConnell and others. The primitive road,

which they valued, had been modernized and the valley with it. It invited people to drive

their cars at higher speeds, and thus quickened the unhurried pace of valley life. It also

invited private landowners to bring more vehicles to the valley, causing still more traffic and

congestion at the landing. It stood to invite further development of summer homes and

private lodges, too, and possibly pressures to improve the entire length of the road as a twolane highway. Instead of maintaining the historic character of the valley, the Park Service

seemed to open the door to a world from which it was supposed to be protecting it. [32]

This depiction perhaps overdraws the intent of the Park Service, for, as with any issue

involving life in the Stehekin Valley, things were much more complex than this. To be

appreciated fully, the agency's approach to the Stehekin Road will be handled in a broader

perspective elsewhere, yet it is relevant here to note that the Park Service's activities

surrounding the road were mired in issues over its ownership, which the agency assumed in

the early 1970s after a rather complicated process, and by its ownership its subsequent

responsibilities to visitors, residents, and property owners. Pressure came from different

directions, and the agency's improvement of the long-neglected Chelan County road could

not satisfy everyone. Some residents, for example, welcomed federal ownership as a means to

assure maintenance of the road and, above all, snow removal. In this respect, the agency was

less a custodian of the nation's natural wonders and more a county road crew. Others, like

McConnell, disagreed with the agency's road policies as a slow invasion of the park's

wilderness. For its part, park managers thought they had struck a fair compromise,

particularly in a park, Superintendent Contor noted, that had "fewer roads than any other

major park in the system." [33]

***

Trails

While controversy surrounded the "few" roads that penetrated or led through some of the

park complex, the primary means of access to the extensive backcountry of the new parkland

went largely unnoticed. The Park Service inherited more than three hundred miles of trails
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from the Forest Service in the North Cascades. In the early 1970s, park officials, like Skagit

Subdistrict Ranger Robert Hentges, contemplated a number of new trails. Some of these

would have reached the proposed system of hostels or would have created new high scenic

routes. More importantly, trails, according to the wilderness theme of the park, would be the

central focus of the park experience. Throughout much of the park complex's first decade,

maintenance crews and backcountry managers -- and to a large degree, private contractors --

opened and repaired the area's trails, following the standards outlined in the backcountry

management plan and leaving the system relatively in the same way as the Forest Service had

left it. Some of the major accomplishments centered on the completion of new trail bridges in

the mid-1970s across Thunder, Big Beaver, Lightning, and Devil's creeks. Safety played an

important part in replacing the old log bridges, hand lines, or other means of crossing that

may have been responsible for several drownings. Two drownings happened on the

Chilliwack River, where a third bridge was planned, to replace an unsafe hand line. Another

trail-related problem stemmed from the Forest Service's rerouting of the Pacific Crest Trail in

1975, when it completed the four-mile Maple Pass Trail from Rainy Pass to the park

complex's boundary. The reroute, park managers believed, was the Forest Service's way of

"forcing" their hand to relocate the Pacific Crest Trail within the complex itself, a project that

was estimated to cost up to $200,000.

***

Interpretation

The park complex's 1970 master plan set forth an interpretive concept that would allow

visitors to experience the deep valleys, high peaks, and wild backcountry to gain an

appreciation of the North Cascades as a scenic wonder and a tangible, thriving natural

environment. Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, the park complex's interpretive program

built on this theme through many kinds of services. These included evening -- or campfire --

programs given at the complex's major campgrounds, and exhibits and publications available

at visitor information centers at Concrete, Newhalem, Marblemount, and Stehekin, as well as

other points of entry into the park complex, such as Hozomeen and the boat bringing visitors

up Lake Chelan (from Lucerne to Stehekin). Other forms of public education involved the

development of ranger-guided and self-guided nature walks, with the installation of waysides

at trail heads, and research into and the interpretation of the park area's rich human history.

This program was especially important in Stehekin where park interpreters began to

document the valley's history and focused a great deal of their attention on interpreting the

Buckner Ranch, as well as other structures and sites evoking a sense of the valley's pioneer

past. Still other aspects of interpretation emphasized environmental education sending park

interpreters into local schools. [34]

The greatest source of interpretation, however, was Highway 20. Initially, park planners

intended to concentrate most of their efforts at the Ruby Mountain tram; the experience of

ascending from valley floor to summit would expose the visitor to the park on a sweeping

scale. They also proposed to make Roland Point a main focus for evening programs. But

when both projects were delayed, the highway corridor itself became the central means of

introducing visitors to the park complex and conveying to them its wilderness significance.

[35]

This turn of events placed greater importance on visitor information centers adjacent to the

highway, located at Concrete (opened in late 1974), Marblemount, and Newhalem, as well as

the Forest Service installation at Early Winters. These circumstances also highlighted the

interpretative program already developed by Seattle City Light. In addition to its popular dam

and lake tours, the city also offered a guided nature trail and museum at Newhalem. The park
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complex's 1976 interim interpretive prospectus also recognized the importance of the

highway to interpretation. It proposed relocating the information center at Concrete to a

larger facility at Newhalem (the Newhalem school), foreshadowing the need for a visitor

center. Most of the park was hidden from motorists, the plan noted, unless they took the time

to stop and acquaint themselves with the area. Thus, in addition to and while awaiting

funding for a visitor center, the plan proposed waysides at key points along the highway. Of

all the problems associated with interpreting the park from the narrow valley, the plan noted

one of the most restrictive: there were few places, save the Diablo overlook, to provide

extensive roadside facilities. [36] These and other aspects of the park complex's

interpretation would await attention of managers in the following decade.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 4:

CONCESSIONS

Besides roads other traditional themes in visitor services commanded attention in the first

decade of the park's management. In national parks, visitors had come to expect lodging and

other amenities. The demand for them and their related costs varied widely throughout the

park system. In some areas the Park Service has constrained private businesses and investors,

while in others it has encouraged them or even provided its own services. By the 1960s, the

national parks provided visitor services under a number of schemes: 1) by private

construction, ownership, and operation of hotels and other facilities; 2) by government

ownership and private operation; 3) by government ownership and operation; or 4) by

government ownership and non-profit or cooperative operation. [1] The concessions in North

Cascades followed the first and second schemes.

In 1965, several years before the creation of North Cascades, Congress passed the National

Park Concession Policy Act that mandated stricter controls and uniformity of national park

concessions. The law grew out of a lingering suspicion that somehow it is wrong for the

federal government to grant a business exclusive rights to provide services in a park and to

profit from it. The 1965 law directed that park concessionaires would contract with the Park

Service to offer prescribed services to the public at rates set by the agency. In doing so,

Congress formally established a controlled marketplace in which concession owners worried

less about business competition than they did about their contractual rights and obligations.

The law assured concessionaires a "reasonable opportunity" for making a profit

"commensurate with the capital invested," but all too often the Park Service seemed to dictate

their profit margins. [2]

Generally, the Park Service and those who owned or ran concessions within the park

complex have not clashed in the same way that well-entrenched concessionaires have in older

parks like Yellowstone and Yosemite. At the same time, when the Park Service took over

management of the North Cascades from the Forest Service, it inherited concession-type

operations, most of which had been there for some time. There were three in Ross Lake

NRA: Ross Lake Resort, Diablo Lake Resort, and Newhalem Resort; and one in Lake Chelan

NRA: the Stehekin Landing. These were existing businesses that operated under Forest

Service special use permits, rather than concession contracts, since the bureau did not have a

concessions policy. While it was Park Service policy to convert these permits into concession

contracts, park managers did not attempt this change immediately. According to the park's

enabling legislation, park managers were to honor these permits and essentially live with

what came with the new parkland. [3]

This state of affairs did not mean that the agency assumed a passive role when it came to

concessions in the park complex. The relationship between the Park Service and concession

operators was mutually beneficial. The Park Service relied on the services concessionaires

provided to make the remote region more accessible and enjoyable for tourists. In the Skagit

Valley this took on added importance when Highway 20 opened and large-scale visitor
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accommodations at Roland Point and the Ruby Mountain tram were delayed. The most

critical area was Stehekin, a tourist destination since the turn of the century where visitors

were dependant almost entirely upon services provided by the local community. In the early

1970s, for example, the Park Service worked with operators to upgrade facilities and make

sure concessions met agency standards. On the one hand this meant that the agency supplied

the Diablo Lake Resort with a new septic sewer system and the Stehekin Landing with a new

sewer and new water system. On the other hand, it terminated the permit for the shabby

Newhalem Resort. [4]

The success of these concessions and their relationship with the Park Service were a rather

mixed lot. In some cases, the Forest Service legacy posed problems. The Ross Lake Resort,

for example, was a sound business. It was located on the southern shore of Ross Lake just

above the dam. In operation since the early 1950s, the resort was entirely afloat financially

and physically. It maintained a collection of floating cabins, docks, and a fleet of small rental

boats, among other facilities, and offered its clientele lake sightseeing and fishing

opportunities. Its owner, Wayne Dameron, had managed to succeed by maintaining a rather

small operation and attracting patrons who returned on an annual basis. Dameron and the

Park Service clashed, however, when Dameron wanted to expand with an eye to taking over

the concession at Roland Point. [5]

In 1970, Dameron insisted that his previous negotiations with the Forest Service in the mid1950s and his subsequent 1962 permit granted him the right -- without seeking Park Service

approval -- to build sixteen new floating cabins and to set up operations at May Creek (near

Roland Point) as the sole concession, to which he claimed he had "prior rights." Park

managers were skeptical that the Roland Point development would become a reality because

of City Light's High Ross plans, and because they doubted he could handle such a large

operation. They also worried that the agency would be legally obligated to buy the cabins

from Dameron should it cancel his permit to prevent his expansion. [6]

Underlying these matters was something more important than Dameron's abilities or the

future of Ross Lake. The exchange revealed the Park Service's attempt to exercise its

authority over concessionaires in the park complex, especially those, like Dameron, who were

under old Forest Service permits. After consulting with the agency's solicitor and concessions

division, park officials successfully resolved the issue in their favor. In January 1971,

Superintendent White notified the concessioner that he did not have "previous approval to

construct any cabins or facilities without written permission" from the Park Service, and for

that matter without an approved site plan. (Apparently, the agency also revoked any rights

Dameron may have had to the Roland Point concession.) Simultaneously, White overturned

an earlier decision denying Dameron's request to construct two new floating cabins.

Confident now in his ability to control the concessioner, the superintendent was willing to

sanction plans for improving overnight lodging. [7]

The Park Service had a slightly different relationship with the Diablo Lake Resort. Like the

Ross Lake Resort, the Diablo Lake Resort began its operations in the mid-1950s under a

Forest Service special use permit. It was a family-owned and operated business, run by

Howard Bradley, his wife and son. Bradley's concession was located on the northern shore of

Diablo Lake, just below Ross Dam. The site, buildings, and facilities had been a construction

camp for Seattle City Light's dam-building projects, all of which Bradley had converted into

a modest business that offered housekeeping cabins, a small marina, and a grocery store.

Open in the summer, Bradley's resort was a small operation that supported his family. Its size

and secluded atmosphere attracted families seeking a quiet and restful summer weekend or

longer vacation. In season, hunting and fishing were the resort's primary attractions.

Unlike Ross Lake Resort, the Diablo Lake Resort was never a strong business after the
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establishment of the park in 1968 and came close to failing entirely throughout the 1970s.

The reasons for the business's decline seemed to be linked to poor planning and overextended

finances. Both Bradley and the Park Service anticipated increased visitation once Highway

20 was completed and that the resort would play a major role in providing visitor

accommodations and services in the new park. For this reason, Bradley appears to have been

anxious to expand and improve his resort. He wanted to construct a restaurant, store, and

new cabins (thirty). He also wanted to add a swimming pool, kid's trout pond, and

playground; provide rental horses; renovate the twenty existing cottages; and upgrade the

water system, among other general and related improvements. The Park Service supported

Bradley's plans and produced a development concept plan in 1971 that essentially covered

these proposals and projected their completion. [8]

There were questions, however, about just how much the resort should expand and what its

long-term role in serving park visitors would be. The Park Service's plan, for example,

suggested that after the highway was completed, the resort would serve an "immediate need

for accommodations and services in the recreation area." In the future, though, other Park

Service projects -- those at Roland Point and Newhalem -- would become the major centers

of visitor services, and thus Diablo Lake Resort would continue to function as a small

vacation retreat. Bradley, though, seems to have thought his business would continue to grow

and be central to the park's visitor services. For this reason, perhaps, in the early 1970s he

financed the initial phase of his expansion, a new restaurant, for a large sum of money --

$180,000 -- which after construction delays (brought on by an environmental impact

statement and poor plans) and other financial obligations increased to $250,000 by 1973. As

it turned out, Bradley's restaurant, which opened in June 1975, never produced the revenues

necessary to make his loan payments, and by the late 1970s Bradley was putting his failed

business up for sale. [9]

Bradley and the Park Service apparently made poor assumptions about what the new park

and renovations to the resort would bring. Although agency officials questioned the size of

Bradley's restaurant (which would seat seventy-five people) and its related costs, they

supported Bradley's plan and converted his special use permit to a concession contract in

1974. Superintendent White believed, as Bradley did, that the restaurant was generally a

sound idea; it would serve the resort's overnight guests as well as bus tour groups and other

travelers on the new highway. An estimated 10,000 people a day would pass over the new

road. With his closest competition being in Marblemount, Bradley could also expect to attract

local residents employed by Seattle City Light and living in Newhalem and Diablo. Finally,

as the resort expanded, the restaurant would come to rely less on highway business and more

on its overnight guests. Needless to say, these expectations fell short of reality. Poor signing

and difficult highway access, among other things, plagued the business, and in the coming

years park officials would work with Bradley and the resort's subsequent owners to resolve

these problems. [10]

Of all the concessions in the park, Stehekin's was the most important. Stehekin's popularity

increased dramatically once the park complex was established. But it was also remote,

accessible only by boat, small plane, foot, or horse, and visitors depended more on the

services offered here than elsewhere in the new parkland. Most summer visitors, for example,

traveled uplake from Chelan on the vessel Lady of the Lake, a four hour trip, and returned

the same day, spending less than two hours in the valley. Some two hundred passengers

arrived at the landing together and toured by bus or other means as many sights as they could

see in a limited amount of time. Others, planning longer trips, ventured up the valley and into

the backcountry for extended backpacking or horseback trips, or simply spent the night at

Stehekin Landing where they could find lodging and food. In short, Stehekin was the central

gateway for all visitors entering or leaving the southern section of the park complex, and thus

its services were a key management concern.
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Agency officials decided that their best option for controlling and managing visitor services

in Stehekin was to acquire some of the existing businesses at the landing and lease them to

concessionaires. By 1970, the Park Service purchased the landing's three private resorts: the

Golden West Lodge, the Stehekin Boatel and Cafe, and the Swissmont Lodge. [11] The

agency's master plan called for improving the landing area to handle the larger numbers of

visitors expected to arrive as the reputation of the new park spread. The long-range goal was

to reserve the landing area -- with its limited space -- for existing day-use activities of the

Stehekin community and incoming tourists, and relocate overnight accommodations away

from the village. However, in these early years, the agency continued the services much as

they were to meet the immediate needs of park visitors.

At the same time, agency officials worked to consolidate and improve the lodging, food, and

other services available at the landing. By the early 1970s, they had reached an important step

in this process when the use-and-occupancy leases retained by the owners of the Swissmont

and Golden West lodges expired. The owner of the Boatel, Curt Courtney, had sold his

property outright to the Park Service. Afterwards, the Park Service closed the Golden West to

overnight lodging; the old hotel and its related cabins and outbuildings required extensive

renovations to meet Park Service standards for which the agency did not have the funding.

Instead, it was converted into an interpretive facility and visitor center.

Perhaps the most significant change came when park managers combined the Boatel and

Swissmont into one concession, which came to be known as the North Cascades Lodge. As

Superintendent Lowell White recalled, it seemed to be a practical and efficient way to

operate the visitor services at the landing. Both park managers and a number of Stehekin

residents believed that a single concessioner would help bring some sense of order and

decorum to the landing. Prior to the Park Service assuming control of the businesses there,

the landing had the atmosphere of "a three-ring circus" or "a zoo," some residents

complained. "One summer," according to one account, "the competing businesses installed

loudspeakers at the landing, and each tried to outdo the others in luring the boat passengers

in for lunch and lodging. Lodge employees were sent out to greet passengers and direct them

to one lodge or another." [12] As one park staffer observed, this type of activity hardly

impressed upon the visitor the atmosphere of a national park; to the contrary, the whole

appearance conjured up images of one's arrival in "Shang-Hai, or some other similar city!"

[13]

Finding the right concessioner for the landing also figured prominently in consolidating

services at the landing. The landing's early concessionaires, Stan Hutson who operated the

Swissmont (or Stehekin Landing Concession) and John O.E. Moore who operated the Boatel,

seemed to have performed poorly in the close-knit Stehekin community and the limitations

imposed by the valley's physical environment. [14] By 1972 both had sold their operations to

Robert Byrd, a long-time Stehekin resident. In his selection of Byrd for the Stehekin Landing

concession, Superintendent White noted that Byrd had the experience to operate the

concession. He had been operating the shuttle bus and rafting trips down the Stehekin River

for two seasons. He had innovative ideas for improving and adding public services, and he

"worked extremely well with the National Park Service." Above all, White stated, Byrd's

familiarity with Stehekin life was central to his decision. (Byrd's uncle was Ray Courtney, an

influential and respected valley resident.) According to the superintendent,

The greatest advantage Byrd offers is his rapport with the Stehekin Valley and

the people who live there. Since this concession is not only a summer operation

for the traveling public but also an important service to residents of the valley

during the off season, Byrd with his knowledge of the people and locale in our

estimation can provide the best overall continuing service....We think he could

offer a good means of...pulling the Stehekin Valley residents together toward a
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common cause, which would not only benefit them but the park and traveling

public as well. [15]

At first, White's faith in Byrd seemed well placed. In addition to food and lodging, Byrd

offered a variety of services, including a shuttle bus, bicycle rentals, float trips, boat rentals,

gasoline, and a Rainbow Falls bus trip. Byrd also complied with the Park Service's desire to

keep the restaurant open throughout the year as a service to local residents, as a way to

strengthen community relations, though often at a financial loss. But in 1976 Byrd's

relationship with the Park Service soured, and the main reason White valued Byrd as a

concessioner -- his local connections -- became the source of tension. Rather than acting as a

unifying force in the community, Byrd seemed intent on dividing the community and pitting

it against the Park Service.

On the surface, the rift was triggered by the Park Service's decision to take over the shuttle

bus system from Byrd. The Park Service based its decision on a 1976 transportation study

that, in general, recommended improvements in the valley's shuttle system to both expand the

service and make it more efficient. In doing so, the agency could accomplish two things:

provide better transportation for visitors and attempt to decrease residential traffic. The

agency would charge a nominal fee to visitors and provide the service free to residents. [16]

Byrd, however, interpreted the agency's actions as an infringement on his rights as the owner

of a private business. Moreover, he believed that the Park Service's plans portended more

serious threats to the unique way of life in Stehekin. As the federal government slowly and,

in his mind, secretly wrested control from individuals, their livelihoods and independence

(namely the freedom to drive where and when they pleased) would be restricted. Byrd

expressed his views at public meetings and in regional newspapers. What began as a critique

of the Park Service's plans for the shuttle system soon extended to include nearly every

aspect of the agency's presence in, and its plans for, the valley. Ultimately, he concluded that

the federal government's only virtuous act would be for the Park Service to relinquish control

of most services and management tasks to valley residents and businesses. [17]

Regional Director Russell Dickenson assured Byrd that the Park Service would work to

improve its communications with him and other Stehekin residents as well as include them in

the agency's planning efforts. For his part, Superintendent White agreed with Dickenson, but

he also thought that Byrd's complaints stemmed from his inability to deal with a bureaucracy

and a general misunderstanding of how the relationship between the Park Service and a

concession operator functioned. It was mutually beneficial; each one helped the other and one

depended on the other. White noted, for example, that nearly all of the Stehekin District's

operations and development funds had been spent on the landing itself and valley road and

directly aided Byrd's concession. Among these improvements were two sets of public docks

at the landing, a remodeled restaurant and restrooms, a new sewer and water system,

improved cold storage facilities, alternate power and energy sources (propane gas),

landscaping, and general road maintenance and renovations of the valley road. In return, the

North Cascades Lodge provided park visitors modest amenities that would enable them to

enjoy the park for short or long periods of time.

Despite attempts to resolve their differences, the Park Service and Robert Byrd parted ways

in the late 1970s. [18] Byrd apparently did not renew his temporary concessions permit and

negotiations for a five-year concessions contract, begun in November 1976, failed. Thus, it

seems, Byrd walked away from the business, and in October 1977, the North Cascades Lodge

closed. By the following spring, however, the Park Service had awarded a new concession

contract to Gary Gibson and Randall Dinwiddie, who reopened the lodge on a limited

schedule in March 1978 and by the summer visitor season had it open full time. [19]
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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 5:

WILDERNESS PROPOSALS AND BACKCOUNTRY

MANAGEMENT

In March 1970, Superintendent Roger Contor affirmed his belief, as well as the Park

Service's, that North Cascades was America's "wildest national park." The new park, Contor

noted, possessed the "classic attributes" of wilderness: "rugged high mountain character,

glaciers, alpine lakes, rivers and streams, alpine forests and meadows, native wildlife and

remoteness." Its most distinguishing characteristic was its inaccessibility. "Terrain,

vegetation, and unforgiving weather all join hands against the wilderness traveler," he

concluded. Later that year, Contor and his staff met one of the park's legislative requirements

by producing wilderness recommendations for the park complex. Released in June 1970,

around the same time as the area's master plan, these recommendations proposed that some

516,000 acres be set aside as wilderness, excluding roads, private lands, and developed areas.

With a few exceptions, the entire national park would be classified as wilderness, and to a

much smaller extent so would some selected lands within the recreation areas. [1]

When the Park Service held hearings on its wilderness recommendations, preservationists

"praised" the agency for its enlightened proposal. Its plan reflected a "forward thinking

vision," a willingness to place the value of biological resources above development. What

they considered especially important was the agency's protection of the two core areas of the

national park -- the Picket Range and Eldorado Peaks. These were two areas that had been

the subject of intense campaigning for wilderness protection in the years leading to the park's

creation. [2]

Yet preservationists strongly criticized several items in the agency's otherwise sound plan. As

we have already seen, aerial tramway proposals received a great deal of attention, because

three of them -- the Price Lake, Colonial Creek, and Arctic Creek trams -- would have

invaded areas recommended for wilderness. The tramways, they suggested, should be

eliminated from park plans and their routes added to the park's wilderness proposal. (If they

were not included, then they should be placed in a wilderness "escrow" account and returned

to wilderness designation should these plans fail later.) [3]

A proposal for enclaves in the wilderness sparked even more opposition. The enclaves, areas

excluded from wilderness classification, numbered eighteen altogether, most of them in the

park's northern unit near the rugged Picket Range. The enclaves, wrote the Wilderness

Society, undermined "the fundamental wilderness concept," for they would not be part of the

"official wilderness, despite their natural wilderness character, and would not be subject to

the provisions of the Wilderness Act." [4]

At the heart of the Wilderness Society's comments, and those of other preservation

organizations, was that enclaves were "contrary to the intent and purpose of the Wilderness

Act," the primary objective of which was to keep "inviolate from the works of man the wild

lands placed within the National Wilderness Preservation System." Several of these enclaves
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were to accommodate shelters, hostels, and camping facilities, while others were to provide

for mechanical devices, such as radio repeaters and snow-measuring devices. [5] The size, in

addition to the content, of the enclaves was especially alarming to preservationists. The

shelter enclaves (fourteen) were nine acres each, and the four hostels (or chalets) were thirty

acres each. Presumably, the size of the enclaves reflected the fact that they would be serviced

by helicopters. Moreover, the hostels would, like the chalets in Glacier National Park,

provide overnight lodging, meals, and sanitation facilities. The wilderness plan proposed to

erect these permanent structures in the park's most remote and wild section. And while they

were well intentioned, the hostels would attract more visitors into the backcountry increasing

the damage to this fragile environment and altering the peace and solitude so integral to a

wilderness experience. Finally, the Wilderness Society concluded, their "presence would open

the door for the introduction of a wide range of construction, equipment, and aircraft into the

heart of the wilderness." Thus preservationists urged the Park Service to reconsider this

aspect of its wilderness plan, for it would not only endanger the wilderness of the North

Cascades but also set a dangerous precedent "leading to the degradation of wilderness values"

throughout the national park system. [6]

Similarly, other features of the park's wilderness recommendations should be eliminated as

well, expanding wilderness acreage in the process. The general theme here was that

wilderness should encompass all of the park and recreation areas except for existing manmade creations such as Seattle City Light's reservoirs, as well as the Highway 20 corridor

with its related recreational facilities and access points to the park's backcountry. This meant

that the Park Service should eliminate the eighth-mile "roadless buffer zone" (or

"management zone") surrounding the park complex's wilderness boundaries. It also meant the

agency should extend wilderness boundaries down to the shoreline of Ross Lake and adjust

those boundaries when and if the level of Ross Lake were raised with High Ross Dam. (This

"escrow" clause also applied to other areas potentially affected by City Light's plans.)

Likewise, wilderness boundaries should begin as close to the park's roadsides as possible.

Private lands and mining claims, both patented and unpatented, could be included legally

within the proposed wilderness boundaries and purchased or condemned at a later date. [7]

The Park Service revised its wilderness proposal, released in August 1970, in response to

some but not all of these recommendations. There was some support of the agency's plans for

tramways and hostels, with only minor opposition to the restrictions on motorized travel --

motor bikes and four wheel drive vehicles -- that wilderness classification would impose on

lands in the recreation areas set aside as wilderness. The agency retained most of its

"management" provisions in its final plan: namely the buffer zone, road right-of-ways, City

Light developments, and several enclaves for shelters, camping facilities, radio repeaters, and

snow-measuring devices. It was also decided to keep the Stehekin Road opened to

Cottonwood, rather than close it at Bridge Creek and place this section of the upper valley

under wilderness designation. [8]

By retaining these elements of its wilderness recommendations, the Park Service

demonstrated that its conception of wilderness did not embrace a truly primitive landscape.

But park officials also made some significant concessions. They omitted all of the tramway

proposals except for Ruby Mountain, which was entirely within Ross Lake NRA, and

retained the Arctic Creek tramway conditionally; that is, if it did not seem feasible after

further study, it would be eliminated from park plans. (This, in turn, would happen.) Of equal

if not greater significance was the agency's removal of the hostels from its final plan. It

eliminated all four from the Picket Range, deleting one enclave altogether and reducing the

other three to nine-acre parcels to accommodate existing shelters. [9]

Eliminating the hostels had both the support of preservationists and Park Service personnel.

As Superintendent Contor recalled, the hostels were Director George B. Hartzog's idea,
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modeled largely after those in Glacier. Contor privately disliked the proposal for the same

reasons expressed by the Wilderness Society, and other groups but he did not want to

confront Hartzog over the issue. Instead, after learning that grizzly bears had been sighted in

the park, he informed the director that hostels and grizzlies were incompatible. The former

attracted the latter, and more seriously, grizzlies had recently killed or injured several visitors

at Glacier's Granite Park Chalet. With this news and the pressure applied by leaders in the

Wilderness Society, Hartzog agreed to get rid of the hostels. [10]

In December 1970, the Department of the Interior forwarded its wilderness recommendations

for North Cascades to President Richard Nixon. The exact acreage of the proposal, 515,880

acres, covered land in the national park and two national recreation areas. Although the

formal proposal had been completed, the wilderness recommendation's path into law

languished for the next decade and a half as Congress considered numerous wilderness

recommendations. Meanwhile, the park's wilderness recommendation continued to evolve. In

the 1970s, it expanded as park managers acquired more private lands, dropped the buffer

zone boundary, and eliminated more enclaves. Although buying private lands reflected a

normal part of management, the other revisions were prompted by Congress. By 1975, the

wilderness recommendation had increased to 528,550 acres. [11]

Despite this, the sluggish process of congressional approval kept the park complex's

wilderness from becoming legal in the 1970s. The president first recommended the North

Cascades wilderness to Congress on April 21, 1971. The North Cascades' recommendation

was part of an omnibus bill made up of thirteen other parks and their wilderness proposals.

The Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands held the first hearing on the legislation, Senate

Bill 2453. Afterwards the agency revised its proposal and in 1975 Senator Henry M. Jackson

introduced wilderness legislation for North Cascades. Although a companion bill was

introduced into the House, and the same process repeated in 1976 and 1977, Congress failed

to act on the legislation, something that was not unusual given the number of proposals before

Congress. Other factors may have slowed the process as well, such as the status of mining

claims, the need to complete an environmental impact statement to accompany the wilderness

proposal, as well as support (or lack of it) for wilderness from the state's congressional

delegation and local political leaders. [12]

Nevertheless, park officials managed the complex's backcountry as if it were legalized

wilderness beginning with its first decade of existence. In one respect, this approach seems to

reflect standard Park Service policy -- that all park backcountries were considered wilderness

no matter their formal classification. In another respect, though, this approach represented a

meaningful stage in the park complex's management history, and for that matter in the history

of the Park Service. North Cascades was about wilderness. Some 92 percent of the complex

lay within recommended wilderness and here park managers could carry out what they saw

as the primary purpose of this parkland.

More than the physical landscape, timing played a role in the importance of wilderness

management. This was a new parkland supposedly untainted by the tradition-bound problems

of balancing visitor services with preservation that afflicted older parks. Rather than revising

established uses or fending off development proposals that would otherwise damage the

fragile alpine environments, park managers envisioned that they would set a new course

based largely on the ideals expressed in the 1963 Leopold Report (and empowered by the

Wilderness Act of 1964). That is, supported by ecological research, wilderness management -

- and resource management in general -- would strive to preserve natural systems and when

possible restore biological resources to their "original conditions." During the park's first ten

years, the major themes in backcountry management were established. Both backcountry

managers and biologists faced several issues -- controlling the numbers of people in, and

their impacts on, the backcountry; restoring damaged areas; limiting the use of pack stock
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(horses) to protect high country meadows among other areas; and coming to terms with

structures and other developments in wilderness -- camps, toilets, trails, shelters, and the like.

Superintendent Contor, an exponent of wilderness preservation and the Leopold Report,

fashioned the beginnings of the backcountry management program directed at these issues;

he produced guidelines for a backcountry management plan in December 1970. It was one of

his last duties as superintendent. [13] In some ways Contor's guidelines represented a new

direction in Park Service management with wilderness as its primary concern, yet other parks,

such as Sequoia and Kings Canyon, had been fashioning similar policies since the early

1960s. [14] What Contor recognized was that North Cascades was a product of the

burgeoning environmental movement of the 1960s, and that the general public would, for the

most part, accept management policies directed at regulating some types of uses and

excluding others, along with restoration projects. In this regard, the main goal was

maintaining the ecological vitality of this impressive landscape.

But the environmental movement, ironically, also spirited on thousands of new backpackers

to search for a wilderness experience and thus to invade and damage the parkland's fragile

alpine reaches. Adding to the impact of the backpacker revolution was the geography of the

North Cascades. It may have been a vast area but only some 350 miles of trail traversed this

steep terrain, confining people to a small percentage of the park. "As in most wilderness

areas," Contor wrote, "the part that has been used has been unintentionally misused. Popular

places have been littered and denuded, the trees hacked up, the flower meadows trampled or

laced with trails, and the few level spots strewn with fireplace scars." The area most severely

damaged by concentrated use, and the area to which Contor referred, was the sensitive

subalpine zone, the area most susceptible to damage. This fragile band of flower-covered

meadows, lakes, stunted evergreens, and melting snowbanks formed roughly eight percent of

the park's wilderness. Its beauty drew nearly all who entered the mountains and thus this zone

sustained about eighty percent of human use. "Protection of this zone," Contor noted, was

"the key to the entire wilderness management effort." [15]

Traditional management problems, however, affected wilderness management, too. In the

parkland's spectacular wilderness, the concept of a fresh start ran head long into the area's

Forest Service past. The park was only beginning anew under Park Service management, and

in reality, it shared more in common with older parks than at first glance because it had

inherited well-established patterns of use under six decades of Forest Service control.

Contor's guidelines reflected the importance of protecting high country meadows and soils

and revising how people experienced this country, largely through restoration, rationing,

research, and education. In the case of popular places like Cascade Pass especially, this

meant restoring delicate plants and rehabilitating the soils through a revegetation program,

and at the same time eliminating camping and instituting policies for day-use only. The

success of this approach lay in a backcountry permit system to distribute hikers throughout

the parkland's wilderness and control where they camped (and thus the resulting human waste

and trash). The permit system would only be acceptable to visitors, he believed, after a

"reasonable number of campsites" were available, and after park rangers "sold" the idea to

visitors through public education. [16]

Protecting the backcountry would come in other ways as well. Eventually, campfires -- and

related wood gathering -- would be prohibited altogether in the subalpine zone to prevent any

further damage to what few trees or snags existed there. Contor also proposed marking trails

with stakes to guide hikers across snowbanks blocking trails as one way to minimize damage

to plant communities, particularly in sensitive areas like Cascade, Park Creek, Whatcom, and

Easy passes.
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More than hikers, horses inflicted the most serious damage to the park's high country, even

though their use had been modest. Contor recommended a number of possible restrictions in

order to retain, rather than eliminate, horse use including separate camps, more research for

low-impact horse camping, proper trail construction, regulating the number of commercial

outfitters and the number horses in any party. Later, Contor made what is considered a

historic policy of limiting horse parties to twelve horses, based on the advice of long-time

horse packer Ray Courtney. [17] Finally, the superintendent recommended that the best form

of wilderness protection was to keep improvements to a minimum, especially new trails, and

to discourage such as fish stocking in high mountain lakes. In this way, park managers would

not encourage more use and thus maintain the values most people cherished in their

wilderness experience -- solitude, primitive conditions, self-reliance.

Contor's guidelines, slightly revised, evolved into the park complex's first backcountry

management plan in 1974. Drafted by Superintendent Lowell White and his staff, it became

the blueprint for park managers for the next decade. Briefly, the 1974 plan implemented a

program to both promote and regulate backcountry use employing the concept of "optimum

level of use," rather than the more popular "carrying capacity" concept. The optimum level of

use was a way park managers gave priority to the visitor experience, resource protection, and

funding. In general, park managers would do what they had always done -- focus their

energy where the most people went and subsequently repair and regulate the use of those

resources being harmed the most by backcountry visitors. Consequently, the plan would

"provide more camping and hiking opportunities" within easy reach of trail heads and

"provide fewer" in the more "remote and fragile areas" of the park. Put another way, the plan

aimed to "reduce use in fragile areas and to increase or stabilize use in resilient areas,"

through a program of backcountry patrols, trail relocation, trail and camp restoration, and

permits. [18]

The optimum level of use concept, however, presented something of a moving management

target; the number of backcountry visitors would always be "arbitrary," in which case it

seemed that park managers were readying themselves to react to problems rather than

engaging in long-term resource management planning based on scientific research. Visitation

rather than preservation seemed more on the minds of park officials. It was estimated, for

example, that the number of backcountry campsites would have to be doubled (from 160 to

300) over a ten year period to allow increasing numbers of visitors a wilderness opportunity.

That said, the plan did establish some strict guidelines for campsite locations, sizes, design,

and sanitation requirements; restrictions on campfires and horse use; standards for trails,

signs, and sanitation facilities and practices; and a monitoring system -- using photographs,

written narratives, and transect lines -- to assess environmental damage in backcountry areas.

[19]

The effectiveness of this management program hinged on, as Contor suggested, the permit

system and the restoration of damaged subalpine environments. First, in 1973, just prior to

the release of the backcountry management plan, the permit system went into operation.

Broadly speaking, the system was to limit the size of parties, disperse as well as inform

visitors about wilderness regulations and practices, and acquire statistics on backcountry use.

The permit system was also intended to streamline, or coordinate, the issuing of backcountry

permits with neighboring national forest wilderness areas. The center of the park's wilderness

operations was located at Marblemount, the backcountry -- or today's wilderness --

information center. Although visitors could obtain permits at other park portals, such as the

Forest Service's Glacier Ranger Station, Marblemount's staff would track the permits and set

quotas for campsites and travel routes. In addition, rangers checked permits in the

backcountry, providing further opportunities for public contact, education, and protection.

The permit system worked well, averaging a high rate of compliance. Over time park

managers refined the system. Most noteworthy, they dropped the original reservation system
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because it was "time consuming and confusing" and replaced it with a first-come, first-served

system in 1976. [20]

Second, from the beginning park managers saw as their highest priority the protection and

restoration of subalpine environs, especially the severely eroded low-elevation passes.

Throughout the 1970s, regulating the use of and replanting these denuded areas with native

plants epitomized the "new approach" to resource management in the National Park Service,

based on the influence of the Leopold Report and a more recent ecological approach to

management practices and decisions. Nowhere in North Cascades was this symbolized better

than at Cascade Pass. Overrun for years by horse parties and hikers, Cascade Pass slowly

regained some of its natural integrity by the late 1970s through the combination of research,

revegetation, and restrictions.

The story of Cascade Pass intersects with other management concerns in North Cascades,

such as the park's wilderness mission and issues of access. The park's creation had assured

protection of this wild country and prevented the possible completion of a road over Cascade

Pass. But how to protect the popular Cascade Pass, one of the few places where the casual

visitor could see this spectacular country, was not resolved upon the park's establishment. In

fact, traditional concerns and management approaches persisted. Preservationists called for

closing the Stehekin Valley Road above Bridge Creek and returning it to a wilderness state,

thus making it more difficult to reach the pass and reducing the pressures on it. Yet the Park

Service thought otherwise; keeping the road open would allow visitors to drive the road, have

a relatively traditional park experience, and by virtue of easy access and the schedule of the

shuttle bus, limit hiking to a daytime activity. (It was believed that camping was the major

source of damage.) On the other side of the pass, where the majority of visitors entered, the

Park Service attempted to regulate access by initiating a shuttle system, but public opposition

quelled this proposal, mainly to preserve the traditional, democratic right to see a national

park from one's own car.

Use still dominated the Park Service mission, though a commitment to the protection of

biological resources now shared the same stage. This commitment, however, did not lead to

the closure of Cascade Pass entirely, but rather to a compromise of more restricted activities

and rehabilitation. Nevertheless, park officials developed a successful program, building on

early efforts by the Forest Service, dedicated to the protection of the pass's natural values. In

the late 1960s and early 1970s, several botanists and plant ecologists, namely Dr. Dale

Thornburgh, Dr. George Douglas, and Joe and Margaret Miller, studied the erosion problem

at Cascade Pass, documenting the damage to plants and soils caused by both trails and camp

sites and years of overuse. [21]

Based on these and informal observations, the Park Service decided to close the pass to

camping (and horse use) in 1970, and devised a plan in 1974 to restore the camp sites at the

pass and its vicinity to their natural conditions, improve trails, and revegetate the denuded

meadows. After the plan was released, park officials proceeded to close all campsites in the

immediate area surrounding Cascade Pass -- among them Sahale Arm, Doubtful Lake, Pelton

Basin, Trapper Lake, Mixup Arm, and Basin Creek -- and initiate a multi-year rehabilitation

program. The intent was to permanently close Cascade Pass to camping, develop a

campground at the end of the Cascade River Road, and relocate other camp sites to lower

elevations or more resilient zones. [22]

Nursing the subalpine environment back to health proved to be the greatest challenge, the

greatest element in the program, and ultimately its greatest accomplishment. Although many

park staffers and volunteers contributed their time, none of this would have been possible

without the tireless and selfless efforts of volunteers Joe and Margaret Miller; they not only

studied the natural conditions at Cascade Pass but grew plants from seeds and seedlings
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harvested from Cascade Pass at their home in Bellevue, Washington (and later in cold frames

at Marblemount), and then replanted them at the pass. By 1978, the revegetation of Cascade

Pass was seventy-five percent complete, and similar projects were underway for many of the

park's other subalpine passes and popular camping areas, such as Copper and Egg lakes,

Boundary Camp, Park Creek Pass, and Thunder Creek and Big Beaver basins. [23]

By the late 1970s park managers, like Skagit District Manager John E. Jensen, believed that

the backcountry management program was working well, primarily because the backcountry

management plan was "very good." Revised in 1977, the plan was essentially the same as its

earlier version. The young program had also reached this point because of a growing staff,

composed of a permanent backcountry ranger, eleven seasonal backcountry technicians, and

nine volunteers, totaling twenty-one people in 1977. Volunteers, made up of Student

Conservation Association (SCA) and Volunteers in the Parks (VIP), played a significant role

in operating the information center, conducting patrols, and, like the Millers, participating in

the revegetation program. Backcountry Ranger Dan Taylor oversaw the Skagit District's

revegetation program, and in the coming years, it would expand further through time donated

by volunteers and under the guidance of Taylor's replacement, William Lester. [24]

***

For all its progress, however, backcountry management was a work in progress and the

program would continue to evolve in the coming years. On the one hand, backcountry

management maintained a constant vigil against threats to wilderness values, primarily in the

form of private lands -- the most serious coming from mining. Mining cast a long human

shadow over the North Cascades. Throughout the park complex's first decade, agency

officials worked diligently to acquire the numerous patented mining claims (some 1,600 acres

in the park itself, with smaller concentrations in Ross Lake NRA and the upper Stehekin

Valley) as well as a vast number of unpatented claims (7,000) throughout the complex.

Despite a rather successful program of acquisition and invalidation, the Park Service was not

able to purchase the mining claims that posed the greatest harm to the park's wilderness

setting. One of these was the cluster of patented claims in the Cascade Pass area, known as

the Valuemines. The other was the group making up the Skagit Queen mining claims up the

Thunder Creek basin. This latter claim presented the most serious danger to the park, because

in the mid-1970s its owners planned to develop their claims by constructing a road up

Thunder Creek to the base of Boston Glacier, conducting exploratory operations, and setting

up a milling facility, all of which would have scarred the backcountry beyond repair. [25]

On the other hand, changes in backcountry management would respond to administrative

conditions. In 1977, Departing Backcountry Ranger Dan Taylor noted that the permit system

still needed some refining in terms of the way the park tracked visitors. Working with the

Forest Service to issue one permit for entry into either park or forest wilderness areas was

especially important. [26]

Coming to terms with structures in the park's backcountry also ranked high on the priority

list. At the center of this subject was the concept of wilderness as a primitive landscape, a

place in which human influences were evanescent. Returning the park's wilderness to its

"original condition" influenced a practice of, or at least an attitude for, razing all unnecessary

structures, especially those that were inappropriately sited and concentrated visitor use in

sensitive areas. Yet some, such as fire lookouts and shelters, remained for administrative

purposes. Lookouts, inherited from the Forest Service as part of its fire suppression

management system, continued to serve as fire watch stations; they also aided in backcountry

management for patrols and radio relays. In this regard, they were more readily accepted by

backcountry managers. [27]
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In direct contrast, backcountry rangers and other park staffers believed that shelters degraded

the backcountry and thus the wilderness experience. Moreover, the shelter issue touched on

differences between the park's divisions, for some in the park's maintenance division

contended that the shelters helped in their work -- that is, in the rigorous task of opening and

improving the park's trails in the rugged and remote terrain of the North Cascades. The

internal controversy was also fueled by Olympic National Park's recent policy of removing

backcountry shelters. At the same time, a few outspoken visitors wanted the shelters

preserved. By the late 1970s, the Park Service was reconsidering its treatment of backcountry

shelters, especially in light of their historical significance and the agency's legal obligation to

protect them and other historic structures. [28]

Another management practice, which often sparked conflicting views, was the use of

helicopters. At the time, this mode of transportation received the support of backcountry

managers. Preservationists had long criticized the practice of helicopter use in the park

complex, particularly during the park's first years when planners and other park officials flew

frequently over the northern Cascades. Given the nature of the park's mountainous and

roadless country, helicopters presented the most effective means of accessing the park,

recalled Superintendent Contor. In addition, helicopters also facilitated backcountry

operations by supplying and distributing backcountry workers. This was a reasonable

alternative to, and less environmentally destructive choice than, using pack stock. Although

park officials recognized that helicopters presented another kind of modern intrusion in

wilderness, they advocated that the use of both "helicopters and power equipment" (such as

chain saws) be continued -- but in a judicious manner. [29]

In the next two decades of management, the Park Service would make significant strides in

resolving these issues. A major starting point was the creation of the park's wilderness by an

act of Congress in 1988. The language of the bill would also help resolve other nagging

management problems, in particular those surrounding hydroelectric developments and the

use of natural resources in the complex's two recreation areas.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 6:

RESEARCH AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The establishment of North Cascades coincided with fundamental changes in resource

management and research in the national park system. With the appearance of the Leopold

Report in 1963, the Park Service shifted its emphasis from preserving and protecting objects

of special interest to the general public to restoring park ecosystems and allowing natural

processes to take their course. A catalyst for change, the report helped implant a new

management philosophy that would stress ecologically-oriented management in place of

manipulating the environment to meet the needs and desires of visitors. Returning parks to

their natural conditions meant eliminating past practices that favored one particular wildlife

species over another, and removing exotic -- or introduced species -- and reintroducing

native ones. This new perspective applied to all resources within national parks. With

ecological research, the report concluded, the Park Service should maintain -- or recreate

when necessary -- "the biotic associations within each park" as nearly as possible as "when

first visited by the white man." Placing natural values over human values -- or at least

working to minimize human impacts -- formed the core of the agency's resource management

approach. [1]

The Leopold Report offered some specific recommendations for carrying out this new

management approach, namely that parks should hire a large staff of ecologists to conduct

wide-ranging research projects, set aside research reserves within the different environments

of the parks which might exclude visitors, and respect the findings of scientists and

incorporate them into the parks' management programs. Finally, in order to implement the

Leopold Report, the Park Service established guidelines for managing resources in natural

parks and required that each natural area park prepare a resource management plan, all of

which were to incorporate the report's basic tenets. [2]

The Leopold Report formed the foundation upon which North Cascades managers would

build the park's early resource management program. While this was similar to other areas in

the national park system, North Cascades differed from other parks because its establishment

came after the Park Service had implemented its new direction in resource management. As

in other programs, park managers looked forward to a clean start. Without the difficulties of

revising tradition-bound uses and practices that often harmed the natural environment, they

would push forward with a program that placed the integrity of biological resources and

ecological relationships first.

As Superintendent Roger Contor believed, the agency had the opportunity to promote a new

tradition of park management and shape a new set of visitor expectations based on

ecologically-minded policies, and thus he made resource management, with the agency's new

focus, the cornerstone of his administration. Although Contor's tenure was rather brief, his

emphasis on maintaining or restoring the new parkland's natural environment and basing all

management decisions on sound scientific evidence provided a solid foothold for the park's

first decade of management. Beginning with the early stages of the park complex's
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management, Contor and his staff developed an ambitious resource management program,

based largely on a research plan that covered all of the area's resources and life zones,

initiated cooperative interagency research projects with the U.S. Forest Service and various

state agencies, among other government entities, and sought the assistance of university

researchers in studying the North Cascades.

The importance of research to the new park area's future management was twofold. First,

Contor, with a background in wildlife biology, felt strongly about research as a guide to

management. This belief dovetailed with the current trends in the agency and Contor's own

support of the Leopold committee's recommendations. As superintendent of Craters of the

Moon National Monument in the mid-1960s, for example, Contor oversaw the completion of

the monument's first resource management plan, the first in Western Region, employing the

ecological principles outlined by the Leopold committee.

Second, and of more significance, without an adequate research program the Park Service

could not hope to protect this new parkland. When the agency took over management of the

northern Cascades, park officials discovered that they knew very little about this impressive

country. This became especially apparent as they set out to draft the complex's master plan.

Despite sixty years of management by the Forest Service, there seemed to be few scientific

studies about the region that would help agency officials describe the basic facts, problems,

and recommended management approaches for the park's resources. The most extensive

information covered the range's geology, dating from the turn of the century. The range's

other natural features were covered superficially in the more recent special studies generated

by the North Cascades Study Team during the early 1960s. Otherwise, "the North Cascades

were uniquely unknown," Contor observed. In short, the old park management saying

applied: it was impossible to protect or restore the area's natural conditions if managers did

not even know what these were. [3]

To resolve this problem, Contor reached out to the scientific community. In May 1969, he

and his staff organized the North Cascades National Park Scientific Symposium at the park's

headquarters. The symposium, made possible in large part by the work of the park's

interpretive specialist, Harry Wills, brought together a group of noted ecologists from the

Northwest. Its main purpose was to serve as "a notice to the scientific community that the

National Park Service is interested in basing management and planning on sound research."

In doing so, park officials hoped to prime the financial pump for research -- that is, make the

case for funding research in the park -- and achieve the lofty goal of setting "an example to

the nation of a proper approach to land management." The meeting proved helpful in

establishing research priorities and management objectives for the master plan. The top

priority of a long list of priorities was an ecological inventory of the entire park complex,

followed by a thorough list of management problems related to human impacts on the natural

environment, as well as studies ranging from research on the area's flora and fauna, to

benchmark studies to evaluate future changes in the park's ecosystem, and to a complete

human history of the complex. [4]

In early 1970, Contor could announce some accomplishments, many of which originated

from the symposium. The highest management problem identified in the meeting was damage

to the park's fragile subalpine vegetation at low-elevation passes such as Cascade Pass. Not

surprisingly, several studies were completed or were underway that would have a direct

benefit on the protection and repair of these sensitive areas. Since the park had no budget for

research, most of these studies were university related or associated with the U.S. Forest

Service's Pacific Northwest Forest Range and Experiment Station; North Cascades would also

benefit from the establishment of the first cooperative park studies unit at the University of

Washington in 1970. Contor further noted that progress was being made on the autoecology

of the horse -- a study that would help assess the effects of horses on the park environment as
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a way to limit their presence in and damage to the high country. In addition, researchers were

conducting forest insect and disease surveys; this work, however, was being conducted by the

Forest Service as a carry over from when they managed the area. [5]

Without a research budget, the park could not expect to attract university scientists to carry

out projects. But this initial work helped form the resource management statement in the

park's first master plan released later that year. While the park complex brought together a

variety of uses associated with a national park and two recreation areas, the plan emphasized

an overall philosophy of protection and restoration of the complex's most dominant feature --

its backcountry -- and those sensitive areas highly susceptible to damage.

This backcountry and its fragile alpine ecosystems must be managed carefully to

prevent damage by visitors and livestock. Corrective measures will involve

revegetation of the denuded areas; improvement of the surface, grade, and

drainage of trails; elimination of fires and overnight camping in the more fragile

locations; control of horse traffic so that grazing and hitching of horses is not

continued in the damaged areas; and the general dispersion of alpine activities,

either up toward the snow and rock environment of the mountain-climber, or

down into the more resistant fir and hemlock forests below the passes. [6]

This philosophy of protection and restoration also extended to the park complex's array of

fish and wildlife, of which relatively little was known. Because the complex contained two

recreation areas, one thing was for certain: some of these animals, namely deer, would be

hunted and fish caught -- and park managers would regulate this activity through a

cooperative agreement with the Washington State Department of Game as stipulated in the

legislation for North Cascades.

It was Contor's hope that a comprehensive research program would develop to support the

needs of resource management, but in these early years of park management, funding for

special projects took time; they required project statements, priority lists, approval from the

regional office in Seattle and final approval from the Washington office. Moreover, there was

also the need for producing a resource management plan to forecast the future goals and

objectives of the fledgling program. Contor had thought, it seemed, that while this process

was underway, independent researchers affiliated with universities and other agencies might

fill the void, and thus he emphasized the opportunities the new parkland held for research,

especially in the form of research natural areas. We want to make an "all-out effort to learn

as much as possible" about the North Cascades "to preserve the most important elements for

future scientific study." Speaking at a Northwest scientific symposium on natural areas in the

spring of 1970, Contor noted that some progress was being made in funding a survey of

possible research natural areas in the park and he encouraged others to assist in the process

by submitting proposals to his office. Similar to the Leopold committee's recommendation for

setting aside research areas in national parks, the research natural areas would "preserve

typical or unusual biological or geologic features, associations, or other phenomena. It is our

ultimate objective to preserve examples of all significant ecosystems." [7] By the late 1970s,

Contor's promotion met with some success, for at least five research natural areas had either

been proposed or approved. (These were Boston Glacier, Stetattle Creek, Pyramid Lake,

Ridley Lake, and Silver Lake.) [8]

The ability of research to aid in park management did not necessarily focus on the natural

environment itself. Contor believed that understanding the park complex's human past

occupied an important role in understanding the environment of this new park area as a

whole. To this end, historian Erwin Thompson produced the first survey of the park

complex's history, charting the basic themes of Indian and white history in the North

Cascades. The study complemented other studies that documented the complex's mining sites
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and homesteads, and gave managers greater insight into how humans had interacted with the

park's natural systems.[9]

Ironically, some of the most extensive research conducted in the park during its early phase

of management had little to do with the Park Service's management but rather with Seattle

City Light's plans to raise Ross Lake. City Light's controversial project, which raised

objections from environmentalists on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border, led to a series of

biological surveys of the project area to assess the impact of the higher lake level. Scientists

from Canada and the United States, some working for City Light, others for private groups or

state agencies, conducted fairly extensive studies of Ross Lake and the Skagit Valley's

wildlife, fisheries, and forest communities. By the mid-1970s, as part of the Federal Power

Commission's requirements for its amended license, City Light undertook thorough aquatic

and fisheries studies of its entire Skagit River project -- including Ross, Diablo, and Gorge

lakes and the Skagit River below Newhalem. This long-term investigation produced a

considerable amount of research throughout the remainder of the decade, as the complicated

process of assessing environmental impacts and solving international conflicts produced by

City Light's plans wore on. For the most part, as with other facets of the High Ross affair in

the 1970s, the Park Service remained largely neutral on the research front, except for a study

by Dr. Grant Sharpe to assess the project's damage to the Big Beaver Valley at the request of

the Park Service in the early stages of the controversy. Otherwise, the park's research

biologist, Robert Wasem, kept abreast of the ongoing investigations and reports, all of which

might eventually assist park officials in their management efforts.[10]

Despite the attention the High Ross affair drew, park managers put together a rather

impressive research program; its success varied with funding, need, and the ability of a

relatively small staff -- usually limited to one permanent biologist and seasonals -- to carry

out projects for a such a wild and large area. The assignment of Wasem to the park's staff in

1970 marked a high point in the park's nascent research and resource management program.

(At this time in the park's history there was no formal division of resource management.)

Wasem came to the park from Glacier and for at least half a year was employed by the

agency's Washington office of Natural Science Studies before he, and all field biologists,

were transferred to park staffs. By the end of 1972, Wasem had begun preparing the park's

resource management plan with a committee headed by the regional scientist. He had also

prepared a list of the approved natural resource studies. The resource management plan was

more a research plan and largely ineffective because it was not formally tied to the park's

budget, and because priorities in the young park changed quickly causing many of the

proposals to be out of date. On the other hand, the research list was significant for several

reasons. First, the twenty-four projects attested to the new park's need for research into nearly

every aspect of its natural environment. Without these, as one North Cascades official noted,

decisions affecting park resources would only be informed by "educated guesses." Second,

many of the proposals went unfunded during the park's first decade of management.

Although independent researchers connected with universities often carried out studies, their

results were seldom known and their use to management were rarely of any value to park

management. The list of unfunded research projects included proposals for ecological and

zoological inventories, a study of plant succession, water pollution studies, exotic plant

surveys, a study of the history of human uses of natural resources, an investigation of the

park's climate and glacial activity, a review of the area's geologic research, a forest resource

survey of the lower Stehekin Valley to manage the firewood cutting program, and ecosystem

surveys to assess the impact of the park's proposed visitor-use developments (Roland Point

and backcountry hostels, for example). Still other studies were needed to assess the

consumption and possible regulation of resources such as river gravel, sand, and soil in the

Stehekin River Valley.[11]

Finally, those projects that were undertaken reflected the most pressing management
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priorities. And thus they received funding and were carried out by the park biologist as well

as by independent researchers under contract. These projects included, as one might imagine,

studies of human impacts on, and the restoration of, the park complex's subalpine zone, a

botanical inventory, forest fire ecology, studies of the North Cascades complex's aquatic

ecology -- an umbrella project for the complex's many high mountain lakes, and streams --

and the related study of assessing the effects of sport fish introduction upon naturally fishless

high mountain lakes.

Repairing the sensitive subalpine environment formed a central component of the park

complex's backcountry management program. Park managers depended on the volunteer

work of Joe and Margaret Miller whose revegetation studies of Cascade Pass and their forest

fire ecology study in the 1970s proved invaluable to the rehabilitation of this and other lowelevation passes in the park's wilderness. (Because of this, other studies, and the agency's

interest in restoring natural processes, park managers developed a fire management plan to

allow, within certain guidelines, naturally caused fires to burn in order to perpetuate natural

ecosystems.)[12] In addition, agency officials contracted with George Douglas, a botanist at

the University of Alberta, to conduct a study on revegetation of sub-alpine denuded areas.

His work assisted park managers in their restoration efforts. Without the volunteer efforts of

the Millers and the work of contract botanists like Douglas, the park's subalpine-zone passes

would not have received the attention and rehabilitation they deserved, nor would the

complex's backcountry management have fared as well as it did.

Throughout the 1970s, North Cascades Biologist Wasem conducted at least seven research

projects, the majority of which concentrated on the park's lakes, reservoirs, and rivers with

particular emphasis on their ecology and native or nonnative fish populations. By the middle

of the decade, Wasem could count on the assistance of several seasonal biological technicians

in carrying out these and other projects. However, biological research by its very nature took

place over a rather long period of time, made even longer by the short-working seasons in the

high country of the North Cascades. Yet Wasem's work was to serve a management purpose:

to determine, according to agency policies, the natural condition of the complex's lakes and

rivers. Ultimately, his research intersected with the first high profile resource management

controversy of the new parkland's first ten years: the question of fish stocking in the high

lakes of North Cascades.

***

In the mid-1970s, Wasem's research, though not complete, suggested that many of the

national park's high mountain lakes were naturally fish free, but many had been stocked over

the past thirty or more years by the Washington State Department of Game -- and with the

department's permission by private sport-fishing associations -- with native and non-native

fish. While sport fishing in national parks dates to the creation of Yellowstone and was

"enhanced" through stocking programs in many of the nation's parks, the Park Service

reconsidered this policy in light of the Leopold Report, especially with its emphasis on

returning park environments to their "original condition" and eliminating exotic species.

Furthermore, much of the discussion hinged upon the meanings of the words "barren" and

"native." Lakes without fish, for example, were often considered to be barren by the state;

this implied the lakes were sterile pools of water, which was not the case at all. The best

description of these lakes was "fish free," according to Park Service officials. And for the

state to plant fish native to this region was highly problematic. As agency officials pointed

out, an introduced fish was not native to a lake that was fish free. Lakes were not cornfields

prepared for harvest.

In 1975, based on Wasem's research, Superintendent Lowell White instituted a new policy for

the park's high mountain lakes stating, in essence, that the agency would no longer stock
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naturally barren lakes and would not restock those lakes into which native trout had been

introduced, since most of these lakes could support naturally reproducing populations and

provide anglers with a "reasonable catch." The new policy would not affect the complex's two

recreation areas and their sport fisheries; Ross, Diablo, and Gorge lakes as well as Lake

Chelan continued to be stocked by the game department. [14]

Overall, the goal of this policy was to allow natural processes to take over by gradually

phasing out "all stocking over the next 50 years," Wasem wrote, thereby leaving "only

naturally reproducing trout as inhabitants of the naturally fish free high lakes of the North

Cascades." From a scientific standpoint, this policy represented a compromise, for it

recognized that in cases where lakes had been planted with trout, mainly rainbow and

cutthroat, these lakes and their fish populations would be considered "natural" or "wild" as

long as they continued to reproduce without human assistance. At the same time, it also

recognized that the agency had the responsibility of preserving the integrity of the park's

"remaining aquatic ecosystems" (or fish free lakes), not just from fish stocking but also from

over use and thus the impacts their fragile shorelines and plant life sustained. [15]

Superintendent White's attempt to halt fish stocking in the park's high mountain lakes was

met with immediate and loud choruses of anger from sport fishing groups (the Washington

State Hi-Lakers and Trailblazers) and considerable resistance from the game department. The

fishing groups had been stocking trout in the high lakes of Washington's Cascades since the

mid-1930s, and considered the stocking program as "theirs" and bristled at any interference.

They protested the new policy because they believed that the Park Service was reneging on its

commitments to fish management. Both the congressional hearings on the park's

establishment and the park complex's legislation mandated the agency to cooperate with the

game department in fish and wildlife management. The argument here, of course, was that

since the legislation called for cooperation and gave the game department the authority to

grant hunting and fishing licenses in the park complex, the Park Service should continue to

honor the past practices of stocking high mountain lakes. In fact, these groups believed that

the game department, not the Park Service, had jurisdiction over the new park's fish and

wildlife. Members of the Hi-Lakers and Trailblazers worried that without stocking their

angling adventures into the high country of the North Cascades would be diminished. And

they resented it. [16]

Superintendent White tried unsuccessfully to convince these sports fishermen of the virtues

of managing and restoring nature to its original condition. In the summer of 1975, for

example, he informed them that the fish stocking in high lakes of national parks was being

"phased out," noting the course taken by Yellowstone and Glacier. This, however, did not

necessarily apply to the high lakes of recreation areas. White acknowledged that sport fishing

was "an approved type of visitor activity in natural areas and recreation areas." Yet based on

guidelines stemming from the Leopold Report, the agency only encouraged sport fishing in

natural areas as long as it did not interfere with the "restoration and perpetuation" of aquatic

ecosystems. In this respect, he stated, trout were "not native to the high mountain lakes of the

North Cascades." There were too many physical barriers to upstream fish migration and thus

their presence was the result of artificial introduction by man, and therefore park policy

would no longer allow fish stocking. [17] Leaders in the sport fishing organizations

responded to White's policy explanation as simply an unsubstantiated, vague reason for

betraying the public and its right to fish in the North Cascades. The organizations, in turn,

brought considerable political pressure against White and the Park Service, involving Senator

Henry M. Jackson's office, and forced the Park Service to reconsider its position. [18]

Another force pressing the agency to reconsider its position was the Washington State

Department of Game. The legislation creating the North Cascades complex made special

provision for the management of fish and wildlife. The creation of Lake Chelan NRA, for
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example, was largely the result of lobbying from hunters. Moreover, out of concern for state

fishery management, the legislation creating Lake Chelan NRA was meant to accommodate

existing or planned fish hatchery programs in the Stehekin River drainage at the head of Lake

Chelan, mainly the Company Creek hatchery. On the subject of jurisdiction, the legislation

recognized the game department and its past management practices in the North Cascades

and thus stipulated that the department would issue hunting licenses in the recreation areas

and fishing licenses in the entire complex. Finally, the legislation asserted that both the game

department and the Park Service should enter into a cooperative agreement for the

management of the park complex's fish and game. To this end, Superintendent Contor, along

with Olympic National Park Superintendent Bennett Gale, met with the game department's

director, John Biggs, and drafted a memorandum of understanding between the two agencies

in late 1968. Although the Park Service approved of the document, the game department

never seemed to act on it officially. Nevertheless, relations between the two agencies

appeared to be good. State field biologists worked with park biologist Bob Wasem on a

number of projects and management concerns which included increasing deer browse in Ross

Lake NRA, cooperating in deer habitat and population studies, looking at the possible

reintroduction of native wildlife such as bighorn sheep, conducting surveys of the park

complex's wildlife, overseeing hunting in the recreation areas, and coordinating fish

management.

It was on this latter issue that the two agencies clashed. When Washington Department of

Game officials learned of the Park Service's new policy for the high lakes in North Cascades,

they were angry. They interpreted the policy as a serious infringement on their fish

management program in what was now the park. Of the 235 lakes (reservoirs, lakes, and

ponds) identified in the complex, according to game department biologist Douglas Fletcher,

the department could only include 54 in its program; most of these were in the recreation

areas and none of them was in the high country. Fletcher and the department maintained that

the North Cascades legislation intended for recreational fishing to continue in park and

recreation areas, and that both agencies were responsible for maintaining the fishery. The

department, like the sport fishing groups, did not agree with the park's policy of managing the

lakes to preserve their natural conditions. State biologists also contended that there was not

enough evidence to determine which lakes were fish free before whites arrived, that the

policy unfairly singled out anglers (who were not necessarily responsible for damage to high

lake environments), and that the no-stocking policy was inconsistent with practices in other

parks. As Fletcher concluded:

Our administration feels very strongly that we have an important stake in the

high lakes of the North Cascades Complex and it was certainly not our

understanding at the time of the creation of the Park Complex, or now, that we

have given up any authority to manage fish populations in the complex....[W]e

feel that to give up a management option on the remaining high lakes in the Park

would be a severe blow to our high lake program in this part of the State and to

the high lake anglers who use them. The intent of the legislation is clear, and

fishing is certainly a recreational value. [19]

In response to mounting political pressure from special interest groups and the game

department, Superintendent White proposed a "policy variance" for the North Cascades. In

other words, as a solution to the political fallout created by the Park Service's policy of no

fish stocking in high mountain lakes, he proposed that "such a variance be on a lake-by-lake

basis and not include lakes containing a self-sustaining population or that are presently

naturally barren of fish life." [20] The reasoning behind this proposal, White stated, was that

should the Park Service take a hard stance against stocking, it was likely that some

disgruntled fishermen might illegally stock exotic species of fish in the high lakes, and thus

the policy would accomplish nothing. Moreover, a policy variance might also appease the
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game department and lead to a more formal memorandum of understanding between the two

agencies on fish management than the 1968 agreement. [21]

The policy variance proposal eventually reached the Park Service's Washington office in

December 1975, where the directorship denied it. Regional Director Russell Dickenson

requested the Washington office to reconsider the proposal the following year. Dickenson

pointed out that critics of the North Cascades fish stocking policy had a case, based on past

practices and statements made by former Director George Hartzog during the congressional

hearings on the park complex's establishment. Even though Hartzog did not specifically say

that his agency would continue to plant fish in the North Cascades, his reference to the Park

Service's fish-stocking practices was taken literally by sportsmen's groups, and current

policies, in their minds, did not apply. The regional director recommended flexibility in this

case, for the political repercussions could influence agency management practices in other

areas. (Dickenson was referring in particular to recent attempts to halt fish stocking in several

national parks in California. He maintained North Cascades was different because it had

some legislative history referring to the practice.) By allowing some fish stocking to continue

in selected high lakes, he concluded, fish planting "would phase itself out in a few more

years." [22]

In July 1976, Dickenson reported that he had decided, apparently without the formal blessing

of the agency's directorship, "to affirm our commitment to fish stocking" in North Cascades

under the policy variance. The intent here was to work out a variance as part of a

memorandum of understanding with the Washington Department of Game. Meanwhile, game

department officials blasted the policy variance and its guidelines, all of which smacked of

the same unwarranted restrictions proposed earlier. At one point, the game department

notified Superintendent White that it intended to go forward with fish planting as planned in

order to "maintain what is left of the sports fishery which we and interested sportsmen have

worked so diligently to develop and frankly protect by the formation of the North Cascades

Park and wilderness area." The issue here was one of jurisdiction, and the game department

was asserting its authority to carry out its program without the Park Service's permission,

something the regional solicitor determined the game department could not do. The

department, in short, could only manage the fish and wildlife within the park as long as it was

in concert with the area's management plans. [23]

The fish-stocking issue was not fully resolved in the 1970s. Despite some posturing, both

sides eventually agreed to revisit the issue as part of an attempt to develop a memorandum of

understanding for fish management in the North Cascades. By 1978, the variance, modified

several times, was finally accepted as part of the first statewide cooperative agreement

between the Park Service and the Washington Department of Game. Although all interested

parties cooperated, the issue would flare up again when management priorities in the park

changed in the 1980s. [24]

***

While not nearly as politically contentious as the fish-stocking controversy, wildlife

management mainly focused on inventorying and monitoring the complex's wildlife

populations -- deer, mountain goats, mountain lions, coyotes, and bears, among many others -

- and their habitats. In all of this, bear management marked the most visible wildlife

management issue of the park's first decade. Historically, bear management has been the Park

Service's most complicated animal management problem. Bears, of course, were sources of

entertainment in many of the nation's oldest parks where visitors gathered to watch them feed

at the bear pits or take handouts by the roadsides and in campgrounds. When the Park

Service began to curtail this activity, bears accustomed to easy handouts began to forage

through campgrounds and food service areas and inevitably damaged property and injured,
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sometimes killed, park visitors. To avoid these problems, the Park Service attempted a

variety of solutions -- educating visitors, bear-proofing garbage containers, relocating

"problem bears," and destroying "offensive bears" who posed a threat to human life.

Unfortunately, destroying bears became the easiest solution in some parks. Even after the

Park Service adopted a management policy based on ecological principles, bear problems

persisted in most national parks. By now though, the agency had adopted more strategies to

avoid human-bear conflicts, and initiated research to help solve bear problems. The need for

this became especially apparent in the late 1960s and 1970s as more park visitors headed into

the backcountry, thus increasing encounters with bears. Bear research emerged as one of the

high points of Park Service wildlife management, leading to better methods of drugging,

handling, and relocating bears from problem areas, as well as sanitizing campgrounds and

storing food, all of which contributed to visitor safety. Yet for all of this research, bear

management remained problematic and controversial, since people, their food, and bears

continued to come into contact in national parks, and thus the potential for destructive and

potentially dangerous encounters remained. [25]

These trends characterized much of the bear management in the first decade of the park

complex's management. On the one hand, the new parkland held the potential for one of the

Northwest's last stronghold of the grizzly. When Superintendent Contor first arrived, he

learned that biologists from the Washington Department of Game as well as Canadian

wildlife biologists had seen grizzlies in the upper Skagit basin near the Canadian border in

what was now the park complex. Although other sightings of the bears were few and difficult

to verify, Contor's spirits were buoyed when Washington State prohibited hunting of grizzlies

in 1969. He had discussed the issue with game department officials and believed that these

discussions and the creation of the North Cascades complex may have contributed to this

decision. Manning Provincial Park across the border in British Columbia protected the grizzly

and now so would North Cascades National Park. Perhaps, he concluded, "we will have the

grizzly around for a while." [26]

Grizzly bears, however, never seemed to make their presence known in the park complex

after these initial sightings. Black bears, on the other hand, were a source of concern in both

the Stehekin and Skagit valleys as incidents of property damage and encounters with visitors

and residents rose. As in most parks, problems with bears occurred primarily in

campgrounds. Unlike most parks, however, encounters with bears in Stehekin arose from

other sources as well, primarily private homes and the Stehekin dump. Although rangers

trapped and relocated problem bears in the Skagit Valley, Stehekin posed still another

variation to this approach, since it was difficult, or impossible altogether, to remove bears

from the valley. (Some problem bears were captured and barged down the lake, and then

they were released on national forest land without the Forest Service's knowledge.) And with

the influx of visitors to the new park and thus an increase in camping in the valley, it did not

take bears long to nose out this new source of food. To some degree, hunting in the recreation

areas limited the black bear population. But even this was complicated in Stehekin where

park managers restricted bear hunting to the upper valley, away from popular bear feeding

grounds like the Buckner apple orchard, to make the event more sporting. The restrictions

were also intended to protect people in this relatively populous section of the recreation area.

Despite relocation and removal practices, and closing the Stehekin dump, some bears were

killed annually in either district to protect life and property.

In 1975, park managers drafted a bear management plan to address the bear problems in both

front country and backcountry areas. The main theme of the plan was "to give uniform

guidance in the control of 'problem' bears," the main thrust of which was to "prevent bear

problems from developing." The plan stressed increasing visitor education, bear-proofing

garbage cans and removing garbage on a frequent basis, closing all garbage dumps, among

other sanitary measures, as well as improving camping facilities by installing cables for food
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storage and closing areas to visitors where bears posed a threat to human life. In Stehekin

this last approach was important since relocating bears required a helicopter and one was not

always available. The last resort, in controlled situations, was destroying the bear. The

success of the bear management program following the release of the plan seems to have

been mixed. Black bears continued to be a "problem." They did not injure visitors or

Stehekin residents, yet they damaged property. Almost every year residents killed bears

claiming the animals were trying to break into their homes after fruit and other foods. [27]

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 7:

DAM DILEMMA: NORTH CASCADES NATIONAL

PARK AND THE HIGH ROSS DAM CONTROVERSY

Among the many factors influencing the management of North Cascades, hydropower

commands, perhaps, the greatest attention. Hydroelectric projects literally have shaped the

landscape of the park and created an array of management issues. In the late 1920s, for

example, a hydroelectric dam raised the level of the picturesque Lake Chelan, and in the late

1950s, a similar project on the Baker River, which rises in the park's high country, formed

the modern Baker Lake just west of the park. In both cases, the hydroelectric operations lie

outside the boundaries of the parkland but their manipulation of the level of the lakes for

power production has potential consequences inside the park, ranging from shoreline erosion

to the destruction of fish populations. Nature, and indeed altered nature, knows no

boundaries.

The true centerpiece of hydroelectric power in North Cascades, however, is Seattle City

Light's Skagit River Hydroelectric Project. Located in Ross Lake National Recreation Area

(NRA), the project's three dams -- Gorge, Diablo, and Ross -- harness power from the Skagit

and form a chain of emerald green lakes that bear their names. Dealing with Seattle City

Light and its plans to expand its power production proved to be one of the most contentious

episodes in the history of the new park. Although City Light had a number of proposals to

construct new dams, the utility's main focus was increasing the height of Ross Dam, and thus

the High Ross project, as it came to be known, became the most volatile and contested issue

of the day. [] In short, it became a defining issue in how the Park Service would deal with its

largest and most powerful tenant and, in turn, manage Ross Lake NRA.

In the late 1960s, Seattle City Light moved forward with its plans to increase the height of

Ross Dam. The High Ross project would have raised the level of Ross Lake flooding miles

of shoreline within Ross Lake NRA and flooding most of the Skagit River Valley in British

Columbia. [2] Raising the dam, completed in 1949, had been in City Light's original plans, as

a means to increase power production for a growing metropolitan area. In 1942, the

International Joint Commission approved of the city's project and the city had signed an

agreement with British Columbia officials to compensate the province for damages. But in

the early 1950s, British Columbia tried to back out of the agreement, stalling the project. In

the 1960s, the movement to establish North Cascades National Park further threatened the

project. In 1967, however, City Light had reached an agreement with Canada, which

evidently allowed it to flood Canada, and the legislation creating North Cascades in 1968

assured the utility that the Park Service would not interfere with its plans. Although the city's

way to completing its project seemed clear, environmentalists on both sides of the border rose

up in opposition. They contended that High Ross would destroy the free-flowing Canadian

Skagit, fish populations, wildlife habitat, and more of the northern Cascades' wild country.

The government of British Columbia joined in to fight the project on environmental as well

as legal grounds, asserting that Seattle could not adequately compensate the province for the

loss of its valley.
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Complex and contentious, the High Ross controversy dragged on into the early 1980s. By this

time, the two government bodies responsible for settling such matters, the Federal Power

Commission (FPC) and the International Joint Commission (IJC), had ruled in favor of

Seattle City Light. That is, the FPC approved the amendment to City Light's license (needed

to raise Ross Dam), and the IJC determined that City Light's legal right to flood Canada was

valid, based on the 1967 agreement. Furthermore, neither one believed that the environmental

consequences were significant enough to stop the project.

At the same time, however, the IJC preferred that Seattle and British Columbia negotiate a

settlement. Popular sentiment was overwhelmingly in favor of protecting the wild lands of the

northern Cascades and upper Skagit Valley. Although Seattle maintained it had the legal

right to flood the upper Skagit Valley, it eventually agreed to seek a negotiated settlement,

especially in the highly charged environmental politics of the period. Recent events such as

the default of the Washington Public Power Supply System and the passage of the Northwest

Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act had damaged the image of public power and

placed a greater emphasis on energy conservation. As a result, City Light's argument for

raising the dam -- for peaking power in winter months -- lost its vigor. More importantly, the

issue had become an international incident of sorts. At one point, B.C. protesters lined the

remote U.S.-Canada border at the northern edge of Ross Lake to save the upper Skagit

Valley from "Yankee oppression." Thus, in 1984, more for diplomatic and political than

environmental reasons, the two sides signed a treaty in which British Columbia would

compensate Seattle with power comparable to what would have been generated by High Ross

in return for the city suspending the project. [3]

The High Ross affair's status as an environmental issue of international proportions has

obscured one major point: The raising of the dam was to take place within a unit of the

American national park system. Curiously enough, Ross Lake NRA shared its border with

British Columbia and would, in the end, benefit from that relationship. That is, the resolution

prevented the recreation area from being flooded, and one might say, Canada saved Ross

Lake NRA for the American public albeit indirectly. What role did the Park Service play?

After all, it was the agency directly responsible for the area's protection.

The Park Service's role in the controversy reveals that it underwent the same change of heart

as many Americans about dams. This was a period of some twenty years when changing

times and values revised the image of dams from symbols of progress to symbols of

ecological disaster. This popular reorientation evolved on both sides of the border and

brought the High Ross project to a halt. [4] It would influence how park managers viewed

their role in managing the recreation area. Although Ross Lake was artificially created, the

Park Service ultimately regarded the protection of its natural environment as its primary

purpose. The agency arrived at this position, however, slowly. Its approach to managing

recreation areas presented something of a dam dilemma. Should they be managed for

development or preservation? The agency's position on this was unclear initially; the

legislation governing the recreation area was confusing, and faced with political pressure to

both protect and develop Ross Lake, the agency seemed uncertain about the management

direction it should take.

It appeared that British Columbia would play a greater role in protecting a parkland in

another country than the agency assigned to that task. The reason for this, in part, lies in the

Park Service's strange relationship with dams. Originally, the agency protected the nation's

premier natural areas. The agency's creation in 1916, in fact, had been precipitated by the

recent damming of Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park. But during the 1930s, it

began to manage reservoirs created by other federal agencies such as the Bureau of

Reclamation. Taking over the management of recreation areas (like Lake Mead, the first) was
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part of the agency's expansion during the New Deal. It increased the Park Service's chances

of survival in the government's reorganization by giving it the lead role in recreational

planning and development for the nation. It was a move, critics argued, that distracted the

agency from its true mission and opened the door to the proposed damming of Echo Park in

Dinosaur National Monument -- the Hetch Hetchy of the 1950s. [5]

The evolution of the Park Service's management of parks and recreation areas is illustrated

well in the northern Cascades. For the first time, a national park and two recreation areas

were under one administration. What most accounts of the High Ross affair fail to appreciate

is that all three areas function as an interrelated whole, and thus they tend to isolate Ross

Lake from its larger setting. But in reality, what happens to it affects the half-million acre

national park, the dominant feature of this region, particularly because the recreation area

roughly bisects the park.

Besides its administrative function, the park complex represented a significant victory in

wilderness preservation in the postwar era. But the new parkland's establishment represented

the concessions necessary to achieve that victory. One of the many political compromises

leading to the creation of North Cascades was that law makers drew the boundaries around

Ross Lake to accommodate High Ross. (This, of course, was in addition to other proposed

projects such as the one on Thunder Creek that influenced the recreation area's boundaries.)

Moreover, law makers retained the FPC's authority over hydroelectric projects in the

recreation area's legislation and thus prevented the Park Service from interfering with High

Ross. [6]

What, one might ask, was Congress thinking? Had it forgotten the public outcry over the loss

of Hetch Hetchy or the more recent but thwarted attempts to dam Dinosaur or the Grand

Canyon? Apparently, Congress reasoned that the rising waters would not submerge any lands

within a national park, and therefore would not violate the sanctity of a national park. [7] The

law makers, of course, had miscalculated at a time of heightened environmental awareness in

which dams had become the equivalent of environmental sin. Groups like the Sierra Club and

North Cascades Conservation Council (N3C), among the most active in the North Cascades

campaign, fought the project because the loss of any more wild lands, whether in a park or

recreation area, was unacceptable. In their minds, this isolated, man-made lake, set in a

jumble of precipitous, glacier-clad peaks, possessed the scenic qualities and unique natural

wonders of a national park and deserved similar protection. For them, wilderness persisted

even around a reservoir, and they argued that the legislation had wrongfully omitted several

scenic wilderness valleys from the park, such as Big Beaver, out of deference to the High

Ross project. [8]

Throughout most of the High Ross controversy, however, the Park Service seemed

unresponsive to these views. To be sure, the agency found itself constricted by law and

forced into neutrality on the issue, but it was also reluctant to assert itself in the protection of

Ross Lake's natural values. This hesitancy reveals another reason for the agency's role in the

High Ross affair. Besides the strange relationship with dams, there were the paradoxes

associated with national park management. The management philosophy of preservation and

use, now familiar in the annals of national park history, increased popular support for parks

but all too often at the expense of the their natural conditions. Even in the late 1960s and

early 1970s, when the agency had adopted a management policy based more on ecological

principles, its ability to break with tradition was uneven at best. [9]

If the agency's commitment to preservation of national parks has seemed at times ambiguous,

its management of national recreation areas has raised even more doubts. Recreation areas

were the second cousins of parks. The public's expectations of the agency, regardless of what

kind of area it managed, were high; it cared for the nation's parks and should treat anything
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else under its jurisdiction with similar respect. In 1964, Secretary of the Interior Stewart L.

Udall attempted to clarify the distinction between areas under the Park Service's jurisdiction.

He separated them into three management categories, natural, historical, and recreational,

each with its own management concept and administrative policies. In doing so, he affirmed

recreation areas' lower stature. In a recreation area, a wide variety of uses, such as fishing,

hunting, boating, timber harvesting, and mining, were acceptable with certain provisions.

While this policy recognized the expansion in outdoor recreation in the nation and the

addition of nontraditional parklands like national seashores, it made the protection of the

natural environment a secondary priority. In these areas, the agency only had to present a

"pleasing environment" to the public. [10]

The recreation policy manual, in an attempt to clarify intent, left a great deal of the area's

actual management open to interpretation. Management was based on the recreation area's

enabling legislation, the fuzziness of congressional intent, and the Park Service's own

ambiguous management philosophy. In seemingly concrete language, the legislation for Ross

Lake NRA stated that its purpose was to "provide for public outdoor recreation" and

protection of the area's "other values" was only important insofar as it contributed "to the

public enjoyment" of the area. [11] The most important information regarding the recreation

area's management did not appear in the legislation but in a statement by Secretary Udall

during the 1967 Senate hearings on the North Cascades bill. Udall, in short, declared that the

"basic reasons" for creating Ross Lake NRA were to permit High Ross and a broader range

of recreational activities than "normally the custom within a National Park." [12]

Although it seemed that Ross Lake NRA was officially approved for liberal uses, similar to a

national forest, each group with an interest in the area's management interpreted its purpose

differently, and in turn created further management conflicts and controversy.

Preservationists, for example, believed High Ross was a political birthmark in the park's

creation, something it would grow out of later. In their view, the purpose of North Cascades

was wilderness preservation; the decade-long, bitter struggle to create the area had proven

that. And they criticized the Park Service for excluding the project area from its wilderness

designations covering the entire park and portions of the recreation areas. [13]

For its part, Seattle City Light was unwavering in its own literal interpretation of Udall's

statement, treating it as the central purpose of the recreation area and one of its justifications

for pressing forward with the project. Nationally renowned as a successful public utility, City

Light tended to see engineered nature as just as valuable as wilderness, and implied after the

park's establishment that it had "created" the recreation area by making the Skagit Valley's

wilderness "usable." High Ross would only create more "usable wilderness," enhancing rather

than interfering with the Park Service's management of the recreation area. [14]

In either case, Congress' intent was purposefully vague. High Ross was a political expedient,

something Washington's Senator Henry M. Jackson agreed to in order to accomplish the

larger goal of creating the park. By withdrawing High Ross from the proposed park's

boundaries, Jackson eliminated one of the many road blocks to the park complex's creation; it

was a compromise that left the final decision on the project up to the FPC and not Congress.

Though it may have appeared he was granting his approval of the project, the veteran

politician knew that in the current political climate City Light faced a stiff challenge from

environmentalists. [15]

Confronted with these differing views, the Park Service fell back on its standard approach to

conflict. It tried to please everyone. Throughout its history, the agency depended on public

opinion and federal appropriations for its survival. In short, its management decisions have at

times seemed more concerned with achieving popularity than taking a hard-nosed stance in

protecting biological resources. Its approach to managing Ross Lake NRA, at least for most
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of the 1970s, did not focus on protecting the recreation area's natural values. This was a

highly controversial topic during the FPC's licensing process and the 1974 hearings.

Maintaining its neutrality, the agency let others come to the defense of the Big Beaver

Valley's "cathedral of trees" and what forest ecologists testified was an irreplaceable

laboratory of nature; it was one of the most ecologically significant sites in western

Washington for studying a bottom-land boggy cedar environment. [16]

Instead, the agency embarked on a program for developing Ross Lake for recreation. This

after all was the area's primary mission. It was also a program for which the Park Service

could count on strong political support. Perhaps most confusing about this approach was the

agency's conceptualization of the recreation area as a "wilderness threshold." A staging area

at the edge of the park's wilderness, it would introduce visitors to the "mood and temper of

the wild country" beyond. [17] This meant that the recreation areas (in the park complex)

would be the focus of visitor services and developments, removing traditional park

development pressures from the park itself. [18]

But rather than eliminating development conflicts, this strategy merely transferred them from

one area to another. As preservationists discovered, wilderness threshold seemed to be a

euphemism for large-scale development. They pointed to the agency's plans for tramways,

large-scale development at Roland Point on Ross Lake, and a road to Roland Point from

Highway 20 as evidence. The immediate issue at hand was one that has affected all parks

historically -- access. Access, along with the agency's strange relationship with dams and

management paradoxes, further illustrates why the agency seemed to hesitate when it came to

protecting the area's natural environment. Without the Roland Point project, there would be

no highway access to the southern end of Ross Lake.

The Roland Point road and lake shore development were eventually shelved, due to

prohibitive costs, environmental impacts, and opposition from preservationists. But political

pressure for something similar remained and led to perhaps the strangest event of all. The

National Park Service endorsed the High Ross project. The main reason for this was that

while it could not afford financially, environmentally, or politically to build a road to or

provide services on the lake itself, it could get City Light to provide virtually the same thing

as part of its construction of High Ross. The agency could make such a request as part of the

licensing process for High Ross (otherwise known as Exhibit R). It was one of few areas the

agency actually had any control over in this stage of the licensing process. [19]

By doing so, the agency solved its access problem. But it created another one in the process.

By promoting High Ross, albeit as a planning alternative, the agency appeared to be on the

verge of the inconceivable, turning back a century of national park preservation. That the

dam was in a recreation area did not matter, for it was the agency charged with protecting the

nation's parks that had made the decision. In order to bring hundreds of thousands of visitors

to the shores of Ross Lake, national park managers were willing to concede the loss of Big

Beaver Valley and the lake's other natural values. In doing so, they would fulfill the area's

purpose and what was interpreted as Congress' intent -- to make the lake reasonably

accessible for water-oriented recreation. All this to save park visitors the drive through

Canada.

Condemning as this sounds, the Park Service's position was, once again, not entirely clear.

During the 1974 FPC hearings, former Secretary of the Interior Udall testimony's cast doubt

on the Park Service's position. Udall testified that the High Ross exemption had indeed been

a political expedient and that he believed personally that the project should not go forward

because of the environmental and scenic damage it would cause. Then, shortly after it

endorsed High Ross, the Park Service began to back-pedal and shifted its emphasis to the

protection of the recreation area's biological resources. When the Federal Power Commission
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released its initial approval of High Ross in 1976, North Cascades park managers petitioned

the Department of the Interior to intervene before a final license was issued. Their reason for

intervention concerned the loss of natural resources in the recreation area -- Big Beaver's

ancient trees, beaver ponds, cutthroat trout spawning grounds, and scenic attractions such as

waterfalls, high bluffs, and rock outcroppings. They did not mention recreational

developments. [20]

The agency's request had little effect on the licensing process. The Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (which replaced the FPC) approved City Light's amended license to raise Ross

Dam in 1977. Afterwards, a coalition of environmental groups (both American and

Canadian), the U.S. Department of the Interior, and a number of affected Indian tribes (Upper

Skagit Tribe, Swinomish Tribal Community, and Sauk-Suiattle Tribe) requested a rehearing.

While the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted the new hearing, it issued

its final approval of the amended license in August 1978. And even though

environmentalists, led by N3C and the British Columbia-based Run Out Skagit Spoilers

(ROSS), appealed the decision to the Washington, D.C., Circuit Court of Appeals in 1980,

the court upheld the decision, bringing the legal suits against the amended license to a close.

Nevertheless, the Park Service's role in this process demonstrated that its emphasis had

changed in the management of national recreation areas. The preservation of natural values

was now its greatest concern. This happened, one might say, because the environmental

movement finally had caught up with the Park Service. This new emphasis grew out of

numerous environmental laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), and

more specifically out of amendments to the Park Service's Organic Act in 1970 and 1978.

These revisions, among other things, asserted that the agency's mission statement applied to

all park units, including recreation areas, and affirmed that only Congress could authorize

activities that might impair the values and purposes for which an area of the national park

system was established. In other words, Congress determined that the agency's management

categories had weakened rather than strengthened the park system from internal as well as

external threats. The system, according to Congress, should be managed as an integrated

whole. More important, all areas within the park system should be managed with the same

regard as national parks. Thus, the service abandoned the separate management categories in

the late 1970s and at least in theory began treating Ross Lake NRA as a national park. [21]

The most striking example of this was the Park Service's control over access to the dam site.

Rather than supporting High Ross, now agency officials "unofficially" blocked the project

with a special use permit. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Seattle City Light anxiously

attempted to complete the final phase of Ross Dam, after it appeared the utility had won

approval and before British Columbia could get the IJC to hear its case again. (B.C. was

contesting not only the 1967 agreement but also the 1942 Order in Council which had

precipitated much of this controversy.) And thus for a brief moment the only thing that stood

between the dam and its completion was the permit itself. The permit would have allowed

City Light to build a construction road across a small section of Park Service land from

Highway 20 down to the dam. In return for that permit, the agency required three things: 1)

that the legal suits against its license be resolved, 2) that it settle its differences with British

Columbia, and 3) that it complete an environmental assessment of the road's construction.

Officially, the agency claimed that these provisions were only practical; without the first two

there would be no reason to build the road at all. Unofficially, it was stalling the project, in

effect holding it hostage, while British Columbia continued to contest Seattle's authority to

flood the Skagit Valley before the IJC. [22]

However progressive and assertive the Park Service had become in the protection of Ross

Lake, it could only delay but not prevent or openly resist High Ross. It was serendipitous,

then, that British Columbia contested Seattle's right to flood the upper Skagit Valley in the
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early 1980s. The complicated 1984 agreement between Seattle and British Columbia ended a

twenty-year struggle of what City Light called a seemingly "irreconcilable issue." [23] And

the accompanying treaty between the United States and Canada removed an "environmental

irritant" between the two countries at a time when environmental issues, such as acid rain in

the Great Lakes region, were creating tensions along the borderland. [24]

Yet what has often been under-appreciated in this larger arena was that the agreement helped

save an American parkland. This was an important turn of events, especially since at first the

National Park Service seemed intent on developing the recreation area and supporting High

Ross. In time, the agency solved its dam dilemma, but only after groping toward a policy

position that would assure the protection of the recreation area's natural environment. In the

end, the Park Service's approach to protecting Ross Lake NRA's natural values would not

have been possible without British Columbia's persistent opposition to Seattle City Light's

plans. The treaty has forged a relationship between Canada and the America public, and thus

the National Park Service, in the protection of Ross Lake. The treaty is only a "paper dam,"

good through 2066, and thus Canada still controls the future of Ross Lake, for should it

terminate its agreement, Seattle could, theoretically, build High Ross. The treaty further

bonded the two countries in the protection of this parkland by establishing the Skagit

Environmental Endowment Fund of $5 million for the enhancement of recreational

opportunities in, and environmental protection of, the area above Ross Dam. The fund would

be administered by a joint commission, known as the Skagit Environmental Endowment

Commission. The relationship fostered through the commission and fund, like Canada's role

in protecting Ross Lake, was an unintended consequence. It suggests another aspect to our

understanding of this international controversy, and that protecting national parks can come

from unexpected sources and in indirect ways. [25]

***

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the High Ross resolution and the Park Service's new

management approach to Ross Lake represented a significant stage in the park complex's

history. In the near future, park managers would look to implement plans delayed by the

controversy or to move forward with new ones. Likewise, resource management concerns

would be approached in a similar fashion. But all was not finished with City Light, and a

major undertaking awaited park managers. In 1977, City Light's license for the entire Skagit

River project had expired. The High Ross affair, however, delayed relicensing until the mid1980s. Although perhaps more complex and contentious than High Ross, as many agency

officials were coming to realize, relicensing would offer new ways of interacting with City

Light, especially in the protection of Ross Lake NRA's natural values.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 8:

STEHEKIN: LAND OF FREEDOM AND WANT

Lake Chelan National Recreation Area (NRA) presented park managers with problems

similar to those in Ross Lake National Recreation Area and the issues surrounding Seattle

City Light's operations. They faced the challenge of managing a recreation area where the

underlying question was whether or not the protection of natural values should take

precedence over existing uses. At the center of Lake Chelan NRA's management, however,

was something far different from a hydroelectric project. The focus here was the community

of Stehekin, consisting of a vocal group of some ninety year-round residents who have

captured the attention and time of Park Service staff.

The Park Service's management of the Stehekin Valley has been complicated by its

classification as a national recreation area (many, including agency officials, have contended

it should have been a national park) and its accompanying legislation and congressional

documents. Equally important in complicating the valley's management has been Stehekin's

image and its history as a place removed from the currents of modern America. Popular

views of Stehekin suggest that it represents a place where America's pioneer past still exists,

and this existence has had, and continues to have, a powerful hold on the imagination. Real

or imagined, the frontier lifestyle of a self-sufficient, self-reliant people evokes passionate

and often contrary opinions from individuals from all walks of life about how this place

should be protected. Given the spirited individualism of residents and the values visitors find

in the valley's isolated setting and remarkable scenery, there has been little popular consensus

about the area's management, and thus the course taken by the Park Service naturally has

been rocky.

One way to think of the Park Service's management issues in Stehekin is to frame them

within the paradox that characterizes much of the history of the American West, the paradox

of freedom and want. That is, Americans derived their sense of identity, their sense of being

unrestrained and free, from the West's landscape of bountiful nature, a landscape where

nature seems forever pristine and new and wears a powerfully attractive image. This

condition of free land, open spaces, and natural wealth and beauty nurtured the myth of the

American West. But at the other end of this state of mind was the fact that westerners came

to dominate the natural world through technology, something they believed was a positive

force, enabling them to extract minerals, build irrigation systems and dams, cut forests, and

make other improvements for profits and livelihoods. The problem, of course, was that one

came at the expense of the other; nature, restrained and altered by technology, could not offer

a sense of freedom. [1]

This paradox, these opposing dreams, helps to understand the history of Stehekin, a

microcosm of the western condition. At the turn of the century, the valley's impressive

natural scenery and apparent wealth attracted the area's first miners and homesteaders and

others who, more often with a greater margin of failure than success, pursued their visions of

prosperity and new beginnings. Moreover, there is another element to this paradox that adds
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some insight to Stehekin and the Park Service's presence: the role the federal government

played in fostering -- and later protecting -- this sense of freedom through the ownership of

property. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the federal government

distributed the public lands to Americans using a number of land laws. Soon after, however,

when land speculation and resource depletion demonstrated the shortcomings of the agrarian

ideal, the federal government closed the public domain to settlement. It then began to manage

the nation's remaining public lands, with the rise of the conservation, as a kind of national

commons -- forest reserves (national forests) and national parks being the most predominant

areas. [2]

Federal land management not only regulated the use of the nation's forests and preserved the

country's natural wonders, but it also helped maintain the feeling of freedom that westerners,

residents of the Stehekin Valley included, derived from owning, and to a large extent, earning

their living from their own land. For it was often the case that these lands were nested in, or

were close to, federal lands. By protecting and managing the use of national forests

surrounding private lands, such as those in Stehekin, the federal government helped

perpetuate the ideal of self-reliance. The Forest Service, for example, prevented the wanton

exploitation of the forests of the northern Cascades for commercial purposes that could have

degraded the quality of life for Stehekin residents. In the meantime, residents were able to

use these same forests, in accordance with regulations, for such things as grazing livestock or

harvesting timber for their own subsistence. Paradoxically, the sense of freedom and

individualism in places like Stehekin was to a large degree dependent upon a federal

presence, a presence that has simultaneously engendered a hatred or dislike of the federal

government because it represents a threat to the very sense of independence it has helped

create. Generally speaking, westerners wanted the services and assistance provided by federal

land management agencies, but they chafed at the limits to their liberty posed by the federal

government.

***

In Stehekin, park managers have had to come to terms with the paradox of freedom and

want. This has meant striking an impossible balance, it seems, between allowing residents

and land owners to maintain their lifestyles unimpeded by the federal government, while at

the same time providing them with services and managing the valley in such a way that

enables life here to continue much as it always has, one of the main points mandated by

Congress in Lake Chelan NRA's enabling legislation. All of this, of course, has had to take

into account agency policies, the purpose of Lake Chelan NRA, and the agency's

responsibility to the American people. Put simply, the Park Service's management of

Stehekin has been complex and contentious, weaving together the typical problems related to

management of a national park area and those associated with a community.

During its first decade of administration in Stehekin, the Park Service acted, for the most

part, as it did throughout the park complex. It set up its administration, and set out to

purchase private lands. It also planned for, and made strides towards, the recreation area's use

by improving, constructing, or acquiring facilities for visitor services and park operations.

But more than any other place within the North Cascades complex, the agency's activities in

the Stehekin Valley have come under closer scrutiny and have raised more criticism.

The main reason for this stemmed from the belief that the Park Service lacked a clear

management focus, and that while it made some positive steps, it also contributed to the

erosion of the valley's natural values and historic way of life. Thus, as Susan Georgette and

Ann Harvey concluded in their examination of the agency's first ten years in Stehekin, the

Park Service had managed the new park area poorly. The agency, they asserted, simply did

not do enough. It purchased some private lands, nearly half of all that existed, but should
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have done more to limit growth and new developments once the popularity of the park

spread. In ten years, the valley's population tripled and residential development escalated. All

of this encroached on the valley's wild charms and came at the expense of its limited natural

resources -- wood, gravel, and sand -- which were available to residents under the more

permissive policies of a recreation area. [3]

Their arguments had a familiar-sounding ring, for they echoed those levied against the Park

Service in its management of Ross Lake NRA during the High Ross affair: the agency simply

was not giving equal treatment to the care of the valley's natural values. It seemed more

concerned with allocating resources to residents, improving the valley road and visitor

facilities, installing (apparently in an insensitive manner with the surrounding scenery) its

own structures near the abandoned golf fairways, and providing services to residents, such as

free garbage removal. If the valley had lost any of its pioneer qualities and scenic luster, the

Park Service, they implied, was the problem. Rather than take a firm stand in the face of

conflict and controversy, brought on by locals who bristled at federal regulations, the Park

Service instead maintained that its mission -- and thus the recreation area's purpose -- was

ambiguous. In this regard, they suggested, the agency hid behind a shield of ambiguity and

succumbed to local influence at the expense of the national interest.

Here, then, was yet another management metaphor and paradox: local influence and national

interest. By seeking to appease local demands, the Park Service had forsaken the nation's

interest in this national park area. One, it seemed, came at the expense of the other. In fact,

for most of the recreation area's first decade, the Park Service let its management attention

drift with the tides of local influence. In the end, Georgette and Harvey identified what they

believed were the central errors in the Park Service's management of Stehekin: the issues of

congressional intent and compatible uses. In their interpretation, Congress' intent may not

have been explicitly clear in defining the purpose of Lake Chelan NRA, but it was clear in

that it intended for the Park Service to define what compatible uses were and then to enforce

them. Having done this would have empowered the agency to control incompatible

development (such as subdivisions) and population growth in the valley, resist local

pressures, and defend park values and the national interest. [4]

***

Georgette and Harvey present a critical portrayal of the Park Service's first ten years in

Stehekin. But they made assumptions about the agency's management mission that were not

necessarily borne out by history. Primarily, they believed that the agency should have

accorded the Stehekin country the same status as a national park. They failed to appreciate,

perhaps because they were too close to their subject in time, that the Park Service's approach

to managing recreation areas underwent a marked change between the late 1960s and late

1970s. As the High Ross controversy revealed, recreation areas were treated as the second

cousins of parks, with recreational enjoyment taking precedence over protection of the natural

environment. The management categories that the Department of the Interior established

clearly distinguished between natural areas -- or national parks -- and recreation areas. The

former required stricter regulations to preserve their natural conditions; the latter allowed

more liberal uses of natural resources, akin to those of a national forest. [5] Certainly, the

park campaign, early legislative proposals, and the physical beauty of the Stehekin country

suggested otherwise -- even in the minds of some agency officials. But the reality was that it

was within a national recreation area and subject to a different set of policies, policies which

would not be revised until the late 1970s and early 1980s, as Georgette and Harvey sent their

draft to press. [6]

More importantly, most critics ignore or minimize the fact that Stehekin was managed as part

of the larger North Cascades complex. It was part of a larger interrelated whole. And thus
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park managers viewed the area from this perspective as they considered where the valley fit

into their overall vision for the wilderness park. That vision appeared in the park's 1970

master plan. The Stehekin country's greatest value, the plan suggested, was its "unique

position as a wilderness threshold." It was one of the few and highly valued entryways to the

park's wilderness. The agency would also endeavor to retain the valley's "leisurely charm,

tranquility, and rustic atmosphere." Ironically, as many learned during the High Ross affair,

the wilderness threshold concept often meant visitor developments, and in this case

developments which could potentially alter the valley's "away-from-it-all" character. Here

then the agency faced a familiar dilemma, the paradoxical management philosophy of

preservation and use. [7]

High on the priority list were improvements to the Stehekin Landing where space was

limited, and for this reason, planners believed it should be reserved for existing day-use

facilities such as "boat-docks, marinas, eating facilities, parking areas for cars, freight and

transportation terminals, a store, post office, and visitor information facilities." The landing

was the center of the Stehekin community and would be the central contact point for park

visitors. In the future, all overnight facilities would be developed away from the landing, with

the exception, it seemed, of private developments. Furthermore, the unsurfaced Stehekin

Valley Road, what some called "the road to nowhere," would see more use and, on a much

smaller scale than Highway 20, would function as the main artery of travel up and down the

valley. The plan proposed a public transportation system -- shuttle buses -- that would convey

hikers and others to their various destinations along the twenty-five miles of road from the

landing to Cottonwood Campground. The plan also envisioned expanding on existing as well

as developing new campgrounds, a series of hostels, and trails at popular hiking areas the

length of the valley. It also proposed installing food services, a hostel, and a store at Bridge

Creek, just north of the recreation area's boundary at the junction of the Pacific Crest Trail.

[8]

***

Ultimately, these plans were meant to transform the area into a national park site. The Park

Service and national park patrons had certain standards and expectations, and unimpaired

natural scenery was one of them. Along these same lines, agency officials moved quickly to

prevent any further filling of the lakeshore near Silver Bay for residential developments,

working out an agreement with Chelan County by 1970 based on a recent Washington State

Supreme Court decision. This would prevent any further visual scarring and natural

degradation of the shoreline that might otherwise mar the scenic experience as visitors

arrived at the landing. North Cascades officials also believed that this legal decision granted

them another measure of control in this regard; it provided them with jurisdiction over the

portion of Lake Chelan lying within the recreation area's boundaries. [9]

Ensuring public access and services at the landing was also crucial to the new park area's

operations. By 1970, the Park Service had acquired the valley's three private lodges. In this

way, the agency had better control over operations by offering an concessioner a controlled

monopoly. It could also remedy the competitive scene at the landing between different

businesses when the boat arrived. It was a scene, as one ranger noted, hardly becoming of a

national park experience. Around this same time, park officials acquired the landing site itself

-- the public docks and boat landing from the Chelan County Port Authority. The agency,

however, did not gain control over all forms of access -- such as the privately-owned Chelan

Boat Company and float plane operations -- which continued to operate under special use

permits, and whose operations were mostly subject to local and state regulations. The final

key link in providing for services was the Park Service's acquisition of the valley road from

Chelan County by 1970. [10]
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With this kind of control in hand, agency managers set out to improve and clean up the

valley. One of Superintendent Roger Contor's first management actions was to barge out

some of the valley's junked cars rusting by the roadside, out in fields, or on the landing area

itself. The car removal program was fairly innocuous, but it symbolized that things in the

valley would not stay as they were. High on the list was the "eyesore," according to

Superintendent Contor, of the landing area and nearby Purple Point. Besides shipping out old

cars and machinery, park officials moved the barge dock north several hundred feet and

designated parking areas (for day use and long term) as a way to relieve congestion at the

landing. In time, the agency undertook several major improvement projects at the landing --

landscaping the area, renovating the lodges (including turning the Golden West into an

interpretive center), and installing a sewage treatment plant and a water system by the late

1970s. Maintaining and improving the unsurfaced valley road was another major

undertaking. It involved considerable funding from the park's budget, including the

replacement of three bridges, Bridge Creek, Tumwater, and High Bridge, as well as annual

repairs and snow plowing. These improvements, among others, illustrated the Park Service's

belief that this road, as any national park road, played a critical role in the visitor's

experience. Controlling the roadside's scenery, in fact, had been a major motivation in the

agency's acquisition of the road itself. [11]

Only here, road ownership also placed the agency in the position of providing a service to the

local community and creating another set of expectations separate from those of a park

visitor. One example was Company Creek Road, which some residents wanted the Park

Service to maintain and plow snow, but the Park Service did not own the road. As a measure

of good faith, North Cascades officials agreed to maintain and plow the road to the Chelan

Public Utility District's power plant, a distance of some one-and-half miles, and after a legal

decision was handed down, the agency formally agreed to maintain this section of the road.

[12]

As a general rule, the Park Service's management practices considered the most controversial

were those that affected residents. As with other management issues, some of these were

inherited from the Forest Service and were provided for under the recreation area's legislation

and policies. Section 402(a) of the park act charges the Park Service with the "management,

utilization, and disposal of renewable natural resources" and the "continuation of such

existing uses" that would be compatible with both public recreation and the conservation of

its other values, natural as well as historical. Section 402(b) provides for the disposal of

mineral resources as well. Abiding by these legal provisions and honoring inherited practices,

the Park Service continued to allow residents to harvest wood and excavate soil, sand, and

gravel from its lands within the recreation area. [13]

Again the question of change to both the natural scene and historic scene was raised by these

policies, for it seemed that at some point what appeared to be a compatible use would become

incompatible. For the most part during this first decade of management, the Park Service

made little attempt to regulate, study, or restrict these consumptive uses. (The agency would

not undertake any studies until the late 1970s and therefore no strict policy guidelines were

implemented until then.) Residents continued to construct foundations, surface roads, or build

septic systems with soil, sand, and gravel from public lands, and to heat their homes with

wood cut from those same lands, in some cases gathering driftwood from the Stehekin River.

Ironically, the Park Service itself was a large consumer of gravel and other materials for its

maintenance and construction projects. The valley road was a major reason for the use of

gravel. High maintenance costs and gravel consumption, for example, led to the agency

paving the road from the landing to the Harlequin Bridge in 1973.

Firewood cutting was regulated to some extent. In 1971, Superintendent Lowell White

announced that his staff had drafted an interim firewood management plan for Lake Chelan
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NRA, which essentially granted permits to residents to cut firewood in designated areas

between September 15 and May 15, so as not to interfere with the main visitor season.

Approved in 1972, the plan specified how much wood could be taken -- six cords for

permanent residents, two for part-time residents -- from dead and fallen trees. Stehekin

District Manager George Wagner, however, considered the plan as something that more or

less condoned existing uses, and that the agency would have to study it more thoroughly in

several years. A host of issues needed to be addressed ranging from rising residential

populations to the kind of wood cut. More important, Wagner concluded, firewood cutting in

the Stehekin Valley "has a long and controversial history under the previous Forest Service

management in the area." And now, the recreation area's legislative history "has left us with

the problem." [14]

In the case of firewood use, the question of change hinged on whether or not the service

could or would alter past practices. The Forest Service bequeathed a similar "problem" to the

Park Service in the form of the Stehekin Airstrip. As early as 1950, the Forest Service had

wanted to construct an "air emergency strip" at the head of Lake Chelan to operate fire patrol

planes and deploy smokejumpers in the northern Cascades. As an added service, the landing

strip could serve as an emergency landing field for any private planes in the vicinity. The

agency had nearly completed the job by 1960. Low on funds to finish the airfield, the forest

bureau contacted the Washington State Aeronautics Commission seeking assistance in its

completion and subsequent operation. After inspecting the airfield and conducting some

negotiations with the Forest Service, the commission agreed to the bureau's terms and signed

a special use permit to develop and maintain it essentially as an "emergency strip." The

"Stehekin State Airport" opened in 1961. [15]

When the Park Service took over from the Forest Service, it wanted to close the airstrip

altogether, but discovered that the Aeronautics Commission was a formidable political force,

along with local valley residents who wanted it kept open. Contrary to being listed as an

emergency airfield, the Stehekin airfield saw a fair amount of public use. Superintendent

Roger Contor was the first of several agency officials who tried to close the airfield. During

the planning stages for the park and his early negotiations with other state and local

government representatives on the North Cascades Task Force, Contor attempted in vain to

have the airstrip shutdown -- or at the very least have it listed as a private airport. In making

his case, Contor cited the agency's policies against airports in national park areas and the

airstrip's hazardous safety conditions. Members of the commission, however, intent on

keeping the airstrip open, voiced their protest against closing it, and even suggested

expanding the airfield's recreational potential. At best, the Park Service was able to have the

airport reclassified as an emergency landing strip (something the commission, it seems, did

not fully recognize) and continued to issue a special use permit to the commission for its

operation and maintenance. [16]

The agency's positions on other issues, either inherited from the Forest Service or related to

the residential population, often seemed intent on taking the course of least resistance and

raised more questions than they answered about how the agency would proceed in managing

the recreation area. In the early 1970s, for example, the Army Corps of Engineers bulldozed

numerous logjams on the lower Stehekin River at the request of private property owners

whose lands might have been eroded by spring floods. To be sure, the actions took place on

private lands, yet North Cascades officials appeared reluctant to take a stand to protect the

river, its wild character, its critical role for wildlife and fish habitat.

Another decision, to provide a free garbage removal system for residents, cast more doubt on

what the agency intended. In the late 1970s, Superintendent White approved the service

when the local landfill reached its capacity and was closed. Moreover, a change in federal

policy, dating to the early 1970s, prohibited the practice of burning out garbage dumps to
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create more room. Barging out solid waste was an environmentally-conscious decision, one

aimed at protecting the valley's natural values and inducing residents to pack their garbage

out. Otherwise, they might, as some had, leave it on federal lands or clutter up their lands

with it, in the process creating visual eyesores as well as wildlife problems. Some local bears,

attracted to garbage, had become "problem" bears and residents were calling for their

removal. Garbage disposal was costly to the agency, for it involved the construction of a new

building and the purchase of a large compactor. But it may have been costly in other ways,

too. The agency seemed more concerned with keeping residents content than enforcing

regulations to protect the natural environment or establishing policies for the use of natural

resources.

***

In all of these cases, revising past or existing practices and implementing new ones shadowed

the Park Service and cast doubt, as has been argued, on many of its decisions. Above all,

however, the greatest source of change was the Park Service's land acquisition program.

Everything in Stehekin, especially in these early years of management, revolved around land

and liberty. And thus the Park Service's land acquisition policies and practices were at the

center of this small universe. Oddly enough, purchasing land seemed to be the activity the

agency conducted with the most certainty, though here, too, interpretations of congressional

intent varied. Historically, the National Park Service has purchased private lands from within

national parks. It was a fact of life that park boundaries often embraced inholdings and that

the best way to ensure preservation was to own all of the lands -- mining claims, resorts,

homesteads, and the like.

The Park Service's policy of purchasing inholdings -- from willing sellers -- sparked a great

deal of controversy and conflict during the movement and hearings to establish North

Cascades National Park, for many landowners feared that the agency would use the federal

government's powers of condemnation to take their land, and thus they would lose their

unique way of life. Some of these fears were unfounded, but others were not. During the

1960s and early 1970s, Congress began to carve more new park areas out of private lands --

such as Cape Cod National Seashore (1961) -- and the service now sought to buy as much

private land as possible in accordance with the new area's enabling legislation. As a general

rule then, the agency tried to purchase land from all willing sellers (also known as

opportunity purchases) in these newly established parklands and then use condemnation to

acquire lands needed for park operations and protection. In some cases, as with Cape Cod,

Congress made exceptions by allowing hundreds of residents to continue to own and occupy

their homes within the area's boundaries. [18]

The North Cascades legislation, with its accompanying documents, mirrored some of these

trends and attempted to address the worries Stehekin landowners had over losing their land.

First, Congress created a national recreation area rather than a national park to assure the

Stehekin community that it would continue to exist. Second, the legislation directed the

Secretary of the Interior to purchase lands from willing sellers only, and limited the Park

Service's powers of condemnation to those instances where there were incompatible uses,

such as high density subdivisions, high rise developments, and logging. At the time of the

recreation area's establishment, Park Service Director George Hartzog did not mention the

newer land acquisition policies in his testimony before Congress but rather likened Stehekin's

policies to those employed at Grand Teton National Park, which had been established in

1950. Hartzog did so perhaps because the two areas were similar in character and western;

they contained modest homes, summer homes, ranches, and small eating establishments and

lodges, all of which were compatible with the park. [19]

Hartzog's testimony seems to have been the source of the language in the final legislation
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creating Lake Chelan NRA and was the foundation of the Park Service's land acquisition

policies. This language, however, did not mean that Congress did not anticipate an active

land acquisition program. To the contrary, it appropriated $3.5 million, an estimate of the fee

value of all private lands within the new park complex. Moreover, in planning for the

recreation area's management and its land acquisition program, agency officials employed

policies for recreation areas that focused and prioritized land acquisition efforts. That is, land

acquisition policies for recreation areas, released around the same time as the complex's

establishment, stated that the federal government would acquire lands for public use and

enjoyment and effective administration of the recreation area, to ensure that the remaining

lands provided for the preservation of the area's natural values, and to prevent any uses of

private lands from impairing the recreation area's primary purpose. These policies were then

translated into three land classification zones: 1) public use and development, 2) preservation

and conservation, and 3) private use and development. [20]

In Lake Chelan NRA, as a general rule, the agency would seek to purchase lands outright in

fee simple in the first zone, and in the other two zones seek alternative forms of land use

controls such as local zoning or scenic easements; however, direct purchase was still an

option, especially in the private use zone, to protect the area against incompatible uses and if

an owner wished to sell to the Park Service. [21] The agency incorporated these policies into

its land acquisition plan (1969) and the park complex's master plan; the former document

identified areas high on the list of priorities for purchase and the latter document established

the land-use zones. Having done this, the Park Service actively set out to purchase private

land. In 1969, it opened a real estate office, run by Keith Watkins, in nearby Wenatchee, the

county seat of Chelan County. Five years later, in late 1973, the agency had nearly exhausted

the original appropriation for land acquisitions. Of the original $3.5 million, it spent nearly

$2.4 million on lands in the Stehekin Valley, taking possession of some 986 acres and leaving

some 650 acres in private ownership. It spent approximately $800,000 on land in Ross Lake

NRA and North Cascades National Park. Afterwards, with more land to be acquired (some

2,600 acres) but less than $300,000 to work with, the Park Service put the acquisition

program on hold. Although Congress increased the park's land acquisition appropriation by

$1 million in 1976, this money was earmarked for buying the remaining patented mining

claims within the boundaries of the national park. [22]

This original land acquisition program met many of the priorities the service had outlined.

One important focus, as mentioned above, was the purchase of lands and developments for

visitor services, public access, and park operations. The central concern was the landing area

itself -- the boat landing, docks, lodges, and other buildings -- as well as nearby lakeshore

properties suitable for public campgrounds and picnic areas. Another priority area was the

valley and the acquisition of large tracts of private land that might be subdivided or put to

other inappropriate uses. To this end, the agency purchased land near the mouth of the

Stehekin River that had been subdivided and slated for intensive residential developments. It

also obtained nearly all of the Buckner homestead, approximately 100 acres, which included

the historic apple orchard. Still another large tract acquired by the agency was the Peterson

property, the 100-acre fairways for a partially completed golf course, which the service

converted into park housing and a utility area -- home to the trash compactor building,

among others. The final large purchase was several tracts belonging to the Chelan Box

Company in the upper valley, comprising some 300 acres. The company planned to log this

land, and its acquisition by the Park Service would help the agency ensure the protection of

the wild and scenic charms of the upper valley. [23]

***

In time, the Park Service's management practices -- from snow plowing to land acquisition --

became the subject of intense and acrimonious debate, legal disputes, and an investigation by
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the General Accounting Office. This state of affairs has been well-documented, for it

prompted the Park Service to clarify its management policies in Stehekin, to launch a

comprehensive planning effort for the recreation area, and to address a number of changes in

the national park system's management philosophy and regulations, including stricter

guidelines in the protection of natural values in recreation areas and land acquisition policies.

Most of these administrative developments appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the

complex entered its second decade of management, and are the subject of part three of this

study.

From the beginning, however, Stehekin's management problems stemmed in part from its

isolation. Stehekin's remoteness may have made it a special place for tourists and residents,

but it was a quality that impeded management. Communications were slow. There were no

phones in the early years or dependable radios, and management decisions came by mail

brought by boat. Both superintendents Contor and White encountered these difficulties in

their tenures. Community relations played an important role in selling the Park Service's

administration to local constituents. Allaying fears of what the new administration would

bring, quieting concerns produced by the hard-fought park campaign, and implementing

policies and management programs became the daily routine of agency managers in Stehekin.

[24]

One approach the agency took early on was to keep the Stehekin community informed about

agency activities through a monthly newsletter. The newsletter answered any concerns

residents might have expressed to park staff or the superintendent. But what park managers

soon learned was that Stehekin, a place where people valued their independence, was a

community divided. [25] Achieving consensus on any one matter proved to be nearly

impossible, and most management actions received mixed reviews. What added to the

problem was the Park Service's own tendency to seek popular approval for its management

decisions, something the service had long done since it depended on public approval and

federal appropriations for its survival.

At first, North Cascades officials tried to address the community's concerns by urging them to

organize, to speak as one voice, it seems. The Park Service dealt with some issues through

the Stehekin Property Owners Association (SPOA), which had formed in 1970. Through

SPOA residents expressed their discontent with agency policies from parking restrictions at

the landing to road maintenance. By the mid-1970s, it was clear that this approach had fallen

short of its goal. The newsletter was suspended; community relations were uneasy at best,

and not for any one particular reason. [26]

Perhaps the best examples of this condition were Grant McConnell, Guy Imus, and Robert

Byrd. McConnell had impressive credentials for critiquing the Park Service's management.

He was both a professor of political science and a property owner in Stehekin; he had lived

in the valley full-time for several years after World War II, and was one of its most ardent

supporters for preservation during the park campaign. Naturally, he welcomed and praised

the park complex and the Park Service's presence. The creation of North Cascades ended the

threat of logging in the Stehekin Valley and the threat of a road being built into the valley

from Highway 20. The Park Service also reduced the threat of new private developments -- a

vacation-home boom underway before the park was established -- through its active land

acquisition program. To a lesser degree, park managers were working to remove the threat of

mining, but here, too, the agency's presence put preservationists more at ease. [27]

Other aspects of the Park Service's presence worried McConnell and even caused him to

question the agency's commitment to the protection of the valley's natural systems. The

service's decision to keep the valley road open all the way to Cottonwood and its

improvements to the road surface itself, especially paving it from the landing to Harlequin
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Bridge, presented serious threats to the valley's wild and historic character. An improved road

invited more cars to travel at higher speeds and portended more improvements -- more

widening, cuts and fills -- and thus more encroachments on the wilderness of the North

Cascades. McConnell also criticized the agency's decisions not to manage or regulate

preexisting practices or what he deemed were incompatible uses. Woodcutting, while a

genuine need, should be managed more effectively, particularly to prevent the construction or

creation of more roads farther into the valley's forests. The airstrip, on the other hand, should

be eliminated altogether, for it was not only unsafe but not used for emergencies but rather

fishing trips, among other things. In addition, McConnell thought airplanes were

incompatible with the solitude of the valley and surrounding wilderness. But rather than take

a stand, the Park Service built a campground of sorts near the airfield to accommodate an

existing practice and to prevent unsanitary conditions. [28]

In this regard, McConnell's list went on, noting that the agency was unwilling to oppose

unsightly or inappropriate new houses built on private property because the permitting

process was Chelan County's responsibility. In McConnell's view, this was simply an excuse

to avoid conflict and for irresponsible governmental behavior. At bottom, this was

McConnell's main point. The agency's management "problems" in Stehekin might have

stemmed from the ambiguities associated with the purpose and management of a recreation

area, but these were not trivial matters. In an article for The Wild Cascades, McConnell

expanded on this observation.

Most alarmingly they indicate a general passivity in confrontation with threats

that cannot be dismissed by simple orders. The lack of power to give such orders

on many matters or to compel compliance with the purposes for which the NPS

was brought into the area is not a sufficient excuse. Compulsion, far from being

the whole of government, is only its last resort. What is essential is clarity of

vision and a sense of purpose. [29]

If McConnell thought that the Park Service was not doing enough to assert its authority,

others in the valley, like Guy Imus and Robert Byrd, believed it had gone too far. Like many

westerners in isolated locations, their main contact with the federal government came in the

form of regulations. In one instance, the Park Service attempted to restrict the numbers of

horses allowed in the backcountry; other policies sought to place concessions and other

services, such as guided horse pack trips, under one operator. All of this smacked of

government interference with private enterprise. "They got so many damn regulations," Imus

stated in 1973, that "they're gonna drive all us horsemen out of the valley." In other words,

the Park Service's traditional way of operating concessions -- placing them under one

concessioner -- altered the Stehekin tradition of "small, independent family operations."

While one outfitter benefited, others were left to look for new sources of income. The most

notable example of this, of course, was the agency's move to place the landing's lodges and

restaurant under one operator, Robert Byrd. At first Byrd welcomed the opportunity, but in

time he, too, came to resent agency regulations and bureaucratic red tape. [30]

What Byrd and others whose families had lived in the valley for generations objected to

overall was the sense that they had become dependent on the National Park Service. That is,

their independence was subsidized by this government agency. Many in the valley were tied

to the Park Service economically, either directly employed by the agency as laborers,

technicians, or other staff members; or they were under contract for construction and

maintenance projects, had special use permits to conduct businesses like guided pack trips, or

a concession permit to run a business at the landing. What engendered the most criticism was

that the Park Service's presence, through its land acquisition program, had increased property

values and thus property taxes. Although this was itself a complicated issue, since the county

set property values and property taxes, it raised the notion that many had feared before the
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park was established: the Park Service's long-range goal was to buy all the private land in the

valley and remove the residents. Rising land taxes thus alarmed some and led to protests over

the Park Service's land acquisition policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ironically, both

residents and preservationists, those who generally opposed the Park Service and those who

generally favored it, were responsible for the ensuing investigation by the General

Accounting Office and demonstrating the need for a comprehensive management plan in the

next phase of the parkland's administration.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Part III -- 1978-1998

THE WILDERNESS IDEAL AND THE CHALLENGE OF

TRADITIONAL PARK MANAGEMENT

As the 1970s came to a close, the park complex's first decade ended and a new era began.

The park's first decade saw the National Park Service trying to shape a wilderness park in the

broadest sense. Building a wilderness park from the ground up, so to speak, offered a

challenge park managers willingly accepted and viewed with enthusiasm. But as the new

parkland's history unfolded, traditional park management concerns, such as the construction

of facilities for park visitors, drew more attention. Moreover, other management concerns,

those unique to the park complex, particularly those emanating from Stehekin, demanded that

park officials come to terms with lingering questions about the true intent of the park

complex's enabling legislation. Conflict generated by these and other issues was a catalyst for

growth and change in the park complex's next two decades of management. This was a

period in which the Park Service attempted to answer these questions and redirect the park

complex back toward its primary mission of wilderness preservation. In this era, one theme

was consistent. The tension between the wilderness park ideal and traditional park

management was strong. The chapters in this section address changes in the park complex's

administration, practices and controversies surrounding land acquisition, and hydroelectric

issues. Other chapters consider the growth of the park's resource management program,

accommodations for visitors, the designation of the park's wilderness, and the park's

international relations.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 9:

ADMINISTRATION

Several superintendents would guide the park complex through its second phase of

management. In 1978, Keith Miller replaced Lowell White in a straight exchange; Miller left

his post as superintendent at Acadia National Park for North Cascades, and White left his

post at North Cascades for Acadia. After six years, Miller took a position in the Southwest

Regional Office, and was replaced by John Reynolds, who left his post as assistant

superintendent of Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area to serve as the park's

top manager from 1984 to 1988. In late 1988, Reynolds left North Cascades to be manager of

the Denver Service Center, and John Earnst replaced him, having served as superintendent of

Gettysburg National Military Park. When Earnst retired in 1992, William Paleck became the

park complex's most recent superintendent, leaving his position as superintendent of Saguaro

National Monument. These managers addressed pressing issues surrounding land policies in

Stehekin, the relicensing of hydroelectric projects, and other resource management concerns.

They also undertook a new planning effort for the park complex, one which stirred more

controversy in Lake Chelan National Recreation Area. Moreover, they also had to respond to

changes within the national park system with the Park Service's recent reorganization. These

issues reflected that the park's administration had become more complicated and specialized

since the park's creation. And thus to meet the challenges of this new era, the park's

administrative framework and management approach would have to adjust accordingly.

One measure of the park complex's growing pains was the increase in park staff. The staff of

seven permanent and forty seasonal employees in the summer of 1969 had increased to fortytwo permanent and eighty seasonal members by the early 1980s, and was up to seventy-four

permanent and ninety-four seasonal employees in the mid-1990s. The increase was a natural

progression in adding needed personnel to the young park; it also demonstrated the need for

specialized positions to cover the wide array of management concerns, from law enforcement

to specific resource management problems. In addition, the staff was composed of other

members, such as Volunteers in Parks (VIPs), Student Conservation Association (SCA)

workers, members of the Youth Conservation Corps (YCC), and the Young Adult

Conservation Corps (YACC). The presence of these volunteers and inexpensive employees,

who numbered some one hundred people in 1980, illustrated the Park Service's interest in

using an alternative work force to meet all the demands of park management, demands which

could not be met by current funding levels and hiring policies. VIPs and other work groups

provided a valuable source of labor for a variety of projects; they helped with revegetation at

the subalpine passes, provided information and interpretation in front country areas, built and

rehabilitated park trails, organized library records, and conducted research on the park's

natural and human history. [1]

Another matter related to the park's administrative growth was the search for a permanent

home for the park complex's headquarters. While Park Service administrators had selected

Sedro Woolley as the location of the park's headquarters in the late 1960s, the selection of a

permanent building for the park's head office turned out to be a long and drawn out affair.
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The first park office, located in the State Street Office Building, was temporary, park officials

contended. In a short time, they stated, the park's operations would outgrow this facility. In

the meantime they, along with city representatives, began looking for another site. By 1972,

they had decided on four possible sites: the city ball park, the junction of Highway 9 and

Highway 20, the area west of Highway 20 near the log scaling station, and finally the old

Memorial Hospital site. Park Service officials chose the hospital site as the one that would

best meet their present and future needs. These were: 1) that it was large enough (two acres)

to construct a good-sized building with adequate employee and visitor parking, 2) that it was

located in an area in which it would be integrated with the surrounding community, and 3)

that it was located on a major city street (the corner of Bell and State streets) away from

commercial and industrial sections, and at the edge of a residential area. The selection of the

old hospital site would also fulfill one of the main reasons for the park complex's presence in

Sedro Woolley. The hospital's closure occurred around the same time as the park's creation

and spurred the state's congressional delegation to seek a replacement for this loss to the local

economy. Legal and political matters delayed the project for several years, the most notable

problems coming from the park's current landlord, the General Services Administration's

assessment of the site selection, and problems stemming from city regulations. [2]

One of the most important questions in the selection of a new office was directed at the Park

Service's decision to locate the headquarters facility away from Highway 20 -- the main park

thoroughfare. At the heart of the matter was the vision park planners and park managers had

for the headquarters office. In 1976, Regional Director Russell Dickenson described the move

as one that would intentionally eliminate the park's office "as a visitor information facility."

The rationale behind this proposal demonstrated again the influence of Highway 20 in park

operations. When Highway 20 opened in 1972, public use patterns changed, meaning that

most visitors could be found along the highway within the park complex. For this reason, in

the summer of 1973 park staffers had begun to operate the temporary information center at

Concrete, Washington, as called for in the Park Service-Forest Service joint management

plan for the North Cascades. The facility served eastbound travelers as they approached the

park complex. The following year, the park moved the information center to a more

permanent facility in Concrete, a building constructed to look like a railroad depot

complementing a Sedro Woolley group's plans to initiate railroad service between Sedro

Woolley and Concrete. Meanwhile, as called for in the joint plan, the Forest Service opened

its Early Winters information center around this same time on the east side of the Cascades to

meet the needs of westbound travelers. Still another information center for highway travelers

was the park's Marblemount Ranger Station, which was also the center for all backcountry

operations in the complex. The master plan for North Cascades noted that there would be

more visitor information services along the highway in the future; some of these would be a

visitor center at Newhalem as well as roadside waysides and pullouts to orient the motorist to

the northern Cascades. Taken together, these highway information services made any

additional services at the Sedro Woolley headquarters unnecessary and unjustifiable "from a

cost/visitor use standpoint," Dickenson concluded. The new headquarters was completed in

early 1977, and on March 1 of that year the park moved its headquarters operation into the

new facility. [3]

In less than ten years, however, this situation changed again. The park's headquarters staff

continued to grow, and as it did, space in the new facility decreased while rent increased. By

the mid-1980s, it was time to look for another office. In its search for a new office location,

the Park Service, ironically, found itself back on Highway 20. Only this time, members of the

park complex's headquarters staff would be sharing a building with the U.S. Forest Service,

the Mount Baker National Forest District office. This merger of facilities seemed to be both a

practical as well as politically-motivated solution to the current headquarters problem. Since

the parkland's inception, cooperation between the Park Service and Forest Service had been a

major goal in its management, both as a matter of geography and the political realities
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underlying the park complex's creation. In 1985, conditions seemed ripe for another attempt

at interagency cooperation. That year, Doug McWilliams, the forest supervisor, informed

park managers that there would be a significant amount of surplus office space in the

district's new administrative building, still under construction. The Forest Service was

reducing its staff, and this would leave the agency with more space than it needed.

McWilliams suggested that the two agencies combine their operations under one roof in order

to save money on rent and office equipment, make more efficient use of conference rooms,

and consolidate their public information services. For these reasons and those stemming from

its own situation, North Cascades moved into the new headquarters with the Mount Baker

District in March 1986. [4]

This new venture, however, seems to have solved the need for an adequate headquarters

facility temporarily rather than permanently. A central reason was the continued growth of

the park complex's staff. When the park moved to its new headquarters, twenty-four (twenty

permanent and four temporary) employees worked in the office. Two years later, that number

nearly doubled to forty-one (twenty-three of which were permanent). Looking over the

advantages of the joint office, Superintendent John Reynolds noted that the joint information

center worked well; the information visitors received was more accurate and current since

both agencies were available in the same place and at the same time. Cost-saving measures

could be found in sharing the same cooperative association for the sale of publications on the

park and forest. Both agencies saved money using the same telephone system and number,

and were planning on sharing photocopying services as well as internal mail service.

Moreover, the two agencies were sharing knowledge by combining their libraries and they

were beginning to understand each other better as well.

There were disadvantages, too. One of these was that rather than creating a greater clarity in

the differences between the two agencies in the mind of the general public, sharing office

space actually created greater confusion. Another disadvantage was that the building was not

designed with joint operation in mind and some of the shared space (lunch room, storage

areas) proved to be inconvenient to use. Interestingly, Reynolds concluded that relocating the

headquarters back to Highway 20 rendered the office's daily operations less efficient, since

more visitors stopped in requesting information from park personnel. (Ironically, the new

headquarters area took on added importance as an information center once the park shut

down the Concrete information center in the mid-1980s.) [5]

In the late 1980s, the situation had deteriorated to the point where North Cascades managers

were requesting an office space requirements study. As Acting Superintendent David Pugh

reported in October 1988, the park's headquarters space "does not meet the needs of present

park staff in providing adequate working space," as well as storage and warehouse space,

separate offices for managers and those in personnel; nor was there "sufficient parking space

for Government and private vehicles." Although employees felt the squeeze throughout the

year, the lack of office space was "especially acute" during the summer when Park Service

and Forest Service seasonals arrived and the numbers of visitors stopping at the information

center increased dramatically. Thus, before pursuing any alternatives for leasing other office

space or reorganizing the current office, North Cascades wanted "a comprehensive study of

office requirements" to determine "how best to meet the short and long term needs of the

park for headquarters space," Pugh stated. The agency's woes would only continue in the

1990s. A space study concluded that the Park Service needed more space at a new facility

because reconfiguring the office's layout was not an option. Moreover, the agency's joint

lease with the Forest Service on the facility expired in 1990s, and in an effort to continue to

operate in a somewhat normal capacity, the two agencies signed a lease but one that had a

long list of issues that needed to be resolved, including poor lighting and ventilation systems.

[6]
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The trials over securing an adequate headquarters facility were indicative of a much larger

administrative issue for the park -- its growing pains and its adjustments to growth.

Superintendent Reynolds indicated what had brought on the recent issue over space at the

park's front office. It was not simply an increase in park staff, but an increase that reflected

changes in how the park would be managed. One important staff addition was a chief of

resource management who worked out of Sedro Woolley, and who would help coordinate a

parkwide resource management program. This meant that for the first time the park complex

would have a staff member in charge of this program. Similar to trends systemwide, North

Cascades would now emphasize the importance of resource management in the overall

administration of the park. Other positions had been added to the park roster as well which

reflected this new emphasis, such as interns to conduct base line research. The park also

employed a landscape architect to assist with development plans for park projects. "All of

these positions," Reynolds wrote, had been created "in an attempt to address the backlog of

operational needs, and move North Cascades into the future." These positions would help

accomplish one of the central goals of the park: to effectively manage the resources, and the

trend in adding specialists to the park staff would continue up to the present. [7]

The park's future and resource management were central themes in John Reynolds' tenure

and thus the park's administration. Many of these issues would be addressed in the park's new

general management plan, which got underway in the mid-1980s. But first, Reynolds thought

it important to reconsider how the park was set up as an administrative unit, namely the

relationship between the headquarters staff and the complex's two districts. Revising the

park's administrative structure would, in the long run, enable the park to adjust to changes in

park management, such as with the rise of specialists to oversee park programs. This could

not happen effectively with the current system.

When the park complex was established, the Park Service adopted the existing district

manager organization. This organization, as noted earlier, separated the park into two

administrative units: the Skagit and Stehekin districts. The two districts were run by district

managers, who oversaw park operations and park staff for their areas; they answered directly

to the superintendent who was stationed at park headquarters. In this set up, three people ran

the park, each with his own staff. Naturally, the superintendent made the final decisions, but

for the day-to-day operations of the park complex, Lowell White recalled, the district

manager concept allowed the park to run itself. Having district managers also seemed to be a

practical response to the park complex's rugged geography -- the two main river valleys, the

Skagit and Stehekin -- were separated by a constellation of peaks, and thus it was easier to

have local managers oversee local affairs on either side. This was especially true in the case

of Stehekin, whose remote setting made communication difficult, let alone making

management decisions from afar.

But as the park aged, the district manager system seemed incapable of keeping pace with

new developments in the parkland's management. Superintendent Keith Miller made a step

towards reorganization in 1979 when he changed the Stehekin District manager position into

a district ranger. The revision, Miller suggested, reflected a weakness in the district manager

concept, for it saddled the manager with numerous responsibilities. One responsibility in

particular deserved attention by a full-time manager, and that was maintenance. For this

reason, the superintendent transferred all responsibility for maintenance (and the maintenance

division) in Stehekin to the maintenance specialist (later changed to facility manager) at

headquarters. In doing so, the district ranger would be freed up to supervise the numerous

programs which make up park management; some of these were visitor services and

protection, concession operations, community relations, interpretation, and cooperation with

the Forest Service. Moreover, Miller concluded, this revision would "enable the

Superintendent to develop a more cohesive organization between the Stehekin District and

Headquarters." [8]
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Maintaining good community relations meant a great deal in the overall management of

Stehekin and required close contact between the superintendent and his staff, so it made

sense to partially reorganize the parkland's administrative system. But more still needed to be

done. The evolution of the ranger division illustrates this point. At one time in Park Service

history, the ranger was a versatile, "do anything" employee who was the backbone of the

agency. The ranger performed a variety of duties ranging from law enforcement to trail

construction. Throughout his career, the ranger acquired a variety of skills and experience

and was rewarded with advancements in the ranger organization. But that picture began to

change in the mid-1960s, as the ranger's stature declined relative to that of various specialists.

At one time, the ranger division was in charge of both visitor protection and services as well

as resource management. With the arrival of resource management specialists in the 1970s

and 1980s, however, parks created resource management divisions and removed the

responsibilities for resource management from the ranger corps and transferred them to this

new program. Another development which influenced this evolution was the escalation in

crime within national parks, all of which demanded the attention of the ranger force, focusing

its attention from the backcountry to the front country where the greatest concentration of

visitors were and the greatest amount of criminal acts occurred.

By the late 1980s, these were some of the forces which led to change in the administrative

structure at North Cascades. Jonathan Jarvis arrived around this time to head the new

resource management division. And crime, even in a region as seemingly immune from

criminal activity as the North Cascades, was on the rise. All too frequently, park managers

confronted incidents of car clouting, rape, and drug manufacturing. Unifying the park's

districts under one management system seemed to be the most logical solution. Most parks

found it more effective to have a line organization in which a park's various programs were

run by program managers at the park's headquarters rather than appoint a program leader in

each district. This latter approach was too expensive. It would also further divide the park by

reinforcing the impression that these districts were actually two distinct park areas. To be

sure, the nature of the park complex's physical and political terrain led to this perception. But

the goal of the park's founders had been to treat this area as an interrelated unit, the larger

aim of which was wilderness protection.

By 1988, Superintendent Reynolds had accomplished most of his goals for reorganizing the

park. The district manager system, he believed, only supported the status quo -- a "caretaker"

operation -- and could not guide the park along its path to the future, a future which appeared

more and more complicated. He opted for a line organization to help promote a parkwide

rather than district-centered vision of management. Only in this way could North Cascades

meet the challenges that lay ahead. [9] Overhauling the existing administrative system had

not been without some hardship, especially for some members of the park staff who believed

that the district manager organization worked well. One long-time employee stated that the

current system was "more appropriate for this particular park considering the geographic

layout and logistics involved. I believe it makes for a more cohesive and, in the long run,

more efficient team organization. It puts the Manager close to and in touch with the

operation." [10]

Nevertheless, the majority of the park complex's staff supported the new administrative

system, and in 1989, a year after Reynolds left the park, the new organization was mostly

completed. Essentially, it retained the two districts but gave the division chiefs at

headquarters line authority over the whole park rather than having them serve as the

superintendent's advisors and staff. The specialists in the districts now reported to the

division chiefs rather than the unit managers. (Evidently, park officials took to heart the

special situation in Stehekin and reinstated the district manager position there, even though

the entire park operated under a different system.) Among the highlights of the new
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organization was the creation of a ranger division. With a chief ranger for the first time, the

park could address increasing crime, visitor safety and resource protection issues. Other

positions were subject-to-furlough, created to assist in interpretation, a result of an

operations evaluation and staffing study, all of which were part of the general reorganization.

Perhaps most importantly, the new organization established a wilderness district covering the

majority of the park complex. Bringing over ninety percent of the parkland under one district

was a practical solution to maintaining consistent management of the complex's extensive

wilderness. Superintendent Reynolds brought about this change primarily because he wanted

the park to have a strong wilderness ethic. Because William Lester was the Skagit

backcountry ranger and a leading proponent of a park wilderness ethic, the new district

would be run out of Marblemount. With such a large portion of the park set aside in the

wilderness district, the Skagit and Stehekin district rangers would have their jurisdiction

confined, for the most part, to the recreation areas, mainly the road corridors, reservoirs, and

other developed sites in those areas. [11]

The new organization proved to be quite effective, it seems, for only minor reorganizations

have taken place since then. In 1993, for instance, Superintendent William Paleck instituted

an employee committee system for management. The intent was to create a closer working

relationship among the park staff, who were located in remote areas, and to make them more

a part of the decision-making process. Thus, the new committee system would help empower

employees and give them "more immediate access to management and managing." By 1995,

Superintendent Paleck also revised the district manager position at Stehekin, converting the

position to a management assistant stationed in Chelan, whose primary duties now were

public outreach and coordination. In addition, Paleck consolidated all administrative services

in the park complex's two districts under the administrative officer at park headquarters; the

administrative function itself had been merged with the Forest Service's administrative

services. Now the Chelan management assistant, administrative officer, and chief of resource

management reported directly to the superintendent. Finally, Paleck converted the two subdistrict ranger positions into separate district rangers positions. [12]

Reorganization was indicative of much larger changes in the park complex's administration.

As mentioned above, John Reynolds wanted to guide the parkland into the future, and the

way to chart its course was through a new general management plan (which replaced park

master plans). The 1970 master plan, while effective, had outlived its usefulness; times had

changed. In 1985, Reynolds recounted those changes in a lengthy memo, entitled "North

Cascades 20: Direction to the Future." Surveying the 674,000-acre park complex, the

superintendent wrote that "These park areas range from the wildest, most isolated peaks and

valleys to the proud Stehekin community and one of the Northwest's most scenic highways.

The opportunities for protection of mountain ecosystems and what is left from those who

came before us provide a base for a wondrous array of visitor enjoyment and inspiration

potentials." The park complex and the communities within and near it, however, were at a

"critical and important juncture in their history. The initial development phases of their early

years are past, and they are moving from adolescence to maturity." With that, Reynolds

launched a program to prepare a new general management plan, encompassing the full scope

of the park's management, to be in place by the parkland's twentieth birthday. [13]

Even though Reynolds' ideas would be expanded on in the park's management plan, his

memo provided a good survey of the park complex's growth after more than fifteen years of

management and his reasons for moving forward. Land protection, namely the acquisition of

important property in Stehekin and mining claims throughout the park, was mostly complete.

Wilderness management, including both visitor use and resource protection, was well

established. The North Cascades Highway, after being in use for over ten years, was a

popular feature in the park experience. Moreover, the controversial High Ross Dam issue had

been settled with the signing of the 1984 international agreement between Canada and the
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United States. The treaty finally provided a sense of direction for the future management of

Ross Lake and the upper Skagit country. With its provision for the environmental endowment

fund, the treaty promised at long last funding for recreational improvements as well as

environmental enhancement and land acquisition projects on Ross Lake. Nevertheless, a great

deal still remained to be done. "Although it may appear today that the park areas are well

protected and that visitors are easily and well served," Reynolds asserted, "a look at the

future indicates that complacency not only would be naive, it would be irresponsible." [14]

That future could be read in the region's increasing population. In the past fifteen years, each

county within close proximity to the park complex had grown from fifteen to more than fifty

percent. The counties with the highest margin of increase were the nearby Snohomish and

Whatcom counties; the former increased by fifty-seven percent (with a population of

367,000), and the latter by thirty-eight percent (with a population of 114,000). The largest

population base in the region, however, still belonged to the more distant King County with

more than 1.3 million people. In addition, the "high-tech" corridor was moving north of

Seattle, which included the Boeing Company and the Navy in Everett. As had been predicted

in the 1970 master plan, the greatest potential impact from future growth was the Puget

Sound corridor, along Interstate 5, between Oregon and Vancouver, British Columbia. All of

these population figures suggested increased pressure on the park and "undoubtedly" created

"the single greatest concern for the continued vitality and health of the North Cascades

ecosystems in the future." [15]

Population growth posed a serious external threat to the park complex's ecosystems from air

pollution and acid precipitation. It also posed internal threats in the form of increased

visitation. Already, Reynolds noted, the park areas had a visitation of nearly one million a

year. As a recreational draw, the complex could expect even more visitors and more

pressures on the parkland's resources, ranging from impacts to the popular yet highly

sensitive subalpine passes to pressures in Stehekin for more primary residences and second

home construction. In order to address "both the opportunities and possible impacts to park

and recreation area resources," the superintendent concluded, park managers must approach

the situation in "an organized, thoughtful manner, with resolve to protect our resources,

provide for their enjoyment," and to do so "in harmony and cooperation with our neighbors."

[16]

Although the general management plan would cover the Park Service's approach to these

issues, Reynolds' memo contained some salient points for his vision of the park complex's

overall management direction. Foremost in that vision was that the park would have a strong

resource management program, with an emphasis on ecosystem management. At the same

time, it was important to consider the average visitor's experience. The main focus of their

encounter with the North Cascades came by way of the North Cascades Highway; some

800,000 visitors passed over the road through the park complex in the short summer season,

and thus the highway would be the focus of new developments. Linked with the "highway

experience" was the need to improve the park's interpretative program, all to enhance the

visitor's experience, enjoyment, and understanding of the entire North Cascades complex.

Gathering information about the parkland's rich cultural heritage -- from the archaeological

record to the memories of early residents of the Skagit and Stehekin country -- was an area of

management that deserved more attention. Reynolds also believed that the park complex

needed to coordinate other plans with its general management plan, plans for such things as

land protection and resource management issues in Stehekin. Besides that, it was imperative

to coordinate maintenance and improvement programs with sound resource management.

Moreover, he believed in a strong commitment to the park's own employees by involving

them in the decision-making process as well as using their expertise in management projects.

Some of this commitment was demonstrated by his reorganization of the park's

administration, but Reynolds also showed it through his efforts to increase base funding for
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park staff (many of whom were at lower grades compared to other parks of comparable size).

In addition, he worked to increase park appropriations to fund the programs he was seeking

to improve and initiate.

In still other areas, Reynolds' vision for North Cascades was more expansive. He wanted to

enlarge the park by adding the Cascade River drainage, most of Ross Lake except for the

hydroelectric sites, and the lower reaches of Bacon Creek. Like the preservationists who

fought for the park, the superintendent believed that the Cascade River Valley deserved

national park status, especially because the river itself was designated a wild and scenic river

and because the Forest Service still planned to log this area. Placing most of Ross Lake NRA

in the park proper reflected Reynolds' belief that the area displayed national park values --

impressive scenery and unique natural and cultural resources. It also demonstrated that park

managers were ready to reclaim portions of the recreation area reserved for future Seattle

City Light hydroelectric projects in the park's legislation. With the recent High Ross

settlement and City Light's decision to scrap other projects, the time had come. Finally,

Reynolds cast his vision for the park to the north and Canada and the world. He hoped to see

an international park created someday, a park that would include the North Cascades

complex with Manning Provincial Park (as well as an ecological reserve adjoining the park in

the Chilliwack drainage) in British Columbia, Canada. Moreover, the superintendent wanted

to see the entire North Cascades ecosystem -- encompassing Canadian and surrounding

Forest Service lands -- designated as an international biosphere reserve. [17]

Taken together, Reynolds' proposals thrust North Cascades forward to meet its new

challenges, though many of his ideas would remain in the planning stages for some time.

Even so, Reynolds had helped to ensure that the park complex would emphasize its primary

mission of wilderness preservation, and that, despite all of these changes, that its

administration would carry out this mission in a "new steady state."

Reynolds' successors discovered that the path to this new steady state could be filled with

obstacles. Superintendent John Earnst inherited the master planning initiated by Reynolds and

was faced with the lawsuit filed by the North Cascades Conservation Council against the

Park Service in 1989. The lawsuit claimed that the Park Service had failed to comply with

National Environmental Policy Act regulations by not adequately assessing the appropriate

long-term effects of its projects proposed in its management plans for the Lake Chelan

National Recreation Area. The lawsuit was resolved out of court with a consent decree in

1991, and it was left to Superintendent Paleck to oversee the environmental impact studies

and the drafting of the new general management plan and supporting plans for the recreation

area. Completed in 1995, the plans marked an important turning point in the Park Service's

management of the recreation area. After nearly thirty years of administration, it appeared the

agency had a clearer picture of how it would protect this area which had been rife with

controversy.

Both Earnst and Paleck would carry forward another important aspect of the complex's

administration that was underway during Reynolds' tenure: the relicensing of Seattle City

Light's Skagit River Project. The negotiated settlement, which was finally signed in 1996, was

a landmark in the history of North Cascades' administration as well as in the history of

federally licensed hydroelectric projects. The settlement agreement addressed the presence of

the hydroelectric project in Ross Lake National Recreation Area and its mitigation, and

helped direct the future management of the recreation area, so long in question because of the

uncertain relationship between the Park Service and Seattle City Light. Moreover, the

settlement helped spawn park resource management and environmental education programs.

At the same time, the settlement's benefits were still undefined, for the administrative costs

for carrying out some of the projects in the agreement were more than the park could afford.
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One of the more notable events affecting the recent management of North Cascades came

from the National Park Service's reorganization beginning in the mid-1990s. In part a

response to the Clinton administration's call to streamline government operations and the

Park Service's own efforts to reinvent the way it conducted its operations, the reorganization

placed greater responsibility for park programs in the hands of national park managers. The

reorganization changed the way the Park Service conducted business, from the revision of

park regions to the formation of executive committees and park cluster committees to decide

on park project priorities and other matters. Superintendent Paleck played an instrumental

role in the agency's restructuring. He helped draft the agency's restructuring plan, served on

the regional leadership council for the Pacific Northwest, and chaired the Columbia Cascades

Cluster Leadership Council and its executive committee. In addition, other park staffers

served on various advisory committees. As part of the new organizational effort, the park's

administration placed a greater effort on partnerships, such as alliances with the U.S. Forest

Service and other federal and state agencies involved in managing the North Cascades. North

Cascades also sought other means of funding park projects through the creation of the Mount

Rainier, North Cascades, Olympic Fund.

For years, park managers had been trying to build programs, and the effort to seek other

sources of funding reflected a desire to find financial support for park operations. Twenty

years after the establishment of North Cascades, Superintendent John Reynolds had called

attention to the park's "unacceptably low financial base." North Cascades was deficient in

both its operating base and capital improvements funds. In a sense, North Cascades was

operating at 1968 funding levels which supported basic park operations but little more.

Reynolds pointed to disturbing trends in decreasing service to the public, visitor and resource

protection, and facilities maintenance. In part, Reynolds pushed for a new general

management plan as a way to raise awareness of the park complex's critical resource

protection issues. With the completion of the 1988 general management plan, the

superintendent was then able to assert that contrary to popular views, North Cascades had

several "critical resource issues...with many more developing rapidly due to population

increase and other factors in Western Washington." In this way, he argued that the park had

only the "minimal staff capability to address these issues" with little money left over to

establish any "meaningful and effective inventory and monitoring programs." [18]

Funding from fee legislation made only a slight difference. Ironically, Reynolds suggested,

North Cascades was a major national park without "entrance stations, since the main 'park

road' is a state highway." The situation may have been politically acceptable and attractive

from the standpoint of wilderness preservation, but it placed the park at a disadvantage.

North Cascades collected "only user fees, not entrance fees," the superintendent asserted. "As

a result, this park does not benefit from the revenue program that is helping other National

Parks with similar visitation and operations. Dependency on fees is unrealistic in North

Cascades." To resolve the park's funding woes, Reynolds recommended an increase of some

$300,000 in its congressional appropriation to establish an inventory and monitoring

program, protect cultural resources, provide better wilderness management, enhance

interpretation, and expand facilities maintenance activities. His efforts met with some

success, for he secured funding from a number of Park Service programs for the protection of

natural and cultural resources. The operating fund increase was also justified for the

maintenance of the new visitor center. [19]

But conditions within the park continued to change, and the park complex's administration

seems to have struggled to keep pace. That is, as the park staff expanded to meet the

challenges of resource issues, base funding has been stretched thin. Two increases in the

park's operating base have been made since 1992. The increases have made North Cascade's

budget comparable to other parks its size, an improvement over the 1980s. Still, as

Superintendent William Paleck noted, North Cascades has a $1 million shortfall each year in
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funding for basic operating needs. Now rather than being poorer than other parks its size,

North Cascades was just as poor. The projects associated with the City Light settlement and

the new responsibilities associated with reorganization added another dimension to this

situation. Park staff had been creative in seeking funding from other sources, such as the

Skagit Environmental Endowment Commission, and, it seems, would continue to adjust. [20]

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 10:

LAND USE AND PROTECTION

In an ideal world, creating a wilderness park means drawing boundaries around a pristine

landscape to ensure its preservation. In reality, this is not as easily accomplished. North

Cascades was an amalgam of recreation areas and national park, making the singular mission

of wilderness protection more complicated. Recreation areas and national parks had different

purposes. In the case of the North Cascades complex, the recreation areas contained

permanent residents, artificial lakes, dams, and power plants, and they also offered a variety

of other uses deemed inappropriate in national parks. On the other hand, North Cascades

National Park was, like all parks, intended for higher uses: preservation of nature in its

original state, and human appreciation of this wilderness condition. Yet one theme

connecting the management of both recreation areas and national park was the acquisition of

private lands.

In the park complex, private lands came in a number of forms, from mining claims to private

residences and commercial resorts. During the park complex's first decade of management,

park managers set about the task of purchasing private lands, the use of which may have

posed a threat to the preservation of park resources, or the acquisition of which would aid in

the administration of the park complex. In the late 1970s and 1980s agency officials renewed

their efforts to acquire private lands and carry the program forward. In doing so, they

encountered some of their greatest controversies. These controversies stemmed from the

threat of renewed mining activities in the park as well as legal challenges to the Park

Service's land acquisition policies in Stehekin.

To better understand this issue, it is helpful to first look at why there was an issue over

private land in the first place. Typically, as in the case of North Cascades, Congress created

national parks before it secured ownership of, or cleared title to, any inholdings. Doing so

prior to the establishment of a park would have been time consuming and expensive. The

saving clause in the language of most, if not all, park legislation was that the creation of a

park area was subject to "valid existing rights." This meant that after a park's establishment,

Park Service officials set about the task of purchasing private lands, the use of which may

have posed a threat to preservation. Acquisition was often a delicate process of reconciling

park needs with those of private landowners. If done quickly, acquisition could keep land

prices low and thus costs to the government down. If done well, acquisition could keep

public perceptions of the Park Service positive, aiding in further land purchases and

promoting a positive view of the agency. [1]

Inevitably there were problems. This was especially true where the interpretation of the park's

legislation, particularly a park area like North Cascades and the Stehekin country, continued

to be the subject of some debate well after the park act was passed. In the first place, when a

parkland was created with valid existing mineral rights, conflicts surfaced between the

public's interest in the parkland's preservation and the interest of the mineral claimants in

mineral development. [2] In the second place, rarely did Congress appropriate enough money
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for the purchase of all private lands in national parks. North Cascades was not exception.

Prior to the 1960s, this did not always present a problem because most parklands were

carved from other federal lands and required only a transfer from one public agency to the

other. In other cases, state governments might become involved in the purchase of private

lands for the Park Service. Similarly, philanthropists might step forward, as in the case of

Grand Teton National Park, and buy the land for and transfer ownership to the service. By

the 1960s, however, Congress began creating more parks from private lands, necessitating a

new approach. The old approach had been to "wait for willing sellers" unless threats to

resources were imminent. The new approach was that each area's enabling legislation guided

the process of land acquisition. [3]

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Park Service's approach was similar: first the agency would

buy land from willing sellers, and then acquire lands needed for park management and use

through condemnation. The situation was slightly different at North Cascades, given the

political controversy and compromises surrounding the creation of the park complex (in

particular Lake Chelan NRA). The area's legislation instructed the Park Service to buy lands

from willing sellers only and not to purchase lands unless it was to protect an area from an

incompatible use. In other words, it would not use condemnation as a general tool of land

acquisition.

One can gain a sense of how important land acquisition was in the new park's management

by the fact that acquisition preceded the completion of most formal planning documents and

the implementation of other park programs. Complications arose in this process, however,

that were common throughout the park system. Congress authorized new parks faster than it

authorized appropriations for land acquisition. This led to delays in land purchases and the

related problem of inflated land prices -- one reason why the Park Service used up its

appropriation so quickly in Stehekin. Problems also surfaced with the Park Service's

treatment of private land owners. During the 1970s, some land owners charged the agency

with mistreatment; its acquisition program, they contended, was forcing inholders out of

parks in which they were legally allowed. In other cases, agency officials were accused of

harassing land owners until they sold out. Addressing these concerns, a series of General

Accounting Office (GAO) reports, including one assessing the agency's practices in Stehekin,

concluded that the Park Service had purchased too much land rather than employing other

forms of protection such as easements and zoning. These latter methods would have allowed

private owners to remain inside park areas. [4]

The result of these controversies was a new Park Service policy toward land acquisitions. In

1979, the Carter administration required that all parks have land acquisitions plans; these set

forth overall strategies for the agency's acquisition program before it began purchasing land.

The plans would provide a general order for land purchases, clarify what interests would be

acquired -- such as full fee or scenic easement -- and identify what were compatible and

incompatible uses on private lands. In doing so, land owners would know what was an

acceptable use of their lands within the larger park or recreation area setting. More than one

hundred plans were produced under the new policy for existing park units, North Cascades

among them, over the next several years. Still more changes to the land acquisition program

came in 1981 when Secretary of the Interior James Watt took office. Watt tightened the

policy on land purchases even further; he replaced the land acquisition plans with land

protection plans. The main intent of these new plans was that their programs were to be cost

effective to the federal government. Put another way, they needed to find other "practical"

means -- whenever possible -- other than federal purchase to protect lands within park areas.

What followed was the development of a more methodical process (set down in more plans)

to determine that federal funds were spent to buy only the "most critical parcels." [5]

***
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A Story of Two Mines

One of the main priorities of the land protection program was to acquire all of the patented

mining claims within the park complex. Dating to the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, mining in the North Cascades was a colorful subject in the region's history. Here,

as elsewhere in the American West, hopeful prospectors flooded into the range looking for its

hidden wealth of gold and other valuable minerals. Leaving more often than not with empty

pockets and little to show for their hard life in the extreme mountain conditions, prospectors

left a legacy in the landscape; it was a legacy of environmental conquest as well as their own

failure. River beds and mountain slopes bore the physical scars of prospecting and

excavation. Mining machinery lay scattered among the ruins. Nevertheless, the hope of

finding new wealth persisted. That hope persisted in both patented and unpatented mining

claims. When the park complex was established in 1968, there were ninety-one patented

mining claims, amounting to approximately 1,660 acres, all of which were south of Highway

20, and there were some 7,000 unpatented claims throughout the park complex. Despite the

large number of unpatented claims, the most serious threat from renewed mining activity

came from the patented claims. The owner of a patented claim, having proven his claim

contained a commercially viable mineral deposit, had full fee ownership of the minerals and

the surface. More importantly, he had the legal right to develop his claim for any purpose.

[6]

Throughout the early 1970s, agency officials carried out a rather successful program of

acquisition or invalidation of unpatented mineral claims. But they were less successful in

purchasing the patented claims that presented the greatest threat to the park's wild setting.

These claims were in the areas of Cascade Pass and Thunder Creek. In 1971, North Cascades

managers gave these claims their highest priority, but before they could negotiate and

purchase these clusters of claims, the original appropriation for land acquisition was all but

exhausted. Around this same time, the owners of the Skagit Queen mining claims, located in

the upper Thunder Creek basin, voiced their interest in developing their claims. The claims

stretched for several miles along both sides of Skagit Queen Creek, a tributary of Thunder

Creek, below Boston Glacier. Park managers considered this drainage "one of the most

beautiful areas" within the park, and its "destruction...for commercial purposes would strike a

devastating blow to one of the most spectacular areas in the Pacific Northwest." [7]

It had been nearly seventy years since the area had been "improved" for mining. In the first

decade of this century, the Skagit Queen Consolidated Mining Company and later the British

Mining Company set up mining operations. Surface developments included a power house, a

barn, assay office, pumphouse, and machine shop, among other structures. Subsurface

developments were never as impressive as those on the surface, but they did include a 670-

foot crosscut adit. The operation itself, however, proved less successful than the construction

of the mining facilities. By 1915 the mine owners had patented most of the property, most

likely with the intent of selling out, and subsequently abandoning the developments to the

elements.

But in 1972, the Skagit Queen claims suddenly became a valuable commodity, not so much

as a storehouse of minerals but as a piece of real estate. The government needed to purchase

these private inholdings in order to protect the park's wilderness character, and the current

owner of the mining claims, Glenn Widing, believed the government would pay a substantial

amount for his land. He was disappointed. In the summer and fall of that year, the Park

Service's mineral appraisals determined that the mining claims had no mineral value, and

furthermore, that the traces of minerals discovered were of insufficient quantity and quality

to show a commercial value for ownership. Moreover, contractors for the Park Service

determined that the timber values of the claims were high, but the costs of removing the
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timber from such a remote location made the net value of the timber nearly nothing after

harvest. Finally, without mineral or timber values, the land was appraised at $168, 700. This

was hardly the figure, it seems, Widing had hoped for when he purchased the claims from the

Natural Resources Development Corporation, which retained an interest in the mining claims

by contracting with Widing to buy the property for a low down payment. When the Park

Service offered to purchase the claims for their appraised value in January 1973, Widing

turned it down. [8]

In response to this "unsatisfactory price," Widing and his associates informed the Park

Service that they planned to conduct more "exploratory work" that summer, their apparent

intent was to determine for themselves whether the minerals of the Skagit Queen claims

would pay. What followed were two proposals -- or veiled threats -- aimed at forcing the

government to increase substantially its offer for the claims. The first of these proposals was

to construct a road up Thunder Creek in order to bring heavy equipment to the site for

mineral exploration. The road, naturally, would have to cross national park land and into the

park's proposed wilderness area. Under federal mining law, mining claim holders retained a

right of "reasonable" access to their properties within national parks if their claims existed

prior to the park's establishment. For this reason, the Park Service might have been obligated

to grant such a permit. Park officials, faced with the possibility of such wholesale destruction

to this wild region, planned to condemn the land to prevent the road's construction. Yet

before using condemnation procedures, agency managers had a relatively new management

tool at their disposal: the environmental impact statement (EIS) required under the 1969

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In January 1973, Superintendent Lowell White

informed Widing and company that before construction could proceed they would have to

provide information for an EIS. Expensive and time consuming, the EIS provides a detailed

statement describing the proposed action -- or project -- taking place on federal land, its

direct and indirect impacts to the natural environment, the cumulative and long-term effects,

alternatives to the proposal (which includes a "no-action" alternative), and identifies any

irreversible impacts to natural resources. In short, the EIS, with its comprehensive analysis

and public disclosure, could conceivably stall or halt a project altogether.

Perhaps for these reasons, Widing and the Natural Resources Development Corporation met

the request with silence. Two years later, in January 1975, they submitted another request for

a permit to move ahead with mineral exploration and development, having conducted

assessments of ore samples the previous year. Apparently, these samples boosted their

interest in the value of the mining claims. Once again, a main feature of the project was the

construction of a road up Thunder Creek. And once more, Widing and his associates did not

comply with the park's request for information to prepare an EIS. As if to force the Park

Service's hand, the owners of the claims flew a crew by helicopter into the millsite that

summer to survey the claims and conduct further mineral assessments -- all under careful

watch of park rangers. [9]

This work led to the second proposal that seemed intent on pushing the Park Service to pay a

higher price for the claims. The proposal had nothing to do with developing the minerals but

logging the timber from the mining claims. In late September 1975, Widing and company

filed an application with Washington State's Department of Natural Resources to log 220

acres of their claims. The state required the application under the Forest Practices Act, even

though the mining claims were privately owned. Similar to their road proposal, the claim

owners failed to provide enough information about the proposed logging operations. And a

month later, the state, the claim owners, and Superintendent White met to discuss the project.

The owners, again, seemed less interested in the logging proposal itself as they did in the

threat it posed, for they reduced the amount of land they would log to twenty acres. They also

renewed their request to construct a road up Thunder Creek, to aid in the removal of timber

and to bring in heavy equipment to the site. [10]
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The requests for permission to log and to construct a road -- and thus develop the mining site

-- appeared to be more a threat than a reality. By the end of 1975, the owners of the mining

claims had not submitted more information to the state in order to receive their logging

permit. Under the state's version of NEPA, the logging project might require an EIS, another

potentially expensive and time-consuming roadblock. Moreover, Widing and his associates

had not supplied enough information about their proposed road up Thunder Creek, and park

managers assured them that the road project would require an EIS, since it would enter the

park's proposed wilderness area and have such "a major impact." Preparing the report would

require a minimum of a year, given the project's extent and the fact that surveys could not

begin until the snowpack melted in the late spring or early summer. [11]

Whether or not the owners of the Skagit Queen claims actually intended to go through with

developing a mine did not matter. The plain fact was that the Park Service could not force the

owners off their property by legislative or administrative means. Besides mining, the owners

of the claims could not only log the land, but under existing regulations they could also

subdivide it for private residences or a commercial backcountry tourist operation. Above all,

the threat of mining itself required action. In December 1975, Regional Director John Rutter

informed Representative Lloyd Meeds about the issue. The problem, Rutter suggested, was

very simple. The only way to solve the threat of mining up Thunder Creek was to acquire the

claims through purchase or condemnation. Both approaches required money. (To carry out

condemnation, the government needed to have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the land

itself.) As of early 1973, however, North Cascades was out of acquisition funds authorized

under its enabling legislation. [12] Most likely, Meeds carried this message to Congress, for

on October 1, 1976, the president signed into law an omnibus bill that raised the

appropriation ceilings for land acquisitions in a number of national parks, and North

Cascades was among them. The law granted the park an additional $1 million for land

acquisition because the original estimate from 1967 "did not include funds for acquisition of

outstanding mineral interests." More importantly, the central reason for the increase was "to

forestall" the "imminent" threat of mining in the Thunder Creek Basin. [13]

Meanwhile, in 1976 Congress passed another law, the Mining in the Parks Act, that would

allow the Park Service to regulate mines on national park lands. The act's purposes were

broad and general, stating that "all mining operations in areas of the National Park System

should be conducted so as to prevent or minimize damage to the environment and other

resource values." Park managers found little comfort in the law's language or its provisions

for strict regulations of mining activities in national parks. The implication was that mining

would happen in North Cascades, though the law enabled the Secretary of the Interior to

close all units of the park system to further mineral location and mining entry under the

Mining Law of 1872. The law also empowered the secretary to declare as invalid all existing

unpatented claims within units of the park system not properly recorded by September 28,

1977. [14]

Condemnation was the preferred procedure for dealing with the Skagit Queen claims. In

1978, the Park Service initiated condemnation procedures, and three years later, on

September 16, 1981, the court proceedings ended in favor of the agency. The court awarded

the Skagit Queen mining claim owners $277,000 for approximately 645 acres. "This action,"

wrote Superintendent Keith Miller, "assures the visual and resource integrity of this superb

area located in the heart of the North Cascades National Park." [15]

Following the resolution of the Skagit Queen controversy, park managers continued to pursue

the acquisition of the remaining private lands within the park. Fee acquisition, according to

the park's 1983 draft land protection plan, was the "only alternative that adequately satisfies

the requirement for complete protection" and preservation of the park's resources. There were

six patented mining claims, two mill sites, and one mineral right making up the sole
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remaining private interests within the park; they encompassed approximately 236 acres. The

claims were clustered in and near Thunder Creek, Cascade River, Boston Basin, Bridge

Creek, and Lake Anne. [16] Of these, park managers rated the Thunder Creek Mines (or

Dorothy claims as they were also known) as their highest priority for acquisition. There were

at least two reasons for this. First, this one property totaled around 126 acres; this accounted

for more than half of the remaining private lands. The property was made up of six patented

claims of approximately 121 acres and one mill site of approximately 5 acres. Second, like

the Skagit Queen claims, this property was located in the park's proposed wilderness, and its

potential development now represented the wilderness' greatest threat. By comparison, the

other claims were much smaller and the likelihood of their development did not seem as

imminent. [17]

***

Like the Skagit Queen mine, the Thunder Creek mines were a going concern early in this

century in the upper Thunder Creek drainage. In 1921, the Thunder Creek Mining Company

was issued patents for its claims -- the Dorothy claims -- and mill site. The company erected

a number of structures as part of its operation and pressed hard for access to the site. In 1929,

the Forest Service issued the company a special use permit to construct a roadway up

Thunder Creek so trucks could reach the mine. The company also considered a more

ambitious plan to construct a narrow gauge railroad from Diablo up Thunder Creek to its

property. Neither project was ever realized, and mining had long since ceased on the Dorothy

claims. [18] The idea of mining, however, has carried on, especially after the establishment

of North Cascades National Park. And in the early 1980s, the new owners of the claims

embarked on their own mining venture.

Similar to the controversy over the Skagit Queen claims, this mining venture aimed to profit

from rising property values more than it did from the mineral wealth contained in the

property itself. After all, the Dorothy claims were surrounded by a national park and some of

the country's most spectacular wild country, and the new owners expected great returns on

their investment. To protect this pristine landscape, they believed, the government would be

willing to pay a substantial sum. Proving the property's value, though, became something of a

life-long mission for the mine's owners, for the gulf between what the Park Service and what

the owners believed was a "fair" market value for the property was as wide and deep as the

Thunder Creek drainage itself. Trying to bridge this gap would lead to one of the park

complex's longest cases involving mining properties.

The story begins with an old mining company, the Thunder Creek Silver-Lead Mines, Inc.,

dissolving in 1965. William H. Webster, an officer in the company, became the liquidating

trustee, and continued to pay taxes on the land and thus retained ownership. In the early

1970s, as part of its land acquisition program, the Park Service offered Webster $1,000 per

claim. Webster refused the offer, stating that he had been paying taxes on the property for

more than fifty years and that several mining engineers had assured him that his claims

contained "very valuable ore." Thus, he expected an offer of around $2 million for the

property. In the late 1970s, in an attempt to resolve the issue, the Park Service conducted two

appraisals of the claims, one for their mineral values and the other for their overall property

values. In 1978, the agency determined that the property had no commercial mineral values;

that is, similar to the Skagit Queen assessment, gold and other precious metals did not exist

on the property in "sufficient quantity and quality" to justify a commercial venture that would

realize a profit. Around this same time, the Park Service appraised the value of the property

itself at $38,800. [19] Obviously, this was far below what Webster desired.

Matters only grew more complicated. In 1980, William Webster passed away. His two

nephews, William C. and John C. Webster, who lived in Tonka Bay, Minnesota, inherited
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their uncle's estate and eventually gained clear title to the property. In order to satisfy the

numerous shareholders in the now defunct mining company, the Websters were forced to

purchase the claims at a public auction on June 17, 1983, for $67,000, almost twice the

appraised value. Meanwhile, the Webster brothers were anxious to sell their property to the

United States, but like their uncle, they believed it was worth "substantially more than

$38,000" and, of course, the price they paid at auction. Over time, their figures would range

from $3 million to $50 million, far beyond the Park Service's appropriations for the

acquisition of all private lands within the North Cascades complex.

Their reasons for such a high asking price were based on independent evaluations,

evaluations which markedly differed from those commissioned by the Park Service. In

September 1983, for example, George Weaton, a mining engineer, appraised the value of the

Dorothy claims for the Websters at approximately $5 million. Two months later, however,

Luther Clemmer, a Park Service mining engineer, appraised the mineral value of the same

claims at $6,500. Clemmer argued that Weaton's report was poorly done, incomplete, and

inconsistent with "proper appraisal technique," for the report failed to demonstrate whether

the ore could be mined, processed, and marketed at a profit," which, Clemmer concluded, it

could not. Without proof of the claim's economic potential, there was no valuable ore reserve

and thus no mineral value that one could attach to the mine, save for "mine-related

improvements and exploration potential." Weaton's estimate of value, moreover, was not

based upon objective research but "the fantasies and speculation found in old reports prepared

50 years ago." [20]

Although William C. Webster, the main spokesperson of the two Webster brothers,

maintained that he wanted to sell his land to the Park Service and "protect" the scenic

wonders of the North Cascades, he was adamant about getting a large sum of money in

return. To force the issue, he proposed a number of development schemes, none of which

actually materialized, but they nevertheless generated concern from park managers. In 1984,

Webster proposed the first of several ventures: a logging operation on the Dorothy claims.

The operation was highly unlikely. Like the mining proposal, logging would not be

economical; the terrain was too steep, the trees were too mature, and the area was too remote.

Access, a central issue in any case involving private lands surrounded by a national park,

would be a serious problem. In order to protect the wilderness values of the Thunder Creek

basin, among other things, Park officials would not allow a road to be built up Thunder

Creek, and so the only way to reach the claims and remove timber was by helicopter, an

expensive prospect. Furthermore, Webster's proposed logging operation would have to pass a

complete environmental assessment by the state, a review open to public comment. The

logging proposal faded from sight. [21]

Webster's interest in proving the value of his property remained strong. In 1985, Webster

received another report on the potential value of his property, this time from a geologist, that

was quite optimistic -- "overly optimistic" in the Park Service's opinion. With this report in

hand, Webster announced plans to conduct more ore sampling and map vein exposures.

Although it appeared that he might be preparing to develop the mine, Webster's main interest

was establishing -- and perhaps proving the Park Service's assessments wrong -- the true

mineral values of his property.

While Webster was free to develop his property under the Mining Act, he could not do so

without consulting the Park Service first. This stipulation had come with the passage of the

Mining in the Parks Act in 1976. To be sure, the act did not enable the Park Service to

eliminate mining altogether, but it did allow the agency to implement stricter controls over

mine operations, the central feature of which was a "plan of operations." The plan described

the proposed operations, set forth the timetable of those operations, provided a reclamation

plan, outlined the steps taken to meet federal and state environmental standards, and supplied
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an environmental analysis of the mine's potential impact. [22]

Naturally, this did not mean that mining would not occur, only that Webster and others would

have to supply detailed information about their projects before the Park Service would

approve them. On July 9, 1985, the Park Service approved Webster's first plan of operation

(phase one) to collect mineral samples by blasting trenches and to map the claims. Without a

road, Webster accessed his claims by helicopter. Core drilling (phase two) was to have

followed this initial phase, if it proved promising, and also would have been subject to the

agency's approval. Apparently, the samples demonstrated what the Park Service had stressed

all along -- that the mineral values of the Dorothy group of claims simply were not worth

developing; phase two of the project never began. [23]

Webster's plans, however, kept Park Service managers and real estate specialists busy.

Mostly, they attempted to convince Webster what the federal government meant by "fair

market value." In August 1985, Harlan Hobbs, then the Pacific Northwest Region's Chief of

the Division of Lands, informed William Webster that the government has "a responsibility

and a duty to pay 'just compensation' for the property we are acquiring." By law, just

compensation was "the fair market value of the property at the time of taking." Simply put,

fair market value was the price a knowledgeable seller and buyer would agree upon.

Moreover, fair market value did not involve the "mere possibility of minerals" or other

valued resources; one could not put a fair price on such a possibility. Fair market value also

did not involve "any special value of the property to the owner not directly reflected in the

market value," such as a sentimental attachment to or associations with a particular place.

Finally, the "Fifth Amendment allows the owner only the fair market value of his property; it

does not guarantee him a return on his investment." [24]

Nevertheless, Webster, now a partner in the recently formed Thunder Creek Mines company,

pressed on with his challenge. His challenge was not only to establish the value of his

property but also to test agency policies about access to his property. In May 1986, he

informed park managers that he planned to develop a wilderness camp on his claims. The

camp would have been for outdoor recreation -- hiking and mountaineering -- as well as for

rock collecting, specifically quartz crystals. Quartz crystals were the most recent minerals of

value, he asserted, found on his property. In order to make this new operation work, Webster

would once again need some means of access to his land. He proposed using helicopters that

would leave from Colonial Creek Campground. He also proposed using all-terrain vehicles

along the Thunder Creek Trail to reach the camp from, and take materials out to, Highway

20. He would once more be disappointed with the Park Service's response.

Superintendent John Reynolds replied to Webster, stating that he was not opposed to the

"idea of a wilderness camp," but he had concerns about the operation and there were

regulations with which Wester needed to comply. First, park lands could not be used for

helicopter operations without a special regulation. Second, regulations barred motorized

vehicles on trails; moreover, the area through which he would travel was proposed wilderness

and thus managed as legal wilderness, yet another reason for barring motorized travel. Third,

his camp would require a commercial license. And finally, the removal of crystals or other

rocks from the property -- even by guests of the wilderness camp -- was considered mining

and required a plan of operations. [25]

Webster seemed less concerned about the future of his new business venture than he did

about his "constitutional rights" to use his land "in a normal way, including mining

gemstones." He suggested that the superintendent was interfering with his "prior existing

rights," the language in the national park's legislation which allowed him to continue to use

his property after the creation of North Cascades. In a comment that typified his thinking,

Webster stated that Thunder Creek Mines would cooperate with the Park Service fully, and
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promised "not to harm the environment, but we certainly do not need an access permit to

enter our property," and "we will not wait for one." [26]

However threatening Webster sounded, he eventually relented and provided the appropriate

documentation to the Park Service; it was a pattern that repeated itself over the next decade.

One reason Thunder Creek Mines submitted to the Park Service's regulations was that the

agency was the only likely buyer for its property. Another reason was the law. In October

1986, for example, the Park Service's solicitor, Richard Neely, asserted that the "right of

access is not unlimited" but should be reasonable; access was also subject to regulation.

Furthermore, the Park Service was not violating Webster's "constitutional rights" by

subjecting his access to "reasonable regulation." Because Thunder Creek Mines acquired its

patent long before the establishment of North Cascades, the "valid existing rights" proviso in

the park's legislation did not apply. The status of Webster's property, in other words, was that

of private land within a national park, the use of which was protected by the Constitution, but

still subject to regulation. Congress, Neely pointed out, could "regulate mining in national

park areas." Therefore, he advised that Webster "must comply with regulations and obtain an

approved mining plan of operations with an access permit before attempting any type of

exploratory or mining operations" on his property. [27]

In the meantime, Webster commissioned another mineral report, this time one evaluating his

property's quartz crystal and other gemstones, to bolster his assertion that the property was

extremely valuable -- and therefore its fair market value was worth considerably more than

the Park Service's appraisal. In December 1986, Webster supplied Park Service real estate

specialists with another proposal documenting the "potential" income from his property if

Thunder Creek Mines developed a quartz mining operation. According to the mine company's

authority, Gary Coleman, and its own calculations, Webster estimated that his business could

expect an annual net income of $2.8 million over a period of ten years, which was evidently

the amount of time it would take to mine all of the quartz. Therefore, Webster calculated that

the real value of the property was $28.6 million. Add to this other "gemstones...timber, silver,

lead, zinc, and gold, plus recreational income from heli-hiking, mountain climbing school

leases, etc.," he noted, and the property's "income potential" increased substantially. The

potential value of Webster's property, however, never seemed as attractive as finding a way

to get the Park Service to buy it from him. As he concluded, "we are expecting the National

Park Service to buy our property," and would be willing to settle for a figure less than $28.6

million. The question again was what was the fair market value? If it was not a figure in the

millions of dollars, Webster implied, his company would begin mining at once.

The owners of Thunder Creek Mines spun elaborate plans and threatened to invade a

wilderness setting in order to pressure the Park Service into buying its property for a much

higher price than the agency's offer of approximately $69,000. The agency, though, stood

firm. In 1987, Harlan Hobbs received an independent report appraising the quartz crystal

value of the Dorothy claims. It disputed the findings of Webster's report and suggested that

the quality of the crystal was not very impressive, and that there was "little probability" that

Thunder Creek Mines could "develop a successful crystal-producing venture." Hobbs, whose

patience was apparently wearing thin, informed Webster that it appears that "your efforts to

rationalize some substantial mineral values have been a waste of time and money." [28]

Not one to give up on a dream, Webster submitted Thunder Creek Mines' plan of operation

for crystal collecting, which the Park Service approved in May 1987. The collecting evidently

did not produce any new results, and in September of that year, Hobbs reminded the owners

of the mine company of his agency's conclusions: mining might produce crystals in better

condition but not of better quality. Moreover, he noted that his agency's experts concluded

that there was no value to the crystals (or any other minerals) on the claim; even the mining

company's own consultant had not attributed a value to the crystals. It seemed to Hobbs that
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at the very least the Webster brothers wanted to cover the cost of their original investment

and expenses to prove the value of their property. William Webster, for example, believed

his company could still profit from "a recreational crystal collecting operation," even if the

gems did not have any commercial value. For this reason, Hobbs wrote, "he still wanted

several million" for the claims "based on the hypothetical income" from this unproven

venture. No matter what arguments the Websters presented, it was "simply not the

government's responsibility to provide you a return on a bad investment." [29]

Resilient, though perhaps irrational to some, the Websters employed several new strategies

over the next several years. In October 1987, they attempted to donate the property (as a taxdeductible charitable contribution) to the National Park Service. In doing so, they would have

been able to reclaim their initial investment and through a complicated process have

increased the value of the property enough to grant them a substantial profit. The Internal

Revenue Service (IRS) turned down their proposal. In the IRS's opinion, the Websters did not

have a fair market value established and the service would not issue a ruling to establish a

value. In addition, the Websters' proposal called for forming a partnership, made up of them,

who would buy the mining company and then donate their interests in the company (the

mining claims and their "appraised" value) to the government -- provided that the appraisal

exceeded "3 1/2 times their initial investment in order to reach an economic break-even point

for federal income tax purposes." This proposal, the IRS noted, was not about "furthering a

business purpose" but rather about obtaining "a federal tax deduction based upon the

appraised value of their partnership interests being significantly in excess of their acquisition

cost of the partnership interests." In other words, the Websters wanted to form a dummy

company to buy the Dorothy claims, inflate the value of their interests, and then donate their

property to the Park Service. What they could not get from the Park Service in cash, they

could get as a deduction on their taxes from the IRS. [30]

When this alternative failed, the Websters returned to familiar territory. They once more

requested the Park Service to evaluate their property in the Thunder Creek drainage,

primarily to determine the value of its quartz crystals. When that was not forthcoming, the

Webster brothers laid plans to develop a permanent resort on their property. Presented in

October 1988, this latest venture would resurrect the wilderness camp idea; the new operation

would combine crystal collecting, mining, as well as recreational activities. The Websters

estimated that two to three hundred people would visit their resort in the summer season.

They would fly in by helicopter and initially stay in temporary buildings. Other developments

included sewage systems and landing areas for the helicopters. The mine owners went so far

as to hire recreational consultants to produce a prospectus for this service. Apparently, the

venture proved to be more complicated than the Websters anticipated and it never got off the

ground. [31]

The plan for a resort evidently did not have the desired effect; the Park Service continued to

monitor the Websters' proposals but did not raise its offer for the Dorothy claims. On May

17, 1990, the agency made a second offer for the claims of $56,000, substantially less than its

earlier offer. Naturally, the Websters considered this figure "unrealistically low." But the

Websters had reason to believe the Park Service was still interested in their property, for the

1990 land protection plan for the park listed it as the highest priority for acquisition. So they

began to consider other approaches that would move the acquisition process along in their

favor. First, they alerted the Park Service that they had received an offer of $250,000 for

mineral exploration rights to their property, but wanted to allow the government time to

respond before they made any decisions. Second, when the government did not respond to

this new development, the Websters then notified the Park Service that they had connections

to Congressman Bruce Vento, who chaired the House Subcommittee on National Parks and

Public Lands, and would take their case directly to him. Apparently, the Websters were

interested in receiving a settlement similar to the recent one in Voyageurs National Park,
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where a park inholder agreed to sell for $1.2 million after a lengthy battle with the Park

Service. [32]

Although their sights were still set high, the Websters had little to show for their efforts.

William Webster continued to inform park managers of his interest in gaining access to his

property to conduct more surface exploration to establish -- yet again -- the property's value.

He also suggested that he and his brother might reconsider donating their property to the

United States, presumably using another approach to write off the donation at a much higher

value. On September 18, 1991, William Webster made his most concrete proposal to date; he

offered to sell his property to the government for $3,387,600. The figure's exact amount was

important, for it represented how the Websters arrived at their version of fair market value.

Although the property was worth $21 million, "based on the projected consolidated appraisal"

by Northwest Bank, William Webster stated, the Thunder Creek Mines would sell for the

lower amount of $3,387,600 because it was a "fair price to pay." The price was the cost of his

family's original investment in the property, compounded for sixty-five years at 4.7 percent

interest. The Park Service, of course, legally could not pay the Websters this amount for their

property, since it exceeded the fair market value. [33]

Nothing, it seems, had changed. William Webster continued to try and prove his right to

have motorized access to his property, and agency officials continued to respond that he had

misinterpreted the regulations and that they could deny his requests for access, at least the

means of access. In February 1992, Webster offered to accept half of his earlier offer, and

continued to strike an old theme -- that the Park Service had denied him his "constitutional

rights" to access his property. Perhaps, he hoped, that the threat of a law suit, or the threat of

driving a snowmobile or all terrain vehicle up Thunder Creek, would convince the Park

Service to buy his land. Two months later, Webster attempted to increase the political

pressure on the Park Service to meet his demands. He informed Rick Wagner, Hobbs'

successor, that Vento's office agreed with his terms, evidently suggesting that "friendly

condemnation" procedures should commence, in which the government would pay Thunder

Creek Mines its most recent asking price of $1.7 million. [34]

Once more, Webster did not receive the desired response. Wagner related that it was not that

simple. First, Congressman Vento could not dictate to the current administration that

condemnation should proceed apace. He simply did not wield that kind of influence. Second,

condemnation was a slow process. Third, the Park Service could not even begin to think of

initiating condemnation for the appraised value of the Dorothy claims because it barely had

enough funds to cover the appraised value. Finally, Wagner suggested that, as an alternative,

Webster and his lawyers might try to initiate an inverse condemnation, forcing the

government into court and moving the proceedings along. Apparently, Webster was not

interested in pursuing this option. [35]

In 1993, the option Webster chose instead was to mount more legal pressure, and over the

next several years attempted to build a case of "taking" by the federal government. That is,

the Park Service had denied him his legal right to the use of his property, while at the same

time the agency had included the Dorothy claims as part of the national park. In support of

this allegation, one of Webster's main points was that his company should have had

motorized ("all weather") access up Thunder Creek. To support this claim, he argued that the

trail and its bridges had been built by the original mine developers in late 1920s and early

1930s, an assertion based more on speculation than fact. This alone should have been enough

information to suggest the trail somehow belonged to the current company and allow it to

build a road and drive to the mine site. (One section of the mine company's so-called trail

was under Diablo Lake.) Superintendent William Paleck notified Webster that, again,

building a road where there had historically only been a trail, one which predated his

company's ownership and now passed through what was now designated wilderness, did not
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constitute "reasonable access." The property owners, in his opinion, had not been denied

access; they could reach their land by helicopter or by foot or pack animal over the trail. In

fact, they could not produce any legal documents to prove ownership of the trail, after the

Park Service noted that its historical research suggested that the "road" up Thunder Creek had

never been finished by the Thunder Creek Mining Company. Furthermore, the Thunder

Creek Trail was on federal land. [36]

Second, Webster argued that the Park Service maintained a trail through his property, and

thus encouraged park visitors to trespass on his land -- and thus "use" his property. To this

Paleck noted that, while park managers might have relocated the trail at some point, it was

more likely that this trail had always crossed the property, for it was built early in the century.

Any "trespass" by park visitors was unintentional, it seems. Third, there were other related

violations of private ownership. Apparently, park staffers had destroyed one or more

structures on the Webster's land, a claim, the superintendent noted, which could not be

verified. And Webster claimed that the Park Service was trying to "regulate" commercial

activities on private land, that is, requiring a permit for running the proposed wilderness

camp. To the contrary, Paleck asserted, the park had required a permit because the camp

would run some of its programs on park lands. [37]

Despite making these clarifications, the Park Service failed to convince Webster that it was

not denying him or his brother the "real" value of their property. Park managers continued to

inform Webster that regulations were legally binding, and yet Webster continued to propose

ventures similar to previous ones, apparently in an attempt to build his case that the

government had "taken" his land. [38] In support of this tactic, he asserted that the Park

Service had been disingenuous in dealing with him and his family. Agency officials had

attempted to cover up important facts about his uncle's ownership, such as the amount of

money he had invested (and thus the figure of $165,000 the Webster brothers used to

calculate their price for the property.) Of course, the Park Service denied this accusation, but

in time it became clear that Webster was making this kind of assertion not only to further his

legal and political battle but also to mount a media battle. [39]

In 1995, Congressman Jim Ramstad inquired with the Park Service, on behalf of William

Webster, regarding the Thunder Creek Mines. At that time, Acting Regional Director William

C. Walters responded to Ramstad, assuring him that his agency had followed the letter of the

law. More importantly, the Park Service lacked "appropriated funds to acquire the property,"

and as had been the case for some twenty-five years, "there appears to be a large difference

between the potential appraised value [of the mining property] and Mr. Webster's asking

price." Ramstad's concern, apparently, was that the agency was not negotiating in good faith.

Although Walters' agency intended to "gladly resume earnest negotiations" for the property,

it could only do so when "funds become available for a current appraisal and potential

acquisition." What Webster believed, and the reason he had contacted Ramstad, was that the

Land and Water Conservation Fund could be used to purchase his land for his asking price.

While it was true that the fund was the source for the agency's land purchases, the Park

Service reminded Webster that it could only pay him the appraised value, for Congress

closely monitored any purchases drawn from the fund's trust account in excess of the market

value. Congress had to approve any negotiated settlement exceeding market value.

Meanwhile, William Webster was submitting information regarding his case to CBS's news

show, "60 Minutes," regarding Land and Water Conservation Fund abuses and the

unconstitutional taking of private property. Apparently, his case was a prime example. [40]

The outcome of all this was a stalemate. Lawsuits waited in the wings. CBS camera crews

might show up at park headquarters any moment. William Webster continued to propose new

ways to establish the value of his property. The most recent plan, which emerged in 1995,

was to use an air-crane helicopter (Sikorsky) to fly some forty to sixty loads of galena ore
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from the Thunder Creek mine to trucks on the Cascade River Road, and from there transport

the ore to a smelter in Canada, where it would be processed and finally the property's mineral

value would be firmly established. As of July 1997, Thunder Creek Mines was still finishing

its plan of operations for this latest project, and many questions remained to be answered

concerning environmental impacts and restoration. Perhaps the most intriguing was whether

or not the project was possible. Could a Sikorsky helicopter carry its maximum load of nine

tons, or a load near this, at such a high elevation? Could it then safely ascend and fly over

Cascade Pass to waiting trucks? Meanwhile, Webster pressed for purchase of his land

through an appropriation from the Land and Water Conservation Fund; his most recent

valuation, factoring in potential revenues from galena ore as well as tungsten and

molybdenum, came in at $7 million. Once more the idea of a donation surfaced, so that

Webster could deal with the IRS rather than the Park Service in justifying the fair market

value of the Thunder Creek Mines' property. In the end, in the words of Superintendent

Paleck, the "fundamental difficulty is the tremendous difference of opinion" over the value of

the Webster's property. [41] And it was on this point that the issue began and currently rests.

***

Land Crisis in Stehekin

By the late 1970s, the National Park Service's management of Stehekin had a number of

unresolved issues. Most of these stemmed from the agency's land acquisition policies and its

ambiguous definition of compatible use, that is, the kinds of development on private lands

that would not detract from the Stehekin Valley's historic character and its natural beauty. At

this juncture, a decade since the park complex's creation, there were divided opinions about

which direction the Park Service should take to address these issues. Environmental groups

expressed concern for preserving Stehekin's natural and cultural values and pressed the Park

Service to assert its authority and do more about restricting new -- and largely --

inappropriate developments on private property. The agency could do so, they believed, if it

were more assertive and implemented stricter zoning and, more importantly, purchased the

remaining private lands. Others, primarily Stehekin residents and property owners, wanted

the Park Service to be more specific about its management objectives, too. Their interest,

however, arose from a concern that the Park Service presence seemed to be overwhelming

the valley and its "unique" way of life. They reasoned that the agency had purchased too

much private land. Of the approximately 1,700 original acres, the Park Service owned nearly

half. In doing so, it had reduced the valley's land base and thus its "rich heritage" of

pioneering families. Moreover, the agency exercised too much influence in the way the

community conducted its daily life. Examples of this ranged from its control over the

appropriation of natural resources to the limits it placed on business ventures. Whatever their

views, these groups had in mind similar goals for the Stehekin country: protect the historic

community and way of life and the valley's scenic and natural values.

Realizing these goals, however, was another matter. It required that the Park Service establish

management guidelines and define "compatible use" for the Stehekin Valley, two topics with

which the agency seemed to struggle. In this way, agency managers would invariably have to

justify their position to opposing interest groups, and there did not seem to be any political

high ground to shield park officials from public criticism. To coalitions like the North

Cascades Conservation Council (N3C), the goal of park management should have been to

preserve, as intact as possible, the community of Stehekin as it was when the park complex

was established, not the community it had become since 1968. This new Stehekin, N3C

maintained, was dramatically different than the original pioneering community, one

characterized by its small population and subsistence economy. What created this new and

arguably different Stehekin, N3C contended, were the increase in Stehekin residents (many of
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whom were recent arrivals) and property owners, and the shift in the community's economic

base. In 1980, only a small percentage of the year-round residents called Stehekin home

twenty years earlier. A startling figure was the increase in permanent residents. In 1968, there

were thirty-five permanent residents in Stehekin. Ten years later, there were nearly one

hundred. One could hardly grant the current Stehekin population "pioneering" status. [42]

Just as it would be inaccurate to portray Stehekin as a stable community composed of

families with a long history in the area, it would be equally inaccurate to characterize this

new community by its subsistence economy. A cash economy dominated now, one dependent

on outside income from tourism and the National Park Service, which employed up to thirtyfive people on a permanent and seasonal basis. Other evidence of the community's change

was written in the landscape. There were some one hundred dwellings in the valley, nearly

half of which had been built since 1968. These new structures were not only products of an

increased population but also a building boom and land speculation that crested with creation

of the recreation area and its ineffective land-use controls; the worst example of this was

subdivision. Stehekin, the conservation council concluded, had faded into myth. It was a

dangerous myth, for Stehekin had only stopped growing in people's minds. Meanwhile

everyone -- longtime residents as well as recent arrivals -- believed that the recreation area's

legislation protected his or her way of life. This meant that all were "entitled" to use the

valley's limited supply of gravel, sand, top soil, and firewood, when in fact those rights

applied to valley residents at the time the legislation passed. Resource consumption, it

seemed, would go unchecked if the myth were not destroyed; otherwise, the valley's natural

integrity would suffer irreparable damage. [43]

On the other hand, various groups of landowners and residents, represented by the Stehekin

Property Owners Association and Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee, believed otherwise.

From their perspective, the recreation area's legislation and the agency's mission should have

allowed for the continued use of resources without question, and should have limited -- if not

prohibited -- any infringements on these rights by the Park Service. They should have also

protected the rights of property owners to develop their land, mainly to subdivide it into

smaller tracts (which would further increase the valley's population) as they saw fit. In short,

less government involvement was better than more. Any change in this regard by the Park

Service, such as greater regulation of resource use and further land acquisition, was seen as a

threat to the Stehekin way of life. By acquiring more land in the valley, the Park Service was

slowly eliminating the Stehekin community from existence; it would become more a display

piece than a reality in the parkland setting.

In 1977, responding to public pressure to offset the changes in the valley, Regional Director

Russell Dickenson initiated a land-use study. Broadly speaking, a development concept plan

(DCP) would have addressed a host of specific problems related to the Park Service's

management of the Stehekin country and thus finally provided more substantial guidance for

the agency in its management of the recreation area. Previous plans -- the 1970 master plan

and land acquisition policies -- were too general. Among the issues were congestion and

substandard visitor services at the landing, and the design and location of maintenance

facilities and employee housing. Yet a definition of compatibility was central to any planning

success. Without it, planning for the valley would have been a difficult task. That no criteria

for compatibility had ever been developed, noted John Ochsner, head of the planning team,

was a "gross oversight." The reason, ironically, was rooted in what made Stehekin special: its

remote location. The Park Service simply had not anticipated the rate of growth and

development pressures affecting the valley. [44]

In an attempt to define compatibility as well as chart a direction for managing the recreation

area, park planners held workshops and conducted visitor surveys. For the most part, the

responses confirmed existing beliefs about how best to preserve the Stehekin country. Nearly
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everyone in the Chelan, Wenatchee, and Stehekin meetings expressed their desire to maintain

the valley's primitive character and slow-paced way of life; however, they almost universally

opposed Park Service interference with development on private land, except in cases where

pollution and other negative side effects of urban living were concerned. Most participants in

the Seattle meeting expressed their support for protecting Stehekin's unique setting and

lifestyle, but they emphasized a different approach, one in which the federal agency assumed

greater regulatory authority, particularly by establishing limits on private development -- and

hence limits on population growth. Furthermore, Seattle participants, most of whom had

strongly supported the cause for a national park in the North Cascades, stressed that

management of the recreation area should spring from a national rather than local interest; its

purpose was after all national, and the concerns of residents and landowners in Stehekin,

while valid, should not take precedence over the interest of the American public.

Interestingly, a 1978 survey revealed that most visitors thought that the private homes in the

valley enhanced their experience. [45]

The planning effort was short-lived. In September 1978, the agency suspended its planning

efforts before it had the chance to present any alternatives to the public. The main reason for

the suspension was the release the previous September of the Park Service's new land

acquisition policy. The new policy, as it would turn out, was one of several in an evolution of

the agency's land acquisition program in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As noted earlier, the

evolving program tightened controls over acquisitions, leading first to land protection plans

with a program of land purchases and a definition of compatible and incompatible uses of

private land, and then to land protection plans that identified direct purchase of private land

for emergency purposes only and assigned other means of protection whenever possible.

These latter policy changes reflected a new presidency in the 1980s. With the installment of

the Reagan administration, Republicans sought to restore power to private interests in all

matters of federal land policies in the West. [46]

The 1977 land acquisition policy was written to protect the national parks and other parklands

from private land uses that diminished the values for which each area had been set aside.

Largely written in response to congressional concerns over the large number of new

developments in Grand Teton National Park, the revised policy also reflected Congress'

concern that these new developments existed in many park areas, both because they detracted

from the scenic beauty of the parklands and because they inflated the cost of Park Service

acquisitions. At this point in time, the Park Service's policy became more aggressive, and the

agency moved to acquire more unimproved lands within park areas with, according to

Director William Whalen, great "urgency." The Park Service divided its park areas and

acquisition program into two general areas: older parks with remaining pockets of privately

owned land, or "inholding areas" (dating before 1960), and "newly authorized areas," more

recently established areas, like the North Cascades complex, containing extensive amounts of

private lands. Land acquisition would differ in each area. In the older parks, the agency

would pursue land purchases from "willing sellers" and use condemnation only as a last

resort. In newer areas, the agency would seek interest in private property in order to manage

the area effectively and achieve its primary purpose. Thus, direct purchase was not always

necessary. In both types of areas, existing private uses could continue provided they did not

impair the area's resource values or its primary purpose. For a time, a determining factor in

the case of the latter provision was that all areas had specific legislative policies that applied

to each kind of park area (park, recreation area, historic site); the Park Service abolished the

area categories in 1977, and the specific enabling legislation rather than unit title became the

key factor. More importantly, the acquisition policy defined incompatible use rather strictly.

Essentially, it stated that any development on unimproved lands or significant alterations to

existing improvements was considered an incompatible act. In this respect, any new

construction permits or filing of subdivision plats would be interpreted as an incompatible

act. [47]
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An outcry from land owners in several of the nation's parks, specifically Yosemite, Grand

Teton, and Olympic, led to the creation of the National Park Inholders Association (NPIA)

under the leadership of Charles S. Cushman. Cushman's group lobbied hard against the

restrictive definition of compatible use, painting the Park Service in the national media as an

aggressive and arrogant agency infringing on the rights of private property owners. Bowing

to public pressure somewhat, the agency released a revised land acquisition policy in April

1979. [48] While offering clearer language about what it intended in older parks, the Park

Service policy offered only a general picture of its acquisition plans for newer areas like Lake

Chelan NRA; the policy simply stated that acquisition would be carried out in accordance

with the area's authorizing legislation. In short, the revised policy spoke more to what was

compatible and incompatible use in an older national park area than in a newer area like the

North Cascades complex.

In Stehekin the main outcome of this revised policy was confusion. When the first policy

version appeared, the agency was engaged in planning for the valley, but Park Service leaders

were not certain how to apply it to Lake Chelan NRA. They questioned whether or not the

new policy applied to the recreation area. After deciding that it did, agency administrators

assumed that the policy's definition of incompatibility applied to the Stehekin Valley, and

until the revised version appeared in 1979, they worked under this assumption. Some

property owners became agitated with the Park Service; they distrusted the agency and its

intentions under this new acquisition policy. Moreover, NPIA president Charles Cushman

fanned the flames of resentment in 1978 when he spoke at a community meeting in Manson,

which a number of Stehekin land owners and residents attended. [49]

The main concern for both the Park Service and Stehekin interests was how the agency would

employ these new compatibility standards in the Lake Chelan NRA, specifically in the private

use and development zone. On March 1, 1978, Superintendent Lowell White informed

Stehekin residents and landowners of the new land acquisition policies and that the bureau

would modify them "to some extent" in order to comply with the language of the act

establishing the park complex. In May, Superintendent White and planner John Oschner held

a public meeting in Stehekin to discuss some of the alternatives. While presenting their

alternatives, they suggested that the Park Service might exempt the private use and

development zone from the new standards and instead continue to rely on county zoning. But

the county would have to implement stricter zoning regulations for this to occur. To bolster

their argument, they described a future for Stehekin under current zoning that was anything

but attractive. The number of homes would nearly triple, the population would increase nine

fold, and the overall quality of life in the valley would decrease. With the right county

zoning, then, the private use zone would not have to comply with the new standards, and

development could continue. [50]

Although this entire discussion would become moot soon enough, this latter point was

important because it revealed how the public could come to question the Park Service's

ability to manage the recreation area. It left the impression with Stehekin property owners in

the private use zone that they would be exempt from the policy's compatibility restrictions.

But Park Service administrators left their interpretation of the policy open. In his meeting

with Stehekin property owners and residents, Superintendent White suggested that the Park

Service had little control over implementing compatibility standards in the valley, despite the

new policy. As White informed Stehekin residents, it was Chelan County's responsibility to

develop adequate zoning for the Stehekin Valley; the Park Service hoped these regulations

would match their own. Reliance on the county took on a greater importance when the

agency's land acquisition policies became official in 1979. It was then the Park Service came

to rely on the park complex's legislation for its authority. And since the legislation did not

grant it specific power over the county in the recreation area, the Park Service could not
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override the county's zoning regulations should it not approve of them. In effect, for all of its

posturing, the Park Service seemed powerless to control the use of private land in the

recreation area.

To agency officials, cooperating with the county presented perhaps the quickest solution to

the land-use controversies in Stehekin, particularly since the Park Service's land acquisition

policies were currently in a state of revision. This approach, then, was another reason the

Park Service suspended its planning efforts. In June 1978, the Chelan County commissioners,

moved to action over the problems in Stehekin, renewed its planning efforts in Stehekin. In

September of that year, Michael Cecka, an associate planner with the Chelan County

Planning Department, informed Regional Director Dickenson that the county's plan would not

be ready until the spring of 1979. At the request of the commissioners, Dickenson agreed to

suspend the development concept plan, due for release in several weeks, until the county plan

was completed. Both the county and the Park Service were prepared to come to terms over

acceptable kinds of development in the valley, among other land uses. A truce of sorts was

called. Dickenson told the commissioners that his agency intended to define compatible use

as clearly as possible, and the commissioners promised to be cautious when they issued

development permits in the valley. [51]

The accord, however, did not last long. The county released a draft of its plan in April 1979.

The plan, in Cecka's words, was "very permissive" regarding the land-use regulations in

Stehekin, and would do little to control development in the valley. [52] As the plan stated, its

intent was to "recognize and preserve the values which contribute to Stehekin's uniqueness."

In doing so, it focused on "the use of private land within Lake Chelan National Recreation

Area...and its relationships with the public lands and their administration." A major tenet of

the plan was to achieve what long-time resident Ray Courtney described as the true meaning

of Stehekin: self-reliance. Making the valley too accessible and living conditions too

convenient would only weaken this quality. Implementing too many regulations, moreover,

would destroy this quality as well. In general, the plan's recommendations covered topics

specific to Stehekin such as Park Service activities and cooperation. The recommendations

also covered a broad range of topics common to all private lands in the county, including

floodway construction, water quality, resource use, visual quality, transportation, residential

and commercial development, and subdivision. [53]

Although the Park Service had maintained a low profile during the county's planning process,

it reacted strongly against the plan. The county suggested that the Park Service should accept

the plan, particularly its emphasis that the principles of private land use and development

were fully compatible with the intent of the recreation area's legislation. All of this meant, of

course, that the county had interpreted the federal legislation as justification for, or at least

implicit approval of, its proposals. What agency managers took special issue with was the

plan's policies dealing with subdivisions. The two most important subdivision policy

proposals were 1) a minimum lot size of two acres for any new subdivision in the Stehekin

Valley, and 2) subdivision activity should be restricted to short platting, which would allow

for the creation of four or fewer parcels. With a two-acre minimum lot size, the policy would

allow 250 new houses to be built in the valley. If some of the restrictions on development on

large tracts of private land were followed, then the number of structures in the valley would

be around 150. The county plan viewed these provisions as both realistic and restrictive; that

is, development would happen, but the extent and rate of that development might be

effectively controlled through these and other measures. [54]

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the plan's release and recommendations was that it

forced the Park Service to clarify what it meant by compatible use; it was a task the agency

would address time and again without producing a satisfactory definition. Regional Director

Dickenson characterized the plan as a "spur to development" in Stehekin and prepared a
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formal statement opposing the draft county plan. Superintendent Miller presented it to the

Chelan County Commission at a public hearing in Stehekin on October 6, 1979. Dickenson

commended the county's efforts, but he charged that the plan did not provide "adequate

zoning and land use controls. The plan would provide for growth of buildings and seasonal

population to a degree that would be irreversibly damaging to the nationally significant

resources of Lake Chelan National Recreation Area." Second, the plan reflected only local

opinions, and eschewed the views of "a national constituency" which should be consulted in

regard to plans for a "national area." In shaping its response, the Park Service, Dickenson

stated, had consulted this constituency, particularly those who had fought for the park

complex, as well as representatives of the county and Stehekin. [55]

Finally, based on these observations and surveys, Dickenson presented his agency's first

effort to define compatibility in the valley. And that definition focused intently on

subdivision:

The legislative record shows that there was no intent to eliminate uses that

existed when the legislation was passed. In existence were modest homesites,

ranches, limited food services, and lodges. There also were parcels with no

development. It is logical to assume that the type and density of land use that

existed when the area was established was compatible with the purpose of the

area. Further, the intent was to permit development of modest homesites,

ranches, and limited eating establishments or lodges on the then existing

undeveloped lots where such development did not conflict with park needs and

conservation of the scenic, scientific and historic values of the valley. [56]

The Park Service concluded, the regional director stated, that "Congress intended" for

Stehekin to remain as it was when the park complex was established. His agency's primary

responsibility then was to make sure that any "appreciable change" in its size and character

would be considered incompatible with its purpose and thus opposed. Congress had

reinforced this position by authorizing funds to purchase private lands in the valley "in order

to reduce the land base available for additional development and to provide for those parcels

needed for park management. In this way, Stehekin could remain in "balance," that is, with

an "acceptable balance of resource use and services, while preventing congestion and safety

hazards on the valley road, in addition to a deterioration of water quality, both surface and

subsurface. Therefore, Dickenson asserted, "the time has come to stop all subdivision," and

he "urgently" requested that the county implement a two-year moratorium on any subdivision

permits, or until both the Park Service and county could work out a solution to "this critical

problem." [57]

Dickenson addressed other elements of the plan that were incompatible with Stehekin's

purpose or contrary to the Park Service's mission. He proposed that the county plan include a

provision to limit only one single-family dwelling on any existing parcel and that it include

more provisions for protecting the valley's visual quality, such as having all new construction

along the road or lakeshore be setback or screened from view. He also noted that the agency

planned to purchase a 156-acre tract on both sides of the lower Stehekin River in order to

increase public access to the river and protect the west bank's relatively pristine state. This

kind of acquisition was fully justified to preserve the character of the valley, and the agency

would acquire other tracts of private lands for similar reasons. The regional director,

however, did not mean that his agency would oppose any developments on private lands, but

would work toward establishing regulations to soften the physical and visual impact of new

developments and ensure that it fit with the character of the Stehekin country. Along these

lines, he responded to the plan's discussion of the Park Service's management activities,

noting in particular that the agency was not planning any new construction -- or allow others

to do the same -- that would increase visitor use. [58]
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The Park Service appeared ready defend its definition of compatible use. However, the

regional director remained conciliatory. In late 1979, Dickenson noted that his agency would

cooperate with the county "to develop a plan that will preserve the area as intended by

Congress." He chose this option because it was more direct; the park bureau could achieve

the same goal and give the impression that the federal government was willing to work with

rather than against the local government and Stehekin community. [59]

But it seemed that the Park Service was bluffing. Unless the bureau's position on

compatibility was legally binding, the county would essentially control the future of the

valley. This, at least, was how preservation groups interpreted the agency's actions, and what

drove them to pressure the Park Service to assume its rightful role as the defender of this

national treasure. In the summer of 1979, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (SCLDF), on

behalf of the Sierra Club's Cascade Chapter and the North Cascades Conservation Council,

entered into the fray. As one of the SCLDF's lawyers, William S. Curtiss, noted, the Park

Service was wrong to think that it could not regulate the "threats posed by private land

development and increased consumption of Valley resources directly." This was an

"unfortunate and erroneous conclusion" and one not "dictated by the requirements of law."

According to Curtiss and the SCLDF, Congress did not intend to limit the Park Service's

ability to control private development in the valley, especially when that development

threatened its wild character. Nor was the Park Service without legal recourse. The agency

could regulate inappropriate activities on private land by enforcing existing regulations (under

Title 36 CFR), by promulgating new regulations under that title, and by using condemnation.

[60]

The lawyer expressed views of those closest to the North Cascades campaign. He echoed

Grant McConnell's opinion that the Park Service had overlooked the true purpose of the

recreation area's legislation -- protecting the Stehekin country's wild and scenic grandeur with

accommodation for the small community's historic uses of the land. The agency's oversight

was largely responsible for the valley's current problems. Regulation and land acquisition, in

McConnell's opinion, were the two solutions to overdevelopment and resource consumption.

Curtiss also contested Dickenson's response to McConnell: that national recreation areas

operated under different policies (policies allowing for multiple uses) and that the Park

Service interpreted Senate Report 700 to mean that private development should continue in

the valley. This was not "entirely correct," Curtiss wrote. He suggested that the recreation

area had once been proposed as a park and was only removed from that status to allow those

living in the valley "to remain there and to enjoy the existing uses of their land," and to allow

local sports hunting to continue. Nothing in the congressional record could be construed to

suggest that Congress changed the area's designation to "invite the commercial exploitation of

the Stehekin Valley." [61]

One of the most effective management tools, according to the SCLDF, was condemnation.

And it urged the Park Service to use it. The defense fund lawyer noted that Secretary of the

Interior was not restricted in his power to condemn lands, as the Park Service maintained, if

the use of those lands was incompatible with the preservation of the recreation area's values.

Nothing in the recreation area's legislation specifically prevented it, and in fact the legislation

emphasized that the secretary could use the appropriate "statutory authority" available in the

administration of national parks and preservation in general. Nothing in the congressional

testimony, furthermore, authorized any continued development, particularly since the

recreation area's act gave the secretary such broad powers. Finally, the lawyer pointed out

that the agency's solicitor had misled Dickenson. In the solicitor's opinion, condemnation was

an ineffective form of land-use control because it placed a "heavy burden" on the Park

Service; that is, the agency would have to bear the burden of proof -- to prove that a land-use

was incompatible and, it seems, define compatibility once and for all. The agency, the lawyer

suggested, should not shy away from court cases with such important outcomes, especially
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since there was such a good chance of success. [62]

Should the agency not choose to use condemnation, Curtiss proposed a number of other

alternatives. First, the Park Service should implement stricter zoning, by reclassifying the

lower valley as either "Preservation" or "Public Use and Development" (the Park Service's

classifications), thereby eliminating the problem with the private use zone. Moreover, to

make this work, the agency would have to "assert itself in the face of local planning efforts

which would replace the Park Service authority with County authority." Second, in addition

to using existing Park Service regulations, the agency had an obligation to "promulgate and

enforce such regulations" in order to "preserve the natural endowments of the Stehekin

Valley." The reason for this stemmed from the recent Redwoods Act of 1978, a major piece

of legislation that would, in time, play a key role in changing the way the Park Service

managed all park areas for the integrity of their natural values. Finally, the SCLDF implored

the Park Service "to rethink its timid and gloomy view of the regulatory options" available to

protect Stehekin Valley's unique character. "The tools necessary to accomplish the task are at

hand." [63]

In his response, Dickenson stood his ground. The Park Service believed that Congress

intended to preserve the historic community of Stehekin but not to freeze it in time. The rub

in all of this was that compatibility was not precisely defined; it was somewhere between the

Stehekin of 1968 and a Stehekin fully developed for recreation. In other words, Stehekin

should continue to evolve. As for the Park Service's legal authority, Dickenson point out that

condemnation was not politically expedient, while it may have seemed the clear choice of

action to the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. The solicitor's opinion, as the regional director

noted, was that the Park Service had no direct judicial or statutory authority for regulating the

use of private land; however such an authority might be inferred from recent court decisions.

Besides the desire to avoid lengthy litigation, the Park Service appeared to be against

condemnation because it would require funds appropriated by Congress and it would be

expensive. Perhaps more importantly, it would mean accurately defining compatible use and

risking bad publicity. In this regard, the court would have to agree with the agency's

interpretation, and if it did not, this legal precedent might further weaken the service's ability

to protect the valley. That is why, Dickenson concluded, county regulation was "the most

realistic approach" to solving land-use problems in Stehekin at the time. [64]

The outcome of all of this was impasse. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Park Service and

Chelan County officials never arrived at mutually agreeable land-use controls for the

Stehekin Valley. Without an agreement between the Park Service and the county, private

development and expansion of existing facilities in the valley continued with only "minimal

county regulation or oversight." Meanwhile, the Park Service continued to develop

compatibility standards for Stehekin, and the county proposed alternatives for its draft plan in

1980, none of which came close to meeting Park Service priorities. The main issue continued

to be subdivision, and the county suspended its planning process. Until an agreement could

be reached, the entire valley was zoned for "General Use," a classification that allowed

property owners to subdivide and build on a minimum one-acre parcel using a septic tank

and private water supply. [65]

The main reason the county suspended its planning process was that the General Accounting

Office (GAO) was investigating the Park Service's land acquisition program in Lake Chelan

NRA. Responding to criticism against the Park Service's policies in Stehekin, the GAO,

urged on by Alaska Senator Ted Stevens, selected Lake Chelan NRA as part of its a larger

examination of the park bureau's land acquisition and management practices. [66] The twoperson GAO team, led by Charles S. Cotton, conducted its study in the spring of 1980 and

produced its final draft on January 22, 1981. The report's title said it all: "Lands in the Lake

Chelan National Recreation Area Should Be Returned to Private Ownership." [67]
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The GAO report concluded that the agency had inappropriately purchased lands in Lake

Chelan NRA. Many acquisitions were "contrary to Congress' intent to preserve the private

community of Stehekin and to permit additional compatible development to accommodate

increased visitor use." At issue, it seems, was the rate and type of purchase. By acquiring

nearly half of the private lands in the valley in fee simple, the Park Service appeared to be

bent on eliminating the old Stehekin community altogether at a high cost to the government.

Moreover, the GAO believed that "much of the land acquired by the Service was compatible

with the recreation area and did not have to be acquired." Other land protection strategies

would have worked well and at a lower cost to the government, including zoning and scenic

easements. Thus, the GAO report recommended that the Park Service develop a land

acquisition plan for the recreation area, one that clarified compatible and incompatible uses,

and that it sell back "all lands compatible with the recreation area." The report also

recommended that Congress conduct oversight hearings to determine why the agency had not

followed Congress' intent, and that Congress restrict appropriations for land acquisition in the

recreation area until the service had corrected its practices. [68]

The GAO's findings affirmed that congressional intent was open to interpretation, for the

report drew a distinct line between what the Park Service believed and what the agency's

critics believed Congress had meant when it established the recreation area. The question was

whose interpretation was correct? The Park Service and the Secretary of the Interior

responded strongly against the report. Agency officials defended their actions, and pointed

out that the report was "biased." It was "based upon individual comments" provided to Cotton

by several valley residents. Moreover, the report "was filled with inaccurate statements,

unsubstantiated conclusions and recommendations based on hearsay and limited investigation

of material available for review." [69]

To a large extent, this response was valid. In its preliminary review, the GAO suggested that

the agency's land acquisitions were suspect, and that its management did not focus enough on

development for recreation and more on managing the area as part of the park. Moreover,

Charles Cotton's activities and conduct suggest that his conclusions would be highly

subjective and reflect the views of Park Service critics. He was interviewed on a Chelan radio

program prior to the report's release in which he implied that the report would find fault with

the Park Service. He also maintained contact with some Stehekin landowners -- after his

investigation but before the report's release -- informing them of the report's

recommendations during its official review. All of this cast his conclusions in a partisan light.

[70]

Moreover, the report's portrayal of the Park Service's single-minded drive to literally

"purchase" Stehekin was overdrawn. The GAO investigators did not fully appreciate the

complex nature of the recreation area's establishment, the point in time it was created, and the

conditions in Stehekin at that time -- all of which influenced the agency's management of the

area. Nothing about Stehekin's management was as straightforward as the GAO seemed to

suggest. One example of this was the Park Service's purchase of commercial property at the

landing. The agency needed access to, and visitor service facilities for, the recreation area,

but its legislation limited the Park Service to purchasing only those lands offered for sale by

willing seller. When the commercial properties at the landing became available, the purchase

was carried out. The site was attractive because it would require renovation rather than new

construction and it was already an established point of access. In the eyes of the Park Service

planners, this deal was mutually beneficial. [71]

Other examples were related to the threats the Stehekin country faced, threats which had led

to its protection and thus which influenced agency actions. Logging was one of these threats,

and by acquiring the holdings of the Chelan Box Company, the agency eliminated one of the

major threats. Subdivision, of course, was another threat. The Park Service tried to reduce the
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opportunity for overdevelopment by purchasing those tracts offered for sale, including

lakeshore and valley properties. Finally, the land acquisition program had hardly dented the

number of privately owned parcels in Stehekin. Of the nearly 174 tracts in the recreation area

in 1967, there were only seven less owners by 1974 when the agency's acquisition funds were

exhausted. Ownerships splintered and multiplied, and improved properties continued to grow.

[72]

In March 1981, Regional Director Daniel Tobin stated that the Park Service "has never

intended to acquire all the lands in the Stehekin Valley. We are currently unable to acquire

even those lands necessary to protect the original atmosphere of this remote community. We

believe that we have acted in good faith and within the letter, intent, and spirit of the law."

Nevertheless, Tobin and other agency administrators agreed with some of the report's

conclusions, including development of compatibility standards and preparation of a land

acquisition plan for Lake Chelan NRA. But at the same time, it disagreed with other findings.

It renewed its request for an increase in appropriations for acquisitions and opposed the

recommendation to sell back compatible lands to private owners. (The Park Service

maintained that any sale of land back to private owners would require legislation.) [73]

Naturally, the GAO report caused a stir in Stehekin. Rumors flew that soon the Park Service

would be selling land back to the people of the valley and other interested parties. To those

who viewed the Park Service's presence with suspicion, the GAO report seemed to offer local

interests some advantage over the federal government. But this sense of overcoming a

powerful, outside force soon faded. Although it may have appeared to have the force of law,

the GAO's study was a document informing Congress of the Park Service's activities. It was

up to Congress to follow through with its recommendations. Neither the Senate Energy and

Natural Resources Committee nor the House Committee on Interior Affairs held oversight

hearings on the report, as the GAO had recommended. Furthermore, Congress would act in

direct contradiction to the report by appropriating funds for more Park Service land

acquisition in years to come. [74]

This is not to say, however, that the Park Service ignored the report. To the contrary, the

report underscored the fact that park managers still had not addressed one of the most

fundamental aspects of the recreation area's administration, to define compatible and

incompatible use, despite the mitigating circumstances. On August 6,1982, the service

rectified this situation and issued compatibility standards for Lake Chelan NRA. Public

review was a long and at times contentious process, but the finalized standards would

"provide the documentation" necessary to identify what the Park Service considered as an

"appropriate use and development" of the lands within the recreation area. Some of the

incompatible uses were the construction of apartments or condominiums, new construction in

floodway, any new construction that required the dredging or filling of Lake Chelan or the

Stehekin River, the modification of the valley's landscape or conspicuous siting of structures

which would alter the scenic and natural qualities of the area, timber harvesting for

commercial purposes or use outside of Stehekin, and small lot subdivisions. Compatible uses

were defined generally as "existing" and "nonconforming" uses, which referred to those uses

which were in place at the time the standards were written, and which, generally speaking,

could continue.

The document also spoke to the question of how the Park Service would remedy

incompatible uses. Here no new ground was broken. The first step would involve negotiations

with private owners when incompatible uses were being proposed or had occurred.

Condemnation remained a last resort. Moreover, enforcing these land use standards still

seemed ambiguous. The service continued to emphasize its desire to rely on Chelan County

to implement these standards by adopting a similar zoning ordinance. At the time, this

seemed unlikely. Despite this and even though the standards were subject to clarifications,
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qualifications, and exemptions, Regional Director Tobin heralded them as an important stage

in the recreation area's management. For the standards would "enable the National Park

Service" to carry out its administration of the area, and for the first time clearly inform

"property owners of the land uses which are compatible with the recreation, scientific and

historic values" of Lake Chelan NRA. [75]

There was more to solving Stehekin's management problems, however, than defining

compatibility. The land acquisition program was a lightning rod for other problems for the

Park Service in Stehekin, for the agency's ability to purchase private lands touched upon the

extent of its authority over individuals and the land itself in this isolated valley. If standards

were in place, then the Park Service must be in a position to assert its authority. [76] The

main issues revolved around the agency's jurisdiction in the recreation area. Did it truly

control and own the valley roads? Could it enforce the licensing of vehicles, many of which

were decades out of date? Did it own salvage logs, especially those in the Stehekin River?

Could it control business operations on private land? Were its policies regarding the removal

of firewood, top soil, gravel, and sand valid? Thus, how much control it exerted over

everything from land-use planning to natural resource use brought into question what affect

this would have on the way of life in Stehekin. Ironically, this way of life celebrated

individualism, one which was unhampered by federal regulations and reliant on local

initiative, but now its preservation would be ensured by a federal agency. [77]

Ray Courtney, a life-long valley resident and reluctant supporter of the park, summed up this

sentiment when he grew disenchanted with the Park Service's presence in the early 1980s.

The agency's policy, he stated, was that "the only good resident is a dead resident." The park

bureau seemed more at ease with preserving the memory of the old Stehekin homesteader

than the homesteader himself. [78] However critical of the Park Service, Courtney was a

voice of reason among the valley residents, who were an eclectic group of reclusive old

timers, wealthy urbanites with summer homes, passionate preservationists, and employees of

the park complex and its concessionaires. When Courtney died in a trail accident in 1982, the

valley residents lost a leader, and previously unknown clashes among residents and with the

Park Service erupted. In an era of public outcry over federal land regulation, "Stehekin

became a tiny mountain outpost of the Sagebrush Rebellion." [79]

Several incidents illustrate how tensions grew in the valley. In the late 1970s, when the Park

Service refused to allow a resident (Bob Byrd) to start his own taxi service because it would

have competed with the park's licensed concessioner, a handful of protesters stood at the

landing and greeted visitors arriving on the Lady of the Lake with a banner that said

"Welcome to Poland!" Around the same time, the superintendent of the Stehekin School

started a series of anti-Park Service broadcasts on a Chelan radio station. And in the summer

of 1983, a major confrontation occurred when Karl Gaskill, owner of the Honey Bear

Bakery, began selling baked goods from a cart on the dock at the landing. Gaskill asserted

that he was not violating Park Service policy -- selling wares without a permit on Park

Service land -- because he was on a narrow strip of land that still belonged to the Chelan

County Public Utility District (PUD). Although the entire situation seemed petty, it remained

unresolved for several years, the subject of varying legal interpretations. More so, it reflected

a number of problems related to the agency's jurisdiction in the recreation area; the list

included issues over the Stehekin School, the valley road, firewood permits, and the Park

Service's ban on salvaging cedar from the Stehekin River. [80]

Talk of protest rippled through the community and came to a head when the Stehekin

Heritage Defense Committee filed a lawsuit against the National Park Service on January 20,

1985. Made up of residents like Roberta Pitts, Ron Scutt, and Cliff and Tom Courtney, the

Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee wanted to force a showdown with the federal agency

that had, in their view, undermined many of the isolated community's traditional values. The
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Park Service had pressured residents to become "more modern" and in the process more

"dependent upon this federal agency." Someday, "Stehekin could become an historic

exhibit...A place where...visitors can come and see how WE once lived." [81] The lawsuit

made two general claims. One was a long list of grievances, asserting that the Park Service

administration of Lake Chelan NRA had willfully caused economic hardship to the

community by limiting the size of tours, trapping, and use of roads, and by generally

suppressing the economic development of the "town of Stehekin." The agency's management

had also "Perverted the Stehekin cultural life-style intended by Congress and created an

artificial Park Service community." And it had wrongfully asserted its jurisdiction over the

waters of Lake Chelan and the rivers within the recreation area, which should have belonged

to the state, and strip of dock at the landing "actually owned by the Chelan County PUD."

The second claim was much shorter and more direct. The group wanted the Park Service to

sell back the land it had bought, in accordance with the GAO report, and thus return Stehekin

to a viable community. [82]

On August 6, 1985, Judge Robert J. McNichols of the United States District Court in

Spokane, Washington, dismissed the committee's complaint. Judge McNichols ruled that the

court had no jurisdiction over any of the plaintiffs's complaints because the act establishing

the recreation area clearly vested administrative authority over the area with the Secretary of

the Interior and the National Park Service. Moreover, while the judge could understand the

plaintiffs' position, they did not allege any basis for the court to take jurisdiction." The only

way for the court to become involved would be if all "administrative remedies" were

exhausted. Specifically, the plaintiffs would need to show an instance of damage that was the

direct result of a particular Park Service rule or regulation. Another aspect of the suit which

the judge ruled against was Curt Courtney's claim that the Park Service coerced him into

selling his property (the Boatel) at the landing in 1970. [83]

The Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee, disappointed over the judge's ruling, decided not

to appeal the decision, primarily because the judge stated the need for specific examples of

damage and the need to exhaust administrative remedies first. There was also the

skyrocketing cost of legal fees. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund had intervened in the

suit on behalf of the Park Service at the request of N3C and the newly formed Stehekin

Valley Protection Committee. The Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee's budget of $20,000

a year was no match for the Sierra Club's $2.5 million. Thus the committee's hopes "to dispel

the emotional tension that has divided our community through far reaching litigation," was

"dashed" by the "dismissal order, while turbulent times continue in the Stehekin Valley." [84]

In the minds of defense committee members, Stehekin was in a state of crisis. The Park

Service wanted to control residents rather than implement rational and practical policies for

the area's management. It wanted to destroy the community and transform the recreation area

into a national park. [85] Yet because Stehekin meant different things to different people, the

North Cascades Conservation Council and the local Stehekin Valley Protection Committee

interpreted the crisis much differently. They advocated the protection of the recreation area's

"unique natural environment," and stressed that the agency was not exerting enough control

in the valley. As Grant McConnell informed Park Service Director William Penn Mott, Jr., in

August 1985, the Park Service's weak administration "has fostered a sense" among "residents

here that they have an entitlement to cost-free firewood from the limited forest, topsoil, sand

and gravel and other building materials, all without regard to limits of availability or conflict

with the purposes [of the recreation area] clearly stated by Congress." This situation has

"encouraged demands on an escalating scale for services of many kinds." Meanwhile, a local

attitude espoused the view that "any regulation by the Park Service whether for protection of

the natural scene or for public safety" was improper and not to be observed. The recently

dismissed Stehekin Heritage lawsuit exemplified this. Currently, the crisis emanated from a

dwindling supply of firewood, which locals took for granted; a number of new houses under
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construction, with the prospect of more and inflated land prices; an increase in junked cars;

and increased pressure on wildlife. Thus McConnell noted that in "very nearly every respect

the deterioration of the area is accelerating and is highly visible." [86]

The solution was twofold and by now familiar. First, the Park Service director should impress

upon park managers that they have the "authority (and obligation) to regulate the area as a

unit of the National Park System as explicitly provided" in the 1968 legislation. More

importantly, the "local illusion that because this is a National Recreation Area Park Service

regulations do not apply must be dispelled." Second, he urged the director to press forward

with the land acquisition program. The program promised to resolve the crisis. It would not

cost much "in the scale of things," McConnell observed, "but continued over a few years can

reduce all of the problems indicated above to a manageable scale." McConnell's belief that

the "only long term solution" to the area's problems was land acquisition typified the views of

other preservation interests, who in 1985 lobbied Congress to appropriate $1 million for land

purchases in the park complex (and Stehekin country). [87]

Whatever one's perspective, the Park Service's land acquisition program was a major force in

Lake Chelan NRA, (even though no land had been purchased there since 1973 and none

would be purchased until late 1986.) Superintendent John Reynolds believed that the main

problem in Stehekin was the absence of "clear, written policies and plans." In March 1987,

Reynolds expressed these views in a report entitled "Bringing Stehekin to a Manageable

State." The time had come, the superintendent stated, after seventeen years of "haphazard"

operations, to "resolve Stehekin." The only way to accomplish this was in "an all out,

planned, coordinated effort." In this respect, two types of plans would provide the agency

with the proper guidance in Stehekin's management. One was a land protection plan; the other

was the general management plan. According to Reynolds, land protection was the single

most important "component of our program in Stehekin," and the general management plan

would serve as the "cornerstone of the policy guidance needed for Stehekin." [88]

Both plans were produced simultaneously and were intended to complement each other. The

land protection plan, approved in March 1988, replaced the earlier land acquisition plan. Its

most notable characteristic was that it established acquisition priorities. The plan's list of

priorities was to be used with the "willing seller/willing buyer" policy to guide land

purchases. In this way, agency officials could ensure that the park complex's limited

acquisition funds were spent in the best public interest to protect resources. In addition, the

ranking system gave Stehekin property owners a guideline for Park Service management

concerns, particularly when private lands were being proposed for development or expansion.

The plan proposed five categories for the remaining private lands in Stehekin. The first group

focused on the protection of scenic, historic, and wetland/riparian habitat areas; visitor access

to the Stehekin River and Lake Chelan; and areas needed for administrative facilities. The

second group of properties were those considered to have visual and environmental qualities,

but were not threatened by subdivision. These tracts lined the river, lake, or valley road. The

third priority group was made up of properties in the upper valley close to the valley road.

These tracts, the plan proposed, should be protected for their natural qualities, and any

development should follow historic use patterns. The fourth group consisted of those

properties with some level of development or subdivision in place. In the case of these lands,

the plan was concerned with improving water and sewage treatment and maintaining some

control over future development. The final group, labeled "No Interest" or "No Priority," was

made up of lands the agency did not consider important to purchase but rather better left to

retain the community's historic scene. Finally, the plan also contained a provision for

"exchange" tracts. These were unimproved parcels previously purchased by the Park Service

that it would exchange for other higher priority private properties. [89]
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At long last, it seemed, the plan offered some insight into how the Park Service intended to

approach the management of the valley and its remaining private lands. Nearly 700 acres of

private lands remained in the Stehekin country, and around the same time the protection plan

was being drafted, the agency began an active acquisition program. The renewed purchasing

was driven by funding. In 1986 and 1987, Congress appropriated close to $1.5 million. In the

summer of 1986, some of this money went towards an important purchase, the Getty

property, a riverside parcel containing 153 acres; it was the largest single purchase since the

acquisition of the Chelan Box Company's lands and a prime area promoted for subdivision.

With the plan in hand and funding available, the agency started negotiations with the backlog

of offers from willing sellers. In this regard, the land protection plan's priorities were quite

useful; they recommended acquiring in fee simple 92 acres and easements for 345 acres, for a

total of 437 acres, all of which were in the first four priority groups. (The last group

contained 65 acres.) [90]

On its surface, the land protection plan appeared to seek a compromise between the two

political extremes alive in Stehekin. One example of this was the Park Service sale of land it

had previously acquired to the Stehekin School District. The school district land had been

controversial for some time. Chelan County Commissioner John Wall had been demanding

its return to county ownership, along with the valley road and Stehekin community center,

and the Park Service approached the sale as a way to demonstrate its commitment to the

Stehekin community. The sale allowed for the construction of a larger, modern school

facility. [91]

Nevertheless, no group was entirely pleased. To the North Cascades Conservation Council

and the Stehekin Emergency Committee (a new group dedicated to protecting Stehekin's

natural values), the plan did not go far enough. They particularly thought the "No Interest"

category and the policy of land exchange ran counter to the bureau's mission in the valley.

Both of these approaches literally wrote off the protection of some of "the most sensitive

ecosystems in the Stehekin Valley," and promoted more, not less construction, in the process.

On the other hand, despite the sale of the school land, property owners and county

commissioners, such as John Wall, thought the plan and recent Park Service acquisitions of

small, undeveloped parcels reinforced the agency's intentions to take over Stehekin. Some

even suggested returning the valley to the Forest Service, and in what had now become a

familiar refrain, returning all Park Service land to private ownership. [92]

Superintendent Reynolds, faced with numerous problems in Stehekin, drafted the plan to

appeal to all interests, but his intent was to acquire as much land as possible within the

purview of the land protection plan. He believed that acquisition was the most important

solution to Stehekin's woes, save redesignating the recreation area as a national park. [93]

At least unofficially, Reynolds' land protection plan seemed bold, and was incorporated into

the 1988 general management plan. Although the new plan charted the course for the

administration of the valley into the next century, it had serious flaws, according to the North

Cascades Conservation Council. Its main problem was that it was one of many plans in

various stages of development. The general management plan cobbled them together and

confused rather than clarified the bureau's management of Stehekin. In the broadest sense,

both the land acquisition and general management plans did not adequately provide for the

protection of the valley's natural and cultural values. The plans were too liberal; they did not

take a firm stand on the side of preservation. They did not address a number of long-standing

issues that would have truly promoted land protection; the most significant of these was the

Park Service's firewood management plan, which the conservation council viewed as the

"logging" of trees in the valley. Other issues that would have ensured land protection

included the acquisition of all the private lands possible, closure of the Stehekin air strip, and

the prevention of any further modifications to the valley's natural systems. The Park Service
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was letting the wondrous Stehekin country be nibbled to death. [94]

The time had come for preservation interests to sue the government. On September 7, 1989,

frustrated over what it viewed as years of Park Service neglect and mismanagement of

Stehekin, the North Cascades Conservation Council filed a lawsuit against the National Park

Service and Department of the Interior. Filed on behalf of N3C by the Sierra Club Legal

Defense Fund, the lawsuit contended the Park Service had violated the National

Environmental Policy Act by not completing environmental impact statements for its various

plans for Lake Chelan NRA. It had not assessed their cumulative impacts. Instead, it had

produced environmental assessments, a faster yet less intensive analysis, and one not

necessarily open to public review. The principal legal issue was that the assessments failed to

analyze the cumulative impacts of the agency's plans. After two years of negotiations, the

Park Service settled the case out of court, agreeing to a consent decree on April 22, 1991. In

doing so, the bureau would produce a comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS)

analyzing environmental consequences of private and public land uses as well as

management practices. Until the completion of the EIS, the Park Service agreed to suspend

any plans that might alter the recreation area's natural resources. Moreover, the wide-ranging

EIS would address many of the concerns expressed by preservationists over the past two

decades, such as firewood cutting, sand and gravel mining, transportation services, Park

Service developments, and land acquisition. [95]

The Sierra Club and North Cascades Conservation Council treated the consent decree as "a

great victory." According to Stephan Volker, lawyer for the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund,

the "Park Service was presiding over the recreation area by private and public development,

and refusing to do the environmental studies that would have revealed what was being lost."

Once the environmental studies were prepared, the agency would be able "to determine on a

rational basis how to preserve the scenic grandeur and ecologic values of this spectacular

area." [96] Moreover, the settlement was precedent setting for the entire park system. Prior to

this settlement NEPA compliance for general management plans was generally an

environmental assessment, though policy required a more thorough analysis. The consent

decree provided a wake up call for agency officials and the need to prepare environmental

impact studies for general management plans. [97]

The consent decree served as a benchmark in the history of land protection in Stehekin. In

order to protect Stehekin's natural as well as cultural environments, there had to be sound

land acquisition policies. Yet while planning efforts and environmental studies went forward,

Washington's Senator Slade Gorton threatened the new accord. He lashed out at the Park

Service for its land acquisitions in Stehekin. On March 12, 1992, Gorton accused the agency

of "rabid" land acquisition practices, which ran counter to the intent of Congress as set down

in the 1981 GAO report. The agency's stated goal, he noted, was to reduce the amount of

private property in Stehekin to sixty-five acres, those tracts in the so-called no interest zone.

"I will not stand for that," he said. In addition, there was the bureau's insensitivity towards

those who owned property in Stehekin. The Park Service's alleged aggressive tactics, it

seems, bordered on harassment. Ultimately, Gorton was responding to the views of his local

constituents who disliked the Park Service presence and policies, and who continued to

interpret land acquisition as "one of many tools" to transform the recreation area into a

national park. [98]

Unless the Park Service took steps to reform its activities in Stehekin, Gorton vowed to

amend the Interior appropriation bill to halt it himself. Two months later, on May 15, Senator

Gorton followed through with his warning. Senator Gorton's efforts to block land acquisition

in the Stehekin country harkened back to the same issues surrounding the 1981 GAO report.

However, his efforts met with resistance from environmental groups, who viewed Gorton's

tactics as a threat to the consent decree, and other members of Congress. As a compromise,
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the appropriations committee directed the Park Service to submit a report to Congress that

presented the agency's position on its past and proposed land acquisitions. The report was due

to Congress by April 1, 1993, and until then the agency temporarily suspended land

acquisition. More than twenty years after the park complex's establishment, the agency

continued to search for stability in its land acquisition program. [99]

The program, it seems, was often misunderstood, and the Park Service used the recent

challenge, as one preservationist noted, to "lay to rest many of the misconceptions" about its

land protection policies and to "finally bury the GAO report." [100] In May 1992, the agency

took an important step in this direction when it produced a paper on the laws affecting the

administration of Lake Chelan NRA. Released as part of the general management planning

process, the paper addressed a wide array of issues and had special relevance to land

acquisition. Its general message was that "Law and policy are dynamic." Laws and policies

governing the management of Lake Chelan NRA extended beyond the area's original

legislation and policies in place at that time, and they embraced a host of federal legislation

and agency policy revisions that placed a greater emphasis on the preservation of natural

resources. Hence, the management of Lake Chelan NRA, the paper concluded, must consider

"the whole body of legislation, amendments, proclamations, executive orders, rules and

regulations, and directives that are in effect today." [101] Land acquisition, then, was

essential to preserving "the scenic, scientific, historic, and other values" for which the area

was established as well as providing for public outdoor recreation.

The Park Service carried this theme through in its report to Congress on its land acquisitions

in Lake Chelan NRA. Released in April 1993, the report gave a detailed account of its past

and proposed acquisition program. The report's main conclusion was that agency's

acquisitions had been true to the intent of the recreation area's legislation. Since the

establishment of Lake Chelan NRA, the Park Service had purchased approximately 1,170

acres under the "willing seller/willing buyer" program; condemnation had never been used.

Some 460 acres remained in private ownership and approximately 250 acres were owned by

the Chelan Public Utility District. The agency acquired lands to preserve natural resources

and to provide public access to Lake Chelan and the Stehekin River. It also purchased lands

to provide adequate public facilities and administrative facilities. Other purchases provided

employee housing. And perhaps most important of all, the service purchased land to prevent

excessive subdivision. [102]

In making these statements, the agency was responding to recurring questions about

management of the recreation area and its land acquisitions. Contrary to what some argued,

the Park Service claimed that it had not purchased too much land in the Stehekin country.

There were no acreage limits placed on land acquisitions within the area, and all acquisitions

were conducted in strict compliance with the law and guided by planning documents.

Moreover, because land acquisitions were intended to protect natural resources, supply visitor

services and benefits, and provide for administrative needs, the Park Service had not acted

arbitrarily and capriciously in its land purchases. The agency had consistently used the

"willing seller/willing buyer" approach and appraised property at its fair market value, in

accordance with federal regulations. The bureau had also used alternatives to fee simple land

acquisition, such as life estates and easements (first used in 1994), and allowed the continued

use of public land through special use. By the mid-1990s, the agency's report offered a

declaration of sorts, a claim that the land protection program was valid and valuable. At long

last, it seemed to be on solid ground, especially with the completion of the revised general

management and land protection plans in 1995. These two plans, subject to extensive public

review and environmental analysis, in a sense reinforced agency practices in the Stehekin

Valley. In the end, the Park Service continued to rely on Chelan County zoning, to make land

exchange available, to provide firewood and gravel, and to keep the airstrip open. The

question of land protection seemed to have been answered, too. The Park Service retired the
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old concept of compatibility standards and initiated compatibility reviews on a case by case

basis; the reviews would parallel the Park Service's evaluation of its own. Land protection

issues appeared clearer in Stehekin. [103]

***

Ross Lake NRA

Some of the park complex's most controversial land protection issues revolved around the

mining claims in North Cascades National Park and the Park Service's land acquisition

policies in Stehekin. Ross Lake NRA's land protection program fell somewhere in the middle.

Compared to the park and Lake Chelan NRA, the land protection issues for Ross Lake NRA

seemed almost benign. In the first place, Ross Lake did not have the same kind of impending

threats posed by mining in the park, though there were some mining issues. In the second

place, as noted at the outset of this chapter, priorities were different for land protection in

recreation areas than in national parks. Where the park had preservation of natural resources

as a primary goal, Ross Lake NRA had for its main goals the management and development

of a "maximum variety of active outdoor recreation experiences." These experiences included

boating, camping (both by boat and car), hunting, fishing, hiking, picnicking, and horseback

riding. At the same time, park managers were also concerned with conserving the "scenic,

scientific, historic, and other values" contributing to the public's enjoyment of the recreation

area's lands and waters. [104]

But unlike Lake Chelan NRA, Ross Lake NRA did not have controversies erupt over the

meaning of compatible use, and park managers did not find themselves responding to

accusations of both heavy-handed and passive acquisition practices. What united the Park

Service's management approach to both recreation areas was that it came to regard the

protection of their natural values as equally if not more important than their development for

outdoor activities. Still, recreation areas differed from national parks, and while important for

their natural values, Ross Lake NRA and Lake Chelan NRA served as wilderness thresholds

to North Cascades; they were the setting for visitor developments and other facilities deemed

inappropriate for the park's larger wilderness setting.

Two of the main goals, then, of the Park Service's land acquisition program for Ross Lake

NRA were to protect aesthetic values along the Highway 20 and thus the Skagit River

corridor, and to ensure public access to the Skagit River for rafting, camping, and other

activities. By the mid-1980s, the Park Service had acquired several large tracts of land along

the Skagit, lessening the prospect of logging along the narrow river valley. Several of these

were owned by Georgia Pacific and Scott Paper companies. More importantly, the purchase

of the Scott Paper Company lands (some 560 acres) made it one of the final purchases under

the original $3.5 million acquisition ceiling. By the mid-1980s, just over 876 acres had been

purchased in Ross Lake NRA, but there were approximately 2,500 acres of land in nonfederal

ownership, while Seattle City Light had limited rights to19,266 acres under federal license

for the operation of the Skagit River Hydroelectric Project. [105]

According to the recreation area's 1985 land protection plan, the recreation area's management

was not in stasis by any means. There were a number of important management

considerations. First, the existing nonfederal lands fell within Class I or Class II land

categories, land designations for high density recreation or general outdoor recreation,

respectively. In other words, these were the areas that would see the greatest visitation.

Second, some land within the recreation area had been proposed for wilderness designation, a

higher land classification which demanded more restrictive management. Third, park

management plans had designated the Highway 20 corridor as a prime area for expanding
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visitor services and facilities, which also included rafting put-in and take-out facilities. This

kind of concentrated development contrasted sharply with wilderness use.

Meanwhile, mineral leasing and exploration were potentially on the rise in the recreation

area, activities which could have serious impacts on the area's scenic and natural qualities. A

recent ruling by the Department of the Interior, however, promised some protection. The

ruling identified "excepted areas" within the recreation area which were closed to mineral

leasing. In Ross Lake NRA the areas closed to mineral leasing were: all lands within a half

mile of Gorge, Diablo, and Ross lakes; all lands proposed for, or designated as, wilderness;

all lands within a half a mile of Highway 20; and Pyramid Lake Research Natural Area and

all lands within a half mile of its boundary. The ruling also provided strict guidelines for

mineral leasing in other areas of the recreation area.

Finally, proposals to construct several small hydroelectric facilities on federal land presented

perhaps the greatest potential threat to the recreation area's scenic and natural values. At the

time the plan was completed, however, the small hydroelectric projects were on hold pending

legal review. (Eventually, the Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988 would eliminate

FERC's authority over these projects and thus the projects themselves since they were

included within the park's wilderness area.)

A central component of the land protection plan was its definition of compatible and

incompatible uses on nonfederal lands. It described the kind of action the Park Service would

take to protect the recreation area's aesthetic values and natural conditions. Compared to

Stehekin's issues, these seemed straightforward. Some examples of this were: firewood and

Christmas tree cutting were allowed within City Light's transmission line corridor, but

clearing forested land or vegetation within the river and highway corridor was not,

specifically because it would scar the landscape and impair the visual character of the area;

small-scale mineral extraction on private land with an approved plan was permitted, but

mineral extraction that would detract from the river and highway corridor's scenic values or

degrade the river's water quality was not.

Another consideration in ensuring compatible uses of nonfederal lands and protecting scenery

and river access was the type of land ownership. There were three kinds of land owners in

the recreation area. Of the 2,500 acres, Seattle City Light owned 1,128 acres, including the

towns of Newhalem and Diablo; Washington State owned 480 acres, making up the bed of

the Skagit River; private interests owned subsurface mineral rights to 746 acres along the

Skagit (the government retained ownership of the surface rights); and the remaining 145 acres

were owned by private parties (the majority of this land being a patented mining claim). With

lands under municipal, state, and private ownership, park managers proposed a variety of

approaches to land protection, primarily through cooperative agreements, regulations,

easements, and fee acquisition.

Some of the top priorities for land protection reflected these different ways of acquiring

interest in the various nonfederal lands. One of the top priorities identified by the plan was to

enter into a cooperative agreement with City Light for public access to the river on a ten-acre

parcel at the boundary of the recreation area; this would ensure that there would be a take out

for rafters and others using the river once they left the park complex. Another top priority

was the direct purchase of the subsurface mineral rights along the river to ensure this

landscape's scenic beauty and natural integrity. However, where the other patented mining

claims were concerned, the plan proposed seeking conservation easements and fee simple

ownership through donation. Other priorities involved not only protecting natural beauty but

wildlife habitat as well. High on the priority list was the purchase of a conservation easement

for thirty-seven acres of private land adjacent to the Skagit in order to protect wintering bald

eagle habitat. The largest land area involved embraced the 940 acres owned by Seattle, a
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series of tracts along the Skagit corridor. The sole interest here for the Park Service was

scenic preservation -- the landscape viewed both from the river and the highway -- which

could be accomplished through a cooperative agreement. Finally, there were some nonfederal

lands considered to be adequately protected; these were the 188 acres comprising the towns

of Newhalem and Diablo.

As with any management program, developing a plan was the first step, implementation was

the next. The latter generally took more time than the former. In 1986 and 1987, this changed

somewhat; the park complex's acquisition funds increased by nearly $1.5 million, stimulating

the protection program. As a result, one of the main accomplishments of the land protection

program for Ross Lake NRA was the purchase of private land along the Skagit River bald

eagle habitat in 1988. Initially, the land protection plan called for purchasing a conservation

easement for these two tracts; however, further study revealed that these parcels were

important feeding areas for bald eagles wintering on the river. With this information, park

managers revised the plan in order to purchase this land in fee simple for the greatest degree

of protection available and gave the purchase top priority.

By the early 1990s, however, this purchase stood out as the only priority satisfied in the Ross

Lake plan. Except for the above purchase, the 1990 land protection plan made the same

recommendations as the previous plan. But there were two notable differences. The first

stemmed from the recently completed 1988 general management plan for the park complex.

The plan revised the land classification categories within the recreation area. It identified

three: the natural zone, a largely unaltered environment managed to protect its natural

integrity; the special use zone, an area for non-Park Service activities, such as City Light's

hydroelectric project; and the park development zone, lands that would support the major

visitor developments. The second difference was the official designation of the park

complex's wilderness in 1988. With the passage of the Washington Park Wilderness Act,

74,000 acres of land within the recreation area's "natural zone" had become part of the

Stephen Mather Wilderness. Moreover, this wilderness legislation amended earlier

regulations regarding the use of minerals. Briefly stated, the legislation virtually eliminated

mining in the recreation areas. It also effectively eliminated the proposed small hydroelectric

projects because it clarified and limited the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (FERC) in Ross Lake NRA. That is, it specified that FERC only had jurisdiction

over City Light's Skagit River project and its related elements, both existing and proposed. In

this way, park managers were free to draw the wilderness boundaries to include more of the

recreation area and to assert their authority over the kinds of uses proposed for this area

(rather than having the power rest with FERC), all of which ended the threat of small

hydroelectric projects.

These changes, it seems, placed the recreation area on relatively firm footing for protection.

In December 1993, park officials noted that there was "no real need" to update the land

protection plan for Ross Lake NRA. The only potential problem was with the "many split

estate situations," which referred to the federal ownership of surface rights and unknown or

ambiguous ownership of the subsurface rights. In this regard, condemnation would be the

main procedure. Moreover, the most of the nonfederal lands were owned by Seattle as part of

the Skagit project, which was operated under a FERC license, and apparently did not present

any great threat to Park Service interests. [106]

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 11:

HYDROPOWER AND PRESERVATION

Hydroelectric developments, both existing and proposed, took center stage in the park

complex's management in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The license for Seattle City Light's

Skagit River Hydroelectric Project (FERC No. 553) expired, leading to the Park Service's

involvement in the lengthy and complicated relicensing proceedings. Proposed hydropower

projects appeared on the scene as well when dozens of applications for small hydropower

projects were filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Many of these

were in or near Ross Lake National Recreation Area. These, in addition to some other

hydropower issues, forced park managers to attempt to protect park resources without

infringing on FERC's authority. In all cases, preservation became the ultimate goal; achieving

it required diligence and creativity.

***

One of the most important accomplishments in the management of the North Cascades

complex was the relicensing of Seattle City Light's Skagit Project. Until the project was

relicensed for a thirty-year period, the Park Service could not approach the protection of Ross

Lake NRA in a comprehensive manner. As the High Ross Dam affair demonstrated, the

future of Ross Lake was uncertain, and the way to ensure that there would be appropriate

recreational developments and resource protection programs for this area was through the

licensing process. The problem was that even though City Light's license for the project

expired in 1977, its renewal was delayed until the High Ross controversy had been resolved

in 1984. Until that time, and for sometime thereafter, FERC allowed the city to operate under

an annual license.

Thus, in 1984 once the international treaty ending the High Ross dispute was signed, the Park

Service prepared to move forward again as one of the intervenors in the licensing process.

Besides High Ross, a number of plans in City Light's license concerned agency managers.

One of these was the Thunder Creek project, which called for constructing a diversion dam

on Thunder Creek and using a tunnel to divert its water through Ruby Mountain into Ross

Lake. Another was the Copper Creek project, which called for building a dam near the

western boundary of Ross Lake NRA. These were significant issues for the Park Service in

its efforts to protect the recreation area's natural and cultural values, especially since the

license would have such a lasting effect.

Initially, the Park Service picked up where it had left off in the 1970s. It began with Exhibit

R, the section of the Skagit project's license that was essentially a recreation plan. In this

regard, the Park Service could require from City Light that it develop a substantial portion of

the recreational facilities managers believed would be necessary for the protection and public

use of Ross Lake NRA. Even though the Park Service had no legal control over the project

itself, it could under the Federal Power Act (and the authority of the Secretary of the Interior)

direct City Light to mitigate any adverse effects caused by the project. In the early 1970s,
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park officials had concentrated on one element of City Light's operations, High Ross. They

reached an agreement in which the city would compensate the agency for the loss of existing

facilities -- campsites, bridges, trails, and boat docks, among other things -- and provide new

ones, all of which would enhance recreation in the area. They also were aware that City

Light's license was due to expire and that they would need to develop a plan to cover the

entire project. [1]

By 1984, however, the Park Service had changed its views on what it wanted from Exhibit R.

In one respect, this change reflected practical concerns. Regional Director Daniel Tobin

noted that it was important that park managers act quickly because the recreation plan was out

of date. In September 1977, nearly one month before the Skagit project's license expired,

Seattle City Light had filed an application for a new license. [2] The application, Tobin

asserted, contained provisions for an initial five-year program in which City Light would

contribute $500,000 to fund the construction of four major facilities. The trouble with this

plan was that the funds were in 1977 dollars. In addition, Exhibit R provided for a continuing

program at five-year intervals beginning in the fourth year of the first phase. This continuing

program would have been a cooperative effort between the Park Service and City Light.

Although no dollar figure was attached to this second phase, the language in the plan

suggested that it would be less than phase one of the program.

Tobin's interest stemmed from the fact that the plan had never really been implemented.

Many of the facilities "included in the Initial Program have been constructed by the National

Park Service with appropriated funds." He outlined several ways to approach City Light for

reimbursement as part of the revised Exhibit R. One way was direct repayment to the

government for the cost of facilities; another was reimbursement through donation to the Park

Service for future development at the recreation area. A similar approach would have been

the identification of other facilities needed at the recreation area which City Light would

provide. And a final possibility was an approach that combined both financial compensation

and the identification of new projects. Whatever approach managers chose, it should adjust

the estimate for inflation. [3] Moreover, behind the regional director's interest was the fear

that the international treaty might grant City Light unilateral authority over raising Ross Dam,

should Canada break the agreement, and grant it similar authority over relicensing. This, it

seems, was a view espoused by the attorneys for City Light. [4] Tobin's worry, that City

Light might find a way to exclude the Park Service from the current relicensing proceedings

by using the treaty, was unfounded, but it did underscore that the Park Service viewed

relicensing seriously.

On another level, the Park Service approached relicensing with broader goals, goals that

included recreation but also the preservation of natural and cultural values within the

recreation area. As we have seen, the agency's interest sprang from a new environmental

awareness, the passage of major environmental legislation, and changes in popular attitudes

towards the construction of more hydroelectric dams on the nation's last free-running rivers.

Thus, the Park Service looked for ways to mitigate the impacts of the project as a whole

while enhancing the environment and other intrinsic qualities of the recreation area at the

same time. To a large extent, this approach was what many intervenors supported. Indian

tribes, environmental groups, and state and federal agencies, many of whom had participated

in the High Ross battle, saw relicensing as an opportunity "to redress the unmitigated impacts

of the Skagit Project." [5]

It was a situation City Light had not foreseen, for in the past its applications to develop and

expand the Skagit Project had proceeded smoothly, its work viewed as a social amenity

rather than as an ecological disaster. To City Light's credit, it established an Environmental

Affairs Division to handle compliance with the numerous environmental regulations affecting

hydroelectric operations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and to take the lead in
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negotiations for the new license.

City Light's approach to relicensing grew from its experience on several fronts, such as with

High Ross, but also with controversy surrounding its interim relicensing agreement after

1977. Indian tribes, state and federal agencies clashed with the city in 1979 when the Federal

Power Commission accepted the utility's application for relicensing. The various parties filed

motions asserting that City Light had not studied or presented ways to mitigate the project's

major impacts on fisheries. Furthermore, the state of Washington severely criticized the city

for a similar lack of consideration and measures for mitigating impacts on wildlife. The

outcome of all of this was an interim agreement with the city, agencies, and tribes signed in

1981. The agreement recognized that more information was needed on fisheries issues, and

thus stipulated that City Light would modify operations and conduct studies to assess the

project's impacts on fisheries. Other studies, however, to address concerns for wildlife

populations and recreation went unaddressed. To a large extent these were overwhelmed by

the fisheries studies, which were scheduled for completion in the mid-1980s, and formed

another reason for delaying the relicensing process. [6]

Public reactions against City Light's Copper Creek project offered perhaps the most visible

example of the new circumstances faced by the utility. In 1979, the Seattle City Council

approved an environmental impact statement for the dam. The dam, however, was

controversial. Skagit County residents viewed the project with trepidation since it would be

constructed in an area lined with dangerous fault zones. Other interests, such as

environmental groups, fisherman's groups, and river rafters, opposed the project because it

would have inundated a ten-mile stretch of the free-running Skagit River, harmed wintering

bald eagle habitat, and destroyed highly productive salmon spawning grounds. Most

importantly, the Skagit tribes had recently won a court decision over reserved treaty rights for

fishing, and asserted their interest in stopping the project since it threatened to destroy the

fishery for which they had fought to protect. The tribes assumed the lead in protesting against

the dam, and other groups allied with them. [7]

Their arguments provided a convincing case. Studies showed that the dam would flood

important salmon spawning beds, thus reducing the number of salmon in the river. Directly

related to the fate of the salmon was the fate of the bald eagles who wintered on this section

of the Skagit. Without the salmon carcasses, on which the eagles usually fed, the eagle

population would suffer and decline. The Nature Conservancy, who owned a 300-acre eagle

sanctuary downstream from the dam site, called for City Light to abandon the project. Other

studies and events mounted against the public acceptance of the new dam as well. Adding to

the Skagit's intrinsic value was its recent congressional designation as a wild and scenic river

in 1978, under the Wild and Scenic River Act. The designation mandated that this federallyrecognized "wild" river remain in its current condition and that all projects that might affect

this be evaluated. This and other environmental legislation, like the Endangered Species Act,

could have restricted the city's development of Copper Creek. Similar to the High Ross

proposal, a report concluded that conservation and the use of solar energy rather than the

construction of a new hydroelectric facility would provide more energy at a lower cost to

City Light. Because of public opposition, concerns over environmental protection, and the

small amount of power return (the project would have illuminated a few office buildings

downtown for the cost of a $137 million dam), the Seattle City Council shelved the Copper

Creek project indefinitely in August 1981. [8]

The effect, however, was not immediate, and tensions mounted. In 1986, leaders of the North

Cascades Conservation Council, David Fluharty and Patrick Goldsworthy, urged City Light

to engage in the relicensing proceedings. Specifically, they asserted that City Light was

obligated to study ways to mitigate the effects of the Skagit Project's original inundations

behind Gorge, Diablo, and Ross dams. In reply, Randall Hardy, superintendent of Seattle City
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Light, informed Fluharty and Goldsworthy that his agency's view on the matter was quite

different from theirs. In the first place, progress in relicensing was, it seems, awaiting the

completion of studies on the project's impacts on downstream fisheries, related directly to

reservoir fluctuations. Second, Hardy believed that, contrary to the conservation council's

opinion, City Light had conducted "extensive studies of adjacent habitat areas and

recreational use...in connection with the High Ross proceedings and in support of the 1977

application for relicensing." These studies, according to the superintendent, provided a

"sufficient base of field study" to understand generally the "effects of original inundation and

to allow an approximate reconstruction of the habitats now submerged under Ross Lake."

Hardy, it seems, was suggesting that the studies conducted for High Ross and those nearing

completion for downstream fisheries should be enough for the entire project. Or, put another

way, as Ross Lake went, so too did the rest of the Skagit Project. [9]

The council, though, had raised concerns far beyond what City Light's studies had addressed.

They were concerns especially important to the Park Service. Council members stressed that

in relicensing the Skagit Project, City Light should consider "mitigation for upstream impacts

relating to wildlife populations and to recreational and scientific values associated with

reservoir inundation, in other words, the area now included within Ross Lake NRA."

According to Associate Regional Director Richard Winters, this was "a somewhat new

direction for the deliberations," one that had "not been considered previously." This new

dimension became more attractive to agency officials over the next several years, and

recreational needs would soon be one of several areas of interest as they negotiated with City

Light over its project's impact on the entire recreation area. [10]

In 1987, Superintendent John Reynolds and his staff made the first formal step in the

negotiations when they submitted a recreational development proposal for Ross Lake NRA to

be funded by City Light under its new license. But in a short period of time, the entire

process and scope of the park's perspective changed. One reason for this change was that

FERC seems to have grown tired of City Light's delays. In October 1988, FERC notified City

Light that it had nine months to submit its application. More than ten years had passed since

the city's license had expired, and it had yet to submit the various packages to the federal

agency as required by the Federal Power Act and its amendments. Specifically, the city

needed to complete mitigation studies under Exhibit E in 18 CFR Ch. 1; these were far more

inclusive than Exhibit R (a section revised to become Exhibit E). The reports covered water

use and quality; fish, wildlife, and botanical resources; historical and archaeological

resources; recreational resources; and land management and aesthetics. [11]

In response to FERC's order, City Light asked for and received an extension of at least

eighteen months, so it could seek a comprehensive, negotiated settlement agreed to by all

parties to the relicensing proceedings. Broadly speaking, the city was attempting to streamline

a complicated process. Each intervenor had the right to petition FERC independently, in a

sense challenging City Light's application and compelling it to respond as to why it had not

addressed such measures. This approach could, and often did, lead to hostile rather than

amicable relations, and the chances for a fair settlement were remote. As it turned out, both

City Light and the various parties, including the Park Service, saw the advantages to a

settlement and agreed to negotiate an agreement which would then be presented to FERC for

its approval. [12]

In January 1989, Jonathan Jarvis, the park complex's chief of resource management,

expressed a second reason for the Park Service's shift in its approach to relicensing, a reason

that was related directly to Exhibit E because of its full range of natural and cultural

investigations. For the first time, park complex managers began to think that the entire

process held indefinite possibilities for their understanding and protection of Ross Lake NRA.

Central to the Park Service's involvement, Jarvis noted, was its position that the project
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should be "operated and the effects of its presence be mitigated so as to have 'no effect' on

the function of the larger ecosystem." Thus, the agency decided that the "recreational

potential be developed only to the point that the recreational use has 'no effect' on the

function of the ecosystem." [13]

What Jarvis and other managers were suggesting was that this position was the best one

available to them. The complex's original legislation, after all, prohibited the agency's outright

opposition to the Skagit Project. And though the recently passed 1988 Washington Park

Wilderness Act restricted FERC's authority to City Light's existing project and proposed

projects within the recreation area, the fact remained that FERC still had authority over the

Skagit Project's operations. Thus, the debate for park managers centered on understanding the

consequences of the continued occupancy of the area by the Skagit Project. However

attractive in an Edward Abbey sense of environmental reclamation, removing the project was

not a viable option. But assessing the changes brought about to the natural and cultural

environments of the Skagit country by the project was viable -- and critical to protecting the

recreation area's values. [14]

The task ahead was not a simple one. North Cascades managers had to integrate all of the

categories within Exhibit E into "a coherent package." The first stage in this process was

determining the effects of the project's past and continued presence for the next three decades

through a series of studies funded by City Light. Rather than rely on the utility to provide the

information to the park, managers decided to participate in the studies. Park and regional

office staff assisted City Light by writing scopes of work for contracts, serving as technical

advisors, and participating on habitat evaluation teams. When it came to erosion and

archaeological studies, the Park Service conducted the work for City Light under several

memoranda of agreement.

The studies, conducted in the late 1980s, concluded that the project had significantly affected

the upper Skagit Valley. Wildlife and vegetation studies indicated that large habitat losses

contributed to the decline of at least ten wildlife species. Recreation studies found that over

all the impoundments had a serious influence on the management of Park Service lands and

limited the potential management of adjacent recreational resources. More specifically, the

level of Ross Lake, dictated by power generation and flood control, directly affected

recreational boating and fishing. Soil erosion studies concluded that the project caused,

primarily through fluctuating lake levels, more than sixteen miles of eroding shoreline and

resulted in an estimated loss of 1.5 acres a year. Visual quality and aesthetics studies

indicated that the entire project, consisting of dams, reservoirs, company towns, roads, and

power transmission corridors, affected the aesthetics of the recreation area. The transmission

lines had the greatest visual impact. Studies of the upper Skagit basin's cultural resources

revealed more than 120 prehistoric sites within the drawdown of Ross Lake. In all cases,

Ross Lake's continuous fluctuations caused materials to erode from these archaeological

sites, and in some cases, this action caused the loss of, or endangered, the integrity of these

sites. Finally, the fisheries studies suggested that the flow of the Skagit River, controlled by

power production and flood control, had an adverse effect on downstream fisheries.

Spawning habitat was particularly damaged. While salmon and steelhead species were the

primary focus of these studies, they also suggested that many other resident fish experienced

similar disturbances due to stream flows, and that changing lake levels influenced the vitality

of lake fisheries. [15]

The next stage in the process was one of the hardest, deciding what to ask for in the

mitigation package. Initially, the park complex's various divisions, such as resource

management and interpretation, held a series of meetings to draw up a "wish list" of projects

and proposals. They had several park-wide plans on which to rely. The most important of

these, perhaps, was the 1988 general management plan which outlined some long-range
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projects. More specifically, the recreational development proposal submitted to City Light in

1987, with some modifications, proved to be useful. Recently completed resource and

wilderness management plans also identified a list of needs. The relicensing process,

however, offered managers the opportunity to address issues and develop programs that the

Park Service might not otherwise fund. Thus, the final list, complete with specific details and

cost estimates, was a product of both approved plans and long-term needs. It also reflected a

screening process involving a number of criteria; each project was evaluated for its

environmental impact, consistency with approved park complex plans, opportunity for other

sources of funding, and direct relationship to the impacts of the Skagit Project itself. One

thing that was not a limiting factor in the development of the final package was cost. City

Light had not set a cost ceiling, yet it was understood that the utility's net worth was $100

million.

The Park Service's mitigation package proved to be quite effective as the agency entered the

next phase of the process, the negotiation forums. City Light's Environmental Affairs

Division established five forums for negotiation, all of which reflected the topics listed under

Exhibit E. These were fisheries, recreation and aesthetics, wildlife, erosion, and cultural

resources. The division's specialists led the forums, and the intervenors attended those forums

in which they had an interest. Given the range of the Park Service's responsibilities, North

Cascades managers participated in all five. The meetings were time consuming and rigorous,

especially since FERC's deadline was approaching. Members of the park complex's resource

management staff, assisted by regional office specialists, attended more than one hundred

meetings in a one-year period. Each forum was charged with developing both an agreement

and a mitigation plan. This process, though complex enough considering the number of

intervenors and interests, was made even more complex when one considers the overlap

between forums; there was always the chance that mitigation procedures for one problem

might have a negative effect on another. For those in the fisheries forum, for example,

maintaining downstream river flows was essential to the protection of spawning salmon. Yet

this meant that lake levels would fluctuate leading to problems with erosion, recreational boat

launching, in-lake fish spawning, and lake aesthetics. The formation of loose coalitions

among the forums and convening of informal conferences helped resolve many of these

concerns.

What remained to be accomplished was the final settlement itself. There was little to no

precedence for the approach City Light was taking to the relicensing process, and thus there

was little upon which to base expectations. Moreover, there were few ground rules

throughout the meetings, and each intervenor approached the negotiations differently. Some

parties held their cards close. But as Jon Jarvis recalled, the Park Service showed its cards

early. Having a package was quite effective because it told City Light everything his agency

wanted, from greenhouses to an environmental institute and what it all would cost. The

surprise, though, was that City Light seemed willing to accept the park's offer. The real test,

however, came with legal review. Relicensing and settlement agreements were a legal

process, and technical advisors and lawyers representing the various federal and state

agencies and other intervenors worked with City Light lawyers to produce a legal document

that actually "reflected the technical intent of the negotiators."

Still, bringing all of the parties together was stressful in the final months of negotiations. City

Light was especially fearful that there would be a break in ranks, that one disgruntled party

could derail the entire process and jeopardize relicensing. As a result, in September 1990 all

parties signed a preliminary agreement in which they agreed to abide by the proposals

already on the table. Though nonbinding, the agreement was the first formal commitment by

the intervenors and Seattle City Light. The document seems to have served its purpose,

because in November one First Nation from Canada, the Nlaka'pamux Nation (the Lower

Thompsons), unexpectedly tried to join the proceedings. Seattle City Light refused the
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Nlaka'pamux Nation's request and negotiated an independent agreement with the group after

it had a final settlement agreement. The signing of an official settlement by all parties took

place on April 26, 1991, and City Light submitted it to FERC on May 1, 1991. [16]

Although subject to FERC's approval, the settlement was "unprecedented nationally,"

according to City Light, and had profound benefits for North Cascades. The agreement

stipulated that City Light would pay $100 million for mitigation over a thirty year period (for

a total of fifty years beginning when the original license expired in 1977). Some of the more

noteworthy provisions were that City Light agreed to

buy Diablo Lake Resort and construct an environmental learning center;

construct, maintain, and renovate trails, campgrounds, and boat launches in Ross Lake

NRA;

purchase approximately 5,000 acres of land along the Skagit River and South Fork of

the Nooksack River for wildlife protection;

construct a greenhouse to grow 30,000 native plants a year for revegetation of damaged

sites in the project area;

establish a flow plan for the Skagit River to protect spawning salmon and steelhead;

implement erosion control measures;

document and protect archaeological and historic resources within the project area.

[17]

The license also contained a controversial element. City Light still maintained that High Ross

was viable, and included it in the license. In order to move negotiations along, intervenors

decided to take High Ross off the table; however, they did not support the project, and the

settlement agreement contained measures to reopen negotiations if High Ross should proceed.

Finally, High Ross did not pose the great dilemma for the Park Service as it once had. The

agency still could not oppose the project, but with the various natural and cultural resource

studies conducted for the relicensing, managers could make a strong case that Ross Lake

country was "a good piece of land that shouldn't be lost." [18]

Moving from negotiations to implementation of the settlement agreement awaited FERC's

approval of Seattle City Light's license. Park officials expected approval to come sometime in

1994, after the commission had completed its review of the license application and conducted

an environmental assessment for the agreement. It was this very process, however, that

threatened the entire agreement. At least, that was how Seattle City Light and the parties to

the settlement viewed the commission's actions. The critical measure upon which the

settlement agreement rested was the condition that FERC accept the package as a whole; any

"material modification" would void the agreement at the option of any party. Throughout

1991, FERC seemed poised to do just that with its environmental assessment of the Skagit

Project, because it was considering it as part of its larger study of the cumulative impacts of

hydroelectric projects (existing and proposed) in the Skagit Basin. The energy commission

staff noted that by taking this approach it might require City Light to carry out more

mitigation -- in addition to the settlement -- or in place of parts of the mitigation settlement.

Either scenario, noted one City Light official, "could be a deal killer." [19]

The National Park Service requested that FERC reconsider its environmental assessment. It

was unclear, Regional Director Charles Odegaard wrote, how the commission intended to

integrate the Skagit Project with its larger study of the Skagit Basin. City Light's Skagit

Project lay entirely within Ross Lake NRA and the "direct impacts on the park" were limited

to the project. More importantly, Odegaard, echoing the concerns of all parties involved,

urged FERC to consider the magnitude of the agreement at stake. More than a decade of

work had gone into this settlement agreement that already contained a negotiated mitigation

package, as required by the commission, for the Skagit Project's effects on the recreation
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area's various resources. [20] To the relief of park managers and others, FERC's

environmental assessment exempted the Skagit Project from the cumulative environmental

assessment because it did not have "the potential for adverse impacts to at least one target

resource" (anadromous fish, recreation, cultural resources, and sensitive terrestrial ecological

resources). Thus, the commission recommended a separate assessment for the project, which,

it proclaimed, "would range from no effects to substantially beneficial effects" under

conditions proposed in the settlement offer. [21]

Such a positive statement belied the energy commission's treatment of the settlement

agreement. In its draft environmental assessment for the Skagit Project's license, which was

released March 3, 1994, FERC included a preferred alternative that tracked the settlement

agreement. But the license the agency issued did not. What the Park Service and other

interested parties soon realized was that FERC had packaged the offer of settlement and

modified some of the individual mitigation agreements to meet what it viewed as necessary

for issuing a license. This did not necessarily reflect what the parties believed was the true

intent of their agreement. Among other things, North Cascades managers argued that the

proposed license terms were substantially different from any alternative evaluated by the

environmental assessment. Managers also noted that the energy commission had omitted

funds for long-term monitoring in Ross Lake NRA because the commission concluded in its

assessment that relicensing the Skagit Project would have no cumulative adverse impacts and

would even have beneficial effects on the Skagit Basin. (This applied to both environmental

and cultural resources.) Therefore, FERC used this analysis when it reviewed City Light's

license, all of which seems to have mystified City Light, the Park Service, and other

intervenors. As the Department of the Interior related in its comments on the draft

assessment, FERC's review was inadequate and fell short of the requirements under the

Federal Power Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The department

recommended that the commission need not conduct its own environmental analysis of each

of the settlement agreements. The proposed action was to "relicense the Skagit River Project

as mitigated by the measures described in the Settlement Agreements and to implement those

mitigation and enhancement measures." In other words, much of the commission's work had

already been considered and it should have spent its time considering the various proposals

as part of a comprehensive package designed to streamline the assessment process. [22]

In May 1995, Seattle City Light, along with all of the parties to the settlement agreements,

petitioned the energy commission to reconsider its draft license for the Skagit Project; that is,

all parties wanted the commission to issue a license that contained all of the terms and

agreements of the settlement offer intact. [23] On May 24, 1995, the energy commission,

however, issued the license without reconsidering these pleas. Elizabeth Moler, commission

chair, notified Seattle Mayor Norman Rice that the "Commission approved all provisions of

the settlement." But there were minor stipulations with major significance to City Light and

others. As Moler noted, the license would include

all provisions of the settlement that involve matters within the Commission's

jurisdiction. The order accepting the settlement agreement also recognizes that

certain aspects of the settlement are beyond the Commission's jurisdiction. The

order supports the settlement and explicitly recognizes that the licensee may

proceed under these provisions as private agreements among the parties. [24]

In June, the City of Seattle appealed the license order and requested a rehearing before the

commission to resolve "numerous 'technical' problems and omissions in both the license and

environmental assessment," and to have the commission provide an adequate explanation of

"why certain parts of each of the settlement agreements were included as license conditions

and others were not." This latter aspect of the city's complaint was especially baffling to the

parties. The most detailed explanation they received, for example, was when the commission
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excluded elk habitat from the wildlife mitigation plan. The commission chair stated tersely

that FERC was not "in the business of managing elk habitat." [25]

The energy commission granted the rehearing, and the following year, on June 26, 1996, the

commission issued an order for the Skagit River Project's new license, which included "the

measures at issue in the license, together with the terms needed to enable the Commission to

enforce such measures." The commission maintained that the parties criticized it for not

incorporating, word for word, "the language of every element of every Agreement,

suggesting that failure to do so threatens the entire Agreement." This argument focused

primarily on off-site mitigation, FERC noted, and tended to overshadow the commission's

general "acceptance and implementation of the Settlement." In addition, the commission

maintained, even with a settlement agreement, that it was part of its responsibility under the

Federal Power Act to "frame license articles in the manner we deem sufficiently clear and

concise to allow for effective oversight and enforcement." Nevertheless FERC decided to

reconsider its position in order to settle the major issues surrounding wildlife and recreation

agreements. These were namely

provisions for the licensee to obtain and manage off-site elk habitat and six off-site

recreation areas;

fund the Park Service's long-term environmental monitoring within the Ross Lake

National Recreation Area, the North Cascades National Park, and Lake Chelan

Recreation Area;

fund the Forest Service's inventory and planning of bald eagle and other wildlife

habitat in the Skagit National Recreation River Corridor and the Sauk, Suiattle, and

Cascade National Scenic River Corridors.

There were also a number of other issues surrounding fisheries agreements as well as

miscellaneous articles, which the commission agreed to correct; many of these related to

programs to be carried out in the park complex and involved clarifications and revisions to

correct inadvertently omitted language. Throughout this process, the energy commission went

on record stating that many of "the measures will constitute enhancement beyond that which

we determine is required by the comprehensive development standard," and that the

settlement agreements were binding between the parties even if they did not appear in the

license itself. Nevertheless, for all intents and purposes, the commission restored the license

to its original form as presented by City Light in 1991. [26] The relicensing process,

furthermore, contributed to FERC's development of its alternative relicensing process.

With the relicensing of the Skagit Project, a new era was launched in the management of

Ross Lake NRA. As Superintendent William Paleck noted earlier, he anticipated the

settlement agreement to present the park with "a great challenge," for it would bring it into a

closer working relationship with City Light, the Forest Service, North Cascades Conservation

Council, and other intervenors. [27]

Part of that challenge also lay in carrying out the projects. How this would unfold remained

to be seen. The Park Service had essentially contracted with City Light to undertake many of

the projects since they would take place within the park complex. But it was no simple

matter, for they would require staffing and organization. Jon Jarvis had argued for the Park

Service's role in these projects, and attempted to have every project proposal developed with

an overhead figure of some 10 to 15 percent, a figure lower than City Light would have had

to pay a consulting firm. Moreover, the overhead should have been enough to hire a staff to

do the projects -- or at the very least cover the costs of existing park staff. Yet in January

1995, the park complex reported a $200,000 shortfall to cover "additional new NPS

operating/consultation responsibilities called for under the settlement agreements." [28]
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At the same time, the agreement did not commit the agency to finish each project at a certain

time but within a range of years. If the service then failed to complete the construction of a

dock, for example, City Light could then let a contract. More important to remember, Jarvis

recalled, was that the projects had to be specific in order to be approved, and that they were

earmarked to further resource management and recreation in Ross Lake NRA. In this way,

one could argue that they helped foster these programs for the recreation area specifically and

the park complex generally. Already, North Cascades had gained the services of an

archaeologist and a geologist as part of the relicensing investigations [29]; their work, as well

as that of other professionals, would expand our understanding of the area's natural and

cultural values and thus better enable managers to protect them. [30]

***

Newhalem Project. The National Park Service was involved in the relicensing of one more

City Light hydroelectric project in the 1990s. The Newhalem Creek Hydroelectric Project

(FERC No. 2705), part of the city's early development of the Skagit Project, is a run-of-theriver plant with maximum power production of 2.3 megawatts. The city constructed the

Newhalem Project in 1921 to supply electricity to the town of Newhalem during the

construction of the Gorge and Diablo hydroelectric facilities; afterwards, the project's power

was tied into the Skagit system. The Newhalem Creek Project's original powerhouse was

destroyed by fire in 1966 and reconstructed in 1969. Afterwards, Seattle applied to the

Federal Power Commission for the project's first license; the power commission issued the

license in January 1975, but made it effective January 1, 1970. [31]

The Newhalem Project's license expired at the end of 1994, and North Cascades managers

became actively involved in the relicensing process. The Park Service believed that the

project, located within Ross Lake NRA, had "considerable cumulative impacts...in the past"

and would continue to harm the "aquatic resources of Newhalem Creek without additional

protection or mitigation for the aquatic resources of Ross Lake National Recreation,

especially anadromous fish habitat. Seattle City Light's current flow regime of 5 cfs would

render much of the chinook and pink salmon spawning habitat unavailable, would adversely

affect the habitat of juvenile chinook and steelhead, and would further increase the impacts to

fry standings." The Department of the Interior expressed a "strong interest" in the project's

relicensing, primarily to protect "fishery resources and their habitat and mitigation of the

continuing project impacts to those resources, including the effect on the federal reservation

of Ross Lake National Recreation Area and the treaty-reserved fishery interests." [32]

The Department of the Interior concluded that Ross Lake NRA constituted a "reservation" for

the purposes of the Federal Power Act. Therefore, the Secretary of the Interior had the

authority under Section 4(e) of the power act to impose mandatory "conditions for the

[adequate] protection and utilization of the Ross Lake National Recreation Area" as part of

the project's relicensing. [33] (The department's use of Section 4(e), it seems, may have been

the first time it was used in a park area.) In the summer of 1995, the Park Service, in concert

with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Bureau of Indian Affairs, developed preliminary

conditions for the proposed relicensing, and the Secretary of the Interior filed these

conditions with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. A year later, the secretary

submitted a revised list of conditions to the commission. There were six conditions. City

Light would

maintain seasonally adjusted minimum instream flows, or the natural flow, which ever

is less in the Newhalem Creek bypassed reach;

install a tailrace barrier to prevent anadromous fish from entering the tailrace;

implement sequential start-up ramping rates;

move accumulated gravel from behind the diversion downstream to provide a spawning
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channel;

place woody debris, which has accumulated in the diversion or intake structure, into

the Newhalem Creek bypassed reach, and not change woody debris movement

procedures without Park Service approval;

implement the Newhalem Creek Hydroelectric Project Final Erosion and Drainage

Control Plan, and remove any unnatural debris that has fallen or falls in the future into

Newhalem Creek from the diversion access road. [34]

In addition to these imposed conditions, City Light agreed to other measures as part of its

license. The city proposed to develop a historic resources mitigation and management plan to

protect the historic integrity of the project's facilities, which were part of the Skagit River and

Newhalem Creek Hydroelectric Projects Historic District, and to undertake recreational

improvements. The city proposed to construct a trail parallel to the powerhouse road and to

renovate the powerhouse viewing platform and the Trail of the Cedars to improve

accessibility for people with disabilities, if necessary. Besides these enhancement proposals,

the city agreed to continue several existing measures. These included the operation and

maintenance of its fish rearing facility, its powerhouse interpretive display, and the

maintenance of the Trail of the Cedars interpretive trail. [35]

On February 7, 1997, FERC issued the new license for the Newhalem Creek Project, the

operation of which reflected the interests of the Park Service and Interior Department in the

protection of the recreation area's aquatic resources. [36]

***

In the midst of relicensing the Skagit and Newhalem projects, the Park Service faced another

potential threat to Ross Lake NRA in the form of small hydroelectric projects. Small scale

hydropower projects (small hydro) were mostly "run-of-the-river projects," so named

because they used the fall of water rather than the volume of a reservoir to generate power.

They became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was, after all, an era of

environmental awakening and a perceived energy shortage. Small hydro projects were

deemed less destructive than large-scale hydroelectric projects and far less hazardous than

nuclear power plants. (In fact, a nuclear power plant was proposed by the Puget Sound Power

and Light Company near Sedro Woolley on the Skagit River in the late 1970s.) Moreover,

several federal laws -- the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, the Energy

Securities Act of 1980, and the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 -- provided the

tax and regulatory incentives for private industry and investors to pursue these projects.

Especially attractive was an incentive under the Energy Securities Act that authorized FERC

to grant exemptions from licensing to certain small hydro projects based on the agency's

discretion. These measures set off a small hydro rush, many of them in the vicinity of the

nation's parks. Among these areas, Ross Lake NRA stood out because so many projects were

proposed within and near the area in the early 1980s (more than fifty) that agency managers

were concerned about their cumulative impacts on the Skagit River watershed. Ironically, this

flood of proposals came at a time when the projections for energy shortages in the 1970s had

been revised to energy surpluses in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the schemes went forward

leaving park officials wondering, as they had during the High Ross and Skagit Project

relicensing, how they could protect the recreation area's values while not infringing on

FERC's jurisdiction. [37]

Park managers had reason to be concerned. At least nine of the proposed projects lay within

the boundaries of Ross Lake NRA: Damnation Creek, Sky Creek, Thornton Creek, Thunder

Creek (three sites), Birch Creek, Ruby Creek, and Panther Creek. In addition, seven

applications were filed for projects east of Ross Lake NRA on Granite, Canyon, and Ruby

creeks. All of these proposed projects would have adversely affected the recreation area over
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time by altering stream flows, fish and wildlife habitat, and the area's aesthetics with the

installation of generating facilities and more transmission lines, to name a few things. [38]

In 1981, the park sought legal advice from the solicitor's office about its authority over such

projects. What managers learned was largely what they already knew. The Park Service's

ability to regulate dams and hydroelectric projects in and near national park areas was hardly

absolute, and in many respects it was uncertain. In general terms, the Federal Power Act's

1921 amendments excluded parks and monuments, thus prohibiting FERC from licensing any

hydroelectric projects in these areas. But there was disagreement over whose authority

governed projects in other types of national parklands, such as recreation areas (since they

were not specifically mentioned in the act). Naturally, the Park Service believed that the

FPA's exclusion of parks and monuments should apply to all areas within the park system.

On the other hand, FERC believed otherwise and issued licenses for hydro projects in

national recreation areas, the more renowned being one in Glen Canyon National Recreation

Area. [39]

Further complicating matters in Ross Lake NRA was Section 505 of the North Cascades Act,

the section that prohibited the Park Service from interfering with FERC's jurisdiction over

hydroelectric projects. In an effort to prevent small hydropower projects from damaging the

park's ecosystems, managers sought the advice of the solicitor's office as to whether this

section applied to projects other than City Light's. On July 30, 1981, David Watts, assistant

solicitor, gave his opinion that the park act and its legislative history did in fact grant FERC

authority over all projects, not just those existing or anticipated in 1968. [40]

By early 1982, FERC granted exemptions from licensing for the proposed Thornton,

Damnation, Sky, and Birch creek projects in accordance with the Energy Securities Act. Park

managers countered that while FERC could grant exemptions, these did not include a right to

use of the land. In other words, the project applicants would need to apply to the land

management agency, in this case the Park Service, for a special use or right-of-way permit

for the hydro project's features. These included waterlines, penstocks, powerhouses, and

transmission lines, as well as access roads for construction and operation of the projects. The

agency's approval of the permit seemed to present the agency with some means to at least

stall the small hydro proposals; however, the solicitor noted that because of Section 505, the

Park Service could not deny a special use permit to a FERC permittee. As Superintendent

Keith Miller noted, the entire process seemed academic. [41]

Nevertheless, park officials sought a finer ruling on what options were available to them,

specifically whether or not they could deny the permit should the hydro project unduly impair

the recreation area's values. In this regard, Richard Winters, associate regional director for

recreation resources and professional services, reminded Superintendent Miller of the

solicitor's 1981 opinion -- that any restrictions on the project should be "reasonable."

According to the solicitor, an unreasonable restriction was anything that "would absolutely

defeat the economic feasibility of the project." On the other hand, it was reasonable to impose

restrictions that would limit the project's economic potential in order to protect the values of

the recreation area for the enjoyment of the public. [42]

This perspective was put to the test in 1983 when the proponent of the Damnation and

Thornton creeks projects applied to the Park Service for rights-of-way permits for access

roads to their sites. The critical point at this juncture in the proceedings was whether the

agency had the authority to grant these permits to the hydropower developers. Once more the

solicitor's opinion was sought. In May, the solicitor informed the Park Service that the

applications were "legally sufficient to support the granting of rights-of-way," provided that

they were neither "incompatible with the public interest...nor inconsistent with the values

which the recreation area is intended to protect." Put another way, the solicitor suggested that
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while the Park Service could not deny a permittee access, it could impose "conditions

calculated to maintain the identified values of the area." [43]

With this ruling in mind, the park proceeded with the permit process by conducting an

environmental assessment to evaluate the federal action. This process seemed to place the

Park Service in a position to request a full-scale environmental impact statement, thereby

stalling the projects and possibly leading to their demise. But as Daniel Allen, the park

complex's natural resource specialist, noted "We were specifically advised that the subject of

the assessments was NOT whether to construct the projects since that was not the proposed

NPS action." Evidently, Superintendent Miller's sense that all of this was an exercise in paper

work contributed to the production of a "ineffective" draft environmental assessment,

according to Solicitor C. Richard Neely. The preliminary version of the document, he noted,

fell far short of the intent of NEPA; it was too general and did not consider the cumulative

impacts of the projects. When it was released on July 13, 1983, for public review, the

environmental assessment had been revised to reflect most of Neely's comments. For the

most part, conservation organizations, federal and state agencies, and others who commented

on the assessment opposed the projects or found serious shortcomings in its consideration of

the impacts on the cultural and natural resources of the recreation area. In particular, lawyers

for the North Cascades Conservation Council submitted a lengthy brief indicating that the

Park Service had the authority over these small hydroelectric projects and did not have to

grant them permits at all. [44] And the council would file a lawsuit against the proposals if

the agency did not act.

Park Service officials were intrigued by the council's ideas, namely its legal interpretation of

the park complex's legislation, its view of the Park Service's power through NEPA, and its

view that the agency had the power to oppose such projects because of its primary mission of

protecting the recreation area's values. In fact, they were so intrigued that in August 1983 the

regional director requested that the solicitor review the council's comments and if possible

use this to revisit his 1981 opinion. Several months later, David Watts rejected the council's

main argument that FERC's jurisdiction was "limited to site-specific projects" and did not

"extend to the issuance of exemptions from licensing." In general, Watt stood behind his

original opinion, stating that Ross Lake NRA was not like most units of the park system

because it was subject to FERC's "general jurisdiction to authorize projects" here. Section 505

of the North Cascades Act supported this conclusion, and moreover, it did not "impose sitespecific limitations." Furthermore, the exemption process was a "procedural component" of

the energy commission's jurisdiction under the FPA" which it could exercise in the recreation

area under Section 505. However, the solicitor seemed to take a firmer stand on the Park

Service's options. Not only could the bureau impose conditions in the permit to protect the

recreation area's values and purposes, but it could also "deny permission to use NRA

lands...after appropriate environmental and administrative review." [45]

Although Watts' comments seemed to leave an opening for the Park Service to deny the

rights-of-way permits, the solicitor pointed out that there were significant reasons for not

challenging FERC's authority. First, in his view, should the agency successfully deny the

permits (and by association deny FERC's use of exemptions), the applicants would then seek

licenses for their projects. Second, N3C's threat to file a lawsuit contesting the use of

exemptions might have the opposite effect the group intended by placing parks -- instead of

recreation areas -- within the jurisdiction of hydropower exemptions. This would set a

precedent that greatly concerned the solicitor, for it could undermine the protection of the

nation's parks. [46]

The solicitor's opinion apparently satisfied Park Service managers, and by early 1984, they

had issued a finding of no significant impact, essentially completing the environmental

assessment. The official reasons for this stemmed from the fact that the proposed actions did
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not constitute a major federal action and would not affect the quality of human or natural

environments within the recreation area. Altogether the projects consisted of sixty acres and

generated four megawatts each. More importantly, rights-of-way permits normally did not

require an environmental impact statement because they tended to be confined to a small

area. The affected environment covered a fraction of the total land base within the recreation

area and had previously been logged. [47]

Consequently, on January 20, 1984, the Park Service approved the permits for the Damnation

Creek and Birch Creek projects. It was still reviewing the Thornton Creek permit project and

delayed its approval indefinitely when the energy commission encountered legal problems

that would, it seemed, bolster the Park Service's case for denying the small hydro projects.

Two judicial decisions handed down in 1984 promised to have "a significant impact on the

licensing process under the FPA and the issuance of exemptions by FERC. Both cases," the

solicitor wrote, "will strengthen NPS ability to deal with water power projects of all types

within NPS areas where such projects have been authorized." In the first case, The Tulalip

Tribes of Washington et al. v. FERC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Court ruled that FERC "is not authorized to issue case-specific exemptions for any project

that involves new dams or the impoundment of water such as a diversionary dam." In its

ruling the court held that the Energy Security Act of 1980 authorized FERC "to exempt only

those projects that utilized natural water features for the generation of electricity. FERC's rule

that allowed structures not exceeding 10 feet in height and impounding no more than two

acre-feet of water as eligible for exemptions was struck down by the court as being contrary

to the law and thus invalid." In the second case, Escondido Mutual Water Co. et al. v. La

Jolla Band of Mission Indians, et al., the court ruled that FERC "must accept without

modification conditions that the Secretary of the Interior deems necessary for the adequate

protection and utilization of the reservation in accordance with the purpose for which the

reservation was established." [48]

As anticipated by the solicitor, the Ninth Circuit ruling invalidated many, if not all, of the

small hydro exemptions in the North Cascades, including two of the three projects

(Damnation and Thornton creeks) within Ross Lake NRA; these were new projects, calling

for the installation of dams and/or water impoundments, whereas the Birch Creek project

called for renovation an existing project. [49] By no means, however, did this terminate the

small hydro proposals. It meant that the applicant had to request a license from FERC for a

minor project. In October 1984, William L. Divine, who operated the WLD Glacier Energy

Company, submitted license applications to FERC for the Damnation Creek Project (FERC

No. 4412-001) and the Thornton Creek Project (FERC No. 4435-001). Like the relicensing

of the Skagit Project, these applications contained materials covering an overview of the

project, its environmental impacts, and its general design. As part of the application, Divine

also submitted a State Environmental Protection Act checklist to the Washington Department

of Ecology. [50

In 1985, a number of organizations filed motions to intervene in the licensing process.

Groups like the North Cascades Conservation Council, the Seattle chapter of the Audubon

Society and the Seattle Mountaineers were among them, and protested the projects in order to

protect the recreation area's values. As intervenors in the licensing, they argued that FERC

did not have the jurisdiction to license these projects in a national park area, presumably

contesting the agency's interpretation of the FPA. They also contended that, contrary to the

Park Service's legal opinion, Congress' intent was to limit FERC's authority to those City

Light projects existing and planned when the North Cascades legislation was enacted.

However good the intentions, these views seem to have gone unrecognized. [51]

The larger issue, it seems, was the role the National Park Service would assume as the federal

land management agency empowered by recent judicial rulings. The North Cascades
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Conservation Council interpreted the Park Service's apparently passive position on the small

hydro issue as typical of the agency's faults when it came to preserving nature. Despite these

views, the Park Service displayed a great interest in blocking the projects. In October and

November 1985, the National Park Service, through the Department of the Interior, made its

formal review of the Damnation and Thornton creeks hydropower applications to FERC.

Essentially, the Park Service expressed its concern over the lack of measures to mitigate

damage to the recreation area's natural as well as outdoor recreational values. Therefore, it

recommended that FERC place special conditions for mitigation in the licenses before any

construction or operation of the projects began. At bottom, the Park Service suggested that

FERC must assess all of the cumulative impacts of these two projects and their mitigation

measures. The sense here was that it was entirely possible that mitigation would not

adequately repair the damage to the recreation area's values, and thus the agency would have

a strong case for terminating the projects. [52]

To reinforce its position, the Park Service, again through the Interior Department, filed to

intervene in the proceeding for licenses to construct and operate the hydropower projects on

Thornton and Damnation creeks. By September 1986, FERC had granted the department

status and the Park Service began to establish the conditions it believed should be part of the

applications. The department had the option of negotiating these conditions with the applicant

or having FERC impose these conditions under Section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act. [53]

Just what role the agency could take in the negotiations still seemed unclear to park

managers. In January 1987, Superintendent John Reynolds requested the solicitor's opinion

"concerning the appropriateness of the National Park Service intervening in the licensing

process to challenge FERC's jurisdiction within Ross Lake National Recreation Area." The

superintendent once more asked the solicitor to revisit his 1981 opinion, to which Richard

Neely replied that nothing in his legal interpretation had changed. In addition, the

superintendent wanted clarification about his agency's ability to ensure that the projects

complied with environmental laws, such as NEPA. The solicitor assured the superintendent

that the park, as with any other agency or member of the public, was within its legal rights to

comment on "the potential impacts from, or alternatives to, the development of small

hydroelectric projects" within Ross Lake NRA. Finally, the solicitor reminded the

superintendent that Section 505 of the North Cascades Act still applied, yet because of recent

litigation the Park Service stood a greater chance now of controlling the development and

operation small hydro projects through the licensing process. [54]

At this juncture, the Park Service's position to challenge but not oppose the projects outright

had improved. The agency took advantage of these changes in the summer of 1987. During

that year, the projects edged closer to approval when the Department of Ecology found that

they would have no significant environmental impact. All that remained was FERC's

approval, pending its environmental review, which was at least two years away. [55] FERC's

review, however, was part of a larger study of the cumulative impacts that might result from

small hydroelectric projects proposed on the Nooksack and Skagit rivers. Thus, as part of this

process, the Park Service requested that the commission "fully consider the potential

cumulative impacts of the proposed Thornton and Damnation Creek projects on the Skagit

River system." The request conceded that FERC had jurisdiction over such projects in the

recreation area, but urged the commission to "fully consider the purpose of the recreation area

as required by the Federal Power Act." The Park Service also urged the commission to

remember that it could issue a license within a reservation only after finding that "the license

will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created

or acquired." [56]

Park staff, working with FERC in this process, had every reason to believe that the

commission would consider this request. FERC's study of the cumulative impacts of

proposed small hydropower projects led to the withdrawal of many applications, primarily
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because of the time and money required of the applicants to satisfy the compliance with

environmental regulations. Moreover, it appeared likely that the two proposed projects in

Ross Lake NRA might be canceled. In June 1988, the commission dismissed the license

applications for both the Thornton and Damnation projects for a lack of progress. The

applicant, William Devine, had not produced the necessary studies and investigations agreed

to in his application. But then things seemed to turn against the Park Service. In March and

April 1989, the commission granted Devine's appeal and reinstated his license applications,

giving him an extension to the end of the year to file the requested information. [57]

In the meantime, however, one of the most significant events in the administration of the

park complex took place with the passage of the federal Washington Park Wilderness Act of

1988. Passed on November 16, 1988, the act gave formal protection to the park complex's

proposed wilderness under the Wilderness Act of 1964. Moreover, the law amended the

North Cascades Act in several ways, one of which was to clearly state the role of FERC in

the park complex. This amendment, written by Jon Jarvis with the blessing of Superintendent

Reynolds, responded to something Interior Department solicitors had been suggesting for

years: that until Section 505 was changed FERC would have authority over hydroelectric

projects in Ross Lake and Lake Chelan national recreation areas. Section 202 of the

wilderness legislation limited the number of hydroelectric projects in the complex, and thus

the commission's authority to those projects already in existence or proposed at the time of

the area's establishment. According to the legislation, FERC's responsibilities were not "in the

recreation areas," but in the

lands and waters within the Skagit River Hydroelectric Project...including the

proposed Copper Creek, High Ross, and Thunder Creek elements of the Project,

and the Newhalem Project...within the Ross Lake National Recreation Area;

lands and waters within the Lake Chelan Project...[and] the Company Creek

small hydroelectric project at Stehekin within the Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area; and existing hydrologic monitoring stations necessary for the

proper operation of the hydroelectric projects listed herein. [58]

In addition to these revisions, the act placed the wilderness boundary downstream from the

proposed projects on Thornton and Damnation creeks.

With these changes, the small hydro issue ended quickly in the North Cascades complex. In

1989, the Park Service informed FERC that the intakes for both the Damnation and Thornton

projects lay within a wilderness area, and that FERC's licensing authority over the projects

had been withdrawn by the Washington Parks Wilderness Act. Although these changes meant

an obvious loss of power for the energy commission, it abided by the new legislation, finding

it sound, and subsequently dismissed the license applications on July 29, 1989. Upset that

nearly a decade's worth of work had ended abruptly, William Devine appealed FERC's

decision on August 21, 1989; however, FERC denied his appeal on January 26, 1990, stating

that the law clearly prohibited the commission from licensing the Damnation Creek and

Thornton Creek projects. [59]

***

Compared to the issues surrounding Seattle City Light's operations on the Skagit and the

flurry of small hydropower proposals in Ross Lake NRA, Lake Chelan NRA's issues

regarding power production were less controversial. In the Stehekin Valley, for instance, the

Chelan County PUD operated the Company Creek Hydroelectric Project, a small plant

generating less than 2,000 horsepower for the community of Stehekin, under a special use

permit. [60] More important was the Lake Chelan Hydroelectric Project. Its relicensing was

less controversial than the Skagit Project's, but it was not without important meaning for park
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managers. First licensed in 1926, the Lake Chelan project, operated by the Public Utility

District No. 1 of Chelan County (Chelan PUD), was up for relicensing in the early 1970s.

The High Ross issue on the Skagit River and later the relicensing of the Skagit project itself

tended to overshadow the Lake Chelan project. To be sure, City Light's operations had a far

greater presence in, and thus greater impact on, Ross Lake NRA than the Chelan project did

on Lake Chelan NRA. Nevertheless, the hydro project at the foot of Lake Chelan, some fiftyfive miles from Stehekin, raised the lake's level by twenty-one feet to 1,100 feet. The effects

of this could be seen at the head of the lake. Fluctuating lake levels, though not as dramatic

as on Ross Lake, created problems with shoreline erosion. During periods of maximum

drawdowns, some 140 acres of mud flats were exposed at the lake's northern end, near the

outlet of the Stehekin River. Blowing silt was an intermittent problem. In April and May, the

flats dried out and strong spring winds blew silt to the Stehekin Landing, obscuring the view

of the valley and causing silt to accumulate in houses and vehicles and on vegetation.

Blowing silt caused discomfort in most people and possibly respiratory ailments in others.

Changes in the lake's level also caused wear and tear on the docks at the main landing at

Stehekin.

In the early 1970s, as the Park Service became immersed in the High Ross dealings, officials

applied similar tactics in addressing the Lake Chelan project. That is, as a condition of

Chelan PUD's license, the Park Service could require recreational developments, among other

measures, as mitigation for the project's impacts on the lands under its management. Similar

to its negotiations with City Light, the Park Service focused primarily on Exhibit R. In 1974,

the year in which the Chelan project's license expired, Superintendent Lowell White proposed

a number of items for recreation, such as the construction of new boat docks, campground

expansions, and channelizing the lake bed near the Stehekin Landing for the barge. White

also thought that the utility could improve recreational opportunities at the head of the lake

by expanding its lake cleanup, similar to a service performed by City Light on Ross Lake.

Moreover, White believed that the most important project for the PUD would be to assist the

Park Service and Forest Service in the development of Field's Point. In this way, there would

be an opportunity to run the tour boat between Field's Point and Stehekin twice a day, rather

than the daily trip from Chelan, thereby reducing the pressure on Stehekin's services. [61]

After learning that this was a simple relicensing action, and therefore no new sources of

revenue for substantial recreational improvements would be available, Superintendent White

emphasized the Field's Point development as his agency's primary objective in relicensing. In

early 1977, when Chelan PUD released its recreation plan for Lake Chelan in order to satisfy

its requirements for Exhibit R, the Park Service's objective was missing from the plan. The

utility's study, prepared with the assistance of its consultants and the Bureau of Outdoor

Recreation (BOR), considered the whole lake but focused primarily on the lower end. The

reasoning behind this decision was a simple one. Investing some $2.6 million in recreation

here would satisfy the "greatest need." The BOR supported this decision, stating that the

utility's money should go towards enhancing recreational opportunities in an area that was

predominately privately owned. These lands held great recreational potential and were closer

to the residents who could benefit from it. The Park Service and the Forest Service, however,

objected to this reasoning. They believed that the "licensee should aid in the development of

Field's Point." Their main point for involving the utility in the Field's Point project was that

fluctuating lake levels had an impact on uplake recreational opportunities. Moreover, the two

agencies stated that with financial assistance from the utility in the project they could make a

better case to receive federal appropriations to complete it. The BOR viewed this proposal as

"inequitable." Federal agencies should fund federal projects, just as private agencies funded

their own projects. If Field's Point was to be such an important ingress and egress point for

Lake Chelan NRA and Forest Service lands uplake, then the responsibility lay not with the

utility but with the government. To do otherwise would be "at the expense of recreation

development" currently proposed in the utility's plan. [62]
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In their meetings with the BOR, the Park Service and Forest Service continued to press for

some assistance from the utility in the development of Field's Point. While the two agencies

reluctantly agreed with BOR that the utility should not have to share costs for Field's Point,

they seemed intent on having the Chelan PUD provide the boat dock at the new facility.

(How this would be justified was not clear.) This, in the minds of agency managers, was a

compromise because they had earlier wanted the utility to provide not only the dock but also

the access road, parking, and day-use facilities there. [63] Evidently, the two agencies were

not able to negotiate with the utility, and by the mid-1980s had constructed the facility with

federal funds. On another front, the Forest Service and Park Service voiced concern over a

lack of attention to environmental factors. They contended that the application "does not

adequately address the alternative of a stabilized lake elevation for recreation, does not

mention shoreline stabilization, and does not address dust problems at Stehekin." [64] In this

regard, the agencies were more successful. When FERC issued the new operating license for

the hydroelectric project on May 12, 1981, the license directed the PUD to "attend to soil

erosion adjacent to streams and other waters, water pollution and air pollution on federal

land's caused by the District's operation or maintenance of its Lake Chelan Project works." In

1982, this led to an agreement between the utility and the two agencies to undertake a pilot

project to study methods of erosion control on Lake Chelan's shoreline owned by the federal

government; it was the first stage in a shoreline stabilization plan. [65]

Certainly, the Lake Chelan Hydroelectric Project was not as controversial as the Skagit

Project from a management perspective. Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, the Lake Chelan

project's thirty year license was nearly up for renewal (2004), and Park Service officials

anticipated that they would approach the process differently. If their participation in the

relicensing of the Skagit Project was any indication, they would press hard not only for

mitigation and enhancement measures for recreation but for preservation of resources as well.

Chelan County PUD saw the collaborative approach taken by City Light in the Skagit Project

relicensing favorably, too, and in May 1998 filed a request with FERC to use an alternative

approach in relicensing the Lake Chelan project. [66]

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 12:

RESEARCH AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The resource management program at North Cascades fell within the influence of the

Leopold and the National Academy of Sciences reports of 1963. Park administrators stressed

the importance of scientifically informed management, and set out to base their management

decisions on sound research. North Cascades got off on a strong foot in this regard. The

formation of the first cooperative park studies unit at the University of Washington was

directly related to the park's establishment; the new university-based research facility assisted

managers early on in their efforts to understand the wealth and diversity of park resources.

But by the early 1980s, science at North Cascades, as throughout the park system, had not

developed enough to support all management decisions. [1]

The Park Service's own 1980 State of the Parks report concluded that the agency had not

established a comprehensive and coordinated scientific management program. The report

underscored the variety and magnitude of threats to park resources and the agency's inability

to document the pace of change because it did not have an adequate knowledge of the

resources under its care. Out of the report, and its follow-up report in 1981, came the most

significant boost to science in park management since the Leopold and National Academy

reports. The primary proposals included comprehensive inventorying of natural resources, the

development of monitoring programs to detect even incremental change in park resources,

the production of park resource management plans, and an increase in staffing and training in

science and natural resource management. [2]

To a certain extent, these changes at the national level were felt in North Cascades. By the

1990s, the park complex's staff had grown considerably with the addition of a chief of

resource management, wildlife biologists, an aquatic ecologist, and geologist, among other

specialists. Over the years, the staff developed more extensive resource management plans

and developed some of the first long-range inventory and monitoring programs. One recent

study was monitoring the park's glaciers. Although the park contained one-third of all

glaciers found outside of Alaska, little data existed about their histories and role in the park

complex's hydrologic systems.

By the early 1990s, park resource managers conceded that there were still great gaps in their

knowledge about the health of the park complex's natural systems, largely from a lack of

funding and a commitment to research at the national level. This opinion was consistent with

another agency report, National Parks for the Twenty-First Century: The Vail Agenda, which

stated that the Park Service's overall approach to scientific management has been "sporadic

and inconsistent, characterized by alternating cycles of commitment and decline." The

protection of natural resources based on sound scientific research still had shortcomings from

the standpoint of staffing and funding. The agency's acknowledgement of the situation and its

promises to make substantive changes failed to allay the fears of scientists and

environmentalists. They continued to exert pressure on the service to expand scientific

research, viewing the agency's promises as largely rhetorical. [3] In effect, this kind of ebb-
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and-flow cycle of support for scientific-based resource management tended to focus attention

on the most controversial topics, and projects worthy of long-term research often went

unaddressed. At North Cascades, the most visible topics included issues surrounding fish

stocking, resource consumption, Stehekin River erosion, and fire.

***

Fisheries. In its efforts to preserve natural systems, the Park Service often encountered

conflict with those who believed national parks should be managed for the enjoyment of

people rather than the protection of nature. North Cascades officials set out to establish a

foundation for the latter in their resource management program and to inform all decisions

through sound research. Yet, as the controversy over fish stocking revealed, this approach

was not always enough to quiet agency critics, many of whom embraced a more traditional

view of national parks in which recreation was the primary goal. Often recreation involved

more than enjoyment of a primitive natural setting; it involved some kind of manipulation of

the environment, such as planting fish in the high mountain lakes of North Cascades so

people could go fishing.

By the late 1970s, fish stocking continued to be controversial. The policy variance proposed

by Superintendent Lowell White in 1975 was revised and signed by the park and Washington

Department of Game (WDG) in 1979. The policy variance stated that the department of game

could continue stocking lakes that already supported introduced trout populations "where

natural reproduction" was "inadequate to support a reasonable harvest success." [4] The

policy also stated that the department could not stock lakes "naturally barren of fish life and

presently barren of fish life." The park's long-range goal was that all stocking would be

gradually phased out over fifty years. "This would leave only naturally reproducing trout as

inhabitants of the naturally fish-barren high lakes of the North Cascades." [5] The department

of game objected to the elimination of fish planting, it seems, and this language was left out

of the policy variance. Otherwise, it agreed to work with the Park Service to develop a

recreational fisheries management program. The problem was that the Park Service wanted a

program that would rely eventually on natural conditions to sustain fish populations in high

lakes, and the game department wanted a program that would involve an aggressive stocking

program for sport fishing.

The agreement seems to have accomplished little in the way of resolving the differences

between the two agencies. By 1985, the Park Service decided that North Cascades National

Park [6] needed a stronger fish management policy in order to comply with the Park Service's

policy against fish stocking; the policy was set down in the new agency policy book (the

"blue book") that evolved from the three separate policy books for recreation areas, historic

areas, and natural areas. Under the current program, fish planting was increasing and there

was no clearly stated long-range goal to decrease fish stocking altogether. Superintendent

John Reynolds believed that the stocking program needed to be phased out, or at the very

least needed to be modified so that natural conditions prevailed. In addition to his concerns

about the protection of the park's ecosystem, Reynolds worried about the precedent the

current program was setting for the park system. Three parks, Yosemite, Sequoia, and

Lassen, had minimal stocking programs, remnants from larger programs of the past. Since

the early 1970s, their programs had been stable, and they had long-range goals of eliminating

stocking. Moreover, they were not operating under variances from National Park Service

policy. Their superintendents, however, were concerned that stocking was on the increase in

North Cascades and that it might impinge on their efforts to phase out fishing planting.

Recently, they had been approached by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife about

adopting a similar variance. [7]

Bringing North Cascades into line with Park Service policy proved to be just as controversial
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as the policy variance. Washington Department of Game officials expressed their outrage and

disappointment over the Park Service's new goals; they felt they had been slighted in their

"co-management" of the park's alpine lakes, and vowed to continue operating under the

variance. Oddly enough, both the WDG and the Park Service signed a new memorandum of

understanding, approved on August 15, 1985, that nullified all previous agreements, including

the one for the stocking program. Then began the long process of finding a compromise

policy. The WDG clung to the variance, declaring that it was still in effect; the Park Service,

on the other hand, asserted that it had the legal right to phase out fish stocking within North

Cascades. [8]

The Park Service faced a complicated political matter. Convincing the department of game

and its constituents of the value of its management plans appeared to be an insurmountable

challenge. The director of the WDG, Jack Wayland, insisted that "fish planting" should

continue in North Cascades "forever." He believed fish planting was the intent of Congress,

and even the Park Service, as expressed during the park hearings. Wayland refused to

acknowledge that the variance was no longer valid and stated that his agency would continue

to plant lakes with fish as long as it had political support for the program (which it did) or

until the courts ruled against it. Justifying his position, Wayland argued that the long-range

objective had not been expansion of fish planting but "simply full implementation of the

variance, a critical element of which was classifying the lakes in the park with fishery

potential." [9]

In truth, the Park Service was not proposing to eliminate fish stocking entirely but rather to

limit it in order to preserve as many lakes as possible in their natural state. At the heart of the

dispute was a question: Did preservation interfere unfairly with recreational fishing? Sport

fishing groups as well as the department of game seemed to think so and mounted a vocal

campaign against the agency's new proposal. In June 1986, National Park Service Director

William Penn Mott, Jr., responded by establishing a new fish management policy for the

North Cascades complex. The policy sought to find a compromise that would be attractive to

those who thought of parks as purely recreational resources and those who thought of parks

as relatively pristine natural areas.

Mott's policy acknowledged that fishing was an acceptable recreational pursuit in the national

park, but fishing should not come at the detriment of lakes in their natural state. In this

regard, the policy assigned the park's lakes to three categories: "natural fish-free waters, selfsustaining fish population waters, and continue to stock waters." The lakes would be managed

so that those without fish will not be stocked "with any kind of fish." The policy also stated

that the park's other lakes with fish populations, the result of stocking, would be largely left

to survive under natural conditions. Finally, only those waters within the park that were

selected specifically to be managed as "enhanced recreational fishery waters...may be stocked

now or in the future." The three classes of lakes, the policy concluded, "will provide for an

enhanced recreational fishing experience in the park while at the same time assuring that we

provide the opportunity for aquatic research under natural conditions." [10]

In keeping with the agency's emphasis on research-informed policy, Mott ordered that the

Park Service develop and implement a research program that addressed three things. First,

the research program should establish "current fish and aquatic habitat baseline conditions in

park waters." Second, the program should monitor "the impacts of this fish-stocking

guidance on fish and other wildlife." And third, it should determine "changes over time

referenced against current baseline conditions or undisturbed natural conditions where they

are known." The data would be used then to make an informed decision about the future of

"our fish-stocking management." [11]

Before the Park Service could move forward with its research program, it first had to consult
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with the department of game. The 1985 memorandum of understanding bound the Park

Service to consult with the state prior to initiating any research projects or carrying out plans

or programs for fisheries. The memorandum also required the two agencies to consult about

proposals to transplant fish in North Cascades. [12] Coming to mutually agreeable terms was

unlikely. The department of game continued to reject Park Service attempts to limit or phase

out fish planting in the lakes of North Cascades. Wayland informed Mott that his department

could not accept his new policy because it would exclude the state and other interested parties

from the recreational fish management program. [13]

The fish-planting issue came to a head in 1987. In their meetings with the Washington State

Department of Wildlife (formerly the department of game), park officials maintained that

they were abiding by Mott's 1986 directive, thus continuing the moratorium on any stocking

of fish-free waters. Park managers also issued a compromise; they would provide a total of

forty recreational fishing lakes within the park, for a total of sixty-one in the park complex.

Finally, the agency would not make any changes in management actions until completion of

the fishery research project. (The three-year research project, agreed to by both agencies, was

approved for fiscal year 1989.) The project, above all, would satisfy the Park Service's

responsibilities under NEPA to assess the environmental consequences of introducing fish

into naturally fish-free lakes.

The department of wildlife and its supporters objected to the Park Service's proposal; they

claimed that despite finding some common ground on the issue, the agency was still intent on

eliminating fish planting from the park. The controversy, it seems, was on the verge of

exploding into a full-scale interagency battle. In the fall of 1987, Director Wayland

threatened to "bomb" twelve lakes in the park with trout, planting the fish by helicopter,

"unless I am assured that we have reached a satisfactory long-term resolution which allows

continued planting of lakes in the Park." The Park Service replied that it would seek an

injunction in federal court to block the planting. "We are not backing off," noted Associate

Regional Director Michael Tollefson. "We have tried to work with the state and we feel our

position is valid and reasonable." Should the state follow through with its plans, the Park

Service threatened to cite the state for violating federal regulations and would consider killing

the planted fish through "accepted chemical means." [14]

A short time later, however, Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks William P.

Horn intervened and asked the agencies to work out their differences. [15] A truce followed

while the agencies presented their positions to Horn. In the spring of 1988, the assistant

secretary notified the agencies that he had reviewed their materials and found they agreed on

a number of critical matters -- which lakes had been stocked in the past, which were

presumed to be fish free, and which were thought to have the least reproduction of fish.

Beyond that, Horn acknowledged the Park Service's policies regarding fish stocking had

become more conservative in recent years. Thus, the Park Service's study would be a

valuable source for deciding what role "fish-stocking would have in the management of

recreational fishing in the park." Over the next several years, Horn recommended that the

current program continue while the research program was designed and implemented.

Afterwards, he suggested that the two agencies use the research to work cooperatively in

developing a viable recreational fishing program, one subject to public review. [16]

To this end, both the state and Park Service signed a supplemental agreement to the earlier

memorandum of understanding on July 12, 1988. [17] The agreement allowed the department

of wildlife to continue stocking forty lakes (twice as many as under the variance) within the

park for the next twelve years. The two agencies would consult on the number and species of

fish, specific lakes, and the planting frequency of those lakes to be stocked. By all

indications, park officials would limit the fish-stocking program. The Park Service noted that

while Horn's letter and agency policies for natural zones supported this management
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approach, it intended to use the research and monitoring program to "review and modify its

decisions and the agreement as necessary." [18]

In 1994, Oregon State University, which conducted the fish research project for the Park

Service, reported that fish stocking might alter "the invertebrate community structure as well

as indigenous salamander populations. Human impacts on fragile lakeshore environments"

appeared to be more "pronounced where fish are stocked." In other words, sport fishers

attracted to lakes stocked for fishing in turn harmed these sensitive areas. Recent plans called

for more research to be completed by Oregon State University in 1995 to assess the "impacts

of fish stocking on salamander abundance and distribution." All of this would assist managers

in understanding the impact of fishing on mountain lakes over time and assist in the

development of "aquatic resource mitigation and restoration plans." [19] In the new

millennium, the fish stocking policy will be revisited using this and other research data.

***

Other fish management issues in the park complex reflected concerns similar to fish stocking

without the same level of controversy. The primary management theme was to maintain

fisheries in their natural state as much as possible whether in the park complex's reservoirs,

rivers and tributaries, or natural lakes. By the 1990s, research, inventorying, monitoring, and

coordinated management with other agencies dominated the approach taken by park staff.

The intent was to protect and if warranted reintroduce native fish. The internal and external

influences affecting the park complex's fisheries were quite varied, including recreational

fishing, the introduction of non-native species, and the presence of hydroelectric projects.

[20]

In Lake Chelan NRA, preserving the fish native to the lower Stehekin River and Lake Chelan

seemed impossible. Bull trout and Lake Chelan cutthroat trout, the most dominant sport fish,

had all but disappeared after the introduction of such alien species as rainbow trout, brook

trout, kokanee salmon, chinook salmon, and lake trout. Moreover, the introduction of other

genotypes of cutthroat trout made it doubtful that any remnant populations of native cutthroat

lived in the lower Stehekin or in Lake Chelan. One of the biggest problems for the lake was

the introduction of mysis shrimp. These freshwater shrimp had been successful in raising the

size of fish in some Canadian lakes so the fish and game agencies were planting them in

lakes all over the West. In deep lakes like Chelan, however, the nocturnal shrimp dive during

the day below the feeding zone of the fish and rise again at night to feed, competing directly

with the fish for food they were planted to fatten up in the first place. The shrimp almost

proved fatal to the kokanee population in Lake Chelan, in a sense paving the way for the

introduction of chinook salmon and lake trout. Managing the native fish in the lake was only

possible if a fish trap was operated at the mouth of the Stehekin River to prevent kokanee and

chinook from migrating up the river to spawn. The situation was further complicated by the

number of agencies responsible for fisheries management in these waters. There were at least

five: the National Park Service, Washington Department of Wildlife, Washington Department

of Fisheries, Wenatchee National Forest, and Chelan County PUD.

Although the Park Service did not oppose the enhancement of habitat for introduced fish in

Lake Chelan NRA, it wanted to ensure that habitat enhancement did not harm or further

deteriorate the area's native fish population. One way to accomplish this objective was

through a comprehensive fishery management plan for Lake Chelan; the plan would

coordinate the various agencies with interests in the lake's fisheries. Although an interagency

committee produced a draft fishery plan in 1979, it was never finalized and was ineffective.

In the early 1990s, Park Service officials renewed efforts to produce a comprehensive plan,

especially since the department of wildlife had renewed stocking of chinook salmon in 1990.

The idea, according to the park complex's resource management plan, was to "eliminate the
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shotgun approach of each agency managing the fishery for its own particular interests." [21]

Another way was through the relicensing of the Lake Chelan Hydroelectric Project, scheduled

for 2004. As part of the Park Service's mitigation package, agency officials anticipated that

they would submit a proposal for a genetic study looking for remnant populations of native

fish in the Stehekin River, and possibly reintroduce historic fish species to the river and Lake

Chelan. They also anticipated that the proposal would be controversial. Among other things

the question of what was "natural" had changed over the years. Although introduced by the

state in the 1910s, kokanee salmon were now considered a natural fish, since they had been

successfully reproducing in the lower Stehekin River and Company Creek. In addition to

many political and economic considerations, any program to enhance habitat for a known

native fish would have to assess the possible influence it would have on existing "natural"

species like the kokanee.

In the northern half of the park complex, fisheries management operated on a much larger

scale geographically as well as politically. The most notable example of this was the role

played by hydroelectric facilities. They altered the flows of both the Baker and Skagit rivers

and damaged fish habitat; any mitigation of the damaged habitat and restoration of fish

populations involved a complicated bureaucratic process. Salmon received a greater emphasis

in this region, since they were native to the Skagit River system. In fact, it was one of the few

watersheds within the Puget Sound region managed for natural production of salmon. For

much of the last century, Skagit River salmon stocks have declined for a number of reasons

that are not fully understood. But the decline most likely can be attributed to habitat loss

from logging, farming, non-point pollution, and hydroelectric developments. Moreover,

overharvest from commercial, sport, and tribal fishing has reduced salmon populations.

Ultimately, the park complex's ability to protect and manage the salmon runs within its

boundaries depended on its cooperation with other agencies and groups. On the Baker River,

for example, park staff helped several agencies to save the river's native sockeye, one of

three runs left in Washington. Under the current plan, the salmon are trucked around the

dams and deposited in spawning ponds or released into Baker Lake or lower Baker River;

from there they swim up river and into the park to spawn.

On the Skagit River, the Park Service worked with the state and Seattle City Light to

coordinate and monitor salmon and other fish populations and then make recommendations

for management decisions. On the Skagit, however, dams did not block the historic salmon

runs, since salmon did not migrate beyond the Skagit Gorge. [22] The chain of dams did alter

the river's flow though, which in turn altered the spawning grounds for salmon and other

anadromous fish. Furthermore, salmon used the side channels, or tributaries, of the Skagit to

spawn. Without flooding controlled by dams, these channels disappeared. As part of the

fisheries settlement agreement with City Light's relicensing of the Skagit Project, the Park

Service was able to have these and other fisheries issues addressed through Skagit River flow

and non-flow mitigation plans. The plans, extensively detailed, generally provided for river

flows that would maximize the protection of spawning salmon and steelhead and their

offspring. The plans also provided for steelhead production, off-channel salmon habitat

enhancement, chinook salmon research, and the development of the Ross Lake resident trout

program.

The park engaged in cooperative efforts with other agencies to restore fish habitat as well.

One project was the construction of a spawning channel near Newhalem Creek. Constructed

in 1985 by the Washington Department of Fisheries with the assistance of park biologist Bob

Wasem, the channel was intended to benefit both chum and coho salmon populations

returning each year to the upper Skagit. The department proposed eleven more sites within

Ross Lake NRA for spawning channels, hoping to restore coho salmon populations in the

Skagit system. Although the Park Service agreed that the need for restoring habitat was great,

it believed that monitoring the Newhalem spawning channel was essential to understanding
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the value of such a program. Park biologists initiated a seven-year monitoring program in the

early 1990s, and will use this data to determine whether more spawning channels should be

constructed. In another venture, park officials reached a settlement with City Light as part of

its relicensing of the Newhalem Creek Hydroelectric Project. As mitigation for fisheries, the

settlement reduced the project's operation time to about half a year, thereby providing enough

water to support chinook salmon, steelhead, and bull trout.

In other areas of management, the fisheries program broadened its scope by examining the

ecological conditions of the park's fish populations. This kind of work had been the goal of

park officials since the creation of North Cascades. But it took time and funding to

implement, and funding was often unavailable to launch a comprehensive program. In the

first decades of management, the park biologist and his seasonal staff focused primarily on a

wide range of survey work which covered fish, streams, ponds, lakes, as well as basic water

quality analyses. The main intent of this approach was to assess the state of natural systems

before a crisis appeared, but it was piecemeal. In 1993, the program was poised for change

when North Cascades was one of eleven parks accepted for a long-term ecological

monitoring program. Unfortunately, the program, with an annual cost of $1 million, went

unfunded.

Meanwhile, park biologists attempted to support the long-term study by conducting smaller,

pilot projects to classify habitat types and characteristics, for example, in order to extrapolate

from this evidence for the whole parkland. As part of this effort, the park geologist undertook

a project to create landform maps, which would contain information essential to identifying

and classifying aquatic habitat. Particularly significant was a recent arthropod study in the

Big Beaver Valley, a research natural area. Funded by a grant from the Skagit Environmental

Endowment Commission, the two-year study identified at least six hundred species

previously unknown to researchers and the habitats in which they were found.

Finally, because park boundaries were influenced by politics and not natural conditions,

ecosystem management was often management by committee. Park biologists were members

of at least five committees for the management of the Skagit River. They had also linked up

with the Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest, which had one million acres surrounding

the park. And they have recently entered into a cooperative monitoring project of the

Chilliwack River with British Columbia; Canadian authorities wanted to use the Chilliwack

as a reference for pristine habitat for their restoration of other streams in the lower mainland.

***

Resource consumption. The North Cascades Act allowed the use of renewable natural

resources in the park complex's two recreation areas, but the legislation was primarily written

to accommodate existing uses of resources by residents in the Stehekin Valley. [23] The

continued use of the valley's forests for firewood was a volatile topic, and in the late 1970s,

park administrators revisited firewood policies in the Stehekin country. Environmental groups

criticized the policies as "logging" rather than the milder description of "wood gathering"

used by valley residents. Grant McConnell read the 1972 interim firewood plan as a

document condoning the expansion of wood cutting. The plan identified the former Courtney

mill and a "fairway" near the airstrip as two possible sites for wood cutting. Wood cutting in

these areas would lead to the development of more informal roads, McConnell argued,

leading to the needless invasion of a particularly "wild and beautiful part of the Stehekin

Valley." [24] On the other hand, valley residents feared that there would be a firewood

scarcity if wood cutting were restricted to the areas designated in the interim plan. Park

Service managers were also concerned about firewood supplies. They needed to consider the

continuing use of firewood as well as the potential for increased demand for firewood with a

rising local population. Although some checking was done on the amount of wood cut, the
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program operated primarily on the honor system. Managers worried that the current plan

would not allow for a sustainable harvest of firewood.

In 1978, concerns over firewood scarcity motivated the Park Service to better understand the

forest resources of the lower valley. The subject of forest research had arisen as early as 1973

when a proposal was submitted by Park Biologist Bob Wasem. But like most "proposed

contract research," the forest resource study went unfunded. As of 1978, Wasem noted, the

study was ninth on the park's priority list for research. He urged his superiors to fund the

study as soon as possible. With a little luck, he quipped, the study might be completed "while

a forest still exists." [25] The following year Superintendent Keith Miller made the research

project the park's top priority, and the agency contracted with the University of Washington

to complete the Stehekin firewood study. Miller asserted that the issue of firewood use in

Stehekin, as with the use of renewable resources in general in Lake Chelan NRA, was not

going to be resolved without research. [26]

In 1981, Chadwick Oliver and Bruce Larson completed their survey of the Stehekin Valley's

forest resources and related consumptive use of firewood. Their report suggested that there

was a severe depletion of dead trees within the valley and that the current rate of removal of

trees exceeded those dying of natural causes. In other words, the firewood program was not

being managed for sustained yield. Moreover, the current program was having an adverse

affect on a variety of native wildlife; dead trees were important habitat for wildlife,

particularly cavity nesting birds and mammals. In part, the study also concluded what

preservation interests had insisted: the program had created an extensive network of access

roads and unsightly stumps, reducing the valley's scenic appeal. Finally, the study proposed a

woodlot system for firewood cutting that could be managed on a sustained yield basis. Oliver

and Larson established woodlots in four areas. One lot was near the airstrip; two were up the

valley near McGregor Meadows, and the fourth woodlot was part of the old golf course area

in the vicinity of the River Trail. Within the woodlots, there was a total of seventy-six lots up

to an acre in size. In general, the plan's intent was to provide a "perpetual sustainable supply

of firewood" by prescribing that the lots be cut on an eighty-year rotation. The plan also

suggested methods of replanting and other management techniques. All told, the "system was

designed to minimize regeneration problems, maximize flexibility, and provide general

simplicity in management." [27]

Oliver and Larson's study reinforced the need to update the existing firewood management

plan, but there were still questions that required answers before a new plan could go into

effect. The main question was whether the consumption of firewood met the requirements of

Section 402 (a) of the North Cascades Act. Was the harvesting of firewood, a "renewable

natural resource," compatible with the recreation area's recreational, natural, and cultural

values? In 1984, park officials began to revise the valley's firewood management plan with

this and other questions before them, and worked closely with the firewood committee of the

Stehekin Community Council. When Superintendent John Reynolds arrived at his new post in

October of that year, he recognized the plan's importance and pushed for its completion.

North Cascades released a draft firewood management plan and environmental assessment in

April 1985, but it had serious shortcomings, perhaps because it was hastily done. Public

comments illustrated some of the plan's problems. Preservation groups, like the North

Cascades Conservation Council, decried the proposed woodlot system as "clearcutting,"

while some valley residents felt betrayed by the plan's suggestion that their wood gathering

practices were harming the environment. After hearing these comments, Superintendent

Reynolds further investigated firewood gathering in the valley, especially reports of illegal

and insensitive cutting practices. Afterwards, he realized that the draft plan was "unworkable"

and rejected it in December. [28]

Based on his own observations and the recommendations of his staff, Reynolds stated that the
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original draft plan "did not adequately address present and future cordage limits to prevent

significant impairment to the area, did not present a truly sustained yield cutting scenario or a

plan for cutting that followed or could be justified by the Oliver/Larson study." Furthermore,

the alternatives in the plan "did not address other heating sources, replanting programs or the

impact of sustained and increased cutting to meet a growing demand on wildlife in the

Valley." Finally, Reynolds wanted to ensure that firewood cutting was within the intent of the

recreation area's legislation. [29]

Like many issues in Stehekin, firewood cutting was sensitive, and Reynolds assigned

Stehekin District Ranger Curt Sauer the responsibility of writing another draft plan. It was

particularly important that Sauer head up the planning process, so he could work directly with

Stehekin residents and hear their viewpoints. Until the new draft plan was ready,

Superintendent Reynolds issued a temporary plan based, with a few modifications, on the

1972 interim plan. By no means was the planning process without conflict. Park

administrators were attempting to balance resource use and preservation. Many valley

residents chafed at more restrictions on their "rights" to use resources while preservationists,

led by the N3C, continued to insist that wood cutting was inappropriate, and that nothing in

the North Cascades Act required the Park Service to supply firewood to anyone. [30]

After a period of public review, Superintendent Reynolds adopted the new Stehekin Valley

firewood management plan on September 2, 1987. Reynolds chose the Park Service's

preferred alternative: firewood was to be cut in a sustained yield woodlot system, managed on

an eighty year rotation. This would allow for an initial annual limit of 150 cords decreasing

to an annual limit of 120 cords by 1992. Afterwards, the sustained annual yield would be

approximately 100 cords. There were two woodlots, one south of the airfield and the other on

the eastern edge of the former golf course. The woodlots embraced nearly seventy-five acres.

Each year the program would be administered by park staff who would issue permits, collect

fees for the permits, conduct on-site wildlife surveys, enforce regulations and woodlot posttreatment. Post-treatment required slash to be piled and burned, and native seedlings to be

planted. The plan addressed other points of contention as well, noting that the agency would

regulate access to prevent the expansion of primitive roads. In addition to the woodlot

system, the plan identified several other sources of firewood in the valley. These included

"administratively-derived wood," such as hazardous trees removed by the Park Service;

naturally fallen trees; and driftwood from Lake Chelan. The policy also stipulated that

residents would need to burn wood in stoves that met Washington State standards for

emissions and efficiency by 1992. In this way, residents would burn less firewood and thus

conserve firewood on federal land. [31]

Reynolds' decision was not popular with environmentalists. The North Cascades

Conservation Council was particularly offended that the agency would allow live trees to be

cut, even though evidence suggested that the health of the forest was dependent on dead and

decaying trees, too. Moreover, the group stressed that no wood should be cut from federal

lands. The fact that the Park Service condoned this practice suggested that the Park Service

was placing the needs of Stehekin residents above those of the American public. Why should

the resources of public lands benefit so few, and at what cost? How could the agency ensure

that the woodlot system would not damage the natural, scenic, recreational, scientific, and

cultural values of the recreation area? Superintendent Reynolds defended the Park Service's

position by stating that the North Cascades Act "clearly allows the NPS to permit the

utilization of renewable natural resources," such as the collection of firewood, as long as it

does not "impair the values for which the area was established." The current policy, he

concluded, would strike the appropriate balance called for in the enabling legislation. [32]

Members of the conservation council thought otherwise, and the firewood management

policy was the key reason for the group's 1989 lawsuit against the Park Service and its
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administration of the Stehekin Valley. As part of the settlement reached in 1991, the Park

Service agreed to review the firewood program as part of an environmental impact statement.

Specifically, the agency would consider alternative sources of wood and fuel to be used by

valley residents in the future to heat their homes. In 1995, the Park Service completed its new

fire management plan. The greatest difference between this and the former plan was that

firewood cutting would gradually become part of the valley's forest fuel reduction program.

The plan called for phasing out the practice of woodlot cutting over a two-year period while

forest fuel reduction areas were established; the reduction areas would replace the woodlots

as the primary source of firewood. In time, residents would gather firewood from familiar

sources -- such as hazard trees, blowdown trees, trees cut as part of management projects,

driftwood from Lake Chelan -- as well as new sources, such as trees removed from forest

fuel reduction areas by selective manual thinning. The full transition from woodlots to

selective thinning depended on the success of a long-term monitoring program. Finally, the

Park Service seemed to suggest that over time the firewood supply would diminish, and that

while a "renewable resource," it was not an infinite resource. In the future, residents would

burn what was available and seek other sources of heat if necessary. [33]

***

Mineral resources. In the case of firewood, the Park Service could say with certainty that

trees were a renewable natural resource and their use was covered under Section 402 of the

North Cascades Act. The agency could not say the same about mineral materials such as soil,

sand, and stone, covered generally by Section 402(b) of the legislation. During the first

decade of management, park administrators allowed valley residents to excavate these

materials from federal land for their own use with little regulation; the consumption of these

resources fell under the umbrella of existing historic uses mentioned in the complex's

enabling legislation. Moreover, the Park Service was the largest consumer of these resources

and continued to use them for administrative purposes, such as maintaining roads and trails,

without claiming any adverse impacts. The agency, one could argue, created its own problem.

When it paved the lower section of the Stehekin road in the early 1970s, the Park Service

opened a gravel pit on Rainbow Creek and a borrow pit, and started the use of riprap instead

of rounded river rock along the river to shore up the road. By using these resources, the

agency did not, or could not, deny residents the right to continue to take rock, sand, and soil

from federal lands for their own projects, albeit on a small scale. Officials assumed that as

long as they were allowing private use that it was better to concentrate use in areas managers

had already developed rather than disperse use. According to one park document, this

"private use, initially allowed on a minimal scale and without an overall plan for the valley,

became an accepted way of managing Lake Chelan NRA." [34]

Meanwhile, the Park Service focus changed regarding the use of natural resources, especially

to more closely conform to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) and to revisions in the Park Service's policies in the late 1970s which stressed

greater protection of natural values in all park areas. It was around this same time that the

Park Service began to tighten its regulations governing the private use of soil, gravel, and

other mineral materials. In 1979, Superintendent Keith Miller decided that the Stehekin

community could not remove any more topsoil, sand, or gravel from federal land until a

permit system had been established. Miller was concerned especially about the excessive

removal of topsoil from Park Service land by residents for their gardens and lawns. The

superintendent's guidelines basically allowed the practice to continue but to be more closely

monitored by the district ranger. Miller followed up with a soil borrow management plan in

1981, which contained specific guidelines for public and private use, notably the amount of

dirt available on an annual basis. (Evidently, Miller believed that sand, rock, and gravel were

renewable resources, since the Stehekin River's annual floods replenished supplies found

along the river and in the floodplain, where many found these resources.) The plan limited
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the removal of soil to the one borrow pit on federal land, and the agency did not plan to

develop any others. [35] (The plan was in effect until the late 1980s.)

Miller's stand against the overuse of topsoil raised some protest from members of the

Stehekin community. Roberta Pitts, president of the Stehekin Property Owners and Residents

Association, suggested that the superintendent's policy ran counter to valley tradition and

foisted yet another set of regulations on property owners. Miller defended his position, stating

that residents could continue to use topsoil for an indefinite period. But more importantly, he

declared that he did not consider soil to be "a renewable resource when one considers the

hundreds of years it takes nature to develop soil. There is no way within our life times that

the soil removed from the pit will be replaced." The superintendent even suggested that

closing the pit might be the best solution to the issue. It was his responsibility to "assist the

community in sharing a resource to a degree which would help in the development of

gardens, but at the same time insuring that a resource which will not renew itself in hundreds

of years, be carefully controlled and used wisely." [36]

At issue was whether or not the Park Service could legally allow residents to use mineral

resources such as sand, rock, and gravel, in addition to topsoil, taken from federal land. In

1979, as part of a court agreement involving Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, the

Secretary of the Interior agreed to establish regulations implementing the mineral disposal

authority found in the enabling legislation of the five recreation areas, including Glen

Canyon, that permitted mineral extraction. Ross Lake and Lake Chelan recreation areas were

among these areas. In 1981, the secretary published the regulations and they consisted of

three major elements that were applicable to Lake Chelan NRA. First, the only minerals that

could be removed were solid leasables, such as sodium, and solid locatables, such as gold.

Second, a lease was required to remove all minerals. And third, Lake Chelan NRA was

declared an "excepted area," a designation which prohibited all mineral leasing from the

federal lands within its boundaries. According to the environmental assessment carried out in

support of the regulations, the government granted Lake Chelan NRA the "excepted area"

status because any mineral extraction would adversely affect the area's environment and

visitor experience. [37]

The Park Service interpreted the new regulations to mean that it could continue to allow

residents to remove sand, gravel, and similar materials from federal land in Lake Chelan

NRA for private use. Superintendent Miller based his soil borrow plan on this interpretation,

and Superintendent Reynolds extended the plan in 1986. However, agency officials

misunderstood the regulations. Although sand, rock, and gravel were defined as "nonleasable minerals," and therefore were not included in the new regulations, the Park Service

still could not allow their removal until it had prepared a new regulation for this action,

promulgated by the Interior Secretary. Topsoil, on the other hand, was neither a renewable

resource nor a non-leasable mineral, and its extraction in the valley was prohibited altogether.

Superintendent Reynolds informed the Stehekin community of the change in policy in 1987,

stating that past practices were in violation of federal law, specifically Section 402 and the

Mineral Materials Disposal Act. And until the issue was resolved the Park Service would "not

be issuing any permits for the removal of sand, gravel, or stone." [38]

The change in policy created an "unexpected" disruption for many people living in Stehekin,

Reynolds noted, and he vowed his staff would find an "equitable solution" as soon as

possible. The superintendent asserted that the general management plan would address the

issue as part of the current park planning process. Finding a solution, however, presented

something of a paradox. While the Park Service had the statutory authority to permit the

removal of mineral materials such as sand, rock, and gravel, a new regulation could set off

even more problems than it solved. First, such a regulation could threaten the recreation area's

"excepted status," and create pressure to remove leasable minerals from the area. It could be
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argued that the removal of sand and gravel was like surface mining conducted in search of

precious metals. Second, if promulgated, the regulation could set a precedent for the three

other park areas with enabling acts similar to Lake Chelan NRA's. Finally, there was also the

ongoing debate about the "renewableness" of sand and gravel, which they were in geologic

terms, and thus covered under Section 402(a) of the North Cascades legislation; sand and

gravel, in other words, would be treated the same as firewood. All of this served to

complicate rather than simplify the situation.

Park officials found a partial solution in the Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988.

Section 206 of the act amended Section 402 (b) of Lake Chelan NRA's enabling legislation.

The section clarified the authority for mineral resource use:

Within that portion of Lake Chelan National Recreation Area which is not

designated as wilderness, sand, rock, and gravel may be made available for sale

to residents of Stehekin for local use so long as such sale and disposal does not

have significant adverse effects on the administration of the Lake Chelan

National Recreation Area. [39]

The legislation granted the Park Service specific authority in the recreation area over mineral

resource use without a special regulation. In doing so, park managers gave up on the debate

over sand and gravel being renewable and saved other recreation areas from a legal

precedent. [40] After the act passed in the fall of 1988, the Park Service resumed the sale of

sand, rock, and gravel to local residents from the Company Creek pit. The pit had been

selected in 1981 as the main extraction site because it was located away from primary visitor

areas, and because its use would relieve impacts on more sensitive sites along the Stehekin

River.

The Park Service's solution did not sit well with preservation groups. The North Cascades

Conservation Council included the agency's policy for mineral resources in its 1989 lawsuit,

and as part of the April 1991 consent decree, park managers suspended private use of public

sand, rock, and gravel. As specified in the settlement, the Park Service developed a sand,

rock, and gravel plan for the recreation area that once again allowed the removal of mineral

materials by Stehekin residents. The plan and its environmental assessment explored the

entire range of alternatives for the use of sand, rock, and gravel for private as well as public

use, since the National Park Service continued to be the principal user of these resources. The

alternatives included closing the pit and importing material from outside the valley to using

the pit for most administrative and private uses. In general, the most practical option was to

"allow mining of sand, rock, and gravel in the valley but restrict mining to the Company

Creek pit for NPS maintenance and public use and to allow private use for minor

reconstruction only and to allow for importing of material from outside the valley for new

construction." The idea was to confine the size of the pit's footprint and to aggressively

rehabilitate "abandoned" portions of the pit. All of this would be subject to applicable laws,

agency policies, and plans. The main criteria was that use of the valley's mineral resources

would not adversely affect the purposes of the recreation area. Upon completion of the plan

in June 1995, private use of sand, rock, and gravel resumed. [41]

***

Rivers. Although the Park Service manages the rivers in North Cascades in their natural

condition, two of the largest rivers have been significantly modified for human use. Dams

have segmented the Skagit River into three reservoirs for the production of electricity above

Newhalem, and regulate the river's flow below there. The recent settlement agreements for

Seattle City Light's relicensing of the Skagit Project covered much of the mitigation for

erosion, fisheries, and recreational enhancements. Still, managers needed to address
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recreational use of the free-flowing Skagit. Because the dams controlled stream flows, the

river was always runnable and challenging. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Skagit attracted

growing numbers of kayakers, canoeists, and rafters who floated the river on their own or

with commercial guides. [42]

In 1978, park officials studied the effects of river running on the Skagit's riparian zone caused

by overcrowding, human waste and garbage, as well as possible impacts to the river's

aesthetics; they also considered the needs of visitor safety. Managers then developed a

system for monitoring use of the river through a voluntary permit system for private users

and a mandatory permit system for commercial users, who were required to meet certain

safety standards. Rangers also conducted daily river patrols, checking for hazards, picking up

trash, and conducting safety checks of river runners. Other measures included organizing

put-in and take-out parking to relieve congestion. The system appeared adequate since the

number of users had leveled off since 1980, when around 3,200 visitors floated the Skagit,

and by the early 1990s had leveled off at around 2,000 visitors a year. Yet a more pressing

concern was the effects of recreational river running on the overwintering bald eagles along

the Skagit Wild and Scenic River, downstream from Ross Lake NRA. In 1986, the Forest

Service, which managed this section of the river, completed a study of the issue and

concluded that more exhaustive research was needed, and thus the Park Service would

develop mitigation procedures when more information became available. [43]

The Stehekin River vividly displayed human modifications mostly through erosion control

measures rather than large-scale hydroelectric developments. Rising in the glaciers and

snowfields above Horseshoe Basin, the Stehekin meanders through the lower valley in a

wide, uneven floodplain. Over time, its course has changed with spring floods and debris

dams. New channels have formed as the river abandoned old ones and carved a course along

the path of least resistance. From High Bridge to where it empties into Lake Chelan, the river

flows through the recreation area and a mixture of private and public lands where the natural

processes of flooding and erosion threaten, and at times destroy, property and improvements

such as homes, the valley road, and bridges.

Human encounters with the river have centered on protecting land and improvements. Before

and after the Park Service entered Stehekin, residents and government officials altered the

river's course by riprapping its banks to protect their property as well as roads and bridges

from erosion. Other attempts to control the river have been through salvage logging and

channelization. Residents and Park Service managers alike have mined the river at times for

sand, gravel, and stone; in some instances, they wanted to direct its course and in others to

collect materials for development projects. All of these actions have often had unintended

consequences. Riprap to save the road or a home may have been successful, but the solution

to one problem was often the source of another; riprap may have altered the river's flow away

from one area, but as a result, the river threatened another area farther downstream.

The Park Service either ignored or sanctioned activities altering the river's flow for nearly

twenty years. Ironically, agency managers played a large role in the river's changes because

the Park Service had accepted the responsibility to protect public roads and facilities from

flood damage; this meant that the agency carried out a number of riprapping and bank

stabilization projects. While the agency wanted to preserve the river in as natural a state as

possible, its goal was complicated by questions of ownership and multiple jurisdictions, as

well as by the rights of private property owners and the river's use for recreation.

The way the Park Service treated the troubled Stehekin River Resort illustrated one aspect of

its management of the Stehekin River, in particular the relationship between private and

public lands. Shortly after the establishment of the park complex, the owners of the Stehekin

River Resort, which was located near the mouth of the river, contacted the Park Service about
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the damage to their property from severe erosion. In the past, the resort's owners had worked

with the upstream landowner adjacent to the resort to protect the river bank and had planned

to carry out more bank stabilization with log cribbing and riprapping, possibly with old car

bodies filled with gravel. They also contemplated reopening an old river channel so they

could reclaim a "considerable part of our property now in the main bed of the river." The

Park Service, however, had recently purchased this property, and the resort's owners wanted

the agency to consider assisting them in making these modifications. The other option they

proposed was to reclassify their property, eliminating it from the private development zone,

so that the government could purchase it. In either case, the Park Service would help solve

their problem. [44]

The Park Service responded that it did not want direct involvement in river stabilization for

private property owners. The agency simply did not have the funds, and if it assisted the

resort owners then it might set a precedent for helping other owners along the river.

However, park managers agreed to let the resort operators have access to the Brownfield

property if they wanted to carry out the stabilization project on their own, as long as "it was

reasonably compatible with the overall management of the area." [45] Instead, the owners of

the Stehekin River Resort decided to sell their property to the National Park Service. District

Manager George Wagner was interested in the property because the cabins would provide

seasonal housing. In this way, the Park Service could protect the natural outlet to Lake

Chelan from being destroyed by river stabilization work. Superintendent Lowell White

thought otherwise. By acquiring the property, the agency might set a dangerous precedent of

violating the private development zone, and the agency opted not to purchase the resort

property.

The Park Service was trying to prevent setting two precedents and preserve the river in a

mostly natural condition. The resort owners did not share these goals. One owner was caught

trying to riprap the river bank on federal land on the old Brownfield property. In 1972, the

resort's owners notified the Park Service that their property was in danger of being washed

away by the next flood. And that the agency, as the upstream, adjacent land owner, bore some

of the responsibility because it was not stabilizing the stream bank on its property and

because it would not allow them to undertake any stabilization measures. The owners' most

recent proposal was to have the Army Corps of Engineers, currently clearing wood debris

upriver, reopen the old channel as well as place log cribbing and other materials along the

river bank. The project would protect property belonging to the Park Service and resort

owners. Superintendent White notified the owners that flooding and erosion were natural and

that altering the river indiscriminately would have environmental consequences and destroy

one of the "prime features the visitor has come to see and enjoy." Richard Jeffers, one of the

resort's owners, bristled at White's letter, and insisted that this was an emergency situation

and the federal government had some obligation to "preserve some little remaining private

property in this area." [46]

Agency officials were assured by the regional solicitor that the Park Service was not liable for

the plight of the Stehekin River Resort or similar situations. However, park managers were

concerned that they would face severe local criticism if it appeared that they willfully allowed

the loss of both public and private property. They viewed the situation as an opportunity to

purchase more private land. In the spring of 1973, after Dan Campbell, another owner of the

resort, contacted Senator Henry Jackson about the situation, the agency moved quickly to

assure the resort owners that it would seek to buy their property, once it had obtained a

variance to the private development zone policy, and would send engineers to devise, if

possible, an environmentally sound bank stabilization project. [47]

Later that year, however, the agency's Washington office notified Senator Jackson that the

Park Service would not be able to help the resort owners at this time. Again the agency
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worried about precedent. Although it was perfectly legal under current conditions to purchase

the resort property, other owners in the private development zone might request the agency to

buy their properties as well. Certainly, park officials were willing but they had nearly reached

the legislative ceiling for land purchase. Furthermore, a study of the river erosion problem

concluded that the cost of stream bank maintenance for private property far exceeded

available funds, and even if the funds were available, the agency could not legally spend this

amount of money on private lands. It could not afford to help one landowner, and by helping

one it would really need to help many. Finally, the agency continued to have concerns about

the ecological damage river bank stabilization would cause. [48]

Nearly a decade later, park officials revisited the erosion issue. The situation was serious

enough now that managers were willing to take some action to stabilize the embankment. But

the Park Service continued to have reservations about what assistance it could provide

without setting into motion a sequence of events that would be beyond their control.

Contemplating an erosion control project for the Stehekin River Resort, Stehekin Ranger

Noel Poe summed up the situation this way:

If we followed through with rip-rapping and opening stream channels it would be

the first time that the NPS has gone to lengths to protect private property in

Stehekin Valley. Are we required in a NRA to protect private property from a

free flowing river? How much protection? If we start where will we stop? Did

the property owners assume any responsibility when they built on the river

bank? I know if we protect the S.R.R. [Stehekin River Resort] then other

property owners will demand the same effort. At every bend in the river, erosion

is occurring and it is threatening private property. [49]

The Park Service went so far as to draft an environmental assessment of the erosion control

project, but never finalized it. Evidently, questions went unanswered about the river's

hydraulics and what effect the project would have on them. Also unclear were the agency's

legal obligations and authority regarding the river.

The Park Service still approached the issue of erosion with the goal of protecting the river in

its natural state, and hesitated to undertake any projects, such as riprapping or salvage

logging, that would unnecessarily disturb the river's flow. By the late 1980s, the agency had

firmed up its policy regarding the management of the Stehekin River. The 1988 general

management plan stated that the Park Service would implement erosion and flood control

measures in order to protect life and health, public roads and bridges, and to repair erosion

caused by human activities along the riverbank. As for flooding, the agency would allow "a

minimum action to alleviate the immediate emergency flood hazard to existing development

in the floodplain, with the costs of such actions paid by the landowner." What this meant

specifically for the Stehekin River Resort owners, and potentially other private land owners,

was that the Park Service was not going to interfere with the process of erosion on

undeveloped federal lands. By law it could not build in the one hundred year flood plain,

which contained a number of private and agency developments, the Stehekin River Resort

among them. Any erosion control measures would constitute a form of development, and

therefore any proposed projects would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In this regard,

simple bank erosion affecting private land did not count as an "emergency" and any

proposals to stabilize embankments would be denied. In the view of park managers, only

unoccupied federal lands were being threatened by erosion, and therefore they would not

recommend any erosion control action.

This policy did not necessarily release any tension between private landowners and the

federal government. The Park Service maintained that it had proprietary jurisdiction over the

river because it was not a navigable river and could enforce its policy. Private landowners
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had some recourse, however; they could protect their property from floods by erecting riprap

and manipulating the river on their own land with state permits. But often the best place to

alter the river's course was on federal land. Stehekin River Resort owners continued to press

this exact point, but the Park Service refused, in their eyes, to address the problem. The

owners attempted to motivate the Park Service to reconsider its policy by making a special

request to Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan in 1990. The request only sharpened the

agency's resolve against further manipulations of the river, especially since the resort lay

within the floodplain and would always be subject to threat from flooding. Control of the

river through riprap in other locations, one senior agency official argued, had shown that

such actions were "expensive, temporary, and do not result in any guarantee against

washout." Each erosion control measure was connected to erosion at another site, either on

the opposite bank or downriver on private or public land. The erosion taking place near the

resort had been occurring for a long time and would continue "in spite of efforts to control

it." Finally, the resort's owners had not pursued all of the options open to them. The Park

Service agreed to let them complete the erosion control project on federal land at their own

expense, provided they obtain the appropriate permits and complete a plan of operation. They

never followed through. [50]

As with other resource issues in Stehekin, the Park Service's management of the river came

under review with the lawsuit brought by the North Cascades Conservation Council in 1989.

The suit contended that the agency shouldered most of the responsibility for manipulations of

the Stehekin River through its authorizations and actions to riprap the river, in most cases to

prevent the valley road from sliding away. As part of the settlement agreement, the agency

prepared an environmental impact statement for its management of the Stehekin River, which

was included in the amended general management plan of 1995. Until that time, the agency

agreed to end all riprapping along the Stehekin River except in emergencies, and even then to

carry out the action in a temporary fashion. The agreement did little to help the owners of the

Stehekin River Resort or other private landowners seeking to conduct erosion control

measures on federal land. And once the agency had completed its detailed analysis, the

likelihood of the Park Service aiding the resort's owners and others like them did not change.

The agency asserted that in its efforts to manage the river in its natural state, it would not

manipulate the river or its tributaries, and it would not manipulate woody debris -- vital

habitat for fish and other wildlife -- "except to protect public roads and bridges." The agency

would allow some changes to woody debris, such as trimming limbs, to protect kayakers,

canoeists, and rafters, as long as these changes met appropriate guidelines. Woody debris

would not be removed in any case, and the agency would urge private landowners to leave

log jams and other forms of woody debris intact. If necessary, they would take action to

ensure the protection of recreation area resources. [51]

***

Wildlife. Wildlife management concerns in the North Cascades complex tended to cluster

around the various large species of mammals found, or were thought to be found, in the park:

black bear, grizzly bear, wolf, deer, and mountain goat. Historically, these were the animals

visitors associated with a large natural park, especially one of such wild proportions as North

Cascades. Some problems arose directly out of interactions between visitors and wildlife.

More often though, wildlife management issues related to inventorying, monitoring, and

studying the wildlife populations and habitat, as well as hunting in the recreation areas. Park

managers, however, still have only a limited understanding of the wildlife of North Cascades.

Bears. In general, bears have had the greatest potential for harming human life and property

in national parks. In North Cascades, black bears were the greatest threat, though they only

occasionally caused problems. Over the last twenty years, backcountry incidents were still

rare, since bears in more remote locations tended to shy away from human contact. Most
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incidents of human-bear conflict were confined to frontcountry areas -- campgrounds in the

recreation areas and the Stehekin Valley -- where food attracted black bears. As a result, they

became habituated to humans, entered campsites and private property to steal food, and

damaged property in the process. The 1975 bear management plan, revised in 1982,

continued to guide managers in their efforts to reduce the number of human-bear conflicts,

and managers attributed the reduction of incidents to the plan. In particular, improvements

stemmed from better visitor education, an increase in bear-proof garbage cans in frontcountry

campgrounds, the closing of camps frequented by nuisance bears, and the removal of

problem bears through relocation or killing. Destroying bears has steadily declined since the

1970s. During the mid-1980s, park managers killed three bears, but as of 1994, no bears had

been relocated or destroyed for three years. However, it was time to revise the bear

management plan to incorporate the most recent management techniques, to improve both

backcountry and frontcountry campsites to lessen the chances of attracting bears, and to

expand public education and employee training about how to deal with possible human-bear

encounters. [52]

Grizzly Bears. The most significant aspect of bear management, and in part the impetus to

revise the bear management plan, was a renewed interest in grizzly bears. Although park

managers suspected the presence of grizzlies in the North Cascades, they were never able to

verify their suspicions beyond the occasional sighting. That changed in 1975 when the U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Service added the grizzly to the endangered species list as a threatened

species in the lower forty-eight. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the listing prompted

several important surveys of grizzlies in the North Cascades, which evaluated their habitat

and possible reintroduction into the North Cascades. The classification also led the

Washington Department of Game to list the grizzly bear as endangered throughout the state

in 1981. The following year, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service produced the grizzly bear

recovery plan that identified the North Cascades grizzly bear ecosystem "as one of six

possible recovery areas south of Canada." [53]

The park complex, along with surrounding national forests, was the centerpiece of the

ecosystem. In 1983, the recovery plan was set in motion with the formation of the

interagency grizzly bear committee; representatives from North Cascades National Park

participated on the committee, as did specialists from the Washington Department of

Wildlife, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, British Columbia Wildlife

Branch, and B.C. Parks. Interagency cooperation sparked more research. One study

catalogued historical and recent grizzly sightings in the North Cascades ecosystem. And in

1986, the North Cascades grizzly bear working group was formed to evaluate whether the

North Cascades grizzly bear ecosystem could support a viable grizzly bear population. The

evaluation concluded that grizzly bears had existed historically throughout the west slope of

the Cascades Mountains, including the North Cascades complex, and that the North Cascades

ecosystem supported a small, widely-distributed, resident grizzly population of some ten to

twenty bears. A recovery plan for the North Cascades ecosystem was expected to follow in

the mid-1990s. [54]

In the meantime, however, the subject of grizzlies in the North Cascades became a politically

hot topic. Even though researchers were trying to determine whether grizzlies lived in the

North Cascades Range, confusion about the project's intent surfaced in nearby communities.

The possible reintroduction of such a large predator generated considerable interest and fear.

Some members of the public assumed that federal officials might reintroduce the bears into

specially designated recovery areas like the park without consulting them. These concerns

were unfounded, largely because the evaluation did not recommend such an action, and

because a lack of funding jeopardized further work. [55] Finally, the controversial nature of

bear recovery led to the program being placed on hold.
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>Wolves. The recovery of the gray wolf in the North Cascades, like the grizzly, generated

public interest. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, wolf tracks were discovered in the Ross

Lake area. In May 1990, an adult wolf was seen along the international border near

Hozomeen. Park biologists reported hearing wolf pups in the area the following year, and

rangers also saw two gray wolves in this same area that year. Nearly twenty years had passed

since the last wolf sighting in the North Cascades. The wolf signs and sightings stirred

discussion about the presence and possible recovery of wolves in the North Cascades. In

recent years, under authority of the Endangered Species Act, the Park Service has teamed

with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to develop a wolf reintroduction program for

Yellowstone National Park. The initial release of wolves in Yellowstone took place in March

1995, and was followed with great public support as well as reservations. On the one hand,

supporters touted the return of a key element of primal Yellowstone, and on the other hand,

critics argued that a vicious predator was being released and would destroy local livestock

with the government's consent. [56] Beginning in the early 1990s, North Cascades managers

took the first steps in developing their own wolf management program. Park biologists

concentrated their efforts in the upper Skagit Basin near Hozomeen, documenting wolves

through howling surveys, observations, photographs, video recordings, and plaster casts of

tracks. At present, it appears that wolves have "reintroduced" themselves. At least six packs

have been reported in the Cascades north of Interstate 90 (Snoqualmie Pass).

Ungulates. The Park Service's understanding of the ungulate species in the park complex was

narrow, too. Elk, moose, bighorn sheep, mule deer, and mountain goat were all known to

have existed within or near the park complex at one time. Yet only a few studies were

available to inform management decisions, and managers continued to promote the

inventorying and monitoring of ungulates and their habitat. Habitat was especially important

to the health of ungulate populations, and natural fire played a role in stimulating the growth

and production of browse plants. Managers believed that reestablishing a natural fire regime

through a program of prescribed burning and prescribed natural fire management was

essential to their survival.

Restoring ungulates to the park complex was another aspect of management. Bighorn sheep

had been proposed for possible reintroduction, but the restoration of mountain goats received

more interest. Park biologists had considered reintroducing or attempting to restore the park

complex's mountain goat population since the mid-1970s. Historically, biologists knew that

mountain goats were commonly seen in winter months along the shores of Lake Chelan and

commonly seen in the Skagit River drainage. By the 1990s, sightings were less common and

their distribution and status in the park complex and surrounding lands were uncertain,

leading the state to close the park complex to goat hunting. One attempt to restore goat

populations in the Lake Chelan area had occurred in the early 1980s when the Washington

Department of Game, in cooperation with the Chelan PUD and Forest Service, transplanted

twenty-eight mountain goats from Olympic National Park to the northern shores of Lake

Chelan. (The closest site to Lake Chelan NRA was near Lucerne.) Some were known to have

wandered into the recreation area, but their fate was unknown. But much remained in

question about the goat population within the park complex, and park staffers continued to

participate in goat surveys along Lake Chelan and in the Stehekin Valley. Recent plans called

for initiating a parkwide survey of mountain goats to identify their habitat, population, and

distribution. Manager also expected a newly completed graduate thesis on the habitat of goats

in the park to enhance their understanding of the park's goat population. [57]

Birds. Protection of the park complex's wild birds, comprised of some two hundred species,

needed more baseline information. For years, park biologists conducted breeding bird surveys

and an Audubon Christmas bird count centered around Newhalem. But the most high profile

species, namely such endangered or threatened birds as the peregrine falcon, bald eagle, and

spotted owl, received the most attention. Ironically, none appeared to live within the
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boundaries of the park complex. Park managers knew the most about bald eagles. Although

eagles were not known to nest within North Cascades, the Skagit River, below the complex's

boundary, hosted the largest population of wintering bald eagles in the lower forty-eight

states. A long-term monitoring program, initiated by Jonathan Bjorkland in 1981, a biological

technician, determined that the wintering eagle population was stable or increasing. Longrange plans, which were tied to the Seattle City Light relicensing agreement, included further

inventorying and monitoring of eagle use of the Skagit River in Ross Lake NRA below

Newhalem. Other plans were carried out to create surveying and monitoring programs for

spotted owls, peregrine falcons, loons, and harlequin ducks. [58]

***

Forest and wildland fire management. Suppressing fires was a practice followed in all

national parks until the late 1970s, when fire was officially acknowledged as having a vital

role in natural processes. In the early 1970s, park staffers developed a preliminary fire

management plan to ensure that naturally-caused fires would be allowed to burn, within

reason, in order to enhance vegetation and wildlife habitat, and to reduce the risk of

catastrophic fires. The plan indicated that natural fires, primarily from lightning, would run

their course as long as they did not threaten private property and developments. All humancaused fires would be suppressed. In July 1981, an updated fire management plan was

approved, expanding upon the early version. The new plan caused some problems among

park staff. The plan would essentially classify the park as a natural fire area, with numerous

exemptions for suppressing fires. Superintendent Keith Miller was worried that there was too

much risk should a fire get out of control, whereas members of his staff contended that the

park's topography had many natural barriers that made it a good area for allowing natural

fires to run their course. Nevertheless, the plan was implemented. In 1982, resource specialist

Dan Allen proposed a hazard fuel reduction program for the Stehekin Valley, using

prescribed burns to reduce the risk of catastrophic fires. But Miller would not allow it,

evidently the liability and risk being too great, and Stehekin remained in a fire suppression

zone. After the sensational fires in Yellowstone in 1988, the Park Service revised its natural

fire, or so-called "let it burn," policy, leading to the tightening of national policy and

guidelines for the management of naturally ignited fires. The most recent fire management

plan reflected these changes. The park complex was divided into two zones, the suppression

zone and the prescribed natural fire zone. Although naturally occurring fires would still be

allowed to burn, a number of conditions first had to be satisfied, including environmental as

well as political consequences. Fire would ultimately have only a partial rather than a

complete role in the park's ecosystem. [59]

The Hozomeen area and Stehekin Valley were two developed areas in the park complex

where fires had been historically suppressed, and demonstrated the need for an active fire

management program. The approach involved reducing forest fuel loads through mechanical

means or through prescribed burning. In the Stehekin country, for example, fires had been

suppressed for over a hundred years resulting in dangerous accumulations of fuel. Agency

managers recognized in the late 1980s that it was time to rethink past policy. Forest uses and

forest fire suppression had created unnatural conditions for the valley's late successional stage

Douglas fir/ponderosa pine forest stands. The dense forest was less resistant to wildfire, and

the accumulation of downed woody debris created conditions for a crown fire, which was not

natural for this type of forest environment. [60]

In 1989, the park implemented a hazard fuel reduction plan for Stehekin to reduce the

chances of a catastrophic fire wiping out the valley's forest, and destroying human life and

property in the process. The plan initiated a prescribed burning program in the Stehekin

Valley during the early 1990s. The prescribed burns successfully reduced fuel loads on the

forest floor but were unsuccessful in reducing ladder fuels or the dense canopy that cause
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wildfires to spread through tree crowns. The Boulder Creek fire of 1994 underscored this

situation; four thousand acres burned above Stehekin, and the fire could have swept down the

valley. In 1995, park resource specialists revised the fire management plan for Stehekin and

combined it with the firewood management plan. Along with fire suppression and prescribed

natural fires in designated areas, managers also asserted that they would employ both

management-ignited prescribed burns and selective manual thinning in six forest fuel

reduction areas. In doing so, managers believed they would strengthen wildland fire

protection, and as a secondary measure provide firewood for Stehekin residents from thinning

operations. The ultimate goal was to restore the valley's forest to as natural a condition as

possible, and at the same time help resolve long-standing issues over firewood collection.

[61]

***

Environmental monitoring. In the 1980s, the National Park Service began monitoring several

resources that may have been taken for granted in North Cascades: clean water and clean air.

Concern for their protection stemmed from the mandates of environmental protection laws

and concentrated use within the park. In 1974, for example, park biologists initiated water

quality monitoring to measure bacteria in surface water collected near public use areas like

Ross Lake Resort, Stehekin Landing docks, and a number of campgrounds in the two

recreation areas. The program was curtailed after 1990. Concern also arose over the fact that

even the fresh air and pure water of the park complex could be affected by the larger

metropolitan area of the Puget Sound. In the Clean Air Act of 1977, as amended, Congress

mandated an effort to improve or preserve air quality in national parks and wilderness areas.

Under the law, the park was designated a Class I area, which allowed for little increased air

pollution from any new or nearby sources. The recreation areas were designated as Class II,

which allowed for minor increases in pollution from moderate, well-planned growth. [62]

These designations gave the park administration added responsibilities and prerogatives to

maintain visibility and document, and limit when possible, the direct impacts of acid

precipitation. Protecting air quality, like other ecosystem management objectives, demanded

that park managers cooperate with other land management and regulatory agencies in the

North Cascades. Over the years, park managers have worked with the Washington

Department of Ecology on air quality studies and monitoring, primarily in visibility and acid

precipitation problems. Beginning in 1984, park staff carried out visibility monitoring using

automatic 35 mm cameras pointed up Stetattle Creek and Ross Lake. The program was

discontinued in the early 1990s, and no long-term visibility monitoring station had been

erected because of limited funding. In the meantime, park resource specialists concentrated

on monitoring, visually and photographically, smoke conditions from wildfires and

prescribed natural burns within the park complex; they also wanted to ensure that all summer

slash burning was carried out on weekdays during the summer months so visibility would be

high on weekends when visitation was highest. [63]

The park's attempts to monitor and assess potential damage from acid precipitation has been

slightly better. North Cascades lies in the path of prevailing westerly winds blowing across

the urban-industrial complex of the Puget Sound. Although sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide

emissions in the Puget Sound were far below the rest of the nation, the parkland's bedrock

was extremely sensitive to acid precipitation because it lacked calcareous components. Acid

precipitation studies were initiated in the Pacific Northwest in the late 1970s by a number of

government agencies. In 1980, the Park Service engaged in its own work monitoring the

acidity of rains and snow at sampling sites set up in eight locations: Sedro Woolley,

Marblemount, Newhalem, Ross Dam Trailhead, Hozomeen, Stehekin, Copper Ridge, and

Cascade Pass. In 1987, North Cascades was one of four parks in the Pacific Northwest

nominated as a site for the National Dry Deposition Network. During the 1980s, studies were
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also undertaken to measure the impact of acids in rain and snow upon lichens, vegetation,

and lake chemistry. In 1984, a National Atmospheric Deposition Program National Trends

Network (NADP NTN) was established at the Marblemount Ranger Stations and continues to

operate to the present. The station measures about eight chemical parameters of precipitation

including pH. And in 1992, Western Washington University monitored ozone concentrations

at Marblemount. Although data showed that the park was within an acceptable range for air

pollution, more research and monitoring were necessary to assess the long-term effects of

this potential problem. Funding, again, was often only available for the short-term. [64]

***

Cultural Resource Management. More than ten years after the establishment of the park

complex, Park Service officials turned their attention to the protection of artifacts and

structures that represented the relationship of humans to the natural environment of North

Cascades. Early park managers like Roger Contor had emphasized the importance of

historical research in understanding the park complex's natural as well as human history. On

the one hand, biologists used historical accounts to determine the "original condition" of the

North Cascades environment -- the composition and extent of its wildlife, fish, and forests,

and the forces of change brought about by human activity. This kind of evidence would help

them in their efforts to protect or restore the parkland's natural environment. On the other

hand, research into the park's human past sometimes challenged the area's wilderness

mission. The allure of the North Cascades was the range's perceived pristine quality, its

reputation as an alpine fortress against human settlement and resource exploitation. Any

information that would reveal otherwise might tarnish, in the eyes of some, this wilderness

image. Informally, it seems this perspective colored the park's interest in cultural resources.

Federal law, however, mandated that government agencies protect cultural resources under

their jurisdiction. True, North Cascades was valued as a wilderness refuge, and its enabling

legislation did not identify as its central mission preserving relics of the human past.

However, park managers were "responsible for complying with the laws and regulations

applicable to all cultural resources" in every kind of area managed by the National Park

Service, "regardless of their primary mission." [65]

In the late 1970s, historians, archaeologists, and other specialists working for the Denver

Service Center and under contract made initial forays into researching the park complex's

human history. Among other things, they produced the park's first history study, helped

interpret the Buckner Homestead in Stehekin, and inventoried some of area's historic

structures for the List of Classified Structures. Despite these early efforts, the Park Service

did not develop a cultural resource management program for North Cascades until the early

1980s. At that time, cultural resource professionals from the regional office in Seattle

approached park management with a plan for a multi-year, interdisciplinary cultural resource

inventory. The program would identify, evaluate, and protect the complex's cultural

resources. The approach was similar to natural resource management's emphasis on baseline

inventory, for it would enable managers to assess the past, current, and long-term condition

of the park's human artifacts and structures. [66]

Beginning in 1983, the cultural resources program produced a series of studies focusing on

the complex's history, cultural landscapes, archaeology, historic architecture, and museum

management. By the late 1980s, park managers could draw on a number of documents to

assist them in their understanding and protection of resources related to the early and recent

human history of the North Cascades. Among these documents were a historic structures

inventory, historic resource study, historic structures preservation guide, archaeological and

ethnographic overviews, collections management plan, and cultural landscape inventories for

the Golden West Lodge and Buckner Homestead in Stehekin. The documents contributed in

part to a number of accomplishments in the park complex's management of cultural
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resources, including the listing of many structures and sites in the National Register of

Historic Places. Attention to the park's history also renewed efforts in maintaining and in

some cases restoring historic buildings, especially at the Buckner Homestead in Stehekin.

[67]

The park's collections also benefited from the cultural resources program. It funded the much

needed cataloguing of the park's collections, one of many serious backlogs throughout the

park system. It also helped build a bridge between cultural and natural resources management

in the sense that the collection reflected work conducted in studies ranging from biology to

archaeology. Interest in the collections, in fact, assumed such importance that park officials

moved the responsibility for the collection from the division of interpretation into the

division of resource management in 1988. North Cascades was one of the first parks to make

this change, largely because the objects within the collection were park resources and

important for research. The collections program was "entering a new phase," noted Chief of

Resource Management Jon Jarvis. Three seasonal museum technicians had been hired to

work on cataloging, with the intent of entering them into a computer database; the park had

signed a loan agreement for the Buckner property, with its array of farm machinery and

tools; and a new collections storage area had been built in Marblemount, with plans for one

in Stehekin. Current and anticipated field research would generate volumes of items for the

collections, adding further impetus to improve the program. Park officials felt strongly

enough about the collections that they attempted to add a permanent curator to the park staff.

[68]

The first specialist in cultural resources to join the park staff was an archaeologist.

Archaeology was one of the more entrenched disciplines in the Park Service, partly because

some of the earliest legislation in preservation focused on protecting the archaeological sites

of the Southwest. In addition, sites related to prehistory and more recent Native American

activities in the North Cascades spoke to a time before exploitation of the range, and other

places in the country, by Anglo Americans. Indians and their ancestors were part of a popular

picture of original America, one that the Leopold Report endorsed, and since most native

peoples, except in Alaska, had been screened out of national parks, they posed little threat to

modern management interests. At a more bureaucratic level, federal law required

archaeological surveys for any ground disturbance related to park developments and

management decisions. For these reasons, the need for an archaeologist carried more weight

than other specialists in historic preservation. [69]

The regional office in Seattle oversaw the archaeological program for a number of years.

Although the Park Service hired archaeological consultants to perform archaeological surveys

for compliance purposes beginning in the early 1970s, it was not until 1984 when an

archaeologist would have a long-term presence in the park complex. That year, Regional

Archaeologist James Thomson contracted with Washington State University to have Robert

Mierendorf conduct parkwide archaeological surveys and produce the park complex's

archaeological overview (People of the North Cascades), among other smaller projects. By

1989, Mierendorf had become a regional office employee stationed in the park to carry out

the Ross Lake surveys and assist the park with compliance-mandated surveys. He would not

become the park's permanent archaeologist until 1995 when a servicewide professionalization

initiative provided base funding for his position in the park. [70]

Archaeology also made its place in North Cascades because Mierendorf's work revised past

perceptions about the range. Rather than a country native peoples avoided, he discovered

evidence suggesting the opposite. From the ancient trail over Cascade Pass to high elevation

sites such as the one near Juanita Lake, prehistoric peoples as well as historic tribes were

frequent visitors to the range. Citing Mierendorf's overview and research design, Regional

Archaeologist Thomson and North Cascades Chief of Resource Management Jarvis were able
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to convince City Light that one of the key issues in relicensing was the mitigation of cultural

resources in the project area, primarily archaeological resources. In 1987, the Park Service

and City Light entered into a memorandum of agreement, in which City Light would fund a

multi-year archaeological survey undertaken by the Park Service. Mierendorf's surveys of the

Skagit basin, specifically the drawdown area of Ross Lake, uncovered numerous

archaeological sites, confirming that prehistoric groups had made "extensive use of the upper

Skagit Valley." In essence, City Light funded the park's archaeological position until base

funding became available in 1995. It also contributed to an ongoing archaeological program

in Ross Lake NRA as part of the negotiated settlement for the Skagit Project's relicensing. An

estimated $1.5 million was identified in the licensing agreement to support investigations and

mitigation as part of a comprehensive archaeological management plan. [71]

Archaeological investigations would eventually expand to embrace the entire park complex

as part of the Park Service's obligations to inventory all known cultural resources under its

protection. Although most of the park complex was designated wilderness, archaeology

rarely clashed with wilderness management. Archaeological sites and artifacts were obscured

by vegetation, invisible in most cases to the untrained eye, and therefore their protection did

not conflict with notions of a wilderness landscape unmodified by human contact. The

presence of a park archaeologist allowed for close interaction with the park's interpretive staff

who spread the information about the park's prehistory to the public. The presence of a park

archaeologist also helped create archaeological programs in cooperation with the North

Cascades Institute and the Skagit Environmental Endowment Commission. Recently the park

archaeologist joined the park complex's wilderness committee. [72]

Historic preservation faced a more difficult task in becoming accepted by park managers who

believed that the protection of structures in the park's backcountry was in direct conflict with

wilderness management. Historic preservation had assumed a higher profile in park

management with the relicensing of the Skagit Project, when the Park Service became

involved in the documentation and interpretation of the project's historic buildings, cultural

landscapes, and engineering resources. [73] Internally, however, North Cascades managers

shared the concerns of many wilderness advocates within the service who found any historic

structure in wilderness as an unacceptable intrusion on their conception of wilderness as a

depopulated landscape. In the late 1960s and 1970s, backcountry rangers eliminated many

structures, burning trail shelters and other structures considered inappropriate for the

wilderness setting. And the practice continued, although to a lesser extent, throughout the

early 1980s. These practices were among the primary factors leading to the proposal by

regional office cultural resource specialists to conduct multi-disciplinary cultural resource

inventories and intensive training for park managers in the requirements of the National

Historic Preservation Act of 1966. As part of this training, key park managers were

persuaded that the Wilderness Act contemplated that areas with historic values could be

included within designated wilderness, and under current regulations, such structures could

be protected in ways consistent with the preservation of the area's wilderness character. One

of the strengths of the Wilderness Act was that it could prevent developments from invading

a park's backcountry. The designation of the North Cascades wilderness in 1988, for

example, eliminated early agency plans for the Ruby Mountain tramway and the Roland

Point road. At the same time, it did not grant blanket authority to managers who wanted to

raze structures they thought diminished the park's wilderness stature, or in a very real sense,

created management problems by concentrating visitors in fragile, subalpine areas. Making

these decisions required a process of evaluation and public comment, which drew on the

appropriate studies and satisfied the appropriate regulations for compliance with Section 106

of the historic preservation act.

By 1989, many of the park complex's historic structures were listed in the National Register

of Historic Places, a designation which did not guarantee their preservation but did recognize
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their association with the human history of the North Cascades. Whether a Forest Service

ranger station or an abandoned mining site on a talus slope, these places were physical

reminders of the past. Their presence could be appreciated more because of their association

with the cultural history of an area as remote and forbidding as North Cascades. Within the

last decade, then, park managers have recognized more readily that large natural areas can

have a distinctive and valuable history, something that does not necessarily detract from

one's understanding of their wilderness values. Some examples of this new mindset could be

seen in repairs to the park's fire lookouts, the restoration of Meadow Cabin, and the

maintenance of historic log buildings in the Stehekin country, including the George Miller

House and the trail shelters built by Civilian Conservation Corps. Perhaps more than any

other place within the park complex, Stehekin has received the most attention for historic

preservation, given its standing as a historic community, the number of structures owned by

the Park Service, and the fact that Lake Chelan NRA's legislation specifically mentions the

area's history. Interest in adapting the Golden West Lodge for Park Service offices and the

recently completed management plan for the Buckner Orchard spoke in part to this attention.

There were other events that marked the development of the park's cultural resource program.

One of these was the construction of a collections facility for housing the park's collections in

Marblemount as well as administrative offices for the cultural resource staff in 1993. Another

was the creation of a cultural resource management specialist position in 1996. The position,

filled by Jesse Kennedy, was created as part of a long-range plan to place cultural resource

professionals in parks. This fit well with the Park Service's 1996 reorganization, which

placed a greater emphasis on park-based specialists. Besides overseeing the park

archaeologist and the newly-hired, permanent park curator, Kennedy worked to develop the

park's cultural resource program. He took over the compliance issues related to federal

historic preservation laws, advised park staff on cultural resource issues such as the

protection of historic structures, and helped develop management plans for some of the park

complex's historic buildings and landscapes, as well as project statements for the park's

resource management plan. Along with the park curator, Kennedy also oversaw the

management of the collections for San Juan National Historical Park. At present, the cultural

resource program has grown considerably in a relatively short period of time. Through the

program, the park has established strong ties outside the park regarding the cultural history of

the North Cascades. On a regular basis now, park managers consult with tribal governments,

especially the Skagit tribes, who have an interest in park projects. And the park's first curator

not only organized the park's collections but also began collecting oral histories and records

belonging to local families with ties to the history of the North Cascades. [74]

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adhi/chap12.htm

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 13:

VISITOR USE, CONCESSIONS, AND

DEVELOPMENTS

In the history of North Cascades, there was an inherent tension between wilderness

preservation and traditional national park management. No aspect of the park complex's

management revealed this tension more, perhaps, than the agency's attempts to accommodate

the average visitor. During the complex's second era of management, agency officials

addressed some of the more grandiose plans as well as devised new plans to meet the basic

needs of visitors in a large-scale planning effort. The 1988 general management plan,

spearheaded by Superintendent John Reynolds, emphasized that the visitor use pattern

evident at the park's creation was well established. More than 90 percent of the parkland was

considered wilderness, while the remaining non-wilderness sections of the parkland saw more

than 90 percent of its visitors. The new plan also revised proposals now considered

inappropriate or simply unrealistic in an age of environmental activism, and given the

agency's stronger interest in maintaining the integrity of the park's ecological systems. As in

the past, the plan focused primarily on the two geographic regions of the complex, the Skagit

and Stehekin districts. Essential to the planning effort was the role of the Ross Lake and Lake

Chelan national recreation areas as wilderness thresholds, buffer zones to the park wilderness,

and the zones set aside to provide visitor services typically found within a national park. In a

sense, the new planning effort would expand the wilderness threshold concept to its fullest.

In the Skagit District, one of the most evident visitor use patterns was that most of 800,000

visitors to the North Cascades traveled along Highway 20 and stayed within the highway

corridor for the duration of their visit. The challenge was to convey to these visitors and all

visitors, Superintendent John Reynolds believed, the meaning and value of North Cascades

as a wilderness park, to make them participants in, rather than observers of, this wild

landscape. [1]

The general management plan used his idea as its central theme. Certainly, there were other

areas of the parkland that drew the agency's attention, especially Stehekin, but Highway 20

symbolized the challenge of managing a park for wilderness while still meeting the needs of

everyday visitors. Highway 20 was the wilderness threshold of the Skagit District.

Superintendent Reynolds suggested that the highway was "an interpretive and inspirational

visitor enjoyment facility." It provided outstanding scenic driving opportunities, as well as

access to visitor facilities -- concessions, campgrounds, existing and planned overlooks,

waysides, and trails. Moreover, it was the single most important means of communicating

"park values to visitors, and will be throughout the park's history." With wilderness as the

park's main theme, the highway, like other national park roads, was the central means of

conveying this to the motoring public. Indeed, the highway was and would be as close as

many would come to experiencing the park's wilderness values. [2]

Interpretation was an integral part of relating to visitors the meaning of North Cascades and

thus influenced many of the developments planned and completed along Highway 20.
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Although addressed in previous management plans, interpretation received a boost in

importance from the 1988 general management plan. Besides expanding on the park's

interpretive themes of wilderness, natural forces, humans and the environment, the plan

stressed the need for a visitor center along the highway within the park complex. The park

complex's 1976 interim interpretive prospectus had suggested the need for such a facility in

order for visitors to stop and learn about the park landscape through which they were

traveling. And the 1988 general management plan made it one of the highest priorities for

North Cascades. The visitor center, proposed for an area just west of Newhalem, would

provide "an inspirational and informational introduction to the North Cascades," according to

the plan, using a film and exhibits to inform visitors about the parkland's wilderness, the role

of wilderness in American life, resource issues facing the park, and the full range of

opportunities available in the park complex. Park planners realized that what visitors learned

at the visitor center, through various forms of media, would perhaps be their closest

encounter with North Cascades, their only chance to reflect on its wilderness mission and to

appreciate the landscape they could not see themselves beyond the highway corridor.

Park officials believed that the new visitor center would serve several other important

functions. One of these was that it would be an "ideal place to interpret Senator Jackson's

contributions to the national park system and the people of the United States." In 1987,

Congress dedicated North Cascades to Senator Henry M. Jackson's memory, and the law was

one of the reasons for spurring on development because it specifically stated that the agency

should establish sites to interpret Jackson's contributions to the establishment of North

Cascades as well as to "the national park system." The North Cascades visitor center was one

of several places in the park complex chosen for recognizing Jackson. Another function of

the building was that it would have an education center for providing environmental and

resource study programs to "large numbers of schoolchildren and adults from local

communities and the Puget Sound region." [3]

In addition to introducing visitors to North Cascades, the visitor center was a key link in the

agency's plans for the Highway 20 corridor. Many of these plans had been introduced in the

park's 1986 development concept plan for the highway. In that plan, the Park Service pledged

its support to continue its cooperation with other agencies, such as the U.S. Forest Service

and Washington State, "to maintain and enhance" the highway's "scenic and recreational

values." Reasons for this stemmed in part from the highway's popularity. In 1984, the portion

of highway crossing the Okanogan National Forest was designated the North Cascades

Scenic Highway. More specifically, the development concept plan emphasized the

development of new and the renovation of existing day activity sites along the highway and

at Cascade Pass. The plan called for interpretive waysides to be incorporated with

recreational facilities at a number of popular sites, among them the Cascade Pass trailhead,

the Copper Creek take-out, the proposed Pickets overlook, the Goodell Creek campground,

Newhalem, and the overlooks at Gorge Dam, Gorge Falls, and Happy Flats. [4]

One of the main ideas behind these interpretive waysides was to bring to motoring tourists

and other recreationists the story of the North Cascades' natural and cultural history. Each

site, in effect, would provide some elements of the story. Cascade Pass was important

because there was no place to see the park's most notable features -- the Picket Range and

Eldorado Peaks -- from the highway. In this regard, the pass continued to fill this void.

Drivers who wanted to hike the relatively short trail to the pass from the end of the road were

rewarded with views of the parkland's mountains, glaciers, and subalpine terrain at close

range. Similar to past proposals, the agency planned to use a shuttle service to bring people

to the trailhead, if the parking lot at the foot of the pass were filled during peak use periods.

The popularity of Cascade Pass made it difficult to limit visitor use, though the notion

surfaced again during Reynolds' tenure, and thus difficult to prevent damage to the area's

sensitive subalpine vegetation. A compromise of sorts was that interpretive waysides at the
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trailhead would relate information about the natural environment and the revegetation

program. Other areas along Highway 20, namely the overlooks at Diablo and Ross lakes,

would interpret the spectacular mountain scenery and efforts to protect this country, as well

as the history of public power so evident in the landscape of reservoirs, dams, and company

towns along the roadway. [5]

Besides developments for interpretation, the Park Service planned to construct activity sites

along the highway so visitors could have a variety of experiences with the park's diverse

natural resources. Superintendent Reynolds believed this approach was in keeping with what

the Park Service's founding fathers, Stephen Mather and Horace Albright, wanted -- to let

everyday Americans experience their national parks, to create ties between them and the

natural world. The main goal of visitor use was to "encourage and help people enjoy their

natural surroundings free from the distractions of mechanized equipment and imposing

structures." [6]

Echoing the 1970 master plan, the 1988 plan wanted to get people out of their automobiles

and into nature, even in a limited way. The plan contemplated a number of short trails for

highway travelers to give them "the opportunity to enjoy and explore the variety and

grandeur of the North Cascades." Some of these were a trail to Thunder View and a trail to

Happy Falls. An especially important development was the Happy Flats area near the

trailhead to Ross Dam. The area encompassed a wide variety of terrain and environments and

offered many opportunities for visitors "to explore and better understand the unique east-towest ecosystem transitions that occur in the North Cascades." The area was within easy

walking distance of the highway and demonstrated, according to Reynolds, how roadside

activities could be provided in a sensitive manner. As a rule, however, the general

management plan shunned new developments; it excluded any new roads, tramways, or other

major visitor facilities except the visitor center at Newhalem. In this regard, it finally put to

rest many long-standing proposals, such as tramways, which had been shelved indefinitely.

Unlike early park complex managers, Reynolds and others of this generation did not feel the

same compelling need to provide a high vista for park visitors from Highway 20.

Opportunities were available outside the park complex, they believed, primarily on national

forest lands, as well as at Cascade Pass. [7]

In addition to day-time uses, the general management plan noted that Ross Lake NRA would

continue to provide a "variety of overnight experiences." With the exception of Hozomeen

and campsites along Ross Lake, Highway 20 was the central focus. The two concessions, the

Diablo Lake and Ross Lake resorts, still served the general public, however with different

rates of success. The Diablo Lake Resort had never been a successful operation and it

continued to suffer financial losses throughout the 1980s; it changed ownership several times,

but a great deal of the resort's success rested upon traffic from Highway 20, which never

provided enough income, it seems, in the short summer season when the road was open.

After the general management plan was released, the resort failed. By 1990, the resort's most

recent owners listed it for sale. At this point, the concession effectively ended. In December

1991, Seattle City Light bought the facility to use for an environmental learning center, as

called for in the city's negotiations with the Park Service as part of the relicensing of the

Skagit River Project. On the other hand, the Ross Lake Resort, a popular floating fishing

resort, continued to expand and enjoy success. [8]

For highway users seeking something more basic, the three campgrounds in the recreation

area would continue to meet their needs. Campgrounds for auto tourists had been a great

source of contention in the 1970s. Congressman Lloyd Meeds persistently had lobbied the

Park Service to increase the drive-in facilities along the Skagit River, especially since

development plans for Roland Point had been terminated. By the late 1970s, the Park Service

had expanded and improved Colonial Creek and Goodell Creek campgrounds, but it was the
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Newhalem Creek Campground that provided the greatest increase in camping sites. Listed as

the park's top priority for development, Newhalem was opened in 1982. It was thought that

after several phases of construction, it would have a capacity of some 450 sites, beginning

with an initial phase of some 250 sites. It seems, however, that there were problems with

funding and contractors, and when the campground opened there were approximately 120

sites available within five loops. (Later, danger from hazard trees would close several loops.)

News of the campground spread slowly. It was located across the river from the highway by

way of a single-lane bridge, and it rarely filled. [9]

All three campgrounds offered visitors with "distinctly different camping experiences," noted

the general management plan. Goodell, on the highway-side of the Skagit, was and would

remain "an intimate, small campground." Newhalem, located across the river from Goodell,

was best suited for large numbers of people and diverse kinds of users -- those who wanted a

traditional national park car camping experience and those who wanted something similar but

with the comforts of home in their motor homes. Newhalem could also be expanded in the

future to accommodate more of these types of vehicles, as well as expanded to accommodate

a general increase in visitor use. Finally, Colonial Creek would remain a typical park

campground for people in tents and recreational vehicles, especially those who wanted to

boat on Diablo Lake. [10]

Preserving the park's wilderness character was also evident in the Park Service's plans. The

agency expressed interest in studying the Stehekin River and the Skagit River and its

tributaries for wild and scenic river status. The agency's plans for water-based recreation also

demonstrated this focus. Boating would continue to be a viable form of recreation, but the

agency would not go to great lengths to increase its use. In Lake Chelan NRA, the agency

planned to move the boat-in campsites at Flick Creek to Four-Mile Creek, a more attractive

and protected area. The agency also proposed building up to six more boat-in campsites at

Riddle Creek. Yet Park Service officials opposed any expansion or modification of the

Stehekin docks for boats or houseboats because these kinds of changes would alter the

character of the Stehekin landing.

Although valued for its scenic qualities, Ross Lake differed from Lake Chelan because it was

less accessible. In light of the recent High Ross decision, agency leaders decided that they

would manage Ross Lake "to retain its character as the only large wild lake in the region,

offering excellent opportunities for canoeing, kayaking, and fishing." Repeating the ideas of

preservation groups, Park Service managers emphasized that the man-made lake had

wilderness qualities; it provided a "different kind of recreational opportunity," primarily nonmotorized boating and thus greater opportunities for solitude in a wild setting. By preventing

new developments such as the long-promoted access road for boat launching and a marina

near Ross Dam, park leaders believed they would also help protect "the unique Ross Lake

fishery as a naturally reproducing recreational resource." The decision did not necessarily

prohibit motorboat use of the lower end of Ross Lake, yet for practical purposes confined the

use of powerboats to the northern end of the lake near Hozomeen. Boaters could reach the

lake by way of the access road from Hope, British Columbia; most used the lake for fishing.

At the lower end of the lake, boaters had several options. None of them was easy. Boaters

could carry their canoes or kayaks down a short, steep trail to the lake from Highway 20, rent

fishing boats from the Ross Lake Resort, or make arrangements with the Seattle City Light

boat to carry their craft up Diablo Lake and then have it hauled up to Ross Lake by the Ross

Lake Resort truck. Congressman Meeds' dream of a lake easily accessible from Highway 20

was dead. [11]

For the rest of Ross Lake NRA, the agency proposed only modest improvements. The

management plan envisioned few changes for Diablo and Gorge lakes, except for improving

launching ramps on both lakes. Hozomeen would retain its status as "a quiet eddy between
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recreation corridors to the north and south." All management proposals would seek to ensure

that it held on to its "feeling of a simpler time and place with fishing as the primary pastime."

In this regard, Park Service plans called for keeping the area's facilities "semiprimitive," for

boat launching and camping. Most new construction would take place on the Canadian side

of the border with a new visitor center, jointly operated by the Park Service and British

Columbia Parks; it would serve both visitors to the park complex and the Skagit recreation

area in British Columbia. Other plans called for removing the existing amphitheater on the

U.S. side because it was poorly located and moving future programs to the vicinity of the

new visitor center. In addition, there would be trail construction and improvements as well as

the installation of new interpretive waysides in the Hozomeen area. One proposed trail would

follow the lakeshore trail linking the visitor center with the lakeside campground; another

was a section of trail along the east shore of Ross Lake connecting Hozomeen with

Desolation Peak and Lightning Creek.

***

Environmental groups, with few exceptions, warmly welcomed the Park Service's plans for

the Skagit district. The Sierra Club and North Cascades Conservation Council, along with

other groups, applauded the park's decision to eliminate ill-conceived proposals for tramways

and other kinds of developments for visitors to see the park landscape. While they

appreciated the Park Service's intent to keep Hozomeen a "quiet eddy," preservationists

asserted that plans for trails and boat services contradicted this idea. They also argued that the

agency should consider more extensive restrictions on visitor use at Cascade Pass.

Preservationists reserved, however, some of their most pointed criticism for the new visitor

center. In general, they wanted to hold the Park Service to earlier plans, promoted by

Superintendent Reynolds, to construct a new visitor center in Marblemount. Reynolds

conceived of the idea as a way to better meet the needs of visitors traveling to the park and

as a possible way to better facilitate the distribution of backcountry permits and information.

The advantage of Marblemount was that it was located on the highway before the road to

Cascade Pass, and in this way park managers could greet more visitors. In addition to

providing better public service, a visitor center in Marblemount would strengthen the

community, and "avoid taking additional lands from the NRA for development, especially in

the valuable riparian zone." [12]

These and other comments by preservationists pointed up a larger issue about visitor use at

North Cascades: the fact that there was the need at all for a visitor center. Past management

statements had emphasized the need for only minor facilities, yet the new general

management plan was calling for a major structure as the focal point for North Cascades.

Contrary to what critics like the North Cascades Conservation Council contended, the new

visitor center was not "conceptually inappropriate" in a park whose natural features lacked a

central focus, noted agency officials. To the contrary, the facility visitor center would help

give North Cascades a sense of identity. It was a major national park without an entrance

station or grand entry arch signaling to visitors their transition into a special landscape. [13]

Besides defending the purpose of the visitor center, park managers defended the site selection

for the facility. The North Cascades Conservation Council felt strongly that the visitor center

should have been located outside of the park complex, in particular to contact east-bound

visitors before they passed the Cascade River Road. The agency's decision irritated council

members who saw the bureau returning to its old ways of giving greater priority to tourism

development than resource protection.

The Park Service based its decision to locate the visitor center near Newhalem for several

reasons. First, the agency determined that contrary to earlier proposals it needed a visitor
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center within the boundaries of the park complex. Even though an early version of the

Washington Park Wilderness Bill contained the authority for purchasing land for a visitor

center outside the park boundaries, this language was marked out in the bill's final version. In

part, the reason, agency leaders noted, was that it was too expensive to buy land outside the

boundaries and there would be no way to control land use around the new facility,

jeopardizing the visitor experience should commercial or residential growth expand around

the center.

Second, the motivation behind the site selection stemmed in part from the 1987 dedication of

the park to Henry Jackson. (The official dedication ceremony took place on September 6,

1988.) The visitor center was part of the first proposal for a Jackson memorial project, which

included memorials at new interpretive sites and facilities at the Diablo and Ross Lake

overlooks, Happy Flats, and Stehekin. Secretary of the Interior Don Hodel and his staff

championed the cause of the visitor center to honor Jackson. Although a career Republican,

Hodel believed that Senator Jackson, a Democrat, had deeply influenced his career. He

inserted the visitor center into the president's budget request and sold it to Congress. In this

context, the ideal place to interpret Jackson's role in the park's creation was within the park

itself. [14]

Third, the Washington State Highway Department had long-range plans potentially to reroute

Highway 20 around Marblemount, bypassing the proposed visitor center. Fourth, placing the

visitor center outside the boundaries would not have served westbound visitors who, by the

time they reached Marblemount or another location west of the park, would have missed the

opportunity to receive information about the area altogether. And finally, locating the visitor

center east of the Cascade River Road would not be the inconvenience it was once thought;

most people who used the road were going on day hikes or backcountry trips, and the

backcountry center at Marblemount would continue as a contact point for these users. [15]

Park Service officials were also forced to justify their selection of the Newhalem site for

environmental reasons. There were concerns that the new facility might adversely affect bald

eagles on the Skagit River with an increase in traffic, the possible loss of roosting sites in the

site's old growth stands, and the possible construction of a two-lane bridge. Park Service

environmental assessments concluded that the new facility and potential developments would

not harm salmon spawning activities. The visitor center site was a considerable distance

uphill from the river and would not impact salmon spawning. In addition, park studies,

drawing on more than a decade of bald eagle surveys, determined that the proposed visitor

center location was not a roosting site for bald eagles. [16]

Environmental concerns influenced the Park Service's selection of the Newhalem site in other

ways as well. Initially, planners had selected the Goodell Creek Valley for the visitor center.

Evidently, the area selected was in the vicinity of what was then known as the Goodell Creek

Viewpoint, near today's group campground. (The visitor center team had also considered a

site just downstream from the Goodell Creek Campground, on the river side of the highway

and a site just west of the Ross Lake overlook.) Agency leaders favored the site because it

was large, away from competing interests, easily accessed from the highway, and offered a

good view of the Pickets. Upon closer evaluation, they realized that the new facility would be

within or dangerously close to the Goodell Creek floodplain and the creek would require

significant manipulation to protect the facility. There were also concerns that if Seattle City

Light built the Copper Creek Dam, an unlikely prospect, it would essentially make the visitor

center "lakeshore property" at full pool and at drawdown make it an overlook of a mudflat.

The highway would have to be relocated, affecting access to the site, and more importantly,

the relocation of power lines north of the proposed visitor center would invade the view of

the Pickets. [17]
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The alternative site was a glacial bench behind the Newhalem Campground, and its attributes

far outweighed those of Goodell Creek. Newhalem had an excellent view of the Pickets,

good access from Highway 20, and it was a large, flat area. Moreover, it was out of the flood

plain and would not be threatened by Copper Creek Dam. There were some problems but for

the most part were considered minor. The one-lane bridge would need to be replaced

eventually by a two-lane bridge to handle larger volumes of visitors. The area was also on a

north-facing slope and would receive little light in winter. Finally, the visitor center would be

out of the way slightly. The entrance road first took visitors to the campground and then

southwest to the new facility. In September 1988, a park planning team surveyed the two

sites, and after hearing all the options, Regional Director Charles Odegaard decided to change

the location of the visitor center from Goodell Creek to the Newhalem site. [18]

***

As part of the Henry M. Jackson memorial project, the visitor center and related

developments were intended to be completed at a relatively quick pace. The legislation

dedicating the park to the late Senator Jackson had strong political support; it authorized the

Secretary of the Interior to oversee the memorial project, and Jackson's family, friends, and

the foundation established in his name were particularly influential in pressing for the project,

aiding in the design, and securing funding. But the Park Service experienced some problems

in completing the developments. The trouble mostly stemmed from, it seems, the accelerated

rate of design and construction in order to use the available funds in time. There were also

cost overruns. Original estimates for the visitor center and adjacent environmental learning

center were approximately $4 million; other rough estimates placed the cost of the Stehekin

and Diablo sites at $60,000, and the cost of Happy Flats at $450,000. The entire memorial

project would cost approximately $4.5 million. By early 1989, the Stehekin and Diablo sites

were finished for the most part and within their budgets. The other elements of the memorial

project, however, were not as successful. "Additional site and engineering studies," the Park

Service reported, showed that Happy Flats would cost nearly $300,000 more than originally

estimated, and the visitor center complex nearly $3 million more, "excluding the new bridge,"

bringing the adjusted estimate to approximately $6.8 million. [19]

When the Park Service began construction of the visitor center in 1990, there was only

enough funding for the visitor center building, restroom, parking lot (120 spaces), and

general site developments. But there was not enough funding for the design and construction

of the exhibits for the visitor center, new bridge, additional parking spaces, environmental

learning center, and Happy Flats Overlook. Over time, it seems, North Cascades managers

were forced to use park operating funds to complete the visitor center's exhibits, other

developments for the new facility, and projects for the Jackson memorial. The one exception

was the environmental learning center, which would be funded by Seattle City Light as part

of its relicensing agreement with the Park Service, and located at the former Diablo Lake

Resort. Even so, the construction of the visitor center itself was plagued with problems; the

contractor evidently failed to comply with the appropriate design specifications identified in

the contract, and park maintenance personnel had to spend considerable amounts of time

overseeing the project and settling disputes. These troubles increased the cost of the visitor

center. When it was finally completed in 1993, the building's construction bill hovered near

its original estimate of $4 million, without the environmental learning center. A year later,

the Park Service settled a claim with the contractor for an additional $2 million for

uncompensated work, and paid nearly half a million dollars to replace the visitor center's

leaking aluminum roof with a copper roof. [20]

On May 30, 1993, the North Cascades Visitor Center was officially dedicated in a ceremony

attended by Park Service leaders, Helen Jackson, Washington State's congressional

delegation, and representatives of the Skagit River Tribes. Opening day of the visitor center
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also featured the debut of the park's slide program, "A Meditation on Wilderness," and even

though the facility's displays were incomplete, the program focused visitors on what park

managers had long wanted to interpret: the wilderness values of North Cascades. Within

several years of the North Cascades Visitor Center's dedication, its popularity grew as news

of the facility spread and highway signing was improved. In 1995, more than 73,000 visitors

had stopped at the center, an increase of some 80 percent from its first season. Park officials

were, as a result, planning the replacement of the Newhalem bridge with a two-lane structure.

By this time as well, the center's exhibits were in place, and park managers turned their

attention to designing and constructing more trails in the vicinity of the visitor center.

Visitors consistently wanted to hike or take a nature walk in the area. Two trails of note

emerged from this work. In 1994, park staff completed the Sterling Munro Trail, a boardwalk

to a viewpoint of the Pickets, in honor of Henry Jackson's trusted assistant. The following

year, the River Loop Trail, a short nature trail from the campground to the river, was

completed. [21]

Conveying the park's wilderness message to visitors of diverse backgrounds, who were

primarily bound to autos, influenced the agency's planning efforts and the type of facilities it

constructed. The visitor center represented one of the tradeoffs necessary to manage the park

as a wilderness stronghold yet supply traditional national park services at the same time. The

visitor center's location and design particularly suited North Cascades, and complemented

information provided to visitors at other satellite offices, where visitors entered the park

complex. Among them, the Field's Point facility on Lake Chelan, jointly operated and

developed with the U.S. Forest Service, stood out. Dedicated in June 1991, it was a selfservice center, with exhibits conceived and designed by the Park Service, providing visitors

with information about the history of the country they were passing through, between Field's

Point and Stehekin on Lake Chelan. [22] Moreover, the completion of the visitor center at

Newhalem was important because it accomplished what park leaders like Superintendent

Reynolds had envisioned for North Cascades. It also came at a time when most other

proposed developments in the Skagit District awaited, or were in some way connected with,

Seattle City Light's relicensing of the Skagit Project, which was not final until 1996.

***

In the Stehekin District, the general management plan addressed how the Park Service would

develop the Stehekin Valley for the visitor experience as well as the agency's administration

of the area. Relying on a number of more specific development concept plans, it outlined

current and future management actions for visitor information and services, overnight

accommodations, and transportation. As with many management proposals for Stehekin,

these were controversial, but they tended to be overshadowed by the always factious topics of

natural resource use and land protection.

The release of the draft general management plan in 1987 along with the land protection plan

for the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area (NRA) further intensified the controversy

associated with the management of the Stehekin Valley. Valley residents viewed the

documents as the agency's attempts to further limit growth and restrict individual rights.

Environmental groups thought the plans did not limit growth and protect the area's resources

enough, and in 1989, the North Cascades Conservation Council sued the Park Service for not

complying with the National Environmental Policy Act; the agency's plans did not take into

account the cumulative impacts of their actions. Even though the conservation council's

outrage over the Park Service's firewood management program triggered the lawsuit, the

legal action brought all of the agency's plans to a halt. In 1991, the parties signed a consent

decree, a settlement in which the Park Service agreed to produce a comprehensive

environmental impact statement examining the environmental consequences of its plans for

land protection, natural resource use and protection, and other management practices in Lake
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Chelan NRA. [23]

The final general management plan, with accompanying environmental impact statement, was

released in June 1995, and fulfilled the Park Service's obligations under the consent decree.

The recent plan altered significantly some earlier management proposals for natural

resources, such as firewood collection, and clarified the use of sand, rock, and gravel. In

another respect, the new document illustrated further that Lake Chelan NRA, with its

centerpiece of the Stehekin Valley, was more complicated than the rest of the park complex.

It now had its own, multi-volume general management plan to prove it, while the rest of the

parkland operated under the slim document produced in 1988. Nevertheless, both the past and

recent management plans paid close attention to the area's management for visitor use, and

the most consistent theme was that the recreation area served as the gateway to the wilderness

park beyond. [24]

Although the idea of the recreation area as a wilderness threshold, valued for its rustic and

isolated qualities, was first set down in the complex's original master plan, the new planning

efforts revised some earlier proposals now deemed inappropriate for this setting. Gone were

the "wilderness threshold hostels" envisioned on the east side of the valley. Gone as well

were the hostel-type accommodations, store, and food services clustered around Bridge

Creek, and major campground expansion for Cottonwood. Gone also was the emphasis that

the landing be strictly a day-use area. More importantly, however, the management plans

attempted to answer long-time issues surrounding developments in the Stehekin Valley for

visitor use. As in the past, these centered on what was considered appropriate for a national

recreation area, and the often debated true meaning of Stehekin.

In general, the development proposals were relatively benign. They demonstrated the Park

Service's desire to rectify past problems, such as adding employee housing in appropriate

areas, away from the Stehekin River's flood zone and out of other hazardous areas. The

agency also would seek to restore the natural conditions of the shoreline at the head of Lake

Chelan, institute user fees for solid waste disposal, erect a new maintenance facility near the

airstrip, out of the floodplain, and once more remove derelict cars from the valley.

The landing figured prominently in the agency's plans. The idea was to retain the peaceful

atmosphere at the head of Lake Chelan, and the vibrant community activities associated with

the arrival of the boat (with its cargo of mail and supplies). The emphasis was not on

expanding developments for visitor services but on renovating existing facilities and making

the operations at the landing more efficient. The intent was to ensure that visitors, many of

whom stayed only part of the day, could orient themselves to their surroundings, find

information, transportation, food, and lodging so they could experience the recreation area's

range of scenic and recreational opportunities. The landing's development concept plan

proposed redesigning the area, in part, by improving circulation patterns through the

installation of signs and walkways to direct disembarking passengers to the lodge, Golden

West visitor center, nearby shops, and existing trails. The plan also noted that there would be

improvements to the landing's road system, in particular a one-way section of loop road,

better parking, and a reconfiguration of moorage and marina services to accommodate

recreational and commercial activities. Lodging facilities would also be upgraded and

possibly expanded, and the Purple Point Campground and overflow campground would be

retained and improved. Other proposals called for making modest changes to existing

structures and the possibility of constructing new buildings.

The Golden West Visitor Center played a key role in the Park Service's vision for the

landing. The Golden West Lodge, the visitor center's historic name, would be rehabilitated to

serve as both the Park Service's administrative headquarters and visitor center. As a visitor

center, the lodge would introduce visitors to the recreation area, informing them of its history
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and natural surroundings, through a variety of media. The building's rustic character was

essential to conveying the historical ambience of the Stehekin Valley as an "outpost

community," and therefore would be preserved in its original condition as much as possible.

The grounds around the lodge would also be restored to recapture the historic scene from

early this century in hopes that visitors would relax and enjoy the view of the lake and

mountains.

The Park Service's attention to the historic character of the lodge set the tone for the

management of other historic structures. Any renovations or new developments would have

to comply with the overall character of the landing during its historic period, according to the

1995 general management plan. Furthermore, agency plans affirmed the importance of

preserving the Buckner homestead and orchard, and the integral part the Buckner property

played in relating to visitors the valley's history. Much, however, remained to be

accomplished in the way of cataloging, maintaining, and using farm equipment and other

materials, as well as interpreting the area to the public. Similarly, plans also pointed out the

necessity of preserving and rehabilitating the High Bridge Historic District.

In other instances, though, plans for the valley continued to be contentious. One longstanding issue was the Park Service's management of the valley's roads. From the beginning,

the agency considered the Stehekin Valley Road as a motor nature trail, an essential means

for visitors to see the valley and retreat into the Stehekin country's wild landscape. The 1988

general management plan continued this theme. It stated that the road would be "maintained

at its current length, width, and character." In other words, it would be kept open from the

landing to its terminus at Cottonwood. The road would gradually progress from a two-lane,

paved road from the landing to Harlequin Bridge, to a gravel road from there, until above

Bridge Creek where it narrowed and became a primitive road, still safe for vehicles at slow

speeds. The idea was to "increase the visitor's perception of penetrating more deeply into

wilderness, leaving modern America behind. Because of the narrowness and roughness of the

road surface, speeds will be kept very low (between 5 and 25 mph) to allow travelers to relax

and study their surroundings. The low speeds will also allow wildlife and horses to safely use

the road." [25] As a general rule, there would be no public use of vehicles above High

Bridge; only Park Service shuttle buses would be allowed beyond this point.

The Stehekin Valley Road provided a familiar national park experience to most visitors, and

at the same time fulfilled the Park Service's desire to impress upon visitors their gradual

entrance into a wilderness parkland. But not all parties were in agreement on the subject.

Preservation groups continued to object to the agency's decision to keep the entire road open.

They argued that the road should end at Park Creek to reduce the cost of maintaining the

upper road which washed out on a regular basis. Nature wanted to reclaim the road, and it

was time to let it. In this way, the road from Park Creek to Cottonwood would revert to a

trail and expand opportunities for visitors to experience wilderness.

The North Cascades Conservation Council, in particular, was outraged over the agency's

numerous bank stabilization projects to protect the road and its bridges from sliding into the

Stehekin River. The conservation council thus included the Park Service's management of the

road in its lawsuit against the agency in 1989. The lawsuit and negotiated settlement forced

the Park Service to suspend any significant modifications to the road, until it had produced

the necessary environmental studies. Meanwhile, new problems arose that further

complicated the situation. In 1990, the Stehekin River flood caused serious damage to

sections of the valley road, as well as other park roads, but the flood came at a crucial point

in the Park Service's negotiations with the conservation council. And while immediate repairs

were allowed, more extensive repairs, especially the washout of the road at 8-Mile, were

stymied by the legal action. The conservation council considered repairs to this section of

road a significant action because they required substantial amounts of gravel and rock for
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riprap, the use of other local natural resource, and alteration of the river's course. Thus, the

agency delayed the project until well after the consent decree was issued; otherwise it would

have risked reaching an out-of-court settlement and violating the consent decree.

Further complicating the issue, Chelan County renewed its attempts to regain ownership of

the Stehekin Valley Road. In 1990, the county tried to claim the first nine and half miles,

including the disputed section of road at 8-Mile. In June 1993, the Park Service won its

lawsuit against the county and retained ownership of the valley road. Afterwards, park

managers were able to implement a short-term solution to the erosion problem, by

constructing rock barbs along the river bank to deflect and slow the river's current, and by

revegetating the river bank to prevent further erosion. [26]

In the 1995 general management plan, the Park Service deviated little from its past

management of the valley road. Based on extensive public review, the agency decided to

keep the road open to Cottonwood, making the gradual transition from country lane to

primitive road. The plan differed slightly from the 1988 general management plan. Rather

than limit paving at Harlequin Bridge, the Park Service now intended to pave the road (single

lane) to Nine-Mile, evidently to maintain the road surface better and reduce dust over this

well-traveled section. From Nine-Mile to High Bridge, the road would remain single-lane

and gravel. Besides minor improvements for drainage, road surfacing, and turnouts, the plan

noted that private vehicle use beyond High Bridge would be regulated, primarily because of

the poor road conditions, and only the public shuttle, hikers, horses, and bicycles would be

allowed to use the road above Bridge Creek when the shuttle was in operation. Finally, the

agency intended to support its plan for regulating traffic on this upper section of road by

maintaining it to accommodate heavy-duty, high clearance vehicles.

In November 1995, several months after the general management plan was approved, the

worst recorded flood in Stehekin's history occurred, putting the new plan to a test. The EightMile section of road withstood the flooding, but the upper road did not fare so well. Above

Bridge Creek, the road near Carwash Falls was washed out and other sections were damaged;

the Stehekin River changed course below Cottonwood and was now running down the

roadbed. The flood damage caused the Park Service to close the road between Bridge Creek

and Cottonwood. As an interim measure, park managers built a trail over the damaged

sections and opened the upper section of road for use as a trail. These recent events

stimulated more discussions about closing the upper road and permanently converting it to a

trail. The Park Service, however, decided that it would repair the road, citing the general

management plan. Such a decision, noted Superintendent William Paleck, was "the product of

a thoughtful and deliberate decision making process." The plan guided the agency's decision

to repair the road and made it defensible, despite its expense. As outlined in the plan, the

agency set out to repair the road to "heavy-duty, high clearance" vehicle standards, first near

Carwash Falls. But the agency recognized its limits. It could not reroute the upper road

because it was constrained by the wilderness area's boundaries, and thus would wait for the

river to change course before it repaired the section of washout near Cottonwood. [27]

The valley road was a magnet for other issues, especially the protection of the Stehekin River

in its natural state and the erosion of private property. The new plan nevertheless addressed

what the Park Service intended for all roads in the Stehekin Valley. The agency would

maintain the Stehekin Valley Road and protect it from erosion only as a final measure. It

would also maintain the Company Creek Road in a similar fashion; the road's maintenance

had been the subject of some dispute for years between residents and the Park Service.

Moreover, the Park Service determined that it would maintain all other public roads as well,

such as existing gravel roads to Rainbow Falls, the Buckner Orchard, and the airport. Any

materials for major road or bridge improvements would be barged in from downlake, while

materials for routine maintenance would come from the valley's gravel pit. The agency would
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also provide snow removal on the valley road up to Nine-Mile.

A related and controversial subject over the years was how visitors, as well as residents,

moved around the valley. Both the 1988 and 1995 general management plans proposed the

construction of a new, eleven-mile trail from the landing to High Bridge, parallel to the road,

giving hikers and horseback riders views of the river and lake whenever possible. The 1995

plan added some other trails; it recommended a trail system linking key scenic sites and

features in the lower valley, and a new trail from the Castle area to the river trail (which

connected Weaver Point with Harlequin Bridge). The more recent plan also encouraged the

use of bicycles and other forms of nonmotorized transportation on the valley's roads but not

on pedestrian trails.

The most popular means of travel in the valley was by automobile, and the shuttle system

was the major source of transportation during the summer season. In the late 1970s, the Park

Service had taken over the shuttle bus service from a concessioner, believing it could operate

the system more efficiently. The shuttle bus was primarily a way for visitors who arrived by

boat or by hiking over Cascade Pass to see the Stehekin Valley and reach points of interests,

trailheads for backcountry trips, or residential areas. The shuttle service also reduced the

amount of traffic on the valley road, enabled the agency to control access above High Bridge,

and provided the opportunity for interpretation. At the same time, park managers authorized

private tours of the valley, in particular those connected with a resort like the Stehekin Valley

Ranch. In the new management plan, agency managers contemplated turning over some or all

of the operation of the shuttle bus system to the private sector, apparently in an attempt to

reduce costs.

The most contentious transportation issue, however, continued to be the use of the valley

airstrip. Environmental groups strongly opposed the continued use of the Stehekin airstrip.

According to the North Cascades Conservation Council, the airstrip was "the worst scenic

scar in the entire" park complex, and its use had increased throughout the 1980s. The

council, along with other preservationists, not only opposed the airstrip as a visual blight on

the landscape and the inappropriate invasion of the valley's solitude by small aircraft, but also

the maintenance of the clearing -- the trimming of trees and brush in the flight path -- and the

invasion of exotic weeds in the landing field. Council members strongly urged the Park

Service to cancel the state's permit for use of the field and naturalize the landing strip.

Meanwhile, some valley residents, pilots associations, members of the Chelan City Council,

and the Washington State Division of Aeronautics (successor to the Aeronautics

Commission) voiced their interest in keeping the airstrip open. [28]

Overall, the controversy surrounding use of the airstrip hinged on either side proving its case.

The issue came to a head in 1984, the year after a small plane crashed attempting to land

killing several people. Afterwards, the field was temporarily closed because of hazardous

approach conditions. Moreover, the state's special use permit would expire in 1985

(authorized in 1977), and opponents of the airstrip were renewing their efforts to have it

closed. While Park Service leaders agreed to allow minimal maintenance, they contended that

the airfield was an emergency airstrip and that it was more a luxury than a necessity in the

national recreation area, and it should at some point be closed. The Division of Aeronautics,

however, contended the opposite. The airfield was a "state airport" open for public use, and

was of vital necessity for emergency landings, search and rescues, as well as recreational use.

Closing the airfield was not an option, according to the state. In fact, the airport was one of

the "major resources and facilities for protecting the Lake Chelan Recreation Area," noted

one state official. There were three general original reasons for the airport and they were still

valid for keeping the airfield open. First, the airport was necessary for "rapid air access" aside

from the limitations of float planes; second, it was needed as an emergency facility for

airplanes in distress; and third, it was valuable because it provided air access for property
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owners and for those interested in visiting the recreation area. [29]

The issue appeared to be deadlocked. Neither side was willing to budge easily. Rather than

issue a long-term special use permit to the state for its operation of the airfield, the Park

Service issued a renewable, annual permit, and decided that the propriety of continuing the

airstrip would be addressed as part of the park complex's general management plan.

Superintendent John Reynolds wanted the airstrip closed. His view of the airstrip, as with

past park managers, was that this was an emergency airstrip that was not used for

emergencies. Some property owners flew into the valley; others camped by the airfield.

Furthermore, the airstrip was "visually inappropriate" and current trends in use of the airfield

indicated that traffic would increase for recreational and private use, creating "an intolerable

situation for the Service." [30]

But in preparing the 1988 general management plan, Reynolds and other agency officials

decided after public review to retain the airstrip but in a limited capacity. The airstrip would

be retained "in its present condition as an emergency landing strip unless it is declared unsafe

by either the Federal Aviation Committee or the Washington Department of Aeronautics." In

addition, the Park Service declared its preference to close the airfield in the future, especially

if there were problems with air safety and the valley's airspace became overcrowded, and it

was determined that the airfield ran counter to the recreation area's purpose. The agency also

would not encourage recreational use of the strip, would not allow clearing limits to be

expanded, and would require, under permit, that Washington State maintain the airfield. [31]

By the late 1980s, it appeared that the Park Service and the state had agreed to disagree. The

state most likely did not approve of the language in the general management plan which

referred to the airstrip as an emergency landing strip, and thus not necessarily available for

recreational use. Even so, it agreed to a new special use permit. The 1989 lawsuit filed by the

North Cascades Conservation Council forced the Park Service to revisit its decision about

keeping the airstrip open. Superintendent Paleck wanted to close the airstrip, but noted that

the Park Service had testified during hearings on the Washington Park Wilderness Bill that it

would keep the airstrip open as along as the state wanted it. Hence, the language in the 1995

general management plan, while more specific, was similar in content to the early document.

The agency's intent was to place the focus on the state, make it accountable and liable for the

use of the airstrip and proper maintenance as approved by the Park Service, and ultimately

make the state responsible for the airfield's closure.

***

Visitor services in Stehekin have been a great source of concern for park managers since the

complex's creation. Even though park officials liked to play up the "outpost" character of

Stehekin, they still felt obligated to provide visitors with a range of services to enhance their

experience. The Park Service's goal had changed little over time in this area; it wanted to rely

as much as possible on community-based businesses for food, lodging, and other services. In

the past, agency leaders had absorbed criticism for unfairly controlling free enterprise with its

concession contracts, especially at the landing. The most recent occurred in the mid-1980s

when the owner of the Honey Bear Bakery was issued a citation for selling baked goods at

the landing when the boat was in. And it was likely that friction between private businesses

and licensed concessionaires would continue. Nevertheless, by this time, the Park Service

believed that there were a number of adequate services available at the landing and

throughout the valley to accommodate visitors, ranging from day trips to overnight stays to

extended vacations and backcountry trips.

Most services were clustered at the landing. The North Cascades Lodge was the largest

business; it offered cabins, motel rooms, a restaurant, grocery and gift store, marina, fuel, and
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boat rentals. It also offered bus tours of the lower Stehekin Valley, bicycle rentals, car rentals,

and a taxi service. It remained open during the winter season as well, but on a more limited

scale. Several other small businesses occupied cabins at the landing and were quite

successful. These were the House That Jack Built, a local crafts store opened in the late

1970s; the Stehekin Photo Shop, which opened in 1980, selling cards and camera supplies;

and the McGregor Mountain Outdoor Supply, which opened in 1984, offering a range of

backpacking equipment and hiking supplies. Up the valley there were several successful

businesses located on private land. Two of note were the Honey Bear Bakery and the

Stehekin Valley Ranch, which offered guests a restaurant, tent cabins, and a variety of

outdoor recreation services, from hunting to horse riding. In addition, visitors to the valley

could find overnight accommodations in housekeeping cabins and small bed and breakfasts.

There were also float trips offered by one company on the Stehekin River, guided horse trips

by another, as well as scenic floatplane flights available at the landing.

The most worrisome business for the Park Service continued to be the North Cascades

Lodge. The Park Service owns the facility and leases it under a contract to the concessioner.

The business has experienced its share of troubles, leading to poor visitor service and

financial losses for the operator, Gary Gibson, who took over from Robert Byrd in 1978.

(Shortly thereafter Gibson bought out his partner, Randall Dinwiddie.) Gibson engaged in

several business ventures that seemed destined to make the lodge a viable business. In 1983,

for example, Gibson and some partners formed Lake Chelan Recreation, Inc. The business

then purchased the Lake Chelan Boat Company and consolidated the boat company with

Chelan Airways and the North Cascades Lodge. Gibson and his partners renovated the lodge

and grounds, with Park Service assistance, and added new services, such as canoe and moped

rentals. After considerable promotion of the lodge, the business saw its profits increase by

1983. The lodge's operation, however, was unsteady and conflicts arose between Gibson and

Park Service officials. Members of the Stehekin community wanted the concession broken up

into several separate businesses. In 1986, the concession was sold to Steve Gibson (Gary's

brother) and management was changed, but the lodge was retained as a single operation. [32]

Under new management, the lodge's service improved, but old problems, it seems, continued

to plague the business. These problems generally concerned the business's inability to offer

reasonably priced services -- meals, grocery items, and rooms -- and maintain the lodge

facilities. Some of the problems lay in the fact that business could not turn enough profit. The

Park Service may have contributed to this situation because it wanted the lodge to provide

winter services, a marginal operation. The agency considered selling the lodge building to

solve the problem, but then decided to retain ownership and work with the concession owner

to improve his business' efficiency and quality control. Part of the solution called for the Park

Service to expand some of the lodging facilities (add more units to the motel or housekeeping

cabins) so the concession owner could improve his profit margin. This effort was guided by a

development concept plan for the landing and carried through in the most recent general

management plan. [33]

In 1994, a new concession owner took over North Cascades Lodge, now known as the North

Cascades Stehekin Lodge. The previous owner's contract had expired and it was not renewed.

The Park Service anticipated a good working relationship with the new owner, Jack Raines.

As part of the concession contract, Raines and his associates made considerable repairs to the

lodge buildings as well as renovations and landscaping of the lodge grounds. The owner also

hired local residents for his management and staff positions, and provided service year-round.

One service offered by the lodge was groomed ski trails and transportation for guests to the

trails. To ensure that capital improvements continued, the Park Service and lodge owner

collaborated on ways to fund this work using special accounts for franchise and building use

fees. (One fee was the marina user fee.) The Park Service also funded some of the projects.

The concession, though apparently on better financial footing, faced rising operating costs
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and set backs from natural forces. [34]

***

Interpretation. Although interpretation was a key factor in the Park Service's planning and

development for visitor use, the park complex's interpretive program was still in its

developmental stages in the late 1970s. One of the central park programs in conveying the

meaning of the North Cascades' wilderness values to the public, interpretation had yet to

fully blossom. Certainly, many aspects of the complex's program were in place, ranging from

evening programs to self-guided nature walks. But a number of the facilities -- waysides,

overlooks, and a visitor center -- were not yet in place. The early emphasis on Roland Point

and the Ruby Mountain tram for interpretation was partly responsible for the lack of

developments for interpretation. When these projects were delayed and later canceled, it

forced agency managers to redirect their efforts, in particular to Highway 20, and it took time

for the new developments to materialize.

Interpretation also suffered somewhat from a general lack of sophistication and organization.

An interpretive analysis in 1977 concluded that the park complex's interpreters were

enthusiastic and dedicated but short on practical experience and training. The information

disseminated to the public was not easy to find at the various information centers outside the

park complex, and left the average visitor, it seemed, thinking that the North Cascades

complex was a rather bewildering place. Even park staffers expressed these views in passing,

intimating that they did not necessarily know what was happening in other parts of the

complex. The report concluded that these shortcomings typified the growing pains of a young

park and program. To correct these deficiencies, the park administration needed to dedicate

more funding and devote more time to interpretation. Above all, the program warranted a

chief of interpretation, rather than the current staff specialist, to oversee the program and

district operations. [35]

In part, this analysis illustrated the general decline in Park Service interpretation during the

1970s, and by the early 1980s, park managers were making strides to advance the interpretive

program. Waysides were installed along Highway 20, in particular at the Diablo Overlook,

providing a major turnout and site for visitor education, as well as other locations in the

complex, such as at Cascade Pass. Interpreters continued with and added to established

activities, including evening programs at Colonial Campground and Golden West Lodge,

environmental learning programs for children, talks on the Stehekin shuttle bus, and contact

with visitors at information centers. In Stehekin, two new nature trails were developed, the

Imus Creek and Rainbow Mist trails; park managers decided against adding a spur trail to the

Rainbow Mist Trail because it would have been environmentally damaging. The Park Service

also began working with the Stehekin School to interpret the history of Stehekin, and began

operating a joint information center with the Forest Service in Chelan. At Hozomeen, the

amphitheater was relocated closer to the campgrounds to serve more people. Other activities

involved interpreters giving short walks and talks at the Diablo Overlook, the Newhalem

Campground, and Cascade Pass.

Besides adding new activities, park managers ended others that were unsuccessful. The most

notable was the Concrete Information Center. The information center opened in 1974 with

the idea that it would serve not only highway travelers but also visitors traveling the Skagit

Steam Railway. (Hence, the center's "depot" design.) To serve the railroad, the information

center had been established on the northern side of the highway, making it difficult for

motorists heading into the park complex to stop. The railroad, however, only operated for one

season and the center's visitation plummeted, leading to its closure in 1985. Its services were

then transferred to the Marblemount Ranger Station. At the same time, the Park Service

opened a joint information center with the Forest Service at the park headquarters in Sedro
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Woolley. Located on Highway 20, the headquarters was a popular stopping point for visitors.

[36]

The mid-1980s marked a watershed in the development of the park complex's interpretive

program. Completed in 1985, a study identified visitor use patterns and behaviors in the park

complex. The visitor use study may have offered few surprises to park managers; it suggested

that the majority of visitors traveled by car through the complex over Highway 20 and that

few ventured far from their cars. The study was important, however, in the planning effort

underway for the new general management plan. It helped support the need for further

interpretive developments along the highway corridor and the Cascade River Road. Perhaps

the most significant event was the formation of a separate division of interpretation during

the park complex's administrative reorganization. The new organization, as envisioned by

Superintendent Reynolds and his staff, separated resource management and interpretation into

their own divisions with division heads. For the first time, interpretation operated out of a

division with its own chief, William Laitner, who oversaw the park complex's interpretive

programs in the two districts. The program, it seems, was poised to expand to its fullest. [37]

Superintendent Reynolds offered some examples of the ways in which interpretation should

grow in his 1985 statement on park management, "North Cascades 20: Direction to the

Future." A visitor center along Highway 20 within the park topped the list. He also stressed

the importance of improving interpretation through the use of video programs of the northern

Cascades, enhancing the quality of the visitor information centers both in content and

interpreter skills, creating a wider variety of publications, and expanding visitor education.

[38]

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period characterized in the park's history by a flurry

of planning and development, the park's interpretive program fulfilled many of Reynolds'

recommendations. In 1986, the North Cascades Institute formed, modeled after the Yosemite

Institute, dedicated to research and education on the North Cascades. The following year, the

park's first handbook was published and was popular with visitors. The park complex's

newsletter, the "Challenger," first published in 1975, was jointly published with the Forest

Service and back in print in 1988 after going unpublished for a time. In 1990, the Mountain

School was started through the North Cascades Institute to teach school children about the

natural environment, and a year later, the Park Service dedicated the Field's Point Information

Center, which it operated with the Forest Service, on Lake Chelan. These different aspects of

the park complex's interpretive program demonstrated the varied ways in which the park was

growing and conveying the central theme of North Cascades, its wilderness values. [39]

The most significant advance in interpretation -- conveying the wilderness ideal to park

visitors -- came with the development of the North Cascades Visitor Center and the Henry

M. Jackson Memorial. [40] When the visitor center opened in 1993, the Park Service proudly

debuted the center piece of its interpretive program, a sophisticated slide show entitled "A

Meditation on Wilderness." In a conceptual sense, the slide show, with its incredible images

of the North Cascades environment, provided the element missing from the visit of ordinary

people, those for whom planners at one time had envisioned ascending Ruby Mountain by

tram. In the slide program, visitors could see the North Cascades and its diverse resources,

and carry these images with them as they traveled through the complex. But the slide show's

sound track and narration troubled many visitors, for the slide show presented different

cultural views of wilderness throughout time. The result was a program that seemed at once

to convey traditional Western views of nature and "new age" principles. It expressed ideas of

nature from an ecological perspective, emphasizing cycles and renewal, and incorporated

spiritual metaphors and insights from Native American cultures, Eastern philosophy, and

American nature writers. A steady stream of letters from visitors reached the desk of

Superintendent William Paleck and other Park Service leaders, a good many complaining
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about the "new age" religious overtones. Most visitors who considered themselves Christians

were offended by this impression; some took their young children out of the theater before

the program ended, and others simply asked for the sound to be turned off. Still others

complained directly to the director of the National Park Service and Senator Slade Gorton

wondering why tax dollars were being spent on such an unconventional program with its

"new age" subliminal message. [41]

Park Service leaders knew from the outset that the show was unconventional. At minimum,

the slide show challenged people's assumptions about nature and wilderness. In defense of

the slide program, developed by the Harpers Ferry Center with assistance from park staff,

Superintendent Paleck emphasized that it was intended to show the diversity of the park, give

viewers a glimpse of places they would otherwise never see, relate some of the emotional

reactions to wilderness, and convey some of the ideas about nature and wild places held by

different cultures. Moreover, the Park Service was not trying to advocate any religion but to

prompt people to assess how they thought and felt about wilderness. In short, the slide

presentation was intended to suggest that "different people have seen and experienced nature

and wilderness in different ways." In fact, the agency had received enough letters

complimenting the program from people with different world views to convince it to keep the

program operating. Nevertheless, the Park Service developed a video program, "Return to

Wildness," and debuted it in 1997. Although the show was for some time, it was offered as

an alternative to "A Meditation on Wilderness." For all its emphasis on relating the

wilderness values of the North Cascades to park visitors, the Park Service realized that

wilderness meant different things to different people, and that there was more than one way

to convey the park's meaning as a wilderness preserve to people who would never venture

into the backcountry. [42]

***

Maintenance. Typically, maintenance -- from repairing and constructing backcountry trails

and structures to the development of other facilities in frontcountry areas such as

campgrounds and bathrooms -- has cast a wide net. Although maintenance is a diverse

program, represented in a number of areas of park management, it can best be characterized

as a test of endurance: endurance to withstand nature reclaiming roads and trails, and

endurance to coordinate a program in the park's imposing geography. Over the years, the

pattern of the program has shown a more sophisticated approach to improving the condition

of the park's facilities as well as continuing to respond to annual floods and other natural

disasters that claim park roads, buildings, and bridges.

In the 1980s, the highlights were as diverse as they were telling of the program's range of

involvement in the park's administration. By 1981, for example, park crews had completed

the Chilliwack River cable crossing to protect hikers attempting to traverse this wild river.

Around this same time, park officials became involved in the controversy over the location of

the Pacific Crest Trail through North Cascades. They opposed the routing of the trail from

national forest lands -- the Okanogan to the east and the Mount Baker-Snoqualmie to the

west -- over Maple Pass. Park managers worried that the trail (and the foot traffic it would

attract) would cause too much damage to the area's sensitive subalpine vegetation. In 1982,

the issue was resolved when the Pacific Crest Trail Advisory Council agreed to not designate

the trail as the mainline of the Pacific Crest Trail but instead as a wayside trail. By the mid1980s, park maintenance crews were assisting San Juan National Historical Park and Ebey's

Landing National Historical Reserve with maintenance projects. They were also participating

in, or overseeing, the construction of a new trail bridge for Thunder Creek, a new floating

boat house for Diablo Lake, replacing the Bridge Creek Bridge on the Stehekin Valley Road,

reclaiming the Thornton Creek Road cut, and initiating the first stage of restoration of the

Meadow Cabin. [43]
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By 1989, park maintenance managers were describing the program as varied and complex.

The park contained over 384 miles of trail, two recreation areas, boating facilities, as well as

frontcountry and backcountry projects. Coordination could be a "nightmare," one official

observed. That year's highlights alone attested to this fact. Park crews completed the

construction of a boat-in camp on Ross Lake, constructed a boat launch at Hozomeen,

participated in the rehabilitation of backcountry camps, completed the restoration of Meadow

Cabin, and built a trail at Ebey's Landing. But managers expressed concerns over the most

costly and continuous problems: the flood prone Stehekin, Company Creek, and Cascade

Pass roads. By the spring of 1990, floods had claimed a major section of the Cascade River

Road and the following November, two floods in Skagit and Chelan counties caused them to

be declared disaster areas by the federal government. The park received federal disaster funds

for repairing these roads, but the emergency repairs were time consuming and competed with

other planned projects, such the reconstruction and relocation of trails in the park's

backcountry to comply with wilderness management principles. Maintenance, according to

park reports, continued to be a nightmare.

In the early 1990s, however, park reports described the maintenance program differently. It

was no longer the nightmare it once had been. A new system of long-range planning was in

place. The trails program, for example, had a data base for inventorying and monitoring the

conditions of the park's trails and thus prioritizing their maintenance. Overall, the

maintenance program was being operated under a system that would, at least in theory,

prioritize projects to keep up with the park complex's growth as well as its emergencies. In

addition to "routine maintenance," some of the more recent projects included the design and

construction of the floating boathouse and ranger station at Ross Dam, repairs to the park's

four historic lookouts as well as the rehabilitation of other historic structures, construction of

the curatorial facility at Marblemount, and oversight of the completion of the North Cascades

Visitor Center. [44]

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adhi/chap13.htm

Last Updated: 14-Apr-1999
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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 14:

WILDERNESS DESIGNATION AND MANAGEMENT

The Park Service made little headway on wilderness designation for North Cascades until the

early 1980s. In part, the number of park wilderness proposals before Congress swamped the

process, while at the park level the status of mining claims and the issue of High Ross Dam

stymied wilderness planning. In 1984, however, the situation began to change. Washington's

congressional delegation successfully passed legislation establishing wilderness on the state's

national forests, prompting interest in something similar for Washington's national parks.

More importantly, once wilderness advocates learned that the High Ross controversy had

been resolved that year, they renewed their interest in designating wilderness for North

Cascades as well as Olympic and Mount Rainier. Groups like the North Cascades

Conservation Council had been reluctant to pursue wilderness legislation for North Cascades

until High Ross was settled, primarily because the project would have eliminated any chance

to protect the Big Beaver Valley as wilderness.

Park managers recognized the shift in public attitudes and updated the park complex's

wilderness plan to reflect recent changes in 1984. Since the 1970s, agency officials had

continued to revise the complex's wilderness recommendations, adding lands formerly slated

for developments and other uses but deemed inappropriate for current wilderness

management practices. Over the years, for example, managers had eliminated plans for

numerous backcountry hostels, an access road to Roland Point, a corridor for a tramway up

Arctic Creek, and the management buffer along the wilderness boundary. Managers also

added to the proposed wilderness by closing spur roads and acquiring mining claims. At the

same time, they classified other lands in the Big Beaver Valley and Thunder Creek drainage,

as well as patented mining claims, as potential wilderness additions. "Potential wilderness"

referred to lands not owned by the federal government but which it planned to acquire, or

lands owned by the government on which there was a nonwilderness use that the Park Service

anticipated eliminating. Both the Big Beaver and Thunder Creek areas were ineligible for

wilderness because they were still largely within the project area for Seattle City Light and

needed to remain free for possible power development in the future. If the project's

boundaries were revised, these potential additions would be administratively converted to

wilderness. By 1988, the wilderness revisions included the corridor for the tramway up Ruby

Mountain among other things, bringing the total acreage to approximately 634,600 acres of

designated wilderness and some 5,200 acres of potential wilderness -- nearly 120,000 acres

more than the original proposal. [1]

This latest proposal became part of the Washington Park Wilderness Bill introduced on

March 15, 1988, by Washington Senator Daniel Evans. The legislation (supported by Senator

Brock Adams) proposed designating more than 1.7 million acres wilderness within Olympic,

Mount Rainier, and the North Cascades complex. Congressman Rod Chandler (along with

Congressmen Al Swift and John Miller) introduced an identical companion bill in the House

of Representatives. The bill was politically popular. Besides fulfilling the mandate of the

1964 Wilderness Act, the legislation represented the "first attempt to designate wilderness in
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national parks on a statewide basis," noted Evans. In doing so, "we can...ensure the

permanent protection of one of the Nation's most treasured assets -- its national parks." The

bill derived its importance from the long-term affects on the parks. "All of Washington's

parks were established and are managed as wilderness parks," the senator observed. "We

want the national parks in Washington to remain wilderness parks," and this bill "would

prevent development from encroaching further into the wilderness areas of the parks,"

thereby ensuring that these parks would be managed for their "original purposes." [2]

The Washington Park Wilderness Act passed virtually unopposed and was signed into law on

November 16, 1988. In general, the wilderness legislation for North Cascades was similar to

earlier agency proposals with some notable exceptions. First, the wilderness would be named

as a tribute to the agency's first director, Stephen Mather, for his contributions to the National

Park Service. Superintendent John Reynolds came up with the idea after a conversation with

former director Horace Albright. For all of Mather's work, he had not been formally

recognized in the designation of any area in the park system, and the remote and isolated

wilderness of the North Cascades, Reynolds believed, lent itself well to honoring Mather's

legacy. [3] Second, park managers had drawn the boundaries to eliminate a host of potential

threats to the park from small hydroelectric projects. The new boundaries embraced the

headwaters of several proposed projects, terminating them while not infringing on the

authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Agency (FERC) over such projects in the park

complex as prescribed in the North Cascades Act. [4]

Third, the legislation contained several amendments to clarify the park's authority under its

enabling legislation. One revision limited FERC's authority over hydroelectric projects to

existing and proposed elements of those projects within the complex's recreation areas. Two

other revisions specified the use of natural and renewable natural resources within the

recreation areas. One provision eliminated mining and mineral leasing in the recreation areas,

except for the leasing of rock, sand, and gravel to Stehekin residents in Lake Chelan NRA as

long as there was no adverse effects on the recreation area's administration. The other

provision authorized the use or disposal of renewable natural resources in the recreation

areas, primarily in the form of firewood in Stehekin and the removal of trees within power

line rights-of-way in Ross Lake NRA. The legislation stated that such use was only

authorized as long as it was compatible with the purposes of the recreation areas. Resource

use was also subject to statutory authorities pertaining to the administration of the park

system and other statutory authorities governing the conservation and management of natural

resources under federal control. In short, agency officials, who maintained that an array of

laws and policies applied to the management of the recreation areas, now had unequivocal

proof.

These revisions to the North Cascades Act were considered among the most significant by

park management. While they did not necessarily erase all of the park complex's problematic

issues, they did clarify some long-disputed interpretations of, and vague provisions in, the

park act. The legislation also cleaned up some outdated plans for tramways and other

developments by drawing the wilderness boundaries to include the sites for these facilities. In

this regard, the legislation forced the Park Service to limit future expansion and to abide by a

wilderness mandate. The weight of the amendments was felt outside of the park complex,

too. The provision covering minerals, for example, averted the need for a separate statute

governing the use of mineral resources in the recreation areas; otherwise, a precedent could

have been set affecting other recreation areas in the park system with similar language about

mineral use in their legislation. [5]

Although the wilderness legislation accomplished a great deal from the perspective of the

complex's administration, environmental groups thought that the wilderness legislation did

not go far enough, and in some instances reinforced rather than revised management
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problems. The North Cascades Conservation Council, the main voice of opposition, objected

to a number of provisions, many of which reflected their own vision of the true purpose of

the North Cascades complex. The council did not like the use of Stephen Mather's name for

the wilderness because people might mistakenly associate it with the Mather Memorial

Parkway in Mount Rainier National Park. The council strongly believed that the wilderness

boundaries should include Big Beaver Valley and Thunder Creek, as well as other areas

slated for future expansion by City Light. The designation of Big Beaver and Thunder Creek

as potential wilderness did not accord these areas the recognition and protection they

deserved, especially in light of the international treaty resolving High Ross. The Park Service

drew the wilderness boundaries at an elevation of 1,725 feet around the lake to allow for the

raising of Ross Lake with High Ross, as identified in the treaty. The agency defended its

decision by noting that once the treaty expired in 2066 these areas would be administratively

added to wilderness. To the council, the agency's decision smacked of political expediency

instead of displaying the backbone to protect properly the last vestiges of primitive America.

The council viewed allowances for other proposed projects, such as the Copper Creek Dam,

in a similar light. [6]

The council voiced other objections to the Park Service's wilderness boundaries. It believed

that rather than having the wilderness boundaries two hundred feet from Highway 20 and

other park roads, as established by the Park Service, the boundaries should be one hundred

feet from the center line, leaving a buffer of fifty feet on either side. Council members also

wanted to have the wilderness boundaries cross Park Creek, thereby closing the Stehekin

Road at this point, leaving only trail access above there to Cottonwood. The conservation

council reasoned that the upper Stehekin Valley could return to its wilderness state and at the

same time save the government money because it would no longer have to rebuild this

section of road which suffered numerous washouts. Moreover, the recommendation reflected

N3C's continuing attempts to include the Cascade River Valley and the scenic section of

Highway 20 in Granite Creek within the park. [7]

On other matters, the council found the Park Service's provisions for the international

boundary objectionable, noting that the cleared swath along the border was a visual blight

and incompatible with a wilderness experience. The wilderness legislation allowed clearing

to continue when council members believed that Congress should have used this opportunity

to revise clear-cutting practices in wilderness areas and national parks along the boundary.

Finally, the agency's revisions to the North Cascades Act covering the use of natural

resources in the recreation areas were anathema to the meaning of the park complex; rather

than protecting natural resources, the agency was promoting their use. The revisions were

administrative "house cleaning" and the agency's way of "shirking responsibility to protect

land under its stewardship," the council concluded. [8]

For the most part, these complaints went unaddressed in the final legislation, primarily

because the provisions were based on agency policy, because agency managers had the

support of the state's congressional delegation, and because many of the proposals would

require extensive public review. There were some exceptions. The final legislation omitted

plans for a backcountry information center along the highway in Marblemount.

Superintendent Reynolds lobbied for the relocation of the backcountry information center

from the Marblemount Ranger Station, a mile off the highway, because it was "inconvenient

to visitors." The main reason behind Reynolds' plan was the recent approval for the

construction of the Newhalem Visitor Center. The long-awaited visitor center would be too

far east of the junction of Highway 20 and the road to Cascade Pass to efficiently register

backcountry users. [9] In the end, the backcountry information center remained at the ranger

station.

Environmental groups were not the only ones to voice their concerns about the wilderness
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legislation. Some Stehekin residents interpreted the wilderness bill as still another means to

shrink the valley community, restrict its way of life further, and possibly eliminate it

altogether. The Stehekin Community Council complained that the wilderness boundaries were

too close to the valley floor, even though the entire valley floor had been excluded from

wilderness. Specifically, the community council worried that having designated wilderness so

close to Stehekin would create unnecessary conflicts between the two areas -- one managed

for pristine nature, the other as an active community in a recreation area. Stehekin, the

council predicted, would be treated as an external "impact" on the wilderness area and be

subjected to even "tighter governmental controls" by the Park Service in order to protect

wilderness values. The community council lobbied for Lake Chelan NRA to be removed from

the wilderness legislation, stating that the recreation area was not suitable for wilderness. The

Park Service, however, disagreed. Superintendent Reynolds noted that Stehekin residents had

nothing to be worried about; wilderness designation would not change existing backcountry

uses or community use of natural resources. The boundaries recognized the range of the

existing community and possible expansion. Moreover, wilderness designation would help

protect the Stehekin way of life in the long term, providing it one more layer of

administrative protection from outside influences. [10]

In addition, Stehekin would not serve as a wilderness transition zone and be subject to more

regulations. Congress had addressed this issue in other wilderness legislation; the proximity

of wilderness boundaries to a highway or community were not intended to get rid of either

one. Reynolds cited Yosemite Valley as "an ideal parallel to the Stehekin Valley." The two

areas had similar topography and similar wilderness boundaries drawn several hundred feet

above the valley floors, which in essence teamed with visitors, park facilities, and

concessions. When Yosemite's wilderness was established in 1984, there was "no intent by

the NPS or Congress to use the location of the wilderness boundary as a way to eliminate the

Yosemite Valley community," noted Reynolds, just as there was no intent to eliminate the

Stehekin Valley community with the wilderness proposal for North Cascades. [11]

***

The Stephen Mather Wilderness was created nearly twenty years to the day after the

establishment of North Cascades. Superintendent John Earnst noted that the legislation gave

official recognition to the "wilderness values of the North Cascades," and "strengthens our

commitment to long-term preservation of the wilderness character and resources" of the

newly designated wilderness. [12] Interestingly, managers viewed the designation as a major

change that would largely go unnoticed by most park visitors. Backcountry managers, in

short, anticipated little revision in how they had been managing the North Cascades

backcountry. Now the program, which was built around regulated use and rehabilitation of

damaged terrain, would have the strength of law rather than administrative policy behind it.

More importantly, wilderness was given greater credibility as the main management theme of

the park complex. Wilderness covered more than 90 percent of the park and adjacent

recreation areas. During his reorganization of the park complex's administration in the late

1980s, Superintendent Reynolds had established the wilderness district to acknowledge the

administrative importance of wilderness. Reynolds arrived at this decision in part after hiking

the trails in the park complex and realizing that backcountry standards differed between the

Skagit and Stehekin districts. The standards in the Skagit District were higher, and he wanted

to raise the Stehekin District's to the level established by William Lester and Craig

Holmquist, then backcountry ranger and trails foreman for the Skagit District, respectively.

Reynolds wanted their vision of wilderness management and trail maintenance to become the

norm for the entire park complex. Around this same time, the park formed a wilderness

committee composed of representatives from all divisions who coordinated wilderness-related

activities, reviewed flight requests and minimum tool concerns, and advised the

superintendent about wilderness issues. In this way, wilderness management would continue
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to intersect with nearly all facets of the park complex's management. [13]

In the late 1980s, Backcountry Area Ranger William (Bill) Lester and Chief of Resource

Management Jonathan Jarvis summarized the wilderness management program as "a

comprehensive effort to respond to past and present impacts. In order "to apply and refine

existing techniques," park managers had developed "a multifaceted wilderness management

program" consisting of four major components. The first was education. Park staffers

educated visitors about climbing safety and minimum impact techniques primarily through

the information center at Marblemount and frequent backcountry and climbing patrols, all of

which markedly reduced accidents while climbing activity increased, and at the same time

reduced impacts to the fragile subalpine country while increasing the park's credibility with

the public. The second component was the application of the "Limits of Acceptable Change"

(LAC). North Cascades was the first park in the system to adopt this system of impact

monitoring in 1989. It incorporated existing practices as well as new ones as a management

tool; it consisted of site monitoring, backcountry permits, party size limitations, and campsite

designation. The third aspect of the wilderness program was human waste management

through the use of a waste reduction and composting system. The final part of the program

was one of the most essential -- the revegetation of damaged sites. [14]

The wilderness management program had its origins in Superintendent Roger Contor's efforts

to repair denuded subalpine passes and instill respect for the need to avoid other forms of

human-caused damage, such as social trails, uncontrolled camping, and campfire use. By the

late 1980s and 1990s, the result was a regulated wilderness experience. The mandatory

permit system helped disperse visitors, shifted camping away from sensitive and damaged

areas, and promoted minimum impact camping techniques. In short, wilderness users were

required to use established camps if they were traveling in the backcountry by trail, thereby

concentrating use in selected areas and leaving most of the wild country undisturbed. More

than three hundred miles of trails provided access to the park complex's wilderness and some

two hundred designated camps, hardened to absorb use, aided in this process. Fires were only

permitted where park managers had installed fire grates, generally below 3,500 feet, and no

fires were allowed in cross-country areas since fire damage in these areas lasted so long.

Backcountry visitors, from hiker to mountain climber, could expect contact with a ranger,

instructions on appropriate wilderness camping techniques and the purpose of these

techniques; they could expect to use pit or composting toilets, and to keep to a schedule.

These and other prescriptive measures were part of the North Cascades wilderness

experience. [15]

Although controlling wilderness use might seem antithetical to a true wilderness experience,

wilderness managers recognized that in the backcountry, as in any national park area,

protecting the resource while ensuring present and future generations the opportunity for a

wilderness experience was the central goal. From an administrative perspective, it was

essential that the backcountry operation remain flexible enough to address shifting priorities.

The park's organization placed all functions having a direct effect on backcountry

management under the supervision of the backcountry area ranger, or today's wilderness

district ranger. Among these operations were backcountry information, patrols, revegetation

and monitoring. Cooperation with other divisions was important as well, particularly with

trails maintenance. Maintaining trails was critical to resource protection and visitor

experiences in the backcountry, and to this end both divisions worked successfully to meet

their common goals.

Lester and Jarvis viewed the wilderness management program at North Cascades as

successful. "With continued hard work and innovation, the outlook for the wilderness

backcountry of the North Cascades is bright," they wrote. Visitation had increased by 100

percent since in the twenty years since the park's establishment, yet the "backcountry...is less
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impacted today and will see continued improvement in the future. Future generations will

find in North Cascades an unimpaired wilderness legacy." [16]

Understanding the wilderness management program would be incomplete without

understanding the role played by Bill Lester. It happens in the course of a national park's

administration that one individual, often with the assistance of others, comes to be associated

with a particular program. To be sure, backcountry protection began and was in place before

Lester arrived at the park in 1978, but under his direction for fourteen years, wilderness

management developed into its current form. Lester's influence touched the entire program,

but his attention to several aspects of wilderness management were especially important.

Shortly after he arrived, Lester changed the tours of backcountry rangers. Prior to his arrival,

seasonal and permanent backcountry staff were assigned to different areas of the park

complex, the idea being that they would gain a broader knowledge of the backcountry. Lester

saw this practice as inefficient and in 1979 began assigning rangers to territories. Each ranger

would be responsible for areas centered around locations such as Cascade Pass, Whatcom

Pass, Copper Ridge, or Junction Camp, where they would have a semi-permanent campsite.

The change meant that rangers would have lighter loads during trips to the outside, and

lighter loads for trips back in, freeing up space in packs for more food. Finally, rangers would

become more intimately acquainted with one area of the wilderness, better serving the public

and the resource. [17] Education was an important element in wilderness protection.

Information on low-impact camping, the permit system, and ranger patrols proved effective

in curbing damage to backcountry areas inflicted by hikers and stock users, but reaching

climbers with the message was lagging, Lester believed. Climbers frequented the North

Cascades in rapidly growing numbers beginning in the 1970s, and they tended to use fragile

alpine areas for base camps, creating problems with human waste and damaging sensitive

vegetation. Safety was another issue. To address the problem, Lester formed a climbing team

who would be available to consult with climbers in the information office but who would

also make contacts with climbers in popular areas. Moreover, all seasonal backcountry staff

were trained in climbing techniques during orientation. Climbing rangers had both the skill

and knowledge to gain the respect of alpinists who visited the North Cascades and to relate

the park's interest in their safety and respect of fragile terrain. [18]

Lester engaged in other ways to inform the public. When funding was available only for the

design but not the construction of displays on minimum impact camping, vegetation

restoration, and safety for the backcountry information office, he designed and built them

himself for a fraction of the estimated cost. He also taught Boy Scout leaders about modern

wilderness ethics, summed up in the phrase "touch the wilderness gently," now standard in

the park's education program. And in an effort to reach a larger audience, Lester helped start

the North Cascades Institute in 1986. The non-profit institute, supported by the Park Service,

had as its central theme environmental education with a wilderness related theme for all ages.

The institute was particularly important to Superintendent Reynolds, who believed that the

"most effective way to pass on an understanding of the value of parks was through education

programs, especially those geared toward schools where not only kids could learn, but so

could teachers." Forming the institute was one of Reynolds' first proposals after he arrived at

the park complex. At it turned out, Saul Wiesberg and Tom Fleishner (two co-founders of the

institute) had proposed something similar a few years earlier to Superintendent Keith Miller,

who turned them down. Out of this relationship, and the assistance of park staffers like

Margie Allen, the institute became a reality. [19]

Human waste presented one of the most urgent problems facing wilderness managers,

especially in many subalpine areas of the park. As backcountry use increased in the 1970s

and 1980s, the concentration of human waste posed health, aesthetic, and natural resource

problems. Old pit toilets at subalpine camps could not handle the volume of waste;
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decomposition was slow and new pits were needed. But in the shallow and rocky soil of

most subalpine areas, surface water could easily be contaminated with human waste, and

there was not enough space to dig new holes. One solution, used before 1981, was to install,

and later fly out, fiberglass vault toilets. This method increased helicopter use in the

wilderness and came at a high price. To reduce the use of helicopters and to save money,

Lester and others developed a composting toilet using peat moss in the early 1980s. The

system worked well but it was not perfect, because it reduced rather than decomposed the

waste. It also required a strong staff commitment to maintain them. By the late 1990s,

backcountry staff and others were working to improve the design using fiberglass in the

construction of the new composter toilets. Some of these new fiberglass toilets recently have

been installed in the backcountry. [20]

Besides composting toilets, Bill Lester made perhaps his greatest contribution to the park's

revegetation program. One of the strongest themes in the history of wilderness management

has been healing damaged terrain in order to restore the environment to as near its natural

condition as possible. By the late 1970s, the revegetation program was making progress, in

particular at Cascade Pass and some popular camping areas in forested zones. Lester infused

the program with new energy and direction; he expanded the program by finding

enterprising, innovative, and efficient ways to keep the program growing on a limited budget.

In many ways, Lester's involvement was personal as well as professional. His wife, Kathy,

for example, volunteered to take over managing the plant propagation at Marblemount. And

in 1980, without park funding, Lester designed and constructed a greenhouse, using volunteer

labor and scrounged materials, to grow plants on the Marblemount compound. [21]

In a few years, through trial and error, the new facility germinated plants from seeds and

produced four times the number of plants that had been transplanted at Cascade Pass in the

past ten years. With the construction of the greenhouse, the park's revegetation program

began to focus more on the off-site propagation of plants from seed rather than natural

revegetation in closed areas using cuttings from plants. By 1987, some 55,000 plants had

been grown at Marblemount and transplanted at Cascade Pass, and by the 1990s, it was

estimated that 100,000 subalpine plants had been successfully transplanted, healing denuded

areas like Cascade Pass, Monogram Lake, Whatcom Pass, Park Creek Pass, 10-mile Camp,

and other damaged sites. Lester helped promote this transformation from denuded sites to

living meadows by soliciting contracts to grow plants for other agencies and parks; he set up

a donation fund and formed partnerships with a number of local environmental groups such

as the Mountaineers and Washington Native Plant Society. The Student Conservation

Association (SCA) and later the Young Adult Conservation Association (YACC) played

special roles as partners in preservation, providing numerous resource assistants and tens of

thousands of hours of labor to the revegetation program and wilderness program in general.

The resource assistants were considered full members of the park staff and were key

members of the park's revegetation crew; more than thirty went on to become Park Service

employees. [22]

Lester's work did not go unnoticed. In 1985, Superintendent John Reynolds lauded Lester for

his "creativity, persistence, [and] commitment to the resources of this park, and in 1987, the

North Cascades staff nominated him for the Stephen T. Mather Award, given annually by the

National Parks and Conservation Association. Bill Lester's efforts, however, would not have

been so successful without the support of dedicated park employees and volunteers, who

helped contribute to North Cascades' reputation as a leader in restoring damaged wild lands.

Joe and Margaret Miller were key players in developing that reputation. Their work spanned

more than twenty-five years and influenced the rehabilitation of lands not only in North

Cascades but also in parks and forests throughout the Pacific Northwest. In the early 1990s,

park managers constructed a new greenhouse in Marblemount, one larger and more modern

than the facility built by Bill Lester. On Memorial Day in 1993, Superintendent William
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Paleck dedicated the greenhouse to the Millers and made them honorary rangers in

recognition of their long and valuable service to the Park Service. [23]

By the 1990s, the wilderness program was a management model. In 1994, Director Roger

Kennedy presented North Cascades with the Outstanding Wilderness Management Award at

the sixth national wilderness conference. Nevertheless, program leaders continued to "apply

and refine" proven management techniques. The permit system, a cornerstone of the program,

was computerized in 1990 and based at the Wilderness Information Center at Marblemount,

making the permit system more efficient as called for by a former backcountry ranger.

Wilderness managers periodically changed the way they distributed permits. In 1976, they

dropped the reservation system and issued permits only on a first-come, first-served basis.

Revisiting the idea in 1990, managers experimented with a limited backcountry campsite

reservation system, but ended the practice after the 1994 season because it demanded too

much staff time, and only a small number of people with reservations ended up following

through with permits. The program also continued to emphasize education as one of the most

important elements in wilderness preservation through a wide variety of publications and

displays. [24]

Wilderness managers revised other practices as well. They attempted to reduce the use of

helicopters in the backcountry. In the late 1970s, some managers viewed the use of

helicopters as an effective means of carrying out backcountry operations, especially as an

alternative to using pack stock which, it was believed, damaged sensitive subalpine terrain

and created greater maintenance problems for trails. In the 1990s, modern wilderness

managers viewed helicopters as expensive and often intrusive and developed a system to

evaluate each non-emergency flight request and to control the periods in which helicopters

could fly. At this juncture, managers decided to increase and expand their use of pack stock

in order to reduce helicopter use, albeit with some restrictions on where pack animals were

allowed. [25]

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Chapter 15:

THE PARK AND THE BORDERLAND

The 49th parallel separates the United States and Canada. Like most borders, it represents

political rather than geographic realities, including the management of national parks. Two

large American national parks lie along the border, North Cascades being one, Glacier the

other. The protection of nature in these parks does not stop at the border, but nature protection

is subject to matters of international diplomacy, different -- and sometimes similar -- world

views and cultural values, and political systems. The creation of the Waterton-Glacier

International Peace Park in 1932 recognized the common landscape on either side of the

international border, and the common goal of both the United States and Canada in protecting

it. [1] North Cascades has not received the same designation, but the border has nevertheless

played a significant role in the park's management.

The relationship between Canadian and American officials was mostly friendly and

cooperative in the management of North Cascades. The international character of Hozomeen

exemplified this cooperative spirit, as did ventures between biologists and park managers

from both countries in the management of wildlife and fisheries, and recreational

developments. Other aspects of the park's management, however, illustrated that the border

sometimes brought together clashing conservation principles. In 1969, Superintendent Roger

Contor met with British Columbia parks and forestry officials about the Park Service's desire

to provide wilderness protection along the twenty-three miles of boundary shared by the two

countries. British Columbia Parks managers understood Contor's desire to have Canadian

officials designate some of the adjoining country as national or provincial parks. At bottom,

Contor and Park Service leaders hoped that the two countries could manage the borderland

for its wilderness values. On the other hand, provincial forestry officials were cool to the

proposal. Contor was especially concerned about the province's plans to log the Chilliwack

River drainage and provide road access to the area. Logging and road access would scar a

beautiful landscape and entrance to the Chilliwack drainage in North Cascades. It would also

increase the number of people using this major trail into the park, forcing the agency to post

a ranger at the border. Essentially, forestry officials informed Contor that "they planned to

log every possible inch of B.C. right up to the international boundary, and that they had no

concern for protection of wilderness qualities adjacent to our wilderness. They...had too

much, not too little wilderness in B.C. and felt the strength of the province depended upon

sustained yield harvest of all resources." [2]

Park Service officials continued to express their desire to preserve the wilderness integrity of

the Chilliwack drainage. They urged the provincial government to close the southern end of

Chilliwack Lake to logging and other developments, and to expand some of the public

parkland it had created on the southern shore of the lake. Superintendent Contor met with

some British Columbia conservationists and inspected the southern end of Lake Chilliwack

with them in the summer of 1970. His intent was to rally support on the Canadian side of the

border for preserving the lake and country between it and the border in its wild state. At the

time, provincial forestry officials and the army were planning to log and develop the lake
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area further, leading to the creation of Supper Park. Logging operations also commenced in

the Depot Creek drainage next to the park, further worrying Park Service managers. A

cooperative venture in wilderness protection seemed to "fizzle" after this, noted Contor. But

there were reasons to be hopeful. Interest in ecological protection, sparked by the

environmental movement on either side of the border and the High Ross Dam controversy,

grew in British Columbia. In the early 1970s, British Columbia park officials were looking to

expand protection for the Skagit Valley Recreation Area and were attempting to have

Chilliwack Lake set aside as a provincial park. [3]

In his attempt to "do one of the million things" in need of attention for a new national park,

Superintendent Contor directed his efforts elsewhere. However, he urged American

conservation organizations to take up the issue of joint management of the area lying between

Chilliwack Lake and North Cascades. The catalyst for preservation groups to enter this

debate was the planned raising of Ross Dam. In 1971, the North Cascades Conservation

Council spoke before the International Joint Commission, voicing its opposition to High Ross

Dam, and promoted the establishment of the "Canadian Salish National Park contiguous with

the North Cascades Complex." The park would have extended as far east as the Pasayten

Wilderness, which bordered Manning Provincial Park to the north. The idea of an

international park provided one solution to the current crisis, according to the conservation

council and other American and Canadian environmental groups. The international park

would recognize the need for "bi-national regional land management," and more importantly

allow for the Canadian and U.S. Chilliwack Valley and southern end of Lake Chilliwack to

be "managed as a single wilderness valley unit," and prevent any "road extension to the

southern end of the lake." Similarly, the international park would recognize the need for

"unified management of the Skagit, Pasayten, and Ashnola River valleys." [4]

The proposal for an international park, or for some kind of cross-boundary land management,

had the ultimate purpose of blocking Seattle City Light's plans for raising Ross Dam. The

High Ross issue was not an isolated incident, its opponents argued; it would have profound

ecological consequences for both American and Canadian natural resources. A park or

protected area along the international border would help stall or eliminate the project and

advance a greater awareness of the importance of preserving the natural values shared by the

two countries. In 1975, the National Park Service expressed its support for an international

park to the Canadian government should one be established, and that an arrangement similar

to the one in place for Waterton-Glacier would work for the North Cascades-British

Columbia park. Any further work on the park proposal, it seems, went dormant during the

protracted struggle over Ross Dam. [5]

Almost a decade later, the international park idea was renewed with the Ross Dam accord,

signed in 1984. The park proposal blossomed with the closer ties between British Columbia

and U.S. Park Service officials with the international treaty's creation of the Skagit

Environmental Endowment Commission. The joint commission, composed of Americans and

Canadians, administered an endowment fund of $5 million for the enhancement of

recreational opportunities in, and the environmental protection of, the upper Skagit drainage

above Ross Dam. The establishment of the commission was a way to promote international

goodwill after the controversial dam issue was settled, and the projects were meant to aide in

the management of Skagit River drainage in both the United States and Canada. It was

envisioned that the commission would fund projects for the protection of environmental

resources and recreational opportunities, conservation and protection of wilderness and

wildlife habitat, development of various studies, and the planning and construction of hiking

trails and interpretive displays and signs. The endowment commission had been an important

source of funding for projects in the upper Ross Lake area for North Cascades managers. [6]

In 1989, the Skagit Environmental Endowment Commission arranged a public meeting in
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Seattle, Washington, so British Columbia officials could present their proposal to create a

new large park formed by joining Manning Provincial Park with the Skagit Valley and

Cascade recreation areas. While the new park, across the border from the park complex, was

only one of several possibilities in the region's future, it spirited on environmental groups

who declared that the new park would be "part of a great international park," including the

North Cascades complex. The National Park Service was supportive of the international park

idea to the extent that it promoted the agency's larger goal of protecting the North Cascades

ecosystem. The 1988 general management plan stated that the park complex would be

"managed as an integral part of this regional ecosystem, giving full consideration to potential

effects both inside and beyond NPS boundaries." As part of its regional approach to

management, the agency had entered into transboundary management with the fire

management and grizzly bear recovery programs; it had also begun tentative talks with

Canadian officials on the possibility of a jointly managed international park. It was also

working with Canadian parks officials, as well as other federal agencies, to determine

whether or not a portion of the North Cascades could be designated as a world biosphere

reserve. Within this scale of management, the park idea was popular but it seems to have

gained little political support within the upper levels of management with these respective

agencies. [7]

The idea of an international park was still attractive with environmental organizations. In

1992, a coalition of groups from British Columbia and Washington State formed the

Cascades International Alliance. The alliance's goal was to seek full protection for the North

Cascades ecosystem with the establishment of a Cascades international park and stewardship

area, which would bring parks, recreation areas, wilderness areas, and other protected federal

and crown lands to be managed as an ecosystem. The central message was that nature

transcended the U.S.-Canadian border and so should its protection. [8]

In March 1994, the international park movement received a legitimate boost with the "Nature

Has No Borders" conference held at the University of Washington. Sponsored by the

National Parks and Conservation Association, the Henry M. Jackson School of International

Studies, and the National Park Service, the conference brought together political and

academic leaders from the U.S. and Canada to discuss international ecosystem protection in

the North Cascades as well as the designation of an international park and special

management areas. In attendance were Commissioner Stephen Owen, head of the British

Columbia Commission of Natural Resources and Environment, United States Senator Bruce

Vento, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Interior George Frampton. The conference

provided a valuable forum for discussion in an academic sense, but it did not produce a

consensus for action. There was no general agreement on what constituted a "greater"

ecosystem or on how U.S. and Canadian officials should manage an international ecosystem.

Moreover, Park Service leaders, represented by Assistant Secretary Frampton and Deputy

Director John Reynolds, gave only qualified support for the international park proposal. The

Park Service would pursue the international park concept, it seems, only as long as it had

strong public support. In the months following the conference, the international park proposal

received considerable press time because it had become controversial, especially in

Washington. Property rights advocates and members of the nascent "wise-use" movement

denounced the idea, while environmental groups continued to speak about protecting a large

expanse of territory. [9]

Although the Park Service appeared to be taking a neutral position on the international park

proposal, the agency was frequently associated with the controversial topic because it had cosponsored the "Nature Has No Borders Conference" and because an international park would

encompass the park complex. In June 1995, when the Cascades alliance released its proposal

for an international park, the Park Service quickly distanced itself from the subject. In its own

press release, the agency asserted that the park idea originated with private citizens and not
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the Park Service. Superintendent William Paleck appreciated the concern for the future of the

North Cascades reflected in the park proposal, but wanted to deflect any criticism leveled at

his agency. Essentially, the Park Service would only become actively involved if Congress

requested the agency to testify on the matter before Congress. Otherwise, Paleck noted that

cross-border cooperation with Canada had been successful in the past and should "continue

with or without an international park." [10]

By the early 1990s, the list of cooperative efforts had grown quite long. North Cascades and

Canadian park managers had worked together on gray wolf and grizzly bear studies, search

and rescue operations, wildland fire suppression and management, planning for facility needs

at Hozomeen, trail maintenance, solid waste disposal; they also participated in staff

exchanges and providing archaeological consultation as well as technical assistance to the

Lower Thompson Tribe. One of the major sources for bringing the two sides together, the

Skagit Environmental Endowment Commission, had also grown. As of 1993, the commission

had awarded nearly $3.3 million in grants for 125 projects, all of which provided an

invaluable source of funding for the protection and enhancement of the upper Skagit

drainage. The endowment had helped fund improvements to the Hozomeen area, including

campground rehabilitation and shoreline stabilization, as well as other parts of the recreation

area, including interpretive facilities at Happy Creek, the rehabilitation of several boat-in

campgrounds, a raptor survey, and an archaeological study. [11]

The two countries also joined forces to address one of the more long-standing issues on the

borderland, the relaxed condition of the crossing at Hozomeen. The road from Hope, B.C.,

into the northern end of Ross Lake was one of three border crossing roads in Washington

State without a customs check station. In the early 1970s, Superintendent Lowell White had

attempted to tighten controls of the border crossing at Hozomeen, but U.S. Customs officials

did not share his concerns, it seems, and would not allow park rangers to be deputized to

perform customs duties themselves; there was also no money to support such an operation.

Hozomeen's reputation as a quiet eddy lost some of its luster in the early 1990s when

customs agents targeted the crossing as a place that required closer attention. Evidently, there

was some evidence of drug trafficking on Ross Lake. Support for tighter controls soon

followed. Beginning in 1990, park rangers worked with U.S. Customs officials as well as

other U.S. and Canadian agencies in operation "Lightning Creek" at the Hozomeen crossing

as part of a national drug interdiction program. At least six rangers were certified as deputy

customs agents and reported any suspicious activity directly to customs agents at the Sumas

crossing. Funding from drug enforcement sources augmented the park's law enforcement

program, increased the presence of law enforcement officials at the border, and proved to be

an effective way to deter "illegal drug and criminal activity in the Hozomeen area." [12]

The border has a physical presence, too. Where the 49th parallel crosses forested country, a

wide clearing identifies the boundary between the United States and Canada like a line on a

map. The boundary swath, created and maintained by the International Joint Commission, did

not make exceptions for pristine landscapes like the North Cascades or other natural

preserves. The boundary line was a symbol of international relations of sorts, a clearing that

literally separated the U.S. and Canada. Maintaining the clearing sparked controversy.

Federal agencies like the Forest Service and Park Service who protected wild and scenic

lands along the border balked at the thought of the boundary commission cutting trees and

spraying herbicides along the edges of forests or, as in the case of Waterton-Glacier, directly

through a park.

In 1976, the Okanogan National Forest challenged the International Boundary Commission's

authority to clear the boundary strip that formed the northern border of the Pasayten

Wilderness. Citing the Wilderness Act, the Forest Service legal council argued that the 49th

parallel was part of the wilderness area and that the act's provisions precluded the "planned
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clearing of a strip within the Wilderness by the Commission." The agency lost its protest,

however, because the commission asserted that its authority predated that of the Forest

Service. The agency should have known the conditions associated with the boundary when it

drew the wilderness area's boundary along the border, and been aware that a 1925

international treaty authorized the commission's maintenance of the boundary. The

commission also asserted that the Wilderness Act did not prevent its actions. It could

commence with routine border maintenance by virtue of the fact that the act made allowances

for some use of motorized equipment for administrative purposes. [13]

In 1984, the Park Service addressed the boundary clearing issue in North Cascades. The

boundary commission was planning to clear a short section of the Ross Lake NRA border,

adjacent to the Pasayten Wilderness. Superintendent Keith Miller decided not to protest the

work, based on the legal opinion the Forest Service had received. Although the commission

legally had prior rights with which it could enforce its clearing practices, the commission

seems to have been open to meeting some of the concerns voiced by both the Forest Service

and the Park Service. That year, for instance, the superintendents from Waterton and Glacier

national parks met with boundary commission officials to request that the boundary between

the two parks no longer be cleared, in part because of the international peace park status.

However, the commission held firm to its mission, noting that making one exception to the

treaty could lead to more. On a more immediate level, park managers were able to keep

herbicides from being used; engineers performing the clearing would only use chainsaws and

would burn all slash to avoid insect infestation. The commission would employ similar

methods in the northern Cascades. The commission conducted maintenance in approximately

twenty to forty year cycles and planned to complete its clearing to the Pacific, across the park

complex, in the near future. Although the swath was a visual blight and an affront to

wilderness values, according to environmental groups, the Park Service seems to have

accepted the legal right of the boundary commission to keep the swath open (approximately

twenty feet in width) along the northern edge of the Stephen Mather Wilderness. [14]

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

CONCLUSION

The establishment of North Cascades placed it squarely within the postwar environmental

movement and made it one of that movement's leading accomplishments. The park

symbolized the postwar generation's efforts to preserve wilderness for its intrinsic values as

well as its values for people's quality of life. The creation of the park, however, was only part

of the task. Carrying out its mandate was another matter altogether. Considered by many a

flagship park for wilderness preservation, North Cascades bore the marks of political

compromise necessary for its creation in the politically divided period. North Cascades was a

national park complex containing recreation areas and national park, all which had different

purposes and ultimately triggered different expectations from the public. The Park Service

has endeavored, often with a great deal of tension, to make wilderness -- as an ideal and a

management concept -- the central focus of the park's administration.

Park managers and supporters greeted North Cascades with high hopes for preserving "true

wilderness." They saw in this new park a way to shed the traditions of the past, to avert

issues surrounding the paradoxical management mission of preservation and use. But

traditional concerns often took center stage in the park's operations, for it was hard for the

public and for the agency itself to conceive of a national park that did not conform to the

Yellowstone and Yosemite models. In those parks, nature was preserved by accommodating

tourism and developments that provided Americans access to and some amenities while in

them. And so it was at North Cascades. No roads or other developments scarred the park's

backcountry, but meanwhile administrators wanted to build up the two recreation areas to

provide the basic comforts tourists had come to expect in national parks. In this respect, the

park's wilderness, which was eventually protected by federal statute, was not the center of the

park's administrative concerns. Rather, managers directed their efforts where the most

controversy arose, namely the hydropower issues in Ross Lake National Recreation Area and

the land policies and resource consumption issues in Lake Chelan National Recreation Area.

As one former superintendent observed, these issues, especially those in Stehekin, were the

"tail that wagged the park."

Still, wilderness was central to the purpose of North Cascades, no matter the political issues

surrounding Stehekin. What the history of the park's administration reveals is that the concept

of wilderness -- and for that matter the national park ideal -- are not static but change to suit

the needs of society at a particular time. In the politically tempestuous and environmentally

conscious 1960s, the preservation of North Cascades was tantamount to saving a section of

the world not yet exposed to atomic waste and overpopulation. In the 1990s, the concerns of

an earlier generation seem less dramatic but nonetheless important. As the world grows

smaller, park visitors have come to use North Cascades as an extension of their daily, urbancentered lives. Some come to run the trails and return home the same day. Others bask in the

afterglow of the frontier in Stehekin. And still others find in North Cascades what first

attracted calls for its protection as a national park: incomparable beauty. Park administrators

face the challenge they always have had before them: to keep the wilderness ideal central to

the park complex's purpose while accommodating a variety of uses that seem antithetical to
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that purpose.

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North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History (Notes)

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

NOTES

Introduction

1Herman F. Ulrichs, "The Cascade Range in Northern Washington State," Sierra Club

Bulletin 22 (February 1937); 72.

2Today's Columbia Cascades Support Office.

Chapter 1

1Gretchen Luxenberg, Historic Resource Study: North Cascades National Park Service

Complex (Seattle: National Park Service, 1986), 7-62, 173-263.

2Luxenberg, Historic Resource Study, 63-171.

3Luxenberg, 265-302.

4Peter J. Schmitt, Back to Nature: The Arcadian Myth in America (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1969).

5Luxenberg. See also Robert Byrd, ed. Lake Chelan in the 1890s (Stehekin: Robert Byrd,

1972).

6"A Great National Park," Chelan Falls Leader, February 11, 1892.

7"A Park Not Wanted," Spokesman Review, February 19, 1892.

8Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation

Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). Stephen Fox, John

Muir and His Legacy: The American Conservation Movement (Boston: Little, Brown and

Company, 1981).

9Fox, John Muir and His Legacy, 107-115, 139-146. Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune

and None of My Own": A History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma

Press, 1991), 409, for quotations.

10Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience 2nd rev. ed. (Lincoln: University

of Nebraska Press, 1987), 11-32, 82-105.
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11"Lake Chelan and the Valley of Stehekin," Oregon Native Son, January 1900: "Beautiful

Lake Chelan," Walla Walla Union, March 24, 1901. Other magazines that covered the

Mazama trip and excursions to Lake Chelan and the North Cascades were The Overland

Monthly and Harper's Weekly and National Geographic.

12"For a National Park," and "Make Chelan a National Park," Chelan Leader, March 9, 1906:

"Want Lake Chelan Country Made into a National Park," Wenatchee Daily World, March 8,

1906. See also, William R. Halliday, "The Forgotten Father of North Cascades National

Park," Seattle Times, March 16, 1969.

13"Unanimous Opposition," Chelan Leader, April 6, 1906; "Against a National Park," Chelan

Leader, March 16, 1906. Park opponents were most likely inspired by the recent

developments of the Holden Mine located above the west side of Lake Chelan.

14"Fancy of Fact, Which?" Chelan Leader, April 13, 1906: "No Park at Chelan," Chelan

Leader, April 20, 1906. Theodore Catton, Wonderland: An Administrative History of Mount

Rainier National Park (Seattle: National Park Service, 1996), 63-69.

15John Ise, Our National Park Policy: A Critical History (Baltimore: John Hopkins University

Press, 1961), 136-142, 205-207.

16Harold K. Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History (Seattle: University of Washington

Press, 1976), 26-34.

17Ibid., 74-75. Over the years forest boundaries and names changed in response to political

and administrative demands. In 1911, for instance, the Chelan National Forest was divided to

create the Okanogan National Forest.

18Schmitt, Back to Nature; Runte, 82-97.

19"Make Chelan National Park," Wenatchee World, July 26, 1916.

20Mary Roberts Rinehart, Tenting Tonight (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918), 104,

113. Rinehart also noted: It was a land mostly above timberline composed of rocks, rivers,

glaciers -- "more in one county than in all Switzerland, they claim" -- and granite peaks and

hair-raising precipices and lakes filled with ice in midsummer." Lake Chelan added a magical

trait to the region with its exceptional beauty, so "strangely deep and quiet...at the foot of its

enormous cliffs."

21John Barton Payne to Senator Reed Smoot, April 22, 1920, Record Group 48, Records of

the Secretary of the Interior, Central Files, 1907-1936, file 400, National Archives,

Washington, D.C. Other petitions contained in this file called for a park linking the range's

chain of volcanic peaks, Mount Adams, Glacier Peak and Baker.

22Robert Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1954), 184-185. Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, to Honorable Scott Ferris,

Chairman, Committee on Public Lands, House of Representatives, May 15, 1918, RG 48,

Central Files, 1907-1936, file 400, NA. Note that the other reason for opposing the Mount

Baker proposal was that it allowed natural resource development and economic uses --

mining, irrigation, and railroad rights of way. See other correspondence in this file.

23Willard Van Name, Vanishing Forest Reserves: Problems of the National Forests and
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National Parks (Boston: Badger Press, 1929), 170-172. Quotation from 172.

24U.S. Congress, House, 64th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rpt. 1372, Mount Baker National Park,

Washington, January 29, 1917, 8. See also, "Baker National Park is Urged," Seattle PostIntelligencer, December 15, 1915.

25Hal K. Rothman, "'A Regular Ding-Dong Fight': Agency Culture and Evolution in the

NPS-USFS Dispute," 1916-1937, Western Historical Quarterly 20 (May 1989); 141-161;

Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks, 179. Stephen T. Mather to Lindley H.

Hadley, March 13, 1919, RG95, Acc.#68A1216, FRC#43181, file--5500 Land Classification,

National Parks, 1916-1919, FRC-PNR. Mather was referring to Secretary of the Interior

Franklin K. Lane's statement on park management, issued on May 13, 1918. This is reprinted

in Ise, Our National Park Policy, 194-195.

26"Mt. Baker National Park," The Washington Hatchet (April 1916): 1, copy in Record

Group 95, Records of the United States Forest Service, General Correspondence, 1906-1951,

Region Six, file 626--Washington Hatchet National Archives, Washington, D.C. See also,

John C. Miles, Koma Kulshan:The Story of Mount Baker (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1984),

136.

27Hal Rothman, "'A Regular Ding-Dong fight.'"

28"Make Upper End of Lake Chelan National Park!" Wenatchee Daily World, February 11,

1926; "A National Park," Chelan Valley Mirror, March 18, 1926; Miles, Koma Kulshan, 140-

144. Mount Baker Lodge opened in 1927. The North Cascades Study Report, 47, 183. "Step

in Right Direction," Wenatchee World, October 6, 1926; "Glacier Peak Association Formed,"

Wenatchee World, December 10, 1926.

29The Forest Service did not officially designate the Glacier Park Recreation Area until 1938,

and at that time it encompassed 275,200 acres. See "Management Plan for the Glacier Peak

Wilderness Area, Mount Baker and Wenatchee National Forests," U.S. Forest ServiceRegion 6, 1965, RG95, Acc.#73A898, FRC#25219, file 2320--Glacier Peak Wilderness

Area, 1956-1958, FRC-PNR.

30Some publications state that the date is 1935, the official Secretary of Agriculture approval.

See C.J. Buck to Marshall N. Dana, September 20, 1934, Record Group 90, Records of the

Washington State Planning Council, box 38, "North Cascades Primitive Area," Washington

State Archives.

31Craig W. Allin, The Politics of Wilderness Preservation (Westport: Greenwood Press,

1982), 74, 82-84.

32Harlan D. Unrau and G. Frank Williss, Administrative History: Expansion of the National

Park Service in the 1930s (Denver: National Park Service, 1983).

33R.K. Tiffany to Ben H. Kizer, May 28, 1938, Washington State Planning Council Records,

box 85, file 4, Washington State Archives. [1934 ref.] Clayton R. Koppes, "Environmental

Policy and American Liberalism: The Department of Interior, 1933-1953," Environmental

Review 7 (Spring 1983): 17-41.

34National Park Service, "Northern Cascades Area Report," November 1937, 1-3. The North

Cascades study was a top priority in park studies, which looked specifically at Forest Service
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primitive areas.

35"North Cascades Area Report," 3.

36Ibid., 39, 25-26. The report went on to say: "Man's efforts are puny" in such a wild country.

Thus, it "seems obvious that, in great expanses of wilderness with such rugged and varied

features," that "small areas affected by mining dwindle into insignificance and can never give

rise to a serious blemish in the landscape."

37[Robert Marshall], "Three Great Western Wildernesses," The Living Wilderness 1

(September 1934); 10. (Marshall contributed this article anonymously, James M. Glover, A

Wilderness Original: The Life of Bob Marshall (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1986), 264, for

second quotation. Robert Marshall to Irving M. Clark, November 12, 1938, RG 95,

Acc.#70B825, FRC#75834, "Wilderness and Primitive Areas: North Cascades Primitive

Area," FRC-PNR.; "Management Plan for the Glacier Peak Wilderness Area, Mount Baker

and Wenatchee National Forests," United States Forest Service, Department of Agriculture,

1965, RG 95, Acc.#73A898, FRC#25219, FRC-PNR.

38Robert Marshall to Irving M. Clark, May 18, 1938, box 1, file 40, Irving M. Clark Papers,

University of Washington; Glover, A Wilderness Original, 264, 267-268.

39Robert Marshall to Lyle F. Watts, November 6, 1939, RG 95, Acc.#70B825, FRC#7583,

file 1: 2320, "Wilderness Areas and Primitive Areas: North Cascades Primitive Area," FRCPNR.

40Donald C. Swain, "The National Park Service and the New Deal," Pacific Historical

Review 41 (August 1972): 320.

41Leon F. Kneipp, Assistant Chief, Forest Service, to Chief, Forest Service, September 25,

1939. For accounts of the joint team's interactions, see the above citation and Superintendent

Owen A. Tomlinson to Director, National Park Service, September 23, 1939, administrative

files, park history files, North Cascades National Park Service Complex Archives; Lyle F.

Watts, Regional Forester to Chief, Forest Service, August 29, 1939, RG 95, "Land

Classification--Cascade National Park (Proposed)," file 5500, FRC-PNR.

42Watts to Chief, Forest Service, August 29, 1939; Kneipp to Chief, Forest Service,

September 25, 1939. Washington State Planning Council, "Cascade Mountains Study," May

1940, 4. Carsten Lien, Olympic Battleground: The Power Politics of Timber Preservation,

(San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1991), 129-133. "Make It a Park? -- 'Nay' Cries

Swelling," Wenatchee Daily World, October 20, 1939. Coverage of the anti-park campaign

was particularly sharp in the Wenatchee Daily World, the owner of which was a supporter of

the Columbia River dam projects. See Robert E. Ficken, "Rufus Woods, Wenatchee, and the

Columbia River Basin Reclamation Vision," Pacific Northwest Quarterly 87 (Spring 1996):

72-81.

43National Park Service, "National Park Potentialities in the North Cascade Mountains of

Washington," March 1940, on file NPS; United States Forest Service, "Preliminary Report on

the North Cascade National Park Study Area," April 1940, RG 95, Acc.#68A1216,

FRC#43181, file 5500 Land Classification: Cascade National Park (Proposed), FRC-PNR;

Washington State Planning Council, "Cascades Mountain Study."

44Clayton R. Koppes, "Environmental Policy and American Liberalism: The Department of

the Interior, 1933-1953," Environmental Review 7 (Spring 1983): 17-41.
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45A.E. Demaray, Acting Director, National Park Service, to Owen A. Tomlinson,

Superintendent, Mount Rainier National Park, August 3, 1940; Harold L. Ickes to R.H.

Rutledge, Director of Grazing Service, August 7, 1940, Tomlinson Papers.

46Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 1939-1941, vol. 3 (New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1954), 159-160; Harold L. Ickes to Mining World, August 7, 1940; Miller

Freeman to Harold L. Ickes, August 20, 1940; Franklin D. Roosevelt to Miller Freeman,

September 19, 1940, administrative history files, North Cascades National Park Service

Complex; "Mr. Ickes Abandons Cascade Park Project," reprint Mining World, September

1941.

47Lyle F. Watts to Irving Clark, September 10, 1940; "Management Plan for the Glacier Peak

Wilderness Area."

48Grant McConnell, "The Cascades Wilderness," Sierra Club Bulletin 41 (November 1956):

24.

49Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United

States, 1955-1984 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 2-5, 13, 22-34.

50Mark W. T. Harvey, A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American Conservation

Movement (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994), 287-288, 290-292. See

also Michael P. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 1892-1970 (San Francisco: Sierra

Club Books, 1988), 154-180.

51Jack Kerouac, The Dharma Bums (1958; New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 154-180.

52Grant McConnell, Stehekin: A Valley in Time (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1988), 9.

53Steen, 259-271; Clary, 147.

54Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 192-211. McArdle is quoted on 199. See also, Paul

W. Hirt, A Conspiracy of Optimism: Management of the National Forests since World War

Two (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).

55Cohen, 221, for quote.

56See, for example, a report by the Mountaineers entitled, "Recommendations for the

Proposed Glacier Peak Wilderness Area," April 1, 1956, and Philip H. Zalesky, "Glacier Peak

Wilderness Area," c. 1956, Mountaineers Papers, box 2, Glacier Peak file, University of

Washington.

57"Recommendations for the Proposed Glacier Peak Wilderness Area," and Philip Zalesky,

"Glacier Peak Wilderness Area," Mountaineers Papers. Quotations from Zalesky, 1, 5-6.

58Grant McConnell to Patrick Goldsworthy, et al., July 10, 1956, and John Seiker (Chief,

Forest Service Division of Recreation and Lands) to Edgar Wayburn (Sierra Club), October

18, 1956, Zalesky papers, box 2, unlabeled file, UW. United States Forest Service, "Glacier

Peak Land Management Study," February 7, 1957, Warren G. Magnuson Papers, box 92, file

1, University of Washington.
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59The two most effective weapons in the Dinosaur campaign were the film, "Wilderness

River Trail" and the book, This is Dinosaur, written by Wallace Stegner; these were Brower's

ideas.

60David Brower, "Will We Discover the Northern Cascades in Time?" Sierra Club Bulletin

42 (June 1957): 13-16. Grant McConnell, "Northern Cascades," Sierra Club Bulletin 43

(January 1958): 23-25. Simons' complete statement can be found in David R. Simons to J.

Herbert Stone, April 6, 1957, RG 79. Acc.#71A1071, FRC#8639, file L58, North CascadesGlacier Peak Wilderness, FRC-PNR. McConnell, "The Cascades Wilderness," 31;

McConnell, "The Multiple-Use Concept in Forest Service Policy," Sierra Club Bulletin 44

(October 1949): 14. McConnell, who went on to develop this idea into his political critique of

multiple use while a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, used his own

Stehekin Valley as an example of the failings of multiple use. Under the U Regulations, roads

were excluded from wilderness areas, which eliminated Stehekin from the proposed Glacier

Peak wilderness, but this fact still did not detract from the valley's unspoiled beauty. The

road after all was not attached to the outside world; it led to nowhere. Still, under multiple

use management it would lose its integrity as a wilderness threshold, scarred by logging and

haphazard development.

61J. Herbert Stone, "Glacier Peak Wilderness Proposal (1959)", The Living Wilderness 24

(Autumn 1959): 10-12.

62David Brower, "Crisis in the Northern Cascades: The Missing Million," Sierra Club

Bulletin (February 1959(, quoted in The Living Wilderness 24 (Spring 1959): 35. Brower and

fellow conservationists decried "sanitation logging" in recreation areas which foresters could

carry out at their own discretion, essentially, placing in jeopardy all the scenic forests fringing

a wilderness area.

63David Brower, "Crisis in the Northern Cascades: The Missing Million," Sierra Club

Bulletin (February 1959), quoted in The Living Wilderness 24 (Spring 1959): 35.

64Harvey, Symbol of Wilderness, 258, 288; Runte, National Parks, 171.

65Richard W. Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1997), 187-190.

66Alfred Runte, Yosemite: The Embattle Wilderness (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,

1990), 192-197. See also, Ansel Adams, "Tenaya Tragedy," Sierra Club Bulletin 43

(November 1958): 1-4.

67Grant McConnell to David Brower, May 15, 1958, RG 79, Acc.#71A1071, FRC#8639, file

L58, North Cascades-Glacier Peak Wilderness, FRC-PNR.

68David Brower to Grant McConnell, July 16, 1958, ibid.

69The Wilderness Society supported full protection, apparently hoping a wilderness area of

Marshall's proportions would be established. In principle, it supported a park.

70Patrick D. Goldsworthy to Thomas M. Pelly, February 19, 1959, Pelly Papers, box 14, UW.

Sierra Club Bulletin.

71Thomas M. Pelly to Conrad L. Wirth, March 9, 1959, Mountaineers Papers, box 2, National
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Park Proposals, 1961-64, UW. Richard E. McArdle to Thomas M. Pelly, August 24, 1959,

Thomas M. Pelly Papers, box 14, no file name, UW. Conrad L. Wirth to Secretary of the

Interior, December 11, 1959, RG 79, Acc.#69A1292, FRC#905604, box 16, file L58, FRCPNR.

72For a thorough treatment of the politics associated with the park's establishment, see Allan

R. Sommarstrom, "Wild Land Preservation Crisis: The North Cascades Controversy," 1970,

Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington. Don Magnuson and Thomas M. Pelly to Fred.

A. Seaton, Secretary of the Interior, October 6, 1959, Mountaineers Papers, box 2, file North

Cascades National Park Proposals, 1961-64. See U.S. Congress, House, Congressional

Record, 87th Cong., 1st sess., June 7, 1961.

73Henry M. Jackson and Wayne Morse to Orville L. Freeman, May 4, 1961; Orville L.

Freeman to Wayne Morse, Henry M. Jackson, Warren G. Magnuson, and Maurine B.

Neuberger, June 7, 1961, Warren G. Magnuson Papers, box 122, file 15, UW. These senators,

from Washington and Oregon, had jointly asked the secretary to develop a management plan

for the high mountains in their respective states.

74John A. Baker, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, to Thomas M. Pelly, September 13,

1962, Magnuson papers, box 122, file 10, UW.

75See Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence, 54-57. Thomas G. Smith, "John Kennedy,

Stewart Udall, and New Frontier Conservation," Pacific Historical Review 64 (August 1995):

335, 351. During Eisenhower's presidency only two national parks were added to the system,

Virgin Islands and Haleakala.

76A great deal of private meetings and lobbying led to this alliance. After learning about the

North Cascades issue from the Sierra Club, North Cascades Conservation Council and

Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, Udall expressed his support of the park study,

and with Douglas worked to mend relations with the Department of Agriculture and win the

support of Washington's senators. See, for example, correspondence from November and

December 1959 in North Cascades Conservation Council Papers, box 1, Udall

Correspondence file, UW. The members were Edward C. Crafts, chairman, Bureau of

Outdoor Recreation; George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director, National Park Service; Dr. Owen S.

Stratton, Chairman of the Political Science Department, Wellesley College, and consultant to

the Secretary of the Interior; Dr. George A. Selke, consultant to Secretary of Agriculture; and

Arthur W. Greeley, Deputy Chief of the Forest Service.

77Stewart L. Udall and Orville L. Freeman to Edward C. Crafts, March 5, 1963, Stewart L.

Udall Papers, box 156, file 5, University of Arizona.

78United States Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture, The North

Cascades: A Report to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Agriculture

(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture,

October 1965), 78 (Hereafter referred to as Study Report).

79J. Michael McCloskey, ed., Prospectus for a North Cascades National Park (Seattle: North

Cascades Conservation Council, 1963).

80Cohen, 312-313. Cohen suggests that the Prospectus persuaded the Kennedy administration

to study the North Cascades. This seems only partly true. The council had drafted legislation

for Udall in the early 1960s, but this was the only part of the document ready by 1963 when

the study was launched.
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81Study Report, 79; 165 for quotation.

82George B. Hartzog, Jr., to Edward C. Crafts, October 19, 1965, RG 79, Acc.#69A1292,

FRC#905604, box 16, file L58, FRC-PNR. This letter is reprinted in the Study Report, 139-

141.

83George A. Selke to Edward C. Crafts, October 12, 1965, reprinted in the Study Report,

130-138.

84Orville L. Freeman to Stewart L. Udall, November 9, 1965, Udall Papers, box 156, file 4,

UA.

85George A. Selke and Arthur W. Greeley to Edward C. Crafts, December 3, 1965, RG 95,

Acc.#70A109, FRC#129236, file--North Cascades Study Area, FRC-PNR. This letter is

reprinted in the Study Report, 147-150. Selke and Greeley went on to say that management

of the region would permit some resource extraction, "the virile sport of hunting," water

developments, and "incidental harvesting and 'gathering'." In addition, under national

recreation area policies, the Forest Service could develop the ranger of winter sports and

organization camps."

86Edward C. Crafts to Stewart L. Udall, December 25, 1965, Udall Papers, box 156, file 5,

UA.

87First quotations from New York Times, February 13, 1966. Reprinted in Congressional

Record--Appendix, House, February 15, 1966, A737. Last quotation is from John A. Rutter

to George B. Hartzog, Jr., January 20, 1966, RG 79, Acc.#74A598, FRC#19936, file L58,

FRC-PNR. The comments are Frank Brockman's.

88Patrick D. Goldsworthy to George B. Hartzog, Jr., April 5, 1966, John Osseward Papers,

box 8, file North Cascades Conservation Council, University of Washington; "Amen Mr.

Justice," American Forests 73 (November 1967): 30-31; "Ah, Wilderness: Severe

Overcrowding Brings Ills of the City to Scenic Yosemite," Wall Street Journal, June 24,

1966.

89Richard Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks, 194. Emphasis added by Sellars.

90Paul Brooks, "The Fight for the American Alps," The Atlantic Monthly 219 (February

1967): 87-90.

91Gary Snyder, Earth House Hold: Technical Notes and Queries To Fellow Dharma

Revolutionaries (1957; New York: New Directions Books, 1967), 101.

92U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, North Cascades-Olympic

National Park, Hearings on the Study Team Report of the Recreational Opportunities in the

State of Washington, February 11 and 12, 1966, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966. (Hereafter cited

as Hearings on Study Team Report.) It should be noted by the title of the hearings that

Jackson's intentions were questioned. Was he joining the North Cascades issue with the

volatile subject of adjusting Olympic's boundaries to gain publicity or out of real concern?

Was some trade in the works--land exchanges at Olympic for a park in the North Cascades?

Certainly, as many preservationists protested, by relating North Cascades with Olympic,

Jackson would repeat the problems of the 1930s, when so much anger over the creation of
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Olympic led to the successful defeat of the park study for North Cascades. There was so

much protest to the Olympic boundary adjustments during the hearings that the proposal was

dropped--whatever Jackson's true intent.

93Hearings on Study Team Report, 347-349. See also Allan Sommarstrom, "Wild Land

Preservation Crisis," 96-121.

94Memorandum, Orville L. Freeman to President Lyndon B. Johnson, December 28, 1966;

Memorandum, Stewart L. Udall to President Lyndon B. Johnson, December 29, 1966, Udall

Papers, box 156, file 5, UA.

95Senate Bill 1321, "To Establish the North Cascades National Park and Ross Lake National

Recreation Area, to designate the Pasayten Wilderness and to modify the Glacier Peak

Wilderness, in the State of Washington, and for other purposes," October 31, 1967, 90th

Cong., 1st sess.

96U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Parks

and Recreation, Hearings on S. 1321, A Bill to Establish North Cascades National Park...,

90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 14-15. (Hereafter cited as Hearings on S. 1321.)

97Hearings on S. 1321, 14-15.

98Hearings on S. 1321, 336-337, 427.

99It should be noted that protecting Granite Creek, even though the highway ran through it

was necessary to retain the region's scenic qualities as visitors approached and drove through

the park; it was also a way to avoid future, unsightly and destructive, developments in the

area for interpretive purposes, in particular a spur road down Bridge Creek. Hence, protecting

wilderness through development.

100Hearings on S. 1321, 64-68.

101Hearings on S. 1321, 92.

102Adding Lightning Creek to the Pasayten would prevent any future road construction down

the shore of Ross Lake from Canada, even though by the time of the hearings the Park

Service had scratched this from its plans as well as the use of helicopters.

103H. Duane Hampton, "Opposition to National Parks," Journal of Forest History 25 (January

1981): 36-45.

104Intentionally left blank.

105Wesley Arden Dick, "When Dams Weren't Damned: The Public Power Crusade and

Visions of the Good Life in the Pacific Northwest in the 1930s," Environmental Review 13

(Fall/Winter 1989): 119.

106As Jackson stated to Nelson during the hearings: "I think the Seattle Light people...deserve

great tribute for recognizing the conservation possibilities in the Skagit area...I think what you

have done over the years is a good example for others to follow." Moreover, "what you are

doing to assist tourists and outdoor recreationists in the area," the senator concluded, was

"quite remarkable." The boundaries of Ross Lake Recreation Area had already been drawn to
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adjust for the raising of the lake in accordance with plans to raise Ross Dam. This provision

was already part of the first version of S. 1321 and was presented as both a necessary

addition for power production and as an improvement for recreational opportunities along the

lake--from boating to camping and fishing. It should also be noted that the committee left the

actual approval of the project up to the Federal Power Commission. Should the project on

Thunder Creek be turned down, it was expected, Jackson noted, that this area would be

managed as if it were part of the national park. See Hearings, 1967, 59, for quotations.

107Patrick D. Goldsworthy, "Protecting the North Cascades, 1954-1983," an oral history

conducted by Ann Lage, in Pacific Northwest Conservationists, Regional Oral History Office,

the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1986, 53.

108Sommarstrom, "Wild Land Preservation Crisis," 96-104.

109Hearings on S. 1321, 50-51. Evans' statement and state government resolution are on 42-

49.

110Hearings on S. 1321, 51.

111John A. Biggs to Henry M. Jackson, June 21, 1967, Henry M. Jackson papers, box 338,

file 12, University of Washington, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular

Affairs, S. 1321, Report No. 700, October 31, 1967, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 30-31. (Hereafter

cited as Report No. 700.) The committee report, 31, notes the improvements that the game

department and Chelan PUD were seeking to improve fishing in the lake. This was only a

partial concession to the department, which wanted to retain full control of fisheries

management within the entire proposed park, and wanted the Park Service to assume all

responsibility for wildlife damage on private lands inside or outside the park's boundaries due

to the closure of hunting seasons. See Burton J. Lauckhart, Chief, Game Management

Division, to John A. Biggs, September 20, 1967, and Thomas O. Wimmer to Sterling

Monroe, July 26, 1967, Henry M. Jackson Papers, box 338, file 14, University of

Washington.

112Quote from Hearings on S. 1321, 631. The Park Service also added its newly drafted land

and water acquisition policies for natural areas and recreation areas.

113Members of Congress were referring to the relative explosion of parks, recreation areas,

and national seashores during the latter 1960s which caused some overlapping management

as well as created jurisdictional rivalries between the two bureaus. The 1963 "Treaty of the

Potomac" attempted to resolve some of these issues and disputes--such as WhiskeytownShasta-Trinity NRA.

114Report No. 700, 11-12.

115Report No. 700, 31.

116Congressional Record, Senate, November 2, 1967, S15757.

117Fox, John Muir and His Legacy, 288-289.

118National Park Service, Legislative History for North Cascades National Park Service

Complex, vol. I, (May 1986), 15-122.

119
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"Men to Match Our Mountains," The Seattle Times, May 26, 1968, 6-7.

120U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Hearings on H.R.

8970, A Bill to Establish North Cascades National Park..., 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, 80.

121John P. Saylor to Daniel J. Evans, June 26, 1968, Governor Daniel J. Evans Papers, [2s-2-

358], file--North Cascades, Washington State Archives.

122M. Brock Evans to Dave Payton, June 14, 1958, Evans Papers, [2s-2-358], file--North

Cascades, Washington State Archives.

123Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water (New

York: Viking, 1986), 285-290. Quotation from 289.

124Sommarstrom, 137.

125Sommarstrom, 137-140.

126See, for example, U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Report

No. 1870 on H.R. 8970, A Bill to Establish North Cascades National Park..., 90th Cong., 2d

sess., September 9, 1968; and An Act to Establish North Cascades National Park and Ross

Lake and Lake Chelan National Recreation Areas, to Designate the Pasayten Wilderness and

to Modify the Glacier Peak Wilderness, in the State of Washington, and for Other Purposes,

Public Law 90-544, 90th Cong., S. 1321, October 2, 1968.

127Paul Brooks, The Pursuit of Wilderness, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 44.

Part II

1Spokesman Review, October 3, 1968. The North Cascades Act created a park complex of

the two-unit North Cascades National Park, which embraced nearly 505,000 acres, Ross Lake

National Recreation Area of some 105,000 (or 107,000) acres, and Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area of 62,000 acres. The North Cascades Act also created 520,000-acre Pasayten

Wilderness and provided for a 10,000-acre addition to the Glacier Peak Wilderness.

Altogether, the act set aside some 1.2 million acres of wild alpine country.

2See, for example, "Conservationists Not Satisfied," Seattle Times, October 27, 1968, and

Harvey Manning, The Wild Cascades: Forgotten Parkland, rev. ed. (San Francisco: Sierra

Club Books, 1969), 26-27, 145-148.

3Ronald A. Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers (Washington D.C.:

Resources For the Future, Inc., 1984), 109, 111.

4A. Starker Leopold et al., "Wildlife Management in the National Parks," March 4, 1963, 4,

reprinted in Administrative Policies for Natural Areas of the National Park System

(Washington D.C.: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1970), 97-112.

5Department of the Interior, Administrative Policies for Natural Areas of the National Park

System (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1970), 23.

6
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Barry Mackintosh, The National Parks: Shaping the System (Washington D.C.: U.S.

Department of the Interior, 1984), 62-64. Department of the Interior, Administrative Policies

for Natural Areas, 33, 76-83.

Chapter 2

1Charles A. Connaughton, Regional Forester, to Division Chiefs and Forest Supervisors, Mt.

Baker, Okanogan, and Wenatchee National Forests, October 22, 1968, Record Group 95,

Acc.#76A715, FRC#124715, file North Cascades National Park, Federal Record Center--

Pacific Northwest Region.

2Personal interview with Roger J. Contor, June 25, 1996. "Briefing Statement--North

Cascades National Park for Congressman Lloyd Meeds," July 4, 1969, Lloyd Meeds Papers,

box 5, file on North Cascades Development, University of Washington.

3Personal interview with Roger J. Contor, June 25, 1996.

4"Cascade Park Plans Outlined," Bellingham Herald, October 8, 1968; Quotation from

"Booster Group Forms to Support New Park Throughout County," Skagit Valley Herald,

October 11, 1968; "Jackson, Contor Outline Future National Park Plans," Chelan Valley

Mirror, October 31, 1968.

5Margaret J. Stadlman to Lloyd Meeds, November 12, 1968, Lloyd Meeds Papers, box 10,

file D-National Park Service.

6Roger J. Contor to Margaret J. Stadlman, December 4, 1968, Lloyd Meeds Papers, box 10,

file D-National Park Service, University of Washington; Daniel J. Evans to Rogers Morton,

May 3, 1971; W. Lowell White to Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, December 5,

1973, administrative files, file A80, North Cascades National Park.

7Gerald W. Pelton, "Cooperation-Mountain Style," Parks and Recreation (November 1971):

34-35. Article attached to Gerald W. Pelton to North Cascades Reconnaissance Task Force,

December 1, 1971, administrative files, file A3815, North Cascades National Park Service

Complex. Members of the task force were federal officials from the Park Service, Forest

Service (the Mount Baker and Okanogan National Forests), Bureau of Outdoor Recreation,

and Federal Highway Administration. State agencies were represented by officials from the

departments of Commerce and Economic Development, Highways, Game, Interagency

Committee on Outdoor Recreation, Natural Resources, Planning and Community Affairs,

Parks and Recreation, and Program Planning and Fiscal Management. County commissioners

also served on the task force; they represented Chelan, Okanogan, Skagit, and Whatcom

counties, the four counties in which the North Cascades park and forest complex was located.

8National Park Service, Master Plan: North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

Washington (November 1970), 2, 36.

9Master Plan, 2-6. Quotation from 6.

10National Park Service, Wilderness Recommendations: North Cascades Complex,

Washington (August 1970), 1. "Statement of Roger J. Contor," Wilderness Hearings, North

Cascades National Park, June 4, 6, 1970, 2, administrative files, file L48, NOCA.
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11Roger J. Contor to Director, Western Service Center, May 21, 1970, administrative files,

file D18, NOCA; Department of the Interior, North Cascades National Park Service, Forest

Service (August 1974), 8, 37-39.

12Joint Plan, 13-31.

13Walt Woodward, "Superintendent's Report: What's Happening in North Cascades Park,"

Seattle Times, September 14, 1969.

14"New Cascades Plan Unveiled," Wenatchee World, June 23, 1970.

15Ibid.

16"Superintendent's Report," Seattle Times, September 14, 1969.

17"Forest Service Supervisors Leave Fire Line to Face Heated Dispute on North Cascades,"

Seattle Times, July 19, 1970; Harold C. Chriswell to Regional Forester, September 14, 1967,

Record Group 95, Acc.#76A2058, FRC#68115, box 7, Federal Records Center--Pacific

Northwest Region. Harold C. Chriswell to Regional Forester, April 7, 1971, RG 95,

Acc.#76H2058, FRC#68116, file 2150, Special Planning Areas-North Cascades Study, FRCPNR.

Chapter 3

1Alfred Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,

1990), 202-206.

2Roger J. Contor to Walt Woodward, October 19, 1968, administrative files, Yellows,

NOCA.

3Seattle Times, September 14, 1969.

4North Cascades Conservation Council, Committee for the Review of National Forest and

Park Service General Development and Wilderness Proposals for the North Cascades Region,

to North Cascades Conservation Council Board Members, May 1, 1970, John Osseward

Papers, box 7, North Cascades National Park Hearings, June 3-6, 1970, University of

Washington.

5U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Parks

and Recreation, Hearings on S. 1321, A Bill to Establish North Cascades National Park...,

90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 22-23. (Hereafter cited as Hearings on S. 1321.) U.S. Congress,

House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation, Hearings on H.R. 8970, A Bill to

Establish North Cascades National Park..., 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, 951. (Hereafter cited

as Hearings on H.R. 8970.)

6Hearings on S. 1321, 21-22.

7Hearings on H.R. 8970, 953, 959.

8Hearings on S. 1321, 23-24.
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9Ibid., 23.

10Joseph L. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks (Ann

Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1980), 62-63.

11Patrick D. Goldsworthy to George B. Hartzog, Jr., April 5, 1966, Emily Haig Papers, box

29, file 9, University of Washington; Ira L. Spring to Lloyd Meeds, April 23, 1968, Lloyd

Meeds Papers, box 14, file--H.R. 8970: North Cascades Correspondence, University of

Washington.

12"Meeds off on Park Tour; Wants It 'Pro People'," Skagit Valley Herald, August 26, 1969.

13"Testimony by Congressman Lloyd Meeds...on the Development of the North Cascades

National Park," April 12, 1972; Briefing Statement, "General Statement on Development:

North Cascades National Park," February 1, 1977, Lloyd Meeds Papers, box 63, file "North

Cascades", University of Washington.

14North Cascades Conservation Council to Board Members, May 1, 1970.

15For specifics of the Roland Point development, see "Presentation for North Cascades:

Lower Ross Lake and Roland Point," unattributed, undated report, c. 1971, administrative

files, North Cascades National Park. Personal interview with Lowell White, July 19, 1996.

The ferry service and Arctic Creek tramway, though they remained in the plan, never

materialized.

16Lloyd Meeds to George Hartzog, Jr., March 14, 1972, box 6, file "North Cascades", Meeds

Papers, UW.

17This is not to say that the agency abandoned any hopes of gaining access to the southern

end of Ross Lake. As part of its negotiations with City Light over the raising of the dam, the

agency required that the utility provide a public access road and lakeshore facilities. See

discussion in section on the park's relationship with City Light and the High Ross

controversy.

18Press release from Congressman Lloyd Meeds, August 21, 1972, box 63, file "North

Cascades," Meeds Papers.

19Lowell White to Regional Director, October 11, 1972, administrative files, file A38,

NOCA.

20"Testimony of Lloyd Meeds before the Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies,"

May 12,1975, box 63, file "North Cascades", Meeds Papers, UW.

21"Testimony of Lloyd Meeds," May 12, 1975. See, for example, superintendent's annual

reports for the years 1975-1979.

22White interview.

23White interview.

24Personal interview with Roger Contor, June 25, 1996. Roger J. Contor, North Cross-State

Highway Coordinating Committee Meeting, Minutes, December 3, 1969, box 1, file 25;
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"North Cascades Task Force Workbook," c. 1968, box 1, file 27, North Cascades National

Park Service Complex Archives, NOCA (NOCA Archives).

25John A. Rutter to Henry M. Jackson, August 12, 1970, Henry M. Jackson Papers, box 107,

file 20, University of Washington.

26"Cascade Pass Management Plan," January 1, 1974, administrative files, L48, NOCA.

27"Cascade Pass Management Plan," 6. Gary J. Kuiper to D.H. Porter, April 24, 1974; Gary J.

Kuiper to Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, April 16, 1974, administrative files,

file L48, NOCA. See also, "Assessment of the Environmental Impact of Implementation of

the Cascade Pass Management Plan," June 1974, ibid. Kuiper, the park's assistant

superintendent, noted also that area residents were concerned about who would maintain the

road should it be closed. This concern he added, was rooted in the ownership of this Mine-toMarket road, which the county claimed. Kuiper also mentioned pressing forward with a

memorandum of understanding between the park and the county regarding the road's

maintenance and possible closure; however, the regional director seems to have thought it

imprudent to force the issue. Better to work with all parties involved than work against them.

28A summary of public comments can be found in Kuiper to Regional Director, April 16,

1974. The park's files, cited above, also contain transcripts of the meetings.

29Grant McConnell, Stehekin: A Valley in Time, (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1988), 12-13.

30Roger J. Contor to R.J. Brooks, August 12, 1970, administrative files, A36, NOCA. See

also Roger J. Contor to Brock Evans, September 1, 1970, ibid.

31Roger J. Contor to Marc Bardsley, June 23, 1970, administrative files, file D18, NOCA;

Grant McConnell, "Five Years of National Park Service Administration in the North

Cascades," The Wild Cascades (December 1973/January 1974): 11.

32"Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades Park Service Complex, 1973," box 1, file

five, NOCA Archives. McConnell, "Five Years of National Park Service Administration," 12.

It should be noted that not all park managers were in agreement with improvements to the

Stehekin Road. Park biologist Robert Wasem, for example, questioned the "sociological

impact of the road paving" on the primitive nature of the valley. C. Robert Wasem to

Superintendent Lowell White, September 20, 1972, administrative files, file L74, NOCA.

33The issue over the transfer of the Stehekin Road, and the Park Service's related jurisdiction

over the Company Creek Road, where most of the pressure over snow removal came from,

can be found in file 65, NOCA Archives. John A. Rutter to Henry M. Jackson, Henry M.

Jackson Papers, box 107, file 19, University of Washington; Contor to Bardsley, June 23,

1970.

34This summary of the park complex's interpretive program is drawn from Superintendent's

Annual Reports, 1972-1978, and park interpretive planning files, administrative files, file

K1817, NOCA.

35Roger J. Contor to Director, Western Service Center, August 12, 1970, administrative files,

file K1817, NOCA.

36National Park Service, Interim Interpretive Plan, Skagit District, Ross Lake National
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Recreation Area, North Cascades Complex, July 1976, 2-10.

Chapter 4

1John Ise, Our National Park Policy: A Critical History (Baltimore: John Hopkins University

Press, 1961), 606.

2Public Law 249, 89th Cong., 1st sess., October 9, 1965.

3Lowell White to Brock Evans, March 1, 1971, administrative files, file C38, NOCA.

Personal interview with Lowell White, July 19, 1996. It should be noted that in the park

complex's first decade of management there were a number of other concession operators, or

individuals with special use permits, who offered services to the park complex's visitors.

These include the Courtney horse packing concession in Stehekin and several river-rafting

guide services on the Skagit River below Newhalem and one on the Stehekin River.

4"Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1975,"

box 1, file 7, NOCA Archives. White to Evans, March 1, 1971.

5Letter to the Files, Roger J. Contor, November 11, 1970, administrative files, file C38,

NOCA. See related memoranda in these files relating to Ross Lake Resort.

6Ibid.

7Lowell White to Wayne Dameron, January 29, 1971, administrative files, file C38, NOCA.

8National Park Service, Diablo Lake Resort Development Concept Plan: Ross Lake National

Recreation Area, May 3, 1971.

9Diablo Lake Resort Development Concept Plan, 5. "National Park Service Background of

the Diablo Lake resort," c. 1985, administrative files, file C3823, NOCA.

10Lowell White to Director, Pacific Northwest Region, February 28, 1972, administrative

files, file C38, NOCA.

11It should be noted that the names of these resorts vary historically. The Golden West

Lodge, for example, came to be referred to also as the Stehekin Lodge by the time of the park

complex's creation. The Swissmont appears to have also gone by the names of the Stehekin

Resort or the Stehekin Landing Resort. There were, at bottom, three resorts or lodges located

at the landing.

12Susan E. Georgette to Ann H. Harvey, Local Influence and the National Interest: Ten

Years of National Park Service Administration in the Stehekin Valley, Washington,

Publication No. 4, Environmental Field Program (Santa Cruz: University of California Santa

Cruz, 1980), 74.

13Letter to the files, June 24, 1971, administrative files, C38, NOCA.

14Larry Tonge operated the Boatel before Moore.

15
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Lowell White to Files, September 28, 1971, Concessions, box 1, file 4, NOCA Archives.

Other information on the concession operations in Stehekin can be found in this file. See, for

example, Lowell White to John O.E. Moore, July 5, 1972.

16Williams J. Weaver, Acting Superintendent, to Regional Director, April 2, 1976,

Concessions, box 1, file 4, NOCA Archives. See also Stehekin Transportation Plan, April

1976-get full cite. In 1976, park managers proposed a trial operation in which Byrd operated

the shuttle service to High Bridge and from there the Park Service would operate the service

to Cottonwood. A $1 fee per day would be charged by the concessioner for his bus service.

The agency's service would be free to visitors, and would also be free to residents. Park

managers believed, based on the Stehekin transportation study that a system of larger buses in

the lower valley and smaller buses in the upper valley would cost the same or perhaps less.

17Byrd's views were shared by others of course who felt that the Park Service's presence had

altered the valley's character, among other things. It should be noted that Byrd's ideas were

tied to being excluded from the Park Service's recent planning efforts in Stehekin. In

addition, Byrd seemed to object to a private study of Stehekin's concessions that the Park

Service contracted with the Seattle Center for Hotel and Restaurant Administration, located at

Washington State University. One of the main reasons for the study was to find a way to

handle food and other services for the increased number of visitors the New Lady would

bring to the Stehekin Landing. Park managers reported that the report's recommendations

were a success; combining box picnic lunches, outdoor barbeque and light food service at the

restaurant dispersed the boat's passengers. "Superintendent's Annual Report for North

Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1976," 12, Administration and Management, box

1, file 8, NOCA Archives. See also John W. McCracken to Lowell White, April 15, 1976,

and McCracken's accompanying report, "An Operational Analysis North Cascades Lodge,"

April 1976, Concessions, box 1, file 4, NOCA Archives. Robert Byrd imparted his views in

two key letters. Robert Byrd to Lowell White, May 29, 1976; and Robert Byrd to Lowell

White, June 10, 1976, Concessions, box 1, file 4, NOCA Archives.

18The Park Services allowed Byrd to continue operating the shuttle service for the 1976

season, but took over operation officially--the first time since its initiation in 1972--in 1977.

"Superintendent's Annual Report for North Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1977,"

Administration and Management, box 1, file 9, NOCA Archives.

19"Superintendent's Annual Report for North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

1977" and "Superintendent's Annual Report for North Cascades National Park Service

Complex, 1978," Administration and Management, box 1, file 4, NOCA Archives. See also

letters and contract information from the National Park Service to Gibson and Dinwiddie in

concessions files, box 1, file 4. There is, at least in the official record, no mention of how the

Park Service and Byrd parted. One letter in the files suggests that Byrd left the business but

refused to sell his property--chairs, beds, restaurant equipment-- to the new operators.

Chapter 5

1"Statement of Roger J. Contor," Wilderness Hearings, North Cascades National Park, June

4, 6, 1970, 2; Roger J. Contor, "Natural Area Management in Our Wildest National Park,"

March 12, 1970, Lands, Water, and Recreation Planning, box 6, file 84, NOCA Archives.

National Park Service, Wilderness Recommendations: North Cascades Complex, Washington

(August 1970), 1.

2
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North Cascades Conservation Council, Committee for the Review of National Forest and

Park Service General Development and Wilderness Proposals for the North Cascades Region,

to North Cascades Conservation Council Board Members, May 1, 1970, John Osseward

Papers, box 7, File--North Cascades National Park Hearings, June 3-6, 1970, University of

Washington.

3Ibid. See also "North Cascades Wilderness Proposed," The Living Wilderness 34 (Summer

1970): 60-61, and "Cascades Wilderness Additions Urged," The Living Wilderness 34

(Autumn 1970): 60-62. Other excerpts from the Wilderness Society's journal can be found in

the park's files. See "Should the North Cascades Wilderness Be Invaded by Chalets and

Tramways," and "Why North Cascades Proposals Needs Revision," c. 1970; see also

National Parks Association, "North Cascades National Park, Washington: A Wilderness Plan

for the National Park and Surrounding Region," May 1970, administrative files, park history

files, North Cascades National Park Service Complex Archives (Hereafter NOCA Archives).

4"Why North Cascades Proposal Needs Revision."

5Most of these shelters for recording measurements belonged to the United States Geological

Survey.

6Ibid. See also North Cascades Committee to North Cascades Board Members, May 1, 1970.

7See the above citations. For a complete list of comments on the wilderness plan see

Wilderness Recommendations: North Cascades Complex, especially Director Hartzog's letter,

18-20.

8Wilderness Recommendations, 18-20.

9Ibid. It should be noted that there were two other hostels proposed to make up for the loss of

the Picket Range hostels. One was located along the Pacific Crest Trail in the park's southern

unit, and the other was located in Ross Lake NRA on the Lightning Creek Trail.

10Ibid. Personal interview with Roger J. Contor, June 25, 1996. Contor noted that he

explained the situation to Margaret Murie, Olaus Murie's wife, of the Wilderness Society and

she agreed to pressure Hartzog to delete the hostels from the wilderness plan. Primed by this

pressure and recent events at Glacier, Hartzog, it seems, agreed to remove the hostels. But

there were hostels still proposed in Lake Chelan NRA in the Stehekin Valley as part of the

master plan's general scheme to relieve some of the pressure from the landing.

11John A. Rutter to Associate Director, Legislation, National Park Service, June 25, 1975,

Lands, Water, and Recreation Planning, box 6, file 85, NOCA Archives. Rutter details some

of the congressional sequence of events, and suggests that it would not be appropriate at the

time, though it was required, to complete an EIS for the wilderness proposal.

12Ibid.

13Roger J. Contor, "Proposed Wilderness Management Guidelines: North Cascades National

Park," December 1970, Lands, Water, and Recreation Planning, box 6, file 84, NOCA

Archives.

14Sequoia and Kings Canyon present a good comparison for gaining some perspective on the

backcountry management practices for North Cascades. Park Service officials completed the
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first backcountry management plan for the parks in 1961; it addressed broad issues such as a

definition of wilderness, carrying capacity, and a true wilderness experience. It also launched

a vigorous program of meadow monitoring and closures and trash removal. It also

recommended helicopter use as a way to lessen impacts to high country areas, caused by pack

stock, for supplying trail crews, lookouts, and the like--a point of some controversy in the

North Cascades. Sequoia-Kings also shared similar interagency relations and wilderness

concerns over permits as did North Cascades, specifically with bordering national forests. See

Lary M. Dilsaver and William C. Twed, Challenge of the Big Trees: A Resource History of

Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks (Three Rivers, Calif.: Sequoia Natural History

Association, 1990), 265-278.

15Contor, "Proposed Wilderness Management Guidelines," 1-2.

16Ibid. Unless otherwise cited, the following paragraphs are drawn from Contor's report.

17Contor interview.

18National Park Service, "Backcountry Management Plan: North Cascades National Park

Service Complex," March 14, 1974, Lands, Water, and Recreation Planning, box 6, file 85,

NOCA Archives.

19In general, these standards, attached as an appendix to the plan, would conform to other

standards, such as for signs for example, used in national forest wildernesses adjoining the

park complex. They were also intended to contribute to the overall wilderness experience;

posts rather than signs would mark campsites.

20At first, park staffers distribute permits from the main Skagit District office at

Marblemount, but in 1975, the backcountry permit center came into its own when an

"Information Trailer" was moved up from Concrete and the permit center moved its

operations here. See "Superintendent's Annual Report for North Cascades National Park

Service Complex, 1975," and "Superintendent's Annual Report, 1978." See also

"Backcountry Management Plan: North Cascades National Park Service Complex," and John

Hays, " Mandatory Backcountry Permits...North Cascades National Park--Summer 1974,"

February 1, 1975, administrative files, file L3419, NOCA.

21Roger J. Contor, "Natural Area Management in Our Wildest National Park," March 12,

1970, Natural and Social Sciences, box 6, file 3, NOCA Archives.

22National Park Service, "Cascade Pass Action Plan," January 1, 1974, Lands, Water, and

Recreation Planning, box 6, file 85, NOCA Archives.

23The work of the Millers is referenced throughout the park documents and their

contributions are recounted with praise by many park employees. See also "Superintendent's

Annual Report," 1977 and 1978.

24John E. Jensen to Superintendent Lowell White, March 9, 1977, Lands, Water, and

Recreation Planning, box 6, file 85, NOCA Archives. See also Superintendent John J.

Reynolds to Regional Director, August 23, 1985, Administration and Management, box 1, file

22, NOCA Archives.

25The park complex's land acquisition program will be discussed more thoroughly in the next

section of this history. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, many of the park complex's land
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acquisition issues came to a climax. See, for example, Jerry W. Hammond to Regional

Director, administrative files, file L1425, April 7, 1971, NOCA; John A. Rutter to Lloyd

Meeds, December 4, 1975, administrative files, file L2023, NOCA.

26Dan Taylor, "Report on Conditions of the Backcountry and Recommendations for Further

Progress: Skagit District, North Cascades National Park and Ross Lake National Recreation,"

November 1977, 9, Lands, Water, and Recreation Planning, box 6, file 85, NOCA Archives.

See also John E. Jensen to Superintendent Lowell White, May 15, 1978, and related

correspondence in this file.

27Taylor, "Report on Conditions of the Backcountry," 3-4.

28Taylor, 7; Jensen to White, March 9, 1977.

29Jensen to White, March 9, 1977.

Chapter 6

1A. Starker Leopold et al., "Wildlife Management in the National Parks," March 4, 1963, 4,

reprinted in Administrative Policies for Natural Areas of the National Park System

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1970, 97-112. See

also, Richard W. Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1997).

2"Guidelines for Resources Management in the Areas in the Natural Category of the National

Park System," attached to memorandum from Assistant Director, Operations, National Park

Service, to All Field Offices, October 14, 1965, Henry M. Jackson Papers, box 338, file 20,

University of Washington.

3Superintendent Roger J. Contor to Regional Director, June 20, 1969, administrative files,

file N22, North Cascades National Park Service Complex (NOCA).

4"A Preliminary Research Program for North Cascades National Park, Ross Lake National

Recreation Area, Lake Chelan National Recreation Area," June 1969, administrative files, file

N22, NOCA.

5Roger J. Contor, "Natural Area Management in Our Wildest National Park," paper presented

to the Northwest Scientific Association Symposium on Natural Areas, Salem, Oregon, March

27-28, 1970, dated March 12, 1970, administrative files, file N22, NOCA. Richard Sellars,

Preserving Nature in the National Parks, 235.

6Master Plan, 28.

7Contor, "Natural Area Management in Our Wildest National Park."

8The actual approval date for some of the park complex's research natural areas seems to be

missing from the record. Of these areas, Ridley Lake was never approved, and over the years

several more were added. These are Stetattle Creek RNA and Big Beaver Creek RNA. It

should be noted that one of the first research natural areas proposed was Big Beaver Valley, a

site recommended from the Forest Service--since their research natural areas were a product

of that agency. Big Beaver Valley, of course, got caught in the political web surrounding
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High Ross Dam and its designation was postponed. For a list of research natural areas in the

park complex, see Robert Wasem to Superintendent Keith Miller, June 12, 1980,

administrative files, file N22, North Cascades National Park Service Complex.

9Erwin N. Thompson, North Cascades National Park, Ross Lake National Recreation Area,

and Lake Chelan National Recreation Area: History Basic Data (National Park Service:

March 1970). Thompson's work as well as several other studies, such as historic structure

reports, would serve as the kernel for the development of the park complex's cultural resource

management program, which will be covered in greater detail in the following section.

10One would have thought given the severity of the project that the agency would have done

more to protect special places like Big Beaver Valley. Roger Contor's reasoning for having it

studied was to assess its ecological uniqueness. If it qualified as an irreplaceable natural

environment, a laboratory of nature containing precious resources, he might have been able

to use this to stall the High Ross project. But Sharpe noted that there were other places in the

North Cascades where old growth western red cedar, could be found and thus the Big Beaver

Valley was not "one of a kind" or the "last of a kind." On the other hand, Joe and Margaret

Miller conducted an ecological survey of the valley and refuted statements such as these in

their report. Certainly, there was enough evidence to suggest the valley's ecological value, but

constrained by law to not interfere with High Ross, the Park Service waited out the

controversy, withholding any aggressive action to protect Ross Lake until the late 1970s and

early 1980s. See chapter on High Ross for more discussion.

11"North Cascades National Park Service Complex: Summary of Approved Natural Science

Resource Studies Problems," December 1972, administrative files, file N22, NOCA.

12Robert Wasem to Superintendent Lowell White, March 15, 1971; Superintendent Lowell

White to Regional Director, September 1, 1971, administrative files, file Y14, NOCA. The

fire management plan was finished in 1972. See National Park Service, North Cascades

National Park Service Complex: Resource Management Plan, 1981, N2-3.

13Wasem's other studies included inventorying human impacts to backcountry camps,

stabilizing the windswept bed of Lake Chelan during winter draw downs using native plants,

and rejuvenating woody browse plants on Winter Deer Range by cutting and burning.

14Personal interview with Lowell White, full cite. For a summary of White's policy, see

Superintendent Lowell White to Albert L. Odmark, June 6, 1975, administrative files, file

N1423, NOCA.

15Robert Wasem to Superintendent Lowell White, November 3, 1975, administrative files,

file N1423, NOCA.

16See, for example, Albert L. Odmark to Superintendent Lowell White, June 26, 1975,

administrative files, file N1423, NOCA. Robert Wasem learned that trout had been

introduced into the park's lakes and adjacent lakes on Forest Service land by groups like the

Hi-Lakers and Trailblazers but also by various unaffiliated groups and individuals including

the Concrete football team--to get in shape--as well as the occasional game department fish

hatchery manager without his superiors' knowledge.

17White to Odmark, June 6, 1975.

18Odmark to White, June 26, 1976.
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19Douglas H. Fletcher to Robert Wasem, May 9, 1974, administrative files, file N1423, May

9, 1974, NOCA. It should be noted that the sport fishing organizations were the main

constituents of the game department and thus the main supporters of its fish management

program.

20Superintendent Lowell White to Regional Director, November 3, 1975, administrative files,

file N1423, NOCA.

21Park Biologist Bob Wasem wrote the policy variance for Superintendent White in the

spring of 1975.

22Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, Russell E. Dickenson to Associate Director,

January 15, 1976, administrative files, file N1423, NOCA.

23See, for example, Douglas H. Fletcher to Robert Wasem, August 25, 1976; Douglas H.

Fletcher to Superintendent Lowell White, August 16, 1976; and C. Richard Neely to

Regional Director, August 27, 1976, administrative files, file N1423, NOCA. Apparently, the

variance was approved by telephone and never by written notification by the Washington

office.

24W.C. Quick, Acting Regional Director to Bruce H. Ransom, Jr., June 22, 1977,

administrative files, file N1423, NOCA.

25R. Gerald Wright, Wildlife Research and Management in the National Parks (Urbana:

University of Illinois Press): 111-135.

26Personal interview with Roger Contor. See also Superintendent Roger J. Contor to District

Managers, August 4, 1969, administrative files, file N1615, NOCA.

27North Cascades National Park Service Complex, "Bear Management Plan," July 1975. See

also Superintendent's annual reports for the 1970s.

Chapter 7

1The most highly visible and disputed of these other projects was the Copper Creek project,

which would have dammed Copper Creek near its confluence with the Skagit down river

from the Gorge Dam. Proposed around the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Copper Creek

project was eventually shelved by Seattle when a formidable opposition of tribes,

environmentalists, and government entities arose to stop it. The dam would have been located

in a very productive salmon-spawning area of the Skagit, which was also a highly popular

spot for wintering bald eagles. Recent environmental legislation and Indian fishing rights

weighed heavily in favor of the dam's opponents, and City Light suspended the project as a

result. This topic will be covered in more detail in a later section. See Richard Rutz,

"Relicensing the Skagit Project: The City of Seattle's Approach," George Wright Forum vol.

9, no. 2 (1992): 11-12.

2The project would have raised the height of Ross Dam by approximately 125 feet,

completing the fourth stage in the dam's design. In addition, High Ross would have raised the

level of Ross Lake from an elevation of 1,600 feet above sea level to approximately 1,725

feet above seal level.
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3For a comprehensive account of the High Ross issue, see Jacqueline Krolopp Kirn, "The

Skagit River-High Ross Dam Controversy: A Case Study of a Canadian-U.S. Transboundary

Conflict and Negotiated Resolution," Master's Thesis, University of Washington, 1987. Other

works include, David G. Kidney, "The Ross Dam Controversy: A Popular View of an

International Environmental Dilemma," Master's thesis, University of Washington, 1975.

Seattle City Light's official history of the controversy is The High Ross Treaty: Provisions

and Benefits (Seattle: Seattle City Light, September 1985). The Vancouver Sun, October 26,

1970, for quotation.

4For treatments of the conflict as an international issue and changing environmental values,

see the above citations. Other works of interest are Wesley Arden Dick, "When Dams

Weren't Damned: The Public Power Crusade and Visions of the Good Life in the Pacific

Northwest in the 1930s," Environmental Review 13 (Fall/Winter): 1989; Samuel P. Hayes,

Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Marilyn Dubasek, Wilderness Preservation:

A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Canada and the United States (New York: Garland

Publishing, Inc., 1990); and William R. Lowry, The Capacity for Wonder: Preserving

National Parks (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

5The 1936 Park, Parkway, and Recreation Area Study Act gave the agency the lead role in

recreational planning across the nation. That year, the Park Service took over responsibility

for Lake Mead at Boulder Dam. Richard W. Sellars, draft chapter on National Park Service

recreation, in author's possession. For a brief summary of the Park Service's role in

recreation, see Stephen R. Mark, "What Price Expansion? Dams Versus the National Park

Concept," The George Wright Forum vol. 9, no. 2 (1992): 53-61. See also Donald C. Swain,

"The National Park Service and the New Deal, 1933-1940," Pacific Historical Review 41

(August 1972): 312-332; Ronald A. Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers

(Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984): 45; John C. Miles, Guardians of the

Parks: A History of the National Parks and Conservation Association (Washington, D.C.:

Taylor and Francis, 1995): 88-95. Also valuable are Robert W. Righter, Crucible for

Conservation: The Struggle for Grand Teton National Park (Boulder: Colorado Associated

University Press, 1982), 88-93, for a discussion of the National Park Association's opposition

to adding Jackson Lake, a reservoir, to Grand Teton National Park, and Mark W.T. Harvey,

A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American Conservation Movement

(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994): 31-34.

6Fore more information on the park's creation see the chapter on this subject. See also,

Michael McCloskey, "Wilderness Movement at the Crossroad, 1945-1970," Pacific Historical

Review 41 (August 1972): 350. See also Susan R. Schrepfer, The Fight to Save the

Redwoods: A History of Environmental Reform, 1917-1978 (Madison: University of

Wisconsin Press, 1983).

7Roderick Nass, Wilderness and the American Mind 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1982), 161-181, 209-219, 227-237.

8For an insightful essay on the "persistence of wilderness" around a reservoir, see Jared

Farmer, "Field Notes: Glen Canyon and the Persistence of Wilderness," Western Historical

Quarterly 27 (Summer 1996); 211-222.

9Richard W. Sellars, "Manipulating Nature's Paradise: National Park Management under

Stephen T. Mather, 1916-1929," Montana: The Magazine of Western History 43 (Spring

1993): 2-13. Alfred Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness (Lincoln: University of

Nebraska Press, 1990). Some, of course, such as Robin Winks, would say that there is no
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paradox, that the agency's mandate is clearly preservation. Robin Winks, "Dispelling the

Myth," National Parks (July/August 1996): 52-53.

10U.S. Department of Interior, Administrative Policies for Recreation Areas in the National

Park System (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Interior, 1968): 9-10, 16. This handbook

contains Udall's 1964 memorandum.

11Public Law 90-544.

12U.S. Congress, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Parks and

Recreation, Hearings on S. 1321, A Bill to Establish North Cascades National Park..., 90th

Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 15.

13Brock Evans to Henry M. Jackson, November 25, 1969, Henry M. Jackson Papers,

Acc#3560-4, file 91-17, University of Washington; John A. Rutter to R.J. Brooks, December

1, 1969, North Cascades Conservation Council Papers, Acc#1732-2, file 1-2, University of

Washington. "North Cascades: A Wilderness Plan," National Parks and Conservation

Magazine: Environmental Journal (October 1970): 14; "North Cascades Dam Raises

International Controversy," The Living Wilderness 34 (Summer 1970): 54.

14Brock Evans to Peter Le Sourd, January 7, 1969, North Cascades Conservation Council

Papers, Acc#1732-2, file 1-1, University of Washington. Information on Seattle City Light

and its influential leader, James D. Ross, can be found in Wesley Arden Dick, "Visions of

Abundance: The Public Power Crusade in the Pacific Northwest in the Era of J.D. Ross and

the New Deal," Ph.D., diss., University of Washington, 1973, 224-275. See also, Paul C.

Pitzer, Building the Skagit: A Century of Upper Skagit Valley History, 1870-1970 (Portland:

The Galley Press, 1978), 60-73. For City Light's vision of the Skagit Project in harmony with

nature, I am indebted to Linda Nash's excellent paper, "The Changing Course of Nature:

Historical Encounters with a Northwestern River," copy in author's possession.

15U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings on S. 1321, 1967, 59. For Jackson's views, see, for

example, Patrick D. Goldsworthy, "Protecting the North Cascades, 1954-1983," an oral

history conducted by Ann Lage, in Pacific Northwest Conservationists, Regional Oral History

Office, the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1986, 53.

16This is not to say that the Park Service did not care for the Big Beaver Valley or other

natural areas in the flood zone. Reflecting on the issue, Superintendent Roger Contor, for

example, noted that he and other Park Service officials knew they had to save Big Beaver. In

fact, Contor attempted to have Big Beaver studied for designation as a Research Natural

Area, something U.S. Forest Service ecologists had been suggesting prior to the park

complex's creation. Later, Superintendent Lowell White testified before the Federal Power

Commission that while his agency had not conducted any of its own studies, it had worked

closely with researchers investigating the project's environmental consequences for wildlife,

fish, and forest ecosystems. The problem with this, and other research into the environmental

consequences of the project, was that experts for each side tended to cancel each other out. At

the time, the forest ecologist who studied the Big Beaver suggested that there were other

places outside the park where similar stands of old growth western red cedar could be found,

and thus the uniqueness argument lost some of its strength. In addition, Contor pointed out

that there were numerous issues facing the new parkland, High Ross being one of them, and

others the Park Service had more control over. Eventually, the High Ross affair would be

resolved in the park's favor, he believed, given enough time. For a general overview of

arguments by environmental groups during the hearings, see Kidney, "The Ross Dam

Controversy."
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17McCloskey, "Wilderness at the Crossroads," 358-359, and Ernest M. Dickerman, "The

National Park Wilderness Reviews: Lost in the Wilderness," The Living Wilderness 34

(Spring 1970): 40-49. Wilderness thresholds were an outgrowth of the Park Service's rather

reluctant acceptance of the Wilderness Act in 1964, which the Park Service considered a

distraction from its own preservation mission.

18U.S. Department of Interior, Administrative Policies for Natural Areas of the National Park

System (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Interior, 1970), 33, 76-83. As Park Service

Director George B. Hartzog, Jr., believed, the recreation areas in the North Cascades would

help solve the overcrowded and overdeveloped conditions plaguing the nations' great parks.

Hartzog's views on the management of North Cascades can be found in the congressional

hearings. See, for example, Senate, Hearings on S. 1321, 1967, 22-23.

19Robert B. Moore to Gordon Vickery, August 9, 1972, administration files, file A3815,

North Cascades National Park (NOCA). The park's High Ross files reveal how park

managers and other agency officials came to this position as they worked with City Light on

a variety of issues brought on by the new lake level. This tactic emerged out of negotiations

agency officials conducted with City Light regarding their plans for recreational

developments when the lake level was raised. These developments would replace existing

docks, shoreline camps, part of the Hozomeen road, and trails inundated by the rising water.

20"Direct Testimony of Stewart L. Udall before the Federal Power Commission," March 15,

1974; Press Release, Federal Power Commission, February 4, 1976; "Briefing Outline, High

Ross Dam Issue, North Cascades National Park Service Complex," April 20, 1976, Lands,

Water, and Recreation Planning, box 6, file 74, North Cascades National Park Service

Complex Archives (NOCA Archives).

21For an insightful look at the Park Service policies towards recreation areas and threats to

natural resources, see John C. Freemuth, Islands Under Siege: National Parks and the Politics

of External Threats (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 37-84. An internal

document produced by North Cascades park managers traces this evolution in thinking, too.

"A Discussion of Laws Affecting the Administration of Lake Chelan National Recreation

Area, administrative files, L76, NOCA.

22Charles H. Odegaard to Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., October 27, 1980, administrative files, file

A38, NOCA.

23Seattle City Light, The High Ross Treaty, 1.

24U.S. Congress, Senate, Report on Skagit River-Ross Dam Treaty, 96th Cong., 2d sess, June

21, 1984, 1-14; Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada Relating to the

Skagit River and Ross Lake, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend Orielle River in the

Province of British Columbia, April 2, 1984, United States-Canada, Senate Treaty Doc. 98-

26. For a thorough analysis and discussion of the treaty, see Kirn, "The Skagit River-High

Ross Dam Controversy," chapter 5.

25This statement perhaps overdramatizes the situation, since the nature of power needs and

production continually shift, and especially since the recent relicensing of the entire Skagit

Project and other events have granted the agency more authority in dealing with City Light.

For more coverage of the relicensing issue, see the relevant chapter in the next section of this

study. See Jonathan B. Jarvis, "Relicensing the Skagit Project: The USNPS' Approach,"

George Wright Forum vol. 9, no. 2 (1992): 19-30.
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Chapter 8

1Donald Worster, Under Western Skies: Nature and History in the American West (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1992): 79-92.

2Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American

West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 391-415.

3Susan E. Georgette and Ann H. Havery, Local Influence and the National Interest: Ten

Years of National Park Service Administration in the Stehekin Valley, Washington: A Case

Study, Publication No. 4, Environmental Field Program (Santa Cruz: University of California,

1980).

4Georgette and Harvey, Local Influence and the National Interest, 121-126.

5U.S. Department of the Interior, Administrative Policies for Recreation Areas in the

National Park System (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Interior, 1968), 9-10, 16.

6This is not to say that recreation area policies were the only policies that applied to Lake

Chelan NRA. National Parks and recreation areas were governed by a number of laws and

policies, ranging from those that guided the national park system to specific language

pertaining to a particular park site.

7National Park Service, Master Plan: North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

Washington (National Park Service, November 1970), 25-26.

8Master Plan, 25.

9Robert E. Ratcliffe to John A. Rutter, May 11, 1970, administrative files, file L2415, North

Cascades National Park Service Complex (NOCA). Superintendent Lowell White to Regional

Director John A. Rutter, February 11, 1971.

10For a general overview of the Park Service's early operations in Stehekin, see the 1970

master plan and the "Land Acquisition Priority List, Stehekin Valley," June 1968,

administrative files, file L1425, NOCA. More specific information can be found in the

correspondence contained in the above file and sections of this history for concessions and

road developments. It should be noted here that several of these purchases or changes of

ownership that related to the landing and valley road were the subject of controversy, or at

the very least were contested. The transfer of the valley road, for example, from Chelan

County to the Park Service was contested because the agency poorly maintained the road in

1969 and 1970, and those bringing the suite believed the transfer had been illegal. More

important, it seems the source of the lawsuit stemmed from the fact that the agency had not

removed snow from the 1.6 miles of the Company Creek Road, which it had not acquired

and considered a county road and a county responsibility. Eventually, the lawsuit was settled

in favor of the Park Service. On April 30, 1973, the parties agreed to a judgment in which the

Stehekin Property Owners Association would drop their suit contesting the legal transfer of

the Stehekin Valley Road to the Park Service for an agreement that the agency would

reasonably maintain the 1.6 miles of the Company Creek Road. See notes to files,

Superintendent Lowell White, April 15, 1971, and Richard G. Jeffers to United States

Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, May 4, 1973, administrative files, file
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L3027, NOCA.

11Keeping the roadsides scenically attractive had been a main theme in national park history.

When the agency took over management of the Stehekin country it noticed that residents had

filled in sections of the shoreline and had also excavated alongside the road causing erosion

problems and visual scarring. Superintendent Contor, for example, discovered that Chelan

County had granted residents a blanket authorization to take fill material from within the road

right of way. Eliminating this, as much as possible, underlay the agency's interest in the

Washington State Supreme Court's recent decision, Wilbour v. Gallagher (1969), which

would empower them to protect shorelines--inland lakes and rivers--from "objectionable

landfills and structures." See Ratcliffe to Rutter, May 11, 1970, and Superintendent Roger J.

Contor to Regional Director John A. Rutter, January 28, 1970, administrative files, file L24,

NOCA. See also Superintendent Roger J. Contor to Chelan County Commissioners,

December 11, 1969, administrative files, file D30, NOCA.

12See footnote ten.

13Georgette and Harvey, Local Influence and the National Interest, 56-63. Personal interview

with Lowell White, July 19, 1996.

14George F. Wagner to Superintendent Lowell White, September 30, 1971, administrative

files, file L3015, North Cascades National Park Service Complex (NOCA).

15J.K. Blair (Forest Supervisor) to Donald E. Garvik, November 6, 1960, administrative files,

file L38, NOCA.

16Roger J. Contor to files, May 29, 1969; Roger J. Contor to files, June 20, 1969,

administrative files, file L38, NOCA. The agency's position on the airstrip can be followed in

the reports of the North Cascades Reconnaissance Task Force meetings, March 16 and April

21, 1971. The Park Service seems to have agreed to continue the special use permit because

the airport was an established use in the recreation area and small planes, landing and taking

off within a recreation area, were considered compatible with recreation area policies.

17Stehekin Newsletter, September 24, 1971.

18The Conservation Foundation, National Parks for a New Generation: Visions, Realities,

Prospects (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1985), 124, 251. See also,

Joseph L. Sax, "Buying Scenery: Land Acquisitions for the National Park Service," Duke

Law Journal 4 (1980): 714-715, cited in National Parks for a New Generation.

19Public Law 90-544, which created the park complex, contains language regarding land

acquisition policies under Title III, Sections 301-303. Other information relevant to the

agency's land acquisition policies can be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on

Interior and Insular Affairs, Authorizing the Establishment of North Cascades National Park,

the Ross Lake National Recreation Area, the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area...and for

Other Purposes, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, S. Rept. 700, 3-7. Hartzog's statement can be

found in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on

Parks and Recreation, Hearings on S. 1321, A Bill to Establish North Cascades National

Park..., 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 631. This testimony, one of several Hartzog gave, was

incorporated into S. Rept. 700, 4.

20These policies are set down in S. Rept. 700, 5-6.
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21For the agency's interpretation of land acquisition in the park complex's recreation areas,

see Roger W. Pegues to John Rutter, October 14, 1968, administrative files, file L58, NOCA.

22National Park Service, Division of Lands, A Report by the National Park Service on the

Past and Proposed Land Acquisitions in the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area (Seattle:

National Park Service, 1993), 6-19. This document, written in response to a Senate request, is

an excellent summary of the Park Service's interpretation of its land acquisition program in

Lake Chelan NRA.

23Ibid. See also, "Land Acquisition Priority List, Stehekin Valley," June 1968, for names

associated with the properties.

24See, for example, Superintendent Roger J. Contor to Chief, Congressional Services

(National Park Service), August 15, 1969, administrative files, file A3615, NOCA. Personal

interview with Roger J. Contor and Lowell White.

25Stehekin Newsletter, December 24, 1964, Interpretation and Information, box 4, file 8,

North Cascades National Park Service Complex Archives (NOCA Archives).

26Stehekin Newsletter, November 1970, box 4, file 8, NOCA Archives. In this newsletter

Contor welcomes the formation of SPOA. He also addresses some of the tensions with the

community, tensions which puzzled him because he believed that relations were good with

Stehekin residents. It was apparent, however, that residents did not take a liking to many of

the new policies, such as the parking regulations, which provided that overnight parking

would have to be on private land away from the landing, a policy later changed.

27Grant McConnell, "Five Years of National Park Service Administration in the North

Cascades," The Wild Cascades (December/January 1973-1974): 9-11. McConnell's

correspondence with the park administration was fairly extensive and provides a good record

of a preservationist's perspective (as well as a Stehekin landowners' views) of Park Service

policies. See, for example, Grant McConnell to Russell Dickenson, August 5, 1978,

administrative files, file L1425, NOCA.

28McConnell, "Five Years of National Park Service Administration in the North Cascades,"

11-12.

29McConnell, 13-14, quotation from 14.

30"The Park That Ruffled the Calm Along Stehekin's Shore," Seattle Post-Intelligencer,

October 28, 1973. Byrd's problems with the Park Service can be found in the section on

concessions.

Chapter 9

1See, for example, "Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service

Complex, 1980," box 1, file 12; "Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National

Park Service Complex, 1974," box 1, file 6, North Cascades National Park Service Complex

Archives (NOCA Archives). See also "Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades

National Park Service Complex, January 1, 1994-September 30, 1995," administrative files,

file A2621, North Cascades National Park Service Complex (NOCA).
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2Lowell White to Regional Director, December 5, 1973, administrative files, file A80,

NOCA.

3Russell E. Dickenson to Lloyd Meeds, March 31,1977, administrative files, file A8027,

NOCA. "Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

1977," box 1, file 9, NOCA Archives. Personal interview with Lowell White, July 19, 1996.

4Doug Williams to J. Rouse, April 10, 1985, (telephone message record), administrative files,

file A8027, NOCA; John Reynolds to Regional Director, July 2, 1987, administrative files,

file A80, NOCA.

5John Reynolds to Acting Regional Director, April 29, 1986, administrative files, file A8027,

NOCA.

6David Pugh to Regional Director, October 12, 1988; J.D. MacWilliams to Forest Supervisor,

March 5, 1990, administrative files, file A8027, NOCA.

7John Reynolds to Regional Director, July 2, 1987. In the late 1980s, the park staff consisted

of an archaeologist, geologist, aquatic ecologist, and cultural resource management specialist,

to name some.

8Keith Miller to Regional Director, June 12,1979, administrative files, file A64, NOCA;

"Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1979,"

box 1, file 11, NOCA Archives.

9John Reynolds to Regional Director, August 30, 1988, administrative files, file A64, NOCA.

Telephone interview with John Reynolds, October 21, 1996.

10Jerry Lee to Skagit District Manager, February 5, 1988, administrative files, file A64,

NOCA.

11Interview with Reynolds, October 21, 1996. John Earnst to Regional Director, December

28, 1988, administrative files, file A64, NOCA. "Superintendent's Annual Report, North

Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1989," box 1, folder 21, NOCA Archives.

12"Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex," 1993

and January 1, 1994-September 30, 1995, administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

13"North Cascades 20: Direction to the Future," attached to Memorandum, Superintendent

John Reynolds to Park Staff, September 18, 1985, administrative files, file A64, NOCA.

(Hereafter cited as "North Cascades 20.")

14"North Cascades 20," 1-2.

15Ibid.

16Ibid., 3.

17John Reynolds to Ed [Wayburn], October 11, 1987, administrative files, no file code,

NOCA.

18Briefing Statement, North Cascades National Park, April 4, 1988, administrative files, file
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D66, NOCA. Reynolds interview, October 21, 1996.

19Ibid.

20Briefing Statement, North Cascades National Park, April 4, 1988, administrative files, file

D66, NOCA. Reynolds interview, October 21, 1996, "Superintendent's Annual Report, North

Cascades National Park Service Complex, January 1, 1994-September 30, 1995." Telephone

interview with William Paleck, June 17, 1998.

Chapter 10

1The Conservation Foundation, National Parks for a New Generation: Visions, Realities,

Prospects (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1985), 251.

2Philip S. Barnett, "The Mining in the Parks Act: Theory and Practice," in David J. Simon,

ed. Our Common Lands: Defending the National Parks (Washington, D.C.: Island Press,

1988), 415.

3The Conservation Foundation, National Parks for a New Generation, 251.

4Ibid., 252-254.

5Ibid.

6Jerry W. Hammond, April 7, 1971, administrative files, file L1425, North Cascades National

Park Service Complex (NOCA). Barnett, "The Mining in the Parks Act," 416-417.

7Keith M. Watkins to Regional Director, April 1, 1975, Lloyd Meeds Papers, box 63, file

[North Cascades National Park], University of Washington.

8Watkins to Regional Director, April 1, 1975. Widing's visions of profit could be seen in his

purchase of the claims on December 18, 1972, several months after the Park Service had

completed its appraisals.

9John A. Rutter to Lloyd Meeds, December 4, 1975, administrative files, file L3023, NOCA.

"Mining Claims Threaten Cascade Park Splendors," Seattle Times October 20, 1975.

10Rutter to Meeds, December 4, 1975.

11Ibid. I have concluded that the mine owners were interested in the "threat" of mining as a

way to force the government's hand from former Superintendent Lowell White. Personal

interview with Lowell White, July 19, 1996. "Bid to Log in National Park Will Get

Scrutiny," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, October 24, 1975.

12Rutter to Meeds, December 4, 1975.

13Public Law 94-578. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,

Providing for Increases in Appropriation Ceilings and Boundary Changes in Certain Units of

the National Park System and for Other Purposes, Report to Accompany H.R. 13713, 94th

Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 94-1162, May 13, 1976, 12.
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14Barnett, "The Mining in the Parks Act," 416-417. Chelan Valley Mirror, March 9, 1977.

15"Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1978,"

box 1, file 10, and "Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service

Complex, 1981," box 1, file 13, NOCA Archives.

16North Cascades National Park Service Complex, "Land Protection Plan: North Cascades

National Park," 1983 (draft), 15-16. Lake Anne was an additional parcel lying on the park's

boundary; the rest of it lay within national forest. Around ten acres of it was within the park.

According to the 1990 land protection plan, the parcel was no longer a factor, apparently

having been purchased or acquired in some other way by the Forest Service.

17North Cascades National Park Service Complex, "Land Protection Plan: North Cascades

National Park," 1990, appendix D. Conversation with Dan Allen.

18Gretchen A. Luxenberg, Historic Resource Study: North Cascades National Park Service

Complex (Seattle: National Park Service, 1986), 217.

19William C. and John C. Webster to Stockholders of Thunder Creek Silver-Lead Mines Inc.,

July 30, 1981; National Park Service telephone log, October 1, 1970; "Short-Form Appraisal

Report, Tract No. 02-103," August 25, 1978; [Eastman Appraisal], September 27, 1978; file

L1425, Webster file, Lands Division, Seattle Support Office, National Park Service.

(Hereafter cited as Webster file).

20Luther Clemmer, "Comments on George Wheaton's Appraisal of Mineral Interest in the

Patented Dorothy Mine...NOCA," attached to Memorandum, Robert D. Higgins to Regional

Director, May 23, 1984, file 480, Thunder Creek Silver-Lead Mines files, Lands Division,

Seattle Support Office, National Park Service.

21See, for example, Dan Allen to David Malsed, May 25, 1984, file Y34, Webster file.

22Barnett, "The Mining in the Parks Act," 417.

23James Rouse to Regional Director, July 1, 1985; William J. Briggle to Superintendent,

North Cascades National Park Service Complex, July 9, 1985, file L1415, Webster file.

24Harlan F. Hobbs to William C. Webster, August 30, 1985, file L1425.

25John Reynolds to William Webster, June 17, 1986, file L30.

26William C. Webster to John J. Reynolds, July 24, 1986, Webster file.

27C. Richard Neely to Superintendent, North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

October 21, 1986, file NPS.PN.0282.

28Harlan F. Hobbs to William C. Webster, January 27, 1987, file L1425.

29Harlan F. Hobbs to John C. Webster, September 14, 1987, file L1425.

30William C. Webster to Internal Revenue Service, October 22, 1987; Michael J. Montemurro

to William C. Webster, May 3, 1988, Webster file.
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31Although the record is note clear, it seems that the venture failed because it involved

satisfying Park Service requirements, especially since this section of the park had been

officially designated wilderness in 1988. It also involved meeting the requirements of Skagit

Count--such as permits for land use and sewage systems.

32William C. Webster to Bruce F. Vento, August 10, 1990, Webster file.

33William C. Webster to John Earnst, September 18, 1991, Webster files.

34Dan Allen to Rick Wagner, February 26, 1992, [no file code], Webster file. Rick Wagner,

notes on telephone conversation with William Webster, April 15, 1992, Webster file.

35Wagner telephone notes.

36William F. Paleck to Thomas A. Larson, et al., March 26, 1993, file L3015, Webster file.

37Ibid.

38William C. Webster to William F. Paleck, August 25, 1993, Webster file.

39William C. Webster to William F. Paleck, June 29, 1994; William F. Paleck to William C.

Webster, August 9, 1994, file L3015, Webster file.

40William C. Walters to Jim Ramstad, May 11, 1994, file L1425; Webster to CBS, "60

Minutes," fax transmittal with attachments, June 2, 1995, Webster file.

41William F. Paleck to Harold Fardal, July 15, 1997, file L1425; William F. Paleck to

William C. Webster, December 1, 1996, file L1425, Webster file. Quotation from Paleck to

Webster.

42Harvey Manning, Conservation and Conflict: The U.S. Forest Service and National Park

Service in the North Cascades, 1892-1992 (Seattle: North Cascades Conservation Council,

June 1992), 143-146. Susan E. Georgette and Ann H. Harvey, Local Influences and the

National Interest: Ten Years of National Park Service Administration in the Stehekin Valley,

Washington: A Case Study (Santa Cruz: Publication No. 4, Environmental Field Program,

University of California Santa Cruz, 1980), 46-47.

43Harvey Manning, Conservation and Conflict, 144.

44Georgette and Harvey, Local Influence and the National Interest, 83-85.

45Ibid., 86-87. "Stehekin Valley Public Workshop Summary," November 1977, administrative

files, file D18, NOCA.

46The Conservation Foundation, National Parks for a New Generation: Visions, Realities,

Prospects (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1985), 251-252. See also, Keith

E. Miller to Mr. and Mrs. Stuart B. Avery, Jr., October 2, 1978, administrative files, file L14,

NOCA.

47Chelan County Commissioners to Lowell White, June 20, 1978, administrative files, file

L14; National Park Service, "Land Acquisition," Management Policies of the National Park

Service, United States Department of the Interior, September 1977, attached to Lowell White
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to [Stehekin Residents], May 1, 1978, administrative files, file L14, NOCA. Quote from

Georgette and Harvey, 88. Barry Mackintosh, The National Parks: Shaping the System

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1991), 89-90.

48The Conservation Foundation, National Parks for a New Generation, 254. See also NPIA

material attached to White to Regional Director, May 5, 1978, administrative files, file

L1425, NOCA.

49Russell E. Dickenson to Director, January 24, 1978, administrative files, file L1415,

NOCA. Lowell White to Regional Director, May 5, 1978.

50Lowell White to [Stehekin Residents], May 1, 1978, administrative files, file L14;

"Stehekin Valley, Lake Chelan National Recreation Area: Land Acquisition Discussion,"

May 1, 1978, administrative files, file D18, NOCA.

51Chelan County Planning Department, "Chelan County Planning Notes," October 12, 1978.

52Quoted from Georgette and Harvey, Local Influence and the National Interest, 97.

53Chelan County Planning Department, Stehekin Plan (Draft), 1979, administrative files, file

D18, NOCA.

54Superintendent's Annual Report, 1979 and 1980. Stehekin Plan, 55.

55"Statement of Russell E. Dickenson, Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, National

Park Service, at Chelan County Planning Commission Meeting," October 6, 1979,

administrative files, file D18, NOCA.

56Ibid.

57Ibid.

58Ibid.

59Russell E. Dickenson to Michael R. Sherwood, November 2, 1979, administrative files, file

A6423, NOCA.

60William S. Curtiss to Russell Dickenson, July 9, 1979, administrative files, file L1425,

NOCA.

61Curtiss to Dickenson, July 9, 1979. Grant McConnell to Russell Dickenson, August 5,

1978; Russell Dickenson to Grant McConnell, September 1, 1978, administrative files, file

L1425, NOCA.

62Curtiss to Dickenson, July 9, 1979.

63Ibid.

64Dickenson to Sherwood, November 2, 1979.

65National Park Service, A Report by the National Park Service on the Past and Proposed

Land Acquisitions in the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area, April 1, 1993, 22.
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66The GAO offered a more specific reason for selecting Lake Chelan NRA. After its review

of the agency's land acquisition program, the GAO discovered that the interpretation of a

park's legislation was often the source of conflicts about the Park Service's acquisition

practices. The GAO's analysis of legislation for new park areas drew it to the North Cascades

complex, "where interpretation of legislation is a valid point of contention." Roy J. Kirk to

Russell E. Dickenson, February 21, 1980, administrative files, file L1425, NOCA.

67General Accounting Office, Lands in the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area Should Be

Returned to Private Ownership, January 22,1981.

68Ibid., i-v.

69"Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex," 1980.

70Kirk to Dickenson, February 21, 1980; Charles S. Cotton to Stehekin Landowner, c. 1981;

The Byrd's Stehekin Country Services, Newsletter, May 30, 1980, administrative files, file

L1425, NOCA.

71Daniel J. Tobin to Director, National Park Service, October 2, 1980, administrative files,

file L1425, NOCA. See attachments to this report.

72Tobin to Director, October 2, 1980.

73Daniel J. Tobin to Director, National Park Service, March 16, 1981, administrative files,

file L1425, NOCA.

74Robert Byrd to James Watt, February 24, 1981, administrative files, file L1425, NOCA.

Denver Service Center, Planning Newsletter, c. 1992.

75Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., to Friends of Stehekin, August 6, 1982, file L7617, attached to

"Standards for the Compatible Use of Land in the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area,

Stehekin," administrative files, Lands Division. In same file see correspondence which

reveals some pressure on NPS to do new standards. Russell E. Dickenson to Senator Alan

Cranston, July 2, 1981, file L1425; Director, National Park Service to Regional Director,

Pacific Northwest Region, September 1, 1981, file L7617.

76According to the agency's solicitor, the agency could not enforce its standard.

77This is not to say that the Forest Service did not regulate use of the lands under its

jurisdiction prior to the establishment of the recreation area. The Forest Service's approach to

land management was utilitarian, however, and the Park Service's approach was based on a

tradition of scenic preservation, once which sought to exclude resource extraction.

78Ray Courtney to Denver Service Center, Stehekin Valley Planning Team, February 13,

1978, administrative files, file D18, NOCA.

79Rob Carson, "Stehekin: Beauty, Solitude, and the Illusion of Serenity," Pacific Northwest

Magazine, September 1984, 30.

80Ibid. See also Stehekin in concessions file.
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81Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee, Newsletter, c. January 1985, administrative files,

file D18, NOCA.

82"Claims for Relief, Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee," get full cite.

83Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee, et al. v. William C. Clark, et al., August 6, 1985.

Judge McNichols dismissed Courtney's claim that the Park Service had threatened to

condemn his property if he did not sell, because federal law states that an action contesting

the government's title to real property should take place within twelve years of the date the

title is acquired. According to Judge McNichol's, at this late date Courtney was contending

that he was "fraudulently induced to sell." And in such cases, the federal government has

"specifically declined to waive sovereign immunity." Courtney's claim does not seem as

concrete as he stated. He offered his property to the Park Service first in January 1969, but

years later claimed the agency harassed him into selling that summer. It should also be noted

that Courtney was not considered an official plaintiff, either, having added his name to the

suit too late. See Curt Courtney to Roger J. Contor, January 29, 1969, administrative files,

file L1425, Lands Division; "Former Lodge Owner No 'Willing Seller' to Park Service,"

Seattle Post-Intelligencer, August 4, 1992. s

84News Release, Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee, October 7, 1985; Newsletter,

Stehekin Heritage Defense Committee, October 1985, administrative files, file D18, NOCA.

85Esther Courtney, [form letter], November 28, 1984, administrative files, file L1425, NOCA.

86Grant McConnell to William Penn Mott, August 19, 1985, administrative files, file L1425,

NOCA.

87Ibid. Patrick D. Goldsworthy to Dan Evans, August 31, 1985; Patricia Hammett, August

17, 1985, administrative files, file L1425, NOCA.

88John J. Reynolds to Regional Director, March 31, 1987, administrative files, file A6419,

NOCA.

89National Park Service, "Land Protection Plan for Lake Chelan National Recreation Area,"

1988.

90"Land Acquisition Plan," and National Park Service, A Report By the National Park

Service on the Past and Proposed Land Acquisitions in the Lake Chelan National Recreation

Area, April 1993, 27-31.

91John J. Reynolds, "Summary of National Park Service Actions Re: 1981 GAO Report on

Lake Chelan NRA Land Acquisition," May 30, 1988, administrative files, file L1425, NOCA.

See also John S. Wall to James Watt, February 24, 1981, administrative files, file L3215,

NOCA.

92Manning, Conservation and Conflict, 157-165.

93John Reynolds to Ed [Wayburn], October 11, 1987, administrative files, no file code,

NOCA.

94Manning, Conservation and Conflict, 165-168. Although the lawsuit was filed on the legal

point of lack of compliance with NEPA regulations, a deeper issue was that the Park Service
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was not conducting planning with appropriate baseline information. As part of the negotiated

consent decree, mentioned below, Resource Management Chief Jonathan Jarvis saw that the

collection of baseline information was included as a way to get his own agency to collect

date.

95North Cascades Conservation Council v. Manuel Lujan, et al., April 22, 1991.

96Quoted in Manning, 167-168.

97Personal interview with William Paleck, April 17, 1998.

98"Gorton Rips Stehekin Land Buys," Lake Chelan Mirror, March 18, 1992; News Release,

"Gorton Meets with National Park Service about Unabated Land Acquisitions in Stehekin

Area," March 12, 1992; Sylvia Thorpe to Senator Slade Gorton, January 1, 1993, Lands

Division files, file: Past and Proposed Land Acquisitions in LACH, Columbia Cascades

Support Office (CCSO).

99Slade Gorton to Robert C. Byrd, May 15, 1992; David Fluharty to William Paleck,

November 16, 1992; Issue Paper, November 30, 1992, Lands Division files, file: Past and

Proposed Land Acquisition in LACH, CCSO.

100Fluharty to Paleck, November 16, 1992.

101"A Discussion of Laws Affecting the Administration of Lake Chelan National Recreation

Area," May 13, 1992, administrative files, file L76, NOCA.

102A Report...On the Past and Proposed Land Acquisitions in the Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area, 35-39.

103Personal interview with William Paleck.

104Roger J. Contor, "Draft Management Statement for Ross Lake National Recreation Area,"

November 14, 1969, 9, administrative files, file D18, NOCA.

105North Cascades National Park Service Complex, Ross Lake National Recreation Area

Land Protection Plan (Denver: National Park Service, 1985). Material here and below is

drawn from this report.

106"1987, Addendum to Land Protection Plan for Ross Lake National Recreation Area,

Washington"; Charles H. Odegaard to Associate Director, December 17, 1993, Ross Lake

National Recreation Area (Land Protection Plan) files, file D18, Lands Division.

Chapter 11

1Roger J. Contor to John M. Nelson, April 17, 1970, administrative files, file A38; Rod

Pegeus to John Rutter, December 21, 1971, administrative files, file A3815, North Cascades

National Park Service Complex.

2City Light's license for the Skagit Project expired on October 27, 1977.

3
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Daniel J. Tobin to Superintendent, April 23, 1984, administrative files, file L30, NOCA.

4Daniel J. Tobin to Regional Solicitor, February 22, 1985, administrative files, file L7619,

NOCA.

5Richard Rutz, "Relicensing the Skagit Project: The City of Seattle's Approach," The George

Wright Forum vol. 9, no. 2 (1992): 12.

6Rutz, "Relicensing the Skagit Project," 12.

7Rutz, 11-12.

8"Seattle Goes Ahead with Copper Creek," Skagit Valley Herald, October 30, 1979; "Studies

Say Dam Would Endanger Bald Eagles," Skagit Valley Herald, July 11, 1980; "Conservation

Cheaper, Copper Creek Study Finds," Seattle Times, January 15, 1981. "Notice of Surrender

of Preliminary Permit, Copper Creek Project No. 2795," August 5, 1981, administrative files,

file A3815, NOCA.

9David Fluharty and Patrick Goldsworthy to Randall Hardy, November 29, 1985; Randall W.

Hardy to North Cascades Conservation Council, April 28, 1986, administrative files, file

L7619, NOCA.

10Richard L. Winters to Associate Director, National Park Service, June 3, 1986,

administrative files, file L7619, NOCA.

11John J. Reynolds to Randall W. Hardy, August 31, 1987; Dean L. Shumway to Randall W.

Hardy, October 31, 1988, administrative files, file A3815, NOCA.

12Jon Jarvis to Superintendent, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, January 13,

1989, administrative files, file A3815, NOCA.

13Jarvis to Superintendent, January 13, 1989.

14Jonathan B. Jarvis, "Relicensing the Skagit: USNPS' Approach," The George Wright

Forum vol. 9, no. 2 (1992): 20-21. Personal interview with Jon Jarvis, July 11, 1996. Unless

otherwise noted, the paragraphs below are drawn from these sources.

15The fisheries studies funded by Seattle City Light looked primarily at ways to resolve

problems with rapid fluctuations in river levels created by discharges from the Gorge

Powerhouse.

16Charles H. Odegaard to Superintendent, North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

August 20, 1990; "Preliminary Agreement--Skagit River Hydroelectric Project No. 533,"

September 30, 1990, administrative files, file L7619, Skagit River Hydroelectric Project,

FERC No. 533, Columbia Cascades Support Office (CCSO). City of Seattle, Skagit River

Hydroelectric Project, FERC No. 533, Offer of Settlement, April 1, 1991, 1-4. Charles H.

Odegaard to Director, National Park Service, May 1, 1991; Seattle City Light News Release,

June 3, 1991, administrative files, file H30, Skagit River Hydroelectric Project, CCSO. The

City of Seattle drafted an agreement with the Nlaka'pamux Nation in March 1992 which

focused on traditional cultural properties. Ultimately , it seems that the First Nation's presence

in the proceedings was more of an advisory role. City Light allowed them to join even though

they did not have legal standing as a way to keep the process in motion. Moreover, none of
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the federal agencies signed the agreement between the city and the Indian group because it

would have constituted an international treaty and required State Department involvement.

Personal interview with William Paleck, April 17, 1998. See also Susan K. Driver to Charles

Odegaard, March 13, 1992, administrative files, Cultural Resources Division, Columbia

Cascades Support Office.

17Offer of Settlement, 6-19.

18Personal Interview with Jon Jarvis, July 11, 1996.

19Keith Kurko to Ron Hyra, January 25, 1991, facsimile transmittal, administrative files,

Skagit River Hydroelectric Project, CCSO.

20Charles H. Odegaard to Lois Cashell, February 20, 1991, administrative files, file L7619,

Skagit River Hydroelectric Project, CCSO.

21"FERC Issues Cumulative Assessments of Skagit, Nooksack Basins," Hydro-Wire, January

13, 1992, in administrative files, Skagit River Hydroelectric Project, CCSO.

22Barbara Scott-Brier to Lois D. Cashell, April 19, 1994, administrative files, Skagit River

Hydroelectric Project, CCSO.

23Seattle City Light, et al., to the Commissioners, May 12, 1995; George T. Frampton, Jr., to

Elizabeth Anne Moler, May 15, 1995, administrative files, Skagit River Hydroelectric

Project, CCSO.

24Elizabeth A. Moler to Norman B. Rice, May 24, 1995, administrative files, Skagit River

Hydroelectric Project, CCSO.

25William H. Patton to Lois Cashell, June 14, 1995, administrative files, Skagit River

Hydroelectric Project, CCSO.

26United States of America, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Order on Rehearing,"

City of Seattle, Project No. 553-024, -025, June 26, 1996.

27"Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1993,"

administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

28North Cascades National Park Service Complex, Briefing Statement, January 17, 1995,

administrative files, Skagit River Hydroelectric Project, CCSO.

29Technically, the park got the services of an archaeologist for the archaeological survey and

evaluation as part of the mitigation negotiation and agreement. Until the professionalization

initiative of the mid-1990s, the archaeologist's position was in the regional office and dutystationed at the park.

30Jarvis interview.

31Seattle had protested the Federal Power Commission's decision to grant it a license for

twenty-five years instead of fifty, delaying the license. United States of America, Federal

Power Commission, "Order Denying Application for Rehearing, Project No. 2705," March

21, 1975.
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32Barbara Scott-Brier to Bill Walters, July 31, 1995, administrative files, Newhalem Creek

Hydroelectric Project, CCSO.

33Barbara Scott-Brier to Bill Walters, July 31, 1995.

34United States of America, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Final Environmental

Assessment for Hydropower Licenses, Newhalem Creek Hydroelectric Project," November

22, 1996.

35Ibid.

36United States of America, Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission, "Order Issuing

License, Project No. 2705," February 7, 1997.

37F. Lorraine Bodi, "Hydropower, Dams, and the National Parks," in David J. Simon, ed.,

Our Common Lands: Defending the National Parks (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1988),

449-450.

38Daniel L. Allen to Superintendent, November 13, 1987, administrative files, file L54,

NOCA.

39Bodi, "Hydropower, Dams, and the National Parks," 452. Keith E. Miller to Regional

Director, May 28, 1981, administrative files, file L7619, NOCA.

40David A. Watts to Regional Director, July 30, 1981, administrative files, file L7619,

NOCA.

41Allen to Superintendent, November 13, 1987; Keith E. Miller to Regional Director, June

14, 1982, administrative files, file L54, NOCA.

42Richard L. Winters to Keith E. Miller, June 23, 1982, administrative files, file L7617,

NOCA.

43Gina Guy to Regional Director, May 12, 1983, attached to Daniel R. Kuehn to Associate

Director, May 20, 1983, administrative files, file W1823, NOCA.

44Allen to Superintendent, November 13, 1987. C. Richard Neely to Regional Director, July

5, 1983; Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., to C. Richard Neely, July 13, 1983, administrative files, file

L7617, NOCA. Durning, Webster, and Lonnquist to Keith E. Miller, August 16, 1983,

administrative files, file L7617, NOCA.

45Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, to Director, National Park Service, August

25, 1983, administrative files, file L30, NOCA. David A. Watts to Director, November 4,

1983, administrative files, file L7617, NOCA.

46Watts to Director, November 4, 1983.

47"Proposed FONSI--Thornton and Damnation Creeks," attached to C. Richard Neely to

Associate Regional Director, October 7, 1983, administrative files, file L7619, NOCA.

48C. Richard Neely to Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., June 8, 1994, attached to Regional Director,
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Pacific Northwest Region, to Director, National Park Service, June 26, 1984, administrative

files, file L7617, NOCA.

49Allen to Superintendent, November 13, 1987, and telephone interview January 14, 1998.

The Birch Creek Project's license was approved eventually, it seems.

50Ibid.

51Motions of intervention can be found in administrative files, file L7617, NOCA.

52Charles S. Polityka to Kenneth F. Plumb, October 9, 1985; Charles S. Polityka to Kenneth

F. Plumb, November 25, 1985, administrative files, file L7619, NOCA.

53C. Richard Neely to Regional Director, September 9, 1986, administrative files, file L7619,

NOCA.

54David A. Watts to Director, July 24, 1987, administrative files, file L7619, NOCA. See

also, Charles H. Odegaard to Superintendent, September 3, 1987, administrative files, file

L7619, NOCA.

55Allen to Superintendent, November 13, 1987.

56Charles H. Odegaard to Kenneth Plumb, January 6, 1988, administrative files, file L7619,

NOCA.

57Fred E. Springer to William L. Devine, June 22, 1988 (two letters), administrative files, file

L7619, NOCA.

58102 Stat. 3961.

5950 FERC 61,087 (Damnation Peak Power Company, Project No. 4435-008), Order

Denying Appeal, January 26, 1990; 50 FERC 61,086 (Thornton Lake Resource Company,

Project No. 4412-008), Order Denying Appeal, January 26, 1990, attached to Superintendent,

North Cascades National Park Service Complex, to Regional Director, February 5, 1990,

administrative files, file L54, NOCA.

60When the Chelan County PUD applied for a minor hydropower license with the Federal

Power Commission in 1966, the year it was to construct the plant, it withdrew the application

and secured a special use permit from the Forest Service instead. Under authority of the

power commission, the Forest Service could grant permits for such small projects. Copy of

application and FERC ruling on file at North Cascades National Park.

61Rod Pegues to John Rutter, December 22, 1971, administrative files, file A3815, NOCA.

Richard L. Winters to Stan Young and Mike Wright, December 4, 1974, administrative files,

file L7619, Lake Chelan Hydro Project, FERC No. 637, National Park Service, Columbia

Cascades Support Office (CCSO).

62Maurice H. Lundy to Director, July 15, 1977, administrative files, file L7619, CCSO.

63Gene L. Drais to Files, July 28, 1977, administrative files, file L7619, CCSO.

64Drais to Files, July 28, 1977.
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65Roger Purdom to Reviewers, February 2, 1983, administrative files, file L7619, CCSO.

(See attached Environmental Impact Statement.)

66Telephone interview with Phil Campbell, January 27, 1998. Carol L. Sampson to Gregg

Carrington, July 6, 1988, administrative files, file L7619, CCSO.

Chapter 12

1Richard W. Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1997), 204-266. Sellars, 235, notes in error that the discussions for the first

cooperative park study unit emerged out of hearings held on the establishment of North

Cascades in 1970. Since the park was established in 1968, it is more likely that the discussion

took place during the 1967-68 hearings and that the University of Washington research center

was established in 1970.

2Richard Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks, 262-265.

3Sellars, 267-269.

4In its final form the policy variance permitted periodic trout stocking in naturally fishless

lakes if habitat conditions were suitable and the lake had been stocked prior to October 2,

1968. Prior to any stocking, an ecological survey had to be carried out and the lake classified.

5John A. Rutter to Associate Director, National Park Service, November 18, 1975,

administrative files, file N1423, North Cascades National Park Service Complex (NOCA).

The policy variance was granted on September 13, 1979. See William J. Briggle to Director,

National Park Service, November 5, 1985, administrative files, file N1423, NOCA.

6The recreation area policies were considered adequate at this time.

7John J. Reynolds to Regional Director, June 28, 1985; Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., to Jack S.

Wayland, July 18, 1985, administrative files, file N1423, NOCA. Personal interview with

John J. Reynolds, October 21,1996.

8David A. Watts to Director, National Park Service, December 13, 1985, administrative files,

file N1423, NOCA.

9Jack S. Wayland to Ray Duff, et al., May 20, 1986, administrative files, file N1423, NOCA.

10William Penn Mott, Jr., to Acting Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, June 12,

1986, administrative files, file N1423, NOCA.

11William Penn Mott, Jr., to Acting Regional Director, June 12, 1986.

12William J. Briggle to Jack Wayland, June 27, 1986, administrative files, file N1423,

NOCA.

13Jack S. Wayland to William Mott, Jr., July 15, 1986, administrative files, file N1423,

NOCA.
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14Charles H. Odegaard to Director, National Park Service, December 15, 1987, administrative

files, file N1423, NOCA. "'Flying' Fish to Start Fur Flying Between Agencies," Seattle

Times, October 27, 1987. National Park Service issue brief, October 23, 1987, administrative

files, file N1423, NOCA.

15In order to enjoin the state, the park needed the assistant secretary's permission, and hence

another reason for his involvement.

16William P. Horn to Jerry Neal, April 28, 1988, administrative files, file N1619, NOCA.

17The agreement was helped in other ways. The governor replaced Wayland with a more

reasonable commissioner in January 1988. The new commissioner sought legal advice and

realized the state would lose if they went to court over the issue (see Kleppe v. New Mexico),

so he sought an agreement.

18Statement for Management: North Cascades National Park Service Complex (May 1989),

35-36.

19North Cascades National Park Service Complex, State of the Mather Wilderness, 1994

(Sedro Woolley: National Park Service, 1994) 4-6.

20Unless otherwise noted, the following information comes from a telephone conversation

with Reed Glesne, March 5, 1998.

21North Cascades National Park Service Complex, Resource Management Plan: North

Cascades National Park Service Complex (February 15, 1994), 91. Throughout this chapter I

have summarized information on the park's resource management programs in this plan

which provides a topical summary of each program.

22There is some evidence that at least one species of salmon made it through the gorge. Bull

trout and other native fish which colonized the upper reaches of the Skagit made it past

thousands of years ago.

23This point deserves some clarification. It is true that the legislation accommodates Stehekin

residents, but the language of the legislation was originally drafted for Ross Lake NRA and

adapted for Stehekin once it was decided to make it part of a recreation area and not part of

the national park.

24Grant McConnell to Lowell White, January 20, 1972, administrative files, file N16, NOCA.

25Robert Wasem to Superintendent, North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

December 6, 1978, administrative files, file N16, NOCA.

26Keith Miller to Regional Director, February 14, 1979, administrative files, file N16, NOCA.

27Oliver D. Chadwick and Bruce C. Larson, Forest Resource Survey and Related

Consumptive Use of Firewood in Lower Stehekin Valley, North Cascades National Park

Complex (Seattle: College of Forest Resources, University of Washington, October 1981),

135.

28John J. Reynolds to Tom Courtney, December 31, 1985, administrative files, file Y38,

NOCA.
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29John J. Reynolds to Tom Courtney, December 31, 1985; Curt Sauer to Files, January 15,

1986, administrative files, file Y34, NOCA.

30Director, National Park Service, to Senator Daniel J. Evans, February 3, 1986, draft letter,

administrative files, file D18, NOCA.

31John J. Reynolds, "Decision Notice: Firewood Management Plan, Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area," September 2, 1987, administrative files, file Y34, NOCA. North Cascades

National Park Service Complex, Environmental Assessment and Firewood Management Plan

for Stehekin Valley: Lake Chelan NRA (May 1987), 18-19.

32Reynolds, "Decision Notice," September 2, 1987, 1-2.

33National Park Service, Forest Fuel Reduction/Firewood Management Plan: Stehekin Valley,

Lake Chelan National Recreation Area (Denver: National Park Service, June 1995), 79-83.

34Draft Policy Analysis of Public Law 90-544, administrative files, file N16, NOCA, 18.

35Miller's 1979 decision is recorded in Keith E. Miller to District Ranger, Stehekin District,

February 3, 1983, administrative files, file L30, NOCA. Miller's soil borrow management

plan can be found in Keith E. Miller to District Ranger, Stehekin District, August 31, 1981,

administrative files, file L30, NOCA. An expanded version was produced in 1983.

36Keith E. Miller to District Ranger, Stehekin District, February 3, 1983; Keith E. Miller to

Roberta R. Pitts, October 8, 1981, administrative files, file L30, NOCA.

37National Park Service, Environmental Assessment: Mineral Leasing Regulations (Denver:

National Park Service, September 1980). Mary Ann Grasser to Assistant Manager, Western

Team, Denver Service Center, June 26, 1987, administrative files, file N16, NOCA.

38John J. Reynolds to Stehekin Residents and Landowners, June 25, 1987, administrative

files, file N16, NOCA.

39Public Law 100-668; 102 Stat. 3961. The North Cascades legislation pertaining to mineral

resources is found in Title II, Section 206, of the law.

40Communication with Jonathan B. Jarvis, March 18, 199.

41National Park Service, Sand, Rock, and Gravel Plan: Lake Chelan National Recreation

Area (Denver: National Park Service, June 1995), 3-6.

42North Cascades National Park Service Complex, Resource Management Plan, 1994, 124-

125.

43Ibid. Interview with Bob Kuntz, park biologist, May 30, 1998.

44Richard G. Jeffers to Roger Contor, March 30, 1970, administrative files, file L1425,

NOCA.

45George Wagner to Roger Contor, April 7, 1979, administrative files, file L1425, NOCA.
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46Richard G. Jeffers to Lowell White, November 2, 1972; Lowell White to Richard G.

Jeffers, November 8, 1972; Richard G. Jeffers to Lowell White, November 22, 1972,

administrative files, file L1425, NOCA.

47Robert B. Moore to Dan Campbell, April 24, 1973, administrative files, file A38, NOCA.

48Edward J. Kurtz to Henry M. Jackson, July 6, 1973, administrative files, file A38, NOCA.

49Noel R. Poe to Dan Allen, October 13, 1982, administrative files, file D3219, NOCA.

50Charles H. Odegaard to Dan C. Campbell, November 28, 1990, administrative files, file

D18, NOCA.

51National Park Service, Final General Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement;

Lake Chelan National Recreation Area, vol. I (Denver: National Park Service, 1995), iv.

52North Cascades National Park, Resource Management Plan, 1994, 110-112.

53Almack, J.A., et al., North Cascades Grizzly Bear Ecosystem Evaluation, Final Report

(Denver: Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee, 1993).

54Ibid.

55William J. Briggle to Brock Adams, October 26, 1988, administrative files, file N1615,

NOCA. "Plan for Grizzlies Now Has Little Bite," Seattle Times, December 14, 1994.

56Richard Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks, 276.

57Bruce L. Smith, "Status of Management of Mountain Goats in North Cascades National

Park Service Complex," October 15, 1976, administrative files, file N22, NOCA. See also,

"Lake Chelan Mountain Goat Transplant," undated, unattributed typescript in same file.

58North Cascades National Park, Resource Management Plan, 1994, 104-112. Interview with

Bob Kuntz.

59Personal interview with Daniel Allen, park resource specialist, June 16, 1998.

60North Cascades National Park, Resource Management Plan, 1994, 126-130.

61National Park Service, Forest Fuel Reduction/Firewood Management Plan: Stehekin Valley,

Lake Chelan National Recreation Area, 1-2.

62On air quality in the Park Service, see, for example, David Joseph, "Air...A Natural

Resource," Trends 27(4), (1990): 22-23.

63North Cascades National Park, Resource Management Plan, 1994, 31-41.

64Ibid.

65Stephanie S. Toothman, "Cultural Resource Management in Natural Areas of the National

Park System," The Public Historian 9 (Spring 1987): 66.
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66Personal interviews with Cultural Resource Division staff, Columbia Cascades Support

Office, June 1998.

67Ibid.

68Jonathan Jarvis to Superintendent, May 23, 1988, administrative files, file H18, NOCA;

John R. Earnst to Regional Director, October 24, 1988, administrative files, file A2623,

NOCA. The current collections facility, with its administrative offices, was evidently

preceded by another facility.

69The fact that there was money from Seattle City Light to conduct archaeological surveys in

the drawdown during relicensing was also key.

70Personal interview with Robert Mierendorf, February 20, 1997.

71Stephanie S. Toothman and Robert R. Mierendorf, "Mitigating Hydroelectric Power

Impacts on Cultural Resources," The George Wright Forum, vol. 9 (2) (1992): 31-38.

Quotation from 37.

72Mierendorf interview.

73As part of the memorandum of understanding with Seattle City Light to assist in the

documentation of cultural resources associated with and affected by the Skagit Project, the

regional office cultural resource staff directed the preparation of National Register

documentation and Historic American Engineering Record recordation of the Skagit Project.

This technical assistance was carried out as part of the federal preservation program

responsibilities of the Park Service under the 1996 National Historic Preservation Act.

74Telephone interview with Jesse Kennedy, May 20, 1998.

Chapter 13

1Personal interview with John J. Reynolds, October 21, 1996.

2John J. Reynolds to Regional Director, November 12, 1987, administrative files, file D30,

North Cascades National Park Service Complex (NOCA).

3National Park Service, General Management Plan: North Cascades National Park, Ross

Lake National Recreation Area, Lake Chelan National Recreation Area (Denver: National

Park Service, 1988), 19. (Hereafter cited as General Management Plan, 1988.)

4National Park Service, Development Concept Plan: North Cascades Highway and Cascade

Pass (Denver: National Park Service, 1986), 1-7.

5Ibid.

6John Reynolds to Regional Director, November 12, 1987. Reynolds interview October 21,

1996.

7General Management Plan, 1988, 23. Reynolds interview.
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8See Superintendent's Annual Reports for North Cascades National Park Service Complex for

the years 1989-1992, administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

9Superintendent's Annual Reports for North Cascades National Park Service Complex for the

years 1975-1983.

10General Management Plan, 1988, 24.

11General Management Plan, 1988, 23-24.

12Edgar Wayburn to John Reynolds, December 15, 1987, administrative files, file D18,

NOCA.

13National Park Service, "Comments Analysis: North Cascades Visitor Center,

Environmental Learning Center, and Ross Lake/Happy Flat Overlook," c. 1989,

administrative files, file D18, NOCA.

14John J. Reynolds to David Louter, October 29, 1998, administrative files, file H1417,

NOCA.

15Henry M. Jackson Foundation Newsletter, September 1988; National Park Service,

"Comments Analysis: North Cascades Visitor Center, Environmental Learning Center, and

Ross Lake/Happy Flat Overlook." John J. Reynolds to Sara Schreiner Kendall, April 15,

1988, administrative files, file L47, NOCA.

16"Comments Analysis: North Cascades Visitor Center."

17David A. Pugh to Regional Director, October 6, 1988, administrative files, file K18,

NOCA. See also, John J. Reynolds to Files, April 11, 1988, administrative files, file D66,

NOCA. For a list of earlier proposed sites, see John R. Douglass, "Report of Visitor Center

Team Meetings," September 5, 1985, administrative files, file A26, NOCA.

18David A. Pugh to Regional Director, October 6, 1988.

19Charles H. Odegaard to Under Secretary, Department of the Interior, January 25, 1989,

administrative files, file D66, NOCA.

20"Superintendent's Annual Report North Cascades National Park Service Complex, January

1, 1994-September 30, 1995," administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

21"Superintendent's Annual Report North Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1993,"

and "Superintendent's Annual Narrative Report, January 1, 1994-September 30, 1995,"

administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

22"Superintendent's Annual Narrative Report, North Cascades National Park Service

Complex, 1991," administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

23Personal interview with William F. Paleck, July 30, 1998.

24In the text below I summarize and analyze these two documents: National Park Service,

General Management Plan, 1988 and National Park Service, Final General Management
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Plan//Environmental Impact Statement: Lake Chelan National Recreation Area, vol. I

(Denver: National Park Service, 1995). (Hereafter cited as General Management Plan, 1995.)

See also National Park Service, Executive Summary--Final General Management

Plan/Environmental Impact Statement: Lake Chelan National Recreation Area (Denver:

National Park Service, 1995). These texts consider the following implementation plans for

sand, rock, and gravel; forest fuel reduction/firewood management; wilderness management;

transportation; Stehekin Landing and Valley development; and land protection.

25General Management Plan, 1988, 30.

26Michael J. Tollefson to James N. Hall, June 22, 1993, administrative files, file D30,

NOCA. Charles H. Odegaard to Superintendent, North Cascades National Park Service

Complex, August 9, 1993, administrative files, file L7617, NOCA.

27William F. Paleck to Sandy Walker, July 28, 1997, administrative files, file D30, NOCA.

28See Chapter 8.

29Harvey Manning to Daniel J. Tobin, August 22, 1984; Richard L. Winters to William H.

Hamilton, October 26, 1984; William H. Hamilton to Richard L. Winters, November 28,

1984, administrative files, file L38, NOCA.

30John J. Reynolds to William H. Hamilton, March 14, 1985; John J. Reynolds to Regional

Director, January 19, 1988, administrative files, file L38, NOCA.

31General Management Plan, 1988, 31.

32See, for example, "North Cascades Lodge" file in administrative files, file C38, NOCA.

See also "North Cascades Lodge," in the annual concession performance evaluations for

1983-1989 in administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

33Ibid.

34"Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, January

1, 1994 to September 30, 1995," administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

35Hank Warren to Regional Chief of Interpretation, September 2, 1977, administrative files,

file K18, NOCA.

36See Superintendent's Annual Reports for North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

1980-1984, administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

37Personal interview with John Reynolds, October 21, 1996. "Superintendent's Annual Report

for North Cascades National Park Service Complex," 1985, administrative files, file A2621,

NOCA.

38John J. Reynolds, "North Cascades 20: Direction to the Future," (draft) September 18,

1985, administrative files, file A64, NOCA.

39Superintendent's Annual Reports for North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

1985-1991, administrative files, file A2621, NOCA. James S. Rouse to Staff Interpretive

Specialist, March 31, 1988, administrative files, file K18, NOCA.
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40Superintendent's Annual Reports for North Cascades National Park Service Complex,

1989-1995, administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

41See, for example, William F. Paleck to John Toof, August 31, 1995, administrative files,

file A34, NOCA. This file contains the letters of complaint.

42William F. Paleck to Steve and Barb Rincer, August 6, 1996; William C. Walters to Slade

Gorton, January 9, 1998, administrative files, file A3615, NOCA.

43See, for example, the Superintendent's Annual Reports for North Cascades National Park

Service Complex for 1980-1988, administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

44See, for example, the Superintendent's Annual Reports for North Cascades National Park

Service Complex for 1989-1995, administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

Chapter 14

11984 wilderness proposal attached to James S. Rouse to Regional Director, June 28, 1994,

administrative files, file L48, NOCA. Briefing Statement: Proposed Wilderness Designation

for North Cascades, March 15, 1988, administrative files, file L48, NOCA.

2Congressional Record--Senate, March 15, 1988, S2261.

3Personal interview with John J. Reynolds, October 21, 1996.

4Public Law 100-668; 102 Stat. 3961.

5Personal interview with Jonathan Jarvis, July 11, 1996.

6"Why Wilderness in Parks," and "Washington Parks Wilderness Act of 1988," The Wild

Cascades (Summer 1988): 4-8.

7"Washington Parks Wilderness Act of 1988," 9-13.

8Ibid. Quotation from 13.

9John J. Reynolds to Sara Schreiner Kendall, April 15, 1988, administrative files, file L48,

North Cascades National Park Service Complex (NOCA).

10Lillian Byerly to Sid Morrison, May 2, 1988; John J. Reynolds to Regional Director, May

23, 1988, administrative files, file L48, NOCA.

11Reynolds to Regional Director, May 23, 1988.

12John R. Earnst to Dan Evans, December 16, 1988, administrative files, file L48, NOCA.

13Briefing statement, Stephen Mather Wilderness, c. 1988, administrative files, file L48,

NOCA. Reynolds interview. For more information on Reynolds' reorganization, see

discussion in the chapter on administration in part three of the document.
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14William L. Lester to Jonathan Jarvis, "Backcountry Management: North Cascades National

Park Service Complex," September 3, 1987, administrative files, file L48, NOCA, 1-2. See

also, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, State of the Stephen Mather

Wilderness, 1994, chapter 2, 1.

15William Lester to Jonathan Jarvis, "Backcountry Management," 3-5.

16Ibid., 12-13.

17Joseph W. Miller, "Touch the Wilderness Gently! A Ranger's Story," The Wild Cascades

(June 1992): 13.

18Joseph Miller, "Touch the Wilderness Gently!," 13-14.

19Miller, 14. North Cascades National Park Service Complex, State of the Stephen Mather

Wilderness, 1994, chapter 7, 4. John J. Reynolds to David Louter, October 29, 1998,

administrative files, file H1417, NOCA. Reynolds believes that the institute is "the best

educational association in the NPS...focusing on young people's ability to invent and

achieve." Nature and heritage education "based on parks is the best way to let a nation know

what exists."

20Lester and Jarvis, "Backcountry Management," 8-9. Miller, 14-15. State of the Stephen

Mather Wilderness, chapter 8, 4. "Superintendent's Annual Report, North Cascades National

Park Service Complex, January 1, 1994 to September 30, 1995," administrative files, file

A2621, NOCA, 41-42.

21Miller, 15-16.

22Miller, 15-16. State of the Stephen Mather Wilderness, chapter 10, 3-9.

23John J. Reynolds to Regional Director, August 23, 1985, administrative files, file A2623,

NOCA. Miller, 16. State of the Stephen Mather Wilderness, chapter 10, 11.

24"Superintendent's Annual Report, 1994-1994," 42.

25State of the Stephen Mather Wilderness, chapter 6, 4.

Chapter 15

1U.S. Department of the Interior, The National Parks: Index 1993 (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1993), 59.

2Roger J. Contor to Patrick Goldsworthy, February 27, 1972, North Cascades Conservation

Council Papers, box 1, file: Correspondence, 1972-1973. See also, Roger J. Contor to District

Director, October 23, 1969, administrative files, file A3817, North Cascades National Park

Service Complex (NOCA).

3Roger J. Contor to Director, October 12, 1970, administrative files, file A3817, NOCA;

Harry W. Wills to Superintendent, October 6, 1972, administrative files, file A40, NOCA;

Edward J. Kurtz to Norman Peterson, July 2, 1975, administrative files, file A3817, NOCA.
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4Roger Contor to Patrick Goldsworthy, July 2, 1972; Patrick D. Goldsworthy to John Rutter,

June 16, 1971, administrative files, file A3817, NOCA.

5See the chapter on the High Ross issue and the Park Service's response to it for more

information on this topic. Edward J. Kurtz to Norman Person, July 2, 1975, administrative

files, file A3817, NOCA.

6Briefing Statement, Ross Lake Treaty--Skagit Environmental Endowment Commission,

March 7, 1988, administrative files, file A38, NOCA.

7"Canada May Add to North Cascades National Park," Seattle Post-Intelligencer October 5,

1989. General Management Plan, 8. James S. Rouse to Bruce Brydon, June 22, 1989,

administrative files, file A38, NOCA. Park Service officials were considering a regional

management proposal for the North Cascades called the Greater North Cascades Ecosystem

but determined that such a title carried too much baggage, and decided to promote

interagency and thus regional park management by simply referring to the area as the North

Cascades. See John J. Reynolds to Ivan Miller, April 21, 1987, administrative files, file A64,

NOCA.

8Carmi Weingrod, "Two Countries, One Wilderness," National Parks 68 (January/February

1994): 26-31.

9Nancy E. Stromsem to Al Swift, October 21, 1994, administrative files, file A38, NOCA.

10Press Release, National Park Service, June 14, 1995.

11Briefing Statement, Ross Lake Treaty--Skagit Environmental Endowment Commission,

and North Cascades National Park Service Complex, State of the Stephen Mather Wilderness,

1994, chapter 3, 7.

12Personal interview with Lowell White, July 19, 1996. "Superintendent's Annual Narrative

Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, 1990," and "Superintendent's

Annual Narrative Report, North Cascades National Park Service Complex, January 1, 1994-

September 30, 1995," administrative files, file A2621, NOCA.

13Richard L. Fowler to Scott Gudgeon, December 3, 1976; David A. Gantz to Richard L.

Fowler, March 3, 1977, Record Group 79, Records of the National Park Service, Acc#84-

0006, FRC#37277, file L48, National Archives--Pacific Northwest Region. By 1990, the

border clearing and monument marking it were listed in the National Register of Historic

Places for their cultural significance and thus suggested the need for their preservation.

14Robert C. Haraden to Regional Director, April 6, 1984, administrative files, file A40,

NOCA. Keith E. Miller to Regional Director, February 29, 1984, administrative files, file

A3815, NOCA.

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adhi/notes.htm

Last Updated: 14-Apr-1999
North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History (Illustrations)

http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/noca/adhi/photos.htm[11/22/2013 1:58:46 PM]

NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

ILLUSTRATIONS

Map of North Cascades National Park Complex. (click on image for a PDF version)
North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History (Illustrations)

http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/noca/adhi/photos.htm[11/22/2013 1:58:46 PM]

The bold outline shows the study area for the "Ice Peaks" national park in the late 1930s,

extending for the entire range in Washington State. (click on image for a PDF version)
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The bold outline shows the North Cascades Study Team's proposal for a North Cascades

National Park, 1965. (click on image for a PDF version)
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Three of the most influential political figures in the history of the North Cascades. From left to

right are Senator Henry M. Jackson, Representative Lloyd Meeds, and Senator Warren G.

Magnuson. (Person in rear is unidentified.) Together they would help shape the park complex

as it was known today. In this posed shot, taken around 1967, they survey a map of the

proposed route of Highway 20, which they vowed to support. (Courtesy of the University of

Washington)
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North Cascades National Park Established. President Lyndon B. Johnson shares a lighter

moment with Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, far left, and Senator Henry M. Jackson,

next to Johnson, and others after signing the North Cascades Act into law on October 2, 1968.

(Courtesy of the University of Washington)

First Superintendent. After the signing of the North Cascades Act, Senator Henry M. Jackson

poses with Roger J. Contor, the park's first superintendent. Jackson is pointing to Ross Lake

National Recreation Area. (Courtesy of the University of Washington)

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North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History (Appendix A)

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Appendix A

Superintendents

Roger J. Contor 1968-1970

W. Lowell White 1970-1978

Keith E. Miller 1978-1984

John J. Reynolds 1984-1988

John R. Earnst 1988-1992

William F. Paleck 1992-

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North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History (Appendix B)

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

Appendix B

Legislation and Treaty Documents

1. An act to establish the North Cascades National Park and Ross Lake and Lake Chelan

National Recreation Areas, to designate the Pasayten Wilderness and to modify the Glacier

Peak Wilderness Area, in the State of Washington, and for other purposes. Approved October

2, 1968.

2. Treaty with Canada Relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake in the State of

Washington, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend D'Orielle River in the Province of

British Columbia. Treaty Document No. 98-26. Entered into force December 14, 1984. (Text

too lengthy to include).

3. Public Law 100-668. Title II--North Cascades National Park Service Complex Wilderness.

Approved November 16, 1988.

Public Law 90-544

October 2,

1968

[S. 1321]

AN ACT

To establish the North Cascades National Park and Ross Lake and Lake Chelan National

Recreation Areas, to designate the Pasayten Wilderness and to modify the Glacier Peak

Wilderness, in the State of Washington, and for other purposes.

State of

Washington.

Certain

recreation

areas.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I - NORTH CASCADES NATIONAL PARK

Establishment. SEC. 101. In order to preserve for the benefit, use, and inspiration of

present and future generations certain majestic mountain scenery,

snowfields, glaciers, alpine meadows, and other unique natural features in

the North Cascade Mountains of the State of Washington, there is hereby

established, subject to valid existing rights, the North Cascades National

Park (hereinafter referred to in this Act as the "park"). The park shall

consist of the lands, waters, and interests therein within the area designated

"national park" on the map entitled "Proposed Management Units, North

Cascades, Washington," numbered NP-CAS-7002, and dated October

1967. The map shall be on file and available for public inspection in the

office of the Director, National Park Service, Department of the Interior,

and in the office of the Chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture.
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TITLE II - ROSS LAKE AND LAKE CHELAN NATIONAL

RECREATION AREAS

Establishment. Sec. 201. In order to provide for the public outdoor recreation use and

enjoyment of portions of the Skagit River and Ross, Diablo, and Gorge

Lakes, together with the surrounding lands, and for the conservation of the

scenic, scientific, historic, and other values contributing to public

enjoyment of such lands and waters, there is hereby established, subject to

valid existing rights, the Ross Lake National Recreation Area (hereinafter

referred to in this Act as the "recreation area"). The recreation area shall

consist of the lands and waters within the area designated "Ross Lake

National Recreation Area" on the map referred to in section 101 of this

Act.

SEC. 202. In order to provide for the public outdoor recreation use and

enjoyment of portions of the Stehekin River and Lake Chelan, together

with the surrounding lands, and for time conservation of the scenic,

scientific, historic, and other values contributing to public enjoyment of

such lands and waters, there is hereby established, subject to valid existing

rights, the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area (hereinafter referred to in

this Act as the "recreation area"). The recreation area shall consist of the

lands and waters within the area designated "Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area" on the map referred to in section 101 of this Act.

TITLE III - LAND ACQUISITION

SEC. 301. Within the boundaries of the park and recreation areas, the

Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to in this Act as the

"Secretary") may acquire lands, waters, and interests therein by donation,

purchase with donated or appropriated funds, or exchange, except that he

may not acquire any such interests within the recreation areas without the

consent of the owner, so long as the lands are devoted to uses compatible

with the purposes of this Act. Lands owned by the State of Washington or

any political subdivision thereof may be acquired only by donation.

Federal property within the boundaries of the park and recreation areas is

hereby transferred to the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary for

administration by him as part of the park and recreation areas. The national

forest land within such boundaries is hereby eliminated from the national

forests within which it was heretofore located.

SEC. 302. In exercising his authority to acquire property by exchange, the

Secretary may accept title to any non-Federal property within the

boundaries of the park and recreation areas and in exchange therefor he

may convey to the grantor of such property any federally owned property

under his jurisdiction in the State of Washington which he classifies as

suitable for exchange or other disposal. The values of the properties so

exchanged either shall be approximately equal, or if they are not

approximately equal the values shall be equalized by the payment of cash

to the grantor or to the Secretary as the circumstances require.

SEC. 303. Any owner of property acquired by the Secretary which on the

date of acquisition is used for agricultural or single-family residential

purposes, or for commercial purposes which he finds are compatible with

the use and development of the park or the recreation areas, may, as a
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condition of such acquisition, retain the right of use and occupancy of the

property for the same purposes for which it was used on such date, for a

period ending at the death of the owner or the death of his spouse,

whichever occurs later, or for a fixed term of not to exceed twenty-five

years, whichever the owner may elect. Any right so retained may during its

existence be transferred or assigned. Any right so retained may be

terminated by the Secretary at any time after the date upon which any use

of the property occurs which he finds is a use other than one which existed

on the date of acquisition. In the event the Secretary terminates a right of

use and occupancy under this section, he shall pay to the owner of the

right the fair market value of the portion of said right which remains

unexpired on the date of termination.

TITLE IV - ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. The Secretary shall administer the park in accordance with the

Act, of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1-4), as amended and

supplemented.

Sec. 402. (a) The Secretary shall administer the recreation areas in a

manner which in his judgment will best provide for (1) public outdoor

recreation benefits; (2) conservation of scenic, scientific, historic, and other

values contributing to public enjoyment: and (3) such management,

utilization, and disposal of renewable natural resources and the

continuation of such existing uses and developments as will promote or are

compatible with, or do not significantly impair, public recreation and

conservation of the scenic, scientific, historic. or other values contributing

to public enjoyment. In administering the recreation areas, the Secretary

may utilize such statutory authorities pertaining to the administration of the

national park system, and such statutory authorities otherwise available to

him for the conservation and management of natural resources as he deems

appropriate for recreation and preservation purposes and for resource

development compatible therewith.

(b) The lands within the recreation areas, subject to valid existing rights,

are hereby withdrawn from location. entry, and patent under the United

States mining laws. The Secretary, under such reasonable regulations as he

deems appropriate, may permit the removal of the nonleasable minerals

from lands or interest in lands within the recreation areas in the manner

prescribed by section 10 of the Act of August 4, 1939, as amended (53

Stat. 1196; 43 U.S.C. 387), and he may permit the removal of leasable

minerals from lands or interests in lands within the recreation areas in

accordance with the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as

amended (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.). or the Acquired Lands Mineral Leasing

Act of August 7,1947 (30 U.S.C. 351 et seq.), if he finds that such

disposition would not have significant adverse effects on the administration

of the recreation areas.

(c) All receipts derived from permits and leases issued on lands or interests

in lands within the recreation areas under the Mineral Leasing Act of

February 25, 1920, as amended, or the Acquired Lands Mineral Leasing

Act of August 7, 1947, shall be disposed of as provided in the applicable

Act; and receipts from the disposition of non leasable minerals within the

recreation areas shall be disposed of in the same manner as moneys

received from the sale of public lands
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41 Stat. 437,

60 Stat. 950.

61 Stat. 913.

(d) The Secretary shall permit hunting and fishing on lands and waters

under his jurisdiction within the boundaries of the recreation areas in

accordance with applicable laws of the United States and of the State of

Washington, except that the Secretary may designate zones where, and

establish periods when, no hunting or fishing shall be permitted for reasons

of public safety, administration, fish and wildlife management, or public

use and enjoyment. Except in emergencies, any regulations of the

Secretary pursuant to this section shall be put into effect only after

consultation with the Department of Game of the State of Washington.

(e) The Secretary shall not permit the construction or use of any road

within the park which would provide vehicular access from the North

Cross State Highway to the Stehekin Road. Neither shall he permit the

construction or use of any permanent road which would provide vehicular

access between May Creek and Hozomeen along the east side of Ross

Lake.

TITLE V - SPECIAL PROVISIONS

58 Stat. 737;

64 Stat. 87.

SEC. 501. The distributive shares of the respective counties of receipts

from the national forests from which the national park and recreation areas

are created, as paid under the provisions of the Act of May 23, 1908 (35

Stat. 260), as amended (16 U.S.C. 500), shall not be effected by the

elimination of lands from such national forests by the enactment of this

Act.

SEC. 502. Where any Federal lands included in the park or recreation areas

are legally occupied or utilized on the effective date of this Act for any

purpose, pursuant to a contract, lease, permit, or license issued or

authorized by any department establishment, or agency of the United

States, the Secretary shall permit the persons holding such privileges to

continue in the exercise thereof, subject to the terms and conditions

thereof, for the remainder of the term of the contract, lease, permit, or

license or for such longer period of time as the Secretary deems

appropriate.

SEC. 503. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect adversely or to

authorize any Federal agency to take any action that would affect adversely

any rights or privileges of the State of Washington in property within the

Ross Lake National Recreation Area which is being utilized for the North

Cross State Highway.

SEC. 504. Within two years from the date of enactment of this Act, the

Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture shall agree on the

designation of areas within the park or recreation areas or within national

forests adjacent to the park and recreation areas needed for public use

facilities and for administrative purposes by the Secretary of Agriculture or

the Secretary of the Interior, respectively. The are as so designated shall be

administered in a manner that is mutually agreeable to the two Secretaries,

and such public use facilities, including interpretive centers, visitor contact

stations, lodges, campsites, and ski lifts, shall be constructed according to a

plan agreed upon by the two Secretaries.

SEC. 505. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede, repeal,
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49 Stat. 863.

modify, or impair the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under

the Federal Power Act (41 Stat. 1063), as amended (16 U.S.C. 791a et

seq.), in the recreation areas.

Appropriation. SEC. 506. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as

may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, but not more than

$3,500,000 shall be appropriated for the acquisition of lands or interest in

lands.

TITLE VI - WILDERNESS

Pasayten

Wilderness.

Designation.

78 Stat. 890.

16 USC 1131

note.

SEC. 601. (a) In order to further the purposes of the Wilderness Act, there

is hereby designated, subject to valid existing rights, the Pasayten

Wilderness within and as a part of the Okanogan National Forest and the

Mount Baker National Forest, comprising an area of about five hundred

thousand acres lying east of Ross Lake, as generally depicted in the area

designated as "Pasayten Wilderness" on the map referred to in section 101

of this Act.

(b) The previous classification of the North Cascades Primitive Area is

hereby abolished.

Glacier Peak

Wilderness,

boundary

extension.

SEC. 602. The boundaries of the Glacier Peak Wilderness, an area

classified as such more than thirty days before the effective date of the

Wilderness Act and being within and a part of the Wenatchee National

Forest and the Mount Baker National Forest, subject to valid existing

rights, are hereby extended to include portions of the Suiattle River

corridor and the White Chuck River corridor on the western side thereof,

comprising areas totaling about ten thousand acres, as depicted in the area

designated as "Additions to Glacier Peak Wilderness" on the map referred

to in section 101 of this Act.

Map and legal

description,

filing with

congressional

committees.

SEC. 603. (a) As soon as practicable after this Act takes effect, the

Secretary of Agriculture shall file a map and legal description of the

Pasayten Wilderness and of the Glacier Peak Wilderness, as hereby

modified, with the Interior and Insular Affairs Committees of the United

States Senate and House of Representatives, and such descriptions shall

have the same force and effect as if included in this Act : Provided,

however, That correction of clerical or typographical errors in such legal

descriptions and maps may be made.

(b) Upon the filing of the legal descriptions and maps as provided for in

subsection (a) of this section the Pasayten Wilderness and the additions to

the Glacier Peak Wilderness shall be administered by the Secretary of

Agriculture in accordance with the provisions of the Wilderness Act and

thereafter shall be subject to the provisions of the Wilderness Act

governing areas designated by that Act as wilderness areas, except that any

reference in such provisions to the effective date of the Wilderness Act

shall be deemed to be a reference to the effective date of this Act.

Area review;

report to the

President.

SEC. 604. Within two years from the date of enactment of this Act, the

Secretary of the Interior shall review the area within the North Cascades

National Park, including the Picket Range area and the Eldorado Peaks

area and shall report to the president, in accordance with subsections 3(c)

and 3(d) of the Wilderness Act (78 Stat. 890; 16 U.S.C. 1132 (c) and (d)),

his recommendation as to the suitability or nonsuitability of any area
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within the park for preservation as wilderness, and any designation of any

such area as a wilderness area shall be accomplished in accordance with

said subsections of the Wilderness Act.

Approved October 2, 1968.

Legislative History

House Report No. 1870 accompanying H.R. 8970 (Committee on Interior and Insular

Affairs).

Senate Report No. 700 (Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs).

Congressional Record:

Vol. 113 (1967): No. 2, considers and passed Senate.

Vol. 114 (1958):

Sept. 16, considered and passed House, amended, in lieu of H.R. 8970.

Sept. 19, Senate concurred in House amendment.

Public Law 100-668

100th Congress

PUBLIC LAW 100-668—NOV. 16, 1988

102

STAT.

3961

An Act

To designate wilderness within Olympic National Park, Mount Rainier National Park, and

North Cascades National Park Service Complex in the State of Washington, and for other

purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States

of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the

"Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988".

Nov. 16,

1988

[S. 2165]

Washington

Park

Wilderness

Act of 1988

16 USC 90

note.

TITLE II—NORTH CASCADES NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

COMPLEX WILDERNESS

SEC. 201. DESIGNATION.

(a) WILDERNESS.—In furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness Act

(16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.; 78 Stat. 890), certain lands in the North Cascades

National Park, Ross Lake National Recreation Area, and Lake Chelan

National Recreation Area, Washington, which—

(1) comprise approximately six hundred and thirty-four thousand

six hundred and fourteen acres of wilderness, and approximately

five thousand two hundred and twenty-six acres of potential

wilderness additions, and

(2) are depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Boundary, North

Cascades National Park Service Complex, Washington",

16 USC

1132 note.
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numbered 168-60-186 and dated August 1988,

are hereby designated as wilderness and therefore as components of the

National Wilderness Preservation System. Such lands shall be known as the

Stephen Mather Wilderness.

SEC. 202. HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS.

Section 505 of the Act of October 2, 1968 (82 Stat. 930; 16 U.S.C. 90d-4) is

amended as follows: strike "in the recreation areas", and insert in lieu thereof

"in the lands and waters within the Skagit River Hydroelectric Project,

Federal Energy and Regulatory Commission Project 553, including the

proposed Copper Creek, High Ross, and Thunder Creek elements of the

project; and the Newhalem Project, Federal Energy and Regulatory

Commission Project 2705, within the Ross Lake National Recreation Area,

the lands and waters within the Lake Chelan Project, Federal Energy and

Regulatory Commission Project 637; the Company Creek small hydroelectric

project at Stehekin within the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area; and

existing hydrologic monitoring stations necessary for the proper operation of

the hydroelectric projects listed herein".

SEC. 203. LAND ACQUISITION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FACILITIES.

Section 301(a) of the Act of October 2, 1968 (82 Stat. 927; 16 U.S.C. 90b) is

hereby amended to add a new subsection as follows:

"(b) The Secretary is hereby authorized to acquire, with the consent of the

owner, lands outside of the authorized boundaries of North Cascades

National Park Service Complex for the purpose of construction and operation

of a backcountry information center not to exceed five acres. The Secretary

of the Interior is further authorized to acquire with the consent of the owner,

lands for the construction of a headquarters and administrative site or sites,

for the North Cascades National Park, Ross Lake National Recreation Area,

and Lake Chelan National Recreation Area not to exceed ten acres. The lands

so acquired shall be managed as part of the park.".

SEC. 204. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of the

Interior such sums as may be necessary to complete the land acquisitions

authorized pursuant to section 203 of this Act.

SEC. 205. RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCE USE IN RECREATION

AREAS.

Section 402(a) of the Act of October 2, 1968 (82 Stat. 928; 16 U.S.C. 90c-1)

is hereby amended to read as follows:

"The Secretary shall administer the recreation areas in a manner which in his

judgment will best provide for (1) public outdoor recreation benefits and (2)

conservation of scenic, scientific, historic, and other values contributing to

public enjoyment. Within that portion of the Lake Chelan National

Recreation Area which is not designated as wilderness, such management,

utilization, and disposal of renewable natural resources and the continuation

of existing uses and developments as will promote, or are compatible with,
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or do not significantly impair public recreation and conservation of the

scenic, scientific, historic, or other values contributing to public enjoyment,

are authorized. In administering the recreation areas, the Secretary may

utilize such statutory authorities pertaining to the administration of the

national park system, and such statutory authorities otherwise available to

him for the conservation and management of natural resources as he deems

appropriate for recreation and preservation purposes and for resource

development compatible therewith. Within the Ross Lake National

Recreation Area the removal and disposal of trees within power line rightsof-way are authorized as necessary to protect transmission lines, towers, and

equipment;": Provided That to the extent practicable, such removal and

disposal of trees shall be conducted in such a manner as to protect scenic

viewsheds."

SEC. 206. MINERAL RESOURCE USE IN RECREATION AREAS.

Section 402(b) of the Act of October 2, 1968 (82 Stat. 928; 16 U.S.C. 90c-lb)

is hereby amended to read as follows:

"The lands within the recreation areas, subject to valid existing rights, are

hereby withdrawn from all forms of appropriation or disposal under the

public land laws, including location, entry, and patent under the United

States mining laws, and disposition under the United States mineral leasing

laws: Provided however, That within that portion of the Lake Chelan

National Recreation Area which is not designated as wilderness, sand, rock

and gravel may be made available for sale to the residents of Stehekin for

local use so long as such sale and disposal does not have significant adverse

effects on the administration of the Lake Chelan National Recreation Area.".

16 USC

90c-1.

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NORTH CASCADES

Contested Terrain

North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

United States Government Records.

Administrative Files. North Cascades National Park Service Complex. Sedro Woolley,

Washington.

North Cascades National Park Service Complex Archives. North Cascades National Park

Service Complex. Sedro Woolley, Washington.

Record Group 48. Records of the Secretary of the Interior. National Archives, Washington,

D.C.

Record Group 79. Records of the National Park Service. Federal Records Center--Pacific

Northwest Region, Seattle, Washington.

Record Group 95. Records of the U.S. Forest Service--Region 6. Federal Records Center--

Pacific Northwest Region, Seattle, Washington.

Washington State Records.

Record Group 90. Records of the Washington State Planning Council. Washington State

Archives, Olympia, Washington.

Manuscript Collections.

Evans, Daniel J., Papers. Washington State Archives, Olympia, Washington.

Clark, Irving M., Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

Haig, Emily, Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

Mountaineers, The, Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

Magnuson, Warren G., Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

Meeds, Lloyd, Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

North Cascades Conservation Council, Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

Osseward, John, Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

Pelly, Thomas M., Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

Udall, Stewart L., Papers. University of Arizona, Tucson.

Zalesky, Philip, H., Papers. University of Washington, Seattle.

Printed Government Records.

United States Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture. The North Cascades:

A Report to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.:
North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History (Select Bibliography)

http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/noca/adhi/bibliography.htm[11/22/2013 1:58:51 PM]

United States Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture, October 1965.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. North Cascades-Olympic

National Park, Hearings on Study Team Report of the Recreational Opportunities in the State

of Washington, February 11 and 12, 1966. 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Parks

and Recreation. Hearings on S. 1321, A Bill to Establish North Cascades National Park....

90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. S. 1321, Report No. 700.

90th Cong., 1st sess., October 31, 1967.

U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation. Hearings on H.R.

8970, A Bill to Establish North Cascades National Park.... 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968.

Books and Articles.

Allin, Craig, W. The Politics of Wilderness Preservation. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982.

"Amen Mr. Justice." American Forests 73 (November 1967): 30-31.

Brooks, Paul. "The Fight for America's Alps." The Atlantic Monthly 219 (February 1967):

87-90.

Brower, David. "Will We Discover the Northern Cascades in Time?" Sierra Club Bulletin 42

(June 1957): 13-16.

Catton, Theodore. Wonderland: An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park.

Seattle: National Park Service, 1996.

Cohen, Michael P. The History of the Sierra Club, 1892-1970. San Francisco: Sierra Club

Books, 1988.

Conservation Foundation. National Parks for A New Generation: Visions, Realities,

Prospects. Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1985.

Dilsaver, Lary M. and Tweed, William C. Challenge of the Big Trees: A Resource History of

Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks. Three Rivers, Calif.: Sequoia Natural History

Association, 1990.

Foresta, Ronald A. America's National Parks and Their Keepers. Washington, D.C.:

Resources for the Future, Inc., 1984.

Fox, Stephen. John Muir and His Legacy: The American Conservation Movement. Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1981.

Freemuth, John C. Islands Under Siege: National Parks and the Politics of External Threats.

Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991.

Georgette, Susan E. and Harvey, Ann H. Local Influence and the National Interest: Ten

Years of National Park Service Administration in the Stehekin Valley, Washington.

Publication No. 4, Environmental Field Program. Santa Cruz: University of California, Santa

Cruz, 1980.
North Cascades NP: Contested Terrain: North Cascades National Park Service Complex: An Administrative History (Select Bibliography)

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Hampton, H. Duane. "Opposition to National Parks." Journal of Forest History 25 (January

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Harvey, Mark W. T. A Symbol of Wilderness: Echo Park and the American Conservation

Movement. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994.

Hays, Samuel P. Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United

States, 1955-1985. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

-----, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement,

1890-1920. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.

Hirt, Paul W. A Conspiracy of Optimism: Management of the National Forests since World

War Two. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994.

Ickes, Harold L. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 1939-1941. Vol. 3. New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1954.

Ise, John. Our National Park Policy: A Critical History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1961.

Koppes, Clayton R. "Environmental Policy and American Liberalism: The Department of the

Interior, 1933-1953." Environmental Review 7 (Spring 1983): 17-41.

Lien, Carsten. Olympic Battleground: The Power Politics of Timber Preservation. San

Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1991.

Luxenberg, Gretchen A. Historic Resource Study: North Cascades National Park Service

Complex. Seattle: National Park Service, 1986.

Mackintosh, Barry. The National Parks: Shaping the System. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of the Interior, 1984.

Manning, Harvey. Conservation and Conflict: The U.S. Forest Service and the National Park

Service in the North Cascades, 1892-1992. Seattle: North Cascades Conservation Council,

June 1992.

-----, The Wild Cascades: Forgotten Parkland. San Francisco: The Sierra Club, 1969.

McCloskey, Michael J., ed. Prospectus for a North Cascades National Park. Seattle: North

Cascades Conservation Council, 1963.

McConnell, Grant. "The Cascades Wilderness." Sierra Club Bulletin 41 (November 1956):

24-31.

-----, "Five Years of National Park Service Administration in the North Cascades." The Wild

Cascades (December/January 1973-1974): 9-14.

-----, "Northern Cascades." Sierra Club Bulletin 42 (January 1957): 20-23.

-----, Stehekin: A Valley in Time. Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1988.

Miles, John C. Koma Kulshan: The Story of Mount Baker. Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1984.
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Nash, Roderick. Wilderness and the American Mind. 3rd ed. New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1982.

Rothman, Hal K. "'A Regular Ding-Dong Fight': Agency Culture and Evolution in the NPSUSFS Dispute, 1916-1937." Western Historical Quarterly 20 (May 1989): 141-161.

Runte, Alfred. National Parks: The American Experience. 2nd rev. ed. Lincoln: University of

Nebraska Press, 1987.

-----, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.

Sax, Joseph L. Mountains without Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks. Ann Arbor:

The University of Michigan Press, 1980.

Schmitt, Peter J. Back to Nature: The Arcadian Myth in America. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1969.

Sellars, Richard W. "Manipulating Nature's Paradise: National Park Management under

Stephen T. Mather, 1916-1929." Montana: The Magazine of Western History 43 (Spring

1993): 2-13.

-----, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press,

1997.

Simons, David J., ed. Our Common Lands: Defending the National Parks. Washington, D.C.:

Island Press, 1988.

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Press, 1976.

Swain, Donald C. "The National Park Service and the New Deal." Pacific Historical

Quarterly 41 (August 1972): 312-332.

Unrau, Harlan D. and Williss, G. Frank. Administrative History: Expansion of the National

Park Service in the 1930s. Denver: National Park Service, 1983.

White, Richard. "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American

West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Worster, Donald. Under Western Skies: Nature and History in the American West. New

York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Wright, R. Gerald. Wildlife Research and Management in the National Parks. Urbana:

University of Illinois Press, 1992.

Dissertations.

Sommarstrom, Allan R. "Wild Land Preservation Crisis: The North Cascades Controversy."

PhD Dissertation. University of Washington, 1970.

Interviews.

Allen, Daniel. Interview by author, June 16, 1998.
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Contor, Roger J. Interview by author, June 25, 1996.

Glesne, Reed. Interview by author, March 5, 1998.

Kennedy, Jesse. Interview by author, May 20, 1998.

Jarvis, Jonathan, B. Interview by author, July 11, 1996.

Mierendorf, Robert R. Interview by author, February 20, 1997.

Paleck, William F. Interview by author, July 30, 1998.

Reynolds, John J. Interview by author, October 21, 1996.

White, Lowell. Interview by author, July 19, 1996.

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