# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued February 24, 2011

Decided April 28, 2011

CORRECTED April 29, 2011

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 10

‐ 3282

James Hendrix, et al.,

Plaintiffs

‐ Appellants

,

v.

Maury Plambeck, in his official capacity

as City of Indianapolis Director of

Metropolitan Development,

Defendant

‐ Appellee

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, Indianapolis Division

No. 09 CV 00099

Sarah Evans Barker

, Judge

.

O R D E R

After many months of notices and hearings, the City of Indianapolis tore down a public

nuisance—a former bar that had fallen into disrepair. There was some confusion about who

actually owned the property before it was razed, but it is clear that the owner did not seek

compensation through the Indiana courts. Instead he and another party opted to file suit under

§ 1983, claiming a Fifth Amendment takings violation and a Fourteenth Amendment due

process violation. The district court dismissed the suit because the claims were not ripe and

otherwise meritless. Plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 10

‐ 3282 Page 2

I.

In June 2007, two engineers employed by the Indianapolis Department of Public Works

were examining commercial buildings in Indianapolis. One of those buildings at 1409 East

Washington is the focus of this lawsuit. From the outside, the engineers could tell that on the

rear part of the building the roof was collapsing. More engineers were called in, and they all

agreed that the building was unsafe. A placard was placed on the building alerting the owner

and public to that effect.

The next month, when the City of Indianapolis tried to speak with the owner of record,

Darlene Ramsey, and have her fix the roof, they ended up talking with James Smith, who

identified himself as Ramsey’s common

‐ law husband. 1 One of the engineers told Smith about

the problems with the property and the steps he would have to take to remedy them. Over the

next several months, the City waited for Smith to submit some proposed plans on how he

would fix the roof, but he never did.

So in October of that year, the City got an inspection warrant and went inside to check

out the interior. Up until this time, the City’s engineers had only observed the building’s

exterior problems. Once inside, the engineers saw that the roof was collapsed, the floors were

crumbling, the ceiling was falling in at parts, the staircase was collapsed, wires were exposed,

gas tanks and liquor bottles were scattered throughout the place, and there was even a gun on

the floor. In other words, the building was dilapidated and a nuisance. After seeing all this, the

City declared it a hazard and ordered it demolished. A public hearing on the matter was set for

January and notice was sent to Ramsey. There is a dispute about whether she actually received

the letter or whether it was returned. Regardless, the City also had a copy of the notice hand

‐

delivered to her home, and notice was twice published in the Indianapolis Star

. Neither

Ramsey nor Smith attended the hearing, and the building was ordered demolished.

A month later, Ramsey and Smith retained an attorney and sought judicial review

of the demolition order. A hearing on the matter was eventually held in May. At the

hearing, Ramsey told the judge that she had recently quitclaimed the property to James

Hendrix, the party of interest in this appeal. Hendrix attended the hearing and at that time

worked as a paralegal for Ramsey’s attorney. When the judge learned that Ramsey no

longer owned the property, he held that she lacked standing to object to the demolition

1 

### Indiana does not recognize common-law marriages. Indiana Code § 31–11–8–5;

Vaughn v. State , 782 N.E.2d 414, 422 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). So, presumably Ramsey and

Smith were cohabiting for some extended period of time.No. 10

‐ 3282 Page 3

order and overruled her objections. At this time, Hendrix did not try to intervene; instead

he waited for a week and then filed a motion to intervene. His motion was denied as

untimely, and the building was destroyed in July—a full year after it was deemed unsafe.

Sometime later, Smith and Hendrix sued the City under § 1983, claiming that its

actions constituted a taking of Hendrix’s property and otherwise violated his due process

rights. From the complaint and briefs, it was unclear what Smith’s claim was, and the

district court dismissed him from the case. The district court also granted summary

judgment for the City, holding that because Hendrix had not yet pursued an inverse

‐

condemnation claim in the state courts, his claims were not ripe. It also held that Hendrix’s

Fourth Amendment claim was waived and otherwise meritless.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and construe all

facts and reasonable inferences in Hendrix and Smith’s favor. Winsley v. Cook County

, 563

F.3d 598, 602–03 (7th Cir. 2009).

A.

On appeal, Hendrix makes the same principal argument he did below: when the City

demolished the building this constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment and

otherwise violated his due process rights. The fact that Hendrix labels his claim as a

“taking” and a “due process violation” does not affect the analysis. River Park, Inc., v. City

of Highland Park

, 23 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1994). Regardless of how Hendrix labels his claim,

in this area of the law there are certain steps a property owner must take before bringing

a § 1983 lawsuit. Hager v. City of W. Peoria

, 84 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The exhaustion

requirement of Williamson County applies whether plaintiffs claim an uncompensated

taking, inverse condemnation, or due process violation.”).

The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit any taking of property by the state, only

“taking without just compensation.” Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton

Bank

, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). This means that before filing suit under § 1983, a property

owner must seek compensation in the state courts by filing an inverse

‐ condemnation suit.

Id. at 195, n.13. In other words, “a takings claim does not accrue until available state

remedies have been tried and proven futile.” SGB Fin. Serv. v. Consolidated City of

Indianapolis

‐ Marion Cnty

, 235 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Hendrix has not pursued

the remedies that Indiana has provided for property owners who claim they have had theirNo. 10

‐ 3282 Page 4

property taken by the state. See Ind. Code 32

‐ 24

‐ 1

‐ 16, et seq. (providing the procedure for

such claims); Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, Ind.

, 415 F.3d 693, 699 (noting “[w]e have

previously determined that Indiana law provides an adequate state remedy through Ind.

Code § 32

‐ 24

‐ 1

‐ 16”). Thus, his claims are not ripe, and the district court properly dismissed

them as such.

It’s worth noting that while Hendrix does not have a federal takings claim because

he failed to exhaust his state remedies before filing this suit, there is another reason his

claim would likely fail if he did pursue an inverse

‐ condemnation suit: the City did not take

Hendrix’s property. A “taking” occurs when the state either uses its regulatory or eminent

‐

domain power to take a private party’s property for public use, even if that means giving

it to another private party. Kelo v. City of New London

, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). When that

happens the state must provide just compensation to the owner. But that doesn’t mean that

when the state damages private property when exercising its police power there is

necessarily a taking. Johnson v. Manitowoc Cty.

,

__ F.3d

__, 2011 WL 814996 at *5 (7th Cir.

March 10, 2011).

The state may destroy property that is a public nuisance, and that “is very different

from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due

process of law.” Baker v. Mueller

, 222 F.2d 180, 182 (7th Cir. 1955) (quotation omitted). When

the state razes a public nuisance, it is acting within its traditional police power. McKenzie

v. City of Chicago

, 118 F.3d 552, 557 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Razing nuisances, like killing diseased

livestock and burning infected plants, is a time

‐ honored use of a state’s police power”); see

also 409 Land Trust v. City of South Bend

, 709 N.E.2d 348, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)(“Attempts

by the Building Department to enforce building and safety codes do not amount to a

taking.”). And the owner of that nuisance property does not reap a benefit from the state

because his property has to be razed to cure the nuisance. Texaco, Inc. v. Short

, 454 U.S. 516,

530 (1982) (noting “this Court has never required the State to compensate the owner for the

consequences of his own neglect”). It’s just one of the many burdens that attach to living

in a civilized society. That’s precisely what happened here. The building was a nuisance,

and when Ramsey and then Hendrix refused to fix it, the City had to have it razed. Their

neglect does not entitle Hendrix to compensation. In fact, when, as here, the owner retains

title to the property, the City has the right to place a lien against the property for the cost

of razing the building. Ind. Code § 36

‐ 7

‐ 9

‐ 11(a)(1).

In the complaint, Hendrix alludes to a procedural due process claim as well—his

complaint makes allegations to that effect but on appeal the issue is neither clear nor

developed. [Tab 12]. Even if he was making a procedural due process claim on the City’s

use of its police power, it too would fail. We have found that much less notice than what theNo. 10

‐ 3282 Page 5

City gave satisfies any procedural due process concerns. See Pierce v. Village of Divernon, Ill

.,

17 F.3d 1074, 1079–80 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding actual notice and an opportunity to abate

satisfies the due process concerns). Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment on all of Hendrix’s claims concerning the city razing his property.

B.

The district court also found that Smith and Hendrix had waived some claims. In

particular, it found that Smith’s claims were waived because he fails to allege a cause of

action. The complaint makes mention of Smith having a mortgage on the property but

nothing more. It is unclear whether Smith was trying to piggy back on Hendrix’s claims but

to the extent he was, his argument is waived and otherwise without merit. See Argyrpopulos

v. City of Alton

, 539 F.3d 724, 738 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding undeveloped claims are waived).

Also, in response to the City’s motion for summary judgment, Hendrix made some

references to a Fourth Amendment violation. He did not move to amend his complaint, and

his allegations concerning a Fourth Amendment violation are undeveloped even on appeal.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that Hendrix’s Fourth Amendment

claims were waived and otherwise without merit. Id.

III.

In sum, we agree with the district court that Hendrix has failed to exhaust his state

‐

court remedies. So we lack jurisdiction to rule on his claims. Further, the district court did

not err in dismissing Smith’s and Hendrix’s undeveloped claims. Accordingly, the judg

‐

ment of the district court is AFFIRMED.