IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–1271

Filed January 3, 2014

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

DAVID L. STRAND,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission reports respondent committed ethical 

violations and recommends his license be revoked. LICENSE 

REVOKED.

Charles L. Harrington and Nicholas Trè Critelli III, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

David L. Strand, Decorah, pro se.
2

ZAGER, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a 

complaint against the respondent, David L. Strand, alleging he violated 

the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct and Iowa Court Rules. Although 

Strand was served with the complaint, he did not respond or take part in 

any proceedings. A division of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa found Strand violated numerous provisions of the 

rules of professional conduct and recommended we revoke his license. 

We are required to review the report of the commission. Iowa Ct. R. 

35.11(1). Upon our de novo review, we find the Board established by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence Strand violated our rules of 

professional conduct when he converted client funds. Therefore, we 

concur with the commission’s recommendation and revoke Strand’s 

license to practice law.

1

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Strand is an Iowa attorney admitted to practice in 1984. Until his 

temporary suspension effective September 20, 2012, Strand practiced in 

Decorah, Iowa. On March 20, 2013, the Board filed a complaint alleging 

Strand violated twelve rules of professional conduct and two Iowa Court 

Rules in his representation of the Estate of Shiloh Deal and his 

representation of Darlyne Hackman.

Strand’s representation of the Estate of Shiloh Deal began in 

December 2007 when he agreed to represent the estate and Deal’s minor 

daughter for wrongful death claims arising from an auto accident that 

caused Deal’s death. In January 2008, Strand opened an estate for Deal 

 

1Strand is the subject of an “Order of Temporary Suspension” issued by this

Court on September 20, 2012, based on his failure to cooperate with an audit of his 

trust account. The suspension has not been lifted.
3

and was designated attorney for the estate. Deal’s father and aunt were 

appointed coadministrators of the estate, and letters of appointment were 

to issue after the posting by the coadministrators of a $2000 bond. 

However, on March 3, 2009, the estate was administratively closed 

because the bond had not been posted and letters of appointment had 

not been issued.

On or about July 20, 2009, in exchange for the settlement of the 

claims of the estate and Deal’s minor daughter, Strand received two 

checks for $50,000 each from the tortfeasor’s liability insurer. Strand 

reached this settlement without receiving court approval. Also, while the 

coadministrators signed releases to consummate the settlement, they 

had no authority to do so as letters of appointment had never been 

issued and the estate had been closed. Strand did not inform the

coadministrators he had already received the settlement funds from the 

liability insurer. Strand kept the $100,000 paid by the liability insurer 

rather than disbursing it through the estate or for the benefit of Deal’s 

minor daughter.

On or about October 28, 2010, Strand received an additional 

$100,000 from Deal’s underinsured carrier. Again Strand did not inform 

the coadministrators that he had received the funds, nor did he receive 

court approval for the settlement. Strand also kept this $100,000 

payment for himself rather than disbursing it through the estate or for 

the benefit of Deal’s minor daughter.

On March 14, 2012, Strand forwarded a check in the amount of 

$71,000 to the coadministrators of the estate written on his client trust 

account. The check bounced. When the check was presented a second 

time, the check bounced a second time. Strand afterward wired $71,500 

to the account of coadministrator Randall Deal. Of the $200,000 
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received by Strand from the insurance companies, Strand kept $128,500 

for himself. No accountings were ever provided to the court or to the 

coadministrators.

Randall Deal terminated Strand’s representation and hired another 

attorney. Randall Deal and the new attorney requested numerous times 

that Strand transfer his files to the new attorney. Strand never

transferred the files.

After a complaint was filed with the Board regarding his handling 

of this matter, Strand responded with a letter dated August 29, 2012. In 

the letter, Strand made both a misrepresentation and an omission. 

Strand represented that he had received an insurance settlement in the 

“Winter of 2011.” In fact, Strand had received the second $100,000 

payment in October 2010. Strand omitted that he had received the first 

$100,000 payment in July 2009.

In April 2012, Strand represented Darlyne Hackman in the sale of 

her real estate. Strand drafted the documents to complete the sale for 

the price of $15,000. On April 11, 2012, the closing date, the buyer gave 

Strand a check in the amount of $15,000, which Strand deposited into 

his client trust account. Hackman eventually hired a new attorney. 

Despite repeated demands by Hackman and her new attorney, Strand 

did not pay these funds to Hackman. Finally, after Hackman filed a 

disciplinary complaint against Strand, to which he did not respond, 

Strand paid the funds to Hackman’s new attorney in February 2013.

The Board alleged in connection with the above two matters that 

Strand violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.2(a) (allocating 

authority between lawyer and client), 32:1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act 

diligently and promptly), 32:1.4(a) (mandating a lawyer to communicate 

with his or her client), 32:1.5(a) (prohibiting collection of an 
5

unreasonable fee), 32:1.5(c) (requiring a contingent fee agreement to be 

in writing), 32:1.15(c) (permitting a lawyer to withdraw fees from a client 

trust account only as fees are earned), 32:1.15(d) (requiring prompt 

delivery to client of funds that the client is entitled to receive), 32:1.15(f) 

(governing client trust accounts), 32:1.16(d) (requiring upon termination 

of representation a lawyer to surrender the client’s papers and property), 

32:8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a 

lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority), 32:8.4(b) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from “commit[ting] a criminal act that reflects 

adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer 

in other respects”), 32:8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from “engag[ing] in 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”), and 

Iowa Court Rules 45.7(4) (requiring notice contemporaneous with 

withdrawal of any advance fee) and 45.7(3) (permitting a lawyer to 

withdraw fees from a client trust account only as fees are earned).

The Board’s complaint was served on Strand on March 21, 2013, 

but Strand filed no answer or response. On April 16, the Board filed a 

motion urging the commission to deem the allegations in the Board’s 

complaint admitted and to limit the disciplinary hearing solely to 

deciding the appropriate sanction for Strand’s conduct. The commission 

granted the motion. At the hearing, the Board offered numerous exhibits 

into evidence. Strand did not attend the hearing, nor did anyone appear 

on his behalf.

The commission found that Strand committed all the rule 

violations alleged by the Board. Among those violations, the commission

found Strand violated rule 32:1.15(d) by converting client funds. The 

commission found this violation to be the most serious, and it limited the 

focus of its sanction recommendation to this rule violation. Upon 
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consideration of the gravity of converting client funds, the commission

recommended Strand’s license be revoked.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review of attorney discipline proceedings is de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Khowassah, 837 N.W.2d 649, 652

(Iowa 2013). The Board bears the burden of proving by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence the attorney’s misconduct. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 812 N.W.2d 4, 9 (Iowa 2012). The 

convincing-preponderance-of-the-evidence burden requires a greater 

showing than the burden imposed in a typical civil case, but it is less 

demanding than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 831 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Iowa 2013). We 

may impose a lesser or a greater sanction than the sanction 

recommended by the commission if we find the Board has met its burden 

and proven misconduct. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Cannon, 821 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Iowa 2012). We note also that the 

allegations in the Board’s complaint are deemed admitted when an 

attorney does not answer a complaint filed by the Board. Iowa Ct. R. 

36.7; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Adams, 809 N.W.2d 543, 

545 (Iowa 2012).

III. Discussion.

Based upon our de novo review of the record, the allegations 

contained in the Board’s complaint, which are deemed admitted, and the 

exhibits introduced during the hearing, there is convincing evidence in 

the record to show that Strand converted client funds. After nearly one 

year, after a disciplinary complaint was filed against him, and after his 

license was suspended, Strand finally paid to Hackman the $15,000 due 

her from the sale of her real estate. In the Deal case, it took more than 
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two years and a disciplinary complaint before Strand finally paid $71,500

to the estate of $200,000 in settlement funds he had received. The 

record before us does not disclose what happened to the other $128,500

in settlement funds Strand received, but he did not disburse them 

through the estate or for the benefit of Deal’s minor daughter. The Board 

has shown that Strand took client funds to which he had no colorable 

future claim. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowe, 830 

N.W.2d 737, 742–43 (Iowa 2013) (revoking the license of an attorney who 

was convicted of a felony and converted client funds to which he had no 

colorable future claim); Adams, 809 N.W.2d at 546 (revoking the license 

of an attorney who took clients funds to which he had no colorable future 

claim); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d 

301, 309 (Iowa 2009) (“Unless the attorney ‘had a colorable future claim 

to the funds or did not take the funds for [the lawyer’s] own use,’ 

revocation will be ordered.” (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Carroll, 721 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Iowa 2006))).

“It is almost axiomatic that we will revoke the license of an 

attorney who converts a client’s funds to his or her own use.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelsen, 807 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Iowa 

2011). We revoke the licenses of attorneys who convert client funds 

“because it ‘is the only way to impress on [the attorney] and others the 

seriousness of these offenses.’ ” Stowe, 830 N.W.2d at 742 (quoting 

Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Tullar, 466 N.W.2d 912, 913 (Iowa 

1991)). This case is like many other conversion cases, and it requires the 

same sanction. See, e.g., id. at 741, 743 (revoking license of attorney 

who stole and forged two checks from his client and housemate); Adams, 

809 N.W.2d at 545–46 (revoking license of attorney who converted funds 

of two clients); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Reilly, 708 
8

N.W.2d 82, 83, 85 (Iowa 2006) (revoking license of attorney who 

converted client’s settlement funds); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics 

& Conduct v. Bell, 650 N.W.2d 648, 650, 655 (Iowa 2002) (revoking 

license of attorney for converting funds of nonprofit legal organization for 

which he was the treasurer); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ottesen, 

525 N.W.2d 865, 866 (Iowa 1994) (“There is no place in our profession for 

lawyers who convert funds entrusted to them.”).

It is unnecessary to address the other ethical violations Strand 

committed because there is sufficient evidence to prove Strand converted 

client funds. See Stowe, 830 N.W.2d at 741; Adams, 809 N.W.2d at 546. 

Based on the proven conversion of client funds, we revoke the license of 

David L. Strand to practice law in this state.

IV. Conclusion.

The license of David L. Strand to practice law in this state is 

revoked. We tax the costs of this proceeding to Strand in accordance 

with Iowa Court Rule 35.27(1).

LICENSE REVOKED.